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WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS? WHAT ARE THE

COSTS?: OVERSIGHT OF MISSILE DEFENSE

(PART 2)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 16, 2008

Serial No. 110–149

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.oversight.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

——— ———

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE TURK, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 16, 2008 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Gronlund, Lisbeth, Ph.D., senior scientist and co-director of the global

security program, Union of Concerned Scientists, research affiliate,

Program on Science, Technology and Society, Massachusetts Institute

of Technology; Richard L. Garwin, Ph.D., fellow emeritus, Thomas J.

Watson Research Center, IBM Corp.; Jeff Kueter, president, George

C. Marshall Institute; and Philip E. Coyle III, senior advisor, Center

for Defense Information, associate director emeritus, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ............................................................................ 12

Coyle, Philip E. .......................................................................................... 51

Garwin, Richard L. .................................................................................... 22

Gronlund, Lisbeth ..................................................................................... 12

Kueter, Jeff ................................................................................................ 38

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Coyle, Philip E., III, senior advisor, Center for Defense Information,

associate director emeritus, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 54

Garwin, Richard L., Ph.D., fellow emeritus, Thomas J. Watson Research

Center, IBM Corp., prepared statement of ................................................. 25

Gronlund, Lisbeth, Ph.D., senior scientist and co-director of the global

security program, Union of Concerned Scientists, research affiliate,

Program on Science, Technology and Society, Massachusetts Institute

of Technology, prepared statement of ......................................................... 16

Kueter, Jeff, president, George C. Marshall Institute, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 41

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut:

Information concerning testing history ................................................... 116

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 8

(1)

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS? WHAT ARE THE

COSTS?: OVERSIGHT OF MISSILE DEFENSE

(PART 2)

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p.m., in room

2157, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Yarmuth, Welch,

Shays, Foxx, and Franks.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Davis Hake, clerk; Dan

Hamilton, fellow; Christopher Bright, minority professional staff

member; Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy advisor; Benjamin Chance, minority clerk; and Todd Greenwood, minority research assistant.

Mr. TIERNEY. A quorum is now present. The Subcommittee on

National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, ‘‘What are

the Prospects? What are the Costs?: Oversight of Missile Defense

(Part 2),’’ will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and the ranking

member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. And I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Arizona, Congressman Trent Franks, be allowed to participate in this

hearing.

Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open

for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee will

be allowed to submit a written statement for the record.

And, without objection, that is so ordered.

I want to extend my sincere apologies to all of the witnesses.

They are substantial people who we invite to come and work with

us and tell us what knowledge you have and then we have a circumstance like that extended period of votes. So I hope you will accept our profound apologies and know that we appreciate your

being here and helping the committee out.

We are going to go out of order here, because Mr. Shays has to

make a brief stop elsewhere. So I have asked Mr. Shays to please

do his opening remarks, and that will be followed by mine.

Mr. Shays, you are recognized.

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this hearing today and continuing the subcommittee’s oversight of this important topic. And thank you for your courtesy for allowing me to

go out of order and make a statement first.

In September 2000, our subcommittee held a hearing entitled,

‘‘National Missile Defense: Test Failures and Technology Development,’’ on precisely the issues we will examine today. In July 2002,

our subcommittee held a hearing entitled, ‘‘Missile Defense: A New

Organization, Evolution, Technologies, and Unrestricted Testing,’’

on required knowledge for missile defense development.

Many of us forget that the National Missile Defense Act of 1999

states, ‘‘It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as

technologically possible an effective national missile defense system

capable of defending the United States against limited ballistic

missile attacks.’’

Adopted with broad bipartisan support and signed into law by a

Democratic President, the statute answered the question of whether to deploy a missile defense shield. Its decision was supported by

the current administration and has also been endorsed by Congress

in the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act.

The question now is not if but, rather, how to deploy a national

missile defense. Without doubt, this is an extremely complex technical challenge. It literally is rocket science and demands an unparalleled degree of technological precision. The challenges missile

defense must reliably solve include launch determination, target

discrimination, command and control coordination, and target

interception. With such daunting demands, one can only expect the

program to progress unevenly and experience a certain degree of

setback.

We are here to look at the technical process of the progress of

the program since those hearings. Over the past decade, Congress

has appropriated a great deal of money to missile defense. While

acknowledging the difficulty of the task, we must still ensure

progress is being made. Perfection is not expected, but significant

progress has to be. If there are significant problems and delays, we

must consider modifying the program.

I understand we have already fielded an initial capacity to defend the United States and our allies against ballistic missile attacks. This is exactly the type of progress I look for, as we were

far from such progress in the hearings I held into the matters as

chairman of the subcommittee in 2002. I am interested to hear

from our witnesses what problems remain that prevent us from

fully deploying a capable and reliable system.

I thank our witnesses for their time today. I look forward to their

testimony. And I apologize that I will be leaving for a short period,

but I intend to come back.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

And thank you all again for being here. I am sorry Mr. Shays

won’t be here for your opening remarks, but I am sure we will

cover it in terms of questions. The questions of whether we have

an effective system, one that is capable of defending this country,

of course, are huge. I don’t think it meant that we would have a

policy that we would buy before we fly, nor does it mean that we

are going to have a policy that would waste money. And I think

all of those questions are open, as is what the word ‘‘fielded’’ means

in terms of what capacity is out there now.

But this is, in fact, our second oversight hearing of this series

this year. I was present for the earlier hearings Mr. Shays referenced, and I think we had the same questions then as we have

now.

We are going to continue this extensive and sustained oversight

of missile defense for three primary reasons.

First, the Missile Defense Agency operates the largest research

and development program in the Department of Defense, consisting

currently of about $10 billion a year. Since the 1980’s, this is a program that has already cost $120 billion by some estimates, $150

billion or more by other estimates. As some have pointed out, this

is an amount of time and money already exceeding what we spent

on the Manhattan Project or the Apollo program, and there is no

end in sight.

Second, the broader history of missile defense efforts teaches us

a number of important lessons. The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service put it this way: ‘‘Efforts to counter ballistic missiles

have been underway since the dawn of the missile age at the close

of World War II. Numerous programs were begun, and only a very

few saw completion to deployment. Technical obstacles have proven

to be tenacious, and systems integration challenges have been more

the norm, rather than the exception.’’

The third reason for doing these hearings is the excellent analysis and work of those who are testifying before us today and who

have testified at our previous hearings and others like them who

have raised very serious concerns about the efficiency, effectiveness, and even the need for our country’s current missile defense

efforts.

In our first hearing, we had an extraordinary discussion about

the hard realities of the threats facing our country from intercontinental ballistic missiles versus other vulnerabilities that we face,

a discussion which should form the foundation for any wise policymaking but that too often gets forgotten, ignored, distorted or manipulated.

Now, we will tackle head-on the questions of what are the prospects of our current missile defense efforts and at what cost. We

have the very good fortune today to host some of the Nation’s finest

minds and top experts on the subject of missile defense. We have

a group of people who have literally devoted their lives to understanding these problems, who are far more familiar with these

issues than anyone in the world. And I am honored to have them

here today and eagerly await our discussion this afternoon.

When we talk about prospects of missile defense, a number of

issues come up that we will hear extensively discussed today, for

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instance: the realism of the testing regime, the pace of testing, fundamental physics constraints, and a mind-numbing variety of technical challenges, just to name a few.

One problem that comes up again and again is the use of countermeasures. The analysis holds that a country sophisticated

enough to build an intercontinental ballistic missile with a miniaturized nuclear warhead, an effort that we learned from the Congressional Research Service at our first hearing was truly extraordinary, would also develop countermeasures that could pose fundamental problems for any national missile defense system.

As was pointed out by at least a couple witnesses today, the CIA

itself has acknowledged the wide potential use of countermeasures.

The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate concludes, and it is up on

the screen for those who want to read it along: ‘‘We assess that

countries developing ballistic missiles will also develop various responses to U.S. theater and national defenses. Russia and China

each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are

willing to sell the requisite technologies. Many countries, such as

North Korea, Iran and Iraq probably would rely initially on readily

available technology—including separating RVs, spin-stabilized

RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material, booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys—

to develop penetration aids and countermeasures. These countries

could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the

time they flight test their missiles.’’

So our simple question for our panel today is, taking this into account, what are the prospects of success of our current missile defense system, and how likely are we going to be able to overcome

this fundamental problem in the foreseeable future?

The Missile Defense Agency was born at the moment the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty between the United States and Russia was

killed. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld promptly exempted this new

agency from normal acquisition, testing and reporting requirements, and the agency went down a path of so-called spiral development that has been carried out, in the words of one of our witnesses today, to an ‘‘unworkable extreme.’’

A number of our witnesses today will point out the consequences

of this, including that we have an incredibly opaque system and

one in which accountability and transparency are greatly sacrificed.

The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that, assuming

the Missile Defense Agency continues on its present course, the

taxpayers will spend an additional $213 billion to $277 billion between now and 2025. The graphic on the screen reflects that. I

need to stress that this is in addition to the $150 billion we have

already spent.

In a time of economic hardship, budget deficits and many pressing and expensive challenges, both foreign and domestic, we need

to ask ourselves, whether a conservative Republican or a liberal

Democrat: Are we wisely spending the taxpayers’ money here? Is

there a real threat we are trying to guard against? And are we actually going to have something useful at the end of the day? That

is why we are here today, and that is why we are having this hearing.

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And, again, I want to thank the witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. The subcommittee will now receive the testimony

from the witnesses that are before us today.

By brief introduction, Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund—Dr. Gronlund is a

senior scientist and co-director of the Global Security Program at

the Union of Concerned Scientists and a research affiliate in the

Program on Science, Technology, and Society at the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology.

She holds a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Cornell University.

Her research is focused on technical issues related to nuclear terrorism and fissile material controls, the U.S. nuclear weapons policy and new nuclear weapons, space weapons, and ballistic missile

defenses.

She has published widely in scientific and policy journals, given

numerous talks about nuclear arms control and missile defense policy issues to both lay and expert audiences, and testified previously

before Congress, including to this committee, and we welcome her

back.

Dr. Richard Garwin—Dr. Garwin is one of the world’s most eminent physicists and a long-time scholar of missile defense. After

working with Dr. Edmund Teller on the creation of the hydrogen

bomb, Dr. Garwin left the University of Chicago to join IBM Corp.

in 1952, where he remains fellow emeritus in the Thomas J. Watson Research Center in New York.

He is a founder of the modern U.S. Satellite Intelligence Program, and has advised Presidents and Congress on matters of national security his entire career, including 8 years as chairman of

the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board of the Department of State.

He is the recipient of many national and international honors, including being awarded in 2003 the National Medal of Science from

the President of the United States. He has been professor of public

policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, has published more than 500 scientific papers, and holds 45

U.S. patents.

Jeff Kueter is the president of George C. Marshall Institute in

Washington, DC. He focuses on the issues of national security and

the environment. Mr. Kueter also manages the day-to-day operations of the George C. Marshall Institute, authoring its policy papers and analysis and engaging the public and the policymaking

community.

He received his bachelor’s of arts with honors in political science

and economics at the University of Iowa, and a master’s degree in

political science and another master’s of security policy studies in

science and technology studies, both from George Washington University. He has served as research director at the National Coalition for Advanced Manufacturing and at the Washington Nickleby

Consultants.

Philip E. Coyle III—Mr. Coyle is a senior advisor to the Center

for Defense Information. A former Assistant Secretary of Defense,

Mr. Coyle is the longest-serving director of operational tests and

evaluation in the 20-year history of that office. He oversaw the test

and evaluation of over 200 major defense acquisition systems and

reported to the Secretary of Defense and to Congress on the adequacy and results of Defense Department testing programs.

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He is the associate director emeritus at the Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory, where he started in 1959. He was appointed

by President George W. Bush to serve on the 2005 Defense Base

Realignment and Closure Commission.

Mr. Coyle is an expert on military research, development and

testing, on operational military matters, and on national security

policy and defense spending, including defense acquisition reform

and defense procurement. He has an extensive background in missile defense, in military defense systems and in nuclear weapons.

The subcommittee again thanks all of you for being with us here

today. Your decades of experience and firsthand knowledge of the

topics will provide us with an unparalleled independent view into

these complex issues.

It is the policy of the subcommittee to swear you in before you

testify. I would ask you if you would stand and raise your rights

hands, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please reflect that all the witnesses

answered in the affirmative.

Your full written statements will be put into the hearing record,

by unanimous consent.

We normally would ask you to keep your oral statements to 5

minutes in duration, but I think you have agreed to follow along

with the matter, and we are going to be as lenient as we possibly

can. We want to hear what you have to say. We will take your testimony. If it gets to be a little too long, I will try to just tap on

the gavel a little bit and maybe you can bring it to a conclusion.

Otherwise, we, again, thank you. And let’s start, if we can, with

Lisbeth Gronlund.

Your testimony, please.

STATEMENTS OF LISBETH GRONLUND, PH.D., SENIOR SCIENTIST AND CO-DIRECTOR OF THE GLOBAL SECURITY PROGRAM, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, RESEARCH AFFILIATE, PROGRAM ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY; RICHARD L. GARWIN, PH.D., FELLOW EMERITUS, THOMAS J. WATSON RESEARCH CENTER, IBM CORP.; JEFF KUETER, PRESIDENT, GEORGE C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE; AND PHILIP E.

COYLE III, SENIOR ADVISOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR EMERITUS, LAWRENCE

LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATEMENT OF LISBETH GRONLUND

Ms. GRONLUND. I thank you very much for inviting me here

today, and I applaud the committee for taking up this issue. It is

a very important one that I think requires more oversight.

I will first discuss the prospects for building a ballistic missile

defense and some of the security costs that have ensued from efforts.

As you know, last month marked the 25th anniversary of Reagan’s famous Star Wars speech in which he announced his plan to

develop a missile defense system that would make nuclear weapons

impotent and obsolete. His vision of a shield that would protect us

13

from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from rain was

very compelling to many people. I think it is a vision that remains

compelling today. This was a time when the United States and Soviets had 25,000 missiles and 35,000 missiles, and we could see it

was particularly appealing then.

The task now, defending against potential future North Korean

or Iranian long-range missiles, is far less demanding. Anti-missile

technology has also come a long way in the past 25 years. Guidance

and homing have improved so much that all current U.S. missile

defense systems use hit-to-kill technology, where the incoming target is destroyed by ramming into it. Twenty-five years ago, our

missile defenses were nuclear-tipped, because you couldn’t possibly

get close enough to the incoming target.

However, despite this technical progress, the United States is no

closer today than it was 25 years ago to be able to defend against

long-range missiles. As you yourself noted, there will be a lot of discussion today about the perennial countermeasures problem as well

as the lack of testing.

As you will hear all three of us articulate, this issue of countermeasures, steps that a nation would then take to counter a U.S.

defense system, is really at the core of why we will not be able to

build an effective defense. There I believe Phil will talk in more detail about different kinds of countermeasures.

Now, I believe that an independent panel of people who have

technical expertise should have been convened at the beginning of

this program where they would do a big-picture review, but it is

not too late to do a review like this now.

The members of such a panel should not be chosen on a partisan

basis. I know often Congress appoints committees and the Democrats choose half of the members of the committee and the Republicans choose the other half. I don’t think this is the right approach. I think a group like the JASON Group would be ideal to

look at this from a very fundamental point of view.

In other words, to use the analogy that the Missile Defense

Agency uses, is it possible for this system ever to run? Because if

it is not, it is pointless to spend money trying to get it to crawl.

I want to suggest some other things that Congress could do to

better understand the limitations of this system. I think it is important that the committee look into the testing plans for the

ground-based missile defense system. When does MDA plan to test

against a threat using realistic countermeasures, and what are

those countermeasures? When does MDA plan to test against a

tumbling warhead?

In this regard, it would be useful for Congress to require the Missile Defense Agency to set up a red team to prevent superpower

agents that would be within the capability of a nation who could

build a long range-missile and a nuclear warhead.

I think an independent panel is also needed to provide ongoing

peer review, technical peer review, of the program as it moves forward, if it moves forward. And, again, I think it should be a panel

that is nonpartisan, not bipartisan.

For example, one of the initial tests was a so-called fly by test.

There was no team at an intercept. It was simply a test of the sensors on the kill vehicle. It flew by a number of objects of different

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sizes and shapes, and its task was to see if it could pick out the

warhead. There have been lots of questions and concerns raised

about that test, whether in fact it demonstrated anything. This was

a proof-of-concept test. It is still important to understand what

really happened then.

Another issue that merits some consideration on the part of the

committee is the capability of the radar that the United States

wants to deploy in Eastern Europe. There are reasons to believe

that the effectiveness of that missile defense system as portrayed

by the Missile Defense Agency are inaccurate. And, again, it is

something that an independent panel that can do peer review

would be really important to have.

Also, until the Missile Defense Agency conducts these tests with

realistic countermeasures and demonstrates that there is some potential, Congress should provide no funding to purchase and deploy

additional interceptors or radars.

So, let me turn now to the costs. I know many people talk about

monetary costs. I think, while those are large, I think the more significant costs are those to U.S. security.

Many people find a contradiction between my statement that the

missile defense system is not, cannot, will not be effective, and yet

at the same time it will cost other countries who believe it to be

effective to react in a way that undermines U.S. security. And let

me just address that directly.

Other countries and the United States engage in worst-case analysis when they are making military plans. That is their job. So

when they look at what the United States is doing, they assume

that it will work. They also assume that if we are spending this

much money, that we think it will work. And those military planners then decide what to do with their nuclear weapons and their

long-range missiles.

And this has been the essential problem for decades. This is why

the United States and Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. They both came to understand that trying to build defenses would cause the other nation to add missiles, to do something to counter the defense, and they realized this would be a bad

deal for both nations.

Now, we see that, in perhaps a less severe form, the United

States is interested in deploying a radar and interceptors in Eastern Europe. Russia is very unhappy about this. It turns out that

the only threat to the United States that could really destroy our

nation as a functioning society is the Russian missile arsenal, nuclear weapons arsenal. And one reason that is so is that they deploy more than 1,000 of their nuclear armed missiles on high alert,

as does the United States. What this means is that those missiles

are vulnerable to accidental use, to unauthorized use, or to deliberate use but under mistaken assumptions that Russia is under attack by the United States. Basically, when you have weapons ready

to go, you have less control over them.

Back when President Clinton was trying to negotiate the treaty

with Russia, U.S. negotiators explicitly told the Russians that they

should not worry about a missile defense system because they

could always maintain their missiles on launch-on-warning. That

way, they would not need to worry about an incoming U.S. attack

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that would destroy a good fraction of Russian missiles, and then

the rest of them being knocked down by a missile defense system.

We should not want to encourage Russia to maintain its missile defense on launch-on-warning.

Similarly, China has about 20 long-range missiles. You can see

that the intended size of this missile defense system would be a

concern to China. They have had a very modest nuclear weapons

program. We also do not want to give them a reason to increase

their arsenal.

Finally, it is dangerous if U.S. policymakers believe they have a

military capability that they do not have. Recently, President Bush

indicated that, had North Korea’s missile test been successful, had

it been launched at the United States, that we could simply have

shot it down. This is very dangerous, and the Missile Defense

Agency, I believe, has been less than honest about what the true

capabilities of the system are. It leads policymakers to not fully understand the limitations of the system. They might, for example, be

less interested in negotiating with countries that might build longrange missiles. They might be more willing to take provocative

military action.

So those are, I believe, the biggest costs. Those are security costs,

security costs to the United States.

I want to end up by simply summarizing. The ground-based missile defense program offers no prospect of defending the United

States from long-range missiles and undermines efforts to eliminate the real nuclear threats to the United States.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gronlund follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Doctor. And we appreciate

your testimony and look forward to the questions and answers.

Dr. Garwin, if you might, please.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD GARWIN

Mr. GARWIN. I am Richard Garwin, and the title of my testimony

is ‘‘Ballistic Missile Defense in Context.’’

So, first, I want to make some general comments on BMD.

Government programs, especially military programs, should be

beneficial. That is, for the most part, they must pass the test of

open analysis and not just plausibility. A program that is not effective is like a fraudulent cure for disease; it wastes money, but it

also prevents the ill from receiving effective treatment.

This country has a long history of programs attempting to defend

against ballistic missiles. Some have made sense even though they

were not pursued. Others have been flawed from the outset.

Defending against nuclear weapons and the only other weapon of

mass destruction, biological weapons, is extremely desirable, but if

wishes were horses, beggars would ride.

Mr. TIERNEY. My father had a different statement, but I think

yours is a little cleaner than that.

Mr. GARWIN. The Missile Defense Agency [MDA], has responsibilities and capabilities in addition to its most costly and most

publicized one of midcourse intercept of ICBMs from such states as

Iran or North Korea. Some of these programs are quite effective,

such as the recent demonstration that MDA can destroy low-orbit

satellites, which is, however, like shooting ducks in a pond—protected ducks, in fact.

But the primary responsibility, that of protecting the United

States against attack by nuclear weapons or biological weapons, is

a failure and will remain so for the foreseeable future, so long as

MDA attempts to carry it out by midcourse intercept. There are

three reasons.

First, a state wishing to deliver nuclear weapons to injure the

U.S. homeland would far more likely use short-range ballistic missiles or cruise missiles launched from a ship to attack U.S. coastal

cities with nuclear weapons than use an ICBM for that purpose.

Second, if a state did desire to use ICBMs, its delivery of bioweapons would be more effective and impossible to counter by any

proposed missiles defense if it used dozens of bomblets each

equipped with its own heat shield. Separating as soon as the missile achieved its final speed and course in the vacuum of space,

these scores or hundreds of bomblets could not be intercepted individually or collectively by the nonnuclear systems being deployed,

and would fall to their targets in an urban area, posing a greater

threat of death or disease than a single warhead containing the

germs to be delivered.

And, third, should a state be so misguided as to attempt to deliver nuclear weapons by ICBM, they could be guaranteed against

intercept in midcourse by the use of appropriate countermeasures.

The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate that the chairman displayed judges specifically that Iran or North Korea could have such

effective countermeasures by the time of their first ICBM test.

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Now, a little bit more detail on each of these points, and then

I would welcome questions for discussion.

First, the use of nuclear-armed, short-range, ship-fired missiles.

Iran has available Chinese-made HY–2 and C–802 cruise missiles,

as well as SCUD-B ballistic missiles with a range of 300 kilometers, 200 miles, and 1-ton payload that could be fired from ships.

The United States now has no defense of coastal cities against the

launch from a ship of such a missile carrying nuclear or biological

warheads.

The 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to

the United States stated clearly, the threat from ship-launched ballistic or cruise missiles, validated in 2006 by MDA’s chief of analysis and scenarios, as a way in which the adversary could achieve

great strength at low cost, in analogy to the IEDs, improvised explosive devices, that are such a threat in Iraq, but in this case to

deliver city-destroying nuclear weapons. That was Ben Stubenberg

in 2006.

Second, the ICBM with dozens or hundreds of bomblets and reentry vehicles. ICBM delivery of a warhead containing 500 kilograms of anthrax, a thousand pounds, or smallpox must provide a

shield against the heat of re-entry and then a means of aerosolizing

the bio agent so that it will remain suspended as it wafts across

the city. It would be militarily more effective and, incidentally,

proof against intercept by the midcourse interceptors to divide the

payload into many few-kilogram bomblets, each with its own heat

shield and re-entry vehicle, the bomblets of the design from the

U.S. Biological Weapons program in the 1960’s, now declassified.

Effective heat shields for re-entry are available from NASA data

as described in a 2000 report of which Lisbeth Gronlund and I are

co-authors and illustrated in my prepared testimony. So there is a

nice little diagram.

Countermeasures to intercept of a nuclear warhead. So the job

of the Missile Defense Agency is midcourse intercept of the warheads. Others on this panel will discuss decoys and countermeasures in detail, although I am prepared to answer questions.

Here, I just note that MDA claims now to be able to handle decoys on a few ICBMs launched from Iran or North Korea. But its

director, in a 2007 article, writes, ‘‘And the Multiple Kill Vehicle

System is a generational upgrade to the land- and sea-based midcourse interceptors that will allow us to handle decoys and countermeasures.’’

But how does a system potentially available in the year 2015

allow us to handle decoys and countermeasures now? This is not

reality. A classified technical session devoted to the decoy problem

and solutions could bring some assessment of the realistic performance of the system.

So, specifically, here are several questions for the Missile Defense Agency.

First, in the past, defense against ICBM delivery of bio-weapons

against U.S. cities was one of the goals promised by National Missile Defense. I remember Director General Kadish promising that.

Does MDA now believe that the midcourse defense now deployed

has the ability to defend against ICBMs equipped with scores of

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bomblets, re-entry vehicles that separate just after boost phase?

Does MDA believe that threat is not realistic?

I noticed that MDA no longer promises to defend against the bioweapon and ICBMs. I think that is realism on their part, but they

ought to be upfront about it.

Second, in view of the 1999 NIE’s judgment that Iran or North

Korea would have decoys for their ICBMs by the time of the first

flight test, can MDA point to a sound, technical, classified analysis

that analyzes the performance of the present MDA deployed system

against the suite of decoys stated as credible in the NIE that you

saw on the display before, including low-power jammers, chaff, and

simple balloon decoys.

Third, in a June 28, 2007, presentation to a European Union

body, MDA’s executive director assumes, ‘‘interceptor launched 250

to 300 seconds after threat.’’ That is 4 minutes to 5 minutes after

the ICBM is launched in Russia and is viewed by the infrared

warning satellite system.

In one of my papers, and I give the reference, I note that interceptor launched 50 to 100 seconds after threat launch was assumed

by a very competent study. MDA’s assurance that the interceptors

in Poland would not be able to destroy even one Russian ICBM

launched against the United States and the assurances of President Bush and Secretary Gates depend on this assumption of a 4-

to 5-minute delay, 250- to 300-second delay, in launch of the interceptor. MDA should be requested to explain why an interceptor

can’t be launched less than 100 seconds after a threat instead of

this 250- to 300-second assumed delay.

That completes my prepared testimony, and I would be very

happy to answer any questions from the committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garwin follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Doctor.

And I would like to inject, I understand there is a procedural

vote that has been called on the floor. We are going to continue the

hearing. So if anyone wants to go vote, you should feel free to do

that.

Mr. Kueter.

STATEMENT OF JEFF KUETER

Mr. KUETER. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee and

Mr. Franks, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you

today to discuss the growing ballistic missile threat and the options

that we are pursuing to defend against them.

The ability to deliver ballistic missiles at long ranges is increasing among nations hostile to the United States. The ballistic missile’s ability to act as an instrument of terror drives the desire to

acquire missiles at longer and longer ranges. North Korea has

many short- and medium-ranged missiles, yet it continues to pursue the Taepodong. Similarly, Iran is investing in longer-range

missiles even though it, too, possesses a sizable short- and mediumrange arsenal. Like North Korea, with whom they share critical

technologies, designs and plans, the Iranians are seeking solid propellent technologies as well as new missile designs.

Writing in 2001, Brookings Institution scholars Michael

O’Hanlon and James Lindsay note the consequences: ‘‘The prospect

of wholesale slaughter is what gives long-range missiles their

course of power.’’

Without a defense, the choices available to deter missile

proliferators are unpalatable. In June 2006, as concerns about the

North Korean ballistic missile test peaked, Ashton Carter and the

former Secretary of Defense William Perry argued in favor of a preemptive strike to prevent the launch of the test missile. Should the

same policy apply to Iran? What should the United States do when

Iran is ready to test its space launch vehicle that will demonstrate

its capability to have ICBM capabilities?

The risks of such a strategy are obvious, and the consequences

of the war it would start are grim. Even in the case of North

Korea, such a provocative use of U.S. offensive military power risks

too much.

In December 2002, President Bush called for the deployment of

missile defense assets capable of providing an initial defense

against the rogue-state ballistic missile threat. The initial deployment was expected to be, ‘‘modest’’ but limited for available defensive missions beginning in 2004. These efforts were clearly considered, ‘‘just a starting point,’’ for the development of improved and

expanded capabilities.

Today, the United States has 24 ground-based midcourse interceptors in Alaska and California, with a total of 30 planned for by

the end of 2008. Twelve Aegis ships are equipped with long-range

surveillance and track capabilities. Conversion of six more are

planned by the end of the year. These vessels are also outfitted

with the standard Missile–3 interceptors.

The Patriot PAC–3 terminal defense system is in the hands of

the U.S. Army. The construction and integration of the Fylingdales

radar in the United Kingdom, the Cobra Dane radar, the sea-based

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X-band radar, and the forward-based transportable X-band radar,

in addition to the development of the communications and battle

management systems and software linking all of them together, enlarge the battlespace, provide overlapping fields of vision to increase the accuracy of the tracking data, and ease the handoff of

information to the kill vehicle.

The hit-to-kill approach has been successfully demonstrated 34

times by various systems since 2001. Dr. Charles McQueary, the

current director of the Operational Test and Evaluation Office at

the Department of Defense, told the Senate earlier this month that,

‘‘Hit-to-kill is no longer a technical uncertainty. It is a reality,

being successfully demonstrated many times over the past few

years. There is still a long way to go, but the MDA’s disciplined

and principled approach to flight and ground test is continuing to

pay real dividends.’’

Last fall’s midcourse defense flight test shows just how far we

have come. The September test had service men and women crewing the interceptors, the radars and the fire control system and target intercept geometries based on the North Korean launch against

the continental United States. Approximating conditions reminiscent of the summer of 2006, when intelligence reports provided

rough estimates of the times when North Korea might test its

Taepodongs, the warfighter only received notice that the window

for the test was opening and to be on alert, forcing them to react

immediately when the target was launched. Similar approaches are

taken for the flight tests of the other systems.

On the issue of countermeasures, successfully developing and

using them requires detailed knowledge of the defensive system,

exemplary systems engineering to ensure they function properly

with the warhead and flight testing. Detailed technical information

about the operational characteristics of the U.S. system is not readily available.

Flight tests should allow for the study of the performance and

then modification of our own responses. Should flight tests be foregone to avoid such detection, the prospective attacker introduces

significant risk of failure into their missile arsenal. Our system

was tested with these known countermeasures in seven ground and

flight tests between 1997 and 2000. And since that time, the target

acquisition, discrimination and terminal homing abilities of the kill

vehicle are tested regularly, with 2008 plans calling for the resumption of active flight testing against countermeasures. Future

plans entail the use of ever more advanced sensors and algorithms,

as well as a volume kill capability.

On the question of cost, only once in more than 25 years has the

missile defense’s share of the total defense budget exceeded 2 percent of the annual budget, and that occurred in fiscal year 2002

when it reached exactly 2 percent. In recent years, the total varies

from 1.3 to 1.6 percent of the defense budget, I believe an adequate

investment and insurance against an unthinkable outcome.

Like any development program, changing priorities and requirements add delays. With goals changing over the long period of time

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tinctly different approaches and different weapons systems were

pursued, creating a start-and-stop acquisition process that inflated

costs.

In conclusion, the decision to deploy missile defense assets as

they mature is driven by the desire to provide the building blocks

of a defense against emerging threats. The simple fact is that not

all threats are known or will be known, and in the current security

climate many are not deterrable. Even in the current form, the elements of a U.S. missile defense system offer options heretofore unavailable. With further research, development and testing, the accuracies and capabilities of these systems will only improve. Further improvement is essential, but the progress is positive.

NATO’s recognition of the threat posed to Europe from ballistic

missiles is an important recent indicator of the seriousness of the

situation. That NATO and 17 other nations are working with the

United States on missiles is further evidence that ballistic missiles

are recognized as a global security challenge and that the approaches outlined by the United States are valid.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kueter follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for your testimony.

Mr. Coyle, we are pleased to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF PHILIP COYLE

Mr. COYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Tierney, distinguished members of the committee, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to support your examination

of the DOD missile defense programs.

The Pentagon is developing a variety of missile defenses, but the

ground-based midcourse system, the GMD system, is the largest,

most costly and complex of the systems. And my remarks focus on

that system today. It was, once upon a time, called National Missile Defense.

In my full prepared testimony, I raise a number of issues that

I think the Congress should examine. Quickly, those are: No. 1, the

technical and operational performance of the GMD system and the

lack of operational criteria by which the Congress can judge success; No. 2, inconsistent and inaccurate information from the Pentagon with respect to both system performance and the threat; No.

3, the lack of demonstrated performance of the GMD system

against realistic threats involving decoys and countermeasures, as

well as in common operational environments; No. 4, the cost, dollar

cost; No. 5, the vulnerability of the GMD system to a direct attack;

No. 6, the successes of U.S. diplomacy, which has been our most

effective missile defense; and, seven, the ways in which missile defenses can undermine America’s arms control and nonproliferation

objectives.

Mr. Chairman, as you referred to it earlier, former Senator Sam

Nunn has said it best: ‘‘National missile defense has become a theology in the United States, not a technology.’’ As a result, U.S. missile defenses are being deployed without well-established operational criteria. How good is the system supposed to be? Is 10 percent effectiveness good enough, or 1 percent? Can the system handle real threats assessed by the Intelligence Community? How

many interceptors should be required to defeat one target? Without

answers to such questions, it is very difficult for you, the Congress,

to evaluate missile defense programs.

The MDA says it can only defend against, ‘‘an unsophisticated

threat,’’ that is, just one or, at most, two missiles from Iran or

North Korea, with no decoys or countermeasures. Should you believe that Iran or North Korea would be reckless enough to attack

Europe or the United States with a single missile, with no decoys

or countermeasures, and then sit back and wait for the consequences? As we know, ballistic missiles have return addresses. If

Iran or North Korea were reckless enough to attack Europe or the

United States, they wouldn’t launch just one missile. And if they

launched several missiles with decoys and countermeasures, U.S.

missile defenses couldn’t deal with it.

Decoys and countermeasures are the Achilles heel of missile defense. Shooting down an enemy missile going 17,000 miles an hour

out in space is like trying to hit a hole-in-one in golf when the hole

is going 17,000 miles an hour. And if an enemy uses decoys and

countermeasures, it is like trying to shoot a hole-in-one when the

hole is going 17,000 miles an hour and the green is dotted with

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black circles the size of the hole and the defender doesn’t know

which to aim for.

The assessments by the Intelligence Community that North

Korea and Iran would soon know how to field such decoys and

countermeasures, if they didn’t already, has already been referred

to, made back in 1999.

From a target discrimination point of view, a recent GMD flight

intercept tests have actually been simpler and less realistic than

the tests more than 5 years ago. None of the GMD flight intercept

tests have included decoys or countermeasures for the past 5 years.

The GMD system has no demonstrated effectiveness to defend the

United States or Europe under realistic operational conditions.

In its fiscal year 2008 budget request, the Pentagon acknowledged this, saying, ‘‘This initial capability is not sufficient to protect the United States from the exigent and anticipated rogue-nation threat.’’ The MDA budget also reveals that the MDA wants the

proposed missile defenses in Europe to protect existing radar sites

in Greenland and the United Kingdom, not, first and foremost, to

defend Europe.

In the past 5 years, only two GMD flight intercept tests have

been successful. Yet, the MDA must conduct another—about 20 different flight intercept tests before it might be prepared for realistic

operational testing. At that rate, it could take the Missile Defense

Agency 50 years to be ready for realistic operational testing. Developmental tests are still needed to show that the system can work

at night, in bad weather, when the sun is shining in the wrong direction, when the enemy re-entry vehicle uses stealth, when more

than one missile is launched by an enemy, and so forth. The fiscal year 2009 President’s budget asks for over $12 billion

for DOD spending on missile defense. And, over the next 5 years,

that budget request calls for $62.5 billion to be spent on missiles.

If the Congress supports this, by the end of 2013, 5 years from

now, over $110 billion will have been spent since 2003, not counting prior spending in the previous decades.

Since there are no operational criteria established for the system,

the Pentagon doesn’t know what the eventual costs might be. The

costs are open-ended, and there is no end in sight.

Too often the White House, the Pentagon or the MDA makes

statements that could mislead the Congress and the media. My

prepared statement gives a few examples.

Major elements of the U.S. missile defense system are vulnerable

to direct attack. For example, the floating sea-based X-band radar

is literally a sitting duck. So, also, are the early warning radars in

Greenland and in England, as would be the radar proposed to be

sited in the Czech Republic.

The Pentagon does not explain it, but we need to remember that

if we ever need to rely on missile defenses against ICBMs, it would

be in an all-out nuclear war, mushroom clouds and all. The Congress could examine whether missile defenses could be depended

upon under those circumstances.

Diplomacy has been our most effective missile defense. In my full

statement, I describe how in 1999 Dr. William Perry and now more

recently Ambassador Christopher Hill have shown that effective diplomacy is hard to beat. The U.S. proposal to site missile defenses

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in Poland and the Czech Republic has alienated Russia and upset

the overall strategic balance to a degree not seen since the height

of the cold war, but for no good purpose. The proposed U.S. system

has no demonstrated operational effectiveness to defend Europe nor

the United States.

Americans have a tendency to over-rely on technology as the first

best hope to solve our problems. With missile defense, the United

States has been trying for 60 years without success. Other approaches are needed.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coyle follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

I want to thank all four of our witnesses for their testimony and

commend their written testimony in full to the members of the

committee, because you got to synopsize most of it, some of you all

of it, but I think all of it as written is very worth reviewing.

We are going to proceed to questions and answers and try to do

5-minute rounds, but, again, we are going to be a little bit over the

time on that if we need be.

Mr. Lynch, if you are prepared, I am pleased to let you go first.

I know there are some other votes. I will let you and Mr. Franks

go first, and I will just stay through the votes.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I want

to thank you for holding the hearing, and the ranking member as

well.

And I want to thank our panelists for sharing their perspective

on this.

It just so happens this weekend, after visiting Iraq, I had a

chance to stop in Brussels and talk to the NATO folks, and this

issue came up. Let me just say that I came away from my meeting

with our Ambassador and also other folks at NATO with the sense

that this was going ahead, that this process of locating missile defense units in Czechoslovakia and Poland was going forward.

And while I spoke on behalf of this committee to say that we had

great reservations and that we were not on the same page with

that idea from the administration, it is alarming that at least there

are some in the administration who are just proceeding full speed

ahead with this.

I would like to ask you, Mr. Coyle—I thought your testimony was

very helpful. All of the testimony was helpful. But the testing protocols that have been used in the past, I notice that you noted that

since 2000 there have been 13 tests, and 6 were not—well, basically, 6 were failures; 7 were successful. But, more alarmingly,

since 2003, the more recent tests, five tests since then, only two

have succeeded, and three have not. And, yet, here we are, going

forward with a program that could be hundreds of billions of dollars. And, as you have noted in all the testimony, there seem to be

valid countermeasures that would make this expenditure a nullity.

What would you see as being—if we were going forward with trying to vet this system, what would the next step be for us, for the

members of this committee? If we wanted to get a sense of the

workability of this system, what would be the next step, based on

your own assumptions? Not the assumptions of the administration,

but your own assumptions.

Mr. COYLE. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.

The Congress has required in, I believe, the Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Authorization Bill, the Congress has required the Pentagon,

through its Director of Operational Tests and Evaluation, to provide a report as to whether or not the proposed missile defense system for Europe that you mentioned at the beginning of your question would work, would be effective with high reliability under realistic conditions. They required a report, would it work or would it

not work with high reliability under realistic conditions.

I think NATO would be smart, and for that matter so would Poland and the Czech Republic, to require exactly what the U.S. ConVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:41 May 07, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\48660.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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gress has asked for, is to show me—you know, I am from Missouri—show me whether this system would work with higher reliability. I think that same approach could work for the program

that is being conducted here in the United States.

Basically, what we have with the GMD program and with several

other missile defense programs is a procurement program

masquerading as an R&D program. It is an R&D part of the budget, which is fine; that is where it belongs, it is still an R&D program. But we are buying massive amounts of gear, of equipment,

and deploying it all over the world without knowing how effective

is.

I think the Congress could basically apply the same standard

that it has already applied to the proposed systems in Europe to

work that is ongoing by the United States.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Franks, you are recognized for 5 minutes or more.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first say, sir, I just want to express sincere gratitude that

you would allow me to speak here. It is not something that you

have to do. To the entire committee and the staff, this is a courtesy, and I fully realize that and truly appreciate it.

As it happens, I am a member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee, and this issue has

been one of great interest to us and one that we have tried to work

in bipartisan fashion on the committee. In fact, Mrs. Tauscher is

holding oversight hearings tomorrow.

So let me just begin by saying I wish that we did not have intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles in this world. I wish they did

not exist. But since man first took up arms against himself or his

fellow human beings, there has also been offensive weapons, and

the effort has been to build a defensive response to those. And, unfortunately, that matrix continues forward.

And when it comes to intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads on them, I believe that it is vital that we have the

best defense that we can devise, even if it is not perfect, given the

fact that if one lands in one of our major cities, 100,000 people will

die in a blinding moment, and 400,000 or 500,000 more will die

within a week or two or three.

So, it occurs to me that even though many things that the panelists have said as far as the system being imperfect are correct, it

does remain that we need the best defense that we can. The threat

does exist. And I would certainly be open to any better answers.

But as of December 31, 2007, we have begun to do some things

that are pretty significant. We have fielded 21 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, AK, and three more to Vandenberg, and we

are now able to provide a limited defense against a threat from

North Korea. We have also upgraded 10 of our Aegis ships for ballistic missile defense capability, and we have armed them with 21

SM–3 interceptors to devise a defense against short-, medium- and

intermediate-ranged missiles. Seven more destroyers have also

been put in place for long-range surveillance and tracking ability.

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It is important to note that 26 of the last 27 flight tests for missile defense have been successful, 26 of the last 27. There were

those that, some years ago, when it seemed that the only possible

hope that we would have would be mutually assured destruction,

said we would never hit a bullet with a bullet in the sky. That is

not true any longer. We can hit a dot on a bullet with a bullet in

the sky these days. And it is a significant thing.

Two things have changed since this debate first began. First, we

now know that missile defense is possible. It is not perfect, but it

is certainly possible. We also have seen Jihadist terrorism come up

on the scene, who cannot be deterred by the threat of response and

who—some of their leaders call Armageddon a good thing.

These are situations that we need to consider.

Related to countermeasures, I can only assure you my community hears of these issues all the time, and our people are at work,

and I believe progress will be made. And I believe it is always bad

to bet against the innovation of the American people.

Mr. Coyle mentioned that to hit these missiles is like hitting a

hole in one when the hole is moving at 17,000 miles an hour, and

he is precisely correct. But that is also precisely what we did with

a satellite coming in at 17,000 miles an hour in a situation where

we could never have orchestrated such a scenario. We didn’t just

hit the satellite. We had to hit the center force of the satellite with

the hydrazine tank, and we did that. We did that from a ship floating in the ocean in the Pacific, you know, and the target was 250

kilometers away in space. This is an amazing, amazing accomplishment. Again, it is not perfect, but we have made some tremendous

progress.

I am reminded that two airplanes hitting two buildings in New

York cost this economy nearly $2 trillion, and I don’t even know

how to begin to estimate what one ballistic missile from Iran hitting New York with a 100-kiloton warhead on it would do to our

economy and to our concept of freedom. I can only suggest to you

that it would be very profound.

And I know there may be a day when people will look at us and

say you built a system that we didn’t need, it was expensive, it cost

hundreds of billions of dollars; and we may have to apologize to the

American people for doing that. And, Mr. Chairman, I would be

glad to come back to this committee and stand in any line and

gratefully and humbly apologize to the American people for building such a system that we did not need.

But in the world that we live in, I fear that Iran and other countries, terrorist groups, may be able to come up with something that

again would change our concept of freedom forever; and I don’t

want to be one to have to apologize to people that have survived

such a tragedy and say to them we failed to build a system when

we could have.

And, again, I can’t express enough gratitude to all of you for allowing me to speak. You are erudite people on the committee here

and on the panel. I appreciate their perspectives. I hope that we

can work together to turn mutually assured destruction into mutually assured survival. I hope we can work together to save and protect our citizens against potential nuclear missiles, rather than to

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avenge them if such a tragedy occurs. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to talk.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Franks. I appreciate you joining

us, and I appreciate your comments.

I don’t know where to start here. There is a little bit of ground

to cover.

Let me start by asking whether or not it is realistic in the view

of any of the people on the panel here that Iran or North Korea

had they—if they had in any foreseeable or reasonable amount of

time the capacity to send a nuclear ICBM to the United States, is

it foreseeable by any of you that they would be crazy enough to do

that, given the fact that their sending one over has a return address, as Mr. Coyle said? Are you aware of any nation right now

that would take that risk?

We will just go right across the board. Ms. Gronlund.

Ms. GRONLUND. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Garwin.

Mr. GARWIN. I think that Iran and North Korea are both

deterrable. That doesn’t mean that we should encourage them to

build nuclear weapons and delivery means. But I emphasize that

the problem is not apologizing for a system that works. It is apologizing for ignoring the fact that the system that we build will not

work because it ignores—specifically ignores the real threat that

the short-range missiles that these countries have long possessed

can be equipped with nuclear weapons or biological weapons far

more readily and can attack the United States. So if not deterrable,

then the countries would choose that rather than the ICBM approach.

And you don’t need to know much about the defense in order to

realize that a warhead enclosed in a large balloon is proof against

the hit-to-kill interceptor because it doesn’t know where in that

balloon the warhead is.

So if MDA will only realize that and acknowledge it, then they

might begin to propose fielding multiple warheads, multiple interceptors against each offensive missile in order to sequentially deal

with the countermeasures. But if they don’t admit it, then they will

lead us down the road of false security, of fake cures for the illness,

which is where we are.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Kueter.

Mr. KUETER. I believe we need to be concerned about leaders in

North Korea and Iran threatening the use of these missiles.

Mr. TIERNEY. No, my question was, do you personally want to

say on the stand here you believe either one of those countries

would send over a single missile and—just send it over?

Mr. KUETER. I believe they might.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is interesting to know. Thank you.

Mr. Coyle.

Mr. COYLE. I was in Europe a couple of months ago. And talking

with people in Europe, they were quite surprised about the missile

defenses that are being proposed by the United States for Europe,

because they don’t see that Iran has any reason to attack them.

North Korea is too far away, and they don’t see any reason why

Iran would attack them. And I agree with that.

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Does that mean that Europe should, you know, be careless about

future threats? Of course not. But people that I talked with in Europe just didn’t understand why they would be the threat.

Mr. Franks spoke about terrorism, and I think that is something

that we should be concerned about. But, of course, missile defense

is useless against terrorism. It doesn’t work against terrorism. So

as much as we might worry about terrorism and want to do some

things about it, missile defense is not the solution.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

And I might just note I think it is also unrealistic to think a

group of people involved in acts of terror are going to acquire missile technology, have a place to house it, put it together, and be

able to send it over again.

I wish Mr. Franks had stayed to hear some of the conversation

back and forth. I think it might have been helpful, useful.

Mr. Franks did say he thought 26 of the 27 flight tests were successful. Doctor Gronlund, you want to address that for us? I don’t

have that recollection, and my statistics don’t match up.

Ms. GRONLUND. I do. I think there is confusion about short-range

missile defenses and long-range missile defenses, and the number

he cited must include a lot of tests of short-range missile defenses.

The fundamental difference between the two is long-range missiles

spend a lot of time outside the atmosphere, where there is no air

and, therefore, no air resistance. And because of that it is very easy

to deploy decoys, because they will travel on the same trajectory

through space. So it becomes very hard to distinguish one object

from another.

That is not true for short-range missiles. They don’t spend a lot

of time in the atmosphere. There are different kinds of countermeasures, but it is not on the same scale.

And so you see that the Army itself has chosen to pay for some

Patriot batteries; and, you know, they obviously have decided that

this is something they want to spend their money on. That is not

the case with mid-course defense against long-range missiles.

The other key difference is that the only long-range missiles deployed in the world are tipped or have nuclear weapons. So you get

into this inherent problem that countries we are seeking to deter,

who are seeking to deter us, and that would be only Russia and

China, find missile defenses inherently destabilizing. That is not

true for short-range missiles, which are generally armed with conventional warheads.

So I think, you know, citing 26 out of 27 is a deliberate muddling

of these two very different technologies; and just because we know

we can get short-range missile defense to work some fraction of the

time has nothing to say about long-range missile defenses and their

effectiveness. Neither does shooting down our satellite.

Mr. TIERNEY. I wanted to cover that. Dr. Garwin, you might address that.

You mentioned in your remarks hitting that satellite was a bit

like hitting a duck sitting on a pond. Mr. Franks and others, I

should say, have made a big deal about that and somehow tried to

loop it into some association with our missile defense and the midground-based prospect we have here. Can you clarify that for people?

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Mr. GARWIN. Well, I point out that on January 11, 2007, China

destroyed one of their satellites in the same way. So they did it

first. They did it with the same hit-to-kill approach. Not so hard

with a satellite, because it is highly visible, highly predictable. And

in fact for many decades I have published proposals to show that

space-based defenses really are infeasible because they can be

countered by low-tech means, just as China did by lofting SCUD

missiles, available by the hundreds or thousands, with a ton of

gravel to orbital altitude and detonating there so that the satellite

destroys itself by running into the gravel. So very different from

striking in mid-course a warhead that does not want to be destroyed.

And you don’t need to know much about the defense. If the defense takes seconds to understand the rotational characteristics of

the decoys and the warhead, well, all you need to do is to arrange

a ‘‘Sally Rand,’’ a dance of balloons, little balloons so that you have

an ever-changing aspect; and there is nothing that you can count

on. It has never been seen before. It will be the first time you see

it. And everything could be a warhead. Everything could be a

decoy.

In the earlier go-round on missile defense Don Brennan, a very

capable political scientist, argued that our allies in Europe demanded missile defense. They were unhappy with protection by

means of deterrence against the undeterable Soviet threat.

And then he spent a couple of weeks in Europe actually gauging

the sentiment of the leaders and the legislators there, and he came

back very chastened. In fact, our allies were quite satisfied with deterrence; and they didn’t need and found missile defense to be potentially provocative.

So you must remember that President Nixon negotiated the ABM

Treaty of 1972, which denied us any capability of defending the

U.S. population against attack by the Soviet Union. And that was

in part because of the massive capability that the Soviet Union possessed, but it was in part because of the recognition that we would

be unable to defend against—with mid-course intercept—to defend

against even a small number of weapons. And that would be even

with the nuclear-armed interceptors that were available then and

that we fielded in small numbers, a hundred interceptor limit

under the 1972 ABM Treaty.

So you really must address the lack of capacity of the existing

system and the fact that ingenuity goes both ways. We are not

working against mother nature. Ingenious as she is, she doesn’t see

what we are doing and deploys more systems, more capabilities

against it.

The other side is ingenious, too. Technology develops on both

sides, and the defense has a much more difficult row to hoe than

the offense under these circumstances of intercept in space.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I guess that would sort of go to the fact of

Mr. Coyle’s—I think it was one of Paul Nitze’s criteria for this back

in the Reagan years, that you have to have the cost-effectiveness

on the margin. It would be less costly to increase your defenses

than it would be for them to increase their offenses. And that

doesn’t seem to be the case here.

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Mr. Kueter, let me ask you—and I don’t want you to think I am

attacking you in any way here—but you are not a physicist, are

you?

Mr. KUETER. That is correct. I am not.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you have a science background? I look at your

degrees or whatever, and I didn’t——

Mr. KUETER. No, sir, I do not have an academic science background.

Mr. TIERNEY. Given you are surrounded by physicists here, people that are pretty well steeped in that order, what do you say

when they say what they are saying about the decoys? And what

basis do you have for your conclusion that may differ from theirs?

Mr. KUETER. Well, sir, I have talked to the people that are working on the program. I have talked to other physicists that have

studied the program. They have assured me to the level that I am

willing to come and sit before you today and say under oath that

I believe this system is working.

The problem of trying to discriminate countermeasures is very

hard, that it has some of the finest people in the world working on

developing and studying what the countermeasures that might be

deployed against it and devising ways to overcome it, that we have

sophisticated algorithms and discrimination capabilities designed

to do exactly the job that these gentlemen are describing that the

system needs to do, that they have tested it in ground simulations

numerous times over the past 6 or 7 years, and that in the year

to come we will see the system do what it is designed to do, namely, discriminate against countermeasures in a flight test.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is fine. I would just tell you I have sat

through classified and unclassified sessions. I have sat through

these same types of assurances for 12 years that have never really

come to fruition on that, and that is why I was curious as to what

you were basing it on. I was hoping you weren’t going to say you

were basing it on the same people that have been giving us this

line for a dozen years, but it appears to be the case.

Mr. Coyle, you are fairly knowledge about the classified and unclassified aspects of this. Do you have great confidence that the

issue of decoys is going to be resolved anytime soon?

Mr. COYLE. It is really a tough, tough problem. You know, it is

hard to get a scientist to say that anything is impossible, but it is

a really difficult problem. We know how to make balloons in the

shape of Mickey Mouse ears, so I am sure that North Korea or Iran

can make a balloon in the shape of an ice cream cone, big ice cream

cone, which is what a reentry vehicle looks like.

Out in space, that balloon travels just as fast as the reentry vehicle. Out in space, a feather and a lead brick travel just as fast as

each other, and so you can’t tell them apart easily. If you could

somehow magically be transported out into space and could weigh

them or touch them, you could tell them apart easily. But very difficult to do that with sensors on a kill vehicle. Just really tough

job. And so, no, I don’t see that coming to pass.

And that was the whole point of IFT–1A that Dr. Gronlund referred to in her testimony. That test took place when I was in the

Pentagon. I oversaw that test, and it was a kind of test that at the

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posed to be many more tests, because we knew how difficult this

problem would be of discriminating between similar-looking objects.

Unfortunately, the results of IFT–1A got misrepresented, and there

haven’t been other IFT–1As since. So the Pentagon really doesn’t

have information such as they would have possibly gotten if there

would have been a testing program with many complex target sets

to look at.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I mean, I was looking at Theodore Postal—I think most people

on the panel, if not all the people, are aware of Theodore Postal out

of MIT wrote a recent op-ed piece in the Boston Globe, April 15,

2008. In it he said, in June 1997 and January 1998, the Missile

Defense Agency conducted two proof-of-concept missile defense

tests aimed at demonstrating that missile defense kill vehicles

could tell the difference between warheads and decoys. The tests

were simply aimed at determining if the objects could be observed

with enough precision to match what was expected to what was observed. One of the flight tests took no usable data, and the other

could not have succeeded because certain decoys accurately mimicked the appearance of the warhead.

I—meaning Ted Postal—believe the Missile Defense Agency

made false statements to Congress that the tests were a success,

and it modified all of its followup flight tests so that they could

never encounter the simple and effective decoys used in the earlier

proof-of-concept tests.

Do you members of the panel agree with that assessment. Ms.

Gronlund.

Ms. GRONLUND. I am sorry. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. TIERNEY. You want me to repeat the question. Did you hear

any part of what I read?

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes, I did. Just the last clause.

Mr. TIERNEY. The last clause of Mr. Postal’s or the last clause

of mine?

Ms. GRONLUND. Well, back to where I asked you to repeat. Just

repeat the——

Mr. TIERNEY. The last part was whether or not you agree with

that assessment, Mr. Postal’s assessment.

Ms. GRONLUND. I do. In fact, that is why I raised the issue of

the IFT–1A test. And I do want to note that I think it was IFT–

1B that actually did take some data.

But the underlying assumption was that so you had an array of

objects that had a different infrared signature so that they were—

they did appear to be different to the kill vehicle, and the kill vehicle had been told in advance what the warhead would look like.

And that’s not something you would know. So, again, even at that

level, which was a proof-of-concept test, it wasn’t realistic.

Mr. TIERNEY. And have they then decreased the complexity of

the tests?

Ms. GRONLUND. They have. In fact, there is a very interesting

table of the planned test program that goes back to that period of

time where they did plan to introduce decoys of various types, and

it hasn’t happened. It’s gone. That whole schedule has—you know,

it has disappeared.

100

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Garwin, do you agree with Mr. Postal’s assessment as well?

Mr. GARWIN. Yes, I agree. I don’t necessarily agree that the MDA

misrepresented to Congress. I think that the people who spoke to

Congress may not have understood. They may, like Mr. Kueter,

have talked with people who assured them that it was OK. But

they ought to go back and look at the primary data and do it in

an adversarial context so that Dr. Postal and the authorities in

MDA have a chance to present and to confront one another with

their analyses. That is how you come to truth in the scientific field.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Kueter, do you agree with Mr. Postal’s assessment?

Mr. KUETER. No, I do not; and I would encourage those that are

interested in this topic to ask General Obering and his associates

when they appear before you about the ground simulation tests

that this kill vehicle has undergone over the last several years at

the Adak facility. I think you will learn quite a bit about the capability of this kill vehicle against a countermeasure program.

Mr. TIERNEY. You are talking about the capability of the kill vehicle. You are not talking about real tests. You are talking about

simulations, right?

Mr. KUETER. Well, the decision was made at some point in time

to flight test the system to make sure that it would work. You have

to remember that it ran into significant problems with its booster,

as well as quality control issues that precluded the kill vehicle from

separating from the interceptor. It was important to make sure

that we could get it to work before we started dealing with the

problem of complex countermeasures. That is why I believe there

are delays in the GMD testing program and why we have not as

many flight tests as we all would have liked by this point in time.

The September test certainly indicates that we have resolved those

booster and quality control problems, and now we are ready to test

it in flight against this issue of countermeasures.

The other point that I would make that is different from the first

series of flight tests is that we now have much more robust sensor

capabilities that allow us to have overlapping fields of vision in

space that will help this discrimination and detection capability, in

addition to the expansion of the algorithm capability over the last

6 or 7 years.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Coyle, do you agree with Mr. Postal’s assessment here?

Mr. COYLE. Yes, I do. I can’t emphasize strongly enough that the

test IFT–1A is the kind of thing that was originally going to be

done, you know, several times, many times so that you could really

see what you could do with these infrared sensors. But the Missile

Defense Agency has known almost from the outset that they

weren’t going to be able to do it with only infrared sensors, that

it was going to take a variety of different kinds of sensors, and

even then it might not work.

So, for example, one of the things that the Missile Defense Agency has talked about over the years is adding to the kill vehicle, in

addition to the infrared sensors, two colors of infrared that it currently has, adding to the kill vehicle a radar sensor, some type of

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ble sensors in the visible wavelengths and other types of sensors.

And the idea is if we can just get enough different kind of sensors,

you know, maybe we can tell. If we get enough information on

those targets maybe we can sort through them and figure out

which is which and which is the real reentry vehicle.

But it is kind of like the old story about, you know, the two guys

in prison. And one guy says, you know, I am really sick of being

in prison now. I am going to offer to the king to teach his horse

to speak. You know, and the other prisoner says, well, teach the

horse to speak? How are you going to do that? And the first prisoner says, well, you know, the king could die, the horse could die,

or what the heck, maybe I can teach the horse to speak.

When you talk about, well, if I just get more sensors on the kill

vehicle and, you know, if I do enough different things maybe I will

finally be able to figure it out, it is a little bit like trying to teach

the horse to speak.

Mr. TIERNEY. What about what Mr. Kueter says about all these

simulator tests and all this? How does that play in?

Mr. COYLE. Well, the simulations are a fine thing to do. They are

an important thing to do. But as the Director of Operational Testing in the Pentagon today has written, those simulations haven’t

worked out so far.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now even if they did work, there is a difference,

is there not, between a simulation and actually using the actual

kill vehicle and putting it through some sort of realistic operational

type of test?

Mr. COYLE. Absolutely. That is why we do flight intercept tests.

You know, simulations are great, but time and again you see when

you get into realistic conditions that the simulation didn’t really

capture the real world, and you get quite different results. Many

failures are simply because the simulations didn’t capture what

really happens in the real world.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me ask the witnesses, you know, how many

tests would we have to run successfully before we really had confidence in the system? You know, if we run and test some aspect

of this system and it works once, should we just move onto the next

point or is there some standard that we are trying to reach here

where we think it ought to operate successfully so many times in

a row before we move to the next point? Dr. Garwin.

Mr. GARWIN. We put a lot of effort into this year 2000 report

available on the Web, ‘‘Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of

the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned U.S. National Missile

Defense System,’’ and the countermeasures that we discuss there

are intentionally those that require very little knowledge of the defensive system.

So if we know that it depends on infrared sensors, we have countermeasures that will entirely defeat the system by having not all

of the decoys look the same, having a spectrum, a variation of appearances of the decoys which overlap the spectrum of variation of

the warheads; and these would never be tested in such a way that

the United States would have good measurements of them. Mostly,

they would do ground simulations on their side. And it is a lot easier on the offense to do ground simulations because you don’t have

to take the defense into account.

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And that is where perhaps BMD learned that it was really possible to have bomblets for bioweapons with individual heat shields,

and so they have taken those things off the threat that they are

promising to protect against, and they should now confront the fact

that they have no discrimination against these balloons. And if

they admit that, then they might have active discrimination. But

they won’t ever get active discrimination which has a prospect of

working unless they admit that their system will not work——

Mr. TIERNEY. What is ‘‘active discrimination?’’

Mr. GARWIN. Active discrimination means they would take a considerable fraction of their interceptors and arm them with gas

clouds, essentially, that would push on the light-weight balloons.

And they would also push on the reentry vehicles, but they

wouldn’t move so much. And so you can in principle have a means

of discrimination in that way. But you will never get it unless they

admit that their system, as configured now, will not work.

Mr. TIERNEY. What if they use some other type of decoy other

than the one that the gas would have an impact on?

Mr. GARWIN. Well, it is not so hard to see in the budget that we

have active discrimination. And then the other side would start to

think about it, and there are means for countering that.

And you can read about it in some of my papers. A lot of these

things have been worked out long ago when the Strategic Defense

Initiative was first proposed and the problem was to discriminate

against the lasers, space-based lasers, which of course themselves

are vulnerable. But even if they were invulnerable they could be

defeated in this way, by having a very large number of decoys for

the fleeting threat of ballistic missiles.

Satellites can’t have decoys, because they must do their job. They

are up there for a very long time. So that is another reason why

it is a lot easier to do the anti-satellite demonstration than it is to

do a demonstration against a properly configured ballistic missile

threat.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Just another aspect of that. It would seem to me that there are

a lot of moving parts of this. We had some testimony a couple

weeks ago on how complex this is. So as to each component of this,

you know, whether it is the kill vehicle or some other component,

how many times should that be tested? Not in a simulation, because I think that is one part of it, but it doesn’t tell us how it really works or whatever. How many times should each aspect of that

be tested before we are comfortable that, if we really need it, it is

going to work?

Ms. GRONLUND. It depends on how comfortable you want to be.

And the more——

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to be 100 percent comfortable.

Ms. GRONLUND. You can’t. There is no way to be 100 percent

comfortable.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK.

Ms. GRONLUND. It is a little bit like flipping a coin and trying

to determine whether or not the coin is loaded. So you flip it three

times, and it comes up heads three times. Do you say, I am 100

percent confident that this is loaded heads? No. You know, there

are odds of that happening.

103

So you need to—I mean, if you look at how many tests the

United States does of its missiles, nuclear armed missiles, to be

sure that they are accurate, it is close to a hundred per missile.

And a missile is simple. All it has to do is, you know, launch, separate the stages, and boom. It is nothing compared to a missile defense system where it has to react to data coming in. So I mean

to really do an honest testing program, hundreds of tests, all the

different conditions that could apply, different kinds of countermeasures, you know, different angles of attack, etc.

Mr. TIERNEY. Nighttime?

Ms. GRONLUND. Yeah.

Mr. TIERNEY. Angles of the sun?

Ms. GRONLUND. Exactly.

Mr. TIERNEY. Shards?

Ms. GRONLUND. Yeah, right.

But I want to return, if I may, to the issue of, I guess, really

going back to sort of the fundamental issue of could we—could this

work in principle, which is what we tried to address in this countermeasures assessment. So it basically—all you need to know,

what you need to know about a system is what sensors does it

have? Because that is the only means that the system has to judge

the difference between object A and object B and figure out if one

of them is the warhead and the other one isn’t.

Mr. TIERNEY. And that is assuming everything else is working.

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes, absolutely. So this is the best-case analysis

for the missile defense, which is exactly what we did there. It turns

out that at that time the United States was planning to have a

space-based infrared system as well, so there would have been

more sensors.

But it doesn’t matter if in fact, as Dr. Garwin suggested, you

have a lot of objects, that none of them look alike. They have different infrared signatures. They have different radar signatures.

Namely, if a radar looks at them, they are all a little different. If

an infrared looks at them, they are all at different temperature.

It is a little bit—I am sure either Dr. Coyle or Dr. Garwin have

used this analogy. It is a little bit like going to pick up your suitcase at the airport and, you know, there is yellow and there is red,

and—actually, mainly there is black, but just assume—and you can

sure as heck tell the difference between the red and the green one

and the black one and the blue one. But you have no idea which

one has the warhead. So you can discriminate, but it doesn’t do you

any good.

So if you can do that analysis from the get-go, you know, you

could basically now proceed. However, if they insist they can do it,

then they should demonstrate it through testing. I mean, nothing

can be so important that we are willing to field a system that we

have no evidence works. I mean, nothing else that we field follows

those rules.

Mr. TIERNEY. So if I could ask all of you this, so if we had a system that we could test, how many tests would we run before we

are satisfied we are ready to deploy this?

Mr. COYLE. Well, when I was in the Pentagon, there were 25 or

30 tests that were laid out that were going to have to be done. And,

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onstrate at least once in one of those tests, not hundreds of times,

but just once each of the critical issues that you were concerned

about.

Mr. TIERNEY. How many critical issues would you estimate there

are?

Mr. COYLE. Well, about the same number.

Mr. TIERNEY. 25,000?

Mr. COYLE. 25,000 or 30,000. For example—so that is why in my

full statement I said, you know, we need to do a test at night. OK.

Probably be nice if you could do several tests at night. But you

would want to do at least one where you saw that the system could

work at night.

In the early tests that have been referred to already in this hearing, the early tests that were done in the program, the sun was basically shining over the shoulder of the interceptor, of the kill vehicle. And in my old age I am very much aware that I can read a

newspaper a lot easier when the sun is shining over my shoulder,

lighting up the target, the thing I am trying to read, than when

the sun is in my eyes. So all of those early tests, some of which

failed, some of which were successful, the sun was lighting up the

target, so to speak, so that the interceptor could see it.

Well, you would like to do a test at night where the sun wasn’t

there. How well do you read the newspaper at night? You would

like to do a test where the sun is in your eyes. Can you read the

newspaper when the sun is in your eyes? Well, when you go

through and you make a list, it is not hard to come up with a couple dozen or more tests where, if you only did each thing once and

showed that you at least were able to do it once, you wouldn’t need

that many tests.

But the problem is they have to be successful. You can’t just try

it once. You have to succeed. So if you fail the first time or the second time, as has been the case in some of these instances, then you

have to repeat them until you finally succeed.

And looking at the last 5 years in particular, the success rate has

been so poor, just two successes in the last 5 years, that if you had

20 or 30 tests to do at that rate where it took you 5 years to get

two successes, it could take you 50 years before you could get

through 20 or so tests. And I think by then the Congress probably

would have lost patience.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am not sure of that. If we lost patience, you

would think we would have lost it a long time ago, given the track

record of this thing.

You know, I am sure that the Pentagon is going to come in here,

the MDA is going to come in here and tell us, oh, we can discriminate now. I think—Mr. Kueter, I thought you said that at some

point in time, you know, everything is going well. We really came

a long way. We can discriminate it. Do any of the other witnesses

believe that? Dr. Gronlund.

Ms. GRONLUND. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Garwin.

Mr. GARWIN. I think I pointed out in my testimony that they

ought to refer to a technical paper, even a classified technical

paper, with analyses signed by human beings so that you could

subject it to the usual tests. And if we hear only that somebody

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says we can discriminate, well, it reminds me of the discussions

that we had in the SDI era. I had many technical discussions with

people like Greg Canavan, and it turns out that there are lots to

be learned by such interchanges, not only by the people who are

participating in the interchange but by onlookers who can then understand where the reality lays. So you learn a lot by doing that

you miss by not having this technical interchange.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Coyle.

Mr. COYLE. I agree completely. Part of the problem is that the

Congress does not have the access to the information that would

allow it to do, you know, a good job of oversight. If you don’t have

the information and the Pentagon just says trust me, you can’t

really do oversight.

Mr. TIERNEY. I just note for the record that somebody—Mr.

Coyle, I think you may recall. I don’t know about Dr. Gronlund.

You may, also. Earlier this decade, we had some hearings on this;

and there were 50 different items that were not mature for this

2004 deployment. And when we had the hearings and we asked for

a report from the Government Accountability Office, when the report was put on my desk, it was unclassified. I can tell you it is

very unlikely it would have been unclassified if it was good news

for the MDA on that. And we tried to get that declassified. We got

somewhat of a declassified version, but they also went back and

classified some matters supposedly retroactively on this. They have

not been particularly transparent on this, have not been particularly forthcoming on what was going on.

There was a mention made of a September test, a big deal on

this. And I think it might have been General Obering and somebody at the MDA was running around Europe telling everybody

about the September test. Are you all familiar with——

Mr. COYLE. I think a recent test.

Mr. TIERNEY. Recent test.

Mr. COYLE. Yes, there was a test on September 28, 2007 which

was successful. It was a successful flight intercept test that hit the

target. But it didn’t have any decoys or countermeasures on it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Similar to hitting the satellite.

Mr. COYLE. The satellite, also.

Mr. TIERNEY. Were those similar or were they totally different?

Mr. COYLE. Totally separate. This was not the satellite test. This

was a flight intercept test of the GMD program, 1 of the 13 they

have done so far.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is the one where they are seven and six? Thirteen tests?

Mr. COYLE. No, it just happens to be the most recent. The one

that was on September 28, 2007, is the most recent GMD flight

intercept test. There hasn’t been one since then.

Mr. TIERNEY. How many have been there total?

Mr. COYLE. There have been 13 altogether.

Mr. TIERNEY. What is the record?

Mr. COYLE. Seven of those were successful; six were unsuccessful. So that is a little better than 50 percent. But in the last 5

years the success rate has only been 40 percent. They have had two

successes with five tries in the last 5 years.

Mr. TIERNEY. One of which was in September?

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Mr. COYLE. Including the one September 28th of last year, which

was a successful test, but it didn’t include any decoys and countermeasures. So it was actually a simpler test, an easier test for it to

be successful from a target discrimination point of view, because it

didn’t have even simple balloons on it, as some of the very early

tests did.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, with a record of seven successes and six failures on that aspect of this system, does it give you great confidence, Dr. Gronlund?

Ms. GRONLUND. No, it gives you no confidence. And I do want to

point out that these tests are developmental in nature. They are

not operational.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can you describe the difference for us?

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes. Meaning that they are still trying to work

out the basic technology. This is part of a, basically, a research program. These are not realistic situations where the crew has no

warning, where everything proceeds as it would if there were an

actual attack.

As far as we can tell, and I think Dr. Coyle discusses this in his

testimony, in the real world the interceptor would have to change

its course as it got information from the radars while it was flying.

And we don’t believe that has happened yet, that it is told where

to go. So that is what I mean.

And that is perfectly fine if you are developing something new.

If you are developing a new car, you don’t take it out on the freeway. But if you are trying to figure out if it is going to work at

high speeds, you don’t take it out on the freeway either, but you

do test it. And so there were not anywhere close to that kind of

operational testing.

Mr. TIERNEY. And notwithstanding that we are building these

things like they are going out of style here.

Ms. GRONLUND. Exactly. And that’s—you know, the fly beforeyou-buy legislation was designed to explicitly avoid this kind of situation where you end up with junk.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Coyle, wasn’t that your job at some point in

time, to make sure we didn’t fly before we buy?

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. And at one point in time did this program come

under that legislation?

Mr. COYLE. It did. The early tests that we have been referring

to, some of those were on my watch.

Mr. TIERNEY. And at some point Congress in its wisdom allowed

this program to escape that statute? Is that accurate?

Mr. COYLE. I think you could say that, you know, from a historical point of view a couple of things changed this. The first was the

Rumsfeld report, which I think was 1998, if my memory serves me,

which talked about the threat, you know, which emphasized the

threat requiring missile defenses. And then the law that Mr. Shays

referred to earlier that said—where the Congress said you must deploy these things as soon as it is feasible. That 1999 law I think

also changed the situation, because now the Pentagon was under

pressure to deploy hardware, not to show that it was effective.

Mr. TIERNEY. You know what I want to go back to, because I

made a note when Mr. Shays was making that reference. He said

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the 1999 policy voted that we would deploy an effective system.

Anybody here believe the system is effective? Other than Mr.

Kueter. I assume you do? Any other scientist on the board think

it is effective?

Mr. GARWIN. I want to comment on that. Because the requirement—and I think Mr. Shays understands that—is to deploy an effective system.

Mr. TIERNEY. Capable of defending us.

Mr. GARWIN. Yes, capable of defending the United States against

missile attack.

Now I was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission to evaluate

the ballistic missile threat to the United States; and on page 51 of

this Countermeasures volume we quote. We say, Rumsfeld Commission report stated, ‘‘all of the nations whose programs we examined that are developing long-range ballistic missiles have the option to arm these, as well as their shorter-range systems, with biological or chemical weapons. These weapons can take the form of

bomblets as well as a single large warhead.’’

So to the extent that you believe that there is a threat from people who might use bioweapons, we are not deploying a system that

has any capability against bioweapon-armed ICBMs and certainly

no capability against nuclear or bioweapon-armed shorter-range

missiles which could attack U.S. cities from ships. So we do not

have an effective missile defense.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do any of the other—and I know we have been

talking exclusively about the mid-range here, but do any of the

other aspects of this overall program, would they address the problem? You are talking about ships offshore sending in bio or nuclear.

Mr. GARWIN. No, we have no program in MDA to address that.

Sometimes people admit we have no program and we have to get

at that after we do the ICBM defense. But that is the problem. We

spend so much money on the ICBM defense, which is doomed to

failure, that things that might succeed, like boost phase intercept

of inter-continental ballistic missiles or a perimeter defense against

cruise missiles, gets short shrift. They are not discussed at all.

Mr. TIERNEY. You want to say something, Mr. Kueter?

Mr. KUETER. Yes, I want to completely agree with Dr. Garwin’s

assessment of the need for boost-phase defense as well as investments in cruise defense. Those are critical priorities that I would

commend to your attention.

I would remind you that the Congress did appropriate a small

amount of money to begin work on cruise missile defense last year,

and that would be something to continue to scrutinize as we go forward.

Mr. TIERNEY. I intend to. I intend to.

Let me just turn to a comment—I don’t want to keep you folks

here all night, but there was a lot to digest here.

Folks from the Czech Republic came here recently, the chairman

of their Foreign Affairs Committee and a number of other members

of their House of Deputies on that; and they didn’t seem to be considering whether or not the system worked. In fact, several of them

told me it was irrelevant to them whether or not the system

worked for their considerations as to whether or not they wanted

to host the radar. But I don’t think that they considered, from the

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reactions when we talked about it, the fact that maybe somebody

would try to take out that radar. Maybe they might become a target.

And I haven’t talked to the folks from Poland on that, but, Dr.

Coyle, you bring that up in your report. I mean, one sure way to

sort of defeat this whole program, whether or not it will work,

would be to go at that, right, to go at some of the so-called eyes

of the system.

Mr. COYLE. Exactly. Just basic military strategy. If Iran, say,

was crazy enough to attack Europe, first thing they would attack

would be the eyes of the system, that proposed radar that is to be

located south of Prague. And so it would be the first target. And

I think people in the Czech Republic are coming to realize that

they would be the first target.

Now, the Czechs have shown themselves to be brave and courageous people throughout history, and perhaps they might be willing

to take that risk if the system works. But if the system is not effective, it is not fair to ask them to take that kind of risk.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am looking at some of the testimony here. We

went back to the Clinton administration era.

The first test with a tumbling enemy reentry vehicle was

planned to have been in early 2001, but it hasn’t happened yet.

That is a slip of at least 7 years.

The first nighttime test was to have been December 11, 2002. It

hasn’t happened yet either. That is at least 6 years.

The first test with decoy balloons that will closely resemble the

target reentry vehicle was to have been summer of 2002. It doesn’t

seem that will happen anytime soon.

March 2002, the MDA told Congress that the first GMD test

with multiple targets, that is with several mock enemy missiles

launched at once, could take place as early as 2005. That hasn’t

happened yet.

The MDA has never had a successful flight intercept test where

the target is launched from Kodiak and the interceptor from Kwajalein, that is, a long-range flight intercept test more closely resembling a real ICBM trajectory. In the past flight intercept tests, with

the interceptor based in Kwajalein, the MDA has waited until the

mock enemy target launched from Vandenberg, nearly reached

Kwajalein before attempting a intercept.

I mean, this seems like there is a lot of testing to be done. If they

have been slipping 6 or 7 years in all of these, there didn’t seem

to be any indication that these were planned to be tested in the

near future. So I guess we are looking at a long time before these

tests, and you always continue to bring back to me the wisdom of

why we continue to spend money on deployment when these

haven’t been tested.

And for the record, so that other Members hopefully might read

this at some point, there were at least seven reports that were

done in the last couple of years by the Inspector General for the

Pentagon, by the Director of Operations Technology—and Doctor,

you get the last word for me there on that—evaluation by the GAO,

by the OBM on that; and all of them suggested that this program

had serious, serious issues and problems.

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The CBO made the recommendation that we reduce the annual

amount that we spend on this program from the somewhere around

$8 to $9 billion where it was at that point in time down to a number of around $3 billion and force them to get the testing right, a

realistic and operational testing before we move to the next stage

on all these items on that.

Does that not make sense to people here? I mean, it seems that

spiral development, if anybody can explain it—I have never really

heard anybody explain it really cogently, but why on this program

that costs so much would we be taking this concept of building

these things out there? I mean, we have seen in the reports horror

stories of parts for the silos that were supposed to hold the missile

up didn’t work. They keep building them at great numbers a month

at huge expense. So it is not serving the purpose of somebody stopping something bad from happening and checking it.

What rationale, if any, is there to continue this program on the

basis that it is going, as opposed to reining it in, putting it back

under the statute, where they have to prove an element of it is

operational and under realistic testing before we move to the next

part, before we move to integration, before we start deploying? Doctor?

Ms. GRONLUND. I think the only conceivable rationale is if you

don’t care if it works and you are assuming it will have a deterrent

value. I think somebody here mentioned that today.

And the question is, why would this have more of a deterrent

value than the U.S. nuclear arsenal? But there was a report several years ago, I believe General Welch was an author, where the

recommendation was actually to reduce the number of tests. Because the more the tests failed the less the deterrent would be

worth. So I do think that, you know, there is a way in which certain parts of the government do not care if it works, that this is

part of another kind of scheme they have.

Mr. TIERNEY. I have the disturbing news—I want to hear what

you have to say, Dr. Garwin. I do have a vote that I have to go

make at this point in time. I don’t know what the tolerance level

of the witnesses is here. Some of you have come a distance or whatever. I would love to come back and continue this, but I don’t want

to force anybody to stay too long after hours.

And so, quickly, what is the consensus here? If I came back in

15 or 20 minutes, would that be a terrible thing or would people

have to go?

Ms. GRONLUND. No, that would be fine.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Garwin.

Mr. GARWIN. Fine.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Kueter.

Mr. KUETER. Fine.

Mr. TIERNEY. Fine. Then we will recess for about 20 minutes or

so, and then we will be back. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you all for your patience with the continuing saga of votes and no votes. We will get back to the hearing.

Dr. Garwin, you were about to make a response when I interrupted you.

Mr. GARWIN. I don’t remember the subject.

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Mr. TIERNEY. I am sorry?

Mr. GARWIN. I don’t remember the subject.

Mr. SHAYS. You have to remember the subject. Just the question

you are allowed to forget.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think it was something Dr. Gronlund said that

might have keyed you on to another point on that. We were talking

about the number of different tests that were being run and how

long a delay this had been and what likelihood we had that this

was going to be done any time soon.

Mr. GARWIN. Well, a sensible program has a research phase, a

development phase where you decide what is reasonably possible to

achieve, and you build the sensors to do that, a ground test so that

you can present the sensors with simulated objects to see that it

works. If it doesn’t work, if you don’t understand the sensors, if it

doesn’t get to low enough temperature, then you find out there.

And then, ultimately, when everything seems to work and when

it faces all the challenges that you can pose it and there aren’t any

uncertainties anymore, then you go to flight tests and see whether

it works in fact as it works in theory. And that is not what is done

here. That is what we should have been doing, what you would do,

paradoxically, in making progress faster at a $3-billion-a-year annual funding than at a $10-billion-a-year annual funding. At this $10-billion-a-year funding, you are spending all your

money on building radars, deploying interceptors, and not facing

the problems. You postpone the problems because they are too

hard. They take a long time. And in between, in the meantime, you

have this enormous funding stream that doesn’t buy us anything.

So there are two kinds of uncertainties at that point.

Once you deploy—once you test an interceptor, an in-flight test

against realistic countermeasures and you believe that it works, or

without countermeasures, then there is a question of reliability of

the interceptor. Is it 70 percent reliable? A stochastic, a random

failure. Is it 50 percent reliable? 30 percent reliable? And that is

important to tell you whether you need to fire two interceptors at

each missile, three interceptors, five interceptors.

And in the Clinton administration there were such discussions.

It was imagined, as I recall, that one would fire about four interceptors at each threatening missile simply because of unreliability,

not because they were inherently incapable but because their reliability was not proved. So that is the normal development program,

and part of the program is to demonstrate that it will handle the

expected decoys.

MDA has never faced the question of whether it agrees with the

proposed decoys that the 1999 NIE says are feasible and that could

accompany even the first flight test, if they wanted to, the nascent

ICBM power. But, beyond that, there are the tests that Dr. Coyle

refers to, adverse conditions to demonstrate that they work there.

You could have several adverse conditions at once, reducing the

number of flight tests, and then the questions of reliability.

So on the interceptors, random failures can be accommodated by

launching several interceptors instead of just one. Communications

failures can be accommodated by thoroughly testing the system all

the time, having multiple communication paths. Computer failures,

software failures, well, they may not be testable. You could do it

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by intensive simulation, but it is something that needs to be overseen by technically competent people, red-teaming people who are

not part of the program but who propose the challenges and review

the results.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Mr. Shays, do you want to be recognized to

ask a few questions?

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I would like each of you to describe to me your general attitude

about the missile defense program when it started and your attitude now about it. Just a framework that would describe do you

feel like you have already determined your position on this? Are

you open-minded about it? And so on.

But tell me your view when this program began. Did you think

it would work and now think it has failed? That is my first question. Or did you never think it would work and still think it won’t

work? Or you thought it would work and now you think—in the

past and you think it will now.

I would like each of you to do that.

Ms. GRONLUND. When you ask about the system, are you referring to the ground-based missile defense system?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Ms. GRONLUND. The one that was begun under the Clinton administration?

Mr. SHAYS. Uh-huh.

Ms. GRONLUND. Early on in—let me use his prop here—when

that system was under consideration, I participated in a group of

people who studied the issue of countermeasures along——

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t need to know all the things you did or didn’t

do. I just need to know your attitude. I need to know—it is a simple question, really.

Ms. GRONLUND. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you think when we began it that it would fail?

Or you thought it might succeed? Or you had an open mind? You

already decided it wouldn’t work?

Ms. GRONLUND. Right. Well, that was—so this exercise is what

convinced me that the system could be easily defeated by simple

countermeasures. At that point, based on physics, I thought it

would not work. But I think, you know, people will disagree with

that, and the proof is in the pudding. So it needs to be tested thoroughly against realistic threats, and that has not happened. So I

have no evidence to change my opinion, based on analysis.

Mr. SHAYS. Basically, your opinion is, because of countermeasures, whatever we did, you think that the system won’t work.

And so not a wise expenditure of dollars.

Ms. GRONLUND. Right. That the mid-course—the system designed to shoot down long-range missiles in mid-course will not be

effective, and hence it is.

Mr. SHAYS. Because of countermeasures.

Ms. GRONLUND. Because of countermeasures.

Mr. SHAYS. And you believe to date there is nothing that has told

you that you are wrong because you don’t think the proper tests

have occurred.

Ms. GRONLUND. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you. I appreciate it.

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Mr. Garwin.

Mr. GARWIN. I have reviewed for the government every ballistic

missile defense program since 1953. And so in the SDI days we had

mostly space-based defenses. They wouldn’t work because they

were so costly and vulnerable. Even the space-based small interceptors were too vulnerable. They would be shot down as they were

being sent up. We retreated to the interceptors that were groundbased. It was obvious that they would have the problem of decoys

and countermeasures. So I never doubted, never expressed any

doubt that we would achieve hit-to-kill capability against defined

targets. And we did. So that is fine.

My concern was always with the countermeasures. In 1999, I

published a proposal for a cooperative boost-phase intercept, especially against North Korean missiles; and I still believe that is a

reasonable approach.

Mr. SHAYS. But let me just ask you about this, though. So bottom

line is you had real doubts whether the countermeasures—you had

doubts whether we could ever develop a system that could confront

countermeasures. And so—and to date you have seen nothing that

indicates that it can respond to countermeasures. Is that correct?

Mr. GARWIN. That is exactly right. And there are some things

that could be done——

Mr. SHAYS. No, but I don’t want to go there. I just want—we

have limited time. And then but you, unlike some, believe that it

is possible for a bullet, in a sense, to hit a bullet as long as there

aren’t countermeasures.

Mr. GARWIN. Yes, I believe we can hit the warhead-sized bullets

with interceptor-size bullets.

Mr. SHAYS. The reason I ask that is some opponents say we

couldn’t do that. So when they were wrong about that, then they

candidly lose credibility. I don’t mean credibility, but then their argument seems to me to be flawed.

You wanted to grab the phone, Ms. Gronlund. Why?

Ms. GRONLUND. Well, because I also think hit-to-kill—I mean, we

have seen it demonstrated.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Did you ever believe before, that wouldn’t even

work?

Ms. GRONLUND. No. In fact, it has been demonstrated a long time

ago.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, but with all due respect, we have had

hearings where people said that is impossible, it won’t happen. We

have had hearings in this committee where people have said it. I

am not saying you.

Ms. GRONLUND. Right, no.

Mr. SHAYS. So people with tremendous stature say you can’t do

that—and a lot of Members of Congress.

Mr. Kueter.

Mr. KUETER. At the Marshall Institute, we had real doubts about

the ability to effectively conduct mid-course defense when this program was started as the center of emphasis in our missile defense

programs in the 1990’s. Since, we have become quite convinced that

the progress is immensely positive, and we are enthusiastic that we

are providing the Nation with an incremental defensive capability.

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Mr. SHAYS. So you started having some doubts and have been

kind of drawn into this feeling that the system has the potential

to work with further research?

Mr. KUETER. Absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Mr. Coyle.

Mr. COYLE. Mr. Shays, I support research and development in

missile defense. I have worked on missile defense programs myself

not only when I was at the Pentagon but before that, when I was

at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. So I support R&D on

missile defense. It is expensive, but I think the United States can

afford it.

What I don’t support is deploying systems that are not effective

and telling the American people or people in Europe or Members

of the Congress that the systems are effective when they are not.

My issue is particularly that we are spending so much money on

hardware right now whose effectiveness has not been demonstrated.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So your basic view is a system can work, but,

like Congress, don’t deploy until it works. That is the position of

Congress.

Mr. COYLE. Well, when you say a system can work, then you

have to say, well, which system are we talking about? And if we

are talking about——

Mr. SHAYS. No, you said a system can work, not me.

Mr. COYLE. I am sorry.

Mr. SHAYS. You said that a system could work, that you believe

that a system can work. You believe in missile defense, and that

a system can work. I thought that’s what you said.

Mr. COYLE. I don’t believe it is. But if it is I——

Mr. SHAYS. Well, then start all over again. Let’s start all over

again. What is your attitude about a missile defense system?

Mr. COYLE. What I was trying to say, and I hope I did, was that

I support research and development on missile defense, have

done——

Mr. SHAYS. Despite the fact that you don’t think it can work?

Mr. COYLE. No. Because I think it is important to know what you

can do and what you can’t do. It is important not to be surprised

by your adversary.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you, if you don’t think it can work, why

should we do it?

Mr. COYLE. Well, I didn’t say that I thought it could work and

I didn’t say I didn’t think it could ever work. Because you and I

never defined what the ‘‘it’’ was. Are we talking about the GMD

system? Are we talking about defense against ICBMs? Or are we

talking about PATRIOT? They are very different systems.

Mr. SHAYS. Let’s take all three.

Mr. COYLE. So, I think that missile defense against ICBMs in the

presence of more than one missile attacking and where those many

missiles are using decoys and countermeasures is very tough. As I

said earlier in this hearing, it is hard to get a scientist to say that

anything is impossible, but I think missile defense against ICBMs,

where you are talking about many ICBMs and those ICBMs can

use decoys and countermeasures, is very tough. And so I would be

most skeptical about that.

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You will recall that——

Mr. SHAYS. Go to the next one. You have three in that regard.

So you have told me your opinion about that. And so, in the other

two cases?

Mr. COYLE. Well, the next one, I would say the next toughest is

the THAAD program, Terminal High Altitude, whatever the letters

stand for these days. They have changed it.

Mr. SHAYS. It is Terminal High Altitude Area Defense.

Mr. COYLE. Yes. Thank you. That is the next toughest program

I would say after the GMD program. The next toughest after that,

getting easier, so to speak, is the Aegis system. And then finally

the PATRIOT system, which is the shortest ranged of the systems.

Mr. SHAYS. But you think the PATRIOT would be the easiest?

Mr. COYLE. Well, everything is relative here. The PATRIOT itself

has had many problems. It missed some of the missiles——

Mr. SHAYS. But that is not what I asked. But you gave, that is

the one that is the easiest of the ones you mentioned?

Mr. COYLE. Relatively speaking, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Is there value to having a missile defense system

for an errant missile, a missile that was launched not intended to—

where just they went too far and it ended up being launched but

there is no decoy. Is there value in having a system—I would like

each of you to respond—a missile defense system in those cases?

I mean, in the case of Iran, you know, the Jewish community has

this saying, that if your enemy says he is going to kill you, you had

better pay attention. And there is no doubt what the present regime in Iran has said. So the question I am asking is, first, if a

system—if a country like Iran develops a missile system and there

is an errant missile, would there be value in spending the incredible sums of money for a missile defense program; or would it be

better just not to? If you could get that kind of system. Because basically you are all—you feel a bullet can hit a bullet, but you feel

that if they have decoys, you are going to have problems.

Mr. GARWIN. I don’t think it would be worthwhile. You are making a missile; it is equipped with decoys in order to penetrate. It

would be automatic if that missile were launched that it would deploy its decoys. So it would not be intercepted, in my opinion, by

the system.

I think while you were away I made the point that if MDA, Missile Defense Agency, would admit that their present system does

not work, would not work against first generation ICBMs with decoys, then they could get to work on making it work. There are

things that they could do that would make it work, but they are

not going to do them unless they face the fact that it won’t work.

Mr. SHAYS. You and I do agree on one thing, and that is whatever we have we shouldn’t deploy it until it works.

Mr. GARWIN. That is right. And we have deployed and it doesn’t

work.

Mr. SHAYS. So there we may agree, where we have deployed and

it doesn’t work.

Let me just conclude here. So the bottom line with the Missile

Defense Agency, when they have printed a document that says,

with the Ground-based Midcourse Defense [GMDs], we have had 6

hits and 1 miss, and the Aegis ballistic missile defense 13 hits and

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1 miss, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense [THAAD], 4

hits, no misses, and the PATRIOT Advanced Capability–3, 11 hits

and 3 misses. Your point would be to me that is impressive to the

extent they have done that, but none of this involved the decoys.

Is that your position, all of you?

Mr. GARWIN. That is correct. And decoys are difficult with the

terminal systems. So those are in fact quite credible, in my opinion,

in many cases. Decoys are difficult for the offense to deploy in connection with penetrating the terminal systems.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just hear from the others, and then I am sure

my chairman wants to ask some questions as well. Any other comment on that issue? Yes, Mr. Coyle.

Mr. COYLE. Well, I don’t think the numbers are correct, to start

with.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say, this comes from them. And I am

going to submit it for the record, without objection. And if these are

not accurate, they are in deep trouble with me, because this is

their document. So if I could submit that for the record.

Mr. TIERNEY. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

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117

Mr. SHAYS. And also, let me just say, there was the article that

you made reference to that we had asked them to respond to, and

if I could submit that, without objection.

Mr. TIERNEY. I would like to review it first for my own information.

Mr. SHAYS. Certainly. I am not making reference now, but they

made responses. And since I wasn’t here——

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure. Just leave it open so I can take a look at it.

Mr. SHAYS. Absolutely.

Mr. Kueter, any response?

Mr. KUETER. It is undoubtedly true that the Midcourse Defense

Program has not had an active flight test against countermeasures

in quite some time. As I tried to explain, there were reasons for

the delay in the test program that were wholly unrelated to the actual operation of detecting and destroying an RV in space. It had

to do with booster failures, it had to do with quality control problems. That created enormous delays in this program, which they

have now come through and successfully shown they have come

through in the September flight test of last year that we have previously discussed.

Their plan calls for tests against countermeasures in 2008. I

think that when you hear the results of that test we will know a

great deal more about this conversation than today.

I have also tried to reference the fact that they have been actively simulating lots of these countermeasures in their advanced

computing facilities and what not. I think there is a lot to be

learned from that conversation as well.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just conclude by making this point; that the

reason I asked the question is I was extraordinarily skeptical of the

Missile Defense Program. Then I concluded—and it would have not

been something I advocated. So if I had been President of the

United States, I wouldn’t have been pushing the program. Then I

found myself listening to the rhetoric of so many who said, well,

you couldn’t possibly do this, this, and this, and mostly the bulletto-the-bullet. And it appears they are.

So it may be that they set up a straw man, I mean the critics,

and now I have become a believer. And so your testimony—some

of your testimony to me here is don’t be impressed with it because

countermeasures could mean that even if you can hit a bullet on

a bullet their countermeasures will prevent that. That is the testimony I am hearing, and I will obviously take that in consideration.

My general view is the program should continue. Research

should continue. But we sure as heck shouldn’t deploy it until we

know it works.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. That was my motion 2 years ago as well as I think

every year after that, is just reduce the budget to $3 billion for

testing and developing. And I think that got 138 votes. But it

seems like common sense.

I just want to clarify a couple things. This report is now part of

the record, BMDS Hit-to-Kill Testing History Since 2001, indicates

that there were six hits on this, six hits since 2001. That was not

the testimony that we had been hearing earlier, so I just want to

clarify that. This is the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, Defense

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Against Long-Range Threats, says there hits six hits and one miss

since 2001. That is not at all the testimony that we received earlier, so I would like somebody to comment on that.

Apparently when no interceptor gets launched, they don’t call

that a hit or a miss, and I am sure that helps the numbers a little

bit.

Mr. SHAYS. But if I might. If it hasn’t been launched, it doesn’t

have a target to hit.

Mr. GARWIN. It is like the excuse that the dog ate my homework.

So it depends how you count.

Mr. TIERNEY. If I can finish my question on that. Part of the system is that it gets shot out and actually goes someplace. If it

doesn’t get up and going, you missed. It just seems kind of ridiculous to say, oh, if it fails at the very beginning of the test, that is

not considered a failure. But if it fails somewhere after that, it is

a failure. It either got up and it worked, or it didn’t get up and

didn’t work. So the six to one number, again, if I could, it doesn’t

comport with the numbers we heard in testimony earlier.

Dr. Coyle.

Mr. COYLE. Well, it is correct, as this chart shows, that there

have been 10 flight intercept tests in the GMD program. That is

correct. I didn’t bring the numbers for the other programs. I would

be happy to look at those.

But to say that they are not going to count it when the interceptor never gets off the ground, I mean, in battle if the interceptor

never gets off the ground, that is a failure. To say they are not

going to count it because the target, which is the third column——

Mr. SHAYS. Can I just want to correct one thing? Because I don’t

want to distort what they said. I read two hits, one miss.

Mr. TIERNEY. Six hits.

Mr. SHAYS. Six hits or one miss. I should have read the other

two, because they are saying no intercept to launch. They didn’t

say that is a success.

Mr. TIERNEY. No. But they didn’t say it is a miss either. And

that is my point. My point is, two failures to launch brings the

missed number to three. So it means you get six out of nine, and

a no test target failure, I don’t know how you count that, win, lose,

or draw, or something on that basis. So that was one part of it. The

other part was that—and the testimony was that because they

were hitting something in some cases where they were predisposed

to know information that they otherwise wouldn’t know. Am I correct on that? Dr. Gronlund.

Ms. GRONLUND. Yes, you are. I think maybe a more fundamental

problem with this——

Mr. TIERNEY. Let’s first do that before I forget, and then you can

go to the more fundamental problems. Was it your testimony or

Mr. Coyle’s testimony or Mr. Garwin’s testimony that said that in

some of these cases they were given assumptions to work by that

nobody would ever know in a realistic test.

Ms. GRONLUND. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would you explain that a little bit? And then we

will go on to your more fundamental issue.

Ms. GRONLUND. They were told where the target—the trajectory

of the target in some cases early on. They were told the point in

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space to go to. It wasn’t really hitting the target; it was both the

target and the interceptor going to the same place and then finding

each other.

Mr. TIERNEY. So the deck was stacked?

Ms. GRONLUND. The deck was stacked. Which, again, is totally

appropriate for a research and development program. But you don’t

deploy on the basis of that.

Mr. TIERNEY. But it is certainly not considered an operational realistic test.

Ms. GRONLUND. No, no, no.

Mr. TIERNEY. So would any of the six tests that were successful

be considered an operational and realistic test?

Ms. GRONLUND. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Kueter.

Mr. KUETER. As I tried to describe both in my oral testimony and

in the written statement, the September 2007 test had any number

of operationally realistic characteristics to it. The other point——

Mr. TIERNEY. That is one. What about the other five?

Mr. KUETER. Pardon?

Mr. TIERNEY. That is one test. What about the other five?

Mr. KUETER. Well, in the other five you are back in the 2003,

2004 time period, where you are doing proof of concept on whether

you can do hit-to-kill, where you are working out the capabilities

of the sensors that you are building and using for the first time.

I think at that point in the development of the program it is perfectly realistic and reasonable for it to have certain artificialities on

it. That is no longer the case. They are clearly moving in that direction.

Mr. TIERNEY. Except that I don’t think you are going to tell us

that the September test was purely under all operational realistic

conditions.

Mr. KUETER. Well, you had——

Mr. TIERNEY. No. Under all. Where there was nothing about it

that wasn’t realistic and operational. Is that your testimony?

Mr. KUETER. Well, no test is completely realistic. It is a test after

all. There are certain artificialities involved.

Mr. TIERNEY. I just want that understood. It is not like it was

operationally and realistically tested and ready to roll. It was tested with some assumptions. There were predispositions and other

things in mind.

Mr. KUETER. Certainly. And it is run against the standards that

Dr. McQueary and the Office of the OT&E has established for the

MDA to operate under.

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess the edge you hear in my voice is, I have

been following this for 12 years and lots of times the standards

they set ain’t so good. They set the standards so that they can meet

them as opposed to what they might realistically expect.

Mr. KUETER. No. I said it is Dr. McQueary’s standards.

Mr. Tierney. Whatever. Dr. McQueary or somebody else’s standards.

Mr. SHAYS. First, let me say something. I have no dog in this

fight. In other words, maybe I am neither an advocate or an opponent, and maybe I should be one or the other but I am not. But

according to the Missile Defense Agency, they said: The critics say

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we are not testing under operationally realistic conditions. Response—this is their response. The MDA tests are consistent with

operational realistic test criteria developed by the test community

and the warfighter.

The second point. The MDA flight tests increase in operational

realism and complexity with each test, adding increasingly challenging test objectives.

And then the last point. The last two tests, the FTG–02 and the

FTG–03a, the long-range elements, the Ground-based Midcourse

Defense, were operationally realistic.

That is their claim. And I would like to submit this for the

record, because they are going to appear before us.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I think we can ask the witnesses on this point

by point. And I have a dog in this fight, and it is that we not waste

money building something and procuring stuff before they have

been realistically and operationally tested to be effective and moving forward. And that is my dog in this, to the tune of billions and

billions of dollars.

Mr. SHAYS. And I am not being critical of your position.

Mr. TIERNEY. No. I don’t care if you are or not. But I am telling

you, the hunt is we have spent $120 billion to $150 billion so far;

we are planning to spend another $65 billion. We haven’t realistically tested these things. We are building and procuring before it

gets to that point by all reasonable evidence here. And I think that

Mr. Nunn was correct, this seems to be more theocracy than technology on this thing. Otherwise, I think people would back up to

a realistic number, do the testing, and proceed on that basis.

But the critics—amongst them me being one of them—say that

we are not testing under operationally realistic conditions.

Their response, Dr. Garwin. The first one is that MDA tests are

consistent with operationally realistic test criteria developed by the

test community and the warfighter. Is that so?

Mr. GARWIN. No. Operational realistic conditions means decoys,

according to the 1999 NIE. And so long as they do not include the

feasible decoys, it is not an operationally realistic test condition.

Now, did I understand that they said the FTG–02 and –03 were

operationally realistic? Maybe. But the FTG–03, it says in this testing history, target failed to reach sufficient altitude. So it would

have been realistic except it wasn’t there. If that is what I understand.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Coyle, do you have anything to add with respect to the comment that MDA tests are consistent with operationally realistic test criteria developed by the test community and

the warfighter?

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir. I don’t deny that the tests have become

more realistic from a command and control point of view, passing

information back and forth. They have worked hard to make the

tests more realistic from a command and control point of view. But

from a discrimination point of view, no. The way operational tests

are done, you ask DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or one of

the intelligence agencies to tell you what the threat is, and then

you do the test against that threat. The program doesn’t get to decide what that threat is, the testers don’t get to decide what the

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threat is. The intelligence community defines the threat, and then

that determines what sort of operational test would be done.

So the answer is, no, they haven’t done that.

Mr. TIERNEY. What about the MDA saying that the MDA flight

tests increase in operational realism and complexity with each test,

adding increasingly challenging test objectives? Dr. Gronlund.

Ms. GRONLUND. Well, I think what Dr. Coyle said about command and control is correct. But from the very beginning, I guess

this pre-dates 2001, when they were including decoys, certainly we

have gone backward in terms of——

Mr. TIERNEY. You might want to repeat that when he is paying

attention.

Ms. GRONLUND. I am sorry?

Mr. TIERNEY. You may want to hold off and repeat that when he

is paying attention. This is for his benefit.

Ms. GRONLUND. I will hold.

Mr. GARWIN. Let me say something in the meantime.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let’s say it when Mr. Shays can hear it.

Mr. GARWIN. This is just for record. I think you mentioned FTG–

03, and I said it didn’t reach sufficient altitude. But Mr. Kueter reminds me that it was rerun. It was a rerun of that FTG–03a, and

that in fact was a success. In September.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am going to explain that a little bit more, so

thank you on that.

Dr. Gronlund, go ahead on yours. You were talking about the

increasing——

Ms. GRONLUND. Right.

Mr. TIERNEY. With respect to communications.

Mr. SHAYS. Get that from the record what she was saying.

Ms. GRONLUND. I think we should do complete openness here. So

you go ahead and put that in the record.

What I was talking about is the decrease in realism vis-a-vis

countermeasures, that early on, pre-2001, there were some tests

with decoys. Now, they weren’t realistic decoys. But all of that has

been dropped. And there were plans for more ambitious tests

against countermeasures, which has also disappeared.

So on that track, which is a really fundamental track, that is the

reason we are very skeptical about this program. That realism has

decreased.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Coyle, agree? Dr. Garwin. Are you disagreeing

with it?

Dr. COYLE. Yes. What is true in the statement that you read is

that they have done some things to make the tests more realistic.

As, for example, improving command and control systems. And I

think the Navy and their Aegis system has done that the best. But

in terms of other elements of the test that also need to be realistic.

Those have fallen way behind.

Mr. TIERNEY. Does anybody there know what the FTG–02 and

FTG–03a test, the last two tests of the long-range elements were

operationally realistic, what might they be talking about with

that—the last two tests of the long-range elements were operationally realistic?

Mr. KUETER. Sir, I believe they are referring to the radars that

I mentioned, the X-band radars, the sea-based systems, the forward

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deployable systems, as well the other ground-based systems they

may have in addition to the interceptor fields.

Mr. TIERNEY. So they are talking about the whole system in this

case?

Mr. KUETER. What they would refer to as the integrated BMDS.

Mr. TIERNEY. So those two tests supposedly test all the radar as

well as that. What do we know about the FTG–02 and FTG–03a?

Dr. Coyle.

Mr. COYLE. Well, both of those tests involved a launch of a target

from Kodiak with the interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air

Force Base in California. Both times they were successful. What

they did not do, however, whatever that statement is about radar

elements, they did not in those tests use the Sea-Based X-band

Radar. It was watching, it was looking, but it was not hooked up,

so to speak, in a way such that it could tell the interceptor, no,

dummy, you are going to the wrong thing. First of all, there wasn’t

anything else for the interceptor to look at. There was no decoy.

But even if there had been, the radar was not hooked up to say

to the interceptor, no, you are going to the wrong place. Don’t go

to that object, go to this one over here. They didn’t do that in either

one of those tests.

Mr. TIERNEY. So what is operationally realistic about that?

Mr. COYLE. Well, indeed, it is not. Because if the system is ever

to work, the radar has to be able to tell the interceptor, I know you

think you are pointed at the right target but you are not, you have

to go over there. And they haven’t demonstrated that they can do

that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Garwin, do you want to add anything to that?

Mr. GARWIN. No. I really have no information on it, except to

note that the statement is probably true in some sense, that at

least they had their radar watching as a bystander, and later on

they will connect the radar in the loop. And that will be increasing

realism. So I have no reason to doubt that in some sense what they

say is true.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, except that the last two tests were not apparently operationally realistic.

Mr. GARWIN. That is why they say ‘‘increasingly.’’

Mr. TIERNEY. No, they didn’t say ‘‘increasingly’’ on this one. They

made a flat-out statement: The last two tests of the long-range elements were operationally realistic, they say.

Mr. GARWIN. That is not true.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is not true for the reasons that you stated.

Now, somebody in their testimony, I can’t remember quite who I

read, talked about one of the radars being able to follow a baseball.

Was that you, Dr. Coyle?

Mr. COYLE. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is not this piece, though?

Mr. COYLE. I don’t believe that is what you are talking about.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would you tell us what it was in your testimony

you were talking about?

Mr. COYLE. Yes. The Missile Defense Agency has told Congress

that if the Sea-Based X-band was in Chesapeake Bay and the baseball was over San Francisco, that the X-band radar could discriminate that, could see it and discriminate that. And what they don’t

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say is that, for the radar to do that, it has to pulse again and again

and again, keep taking pulses of that baseball. And after it has

done that about 120 times, finally it gets the picture and it says,

ah-hah, I can see you, I can see that round object.

The problem is, if the baseball were moving like a real enemy

warhead would be moving through space, if the baseball is moving

now it is no longer in the field of view. During the time it would

take to do those 120 pulses, the enemy reentry vehicle has moved

so far that it is no longer in the field of view of radar.

So I think what was misleading about that story—I mean, we all

speak in analogies, but what was misleading about that story,

which is often cited about how they can see a baseball across the

country, is that they don’t explain that if it were—if that baseball

were moving as fast as a reentry vehicle would be moving, that indeed the radar couldn’t do that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I was following in the Boston Globe

two things. One is the paper editorialized on April 8th about the

Bush-Putin summit. And apparently then Rick Lehner, the Director of Public Affairs for the Missile Defense Agency, took great

issue because he thought, at least in his reading, that they took

issue with the missile defense technology and he thought they asserted that it doesn’t work. So he wrote a letter back to them saying that he really believes they just don’t understand.

And he says: The first successful intercept test from 1999 to 2002

used the type of decoys we could expect from countries such as

North Korea and Iran, and future tests will introduce more challenging decoys to keep up with expected threats.

Is that true, that the first successful intercept test from 1999 to

2002 used the type of decoys that could be expected from countries

such as North Korea and Iran?

Ms. GRONLUND. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Why not?

Ms. GRONLUND. Because the decoys appeared very different from

the warhead, and the system was also told what the warhead

would look like. So they had very large balloons that had a very

large infrared signature and a different radar signature from the

warhead. I mean, the point of having a decoy is—yeah. OK.

Mr. TIERNEY. I mean, it is this kind of statement that probably

bothers Mr. Shays and I, is that we want to find out where the system is at and we want to find out whether it should be tested or

whatever. Misstatements and exaggerations aren’t helpful on that

point. He goes on to say——

Mr. SHAYS. Could I just jump in here?

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS. The challenge, though, is that they are not here.

Mr. TIERNEY. They will be.

Mr. SHAYS. I know they will. But what my view is, it would be

nice to have them here to counter any time—it would make the dialog more interesting, I think.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, they won’t sit on the panel with other people,

because it has been the policy of the Department that they sapiently don’t like to be challenged on their dialog. But they will be

on another panel, and then we will have people following that

panel so we can get as best we can.

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Mr. SHAYS. Maybe we should ask them to stay to respond again.

Anyway.

Mr. TIERNEY. This Mr. Lehner, who is the Public Affairs Director

for the MDA, then goes on to say: As for how realistic the missile

tests are, I am not certain what the Boston Globe means. For tests

of the long-range system, we launch a target missile from Kodiak,

AK, and then intercept the missile from Vandenberg Air Force

Base in California. The trajectory closely replicates a launch at the

United States from North Korea. We used an operational radar at

Beale Air Force Base in California and the operational command

and control system staffed by military operators from U.S. Northern Command, the same people who man the consoles 24/7.

Is that true, Dr. Coyle?

Mr. COYLE. Well, when they say they used the radar, if that

means it was turned on, yes, that is true. But they didn’t use the

radar to tell the interceptor: You have picked the wrong target, go

here.

First of all, they couldn’t, because there wasn’t a wrong target,

there were no decoys on those tests. But if there had been, they

didn’t use the radar to say, no, go to this target instead of that one,

you just picked the wrong one.

The other problem is, when Colonel Lehner speaks about the

tests that were done in the early years, I am familiar with those

tests. And the balloons, as has already been explained, were much

bigger and brighter than the reentry vehicle. So they didn’t resemble the reentry vehicle. And so the analogy that I used in my formal testimony was, yes, they discriminated between an elephant

and a man, two things that don’t resemble each other. That is what

was done in those early tests.

The challenge of course is when the decoy actually resembles the

reentry vehicle. Now you are trying to tell either two elephants or

two men apart, and that is much tougher.

Mr. TIERNEY. And from my memory from the testimony and

reading the written testimony, whatever, the National Intelligence

Estimates, and the intelligence community expects that a country

able to make a missile would be able to make decoys or whatever

with current technology. They can either buy it from Russia or

China, or they can make it themselves. So you would expect that

they would be doing something at least sophisticated enough to resemble the missile itself.

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Garwin.

Mr. GARWIN. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the analogy of a

radar in Chesapeake Bay and a baseball-sized target at San Francisco. Well, the job would be a lot easier if they were baseballs

rather than reentry vehicles. Because, in our countermeasures volume on page 133, we consider a realistic reentry vehicle, and we

assumed that, as the intelligence community says in their 1999

NIE, that these states have the ability to orient the reentry vehicle.

So if the nose is pointing toward the radar or anywhere near toward the radar, the cross-section, the signal that comes back is not

that from a baseball but from a marble, about a half inch in diameter.

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So it can be very much reduced to be invisible to that radar. So

that is really a misleading analogy.

Mr. TIERNEY. Colonel Lehner also says: The trajectory closely

replicates a launch on the United States from North Korea. And he

talks about the test of the long-range system. They launched the

target missile from Kodiak, AK and intercepted the missile in Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

Would that closely replicate a launch from North Korea, Dr.

Coyle?

Mr. COYLE. Well, it is better than some early tests that didn’t.

But what would really represent that would be a test where the

target was launched from Kodiak and the interceptor was in Kwajalein, not in California. That kind of distance would represent an

ICBM, and they have never had a successful test. They have tried

twice, but have never had a successful test of that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Shays, do you want to ask questions?

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to be leaving, and I just want to make

sure. Mr. Kueter, you were not invited to respond to some of these

questions. Is there anything that you wanted to say before?

Mr. KUETER. I would say that the description of the realism in

these tests is one that you ought to explore in great detail with Dr.

McQueary, who is the head of operational test and evaluation at

the Defense Department, the person who is helping to design the

criteria by which these tests are to be functioned. His statement,

which I quoted from in my testimony to the Senate earlier this

month, indicates tremendous progress in the realism of the testing

program and the quality of the work that is being done. They are

integrated in with the protocols that the Missile Defense Agency is

being held to today. I think that would greatly illuminate this conversation about the contemporary program rather than our perceptions of what the program was.

Mr. SHAYS. In the end, wouldn’t all of us agree that this, what

is an operationally realistic, is a matter somewhat of a subjective

judgment? Wouldn’t that not be true? Not to discount any of the

reservations. It is just to suggest that what is realistic to one may

not be realistic to somebody else. And so it seems to me that we

ultimately have to get the agents before us and have them defend

what is realistic.

And what I would be seeking to learn from the agency would be,

well, are there like 10 steps of realistic? I mean, you dealt with the

one kind of case. But if you make it tougher, stage two, stage three,

and four; and at what stage are they at realistic? But, I mean, that

is kind of where I am coming down.

I mean, what I am finding helpful is that this is no longer in my

mind whether we can hit a bullet on a bullet, but whether with decoys we can achieve what we need. And I can understand that the

more decoys you have, the more sophisticated you have to make

that weapon, that warhead and that missile. And then how realistic is that? So those are the kind of questions that I would be going

to.

In the end, we may say it wasn’t worth $200 billion or whatever.

But then I look at it from the standpoint, if we have already spent

$150 billion, is it realistic to continue based on the, what I call, the

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marginal cost, the cost from this point on? Or should we just cut

our losses and stop?

And then what I try to remember is that when we fought the

first war in the Gulf, I was reminded—I was a new Member—that

all of the systems that worked well for our troops, the ways that

we were able to see them before they could see us and hit them

before they hit us, those decisions were made by a Congress 10

years before I ever became a Member of Congress. But my constituents said, what a great job. We won the war in Kuwait, our troops

did a great job. And they slapped me on the back. And I knew that

really I had nothing to do with that. Those decisions were made by

someone 10 years earlier.

So my concern is always the reservation that I say no to something that ultimately may stop a missile. And if it stops one or two

missiles, then I am going to ask myself, was that worth $200 billion?

So what would be wrong is if people then have a false sense of

security because of a missile system which could be—and then you

do certain things that encourage someone to use a missile and then

the system doesn’t work.

So it works both ways, and I understand that. But I thank all

the witnesses. I am very sorry I wasn’t here earlier. I have not literally unpacked my two attache cases that I brought in when I

came in this week. They are still sitting on my chair unpacked.

So—anyway. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays. Just on that point of what

is operationally realistic, doesn’t our intelligence community help

define that? And we have a 1999 NIE that basically says that Iran

could put whatever decoys were technologically capable at that

time by whether it is Russia or China? So that defines for us what

a realistic set would be. Am I off the base on that? Did I hear it

correctly?

Ms. GRONLUND. I think that is right. I think there would also be

value, as I suggested, in having a countermeasure Red Team,

which there was for a while, and I don’t know if it is still there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Coyle.

Mr. COYLE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think that the difference

between an operationally realistic test and an early developmental

test is something that is vague at all. I don’t recall quite how Mr.

Shays worded it, but I don’t think that this is a subtle thing at all,

the difference between early developmental tests and realistic operational tests.

Forget about decoys. Pretend there are never going to be any decoys, never going to be any countermeasures. You want the system

to work at night. They have never shown that it can work at night.

You want the system to work when the sun is shining in the eyes

of the interceptor so that it makes it harder to see. It uses infrared

sensors that are sensitive to that. You want it to work when there

is more than one missile. Is Iran or North Korea going to fire just

one missile and wait to see what happens?

I don’t think those are subtle things at all, and they have yet to

show those things in the testing programs.

Mr. SHAYS. What would be helpful to the committee I think

would be for you and others to write a list of all the things that

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you think would be realistic. In other words, before you deploy, let’s

do the one in the sun, let’s do the multi. Whatever. And then I

would like to submit that as a request maybe from both of us, and

then we then ask them: How many of these have you in fact done?

But that would be helpful. If you could submit that for the record,

all the ways that they could make the tests more realistic.

Mr. TIERNEY. You weren’t here earlier, but more to point with

this thing would be to ask the MDA to give us a list of standards

of what it is they are supposed to be trying to build. We don’t even

know what it is they are going to hit the point that they think they

are there. We don’t know what it is they are building, what they

define as success, anything of that basis.

Mr. COYLE. And I did include in my full statement such a list.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, I am going to try to go through this as quickly as I can. The Government Accountability Office is describing an

EKV anomaly that has persisted in the GMD flight intercept test

for 7 years, since 2001. If not corrected, this anomaly could cause

the EKV to temporarily lock into the wrong target and miss the

real target.

Can somebody explain that anomaly and the situation for us?

Mr. GARWIN. I don’t know about it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Coyle, do you know about it?

Mr. COYLE. Yes, I do.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would you share that with us?

Mr. COYLE. Yes. There has been a problem with the EKV in tests

ever since 2001, as the GAO reports. It is called an anomaly, which

means that the EKV starts looking at the wrong thing and stays

looking at the wrong thing. And if it keeps doing that too long, it

is going to miss the target. And, fortunately, while they have had

some tests that failed, none of them have failed for that particular

reason, that the anomaly has only persisted for a short while and

not long enough that was the reason that they missed when they

missed.

But, obviously, this is something that has to be fixed, and the

Missile Defense Agency has been trying to fix it. But through one

problem or another, as I explained in my full statement, to this day

they still haven’t been able to get to what the root cause of this

problem is. They know that it keeps happening. They have taken

steps such as improved electrical shielding to make it go away.

They believe they have minimized the problem, but they also see

even in the most two recent tests that have taken place that this

problem is still there.

I am not trying to make a big deal out of it. It is just one of

many little things that have to be chased down. But I think it is

an interesting example, that even solving one little problem like

this one anomaly has taken 7, 8 years, and it is still isn’t solved.

Mr. TIERNEY. The SBIRS High, and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System [STSS], are they components necessary for the

Ground-based Midcourse System we are talking about?

Mr. COYLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do they exist?

Mr. COYLE. No. They are being developed, but they don’t exist.

They are not on orbit in that sense.

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Mr. TIERNEY. If they are necessary for the system and they don’t

exist, then we certainly couldn’t have had any realistically operational tests, because they are even not here. Right?

Mr. COYLE. Exactly. And I have been surprised at some of the

claims that have been made about the capabilities of the system,

considering that those satellite systems are not even in there, not

on orbit yet, and many years before they will be.

Mr. TIERNEY. How many years, do you think?

Mr. COYLE. Well, it is hard to say. They are years behind schedule and literally tens of billions of dollars over budget. But if, as

the Missile Defense Agency sometimes claims, we have operational

capability without them. Why do we need them? And if we need

them, how can we—you know.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Kueter, do you want to answer that? If we

have operational capability without them, why do we need them?

Mr. KUETER. Well, you need the STSS system to help you deal

with your complex countermeasures problem, which is why they

are developing it, why they need to deploy it: For the purpose of

dealing with the rudimentary threat that they believe they face

from North Korea and Iran. They don’t see necessarily a need for

it right now to solve the mission of the initial defense that they

were given by the Congress and the President.

Mr. TIERNEY. If our intelligence agencies think that Iran would

have whatever decoy capability China or Russia might have, why

does it make sense for our MDA people to be telling us they just

think some rudimentary system would be there? They want to give

them all of the credit of being able to send a missile at us, but none

of the credit of being able to do even the most basic and fundamental decoys.

Mr. KUETER. As I think I mentioned, the NIE certainly indicates

that they would have access to that technology, not that they have

necessarily mastered it or are able to deploy it effectively on their

own.

Mr. TIERNEY. But the general consensus seems to be that a country that can build a missile could certainly build decoys.

Mr. KUETER. That they could build them, not that they have

mastered their use or that they would be able to work effectively

in an offensive environment.

Mr. TIERNEY. So we are again assuming that they are certainly

the masters of building a missile but not the masters of building

a decoy. We seem to make assumptions that go every which way,

but always in a way that——

Mr. KUETER. No. No, sir. And I don’t believe that the Agency

would agree with that, either. That is why they are planning tests

against countermeasures and the four or five tests that are planned

over the next 2 years. They understand the need to test against

countermeasures for all the reasons that have been discussed here

today.

The question is, particularly as it pertains to STSS, is whether

you need it uniquely to do the discrimination job, or whether the

X-band radars and the other sensors already available to us can

help do that job as it stands. They appear to be confident that the

seeker on the kill-vehicle in combination with those radars can do

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the discrimination job. We will learn that over the course of the

next 2 years as these flight tests take place.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are you telling me the SBIR High system will be

done in the next couple of years?

Mr. KUETER. No, sir. It certainly will not.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are you telling me that Space Tracking and Surveillance System will be done in the next couple of years?

Mr. KUETER. No, sir. You need that to handle a complex countermeasures environment, one where you have very sophisticated

countermeasures deployed. I don’t even think the NIE would confirm that North Korea or Iran have access to that kind of capability, at least not at this time period. You have to project out when

you think the STSS will be put on orbit. That might coincide with

their acquisition of that capability, in which case we would have a

very happy outcome.

Mr. TIERNEY. Our intelligence won’t confirm that they have a

missile either. But the presumption here is that when they get

ready to have a missile, that they will no doubt be ready to arm

it with sufficiently sophisticated decoys.

Mr. KUETER. We know they have a missile.

Mr. TIERNEY. Am I off base?

Ms. GRONLUND. I mean, the point of our study was to look at

things that were far, far simpler than building a missile and a nuclear warhead. I think some people could do it in their garage. I

mean, Mylar balloons are not that hard to do. So I don’t actually

even know what is meant by a sophisticated countermeasure. The

things that are described in the NIE, the things that we looked at

are not sophisticated.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would we need a SBIRS High or a Space Tracking

Surveillance System to do the Mylar balloons?

Ms. GRONLUND. Well, it wouldn’t help you. Again, we assumed

we had that system when we did that analysis. You can make

these balloons have a variety of temperatures by coating them with

different colors of paint, take your pick, over a range of hundreds

of degrees Fahrenheit or centigrade for that matter.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would radar help you discriminate between those?

Ms. GRONLUND. No.

Mr. GARWIN. I think Mr. Kueter misspoke. He said we know they

have the missile. The North Koreans certainly don’t have a missile

even if they were successful with their TB–2 that could carry a nuclear warhead to the United States. And Iran is far from having

such a missile.

Speaking of realism, I asked in my testimony on page 11 a question for the Missile Defense Agency. And it is: Does MDA believe

that threat is not realistic? That is, the threat of ICBMs equipped

with scores of bomblet RVs, reentry vehicles, that separate just

after boost phase.

So can they defend against that? If they can’t defend against

that, is it because they think that threat is not realistic? Because

the intelligence community does believe it is realistic, we deployed

and others deployed ballistic missiles equipped with bomblet warheads for dispensing chemical and biological munitions in the days

in which we had such capabilities.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Back in 2003, in March, Pete Aldridge, who was

then the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, told Senator Bayh out of Indiana, that as of

that date, March 18, 2003, the projected effectiveness of the system

would be in the 90 percent range. That was with respect to deployment against a North Korean missile launched at the United

States.

Is there any prospect that was true, that statement? Mr. Kueter.

Mr. KUETER. In 2003?

Mr. TIERNEY. March 18, 2003, that there was—as of today, the

projected effectiveness would be in the 90 percent range.

Mr. KUETER. I have no way of knowing what kind of data he had

available to him at that time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Based on the data that you knew about at that

point in time, would that have been an accurate statement?

Mr. KUETER. That is probably an overstatement.

Mr. TIERNEY. Probably. Dr. Gronlund.

Ms. GRONLUND. He didn’t have any data because there was no

data.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Garwin.

Mr. GARWIN. I don’t know what he had in mind. And when he

said would be 90 percent, I don’t know whether he meant a launch

in 2003 could be countered with 90 percent effectiveness——

Mr. TIERNEY. He said, as of today. That would be March 18,

2003. As of March 18, 2003, the projected effectiveness of the system to be deployed in 2004 would be against a North Korean missile launched at the United States would be in the range of 90 percent.

Mr. GARWIN. So, in 2004, when it was deployed. No, I think that

is considerable overstatement.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think we have probably tortured you all sufficiently for the day. There are probably more questions that we may

have to followup, if that is all right with you folks. I think we have

covered a lot of ground here today and really extended your day far

beyond what would have been realistic for you to take in such good

humor.

I want to thank you. I think you have helped us create a record

and helped us at least educate ourselves for further hearings as we

try to explore this issue. I thank you sincerely for coming in, and

I look forward to your further advice and counsel as we move forward on this, and invite you to work with our staff if they could

be helpful in lightening the load of anything that was requested of

you from Mr. Shays or from me as that move forwards, and thank

you very, very much.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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