Affirmed and Opinion Filed April 17, 2015 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01556-CV 

UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1000, Appellant 

V. 

TEXOMA AREA PARATRANSIT SYSTEMS, INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District Court 

Grayson County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CV-10-0917 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Evans 

Opinion by Justice Bridges 

United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 1000 (the Union) appeals the trial 

court’s summary judgment awarding Texoma Area Paratransit Systems, Inc. (TAPS) declaratory 

relief and attorney’s fees. In four issues, the Union argues the trial court’s “final judgment” was 

signed after the court’s plenary power expired; the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

and committed reversible error in denying the Union’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to 

dismiss; the trial court erred in granting TAPS’ motion for summary judgment; and the trial court 

erred in awarding TAPS $115,578.77 in attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

In May 2010, TAPS filed its original petition seeking a declaratory judgment. TAPS 

alleged the Union had engaged TAPS in collective bargaining negotiations regarding TAPS’ 

employees since March 2010. The petition stated TAPS had advised the Union that TAPS was 
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forbidden under Texas law from engaging in collective bargaining, and any agreement reached 

would be in violation of the law and deemed void. The petition sought the following 

declarations: 

(1) that Plaintiff TAPS, as a rural transit district under the Texas Transportation 

[sic], is a governmental entity and political subdivision of the State of Texas; 

(2) that Plaintiff TAPS, as a governmental entity and political subdivision of the 

State of Texas, must comply with Texas law, specifically Chapter 617 of the 

Texas Government Code; 

(3) that Plaintiff TAPS, as a governmental entity and political subdivision of the 

State of Texas, may not enter “into a collective bargaining agreement with a labor 

organization regarding wages, hours, or conditions of employment of public 

employees” pursuant to § 617.002(a) of the Texas Government Code, and that any 

contract entered into in violation of same is void under § 617.002(b) as a matter of 

law; 

(4) that Plaintiff TAPS, as a governmental entity and political subdivision of the 

State of Texas, cannot be forced to engage in such negotiations as such would be 

in violation of Texas law. 

The petition also sought an award of reasonable attorney’s fees under section 37.009 of the 

Declaratory Judgment Act. 

 In June 2010, the Union filed with the National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB) a 

charge that TAPS had engaged in unfair labor practices. Specifically, the Union alleged TAPS 

had, “[s]ince on or about May 27, 2010 . . . refused to bargain with” the Union. In response to 

this charge, TAPS filed with the NLRB a letter asserting Texas law explicitly forbids TAPS from 

engaging in collective bargaining. Further, TAPS objected to the NLRB asserting jurisdiction 

over the matter because a suit regarding the same issues was then pending in state court and had 

been pending since before the Union’s charge was filed with the NLRB. Thus, TAPS argued, 

“the NLRB has no jurisdiction over this matter and must dismiss or, at the very least, abate the 

above-referenced union charge until the state lawsuit has been formally resolved.” In support of 

its argument, TAPS cited Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 748-49 
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(1983), for the proposition that the NLRB “may not halt the prosecution of a state-court lawsuit, 

regardless of the plaintiff’s motive, unless the suit lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law.” 

 In July 2010, the Union filed an answer containing a general denial and asserting (1) 

TAPS’ claims were preempted by federal law, including the National Labor Relations Act; (2) an 

action was pending before the NLRB, involving jurisdictional questions; (3) the court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over the Union; (4) TAPS failed to state “a claim cognizable against” the 

Union; and (5) TAPS misstated Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 

No. 1338, 273 S.W.3d 659 (Tex. 2008) in that the court in that case did not make a determination 

as to whether the prohibition of bargaining applied to DART, but accepted the parties’ 

acquiescence. The Union also requested an award of attorney’s fees. 

In August 2010, the NLRB issued its ruling dismissing the charge against TAPS because 

there was insufficient evidence to support the alleged violation; the Union appealed this decision. 

In January 2011, TAPS filed a traditional motion for summary judgment in which it discussed 

how the Union had engaged TAPS in collective bargaining in the past before TAPS was made 

aware of prohibitions under Texas law forbidding such negotiations. TAPS alleged that, after 

receiving notice from legal counsel and after the expiration of all prior contractual agreements, 

TAPS advised the Union that TAPS was forbidden from engaging in collective bargaining with a 

labor organization. The motion alleged the Union was “attempting to force” collective 

bargaining, necessitating the lawsuit in state court. TAPS reiterated the declarations it sought in 

the state court proceeding and asserted its entitlement to summary judgment on those claims for 

declaratory relief. In support of its motion, TAPS similarly renewed its arguments that Chapter 

617 of the Texas Government Code prohibited TAPS from collective bargaining. 

As to the Union’s claim that TAPS’ suit was preempted by federal law, TAPS again cited 

Bill Johnson’s Restaurants for the proposition that the NLRB does not have jurisdiction over any 
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pending state court suit which has a reasonable basis in fact or law. Bill Johnson’s Rests., 461 

U.S. at 748-49. Further relying on and quoting Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, at 746-47, TAPS 

argued that, “[j]ust as the [NLRB] must refrain from deciding genuinely disputed material fact 

issues with respect to a state suit, it likewise must not deprive a litigant of his right to have 

genuine state-law legal questions decided by the state judiciary. [The] NLRB should allow such 

issues to be decided by the state tribunals if there is any realistic chance that the plaintiff’s legal 

theory might be adopted.” 

To the extent the Union argued the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, TAPS 

pointed out the Union had not filed a special appearance; had filed an answer and general denial 

constituting a general appearance and subjecting the Union to the jurisdiction of the court for all 

purposes; and maintained its offices in Grapevine, Texas, where it was served with notice of the 

suit. On the issue of whether TAPS stated a cognizable claim pursuant to the Texas Declaratory 

Judgment Act, TAPS identified the justiciable controversy as whether TAPS, as a statutorily 

defined governmental entity and political subdivision, can be forced to violate Texas law by 

engaging in collective bargaining. Finally, TAPS asserted it did not misstate the holding in 

DART, 273 S.W.3d at 661-62, where the court held Texas law prohibits a state political 

subdivision from collective bargaining with public employees, and this prohibition has been held 

to apply to DART. Id. at 661. 

In February 2011, the NLRB denied the Union’s appeal of the dismissal of the Union’s 

complaint. In a letter, the NLRB stated TAPS is an exempt political subdivision, and the NLRB 

could not assert jurisdiction over TAPS under section 2(2) of the National Labor Relations Act 

providing an exemption for political subdivisions “to entities that are either: (1) created directly 

by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) 
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administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate,” 

citing NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600 (1971). 

Also in February 2011, the Union filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss in 

which it argued the real dispute between the parties was whether TAPS “is reached by and had a 

duty to collectively bargain with” the Union pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act. The 

Union alleged federal law holds that resolution of this issue is committed to the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the NLRB and noted the NLRB had ruled in TAPS’ favor on the issue. Thus, the 

Union argued, no justiciable controversy remained for the state court to decide, and the state 

court was therefore without subject matter jurisdiction over any claim in the lawsuit. 

On February 25, 2011, the trial court conducted a hearing on TAPS’ motion for summary 

judgment and the Union’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. On March 1, 2011, the 

trial court signed an order granting TAPS’ motion for summary judgment, granting each of 

TAPS’ claims for declaratory relief, and ordering that TAPS recover its “reasonable fees and 

costs upon proof of same.” The next day, the trial court entered an order denying the Union’s 

plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. 

In August 2012, TAPS filed a motion for entry of final judgment supported by affidavits 

and attorney’s records documenting TAPS’ claim for $115,578.77 in attorney’s fees. The 

motion also sought a final judgment incorporating the trial court’s prior order granting TAPS’ 

motion for summary judgment. In September 2012, the Union filed an amended answer in 

which it reiterated its prior claims and asserted TAPS’ request for attorney’s fees and costs was 

barred by laches. On October 16, 2012, the trial court sent the parties a letter (1) stating the court 

was of the opinion that TAPS’ motion for entry of judgment and motion to strike the Union’s 

amended answer should be granted and (2) awarding TAPS $115,578.77 in attorney’s fees. 
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On November 2, 2012, the Union filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of 

law with respect to the trial court’s March 2, 2011 order denying the Union’s plea to the 

jurisdiction and motion to dismiss and October 16, 2012 letter awarding TAPS attorney’s fees. 

The union asserted that its request for findings of fact and conclusions of law was proper and 

necessary because it appeared the court’s March 1, 2012 order granting TAPS’ motion for 

summary judgment was not a final judgment. Nevertheless, on November 15, 2012, the Union 

filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s March 1, 2011 order, March 2, 2011 order, and 

October 16, 2012 letter. 

On November 26, 2012, the trial court signed a final judgment granting TAPS’ motion 

for summary judgment and all of its claims for declaratory relief and awarding TAPS 

$115,578.77 in attorney’s fees and costs. Following the signing of the final judgment, the 

Grayson County District Clerk sent a “notice of judgment” under seal to each of the parties. On 

December 13, 2012, the trial court signed a final judgment awarding the same relief as the 

November 26 judgment and, in addition, awarding attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. This 

appeal followed. 

In its first issue, the Union argues the trial court’s combined orders of March 1, 2011 and 

March 2, 2011, combined with the court’s October 16, 2012 letter, constitute the final judgment 

in this case. Thus, the Union argues, the final judgments signed on November 26, 2012 and 

December 11, 2012 were signed after the trial court’s plenary power expired and are a nullity. 

When there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not 

final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless 

it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties. Lehmann 

v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001). An order that adjudicates only the 

plaintiff’s claims against the defendant does not adjudicate a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third 
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party claim, nor does an order adjudicating claims like the latter dispose of the plaintiff’s claims. 

Id. An order that disposes of claims by only one of multiple plaintiffs or against one of multiple 

defendants does not adjudicate claims by or against other parties. Id. An order does not dispose 

of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled “final” or because the word “final” 

appears elsewhere in the order or even because it awards costs. Id. Nor does an order 

completely dispose of a case merely because it states that it is appealable, since even 

interlocutory orders may sometimes be appealable. Id. Rather, there must be some other clear 

indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case. Id. 

To determine whether an order disposes of all pending claims and parties, it may of 

course be necessary for the appellate court to look to the record in the case. Id. at 205-06. The 

record may help illumine whether an order is made final by its own language, so that an order 

that all parties appear to have treated as final may be final despite some vagueness in the order 

itself, while an order that some party should not reasonably have regarded as final may not be 

final despite language that might indicate otherwise. Id. at 206. 

Here, the record shows the trial court’s March 1, 2011 order disposed of only TAPS’ 

claims, and the March 2, 2011 order disposed of only the Union’s claims. The issue of TAPS’ 

attorney’s fees and costs were addressed in the trial court’s October 16, 2012 letter setting an 

amount of attorney’s fees awarded to TAPS. Not until November 26, 2012 did the trial court 

enter a final judgment incorporating its disposition of the claims of all parties and awarding 

TAPS its attorney’s fees. The same day, the district clerk sent out notice that a final judgment 

had been entered in the case. We conclude the November 26, 2012 final judgment was the first 

judgment that clearly indicated the trial court intended the judgment to completely dispose of the 

entire case. See id. at 205. We overrule the Union’s first issue. 
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In its second issue, the Union argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 

committed reversible error in denying the Union’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. 

Specifically, the Union argues federal labor law preempts TAPS’ declaratory judgment claim 

and no justiciable controversy exists between the parties under Texas law. 

Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex. Dep’t of Parks 

and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Appellate courts reviewing a 

challenge to a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction review the trial court’s ruling de novo. Id.

at 228. A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a cause of 

action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 

34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The claims may form the context in which a dilatory plea is 

raised, but the plea should be decided without delving into the merits of the case. Id. The 

purpose of a dilatory plea is not to force the plaintiffs to preview their case on the merits but to 

establish a reason why the merits of the plaintiff’s claims should never be reached. Id. 

To the extent the Union argues the National Labor Relations Act preempts TAPS’ claims, 

we note the Act excludes from its definition of “employer” any “State or political subdivision 

thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2010). The NLRB itself stated TAPS is an exempt political 

subdivision, and the NLRB could not assert jurisdiction over TAPS under section 2(2) of the 

National Labor Relations Act. The Union also refers to a 13(c) arrangement between the parties 

that, together with the NLRB ruling in this case, disposed of all the issues between the parties. 

Section 13(c) of the federal Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964 (the “UMTA”, now the Federal 

Transit Act) conditions a public transportation authority’s receipt of federal financial assistance 

on “arrangements the Secretary of Labor concludes are fair and equitable” to protect “the 

interests of employees affected by the assistance.” DART v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 273 

S.W.3d 659, 660 (Tex. 2008). Such arrangements “shall include provisions that may be 
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necessary for . . . the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits . . . [and] the protection of 

individual employees against a worsening of their positions related to employment.” Id. In 

DART, DART and its employees’ union operated under a 13(c) arrangement. Id. The court, in 

holding 13(c) did not preempt DART’s immunity from suit under state law, noted that Texas law 

prohibits a state political subdivision from collective bargaining with public employees. Id. at 

661 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 617.002(a), (b) (West 2012)). The union in DART did not 

challenge the applicability of section 617.002. Id. Thus, DART stands for the proposition that a 

13(c) arrangement does not preempt the applicability of section 617.002. See id. at 660-61. 

Under these circumstances, we conclude TAPS’ declaratory judgment claim was not preempted 

under federal labor law. 

To the extent the Union argues no justiciable controversy exists in this case, we disagree. 

TAPS sought a declaratory judgment establishing the applicability and effect of section 617.002 

of the government code. The Union filed a general denial. A general denial of matters pleaded 

by the adverse party which are not required to be denied under oath, shall be sufficient to put the 

same in issue. TEX. R. CIV. P. 92. Further, the Union sought its own attorney’s fees and costs, 

which amounted to a claim for affirmative relief. Falls Cnty. v. Perkins and Cullum, 798 S.W.2d 

868, 871 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990, no writ) (request for attorney’s fees in declaratory 

judgment action is claim for affirmative relief). We conclude a justiciable controversy exists 

between the parties in this case. The trial court did not err in denying the Union’s plea to the 

jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. We overrule the Union’s 

second issue. 

In its third issue, the Union argues the trial court erred in granting TAPS’ motion for 

summary judgment. Specifically, the Union reiterates its arguments that TAPS’ declaratory 

judgment action is preempted by federal labor law and there is no evidence of a live, justiciable 
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controversy between the parties. We have considered and rejected these arguments, and we need 

not address them further. 

As an additional ground for denying TAPS’ motion for summary judgment, the Union 

relies on the affidavit of Richard Hanna, the Union’s vice president. The Union argues Hanna’s 

affidavit “is sufficient to create a triable fact issue as to whether a live, justiciable controversy 

exists under Texas law that precludes summary judgment in favor of TAPS.” 

The standard for reviewing a traditional summary judgment is well established. See 

Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49. The movant has the burden of showing 

that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). In deciding whether a disputed material fact issue exists precluding 

summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true. Nixon, 690 

S.W.2d at 549. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any 

doubts resolved in its favor. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005). We 

review a summary judgment de novo to determine whether a party’s right to prevail is 

established as a matter of law. Dickey v. Club Corp., 12 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2000, pet. denied). 

The Union argues Hanna’s affidavit raises a fact issue as to the existence of a justiciable 

controversy. The affidavit states that TAPS and the Union had engaged in collective bargaining 

between 1998 and 2010. Hanna states this collective bargaining was “pursuant to the NLRA” 

and the Union “has never demanded that TAPS collectively bargain with it pursuant to Texas 

law and the union leadership has never expressed a formal opinion to TAPS or its representatives 

about what Texas law has to say regarding collective bargaining.” Hanna’s affidavit describes 

the Union’s attempt to continue collective bargaining under the NLRA, TAPS’ filing of the 

underlying suit, the Union’s filing of a charge “with the NLRA [sic],” and the NLRB’S 
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determination that TAPS was exempt from the NLRA. The affidavit states the Union “has not 

made any new or additional demands upon TAPS to collectively bargain since the NLRB issued 

its final decision that TAPS is exempt from the reach of the NLRA.” Finally, the affidavit states 

the Union “has made no decision as to what action, if any, it will undertake in the future relative 

to the relationship between it and TAPS.” 

At best, Hanna’s affidavit establishes the Union sought no collective bargaining with 

TAPS during the pendency of the underlying suit. The affidavit leaves uncertain what action the 

Union might take in the future regarding collective bargaining. The purpose of declaratory 

judgments is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, 

status, and other legal relations; and it is to be liberally construed and administered. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(b) (West 2015). We conclude the trial court did not err 

in granting summary judgment on TAPS’ request for declaratory relief. See id.; Nixon, 690 

S.W.2d at 548-49. We overrule the Union’s third issue. 

In its fourth issue, the Union argues the trial court erred in awarding TAPS $115,578.77 

in attorney’s fees and in granting TAPS’ motion to strike the Union’s affirmative defense of 

Laches in connection with the attorney’s fees award. 

The declaratory judgments act entrusts attorney fee awards to the trial court’s sound 

discretion, subject to the requirements that any fees awarded be reasonable and necessary, which 

are matters of fact, and to the additional requirements that fees be equitable and just, which are 

matters of law. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). It is an abuse of discretion 

for a trial court to rule arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles or 

to rule without supporting evidence. Id. Therefore, in reviewing an attorney’s fee award under 

the Act, the court of appeals must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

awarding fees when there was insufficient evidence that the fees were reasonable and necessary, 
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or when the award was inequitable or unjust. Id. Unreasonable fees cannot be awarded, even if 

the court believed them just, but the court may conclude that it is not equitable or just to award 

even reasonable and necessary fees. Id. 

In part, the Union attacks the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees by arguing the trial 

court erroneously failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Union was harmed by 

this failure, and there is no presumption or implied findings to support the trial court’s award of 

attorney’s fees. Under a discretionary statute, findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither 

appropriate nor required. Keever v. Finlan, 988 S.W.2d 300, 306 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. 

dism’d). Because TAPS sought attorney’s fees under a statute that makes the award of 

attorney’s fees discretionary, the trial court was not required to file findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. See id. 

The Union also challenges the attorney’s fees award on the basis that TAPS’ summary 

judgment motion “presented no specific arguments, analysis or evidence . . . as to any of the 

required four limiting factors announced in Bocquet.” See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21 (attorney’s 

fee award under declaratory judgment act must be reasonable and necessary and equitable and 

just). The Union argues the trial court’s March 1, 2011 order granting TAPS’ motion for 

summary judgment and granting TAPS its “reasonable fees and costs upon proof of same” is 

“arbitrary, unreasonable, made without regard to guiding legal principles, and is without 

supporting evidence.” In making this argument, the Union disregards the evidence of reasonable 

and necessary attorney’s fees presented in TAPS’ August 2012 motion for entry of final 

judgment and at the hearing on that motion. We have previously discussed the incomplete nature 

of the relief afforded by the trial court’s March 1, 2011 order. We decline to hold that the trial 

court’s express deferral of a determination of attorney’s fees based on proof to be adduced at a 

later date rendered that award unsupportable because no evidence supported it. 
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The Union argues further that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was not equitable 

and just and the fees were not reasonable and necessary. There are several factors a trial court 

should consider in determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to award. Jarvis v. 

Rocanville Corp., 298 S.W.3d 305, 318 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). These factors 

include: the time, labor, and skill required to properly perform the legal service; the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved; the customary fees charged in the local legal community for 

similar legal services; the amount involved and the results obtained; the nature and length of the 

professional relationship with the client; and the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer 

performing the services. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 

(Tex. 1997); Jarvis, 298 S.W.3d at 318. But a trial court is not required to receive evidence on 

each of these factors. Jarvis, 298 S.W.3d at 318. 

The record contains the affidavits of one of TAPS’ attorneys and the executive director of 

the attorney’s law firm stating the specific challenges presented by this case and specifying 

$115,578.77 was a reasonable and necessary fee. The trial judge also conducted a hearing at 

which he heard evidence concerning the attorney’s fees issue. Further, TAPS attached to its 

motion for entry of final judgment extensive billing records supporting the amount of fees it 

sought. The Union relies on the affidavit of its attorney in which he states the fees TAPS sought 

were not reasonable and necessary. The affidavit cites the factors outlined above and, as 

“reasons” that the fees are not reasonable and necessary, lists six items including (1) failure to 

exercise billing judgment, (2) inclusion of billing/costs for motions and/or discovery never filed 

or served, (3) failure to describe services and costs with sufficient particularity, (4) billing for 

services and costs arising out of the federal administrative proceedings, (5) failure to segregate 

billing and costs declaratory judgment claims from other claims, and (6) billing for services and 

costs beyond the preparation of/attendance at items as reflected on the trial court’s docket sheet, 
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a copy of which was attached. We conclude that, because these “reasons” did not provide 

underlying facts to support the conclusion that the attorney’s fees were unreasonable, the 

affidavit was conclusory and therefore did not raise a fact issue on the question of the 

reasonableness of the requested attorney’s fees. See Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 

(Tex. 1984). Further, having reviewed the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in making its award of attorney’s fees. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21.

Regarding the Union’s complaint that the trial court erred in granting TAPS’ motion to 

strike its amended answer, rule 166a(c) provides that the trial court should render summary 

judgment based on the pleadings on file at the time of the hearing. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). 

Once the hearing date on the motion for summary judgment has passed, but before the court 

signs a judgment, a party must obtain a written order from the trial court granting permission to 

file an amended pleading. Prater v. State Farm Lloyds, 217 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2007, no pet.). Here, on February 25, 2011, the trial court conducted a hearing on TAPS’ 

motion for summary judgment. The Union filed its amended motion adding the defense of 

laches in September 2012. The Union did not seek or obtain a written order from the trial court 

granting permission to file an amended pleading. We therefore conclude the trial did not err in 

granting TAPS’ motion to strike the Union’s amended pleading. Id. We overrule the Union’s 

fourth issue. 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

121556F.P05 

 

/David L. Bridges/ 

DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL 

WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1000, 

Appellant 

No. 05-12-01556-CV V. 

TEXOMA AREA PARATRANSIT 

SYSTEMS, INC., Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District 

Court, Grayson County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CV-10-0917. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. 

Justices Lang and Evans participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee TEXOMA AREA PARATRANSIT SYSTEMS, INC. 

recover its costs of this appeal from appellant UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS 

UNION LOCAL 1000. 

Judgment entered this 17th day of April, 2015.