[Cite as State v. Briggs, 2014-Ohio-705.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 99980

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

LOVELL BRIGGS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-476291 

 BEFORE: Blackmon, P.J., McCormack, J., and Stewart, J. 

 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 27, 2014
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

Eben McNair 

McNair Legal Services, L.L.C. 

8309 Wyatt Road 

Broadview Heights, Ohio 44147 

Christopher G. Thomarios 

75 Public Square 

Suite 800 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Gittel L. Chaiko 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

9th Floor Justice Center 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.: 
{¶1} Appellant Lovell Briggs (“Briggs”) appeals the trial court’s imposition of 

five years community control sanctions after he obtained judicial release on a six-month 

probation violation sentence. He assigns the following error for our review: 

The trial court erred as a matter of law by extending appellant’s aggregate 

community control sanction beyond five years. 

{¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm Briggs’s sentence. 

 The apposite facts follow. 

{¶3} On January 20, 2006, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Briggs for 

one count of failure to pay child support. Briggs pleaded guilty to the indictment and 

was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions. The conditions for 

community control sanctions were: 1) abide by the rules and regulations of the probation 

department, 2) random drug testing, and 3) pay child support in the amount of $153 per 

month. He was advised that the violation of any of the conditions “may result in more 

restrictive sanctions, or a prison term of six months as approved by law.” 

{¶4} On November 21, 2008, Briggs was found to be in violation of his 

community control sanctions. The court, nonetheless, continued Briggs’s community 

control sanctions. In May 2009, the trial court issued a capias for Briggs because he 

failed to appear for his probation violation hearing after he again violated the terms of his 

community control sanctions. Briggs turned himself in to the court on February 25, 

2010. 
{¶5} After a hearing was conducted on March 12, 2010, the trial court concluded 

that Briggs had violated his community control sanctions and sentenced him to six 

months in prison. 

{¶6} On April 20, 2010, Briggs filed a motion for judicial release. After 

conducting a hearing, the trial court granted Briggs’s motion on April 30, 2010. The 

conditions of his judicial release were, 1) he was placed on five years of community 

control sanctions, 2) had to submit to random drug testing, and 3) has to maintain 

employment. Briggs did not appeal from this order. 

{¶7} On July 27, 2012, a warrant was issued for Briggs for failing to abide by the 

terms and conditions of community control sanctions. On August 18, 2012, Briggs was 

brought into custody and on August 27, 2012, the trial court found that Briggs had 

violated the terms of his community control sanctions. The court, however, continued 

his community control sanction with the prior conditions. 

{¶8} On December 13, 2012, the trial court issued another capias for Briggs for his 

failure to comply with the conditions of his probation. Briggs was brought into custody 

on May 10, 2013, and at a hearing conducted on May 15, 2003, the trial court found 

Briggs violated the conditions of his community control sanctions. The trial court again 

continued his community control sanctions. 

{¶9} At the hearing, Briggs’s counsel argued the court could not place him on 

community control sanctions because his original community control sanctions were 

imposed on January 20, 2006 and, even including the capiases, more than five years, had 

elapsed. The trial court stated on the record that it believed the original community 
control sanction was irrelevant because the current community control sanction was 

associated with his judicial release on April 30, 2010. 

Community Control Sanctions

{¶10} In his sole assigned error, Briggs argues the trial court erred by continuing 

his community control sanction because the court was without jurisdiction to continue the 

community control sanction after five years had elapsed from his 2006 conviction. 

{¶11} Briggs relies on R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) for his contention that the trial court’s 

continuation of his community control sanction was invalid because it exceeded the 

five-year time limitation. R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) states in pertinent part: 

If in sentencing an offender for a felony the court is not required to impose 

a prison term, a mandatory prison term, or a term of life imprisonment upon 

the offender, the court may directly impose a sentence that consists of one 

or more community control sanctions. * * * The duration of all community 

control sanctions imposed upon an offender under this division shall not 

exceed five years. 

{¶12} Thus, the above section deals with the trial court’s initial sentencing of the 

defendant. However, in the instant case, the trial court continued the community control 

sanction that was imposed as a condition of his judicial release, not his original 

conviction. R.C. 2929.20(K) states: 

If the court grants a motion for judicial release under this section, the court 

shall order the release of the eligible offender, shall place the eligible 

offender under an appropriate community control sanction, under 
appropriate conditions, and under the supervision of the department of 

probation serving the court and shall reserve the right to reimpose the 

sentence that it reduced if the offender violates the sanction. * * * The 

period of community control shall be no longer than five years. 

{¶13} Thus, each provision has the five-year limitation, but as it pertains to the 

subject matter of each of the statutory sections. R.C. 2929.15 deals with imposing 

community control sanctions as part of the original sentence, while R.C. 2929.20 deals 

with imposing community control sanctions as a condition of judicial release. 

{¶14} Courts have consistently found that R.C. 2929.15 and R.C. 2929.20 are 

independent statutes and serve different purposes. See State v. Mann, 3d Dist. 

Crawford No. 3-03-42, 2004-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 6; State v. Durant, 5th Dist. Stark No. 

2005CA00314, 2006-Ohio-4067, at ¶ 12. The court in State v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. Scioto 

No. 10CA3389, 2011-Ohio-6924, ¶ 13, distinguished the statutes, stating: 

[T]he rules dealing with a violation of an original sentence of community 

control (R.C. 2929.15) should not be confused with the sections of the 

Revised Code regarding early judicial release (R.C. 2929.20) even though 

the language of R.C. 2929.20([K]) contains the term “community control” 

in reference to the status of an offender when granted early judicial release. 

* * * Under R.C. 2929.15, a defendant’s original sentence is community 

control and he will not receive a term of incarceration unless he violates the 

terms of his community control[;] whereas, when a defendant is granted 

judicial release under R.C. 2929.20, he has already served a period of 

incarceration, and the remainder of that prison sentence is suspended 

pending either the successful completion of a period of community control 

or the defendant’s violation of a community control sanction. State v. Jones, 

3rd Dist. Nos. 10-07-26 & 10-07-27, 2008-Ohio-2117, at ¶12 [**8] 

(citations omitted). See also State v. Franklin, 5th Dist. No. 

2011-CA-00055, 2011-Ohio-4078, at ¶ 12. 
{¶15} In the instant case, at the time the trial court continued Briggs’s community 

control sanction imposed as part of his judicial release, Briggs had served less than three 

years of the community control sanction imposed as part of his judicial release. Therefore, 

the community control was not invalid for exceeding the five-year limitation set forth in 

R.C. 2929.20(K). The cases that Briggs cites are distinguishable because none of them 

concern community control that was imposed as a condition of judicial release. They 

concern the imposition of community control sanction as part of the original sentence. 

State v. Redmond, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21500, 2007-Ohio-441; State v. Wright, 2d 

Dist. Darke No. 05-CA-1678, 2006-Ohio-6067; State v. Craig, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

84861, 2005-Ohio-1184. Accordingly, Briggs’s sole assigned error is overruled. 

{¶16} Judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of 

Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

___________________________________________________ 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, PRESIDING JUDGE 

TIM McCORMACK, J., and 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR