UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-1725

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JERICHO BAPTIST CHURCH MINISTRIES, INC., Jericho DC,

Defendant - Appellant,

and

JERICHO BAPTIST CHURCH MINISTRIES, INC., Jericho MD; DENISE 

KILLEN; CLIFFORD BOSWELL; GLORIA MCCLAM-MAGRUDER; 

CLARENCE JACKSON; LYNDA PYLES,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. 

Paula Xinis, District Judge. (8:15-cv-02953-PX)

Submitted: September 30, 2022 Decided: October 19, 2022

Before AGEE, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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ON BRIEF: Donald M. Temple, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Matthew A. Fitzgerald,

Richmond, Virginia, Ava E. Lias-Booker, Melissa O. Martinez, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Bank of America, N.A., filed an interpleader action as a disinterested stakeholder 

seeking protection from liability relating to deposit accounts established in 1999 and 2002 

by Jericho Baptist Church Ministries, Inc. (the “Church”). The accounts were the subject 

of litigation between two factions of the Church, Jericho DC and Jericho MD; each faction 

claimed ownership of the Church and purported to be authorized to access the accounts 

held by Bank of America. Jericho DC filed a counterclaim against Bank of America, 

alleging breach of contract, negligence, and gross negligence in Bank of America’s 

handling of the Church’s account. Jericho DC appeals from the district court’s order 

granting summary judgment to Bank of America and denying its motion for 

reconsideration of the court’s prior order excluding Jericho DC’s expert witness. Finding 

no error, we affirm.

Jericho DC first contends that the district court erred in excluding its expert witness, 

Susan Riley, based on her lack of qualifications and the unreliability of her opinions. “We

review a district court’s decision[] on the admissibility of expert testimony for abuse of 

discretion.” McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 980 F.3d 937, 958 (4th Cir. 2020); see Gen.

Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997) (applying abuse of discretion standard to 

district court’s exclusion of expert testimony). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 

sets forth the requirements for qualifying a witness as an expert. When determining the 

reliability of experiential expert testimony for purposes of Rule 702, a court must “require 

an experiential witness to explain how [her] experience leads to the conclusion reached, 

why [her] experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how [her] experience is 

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reliably applied to the facts.” United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because Riley only worked with customers at an operational bank for a short period 

of time prior to 1985, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding her unqualified 

to offer an expert opinion on the industry standard of care for verifying client signature 

cards on corporate accounts decades later. See Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 

F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that expert witness with no education, training, or 

experience in the area in which she testified failed to satisfy Rule 702 and should have been 

excluded). Moreover, Riley could not explain how her experience supported her 

conclusions, nor was she able to point to any industry standards that supported her 

opinions. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming her opinions 

unreliable. 

Jericho DC next argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to 

reopen discovery to allow Jericho DC to designate another expert after the court excluded 

Riley. A trial court necessarily has wide discretion in managing pretrial discovery, and an 

appellate court should not disturb its orders absent a clear abuse of discretion. Ardrey v. 

United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1986). The Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure generally permit a court to extend a deadline “on motion made after the time has 

expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B); 

see Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)

(listing factors courts consider in excusable neglect determination). Because Bank of 

America had already spent two days deposing Riley, discovery had been closed for over a 

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year, the district court had previously extended the discovery period, and Jericho DC had 

the opportunity to look for an alternate expert once Riley’s qualifications were questioned 

by the district court during the first summary judgment hearing, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Jericho DC’s request to reopen discovery.

Next, Jericho DC contends that the district court erred in ruling that it was required 

to present expert testimony to establish Bank of America’s standard of care. Rule 601 of 

the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that “state law governs the witness’s competency 

regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.” Maryland 

law, which governs Jericho DC’s breach of contract and negligence claims, provides that 

“[a]dding an individual’s name to a bank account involves an understanding of internal 

bank procedures that the trier of fact cannot be expected to appreciate” and that “expert 

testimony was necessary to explain to the jury the reasonable commercial standards 

prevailing in the area with respect to adding names to a customer’s checking account and 

verifying the identities of the signatories.” Schultz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 990 A.2d 1078, 

1080-81, 1085-86 (Md. 2010). Based on its straightforward application of Maryland law, 

the district court did not err in determining that the standard of care could not be established 

without an expert. 

Finally, Jericho DC argues that the district court erred by considering 

unauthenticated records submitted by Bank of America that constituted inadmissible 

hearsay. A district court may consider materials at the summary judgment stage that would 

be inadmissible at trial if the proponent “shows that it will be possible to put the information 

into an admissible form.” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 

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790 F.3d 532, 538 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). The business records exception to the rule 

against hearsay provides that a record of a regularly conducted activity is not excluded by 

the rule against hearsay if certain requirements are met. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). “Rule 803(6) 

does not require that the records be created by the business having custody of them.” Gen.

Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 886 F.3d 346, 358 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). In 

this case, Bank of America showed that the records in question could be authenticated at 

trial and fell into the business records hearsay exception. The district court therefore did

not abuse its discretion in considering the records in its summary judgment determination.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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