IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 21–0828

Submitted September 29, 2023—Filed November 17, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

JAHEIM ROMAINE CYRUS,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Brendan E. Greiner 

(suppression ruling) and Odell G. McGhee II (sentencing), District Associate 

Judges.

Defendant, claiming he was unlawfully seized in his parked car, seeks 

further review of court of appeals decision that affirmed the district court’s ruling 

denying his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.

Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined.

Martha J. Lucey, Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin (argued) and 

Stephan J. Japuntich (until withdrawal), Assistant Appellate Defenders, for 

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester (argued), 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
2

WATERMAN, Justice. 

In this appeal, we must decide whether the defendant was seized in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. A woman called the police to report 

a suspicious car parked in front of her home at night. A uniformed police officer

responded in a marked patrol car and pulled alongside the parked car, activated 

rear-facing lights, shined a mounted spotlight into the car, and walked over and 

asked the driver, “How are you tonight?” Upon smelling a strong odor of burnt

marijuana, the officer searched the driver, found a bullet in his pocket and a 

stolen loaded handgun in his front-seat console, and arrested him. The 

defendant, charged with firearm violations, filed a motion to suppress, which the 

district court denied, finding the officer did not seize him before detecting the 

odor of marijuana. The defendant, a nineteen-year-old Black male, was convicted 

on the minutes of testimony and appealed, arguing his minority status should 

have been considered in evaluating whether he had been seized at the outset of 

the encounter. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed 

the suppression ruling. We granted the defendant’s application for further 

review.

On our de novo review, we agree with the district court and court of 

appeals that the officer did not unlawfully seize the defendant. We apply an 

objective totality-of-the-circumstances test. The lone officer did not activate his 

siren or front-facing emergency lights, display a weapon, block in the defendant’s 

already parked vehicle, or command the driver to stay in his car. On this record, 

the use of the spotlight was insufficient to escalate their initial encounter into a 

seizure. We follow the great weight of authority and decline to modify our 

objective “reasonable person” test to factor in the defendant’s race in evaluating 

the officer’s actions. For the reasons further explained below, we affirm the
3

decision of the court of appeals and the district court’s suppression ruling and 

judgment of conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

At 9:20 p.m. on October 16, 2020, less than five months after George 

Floyd’s fatal encounter with Minneapolis police, a woman called the Des Moines 

Police Department to report a “suspicious” car on Ashby Avenue. She said the 

car initially stopped in her neighbors’ driveway, then parked nearby on the street

before moving again to remain in front of her home. When asked what kind of 

car she saw, the caller said, “[A] gold Impala. Like an older, like probably 2005, 

2006.” But when asked for the license plate, she said that she could not see it. 

A uniformed police officer, Shawn Morgan, was dispatched to investigate.

Officer Morgan drove to the caller’s neighborhood in his marked patrol car,

and the Impala came into his view. The Impala was legally parked with its engine 

off on the north side of the T-intersection at Ashby Avenue and 26th Place. Officer 

Morgan aimed his mounted, directional spotlight to “attempt to see into the 

vehicle” and “see who was sitting in the vehicle or what was going on in the 

vehicle.” Officer Morgan turned on his patrol car’s rear-facing lights “to make 

sure anyone coming from behind didn’t strike [his] vehicle.” He did not activate 

his siren or front-facing emergency top lights.

Officer Morgan’s dashcam video shows that as he slowly pulled alongside

the Impala, Jaheim Cyrus, the Impala’s driver, opened its door into the patrol 

car’s path.

1 Officer Morgan stopped in the middle of the street, without blocking 

in the Impala. Cyrus looked back at Officer Morgan and showed his hands. Cyrus 

stayed in the Impala; the spotlight was still directed at the left side of the Impala.

As Officer Morgan exited his patrol car, he said in a conversational tone, “How 

1Officer Morgan did not capture the interaction with Cyrus on his bodycam. He “forgot to 

grab it off the charger” because he “exited the vehicle a little bit quicker than [he] normally would 

have.”
4

are you tonight?” Those words are clearly heard on the dashcam audio. No 

further conversation between the officer and driver is audible as Officer Morgan 

walked around the front of the patrol car, nodded his head toward Cyrus, and 

spoke into his shoulder-mounted radio. Cyrus put one foot outside the Impala 

and placed his left hand on top of the car door—as if to get out—but then sat 

back into the driver’s seat. 

Cyrus testified at the suppression hearing that he asked the officer 

something like, “Can I get out of my car?” and was told, “No, just stay in the car.”

Cyrus did not describe the officer’s tone. Officer Morgan testified he did not recall 

directing Cyrus to remain in the car and his practice is not to give such a 

command when first responding to “suspicious vehicle” complaints, which often 

“don’t involve criminal activity.”

The video shows Officer Morgan walking to the rear of the Impala. The 

dashcam audio recorded the officer’s recitation of the license plate number 

moments later. Next, Officer Morgan walked to the driver’s-side window where, 

as he later testified, he “immediately smelled the strong odor of burnt 

marijuana.” He then placed his left hand on the top of the car door and asked 

Cyrus for his identification. He noticed Cyrus’s hands were shaking. He opened 

the car door, pulled out his flashlight, and asked Cyrus about the marijuana

odor; Cyrus denied using or possessing any marijuana. 

Officer Morgan placed Cyrus in handcuffs, patted him down, and found a 

round of ammunition in his left front jacket pocket. He put Cyrus in the back

seat of his patrol car before searching the Impala. Officer Morgan discovered a 

Ruger LC9 9 mm handgun with an extended magazine holding nine live rounds 

of ammunition in the center console.

As Officer Morgan read Cyrus his Miranda warning, he noticed a “green 

leafy substance” on Cyrus’s tongue and bottom molars. Cyrus admitted to eating 
5

a small blunt and said it was the first day he had ever used marijuana. Cyrus 

explained that he was in the neighborhood to see his girlfriend because they had

just had a fight, and he was waiting for her to get home. Cyrus admitted to 

parking several places on the street because he did not know her exact address. 

Cyrus denied knowing anything about the Ruger, which Officer Morgan later 

learned was reported stolen. Like the Ruger, the round of ammunition found in 

Cyrus’s pocket was 9 mm. The bullet found in Cyrus’s pocket matched that 

weapon. Cyrus was charged by trial information with carrying weapons under 

Iowa Code § 724.4(1) (2020) and fourth-degree theft under Iowa Code § 714.2(4).

Cyrus filed a motion to suppress, arguing the totality of the encounter with 

Officer Morgan constituted an illegal seizure violating both the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa 

Constitution. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion 

to suppress. Cyrus and Officer Morgan testified, and the dashcam video was 

admitted into evidence. Cyrus testified that Officer Morgan had ordered him back 

into the car; Officer Morgan testified he did not recall doing so and would not 

have done so under the circumstances presented. Cyrus did not testify that he 

was aware the patrol car’s rear-facing lights were on or that his Impala was 

blocked in.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Cyrus was 

not seized during the brief encounter before Officer Morgan smelled marijuana 

and detained him on that ground. The district court declined to find that Officer 

Morgan had ordered Cyrus to remain in his car during the roughly ten seconds 

before he smelled marijuana. The court found Cyrus “not credible” because “the 

video fails to corroborate his testimony” and the State impeached Cyrus for

convictions involving crimes of dishonesty based on his prior theft and burglary 

convictions. The court declined to give weight to Cyrus’s subjective feelings or 
6

find Officer Morgan’s use of the spotlight established a seizure. The court also 

declined Cyrus’s invitation to consider his age and race in determining whether 

a person in his situation would have felt free to leave.

Cyrus stipulated to a trial on the minutes of testimony and was convicted 

of carrying weapons. His sentence was suspended, and he was placed on 

probation.

Cyrus appealed the denial of the motion to suppress. Cyrus argued that 

he was seized when the officer “pulled up beside his car, trained a spotlight on 

him and activated the rear-facing directional lights of the police cruiser.” He 

argued that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. Cyrus also 

argued that the reasonable person test should be broadened to include a new 

factor: Cyrus’s minority status, including “the racial differences in how police 

action is perceived.” Lastly, Cyrus argued for the first time on appeal that the 

reasonable person test should be replaced with a “strict scrutiny standard.” He 

made no strict scrutiny argument in district court.

We transferred this case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district 

court’s denial of Cyrus’s motion to suppress. The court of appeals analyzed each 

factor—the rear-facing lights, the spotlight, and the location of the patrol car—

and concluded that Officer Morgan did not engage in an illegal seizure “beyond 

that accepted in social intercourse.” The court of appeals determined that the 

use of the rear-facing lights, “particularly if not seen by the driver, is insufficient 

on its own to establish a seizure.” The appellate court concluded that a spotlight 

is not as coercive as emergency top lights that “invoke police authority and imply 

a police command to stop and remain.” The court of appeals added that the

patrol car did not block in Cyrus’s Impala. Finally, the court of appeals declined 

to consider Cyrus’s “minority status [as] relevant in our analysis.”

We granted Cyrus’s application for further review. 
7

II. Standard of Review.

“When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or federal constitutional right, 

our standard of review is de novo.” State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 

2019) (quoting State v. Coffman, 914 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Iowa 2018)). “Each case 

must be evaluated in light of its unique circumstances.” Id. (quoting Coffman, 

914 N.W.2d at 244). “We review the entire record to independently evaluate the 

totality of the circumstances . . . .” State v. Torres, 989 N.W.2d 121, 126 

(Iowa 2023) (omission in original) (quoting State v. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453, 458 

(Iowa 2022)). “[W]e give deference to the district court’s fact findings due to its 

opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but we are not bound by 

those findings.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hauge, 973 N.W.2d at 458).

The defendant bears the burden of proof as to whether a seizure occurred. Fogg, 

936 N.W.2d at 668.

III. Analysis.

We must decide whether Officer Morgan “seized” Cyrus during their tento fifteen-second interaction before the officer smelled burnt marijuana and 

detained him for that reason. Cyrus argues he was seized in violation of both the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of 

the Iowa Constitution, and he argues we should construe the Iowa clause as 

providing greater protection against seizures than the Fourth Amendment. 

Because the federal and Iowa search and seizure clauses are worded nearly 

identically and we are not persuaded to apply them differently in this case, we 

will analyze both provisions together. See State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 847 

(Iowa 2019) (“We generally ‘interpret the scope and purpose of the Iowa 

Constitution’s search and seizure provisions to track with federal interpretations 
8

of the Fourth Amendment’ because of their nearly identical language.” (quoting

State v. Christopher, 757 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Iowa 2008))).

“[W]hether a seizure occurred is determined by the ‘totality of the 

circumstances.’ ” Fogg, 936 N.W.2d at 668. (quoting State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 

838, 842 (Iowa 2008)). Specifically, “objective indices of police coercion must be 

present to convert an encounter between police and citizens into a seizure.” Id.

(quoting Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 843). No seizure occurs if a reasonable person 

would feel free to leave. Id.

“Factors that might suggest a seizure include ‘the threatening presence of 

several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of 

the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 

compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.’ ” Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 

at 842–43 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). “The 

use of sirens, flashing lights or other signals to pull a moving vehicle to the side 

of the road might also constitute a show of authority that is a seizure.” State v. 

Harlan, 301 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Iowa 1981). We find none of those factors occurred 

before Cyrus’s lawful detention for marijuana use.

Cyrus argues Officer Morgan seized him by the combination of several 

police actions: (1) stopping his patrol car in the middle of the street with 

rear-facing lights activated while partially blocking Cyrus’s exit; (2) shining the 

spotlight into Cyrus’s vehicle; and (3) the officer’s quick exit and order for Cyrus 

to stay in the car. The State responds that Cyrus was not blocked in and never 

claimed he saw the rear-facing lights; the officer’s use of the rear-facing lights

and spotlight was appropriate at night; no siren or front-facing emergency lights 

were activated; and, as the district court found, the officer’s initial greeting (“How 

are you tonight?”) was not followed with a command to stay in the car. The 

district court and court of appeals determined that Cyrus failed to meet his 
9

burden of proof to show he was seized. Based on our de novo review of the record, 

we agree Cyrus was not seized before the officer smelled burnt marijuana.

We will address each factor argued by Cyrus and then explain why we 

decline Cyrus’s invitation to modify our objective test for seizure to include taking 

into consideration his age and race.

A. The Patrol Car’s Positioning in the Street with Rear-Facing Lights 

Activated. Officer Morgan was responding to a citizen report of a suspicious 

vehicle—an older gold Impala. Although the officer could have pulled in behind 

the Impala, he drove slowly alongside it when Cyrus abruptly opened his car 

door into the patrol car’s path. Officer Morgan understandably stopped in the 

road. He had prudently activated his rear-facing lights before stopping as a 

precaution against another nighttime driver rear-ending his patrol car. The

rear-facing lights are not visible on the dashcam video, and Cyrus, who testified 

at the suppression hearing while represented by counsel, never claimed he saw 

them. We have held that merely activating rear-facing lights, without using the 

front-facing emergency lights or siren, is insufficient to constitute a seizure. See 

State v. Prusha, 874 N.W.2d 627, 628, 630 (Iowa 2016); see also United States v. 

Tanguay, 918 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2019) (finding no seizure when an officer 

“activated only his rear-facing lights, and Tanguay, who was already stopped, 

makes no claim to have been able to see them”). We reach the same conclusion 

here.

Nor is the patrol car’s position “in the middle of the street” sufficient. See

People v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187, 204 (Ill. 2006) (declining to hold that a 

police officer’s stopping in middle of the roadway “in a manner not allowed for 

private citizens is inherently coercive” and reversing the finding that a seizure

occurred). Importantly, Cyrus was not blocked in. See id. at 205 (noting that the

officer did not block in the defendant). The testimony at the suppression hearing 
10

and dashcam video confirmed Cyrus had room to pull forward and turn around

to drive away. See Fogg, 936 N.W.2d at 670 (determining the driver was not 

seized when the officer stopped in an alley blocking her path forward because

“[s]he was not boxed in” as “she could have driven backward either with or 

without turning around”). We agree with the district court and court of appeals 

that these actions by Officer Morgan did not establish a seizure.

B. Officer Morgan’s Use of the Spotlight. We next address a factor 

missing in Fogg: the officer’s use of his patrol car’s attached directional spotlight. 

See id. at 669 (noting that the officer “did not shine a light into . . . Fogg’s 

vehicle”). Officer Morgan was responding to a nighttime complaint of a suspicious 

vehicle. Aiming his spotlight into the Impala from alongside enabled him to see 

if the car had any occupants. We have held that an officer did not seize a driver 

by shining a flashlight into the car. See Harlan, 301 N.W.2d at 719, 720 (noting 

that the “officer, like any other citizen, had a right to look into the car” and 

concluding that this was “an innocuous police–citizen encounter that did not 

implicate the fourth amendment”). Indeed, the neighbor who phoned in the 

suspicious vehicle report lawfully could have shined her own flashlight into the 

Impala. It would be unreasonable to expect an officer responding to a nighttime 

report of a suspicious vehicle to approach the darkened car without illuminating 

its interior. See People v. Tacardon, 521 P.3d 563, 570–71 (Cal. 2022) 

(“A spotlight can be used to illuminate the surrounding area for safety or other 

purposes . . . [and] might help both the officer and the civilian see what the other 

is doing and make decisions accordingly.”). 

In People v. Tacardon, the California Supreme Court recently declined to 

impose a bright-line rule that the use of a spotlight constitutes a seizure:

A court must consider the use of a spotlight together with all of the 

other circumstances. It is certainly possible that the facts of a 

particular case may show a spotlight was used in an authoritative 
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manner. These may include flashing lights at the driver to pull the 

car over or attempting to blind the driver, which would be relevant 

considerations under the totality of the circumstances. But use of a 

spotlight, standing alone, does not necessarily effect a detention.

Id. at 571 (citation omitted) (finding no seizure when the officer trained a 

spotlight at a parked vehicle). The dissent did not favor a per se rule either, but 

it gave more weight to the use of the spotlight: 

The court apparently envisions that a reasonable person in 

Tacardon’s circumstances would think, “Oh, the officer who just 

eyeballed me, made a U-turn, pulled up behind me in his patrol car, 

pointed a bright spotlight at my car, got out of his car, and is now 

walking toward me isn’t trying to stop me. He just turned on his 

spotlight to see what’s going on. Good thing he didn’t turn on his 

emergency lights . . . looks like I’m free to leave.” This strains 

credulity.

Id. at 580 (Liu, J., dissenting). The dissent, on the facts of that case, concluded 

that a seizure was shown. Id. at 581.

Other courts have held that the use of a spotlight is a factor to consider

but not, by itself, a per se seizure. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 107 P.3d 1214, 1218 

(Idaho 2004) (stating that Idaho “joins the many other jurisdictions which have 

held that the use of a spotlight alone would not lead a reasonable person to 

believe that he was not free to leave, though it may be considered under the 

totality of the circumstances”); Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d at 206 (“Courts in other 

jurisdictions have also generally found that the use of a flashlight or a spotlight, 

without other coercive behavior, is insufficient to transform a consensual 

encounter into a seizure.”). We agree and likewise decline to impose a bright-line

per se rule.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the 

use of a spotlight under similar circumstances in United States v. Mabery, 

686 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2012). There, officers responded to a nighttime report of 

a suspicious Jeep legally parked by an apartment building. Id. at 594. When the 

driver noticed the patrol car, he turned off his dome light. Id. An officer stopped 
12

the patrol car in the street and spotlighted the Jeep. Id. Another officer activated 

the patrol car’s rear emergency lights. Id. Mabery opened the Jeep door and got 

out. Id. The Eighth Circuit panel reasoned that the act of shining a spotlight on 

a vehicle was “no more intrusive (and arguably less so) than knocking on the 

vehicle’s window.” Id. at 597. The officers did not give commands or draw their 

weapons. Id. These facts, taken together, did not “indicate anything more than 

an otherwise-routine police–citizen encounter.” Id. at 596; see also United 

States v. Campbell-Martin, 17 F.4th 807, 814 (8th Cir. 2021) (applying Mabery to 

find that the use of a spotlight was not a seizure); United States v. Lawhorn, 

735 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The act of shining a spotlight on a person’s 

car typically does not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment.”). We reach the same conclusion on our record.

Other courts have also found that an officer’s use of a spotlight did not 

constitute a seizure. See, e.g., People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1388 (Colo. 1997) 

(en banc) (“[T]he flashlights and spotlight were used as a matter of practical 

necessity as the encounter took place when it was getting dark, and we do not 

attribute any significance to their use.”); State v. Clayton, 45 P.3d 30, 34 

(Mont. 2002) (holding that there was no seizure when the officer used the 

spotlight not as a show of authority but rather “to determine the number of 

passengers and what the driver was up to”); State v. Calhoun, 792 P.2d 1223, 

1225 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the use of a spotlight did not alter the 

encounter into a seizure); cf. State v. O’Neill, 62 P.3d 489, 497 (Wash. 2003) 

(en banc) (holding that no seizure occurred when the officer used a flashlight “to 

see what would be observable in daylight”).
13

We agree that training a spotlight at the driver could be a factor in 

establishing a seizure.2 But on this record, we find that Officer Morgan’s use of 

the spotlight did not escalate his investigation into a seizure of Cyrus.3

C. Officer Morgan’s Quick Exit and Statements. Cyrus also contends a 

seizure is shown by Officer Morgan’s quick exit from the patrol car and telling 

Cyrus to stay in his car. The officer testified that he exited his patrol car quicker 

than he normally would, but our own review of the dashcam video shows him

walking casually, not hurriedly, to Cyrus’s Impala. It is undisputed that the 

officer’s first words to Cyrus were, “How are you tonight?” His tone was 

nonthreatening and conversational. No command to stay in the car is audible. 

He appears to be talking into his shoulder microphone rather than to Cyrus, who 

sits back in his driver’s seat. Although the officer acknowledged he did not 

remember exactly what he said next, he credibly explained that his practice 

under these circumstances would not be to give a command. The district court 

heard both Officer Morgan and Cyrus testify in person and found no command 

was given to stay in the car. The district court found Cyrus not credible, and we 

give weight to that credibility finding. See Torres, 989 N.W.2d at 126. The court 

noted Cyrus had prior felony convictions for crimes of dishonesty (theft and 

burglary).4 We also note Cyrus lied to Officer Morgan at the scene when Cyrus

2See United States v. Packer, 15 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding a seizure when one 

officer parked their patrol car in front of the defendant’s car and a second officer parked their 

patrol car behind the defendant’s car, both officers directed their spotlights at the car, and one 

officer approached with a flashlight and told the defendant to put their hands in the air); State v. 

Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 244–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (finding a seizure when the officer 

“boxed in” the defendant’s truck on a dead end street, directed a spotlight at the truck, held a 

large flashlight into the truck, and used a commanding tone and demeanor toward the 

defendant).

3We reach the same conclusion based on the record in State v. Wittenberg, ___ N.W.2d 

___, ___ (Iowa 2023), also decided today.

4See Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.609(a)(2) (allowing impeachment by evidence of a conviction 

of a crime involving dishonesty); State v. Harrington, 800 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Iowa 2011) (“It has been 

settled law in this state that convictions for theft and burglary with intent to commit theft are 
14

denied possessing any marijuana, and we question his denial that he knew about 

the loaded 9 mm Ruger in his car’s console when he also had a 9 mm round of 

ammunition in his jacket pocket. We agree with the district court that no 

command was given, and Officer Morgan’s conduct did not constitute a seizure.

Cyrus had the burden to prove that he was seized by Officer Morgan. After 

considering Officer Morgan’s actions under the totality of the circumstances and 

applying our objective reasonable person test, we agree with the court of appeals 

and the district court that no seizure occurred before Officer Morgan detected 

the odor of burnt marijuana, which then provided a lawful ground to detain and 

search Cyrus and the Impala.

D. Cyrus’s Age and Race. Cyrus—in district court and on appeal—argues 

that his status as a young Black male should be considered when determining 

whether Officer Morgan seized him. He argues a driver’s minority status affects 

how they perceive police actions; that is, a young Black male, months after 

George Floyd’s death, is less likely to feel free to leave than an older white driver 

under the same circumstances. The State argues that “[a] reasonableness test 

[for seizure] that varies based on any individual’s unique status would be 

exceedingly difficult for police officers, lawyers, judges, and even the individual 

affected to apply fairly.” We decline Cyrus’s invitation to change our objective 

test to consider the characteristics of the driver. Rather, we adhere to our 

precedent that examines the officer’s conduct objectively, without varying the 

outcome based on the race, age, or other traits of the driver. See Harlan, 

301 N.W.2d at 719 (holding that a seizure occurs when “the officer, by means of 

crimes of dishonesty.”). Cyrus never argued his prior convictions were not crimes involving 

dishonesty within the meaning of rule 5.609(a)(2). See Harrington, 800 N.W.2d at 51 n.4. When 

we approved substantive updates to Iowa’s rules of evidence in 2022, we declined to adopt the 

“elements test” in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) (requiring that the “elements of the crime 

required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a dishonest act or false statement”).
15

physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a 

citizen” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968))).

While the test is “necessarily imprecise,” it “is flexible enough to be applied 

to the whole range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, [and] 

it calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, 

regardless of the particular individual’s response to the actions of the police.” 

Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988). The test “allows the police to 

determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the 

Fourth Amendment.” Id. And “[c]larity as to what the law requires is generally a 

good thing.” Welch v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 801 N.W.2d 590, 601 (Iowa 2011) 

(discussing the need for a “bright-line rule” that provides clear guidance to law 

enforcement). This is especially true “when the law governs interactions between 

the police and citizens” and when officers must make “quick decisions as to what 

the law requires where the stakes are high, involving public safety on one side of 

the ledger and individual rights on the other.” Id. We question the practical 

workability and predictability of a seizure test that depends on the individual 

characteristics of the driver instead of the actions of the officer.

To support his argument, Cyrus relies on language taken out of context 

from United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, where the defendant consented 

to a search of her person by Drug Enforcement Agency agents at the Detroit 

airport after she disembarked from a flight from Los Angeles. Id. at 547–49. In 

addressing whether her consent was voluntary, the Court stated:

[I]t is argued that the incident would reasonably have appeared 

coercive to the respondent, who was 22 years old and had not been 

graduated from high school. It is additionally suggested that the 

respondent, a female and a Negro, may have felt unusually 

threatened by the officers, who were white males. While these factors 

were not irrelevant, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, [412 U.S. 218, 

226 (1973)], neither were they decisive, and the totality of the 

evidence in this case was plainly adequate to support the District 
16

Court’s finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to 

accompany the officers to the DEA office.

Id. at 558 (emphasis added). The problem for Cyrus is that the italicized language 

he relies on addressed a consent search, not a seizure. We too consider the 

“personal characteristics of the [consenter], such as age, education, intelligence, 

sobriety, and experience with the law” when adjudicating whether consent to a 

search is voluntary. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d at 462 (alteration in original) (emphasis 

omitted) (quoting State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 378 (Iowa 2007)).

5 Consent 

turns on the subjective state of mind of the consenter. But Cyrus’s consent is 

not at issue. Officer Morgan did not ask for Cyrus’s consent to search him or his 

car, nor did Cyrus offer his permission. Neither our court nor the United States 

Supreme Court considers the age or race of the suspect in determining whether 

the officer’s conduct constituted a seizure.

It makes sense to have a different test for seizure and consent. A seizure 

often occurs before any face-to-face communication between the officer and the 

driver, such as when a driver is pulled over after emergency lights are displayed. 

The court determines whether a seizure occurred based on the officer’s conduct.

Fogg, 936 N.W.2d at 668 (requiring “objective indices of police coercion”). By 

contrast, with consent, the officer and driver have engaged in face-to-face 

communication, and the court determines whether the driver’s consent was 

voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances, including the consenter’s 

personal characteristics. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d at 462; see also Schneckloth, 

412 U.S. at 227–29 (applying totality-of-the-circumstances test, including 

accounting for “the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who 

consents”).

5Our cases have not listed race or gender among the “personal characteristics” of the 

consenter. See Hauge, 973 N.W.2d at 462. The lone dissenter in Hauge argued that race and 

culture should be considered when evaluating consent. See id. at 491–92 (Appel, J., dissenting).
17

Cyrus also relies on dissents in our cases addressing pretextual stop 

claims. Brown, 930 N.W.2d at 863–71 (Cady, C.J., dissenting) (critiquing the 

majority’s holding rejecting the consideration of the officer’s subjective motives 

in pretextual stops and discussing how these stops have “disproportionally 

affected African-Americans in our state and across the nation”); State v. 

Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362, 374 (Iowa 2014) (Appel, J., dissenting) (discussing 

how pretextual stops may subject African-Americans and other minority groups 

to “stops for ‘driving while black’ ”). But Officer Morgan did not stop Cyrus, who

was already parked; and the officer approached the Impala without knowing the 

car was occupied, much less the driver’s race. We have long adhered to an 

objective standard for traffic stops and have expressly declined to consider the 

driver’s race when adjudicating the validity of an officer’s actions. Brown, 

930 N.W.2d at 854 (majority opinion). We decline Cyrus’s invitation to adopt 

these dissenting views.

The great weight of authority in other jurisdictions rejects using the 

suspect’s race as a relevant factor in a seizure analysis.6 A noted commentator 

6Compare United States v. Knights, 989 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 2021) (discussing in 

detail the problems that arise from using race as a factor in deciding whether a seizure occurred, 

holding that “the race of a suspect is never a factor in seizure analysis,” and noting that “our 

sister circuits [have also never] considered race in the threshold seizure inquiry”), United States v. 

Easley, 911 F.3d 1074, 1081–82 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding that “[n]either this court nor the 

Supreme Court has ever considered race a relevant factor in the Fourth Amendment context” 

and stating that “a seizure analysis that differentiates on the basis of race raises serious equal 

protection concerns if it could result in different treatment for those who are otherwise similarly 

situated”), Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 386–87 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that 

the defendant’s subjective beliefs were irrelevant because “[t]o agree that [the defendant’s] 

subjective belief that he was not free to terminate the encounter was objectively reasonable 

because relations between police and minorities are poor would result in a rule that all 

encounters between police and minorities are seizures” and “[s]uch a rule should be rejected”), 

United States v. Sanders, 2021 WL 4876230, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 19, 2021) (“The race of a 

suspect is thus not a factor in seizure analysis.”), and In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 499, 501–02 

(D.C. 1992) (en banc) (declining to consider the defendant’s race as a factor), with State v. Sum, 

511 P.3d 92, 103 (Wash. 2022) (en banc) (basing its decision to consider race and ethnicity as 

“relevant to the question of whether a person was seized” on the state’s own concession, the state 

constitution, “recent developments in this court’s historical treatment of the rights of BIPOC, 

and the current implications of [its] decision”), and United States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 
18

warns that using age or race would be “unmanageable” and would lead us “down 

the proverbial slippery slope, necessitating attention to other varieties of special 

vulnerability.” 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 

Amendment § 9.4(a), at 586–87 (6th ed. 2020) (stating that a test that uses a 

“reasonable youth” test would “doubtless prompt imaginative defense counsel to 

seek recognition in other cases of ‘reasonable woman,’ ‘reasonable black’ and 

similar variations” (emphasis added)).

We decline to alter our longstanding seizure test to consider the 

defendant’s age or race, and we reiterate that the reasonable person test “is 

sound law, and it remains the law today.” Fogg, 936 N.W.2d at 669. The district 

court and the court of appeals correctly declined to consider Cyrus’s age or race 

in determining whether Officer Morgan’s actions constituted a seizure.7

IV. Disposition.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals 

and the district court’s suppression ruling and judgment of conviction.

AFFIRMED.

773 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering “the publicized shootings by white Portland police officers of 

African-Americans” as part of the determination, under the “totality of the circumstances,” of 

whether a seizure occurred). But c.f. United States v. Smith, 794 F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir. 2015) 

(holding that while race is “ ‘not irrelevant’ to . . . whether a seizure occurred, it is not dispositive 

either”); State v. Jones, 235 A.3d 119, 126 (N.H. 2020) (deciding that “race is an appropriate 

circumstance to consider,” although the court reached its conclusion “irrespective of the 

defendant’s race”); Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 152 N.E.3d 108, 121 (Mass. 2020) (discussing other 

courts that have adopted or declined to adopt race as a factor and then declining to “decide here 

whether the race of a defendant properly informs the seizure inquiry”); State v. Spears, 

839 S.E.2d 450, 461 (S.C. 2020) (“We need not consider whether Spears’ race is a factor to be 

considered when resolving the issue of whether the encounter was consensual.”).

7For the first time on appeal, Cyrus argues for a strict scrutiny test in lieu of our existing 

reasonable person test. No other court has adopted a strict scrutiny seizure analysis. His

argument is unpreserved, and we decline to reach it. See In re V.H., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2023 WL 

6761321, at *4–5 (Iowa Oct. 13, 2023).