NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

RONALD REED WRIGHT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0142

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201800455

The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Nathan Curtisi

Counsel for Appellee

Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman

By Jill L. Evans

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-9-2020
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Ronald Wright appeals his conviction and sentence for 

misconduct involving weapons. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In March 2018, a Mohave County Sheriff’s Office deputy was 

dispatched to a residence in Kingman.1 The deputy observed Wright 

standing outside the home, facing a woman in the doorway. When the 

deputy told Wright he was under arrest, Wright removed a backpack he 

was wearing and attempted to toss it to the woman. The deputy “grabbed 

the backpack,” arrested Wright, and searched them both. In the backpack, 

the deputy found a loaded firearm, which Wright, who knew he was a 

prohibited possessor, was not permitted to have.

¶3 The jury convicted Wright of one count of misconduct 

involving weapons. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 13-3102(A)(4)2 (“A person 

commits misconduct involving weapons by knowingly . . . [p]ossessing a 

deadly weapon or prohibited weapon if such person is a prohibited 

possessor.”). The trial court found the State had proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Wright had two historical prior felony convictions,

sentenced him as a non-dangerous, repetitive offender to the minimum 

sentence of eight years’ imprisonment, and credited him with 254 days of 

presentence incarceration. Wright timely appealed, and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury 

verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against the [defendant].” State 

v. Nelson, 214 Ariz. 196, 196, ¶ 2 (App. 2007) (citing State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 

246, 246, ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of rules and statutes.
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

I. Jury Instructions

¶4 After the close of evidence, the trial court discussed jury 

instructions with the parties. Although the State was required to prove 

Wright “knowingly” possessed a deadly weapon or prohibited weapon as 

a prohibited possessor,see A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), defense counsel asked the 

court to include “all mental states” in the jury instructions “for comparison 

sake,” so the jury would understand “there are different culpability levels 

in crime and that this crime involves the culpable state of knowingly.” The 

court denied the request.

¶5 Wright argues on appeal that by refusing to instruct jurors on 

other mental states, the trial court deprived him of a “meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 

479, 485 (1984). In particular, Wright asserts that jurors could have found 

he possessed the firearm recklessly, but not knowingly, so as to warrant an 

instruction on recklessness. “We review a court’s refusal to give a 

requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion,” State v. Lewis, 236 

Ariz. 336, 346, ¶ 44 (App. 2014) (citing State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 363-64, 

¶ 51 (2009)), and find no error here.

¶6 Although a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction “on all 

theories reasonably supported by the evidence, ‘when a jury is properly 

instructed on the applicable law, the trial court is not required to provide 

additional instructions that do nothing more than reiterate or enlarge the

instructions in defendant’s language.’” State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 566, 

¶ 91 (2014) (quoting State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309 (1995)). Here, the only 

mental state applicable to the charge against Wright was “knowingly,”3 see 

A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), which the court correctly defined for jurors as 

“act[ing] with awareness of the existence of conduct or circumstances 

constituting an offense.” See A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b); see also Rev. Ariz. Jury 

Instr. (Criminal) 1.0510(b) (5th ed. 2019). The definition of “knowingly” 

inherently excludes other mental states — such as recklessness or criminal 

negligence — that do not satisfy the elements of that definition. The court 

3 Although the trial court acknowledged Wright could have also been 

convicted of misconduct involving weapons if the jury found he

“intentionally” possessed a firearm, the court concluded there was no 

reason to instruct jurors on “intentional” possession under the facts of the 

case, and Wright does not challenge that decision.
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

4

was not required to provide additional instructions, or put a gloss on the 

existing instruction, that would explain what “knowingly” does not mean. 

¶7 Nor did the trial court’s refusal to instruct jurors on mental 

states inapplicable to the charged offense offend principles of due process

by impeding Wright’s ability to present a complete defense. Because the 

parties stipulated that Wright was a prohibited possessor on the date of the 

offense, the only question at trial was whether he knowingly possessed the 

firearm that was found in the backpack. And, although the defense chose 

not to present any direct testimony or evidence, Wright received a fair 

opportunity to defend against the element of knowing possession through 

cross-examination and argument.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove Prior Convictions

¶8 After the jury found Wright guilty of misconduct involving 

weapons, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s allegations that Wright 

had two prior felony convictions. At the hearing, the State offered certified 

copies of: the judgment and sentencing order for one prior conviction; the 

sentencing order for another prior conviction; a “pen pack” from the 

Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) consisting of a summary 

inmate report, photograph, and fingerprints; and a booking photograph 

and fingerprints taken from Wright in the instant case. After considering 

the evidence and argument, the court found the State proved the prior 

convictions beyond a reasonable doubt “[b]ased on the identifying 

information” provided.

¶9 Wright argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence 

proving he was the person who committed the alleged priors. Because he 

did not make this objection at trial, he bears the burden of proving 

fundamental, prejudicial error to merit relief on appeal. See State v. Fiihr, 

221 Ariz. 135, 136, ¶ 1 (App. 2008) (citing State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 

567-68, ¶¶ 19-20 (2005), and State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 154 (1991)).

¶10 The certified records of the prior convictions describe a

person named “Ronald Reed Wright” with a birthdate of January 29, 1961; 

the same information is contained in the ADOC pen pack, as well as the 

booking documents associated with the instant case. Moreover, Wright’s 

booking photograph from the instant case resembles the photograph from 

the ADOC, both include a similar chin scar, and the ADOC summary 

inmate report list descriptions for two offenses committed by Wright on 

September 10, 2014 and August 29, 2006 — the same offense dates listed in 

the certified sentencing orders provided by the State.
STATE v. WRIGHT

Decision of the Court

5

¶11 This evidence is sufficient to identify Wright as the person 

convicted of the prior felonies. See State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445, 446-47 

(1969) (concluding a photograph and judgment of conviction were 

sufficient to prove a prior conviction despite lack of expert fingerprint 

comparison); State v. Baca, 102 Ariz. 83, 87 (1967) (concluding photographs 

and a “detailed description” of the offender in record of conviction were 

sufficient to prove the defendant was the same person convicted of a prior 

felony). Accordingly, Wright fails to prove error, fundamental or 

otherwise.

CONCLUSION

¶12 Wright’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.