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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 17, 2003 Decided November 18, 2003

No. 02-5317

ELLEN W. SCHRECKER,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv00026)

James H. Lesar argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant United States Attorney.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.
2

Michael E. Tankersley was on the brief for amici curiae

Public Citizen, Inc., et al. in support of appellant.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: Ellen Schrecker appeals the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment to the U.S.

Department of Justice (‘‘the Government’’), in a case arising

out of Schrecker’s Freedom of Information Act (‘‘FOIA’’)

request for Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘‘FBI’’) records

relating to McCarthy-era investigations of Gerhart Eisler and

Clinton Jencks. The Government produced over 24,000

pages of responsive documents, but redacted names and other

information identifying third-party individuals mentioned in

those records pursuant to Exemption 7(C) in FOIA. Exemption 7(C) permits an agency to withhold information compiled

for law enforcement purposes where disclosure of such information ‘‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)

(1996).

In a prior appeal involving the same parties, we remanded

the case to the District Court in order for the Government to

show that it had taken ‘‘certain basic steps’’ to ascertain

whether the individuals whose names were withheld under

Exemption 7(C) are living or dead. Schrecker v. United

States Dep’t of Justice, 254 F.3d 162, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Schrecker now challenges the District Court’s findings on

remand that the Government’s efforts were adequate and that

nondisclosure of the information under Exemption 7(C) is

justified. See Schrecker v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 217

F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2002). We affirm the judgment of the

District Court.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal is the latest installment in a saga that began 15

years ago. Appellant Ellen Schrecker is a history professor,

a published author, and an expert on McCarthyism. In 1988,
3

she submitted a FOIA request for FBI records on Gerhart

Eisler and Clinton Jencks. Both were the subjects of FBI

investigations during the McCarthy Era, in 1947 and 1953,

respectively. Schrecker v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 14

F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 (D.D.C. 1998). Schrecker resubmitted

her request in November 1994, after the Government withheld a portion of the documents responsive to her initial

request. Two months later she initiated this law suit in the

District Court, challenging the adequacy of the FBI’s releases. Id.

In 1998, after the Government had conceded that ‘‘a ‘significant portion’ of its withholdings may have been inappropriate,’’ the District Court ordered the Government to reprocess

all withholdings from responsive documents. Id. at 117.

After reprocessing, the Government prepared a 100-page

Vaughn index from over 24,000 pages of responsive documents. See Schrecker v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 74 F.

Supp. 2d 26, 28 (D.D.C. 1999). A Vaughn index describes the

information withheld from a sample of the responsive documents selected by the requesting party and explains the

relevance of the FOIA exemption under which each item is

withheld. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C.

Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).

In 1999, the District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the Government’s

decision to withhold information from the responsive documents on the basis of six FOIA exemptions, including Exemption 7(C). Schrecker, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 29-35. On appeal, we

affirmed the District Court’s decision with two exceptions.

We first held that because the Government had acknowledged

the previous existence of responsive ‘‘ticklers’’ (duplicate files,

usually maintained by FBI supervisors, that contain copies of

documents which may not have survived in other filing systems and may contain unique annotations), the Government

was required to search for these records. Schrecker, 254

F.3d at 164-65.

More relevant for the instant appeal, we found that the

record was not sufficiently developed to permit proper review
4

of the Government’s invocation of Exemption 7(C). The fact

of an individual’s death, we held, is a relevant factor in

determining whether the Government properly withheld the

individual’s personal information under Exemption 7(C). Id.

at 166. The Government affirmed that it had investigated

whether the relevant individuals were deceased, relying on

several clues and sources: (1) Who Was Who, a book of

famous individuals; (2) the ‘‘100-year rule,’’ which presumes

that an individual is dead if his or her birth date appears in

the responsive record and is more than 100 years old; and (3)

‘‘other readily available information.’’ The record showed

that the ‘‘other readily available information’’ included internal FBI records, but it was unclear as to whether it also

included the Social Security Death Index (‘‘SSDI’’), a privately maintained database using Social Security Administration

data. Id. at 166-67.

We held that, ‘‘[w]ithout confirmation that the Government

took certain basic steps to ascertain whether an individual

was dead or alive, we are unable to say whether the Government reasonably balanced the interests in personal privacy

against the public interest in release of the information at

issue.’’ Id. at 167. We reversed the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment on the Exemption 7(C) withholdings and

remanded the case for further proceedings. The court instructed that, on remand, the Government should be permitted to document the ‘‘other readily available information’’

upon which it relied. The District Court then could properly

evaluate whether the Government ‘‘did all it should have

done’’ and, on this basis, determine whether the Exemption

7(C) withholding was justified. Id.

On remand, the District Court again granted summary

judgment for the Government, relying in significant part on

two declarations from Scott A. Hodes, then Acting Chief of

the Litigation Unit, Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts

Section at FBI Headquarters. See Schrecker, 217 F. Supp.

2d at 34-38. The court found that the Government’s search

for responsive ‘‘ticklers’’ satisfied the Government’s duty under FOIA. Id. at 34-35. With regard to Exemption 7(C), the

court found that the Government had investigated the life
5

status of the individuals whose names were withheld, using

the following clues and sources: Who Was Who; the 100-year

rule; previous FOIA requests; ‘‘internal sources’’; and SSDI

searches where the individual’s social security number appeared in the responsive records. Id. at 37. The District

Court rejected Schrecker’s argument that the FBI should use

name-based searching of the SSDI when social security numbers are not available, finding that a social security number is

necessary to verify that an individual listed in the database is

the same individual appearing in the responsive document.

The court found that it would be unduly burdensome for the

Government to search unresponsive files for the social security number of every individual mentioned in a responsive

document. Id. at 38.

The District Court accordingly held that the Government

had done all it was required to do in investigating whether

the individuals whose personal information was withheld were

dead. The court also concluded that the Government had

appropriately balanced privacy and public interests in withholding the information under Exemption 7(C) and, therefore,

held that the Government was entitled to summary judgment.

Id. at 38-39. Schrecker now appeals the District Court’s

decision as to the Exemption 7(C) issues. Public Citizen,

Inc., and seven other organizations (‘‘Amici’’) were granted

leave by the court to file a joint amicus brief in support of

Schrecker.

II. ANALYSIS

A. FOIA Exemption 7(C)

FOIA Exemption 7(C) provides, in relevant part, that an

agency may withhold ‘‘records or information compiled for

law enforcement purposes’’ to the extent that their production

‘‘could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1996).

Exemption 7(C) requires the agency and the reviewing court

to weigh the public interest in the release of information

against the privacy interest in nondisclosure. See United
6

States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of

the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989).

The public interest in disclosure must be evaluated in light

of FOIA’s central purpose: ‘‘to open agency action to the

light of public scrutiny.’’ Id. at 772 (quoting Dep’t of Air

Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)). This inquiry,

moreover, should focus not on the general public interest in

the subject matter of the FOIA request, but rather on the

incremental value of the specific information being withheld.

See, e.g., King v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210,

234 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

On the privacy side of the ledger, our decisions have

consistently supported nondisclosure of names or other information identifying individuals appearing in law enforcement

records, including investigators, suspects, witnesses, and informants. See Fitzgibbon v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 911

F.2d 755, 767-68 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Keys v. United States Dep’t

of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1987); King, 830

F.2d at 234-35; Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Judiciary Comm. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d

574, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Bast v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lesar v. United

States Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

In Safecard Services, Inc. v. SEC, we adopted a categorical

rule permitting an agency to withhold information identifying

private citizens mentioned in law enforcement records, unless

disclosure is ‘‘necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity.’’

926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Nation Magazine, Washington Bureau v. United States Customs Serv., 71

F.3d 885, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining and reaffirming the

Safecard rule). Although the court has held that ‘‘government officials do not surrender all rights to personal privacy

when they accept a public appointment,’’ Bast, 665 F.2d at

1255, we have not had occasion to decide whether the Safecard rule applies to former officials no longer in government

service.
7

We have recognized, however, that the privacy interest in

nondisclosure of identifying information may be diminished

where the individual is deceased. ‘‘The fact of death, therefore, while not requiring the release of information, is a

relevant factor to be taken into account in the balancing

decision whether to release information.’’ Schrecker, 254

F.3d at 166; accord Campbell v. United States Dep’t of

Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Summers v.

Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1084-85 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(Silberman, J., concurring). Therefore, in the instant case,

we must review the District Court’s holding that the Government has taken the necessary ‘‘basic steps to ascertain whether an individual was dead or alive.’’

B. The Instant Appeal

With this background in mind, we now turn to Schrecker’s

challenge to the District Court’s decision. We review de novo

a decision granting summary judgment to an agency claiming

to have complied with FOIA. Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at

889.

1. The ‘‘Reasonable Efforts’’ Standard

Schrecker’s principal claim on appeal is that the Government’s methods for determining life status are inadequate.

She asserts that an agency’s FOIA search methodology must

be ‘‘reasonably calculated’’ to produce the information sought.

See, e.g., Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir.

1990). Schrecker alleges that the Government’s search methods in this case are highly unlikely to reveal whether an

individual is living or dead, and cites as evidence the Government’s failure to identify any specific instance in which its

methods resulted in the disclosure of a name.

In Campbell, we held that ‘‘[a] court balancing public

interests in disclosure against privacy interests must TTT

make a reasonable effort to account for the death of a person

on whose behalf the FBI invokes exemption 7(c).’’ 164 F.3d

at 33 (citing Summers, 140 F.3d at 1084-85 (Silberman, J.,

concurring); id. at 1085 (Williams, J., concurring)). In undertaking the review required by Campbell, a court must
8

assure itself that the Government has made a reasonable

effort to ascertain life status. And the Government’s efforts

must be assessed in light of the accessibility of the relevant

information. See Summers, 140 F.3d at 1085 (‘‘[T]here would

be a question whether the Bureau’s invocation of the privacy

interest represented a reasonable response to the FOIA

request, at least if the Bureau has, or has ready access to,

data bases that could resolve the issue.’’ (emphasis added));

see also Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542 (‘‘The adequacy of an agency’s

search is measured by a ‘standard of reasonableness,’ and is

‘dependent upon the circumstances of the case.’ ’’ (footnote

and citation omitted)). We have cautioned, however, that it

would be inappropriate for the court to mandate ‘‘a brightline set of steps for an agency to take in this situation.

FOIA, requiring as it does both systemic and case-specific

exercises of discretion and administrative judgment and expertise, is hardly an area in which the courts should attempt

to micro manage the executive branch.’’ Johnson v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 776

(D.C. Cir. 2002).

The failure to discover the information sought is not conclusive evidence that the agency has failed to make a reasonable

effort. See id. at 775-76 (upholding the adequacy of the

Government’s efforts despite its failure to determine whether

the individuals in question were alive or dead); see also, e.g.,

Weisberg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476,

1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (The relevant issue ‘‘is not whether

there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to

the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate.’’ (emphasis in original)). The reviewing

court therefore should not focus primarily on the agency’s

rate of success in unearthing the information sought. Rather,

the proper inquiry is whether the Government has made

reasonable use of the information readily available to it, and

whether there exist reasonable alternative methods that the

Government failed to employ.

Schrecker’s criticisms of the Government’s methods are

numerous, but ultimately she advocates only two alternatives:

name-based searching of the SSDI and replacement of the
9

100-year rule with an alternative presumption. On the record

at hand, we see no merit in the alternative methods proposed

by Schrecker.

2. The Scope of Application of the Government’s Methods

Before turning to Schrecker’s method-specific arguments,

we pause to address her threshold objection that the affidavits submitted in support of the Government’s motion for

summary judgment are fatally vague. Specifically, she points

to the Fifth and Sixth Hodes Declarations’ reference to use of

certain tools as a matter of ‘‘discretion’’ or ‘‘where possible’’

as calling into question whether the tools were actually

applied to all the information withheld under Exemption 7(C).

We find no merit in this argument. The Sixth Hodes

Declaration unambiguously states that ‘‘all possible ‘tools’ TTT

were utilized in the processing of these documents in order to

maximize disclosure to plaintiff.’’ Sixth Hodes Decl. ¶ 13,

Joint Appendix (‘‘J.A.’’) 49-50. The references to employment

of certain methods in the FBI’s ‘‘administrative discretion’’

clearly indicate the Government’s position that it did opt to

apply the methods even though it was not legally required to

do so. See Fifth Hodes Decl. ¶ ¶ 10, 13, J.A. 34-36; Sixth

Hodes Decl. ¶ 14, J.A. 50. The Fifth Hodes Declaration’s

statement that the methods were used ‘‘where possible’’ is

similarly clear when read in context. See Fifth Hodes Decl.

¶ 10, J.A. 34. The Government took the position that it was

only possible: (1) to apply the 100-year rule where the

individual’s birth date appeared in the responsive pages, see

id. ¶ 11, J.A. 35; (2) to rely on a search of the SSDI where

the individual’s social security number appeared in the responsive documents, see id. ¶ 13, J.A. 35-36; and (3) to rely

upon institutional knowledge of the death of certain individuals from past FOIA requests where such knowledge existed.

See id. ¶ 12, J.A. 35. We address the reasonableness of the

Government’s methods below, but as a preliminary matter we

find that the Hodes Declarations adequately support the

Government’s assertion that the methods were affirmatively

and consistently applied to all of the information withheld.
10

3. Name-Based Searching of the SSDI

We concur with the District Court’s conclusion that a

researcher must have the target’s social security number in

order positively to verify that the individual appearing in the

SSDI is the same individual referred to in a responsive

document. See Schrecker, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 38. The

possibility of multiple matches for a single name necessitates

a ready and conclusive means of verifying that the individual

in the database and the individual in the FOIA record are one

and the same. See Sixth Hodes Decl. ¶ 16, J.A. 51-52; Reply

Br. Addendum 1 (showing 13 separate results from a namebased search of the SSDI for Joseph Fischetti, the subject of

another of Schrecker’s FOIA requests). The fact that a

name-based search of the SSDI may reveal other identifying

information, such as the date and place of an individual’s

birth, does not obviate or diminish this need for ready

verification.

As noted above, the Government only searched the SSDI

where the social security number of the individual in question

appeared in the responsive pages. See Fifth Hodes Decl.

¶ 13, J.A. 35-36; Sixth Hodes Decl. ¶ ¶ 15-16, J.A. 51-52. The

Government specifically declined to go beyond the responsive

documents to investigate the individuals’ social security numbers, a policy it justified on two grounds: (1) that such

research would violate these third parties’ privacy rights; and

(2) that it would be unduly burdensome. Id.

We find the first of these justifications unpersuasive. The

Sixth Hodes Declaration states only that ‘‘[t]he records that

may possess these individuals’ Social Security numbers were

created either for law enforcement purposes or internal

administrative personnel purposes; they were not created

for the purpose of ascertaining whether individuals contained

in these records are alive or deceased for purposes of FOIA

requests.’’ Sixth Hodes Decl. ¶ 16, J.A. 52 (emphasis in

original). We fail to see how the purpose for which an

internal record was created bears on whether searching the

record for an individual’s social security number would violate

that individual’s privacy. If searching responsive documents
11

(created for law enforcement purposes) for social security

numbers is not barred by privacy concerns, it is unclear how

searching other internal documents would be. The Government offers no further support for this ‘‘privacy’’ justification

nor can we discern any.

We nevertheless hold that it would be unduly burdensome

to require the Government to research nonresponsive records

for the relevant individuals’ social security numbers. We

have held that there are limits to the lengths to which an

agency must go in responding to a FOIA request. See

Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 891-92; Am. Fed’n of Gov’t

Employees, Local 2782 v. United States Dep’t of Commerce,

907 F.2d 203, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The same principle

applies here. The record before us does not indicate whether

it would be possible to conduct an automated search of any

internal FBI files that might contain the social security

numbers of individuals whose names appear in responsive

documents of this vintage, or whether a physical search would

be necessary. Even if an automated search were possible,

any name-based search would likely encounter the same

obstacle posed by the SSDI: duplication of names making

verification difficult or impossible. The difficulties implicit in

such a search would be multiplied by the number of names

withheld. In this case, 113 such names appeared in the 100-

page Vaughn index alone, and the responsive documents

totaled over 24,000 pages. To require the Government to

shoulder such a potentially onerous task – with dubious

prospects of success – goes well beyond the ‘‘reasonable

effort’’ demanded in this context.

Our position is unaffected by Schrecker’s reference to the

example of Joseph Fischetti, the subject of another of her

FOIA requests. Schrecker asserts that the FBI accepted a

printout of the results of an SSDI search, showing 13 separate hits, as proof of Fischetti’s death, and that the FBI

began processing his records on this basis. See Reply Br.

Addendum 1. As the District Court noted, however, Fischetti

was the sole subject of that FOIA request, not one of a

multitude of third parties appearing in responsive documents.

See Schrecker, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 38. While it may be
12

reasonable to pursue internal research to determine whether

a single subject is the same individual shown by the SSDI to

be deceased, we conclude that it would be unduly burdensome

to require the Government do so for the large number of

third parties appearing in documents responsive to Schrecker’s request.

4. The 100-Year Rule

Schrecker posits three distinct challenges to the Government’s 100-year rule, but fails to establish that the rule is

unreasonable or to propose a viable alternative. Schrecker

first argues that the rule is doomed as an effective tool

because it is only invoked where the responsive records

contain the individual’s birth date, which is rare. See Fifth

Hodes Decl. Ex. A, J.A. 39-46 (showing birth dates for only

three of the 113 individuals appearing in the Vaughn index).

While Schrecker proposes no alternative means of ascertaining the birth dates of the individuals in the records, we note

that requiring the Government to search beyond the responsive records for such information would impose an unreasonable burden similar to that required to search for an individual’s social security number.

Second, Schrecker argues that 100 years is an unreasonably long time period upon which to base the rule. She

argues that current average life expectancy for both sexes is

less than 80 years, and that average life expectancy was lower

for the individuals appearing in the responsive records, all of

whom were adults in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Amici

flesh out this argument with numerical estimates derived

from actuarial tables compiled by the Social Security Administration. They assert that the median life expectancy for

males who were 30 and 40 years old in 1950 is about 74 years,

and the median life expectancy for females who were 30 and

40 years old in 1950 is about 82 years. Br. for Amici at 9

(citing FELICITIE C. BELL & MICHAEL L. MILLER, LIFE TABLES

FOR THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY AREA 1900-2100 (Social

Security Administration Actuarial Study No. 116, Aug. 2002)

(Table 7, Cohort Life Tables for U.S. Social Security Area by

Year of Birth and Sex) (hereinafter ‘‘SSA Actuarial Study’’)).
13

Amici further contend that the chance that a male who was 30

in 1950 would live to be 100 is only 0.01%, while the chance

that a female who was 30 in 1950 would do so is only 2%. Br.

for Amici at 16 (calculations derived from SSA Actuarial

Study).

We find that the Government’s use of 100 years as the

basis for the rule nonetheless is reasonable. This baseline is

intended to prevent disclosure of personal information unless

it is highly probable that the individual in question is dead.

Amici’s statistics, if correct, confirm that the rule is properly

tailored to this purpose. The likelihood that living individuals’ personal information would be disclosed presumably

would increase proportionately with any reduction in the time

frame upon which the rule is based. While the 100-year rule

is more protective of personal privacy than Schrecker would

prefer, it is not unreasonable.

Third and finally, Schrecker asserts that, in the absence of

a birth date, the Government improperly presumes that individuals mentioned in records of this vintage are alive. Amici

provide statistical support, asserting that there is a 28%

chance that a man who was 30 in 1950 is alive today, and a 4%

chance that a man who was 40 in 1950 is still alive. Br. for

Amici at 8 (citing SSA Actuarial Study). There is a somewhat greater likelihood that an adult woman of that era is still

alive: 47% for a woman who was 30 in 1950, and 13% for a

woman who was 40 in 1950. Id.

We again find reasonable the Government’s prophylactic

presumption that the individuals whose names appear in

these records are alive. It may be more likely than not that

any given individual named in these records is dead. But

Amici’s own statistics, if correct, indicate that there remains a

substantial probability that a given individual is alive: about

one in two or greater for women who were 30 or younger in

1950, and about one in four or greater for men who were 30

or younger in 1950. Again, the Government’s rebuttable

presumption that an individual is alive is more protective of

personal privacy than Schrecker would like, but it is not

unreasonable.
14

5. Balancing of Privacy and Public Interests

Having determined that the Government has satisfied its

duty to investigate whether the relevant individuals are living

or dead, we now affirm the District Court’s finding that the

Government appropriately balanced public and privacy interests in withholding personal information under Exemption

7(C).

Our precedents give strong support to Government decisions to withhold names and identifying information from law

enforcement records. See, e.g., Safecard Servs., 926 F.2d at

1206; Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767-68; Keys, 830 F.2d at 347-

48; King, 830 F.2d at 234-35; Senate of the Commonwealth

of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 588; Bast, 665 F.2d at 1254-55;

Lesar, 636 F.2d at 487-88. Assuming that the ‘‘private’’

individuals mentioned in the records are living, their names

and identifying information are presumptively exempt from

disclosure under the Safecard rule. See Safecard Servs., 926

F.2d at 1206 (holding that information in law enforcement

records identifying private individuals is exempt from disclosure unless release is necessary to ‘‘confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity’’);

Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 896 (reaffirming Safecard rule).

We have long recognized, moreover, that ‘‘the mention of

an individual’s name in a law enforcement file will engender

comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.’’ See Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Therefore, persons involved in

law enforcement investigations – witnesses, informants, and

the investigating agents – ‘‘have a substantial interest in

seeing that their participation remains secret.’’ Senate of the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 588. Where, as

here, there is a reasonable possibility that the individuals in

question are alive, their privacy interests remain strong. The

passage of time, without more, does not materially diminish

these interests. See Keys, 830 F.2d at 348 (finding that

passage of 40 years did ‘‘not so dilute the privacy interest as

to tip the balance the other way’’); King, 830 F.2d at 234
15

(upholding nondisclosure of identifying information from 30-

to 40-year-old records).

The countervailing public interest in disclosure of the

names and other identifying information of those appearing in

the responsive documents is weak. Schrecker asserts that

disclosure of this information would shed light on the workings of government by permitting closer public scrutiny of the

Eisler and Jencks investigations. But ‘‘[w]e have rejected

similar claims in the past because the type of information

sought is simply not very probative of an agency’s behavior or

performance.’’ Safecard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1205. Whatever

the incremental value of disclosure of the names in the Eisler

and Jencks records, it does not outweigh the relevant individuals’ clear and significant privacy interest in nondisclosure of

their personal information. See, e.g., Bast, 665 F.2d at 1255

(finding that the putative value of releasing redacted information did not outweigh the invasion of personal privacy). The

Government therefore was justified in withholding this information under Exemption 7(C).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the District

Court’s decision granting summary judgment to the Government.