UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, DC 

FAADOCKETN0.16-15-07 

WILLIAM ALFRED HICKS, JR. 

alk/a BILLY HICKS, 

Complainant 

v. 

CITY OF MOUNT AIRY, NORTH 

CAROLINA; and THE COUNTY OF 

SURRY, NORTH CAROLINA; tlnough 

the MOUNT AIRY/SURRY COUNTY 

AIRPORT AUTHORITY, 

Respondent. 

Submitted By: 

Randolph M. Jan1es, 

N.C. Bar No. 10,000 

Attorney for Complainant 

RANDOLPH M. JAMES, P.C. 

P.O. Box 20069 

Winston-Salem, NC 27120 

Phone: (336) 724-7707 

Facsimile: (336) 724-9722 

Email: rmjames(ZV,rmjameslaw.com 

) 

) 

) COMPLAINANT'S REPLY TO 

) RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR 

) LEAVE TO FILE OPINION AND 

) JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED 

) STATES DISTRICT COURT AND 

) REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 

) NOTICE OF THE SAME 

) 

) 

) RECEIVED 

JAN 11 2016 

PART 16 DOCKETS 

Pursuant to 14 CPR, § 16.19(c), William Alfred Hicks, Jr., by and through counsel, 

hereby replies to Respondent's Motion for Leave to File the Opinion and Judgment of the United 

States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in Hicks v. Airport Authority et ai. 

and Respondents' Request for Judicial Notice of the Same. 

CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 

Complainant, William Alfred Hicks, Jr. ("Billy" or "complainant"), a past 

member of the Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority and past tenant at the Airport itself, 

filed a formal complaint pursuant to Title 14 CPR, Part 16, against the Mount Airy/Surry County 
Airport Authority, the governing body of the Mount Airy/Surry County Airport ("KMWK"), as 

designated by the City of Mount Airy and the County of Surry, both located in North Carolina, 

who are the Sponsors of the Airport. The Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority (herein 

"Airpo1t Authority") are appointed by the Sponsors and make the policy and procedure needed to 

operate the facility. 

Billy's Complaint arises from actions taken by the Mount Airy/Surry County Airport 

Authority ("Airport Authority) that Billy believes violate the Sponsor Assurances assumed by 

the Airport Authority when accepting funding grants. The Federal Aviation Administration 

("FAA") has jurisdiction to determine compliance with obligations and assurances pertaining to 

the Airport Improvement Program through Title 49 U.S.C. §47101, et. seq., and Airport Sponsor 

Assurances through 49 U.S.C. §47107, et seq. 

Respondents have filed another motion in the case, a Motion for Leave to File the 

Opinion and Judgment in federal district litigation between the parties, and have requested 

judicial notice of the Opinion and Judgment in that case. 

REPLY 

Respondents continue in their attempt to make this FAA Complaint about the termination 

of Billy's hangar lease, instead of the pattern and practice of actions which reward those who 

support the Airport Authority in actions to support the granting of an ex violations of their 

Sponsor Assurances. In the Part 16 formal complaint process, each party must file documents 

sufficient to present all the relevant facts to determine if an airport sponsor is in compliance. 14 

CFR Part 16, §29. Here, both parties have had the opportunity to file pleadings which relate to 

the charge that the Mount Airy-Surry County Airport Authority is in violation of their Sponsor 

Assurances. 

2 
Additional documents pertaining to the litigation between the parties is irrelevant, as the 

decision by the North Carolina Middle District Court in Case Number 1:15-cv-38 does not find 

facts or law answering the question as to whether the Airport Authority is in violation of their 

federal obligations. 

I. Jurisdiction 

The FAA Compliance program is designed to achieve the airport sponsor's voltmtary 

compliance with the Federal obligations the airport accepts when developed with FAA 

assistance. Scott Meyer v. City of Cincinnati, OH, FAA Docket No. 16-12-14 (Director's 

Deterrnination)(Aprill2, 2014), p. 10. In addressing allegations of non-compliance, the FAA is 

making a decision about whether the airport is currently in compliance with applicable federal 

obligations. Jd. Specifically, the FAA is empowered to investigate and adjudicate a complaint 

that an airport proprietor has violated the binding Sponsor Assmances. 14 CFR §l6.l(a). The 

FAA has jurisdiction to determine compliance with obligations and assmances pertaining to the 

Airport Improvement Program through Title 49 U.S.C. §47101, et seq., and Airport Sponsor 

Assurances through 49 U.S.C. §47107, et seq. 

The FAA designed the Airport Compliance Program to assist in ensming a safe national 

system of public use airports, which are operated by the sponsors in a manner which is consistent 

with the federal obligations. The Mount Airy/Surry County Airport is a federally-obligated 

airport. As such, the Airport Authority must comply with the assmances for Airport Sponsors. 

Though KMWK's original obligations were only pursuant to Title VI, Civil Rights Act and the 

Statutory Exclusive Rights Prohibition as the original grants had expired, KMWK has been 

accepting new grants since at least 2010, which would impose new Federal Obligations tied into 

those grants. 

3 
H. Facts Pertinent to Respondents' Motion for Leave to File Opinion and Judgment 

from 1:15-CV-38. 

The Complainant filed suit against Respondents in the Middle District of North Carolina 

due to his belief the disparate treatment by the Airport Authority violated Complainant's 

constitutional rights. In Respondents' Motion for Leave to File Opinion and Judgment of the 

United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in Hicks v. Authority et al., 

MDNC Case No. 1:15-CV-38 and Request forJudicial Notice of the Same (herein "Motion for 

Leave to File Opinion and Judgment"), Respondents state both the Complainant and 

Respondents have referred to the federal complaint and amended complaint in the pleadings such 

that the Opinion and Judgment are relevant to this proceeding. (Motion, '1]1 ). Respondent omits 

that Complainant has only referenced the federal litigation in response to arguments made by 

Respondents in motions, and has not relied on the federal litigation in support of the Part 16 

Complaint. Other than the conclusory statement that the Opinion and Judgment are relevant, 

Respondents offer no proof of the documents relevance. 

Billy, in his Part 16 Complaint, did not refer to the complaint or amended complaint from 

the federal court case, nor relied on the issues in the federal litigation to support his Complaint. 

Of the 45 Exhibits submitted with the Part 16 Complaint, the federal complaint or amended 

complaint are not included. Respondents, in their Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for 

Summary Judgment ("Motion to Dismiss"), reviews the prior litigation history between the 

parties -referencing a state court summary ejectment case and the federal lawsuit. (Motion to 

Dismiss, pp. 3-5). The Motion to Dismiss Exhibit 7 is a composite exhibit of lawsuits 

Respondents argued were relevant to Billy's Part 16 Complaint. (Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 7, AN). This includes the Hicks complaint in federal court (Id., Ex. 7H) and the first amended 

4 
complaint in federal court (Id., Ex. 7N). Again, Respondents offer no reason why the documents 

are relevant, just offers the documents as exhibits to the Motion to Dismiss. 

In Billy's response to the Motion to Dismiss, the litigation is mentioned in one sentence: 

"Billy and the Airport Authority have been in involved in litigation over the lease termination, 

including the declaratory judgment action and summary ejectment action relating to the hangar 

lease and a federal lawsuit arising from the retaliation Billy has faced for opposing the special 

treatment of the sole FBO at KMWK .. " (Complainant's Response to Respondents' Motion to 

Dismiss or in the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4). 

Complainant does not rely on the federal litigation in his Response to the Motion to 

Dismiss, because the litigation between Billy and the Airport Authority is not at issue in the Part 

16 Complaint. Respondents mistakenly argued in the Motion to Dismiss that the Part 16 action 

was designed to force the Airport Authority to issue Billy a lease such that the state court 

litigation is a bar due to res judicata and collateral estoppel (Motion, p. 7, '1[6), however, a 

request that the "FAA broker a new lease" (Motion, p. 7, '1[6) was not relief requested by Billy in 

the Part 16 Complaint. As the claims at issue are different in the state court litigation (summary 

ejectment on the lease) a11d the federal litigation (equal protection, due process) from the claims 

at issue in the Part 16 Complaint (violation of sponsor assurances), Billy's Part 16 Complaint is 

not precluded by either the state or federal litigation. 

Respondents' Answer to the Complaint again references the state ejectment action and 

federal litigation, on pp. 4-5, in the fact section. (Answer, pp. 4-5). Respondents' Answer also 

incorporates the exhibits, affidavits, and motions previously filed, which included a reference to 

the federal litigation. (Answer, p. 8). Though Respondents state the federal litigation amended 

complaint was cited in support for its affrrmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel 

5 
(Motion for Leave to File Opinion and Judgment, p. 2, '1(1), the Answer actually states the claims 

about the lease tennination and waiting list removal are barred by res judicata and collateral 

estoppel for the state summary ejectment litigation, not the federal litigation. (Answer, p. 20, '1(8). 

Complainant then references the litigation in his Reply, stating the litigation between the parties 

were attempts at resolution. (Reply to Answer, p. 6). 

Though Respondents have repeatedly attempted to drag the federal (and state) litigation 

between the Complainant and Respondents into the Part 16 adjudication, the federal litigation is 

not relevant to the Part 16 Complaint. Billy's Part 16 Complaint does include some of the same 

facts listed in the prior litigation, as support for his argument the Airport Authority operates in a 

manner which is in violation of the Airport Sponsor Assmances. The Part 16 Complaint also 

includes many additional facts about a pattern and practice of behavior by the Airport Authority 

which was not relevant to the federal litigation, and were not included in the federal pleadings. 

HI. The Documents Offered in the Motion for Leave to File Are Not Relevant to the 

Part 16 Proceedings. 

Each party must file the documents it considers sufficient to present all relevant facts and 

arguments necessary for a determination as to whether the sponsor is in compliance. 14 CFR 16 

§ 16.29(b )(1 ). In rendering its decision, the FAA may rely on the Complaint and responsive 

pleadings. Id. Relevance is not defined in 14 CFR §16.3 (Definitions). The Federal Rules of 

Evidence define relevance as evidence which "has any tendency to make a fact more or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the 

action." Fed. R. Evidence 401. 

The Respondents bear the bmden of proof for their motions or requests, as well as the 

bmden in proving an affirmative defense. Platinum Aviation and Platinum Jet Center BMI v. 

Bloomington-Normal Airport Authority, FAA Docket No. 16-06-09 (March 5, 2008), p. 13. 

6 
Respondents have offered no case law, no evidence and no argument as to why the federal 

litigation arising from a constitutional claim would be relevant to the issue of sponsor 

compliance. Respondents have not shown why the Opinion and Judgment of the District Court 

would make any fact more or less probable, nor how it is of consequence in determining the 

action on whether the Airport Authority has violated its sponsor assurances. 

In Platinum, the parties were previously involved in state litigation to resolve contract 

issues, and even though the Illinois state court fmmd the Platinum agreements valid and 

enforceable under Illinois law, the FAA found the same agreements were in violation of the 

sponsor assurances and had to be modified, ruling the Complainants' contractual rights were 

subordinated to the Respondents' federal obligations. Platinum, p. 15. "The Part 16 process 

ensures respondents comply with their agreements with the federal government to protect and 

serve the public interest. The resolution, though unsatisfactory to the Complainants, meets the 

Respondent's federal obligations regarding this issue.Jd., pp. 15-16. 

In Platinum, the litigation was relevant to the part 16 complaint, as the complainant 

argued the sponsor could not unilaterally modify a valid and enforceable agreement. Unlike 

Platinum, the lease agreement here has been litigated in the state summary ejectment action, and 

Billy discussed the lease termination and summary ejectment as factual support for the retaliation 

and disparate treatment claims in the federal litigation. Billy did not base his Part 16 Complaint 

upon the federal litigation nor is he seeking to have the FAA enforce his prior lease agreement 

such that the Opinion and Judgment in the federal litigation would be relevant to the Part 16 

Complaint. 

7 
A. The federal litigation was not used in Respondents' res judicata or collateral 

estoppel defenses, which were based npon the state summary ejectment action. 

The res judicata and collateral estoppel defenses raised by the Respondents were raised 

for the claims arising from the lease termination, based upon the state ejectment action, not the 

federal litigation. See Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, p. 7, ~6 ("the claim is at its core a 

contract dispute which was previously litigated); Answer, p. 20, ~8 ("Complainant's claims 

regarding the lease and the waiting list have been litigated in state court and are baned by resjudicata and collateral estoppel."). At the time those defenses were raised, there was no final 

judgment in the federal litigation, such that the Respondents could have been referring to the 

federal case as "previously litigated". As such, the Opinion and Judgment from 1 :15-CV-38 are 

not relevant to the res judicata or collateral estoppel defenses raised by Respondents. 

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, precludes re-litigating claims where a court of 

competent jurisdiction has issued a final judgment on the merits against the identical parties (or 

one in privity) if the causes of action are the same. In Re Naples, FAA Docket No. 16-01-15 

(Final Agency Decision and Order)(Aug. 25, 2003), p. 21 (citing Allied Pilots Ass/n v. Pension 

Benefit Guar. Corp., 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 13898, *9 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 2003); Hollandv. 

Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 309 F.3d 808, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2002); and Citibank, NC. v. Data Lease 

Financial Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1501 (llth Cir. 1990)). 

Tho~gh the parties in Hick's federal litigation included the Airport Authority, the causes 

of action are not the same, as the federal litigation did not involve the grant assurances, which 

are the issue in the FAA Part 16 Complaint. Naples, p. 23. As there can be no claim preclusion 

for a case on different claims, the Opinion and Judgment are not relevant to Respondents' res 

judicata defense. 

8 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars issues which have been previously litigated 

when those issues are identical. Naples, p. 23. Again, the Part 16 Complaint deals exclusively 

with a determination on whether Respondents are in violation of grant assurances; the issues in 

the federal litigation, as can be seen from the complaint and amended complaint, did not deal 

with grant assurances but with whether the Airport Authority's treatment of Billy Hicks violated 

his constitutional rights. See Naples, p. 23-25. 

Additionally, comity, defmed as respecting another adjudicatory body by giving effect to 

its case law, does not require the FAA to follow a district court decision. Naples, p. 24. Comity is 

discretionary, not obligatory, and Respondents have offered no argmnent or support on why a 

federal constitutional claim of equal protection or due process would apply to the determination 

of whether the Airport Authority has violated its sponsor assurances. 

Respondents cannot boot strap the federal litigation into their res judicata and collateral 

estoppel defense to argue the relevance of the federal Opinion and Judgment. As can be seen in 

the complaint and amended complaint already entered into the record by the Respondents, the 

federal action did not seek tore-litigate the lease termination from the state ejectment action, but 

sought a determination on whether the actions by the Airport Authority (including the lease 

termination) were a violation of Billy's constitutional rights. The claims raised in the complaint 

and amended complaint in the federal case were based upon the Airport Authority's actions 

violating the constitutional protections against disparate treatment and due process. (Motion to 

Dismiss, Ex. 7H, 7N). The federal litigation carmot be used in a res judicata or collateral 

estoppel defense to the Part 16 determination of whether the Airport Authority violated sponsor 

assurances. 

9 
Though Respondents state the Opinion and Judgment are relevant to the proceedings 

(Motion for Leave, ~4 ), they offer no proof for the alleged relevance. Respondents have the 

burden of proof in their motions, and simply submitting documents the documents do not meet 

the burden if they fail to explain how the documents support their specific allegations. See 

JetAway v. Montrose County, FAA Docket No. 16-08-01 (Director's Determination)(July 2, 

2009), p. 8, FN 7. 

While in some cases, a state or federal lawsuit may be relevant to a Part 16 proceeding, 

the FAA is not bound by court decisions on issues covered by grant assurances. See Skydive 

Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Harry County Department of Airports, South Carolina, FAA Docket No. 

16-14-05 (Director's Determination)(October 7, 2015), p. 31. Issues such as eviction or lease 

tenninations can be reviewed by the FAA, and can be considered within the scope of the 

applicable grant assurances. Id., p. 32. However, Complainant did not rely upon the federal 

litigation in his Complaint, and Respondents have offered no proof on why the federal litigation 

is relevant, nor why the Opinion and Judgment of the federal court should be entered as part of 

the pleadings in this Part 16 Complaint. 

CONCLUSION 

As the outcome oflitigation between the parties is not relevant to the whether the 

Respondents are in violation of the grant assurances, the Respondents' Motion for Leave to File 

the Opinion and Judgment in 1:15-CV-38 and their Request for Judicial Notice should be denied. 

This, the 31 day of December, 2015. 

10 
11 

an olph M. James, 

N.C. Bar No. 10,000 

Attorney for Complainant 

P.O. Box 20069 

Winston-Salem, NC 27120 

Phone: (336) 724-7707 

Facsimile: (336) 724-9722 

Email: rmjames@rmjameslaw.com 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Randolph M. James, certify on December 31, 2015, I filed and served this 

Complainant's Reply to Respondents' Answer (together with all the attachments and exhibits 

hereto), by placing the original and three copies addressed to the FAA in a prepaid, first-class 

envelope in the custody of the United States mail as defined by Title 14 CFRPart 16, §16.3, and 

by mailing a copy to counsel of record by depositing the foregoing in U.S. mail, addressed to: 

FAA Part 16 Docket Clerk, 

AGC-600 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

(Original and Three Copies) 

Howard C. Jones, II 

105 West Fourth Street, Suite 400-E 

Winston-Salem, NC 27101 

Attorney for Motmt Airy/Snrry County 

Airport Authority 

12 

Edwin M. Woltz 

119 Rawley Avenue 

Mount Airy, NC 27030 

Attorney for the County of Surry, NC 

Hugh B. Campbell, III 

235 E. Independence Blvd. 

PO Box 1846 

Mount Airy, NC 27030 

Attorney for the City of Mount Airy, NC 

Randolph M. James, 

N.C. Bar No. 10,000 

Attorney for Complainant 

P.O. Box 20069 

Winston-Salem, NC 27120 

Phone: (336) 724-7707 

Facsimile: (336) 724-9722 

Email: rmjames@rmjameslaw.com