S. HRG. 110–777 

NOMINATIONS OF THE 110TH 

CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JANUARY 30 THROUGH DECEMBER 19, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

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NOMINATIONS OF THE 110TH CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION 

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48–267 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 110–777 

NOMINATIONS OF THE 110TH 

CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JANUARY 30 THROUGH DECEMBER 19, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

110TH CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire* 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Republican Staff Director

*Note: Reassigned to Committee on Finance January 24, 2008. 

—————

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

110TH CONGRESS—SECOND SESSION

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming* 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Republican Staff Director

*Note: Appointed February 12, 2008. 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

[Any additional material relating to these nominees may be found 

at the end of the applicable day’s hearing.] 

Tuesday, January, 30, 2007 Page 

Negroponte, John D., to be Deputy Secretary of State ......................................... 6 

Thursday, February 15, 2007 

Crocker, Ryan C., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq .............................. 79 

Wood, William B., to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ... 75 

Tuesday, February 27, 2007 

Fox, Sam, to be Ambassador to Belgium ............................................................... 130 

Phillips, Stanley Davis, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia ............... 127 

Tuesday March 13, 2007 

Almquist, Katherine, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for 

International Development for Africa ................................................................ 166 

Bonicelli, Paul J., to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development for Latin America and the Caribbean .......................... 163 

Chin, Curtis S., to be U.S. Director of the Asian Development Bank ................. 178 

Debevoise, Eli Whitney, III, to be U.S. Executive Director of the International 

Bank for Reconstruction and Development ........................................................ 181 

Kunder, James R., to be Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development .......................................................................................... 158 

Lundsager, Margrethe, to be U.S. Executive Director of the International 

Monetary Fund ..................................................................................................... 177 

Menarchik, Douglas, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for 

International Development for Europe and Eurasia ......................................... 160 

Thursday, March 15, 2007 

Khalilzad, Zalmay, to be Representative to the United Nations, with the 

rank and status of Ambassador, and the Representative in the Security 

Council on the United Nations, and to be Representative to the Sessions 

of the General Assembly of the United Nations during his tenure of service 

as Representative to the United Nations ........................................................... 212 

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Page

IV 

Thursday, March 22, 2007 

Fraker, Ford M., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ................ 261 

Wednesday, April 18, 2007 

Carter, Phillip, III, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea ....................... 284 

Garvey, Janet E., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon ..................... 282 

Marquardt, R. Niels, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and 

the Union of Comoros .......................................................................................... 280 

Tuesday, May 22, 2007 

Hughes, Miriam K., to be Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia .. 311 

Hume, Cameron R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia .................. 305 

Huso, Ravic R., to be Ambassador to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic ..... 317 

Keith, James R., to be Ambassador to Malaysia ................................................... 308 

Klemm, Hans G., to be Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of TimorLeste ...................................................................................................................... 314

Tuesday, June 12, 2007 

Jeffery, Reuben, III, to be Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, 

and Agricultural Affairs ...................................................................................... 340 

Tuesday, June 19, 2007 

Cook, Frederick B., to be Ambassador to the Central African Republic ............. 373 

Garvelink, William John, to be Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo .............................................................................................................. 360 

Green, Mark, to be Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania ................ 352 

Nesbitt, Wanda. L., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire ............. 376 

Nolan, Robert B., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho ........................ 357 

Parker, Maurice S., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland ................. 355 

Perry, June Carter, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra Leone ............. 370 

Wednesday, June 20, 2007, Morning 

Brownfield, William R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia ............ 408 

Duddy, Patrick Dennis, to be Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela .................................................................................................................... 413 

McKinley, Peter Michael, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Peru ................. 411 

Wednesday, June 20, 2007, Afternoon 

Ereli, Joseph Adam, to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain ................... 452 

Norland, Richard Boyce, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Uzbekistan ....... 454 

Patterson, Anne Woods, to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan ........................................................................................................................ 446 

Powell, Nancy J., to be Ambassador to Nepal ....................................................... 450 

Seche, Stephen A., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen ........................ 457 

Page

V 

Thursday, June 21, 2007 

English, Charles L., to be Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina ................... 494 

Kennedy, J. Christian, to be Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues ....................... 497 

Moore, Roderick W., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro ............. 501 

Munter, Cameron, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia .......................... 499 

Withers, John L., II, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Albania .................... 492 

Tuesday, July 24, 2007, Morning 

John, Eric G., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand ............................ 537 

Michalak, Michael W., to be Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 540 

Tuesday, July 24, 2007, Afternoon 

Fore, Henrietta Holsman, to be Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development .......................................................................................... 559 

Wednesday, September 5, 2007 

Brinker, Nancy Goodman, to be Chief of Protocol ................................................ 646 

Kimmitt, Mark, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs ....................................................................................................................... 642 

Siegel, Ned L., to be Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas ......... 646 

Thomas, Harry K., Jr., to be Director General of the Foreign Service ............... 646 

Tuesday, September 18, 2007 

Egan, Christopher F., to be Representative of the United States to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, with the rank of 

Ambassador .......................................................................................................... 698 

Wednesday, September 19, 2007 

Boulware, Mark M., to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania . 719 

McGee, James D., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe .................... 725 

McMullen, Ronald K., to be Ambassador to the State of Eritrea ........................ 727 

Nigro, Louis J., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chad ................................. 729 

Sanders, Robin R., to be Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria .......... 714 

Wells, Barry L., to be Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia .................... 716 

Tuesday, September 25, 2007 

Fannin, P. Robert, to be Ambassador to the Dominican Republic ...................... 763 

Johnson, David T., to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs ................................................................... 755 

Simons, Paul E., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chile ............................... 766 

Wednesday, October 3, 2007 

Mathieu, Gail D., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia ........................ 801 

Mozena, Dan, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Angola ................................. 803 

Reddick, Eunice S., to be Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic, and to 

serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador 

to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe ..................................... 797 

Steiger, William R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Mozambique ............. 806 

Page

VI 

Wednesday, October 17, 2007 

Obsitnik, Vincent, to be Ambassador to the Slovak Republic .............................. 833 

Speckhard, Daniel V., to be Ambassador to Greece .............................................. 827 

Stephenson, Thomas F., to be Ambassador to the Portuguese Republic ............ 830 

Tuesday, October 30, 2007 

Heath, Daniel D., to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the International 

Monetary Fund ..................................................................................................... 858 

Kennedy, Patrick F., to be Under Secretary of State for Management .............. 851 

Mulvaney, Sean R., to be Assistant Administrator for Management of the 

U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................... 855 

Wednesday, December 19, 2007 

Glendon, Mary Ann, to be Ambassador to the Holy See ...................................... 892 

Larson, Charles W., Jr., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Latvia ................ 894 

(1) 

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Negroponte, John D., to be Deputy Secretary of State 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 

SD–216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, 

Obama, Menendez, Voinovich, Murkowski, Cardin, Casey, Webb, 

Isakson, and Vitter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH BIDEN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order, please. We’re delighted this morning to have Ambassador Negroponte back before 

us. We’re equally delighted to have Senator Stevens and Senator 

Lieberman. We’re told by staff you folks have a full morning and 

a lot going on in your committees, so Senator Lugar and I will forego our opening statements and yield immediately to you, Senator 

Stevens, for your introduction and then to Senator Lieberman. 

Then we will make our opening statements and invite Ambassador 

Negroponte to make his, if that meets your needs. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That’s very gracious of you. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you so much. Let me put my statement 

in full in the record and just summarize—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I’m pleased 

to be back again before your committee. Ambassador Negroponte 

and I have been friends from at least 1977, when he was Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries. I’m delighted he’s joined today by his wife, Diana, and Maria and George 

and Sophia behind us. 

John came to Alaska in that capacity many times and he handled the fisheries agreements that were important to our young 

State. He negotiated in 1978, the landmark accord, which protected 

Alaska’s salmon stocks from Japanese high sea fisheries and those 

benefits continue through today. 

2 

Over the years, I have worked with John in many positions. I’m 

sure you all know his background but he has been Ambassador to 

four countries: Honduras, Mexico, The Philippines, Iraq. He has 

been a permanent representative to the United Nations and Director of National Intelligence. I think—I don’t know any man who 

has had more positions in my time here. He has been one who has 

had great success, particularly in his most recent assignment 

where he has brought together this massive intelligence concepts 

of our Federal Government and coordinated them and done an excellent job and I think everyone realizes what a great job he’s done. 

He now seeks to go back to the Department of State. As we all 

know, that is where his heart has been and he has stated himself 

that all his life, he has wanted to do this kind of this work and 

this position he’s going to take now is extremely important to us 

and our country. 

Winston Churchill once observed that the price of greatness is responsibility, and John has been willing to accept responsibility on 

many occasions. So I hope the committee will quickly recommend 

his confirmation as the Deputy Secretary of State and I know of 

no man who can do a better job. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens. I do understand you may have to leave, and thank you for making the effort to be here. 

Senator STEVENS. I’ll turn it over to my colleague to finish his 

comments. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lieberman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Lugar, Senator Coleman, and other members of the committee. 

I’m greatly honored to appear before you and to have been asked, 

along with Ted Stevens, to introduce John Negroponte to this committee and to ask you to confirm him for the high position of Deputy Secretary of State. He is enormously well qualified for this position. 

Ted said he went back to 1977 in knowing John. I would like to 

say that we go back to the sixties. We were both at Yale. We may 

have crossed as he left in 1960 and I entered there by trying to 

subtly indicate that he is older than I am. I am much more distinguished. [Laughter.] 

There, it struck me that we swore allegiance at the end of our 

alma mater to God, Country and Yale. I think John and I both 

thought that was in descending order of importance, God, Country 

and Yale and in fact, like so many at that time, he was committed 

to a life of public service and went right from college to the Foreign 

Service and has served our Nation with the highest honor and 

greatest positive effect in a number of posts that are part of his 

record, which I will not enumerate, since that time, including being 

Ambassador to Iraq during a very difficult period where he, I 

thought, was very effective and advanced the cause of both stability 

and freedom to the best of his ability. 

When he was nominated for this post, John said, and I quote, 

‘‘Whether in Baghdad, Kabul, Kosovo, or elsewhere, these dedicated 

3 

professionals, that is the—his fellow members of the Foreign Service are on the front line of advancing America’s commitment to 

freedom.’’ 

And I agree with that and I appreciate his commitment to those 

who with him, have served as Foreign Service officers, the cause 

of our Nation abroad and I think it gives him an extra measure of 

understanding of effectiveness as he comes to this high position. 

I would add just one more experience that I’ve had with John 

that I think speaks well for his ability to take on what is not only 

a diplomatic assignment but also an administrative assignment. 

As my colleagues know, the Senate asked our Senate Committee, 

then known as the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 

now Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to take up the 

task of considering and recommending to the Senate the legislation 

recommended by the 9/11 Commission and then seeing it through 

the Senate and the House to passage. 

Obviously, that Commission recommended and we in Congress 

created the new position of Director of National Intelligence, the 

DNI, to essentially bring together these disparate entities within 

our American Intelligence community, which had not been working 

well together. So to make a long story short, had not connected the 

dots, if you will. 

This was a challenge that required not only a strong administrative hand, if I may say so, but all the diplomatic skills that John 

Negroponte learned in his many diplomatic assignments, which is 

negotiating among and coalescing the disparate groups within the 

American Intelligence community. He has done, I think, an extraordinarily good job at that. 

The work goes on because it’s enormous work but he has brought 

us, in a short period of time, to a point where we are quite simply, 

because of his work, better protecting the people of America and 

preventing a reoccurrence of the nightmare that we all experienced 

on 9/11. 

I can think of no one who is better able, at this moment, to assist 

Secretary Rice, both in the management of the Department of State 

and in the implementation of its responsibilities throughout this 

challenging world. 

So I’m honored to have been asked to introduce Ambassador 

Negroponte to you. I recommend him to you and I hope you’ll be 

able to confirm him unanimously. 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Both of you 

being here speaks loudly for Ambassador Negroponte. I appreciate 

you being here. 

As indicated earlier, I’ll proceed now with a brief opening statement and Senator Lugar will have an opening statement, and we’ll 

turn it over to the Ambassador with our hope and expectation that 

he’ll introduce his family to us again and make his statement. 

Then we’ll go to questions. 

Today, as is obvious, the committee considers the nomination of 

John Negroponte to be the Deputy Secretary of State. It has been 

over 7 months since Deputy Secretary Zoellick announced he was 

leaving the Department, and in doing so, the administration has 

set a dubious record—the longest period without a Deputy SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
4 

retary of State since the position was created in 1972. So we’re 

happy, and the reason why we moved this as quickly as we could 

is to rectify that situation. 

Ambassador Negroponte is well known to us all. I will not take 

the time of the committee nor the nominee to go through his long 

record of service, some of which has been referenced already. Senior officials must have good judgment, and they must be forthcoming with the Congress and the American people about the difficulties we face in Iraq and elsewhere. I would say respectfully, 

Mr. Secretary, that Deputy Secretary Armitage, from my position, 

was just such a person. I would urge you to take a look at him as 

a model, in my view, for dealing with the committee. 

Last week, General Petreus, the new military commander in 

Iraq, told the Committee on Armed Services that the situation in 

Iraq was ‘‘dire.’’ The Iraq Study Group, whose leadership will appear before this committee this afternoon, called the situation 

‘‘grave and deteriorating.’’ Because it has been reported that you, 

Mr. Ambassador, will be taking a leading role in Iraqi policy, as I 

indicated to you in the ante room, I’m going to ask you to give your 

assessment of the situation in Iraq. How is Iraq different than 

when you served there? Do you believe the President’s surge policy 

will succeed? What are the elements of a workable political solution 

that the President says is needed and we all say is needed, in order 

to end the sectarian violence? What are the elements of that solution? 

If you are confirmed, I hope you will not confuse the Senate’s endorsement of you as an endorsement of the policies of the administration that has nominated you. After 3 weeks of hearings in this 

committee, I am more convinced than ever that surging our forces 

into the midst iof a cival war in Iraq is a tragic mistake. I’m equally convinced that our only chance to leave Iraq with our interest 

intact, rests on a political solution that ends the sectarian violence 

and the cycle of revenge. It seems to me that can only be accomplished by empowering strong regional governments, as the Iraqi 

constitution provides for, giving the Sunnis a fair share of the oil 

revenues, and bringing in the neighbors in support of such a political settlement. 

If we do that, we still have a chance, at least a chance of avoiding having traded a dictator for chaos. If we’re going to surge anywhere, Mr. Ambassador—you will probably hear from some of the 

committee beyond me but you’ll clearly hear on the Senate floor— 

we think that surge should be Afghanistan, not Iraq, where the 

Taliban appears to be making a serious comeback. So there may be 

some questions about Afghanistan, as well. 

Every Deputy Secretary takes on duties assigned to him by the 

Secretary of State, so I will ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to outline 

the areas of responsibility that you expect to have as Deputy Secretary and to give us your assessment of the major policy questions 

facing us in each of those areas. 

I’d like to specifically request that you give your views on Darfur, 

which was a major responsibility undertaken by Deputy Secretary 

Zoellick, which seems to have fallen from the priority list. 

The administration has rightly called Darfur genocide but those 

words have not matched our deeds thus far to stop it, and I’d like 

5 

your assessment as well on North Korea, which I understand will 

be part of your job description. 

So let me now, again welcome you but turn this over to Senator 

Lugar for any remarks he may have. Then we’ll hear from you, and 

I hope you’ll introduce your family. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a pleasure to welcome John Negroponte again to this committee. As a result of his 

distinguished career in government, most recently as the Nation’s 

first Director of National Intelligence and his earlier assignments 

as our Ambassador to Iraq and our Ambassador to the United Nations, he is well known to many of us. 

We admire his accomplishments and we are thankful for the cooperation he has provided to our committee in the past. We know 

that you share the committee’s view that the State Department has 

a leadership role to play in addressing the urgent international 

challenges facing our country. We need a diplomatic core that can 

shape complex bilateral relationships, repair and build alliances, 

and pursue United States policy through a labyrinth of foreign languages and cultures. 

We need ambassadors who can lead our interagency teams overseas, negotiate successfully with host governments, and speak authoritatively as the President’s personal representatives. 

We need foreign aid programs run by professionals who know 

how to encourage democratic practices and boost economic development, even in the toughest environments—and we need communications experts who can get our message across to foreign audiences. 

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the challenges of North Korea 

and Iran, crises in Darfur and Somalia, consume both time and energy at the Department and of this committee. A host of other 

issues, including international energy security, the spread of HIV/ 

AIDS and other diseases, the Arab/Israeli peace process, our developing relationships with emerging giants in China and India, and 

our outreach in our own hemisphere require daily attention. 

But we must also strengthen the Department itself. The Deputy 

Secretary has traditionally handled key management problems before they reach the Secretary, refereeing internal squabbles, and 

overseeing the right mix of tools, people, and resources to address 

whatever crisis is brewing next. Thus, you must be concerned not 

only with the Department’s direction but also with its capabilities. 

This committee has worked enthusiastically to bolster these capabilities. In 2003, we embarked on an effort to improve the capacity of the Department to deal with stabilization and reconstruction 

emergencies. Last June, the Senate unanimously passed legislation 

that Senator Biden, Senator Hagel, and I sponsored to authorize a 

crisis response fund, the State Department’s Reconstruction and 

Stabilization Office and a Rapid Response Corp. The President’s 

call in his State of the Union speech for the creation for such a civilian corp is a breakthrough for this concept. We should work to 

translate the President’s enthusiasm into funding personnel and 

responsibility. 

6 

This committee has been instrumental in efforts to boost the Department’s capability in other ways. We have worked with our Senate colleagues to foster support for multiagency contributions to the 

building of safe embassies. We have worked to maintain the Department’s primacy in determining which countries will receive the 

United States foreign assistance and how much they should receive. We are working to back up the authority of ambassadors as 

they oversee the United States’ campaign against terrorism. 

We continue to argue for a foreign policy budget that reflects the 

pivotal roles of the State Department, USAID, and the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation. All of these efforts are works in progress 

and we need you as a partner in pursing them. 

One other area where I hope you can make improvements is in 

the timely filling of key policy positions. The position for which you 

have been nominated has been vacant since July 7, 2006. The Department is without a Counterterrorism Coordinator. The Under 

Secretary for Economic Affairs—a portfolio which includes critical 

international energy issues—is soon to depart for the World Food 

Program. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Office went without 

a permanent coordinator for some 8 months before John Herbst arrived. The Political Military Bureau is losing its leader, and there 

are a number of other top posts that are being vacated. 

We should be seeking the best people to fill posts as attrition occurs. We’re a Nation at war in two countries, and every gap in civilian leadership is felt. 

With a Foreign Service career that has spanned decades, you 

have a unique understanding of the Department’s shortcomings as 

well as the vital contributions its employees make to building a 

peaceful and prosperous world. I am grateful that you are undertaking this task and I look forward to working with you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Ambassador, the floor 

is yours. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN NEGROPONTE, NOMINEE TO BE 

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Thank you very much, Chairman Biden and 

Senator Lugar and members of the committee. It is a privilege to 

appear before you as the President’s nominee for the position of 

Deputy Secretary of State. 

I am accompanied this morning by my wife, Diana, and to her 

right is my daughter, Sophia, and to her right is my daughter, Marina, and to her right is my son, George. 

Chairman BIDEN. Welcome. This is getting to be an old habit for 

you guys. Welcome back. It’s delightful to have you here. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Thank you, sir, and I also have a daughter, 

Alejandra, who may show up later in the hearing. She had an engagement that she had to attend earlier this morning. 

Let me say at the outset how much I appreciate Senators Stevens and Lieberman taking time from their busy schedules to 

present me to the committee. Over the year, they have offered me 

a great deal of wise counsel, support, and not the least, warm 

friendship. 

7 

Mr. Chairman, as someone who started his career as a young 

Foreign Service officer on October 5, 1960, I welcome my nomination to be Deputy Secretary of State as an opportunity of a lifetime. 

During my tenure in the Foreign Service, I have been a Vice Consul, a Consul, a Consul General, an Assistant Secretary of State, 

and an Ambassador. These positions have enabled me to serve at 

a one-officer post in Hue, in South Vietnam, and as Chief of Mission of one of our largest embassies in Mexico City. 

Both assignments were challenging and rewarding as were the 

many others in Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East 

and of course, here in Washington. 

If I am confirmed by the Senate, the experience overseas and at 

home will help Secretary Rice promote the transformational diplomacy that is the cornerstone of her leadership of the Department 

of State. 

Globalization is bringing many challenges to the world, empowering a host of new international actors. Nonetheless, constructive 

diplomatic relations between and among nations remains central to 

preserving international stability and security and expanding opportunities for economic and cultural interactions. 

Diplomacy helps us pursue peaceful cooperation in regions 

threatened by conflict. It helps us bolster the international rule of 

law and ensure respect for human rights. It gives the opportunity 

to support weak and failing states and build coalitions to stabilize 

and strengthen them and it enables us to protect our citizens, advance our economic interests and promote our image as a Nation 

defined by its democratic values. 

I have appeared before this committee for confirmation hearings 

seven times. The first occasion, 30 years ago, when my responsibilities focused on oceans, fisheries, and law of the sea, and most recently, when the President nominated me—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t mean to interrupt, but we’re still looking 

for that treaty. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, that’s why I stuck that in here, Mr. 

Chairman. I was hoping you might say that. [Laughter.] 

And most recently, when the President nominated me to be 

United States Ambassador to the newly sovereign Iraq, I volunteered to go to Baghdad because I believed and still believe that 

it is possible for Iraq to make a successful transition to democracy. 

I believed and still believe that failure in Iraq would be a disaster 

for Iraqis, for our friends in the region, and for the United States. 

If confirmed, I expect to devote considerable time and effort to the 

implementation of our policies in Iraq. 

Supporting our Nation’s security on the frontlines of this new 

century, the men and women of the Department of State face great 

challenges. The United States must maintain a full-time diplomatic 

presence in many parts of the world where conditions are demanding, harsh, and often dangerous. It is a tribute to the courage and 

dedication of our Foreign Service that the Department already has 

filled 84 percent of its positions in Iraq for the summer of 2007, 

and 96 percent of the positions programmed for Afghanistan. 

The Secretary’s vision of transformational diplomacy goes beyond 

the special needs we must address in Afghanistan and Iraq, however. The Department of State is a critical component of national 

8 

security and I hope the Department will be viewed that way in 

terms of its mission and budget. We have well over 100 hardship 

posts around the world and 22 posts where restrictions limit or prohibit accompaniment by family members. The Department’s senior 

leadership has a great responsibility to support and protect all its 

personnel abroad, just as it has an obligation to develop our future 

generations of diplomatic leaders. 

If the Senate confirms me, I would hope that in addition to Iraq, 

I could make a strong contribution to our foreign policy in those 

parts of the world where I have spent the most time in my career: 

Asia and Latin America. As Deputy Secretary, I will face challenges in many other areas, too numerous to list in full, from promoting America’s economic business and energy interests overseas 

to supporting our programs in public diplomacy. 

Mr. Chairman, I have always consulted closely with this committee and any Members of Congress who have an interest in 

issues for which I am responsible. I will remain available to you 

and seek your counsel and again, I want to say that I regard this 

nomination as a great honor and I am grateful to President Bush 

and Secretary Rice for the confidence that they have placed in me. 

I would welcome the committee’s questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Negroponte follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN. D. NEGROPONTE, 

NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, it is a privilege to 

appear before you as the President’s nominee for the position of Deputy Secretary 

of State. 

Let me say at the outset how much I appreciate Senators Stevens and Lieberman 

taking the time from their busy schedules to present me to the committee. Over the 

years, they have offered me a great deal of wise counsel, support, and, not the least, 

warm friendship. Senator Stevens, Senator Lieberman, I am in your debt. Thank 

you very much. 

As someone who started his career as a young Foreign Service officer on October 

5, 1960, I welcome my nomination to become Deputy Secretary of State as an opportunity of a lifetime. 

During my tenure in the Foreign Service, I have been a vice-consul, consul, consul 

general, assistant secretary of state, and ambassador. These positions have enabled 

me to serve at a one-officer post in Hue, South Vietnam, and as chief of mission 

of one of our largest embassies in Mexico City. Both assignments were challenging 

and rewarding, as were the many others in Asia, Latin America, Europe, the Middle 

East, and of course, here in Washington. If I am confirmed by the Senate, my experience overseas and at home will help Secretary Rice promote the transformational 

diplomacy that is the cornerstone of her leadership of the Department of State. 

Globalization is bringing many changes to the world, empowering a host of new 

international actors. Nonetheless, constructive diplomatic relations between and 

among nation states remain central to preserving international stability and security, and expanding opportunities for economic and cultural interactions. 

• Diplomacy helps us pursue peaceful cooperation in regions threatened by conflict, bolster the international rule of law, and ensure respect for human rights; 

• It gives us the opportunity to support weak and failing states and build coalitions to stabilize and strengthen them; and 

• It enables us to protect our citizens, advance our economic interests, and promote our image as a nation defined by its democratic values. 

I have appeared before this committee for confirmation hearings seven times—the 

first occasion 30 years ago when my responsibilities focused on oceans, fisheries and 

law of the sea, and most recently when the President nominated me to be United 

States Ambassador to the newly sovereign Iraq. I volunteered to go to Baghdad because I believed and still believe—that it is possible for Iraq to make a successful 

transition to democracy. I believed and still believe—that failure in Iraq would be 

a disaster for Iraqis, for our friends in the region, and for the United States. If conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
9 

firmed, I expect to devote considerable time and effort to the implementation of our 

policies in Iraq. 

Supporting our Nation’s security on the front lines of this new century, the men 

and women of the Department of State face great challenges. The United States 

must maintain a full-time diplomatic presence in many parts of the world where 

conditions are demanding, harsh, and often dangerous. It is a tribute to the courage 

and dedication of our Foreign Service that the Department already has filled 84 percent of its positions in Iraq for the summer of 2007 and 96 percent of the positions 

programmed for Afghanistan. 

The Secretary’s vision of transformational diplomacy goes beyond the special 

needs we must address in Iraq and Afghanistan, however. The Department of State 

is a critical component of national security, and I hope the Department will be 

viewed that way in terms of its mission and budget. We have well over 100 hardship 

posts around the world and 22 posts where restrictions limit or prohibit accompaniment by family members. The Department’s senior leadership has a great responsibility to support and protect all its personnel abroad, just as it has an obligation 

to develop our future generations of diplomatic leaders. 

If the Senate confirms me, I would hope that, in addition to Iraq, I could make 

a strong contribution to our foreign policy in those parts of the world where I have 

spent the most time in my career—Asia and Latin America. But as Deputy Secretary I will face challenges in many other areas too numerous to list in full from 

promoting America’s economic, business, and energy interests overseas to supporting our programs in public diplomacy. 

Mr. Chairman, I have always consulted closely with this committee, and any 

Member of Congress who has an interest in issues for which I am responsible. I will 

remain available to you and seek your counsel. 

Again, I regard this nomination as a great honor, and I am grateful to President 

Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have placed in me. 

I welcome the committee’s questions. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Your experience is so broad and your recent assignments have been so significant, I suspect all of us have an awful lot of questions. 

I will take you at your word that you will make yourself available to the committee so we won’t have to pursue every one of them 

today. And again, I welcome your family. With the permission of 

the Chairman, I’d like to suggest 8-minute rounds. Let me begin 

by asking you, Mr. Secretary, do you support or oppose a dialog 

with Iran and Syria now, regarding Iraq? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I believe that both Syria and Iran have not 

been doing what they could do to support a peaceful course of 

events in Iraq and I think that they know what they need to do. 

As far as dialog is concerned—and I refer specifically with regard 

to Syria, to allowing 40 to 70 foreign fighters to flow into Iraq 

through Syria every month. That’s the intelligence communities’ estimate and Iran’s support amongst other things, for extremist Shia 

elements in Iraq. 

As far as dialog is concerned, as you know, Senator, we have an 

embassy in Syria so there has been no lack of opportunity to exchange views if the Syrians had chosen to dialog with us constructively and that door is always open to them. 

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, we’re waiting to hear from them. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. There’s a channel, I would say. 

The CHAIRMAN. But they must initiate the channel. That’s what 

your saying? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I don’t think that our people in our embassy 

in Damascus are adverse to initiating a discussion with the Government of Syria. 

The CHAIRMAN. But have they? 

10 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I haven’t reviewed all the diplomatic traffic of 

late but my point is that that diplomatic channel exists at the 

Charge d’Affaires—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m not trying to be confrontational. I’m trying 

to make sure I understand. We’ve haven’t had an ambassador in 

there since last summer, and I’m trying to get a straight sense of 

what the administration’s position is. They point out, accurately, 

that they know what our concerns are, quote unquote. But my specific question is, do you believe that at your level, the level of the 

Secretary of State, do you think there should be an initiation of discussions with Syria and with Iran relating to Iraq? Not whether 

they can come to us. Should we initiate discussions? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think the view at this time, Mr. Chairman, 

is that they know what they need to do. I would never want to say 

never with respect to initiating a high-level dialog with either of 

these two countries but that’s the position as I understand it at 

this time. The one other point I’d like to make with respect to Iran 

is that we have, I think, made what I would consider at least, to 

be a very interesting and attractive offer to them in exchange for 

suspension of their nuclear enrichment program, which is now 

something that has been demanded unanimously by the Security 

Council, that would open the door to a dialog with us and that as 

Secretary Rice has said on a number of occasions, if they were to 

do that, she would be more than prepared to have discussions with 

the Government of Iran. 

The CHAIRMAN. In the jargon of ordinary Americans, that’s a precondition, correct? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. A precondition but it is not a unilateral precondition, Mr. Chairman. It’s one that, in fact, is demanded by the 

international community through a unanimously adopted Security 

Council resolution. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s correct but it might be misleading. 

Our European friends, as I talk to them, think we should be having 

dialog, separate and apart. So it’s misleading to suggest that there 

is a unilateral view among our allies in the United Nations, that 

they should cease and desist. That view is separate and distinct 

from what leaders at our level in European capitals are saying to 

me, why aren’t you? We have urged the administration, on a separate track, to have direct dialog relative to Iraq. Is that not true? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I’m sure there are European countries that 

would urge us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m sure you know that, right? I mean, you 

know that to be a fact. You head up the entire intelligence community. Is there any doubt about what I just said? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I just can’t name for you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No, I’m not asking you to name—— 

Mr. NEGROPONTE [continuing]. At the moment, which countries—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But you don’t doubt that at all? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. No, I don’t doubt it whatsoever. 

The CHAIRMAN. So it’s just slightly misleading to suggest that 

there is a uniform view from Europeans and the Security Council. 

Let me move on. 

11 

What is the administration’s view or your view about the development that appears to have taken hold that Saudi Arabia and 

Iran are really brokering Lebanon now? Is that a good development 

or a bad development? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I think it is a reflection of the fact that 

countries in the region have a strong interest in what is happening 

in Lebanon. Iran, of course, has been a significant player in that 

country, indirectly at least, for a number of years through its support for Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia, I think, is a little bit concerned, 

if I might characterize it that way, at the upsurge or the rising influence of Shia Islam in the Middle East and since they have a 

number of Sunni friends in Lebanon and that they have provided 

a certain amount of economic assistance. In fact, after us, I think 

they were the second—made the second largest pledge at the recent 

assistance conference. 

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that’s correct. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Right. So I think both of those countries 

have—I believe they have some role to play in the situation in Lebanon. 

The CHAIRMAN. Are the newspaper accounts accurate, that the 

Saudis and the Iranians are talking with one another as well as 

the parties in Lebanon? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I believe that there is some recently initiated 

dialog between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

The CHAIRMAN. The only point I’m making is I know of no country that has a greater concern about the rise of Iran, with the possible exception of Israel, than Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis have 

concluded that they have a mutual interest, it appears, in making 

sure that Lebanon doesn’t evolve into a civil war again. So they’re 

talking, which really makes it even more confusing to me why 

we’re not initiating discussions on a single track or with no preconditions, with those two countries. 

I have 30 seconds left, so I’ll yield to my friend from Indiana. 

Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’m heartened by your initial testimony, Secretary Negroponte, that you 

favor a Law of the Sea Treaty. We’ve been working on this, as you 

know, for a while and it hasn’t happened yet but I would be hopeful that the chairman would initiate work on the situation. Would 

you just affirm again the administration’s position? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I’m grateful that you asked the question 

and I put the reference to Law of the Sea in my opening statement 

because I spent a number of years working on related questions 

and there must be literally hundreds of individuals in this town 

and throughout the United States who at one point or another, 

over the past 30 or 35 years, have worked on the Law of the Sea 

and you will recall, Senator, back in the 1970s, this was considered 

one of the defining issues in negotiations between us and the Third 

World. I think it is a treaty that is very much in the national interest and in the national security interest. I understand it has been 

voted out of the committee one time and sent to the floor. I’ve also 

been advised that given the time that has elapsed, it may be desirable—but this would be at your own—this would be up to the SenVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
12 

ate and your committee to have another hearing on the issue of the 

Law of the Sea before sending it back. 

But I do think that a very strong case can be made that this is 

a treaty that is in the national interest. It protects our economic 

and national security interests. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you for that affirmation. It was interesting, Senator Stevens was here to introduce you this morning, 

and he related your long association on issues related to the Low 

of the Sea and that, of course, enthused Senator Stevens as they 

do us. 

I want to use this hearing to inquire, not that you’re able to solve 

these problems, but perhaps you can alleviate them. I’m just concerned after briefings we’ve had with Chris Hill, our ambassador 

to talks with the North Koreans, 6-party talks, that for example, 

just the other day, before the meeting in Berlin with Ambassador 

Hill and representatives of North Korea. There was a meeting involving administration officials, including State Department officials, to discuss proliferation finance with some of our major allies. 

On the margin of the meeting, some American officials reportedly 

raised the prospect of imposing a travel ban on key North Korean 

leaders as provided under a United Nations resolution that gives 

them that ability. Unhappily, of course, this came just as Ambassador Hill was preparing to try to get North Korean leaders to 

meet with him in Berlin. So he was able to allay that but it’s startling that our administration people were even making that suggestion. Now the State Department has raised that all the time, sort 

of month after month but nevertheless, right on the threshold of 

having the potential for six-power talks again, why we want to censure the North Koreans and maybe properly so. We’re not doing 

enough to account for their funds. This could have been done in 

July, August, September, and October, but right before we come 

once again to the threshold—all I’m asking, and this will be an internal problem, I suspect, for you and Secretary Rice, to find who 

in the administration is orchestrating these countervailing situations. They are not helpful and without gaining any assent from 

you because you’ve not been involved, I would just say that we take 

it seriously in the committee as you do. This is a very, very important set of negotiations. 

Let me just ask affirmatively, however, on January 11, President 

Bush signed legislation that Senator Obama and I had authored on 

proliferation interdiction assistance. This deals with weapons that 

are other than weapons of mass destruction. In one tour, we discovered large stashes of weapons. We discovered Europeans were 

working in Ukraine, for example, to try to get MAN-PAD missiles 

under control and various other weapons of terror. So the law has 

been passed, but will you work to try to make certain that there 

is some funding and planning and effective administration of our 

participation with Europeans and others who could be involved in 

attempting to control these weapons? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I certainly intend to look into that, Senator. I 

hope you’ll indulge me. I still have a day job and I continue to be 

the Director of National Intelligence so I haven’t been able to master every one of these subject matters as well as I would have 

liked. 

13 

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that but I’m just highlighting it on 

the screen. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. But I will certainly put that on my radar 

screen. 

Senator LUGAR. And on the same subject, present interdiction efforts—including the Proliferation Security Initiative—are moving 

ahead but how are these effectively coordinated within the State 

Department? And if you have not researched that, please do so. It 

seems to me this is another area in which a number of our authorities are trying to do a lot of good but it’s not evident that everybody 

is on the same page and it’s important that they get there. The 

State Department does have quite a role in this and we’ve had Bob 

Joseph and others testifying from time to time but I’m hopeful that 

all these proliferation efforts succeed because currently, there is a 

great deal of accounting in the press for what seemed to be failures 

or holes in the system. The Department of Defense has a role here, 

too, and the National Security people, but clearly, your coordination of this, your mastery of many parts, would be extremely important. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think Under Secretary Joseph has done some 

excellent work in this regard and the intelligence community has 

been very supportive, of course, of the Proliferation Security Initiative and I think there have been some interesting and significant 

successes over the past couple of years in that regard. 

Senator LUGAR. Perhaps at some point later we’ll have a chance 

to review with you as you survey the situation, how we can be effective. 

Finally, let me just say that I sent a number of our staff members to 20 embassies to look at coordination between the State and 

the Defense Departments in the campaign against terror. They’ve 

written a very good report. It’s been widely commented on in the 

press as well as the official circles. I don’t know whether you’ve had 

a chance to review the study but I hope that you’ll do so. We had 

direct testimony as to various embassies in which the ambassador 

was not necessrily completely clueless with regard to what the Defense Department was doing, but very frequently not wholly informed, and it offends people. We’re a bit lax in cluing our ambassador in. 

Now, having all of these activities going on in a country—you’ve 

served as an ambassador to various countries—can be rather 

unnerving, if you’re the ambassador and you do not really know 

what other parts of your government are doing, particularly as conspicuous as the Department of Defense. Now without getting into 

interagency warfare here, let me just say, this is a serious problem, 

and we tried in a tactful way by visiting 20 embassies, to try to 

bring testimony of specifics. I hope that you will study that and 

work to coordinate those problems. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I will, indeed, Senator, and I do want to say 

here I think it is important to state for the record that I’m a strong 

believer in the country team system. I’m a strong believer that our 

ambassadors abroad are the coordinators of the entire United 

States Government effort in particular countries except in the case 

of military commands, and I believe that it is the responsibility of 

14 

ambassadors to be intimately familiar with the activities of all 

agencies operating in their country of assignment. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Negroponte. It’s nice to have you before the committee. I particularly want to thank you for your years of public service. I had 

the opportunity to be with you in Iraq when you were our ambassador and I must tell the committee, I was very much impressed 

by the manner in which you gave us access to information during 

that period of time, and your frank assessments during that period 

that I was there. So I applaud you for your years of public service. 

I want to ask, if I might, just a couple questions that perhaps 

you’re prepared to answer now. If not, I’m sure we’ll have a chance 

later to talk about these. As I visit embassies around the world, 

U.S. Embassies, I’m always concerned about the support that we 

give—budget support to the various missions. There always seems 

to be not enough dollars available, which is true in all agencies, but 

it’s particularly concerning to me because of the increased expectations we have about our embassies’ work around the world. 

I’m just wondering what your budget priorities would be in the 

agency, to help in our field missions around the world, as to whether you—you know there are going to be tight budgets. You know 

you’re not going to get all the dollars you need. But whether you 

have a game plan so that we can better meet our needs around the 

world. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think that I’d have to defer, Senator, in 

terms of giving you any specifics with respect to budget priorities 

at this time, particularly since the budgets have just been submitted and we’re really not—I’m not in a position at this point, I 

don’t think, at any time soon, to be helping shape the 2008 or 2007 

supplemental budgets. 

Senator CARDIN. But you have served as ambassador at several 

posts. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. You know the frustrations that are out there in 

the field. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I do and I think that as somebody who has 

been a career Foreign Service officer all my life, I tend to put, in 

my own mind, the highest priority on providing recruiting and supporting the best qualified possible personnel so I think human resource issues are going to be a very high priority for me and then 

of course, supporting these people adequately in the field. I think 

that one large part of that budget you’re talking about, Senator, is 

of course the security requirements, which have risen. I won’t say 

astronomically but they’ve risen very significantly over the years in 

terms of the kinds of monies that have to be spent to be able to 

protect our embassies and consulates overseas. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. I want to go to an area that I consider the highest priority on the short-term and that’s the Sudan 

and Darfur. I have been—this Nation has played a critical role in 

bringing world attention to the problems in the Sudan. We have 

not gotten the type of help internationally to stop the genocide. 

15 

There have been conversations about a Plan B although I’m not 

certain what a Plan B is. I’m just interested in your assessment of 

what we need to do in Darfur and your commitment to make sure 

this receives the highest priority within the Department of State. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I’m certainly conscious, Senator, of the importance of Darfur. I had an opportunity to work on that issue some 

when I was the Ambassador to the United Nations. I also think it 

is important that the President selected Mr. Andrew Natsios to be 

the Special Negotiator, the Special Envoy for Darfur, and I think 

that has been a very positive development. I think he brings a lot 

of energy to that issue and as Director of National Intelligence, we 

have quite significantly increased the priority we attached to collecting intelligence and information on what is happening in the 

Darfur region. But as you quite, I think, correctly suggest in your 

question, we’re not there yet. The rebel groups still have not been 

brought into—a number of them have not been brought into the 

agreement. There are still problems with the government not wanting to allow a U.N. force into the country and I think that Darfur 

is going to require continued or continue to require a sustained effort on the part of our Government. 

Senator CARDIN. I thank you for that. I agree with that and I 

think we need to look at effective ways to bring an end to the genocide. 

I’m just curious, as Director of National Intelligence, you’ve 

played a critical role in trying to coordinate intelligence gathering 

and analysis among the different agencies, particularly concerns 

that we’ve had within the Department of State and Department of 

Defense. Is your position going to change now that you’re moving 

from the Director to the State Department? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I’d like to think not, Senator. I think that in 

my experience during these almost 2 years as Director of National 

Intelligence, what we’ve really worked toward is to try to integrate 

the intelligence community as much as possible so that you have 

a sort of seamlessness among all the different agencies and I think 

we’ve built up a much greater degree of collegiality and integration 

than existed previously. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, we’ll see whether your position stays consistent now that you’re changing roles. Let me just touch upon an 

issue that is going to be critical and that is how we’re dealing with 

Iran and how we’re dealing with Syria, under what conditions 

should we engage in direct talks with those countries and what role 

they play in trying to resolve what’s happening in Iraq and in the 

region. I just welcome your thoughts as to how we are going to be 

effective in policies in Iran and also in Syria. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. First, I’d like to say, Senator, that I think Iran 

has—its behavior has been emboldened in the past couple of years. 

I think back in 2003, their behavior was not as bold as it has been 

recently in terms of their assertiveness in Iraq, where I mentioned 

earlier, they’ve been providing this lethal equipment to Shia extremists in Lebanon, in the Palestinian territories. I think that just 

generally speaking, Iran has played a more assertive role than it 

did previously. I think Syria also has not played a constructive 

role. The situation in Lebanon, the assassination of President 

Hariri. We still haven’t got to the bottom of that and there are conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
16 

cerns in that regard and their failure to take adequate measures 

to stop the flow of foreign fighters across their border and into 

Iraq. I was mentioning earlier—I don’t know if you were here—to 

Senator Biden that we have diplomatic relations with Syria and we 

have an avenue for dialog although we have not initiated high-level 

talks with them and we have been discussing the Iran issue with 

our European friends and the Security Council and in the context 

of the nuclear issue, there has been a dialog with Iran, albeit indirectly. But the view at the moment is that we are reluctant to initiate a high-level diplomatic dialog with Iran until there has been 

some progress on this nuclear issue. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you and welcome, Mr. Ambassador. As you know, you have many admirers and supporters 

here in the Congress that is a result of the respect that you have 

achieved over many years of service to this country. I believe—and 

I have told you this—that in my opinion, you are one of the preeminent diplomats of our time and we are grateful that you and 

your family have agreed to take on another challenging assignment. We’ll miss you as Director of National Intelligence and you 

and I have had an opportunity to work closely on that issue. But 

the experience that you will bring, in addition to your other experiences, to the new job at State will be important and they will relate 

directly as you know better than almost all of us—it will relate directly to what you will be dealing with. And to your family, thank 

you, for your continued sacrifices. I know you are very proud of 

your father and your husband, as you should be. 

I want to pursue the diplomatic course since that’s what you are 

and that’s what you will be working on in the portfolio that you 

will take responsibility for and in your testimony, you note and I 

quote, ‘‘Diplomacy helps us pursue peaceful cooperation in regions 

threatened by conflict, bolster the international rule of law, and ensure respect for human rights,’’ and I think there is rather wide 

agreement on that point up here. 

The two primary authors of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, the 

Iraqi Study Group Commission, will appear before this committee 

this afternoon and we will get into some detail on their 79 recommendations, some of them very much focused on what we have 

talked about this morning to some extent, Iran and Syria. And if 

you recall, one of the most significant contributions, I believe, recommendations surely, that was made by that Commission of 10 individuals of various political philosophies, all I think qualified to 

study a critical issue. But one of their most important recommendations, at least in my mind, was their focus on a regional 

diplomatic strategy on Iraq that includes engagement with Iran 

and Syria. 

Now, judging from your testimony and what your life has been 

about, the Baker-Hamilton Commission focused on diplomatic engagement and I think most of us have some general agreement 

that the future of Iraq will be determined by some diplomatic 

framework, some political accommodation, resulting in a political 

resolution. It won’t be decided by the military—nothing ever is. 

17 

Now, we heard what you said in response to direct questions 

about Iran and Syria and I first would ask you, do you agree with 

the Baker-Hamilton Commission report? That again, there must be 

a regional diplomatic strategy and focus on Iraq that includes engagement with Iran and Syria—without going into the specifics but 

would you agree with that general concept? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I would agree that the regional actors have a 

role to play in the stability and security of Iraq. I would depart 

from that proposition and that, of course, would include Syria and 

Iran. But then if you go to the next question as to where would you 

concentrate your diplomatic activity as a matter of priority and initially, then I think opinions might differ as to exactly how you 

would focus that but certainly one area where I think everybody is 

comfortable advocating diplomacy is in trying to shore up support 

for the Government and the country of Iraq by its neighbors and 

we’ve certainly approached other countries in the region—Saudi 

Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and so forth, but you’ve heard my answer 

on the Iran and Syria question. 

Senator HAGEL. But if diplomacy is important as you have noted 

here and I believe in your words, you talk about peaceful cooperation in regions—regions—your words—and it was noted regions in 

the Baker-Hamilton report, then wouldn’t it follow that some 

framework is going to have to be presented, built, that would include the regional powers. I mean, that’s my comprehension of 

what you said and what the Baker-Hamilton report—— 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Right. 

Senator HAGEL. Again, understanding that there are differences 

in how you do that. But my question to you is, do you think that 

regional framework is important to solve or start to resolve the 

chaos, the problem that we have in Iraq? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think it—first of all, I think it is important 

that there be an understanding by the different countries of the region, including Syria and Iran, for example, as to what kind of behavior is expected from them and what kind of behavior could help 

contribute to stability in Iraq. I would not say that as a matter of 

priority, one would have to go right to a regional-type conference 

or regional-type diplomatic scenario although I don’t think that 

that should be ruled out. It was used with respect to Afghanistan 

with all the neighbors of Afghanistan. You may remember the sixplus-two formula. 

Senator HAGEL. As you know, you were there and of course, with 

your intelligence assignment the last year and a half, you know, of 

course, that the Iraqi Government, the Prime Minister, the President have made trips to Tehran. The Iraqi Government is dealing 

with the Iranian Government, directly, at the highest level, between the President and the Prime Minister. Is there some contradiction there? Do you believe that we won’t deal with those 

countries? But yet our Iraqi allies, who we are supporting with our 

blood and our treasure and our reputation, we are not on the same 

page there? Is there some conflict to that in your mind? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I wouldn’t want to suggest that we’re not 

aware of what Iran thinks on various subjects. I wouldn’t want to 

suggest that we’re completely cut off from understanding what 

their positions are because certainly in the negotiations at the 

18 

United Nations with respect to the nuclear program, we’ve learned 

through the Europeans in some detail, we’re in contact with the 

many different friendly countries to us that have diplomatic representation in Iran. We learn a lot. We have our own interest section, the Swiss Embassy in Tehran handles our interests in 

Tehran. So we’re not devoid of diplomatic possibilities although I 

would be the first to concede that it’s not the same thing as having 

full—blown direct diplomatic contact. 

Senator HAGEL. Do you think we are drifting toward a military 

confrontation with Iran? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I don’t think that has to be, Senator. I think 

we would strongly prefer that the issues between us and Iran be 

resolved peacefully. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join the 

chorus of voices that have spoken about your outstanding service 

to our country and admire and appreciate it. I enjoyed our conversation about several different aspects and looking forward, I 

want to say, Ambassador, that in that context, however, if at the 

end of the day, I support your nomination, which I likely will, unless you answer questions today in a way that confounds me, which 

I doubt—that doesn’t, however, express a support for the President’s policies because I believe the President is headed in the 

wrong direction. So having said that, let me just ask you a couple 

of questions. 

Do you agree with the assessment of the situation on the ground 

in Iraq that the Iraq Study Group put out at the time of its report? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I was anticipating questions on Iraq, 

Senator. I prepared a few remarks here that I think are responsive 

to that, because I expect it will be transmitting the national intelligence estimate on Iraq to Congress the first thing next week, by 

Monday at the latest. Of course, I want the NIE to speak for itself, 

but what I would like to say is that my belief that success in Iraq 

remains possible is based on my experience in dealing with Iraq as 

United States Ambassador to the U.N. and Ambassador to Iraq and 

as Director of National Intelligence, and I don’t think I’m at variance with the intelligence community in my judgments and here’s 

what I would say. 

Iraq is at a precarious juncture. That means the situation could 

deteriorate, that there are prospects for increasing stability in Iraq 

and achieving increased stability will depend on several factors. 

Among them, the extent to which the Iraq Government and political leaders can establish effective national institutions that transcend sectarian or ethnic interests and within this context, the willingness of Iraqi security forces to pursue extremist elements of all 

kinds. 

It will also depend on the extent to which extremists, most notably al-Qaeda in Iraq can be defeated in their attempts to foment 

intersectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis and lastly, the extent to which Iraq’s neighbors stop the flow of militants and ammunitions across their borders. So I think that progress is possible in 

these dimensions, laying the foundations for success. 

19 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that answer but let me be more 

specific. Let me read some excerpts and tell me whether you agree 

or disagree: violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and 

lethality. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think over the past year, that’s been true. 

Senator MENENDEZ. That, in fact, in the political context, the national government does not act as a national government but looks 

at it in its own sectarian interests. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think that’s been a challenge. I think that 

has been difficult for the Prime Minister but I do think that there 

are some encouraging indicators in that regard, that there has 

been very little effort to promote national reconciliation as a result 

of those sectarian viewpoints. Again, I think that—I’m hopeful of 

some progress in that area, that corruption is pervasive within the 

existing Iraqi Government. Corruption is a serious problem. 

Senator MENENDEZ. My concern, Ambassador, is that while we 

have focused on the escalation of the war the President promotes, 

a whole host of things critical to the very success in Iraq that you 

say in your opening statement that is so important to the Nation, 

to our Nation, are not about an escalation of the war but are about 

a whole host of diplomatic efforts to achieve the Iraqis moving forward and it seems to me that without benchmarks that have a real 

consequence to them, which I have seen the administration reject 

so far; certainly when the Secretary was here, I asked her those 

questions and she largely rejected them. Without benchmarks to 

have a real sense that we are moving forward on all of these different categories, among others: oil, distribution of resources for 

the nation. It seems to me that all of that is a much more monumental challenge at the end of the day and that’s the very essence 

of what the State Department should be at the forefront of and I 

think largely we have failed to see significant progress in that respect and my question is, therefore—I heard your statement but 

my question is therefore what is it? Give the outline of when you’re 

confirmed, what you’ll be doing with the Secretary to change the 

very essence of moving the Iraqis in a much different direction that 

they have been recalcitrant to move. Because before sending 20,000 

more of our sons and daughters on the roll of a dice and the hope 

that some of these things would move in a different direction, it 

seems to me we have to know what your plan is to actually accelerate the pace and the surge of diplomacy that will move the Iraqis 

to a better place than they are now because without that, none of 

this is going to succeed. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. First of all, Senator, I think there is an enormous amount of diplomacy that already goes on with the Government of Iraq, starting with frequent conversations between the 

President of the United States and the Prime Minister and then of 

course, the Secretary and our ambassador out there. I think you’re 

right to say that we are very challenged but I do think that there 

are benchmarks, if you will, that ought to be pursued and I think 

you’ve alluded to a couple of them. One is certainly the national 

reconciliation process and the passage of a law regarding deBaathification. Another has to do with oil revenues—and these are 

all issues that are being worked in the Iraqi National Assembly at 

the moment. Then I think another important one is that we hope 

20 

that local elections and regional elections will be carried in the 

country of Iraq during the course of 2007, where hopefully some of 

the different groups that have been underrepresented, such as in 

the Sunni areas, can regain some of their representation in those 

elections that take place during the coming years. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So those are examples of some of the kinds 

of benchmarks that we’ll be looking at—I hope we’ll consider consequences to benchmarks and last, since my time is about to expire—this is on a different topic—I do hope that with your experience in Latin America, that while you’re obviously going to be 

spending a great deal of your time on Iraq, that we look to expand 

what is our view of United States policy in Latin America. Trade 

is important and narcotics interdiction is important but when half 

of the people in the hemisphere live below the poverty level, it creates a whole host of challenges for us here, domestically. The 

things we debate about often relate to that and when we have— 

the only place in the world that we have, for the last 3 years, cut 

development assistance to under the budget of the administration 

is Latin America and the Caribbean—not in the national interests 

of the United States, not in the national security interests of the 

United States—and I hope we can have a more robust policy because it’s in the vacuum of having a more robust policy that the 

Chavez’s of the world get to play a bigger role than they should be 

playing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. With permission of the committee, I’d read on 

page 60 of the Iraq Study Group report—there’s a line—‘‘It should 

be unambiguous that continued U.S. political, military, and economic support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi Government demonstrating political will and making substantial progress toward 

the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, 

and governance.’’ 

Senator. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate it. Ambassador, it is great to have you here with your family. I know your 

son and daughters have probably had a most unique life not without sacrifice. I’m sure they’re thinking about a lot of things right 

now other than our questions and are looking for this to end, and 

thank you to your wife for being here and supporting you in this 

way. 

I know that your role as Deputy will be to really generally supervise the Department of State, and that you, in your opening comments, talked about transformational diplomacy. I was with Secretary Rice earlier today and I know that came up. Could you articulate for us, since you will be making that, if you will, work 

throughout the Department, exactly what transformational diplomacy is in your mind? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I think the principle feature of it, Senator, is to redeploy if you will, adjust the deployment of our diplomatic efforts and our diplomatic establishments around the world, 

more toward some of the hot spots and the more challenging geographic areas of the world. I think that there has been a tendency, 

over the years, to be overrepresented, if you will, diplomatically in 

the highly developed countries of the world and less represented in 

21 

the less developed parts. There is the additional fact that you have 

a lot of new states in the world, particularly on the periphery of 

the Soviet Union. So I think that the main notion of Secretary is 

to get our people out into these difficult hot spots. In addition to 

that, to try to increase our representation through having these socalled presence posts, which would be very small, maybe one officer 

in some locations of interest around the world. And I think the Secretary felt that my type of Foreign Service career, where I spent 

virtually all of it serving in less developed parts of the world, in 

the Third World, if you will, was one of the qualifications that interested her in my background. 

Senator CORKER. What exactly does that mean to the Department as far as upheaval, change—when you talk about transformational—what does that really mean throughout the entire 

State Department? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I haven’t looked at the details of what 

it would mean. What I do know is that at the present time, there 

is the thought of moving a couple of hundred positions from Western Europe, for example, to other diplomatic posts in the farther 

reaches of the world but I haven’t had an opportunity to study in 

detail all the implications that these moves would have. 

Senator CORKER. You were in intelligence, obviously are still 

today, as a matter of fact. You’ve been in the State Department, 

have been around the world, and I think are very qualified to address an issue that has come before this committee and that is, in 

looking at the things that have occurred over the last 4 or 5 years 

and some of the breakdowns that have occurred that have caused 

judgments to be made based on information, based on things that 

may or may not have been the case. There tends to be a concern 

about just our country’s readiness, if you will, to deal with the 

world as it is today—the State Department, the Department of Defense, Intelligence. I know that this has really maybe not so much 

to do with your confirmation but you are in a unique position to 

assess that and I’m just wondering what you might say as it relates to our country’s readiness to really deal with the world that 

really is transforming, that does no longer—we’re no longer in the 

cold war and obviously, the types of challenges that we have are 

most unique. How do you assess our readiness in general? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. If you were asking me that question from a 

point of view of intelligence and whether we’re prepared sufficiently with regard to the threats that are out there, Senator, I 

would say that there have been substantial improvements since 9/ 

11 in terms of our preparedness, in terms of having increased our 

intelligence capabilities, of having integrated our efforts better and 

of having improved information sharing between the different 

agencies. If you ask me the question, is our diplomatic establishment as well prepared as it can be, with the greater variety of 

problems that we have to deal with in this world, when you think 

about the fact that we no longer face just one monolithic threat, if 

you will, as we did during the cold war, that we face a wide range 

and diversity of problems on this planet, I think there is still a lot 

of work to be done. 

Senator CORKER. It seems to me that as it relates to actually a 

number of comments, that the activities that we have on the 

22 

ground through civilians, through the State Department, are equally important to what we’re doing, maybe more so, to what we doing 

militarily in Iraq right now. It seems to me that one of the big 

issues we’ve had is a real lack of working together, of communicating, of having a coherence there on the ground. I’m wondering 

if you can address that and how you think that might be changing 

with what is occurring at present in Iraq—the ability to get money 

out, the ability to really coordinate efforts in an appropriate manner, to lessen our need for military involvement down the road. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I mean, I do think our efforts are fairly well 

coordinated in terms of ambassadors and military commanders 

working well in the field. I think there is an issue of resources. It 

is, as a general rule, it’s probably easier to obtain resources that 

are directly supportive of our military, whereas sometimes investment in foreign assistance or support for the security forces of another country, for example, could be a more cost effective way of 

going about things. So I guess what I would say in reply to you, 

Senator, is that as we carry out our policies in countries like Iraq 

and Afghanistan, we need to be mindful of the important contribution that the civilian component of our national security effort can 

make. 

Senator CORKER. You’ve had an extensive background in the 

Western Hemisphere and South America and we see a lot of developments taking place there. I know our country fixates a great deal 

on the Middle East, just in reference to oil and energy supplies and 

how that affects the world but in many ways, South America is 

equally or more important to us in that regard. I’m wondering if 

you can just give a general assessment of the developments you see 

taking place, socialism, anti-Americanism that is there and the 

type of efforts you think need to be undertaken in the State Department to make sure that our economic security down the road 

as it relates to energy supplies and trade, stay intact. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Senator. I think Latin America 

has been a mixed picture in the past couple of years. There have 

been a lot of elections, I think, in a number of places—democratic 

regimes have been elected. I think that in Mexico, in Peru, they 

were recently elections—Ecuador and Nicaragua and so forth. I 

think that one of the trends that we need to be concerned about 

is kind of a frustration among some of the populations of Latin 

America that democracy is not necessarily delivering the kinds of 

results that people had hoped for and that has, in turn, given rise 

to a certain amount of populism. I guess that is most clearly symbolized by Mr. Hugo Chavez, the president of Venezuela and I do 

not think he has been a constructive force in the hemisphere so I 

think countries like Bolivia, among others, have been under the influence of Mr. Chavez, who has been trying to export his kind of 

radical populism and I think that his behavior is threatening to democracies in the region but by and large, I think that democracy 

is doing quite well in the hemisphere and I guess the last point I 

would make is that the situation in Columbia is a critical one to 

our interests and I think it is very, very important that we continue to support the Government of Columbia and its efforts to 

bring that country under control and to finally put an end to the 

guerilla activity that is taking place in that country. 

23 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Obama. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you. I look forward to your continued service and I 

suspect, more time before this committee over the next couple of 

years. I’ve got two very different sets of questions. 

The first relates to Iran. There has been a lot of speculation in 

the press lately with regard to United States policy toward Iran. 

Administration sources, although unnamed, have been fairly explicit in indicating that the administration is attempting to send 

some shots across the bow with respect to Iran, both regarding its 

interference in Iraq but also its nuclear program. You’ve got carrier 

groups being amassed in the region. You’ve got a policy that appears to be purposely somewhat ambiguous in terms of how the administration is going to pursue Iranians who are on Iraqi soil. 

This has led to grave concern on the part of many observers that 

we are stumbling into a more aggressive posture with respect to 

Iran. I would like to get some sense from you as to what exactly 

our Iran policy is right now and are we coupling the issue of Iraq 

with the very legitimate concerns with respect to Iran’s nuclear 

program—do we see those as related? Do we see those as separate? 

Because I know the chairman has talked about this. I think it’s 

very important from this committee’s perspective that there is clarity and transparency in terms of U.S. policy so that we don’t repeat 

some of the mistakes that have been made in the past with respect 

to our Middle Eastern policies. So do you want to address that very 

briefly? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think first I would start from the premise I 

mentioned earlier that Iran has been emboldened in its behavior 

during the past couple of years and has played a more assertive 

role and that certainly manifests in Iraq where we have increasing 

evidence that they have been providing lethal assistance to extremist Shia groups in that country and that’s destabilizing behavior as 

far as Iraq is concerned. With respect to their nuclear program, of 

course, they have been adamant, it seems, in their desire to pursue 

an enrichment program and the intelligence community’s assessment is—continues to be and it has been for a couple of years, that 

Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons. I would characterize our policy as desirous of resolving any issues we have with 

Iran by peaceful means, but at the same time we don’t believe that 

their behavior, such as supporting Shia extremists in Iraq, should 

go unchallenged. So it’s a balance, if you will, but if they feel that 

they can continue with this kind of activity with impunity, that 

will be harmful to the security of Iraq and to our interests in that 

country. 

Senator OBAMA. Let me just be clear. I think it is entirely appropriate for United States forces to do whatever we need to do to protect United States troops and if there are Iranian aggressors inside 

Iraq that are aiding in attacks on United States troops or making 

our troops more vulnerable, then within Iraq, I think, action is appropriate. I also think that with respect to the nuclear program, I 

don’t know anybody on this panel who does not believe that that 

would create great danger for the region and the world and that 

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tain nuclear weapon capability and that we should keep all options 

on the table in pursuing that. What I think many of us are concerned about is that we stumble into active hostilities with Iran 

without having aggressively pursued diplomatic approaches, without the American people understanding exactly what is taking 

place and so, I just want to suggest that in your important role as 

Deputy Secretary of State that you, Secretary Rice, and others are 

mindful that this committee is going to be paying attention and 

that we do not want to see precipitous actions that have not been 

thought through, have not been discussed, have not been authorized. 

Let me just change the subject real quick in the time that I have 

remaining. This is an issue that actually seems somewhat parochial but I think, as you’ll see, is of concern across the world. About 

a year ago, the Chicago Tribune ran a three-part investigative series on mercury contamination in the fish that we eat and the Tribune series found a stunning level of mercury in fish, not just in 

saltwater fish like tuna or swordfish but in fresh water fish that 

our constituents, particularly around the Great Lakes region, 

might catch in their favorite local lakes. As I’m sure you know, 

mercury is a potent neurotoxin, particularly for pregnant women 

and children. The problem is that with respect to mercury, it 

doesn’t matter where on the globe it is used because while half of 

it dissipates locally, the other half can deposit itself on the other 

side of the world. So no matter how vigilant we are in the United 

States about mercury use, we need to monitor what’s happening 

abroad. Currently, the U.S. sells large quantities of mercury to the 

developing world where tracking and environmental laws are lax 

and where mercury is still used in thermometers and thermostats 

and gold mining, although there are plenty of affordable substitutes for mercury. There is no real reason for developing countries to switch as long as we keep selling our mercury overseas, 

which brings me to the matter I want to raise with you. 

Next week, the State Department representatives will attend a 

U.N. meeting in Kenya to decide the next steps in worldwide mercury reduction strategies. The European Union has already committed itself to stop selling mercury overseas by 2012. Secretary 

Lugar and I—Senator Lugar and I—I’m giving you a promotion 

there, Senator Lugar. 

The CHAIRMAN. From a legislative standpoint, that doesn’t sound 

like a promotion. 

Senator OBAMA. Senator Lugar and I sent a letter last month to 

Secretary Rice asking about the U.S. strategy for this important 

meeting. Yesterday, I received a letter. Senator Lugar may have received the same letter that said the State Department still hasn’t 

decided what to do at the meeting. Now these meetings occur every 

2 years. The next one is next week. So I was a little stunned that 

the State Department didn’t yet have a plan on this issue. The 

State Department letter did suggest that it had a preference for 

using nonbinding voluntary partnerships with other countries instead of binding treaties and agreements to reduce mercury around 

the world. Now, obviously, the State Department has got a lot on 

its plate between Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and so on. This is an 

issue of importance to my constituents though, and I wanted to 

25 

find out, No. 1, given the importance of this issue, why the State 

Department isn’t advocating a tougher approach to the problem 

and second, the European Union has committed itself to stop selling mercury by 2012. Would you support the United States adopting a similar ban on mercury sales abroad? I know you may not 

have prepared for this question but I’m wondering if you have some 

thoughts on it and if not, then I’d like to get a formal response 

from the State Department to follow up on the letter that we’ve already received. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. We’ll certainly arrange for that. I’m not personally familiar with that issue, although I was once a representative on the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission. 

Senator OBAMA. So you know a little bit about it. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. And I was Assistant Secretary of State for 

Oceans Environments so I am certainly familiar with dealing with 

that type of issue. I’d be pleased to look into it. 

Senator OBAMA. Good. I would like you to. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I’d 

like to thank you very much for your willingness to continue to 

serve our country at what I consider to be one of the most critical 

times in our Nation’s history in dealing with our national security 

and in terms of world peace. And I want to thank your wife and 

your children for the sacrifice that they’ve made so that your husband and father could serve his country. It’s very much appreciated 

and I’m sure you were all worried when he went into Iraq. I know 

when he came to the office to talk about it, I said he was taking 

his life in his hands going in there. Thank you so much. 

As you know, Mr. Negroponte, I’ve been interested in a couple of 

areas—No. 1, anti-Semitism and Muslim-phobia and we’ve been 

trying for 4 years to get the OSCE to fund out of their core budget, 

the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Resources, which 

is a part of the OSC in terms of dealing with human rights and 

religious things. 

I would just like to underscore how important I think that decision in putting it in the core budget is, because if you look at the 

long-term war on terror—and it’s going to be with us a long time— 

how we deal with the human relations infrastructure in the various 

countries in terms of anti-Semitism and in terms of the Muslim 

world, particularly Muslims and dealing with modernity, are going 

to have a big impact on whether or not we’re successful or not in 

the long run on this war on terror. 

The second one deals with Serbia and Kosovo. Again, I want to 

congratulate the State Department in terms of not setting an artificial date for the finishing of those negotiations. I appreciate the 

outreach to Serbia. They’ve been—if we’re successful, the forces of 

democracy won but the issue between how—the final status in 

Kosovo is still something that is up in the air and I would hope 

that as it moves to the Security Council that we stay on top of it 

so we don’t end up having another conflict in that part of the 

world. 

When you were in the office, we talked about management and 

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26 

sight of Government Management and the Federal Workforce, and 

the fact of the matter is that we have been receiving, and I think 

Senator Lugar made reference to it in his opening statement, we’ve 

got some tremendous management problems today in the State Department, and for the record I would like to have the record of the 

last 2 years in terms of retirement, in terms of key positions that 

are open and not filled. I remember when Colin Powell took over. 

He talked about the team. He really instilled some new esprit de 

corps in the Department and from what I understand right now, 

it has sagged quite a bit. And I’d just like to know from you in 

terms of the role that you’ve been asked to play, what you are 

going to do about trying to get a handle on that and see if we can’t 

quiet things down, stabilize it and bring back the feeling in the Department so that we just don’t keep hemorrhaging as we have in 

the past. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, we’ll certainly provide the information 

about the key positions and the vacancies and I think some of this 

is simply part of a normal rotational cycle that will happen during 

the course of any 8-year administration, Senator. But as far as how 

I visualize my own role in the Department, I think I can be of assistance to the Secretary in helping lead the Department, both here 

in Washington and abroad, the Foreign Service. I would like to 

think that one particular strength I can bring to the Department 

is my knowledge of how the Foreign Service works and my relationships with many Foreign Service officers, so I would like to 

build on that and strengthen the sense of satisfaction and enthusiasm for the work that they are doing. I want to be supportive to 

the Secretary and her efforts to carry out this transformational diplomacy that we were talking about earlier. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, you are a career Foreign Service person. I suspect that everybody is kind of excited that you’re coming 

back to the State Department. I really think you ought to talk to 

Secretary Rice about maybe spending a little time there in the Department, bucking people up and letting them know that there is 

going to be some fresh wind, new water coming into the State Department because the whole operation really depends on the motivation of the people that work in the Department and I think it 

is really important that it be paid attention to at this time. 

[Disruption in background.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you please cease? I’d ask the police to escort our visitor from the room. I would suggest that proves the 

acoustics in the room are good. I thank the Capital Police. We’re 

going to have to clear the room. We can talk about this later. I 

would ask you to please leave the room and let the witness testify. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, will you add a minute and a 

half to my time? 

The CHAIRMAN. No. Yes, I will. Add a minute and a half to your 

time. So we’ll just let you go over a minute and a half. Don’t reset 

the clock. 

Senator VOINOVICH. This gets to Iraq. Many of us feel and the 

Iraq Study Task report came back and talked about engaging people in the region to try and get them to help provide a political solution to the situation. The question I have is, should we be convening a group of people and you’ve mentioned Saudis, the SyrVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
27 

ians—not the Syrians necessarily but the Egyptians and the Jordanians to come together and basically say to them, if we ultimately move out of here and this place blows up, it’s going to have 

a very detrimental impact on the region and you ought to be interested in helping us stabilize the area or stabilize Iraq. The question 

I have is, why haven’t we done that or in the alternative, why 

hasn’t Maliki reached out to these people and called them together 

and said, hey guys, things are pretty bad here. Some of you are 

meddling in this situation. If this thing blows up, what impact is 

it going to have in terms of refugees? Saudis, if Sunnis start to be 

massacred, you’re going to be probably asked to get involved in this 

and we could have a real blow-up. Where are we with this and why 

aren’t we moving in that direction right now? Or at least, why isn’t 

Maliki moving in that direction? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, first of all, Senator, I would agree with 

you that the role that countries in the region could play could be 

positive, although I think in the past, at least, and certainly in the 

time I was there and in my observation, there has been a reluctance on the part of a number of countries to be proactive with respect to Iraq and certainly been reluctant to establish a diplomatic 

presence in that country because of the security situation so I think 

that they’ve been a bit hesitant. I think today, you’re starting to 

see a shift in that situation and countries like Saudi Arabia and 

Jordan, maybe also Egypt—more concerned than they were previously. So I think that could lead to some positive outcomes. 

With regard to the Government of Iraq, I think they try. They 

try quite hard. Both Prime Minister Maliki and President 

Talabani, and particularly President Talabani, have traveled quite 

extensively throughout the region and I think that needs to be encouraged. 

They’ve probably not gotten as far as they would like in terms 

of interest and acceptance and recognition in the region as they 

would have preferred but they have to continue trying to do that. 

For example, there are countries that could provide debt relief to 

Iraq that haven’t done so yet. I would say Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as examples of that, but that would be just one example of the 

kind of contribution they could make to helping the situation in 

that country. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I’ll just finish up that I hope that they 

understand that there is some real concern in this country about 

what we’re doing and if they look at the tea leaves, we’re going to 

be out of there over a period of time—how much we’re still not 

sure. They’ll be some presence and I would hope that somebody underscores to them how necessary it is for them to get involved in 

the situation. I think it is also very important that the American 

people know that some attempt has been made at that because 

from our perspective, it really hasn’t been made. I know the Secretary has moved around and talked to this group and that group, 

but in other instances we’ve brought together countries that had 

strategic interests. We did that in North Korea. We’ve done that, 

to a certain extent, with Iran. We’ve done that to a certain extent 

in Lebanon—you know, bring all the folks together and talk about 

it. I would really urge you and the Secretary to give serious 

28 

thought to formalizing this—maybe not. Maybe we ought not to do 

it. Okay? But somebody should do it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, thank you as well and I want to reiterate what a number 

of my colleagues said about your public service and your contribution and obviously the commitment of your family, which is a big 

part of what you’ve done and we’re grateful. 

I’m going to try to cover maybe four areas, if I can. I’ll try to do 

them rather quickly, starting with, of course, Iraq and Iran. I want 

to pick up on some of what Senator Voinovich spoke to a moment 

ago about the region. One of the points the Iraq Study Group 

made, among others, and I think this is pertinent to this afternoon’s hearing but I know of your experience in the region and in 

particular, with regard to Iraq. 

At one point, the Iraq Study Group made the following assertion. 

It said, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, for the most part, have 

been passive and disengaged. And I wanted to get your perspective 

on that. A, whether you agree with that assessment and B, if you 

do agree, how you think this country and this State Department, 

under your leadership and Secretary Rice’s leadership, can change 

that dynamic, if you believe that to be true, on being passive and 

disengaged. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think that I perhaps would state it slightly 

differently. I think they’ve not been as engaged as we would like 

them to be. I think the possibility of them being more engaged is 

increasing as they watch developments in the region, namely both 

the situation in Iraq and also the emboldened behavior of Iran that 

we’ve been talking about, which I think is a cause of concern for 

them. And if I could just add one point, I think, in reply to both 

Senator Voinovich’s and your question, I think regional diplomacy 

and regional efforts can play an important part—there’s no doubt 

about it—but I do think we need to be clear that the large—the 

preponderance of the problems that Iraq faces are internal in nature. 

Senator CASEY. With regard to Iran, we’ve heard a lot today and 

you spoke to it directly. I guess I want to focus on two areas. One 

is, I’ll deal with the press question first. There was a story today 

in the New York Times about the concerns about the European 

Union—the European Nations not working with our Government 

with regard to Iran, and concerns about whether or not they’ll 

agree to any kind of restrictions or policies that will impact economically on how we deal with Iran. What can you tell us about 

the thrust of that story, A, and B, if the premise of that story is 

correct in your judgment, what do you think you must do and the 

Department must do? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I read the story and I haven’t had a 

chance to check back with the office and look at it in depth, but 

what struck me about the story is that it sounded a little bit premature to me because we’re just—we’re waiting for a report from 

the International Atomic Energy Agency. If I’m not mistaken, it’s 

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29 

port that then the countries will have to decide what else to do before the Security Council in light of Iran’s decision to press ahead 

with its centrifuge program. So I think it may be a little bit early 

to talk about what kind of actions countries are prepared to take. 

Having said that, countries have had differing views on what types 

of sanctions should be applied. I think the important point is that 

the last Security Council resolution on Iran was adopted unanimously and I think that from an intelligence community point of 

view, our assessment is that that resolution had some impact on 

the internal dynamics in Iran and the dynamics of the debate that 

is being carried out in the political elite in that country, and some 

of the people in Iran may now be beginning to wonder what kind 

of difficulties and what kind of complications is the pursuit of their 

enrichment program bringing to that country. 

Senator CASEY. And just a broader question with regard to Iran, 

I think what you see today around the country—I certainly hear 

it in Pennsylvania. We’ve lost over 140 lives in Iraq. There is a lot 

of discussion about and speculation about the Bush administration 

taking steps with regard to Iran that reminds people about mistakes made with regard to Iraq. I realize you can’t compare the 

two, necessarily, but what I think a lot of people need to hear from 

this administration, and certainly from the State Department, is 

that when this administration approaches the gravity of the question of Iran, a much bigger country, much bigger threat militarily, 

obviously than Iraq has been, with all the problems we’ve had in 

Iraq, what I need to hear and I think what a lot of people need 

to hear is what is the—set aside the military strategy—what is the 

diplomatic strategy in the next 6 months, say. Let’s limit it to 

that—from what you can gather, of this administration and certainly by way of the State Department, to deal just diplomatically 

with Iran, because I think people need some assurance. It seems 

to me, this may be only a perception that is not accurate but it always seems to me and to many others, I believe, around the country, that even as the administration says that it has every option 

on the table, it seems that the military option always is put forth 

first and seems most of the time the administration spends considering options, most of the time and effort and focus is on a military 

option instead of discharging or considering every possible other 

option, including one of sustained and robust diplomacy, but I’d 

just like to have your thoughts on that. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I guess the first thought I would offer, 

Senator, is that of course, diplomacy and other elements of national 

strategy just have to work hand in hand. They don’t operate in an 

isolated fashion, so that for diplomacy to be effective, it is also important that we have a robust national security posture. I don’t 

think there is any doubt about that. But with respect to Iran, first 

of all, I’d reiterate what I said earlier, which is that we would like 

to resolve the issues that confront us with respect to Iran by peaceful means. I would state that there are two main concerns. There 

are others as well but the two principle ones are the enrichment 

program and there is actually a substantial diplomatic effort underway through both the United Nations and working with the European Union, vis-a-vis Iran, and we’ve also indicated that we 

would be prepared to broaden our diplomatic activity with Iran if 

30 

they were to take that first step of stopping their enrichment program. And the other main concern is, of course, Iraq and the support that they provide to Shia extremists in that country and they 

certainly know our position on that score. 

Senator CASEY. I have many more but I’m out of time. Thank 

you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, 

Ambassador, for your willingness to continue to serve, and to your 

family for their support so that you can do just that. We greatly 

appreciate it. 

Most of the questions this morning certainly and fairly have been 

focused on the situation in Iraq, a fair amount on Iran, as well, but 

as we discussed when I had the opportunity to sit down with you 

for a few moments, your portfolio is quite broad and we had a 

chance to talk a little bit about the task that you will have in the 

Far East—China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan—certainly 

areas that I have been very involved with on the subcommittee 

that I had chaired and now ranking, on this committee. 

Let me ask you about the situation in North Korea, the dual 

track that is proceeding. I understand that today, in fact, we are 

resuming the second round of talks on the financial restrictions 

that the United States has imposed against Pyongyang. Can you 

just very briefly give me your assessment as to where we are and 

how you see us proceeding with North Korea in view of the sixparty talks? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think the key thing, Senator, is we’re of 

course concerned by the fact that they tested their Taepodong missile last summer and that they also had this—more recently, this 

nuclear explosion. And our main objective is to achieve a 

denuclearized Korean Peninsula and we are pursuing that objective 

along with the other parties to the six-party talks. So our main 

focus is to try to get North Korea committed to putting a freeze on 

its nuclear program, which would mean freezing their nuclear reactor and their reprocessing facility and subjecting those activities to 

international inspection. So that’s the main purpose of these diplomatic efforts that are underway at this time. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. And in view of the effort that we all agree 

on, which is a Korean Peninsula free of a nuclear threat there, but 

also recognizing that we have the United States sanctions issue, 

the financial sanctions that from North Korea’s perspective is saying, that’s a different matter, that’s a different issue. There are 

some who have suggested that that is forwarding the efforts for the 

six-party talks to be successful. I guess my question to you is, in 

view of how we are doing this dual track, are we on track, in your 

opinion? Are we making the progress necessary to get to the final 

goal, which is to see the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, it’s a very difficult issue and I wouldn’t 

want to raise false hopes here but I do think there are some 

grounds for optimism that we can move that issue forward. And as 

far as the sanctions are concerned, while some might argue that 

it’s a disruptive factor, I think others might make the case and perhaps even equally or more plausibly that those kinds of sanctions 

can provide a bit of leverage in these discussions. But I think there 

31 

are a number of factors at work—that must be at work on the 

thinking of the North Koreans. There again, I think the United Nations has played a role. The fact that the Security Council adopted 

a unanimous resolution, which placed North Korea, for the first 

time, at odds with their traditional friend, China. It must have 

given them pause about the situation that they have created for 

themselves. So I suspect there are a number of different facts that 

are influencing their thinking at this time. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do you support or would you support sending Chris Hill to Pyongyang for the discussions? Do you think that 

would be helpful? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think that would have to be a tactical decision that the Secretary would have to make in the context of whatever diplomatic development is taking place at that particular time. 

I certainly wouldn’t rule it out. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. In several conversations that I have had 

with some of our friends over in Japan on a multitude of issues, 

I’m reminded that Japan has been our firm and constant ally for 

many years and that some feel that relationship can almost be 

taken for granted. They’re not a trouble maker in that corner of the 

world and there’s almost a sense that sometimes, unless you’re in 

a hot spot, you don’t get the attention from the United States that 

they would hope to receive and when issues come up that are perhaps their priority but not a priority of the United States, there 

can be some issues, there can be some friction there. Recognizing 

that your portfolio is going to include most of Northeast Asia, do 

you anticipate that you’re going to be spending some time over 

there? What kind of message do you anticipate that you will bring 

as you reach out to some of our friends and neighbors over there? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, first, yes I do expect to spend time working on Northeast Asia, including the whole question of the longerterm structures for peace in that region. I think that’s a subject 

that we need to be giving some thought to, although obviously 

within the time frame of this administration, there is not enough 

time to bring that to some kind of an end state. But second, also, 

I would expect to devote an important amount of time to our relationship with Japan and for me, as someone who started my career 

in East Asia more than 45 years ago, our relationship with Japan 

has always been a cornerstone of our policy toward East Asia. I 

don’t think we should take the relationship for granted. I think it 

needs to be nurtured and Japan remains one of our most important 

allies in the world. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I appreciate the lengthy relationship 

you have built over there and I think that will only help us in our 

efforts. 

One more question about the region there. Over the weekend, 

Taiwan President Chen Shui-Bian called for a new constitution for 

Taiwan. Do you—what is the State Department’s view on President 

Chen’s remarks or comments? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. The State Department view is that we support 

a one-China policy and the foundation documents that three different communiques with regard to the unity of China and we believe that it would be unwise to do anything that might be in cross 

purposes with those three communiques. 

32 

Senator MURKOWSKI. So do you think that a new constitution 

would be at cross-purposes? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I would want to study the implications but it 

certainly strikes me that that would be a distinct possibility. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. I’ve got time for one more quick one. Last 

week at the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, I 

heard some testimony about the structure in the world in terms of 

our oil and gas resources and at that hearing, it was reported that 

75 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas resources are now controlled by state-owned oil companies. As we recognize our increased 

dependence on foreign sources of energy, how does this—the fact 

that we’re dealing with state-controlled entities—how does this impact our policy choices, really our relationship with our allies? 

We’re dealing with the countries for an energy source that we deem 

absolutely critical. What does this mean? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I think it makes access to energy more 

challenging, particularly for those parts of our private sector that 

are interested in exploration and exploration because they have to 

deal with these state-owned corporations who very frequently— 

more often than not, I think, are not willing to let out exploitation 

contracts to private investment. 

On the other hand, I have noted, certainly in countries that I’ve 

served in, such as Mexico, among others, which do have large 

state-owned oil corporations, that they also confront a challenge, 

which is how as a state-owned oil corporation, can you mobilize sufficient investment to do the necessary exploration and exploitation. 

So I think that sooner or later, a number of these state-owned oil 

corporations around the world are going to have to face up to the 

reality that private investment from investors around the world 

can be a very, very helpful factor to them in increasing their production. So there is the basis for some kind of a bargain there, it 

would seem to me. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, I have 

to take a phone call. I expect to be back before the committee finishes but since, at this moment, we only have two more Senators 

to question, I’m going to ask the chairman, if I am not back by 

then, to adjourn the hearing. We’ve consulted very briefly, and it 

is my hope and intention that we will move to a rapid consideration and executive session of your nomination. I expect that it will 

be favorable. and I would expect that we’ll try to get this to the 

floor as soon as possible. Seven months is a long time to have this 

post vacant, so we’ll do our best to accommodate that. 

I hope to be back before it finishes, but I must take this call so 

I recognize Senator Webb. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to have to leave because I’ve got some people who have been waiting on me so I would 

like to state for the record that I am very supportive of the nomination of Mr. Negroponte to this position. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, okay, thank you. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. It may be shorter than I thought. 

33 

Senator WEBB. Ambassador Negroponte, I’m sorry I missed a 

good portion of your hearing. We’ve got two confirmation hearings 

going on at the same time, one up in the Armed Services Committee, where I also serve. I have a great regard for the contributions that you’ve made to our country over the years. 

[Senator Webb speaks a Vietnamese phrase.] 

You don’t have to translate that. That was a little bit of Vietnamese. Ambassador Negroponte is quite proficient in Vietnamese. 

During this committee’s hearing with Secretary of State Rice on 

January 11, I asked her a very straightforward question on the administration’s policy regarding military action against Iran and 

this is a quote: I asked, is it the position of this administration that 

it possesses the authority to take unilateral action against Iran in 

the absence of a direct threat, without Congressional approval? It 

has been nearly 3 weeks since I asked that question and I followed 

up with a letter and this is basically a yes or no question regarding 

an urgent matter affecting our Nation’s foreign policy and particularly as we watch some of these incidents that have been occurring 

over the past couple of weeks. I would pose the same question to 

you today. Is it the position of this administration that it possesses 

the authority to take unilateral action against Iran in the absence 

of a direct threat without Congressional approval? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Senator, I think you put me in a bit of a difficult position. If the Secretary hasn’t sent a reply back to you, I 

think I’d be reluctant to substitute mine for hers. But let me just 

reiterate what I said earlier in reply to a number of questions that 

we wish to resolve any differences we have with Iran by peaceful 

means. We don’t rule out other possibilities but our focus at the 

moment is on resolving these issues by peaceful means. 

Senator WEBB. Would you pass on to the Secretary my request 

that the written question be replied to in a reasonably rapid manner, like soon. I appreciate that. 

I caught the tail end of your response with respect to our relations with Japan and I, like a number of people, including you, I 

think, have a long relationship with Japan and view Japan as 

probably our greatest long-term ally in the region with all the 

things that are going on. I have a pretty strong concern about our 

relations with China. And I’m concerned principally that because 

of the attention on the Middle East, we have not paid sufficient attention to China, other than the economic side. There is a whole 

laundry list that I won’t go through in terms of where I believe, 

as a Nation, we are becoming disadvantaged in our relationships. 

But specifically, I’m curious as to your thoughts on this relationship, particularly when we see the economic disadvantage on the 

one hand and, clearly, on the other, an increased build-up to the 

expansion, which some would say inevitable, of Chinese interests 

in this hemisphere and also in Africa. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Senator, China is a very important country 

and it is going to be for the century ahead of us. I think it is in 

our interests to engage China. I was involved in the first outreach 

to China, back in the early 1970s. I went with Dr. Kissinger there 

in 1972, shortly after President Nixon’s historic visit there. I think 

we need to engage China. I think we—on all levels and I think that 

ought to be our approach to that country, not one of confrontation 

34 

but engagement, and Deputy Secretary Zoellick had conducted a 

senior dialog with them on political matters, which I expect to be 

able to resume at the level of Deputy Secretary of State. And I look 

forward to doing that and I look forward to consulting with you 

about our approach and how we go about that. 

Senator WEBB. Would you agree that there is something of a parallel in the sense in the early opening up to China that you participated in. We had a situation rather similar to Iran’s today, not a 

direct parallel but certainly a similar situation where China was a 

rogue nation with nukes, had an American war on its border, was 

known to have been providing supplies to people who we were 

fighting on the battlefield, and yet we did aggressively engage 

them, diplomatically, and arguably over a period of decades, we 

have been very instrumental in bringing them into the international community. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I see what you’re driving at. The one major 

difference, of course, is that China is just such a larger factor. It’s 

so much larger a country and it’s more than a billion people whereas Iran is 70 or 80 million people so we’re not talking exactly about 

the same kind of dimensions here. But I see your point. 

Senator WEBB. But in terms of potential impact, when we look 

at the emergence of Iran and the difficulties that we’re going to be 

having with Iran in that region, it would seem to me that without 

giving up any of the deterrent issues that we have and without giving up our position on such issues as recognition of Israel or Iran’s 

nuclear program, that an aggressive engagement with Iran over 

the long-term could be beneficial in the same way that this relationship with China has been beneficial. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. We’ve had some discussion earlier about the 

question of engagement with Tehran and that doesn’t seem to be 

in the cards at this particular point in time, but one other pretty 

significant difference I think I want to highlight is that Iran, if 

anything, I’d say is more of a rogue nation. If you think of their 

support for international terrorism and their effort to prevent reconciliation between the Arabs and Israelis at all costs, and their 

state sponsorship for terrorism, which they, I think, quite brazenly 

use as a tool in their national security policy. 

Senator WEBB. Well, I certainly wouldn’t disagree with you on 

the nature of the rhetoric and some of the actions that have come 

out of Iran. At the same time, they did cooperate with respect to 

Afghanistan, after the 2001 invasion. It just would seem to me that 

we need to be looking at both ends of the diplomatic scale and I 

look forward to having further discussions about that and I thank 

you for your time. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. Do you 

have any further questions? 

[No response.] 

Senator LUGAR. Let me just thank you on behalf of the chairman 

and the committee. We appreciate you being here, your responses 

to our questions. Let me just say as a matter of business here, all 

questions for the record should be submitted before the close of 

business tomorrow and the record will be kept open for that purpose. There have been some questions raised and so we want to 

complete the record. As the chairman has pointed out, it is his inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
35 

tent and I agree to that, to try to have an Executive Session to take 

action upon your nomination at the earliest possible moment. We 

realize the urgency of filling the post and having an Under Secretary on the job. 

We thank you very much for your appearance and that of your 

family and the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In last week’s hearing, Dr. Ed Luttwak emphasized the differences between Iraqi Shiites who are Arab and Iranian Shiites who are Persian. He also said, 

‘‘The United States is a great power. The Iranians are a puny power. Their importance in that area is temporary based on the fact that the people of that area, the 

leaders, don’t see a coherent policy from the United States of America.’’ Do the Iranians hope eventually to dominate Iraq? Could they prevail, given the natural rivalries? 

Answer. Tehran has legitimate national interests related to its neighbor, Iraq. 

After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iranians, not surprisingly, have attempted to 

play a role in Iraq’s political process. They developed ties with many current Iraqi 

Government officials who, during their years of opposition to Saddam, lived in Iran. 

Iran can and should play a constructive role in supporting Baghdad’s efforts to 

establish security. Unfortunately Tehran’s activities have been detrimental to the 

internal democratic development and security of the Iraqi people. The provision of 

material support and training to Shia militias and other groups has resulted in the 

deaths of United States troops, coalition forces, and Iraqi citizens. Iran’s motivations 

in carrying out these actions are not clear, but our experience with similar Iranian 

involvement with Shia Arab groups elsewhere in the region, especially Lebanon, 

suggests that the Iranians use local surrogates to advance Iranian agendas at the 

expense of legitimate local interests. 

The United States remains committed to a stable and democratic Iraq, and the 

Iraqi leadership has affirmed its commitment to discouraging Iranian interference 

in its internal affairs. The United States has confidence that our partnership with 

the Iraqi Government, coupled with assistance from friends and allies in the region, 

will prevail against harmful Iranian meddling. 

Question. What is your reaction to another comment of Dr. Luttwak’s: ‘‘When generals say we don’t need more troops in Iraq, it’s not that they were patsies or playing along with the administration policy at the time, it’s that you don’t know how 

to employ them, because you cannot patrol without intelligence. And, unfortunately, 

Central Intelligence doesn’t provide it. We have raiding forces in Iraq, which are tremendously effective. They’re hardly ever used because, to make a raid, you need intelligence . . . That’s why, even if you knew nothing of the politics or the strategy 

or the theater strategy, purely at the tactical level you would say: Don’t send me 

troops. Reduce them.’’ 

Answer. I respectfully disagree with the assertion that our military ‘‘don’t know 

how to employ’’ their forces in Iraq because the United States intelligence community does not provide adequate intelligence. The United States intelligence effort in 

Iraq is robust, and I have devoted considerable attention to this issue as Director 

of National Intelligence. There is strong civilian-military interagency coordination 

and cooperation to provide our forces with the best information possible to support 

their operations. Tactical level civilian-military cooperation has been particularly effective against al-Qaeda in Iraq, as demonstrated by the successful effort against 

Abu Musab Al Zarqawi last summer, among other operations. I would be pleased 

to arrange a classified briefing through appropriate channels to provide further details. 

Question. How long do you anticipate that the surge of troops will need to be sustained? Many have suggested that the Iraqi military will not be able to do what we 

expect them to do in the near future. How soon will we have a clearer picture as 

to Iraqi capabilities and political will? 

36 

Answer. The President noted in his January 10 address to the Nation that the 

Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces 

by November of this year. 

The transfer of particular provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and transfer 

of the Iraqi army to the command and control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command 

(IGFC) are expected to occur once Iraqi forces and command relationships have developed sufficiently to allow the Iraqis to be in the lead as opposed to a supporting 

role. To date, three provinces have PIC’ed and five Iraqi army divisions are under 

IGFC control. 

As MNF–I and Iraqi forces achieve success in establishing security for the Iraqi 

population, a primary goal of the surge, in addition to building their forces and command relationship, the United States would then be in a position to reevaluate its 

force structure in Iraq. 

General Patraeus stated in his Senate testimony that by late summer we expect 

to have an assessment of the success of the Baghdad Security Plan. 

Question. Can a surge in civilian reconstruction and stabilization take place when 

the security situation is so dire? 

Answer. The security situation in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq is serious, and 

does complicate our efforts to implement programs. We are addressing this concern 

in two ways. 

First, in places like Baghdad and Anbar where security is currently a challenge, 

Iraqi forces, supported by and embedded with American forces, are working to secure parts of those provinces so that reconstruction and civilian life can resume. The 

areas that are secured will be expanded and the population protected. This is why 

it is important to have resources in the Department’s budget for civilian programs 

in order to carry out the programs needed to show Iraqis that they have a stake 

in their neighborhoods being peaceful and secure. 

Second, there are areas that are secure enough for civilian programs addressing 

long-term political stability to be carried out. These areas include locations in which 

support for moderates over extremists demonstrates the benefits of working out 

their disputes through a peaceful political process rather than through fighting. A 

core objective of the President’s new strategy is to empower moderates, defined as 

those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their interests peacefully, politically, 

and under the rule of law. This will be an important role for our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 

Question. State has met its staffing needs in Iraq, but only through the Secretary’s involvement and that of other senior officers, including yourself when you 

were an ambassador there. Other agencies and departments have not been as successful. 

(A) Challenges in meeting staffing targets stem from both budgetary (no international emergency line items in their budgets) as well as legal restrictions (the 

President cannot order civilians to war, they must volunteer, adding to the time it 

takes to deploy). Is the President seeking changes to these authorities? Will State 

begin directed assignments? 

(B) What is the Department’s vision for adding 300 new personnel to the Iraq mission? Will these be contractors, grantees, NGO operatives? 

(C) Will the U.N. or other international organizations ramp up? What is the contractor and NGO presence in Iraq today? 

Answer. (A) Fully staffing our most critical posts, including Baghdad and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, is one of the State Department’s highest priorities. The Department has made changes to its bidding and assignments 

process and offered a generous incentive package to entice bidders to volunteer for 

service in Iraq. I am proud to report that State Department employees have willingly responded to these calls for service and have volunteered to serve at even the 

most difficult and dangerous posts abroad. 

In the current assignments cycle, we have already filled 89 percent (156 positions 

out of 176) of Foreign Service positions in Iraq for summer 2007. For Embassy 

Baghdad, we have committed candidates for 117 out of 128 jobs. For the Iraq PRTs, 

we have 39 committed candidates for 48 jobs. The Bureau of Human Resources, the 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and other senior leaders in the Department are 

reaching out to potential candidates to fill the remaining positions. We also are looking at qualified civil service employees or eligible family members to fill some positions in Iraq on limited noncareer appointments. I am confident that these positions 

will be filled. 

To date, the Secretary has not had to utilize directed assignments to meet our 

staffing needs in Iraq. We are prepared to direct the assignment of Foreign Service 

37 

members should that become necessary. Our goal, however, is to fill the positions 

in Iraq and in all of our missions around the world with qualified, willing employees 

who can carry out our crucial United States foreign policy objectives overseas. 

At this time, the Department is not seeking any additional authorities related to 

assignments. The administration has sought various legislative changes to improve 

the incentives for overseas service. A number of these incentives were included in 

H.R. 4939 and passed by the 109th Congress, but others, such as the Foreign Service Modernization provisions in H.R. 6060, were not approved in 2006. The Department will continue to pursue Foreign Service modernization to reduce the 18.6 percent pay gap for overseas service. Indeed, I was amazed to learn that an officer can 

be paid more for serving in Washington than in many hardship and danger posts. 

Other proposals may also be forthcoming, as we reevaluate the existing incentives 

for hardship service and determine if other legislative changes are needed to support and compensate our employees who serve in the most difficult posts overseas. 

(B) The Department is identifying an additional 10 senior officers to lead new 

PRTs in Iraq. These teams will work directly with military brigade combat teams 

(six in Baghdad, three in Anbar, and one in North Babil). We intend to use a mixture of personnel from DoD, USAID, other civilian agencies, and State, in addition 

to contractors, to fully staff the PRTs. These civilian specialists will provide the kind 

of professional knowledge not normally found in diplomatic missions, such as expertise in animal husbandry, small business formation, medical administration, and cooperative marketing. 

(C) As of January 16, 2007, there were 320 United Nations staff on the ground 

in Iraq, including approximately 221 U.N. security guards. Due to security concerns, 

the U.N. has redeployed international staff from Baghdad to Amman, Jordan, and 

to Kuwait. We believe that the U.N. has a vital role to play in Iraq’s development 

and want the U.N. to maintain a strong staff and geographic presence to assist the 

Iraqi people. 

The World Bank has two international staff in Baghdad’s International Zone and 

is in the process of strengthening its presence there to enhance the policy dialog 

with the Iraqi Government and improve donor coordination. 

The International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) are the primary recipients of United States funding for NGOs in Iraq. 

Through staff based in Iraq, both NGOs support political party development and 

outreach on constitutional issues. Other international NGOs present in Iraq include 

Community Habitat and Finance (CHF) International, Mercy Corps, the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the International Medical Corps (IMC), 

International Relief and Development (IRD), Counterpart, ACDI/VOCA (Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance), and the International Red Cross. 

Question. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: 

• Some PRTs have been very effective, while others have had significant challenges primarily stemming from security and staffing. What is the plan going 

forward? 

• What are the political trends outside Baghdad? Have the PRTs been effective 

in empowering moderate parties? Is that a part of the mandate? 

• There is no PRT in Najaf now, a key location for its prominence in Shia politics. 

Will one of the new PRTs be placed there? 

Answer. Under the expanded PRT program, launched by the President in the 

‘‘New Way Forward,’’ we will double the number of PRTs from 10 to 20, through 

a three-phase roll-out program. Nine new PRTs—the immediate priority—will be colocated with Brigade Combat Teams engaged in security operations in Baghdad and 

Anbar Province. 

In the next two phases, we will add a new PRT in North Babil and augment existing PRTs with specialized civilian technical personnel. Security for the PRTs in 

Basrah, Dhi Qar, Irbil, and Babil will continue to be provided by diplomatic security. Staffing the expansion will be an interagency, fullcourt-press effort. Within the 

next 3 months, State, DoD, and USAID will deploy nine, four-person core-teams to 

the new PRTs in Baghdad and Anbar, each including a senior-level State Department team leader. We have identified 10 candidates for these positions. After deployment of the core teams, we will also send specialists to augment the effort. 

Staffing for the other PRTs is an ongoing process. Most will be specialists in fields 

such as rule of law, economic development, engineering, and agribusiness and, 

therefore, may be contractors and temporary excepted civil service direct hire employees with targeted expertise. 

38 

The President has decided to expand the size and reach of the PRTs due to their 

success in building Iraqi capacity and self-sufficiency to-date. Since 2005, PRTs 

have: 

• Conducted extensive training in governance and municipal planning for provincial, district, and subdistrict offices; 

• Served as a focal point for coordinating international assistance; 

• Worked with Provincial Reconstruction Development committees to improve the 

provincial governments’ ability to systematically identify and prioritize the reconstruction and development needs of their provinces and to improve the delivery of essential services; 

• Facilitated better working relationships between provincial leaders and their 

counterparts in the central government, improving their ability to secure funds 

from the center to pay for provincial projects; and 

• Reached out to local and provincial leaders (including grass-roots groups) who 

want to make a difference in making Iraq’s democracy work. 

A core objective of the President’s new strategy is to empower moderates, defined 

as those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their interests peacefully, politically, and under the rule of law. The expanded PRT program will be central to that 

effort. PRTs will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance, 

such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and develop 

provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable manner. 

Political trends outside of Baghdad vary from province to province. Parts of Iraq, 

such as the Kurdistan region, enjoy relative security and prosperity. Ninewa, 

Tamim (Kirkuk), and Salah al-Din have occasional acts of terrorism, but political 

life continues despite such acts. In Anbar and Diyala, acts of violence are disrupting 

political life. In south-central Iraq, sectarian violence is negligible, but there have 

been sporadic episodes of Shia-on-Shia violence between Badr Organization and 

Jaysh al-Mandi elements, or involving fringe groups such as the Soldiers of Heaven 

just outside of Najaf. In Basrah, militias and political disputes have a negative impact on the political development of that province. 

I agree that Najaf is a key location. In 2006, the State Department established 

a Provincial Support Team for Najaf, which is housed with PRT Babil in Hillah. The 

State Department and the Department of Defense are exploring the possibility of 

a full PRT based close to Najaf. 

Question. What assurance can we have that the $10 billion in Iraqi funds pledged 

for reconstruction in the coming year will be forthcoming? How much of it will be 

spent by the central government versus by the provinces? 

Answer. The Government of Iraq (GOI) included $10 billion in investment expenditure in its draft budget for 2007. This planned level of funding is therefore an Iraqi 

initiative and reflects the policy goals of the GOI. Over the last 2 years, some Iraqi 

ministries have had difficulty expending their capital budgets. 

The GOI is tackling this problem of budget execution with strong support from 

an Embassy Baghdad task force that provides technical assistance to Iraqi ministries. As President Bush indicated on January 10, helping Iraq resolve these 

issues will be one of our top priorities this year. Ambassador Tim Carney, the new 

Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, will focus in this challenge. 

Iraq has already taken some steps. New rules in the Iraqi budget law, if passed, 

would call for the reallocation of money from underspending ministries per a midyear review, thereby enhancing near-term incentives to spend. The Ministry of Finance also plans to send a budget execution status update detailing capital expenditure rates of each ministry to the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister, and the 

media, starting in March 2007. These measures will help ensure that the $10 billion 

in reconstruction funding is forthcoming. 

Although the 2007 Iraqi budget is still being considered by the Council of Representatives, current versions of the budget allocate $2.4 billion to Provincial Councils for investment projects. In addition, of the $4.7 billion allocated to Kurdistan 

region for government functions and investment, $1.6 is provisionally destined for 

investment. Therefore, approximately $4 billion of the $10 billion in Iraqi funds for 

reconstruction will be spent by the provinces, subject to caveat that the Iraqi budget 

is still being formulated. 

Question. The Iraq Study Group and many of our witnesses have emphasized reinvigorated regional diplomacy. Other than statements of concern, what concrete actions steps have we seen from regional actors indicating that they understand what 

is at stake? What can we expect from Iraqi outreach to its neighbors, especially 

those the administration is reticent to engage? 

39 

Answer. We have urged the Iraqi Government to reach out to its neighbors. While 

progress has been made in terms of regional engagement over the past year, more 

efforts need to be made. With respect to Syria and Iran, we support Iraqi direct dialog with Damascus and Teheran—focused on building relationships based on the 

principle of full respect for Iraqi sovereignty and support for a peaceful, stable Iraq. 

Iraq’s neighbors have been involved significantly with the United Nations-Iraq 

sponsored International Compact with Iraq (ICI) from its inception. Under the ICI, 

Iraq commits to a series of primarily economic reforms that will allow it to become 

self-sufficient over the next 5 years. In exchange, its international partners will support Iraq through new assistance, debt forgiveness, and investments. The compact 

provides a framework for Iraq’s economic transformation and integration into the 

regional and global economy. 

As members of the Preparatory Group to the ICI, countries such as Saudi Arabia, 

Kuwait, and the UAE have helped shape the ICI. Both Kuwait and the UAE have 

hosted Preparatory Group meetings. 

We have pressed Iraq’s neighbors, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council states 

along with Egypt and Jordan (GCC+2), to enhance the level of their representation 

in Baghdad and to take further steps to support the Iraqi Government. In particular, Secretary Rice recently traveled to Cairo, Riyadh, and Kuwait, where she 

met with the GCC and Egyptian and Jordanian foreign ministers. Nevertheless, we 

need to do more work with Arab states to win their complete endorsement of the 

ICI and the Maliki government, through such steps as debt reduction and delivering 

on their assistance pledges. This is a major focus of both the Secretary’s monthly 

engagement with the GCC+2 ministers and with Deputy Secretary of Treasury 

Kimmitt’s work in the region. 

Question. As one of the most experienced diplomats in the United States, you 

know that diplomacy is often about talking with adversaries. There are many things 

to be gained through such talks even if all points are not resolved in one’s favor 

and full agreement cannot be reached. To what extent does the administration’s decision not to bring Syria and Iran into discussions about Iraq reflect a lack of confidence in diplomatic endeavors, in general, and in the Department, in specific? 

Answer. We encourage all of Iraq’s neighbors to be responsible partners in supporting and assisting the Iraqi Government. Unfortunately, we have seen no evidence that the Iranian and Syrian regimes are willing to abandon their destabilizing 

policies in Iraq. 

Syria continues to harbor former regime elements and has made insufficient 

progress in dealing with the transit of foreign fighters across the Syrian-Iraqi border. Syria knows what it needs to do to support Iraq, based upon extensive dialog 

earlier in this administration. The Iraqis recognize this threat, which is why they 

are trying to implement with Syria a memorandum of understanding to deal with 

terrorism and border control. Time will tell whether the Syrians will be able to live 

up to their pledge to the Iraqis. 

Likewise, Iran continues its destabilizing activities in Iraq—and indeed, across 

the Middle East. The Iranian regime remains the world’s leading state sponsor of 

terrorism, and there are no indications the regime seeks to abandon its support for 

extremist actors in Iraq, or elsewhere. 

We are not opposed to a wide-ranging dialog with Iran. In fact, the Secretary has 

stated she would lead such an effort. Our only requirement is that Iran suspend 

its nuclear enrichment and related efforts, which the international community, 

IAEA, and U.N. Security Council all fear may be aimed at developing nuclear weapons, during that dialog. 

Question. State’s Iraq team has been hampered by unfilled vacancies. There has 

not been a Deputy Assistant Secretary for some months. Where DoD and the military leans forward and provides information for oversight purposes and to inform 

our opinions, State has taken months to respond to QFRs. When testifying, State 

officials are not cleared to speak freely on important issues involving judgment and 

opinions. What can be done to rectify this situation? 

Answer. I respectfully disagree that the State Department’s Iraq team is hampered by unfilled vacancies. For example, State has filled at present 96 percent of 

the positions it has in Iraq, with 98 percent of the positions filled for PRTs—all volunteers. In fact, State’s job assignment policy in the present assignments cycle was 

to emphasize filling unaccompanied and limited accompanied posts, including Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and then turn to assignments to other non-hardship posts overseas. And while we still have some positions to fill for summer 2007, we are well 

ahead of schedule in making summer 2007 assignments compared to where we were 

40 

this time last year. We believe that this policy has been very successful at meeting 

our staffing goals for Iraq. 

Ambassador Lawrence Butler assumed the Deputy Assistant Secretary position 

this month. In the Department’s view, tolerating a vacancy for a limited time in 

order to assign the best and most qualified person for the job is preferable to simply 

filling the slot. However, delays in filling key positions are not unprecedented nor 

are they always unavoidable, particularly given the unique assignment rules of the 

Foreign Service. 

I understand that sometimes our responses to QFRs are not as swift as they 

should be. On many occasions, the Department must coordinate responses with our 

embassy and other entities in order to provide Congress with the most accurate account of facts on the ground, which sometimes delays the Department’s ability to 

respond as quickly as it would like. I understand that State has taken internal steps 

in order to improve its response times. 

In the Department’s view, our officials do speak their minds and offer their opinions when testifying on the Hill. Most recently, Secretary Rice, as well as the Senior 

Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq, Ambassador David Satterfield, 

and Ambassador Khalilzad, provided frank, candid testimony and briefings, and 

they will continue to do so. 

Question. A robust FMS program should be put in place to equip Iraqi forces. This 

would replace NSPD 36 authorities given to CENTCOM and give full advantage of 

the services available under FMS and the expertise and capabilities of DoD logistic 

organizations (and U.S. contractors). Such a change would provide a sound legal 

framework for the program as well as important Congressional oversight mechanisms. Will State be implementing such a program for Iraq this year? If not, why 

not? How can the information flow about training and equipping be improved? 

Answer. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I) is 

working with the Government of Iraq to move toward a traditional bilateral security 

assistance relationship. A critical part of this transition is Iraqi participation in the 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Their participation began in earnest in 2006 

when the Iraqis committed over $2.34 billion of Iraqi national funds to support procurement of equipment for the Iraqi armed forces. As the Iraqi armed forces develop 

into a professional and modern military, we will consider the appropriate funding 

and support for its continued long-term development. The State Department fully 

supports transition of the Government of Iraq to a normalized security assistance 

relationship when ministerial capacity permits transitioning MNSTC–I responsibilities to an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq. 

Question. While United States-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations are ongoing, South Korean officials have not engaged in meaningful negotiations for the full resumption of exporting United States beef products to that country. The major issues to be resolved include: (1) Establishing a tolerance for bone 

fragments in boneless product; (2) advancing market access for bone-in products; 

and (3) market access for products from animals regardless of age. 

It has been almost a year since the United States and Korean health officials 

agreed on initial conditions to resume trade. Unless restoration of the beef trade occurs prior to the conclusion of FTA talks, some in the Congress will likely object 

to a free trade agreement. Many are hoping that resumption of the beef trade is 

at the forefront of any economic discussion with Korea. What are the prospects for 

having this problem resolved in a timely way? 

Answer. Resumption of normalized trade in United States beef is one of our highest priorities in our economic discussions with Korea. United States beef is safe, and 

we have made it clear to Korea that while our beef discussions are not technically 

a part of the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) negotiations, if the beef issue has not been adequately addressed by the time the agreement 

is considered by Congress, it will be hard to gain sufficient stakeholder and legislative support and could jeopardize the agreement’s passage. 

USTR and USDA are actively working to find a commercially viable solution to 

the difficulties our exporters have experienced in trying to get United States beef 

back in the Korean market. Upcoming technical talks, scheduled for early February, 

are a positive step toward the normalization of the beef trade with Korea. 

Question. During the past 6 years, strongly competing views over North Korea 

policy within the State Department, and throughout the administration, have contributed to inconsistent actions and mixed messages from United States officials. 

As one example, a few days before Assistant Secretary Hill’s recent Berlin meeting with North Korean officials, United States administration and other State Department officials were in Paris to discuss proliferation finance with some our major 

41 

allies. On the margins of this meeting, some American officials reportedly raised the 

prospect of imposing a travel ban on key North Korean leaders, as provided under 

a United Nations resolution condemning Pyongyang’s nuclear test. Please review 

this report to verify accuracy, determine who was involved, and also, who authorized 

this issue being raised only a few days before Assistant Secretary Hill was meeting 

with North Korean leaders? 

Separately, State Department officials informed the committee last week that the 

United States was calling for the suspension of all UNDP programs in North Korea, 

until an outside audit has been conducted on those programs. 

Apparently some in the administration believe that North Korean leaders may be 

redirecting UNDP funding to other than intended projects, and that the UNDP is 

not doing enough to account for their funds. Administration officials contend they 

have to force the issue at this time because the UNDP is in the process of a onceevery-3-years review of its programs in North Korea. However, this has reportedly 

been a matter of long-standing interest to the Department, and a recent letter expressing United States’ concern with the UNDP publicly appeared the same week 

that Mr. Hill was meeting with North Korean officials in Berlin. 

Although the President and Secretary Rice have repeatedly affirmed their decision 

that Assistant Secretary Hill should pursue a negotiated solution with North Korea, 

actions have been taken that on the surface, appear intended to subvert that process. 

What will you do, as Deputy Secretary, to ensure conformity with the President’s 

approach to North Korea on the part of all State Department officials? 

Answer. As the President and the Secretary have noted clearly and repeatedly, 

we seek a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the North Korea nuclear issue, and we 

believe that the Six-Party Talks are the best vehicle for getting us to such a resolution. At the same time, the President and Secretary Rice have been clear that 

UNSCR 1718 should be implemented fully and effectively. 

Our policy on North Korea involves a dual-track approach in which our efforts at 

the negotiating table are accompanied and enhanced by defensive measures. These 

defensive measures, which target the DPRK’s proliferation and other illicit activities, are intended, primarily, to defend the United States against the very real 

threats posed by these activities. Our defensive measures are also intended to make 

clear to the DPRK the cost of its dangerous and illicit activities in contrast to the 

benefits it stands to gain through a negotiated end to its nuclear programs. 

A dual-track approach, such as the one we have been employing with respect to 

North Korea, requires the strongest of interagency cooperation and coordination. I 

intend to ensure that all concerned participants understand and meet the policy 

goals set by the President and the Secretary. 

The Paris meeting appears to be a reference to G–7 meetings the previous week. 

During a bilateral working-level meeting, United States and French officials discussed developing a common list of individuals for travel ban to submit to the 

UNSCR 1718 Committee in New York. At that meeting, U.S. officials did not pass 

any proposed list of names for travel ban under 1718. The United States is not seeking to impose a travel ban on the DPRK’s diplomatic officials. United States efforts 

to implement UNSCR 1718’s requirements in reference to travel bans will center on 

individuals associated with North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and entities 

previously designated under E.O. 13382. 

Regarding UNDP, we welcome UNDP’s recent decision to audit its operations in 

North Korea. Management reform, in particular the establishment of credible and 

effective systems of internal controls and accountability, is a primary goal of our policy toward the U.N. system. We have repeatedly urged the management of UNDP 

to improve its internal controls and accountability in development programs worldwide, to include providing greater transparency to member states. We are working 

with UNDP and executive board members to improve monitoring and management 

controls to ensure funds for all UNDP programs, not just in the DPRK, are used 

for their intended purpose. 

Question. In view of the recent announcement of a $10.6 billion supplemental 

emergency appropriation request for Afghanistan, of which $2 billion is intended for 

reconstruction, it is important to understand fully the expectations being set for 

such a significant request. It is also extremely important that the American people 

understand why, more than 5 years since our direct engagement following 9/11, the 

United States is still committed to the purpose of rebuilding the region. 

Can you put this supplemental request in context with your efforts to date in Afghanistan and the expectations for our continued engagement there? What are the 

primary areas of U.S. engagement? What are the expectations of our international 

partners and the Government of Afghanistan? 

42 

Answer. ‘‘Rebuilding’’ is really the wrong word; the right word would be ‘‘building.’’ In 2001, there was no Government of Afghanistan. There were no institutions, 

and there was no physical infrastructure upon which to build. Our challenge has 

been helping the Government of Afghanistan to stand up its institutions, build its 

security forces, and develop the infrastructure it needs to extend its control throughout the country. 

Remarkable progress has been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001. For example, 

6 million students are now in school, including 2 million girls, and 83 percent of 

the population has access to healthcare, compared to only 8 percent in 2001. We 

must now consolidate our gains. Continued security challenges in 2006 demonstrated that the new Afghanistan is still fragile and that the threat of the 

Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other extremist groups has not disappeared. Much more remains to be done to make Afghanistan a stable, democratic, prosperous country that 

will never again be a safe haven for terrorists. Last year, we conducted a strategic 

review of our policy which concluded that the international community, including 

the United States, needs to increase its level of support in the political, economic, 

and military spheres to defeat the revitalized Taliban insurgency and al-Qaeda terror. As a result, Secretary Rice announced that the administration will request $10.6 billion in new assistance over the next 2 years: $2 billion for reconstruction and $8.6 

billion for the Afghan National Security Forces. This significant funding request 

comes on top of the over $14.2 billion the United States has already provided in reconstruction and security assistance since 2001. The new United States commitments—financial, military, and political—do not signal a change in our goals for Afghanistan. Building on the results of our previous efforts they will enable us, 

through a comprehensive approach, to secure our successes for the long run. 

Should Congress appropriate the new funds requested by the President, our primary areas of engagement for stabilizing the country, supporting the economy, and 

extending the reach of the Afghan Government will be: the Afghan National Security Forces; roads; electric power; rural development; counternarcotics; and governance. Afghan National Security Forces: In the past 5 years, we have trained and 

equipped an Afghan National Army which is now about 30,000 strong. We expect 

the total number of military personnel to eventually reach 70,000. The army has 

proved its capabilities fighting alongside Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security and Assistance Force troops. The new funding of $8.6 billion will 

help us significantly accelerate the military training effort. Police training will also 

continue to be a priority. Over 49,000 police have been trained and equipped so far 

by the United States and Germany, expanding toward a ceiling of 82,000. More 

work remains to be done to improve performance and retention. Developing and sustaining capable Afghan security forces is critical to our success and is essential to 

eventually relieving the burden on our own forces. 

Roads: In the past 5 years, about 75 percent of Afghanistan’s national ring road— 

1,400 miles long—has been completed by the United States and our allies, and the 

remainder will be finished by 2010. The United States has also completed over 900 

kilometers of secondary and district roads. A United States-constructed two-lane 

bridge connecting Afghanistan to Tajikistan over the Pyanj River will be completed 

in 2007. With new funds, we would support further construction on strategic provincial and district secondary roads, particularly in the south and east. 

Power: Several multinational projects are underway to build Afghanistan’s hydro 

and electrical power systems. These include the multidonor Northern Electrical 

Power System. With new funds, the Northern Electrical Power System is scheduled 

to be finished in 2009, and is expected to provide Kabul and northern cities with 

electricity imported from Central Asia. We also intend to push ahead with construction at the Kajaki hydropower dam site and the Southern Electrical Power System 

to bring more electricity to Kandahar and other areas in the south. 

Rural Development: Over the past 5 years, about 5 million boys and girls have 

returned to school, and hundreds of schools and health clinics have been built or 

rehabilitated. With new funds, we would invest in rural development through rural 

roads, credit, improved seeds, basic health services, primary education, irrigation 

systems, and alternative crops. Continuing efforts to deliver quality basic education 

would be complemented by programs that will increase the technical and managerial capacity of Afghans in both the public and private sectors. 

Counternarcotics: We will expand our efforts to reduce the amount of poppy cultivation and trafficking. After a decrease in poppy cultivation in 2005, Afghanistan 

produced a record poppy crop in 2006. To fight back, we have started to implement 

a comprehensive five-pillar strategy that includes: a counternarcotics public information campaign; an alternative livelihoods program; poppy elimination and eradiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
43 

cation efforts coordinated with governors and local officials; law enforcement and 

interdiction efforts; and reform of the law enforcement and justice systems. This 

strategy must be pursued rigorously and be given time to work. 

Governance: We plan to continue strengthening national, provincial, and local 

governance through training, construction of district administrative centers, and assistance with drafting and implementing needed commercial and criminal legislation. We intend to work to strengthen the justice sector through training programs 

for judges and prosecutors, construction of courthouses, and other programs to expand the rule of law. 

Our international partners and the Government of Afghanistan expect the United 

States to lead the way in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The 

strong, long-term United States commitment that we display is having a significant 

effect on the morale of our allies and of the Government of Afghanistan. Critical to 

our efforts, this commitment also creates trust within the Afghan population. 

Question. There have been three attempts to rebuild and reform the police sector 

in Afghanistan. The first was a German program under the multi-pillared international partnership. The second effort, led by State, was designed to train police 

by the hundreds rather than by the dozens, but was still considered too slow. A 

third effort by Department of Defense came subsequent to a waiver permitting Department of Defense to run police training as an element of larger security sector 

reform. This third effort was declared a ‘‘failure’’ by the current commander who revamped it after his arrival early in 2006. The supplemental request of $8.6 billion 

contains a sizable sum for security reform: What is the role of the State Department 

in the latest Department of Defense effort to train police? 

Answer. Police training is a coordinated effort with the Department of Defense. 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan helps execute police training 

programs with State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, but all police training efforts fall under the policy guidance and general oversight of the Ambassador. 

The senior embassy and military leaders have excellent relations and work together to administer and improve the police program. In fact, contracted Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs trainers and the military 

often work jointly in the field on police training. 

Question. How can we be assured that this effort will meet with greater success 

than previous programs? Are there unique difficulties to training police in Afghanistan? Do you believe they are finally able to be overcome? 

Answer. The program to train and equip the Afghan National Police is generally 

well-conceived and well-executed, but it is important to recognize that the training 

is a work in progress. We are building a 62,000-member force and increased Taliban 

activity in 2006 has made the job even more difficult. Unlike the Afghan army, the 

police must be dismantled and then rebuilt from the top down in order to extract 

corrupt leaders and unravel structures based on tribal and ethnic ties, rather than 

professional criteria. It will take a sustained effort over several years to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program, let alone adequately assess the program. 

The interagency security effort has adapted to meet the changing security and relative funding needs to ensure the success of the Afghan security forces. We will further improve that situation with the allocation of $2.5 billion in new funds for training and equipping the Afghan National Police. This is not just a question of funding 

training, which remains flat at about $325 million, but also of ensuring that recruits 

are equipped with the tools to carry out their mission, which is where the remaining 

$2.2 billion in police funds would largely go. Training and equipping efforts augment 

and enforce each other. Training will not help a recruit who is outmanned, 

outgunned, and underpaid. We must look comprehensively at all the factors that 

will lead to success for the Afghan police and move forward on all fronts. 

The difficulties establishing the Afghan police are similar to the difficulties in any 

post-conflict environment with a total breakdown of institutions, law, and economy. 

We encounter many of the same problems in other countries, such as Haiti, Bosnia, 

and Iraq: corruption, illiteracy, low pay, and an insecure environment. These difficulties have developed over many years and will require a sustained effort over 

many years to resolve. 

Question. How will this program be monitored? Are there measurements other 

than number of trainees successfully graduated? Is the professionalism of trainees 

tracked after they graduate? 

Answer. The graduation of trainees is only the first step in the establishment of 

a professional, competent police force. After that initial training, we use our nearly 

44 

400 U.S. police officer mentors on the ground to monitor the police at both the unit 

and individual level to determine if they are using the skills they have been taught. 

When deficiencies are found, the mentors act to correct them, whether this means 

additional training, correcting substandard behavior, or, in extreme situations, 

changing personnel. 

Question. When the NATO International Security Assistance Force assumed control of security throughout Afghanistan they made clear their intent to increase the 

reconstruction effort as a key to progress. 

Is there political support within NATO countries to increase support for reconstruction? What will that mean for NATO forces deployed throughout the country? 

What percentage of international assistance flowing to Afghanistan is non-United 

States and what recent new commitments have been made? 

Answer. At both the Riga Summit in November 2006 and at the informal NATO 

Foreign Ministerial in January 2007, NATO International Security Assistance 

Forces allies reaffirmed their strong commitment to the mission in Afghanistan and 

to the reconstruction and development of that country. All allies have embraced the 

concept of a ‘‘comprehensive approach,’’ where security operations are coordinated 

with reconstruction and development. Due to International Security Assistance 

Forces allies’ support for this comprehensive approach, NATO forces deployed 

throughout Afghanistan are encouraged to coordinate with the U.N. and Government of Afghanistan-chaired Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board to ensure 

that security efforts are followed-up with reconstruction and development initiatives. 

Since 2001, the United States has provided over $14.2 billion in aid: nearly $9 

billion in security assistance and $5.2 billion in reconstruction, humanitarian, and 

governance assistance. This is approximately 45 percent of total donor assistance to 

Afghanistan. With our request for an additional $10.6 billion for the next 2 years, 

we will continue to be the largest contributor to infrastructure reconstruction and 

the development of the Afghan National Security Forces. 

At the informal NATO Foreign Ministerial, several allies announced new donor 

assistance commitments. To provide a few examples: Canada pledged $8.5 million 

for victims assistance, and $10 million for police salaries (Afghanistan is Canada’s 

No. 1 aid recipient); Norway has pledged to increase its assistance by 50 percent 

in 2007 (making Afghanistan the No. 2 recipient of Norwegian aid); and the European Union has pledged ÷150 million annually over the next 5 years. 

Question. A significant amount of information from a variety of sources indicates 

that continued instability in Afghanistan, especially in the south and east, is due 

to the unconstrained flow of persons and resources across the Afghan-Pakistan border. 

How can the State Department and the supplemental appropriation improve the 

essential Afghan-Pakistan relationship? Are there new efforts to enlist Pakistani 

help in engaging and capturing the Taliban? Do the Pakistanis themselves have 

new ideas that should be pursued? 

Answer. To meet the challenge of violent extremism, the administration is advancing a three-pronged strategy that leverages political, military, and economic 

tools. The administration supports the Pakistan Government’s new Frontier Initiative, a developmental, security, and governance strategy to deny safe haven to the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda along Pakistan’s Afghan border—including in the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas and parts of Balochistan. The Pakistani Government has 

already planned and allocated resources to this effort and has asked the United 

States for additional support for the security, services, and development sectors required to transform this region. Immediate United States technical assistance and 

training for the Tribal Area Development Authority and the Tribal Areas Secretariat would greatly increase Pakistani capacity to design, plan, manage, and monitor programs in the tribal areas, and would bring immediate benefits in the form 

of nonterrorist alternatives for employment to the population at risk for recruitment 

by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 

The State Department is exploring ways to support two initiatives designed to 

strengthen Pakistan’s capability to eliminate terrorist safe havens and strengthen 

control of the border with Afghanistan. The first initiative will enhance the capacity 

of local security forces such as the Frontier Corps, the Frontier Constabulary, and 

tribal levies. The second initiative, Pakistan’s Sustainable Development Plan for the 

tribal areas, is a program of economic and social development and governance reform intended to meet the needs of the local population and render them more resistant to the appeal of violent extremists such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Robust 

support for these two initiatives is expected to improve the security environment in 

45 

the frontier areas, whose Pashtun population spans the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and to contribute greatly to creating an environment inhospitable to violent extremism. 

The United States has strongly encouraged Pakistan and Afghanistan to strengthen their bilateral relationship. We have actively facilitated cross-border communication through military and civilian channels. Military communications are facilitated 

through radio communications and face-to-face meetings by tactical commanders 

along the border, as well as Tripartite Commission (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the 

International Security Assistance Force/U.S. military) working groups and meetings 

at both the operational and strategic levels. On the civilian side, we have encouraged Pakistan to host talks on border security management and a conference for civilian law enforcement agencies of both countries. U.S. diplomats are also facilitating initiatives to establish institutionalized parliamentary exchanges and to promote media exchanges. 

To facilitate economic development in Afghanistan and the border areas of Pakistan, President Bush announced his intention to seek Congressional approval for the 

Reconstruction Opportunity Zones program. The Reconstruction Opportunity Zones 

are a critical economic component of our development strategy and offer a vital opportunity to improve livelihoods, promote good governance, and extend and 

strengthen the writ of the Afghan and Pakistani Governments. Establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones will help to kick-start industrial production and 

bring benefits to these targeted economies along with greater cooperation between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consultations with Congressional staff and industry as 

well as the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently on-going and 

the State Department and United States Trade Representative will present an outline of legislation to Congress soon. 

The International Security Assistance Force-led military coalition in Afghanistan 

works closely with the Pakistani military through the Tripartite Commission. On 

their side of the border, Pakistani security forces are engaged in denying al-Qaeda, 

Taliban, and other militants safe haven on Pakistani territory. Raids by Pakistani 

security forces on hideouts and training areas have disrupted the insurgents’ operations, prompting retaliatory strikes that have killed and wounded Pakistani forces, 

government officials, and civilians. The Government of Pakistan currently maintains 

more than 900 monitoring posts along the 2,300 km border with Afghanistan. The 

Pakistani Government recently announced stringent new measures to tighten security along the border. Pakistan has also announced plans to close several lawless 

refugee camps in the border region, repatriating the residents to Afghanistan. 

Question. How has the justice sector been incorporated into a coherent reconstruction and reform plan to improve basic governance across Afghanistan from the ministry to the local police? 

Answer. Justice benchmarks were incorporated into the Afghanistan Compact 

agreed to in London in January 2006. Reforming the justice sector—in the context 

of competing formal and informal systems, widespread corruption, and an active insurgency—is a formidable challenge. By creating a Rule of Law Coordinator on the 

U.S. Embassy staff, we plan to intensify and focus our engagement on justice sector 

issues with Afghan officials and the international community (led by Italy) on meeting these benchmarks. 

President Karzai’s appointments of an activist Attorney General and a reformist 

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court offer a window of opportunity for United States 

and international efforts to bear fruit in improving the delivery of real justice to the 

Afghan people. 

Our ongoing commitment to support justice, governance, and the rule of law in 

Afghanistan is reflected by the $2 billion administration request in new assistance 

announced January 26. Those funds will help strengthen governance at all levels 

(national, provincial, and local) through a comprehensive and coordinated web of 

U.S.-supported programs. Some examples include construction of district administrative centers, assistance with drafting and implementing commercial and criminal 

legislation, training and mentoring of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, police-prosecutor training programs, nationwide corrections training and infrastructure support, and other programs to expand the rule of law. Provincial reconstruction teams will provide training, infrastructure, and equipment required to improve 

provincial and district governance. Parliamentarians will be trained in legislative 

research, drafting, and constituent outreach. Civil society groups, including the 

media, will receive training and other support. 

Police training is a coordinated effort with the Department of Defense, so there 

are no separate efforts. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan helps 

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national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, but all police training efforts fall 

under the policy guidance and general oversight of the ambassador. Senior embassy 

and U.S. military leaders work together to administer and improve the police program and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs-contracted trainers and the military often work jointly in the field on police training. 

The interagency effort has been underfunded relative to the challenge. The alloca- tion of $2.5 billion in new funds for training and equipping the Afghan National Police will improve the situation. This is not just a question of funding training, which 

remains flat at about $325 million. The remaining $2.2 billion in police funds would 

largely ensure that recruits are equipped with the tools to carry out their mission. 

Training and equipping efforts augment and enforce each other. Training will not 

help a recruit who is outmanned, outgunned, and underpaid. We must look comprehensively at all the factors that will lead to success for the Afghan police and 

move forward on all fronts. 

Question. The United States has provided significant resources to Pakistan as a 

partner in countering terrorism. This assistance has included economic, development, and security assistance. The embassy is a hardship post and under great 

pressure from a security standpoint, as seen on Friday by the terror bomb attack 

at a hotel in Islamabad and the rough treatment of a New York Times reporter in 

the Frontier Territories. 

Due to the high level of security for United States officials and the necessity for 

extreme care in the conduct of business, what measures is State taking to ensure 

that such a significant level of assistance to Pakistan is being effectively managed 

and monitored? How is the impact of this assistance being measured given limited 

access to parts of the country where it is being carried out? 

Answer. Embassy officials take exceptionally strict security measures in Pakistan, 

particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; they are able to access 

most, but not all, projects and sites. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement’s Narcotics Affairs Section programs are regularly visited and monitored in the border areas by the Narcotics Affairs Section team, which includes Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service nationals, as well as international and domestic contractors. Ambassador Crocker and Assistant Secretary Patterson have also 

visited border outposts. 

Projects monitored directly by the section team include road construction projects 

and the construction of border outposts. Embassy officials have not been able to 

monitor programs firsthand in North and South Waziristan and parts of Khyber 

Agency in the tribal areas, but have established reliable alternate verification procedures to continue a limited number of programs. Narcotics Affairs Section programs, 

for example, are very successful in the tribal areas. 

In addition to programmatic visits to the tribal areas and Balochistan, there is 

a Narcotics Affairs Section team dedicated to monitoring the use of the millions of 

dollars of commodities provided to Pakistani agencies. The agencies have been 

grateful for these commodities and are meticulous in monitoring their use. Each 

agency provides quarterly reports that list the condition of each set of night-vision 

goggles, Motorola radios, and vehicles, and also provides specific examples where 

this equipment was used. For example, the night vision goggles have been used in 

investigating drug syndicates and tracking Taliban fighters in the tribal areas. 

Through interagency ground monitoring and aerial surveys, Pakistan and the 

United States Government confirmed that Pakistan’s poppy cultivation levels continue to decline. It is expected that Pakistan will achieve poppy-free status in the 

next few years. 

Agreements applicable to the transfer or sale of defense articles to Pakistan allow 

for United States officials to access such articles whereby the officials may check 

both inventory controls and technical security measures. Despite the difficult security environment, the embassy’s Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan is able 

to monitor the use and storage of all such defense articles transferred to Pakistan. 

The Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan also monitors and validates expenses 

reimbursed by Coalition Support Funds. 

With respect to economic and development assistance, the USAID mission employs a variety of approaches to ensure accountability. USAID works closely with 

approximately 40 partner organizations that have direct responsibility for implementing USAID-funded programs in the field, including regular office visits and 

periodic site visits. While security constraints are sometimes formidable, United 

States and local staff can travel to many parts of Pakistan where activities are underway. Access is most limited in parts of Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier 

Province bordering Afghanistan. To a large extent, the monitoring of projects in 

Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is done with the help of 

47 

USAID’s Pakistani counterparts. In contrast, access is very good across the entire 

earthquake-affected region, where USAID makes frequent helicopter visits even to 

the most remote construction sites. 

As is typically the case at USAID missions across the world, monitoring and evaluation concerns are addressed through a variety of mechanisms, including annual 

reports to Washington, periodic (usually quarterly) contractor and grantee reports, 

and site visits. A highly skilled national staff makes an important contribution toward managing and monitoring programs in the field. USAID’s staff of 10 Foreign 

Service officers and 5 other long-term American employees is occasionally supplemented by short-term expatriate staff. At least one-third of the long-term United 

States staff presently stationed in Islamabad speak Urdu, providing an important 

level of knowledge and understanding of the local situation. 

Disbursement of annual budget support (2005–2009) is guided by the Shared Objectives, a set of goals mutually agreed between Pakistan and the United States, focusing on Growth and Macroeconomic Stability, Investing in Human Capital and 

Private Sector Development, and Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction (including 

ensuring transparency of funding). Providing Pakistan with balance of payments, 

budget, and policy reform support has been critical to Pakistan’s stability in a time 

of increasing demands on Pakistan for cooperation in the war on terror and in support of coalition activity in Afghanistan. Pakistan provides the United States embassy a summary of the relevant portions of its current overall budget for the fiscal 

year, and states how its spending will be modified with the addition of the Pakistani 

rupee equivalent of $200 million. USAID in Pakistan monitors these funds at the 

national budget level to help verify United States Government contributions are 

used in accordance with the contract agreements. The United States Government 

meets annually with the Pakistani Ministry of Finance to review Pakistan’s 

progress on the Shared Objectives. 

Question. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, is a 5- 

year program that faces reauthorization next year. What is your assessment of the 

program’s successes and challenges thus far? How is the administration working 

with other governments and multilateral efforts to maximize our ability to fight the 

AIDS pandemic? 

Answer. The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Emergency Plan/ 

PEPFAR) is a $15 billion, multifaceted initiative to combat HIV/AIDS around the 

world. Established in 2003, PEPFAR is the largest commitment ever by any nation 

towards an international health initiative dedicated to a single disease. 

The emergency plan’s 5-year global strategy focuses on implementing bilateral 

programs in 15 of the most affected countries (Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 

Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Viet Nam, and Zambia), which together comprise 50 percent of the 

global pandemic. PEPFAR also consolidates and coordinates initiatives in more than 

100 countries where the United States has bilateral programs, and amplifies the effects of other global interventions by partnering with and contributing to the Global 

Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund). Additional international partners include the World Bank, the United Nations Joint Program on 

HIV/AIDS (IJNAIDS), other national governments, and a growing number of businesses and foundations in the private sector. 

All U.S. Government bilateral HIV/AIDS programs therefore are developed and 

implemented within the context of multisectoral national HIV/AIDS strategies, 

under the host country’s national authority. Programming is designed to reflect the 

comparative advantage of the United States Government within the host government national strategy, and it also leverages other resources, including both other 

international partner and private sector resources. For example, given the magnitude of the United States Government investment in the Global Fund (in the first 

3 years of PEPFAR, the United States contributed $1.9 billion to the Global Fund 

or approximately 30 percent of all Global Fund resources) and the commitment of 

the United States Government to working collaboratively with other international 

partners and multilateral institutions, bilateral programs provide support to Global 

Fund grantees; help to leverage Global Fund resources, when necessary; and bring 

successful programs to scale. 

Recognizing that country ownership is key, PEPFAR works closely with host governments, program partners, and people living with HIV/AIDS in the local communities, to implement evidence-based HIV interventions that meet locally identified 

needs and conform to each country’s national priorities. PEPFAR also focuses upon 

the needs of women and families, including orphans and vulnerable children. 

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48 

lion HIV-positive people, preventing 7 million new infections, and supporting care 

for 10 million people living with and affected by HIV/AIDS. 

When President Bush unveiled the emergency plan in 2003, only an estimated 

50,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa were receiving treatment for HIV/AIDS. 

Through September 2006, 822,000 people in PEPFAR’s 15 focus countries were receiving treatment supported by United States Government bilateral programs. 

Treatment services are being scaled up at a carefully monitored but rapid rate. 

In 2006, across PEPFAR’s 15 focus countries, on average 93 new antiretroviral therapy (ART) sites came online and the number of sites providing treatment has increased from 800 in fiscal year 2005 to 1,912 in fiscal year 2006. By the end of fiscal 

year 2006, 50,000 more people were put on life-saving ART every month. In order 

to ensure that treatment is being provided for children and women, PEPFAR tracks 

ART clients by age and gender. These records indicate that approximately 61 percent of those receiving PEPFAR-supported treatment in fiscal year 2006 were 

women and almost 9 percent were children. 

Through fiscal year 2006, PEPFAR provided care for nearly 4.5 million HIV-positive people around the world, including approximately 2 million HIV orphans and 

vulnerable children. This is a good start—but countless more HIV-positive people 

are not receiving the treatment and care they need, in part because they do not 

know they are HIV-positive. One major barrier to identifying HIV status is the absence of routine testing in medical settings; to address this problem, PEPFAR supports provider-initiated ‘‘opt-out’’ testing in selected health care settings. In pilot 

studies, implementing the opt-out policy raised HIV testing rates dramatically. 

HIV/AIDS also places a growing strain on already stressed health care systems 

and workers in PEPFAR countries where systemic weaknesses in areas such as 

health networks and infrastructure are persistent obstacles to building human resource capacity and expanding health systems. In response, in fiscal year 2006, at 

least 25 percent of PEPFAR’s total resources were devoted to capacity-building in 

the public and private health sectors—such as supporting physical infrastructure, 

healthcare systems, and workforce development. Eighty-three percent of PEPFAR 

partners were indigenous organizations, and the emergency plan supported training 

or retraining for more than 842,600 service providers (with individuals being trained 

in multiple areas in certain cases) and supported approximately 25,100 service sites 

in the focus countries. 

Moreover, the emergency plan and its host country partners support national 

strategies with innovative approaches to training and retention; broadening of policies to allow for task-shifting from physicians and nurses to clinical officers, health 

extension workers, and community health workers; and the use of volunteers and 

twinning relationships to rapidly expand the number of local service providers required to respond to this disease. This focus on strengthening networks provides a 

base from which to build institutional and human resource capacity, in order to rapidly expand prevention, treatment, and care services. 

In order for comprehensive HIV/AIDS programs to be sustained, a continuous inflow of high-quality medicines and supplies is needed. In concert with in-country 

partners, the United States Government is supporting host nations’ efforts to build 

the necessary supply chain systems. In 2005, the emergency plan partnered with 

leaders in the international supply chain management field, including four African 

organizations, to establish PEPFAR’s Supply Chain Management System (SCMS). 

The mission of SCMS is to strengthen supply chain systems to deliver an uninterrupted supply of high-quality, low-cost drugs, lab equipment, testing kits, and other 

essential medical materials that will flow through a transparent and accountable 

system. 

While PEPFAR’s focus is and will remain HIV/AIDS, program implementers coordinate with a number of international partners with related global health programs, including global TB and malaria initiatives. In addition, PEPFAR’s capacitybuilding initiatives have positive spillover effects: Upgrading health systems and 

strengthening the health workforce serve to improve healthcare delivery overall. In 

addition to strengthening infrastructure, expanding health services, and stimulating 

economic growth, such improvements also enable developing countries to cultivate 

good governance and build freer and more stable societies. It is a mistake to think 

of HIV/AIDS in terms of health alone. It is among the most serious economic development and security threats of our time—precisely why the President and PEPFAR 

host nations have made addressing it such a high priority. 

Question. In September 2005, President Bush announced the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, and the Department of State has hosted 

international conferences with representatives of foreign governments on avian flu. 

Can you please tell us about the latest activities of the international partnership? 

49 

How many countries have joined this initiative? In addition, how much money has 

the United States pledged to combat avian flu and prepare for a possible pandemic? 

On what programs is this money being spent? 

Answer. The International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza met in 

Washington, DC, on October 6–7, 2005, and again in Vienna, Austria, on June 6– 

7, 2006. Representatives from 93 country delegations, 20 international organizations, and some nongovernmental organizations attended the Vienna meeting. The 

Government of India will host the next meeting of the international partnership in 

the last quarter of 2007. 

President Bush’s initiative, which emphasizes core principles such as transparency and sharing of flu samples, has served to raise high-level political awareness, to galvanize nations both to combat the spread of avian influenza and to prepare for a possible human pandemic, and to help coordinate donor spending plans. 

At international pledging conferences in Beijing, China (January 2006) and 

Bamako, Mali (December 2006), the United States Government led all bilateral donors with pledges totaling $434 million in international assistance for avian and 

pandemic influenza. Funds pledged by the United States are going to a variety of 

activities to prevent and respond to avian and pandemic influenza threats, including 

the following: 

• Nearly $138 million for bilateral assistance activities; • Almost $64.5 million for regional programs including regional disease detection 

sites; • Close to $44.5 million for support to international organizations; • $66.6 million for stockpiles of non-pharmaceutical supplies; • More than $40 million for international technical and humanitarian assistance 

and international coordination; • Over $9 million for wild bird surveillance and international research (including 

vaccines and modeling of influenza outbreaks); • $8.6 million for global communications and outreach; • $5.7 million for global contingencies, including emergency response; and • $10 million for building vaccine production capacity. 

The collective efforts of the U.S. Government, foreign governments, and international organizations have reaped results. For example, the United States has 

helped train 15,000 animal health workers, 3,000 human health workers, and nearly 500 veterinarians in outbreak response. These workers will strengthen the emergency response capabilities of many nations and will enable the world to have better 

information on animal outbreaks and an actual pandemic, should it occur. 

Question. The wars in Afghanistan and especially Iraq have diverted State Department and USAID resources and personnel from the rest of the world. Does the 

Department have a means of measuring the impact of what is being called in the 

Foreign Service ‘‘the Iraq tax?’’ Is it having a negative effect on the Secretary’s 

‘‘transformational diplomacy’’ initiative? Is this a problem that you see as one of 

your responsibilities to address? 

Answer. To meet our staffing needs in Iraq, the Department used many positions 

originally intended to fund language proficiency training as part of our Diplomatic 

Readiness Initiative. These positions would have created a ‘‘training float’’ to allow 

for long-term training, without creating staffing gaps overseas. Our fiscal year 2008 

budget submission includes 104 positions to help close the training gap due to positions that were diverted to Iraq. In addition, in order to fully staff the positions in 

Iraq, we have removed some lower priority positions from the bid list. Approximately 140 domestic and overseas positions were affected in the current assignments cycle. 

While some lower-priority positions have not been filled and some training has 

been deferred, our efforts to shift internal resources and positions to quickly ramp 

up our operations in Iraq have not had a negative impact on the Secretary’s Transformational Diplomacy Initiative and the related global repositioning of State Department personnel. As Deputy Secretary, I would certainly take an active interest 

in strategic decisions related to the positioning of State Department personnel, be 

it to support our goals in Iraq or Afghanistan or to implement the Secretary’s vision 

of transformational diplomacy. 

Question. The current Foreign Service compensation system provides mid- and 

entry-level officers stationed in the United States with annual ‘‘locality pay’’ increases that are not given to similarly-ranked officers stationed abroad. Over the 

years, this has had the unintended consequence of compensating officers at a higher 

salary when they are stationed in the United States than when they are stationed 

overseas. Before the 109th Congress adjourned, a bill that addressed this inequity 

50 

and, at the same time, instituted a pay for performance system in the Foreign Service, was in the process of final completion. What will be the Department’s view on 

that bill? Will it press for passage in the new Congress? 

Answer. Foreign Service modernization for the nonsenior ranks continues to be 

a top legislative priority in the management area. We look forward to continuing 

discussions this year with Congress, OMB, the other Foreign Affairs agencies and 

our colleagues at the American Foreign Service Association to amend the Foreign 

Service Act of 1980 and modernize the Foreign Service pay system. 

The purpose of Foreign Service modernization is to close the overseas pay gap for 

FS–01s and below and bring all Foreign Service members under a pay-for-performance system similar to the one that exists for the Senior Foreign Service. A crucial 

component of a pay-for-performance system for personnel who are recruited in one 

central location and who rotate frequently between overseas and domestic locations 

is a worldwide pay scale ensuring that performance overseas is not valued less than 

in Washington. The 18.6 percent difference in base salary when serving abroad undercuts post differentials and allowances, especially those for hardship and danger, 

and remains a significant financial deterrent to service overseas. 

Foreign Service modernization would cover all foreign affairs agencies that are 

governed by the Foreign Service Act, including Agriculture, Commerce, AID, Peace 

Corps, BBG, and State. Other agencies that regularly send employees overseas for 

extended missions, such as the CIA and the Department of Defense, have already 

dealt with the locality pay disparity and do not face the same pay gap for overseas 

service. The CIA pays equal overseas and domestic base salaries, and the military 

never used locality pay at all, awarding their members the full annual pay adjustment without a portion being devoted to locality pay. As we ask our employees to 

take on more challenging and dangerous assignments overseas, the Department 

needs Foreign Service modernization to effectively compete with other Government 

agencies and the private sector and to fully compensate our employees for their 

service abroad. 

Question. We understand that over a million dollars has been collected privately 

in response to the State Department’s request for financial assistance to create a 

diplomacy center including a museum of the history of American diplomacy. Can 

you tell us what progress is being made on this project? What is your view of the 

effort? 

Answer. We acknowledge your long-standing support for a U.S. Diplomacy Center 

(USDC) and museum, one that will be devoted not only to the to the history of U.S. 

diplomacy, but also to the immense contributions that current diplomacy makes to 

our security, prosperity, and freedom. 

FUNDRAISING

The Department of State’s non-profit partner for the U.S. Diplomacy Center, the 

Foreign Affairs Museum Council (FAMC), has raised over $1.3 million toward the 

museum. Senator Mathias is the chairman and Ambassador Steve Low is President. 

SUPPORT

All major Foreign Service organizations including the Council of American Ambassadors and American Foreign Service Association have signed a letter of support. 

PROGRESS ON THE MUSEUM

In late 2005, a design team was selected through GSA’s Design Excellence program to work with the Department. Throughout 2006, the design team worked to 

develop a concept plan which was presented to Secretary Rice last September. The 

next step is to begin a capital campaign. 

I share Secretary Rice’s enthusiasm for what she termed a ‘‘smart’’ project for the 

Department. 

Question. On January 11, President Bush signed legislation containing provisions 

that Senator Obama and I authored relating to proliferation interdiction assistance 

and the safeguarding or elimination of dangerous stockpiles of conventional arms. 

Will you work to ensure that funding, consistent planning, and effective implementation are provided to carry out these provisions of Public Law 109–472, the 

State Department Authorities Act of 2006? 

Answer. Yes. The State Department appreciated the cooperative efforts of the Foreign Relations Committee to develop this legislation and take our concerns into account. The new law will support our efforts to develop international cooperation to 

detect and interdict WMD-related shipments through the Proliferation Security IniVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
51 

tiative (PSI) and other means. Coordinating the variety of U.S. technical assistance 

programs that help international partners develop relevant interdiction capabilities 

will be an important aspect of our international capacity building. 

The aspects of the bill relating to the elimination of dangerous stockpiles of conventional weapons will advance the Department’s efforts in support of humanitarian 

demining, unexploded ordnance clearance, removal of abandoned weapons, and destruction of excess and obsolete munitions, small arms, and light weapons. 

The Department looks forward to cooperating with the committee on these important issues. 

Question. Do you believe that all present U.S. interdiction efforts, including 

through the Proliferation Security Initiative, are effectively coordinated within the 

interagency? Do our interdiction partners have the necessary equipment and training or access to U.S. assistance to effectively carry out interdiction activities? 

Answer. The PSI has been an important organizing principle, not only for the 

United States, but also for our international partners. All PSI activities are conducted via an extensive interagency coordination process under the overall direction 

of a policy coordination committee chaired by National Security Council (NSC) staff, 

with clearly defined strategy documents that describe agency roles, responsibilities, 

and common goals. 

The Department of State is responsible for conducting diplomatic activities relating to the PSI, including interfacing with foreign governments as appropriate to undertake an interdiction. The Department of Defense is responsible for developing 

operational capacity among PSI states and undertaking interdictions that involve 

military assets. Interagency communications are well established and continuous. 

The agencies involved include the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Treasury, 

Commerce, and Justice, multiple components of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence community. Such broad interagency cooperation allows the 

United States to leverage the capabilities and resources of these agencies effectively. 

Capacity building and assisting states in developing the political will, legal basis, 

and capability to undertake interdiction and prevention actions is a key goal of the 

PSI. The Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 

program is an important tool in assisting governments to develop capacity to undertake a PSI interdiction. EXBS funds U.S. efforts to work with states to strengthen 

export controls, improve legal and regulatory frameworks and licensing processes, 

develop border control and investigative capabilities, improve outreach to industry, 

and enhance interagency coordination. 

In addition, the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) coordinates the 

U.S. Government response to nuclear smuggling events worldwide and addresses 

priority antinuclear smuggling needs through a combination of international and 

U.S. financing and assistance programs, including proliferation detection and interdiction activities. 

Question. I sent a number of our staff to some 20 embassies to look at the coordination between the State and Defense Departments in the campaign against terror 

and report back to me their observations and recommendations. One of the recommendations is that the Secretaries of State and Defense sign a global memorandum of understanding that makes explicit the role of the ambassador in overseeing military activities in-country. Is this something that you agree should be 

pursued? 

Answer. I have reviewed your staff’s report and found it quite useful. The report 

highlights a number of very important issues regarding our embassies’ operations 

and the relationship between the State Department and the Defense Department 

overseas. I agree with the report’s emphasis on the need for ambassadors to exercise 

strong leadership and oversight of all activities in their country that fall under chief 

of mission authority. 

Our ambassadors overseas generally have a very good working relationship with 

the combatant commanders in their area in dealing with these issues as they arise. 

As Deputy Secretary of State, I will support efforts to ensure that chiefs of mission 

and combatant commanders work effectively together. 

As I understand it, the possibility of developing a global MOU between State and 

Defense to cover in-country military activities has been under consideration but no 

decisions have yet been made on this issue. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I plan 

to examine this issue in greater detail. But, in the first instance, I will place emphasis on the importance of chiefs of mission fully exercising their authorities and oversight responsibilities. 

Question. Last year, this committee approved the nomination of Ambassador Randall Tobias to be the Administrator of USAID and to serve simultaneously as the 

52 

first Director of Foreign Assistance, a newly created position within the Department 

of State. In this capacity, Ambassador Tobias is charged with managing and coordinating U.S. foreign assistance programs. What is your assessment of the progress 

of the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance in achieving these objectives? Are 

further adjustments needed? Will Secretary Rice continue to make this a priority 

for the Department, as part of her ‘‘transformational diplomacy’’ strategy? 

Answer. The Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance is making good progress. 

In the time since it was stood up, the office has launched fiscal year 2007 operational planning, a fiscal year 2007 supplemental, and has prepared the fiscal year 

2008 budget. The fiscal year 2008 budget is transparent, accountable, and justified. 

I believe that the Secretary will continue to make this a priority for the Department 

as a part of ‘‘transformational diplomacy.’’ To ensure transformational diplomacy objectives are met, it is essential that we ensure that foreign assistance is used as 

effectively as possible to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states. If confirmed, one of my priorities will be to become more familiar with the activities of 

the Director of Foreign Assistance, so as to better enable me to personally evaluate 

the effectiveness of this new office. 

Question. I have opposed the granting of authority to the Department of Defense 

to organize and implement its own foreign assistance programs. Nonetheless, the 

Department of Defense has received authority from Congress to pursue its section 

1206 train and equip program, albeit with the ‘‘concurrence’’ of the Secretary of 

State. Do you agree that it is preferable that the Secretary of State maintain primacy in all foreign assistance programs, even in cases where Department of Defense 

funding is involved? 

Answer. The State Department appreciates the need for select new DoD authorities as an essential means of addressing rapidly evolving security challenges posed 

by, among other things, the global war on terror. This is particularly true in environments where U.S. forces are present. The Secretary has expressed support for 

such authorities in many cases, contingent upon the explicit preservation of her 

statutory role with respect to foreign assistance, through DoD’s exercise of these authorities ‘‘with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,’’ and in some cases through 

joint development procedures. In sum, any new authorities should be tailored toward the common goal of providing for closer integration of the administration’s foreign assistance efforts, consistent with the Secretary’s responsibility for the overall 

supervision and general direction of U.S. foreign assistance. 

Question. With the Director of Foreign Assistance, Randy Tobias, reporting directly to the Secretary, what role will you play in foreign assistance planning in 

countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, who serves concurrently as Administrator of USAID, has authority over all Department of State and USAID foreign assistance funding and programs in all countries and is charged with developing a coordinated U.S. Government foreign assistance strategy and directing consolidated foreign assistance policy, planning, budget, and implementation mechanisms. The consolidation of these foreign assistance authorities under a single umbrella has heightened accountability and the alignment of activities within countries 

and across regions, and will ultimately make us better stewards of public resources. 

If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I will have the opportunity to work closely with 

Ambassador Tobias. I am impressed with the work that Ambassador Tobias has 

done with the fiscal year 2008 budget, and, if confirmed, I do look forward to our 

close collaboration. 

Question. Last fall, Secretary Rice created the new position of International Energy Coordinator at the State Department. It is an action similar to that which Senator Biden and I are calling for in legislation, specifically in the Energy Diplomacy 

and Security Act. 

What authorities in the budget have been given to the new Energy Coordinator? 

The Energy Coordinator has been placed below the Under Secretary for Economic, 

Business, and Agricultural Affairs, yet energy and environmental programs are also 

undertaken through the Under Secretaries for Political Affairs, Democracy and 

Global Affairs, and Arms Control and International Security. Do you believe that 

placement of the coordinator within EB is sufficient for formulating policy and effectively coordinating the programs spread among the jurisdiction of these four Under 

Secretaries? 

Does the Department support passage of the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act? 

If not, why not? 

53 

Answer. The creation of the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary and International Energy Coordinator did not impact the structure of reporting responsibilities of offices in the Department involved in energy policy, and required no new 

authorities. Resources for the Special Advisor to the Secretary and International Energy Coordinator are provided by the office of the Under Secretary for Economic, 

Energy and Agricultural Affairs. 

The coordinator reports to the Secretary through the Under Secretary for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs, who is the senior State Department official 

responsible for energy issues. The placement of the position is not within EB (now 

EEB—Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs). The coordinator provides 

strategic oversight, develops new policy approaches and initiatives, and integrates 

energy issues into the decision making process at senior levels of the Department. 

Toward that end, the coordinator works closely with the Department’s regional and 

functional bureaus, and with the offices of the other Under Secretaries, to address 

the multitude of foreign policy-related energy challenges we face. 

The administration shares your concerns over energy security and also recognizes 

it to be a priority for U.S. diplomacy and national security. The Department appreciates Congressional input into this critical area of foreign policy, and we want to 

continue to work with you to accomplish this goal. Though the administration does 

not yet have a formal position on the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act, we note 

that it lays out thoughtful and useful ideas on how to bolster energy security, and 

the Department is already pursuing many of these. In addition to the creation of 

the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary and International Energy Coordinator, through the Department’s efforts the International Energy Agency has 

provided China and India access to its meetings to expose them to greater marketbased energy security mechanisms. The Department has chosen to combat the recent wave of resource nationalism in the Western Hemisphere indirectly by supporting, interalia, Mexico’s Mesoamerica energy initiative, which seeks to harmonize 

Central American electricity grids and promote regional economic and energy integration. The Department has also increased its public diplomacy efforts in the region. 

Question. What are the State Department’s priorities for international energy activities? Are those priorities shared throughout the Department? How do they differ 

from priorities pursued by other agencies in the Federal Government? 

Answer. State’s energy priorities rest on three pillars designed to further the 

President’s energy agenda: (1) Increase and diversify production, sources, types, and 

security of energy supply and infrastructure; (2) manage energy demand growth; 

and (3) accelerate the development and deployment of energy technology. Our approach focuses U.S. Government resources, leverages—wherever possible—the capital and management talent of the private sector, and targets those geo-strategic opportunities that will yield the greatest benefit. We are engaged in regional efforts 

to increase cooperation on biofuels production and technology in Latin America, 

Europe, and Asia. We continue to diversify and increase global oil and natural gas 

supplies in West Africa, North America, and the Caspian. We are pursuing an ambitious United States-European Union agenda to accelerate the development and deployment of alternative energy technology across the Atlantic and into the developing world. We continue to engage bilaterally and multilaterally with China and 

India to improve their energy efficiency, accelerate their adoption of renewable energy technology, and expand their use of civilian nuclear power. We also continue 

to make progress through the International Energy Agency (IEA) toward a cooperative relationship with China on emergency response and market-based energy strategies. In addition, we have planned nearly 100 collaborative activities with China, 

India, Japan, Korea, and Australia through the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 

Development and Climate. 

Our efforts are coordinated within the Department, and we work closely with 

other agencies, especially the Department of Energy, on these initiatives. Our energy priorities are coordinated with and consistent with those of other agencies. If 

confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I will ensure that this remains the case and devote 

further senior-level attention to international energy issues. 

Question. Do you believe that current global energy trends pose a threat to U.S. 

national security? If so, do you believe that current U.S. programs are sufficient to 

meet that threat? As Deputy Secretary, what would you do to enhance programs related to energy security? 

Answer. From 2003 to 2006, we witnessed unprecedented growth in world demand 

for oil, which, coupled with a lack of world excess production capacity, resulted in 

an increase in the world price of oil over the same period. We are starting to see 

54 

some relief given demand growth levels in the OECD. However, high revenues associated with high prices have emboldened some producing countries to pursue foreign 

policies that conflict with our national security interests. The physical security of 

critical energy infrastructures is also of concern. 

I do believe that current U.S. programs are sufficient to meet these concerns. The 

Secretary has taken important steps to increase the Department’s focus on energy 

policy and capacity to address energy security concerns. Last October, the Secretary 

established a new position of International Energy Coordinator and Special Advisor 

to the Secretary, reporting through the Under Secretary for Economics, Energy, and 

Agricultural Affairs. The coordinator is working to provide strategic oversight, to develop and promote new policy approaches and initiatives, and to better integrate energy policy considerations at the highest levels of Department decision-making. He 

is working closely with the Department’s regional and functional bureaus and other 

agencies involved with energy policy. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I would 

maintain the Secretary’s emphasis on this issue and seek further initiatives to enhance the security of supply as well as the investment climate and transparency of 

oil producers. 

Question. Do you believe the prospect of global climate change poses a threat to 

U.S national security? If so, do you believe that current U.S. programs are sufficient 

to meet the threat? As Deputy Secretary, what would you do to enhance programs 

related to climate change? 

Answer. I believe it is critical that our efforts to address climate change are undertaken in the context of overall national interests, including promoting economic 

growth and increasing energy security, as well as reducing pollution and providing 

access to energy. These objectives affect the security of our people and all nations. 

The United States has a comprehensive set of policies and programs in place that 

generate tangible results in both the short and the long term to address climate 

change at home and abroad, and the United States is collaborating with countries 

around the world in that effort. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I would work to 

strengthen that cooperation. 

A core element of President Bush’s international engagement on climate has been 

an emphasis on the creation and commercialization of transformational technologies 

that will help countries address climate change while maintaining economic growth. 

An example of this is our Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). APP is one of our most important programs because it generates results where they matter most—in the countries that are the world’s major emitters 

of greenhouse gases. In each APP country, governments and the private sector have 

forged partnerships to develop and deploy clean, efficient energy technologies. 

The APP is just one of the many international partnerships that the United 

States has initiated since 2002 to promote development and deployment of new, 

cleaner technologies. They include partnerships to collect and reuse methane—a 

powerful greenhouse gas; to capture and safely store carbon dioxide; to develop and 

deploy clean, safe nuclear energy technologies; and to develop cost-effective hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. 

In addition, we have launched 15 bilateral climate change partnerships with countries and regional organizations that, together with us, represent over 80 percent 

of the world’s emissions. 

The United States is also addressing climate change at home. In 2002, the President set an ambitious goal to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18 percent by 2012. We have a diverse portfolio of policy measures—and results to show for them. Our emissions performance since 2001 has been among the 

best in the OECD. 

Question. Please describe the division of responsibility between the Departments 

of State and Energy in formulating and implementing international energy policy. 

How does the need to reduce our dependence on foreign oil for national security reasons get factored into interagency discussions on energy? Should the role of the 

State Department in interagency discussions be strengthened? 

Answer. The Department of State is responsible for the foreign policy aspects of 

U.S. energy security. Energy security is inextricably linked to foreign policy and 

State ensures that these aspects are fully reflected in the policy making process and 

in our overseas diplomacy. State cooperates very closely in this with the Department 

of Energy, which brings great technical resources and expertise to help formulate 

and implement international energy policy, as well as with other agencies on related 

issues of climate change and sustainable development. State is the face of energy 

policy interaction with the governments of most countries through U.S. embassies 

around the world. The Department of Energy works with State in representing 

55 

United States positions in multilateral bodies including the International Energy 

Agency, Asia Pacific Economic Community, Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate, and the International Energy Forum, among others. 

Interagency discussions of ways to reduce domestic U.S. dependence on foreign oil 

include scientific research and technical and regulatory issues, which are largely the 

purview of the Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, and a number of 

other domestic agencies. The Department of State provides guidance on the international aspects of these discussions. The impact of oil imports on U.S. national security also depends significantly on reducing oil dependence in other major oil consuming countries, as well as on cooperative relations with major oil producing countries. These international relationships are areas of State lead in close cooperation 

with the Department of Energy and others. 

Question. Do you believe that all present U.S. international energy and environment efforts are effectively coordinated within the Department of State? 

Answer. Yes. Energy and environmental policies and programs are largely managed by the Bureaus of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs (EEB) and Oceans, 

International Environmental and Scientific Affairs with support from the Department’s Special Advisor to the Secretary and International Energy Coordinator. 

These actors work together closely, permitting the Department to carry out a wide 

array of activities designed to fuel the engine for global development and prosperity 

that is the U.S. economy, while at the same time promoting environmental protection and the sustainable use of the world’s natural resources. 

Question. Do you believe that all present U.S. international energy and environment efforts are effectively coordinated within the interagency? 

Answer. The interagency community is working more closely together than ever 

in executing the President’s energy and environmental policies and programs. From 

the working level to the most senior decision makers, representatives of the Departments of State, Energy, Treasury, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, Agriculture 

as well as the EPA, USAID, NSC, CIA, Council for Environmental Quality and 

other agencies meet and communicate regularly to coordinate their efforts in addressing complex international energy and environmental issues. 

Question. Will the President’s call in his State of the Union speech for the creation 

of a civilian response corps be reflected in the President’s budget for the Office of 

the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department? 

Answer. We are requesting 57 positions in the fiscal year 2008 budget for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to help regularize current temporary, detailed, and contracted staff, and to augment them. This is critical 

to improve State’s civilian surge capacity. 

In the State of the Union, the President also called for the development of a Civilian Reserve Corps. The corps would provide the country with a vital resource— 

trained civilian experts with skills the U.S. Government does not currently have in 

adequate numbers for reconstruction and stabilization efforts, such as police trainers, prosecutors, economists, health practitioners, and urban planners—and in a 

way that is more cost-effective and flexible than bringing on full-time government 

employees. How this corps would be designed, established, and funded needs to be 

determined, following close consultation with Congress and with key interagency 

partners. 

Question. The President did not mention the State Department’s lead role in this 

effort (the civilian reserve corps)—are alternatives being considered? 

Answer. We believe that it is key for the State Department to have the lead role 

in developing this effort, which would follow the December 2005 Presidential Directive empowering the Secretary of State to improve U.S. Government preparation of, 

planning for, and conduct of post-conflict operations. The State Department’s Office 

of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has made progress strengthening civilian response capacity, including laying the groundwork for a civilian reserve. That said, the administration would like to consult closely with Congress on 

this issue, and welcomes your ideas on how to most effectively move this initiative 

forward. 

Question. Describe the diplomatic efforts taken by the United States to prevent 

an escalation of tension between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government 

of Iraq over Kirkuk and the PKK. Has the United States made any inquiries or 

statements to Turkey about these issues? What role is General Ralston playing? 

How is this being coordinated? Is he reporting through the ambassador, or through 

the CENTCOM Commander? 

56 

Answer. General (Ret.) Joseph Ralston, appointed as the Secretary of State’s Special Envoy for Countering the PKK last August, is leading the State Department’s 

diplomatic efforts to fight the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The General is working closely with his Turkish counterpart, General Baser, and Iraqi counterpart, Minister al-Waeli. Since his appointment as Special Envoy, General Ralston 

has traveled repeatedly to the region and has engaged productively with both sides. 

General Ralston reports directly to Secretary Rice, but he has also coordinated 

each step of the initiative with officials at the Department of Defense, National Security Council, and other Washington agencies, as well as our embassies in Baghdad 

and Ankara. He has kept in close touch with both the U.S. European and Central 

Commands. 

General Ralston has engaged the Turkish and Iraqi Governments as well as officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government. His conversations have focused on 

building confidence between Turkey and Iraq and obtaining cooperation to fight 

against the PKK, which is using northern Iraq as a base of operations for attacks 

against Turkey. He has not addressed the status of Kirkuk in his conversations. The 

status of Kirkuk is an issue for the sovereign Government of Iraqi, and the process 

for resolving the status of Kirkuk is codified in the Iraqi Constitution. That being 

said, we support all efforts that will lead to a peaceful resolution of Kirkuk’s future. 

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Your response to my question on how long the surge will need to be sustained included an assertion made by President Bush that the Iraqi Government 

plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November of 

this year. This runs contrary to an assessment of the intelligence community, which 

stated: ‘‘Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security 

forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during 

the term of this estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall 

security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part 

of 2006.’’ 

In light of the NIE, how long do you estimate that surge level reinforcements are 

going to be needed in Iraq? How does this affect your civilian manning estimates? 

Answer. There are four major factors that the Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF– 

I)—Iraqi Joint Committee for Transfer of Security Responsibility (JCTSR) takes into 

consideration when recommending whether or not a province/city transfers to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)—the security situation is one of these factors, but there 

are other factors as well, such as the capacity of provincial governments to deliver 

services. All must be viewed together and weighted according to the situation in 

that province. The final decision on transfer is made by the Iraqi Prime Minister 

via the Ministerial Committee for National Security. 

The four factors are: (1) Provincial threat assessment; (2) Iraqi Security Forces 

capability assessment; (3) Iraqi Provincial Governance assessment; and (4) MNF– 

I capability to support the ISF and respond to requests for assistance. 

This is the process that has led to the transition of three provinces (Muthanna, 

DhiQar, and Najaf) from MNF–I control to Provincial Iraqi Control over security. 

We expect other provinces will follow this same process. 

The end date for the surge is dependent upon the security situation on the ground 

in Iraq and will be determined by the President in consultation with General 

Petraeus and his military commanders. Civilian manning is only partly driven by 

the surge; we continue to plan for a civilian presence in Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams for as long as there is a demonstrated need, cooperation from the Iraqi Government, and funding from Congress. 

Question. Is part of a PRT’s function to empower moderate political forces in the 

provinces? As we look to possible provincial elections in 2007, do we have a sense 

of what political sea changes will be solidified? While they are provided for under 

the Iraqi constitution, is this something we are advocating, as well as prepared to 

support with financial and logistical resources? 

Answer. A core objective of the President’s new strategy is to empower moderates, 

defined as those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their interests peacefully, 

politically, and under the rule of law. The expanded PRT program will be central 

to that effort. PRTs will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted asVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
57 

sistance, such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and 

develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable manner. 

Provincial elections provide another key means of empowering local leaders and 

ensuring more representative local government. It is too early to say what political 

trends or changes will solidify in the lead-up to those elections. However, we support the idea of holding provincial elections later this year, and will continue to target our assistance toward the development of the necessary institutions. To that 

end, the President’s 2007 supplemental and 2008 budget includes requests for continuation and expansion of existing democracy programs, implemented by the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute and new programs such as the National Institutions Fund, the Political Party Participation 

Fund, and media reform programs, as well as for programs to support civic advocacy 

and democratic development activities, business associations, labor unions, and 

other political actors. The central goal of all these efforts will be to empower moderates and counter the destructive influence of extremists who are using violence 

to achieve their aims. 

Question. This fails to provide an understanding about what the MoD is capable 

of now, or when such a program will be put in place. One of our concerns is our 

ability to oversee these transfers in a traditional fashion. How can the information 

flow about training and equipping be improved? Please be specific and cite examples. 

Answer. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I) is 

working with the Government of Iraq to move toward a traditional bilateral security 

assistance relationship. A critical part of this transition is Iraqi participation in the 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system which began in earnest in 2006 when the 

Iraqis committed over $2.34 billion of Iraqi national funds to support procurement 

of equipment for the Iraqi armed forces. The information flow on equipment for the 

Iraqi security forces procured through FMS has already begun, such as with the 

congressional notification of the sale of a $250 million logistic support package for 

helicopters, vehicles, and weapons in September 2006. In December, congressional 

notification was made for the sale of 522 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), light armored vehicles, light utility and cargo trucks for an estimated cost of $463 million. However, due to the urgency of the Iraqi Security Forces 

requirements, neither of the sales were included in the calendar year 2006 Javits 

report due to the time criticality of the events. Similarly, the 20-day notification requirement is occasionally waived to expedite the sale of U.S. manufactured material. 

During his nomination hearing, General Petraeus stated his intent to increase the 

information flow to Congress regarding the training and equipping of Iraqi security 

forces through monthly briefing updates. As Iraqi procurement practices mature and 

the security environment improves a more normal processing of FMS cases should 

be possible. For further details regarding the training and equipping of the ISF, the 

State Department defers to the Department of Defense. 

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR NORM COLEMAN

Question. Hmong graves issue: A large group of Hmong refugees living in the 

ground of the Wat Tham Krabok in Thailand were recently resettled in the United 

States, including about 5,000 in Minnesota. The U.S. Government did, in my opinion, the right and honorable thing in finding a home for the living members of the 

Hmong community in Wat Tham Krabok. Now we need to treat the deceased members of this community in a similarly honorable fashion. 

For some time, the Thai Government has been exhuming and cremating these 

bodies. While I understand the Thais supposedly have health concerns relative to 

these bodies, the current situation is not tenable. The Thais have reportedly offered 

to transfer bodies to their family members (for a fee), but these are refugees who 

cannot travel, there are problems with identifying bodies, and it is not difficult to 

imagine disputes over bodies. Cremation is also a big problem from a Hmong cultural standpoint. Unfortunately, it is difficult to chart a path forward. One possibility would be for the Hmong community in the United States to coalesce behind 

a group of individuals who could travel to Thailand in their name and relocate the 

remaining bodies to a more agreeable location. 

If confirmed, will you work with me, the Hmong community, and the Government 

of Thailand to resolve this matter in a culturally respectful manner? 

Answer. I look forward to working with you to resolve this matter. The State Department was made aware of the exhumation and cremation of Hmong remains burVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
58 

ied in the Wat Tham Krabok in Thailand and subsequently took steps to help resolve this matter. The U.S. embassy was first informed of this situation in November 2005, by which time most of the exhumations had already taken place. Nonetheless, the United States embassy in Thailand reached out to the Royal Thai Government to explain the concerns of the United States Hmong community and to encourage a mutually agreeable solution. We understand that the Thai authorities, including temple officials, are willing to work with the families of the deceased that wish 

to claim exhumed remains that have not yet been cremated. If confirmed, I will continue the State Department’s efforts to work with all interested parties to reach a 

mutually acceptable solution. 

Question. Restoration of democracy to Thailand: On a somewhat related note, 14 

years of democratic rule in Thailand came to an end last September with a military 

coup. The military-installed government insists that it is committed to restoring democracy, but it continues to impose martial law in much of the country, restrict 

press freedom, and limit activity by political parties. 

Are you satisfied that the military government is moving fast enough to restore 

democracy? Are you considering any additional measures to encourage the government to move faster to restore democracy? 

Answer. The Thai interim government continues to take concrete steps to restore 

democracy, although the pace of lifting martial law has been more deliberate than 

we would like. The senior Thai military leader reiterated in an interview with western journalists on January 31 the leadership’s strong commitment to hold democratic elections before year’s-end, which we welcome. Nonetheless, the State Department and our embassy continue to urge Thai authorities to move as expeditiously 

as possible to return Thailand to democratic rule, including full restoration of civil 

liberties. 

In immediate response to the September 19 coup, the U.S. Government suspended 

$29 million in bilateral assistance to Thailand and continues to carefully review all 

significant interactions with Thailand, including military exercises, on a case-bycase basis. In discussions with the Thai Government, we continue to strongly emphasize that a full restoration of bilateral relations, to the excellent levels we enjoyed prior to the coup, is contingent upon Thailand’s quick return to democracy. 

If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of restoring democracy in Thailand. 

Question. Recent events in East Africa have created a window of opportunity to 

bring security and humanitarian relief to the impoverished and war-weary people 

of Somalia. 

If confirmed, how will you seek adequate troops to replace the Ethiopians who 

currently occupy the capital? 

What steps must the United States take to foster political stability and how will 

you implement a strategy for Somalia if confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State? 

Our ability to craft a productive Somalia policy is limited by the lack of a United 

States ambassador in Mogadishu. I have called for the appointment of a special 

envoy. Will you dedicate State Department resources to day-to-day management of 

this situation? 

Answer. The rapid deployment of an African stabilization force in Somalia is one 

of three priority United States initiatives in Somalia. While supporting efforts to 

achieve rapid deployment of this stabilization force, the United States continues to 

encourage a process of inclusive political dialog between the leadership of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other key Somali stakeholders, as well as 

to work with its international and regional partners to mobilize donor assistance to 

help build the governance capacity of the TFG. 

Our most immediate objective is to stabilize the situation in southern Somalia and 

help establish a secure environment for political dialog through the deployment of 

an African stabilization force to Somalia. Uganda has offered to deploy 1,500 troops 

to Somalia pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725. The African Union (AU) is also planning for a broader AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 

which was approved by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on January 19, 

and is actively engaged in seeking additional troop contributions for this effort. In 

January, Kenyan Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju traveled to several African countries to explore additional troop contributions. Following the recent African Union 

Summit in Addis Ababa, other African countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, and Burundi expressed a desire to offer troops. The United States is actively supporting 

this effort. We have made $10 million available immediately to provide airlift and 

equipment for the Ugandan deployment and we are taking steps to make additional 

resources available. 

59 

Most important is the path to peace, reconciliation, and stability. The key to longterm stability in Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation. 

To a great extent, the ability to achieve reconciliation will be determined by the 

willingness of the TFG leadership to reach out and create an inclusive political process. As part of the administration’s strategy to promote political stability in Somalia, the United States continues to urge the TFG leadership to move forward with 

a process of political dialog leading to a sustainable political solution and the formation of an inclusive government of national unity based on the framework of the 

Transitional Federal Charter. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will ensure that the United States’ strategy for Somalia continues to emphasize the need 

for a lasting political solution and that United States representatives are actively 

engaged in supporting a Somali-led process of inclusive dialog. 

Adverse security conditions currently prevent the establishment of a full-time 

United States diplomatic presence or any formal international diplomatic presence 

inside Somalia; however, the United States continues to engage with Somali interlocutors through the United States embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, which is responsible 

for United States engagement in Somalia. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, 

I will seek dedicated resources to support effective United States engagement in Somalia. 

Question. One of my constituents, Ms. Bree Schuette, has been fighting a custody 

battle with her former husband, a Russian citizen, Mr. Mikhail Yurievitch 

Slobodkine. After many years of abuse and the death of their son under mysterious 

circumstances, Ms. Schuette fled Russia for the United States, leaving behind her 

daughter, Veronika, a dual Russian/American citizen. On April 29, 2005, Ms. 

Schuette won from Russian courts full custody and place of living for Veronika, and 

the custody decision was upheld by the Russian Appeals Court in August 2005. Despite all of Ms. Schuette’s legal victories, her rights under Russian law continue to 

be violated. Mr. Mikhail Yurievitch Slobodkine, Veronika’s father, has refused to 

obey the court order and give up Veronika. Ms. Schuette has not seen Veronika in 

2 years, and her ex-husband has essentially vanished with the child, possibly to the 

Volograd region. Monday was Veronika’s seventh birthday. 

If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, will you raise this case with appropriate Russian officials and press them to seek the return of Veronika to her mother? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will pursue this case with appropriate Russian officials. Senior United States Government and State Department officials, including 

Attorney General Gonzales, Ambassador William Burns, Assistant Secretary Harty, 

and the Principal Officer in St. Petersburg have raised this case with the Russian 

Government on repeated occasions. We will continue to press the Russian authorities to locate Veronika and enforce the Russian court order awarding custody to Ms. 

Schuette. 

Question. Due to the military engagement last summer, the United States embassy in Lebanon remains backlogged in its consular section. Because of instability 

last summer, many relatives petitioned for immigrant visas. Their petitions are now 

approved, but not scheduled. My understanding is that the consular section is fully 

scheduled for the entire month of February and still has 400 cases in the queue for 

an appointment. With the continuing potential for instability in that region, we 

would be well advised to work through this backlog in the near-term, so we can assuage families who have done everything according to the rules so far. 

How does the State Department intend to work through this visa backlog at the 

United States embassy in Beirut? 

Answer. The consular section in Beirut has been working hard to address the 

backlog of immigrant visa cases in the queue. Between September and the end of 

2006, Embassy Beirut successfully reduced the immigrant visa appointment backlog 

by nearly half. At the same time, the embassy also eliminated the 2-month buildup of missed appointments caused by the suspension of services during the war. 

Recent changes in the immigrant visa process will likely allow Embassy Beirut 

to permanently increase its appointment capacity by 25 percent. Based on current 

workload assumptions, we anticipate eliminating the backlog of cases held domestically at the National Visa Center within approximately 12 weeks. Once cases arrive 

in Lebanon, they should be processed in a matter of weeks. We are hopeful that 

Lebanon will be current in its processing of IV cases by the summer. I will be sure 

to look into this situation again after I am confirmed. 

60 

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

Question. Why isn’t the State Department advocating a tougher approach to reducing mercury contamination around the world? 

Answer. The United States is advocating a partnership approach that we believe 

fosters the most effective use of human and financial resources to address risks associated with international mercury pollution. We believe that partnerships are a 

positive and effective way to engage countries that might otherwise be unresponsive 

to approaches that put them immediately on the defensive. Partnerships enable us 

to tailor our approach to immediate problems in priority areas and countries and 

achieve near-term results. In our view, partnerships are more practical and effective 

than protracted treaty negotiations that may or may not produce future results— 

but impose significant opportunity costs here and now. 

Question. The European Union has committed itself to stop selling mercury by 

2012; would you support the United States adopting a similar ban on mercury sales 

abroad? 

Answer. The issue of a ban on mercury sales abroad is multifaceted, and we need 

to know more than we do today about the potential impacts, particularly the unintended impacts, of such a ban. For example, those who support an export ban argue 

that it would increase the price of mercury and thereby decrease demand, particularly in developing countries. Others argue that a ban on exports could lead to an 

increase in primary mining of mercury in developing countries, whereas United 

States mercury exports come from environmentally preferable sources (recycled mercury or mercury obtained as a by-product from mining other metals such as gold). 

Still others are concerned that long-term storage options for quantities of mercury 

from decommissioned chlor-alkali plants and State recycling programs have not yet 

been adequately addressed, such that an export ban now would not be pragmatic. 

Any effort to restrict trade in commodity mercury thus should carefully consider 

all potential impacts so that conditions among the world’s most vulnerable populations are not exacerbated. We believe that further study is needed of the potential 

impacts, particularly unintended impacts, of such a ban, and that the issue of longterm storage needs to be addressed. 

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

Question. When you were in the office, we talked about management. And I have 

another hat that I wear; I’m now ranking member of the oversight of Government 

management and the Federal workforce. And the fact of the matter is that we have 

been receiving—and I think Senator Lugar made reference to it in his opening statement—we’ve got some tremendous management problems today in the State Department. And for the record, I would like to have the record of the last 2 years 

in terms of retirement, in terms of key positions that are out—open and not filled. 

I remember when Colin Powell took over. He talked about the team. He really 

instilled some new esprit de corps in the Department, and from what I understand 

right now it’s sagged quite a bit. And I’d just like to know from you, in terms of 

the role that you’ve been asked to play, what you’re going to do about trying to get 

a handle on that and see if we can’t quiet things down and stabilize it and bring 

back the feeling in the Department so that we just don’t keep hemorrhaging as we 

have in the past. 

Answer. Following, per your request, is a list of key personnel vacancies at the 

State Department. As I noted during my confirmation hearing, filling these vacancies will be a personal priority and I look forward to working with the Secretary, 

Congress, and the White House on this issue. 

Position Vacated Status 

Deputy Secretary of State ................................... June 2006 .................... Deputy Secretary Designate Negroponte had his 

hearing on 1/30/07; awaiting confirmation. 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) ............. Jan. 2007 ..................... Vacant. 

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (T).Feb. 2007 ..................... White House has announced intent to nominate 

John Rood. 

Assistant Secretary Political-Military Affairs 

(PM).

Jan. 2007 ..................... Vacant. 

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Position Vacated Status 

Ambassador-at-Large To Combat Trafficking in 

Persons (G/TIP).

Dec. 2006 ..................... Vacant. 

Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

Dec. 2006 ..................... White House has announced intent to nominate 

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. 

And I think some of this is simply part of a normal rotational cycle that will happen during the course of any 8-year administration, Senator. 

But as far as how I visualize my own role in the Department, I think I can be 

of assistance to the Secretary in helping lead the Department, both here in Washington and abroad—the Foreign Service. I would like to think that one particular 

strength I can bring to the Department is my knowledge of how the Foreign Service 

works and my relationships with many Foreign Service officers. So I would like to 

build on that and strengthen the sense of satisfaction and enthusiasm for the work 

that they are doing, and I want to be supportive to the Secretary in her efforts to 

carry out this transformational diplomacy that we were talking about earlier. 

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

Question. Is it the position of this administration that it possesses the authority 

to take unilateral action against Iran, in the absence of a direct threat, without congressional approval? 

Answer. In the President’s January 10 address to the Nation on The New Way 

Forward in Iraq, he made clear that Iran was providing material support for attacks 

and interrupting the flow of support from Iran and Syria and that such action is 

unacceptable. The President also noted our intention to seek out and destroy the 

networks that are providing the advanced weaponry and training that threaten our 

forces in Iraq. 

The administration believes there is clear authority for United States operations 

within the territory of Iraq to prevent further Iranian-supported attacks against 

United States forces operating as part of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF–I) or 

against civilian targets. Such attacks directly threaten both the security and stability of Iraq and the safety of our personnel; they also continue to undermine the 

region’s security and stability. United States military operations in Iraq are conducted under the President’s constitutional authority and the Authorization for Use 

of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107–243), which authorizes 

the use of armed force to defend the national security of the United States against 

the continuing threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. The United Nations Security Council has 

authorized all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of Iraq’s security and stability, which encompasses MNF–I conducting military operations against 

any forces that carry out attacks against MNF–I or Iraqi civilian and military targets. 

This question asks what authority might be relevant in connection with a hypothetical military operation in Iran. As the administration has said, we are not planning to invade Iran. For over 2 years, we have actively pursued a diplomatic strategy to address Iran’s nuclear program, and we remain committed to resolving our 

concerns with Iran diplomatically. Of course, the Constitution charges the President 

to protect the United States and the American people. As Commander in Chief, he 

must be able to defend the United States, for example, if U.S. forces come under 

attack. Whether and how to do so in any specific situation would depend on the 

facts and circumstances at that time. Administration officials communicate regularly with the leadership and other Members of Congress with regard to the deployment of U.S. forces and the measures that may be necessary to protect the security 

interests of the United States and will continue to do so. 

Question. Do you agree with Under Secretary of State Burns that the United 

States is ‘‘upping the ante’’ to send a message to Iran with the President’s military 

deployments? 

Answer. The United States remains committed to a diplomatic solution in the 

standoff with the Iranian regime, and we continue to call upon the regime to fully 

and verifiably suspend all nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities as a precursor to direct talks. The passage of United Nations Security Council resolutions 

62 

1696 and 1737 reflects our efforts to encourage international diplomatic cooperation 

in applying pressure on the Iranian regime to change its destabilizing behavior. Together with our partners in the international community, we have moved against 

Iranian banks that are aiding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 

financing terrorism. 

Likewise, in response to Iran’s threatening behavior in the region, as evidenced 

by Tehran’s call for the complete destruction of Israel and its support for Hizballah, 

Hamas, and Iraqi militant groups, we have moved a second carrier battle group into 

the gulf. Our regional allies support this move, which is not to provoke the Iranian 

regime, but to reinforce a longheld United States foreign policy objective: gulf security. Our expanded military presence in the gulf helps ensure the free flow of oil 

and other resources, protects our interests in Iraq, reassures our regional allies, and 

helps stabilize the Middle East. 

We are also responding to illegitimate and destabilizing Iranian action in Lebanon 

and Iraq, and calling attention to Iran’s involvement in multiple terrorist attacks 

across the globe. These various steps are all fully integrated components of our often 

stated ‘‘priority to diplomacy’’ policy in dealing with the threat Iran poses. 

Question. Does the United States have a concerted strategy to make Iran suffer 

consequences for its actions? 

Answer. Our strategy with Iran is aimed at pressuring the regime to: (1) Abandon 

its pursuit of nuclear weapons; (2) end support for terrorism; (3) end destabilizing 

activities in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and throughout 

the Middle East; and (4) respect the rights of its citizens who would like to see 

greater democratic freedoms. Our most urgent task lies in curbing the regime’s nuclear ambitions. 

On June 6, 2006, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (U.K.), 

and the United States presented Iran with a generous package of incentives providing economic, political, and technological benefits for the Iranian people following 

a successful conclusion of negotiations aimed at resolving international concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Equally significant, Secretary of State Rice announced on May 21, 2006, that the United States would join our European allies 

in directly engaging the Iranian regime if it verifiably suspended its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. In announcing this offer, Secretary 

Rice also reaffirmed the United States’ support for the Iranian people’s right to 

enjoy the benefits of peaceful, civil nuclear energy. The Iranian regime, however, rejected this historic opportunity to reintegrate into the international community, and 

has instead continued along a path of confrontation and isolation by refusing to 

abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

Following Iran’s failure to comply with UNSCR 1696, which required that Iran 

suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities by August 31, 2006, the 

United States engaged in several months of consultations with the other permanent 

members of the Security Council and Germany, which culminated in the unanimous 

passage of UNSCR 1737 on December 23, 2006. Resolution 1737 requires Iran to 

suspend its proliferation-sensitive activities and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve all outstanding issues related to 

its nuclear program. It imposes sanctions under article 41 of chapter VII of the U.N. 

Charter and obligates member states to freeze assets of several entities and individuals who are listed in the resolution’s annex due to their association with Iran’s nuclear and/or missile programs. We are working with other nations—including the 

U.K., France, Germany, India, Egypt, Brazil, Japan, and Australia—to promote and 

ensure swift implementation and monitoring of UNSCR 1737. The IAEA Director 

General will report back to the UNSC by February 21, 2007, regarding Iran’s compliance with UNSCR 1737. Following receipt of his report, the UNSC may pursue 

additional chapter VII actions directed at the Iranian regime if it is found to be in 

continued noncompliance. 

Outside of the United Nations, we are also increasing pressure on Tehran. In November 2006, we successfully convinced the IAEA Board of Governors to reject an 

Iranian-requested technical cooperation project that may have aided its construction 

of a heavy-water research reactor at Arak capable of producing significant quantities of high-quality plutonium. 

As part of our efforts to stymie Iranian progress toward improved ballistic missile 

delivery and other military capabilities, we are taking measures to strongly enforce 

the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). 

Efforts to block Iranian access to the international financial system are perhaps 

our best tool for pressuring the regime. Under Executive Order 13382, the United 

States has designated 11 individuals and entities associated with Iran’s weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs. Once designated, entities cannot 

63 

conduct business in U.S. dollars and assets currently held by U.S. banks are frozen. 

Citing ties to WNID proliferation activities, the Department of the Treasury has 

also used domestic authorities to terminate the access of Iran-based Bank Sepah 

and Bank Sepah International to the U.S. financial system. 

The international community has affirmed that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is unacceptable. As we go forward, we will seek to maintain international consensus regarding the steps that Iran must take to comply with its obligations. 

Question. Do you agree that by taking such actions in the Persian Gulf, the 

United States creates conditions that are dangerously unpredictable? 

Answer. Our current and any future actions in the gulf do not and will not create 

conditions that are dangerously unpredictable. It is precisely the Iranian regime’s 

behavior that creates instability and unpredictability in the region. The U.S. presence in the region is seen by all the gulf countries as stabilizing, as shown by their 

manifold concrete support for our military presence. Our policy of supporting gulf 

security has been a cornerstone of our Middle East engagement for over six decades, 

and the Iranian regime must understand that it cannot destabilize the region without a reaction from moderate Arab states and the United States. 

Question. Would it not be preferable for the United States to carry out its diplomatic initiatives beyond today’s half measures by seeking a broader international 

diplomatic resolution of the war in Iraq that would include participation by all nations in the region, including Iran and Syria? 

Answer. We encourage all of Iraq’s neighbors to act responsibly in supporting and 

assisting the Iraqi Government. To that end, we continue to call on Iran and Syria 

to suspend their destabilizing activities. Unfortunately, we have seen no evidence 

indicating that they wish to play a responsible role. Like Iraq’s other neighbors, 

Iran and Syria must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and act 

in a manner that supports a stable and democratic future for the Iraqi people. We 

support Iraqi direct dialog with Damascus and Teheran—focused on building relationships based on the principle of full respect for Iraqi sovereignty and support for 

a peaceful, stable Iraq. 

We have made many efforts in the past to engage the Syrian Government. Former 

Secretary Powell visited Damascus in May 2003 to discuss post-conflict Iraq. Following that, in September 2004, then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 

Affairs, William Burns, met with President Asad; former Secretary Powell met 

again with then-Syrian Foreign Minister Shara’a at the UNGA in late September 

and in Sharm el Sheikh in November 2004; and former Deputy Secretary Armitage 

visited Damascus in January 2005. In each of these efforts, the Syrians promised 

to take action against the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, end its support for 

former regime elements living in Syria, and end its sponsorship of terrorism. We 

have yet to see any response to our efforts to engage in the last 4 years, and believe 

this track record does not demonstrate Syria to play a positive role in the region. 

The President made clear in his January 10 speech to the American people on 

the administration’s New Way Forward in Iraq, that Iranian support to armed 

groups who want to harm United States forces and perpetrate violence in Iraq 

would not be tolerated. The President also noted our intention to seek out and destroy the networks that are providing the advanced weaponry and training that 

threaten our forces in Iraq, including those involving Iranian assistance. As well, 

during recent meetings in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait, regional partners expressed their strong concern over the growth of negative Iranian involvement in 

Iraq and al-Qaeda terror. 

We are actively pursuing a comprehensive diplomatic strategy to address Iran’s 

nuclear program and destabilizing activities throughout the region. As the President, Secretary Rice, and other senior officials have publicly stated, we are committed to resolving our concerns with Iran diplomatically, but have yet to see the 

same commitment by Iran. 

RESPONSES OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. How do you see your role as Deputy Secretary? Have you discussed your 

role with the Secretary? How do you expect to divide your time between organizational and policy issues? Are there specific issues or regions on which the Secretary 

expects you to take a lead role? 

Answer. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will assist Secretary Rice in 

the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and function as the Chief Operating Officer of the 

64 

Department. The Deputy Secretary position has many varied responsibilities, including administrative oversight of the Department, coordination and supervision of 

U.S. Government activities overseas, representing the Department’s position before 

Congress, and managing key foreign policy issues on the Secretary’s behalf. How I 

might divide my time among these responsibilities would depend on the circumstances and most pressing issues of the moment, but I expect to focus on all 

of these critical areas. 

In my discussions with Secretary Rice, we also have discussed the need for me 

to devote considerable time and effort to the implementation of our policies in Iraq. 

In my previous assignment before becoming Director of National Intelligence, I volunteered to serve as United States Ambassador to the newly sovereign Iraq because 

I believed—and still believe—that it is possible for Iraq to make a successful transition to democracy. Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the Iraqis, for our friends 

in the region, and for the United States. I anticipate devoting a considerable amount 

of time to this complex, challenging, and vital national security issue, if confirmed 

as Deputy Secretary of State. 

If confirmed, I would hope that, in addition to Iraq, I could make a strong contribution to our foreign policy in those parts of the world where I have spent the 

most time in my career—Asia and Latin America. The Secretary and I have specifically discussed my taking responsibility for diplomacy related to security in North 

Asia and for our political dialog with China. We have also talked about how I could 

help her advance our agenda in this hemisphere. Moreover, I expect to help Secretary Rice promote America’s economic, business, and energy interests overseas as 

well as the transformational diplomacy that is the cornerstone of her leadership at 

the Department of State. 

Question. Based on your extensive experience in the State Department, what initiatives do you believe are necessary to improve management at the Department? 

Answer. As a career Foreign Service officer, I am intimately aware of the sacrifices and benefits of Foreign Service life. A Foreign Service career is much more 

than a 9 to 5 job; it’s a commitment to devote your life, and that of your family, 

to advancing U.S. interests abroad. The same principle holds true for the Department’s dedicated civil service employees and the 37,000 locally employed staff in 

U.S. missions overseas, many of whom work for the U.S. Government at great personal risk. 

This level of commitment and sacrifice from employees requires an absolute 

pledge from the Department’s senior leaders to support and defend the needs and 

interests of State Department personnel. As Deputy Secretary, I will reinforce the 

Secretary’s efforts to bolster the Department’s resources and secure the funding we 

need to train, protect, and reward our employees. Our highest priority should be 

taking care of our people. 

In particular, I look forward to working with the Congress and the White House 

to minimize vacancies in senior positions at the Department. While some vacancies 

are an inevitable result of our nomination system and political cycles, the number 

and length of those vacancies should be kept to a minimum. 

Question. During President Bush’s first term, Secretary Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense were widely perceived as having played a prominent, if not dominant, role in shaping U.S. foreign policy in critical areas. Do you believe there has 

been a significant expansion of the role played by the Defense Department in foreign policy? If so, what impact do you believe this has had on the conduct of U.S. 

foreign policy? How would you help Secretary Rice in ensuring that the State Department takes the lead on important foreign policy issues? 

Answer. We are at a critical juncture in our foreign relations with key and potential allies, faced with challenges in all corners of the world from terrorists and insurgents. All agencies of the U.S. Government are working together to best meet 

these challenges. Bureaucratic barriers between agencies do not serve our interests, 

and collaboration between U.S. agencies on planning, budgeting, and operations results in stronger foreign relations overall. In this regard, the Defense Department 

has an important role to play in the development of our national security policy and 

on our interactions with foreign governments, although the Secretary of State is the 

President’s lead advisor on the development and execution of U.S. foreign policy and 

the cabinet official responsible for the day-to-day conduct of U.S. foreign relations. 

Having said that, in my last two assignments as Ambassador to Iraq and as Director of National Intelligence, I developed excellent working relationships with the 

Pentagon and the uniformed services. If confirmed, I expect to build on my extensive 

past experience in dealing with the Department of Defense. 

65 

Question. What steps is the administration planning to take to address the continued conflict in Darfur? Has the administration begun to implement the so-called 

‘‘Plan B’’ that the special envoy to Sudan described to committee members last year? 

What exactly does Plan B entail? Do other partners in the international community 

support this plan? 

Answer. One of the top diplomatic priorities of the United States in Africa is the 

peaceful end to the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Part of our strategy 

is the rapid transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan to a more robust U.N./ 

A.U. hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur. Such a force is vital to our effort to 

stabilize the security situation, ensure access for humanitarian assistance, and protect internally displaced persons and refugees. There are also ongoing discussions 

about complementary U.N. peacekeeping forces in Chad and the Central African Republic to protect refugees and other civilians. We are working closely with our partners in the A.U., U.N., and especially with those with influence on Sudan such as 

Egypt, Russia, China, and the E.U., to support the U.N. effort. The special envoy 

to Sudan recently traveled to China to explain the United States’ position on Darfur 

and to encourage the Chinese to use their influence to stop the atrocities. 

We are also working actively to bring those rebel groups that did not sign the 

May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement into negotiations to join an enhanced agreement. 

In doing so, the special envoy recently traveled to Chad where he met with many 

rebel leaders from varying parties, heard their views, and pushed for their united 

participation in a peaceful political process led by the U.N. and the A.U. 

On peacekeeping in Darfur, we have been pressing Sudan and the A.U. to finalize 

agreement with the U.N. on the three-phased peacekeeping plan reached on November 16, 2006 in Addis. On December 23, 2006, the U.N. began implementation of 

the U.N. light support package to the African Union Mission in Sudan (phase I). 

The A.U. and U.N. have reached agreement on the elements of the heavy support 

package (phase II), and have sent a letter to President Bashir requesting his full 

cooperation for the deployment. Detailed discussions between the A.U. and U.N. on 

the modalities for the hybrid force are ongoing. We are encouraging all the parties 

to move rapidly, and are reaching out to encourage countries to contribute personnel 

and troops to these efforts. 

If, however, we determine that the regime in Khartoum is deliberately acting to 

prevent peace from being achieved in Sudan, including efforts to delay or otherwise 

deter implementation of the Addis Agreements, we will adopt a more coercive course 

of action. We cannot discuss Plan B publicly, but Andrew Natsios, the President’s 

special envoy to Sudan, would be happy to meet with you to discuss the plan privately. Our goals remain the deployment of a robust U.N./A.U. hybrid force with the 

authority to use force to protect civilians, the achievement of a peaceful political 

process that ultimately brings all rebel groups into the Darfur Peace Agreement 

(DPA), and continued access for necessary humanitarian work. 

Question. How would you evaluate the status of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan? Is there any cause 

for concern? What should the U.S. Government be doing to support improved implementation of the peace agreement? 

Answer. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005, much has been accomplished. The Government of Southern Sudan 

(GOBS) has been fully established, over $1.5 billion in oil revenues has been transferred to the GOBS, and the U.N. reports that the redeployment of northern troops 

from the south is on schedule. However, the issues that remain are some of the most 

challenging. 

The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has failed to introduce transparency 

in accounting for oil revenues, and the GOBS is likely entitled to much more than 

it is currently receiving. The overall progress on withdrawing northern troops from 

the south masks the nearly complete lack of redeployment from the oil-rich Upper 

Nile region. The NCP has also moved slowly to support the work of demarcating 

the North-South border. 

Meanwhile, northern backed militias continue to operate in the south and create 

instability. In Abyei, home to Sudan’s most productive oil field, the NCP has refused 

to accept the Abyei Boundaries Commission report. 

Moving forward on CPA implementation will require continued high-level engagement from the United States. Our diplomatic missions in Khartoum and Juba, the 

special envoy to Sudan and the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs have dedicated extensive efforts to the CPA, including recent trips by the special envoy to 

Juba, Malakal, and Abyei in the south. The United States has helped to establish 

the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and we are its most vocal member. We 

have taken the lead on efforts to turn the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/ 

66 

Army (SPLM/A) into a responsible political party capable of governing, with a regular army that can ensure peace and security. We also work with United Nations 

Mission in the Sudan (LTNMIS), which plays an important role in supporting the 

CPA. The United States was the first country to establish a full-time diplomatic 

mission in Southern Sudan, and we continue to be the largest donor to the recovery 

and development of the region. The United States will continue to help the south 

create a more level playing field within the Government of National Unity (GNU) 

and demand full implementation of the CPA. This is the only way to foster the establishment of a strong and united Sudan that is stable and at peace with its neighbors. 

Question. What, if any, supplementary medical coverage and long-term disability 

benefits do PRT members in Iraq and Afghanistan receive? What about contractors? 

Is the Department working on improving these health benefits? 

Answer. Both civil service and Foreign Service employees of the State Department 

employees serving in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan are eligible a generous package of medical and disability benefits. State employees can choose from 10 group health insurance plans available to all Federal 

employees. Employees assigned to the PRTs can utilize the medical units at the embassies in Kabul or Baghdad, if needed. Embassy Baghdad has a full-time social 

worker who has traveled extensively to the PRTs as well. An Amman-based regional 

psychiatrist also visits Iraq periodically and has visited employees stationed outside 

of Baghdad. 

Employees in PRTs also have access to mental health services, if requested, 

through the State Department’s Office of Medical Services Employee Consultation 

Service. Employees and eligible family members can also take advantage of a 24 

hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week support hotline coordinated by the Department’s Family 

Liaison Office and offered through the Managed Health Network. 

State employees are eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, should they be injured in the line of duty. Long-term disability benefits are offered under worker’s 

compensation. Generally, Personal Service Contractors (PSCs) are eligible for Federal Government workers’ compensation benefits. Independent contractors are not 

eligible for benefits and would apply for workers’ compensation benefits though their 

employers. 

We are continuously evaluating the existing incentives for hardship service and 

determining if changes are needed to further support and compensate our employees 

who serve in the most difficult posts overseas. The Department does not have any 

plans at this time to propose changes to the existing health benefits package. 

Question. As you know, Senator Lugar and I have introduced S. Res. 30, which 

calls for the United States to take an active role in international climate change negotiations under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, with the objective of securing U.S. participation in binding agreements that establish commitments by all major emitters of greenhouse gases and further achieve a significant 

long-term reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions. Does the administration 

have a position on our resolution, and what is the administration’s current position 

on negotiations under the Framework Convention, on an agreement to cover the period after 2012, post-Kyoto? Shouldn’t we be working now on those next steps? 

Answer. The administration shares your views that engaging developing countries, implementing clean energy technologies, and protecting U.S. economic interests are of paramount importance to addressing climate change. 

The United States is taking an active role in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In addition to vigorously engaging in the 

issues negotiated under the convention, we are also its largest donor nation. Regarding an agreement to cover the period after 2012, the United States does not support 

an approach that would harm our economy, and we believe that a prescriptive targets and timetables framework is inconsistent with the need for a global response 

to climate change since developing countries reject binding emissions caps. 

The United States believes that international climate actions must accommodate 

diverse national circumstances and approaches, and that climate actions should be 

considered in tandem with economic and other sustainable development goals. 

Countries in the developing world are focused on economic growth and providing for 

the needs of their citizens. 

We believe that climate policies should recognize and complement these priorities. 

We are pursuing an approach through a range of collaborative approaches that focus 

on practical results. 

Our flagship climate initiative, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), is one example of this approach. The APP is one of our 

67 

most important programs because it generates results where they matter most—in 

the countries that are the world’s major emitters of greenhouse gases. 

The APP brings together Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the 

United States to tackle complementary energy, economic, and environmental goals. 

In each partner country, governments and the private sector are collaborating to implement clean, efficient energy technologies and practices. 

The APP is just one of the many international partnerships that the United 

States has initiated since 2002. They include partnerships to collect and reuse methane—a powerful greenhouse gas; to capture and safely store carbon dioxide; to develop and deploy clean, safe nuclear energy technologies; and to develop cost-effective hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. In addition, we have launched 15 bilateral 

climate change partnerships with countries and regional organizations that, with us, 

represent over 80 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 

Our emissions performance since 2001 has been among the best in the OECD. 

From 2000 to 2004, for example, U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide emissions increased by only 1.7 percent, while those in Europe grew by 5 percent. The results 

of our climate policy underscore the fact that there are diverse yet complimentary 

approaches to addressing climate change. 

Question. Given your January 11 testimony before the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence that al-Qaeda operates from ‘‘their leaders’ secure hide-out in Pakistan,’’ what new approaches toward Pakistan will you pursue to end half a decade 

of safe haven given to Bin Laden and his cohorts? 

Answer. While we do not know Osama bin Laden’s precise whereabouts, al-Qaeda 

continues to exploit parts of the tribal areas of western Pakistan. It is not accurate, 

however, to say that the Pakistan Government is granting them safe haven as a 

matter of policy. In fact, Pakistan has been a vital partner in our fight against alQaeda. Pakistan’s military operations against al-Qaeda and other foreign militants 

in the tribal areas since 2004 have cost it hundreds of casualties but have not succeeded in breaking foreign extremist networks in areas that are essentially outside 

government control. Militant extremism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

and the Northwest Frontier Province is perceived in Islamabad as a major threat 

to Pakistan’s internal security. 

We are pleased that the Government of Pakistan continues to take forceful measures against all terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, but we recognize that purely 

military solutions are unlikely to succeed. While President Musharraf remains committed to rooting out violent extremist elements from Pakistan, we support his efforts to adopt a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism and countering insurgency. 

The State Department is exploring ways to support two initiatives designed to 

strengthen Pakistan’s ability to eliminate terrorist safe havens and strengthen control of the border with Afghanistan. The first will enhance the capacity of local security forces such as the indigenous Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, and tribal 

levies groups that carry most of the responsibility for security in those areas. The 

second, Pakistan’s Sustainable Development Plan for the tribal areas, is a program 

of economic and social development and governance reform intended to meet the 

needs of the local population and render them more resistant to violent extremists 

such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Robust support for these two initiatives would 

improve the security environment in the frontier areas, whose population spans the 

Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and contribute greatly to creating an environment inhospitable to violent extremism. 

Meanwhile, I believe it is essential that the situation in the Pakistan-Afghanistan 

border area be the subject of constant high-level dialog between us and the leaders 

of both countries. 

Question. Some administration figures seem intent on playing Sunni and Shia 

Muslims against each other, in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. Do you 

approve of this, or do you see such a policy as presenting grave dangers to America 

from both Sunnis and Shia? 

Answer. Our foreign policy toward the Middle East is not based on religion or ethnicity, but seeks to encourage moderation and minimize extremism. The United 

States has worked hard to promote reconciliation and national unity—across the 

historical divide of Sunni-Shia relations—in places like Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Today those governments are more multiethnic and confessionally mixed than 

ever before. Playing off religious or ethnic differences is a recipe for increasing, not 

taming, violence in this region. 

We are concerned about Iranian regime’s support for terrorism throughout the region, specifically its support for both Shia and Sunni extremists (Hizballah and 

68 

Hamas, respectively) and its destabilizing activities in Iraq. However, our differences with Iran lie with illicit behavior and dangerous ambitions of the Iranian 

regime, and not with the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Iranian people, 

or the Shia in general. Our strategy is to counter the threats posed by the Government of Iran while expanding our engagement and outreach to the Iranian people. 

More broadly, we support the empowerment and dignity of all the people in the region, regardless of ethnicity or religious belief, and we condemn extremism in all 

forms. 

Question. The administration has proposed $2 billion in reconstruction funds for 

Afghanistan. Two billion dollars spread over 2 years does not represent an increase 

in reconstruction funding, despite the fact that General Eikenberry and General 

Jones have requested a significant increase in reconstruction funding. Is the proposed amount of funding sufficient? What is our strategy for strengthening the implementation of reconstruction programs? 

Answer. The amount of funding is sufficient given the limited capacity in Afghanistan to implement projects quickly. What is important is that we maintain a consistent and substantial level of funding over a period of time long enough to enable 

the Afghan economy to gain traction on its own. 

Our strategy for strengthening the implementation of our reconstruction programs 

centers around capacity building in both the public and the private sectors, to increase the quality of Afghan firms and the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to provide basic services, effective governance, and efficient administration of 

public funds. 

Building capacity of Afghan firms to deliver goods and services is critical. Where 

applicable, our programs incorporate private sector capacity building components. In 

the infrastructure sector, for example, we are training Afghans to build and maintain the road assets United States assistance has funded. A vocational training 

program currently underway in Nangarhar is providing construction, electrical, 

plumbing, and other building trade skills to improve the skills of the local workforce 

employed by Afghan firms. We also provide credit, business skills training, and 

other assistance to enable Afghan firms to increase their competitiveness and profitability. This assistance, combined with regulatory, administrative, and other technical assistance is helping the Government of Afghanistan become an enabler of private sector activity. 

For the government’s line ministries in Kabul as well as the provincial capitals, 

we will be implementing the Afghan Building Capacity program, which provides 

technical training in pubic administration skills and scholarships for advanced degrees and technical training in Afghanistan and abroad. We will concurrently improve the quality of education delivered by Afghan universities to help build the 

technical skill base needed for a modern economy and state. 

Question. The administration has proposed $8.6 billion in security funds for Afghanistan. Both General Karl Eikenberry and General James Jones have noted the 

need for an improvement in the use of security funding (according to the Inspectors 

General of State and Department of Defense, current police training has already 

cost $ 1.1 billion dollars, yet it has resulted in a nonfunctional police force). What 

will be done with the $8.6 billion that addresses this concern? Do your plans for 

using this money represent a true change of course? 

Answer. The $8.6 billion requested for security assistance will be used to further 

train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces. Our plans for using these 

funds reflect an urgent need to augment our work to train effective and legitimate 

security forces that can protect the Afghan people from extremists and insurgents. 

For the police, the course is well-charted regarding training, and we expect it to 

remain the same. We expect, however, to increase emphasis on police equipment 

and infrastructure. Training and equipping efforts augment and reinforce each 

other. We must look comprehensively at all the factors that will lead to success for 

the Afghan police. It will take a sustained effort over several years to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program, let alone adequately assess the program. 

We also intend to boost our efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Army. 

In fiscal year 2007, we plan to intensify our efforts to train this force so the Afghan 

Government can address security concerns. The Afghan army is currently fighting 

alongside NATO International Security Assistance Forces, and is an integral component of our efforts to take on the Taliban and extend the reach of the Government 

of Afghanistan’s authority. At the moment, the army is in need of more soldiers and 

more equipment to meet the current security challenges. The $8.6 billion in reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
69 

quested security assistance funds will help us reach our goal of a well-trained and 

effective Afghan army. 

Question. In addressing the illicit opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, does 

the administration intend to press the Government of Afghanistan to accept a program of aerial eradication of poppy? 

Answer. The Government of Afghanistan has decided not to use spraying of herbicides to eliminate poppy cultivation this year, but will implement a robust manual 

and mechanical eradication program to eradicate illicit poppy fields. We will focus 

on making manual and mechanical eradication efforts as effective as possible, without ruling out the future use of other options, such as ground-based or aerial spraying of herbicides. 

The United States remains prepared to assist the Government of Afghanistan— 

if requested—in using herbicides to eradicate poppy. For many years the United 

States has assisted the Government of Colombia and other governments around the 

world in using herbicide to control illicit narcotics crops. Herbicide offers a safe and 

effective method for eliminating illegal crops, and it may be an appropriate tool for 

Afghanistan to use in future years. 

The United States Government will continue to provide assistance to Afghan law 

enforcement institutions that eradicate poppy crops, including the Ministry of Interior’s Afghan Eradication Force. 

While President Karzai did not approve the use of herbicide, he recognizes that 

poppy cultivation poses a grave risk to Afghanistan’s security. We welcome his renewed focus on developing a strong eradication program this year and will continue 

to work with Afghanistan to eliminate poppy cultivation. 

Question. In the next few months, the issue of Kosovo’s future status will likely 

come before the United Nations Security Council. If, as has been threatened, Russia 

uses its veto to block Security Council approval of Kosovo’s independence, would you 

still support the United States recognizing Kosovo as an independent state? 

Answer. We strongly support the settlement terms prepared by U.N. Special 

Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. This package creates the conditions under which Southeast 

Europe can have stability and certainty in its future, Kosovo can govern itself democratically, and Kosovo’s minorities can receive generous protection. We expect that 

Ahtisaari’s proposal, once finalized, will be discussed in the U.N. Security Council 

and that we will consult closely with Russia and other Security Council members 

on the best way forward. We are working to ensure a successful conclusion to the 

Kosovo status process established by the UNSC and believe we should refrain from 

speculating about hypothetical developments in the Security Council. 

Question. What do you see as the proper role for NATO in promoting global peace 

and security? As the alliance moves forward, how inclusive or exclusive do you believe it should be in its mission and membership? 

Answer. NATO plays a vital role in promoting peace and prosperity and advancing freedom and democracy. We strongly support the aspirations of countries within 

the Euro-Atlantic area that seek membership. 

NATO remains the essential forum for action and dialog on transatlantic security 

and its primary responsibility is to provide security for its members. September 11 

and the Madrid and London train bombings demonstrated that the key security 

issues facing the allies have changed fundamentally since the cold war. NATO has 

evolved with the times. The alliance is increasingly outward looking because the 

challenges to our common security are increasingly transnational and global—for 

example, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and insecurity of energy 

sources. 

Our partnerships with non-NATO countries leverage and enhance NATO’s effectiveness and benefit the alliance. In Afghanistan, for example, in addition to all 26 

NATO Allies, we have over 11 contributing countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and Finland. 

At NATO’s Riga Summit in November 2006, the allies agreed to support a partnership initiative that will ensure that non-NATO countries that share our values 

and are willing to commit personnel and resources to a common purpose with NATO 

will have a more structured operational relationship with the alliance that facilitates seamless planning and execution. 

This is not the same as saying that the alliance has no borders or that its collective defense provisions apply to partners. The alliance is anchored in the North Atlantic Treaty and the Article 5 commitment. The Riga declaration is recognition by 

allies of the vital role being played by NATO’s partners who are committing troops 

and resources in places of mutual concern like Afghanistan and Kosovo. 

70 

Question. Policy analysts and scholars have noted that Latin America has not received the attention that was anticipated at the beginning of President Bush’s first 

administration. Given your experience in the region, what recommendations do you 

have for the administration to increase attention toward the region? What specific 

issues need to be addressed more effectively? How would you work in your capacity 

as Deputy Secretary of State to do this? 

Answer. The administration has, in fact, devoted considerable attention and resources to the region. In the area of foreign assistance, resources dedicated to the 

Western Hemisphere have nearly doubled from 2001 to 2007—even without including the Millennium Challenge account funds that already have been made available 

to Nicaragua and Honduras, and that are about to be made available to El Salvador. 

The President himself has traveled through the region 10 times since taking office, and his visits have been complemented by numerous visits by cabinet-level officials from a variety of Departments. He is planning another trip to the region in 

March. 

All that is not to say that we should be content with the status quo. While all 

but one of the governments of the hemisphere were elected democratically and economic indicators have been positive, democratic institutions remain weak and under 

assault in several countries, in part because governments have not been able to deliver on the promise of democracy that is security and prosperity for all citizens. 

We aim to focus our efforts and our resources to help governments respond to 

their citizens by consolidating democracy, promoting prosperity, investing in people, 

and helping protect the security of the democratic state. If confirmed, I look forward 

to my own involvement with the region as Deputy Secretary, if confirmed, and the 

opportunity to draw on my many years of experience dealing with our hemisphere. 

Question. Given the wave of presidential elections that have taken place in the 

region over the past year, can you discuss the status of democracy in the region? 

How can United States democracy and foreign assistance programs be more effective 

in supporting political stability in Latin America? What was the level of support 

that we provided to Latin American countries in the previous fiscal year for democracy promotion? 

Answer. Some two decades have passed since Latin Americans in country after 

country rejected authoritarian models in favor of democracy. Every country except 

Cuba has held national elections to elect its President. On the whole, these have 

been relatively free elections resulting in unprecedented continuity in the region as 

leaders have served out their terms and handed power peacefully over to the next 

elected leader. 

The wave of elections in the Americas (17 in total) over the last year is testimony 

to the durability of this process in most countries. However, democracy can be 

challenged where a personalistic populism threatens to overwhelm democratic institutions in countries where those institutions are weak. If citizens perceive that 

democratically elected regimes fail to address their most important needs, then democracy itself may be imperiled. That is why we are working to strengthen democratic governance so that citizens receive the benefits of good governance. Latin 

Americans have a right to expect their democratic governments to be responsive and 

accountable. Access to economic opportunity and the social mobility that it creates 

are fundamental components of social justice and are necessary to ensure that democracy continues to flourish. 

Our democracy and foreign assistance strategy recognizes the transformational 

power of democracy. Both bilaterally and in collaboration with such entities as the 

Organization of American States (OAS) and other institutions of the Inter-American 

System, we are working to attack inequality, political marginalization, and exclusion. In order to consolidate democracy, the United States will continue to work together with our regional neighbors throughout the hemisphere. We support efforts 

to create competitive and inclusive political systems so that all citizens have access 

to political power. With greater competition, less corruption, greater accountability 

of elected officials, and better stewardship of state resources, citizens of the region 

can enjoy an improved quality of life. To achieve this, we will strengthen judicial 

independence and capacity, internal controls, and effective prosecution of corruption 

and other complex crimes. We will seek to strengthen institutions of representative 

democracy, such as political parties, legislatures, executive agencies, media, and 

civil society. 

The United States provided $174,698 million in foreign assistance to Latin American countries in fiscal year 2006 to contribute to the objective of governing justly 

and democratically. 

71 

Question. How do you anticipate that the new U.N. Secretary-General will address 

reform at the United Nations in his first year? In your role as Deputy Secretary, 

do you anticipate working on U.N. reform? 

Answer. The arrival of Secretary-General Ban and his new team offers member 

states an opportunity to reinvigorate the U.N. management reform process and foster a climate of ethical conduct. We are pleased that Secretary-General Ban led by 

example by making public his own financial disclosure statement. We are also 

pleased that he has called for a system-wide audit of U.N. funds and programs. In 

the near future we would like to see Secretary-General Ban take the following steps: 

• Ensure full operational effectiveness of the U.N. Ethics Office; • Effectively exercise his budgetary discretion; • Implement International Public Sector Accounting Standards; and • Achieve greater efficiencies in the use of existing resources. 

While there are some actions the Secretary-General can take independently, most 

of the burden for reform falls on the member states themselves and in the coming 

months, we expect member states to consider the following items: 

• Progress on review of U.N. mandates; • Activation of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee; • Strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight Services and ensuring its operational independence; • Strengthening U.N. procurement processes; and • Improving U.N. human resources management policies and practices. 

If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will work with my colleagues in the 

Department and at our mission to the United Nations to emphasize the continued 

importance of high ethical standards at the U.N. 

Question. United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased markedly in the 

past few years, now totaling over 80,000 troops globally with new missions in countries such as Lebanon, Liberia, Sudan, and Haiti. Can you comment on the value 

of U.N. peacekeeping operations in supporting and advancing U.S. interests? Beyond paying the dues assessed by the United Nations, does the United States provide any other support to U.N. peacekeeping missions? Do you know of areas in 

which we should be providing such support? 

Answer. U.N. peacekeeping serves U.S. national interests. We have a stake in the 

outcome of events in every region of the world. U.N. peacekeeping missions engage 

and commit the international community to seek solutions to violence and instability. Through our ability to draw upon global resources through a U.N. peacekeeping mission, we are able to address urgent international needs without committing U.S. forces. U.N. peacekeeping operations cost the U.S. approximately a quarter 

of what we would pay if we were asked to deploy American forces. I am personally 

a very strong believer in the utility of U.N. peacekeeping operations and was impressed by the demonstrated effectiveness of these operations during my tenure as 

ambassador to the U.N. in countries such as Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo, and Liberia. 

In the U.N. Security Council and through our contributions to the U.N., the 

United States ensures that U.N. peacekeeping mandates are clear, credible, and 

limited to what is achievable. We use our voice and vote to ensure that these missions are consistent with U.S. national interests. The United States has been in the 

lead in efforts to ensure that U.N. peacekeepers are properly prepared and equipped 

to defend themselves and to fulfill their mandate. 

Direct U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations is limited but important. The U.S. currently has 298 police officers and 26 military officers deployed in 

8 U.N. peacekeeping missions. In addition, the United States from time-to-time provides direct support for U.N. operations. For instance, the Department of Defense 

arranged for the November 2006 deployment of an Indonesian battalion to participate in the U.N. mission in Lebanon. 

Given even greater force generation requirements for peacekeeping in the foreseeable future, an important area of United States support for peacekeeping is through 

our Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), including its African sub-component, 

the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. 

GPOI programs enable willing partners to build the capabilities to help meet the 

growing U.N. demand for competent peacekeepers. U.N. and African Union missions 

in Africa and Lebanon already benefit from ACOTA-trained units. In addition, GPOI 

initiatives are helping Indonesia, Mongolia, and several Central American countries 

build their capacity to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Continued GPOI 

support is essential to help the international community as a whole meet the increased demand for peacekeeping. 

(73) 

NOMINATIONS 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Crocker, Ryan C., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq 

Wood, William B., to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:19 a.m., in room 

SD–628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Jr., 

Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Isakson, and Vitter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. This hearing will come to order. 

Good morning, everybody, thank you for being here. 

We have a couple of votes at 10:30, and so we’re going to try to 

move as expeditiously as possible. Senator Lugar will be here in a 

little while. 

It’s my privilege to convene this hearing. We welcome both Ambassador Wood and Ambassador Crocker here to take part in it. 

Needless to say, you’ve both been nominated for incredibly challenging, and important, posts. And I’m absolutely convinced, and 

indeed comforted by the fact that both of you have extensive experience. We’re lucky to have individuals with your depth of background who are prepared to undertake these kinds of difficult tasks 

and in dangerous and complicated places. And we all, on this committee, trust the experience that you bring to the table, will serve 

you and the country well. 

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are obviously vital to America’s national security interests. Certainly the war in Iraq, if not 

initially so, now is because of the implications on the down side. 

Many of us on this committee have expressed opinions, and feel 

very strongly that the war in Iraq has had disastrous consequences 

for our national security. We’ve seen more than 3,000 of our bravest young men and women make the ultimate sacrifice, and we’ve 

spent over $350 billion of taxpayers’ money on a war that, it is 

hard not to conclude, has made us less safe, has made the region 

more volatile, has, in fact, strengthened some of our antagonists, 

74 

and particularly made more complicated the relationship with Iran, 

Hamas, and radical Islam. 

The administration’s mistakes and miscalculations have made a 

difficult situation in Iraq even more complicated. But the fact is, 

that we now owe it to our troops, to their families, and most importantly, to the country to find, not just a new way forward in Iraq, 

but the right way forward. 

That will start with recognizing that there is no military solution 

to the violence in Iraq. The only hope for stability is a sustainable 

political solution that resolves the fundamental differences between 

the primary stakeholders. 

The Sunni-Shia conflict that has erupted into civil conflict in 

Iraq, and now spread throughout the region, and beyond the region—it goes back over 1,300 years. As we discussed, Ambassador 

Crocker, right now both sides believe that they can win, and that’s 

a dangerous equation. 

The Sunni have to recognize that they will no longer be running 

the country in the way that they were, and agree to put down their 

arms and join the political process. And the Shia must move beyond their longstanding fears of Sunni domination and agree that 

they have to share power and come to some agreement with respect 

to the resources and the fundamental structure regarding the country. 

The issues of oil revenues, federalism, de-Baathification, and the 

militias are essential to ending the violence. 

In the absence of this political solution, I think it’s the majority 

view of this committee, and the majority view of the Senate, and 

Congress when ultimately expressed, that sending more than 

21,000 additional troops is not going to solve the fundamental problem. It may provide a little more security, it may not. But it is not 

going to solve the fundamental problem. 

And so, we need to encourage that political solution, and I know 

that members of the committee will have questions regarding that 

as we proceed forward. 

We also have to recognize that we cannot solve the problems in 

Iraq alone, I know, Ambassador, you share that view. Any sustainable solution has to involve Iraq’s neighbors, and the international 

community. And, perhaps most incomprehensible is the failure of 

this administration to engage in the broad-based international diplomacy, and also the regional diplomacy. 

In each of the trips I’ve made in the last several years, I have 

been struck by the plea of leaders of the neighboring countries for 

a more robust diplomatic effort on our behalf, which has yet to materialize. Iraqis need to take responsibility for Iraq, and your challenge, Ambassador, will be obviously, to help encourage that, and 

to try to help create the framework and structure to empower it. 

I happen to believe that a deadline is essential. Because there’s 

been a lack of accountability in their behavior. And, I think it was 

6 months ago that General Casey, and Ambassador Khalilzad both 

said that the Iraqi Government had about 5 or 6 months to make 

the critical decisions, or else. 

The ‘‘or else’’ has come, and passed. The 5 or 6 months has come, 

and passed. And the violence is higher, and the situation more 

grave. So, clearly there is an enormous challenge in front of us. 

75 

In addition, we’ve reached a critical juncture in Afghanistan. For 

several years now, I—and a few others—have been arguing that we 

needed a more robust presence in Afghanistan, and that we were 

taking our eye off the real conflict, which was in Afghanistan, 

where Osama bin Laden launched the attacks, and the Taliban is 

now somewhat resurgent. 

So, there is an additional challenge there—the accumulated affects of violent terrorist insurgent attacks, corruption, inefficient 

social resources, and growing income disparities are taking their 

toll. A point could be reached at which the government becomes 

relevant to the people, and that is, indeed, the greatest challenge 

that we have is to maintain the credibility of the government that 

we helped give birth to. 

So, America is facing extraordinary challenges in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan. And the coming months are going to be critical to 

both countries, and critical to our country as well, in terms of our 

larger interests in the region. 

So, I had hoped that Senator Lugar would be here—he’s not here 

yet. When Senator Coleman gets here, he’s the ranking member on 

the committee, I’ll recognize him for an opening statement, but 

we’d like to proceed—given the vote pressure—to your statements, 

and then we’ll get around to questioning as rapidly as we can. 

So, if you would like to start off, Ambassador Wood. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. WOOD, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN 

Mr. WOOD. I thank you very much, Senator Kerry. 

I am grateful to the Senate for having confirmed me to be Ambassador to Colombia, and I am honored to appear before you 

again, as President Bush’s nominee to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 

The United States has been closely involved in Afghanistan since 

2001, and rightly, since the Taliban regime served as the launching 

pad for al-Qaeda’s savage attack on our cities that year. 

Afghanistan is struggling to find its way to the path of responsive popular government and economic development that was interrupted in 1978 by a coup, then by invasion, then by internal strife. 

In Afghanistan, the United States is pursuing a comprehensive solution that combines the push of security and law enforcement, 

with the pull of economic opportunity, humanitarian aid, and 

peaceful reintegration. 

Since 2001, the United States has provided $14.2 billion in assistance, of which $9 billion was to train and equip Afghan security 

and police forces, and $5.2 billion was for reconstruction. If confirmed, my job would be to support every aspect of this comprehensive strategy. 

Our assistance already has produced an impressive record of accomplishment. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, in Berlin last month, compared to last year and previous years, this year there is more army, more police, more government, more roads, more development, more economic opportunity, more legitimate economy, and more pressure on the Taliban 

from all sides, including Pakistan. 

76 

Now, the administration is seeking assistance of $10.6 billion over 2 years, of which $8.6 billion is for police and security assistance, and $2 billion for reconstruction, and other economic aid. 

The major categories of our economic and reconstruction assistance include economic growth, democracy, governance, roads, electricity, health and education, and food aid. 

Special programs are aimed at the south, traditionally the poorest region in Afghanistan, and a center for opium poppy cultivation, and insurgent activity. 

An estimated one-third of the Afghan economy is based on the 

heroine trade. That share is declining steadily as legitimate economic activity grows faster. But poppy cultivation is well-defended 

by those who profit from it, including the supposedly spiritual 

Taliban. 

Techniques to fight the drug trade differ from country to country, 

but continuation of the violence and corruption of the drug trade 

feeds the Taliban and puts a low ceiling on everything the Afghans 

and their friends can hope to accomplish. My job would be to try 

to forge a consensus, both inside and outside Afghanistan, about 

how to end the drug trade, and then make it work. 

One challenge is the probability of increased violence in the 

spring by the Taliban, as there has been for the last several years. 

Although the Taliban probably poses no strategic threat to the Government of Afghanistan at this time, it is important that the Afghan Government, local leaders, internal security forces, and ISAF 

forces prepare for such attacks. I would consider it a critical part 

of my job to support them, however possible. These are impressive 

challenges, worthy of our best efforts. 

For my part, I bring 30 years of experience in the Foreign Service to the task. In my current assignment, I have led one of our 

largest embassies in the world, with more than 2,200 personnel, 

and 40 offices and agencies in an environment of terrorism and 

narcotics trafficking. 

I am enormously proud of the work of the embassy team over the 

last few years, and of the accomplishments of our partnership with 

the government of President Uribe. In this regard, I would like to 

note that 2 days ago, February 13, marked the fourth anniversary 

of the capture by the FARC terror organization of Mark Gonsolves, 

Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes. They are America’s longestheld hostages. In the embassy, we think about them every day, as 

we think about their families. Their safe return is not just a matter 

of policy for us, it is personal. We are grateful for the splendid cooperation of the Uribe Government in the matter, and we hold the 

FARC responsible for their well-being and immediate safe return. 

Although the issues and solutions are different in Afghanistan, 

I would hope to bring to our new assignment the same focus on 

mission, teamwork within the embassy, and with our military colleagues, on international cooperation, and on partnership with the 

government of President Karzai. 

Finally, I would like to renew the promise I made in my confirmation hearings in 2003, to embrace a full dialog with this committee, and with the Congress as a whole, to answer your questions 

fully and honestly, to welcome your visits, and above all, to cooperate to achieve our common goals in Afghanistan. 

77 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wood follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. WOOD, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

I am grateful to the Senate for having confirmed me to be Ambassador to Colombia and I am honored to appear before you again as President Bush’s nominee to 

be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. I want to thank the President and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. 

In both countries we have a completely positive agenda, helping governments that 

deserve our help to overcome decades-long problems and provide peace, rule of law, 

economic opportunity, and responsive government to their people. In both countries, 

we and our allies also face an acute threat from insurgency, terrorism, and illicit 

narcotics trafficking. 

The United States has been closely involved in Afghanistan since 2001, and rightly, since the Taliban regime served as the launching pad for al-Qaeda’s savage attack on our cities that year. 

Afghanistan is struggling to find its way to the path of responsive popular government and economic development that was interrupted in 1978 by a coup, then by 

invasion, and then by internal strife. 

After the ouster of the Taliban by Afghan forces in 2001 with strong United 

States support, in January 2004 Afghanistan adopted a liberal constitution that 

opened the door to national healing and effective, honest, inclusive government. 

In October 2004 the Afghan people elected President Hamid Karzai in open, popular elections with the participation of some 15 candidates and more than 10.5 million registered voters. After his victory, President Karzai, who had been interim 

President since December 2001, named a multiethnic cabinet to confront the challenges and opportunities of the new Afghanistan, and to develop a new cooperation 

between the central government and local leadership. In 2005, a multiethnic, nationally representative Parliament was elected into office by the Afghan people. 

Twenty-seven percent of the Parliamentarians are women. 

In Afghanistan, the United States is pursuing a comprehensive solution which 

combines the ‘‘push’’ of security and law enforcement, with the ‘‘pull’’ of economic 

opportunity, humanitarian aid, and peaceful reintegration. Since 2001, the United 

States has provided $14.2 billion in assistance, of which $9.0 billion was to train 

and equip Afghan security and police forces, and $5.2 billion for reconstruction. 

That assistance already has produced an impressive record of accomplishment. In 

the words of Assistant Secretary of State Boucher in Berlin last month, ‘‘. . . compared to last year and previous years, this year there is more army, more police, 

more government, more roads, more development, more economic opportunity, more 

legitimate economy, and more pressure on the Taliban from all sides, including 

Pakistan.’’ 

Now the administration is seeking assistance of $10.6 billion over 2 years, of 

which $8.6 billion is for police and security assistance and $2.0 billion for reconstruction and other economic aid. If confirmed, my job will be to spend all funds 

effectively and transparently, to achieve the ends they were destined to serve in the 

best possible way. 

The major categories of our economic and reconstruction assistance include economic growth, democracy and governance, roads and electricity, health and education, and food aid. Special programs are aimed at the south, traditionally the 

poorest region of Afghanistan and a center for opium poppy cultivation and insurgent support. 

If confirmed, I expect to have the satisfaction of marking the completion of the 

road system from Kabul to Herat, which will open up new commercial possibilities 

and help knit the country together. The United States Government has completed 

715 kilometers of the ring road, and has constructed almost 2,300 kilometers of secondary and tertiary roads. I would also expect to see major improvements in the 

power system. The Kajaki dam hydropower system and the southern power grid 

should come fully on line in 2008, to get electricity to Kandahar and the south. 

I would work to accelerate provision of alternative livelihoods to opium production, including agricultural, livestock, and business assistance, particularly to the 

southern provinces that are the center of both poppy production and the insurgency. 

Part of my job would be to coordinate and advance this assistance, and a host of 

other projects that are moving forward under the auspices of the ‘‘Afghanistan Compact’’ adopted by Afghanistan and more than 60 donor countries and international 

organizations in London a year ago. 

78 

An innovative aspect of international work in Afghanistan is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which provide a local international presence, advance provincial 

development, governance, and security, and help ensure these efforts are coordinated at the national level. U.S. diplomats and USAID field officers work side by 

side with their military colleagues at 12 U.S.-led PRTs and 10 PRTs led by other 

ISAF countries. The United States is playing an important role in these teams and 

I would expect to make that a big part of my work. 

An estimated one-third of the Afghan economy is based on the heroin trade. That 

share is declining steadily as legitimate economic activity grows faster. But poppy 

cultivation has existed in Afghanistan for years, and is well-defended by those who 

profit from it, including the supposedly spiritual Taliban. 

Techniques to fight the drug trade differ from country to country. But one thing 

is clear: Continuation of the violence and corruption of the drug trade feeds the 

Taliban and puts a low ceiling on everything the Afghans and their friends can hope 

to accomplish there. In this regard, my job would be to try to forge a consensus both 

inside and outside Afghanistan about how to deal with the drug trade, and then 

make it work. 

The region is a critical, difficult one, filled with hopeful news and with daunting 

challenges. If confirmed, my job will be to help a developing and democratic Afghanistan serve as a bridgehead of stability for its neighbors, and be part of their solution, not part of their problem. In return, the United States will expect that 

Afghanistan’s neighbors do everything in their power to isolate that Taliban, dismantle its insurgency, and counter its support for the heroin trade. I would intend 

to continue the practice of my predecessor and Ambassador Crocker to maintain the 

closest possible dialog and cooperation between embassy Kabul and Embassy 

Islamabad. I note that Secretary of Defense Gates had successful talks with the 

Pakistani Government last weekend, in which the subject of Afghanistan figured 

prominently. 

One challenge is the probability of increased violence in the spring by the Taliban, 

as there has been for the last several years. It is important that the Afghan Government, local leaders, internal security forces, and ISAF forces prepare for such attacks. I would consider it a critical part of my job to support them however possible. 

But it is also important that we not overemphasize what the Taliban is capable of. 

As General Eikenberry, outgoing commander of the Combined Forces Command in 

Afghanistan, said last month in Berlin: ‘‘The enemy is not strong. The challenge of 

Afghanistan is that the institutions of the state remain weak. . . . There have been 

no areas of Afghanistan where this extremist enemy has been able to take an existing presence of the Government of Afghanistan—with good security, with good social 

services—and push that out. There are no examples of that. It’s the areas of weak 

governance where the enemy has been able to gain strength.’’ I agree. 

If confirmed, my job—more than any other—will be to cooperate with ISAF to 

maintain security, and to advance as rapidly as I can the strengthening of national 

and local Afghan institutions and the provision of new economic opportunity to the 

Afghan people. 

These are impressive challenges, worthy of our best efforts. For my part, I bring 

30 years of experience in the Foreign Service to the task. In my current assignment, 

I have led one of our largest embassies in the world—with more than 2,200 personnel and 40 offices and agencies—in an environment of terrorism and narcotics 

trafficking. Our core task was to support Colombia’s popular government and 

strengthen its democratic institutions in order to better confront these challenges. 

The fight is not over and there is much more to be done. I am enormously proud 

of the work of the embassy team over the last few years, and of the accomplishments of our partnership with the government of President Uribe. 

In this regard, I would like to note that 2 days ago, February 13, marked the 

fourth anniversary of the capture by the FARC terror organization of Marc 

Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes. They are America’s longest-held hostages. In the embassy we think about them every day, as we think about their families. Their safe return is not just a matter of policy for us; it is personal. We are 

grateful for the splendid cooperation of the Uribe Government in the matter. And 

we hold the FARC responsible for their well-being and immediate safe return. 

Although the issues and solutions are different in Afghanistan, I would hope to 

bring to my new assignment the same focus on mission, on teamwork within the 

embassy and with our military colleagues, and on cooperative partnership with the 

government of President Karzai. 

Finally, I would like to renew the promise I made in my confirmation hearings 

in 2003: To embrace a full dialog with this committee and with the Congress as a 

whole, to answer your questions fully and honestly, to welcome your visits, and 

above all to cooperate to achieve our common goals in Afghanistan. 

79 

Thank you. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Crocker. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ 

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the committee—— 

Senator KERRY. Let me, excuse me Ambassador Crocker, I see 

Senator Lugar has joined us. Let me turn to Senator Lugar and see 

if he has an opening statement first, and then we’ll proceed. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I do have a short opening statement. Let me deliver a part of it, and then leave the rest for the 

record. 

I just simply wanted to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming 

our distinguished nominees, Ambassadors William Wood and Ryan 

Crocker. The posts they will soon occupy are among the most consequential ambassadorships in American history. They will be at 

the epicenter of our efforts to secure and reconstruct Afghanistan 

and Iraq, and help provide those governments with the best opportunity to achieve nationhood. 

What happens in these countries in the coming months will deeply affect, and perhaps, determine whether the Middle East will 

move forward more productively and in peaceful conditions beyond 

the grip of terrorist influences and sectarian violence. 

Two weeks ago, before this committee, former Secretary of State 

Henry Kissinger recalled a half-century of United States involvement in the Middle East. He argued that this history was not accidental. We have been deeply involved in the region, because we 

have enduring vital interests at stake, and protecting those interests cannot be relegated to a political timeline. We may make tactical decisions about the deployment or withdrawal of forces, but 

we must plan for a strong, strategic position in the region for many 

years to come. 

We need to be prepared for a whole array of United States forces 

to defend oil assets, target terrorists, deter adventurism by Iran, 

provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict, and generally 

reassure friendly governments that the United States is committed 

to the Middle East and South Asian security. 

With so much at stake, I am pleased the President has nominated veteran diplomats and experienced managers to lead the 

American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the rest of my statement be entered in the record, and I thank you for giving me this opportunity. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Without 

objection, it will be made part of the record. 

Ambassador Crocker, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:] 

80 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

I join in welcoming our distinguished nominees, Ambassadors William Wood and 

Ryan Crocker. The posts they would occupy are among the most consequential ambassadorships in American history. They will be at the epicenter of our efforts to 

secure and reconstruct Afghanistan and Iraq and to help provide those governments 

with the opportunity to achieve nationhood. 

What happens in these countries will deeply affect—and perhaps determine— 

whether the Middle East will move toward more productive and peaceful conditions 

beyond the grip of terrorist influences and sectarian violence. 

Two weeks ago, before this committee, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recalled 

a half-century of United States involvement in the Middle East. He argued that this 

history was not accidental. We have been deeply involved in the region because we 

have enduring vital interests at stake. Protecting these interests cannot be relegated 

to a political timeline. 

We may make tactical decisions about the deployment or withdrawal of forces, but 

we must plan for a strong strategic position in the region for years to come. We need 

to be preparing for how we will array U.S. forces to defend oil assets, target terrorists, deter adventurism by Iran, provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict, 

and generally reassure friendly governments that the United States is committed 

to Middle East and South Asian security. With so much at stake, I am pleased that 

the President has nominated veteran diplomats and managers to lead the American 

presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

It is also vital that the Bush administration move quickly to fill the ambassadorial post in Pakistan being vacated by Ambassador Crocker. Our relations with 

that country also are important to U.S. national security. Ambassador Wood’s efforts 

in Afghanistan will be heavily impacted by what happens across the border, and we 

must ensure that there is no prolonged absence in Islamabad at such a critical time 

for the region. 

Today, we look forward to a thorough discussion with Ambassadors Wood and 

Crocker about their perspectives on Afghanistan and Iraq and their plans for providing leadership to our embassies. We recognize the deep personal commitment 

necessary to undertake these difficult assignments, and we are grateful that leaders 

of their stature and experience are willing to step forward. 

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, may I begin by introducing members of my family 

who are with me today? 

Senator KERRY. Absolutely. 

Mr. CROCKER. My wife, Christine. 

Senator KERRY. Welcome, delighted to have you here. 

Mr. CROCKER. Christine and I met in Baghdad in 1979, and 

we’ve deployed together ever since. To Beirut twice, to Afghanistan, 

and now to Pakistan. 

Sitting next to Christine are my sister-in-law, Cindy Hall, and 

my niece, Cameron Hall. They have been our home front throughout these many years, and I’m delighted they’re here today. 

Senator KERRY. Well, we’re delighted to welcome them, thank 

you. 

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, it’s an honor and a privilege to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to be Ambassador 

to Iraq. I thank you for this opportunity, and for your consideration. 

Mr. Chairman, the picture is not a pretty one. Iraq today is in 

the grip of terrorist, insurgent, sectarian, and criminal violence 

that threatens the country’s future. This violence, particularly in 

Baghdad, has spiraled out of control. Daily life for ordinary Iraqis 

in Baghdad is dangerous and difficult. 

The only way to give political and economic progress in Iraq a 

chance, to give the Iraqi people a chance, is for the Iraqi GovernVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
81 

ment, with our help, to wrest the power on the street away from 

violent groups. 

In an ideal world, the Iraqis would be able to do the job themselves. However, it takes time to build this capability, and this is 

why the United States needs to help. 

But it is the Iraqis, Mr. Chairman, who must lead this effort, 

and Prime Minister al-Maliki has pledged to go after anyone who 

perpetrates sectarian or political killing, regardless of sectarian affiliation. 

There are other problems as well. The hard political reality is 

that the average Iraqi still does not feel that the government’s actions have brought about an improvement in security or the quality 

of life. They say much the same thing about the actions of the Coalition. 

Not enough jobs is a problem, corruption is a problem. So are the 

lack of electricity, and the inability of the government to spend its 

own budget. 

Despite all of the problems Iraq faces, there are also some encouraging developments. Iraq, since 2005, has held two national 

elections. The Iraqi people drafted and approved a constitution. 

Iraq is moving toward local and provincial elections, which should 

legitimize local political leaders, and broaden the representation of 

groups that did not participate in the past. 

On the economic front, Iraqis are debating a hydrocarbon law 

that we hope will create new investment, and most important, reinforce the principle that all Iraqis will share in the future wealth 

of the economy. Iraq has made progress toward concluding an 

international compact, which, when completed, will commit Iraq to 

a comprehensive economic reform package and return for assistance and incentives by the international community. 

All of this said, Mr. Chairman, it is security that remains the 

greatest challenge that Iraq faces. The President has laid out a 

new way forward. Containing the violence, particularly in Baghdad 

and Anbar, is the immediate imperative, but it is not the full solution. 

The President’s plan to augment our forces by more than 20,000 

troops, also calls for a doubling of the number of provincial reconstruction teams, and PRTs, as well as strengthening the existing 

10 PRTs to help with economic and political development at the 

provincial and local level. 

A successful strategy for Iraq, as you’ve said, Mr. Chairman, 

must go beyond military operations. The two efforts, military and 

civilian, go hand-in-hand. The one cannot succeed without the 

other. 

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken to General Petraeus, and I can assure you that if I am confirmed by the Senate, there will be full 

unity of effort by the civilian and the military components of the 

government. 

Iraqis must see that military operations are accompanied by visible and enduring improvements in their lives, and to do this, we 

need resources. Our military has to be resourced to support Iraqi 

forces to clear and to hold. Adequate funding for the civilian agencies is equally important, if we are to accomplish the critical third 

element of that equation, to build. 

82 

Mr. Chairman, as the President has told Prime Minister Maliki, 

the patience of the American people is not unlimited. It will require 

hard work, and hard decisions on the part of the Iraqis. If you confirm me, I intend to deliver that message clearly to Iraq’s leaders. 

The Iraqis have to make some tough choices, and then follow 

through on them. We need to help them to do so. 

Their success will be ours, in Iraq, in the region, and beyond. But 

similarly, failure would feed the forces of terror and extremism well 

beyond Iraq’s borders. We would all pay the price. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay tribute to the extraordinary men and women of the State Department, USAID, and the 

other civilian agencies who join our military forces in serving our 

Nation. They have volunteered for difficult duty in Iraq, and elsewhere, as we fight this long war, at a cost to their family lives and 

often at great personal risk. 

We have no shortage of volunteers for Iraq, a tribute to the loyalty and patriotism of those who serve the State Department and 

its sister agencies. 

Mr. Chairman, without question, we are in a very hard fight. The 

one assurance I can give you is that, if I am confirmed, I will draw 

on all of my experience, and all my ability, to provide the best leadership I can for our mission in Iraq, and in support of the Iraqi 

people. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crocker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, distinguished committee members, ladies and gentlemen, 

It is an honor and privilege to appear before you today as the President’s nominee 

to be the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq. Thank you for this 

opportunity and for your consideration. It is an honor to have the chance to continue 

to serve our great Nation. And it is a particular privilege to have the opportunity 

to work with the brave men and women of the U.S. State Department and our other 

civilian agencies who serve alongside our military personnel. 

Mr. Chairman, I first served in Iraq in the late 1970s when Saddam Hussein consolidated his hold on power. I next worked on Iraq issues from 2001 to 2003, when 

I was Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. In 2003, 

I was the first Director of Governance for the Coalition Provisional Authority in 

Baghdad. 

Mr. Chairman, Iraq today is in the grip of insurgent, terrorist, sectarian, and 

criminal violence that threatens the country’s future. The central provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, and Diyala, in particular, face violence from many sources: Al-Qaeda 

in Iraq, sectarian Shia militias, Sunni insurgents, foreign jihadists, organized criminals, and groups backed by Iraq’s neighbors that seem intent on spreading harm 

and chaos. This violence, particularly in Baghdad, has spiraled out of control. Daily 

life for ordinary Iraqis in Baghdad is dangerous and difficult. 

The only way to give political and economic progress in Iraq a chance—to give 

the people a chance—is for the Iraqi Government, with our help, to wrest the power 

on the street away from these violent groups by directly confronting the sources of 

the violence. In an ideal world, the Iraqis would be able to do the job themselves. 

Unfortunately, it takes time to build this kind of capability. And this is why the 

United States needs to help. The Iraqi people need friends and allies to help them 

stop those in Iraq who are using violence to win power, but as the President and 

the Secretary have said repeatedly, we must see the Iraqis themselves leading this 

effort and delivering on their promises with concrete action. 

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has pledged to go after anyone who perpetrates 

sectarian or political killing, regardless of sectarian affiliation. As he said himself 

last week, progress is slower than he—or we—would like. The leaders of some networks of insurgents and militias have been detained or killed. However, there is 

83 

much, much more that needs to be done by the Iraqi Government. The government 

must also deal with corruption as well as its inability to spend its own budget for 

reasons that make sense to individual Iraqi bureaucrats but make no sense in the 

face of the urgent need to provide security, develop an economy, and reestablish the 

Rule of Law. Security is, and will remain, the greatest and most immediate challenge we will face. 

Mr. Chairman, on the economic and political fronts, we also face some very real 

challenges. The reality of Iraqi politics is that the average Iraqi still does not feel 

that the government’s actions have brought about an improvement in security or the 

quality of life. They say the same thing about the actions of the coalition. The lack 

of jobs is a problem. Corruption is a problem. So is the lack of electricity. The legacy 

of more than 20 years of Saddam’s misrule is coupled with a violent insurgency that 

began in April 2003 to increase the tribulations of the people of Baghdad and Iraq. 

Despite all the problems Iraq faces, there are signs of hope. It is no small feat 

that Iraq since 2005 has held two national elections. The Iraqi people drafted and 

approved a constitution. In 2006, they formed a National Unity Government. And 

Iraq is moving closer to holding local and provincial elections, which could take 

place as early as this fall. Such elections should legitimize local political leaders and 

broaden the representation of groups that did not participate in the past. Although 

steps have been taken to start a process of reconciliation, visible progress remains 

to be seen. Iraqis have taken steps forward on reforms to the de-Baathification 

laws—but there is a long way to go before there is a law that everyone can accept. 

In the region, Iraq’s top leaders are now reaching out to their neighbors to normalize diplomatic and economic relationships. Iraq is also openly and directly confronting and engaging Syria and Iran on their unhelpful interference in Iraq’s political and security situations, and trying to urge them to play more constructive roles. 

On the economic front, Iraq is also moving toward a hydrocarbon law that we 

hope will create new investment that will benefit the Iraqi people and the world 

economy as well as reinforce the principle that all Iraqis will share in the future 

wealth of the country. Iraq has made steady progress toward concluding an international compact, which, when completed, will commit Iraq to a comprehensive economic reform package in return for assistance and incentives by compact donor 

countries. Again, like everything else, there will be massive amounts of work to be 

done, which will require the full commitment of the Iraqi Government to achieve. 

Mr. Chairman, in support of these efforts, the President, on January 10, laid out 

a new way forward in Iraq. Containing the violence, particularly in Baghdad and 

Anbar, is the immediate imperative, but it is not the full solution. This is why the 

President’s plan to augment our forces by 21,500 troops also includes a considerable 

civilian support reinforcement of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams—PRTs—to 

help with economic and political development at the provincial and local level. The 

President’s plan calls for a doubling of the number of PRTs as well as strengthening 

the existing 10 PRTs. A successful strategy for Iraq must go beyond military operations. The two efforts—civilian and military—go hand in hand. The one cannot succeed without the other. Iraqis must see that military operations are accompanied 

by visible and enduring improvements in their lives. To do this, we need resources. 

Our military has to be resourced to clear and hold. Adequate funding for the civilian 

agencies is equally important if we are to accomplish the critical third element of 

the equation—building. 

Mr. Chairman, as the President told Prime Minister Maliki, the patience of the 

American people is not unlimited. It will require hard work—and hard decisions— 

on the part of the Iraqis. If you confirm me, I intend to deliver that message clearly 

to Iraq’s leaders. At the same time, the United States is not the kind of country 

that abandons its friends in their darkest hour. To do so now in Iraq would unleash 

a series of destructive consequences not just in Iraq, but for the entire region and 

for our own vital interests. The Iraqis have to make some hard choices and then 

follow through on them. We need to help them do so. 

Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like to pay tribute to the extraordinary men 

and women of the State Department, USAID, and the other civilian agencies serving 

our Nation. They have volunteered for difficult duty in Iraq and elsewhere as we 

fight this long war, at a cost to their family lives and often at great personal risk. 

We have no shortage of volunteers for Iraq, a tribute to the loyalty and patriotism 

of those who work for the State Department and our sister agencies. I would also 

like to take the opportunity to express my profound respect for our Foreign Service 

Nationals who help staff our embassies worldwide. They are dedicated, courageous 

colleagues who deserve a great deal of recognition. In Iraq, many of our local staff 

work under hardship, including threats to themselves and their families, in support 

of building a better world for them and for us. 

84 

Mr. Chairman, without question, we are in a very hard fight. The one assurance 

I can give you is that if confirmed, I will draw on all my experience and ability to 

provide the best leadership I can for our mission in support of the Iraqi people. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Ambassador Crocker. 

Let me just say to my colleagues, that we’re under the gun, here, 

in terms of a vote coming up, so I’m going to limit everybody—myself included—to a 5-minute question period. I hope, I know we all 

chafe under the time we get, and it’s difficult. Normally, I’d love 

to do more, but during the votes, for those who have extended 

questions, we can cycle through in a way that will give people a 

little more time to be able to ask questions if they want to. 

Again, let me emphasize how lucky we are, I think, to have professionals of your caliber willing to take on this task. You are taking on probably two of the most important posts in the entire diplomatic field today, and certainly, two of the most challenging. And, 

so it’s really important to us to be able to have the right people 

there. 

Three of us here on this committee—Senator Webb, who’s not 

here, Senator Hagel, and myself—were once young soldiers, 

plunked down in the middle of a civil war. And we learned, firsthand, how really difficult it is when you don’t speak the language, 

and you’re trying to sort through culture and history. And, so I 

think we’re particularly sensitive to what our young soldiers are 

being asked to do over there. And we understand their enthusiasm, 

and their courage, and their commitment to the mission. 

The issue really is, Ambassador Crocker, no matter what we do 

on the ground militarily, the fundamental struggle there is a struggle for power, with deep cultural and historical beliefs on both 

sides. 

Sunni have mostly run the country. Not always, there have been 

some instances of a kind of, you know, meeting of the minds, but 

by and large they’ve run it, and the most modern history, the Shia 

uprising of the early 1990s was met with a brutal—tens of thousands of Shia murdered—response. That memory, and my conversations with Shia over there, when I’ve been over there, is large. 

The Sunni, on the other hand, are not only fearful in the neighboring countries—King Abdullah, President Mubarak, the Saudis— 

about the rise of Shiism, and the connection to Iran, but they are 

also, within Iraq, operating with a deep-rooted belief that they 

were born to run the show. And they believe they’re going to return. 

Those of us who have been watching this struggle now for these 

past few years are confounded by the absence of an Iraqi commitment to resolving those fundamental differences. We’re now 4 years 

into it, we’re several years into a sort of diplomatic, quote, effort. 

We still don’t have an oil law. We still don’t have a resolution of 

the fundamental structure of the federalism, and how that would 

play out. 

So, would you share with the committee your vision of, sort of, 

the order of priorities, and what you see as the possibilities of your 

ability to affect that, and leverage it, and do you agree that that 

is the essential ingredient? Not what General Petraeus does, but 

in fact, Prime Minister Maliki’s conference—which we have yet to 

see materialize—and the diplomatic, political resolution? 

85 

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I agree completely, that the core 

of the problem—and therefore the core of any possible solution— 

is political. Military—successful military action—can provide the 

space, and set the stage for political solutions, but it is only political solutions that can resolve the conflict. 

That said, sir, the violence that we see every day on our TV 

screens, and that the Iraqis live through every day, has now dominated, in my view, the political discourse. It is hard for me to see 

how Iraqis can act on some of the other critical elements that you 

identified, in this atmosphere of violence. 

And, that is why—in my view—the Baghdad security plan, led 

by Iraqis, supported by us, is a critical undertaking. 

Senator KERRY. But, let me just ask you about that, quickly. In 

Israel, where the security has been intense, where for years the 

military has had super-training, there’s a cohesiveness, there’s a 

national state—there’s been little to prevent somebody from walking into a restaurant, or a crowded bus, and blowing it up. It seems 

to me that, unless you, sort of—I mean, would you speak to that? 

I mean, isn’t there even—with less security, less cohesiveness, 

greater divergency of different interests and militias, that ability to 

create violence, absent the political solution—no matter how many 

troops you put in, it seems to me—is going to loom large. 

Mr. CROCKER. And that would lead me, Mr. Chairman, to approach this issue with the sense that we don’t start with a list of 

priorities, one, two, three—we’ve got a series of urgent priorities. 

If the surge effort is able to bring down violence, then that will 

quickly have to be reinforced, first on the ground, in these neighborhoods where it’s taking place. That is the importance, I think, 

of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We’ve already chosen the 

core leadership for those teams. They will be going through training beginning in a couple of weeks and they will be on the ground 

before the end of March. 

The hope, Mr. Chairman, would be that a combination of a 

dampening down of violence, reinforced by political and economic 

activity on the ground, could then create an atmosphere in which 

we and the Iraqis are able to leverage some of the more strategic 

issues that you mentioned. Getting the hydrocarbon law through, 

reforming the de-Baathification process, moving ahead with a constitutional reform process. On the economic side, moving toward 

budget implementation, so that Iraqi resources are actually expended by the Iraqi people. I see this as all linked together. 

I think we have to see if a dynamic can be started there. Prime 

Minister Maliki’s initiative for a regional conference that Iraq 

would host, I think, is an excellent step in this direction, to bring 

in all of Iraq’s neighbors. Some have been supportive, some have 

been neutral, some of have been destructive. They all play a role, 

and that role needs to be shaped to be better. 

So, I think this is a good initiative, and if this kind of regional 

diplomatic activity is accompanied by some positive steps on the 

ground, I think it will be more possible to get Iraq’s neighbors to 

step forward in a constructive way. 

Then one can take it a final circle out, to the international effort. 

The international engagement, through the international compact 

with Iraq can reinforce all of this, and be reinforced by progress at 

86 

the center. So, I would see these as interlocking imperatives—we’ve 

got to move on all of them, we’ve got to do it, pretty much in real 

time, but the violence is—if there was one that stands out, it is the 

violence, and the need to temper that down. And, I think we’re 

starting in the right place. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Ambassador. I have other questions, 

but I’ll wait until we come back for the next round. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Wood, I have two areas I’ll ask, to begin with, and 

then let you use up the—my allotted time. 

First of all, you have mentioned experience in Colombia with the 

drug trade. Would you trace what parallels there might be between 

that experience in Colombia, and what you may find in Afghanistan? And, furthermore, how involved can the American ambassador, or the American presence be in governing and bringing to 

a halt the drug trade? Or, is the situation so self-sustainable that, 

regardless of our efforts, or of others, it is bound to be, and you 

simply try to temper it and live with it? 

Second, arguably, the new supplemental that we’re seeking has 

a sizable portion for security reform. Now, this would be the fourth 

attempt at police reform in Afghanistan, one by the Germans, two 

by us—none very sustainable thus far, or very comprehensive. And 

yet, this is tremendously important for the governance of the country, leaving aside the drug trade, governance in general, and the 

presidency of Hamid Karzai. 

Would you give your thoughts—as you reflected upon the drug 

trade and police training in Afghanistan? 

Mr. WOOD. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Regarding, there are some parallels between the situation in Colombia, but there are also many differences. From a technical point 

of view, the predominant drug in Colombia is cocoa, which is a 

shrub, which is difficult to eradicate, because you have to get the 

root system, as well as what’s above the surface. And in Afghanistan, the predominant drug is opium poppy, which is a flower 

which you can kill simply by breaking the stem. 

Colombia has a year-round growing season, Afghanistan only has 

one growing season a year. Possibly, for me, frankly, the principle 

difference is that virtually all of the cocoa grown in Colombia goes 

to the United States. Which means it directly affects our citizens, 

and a conservative estimate is that 3,000 United States citizens die 

a year from cocaine produced in Colombia. That’s more Americans 

than died in the World Trade Towers. So, Colombian drugs represent a World Trade Tower tragedy every year. 

In Afghanistan, only about an estimated 10 percent of the heroine reaches the United States, and the other 90 percent is in Europe, and Russian, and elsewhere. 

That said, as I said in my statement, one thing that was completely clear in Colombia was that illicit narcotics trade corrupts 

everything it touches—good governance, clean governance, honorable livelihood in the countryside are all impossible where there is 

a flourishing drug trade. We think of terrorists as the lowest form 

of human life, because they target innocents. In Colombia, we’ve 

87 

seen terrorists corrupted by the drug trade, to give up even the 

vestige of ideology, in favor of serving that perverse industry. 

So, as we support the Government of Karzai, as we support good 

governance, both centrally, and in the provinces, and where the 

people live—more local level, and sort of a valley-by-valley governance, destroying the opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade 

inside of Afghanistan is absolutely fundamental to achieving all of 

other goals—security, political, social, economic, developmental, humanitarian. 

I think the United States can play a role—a very important 

role—in forming a consensus which currently does not exist, either 

inside Afghanistan, or amazingly, among the countries whose citizens are the primary victims of the heroine trade from Afghanistan. Again, the techniques may be different from those of Colombia, but it’s absolutely crucial that we reach a consensus, and move 

out against this corrosive cancer. 

Senator LUGAR. How about police reform? 

Mr. WOOD. Police reform—police reform is absolutely fundamental. Policemen talk about the golden thread, which unites policemen with the communities they serve. And, if the communities 

don’t trust the police, if the police don’t feel a sense of responsibility to those communities, then it’s not a police force, it’s a internal, repressive force. 

We are working very hard, I am having meetings with our—I 

have had meetings with our, our—people in charge of our policetraining program, both on—in the State Department and in the Defense Department, which has the lead in the program for us. It’s 

not easy. I think we can do it, and I can only say that it’s one of 

my highest priorities. 

Senator KERRY. Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here today. You’re both going to 

be, obviously, taking on some of the most challenging assignments 

in our government. And I want to join the Chairman and all our 

colleagues in thanking you for your service. 

I’d like also to take this opportunity to share with you my admiration and appreciation for the men and women who are serving 

in our embassies in Kabul and Baghdad, and for those serving in 

the Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout each country. 

These are incredibly brave and committed individuals, and we so 

rarely hear about the sacrifices they make and the dangers they 

face as they do their work. So, I hope you’ll both communicate that 

to the many people that you’ll be working with. 

Ambassador Crocker, it was good to see you this week, and I 

want to ask you if you’re confident that sending more United 

States troops to Iraq—according to the President’s new plan—will 

help address the increasing sectarian violence, as civilian fatalities, 

bombings, strengthen the sectarian militias, and the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq. 

Mr. CROCKER. I think that the Baghdad security plan is an essential endeavor, if the tide is going to turn in Iraq. It will not, in 

itself, be sufficient, as I said earlier, but it is necessary, in my 

view, if the Iraqis are going to get to a better place in a number 

of areas. 

88 

The Iraqis are the main force in this effort, and I—as I look at 

the situation at this time, if I do go to Iraq, if I am confirmed by 

the Senate—I see this as an important transition period, in which 

the Iraqis simply must take the lead. They must take the lead in 

security, they must take the lead in doing what only Iraqis can do, 

which is broker political solutions—they must take the lead in driving their own economy. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I certainly agree with that, but let me get 

back to the question of whether the troop surge will help. The data 

this committee has reviewed shows that regardless of the size of 

United States troops’ presence in Iraq, Iraqi civilian fatalities, estimated strength of the insurgency, strength of the Shia militias, 

daily average of interethnic attack and the estimated number of 

foreign fighters have all risen during the past 3 years, without fail. 

Given that we can’t, from this data, draw a connection between 

U.S. troop levels, and any of these important indicators, how can 

you be confident that sending in more U.S. troops will actually 

have a positive impact? And, I’ve heard your other disclaimers, but, 

what is it about this particular troop increase that you have any 

confidence in believing it will affect those factors? 

Mr. CROCKER. There are several factors. First, and again, the 

most important is the commitment of Iraqi forces. As I understand 

it, 18 brigades of Iraqi forces committed to the Baghdad security 

plan. Previous efforts, again, as I understand it have not succeeded 

as had been hoped, because of limited forces. This time, the Iraqis 

are committed to providing very substantial forces. 

That said, it seems to me that our role in support is going to be 

fairly crucial. They are not yet ready to undertake something as 

enormously challenging—and you’ve described the challenge—on 

their own. So, the—approximately five brigades of U.S. forces that 

we would commit to this, I think, play a critical, supporting role 

in increasing the chances for success of this entire endeavor. 

And, this is a different mission than we have seen in the past. 

In this case, the explicit mission statement is to provide security 

for the Iraqi people. That’s the ‘‘hold’’ part of the operation, clear 

and then hold. In the past, we have not had the forces, or even necessarily the mission, to do the hold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ambassador, thank you. 

Mr. CROCKER. There’s no guarantee of success, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me quickly—I understand you wanted to 

answer more, but I only have a few more seconds to ask questions 

of Ambassador Wood, but I obviously enjoyed our conversation. 

And, I also enjoyed our meeting, Ambassador Wood. Given that 

security conditions have continued to deteriorate, particularly in 

southern Afghanistan, tell us what specific changes the United 

States Government is making to react and respond effectively to 

the new conditions on the ground. What are we going to do differently? 

Mr. WOOD. As you know, Senator Feingold, we’ve just had a 

change of command, and a restructuring of the ISAF leadership in 

Afghanistan. We recently decided to ask a brigade of the 10th 

Mountain Division to extend its stay, and the Pentagon announced 

yesterday that the 173rd Airborne Division—Airborne Brigade— 

would be moving to Afghanistan. 

89 

We are, and the President has requested $10.6 billion in new 

funding. So, we in the United States are trying to do our part to 

beef up security, and beef up the social, economic, and other programs that form the counterpart of security, and a necessary counterpart. At the same time, Secretary Gates met in Seville with our 

NATO allies, urging them to increase their participation, and 

equally importantly, increase the aggressiveness of their deployment. More than 60 nations are contributing on the economic, and 

developmental, and humanitarian side—I think that we are sharpening our efforts. I don’t think we’re changing our efforts, but I 

think we’re sharpening them, and focusing them better. 

Certainly, the first thing, the first question I will be asking myself, if confirmed, upon arrival in Kabul is, ‘‘Is the mix right?’’ It 

looks to me like it’s right at the moment, it looks to me like it’s 

a good balance. But certainly, I think over the last month, just last 

month, we’ve seen a substantial refocusing and reenergizing of our 

efforts in Afghanistan. Thank you. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Gentlemen, welcome. We are grateful that each of you has 

agreed to take on a new assignment, a difficult assignment, but 

has been noted here this morning, the two of you represent two of 

the most highly regarded, experienced diplomats we have in our 

Government. And again, we are grateful that you agreed to take 

on new challenges. 

Christine, thank you for your continued role in all of this, and 

we are very mindful of the fact that you began your career alongside the Ambassador, and it will be, what, 28 years since you met 

in Baghdad. I’m not sure it’s a reunion, but nonetheless, you will 

be going back together, and thank you for doing what you’re doing. 

I’d like to focus on Iran with each of you for a moment. Headlines 

for papers across the world today are filled with headlines like the 

Washington Post, ‘‘Iranian Aid Forces in Iraq, Bush Alleges,’’ 

‘‘President Denies Seeking Pretexual War With Iran,’’ there’s another story, ‘‘Eleven Elite Iranian Troops Killed in Bombing, U.S. 

Role Alleged.’’ It has been much the topic, Iran, our role, Iran’s role 

in Iraq the last few days. And I want to get your, each of you, your 

sense of a couple of things. 

One, I’m sure you both are aware of a July 2004 report that was 

offered by now-Defense Secretary Robert Gates, as well as the 

former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who just 

recently testified before this committee. They cochaired this report, 

underwritten by the Counsel on Foreign Relations, entitled, ‘‘Iran, 

Time for a New Approach.’’ And they says some things, as I’m 

quoting from the Gates-Brzezinski report, ‘‘The current lack of sustained engagement with Iran harms U.S. interests in a critical region of the world.’’ They went on to say, ‘‘Iran could play a potentially significant role in promoting a stable, pluralistic government 

in Baghdad.’’ They went on to say, ‘‘It is in the interest of the 

United States to engage selectively with Iran to promote regional 

stability.’’ 

90 

Since Iran is going to dominate much of your lives, as already 

it does with you, Ambassador Crocker, as you are Ambassador, currently, to Pakistan, and certainly Ambassador Wood will be dealing 

with Iran in his new capacity. My question to each of you—do you 

agree with what Secretary Gates and Dr. Brzezinski said in their 

report, that we should engage Iran, and I would also note—as you 

have both read, the 79 recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report, which they also focus on new diplomatic initiatives with Syria 

and Iran. 

We’ll start with you, Ambassador Crocker. 

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Senator Hagel. 

I began my career in Iran, before the Revolution and I have some 

lingering sense of the complexities of that country and civilization. 

Sir, I believe that Iran should be engaged. I think, in the context 

of Iraq, that engagement should focus between Iraq and Iran—I 

think, that’s where the emphasis needs to be. The Iraqi Government has reached out to Tehran and, as you know, the Prime Minister and the President have visited, and there have been senior 

Iranian visitors in Baghdad. We, in no way, oppose this. 

Similarly, Prime Minister Maliki’s initiative to convene a conference of neighbors that would include Iran, I think, is important. 

Iran is a neighbor. Iraq’s largest and longest land border is with 

Iran, that geography doesn’t change. Iran is currently playing a, 

not only unhelpful, but I think a deeply disturbing role in Iraq. We 

would obviously like to see that change. At this juncture, I am not 

persuaded that we, ourselves, could be the agent of that change. 

The Iranians understand us, I think, pretty clearly. Perhaps 

through engagement in a regional context they will take another 

look at what their long-term interests in the region are, and visa-vis Iraq are, and shift course. But, my own view is that this is 

the vector on which we should proceed. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. If I could ask Ambassador Wood to 

respond. 

Thank you, Ambassador Crocker. 

Mr. WOOD. Thank you, Senator Hagel. 

Just very briefly, of course, Iraq and Afghanistan bracket Iran, 

so for both of us, Iran is an important—fundamentally important 

issue. And, in the case of Afghanistan, the United States and Iran 

have a number of interests in common. There are a number of 

areas where we could, profitably, work together if we could begin 

a process of engagement. Iran is strongly counter-drug, for instance. They have one of the highest numbers of heroine addicts in 

the world. And their efforts to fight the heroine trade is extraordinary. 

At the same time, we have to get past the issue of weapons of 

mass destruction, solve it, and we—indeed, if, as some reports are 

indicating—there is some involvement by Iran in providing weapons to people who are shooting at Americans, that becomes an 

enormously complicating factor. 

I completely agree with Ambassador Crocker, and engagement— 

a constructive engagement with Iran would be to everyone’s benefit. But I think the decision lies in Tehran more than it does in 

Washington. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

91 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator Hagel. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just say, I am reticent to support either one of you. Not 

because of your abilities, or your qualifications—I think you’re imminently qualified. But it seems that every time we support one of 

the President’s nominees for one of these critical positions in Iraq 

or Afghanistan, then we hear from the President that—he uses it 

as a criticism for us not supporting his policies. And, as far as I’m 

concerned, if I do end up supporting your candidacies for these 

nominations, it won’t be because I support his policies. And I would 

urge the White House to reconsider that tact, because I think 

they’re going to put some very imminently qualified candidates, 

that would serve the country well, in peril, if that continues to be 

the course under which the administration criticizes those of us 

who vote for their nominees that are qualified, but ultimately is 

used as a criticism, subsequently, for not supporting the President’s policies. 

Having said that, let me ask both of you, when you take your 

oath, who is it to? 

Mr. WOOD. The Constitution. 

Mr. CROCKER. To the Constitution of the United States; to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. WOOD. Exactly, the Constitution. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And that means, being honest and forthright 

when you come before the Senate, is that not true? As part of that 

oath? 

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WOOD. Absolutely. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, because I ask that question, because I 

think we need some honest and straightforward talk, particularly 

from those who are going to be our ambassadors in Iraq, in Afghanistan, because I’m not particularly sure that we’ve always heard 

that. 

Let me ask you, Ambassador Crocker, when you were in Baghdad from May to August in 2003 as the first Director of Governance with the Coalition Provisional Authority, helping to create 

Iraq’s governing council, there was an article in the Washington 

Post which read, ‘‘Crocker has spent the summer of 2003 helping 

to form Iraq’s governing council, left the country, frustrated, at the 

CPA’s reluctance to reach out to the minority Sunnis. 

Is that a correct statement? 

Mr. CROCKER. Not exactly, sir. First, I in no way contributed to 

that article. 

Senator MENENDEZ. It’s not quoting you. I’m asking you whether 

the paraphrasing of the statement, is that correct? 

Mr. CROCKER. It is not correct. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Is the Sunni population adequately represented in the current Iraqi Government? 

Mr. CROCKER. No, sir. I was frustrated by our inability to identify in that period of time, Sunnis that had the leadership stature 

that we could find in the other communities. It was not that anyVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
92 

one prevented me from making that effort. It was, in those initial 

months, the tangle of post-Saddam/Sunni politics—was such that it 

was very, very difficult to identify Sunni leaders of weight and consequence. That I found frustrating. And I still do. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Isn’t it essential for greater Sunni participation, if we’re to have any hope of the type of government with national unity that we hope for? 

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, it is one of a number of essential steps that 

have to be taken. It’s really two things, the Sunnis have to be permitted to play a full role, and they have to be prepared to step forward to do it. And I’m not sure that either is the case right now. 

Senator MENENDEZ. In the same article, it says, ‘‘Even before the 

invasion, he’’—referring to you—‘‘wrote a blunt memo for then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, warning of the uncontrolled sectarian 

and ethnic tensions that would be released by the overthrow of 

Saddam Hussein.’’ Can you tell me about that memo? 

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, what I can say is that as serving as a Foreign 

Service Officer of more than 35 years now, I consider it my obligation to offer the best advice I can to my superiors, to argue my 

points of view, whatever they may be, whatever the issue is. And 

then, once decisions are taken, it is my obligation to support those 

decisions. That would be my answer. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Was the memo appropriately characterized 

by that statement that I read to you? 

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, again, in this period, I put forward a range 

of views. I’d really prefer not to characterize the internal advice 

that I give to my own superiors. Decisions were taken, and I supported those policies. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let me just close by saying, that’s why 

I asked you who your oath is to. We would appreciate the essence 

of your candid advice. And that’s far more helpful than deviating 

from answering the question. And it’s in that context that I hope— 

that if you ultimately achieve these positions, I know you’ve got to 

respond to the administration—but when you’re here before the 

Senate, I hope you’re going to give us some candid advice, not colored by what you feel you have to say because of the administration’s policies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to say, I’m thrilled to support these nominees. I had 

the pleasure of serving as Chairman of the Western Hemisphere 

subcommittee, my first 4 years in office here, and worked closely 

with Ambassador Wood in Colombia. He’s an extraordinary, extraordinary public official who is—gives so much and takes on 

tough assignments. Colombia was very tough. And, I think we’ve 

seen transformation there, I think Uribe’s been a great leader. A 

lot more to be done, but I am deeply impressed with the ability, 

the integrity, the energy that Ambassador Wood brings to the process. 

Ambassador Crocker and I had a chance to be in Pakistan. I was 

in Pakistan when he served there—another tough, tough, tough assignment. And now, moving over to a tougher assignment. And, I 

93 

think the President has really picked among the best and the 

brightest and the most talented to take on what is a challenge. 

Iraq is a challenge. Iraq is a mess. And we’ve got to change 

things. Afghanistan, which when I was in Kabul a couple of years 

ago, it was bustling. Very different from Baghdad, it was bustling. 

And now we see challenges. And so, I want to applaud the President for his leadership and vision in choosing these ambassadors. 

These are some very tough assignments. 

Let me focus on two issues, I do want to follow up from my colleague from Nebraska. Ambassador Crocker, you’ve indicated, and 

I think your quote was that you were, that Iran is playing a deeply 

disturbing role in Iraq. They’re also playing a deeply disturbing 

role in Lebanon, aren’t they? 

Mr. CROCKER. Without question, sir. It’s a role they’ve played 

since 1982. 

Senator COLEMAN. And they’re playing a deeply disturbing role, 

I think, in Gaza, with Hamas? 

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, sir. 

Senator COLEMAN. And our allies, I believe that—one, I believe 

we have to have a realistic assessment of what we get out of discussion with Iran. I think we should be talking to the Iranians, 

particularly in the context of a regional discussion. I don’t think we 

should be negotiating with them, unless they recognize that they 

are playing a deeply disturbing role, and are prepared to change 

that. 

But one of the concerns I have is our allies—the Egyptians, the 

Saudis, the Jordanians—they have a stake in stability in Iraq, 

don’t they? 

Mr. CROCKER. Very much. 

Senator COLEMAN. And is it fair to say that Iran’s involvement 

there is one of the barriers, and one of the challenges we have to 

more fuller engagement from some of our other allies to play the 

kind of role that we need them to play in Iraq? 

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, that’s a very important observation. I’d just 

make two points. First, as I understand it, the reasons put forward 

by some of our Arab friends in the region for not engaging more 

fully with the current Iraqi Government is their concern that it is 

sectarian in nature and in action. Clearly, the Maliki Government 

needs to show the contrary—that it is a government of all of the 

Iraqi people, and that’s why their performance in the security plan 

is going to be so closely watched, and so critical. 

It is also the case, in my view, that if Iraq’s Arab neighbors are 

concerned over Iranian involvement and influence in Iraq, then 

they are far better served by engaging themselves, constructively, 

with the Maliki Government, and with the Iraqi people, being 

present on the scene, and therefore, being a counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq. 

Iranian influence does not lessen if Iraq’s Arab neighbors refrain 

from playing a constructive role. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I would take it, by making that statement here, that that’s the same kind of statement you’re going to 

make in discussions with our allies who have an interest in greater 

stability in the Middle East. They’re not playing the roles that need 

to be played now, and the other side of that is, some of us have 

94 

doubts about Maliki’s ability to do what has to be done. There is 

concern that the ties with Iran are such that, is he willing to step 

forward. And a lot of us are concerned about that. So, I hope that 

what we’re hearing here is what you will be expressing with great 

passion when you’re confirmed. 

Mr. CROCKER. That would be my intention, sir, again to both audiences, the Maliki Government, and Iraq’s Arab neighbors. 

Senator COLEMAN. Ambassador, how important is it that 

Musharraf fulfill a commitment he made to us when we were in 

Pakistan, with Senator Frist, leader at that time, a number of my 

colleagues, he met us, I think it was in uniform, but he said he was 

going to take off the uniform in a couple of years. There’s an election supposed to be taking place, and he made a commitment to 

democratic principles. He talked about the importance of moderation in the Middle East, and he wanted to be a voice for that. How 

important is it for him to fulfill that commitment? To, in fact, move 

from military with a uniform to nonuniform, and have some measure of democracy, in fact. How important is it for civilian Afghanistan for that to occur in Pakistan? 

Mr. WOOD. Senator Coleman, first, thank you very much for your 

kind words with reference to me, and I look forward to continuing 

to work with you. 

Second, I think that the concept of democracy, the concept of civilian democracy, the concept of responsive government, the concept of government that is accountable directly to the voters is a 

central issue, everywhere in the world. And, obviously, we support 

it completely. 

Frankly, regarding a more detailed answer to your question, I’m 

a little reluctant to answer a question about Pakistan, sitting next 

to the sitting Ambassador in Islamabad. So, Ryan, I don’t—— 

Mr. CROCKER. Feel free. [Laughter.] 

Mr. WOOD. I don’t know if you’d like to elaborate on my answer. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. I do hope that both of you have a lot of conversation. Obviously, what happens in Pakistan is critically important to stability in Afghanistan. 

Senator KERRY. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me also take this opportunity to thank both of you for 

your career of service to our country. You have served our country 

with distinction, and we’re proud of your service. And you’re prepared to take on a very challenging assignment. 

I just want to underscore what Senator Menendez said, I think 

it’s extremely important that, in the information that you give to 

us individually, and to our committees, that you be as candid as 

possible. Because it’s important that this country speak with the 

strongest voice possible on foreign policy issues, with the executive 

branch and the legislative branch working as closely as we can together. And, I think you can play a critical role in that regard. 

I’m one of those who believe that in Iraq, the United States did 

not give diplomacy the appropriate attention before using military 

force in Iraq. I mention that because Senator Hagel brought up 

Iran, and Iran has been in the headlines, and I think many of us 

are concerned as to whether the use of force will be an opinion used 

95 

in Iran, prior to exhausting the diplomatic arena. And, that concerns many of us. Iran’s a very—it’s a country of great concern to 

America. It’s a great concern to us for many reasons that have been 

mentioned here today. And it certainly will effect both Afghanistan 

and Iraq, whatever happens in Iran. 

So, I just want to get your view as to the risk that we run? Obviously, we need to deal with Iran’s support for terrorism, its support 

of nuclear weapons program, and we need to engage internationally 

and I agree with Senator Coleman, there are different ways of engaging internationally. It does not—and we have to be very careful 

in the manner in which we use engaging Iran. But, I do think that 

we need to be extremely active on the diplomatic front in that region, and with our allies, as it relates to Iran, and I would like to 

get your views as to the risks that we had in our foreign policy 

judgments as it relates to Iran. 

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, if I could begin. 

Iran is a central issue, there is no question about it, Iraq and Afghanistan, regionally and internationally, as they pursue a nuclear 

weapons program. The President, the Secretary of State, and other 

senior officials, I think, have all been clear—we, in no way, seek 

a military confrontation with Iran on any of these issues. These are 

problems to be solved politically, but it will require a different 

course of action on the part of Iran. 

I think that statements such as you’ve seen in the last couple of 

days where we’ve brought forward the evidence that the government has of the Iranian involvement in supplying weapons and 

munitions that are being used to kill our soldiers, is an important 

part of this process. To make it clear to the Iranians that we know 

what they’re doing, that, in my view, is probably the best way to 

get them to consider the consequences of their actions, and choose 

different courses. 

But again, I would emphasize, I’ve been around the Iran issue 

now for a number of years—it is not the intention of the administration to seek conflict with Iran, it is precisely the opposite. 

Senator CARDIN. Ambassador Wood, if you want to comment 

briefly, I want to ask one more question, so if you could be brief. 

Mr. WOOD. I would only add that in my work in New York at 

our mission before the United Nations, I had the opportunity to 

work with Iranian diplomats. We didn’t agree often, but when we 

agreed we were able to put those agreements into operation for the 

benefit of both countries. 

The question is can—right now, Iran doesn’t seem to want to 

work with us. And, right now, Iran seems to be taking positions in 

some really fundamental areas—weapons of mass destruction, and 

support for—or at least tolerance of support for groups—that are, 

that don’t contribute to stability in a large part of the world, an 

important part of the world. 

So, we have this sad dichotomy on the one hand—we know that 

if we could find a bridge, through acceptable policies in Iran, both 

Iran and the United States could benefit. But, we have this gap in 

the bridge. And the gap in the bridge is on some very fundamental 

things. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin. 

96 

Let me just say to everybody, we’ve got three votes now, coming 

up shortly. So, if we can, I think, stay on this schedule, we ought 

to be able to get every Senator in before we’re under the gun there. 

So, Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank both of you for your service. I know you’re 

extremely qualified, and I look forward to supporting your nomination. I want to thank your families, too, for being here, and for 

what they do. 

I met with General Petraeus, like many of us did individually 

when he was being confirmed, and I think a lot of us look to him 

to be someone who will have the strong leadership and the enterprising ability to actually do the things that need to be done on the 

ground in Iraq. 

But, as I was talking with him, he said, ‘‘Look, you can confirm 

me and I’m important. But the most important person that needs 

to be in Iraq is Ambassador Crocker. He needs to be confirmed, and 

needs to be on the ground there, because what is happening on 

that side of the equation actually, in many ways, is more important 

than what we’re doing militarily.’’ 

So, I have two questions. One is—and one of the things I asked 

General Petraeus was—Are you fully supported by the Administration? Are you getting everything you need? And will you tell us if 

you’re not? Because, I think many of us wonder whether there’s 

somebody here, in Washington, waking up every day, making sure 

that that is the case. 

And I guess my first, my first question to you is, do you feel totally supported and explain to us a little bit the line of communication and who you work with daily, here, to make sure that you 

have the things on the ground there that are most important in 

solving our problems in Iraq. 

Mr. CROCKER. In terms of communications, Senator Corker, I expect I will have direct access to the Secretary of State, to the National Security Advisor, among others, and direct access to the 

President, as necessary. There is no higher priority for this administration. It’s been made clear to me in my consultations within the 

administration that if I am confirmed and go out there, that whatever I see that needs attention, I need to get it back to the the appropriate level, and the phones I call will answer. So, I go out with 

the confidence that I will have the access I need, and as a result 

of that, the support I need. 

Senator CORKER. The action on the ground, and you know, you 

obviously are involved in diplomacy, but obviously there’s tremendous operational aspects to what you’re doing, and rebuilding a 

country there, and I heard you mention about the core leadership 

groups being selected, and that people are being trained, and at the 

end of March many of them will be on the ground. 

One of the things that truly is hard to understand. Unemployment is a huge factor there. One head of household there supports 

13 people in Iraq, so it’s much different than here in America, and 

ultimately, maybe even more important, in some ways. 

But it seems to me the timing—I know that all of us are looking 

for tremendous changes to occur over the next 6 months. And it 

seems to me the timing of what you have to accomplish is going 

97 

to be slower, possibly, than necessary to tie in, the way it ought 

to tie in, to the military action today in Baghdad. I wonder if you 

could respond to that? 

Mr. CROCKER. As I understand the timeline, Senator, none of this 

happens overnight. Not just on the civilian side, but not on the 

military side, either. This notion of a surge, it may almost be a 

misnomer, because it implies something big and immediate—this 

will be phased in over time, as I’m sure you heard when you spoke 

to General Petraeus. And, in terms of effects, I believe it is his 

judgment that it’s going to be in the late—in the mid- to late-summer period—that we’ll see those. So, the clear and the hold part of 

this operation will be phased in and built up over time. We’re just 

not going to have one of those instant moments when you can say, 

‘‘It worked, it’s a great success,’’ or ‘‘It’s an absolute failure.’’ That 

is going to be a judgment based on some period of time. 

I’ll have to make, obviously, my own direct assessments on the 

ground if I’m confirmed by the Senate. But my understanding now 

of the timelines to staff the PRTs, the 10 new PRTs, is that the 

combination of core staff, and then individuals identified in certain 

specialties by DoD, largely from reservists, should enable the PRTs 

to be ready to engage on the ground in the build effort, as soon as 

that ground is, in fact, held. That’s the connection we have to 

make, and clearly, if I’m confirmed, that will be a top priority in 

my discussions with General Petraeus. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. I know the time is up. Thank you, 

sir. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Corker. 

It looks like we’re going to make it, here, so, Senator Casey. 

Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. In the short time we have, to both Ambassadors, 

I want to thank you for being here today. Your extraordinary public service and your valor—people forget that the work that you do 

involves a risk, a personal risk, as well—and we’re grateful. 

In the limited time we have, let me just ask about two questions—I hope—two or three. 

First of all, Ambassador Crocker, I want to direct your attention 

to the President’s plan, which I think is an escalation. Others use 

the term ‘‘surge,’’ but in particular, I’m concerned about—and I 

know you are, and all of America is concerned about—the ability 

of the Iraqi Security Forces to do what they must do. Not just longterm, but especially in these early engagements in the streets and 

the neighborhoods in Baghdad—extraordinarily dangerous circumstances. 

I really have my doubts, based upon the history, but also based 

upon some recent stories. There are several stories in the press— 

two that I am looking at in the New York Times. I know the Washington Post had one. New York Times, January 25 and January 30, 

you’ve seen these. We’ve referred to these before, but ‘‘the air of a 

class outing, cheering and laughing’’—these are Iraqi forces—showing up late, not doing the job. The American forces having to do 

a lot more than they have to do. When we use the term ‘‘embedded 

forces,’’ that sounds good until you see the reality of these articles. 

So, I don’t want to dwell on the details of this, but it’s clear from 

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ficult for the Iraqi Security Forces to do what they must do, which 

undergirds this strategy. 

And, I’d ask you in the context of your work, but also in the context of what I see in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania is now at the 150- 

mark. Third highest death toll in terms of soldiers who have perished in Iraq. I just want to ask you about your assessment of that, 

currently. The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to do what they 

must do in this new engagement. 

Mr. CROCKER. Sir, you’re absolutely right to put the emphasis 

where you have, that was the point I was trying to make earlier 

in saying that we are transitioning. This is now a period in which 

the Iraqis carry the main effort. And that is as true in security as 

it is anywhere else. 

There’s a lot of discussion of benchmarks, and I think there are 

some very important benchmarks out there, along the lines you 

just described. First, will the Iraqi forces show up for the engagement in the time and in the numbers that they’re committed to? 

Second, will they perform professionally and evenhandedly, going 

after perpetrators of violence, regardless of their political or sectarian affiliation? These are going to be very key tests that they 

are going to have to meet and pass. 

The command structure that I understand they’ve established, I 

find encouraging. The Lieutenant General in overall command, who 

enjoys a good professional reputation, happens to be a Shia. His 

two deputies—to Major Generals, one police, one regular army—are 

both Sunnis. So, it looks to me like they’re putting the right kind 

of balanced command structure in place that would indicate that, 

at least they understand some of the problems in the past, and are 

prepared to meet them. 

But, ultimately, it will be what happens on the ground. 

Senator CASEY. Well, I urge you—and I know you will do this 

anyway, but I think it’s important to repeat it—to hold our government accountable for enforcing the kind of discipline and the kind 

of benchmarking, and any other measuring tool that we use to 

make sure Iraqi Security Forces are doing what they must do, 

promptly. 

I know I have, maybe, another minute, but for both Ambassadors, because you both, obviously, play a role in the past and the 

future of this. The relationship between General Musharraf and 

Mr. Karzai, in terms of where that relationship is now, and especially in the context of President Bush bringing them together in 

September of 2006. Where is it, is it a positive relationship, or has 

it deteriorated? What can you tell us about that? 

Mr. WOOD. In the meeting with the tri-apartheid supper with 

President Bush, plans were made for a jirga, an assembly of some 

nature, between Afghan and Pakistan leaders. It was hoped that 

that gathering could be held—would have already been held—it is 

still very much on the agenda, and we’re hoping, we’re hoping to 

see the two sides come together in a matter of months, to exchange 

their own views. 

Going beyond that, I think that the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a complicated one. Both sides are contributing to help the—each is helping the other—each often wonders 

if the other could be doing more. I think that, I think that this is 

99 

a process that will continue, I think it will get better. I can only 

say that it would be my intention to continue the practice of Ambassador Crocker and, if confirmed, my predecessor, Ambassador 

Newman to maintain absolutely seamless communication between 

Embassy Kabul and Embassy Islamabad. So, that we can work together to help President Karzai and President Musharraf work together. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Casey. 

Just a really quick question as we wrap up here—and we are 

going to wrap up—sometimes the Senate stands in the way of 

progress. Today it’s somehow facilitating this hearing and liberating you people early, letting you off the hook. 

I’m going to leave the record open for a week, since we’re out of 

session, and that way it won’t interrupt our ability to be able to 

expedite these nominations, which we want to do, but it will also 

allow for any questions of any colleagues who want to follow up in 

writing during that period of time. 

In addition, let me just ask you, as a matter for the record—do 

either of you have any conflicts of interest, or issues from which 

you might have to recuse yourself, with respect to the performance 

of your responsibilities? 

Ambassador Crocker. 

Mr. CROCKER. I do not, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Wood. 

Mr. WOOD. I have none, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Okay. 

And another quick question. Is the criticism of the Afghanis of 

President Karzai—both of you might comment on this, since you’re 

currently there—is it legitimate with respect to the harboring of 

Taliban fighters within Pakistan, and also, obviously, the question 

that looms large to every American, is the al-Qaeda refuge? Do you 

want to both comment on that? 

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, sir, if I could start. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, Pakistan has been in this fight 

since right after 9/11. They have lost hundreds of their soldiers, a 

number of their civilian officials, many progovernment tribal leaders in that tribal belt engaged against both al-Qaeda and a resurgent Taliban. So, in my judgment, their commitment is not in question on this. 

The challenge they face, and President Musharraf has acknowledged this, is one of capacity. For example, there are several million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, many of them concentrated in 

large refugee camps, over which the Pakistani Government has no 

control, and in some cases, not even access. So, their ability in 

some cases, particularly against the Taliban, I think, is limited. 

But, I’ve worked with him for over 2 years, closely on these 

issues. I believe President Musharraf is firmly committed to this 

fight. 

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Wood. 

Mr. WOOD. Senator, only to echo what Ambassador Crocker said. 

Certainly my briefings here in Washington indicate that there is 

no intention, no policy of the Government of Pakistan to tolerate 

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a Taliban presence, to lend support to Taliban or other terrorist 

groups in that region. 

Pakistan also faces an insurgency in Balukistan, which Pakistan 

has also not been able to resolve, physically. So, there is a parallel 

example, not related to the Taliban, and not related to Afghanistan, of the lack of capacity of Pakistan to deal directly and conclusively with the problem. But we don’t think it’s a question of will. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Just for the record, I think it was the hope 

that we could move these nominations forward, perhaps voice vote 

them today, so that they could be on the ground very quickly. 

Does your keeping the record open preclude that? In other 

words—? 

Senator KERRY. Well, it would if we were going to do that. I was 

not aware that Senator Biden was planning to do that. If he is, obviously, we don’t want to interrupt that. 

I’m correct, it’s going to happen at the next business meeting. So, 

it’ll be the issue of, I think, the 1 week, since we’re not here. So, 

it’ll have to be the next business meeting. 

In that case, obviously, unless Senator Biden changes—I think 

these are the last votes coming up—and so I don’t think it’s going 

to be possible for us to have a quorum between now and then, 

which is why I left that open. But I’d make that contingent on— 

if there were to be a business meeting to be able to be scheduled— 

then the record will not stay open that period of time. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. I appreciate your calling it to our attention. 

Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. You’ve heard praise from 

everybody here, for obvious reasons. We’re confident you will be 

confirmed, overwhelmingly, as rapidly as possible, and we look forward to getting you out there. 

And again, we want to thank your families. This is not easy on 

anybody, we understand that, and we’re very grateful to everybody 

for being willing to take this on. 

Thank you, we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM B. WOOD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Since the 1947 partition of India, Pakistani and Afghan relations have 

been at odds about India’s activities in Afghanistan. According to the World Food 

Program, the Government of Pakistan prohibits the transit of Indian aid bound for 

Afghanistan. 

(A) What role do you see India playing in Afghanistan, as well as what role does 

it play in the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan? 

(B) To what degree is a broader regional diplomatic approach necessary to sustainable stability and development in Afghanistan? 

(C) How will you and your staff engage with the United States embassy in India? 

(D) What other international institutions working in Afghanistan recognize and 

address India’s role in the region? 

Answer. (A) I understand that India has played a constructive role in Afghanistan 

and is considering expanding its activities there. There are four Indian consulates 

in Afghanistan plus an embassy in Kabul. It is the eighth largest donor overall and 

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does important infrastructure work, mainly in roads and power. The Indians are 

also considering assistance to help provide training to Afghan bureaucrats. Three 

Indians have been killed while working on reconstruction projects. In addition, last 

November, India hosted the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghan 

Reconstruction. Both India and Afghanistan consider their relationship to be a close 

and important one. 

The Afghan-Indian relationship does cause tension in the region. The Indians are 

frustrated by Pakistan’s refusal to allow direct overland transit from India across 

Pakistan and into Afghanistan. The Pakistanis express concerns over Indian’s growing presence in Afghanistan. 

(B) The United States is pursuing a broad regional approach in Central and South 

Asia that will bind the two regions together and help secure Afghanistan’s future. 

The objective is to link energy-rich Central Asia with energy-poor South Asia via 

an Afghan ‘‘land bridge’’ that will encourage stability and promote economic development. 

(C) The staff of Embassy Kabul cooperates closely with our colleagues in New 

Delhi over the variety of issues important to United States’ interests as they relate 

to Afghanistan and India. If confirmed, I will participate fully in this dialog. 

(D) A variety of international organizations, including the U.N. and NATO, recognizes India’s work in Afghanistan, and work with India to achieve their common 

goals. 

Question. Afghanistan’s Governments have never recognized the Durand Line between the two countries as an international border and have made claims on areas 

in the Pashtun and Baluch regions of Pakistan. 

Is the issue of the Durand Line an important element of the current Afghan-Pakistan tension? 

Answer. The Durand Line continues to be an unresolved issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The status of the line is not an active issue and neither the Pakistani nor Afghan Governments is pressing for it to be resolved immediately. 

Question. Afghanistan has long been considered a ‘‘buffer’’ state to its neighbors 

who have manipulated politics, commerce, and governance. With the demise of the 

Soviet Union, the Central Asia nations have exerted more influence, although not 

always independently, as has China. 

What significant, positive and negative activities and roles have China, 

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran each taken in regard to Afghan stabilization and reconstruction from the United States’ perspective? 

Answer. Regional stability, counterterrorism, energy security, trade and economic 

growth, and antinarcotics production and trafficking are common themes in Afghanistan’s relationship with China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and 

Iran, and in this regard these countries have more of a stake in each other’s prosperity than at any other time in history. All five of these regional neighbors have 

participated in the two Regional Economic Cooperation Conferences on Afghanistan, 

the first held in Kabul in December 2005 and the second in New Delhi in November 

2006. 

The Afghan Government is in the process of negotiating bilateral power purchase 

agreements with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as part of Afghanistan’s 

Northern Electrical Power System (NEPS) project, which aims to bring reliable, 

unimpeded power to Kabul by 2009. Each country involved clearly recognizes the 

economic benefits that will come from cooperation. We remain confident in the ultimate success of this initiative. 

Tajikistan and Afghanistan have a particularly strong bilateral relationship. A 

United States-funded bridge between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, due to be completed in summer 2007, will revitalize regional trade routes and serve as a symbol 

of positive change. 

Iran and Afghanistan share antinarcotic and border security objectives, and near 

Herat, Afghanistan’s largest western city, Iran has built multilane highways and 

provided uninterrupted electricity. Iran has invested over $300 million in Afghanistan over the past 5 years. There are concerns, however, over the influence of Iranian economic assistance in certain parts of the country. We need to remain vigilant 

about Iranian activities in Afghanistan. 

China has also played a low-key role in Afghanistan. Since 2001, China has 

pledged $210 million in bilateral assistance for development projects, although we 

understand that very little has actually been distributed due to security concerns. 

China shares our concerns about cross-border extremism, narcotics production and 

trafficking, and the destabilization that Taliban-style radicalism could produce in 

Central Asia, including in nearby regions of China. China has sponsored the ShangVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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hai Cooperation Organization, which is a regional grouping designed to enhance political and economic cooperation. 

Question. A significant amount of information from a variety of sources indicates 

that continued instability in Afghanistan, especially in the south and east, is due 

to the unconstrained flow of persons and resources across the Afghan-Pakistan border, thus fueling insurgent efforts to destabilize Afghanistan’s Government. 

How will you and your entire embassy engage with Ambassador Crocker, until he 

departs, and our United States mission in Islamabad to moderate the negative influences across that border and encourage mutual support? 

Answer. The staff at the United States embassy in Kabul is in frequent contact 

with its counterparts at the United States embassy in Islamabad. I intend to continue that close cooperation, including through regular informal exchanges of views, 

frequent visits, and occasional joint calls on our host governments. I will work with 

Ambassador Crocker and his successor to ensure that our messages to senior officials in the Pakistani and Afghan Governments and to our allies in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force are mutually reinforcing. In the past, Embassies 

Kabul and Islamabad have periodically sent groups of their staff to the other capital 

in order to meet with their embassy counterparts, as well as with host government 

officials. If confirmed, I will seek to continue this practice. 

Question. You have specifically highlighted the importance of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams across the country as a critical link for the central government, 

and that you intend to concentrate on their activities. It appears that significant resources have been shifted from the north and west to the highly volatile south and 

east. Though these resources are necessary in the south and east, the rationale to 

reduce resources elsewhere that are prone to following the same path of increasing 

violence and instability appears misguided. 

(A) Are resources being reduced in the still volatile western and northern regions? 

(B) How will you ensure that neglect does not precipitate a target for those being 

squeezed out of the south and east, as the poppy production has so easily done? 

(C) To what degree have NATO nations backed up their call for increased reconstruction funds to accompany their security efforts since taking over security responsibility in November at International Security Assistance Force? 

Answer. (A–B) I am committed to protecting the gains made throughout Afghanistan since 2001, particularly in the north and west. There has not been a significant 

shift of resources from the north and west to the south and east. Rather, we are 

adding resources—and asking allies to do the same—in the areas where they are 

most needed to accomplish our mission. 

The increase of 3,500 United States troops in eastern Afghanistan, announced on 

February 9, will not reduce forces and engagement elsewhere in Afghanistan. Together with our allies, we will continue to ensure that the necessary capabilities and 

resources are allocated to accomplish our mission throughout all of Afghanistan. 

Nor are we reducing our commitment to Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the 

north and west as a result of our efforts to augment efforts in the south and east. 

Sweden and NATO allies, Norway and Hungary, stepped in to lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the north and west when the British and Dutch moved assets 

from northern Provincial Reconstruction Teams to the more volatile south in 2005 

and 2006. Thanks to this coordination among NATO allies, there has been no reduction of Provincial Reconstruction Team presence in the north and west. 

(C) The international community—including NATO allies who took responsibility 

for security throughout Afghanistan in October 2006—has shown commitment and 

staying power in Afghanistan, both in security and development. Since 2001, NATO 

allies and others in the international community have made multiyear reconstruction and security assistance pledges to Afghanistan totaling over $31.8 billion 

(through 2013), more than enough to cover all recurrent budgetary expenditures and 

put the country well on its way to meeting the 5-year operating (recurrent and development) target of $20 billion established in the 5-year (2006–2011) Afghan National Development Strategy. 

Question. Significant United States resources have been expended in concert with 

the international community since 2001 in removing the Taliban government, dispersing al-Qaeda, establishing an elected government, stabilizing, and helping to rebuild Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan has continued to call for the use 

of a common fund for reconstruction and development that is administered by the 

Afghan Government in order to empower its ministries and reduce competition for 

human and financial resources. 

(A) Describe how United States funds flow to projects in Afghanistan, bilateral 

and multilateral assistance. Show these flows for the last 2 years. 

103 

(B) Why are the funds provided in this way and what is U.S. policy regarding the 

common international funding vehicle? 

Answer. (A) I am committed to effective, efficient, and timely implementation of 

all United States and multilateral assistance in Afghanistan. Total United States 

assistance to Afghanistan stands at over $14.2 billion from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal 

year 2007. This assistance cuts across U.S. Federal agencies, with roughly 65 percent coming from the Department of Defense, 30 percent coming from the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, and another 5 percent coming from other Departments (Justice, Treasury, etc.). In fiscal year 2006, 

total United States security and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan exceeded 

$3.3 billion, and in fiscal year 2007 stands at over $2.7 billion. In February, the administration requested an additional $6.9 billion (combined Department of Defense 

and Department of State) in assistance for Afghanistan through a fiscal year 2007 

supplemental. 

Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development funds—constituting roughly 30 percent of all United States aid to Afghanistan—are implemented through a variety of mechanisms, including procurement contracts, grants 

to nongovernmental organizations, technical assistance to the Afghan Government, 

and several U.N. and World Bank-administered programs and trust funds (Afghan 

Reconstruction Trust Fund, Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan, CounterNarcotics Trust Fund, and the National Solidarity Program). If confirmed, one of my 

first tasks will be to review implementation mechanisms for our projects, and coordination with other bilateral and multilateral donors. 

(B) Increasing aid effectiveness was a major theme at the 2006 London Conference and figures prominently in the Afghanistan Compact adopted by over 60 nations. The Afghan Government asked that donors channel foreign assistance directly 

through it, both to strengthen the role of the government and to provide cost-effective and efficient means of disbursing aid. 

Assistance covers a wide spectrum—including institutional reform, policy formulation, human resources management, budgetary preparation and execution, technical 

expertise, procurement, and other topics. USAID is also performing assessments of 

line ministries—through the 5-year, over $200 million Afghans Building Capacity 

program (ABC) to identify where there are gaps in the ability to execute procurements, manage budgets, and provide effective oversight (internal and external to the 

ministry)—key elements required for the Government of Afghanistan to be able to 

more effectively execute projects on behalf of the people. The program will also provide technical assistance to the ministries to help build their capacity. 

I am committed to increasing the Afghan Government’s ability to efficiently disburse donor assistance, build its physical infrastructure, and develop institutional 

safeguards against corruption. 

In the meantime, we have augmented our long-term capacity-building efforts with 

contributions totaling over $500 million to the various international funding vehicles 

that channel assistance directly through the Afghan Government. The United States 

is the largest contributor to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, and 

is the second largest contributor to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. We 

have also made significant contributions to the National Solidarity Program and 

Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund. 

Question. Nongovernmental organizations have played a significant role in Afghanistan since well before the Taliban arrived. 

What will your priorities be with regard to working with the nongovernmental organization community? 

Where do you see the nongovernmental organization community in the larger picture of aid to Afghanistan? 

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to establish a close dialog with nongovernmental 

organizations on human rights including women’s rights, humanitarian issues, and 

the host of social and technical issues in which they are active. Nongovernmental 

organizations play a vital role in helping Afghanistan recover from the post-conflict 

devastation brought on by three decades of war and violence. Many of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development assistance programs in 

Afghanistan are channeled through United States and Afghan nongovernmental organizations who are working on the front lines of reconstruction. 

Nongovernmental organizations work in all 34 Afghan provinces and help us 

reach remote corners of the country where our assistance would otherwise be limited. In addition, some organizations have longstanding ties to Afghanistan, providing a critical history of trust in a society that strongly values enduring relationships. 

104 

Nongovernmental organizations are also helping local communities strengthen 

their capacity and move beyond the traumatic Taliban period by emphasizing women’s empowerment. Over 50 percent of United States funds provided to local Afghan 

nongovernmental organizations are either women-led or provide services that directly assist women and girls. 

I will continue to coordinate closely with nongovernmental organizations as a priority partner in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. 

Question. The current supplemental request of $8.6 billion contains a sizable portion for security sector reform, including a portion for the fourth attempt at police 

training in Afghanistan. In the November 2006 Inspectors General Report for the 

Department of State and the Department of Defense entitled ‘‘Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness,’’ Appendix J—a letter from 

Commander CENTCOM—indicated their concern that State did not appreciate their 

‘‘legal and official role’’ as the official lead for police train and equip. This ambiguity 

raises concern over effective oversight and management of the program. 

(A) What is the State Department’s response to the report and what has State 

done to ensure the recommendations made have been implemented or considered for 

implementation? 

(B) What recommendations have been adopted by State and other actors in the 

program? 

(C) How will you ensure the State Department maintains its proper role in police 

training and equipping and assure full and effective oversight and policy guidance? 

(D) What measures of effectiveness will be used in this new effort to train police 

to ensure that reconstruction resources are having more than just a superficial effect? 

(E) How will this program be monitored to ensure that the policy of building a 

security sector capacity is more than just a spreadsheet calculation of output and 

rather a true measure of its effectiveness in meeting Afghans expectations and its 

institutional responsibilities? 

Answer. (A) The State Department is pleased with the conclusion of the Inspector 

General Report that the Afghanistan Police Program is a well-executed program. 

State also agrees with the report’s assessment of the challenges involved in effecting 

reform in an insecure environment. 

All of the recommendations made by the report have either already been carried 

out or are in the process of being implemented. State has already increased the 

strength of the mentor program by more than 50 percent from 252 mentors at the 

time the report was drafted, to nearly 400 field mentors, 40 executive and professional mentors, and 80 training advisors present in Afghanistan today. We also continue to work with our international partners to encourage additional contributions 

and coordinate accordingly, particularly as the European Union (EU) works to develop and implement plans for an upcoming EU mission to Afghanistan. The EU 

anticipates providing up to 160 police advisors who will complement existing mentoring and reform efforts undertaken by Germany and the United States. 

State has also created and filled a permanent Contracting Officer Representative 

position at Embassy Kabul and provided copies of the relevant contracting documents to both the embassy and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A, the military organization responsible for oversight of security assistance programs in Afghanistan). State is also working with CSTC–A and Embassy 

Kabul to draft the strategic documents recommended in the report and has already 

begun implementing the first phase of a regionally based joint justice/police integration project to address the need identified by the report for linkages between the 

two sectors. 

(B) Please see previous answer. 

(C) State fully appreciates its leadership role in implementation of the Afghan Police Program and continues to work closely with Defense, Embassy Kabul, and 

CSTC–A to ensure that all elements of execution of this critical program are well 

coordinated, executed, and properly monitored. In addition to the contracting personnel mentioned above, State also has dedicated teams of expert police advisors 

embedded within Embassy Kabul and within CSTC–A to provide oversight for all 

elements of the program for which State has responsibility. 

The CENTCOM letter referenced in the question (Appendix J) states only that the 

report ‘‘should be closely reviewed and amended to ensure that it accurately states 

the legal and official responsibilities and authorities related to the police train and 

equip mission,’’ articulating a concern that the report be fully accurate in its description of the roles and responsibilities of each implementer—something both Defense and State had highlighted as a concern. 

105 

(D) Departments of State and Defense work closely together to ensure we are 

monitoring the program effectively using appropriate metrics. While we continue to 

monitor the number of police trained and deployed, we also work with CSTC–A to 

assess the capability of Afghan police, unit by unit, to assume responsibility for the 

internal security of Afghanistan. Such monitoring is accomplished through use of 

the field mentors who report regularly on the qualitative progress of the ANP they 

mentor. 

(E) Please see previous answer. 

Question. International observers and human rights defenders note serious discrepancies between the Afghan Government’s declared support for international 

human rights standards and the activities of Afghan officials at the provincial and 

district levels. 

How would you characterize those observations? 

If confirmed, what initiatives would you undertake to help Afghanistan’s Government better promote and protect human rights in all regions of the country? 

Answer. Although Afghanistan has made important human rights progress since 

the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan’s human rights record remains poor. 

This is mainly due to weak central institutions, a deadly insurgency, and an ongoing 

recovery from 21⁄2 decades of war. 

In its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Afghanistan, the 

United States Department of State documented numerous cases of arbitrary arrests 

and detention, extrajudicial killings, torture, and poor prison conditions. Prolonged 

detention, often due to a severe lack of resources and pervasive corruption in the 

judicial system, is a serious problem. There are also cases of official impunity and 

abuse of authority by local leaders. 

Afghans also frequently turn to the informal justice system, which does not always protect human rights principles. As reported in the U.S. Department of State’s 

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, freedom of religion, although 

provided for by the national constitution, is restricted in practice. 

Afghanistan has, however, made historic progress toward democracy and the protection of human rights since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The new Afghan Constitution includes broad human rights protections for all Afghans and recognition 

of Afghanistan’s international human rights obligations. In accordance with the 

2002 Bonn Agreement, the government established the Afghan Independent Human 

Rights Commission, which now has nine regional offices throughout the country, has 

resolved numerous complaints of human rights violations, and closely monitors the 

overall human rights situation, as well as individual cases. 

In the January 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the Government of Afghanistan committed to: Strengthen its capacity to comply with and report on its human rights 

treaty obligations; adopt corrective measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion, and illegal expropriation of property; strengthen freedom of expression, including freedom 

of media; include human rights awareness in education curricula; promote human 

rights awareness among legislators, judicial personnel and other government agencies, communities, and the public; monitor human rights through the government 

and independently by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; and support the commission in the fulfillment of its objectives with regard to monitoring, 

investigation, protection, and promotion of human rights by end-2010. 

The Government of Afghanistan also committed in the Afghanistan Compact to 

implement the Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice Action plan by end-2008. This 

transitional justice plan identified five areas for action, including strengthening the 

credibility and accountability of state institutions. 

If confirmed, I will press the Afghan authorities, at all levels, on these issues and 

emphasize that good governance, respect for human rights including women’s rights, 

and the rule of law are essential. Together with our allies and partners, and the 

United Nations, I will also encourage initiatives that consolidate a stronger sense 

among all Afghans that they have a stake in building a democratic government that 

respects human rights. 

Question. The Karzai government has included known warlords and other individuals suspected of criminal activities in its administration. This risks a further loss 

of credibility for the new Government of Afghanistan and an inability to hold government officials accountable or effectively pursue the rule of law in general. 

How is the United States dealing with such appointments? Is the administration 

(U.S.) looking into this issue? 

What steps is it considering to try to address the negative impact this is having 

on the rule of law? 

106 

Answer. The United States is watching closely the historic transition of Afghanistan from civil war and a legacy of severe human rights abuse toward democracy 

and the protection of human rights. We support the Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice; the reconciliation of insurgents through the Program Takhim-eSoh (PTS); the work of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; and reform and strengthening of the judicial system. 

Specifically, we strongly encourage the Afghan Government’s implementation of 

the 3-year Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice, adopted in December 

2005 and launched by President Karzai on December 10, 2006. The plan has five 

key elements: Acknowledging of the suffering of the Afghan people; strengthening 

the credibility and accountability of state institutions; establishing the truth about 

atrocities committed between the Revolution in April 1978 and the fall of the 

Taliban in late 2001; promoting reconciliation; and establishing a proper accountability mechanism to investigate and prosecute individuals who committed war 

crimes and other egregious human rights abuses. All five components are important. 

We also encourage a determined fight against corruption inside the Afghan Government. In 2006, President Karzai appointed an Attorney General and a Chief Justice who are focusing intensely on corruption. The Afghan Government has also 

taken a number of steps against corrupt governors and officials, and several governors have been removed over the past 12 months. Additionally, the Afghan Government initiated rank and pay reform to remove police officers involved in human 

rights violations and high-level corruption. The reform resulted in the removal of 

more than 70 senior-level officers. International support for recruiting and training 

of new Afghan National Police is also conditional upon new officers being vetted in 

a manner consistent with international human rights standards. We will make sure 

that these policies are continued and fully implemented. 

RESPONSES OF RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. You may remember our meeting during June 2003, on my trip to Baghdad, where we sat in a poorly lit, somewhat air-conditioned conference room meeting 

with three clerics, a Sunni, a Shiite, and a Christian who waxed at length about 

their vision for Iraq and how it was under Saddam. Some have suggested the winner-take-all sectarian nature to Iraqi affairs occurred much later, or was created by 

the United States’ unseating of Saddam. What is your view? 

Answer. The majority of Iraqis still express gratitude for their liberation from 

Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regime. Circumstances afterwards, however, have undermined the conditions necessary to provide Iraqis with the security and stability 

they deserve. Since 2003, the combination of insurgent and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)- 

led attacks on Iraqi civilians, often based on their sectarian affiliation, has led to 

increased tension between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia populations. The most damaging 

was an attack on one of the most holy Islamic Shia sites, Al-Askariya Mosque, in 

February 2006. As a result, sectarian tensions burst into the open. 

The Government of Iraq is currently committed to a new Baghdad Security Plan 

that is focused on quelling sectarian violence and protecting the population. A key 

component of this strategy is Prime Minister Maliki’s commitment to pursuing all 

perpetrators of violence regardless of their sect or party affiliation. We are supporting the Government of Iraq in these efforts. 

Question. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) mentioned a ‘‘bottom up approach’’ could help reverse the negative trends. Would you care to comment? 

Answer. The NIE defined a ‘‘bottom-up approach’’ to reversing negative trends in 

Iraq as one which promotes neighborhood watch groups and establishment of grievance committees. It is certainly true that any mechanism that empowers ordinary 

citizens to solve their problems according to a rule of law process, vice the force of 

violence, is a step in the right direction as part of a larger process of national reconciliation. 

We believe that a coordinated set of actions at both the national and local level 

need to proceed simultaneously to help reverse the negative trends the NIE identified. At the local level, Provincial Reconstruction Teams are charged with strengthening moderates, marginalizing extremists, and otherwise empowering local governments to deliver goods and services to an electorate that will hold them accountable. 

This is one way in which we are implementing a bottom-up approach. Much of 

the efforts to empower local Iraqis to solve their problems will have to be implemented by the Iraqis themselves. A new provincial powers law is being debated in 

the Council of Representatives, which will help, though the task of implanting it 

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will be a challenge. A host of reconciliation initiatives have been proposed. The process of mending frayed relationships will be one of which Iraqis will need to work 

for many years to come. 

Question. I am hopeful Congress will begin meaningful debate soon on 2007 Supplemental Appropriations, which you will need to execute your mission. It has some 

$824 million to operate the embassy and PRT’s and another $966 million for economic support programs, rule of law, democracy, migration and refugee assistance, 

and USAID operating expenses. Will this be sufficient to leverage the Iraqis to action on their budget execution? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request level of $2.34 billion is critical 

to building Iraqi self-reliance and to expanding our current efforts to improve the 

institutional capacity of key Iraqi ministries to address the needs of the Iraqi people. We will focus on developing the Iraqi Government’s critical management capabilities, such as budget formulation and execution, which will improve services and 

enhance the governance capacity of Iraq’s executive branch. With these funds, 

project management units will be established to help Iraqi ministries execute their 

budgets. Iraq has signaled its intent to improve its capital budget spending in 2007 

by including a provision in the budget law passed by parliament that permits the 

Ministries of Finance and Planning and Development Cooperation to transfer capital investment funds from those ministries and provincial governments failing to 

spend 25 percent of their capital budgets by the midpoint of the fiscal year to ministries with better prospects for executing projects with those funds. 

This funding will also expand the presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs). One of the main missions of PRT’s is to work with local governments to improve their capacity, including their ability to design programs and request money 

from the central government. We are encouraged that the 2007 Iraqi budget includes over $2 billion for regional governments. 

On January 10, the Secretary named Ambassador Tim Carney as the Coordinator 

for Economic Transition in Iraq. Ambassador Carney, who is based in Baghdad, reports directly to the ambassador and will work closely with Iraqi officials to ensure 

that Iraq’s considerable resources are brought to bear on the task of rebuilding Iraq. 

One of the issues he will focus on is helping the Iraqis better execute their budgets, 

particularly on capital spending for investments to improve essential services and 

promote economic development. 

USAID operating expenses are not included in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental 

request, but have been included in the fiscal year 2008 GWOT Costs request. 

Question. To what extent can private sector solutions be expanded effectively in 

Iraq? How can we structure our assistance to improve that effort? 

Answer. Private sector solutions can and should be expanded effectively in Iraq. 

Iraq has a tradition of over 4,000 thousand years of entrepreneurship and commerce. Today, private sector-led growth could energize the Iraqi economy. This is 

especially true for such critical sectors as banking and microfinance, which could 

meet an enormous pent-up demand for credit, an economic force multiplier. 

We have worked hard to support private-sector solutions in Iraq. Under the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), we have supported a program to expand 

microfinance institutions to provide small- and medium-sized companies with the 

capital they would not otherwise be able to borrow. The goal of these programs is 

to help establish these institutions, which will then serve as models for other Iraqi 

institutions, including commercial banks, to emulate. To date, USG support has enabled six microcredit institutions to extend over 29,000 loans. We are also providing 

technical assistance programs to help Iraq enact the kinds of laws and regulations 

that will make it easier to register companies, conduct trade, and access credit. We 

have requested funds under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental to continue these activities until Iraqi institutions can fill this void. 

It is also worth noting that DoD’s effort to restart idle State Owned Enterprises 

(SOEs) and other manufacturing entities in Iraq has privatization as a long-term 

goal. 

Question. Are our policies encouraging Iraqi Government officials to continue to 

reduce subsidies, reduce the public distribution system to a means tested entitlement for the poorest Iraqis, and provide the commercial legal framework to stimulate not only agriculture, but canning and other agribusiness? 

Answer. As part of Iraq’s Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the GoI has 

agreed to phase out the PDS and replace it with a targeted, means-tested system 

to protect Iraq’s most vulnerable citizens. We support GoI’s efforts to phase out the 

PDS and have provided the GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the 

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tion and Management Office (IRMO) has an officer at the Ministry of Trade who 

monitors the PDS to make sure that food is getting to the various parts of Iraq. 

Also, the United States Department of Agriculture has an officer in Iraq who monitors food imports, including for the PDS. 

In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule stating that 

anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a new location as long as they 

had their ration card. However, there are reports that the pre-2003 practice of deregistering at one’s former food distribution point and registering at the food distribution point in one’s new neighborhood is now being reinstituted. It is not certain 

that the GoI is redirecting food from areas with net population losses to areas with 

net population gains to ensure adequate supplies. 

Question. The international community is gearing up to help with the refugee and 

IDP population, but what is the Iraqi Government doing? 

Answer. The response to the IDP situation within the Government of Iraq rests 

on the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM). The ministry, which was 

created in 2003, has branches in each of the Iraqi provinces, except the three Kurdish provinces. MODM periodically distributes food and nonfood items and collects 

data on the number of displaced persons. 

For a third consecutive year, the U.S. Government has funded a capacity building 

program to train MODM staff and assist it to develop its mandate, operating procedures and policies, and its coordinating role with nongovernmental organizations assisting IDPs. The Iraqi Government, United States Government, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations’ focal point for 

refugees and IDPs, will continue to work with MODM to strengthen its capacity to 

coordinate assistance to IDPs and refugees. 

UNHCR is increasing its staff in the region to help with the increased numbers 

of IDPs and refugees. 

The Ministry of Trade provides all Iraqis, including IDPs, monthly food rations. 

The Ministry of Social Affairs provides rent subsidies to a small percentage of IDPs 

(around 10 percent). 

Question. Who in the embassy will you charge with the refugee and IDP issue? 

What is the military role in this matter? 

Answer. We have a political officer designated as the Refugee Coordinator at our 

embassy in Iraq. The Refugee Coordinator works closely with counterparts at the 

State Department, particularly those in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 

Migration and USAID/OFDA, as well as with counterparts at United States embassies in the region, such as Amman and Damascus. The Refugee Coordinator also 

works with the Multi-National Force in Iraq to address protection issues relating 

to Iraqi IDPs and refugees. I would refer you to the Department of Defense for more 

specific information on the role of the military in this matter. 

Question. The old oil-for-food food ration system is still in place—but I understand 

that Iraqis cannot access it if they have fled from their homes. Can we help the 

Iraqis construct a more flexible distribution to help feed IDPs? 

Answer. To date, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi internally displaced persons 

(IDPs) have sought shelter with host families. United States Government agencies 

are actively providing protection and assistance to IDPs and their host communities 

in Iraq, including distribution of food and other necessities. With additional resources, including funds in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, we will expand our assistance program activities to reach more IDPs and host communities. 

Since fiscal year 2003, the Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has contributed more than $194 million to provide 

humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in Iraq. In fiscal year 2006, 

OFDA’s program assisted 175,000 IDPs. In fiscal year 2007, OFDA plans to increase 

the number of beneficiaries to 300,000. 

OFDA’s partner organizations fund rapid response mobile teams and provide 

emergency food assistance and relief commodities, including winterization supplies. 

OFDA’s partners are also improving IDPs’ access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities, supporting small-scale community infrastructure, and 

providing water by tanker truck where necessary. In addition, they oversee livelihood programs providing income generation and cash-for-work opportunities, as well 

as vocational training. 

In addition, the State Department, in partnership with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, provides substantial relief to IDPs in Iraq, including supplying food and household items to 

50,000 vulnerable families. 

109 

Neither the United States Government nor other entities directly advise the Government of Iraq (GoI) on the Public Distribution System (PDS). As part of Iraq’s 

Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the GoI has agreed to phase out the 

PDS and replace it with a targeted, means-tested system to protect Iraq’s most vulnerable citizens. We support the GoI’s efforts to phase out the PDS. We have provided the GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and recommendations for how to eliminate this system. 

In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule stating that 

anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a new location as long as they 

had their ration card. However, there are reports that the pre-2003 practice of requiring Iraqis to de-register at their former food distribution point and re-register 

at the food distribution point in their new neighborhood is now being reinstituted. 

Question. How much does it cost to train an Arabic speaker to 3:3 capability? 

What percentage of Arabic speakers in the Foreign Service have served at least a 

year in Iraq? Please be as detailed as you can in responding to this. 

Answer. The Arabic course at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), which is designed to bring an individual from a 0/0 (zero) level of proficiency to a 3S/3R (General Professional Proficiency in speaking and reading), is a 2-year program. The first 

year, in Washington, DC, is designed to bring an individual from 0 to 2S/2R (Limited Working Proficiency) and estimated instructional costs are about $28,000 for 44 

weeks of training (based on fiscal year 2006 tuition rate). The second year, overseas 

at FSI’s field school in Tunis, typically brings these individuals to a 3S/3R and estimated instructional costs are about $32,000 (based on fiscal year 2006 cost recovery 

formulation). Instruction cost estimates do not include nontraining expenditures, 

such as employee salaries and benefits, post allowances, per diem (in Washington), 

travel and POV shipping, post-housing and post-support.State Department recruiters specifically target schools and organizations with language programs to increase 

the recruitment of Arabic and other critical needs language speakers. Since 2004, 

the Department has given bonus points in the hiring process to Foreign Service candidates with demonstrated proficiency in languages such as Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi, 

among others. These bonus points materially increase the chance of receiving a job 

offer for candidates who have passed the written examination and oral assessment. 

The Department of State requires Arabic speakers to demonstrate a score of S2/ 

RO (Limited Working Speaking Proficiency/No Reading Proficiency) or above to 

meet tenure requirements. As of December 31, 2006, there were 676 Foreign Service 

generalists and specialists with a tested Arabic proficiency of S2/RO or higher, including employees trained by FSI and employees who already spoke Arabic before 

joining the Department. These Arabic speakers fill critical language designated positions at more than 20 embassies and consulates throughout Near East Asia. 

Of the 676 Arabic speakers, 74 Foreign Service employees (11 percent) have 

served in Iraq for at least 1 year. Twenty-nine of those employees speak Arabic at 

a proficiency level of S3/R3 or above and 45 employees speak Arabic at a level less 

than S3/R3. When the initial deployment for Iraq began in 2003, most personnel 

were sent for 6-month assignments. Eighty-seven of the Foreign Service’s Arabic 

speakers (13 percent) have served in Iraq for a 6-month assignment, with 41 employees at a proficiency level less than S3/R3 and 46 employees at S3/R3 or above. 

If 6-month and 1-year tours in Iraq are considered together, 161 of the Foreign 

Service’s Arabic speakers (24 percent of the total) have served in Iraq since 2003. 

Question. Secretary Gates said that he engaged the cabinet in this issue, but have 

you had opportunity to engage other cabinet agencies who have been slow to provide 

needed expertise? What else can be done to ensure we get the most qualified individuals on the job? 

Answer. NSPD 36 directed cabinet agencies to encourage their employees to take 

assignments in Iraq on a nonreimbursable basis. In response, some highly qualified 

United States Government employees from a number of Federal agencies have 

served with distinction in Iraq. But, in other cases, equally talented employees have 

found it difficult to volunteer for Iraq service, because their parent agencies do not 

have the necessary budget for overseas travel, danger pay, and other extraordinary 

personnel costs. In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, we have requested funding 

to reimburse other agencies for these extra costs for employees going to serve in 

Iraq. We believe this funding will make an appreciable difference in the ability of 

all cabinet agencies to contribute directly to our mission in Iraq. 

110 

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM B. WOOD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. On December 26, 2006, the Los Angeles Times published an article entitled ‘‘Heroin From Afghanistan Is Cutting a Deadly Path.’’ According to the article, 

‘‘supplies of highly potent Afghan heroin in the United States are growing so fast 

that the pure white powder is rapidly overtaking lower-quality Mexican heroin, 

prompting fears of increased addiction and overdoses.’’ 

Can you please review this article in detail and comment on its assertions? How 

much Afghan opium has entered the United States each year since 2000? Has it increased on a yearly basis? Is there a significant difference between Afghan and 

Mexican opium? 

Answer. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has no reports that can verify the article’s suggestion that Afghan heroin, as a percentage 

of the United States market, has doubled from 7 to 14 percent. Though DEA does 

not break down heroin by country of origin (except for Mexico), DEA believes that 

the United States’ market share of Afghan heroin is approximately 8 percent, and 

asserts that it has not seen a spike in the United States. Further, the Department 

of Homeland Security Contraband Smuggling Unit reports that it has not seen anything indicating that there is an increase in Afghan heroin in the United States. 

The reporter for this article used Heroin Signature Program numbers for Southwest 

Asian heroin as the basis for his story. This number encompasses more than just 

Afghanistan and is not the overall measure of heroin in the United States. Moreover, local law enforcement also is not in a position to be able to determine where 

the heroin is sourced from; only DEA analyzes and categorizes this information 

through lab analyses and its Heroin Domestic Monitoring Program (ROMP). The 

HDMP reported that in calendar year 2005, only 3 percent of the samples purchased 

and analyzed was identified as Southwest Asian heroin. South American heroin accounted for 56 percent and Mexican heroin for 40 percent of the samples purchased 

and analyzed. 

The difference between Afghan heroin and Mexican heroin is in its purity levels. 

Afghan heroin can have purity levels of up to 90 percent while Mexican black tar 

heroin is of low quality, with purity levels of less than 35 percent. Mexican brown 

tar heroin purity can range from 50–70 percent. Many of the deaths due to 

overdoses have been attributed to Fentanyl, a synthetic heroin with very high purity 

levels, which may be confused with heroin from Southwest Asia. 

The Center for Disease Control’s Epidemic Intelligence Service reports that the 

increase in the number of deaths cannot be attributed specifically to heroin as the 

statistics used from the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10 codes) indicate deaths from a broad range of drugs. 

Question. S.147—the Afghan Women Empowerment Act—would provide resources 

where they are much needed in Afghanistan, to Afghan women-led nongovernmental 

organizations, empowering those who will continue to provide for the needs of the 

Afghan people long after the international community has left. 

S. 147 would provide $30 million to women-led nongovernmental organizations to 

specifically focus on providing direct services to Afghan women—services such as 

adult literacy education, technical and vocational training, and health care services. 

In addition, it would authorize the President to appropriate $5 million to the Afghan 

Ministry of Women’s Affairs and $10 million to the Afghan Independent Human 

Rights Commission. 

How could such funds benefit the women of Afghanistan? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2006, $50 million was provided specifically to support programs and activities benefiting women and girls. Activities funded include microfinance, and small- and medium-enterprise loans for women; vocational training and 

employment opportunities to women, especially in areas of poppy production; comprehensive programs for maternal and child health; community education for girls 

in remote areas; literacy and textbooks for girls; support to the Women’s Teacher 

Training Institute and the Women’s Dormitory at Kabul University; access to justice 

systems for women; gender advisor for economic governance and private sector 

strengthening; support to the Afghan Women’s Business Federation and Arzu Carpets; capacity building for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs; and support for recurrent operations and maintenance costs related to women programs of the Government of Afghanistan’s budget. 

The United States agrees that women-led and women-focused nongovernmental 

organizations are critical to Afghanistan’s advancement. Should the $30 million 

specified in S. 147 be made available, we would provide technical assistance and 

other resources benefiting women-led nongovernmental organizations, as is planned 

111 

under the mission’s new, comprehensive capacity building program known as Afghans Building Capacity, or ‘‘ABC,’’ which, among other things, focuses on teaching 

nongovernmental organization-specific skills to develop, implement, and monitor effective projects. Women-led nongovernmental organizations are lacking. This intense 

capacity building effort will help. 

With additional funding we would intend to pursue the following implementation 

steps: 

• Outreach—Strengthen and diversify our outreach to women-led/focused organizations. Although we have grants with five women-led organizations today and 

work closely with the Afghan Women’s Network’s 80 members, we are looking 

to include others. 

• Capacity Building—As noted above, we would provide training and technical assistance to women-led and women-focused nongovernmental organizations as 

well as to entities that interact with the nongovernmental organizations, such 

as the various ministries, universities, businesses and local government offices. 

This training and assistance will specifically target the design, implementation 

and monitoring of projects. It also aims to build skills among women-focused 

and women-led nongovernmental organizations so that they may better involve 

communities in program development, implementation, and monitoring. 

Question. Pakistan is currently one of the largest recipients of United States foreign aid. In fact, funding to reimburse Pakistan for its support of United Statesled counterterrorism operations is currently estimated at $80 million per month. 

However, the Afghan Government and many other experts argue that Pakistan has 

done little to stop the flow of weapons and fighters into Afghanistan, and in fact 

may even be aiding the insurgency. What can be done to produce stronger results 

from Pakistan? 

Answer. Pakistan is a vital partner in our fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 

The Government of Pakistan is committed to the war on terror and is taking strong 

measures to eliminate the threat posed by both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Pakistan 

has lost hundreds of its soldiers, a number of its civilian officials, and dozens of progovernment tribal leaders in the tribal belt who have engaged in combating the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda. 

As President Musharraf has acknowledged, Pakistan does not have enough security forces to control the rugged 1,500 mile border with Afghanistan. Several million 

Afghan refugees live in Pakistan, many of them concentrated in large refugee 

camps; the Taliban has used these camps as hideouts. The Government of Pakistan 

also perceives militant extremism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as a 

major threat to the nation’s internal security. However, President Musharraf has 

undertaken military operations against terrorists on Pakistani soil in spite of domestic opposition. 

We continue to urge the Government of Pakistan to take forceful measures 

against all terrorist groups, including the Taliban. We also support President 

Musharraf’s efforts to adopt a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism 

and countering insurgency. 

I understand that the State Department plans to support an initiative to enhance 

the capacity of local security forces in the border regions, such as the indigenous 

Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, and tribal levies. We will also support Pakistan’s Sustainable Development Plan for the tribal areas for economic and social development and governance reform intended to meet the needs of the local population 

and render them more resistant to violent extremists such as al-Qaeda and the 

Taliban. 

For my part, if confirmed, I intend to work daily not only with the Government 

of Afghanistan but also with our embassy in Islamabad to strengthen Afghan-Pakistani cooperation along the border and effective action against terrorists and their 

supporters there. 

Question. There have been reports that many Afghans feel that their country is 

not a high priority for the United States. What will you do to change this perception? 

Answer. Polling data shows that the United States continues to enjoy the confidence of the Afghan people. Even in less secure areas of the country, a 60 percent 

majority continues to express confidence in the U.S. mission (ABC News Poll, October 2006). Nationwide, the trend is even better. A large majority of Afghan citizens 

view the United States’ influence as positive, and 74 percent of Afghans have a favorable view of the United States (ABC News Poll, October 2006). The Taliban is 

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est since 2004. Over 90 percent of Afghans disapprove of Taliban attacks on Afghan 

citizens—whether military or civilians (ABC News Poll, October 2006). 

Afghans continue to consider electricity, jobs, roads, and security as their top priorities. Our assistance program—over $14.2 billion since 2001, with an additional 

$10.6 billion requested for fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008—is addressing these 

concerns, which is one reason why a majority of Afghan citizens continue to be hopeful for the future. 

If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that United States efforts in Afghanistan 

receive the support of the Afghan people and that they in turn understand the extent of their efforts and do their part to ensure success. 

Question. International observers and human rights defenders note serious discrepancies between the Afghan Government’s declared support for strong human 

rights and the activities of Afghan officials at the provincial and district levels. Do 

you believe these characterizations are accurate? If confirmed, what specific initiatives would you undertake as ambassador to help Afghanistan’s Government better 

promote and protect human rights in all regions of the country? 

Answer. Although Afghanistan has made important human rights progress since 

the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan’s human rights record remains poor. 

This is mainly due to weak central institutions, a deadly insurgency, and an ongoing 

recovery from 21⁄2 decades of war. 

In its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Afghanistan, the 

United States Department of State documented numerous cases of arbitrary arrests 

and detention, extrajudicial killings, torture, and poor prison conditions. Prolonged 

detention, often due to a severe lack of resources and pervasive corruption in the 

judicial system, is a serious problem. There are also cases of official impunity and 

abuse of authority by local leaders. Afghans also frequently turn to the informal justice system, which does not always protect human rights principles. As reported in 

the United States Department of State’s Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, freedom of religion, although provided for by the national constitution, is 

restricted in practice. 

Afghanistan has, however, made historic progress toward democracy and the protection of human rights since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The new Afghan Constitution includes broad human rights protections for all Afghans and recognition 

of Afghanistan’s international human rights obligations. In accordance with the 

2002 Bonn Agreement, the government established the Afghan Independent Human 

Rights Commission, which now has nine regional offices throughout the country, has 

resolved numerous complaints of human rights violations, and closely monitors the 

overall human rights situation, as well as individual cases. 

In the January 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the Government of Afghanistan committed to: Strengthen its capacity to comply with and report on its human rights 

treaty obligations; adopt corrective measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion, and illegal expropriation of property; strengthen freedom of expression, including freedom 

of media; include human rights awareness in education curricula; promote human 

rights awareness among legislators, judicial personnel and other Government agencies, communities, and the public; monitor human rights through the government 

and independently by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; and support the commission in the fulfillment of its objectives with regard to monitoring, 

investigation, protection, and promotion of human rights by end-2010. 

The Government of Afghanistan also committed in the Afghanistan Compact to 

implement the Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice Action plan by end-2008. This 

transitional justice plan identified five areas for action, including strengthening the 

credibility and accountability of state institutions. 

If confirmed, I will press the Afghan authorities, at all levels, on these issues and 

emphasize that good governance, respect for human rights including women’s rights, 

and the rule of law are essential. Together with our allies and partners, and the 

United Nations, I will also encourage initiatives that consolidate a stronger sense 

among all Afghans that they have a stake in building a democratic government that 

respects human rights. 

Question. The significant rise in attacks against schools in Afghanistan—particularly against girls’ schools—is of grave concern. What more can be done to ensure 

that children can safely attend school in Afghanistan? Is there any truth to recent 

reports that the Taliban is working to re-open girls’ schools in the south? 

Answer. I share your concerns about attacks against schools and teachers in Afghanistan. Education for all young people and training for those who lost their 

113 

school years during the last two decades of conflict are key to Afghanistan’s future 

stability and development. 

Afghan law makes education up to the secondary level mandatory, and provides 

for free education up to the college, or bachelor’s degree, level. According to the Ministry of Education there were 9,033 basic and secondary schools operating in Afghanistan in 2006. School enrollment increased from 4.2 million children in 2003 

to over 5.2 million during the year 2006. Of these, in primary school, approximately 

35 percent are girls. 

Violence, however, continues to impede access to education in some parts of the 

country where Taliban and other extremists threaten or physically attack schools, 

officials, teachers, and students, especially in girls schools. The majority of schoolrelated violence in 2006 occurred in 11 provinces in the south. The Ministry of Education reported that 20 teachers were killed, 198 schools were attacked, and a total 

of 370 schools were closed temporarily during the year owing to attacks, preventing 

almost 220,000 students from receiving an education. 

The Afghan Government is prosecuting individual cases of attacks against teachers, students, and schools. In some districts, the local population has organized to 

protect their schools. Full access to education, however, will only be achieved 

through improved security. The United States is training and equipping Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army troops to help. 

We have no reason to believe that the Taliban are working to re-open girl schools 

in the south. 

RESPONSES OF RYAN CROCKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. You may remember our meeting during June 2003, on my trip to Baghdad, where we sat in a poorly lit, somewhat air-conditioned conference room meeting 

with three clerics, a Sunni, a Shiite, and a Christian who waxed at length about 

their vision for Iraq and how it was under Saddam. Some have suggested the winner-take-all sectarian nature to Iraqi affairs occurred much later, or was created by 

the United States’ unseating of Saddam. What is your view? 

Answer. The majority of Iraqis still express gratitude for their liberation from 

Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regime. Circumstances afterwards, however, have undermined the conditions necessary to provide Iraqis with the security and stability 

they deserve. Since 2003, the combination of insurgent and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)- 

led attacks on Iraqi civilians, often based on their sectarian affiliation, has led to 

increased tension between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia populations. The most damaging 

was an attack on one of the most holy Islamic Shia sites, Al-Askariya Mosque, in 

February 2006. As a result, sectarian tensions burst into the open. 

The Government of Iraq is currently committed to a new Baghdad Security Plan 

that is focused on quelling sectarian violence and protecting the population. A key 

component of this strategy is Prime Minister Maliki’s commitment to pursuing all 

perpetrators of violence regardless of their sect or party affiliation. We are supporting the Government of Iraq in these efforts. 

Question. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) mentioned a ‘‘bottom up approach’’ could help reverse the negative trends. Would you care to comment? 

Answer. The NIE defined a ‘‘bottom-up approach’’ to reversing negative trends in 

Iraq as one which promotes neighborhood watch groups and establishment of grievance committees. It is certainly true that any mechanism that empowers ordinary 

citizens to solve their problems according to a rule of law process, vice the force of 

violence, is a step in the right direction as part of a larger process of national reconciliation. 

We believe that a coordinated set of actions at both the national and local level 

need to proceed simultaneously to help reverse the negative trends the NIE identified. At the local level, Provincial Reconstruction Teams are charged with strengthening moderates, marginalizing extremists, and otherwise empowering local governments to deliver goods and services to an electorate that will hold them accountable. 

This is one way in which we are implementing a bottom-up approach. Much of 

the efforts to empower local Iraqis to solve their problems will have to be implemented by the Iraqis themselves. A new provincial powers law is being debated in 

the Council of Representatives, which will help, though the task of implanting it 

will be a challenge. A host of reconciliation initiatives have been proposed. The process of mending frayed relationships will be one of which Iraqis will need to work 

for many years to come. 

114 

Question. I am hopeful Congress will begin meaningful debate soon on 2007 Supplemental Appropriations, which you will need to execute your mission. It has some 

$824 million to operate the embassy and PRT’s and another $966 million for economic support programs, rule of law, democracy, migration and refugee assistance, 

and USAID operating expenses. Will this be sufficient to leverage the Iraqis to action on their budget execution? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental request level of $2.34 billion is critical 

to building Iraqi self-reliance and to expanding our current efforts to improve the 

institutional capacity of key Iraqi ministries to address the needs of the Iraqi people. We will focus on developing the Iraqi Government’s critical management capabilities, such as budget formulation and execution, which will improve services and 

enhance the governance capacity of Iraq’s executive branch. With these funds, 

project management units will be established to help Iraqi ministries execute their 

budgets. Iraq has signaled its intent to improve its capital budget spending in 2007 

by including a provision in the budget law passed by parliament that permits the 

Ministries of Finance and Planning and Development Cooperation to transfer capital investment funds from those ministries and provincial governments failing to 

spend 25 percent of their capital budgets by the midpoint of the fiscal year to ministries with better prospects for executing projects with those funds. 

This funding will also expand the presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs). One of the main missions of PRT’s is to work with local governments to improve their capacity, including their ability to design programs and request money 

from the central government. We are encouraged that the 2007 Iraqi budget includes over $2 billion for regional governments. 

On January 10, the Secretary named Ambassador Tim Carney as the Coordinator 

for Economic Transition in Iraq. Ambassador Carney, who is based in Baghdad, reports directly to the ambassador and will work closely with Iraqi officials to ensure 

that Iraq’s considerable resources are brought to bear on the task of rebuilding Iraq. 

One of the issues he will focus on is helping the Iraqis better execute their budgets, 

particularly on capital spending for investments to improve essential services and 

promote economic development. 

USAID operating expenses are not included in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental 

request, but have been included in the fiscal year 2008 GWOT costs request. 

Question. To what extent can private sector solutions be expanded effectively in 

Iraq? How can we structure our assistance to improve that effort? 

Answer. Private sector solutions can and should be expanded effectively in Iraq. 

Iraq has a tradition of over 4,000 years of entrepreneurship and commerce. Today, 

private sector-led growth could energize the Iraqi economy. This is especially true 

for such critical sectors as banking and microfinance, which could meet an enormous 

pent-up demand for credit, an economic force multiplier. 

We have worked hard to support private-sector solutions in Iraq. Under the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), we have supported a program to expand 

microfinance institutions to provide small- and medium-sized companies with the 

capital they would not otherwise be able to borrow. The goal of these programs is 

to help establish these institutions, which will then serve as models for other Iraqi 

institutions, including commercial banks, to emulate. To date, United States Government support has enabled six microcredit institutions to extend over 29,000 

loans. We are also providing technical assistance programs to help Iraq enact the 

kinds of laws and regulations that will make it easier to register companies, conduct 

trade, and access credit. We have requested funds under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental to continue these activities until Iraqi institutions can fill this void. 

It is also worth noting that DoD’s effort to restart idle State Owned Enterprises 

(SOEs) and other manufacturing entities in Iraq has privatization as a long-term 

goal. 

Question. Are our policies encouraging Iraqi Government officials to continue to 

reduce subsidies, reduce the public distribution system to a means tested entitlement for the poorest Iraqis, and provide the commercial legal framework to stimulate not only agriculture, but canning and other agribusiness? 

Answer. As part of Iraq’s Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the GoI has 

agreed to phase out the PDS and replace it with a targeted, means-tested system 

to protect Iraq’s most vulnerable citizens. We support GoI’s efforts to phase out the 

PDS and have provided the GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the 

PDS and recommendations for how to eliminate this system. The Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) has an officer at the Ministry of Trade who 

monitors the PDS to make sure that food is getting to the various parts of Iraq. 

115 

Also, the United States Department of Agriculture has an officer in Iraq who monitors food imports, including for the PDS. 

In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule stating that 

anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a new location as long as they 

had their ration card. However, there are reports that the pre-2003 practice of deregistering at one’s former food distribution point and registering at the food distribution point in one’s new neighborhood is now being reinstituted. It is not certain 

that the GoI is redirecting food from areas with net population losses to areas with 

net population gains to ensure adequate supplies. 

Question. The international community is gearing up to help with the refugee and 

IDP population, but what is the Iraqi Government doing? 

Answer. The response to the IDP situation within the Government of Iraq rests 

on the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM). The ministry, which was 

created in 2003, has branches in each of the Iraqi provinces, except the three Kurdish provinces. MODM periodically distributes food and nonfood items and collects 

data on the number of displaced persons. 

For a third consecutive year, the U.S. Government has funded a capacity building 

program to train MODM staff and assist it to develop its mandate, operating procedures and policies, and its coordinating role with nongovernmental organizations assisting IDPs. The Iraqi Government, United States Government, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations’ focal point for 

refugees and IDPs, will continue to work with MODM to strengthen its capacity to 

coordinate assistance to IDPs and refugees. 

UNHCR is increasing its staff in the region to help with the increased numbers 

of IDPs and refugees. 

The Ministry of Trade provides all Iraqis, including IDPs, monthly food rations. 

The Ministry of Social Affairs provides rent subsidies to a small percentage of IDPs 

(around 10 percent). 

Question. Who in the embassy will you charge with the refugee and IDP issue? 

What is the military role in this matter? 

Answer. We have a political officer designated as the Refugee Coordinator at our 

embassy in Iraq. The Refugee Coordinator works closely with counterparts at the 

State Department, particularly those in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 

Migration and USAID/OFDA, as well as with counterparts at United States embassies in the region, such as Amman and Damascus. The Refugee Coordinator also 

works with the Multi-National Force in Iraq to address protection issues relating 

to Iraqi IDPs and refugees. I would refer you to the Department of Defense for more 

specific information on the role of the military in this matter. 

Question. The old oil-for-food food ration system is still in place—but I understand 

that Iraqis cannot access it if they have fled from their homes. Can we help the 

Iraqis construct a more flexible distribution to help feed IDPs? 

Answer. To date, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi internally displaced persons 

(IDPs) have sought shelter with host families. United States Government agencies 

are actively providing protection and assistance to IDPs and their host communities 

in Iraq, including distribution of food and other necessities. With additional resources, including funds in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, we will expand our assistance program activities to reach more IDPs and host communities. 

Since fiscal year 2003, the Agency for International Development’s Office of For- eign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has contributed more than $194 million to provide 

humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in Iraq. In fiscal year 2006, 

OFDA’s program assisted 175,000 IDPs. In fiscal year 2007, OFDA plans to increase 

the number of beneficiaries to 300,000. 

OFDA’s partner organizations fund rapid response mobile teams and provide 

emergency food assistance and relief commodities, including winterization supplies. 

OFDA’s partners are also improving IDPs’ access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities, supporting small-scale community infrastructure, and 

providing water by tanker truck where necessary. In addition, they oversee livelihood programs providing income generation and cash-for-work opportunities, as well 

as vocational training. 

In addition, the State Department, in partnership with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, provides substantial relief to IDPs in Iraq, including supplying food and household items to 

50,000 vulnerable families. 

Neither the United States Government nor other entities directly advise the Government of Iraq (GoI) on the Public Distribution System (PDS). As part of Iraq’s 

Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the GoI has agreed to phase out the 

116 

PDS and replace it with a targeted, means-tested system to protect Iraq’s most vulnerable citizens. We support the GoI’s efforts to phase out the PDS. We have provided the GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and recommendations for how to eliminate this system. 

In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule stating that 

anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a new location as long as they 

had their ration card. However, there are reports that the pre-2003 practice of requiring Iraqis to de-register at their former food distribution point and re-register 

at the food distribution point in their new neighborhood is now being reinstituted. 

Question. How much does it cost to train an Arabic speaker to 3:3 capability? 

What percentage of Arabic speakers in the Foreign Service have served at least a 

year in Iraq? Please be as detailed as you can in responding to this. 

Answer. The Arabic course at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), which is designed to bring an individual from a 0/0 (zero) level of proficiency to a 3S/3R (General Professional Proficiency in speaking and reading), is a 2-year program. The first 

year, in Washington, DC, is designed to bring an individual from 0 to 2S/2R (Limited Working Proficiency) and estimated instructional costs are about $28,000 for 44 

weeks of training (based on fiscal year 2006 tuition rate). The second year, overseas 

at FSI’s field school in Tunis, typically brings these individuals to a 3S/3R and estimated instructional costs are about $32,000 (based on fiscal year 2006 cost recovery 

formulation). Instruction cost estimates do not include nontraining expenditures, 

such as employee salaries and benefits, post allowances, per diem (in Washington), 

travel and POV shipping, post-housing and post-support. 

State Department recruiters specifically target schools and organizations with 

language programs to increase the recruitment of Arabic and other critical needs 

language speakers. Since 2004, the Department has given bonus points in the hiring 

process to Foreign Service candidates with demonstrated proficiency in languages 

such as Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi, among others. These bonus points materially increase the chance of receiving a job offer for candidates who have passed the written 

examination and oral assessment. 

The Department of State requires Arabic speakers to demonstrate a score of S2/ 

R0 (Limited Working Speaking Proficiency/No Reading Proficiency) or above to meet 

tenure requirements. As of December 31, 2006, there were 676 Foreign Service generalists and specialists with a tested Arabic proficiency of S2/R0 or higher, including 

employees trained by FSI and employees who already spoke Arabic before joining 

the Department. These Arabic speakers fill critical language designated positions at 

more than 20 embassies and consulates throughout Near East Asia. 

Of the 676 Arabic speakers, 74 Foreign Service employees (11 percent) have 

served in Iraq for at least 1 year. Twenty-nine of those employees speak Arabic at 

a proficiency level of S3/R3 or above and 45 employees speak Arabic at a level less 

than S3/R3. When the initial deployment for Iraq began in 2003, most personnel 

were sent for 6-month assignments. Eighty-seven of the Foreign Service’s Arabic 

speakers (13 percent) have served in Iraq for a 6-month assignment, with 41 employees at a proficiency level less than S3/R3 and 46 employees at S3/R3 or above. 

If 6-month and 1-year tours in Iraq are considered together, 161 of the Foreign 

Service’s Arabic speakers (24 percent of the total) have served in Iraq since 2003. 

Question. Secretary Gates said that he engaged the cabinet in this issue, but have 

you had opportunity to engage other cabinet agencies who have been slow to provide 

needed expertise? What else can be done to ensure we get the most qualified individuals on the job? 

Answer. NSPD 36 directed cabinet agencies to encourage their employees to take 

assignments in Iraq on a nonreimbursable basis. In response, some highly qualified 

United States Government employees from a number of Federal agencies have 

served with distinction in Iraq. But, in other cases, equally talented employees have 

found it difficult to volunteer for Iraq service, because their parent agencies do not 

have the necessary budget for overseas travel, danger pay, and other extraordinary 

personnel costs. In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, we have requested funding 

to reimburse other agencies for these extra costs for employees going to serve in 

Iraq. We believe this funding will make an appreciable difference in the ability of 

all cabinet agencies to contribute directly to our mission in Iraq. 

(117) 

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Fox, Sam, to be Ambassador to Belgium 

Phillips, Stanley Davis, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barack Obama presiding. 

Present: Senators Obama, Kerry, Cardin, Coleman, Voinovich, 

and DeMint. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS 

Senator OBAMA. This hearing will please come to order. This is 

the hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Today, the 

committee will consider the nominations of Mr. Stanley Davis Phillips to serve as Ambassador to Estonia and the nomination of Mr. 

Sam Fox to serve as Ambassador to Belgium. 

I welcome both gentlemen and their families to our hearing. 

Now, I know we have a busy agenda. There are a number of witnesses who are wishing to present what I will—what I’m sure will 

be glowing testimony of both nominees. Because we’ve got a lot of 

people who wanted to speak, we’re going to try to keep things moving, and I ask that everybody try to keep their comments as brief 

as possible. And I will try to lead by example. 

The ambassadorial posts for which Mr. Phillips and Mr. Fox have 

been nominated are important ones, and there are significant U.S. 

interests at stake in both relationships. Estonia has been a leader 

in efforts to establish more democratic, accountable governments in 

eastern Europe; the country’s troops have also served alongside 

U.S. forces in numerous international peacekeeping missions. Belgium is a founding member of NATO and the European Union, and 

the host country to both these institutions. Belgium’s relationship 

with the United States provides the diplomatic backdrop for most 

high-level discussions on transatlantic cooperation, so it’s clearly 

critical that we have capable, qualified individuals in these two positions. 

I see that we have a number of Members of the Senate, and 

former Members of the Senate, who are interested in introducing 

118 

the nominee, so, in the interest of time, I will stop here and turn 

to my good friend Senator DeMint, ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee, for his opening statement. And following that, we’ll proceed to introductions and opening statements 

from the witnesses. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Out of deference to Senator Coleman, since he was here first, if 

he would like to make an opening statement, I’ll yield to him first. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield to the ranking member at this time. And I know a number of my colleagues—I’m sure 

their schedules are full, so I would hold my statement and comments until after the ranking member and my colleagues have had 

a chance to do their introductions. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I’ll try to be 

brief. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator DEMINT. And thanks for holding this hearing and moving the process forward. 

Good afternoon, Mr. Fox and Mr. Phillips. I appreciate your 

being here today and your willingness to serve our Nation as ambassadors. 

Today, the role of an ambassador is daunting. Without a doubt, 

there are many challenges and opportunities in Europe, and you 

will both be in very crucial positions to help foster the transatlantic 

relationships between the United States and Europe. Your willingness to be good listeners and advocates are vital to U.S. foreign policy. 

Often, we hear European leaders express how the United States 

and Europe share a common set of values. I agree with them. We 

have a long history of shared values that include the ideals of freedom and economic opportunity. We’re committed to the idea of free 

markets and free societies. However, if we truly share these values, 

we all must believe they contain the answers to the challenges that 

confront us. European societies and their economies currently face 

many of the demographic problems we will face in the near future. 

There are lessons we can learn from them, but there are also ideas 

that we can share. The ideas of free marks and free societies can 

unleash creative solutions. 

I believe European nations have incredible capability and potential to grow and to be more productive; however, it requires a willingness on the part of Europe’s leaders to draft policies that unleash their people and trust what they’re capable of. 

As ambassadors, it’s important you share and advocate the values that serve as a foundation to our prosperity. With your influence, Europe can be an even larger driving force in the world, economically and socially, and that would benefit everyone. 

I also hope you will spend more of your time outside the embassy 

and government offices. The American culture is loved in Europe, 

but the same is not always true of American policy. However, the 

two cannot be conveniently separated, as many Europeans believe. 

And successful diplomacy is no longer an activity just between 

heads of state, but between the people of each nation. Much of this 

119 

can be accomplished through and economic ties. If you’re committed to changing perceptions and wish to be successful American 

advocates, you will need to deliver your messages to the people directly. 

The best days of Europe are still ahead, and you both can play 

a role in making this a reality. I thank you both again for being 

willing to serve. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield back. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Senator. 

At this point, what I’d like to do is welcome my colleagues from 

North Carolina who are here to introduce Mr. Phillips. And we’re 

going to go in order of both seniority and attractiveness—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BURR. Leave me out of it. 

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. With Senator Dole, and then we’ll 

proceed to Senator Burr. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH DOLE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, Senator Coleman. It’s a great privilege to introduce Dave Phillips, who 

has been nominated by the President to serve as the sixth United 

States Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia. 

I’m honored to come before this committee to enthusiastically express my support for this nomination. Dave and his wife, Kay, have 

been dear friends through many years. Dave is one of the finest 

government and business leaders that North Carolina has known, 

and is more than qualified to join the ranks of our diplomatic corps. 

Our country is blessed, indeed, to have such talented and experienced people who are willing to serve in our embassies overseas. 

I’m confident that Dave will serve with great distinction as the primary liaison between the United States and Estonia. 

If confirmed, Dave Phillips will be responsible for promoting and 

protecting United States interests in Estonia, ever more important 

to the region as a whole since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 

1991. Since then, the country has been able to develop economic 

and political ties with western Europe, and, in just the past few 

years, has joined NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade 

Organization. Estonia is a success story, how a former Soviet bloc 

country can transition to a democracy and modern market economy. 

Just last September, President Bush visited Estonia to underscore the importance of free-market democracies and what they 

demonstrate to countries pursuing the same goals. Without question, Dave Phillips is the right person to serve as our chief representative to this country at this time. He’s been involved in international commerce his entire professional life. As an international 

businessman, he promoted American furniture and textile businesses abroad. As Secretary of Commerce for North Carolina, he 

built relationships with other countries and is responsible for 

North Carolina’s offices in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Mexico City, Frankfurt, and London. He led trade missions around the world and 

interfaced with business and government leaders, alike. 

120 

For all of Dave’s international achievements, his most stellar accomplishment may have been here at home. He served as chair of 

the World Games of the Special Olympics in 1999, which, I’m proud 

to say, were held in North Carolina. At those games, he was able 

to bring together represents from 150 countries for a spectacular 

event. 

Mr. Chairman, with his vast business and government expertise, 

Dave Phillips possesses the critical diplomatic and leadership skills 

needed to succeed in this important position. He will make a firstrate United States Ambassador. 

Before I conclude, let me commend Aldona Wos for her service 

as United States Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia these past 

2 years. Our country’s relationship with Estonia, economically, politically, socially, and militarily, is better off because of Ambassador 

Wos’s efforts. 

I’d also like to acknowledge Sam Fox, who has been nominated 

by the President to serve as United States Ambassador to Belgium. 

Sam has been a close personal friend of Bob and Elizabeth Dole for 

many years, and I have known him to be unparalleled in his commitment to philanthropy and education. He and his wife, Marilyn, 

do so much to better communities here at home and abroad. He 

will make an excellent United States Ambassador. 

Mr. Chairman, you have two outstanding nominees before you 

today. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much. 

Senator Burr. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Senator BURR. Mr. President—I mean, Mr. Chairman—excuse 

me—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator OBAMA. That’s okay. [Laughter.] 

Senator BURR. That was a good Carolina suck-up there. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. To my colleagues, thank you for the 

opportunity for Senator Dole and me to come in and talk about, 

one, a dear friend, but, two, somebody who’s eminently qualified. 

He’s an extraordinary individual. He brings the qualifications that 

the United States needs in our embassies abroad. And I know he 

will do an outstanding job as the Ambassador to the Republic of 

Estonia. 

The United States and Estonia have had relations since 1922. 

That relationship grew into a deep friendship when the United 

States continued to recognize Estonia’s mission to the United 

States even while their homeland suffered 51 years of Soviet occupation. Indeed, this formed a solid foundation on which the United 

States and Estonia relations have flourished ever since, and Dave 

Phillips is the right man at the right time to continue to enhance 

those already strong ties. 

As an accomplished businessman, philanthropist, and father, 

Dave has, in fact, been performing the duties of an ambassador for 

121 

many years, and we, from North Carolina, are so proud to call him 

our own. 

As you heard my colleague say, Dave represented the United 

States as the chair of the Special Olympics World Games here in 

Washington, and abroad, as a member of the board of the Smithsonian Institute, meeting and carrying America’s message to leaders 

all over the world. 

United States relations in Europe are more important today than 

they’ve been since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Once again, we see 

a familiar Russia seeking to exert its influence throughout eastern 

Europe and the Baltics. This crucial time is why we need a man 

like Dave Phillips, with his deep understanding of business and 

commerce, to cement the United States/Estonia relationship and to 

reassert the United States support for a free and democratic Europe. 

I urge my colleagues strongly to support Dave Phillips’ nomination. 

I, as my colleague Senator Dole has done, am also here to highlight the great nomination of Sam Fox. I know there are others 

here to speak for him, but I believe that, when you know somebody 

well, there are not enough people that can stand up and speak to 

your character and your ability. Today I am convinced we have two 

of the finest nominees in front of us that—the nominations could 

be made—to serve this country in our embassies abroad. 

I thank the Chair. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Senator Burr. 

We, next, are going to get introductions for Mr. Fox. The senior 

Senator from Missouri is Senator Bond, but I understand that Senator McCaskill is supposed to be presiding in 15 minutes. Senator 

Bond, would you be willing to let Senator McCaskill go first? 

Senator BOND. It’s a pleasure to be here with my current colleague and former colleague, sir—— 

Senator OBAMA. Absolutely. 

Senator BOND [continuing]. And I will pass the microphone delicately over to—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Bond. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is an 

honor to be here today with, also, Senator Danforth. He is—was a 

incredibly leader for our State and embodies so much of what we 

should be about in the United States Senate, and that is working 

across party lines to try to find that elusive middle ground that is 

good for all America. 

I am here today to embrace and endorse Sam Fox as the nominee 

of the President to Ambassador to Belgium. I think many people 

would maybe want to dwell on the fact that he is a—at his essence, 

a self-made man, the sixth child of immigrant parents, grew up in 

very modest surroundings, with no indoor plumbing. And the fact 

that he has made a wildly successful business—and, I think, for 

many in America, that is the American dream—I would like to just 

briefly credit Sam Fox for the part of the American dream that we 

don’t spend enough time talking about, and that’s the way he has 

122 

grown his family of five children, and his grandchildren, and the 

way he has taught them all to look beyond self to the community. 

Through his foundation, he and his family give to over 150 different charities. St. Louis has been very lucky to receive the generosity of the Fox family in many different ways, whether it’s 

Washington University, the Boy Scouts, or the Art Museum. He 

really is somebody that understands that we need to give tribute 

to the country that gives us so much by giving back to other people. 

And that, I think, is really the essence of the American dream. 

It is who he is as a man. He is a good man. He would be a great 

ambassador. I think he would make our country very proud. I 

think it is important right now that we send ambassadors around 

the world that make our country proud. I think Sam Fox would do 

that. 

And I would like permission to put my written statement in the 

record on his behalf. 

And I thank you for allowing me to speak briefly so that I may 

go do my freshman duty of presiding over the Senate. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

Mr. Chairman and fellow Senators, it is a privilege for me to join you today to 

present to the committee a distinguished citizen of the great State of Missouri, Sam 

Fox, who has been nominated by President Bush to be Ambassador to Belgium. 

Sam Fox represents much that is good about America and is an excellent choice 

to represent our country to the state of Belgium. The youngest child of immigrant 

parents, Sam is the quintessential self-made man. As a small boy, growing up in 

a home that for many years lacked indoor plumbing, Sam realized that hard work, 

good ideas, and perseverance could take a person a long way. He put these values 

to use and worked his way into college, the first in his family to attend, and then 

worked his way straight through school. Twenty-five years after graduating, he 

founded the Harbour Group, a business that now has over $1.5 billion in annual 

revenues. Many would say that Sam Fox has lived the American dream—I would 

agree. 

But Sam Fox is not just characterized by his business success, but by his embracement of American values—hope, hard work, a sense of duty, an entrepreneurial spirit and—among our most revered values—a dedication to giving back to 

the community. Sam and his wife, along with their five children, contribute to over 

150 charities through the Sam Fox Foundation. He has served as president of the 

Greater St. Louis Council of Boy Scouts and president of the Board of the St. Louis 

Art Museum. He has given extensively to his alma mater, Washington University, 

in St. Louis. He has been recognized with the Woodrow Wilson Award for Corporate 

Citizenship and the Marco Polo Award for his humanitarian and economic work involving China. 

Ninety-three years ago Sam’s father, Max Fox, landed on Ellis Island so that he 

could provide a better life and a better future for his family. I recommend that this 

committee support Max’s sixth child, Sam Fox, for the position of United States Ambassador to Belgium, where Sam can represent the great American story, the greatness of American values, and the great potential of the American dream. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Bond. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. ‘‘KIT’’ BOND, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

DeMint, Senator Coleman, Senator Voinovich. It’s an honor to join 

with fellow Missourians in supporting the nomination of the President of Sam Fox to be Ambassador to Belgium. 

123 

Sam is a wonderful man, as you’ve heard already. We are delighted that he’s accompanied by his marvelous family—his wife, 

Marilyn, and children, Cheryl, Pamela, Jeffrey, Greg, and Steven— 

whom I trust he will introduce. 

It’s already been said, he has a distinguished record of service to 

the American people at the national, State, and community level, 

and I’ve had the pleasure of knowing Sam for many years, and 

know, as my colleague said, that he is a dedicated man who’s spent 

his life pursuing projects that enrich our communities and our families. 

Professionally and morally, Sam is eminently qualified to hold 

the post for which he has been nominated. He does exemplify the 

American dream, born in Desloge, Missouri, a small town, he 

earned a bachelor’s degree from Washington University, and proudly served in the U.S. Navy. In 1976, he founded the Harbour 

Group, a privately owned operating company specializing in the acquisition and development of manufacturing companies. His dedication and hard work has made Harbour Group one of the most successful companies of its kind in America. 

He’s often frank and candid with his colleagues and his friends, 

but Sam’s optimism and enthusiasm have made him a leader in 

the business community and will make him a valuable addition to 

the United States diplomatic corps in Europe. 

Sam’s best known for his tireless advocacy of those in need. The 

son of Jewish immigrants, Sam remembers his parent were not 

wealthy, but they always sought to give back to the community 

that had given them hope for a new beginning. Following in this 

tradition, Sam and his wife, Marilyn, created the Fox Family Foundation over 20 years ago. Each year, the Fox Foundation supports 

up to 150 different organizations in the St. Louis area, to provide— 

including providing basic human needs, such as food and shelter, 

to those in need. However, Sam’s efforts don’t stop there. He’s an 

exemplary citizen who has been extremely active in a wide variety 

of civic affairs. He’s served in key leadership roles with the United 

Way, the Boy Scouts, the St. Louis Science Center, Civic Progress, 

and Barnes-Jewish Hospital. The communities Sam supports have 

recognized his contributions to the common good, as evidenced by 

the numerous awards he has received, including Woodrow Wilson 

Award for Corporate Citizenship and the St. Louis Citizen of the 

Year. 

Sam Fox’s business achievement and philanthropic work leave no 

doubt in my mind that he has the ability to represent effectively 

the best interests of the United States. His understanding of complex issues that impact our national and international interests 

will stand him and the administration in good stead as we face the 

endless array of emerging challenges bound to emerge in the days, 

months, and years ahead. 

Sam’s a good man, dedicated to his family, his community, and 

his country. As I stated previously, it’s an honor to recognize his 

many contributions to our common good. Most of all, I’m proud to 

call him a friend. I know he’ll serve the best interests of the United 

States ably and faithfully. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Senator Bond. 

124 

We will proceed, then, with Senator Lieberman, Senator Specter, 

and we will end with the distinguished Senator Danforth, from 

Missouri. 

Senator Lieberman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator LIEBERMAN Thank you. Senator Danforth can offer not 

only an endorsement, but a benediction. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Chairman, I’m honored to be here to join with Senator 

McCaskill, Senator Bond, Senator Specter, and our dear friend and 

former colleague Senator Danforth in urging this committee to report favorably on the nomination of Sam Fox to be Ambassador to 

Belgium. 

I suppose that the array—what I can add to this distinguished 

group of colleagues is to prove that Sam not only has bipartisan, 

but tripartisan, support—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. For his nomination, and to 

say—just to echo, and really speak briefly—Sam Fox represents 

what America’s all about. And that’s why he will be, when confirmed, an extraordinary ambassador. 

It’s been said, but these are wonderful stories. Somebody—child 

of immigrants, born in very modest means, just had the dream 

that, in America, if you work hard and play by the rules, you can 

make it. And that’s what he did, and he made it; and, when he did, 

he gave back to the community and the country in a thousand different ways. 

Sam is an extraordinary philanthropic person. If I may be more 

colloquial, he’s one of the softest-touches in America. This guy 

doesn’t say no to somebody who comes and asks for help. And he 

has given enormous—made an enormous amount of good things 

happen for people. 

I’d say just a word, that I don’t mean to be parochial, but I say, 

as a Jewish American, that I’m proud to be supporting Sam Fox. 

As a proud Jewish American himself, he will bring that experience 

to Belgium, to the center of Europe, at a time when there is some 

division and suggestions of bias rising again. And Sam, from his 

own experience about the openness and mutual respect that he 

found in America, and that, in turn, he has given to this fellow 

Americans, I think, can have an extraordinarily positive effect. I’m 

honored to call Sam Fox my friend. I appreciate his friendship, and 

I am honored to ask you to send him to Brussels as our next ambassador. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Specter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, other distinguished members of 

this panel, I am proud to join this very distinguished array of introducers. 

125 

I would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be made 

a part of the record, because I’m going to have to return to the Appropriations Committee, which is hearing—— 

Senator OBAMA. Without objection. 

Senator SPECTER [continuing]. Secretary of State Condoleezza 

Rice and Secretary of Defense Bob Gates. 

I’ve known Sam for the better part of 20 years, and I associate 

myself with the remarks which have been made here. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, if you had this much support, you’d 

be a shoo-in. [Laughter.] 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you. 

Senator SPECTER. Good luck, Sam. 

Mr. FOX. Thank you very much. 

Senator SPECTER. I don’t think you need a whole lot of luck. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Specter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA

I am pleased to attend today’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in 

order to provide an introduction for Mr. Sam Fox of Missouri, who has been nominated to be Ambassador of the United States to Belgium. 

Mr. Fox was born and raised in Desloge, Missouri. He graduated with honors from 

Washington University in Saint Louis in 1951 and served in the U.S. Naval Reserve 

from 1951–1955. 

As the founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of the Harbour Group, Mr. 

Fox has helped the company earn an outstanding national reputation for its record 

of success in acquiring and building high quality companies. 

Mr. Fox has been extremely active in civic affairs, serving in key leadership roles 

in cultural, educational, and charitable institutions throughout the St. Louis area, 

including the Saint Louis Symphony Orchestra; the Opera Theatre of Saint Louis; 

Barnes-Jewish Hospital; the Saint Louis Science Center; Civic Progress; the Boy 

Scouts; the Saint Louis Art Museum; and the United Way. 

Mr. Fox has also been a major supporter of Washington University. From 1999– 

2001, Mr. Fox served as the vice chairman of the University’s Board of Trustees. 

From 1998–2004 he served as the chairman of the Campaign for Washington University, helping raise over $1.5 billion. In 2004, he became the only Lifetime Trustee 

elected in the University’s history. In October 2006, the University showed its appreciation for his longtime service and support by dedicating the new Sam Fox 

School of Design and Visual Arts in his honor. 

Washington University is not alone in its praise for Mr. Fox. In 2003, he was 

named Saint Louis Citizen of the Year, an annual award given to a community leader who demonstrates concern for Saint Louis’ growth and vitality. That same year, 

he was a recipient of the Woodrow Wilson Award for Corporate Citizenship, which 

is given to those executives who recognize the role they can play in improving society in general, while at the same time advancing the long-term interests of their 

firms, employees, and shareholders. In 2005, he received the Horatio Alger Award, 

which recognizes Americans of modest roots who achieve success through hard 

work, honesty, and perseverance. 

I have traveled to Belgium seven times during my tenure in the Senate and have 

seen the work done by the United States Ambassador in Brussels firsthand. I am 

confident the embassy will be in good hands with Mr. Fox at the helm. I urge my 

colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee to report his nomination favorably. 

I look forward to casting my vote in favor of Mr. Fox’s nomination in the Senate. 

Senator OBAMA. And finally, Senator Danforth, who we thank 

not only for his service to the State of Missouri, but also for his 

service as United States Ambassador to the U.N., and, particularly 

timely, his outstanding work as a Special Envoy in Sudan. We very 

much appreciate your efforts on behalf of the country and the 

world. 

Please proceed. 

126 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN DANFORTH, 

FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator DANFORTH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the 

opportunity of speaking on behalf of my friend Sam Fox. 

I am not going to dwell on his biographical information. That is 

now well-known to the committee. I’m simply going to speak about 

a person I know, and I know well. 

I have been in Sam’s home. He has been in mine. My daughter, 

Mary, is a very close friend of two of Sam’s sons and their families. 

My grandchildren go to school with Sam’s children. This is a long 

family connection, and I can say, if there is any way, Mr. Chairman, that you can wangle an invitation to go fishing with Sam Fox, 

accept that invitation. [Laughter.] 

He, as has been said, grew up in Jefferson County, Missouri. It’s 

the same county that gave us Bill Bradley, as a matter of fact. He 

is a self-made man. I did not know him in Jefferson County, and 

I do not know him in the world of business. I simply know Sam 

Fox as a human being. And I know what he means to me as a person, and I know what he means to my hometown of St. Louis. As 

a person, he is very bright, he is very energetic and warm. I would 

call him ebullient. And, above all, as you heard, particularly from 

Senator Lieberman, he is generous. As I think Senator Lieberman 

said, he’s a soft touch. The other side of that is that after you touch 

him, he touches you, and you learn, after a while, that, when you 

get an envelope in the mail from the Harbour Group, your heart 

sinks, because you can’t—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DANFORTH [continuing]. Say no to Sam Fox. He has been 

involved in so many good causes in St. Louis. Washington University, which is such a stellar academic institution, the St. Louis Art 

Museum, the Boy Scouts, the United Way, and the list goes on and 

on. And, as Senator Bond pointed out, he’s been recognized for 

what he means to our town by being named Citizen of the Year. 

After Sam—after the announcement was made that Sam was— 

had been nominated for Ambassador to Belgium, I was speaking to 

my brother, Bill, about the nomination, and my brother said, ‘‘You 

know, this is a huge loss for St. Louis.’’ And I said, ‘‘Well, it’ll probably only last a few years,’’ and he said, ‘‘It’s a huge loss for St. 

Louis.’’ I think it’s a gain for our Government and our country and 

our relationship with Europe. But Sam really means a lot to St. 

Louis, and there’s no doubt about that. 

I’d just like to add one other point, Mr. Chairman. Sam is the 

nominee of a Republican President, and the Senate is no longer Republican, alas. But—so, I thought that I’d just meet head-on, you 

know, why would a Democratic Senate want to confirm Sam Fox, 

other than to get him out of the way? But I think that the reason 

is just the kind of person he is and what he would bring to the job 

of ambassador. He would bring the same energy, he would bring 

the same personal qualities, the same spirit of generosity, the same 

kindness, the same decency that are right at the heart of Sam Fox. 

And so, he would make an outstanding ambassador. 

But I—when I was preparing my thoughts for today’s meeting, 

I thought, well, I won’t just—I won’t just speak for myself. So, last 

Friday I spoke on the phone with the leading Democrat in our 

127 

State, my former colleague and my good friend, Tom Eagleton. And 

he started to dictate to me exactly what he wanted me to say about 

Sam. And then, with absolutely no confidence in my stenographic 

skill, he put it in writing, and he sent me this following quote, 

which he asked me to read to the committee. Tom Eagleton said, 

‘‘I am enthusiastically for Sam Fox to be Ambassador. He is a generous, concerned citizen of St. Louis. He is the epitome of a humanitarian.’’ And, as usual, Senator Eagleton puts it more eloquently 

than I can. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to 

support my friend before this committee. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Senator. 

We’d like to now proceed to opening statements. 

Mr. Phillips, we’d like you to begin. You can proceed with your 

opening statement. If you’d like to introduce the members of your 

family, please feel free to do so. I’ve had the opportunity to meet 

them. They seem like a wonderful family. 

In the interest of time, if it’s possible for you to summarize your 

opening testimony, that would be wonderful, because what we can 

then do is include your full testimony in the record. But, obviously, 

if you feel more comfortable reading the entirety of the testimony, 

you can certainly do so. 

STATEMENT OF STANLEY DAVIS PHILLIPS, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Members of the committee—Senator Cardin, Senator DeMint, 

Senator Coleman, Senator Voinovich—I’m honored to appear before 

you today as President Bush’s nominee to be the next Ambassador 

of the United States to Estonia. 

I would like to express my gratitude to the President and to Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they have placed in me. I 

would also like to thank Senator Dole and Senator Burr for introducing me, and very much appreciate their help and guidance. 

It would be a great privilege for me to be allowed the opportunity 

to serve the United States. Throughout my life, I have traveled 

internationally, and think there is nothing more important than to 

learn about the world and mankind. 

I began traveling internationally when I was in high school. In 

1961, as a member of one of the first student exchange programs 

between America and the Soviet Union, I attended the University 

of Moscow and then, for 2 months, traveled by plane, train, and 

boat to some regions that have since taken their place as independent countries, such as Georgia and the Ukraine. It was an incredible experience. 

I have been involved, for my entire professional life, in international commerce, for more—30 years, I promoted American business by financing accounts receivable of foreign companies by 

building showrooms for foreign exhibitors in High Point, North 

Carolina, for the international furniture market, and by manufacturing textiles in North America that were exported globally. 

During the 1990s, I served as Secretary of Commerce for North 

Carolina for Governor Jim Hunt, and had the opportunity to establish trade and business recruitment offices and lead many trade 

128 

missions to diverse nations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. 

I also had the unique experience to meet with many different heads 

of state and governments, including Prime Minister Rabin of Israel, 

Prime Minister Murayama of Japan, President Mandela of South 

Africa, President Zedillo of Mexico, and even President Mugabe of 

Zimbabwe. 

However, the most exciting international involvement of my life 

was chairing the World Games of the Special Olympics in 1999. 

One hundred and fifty countries participated, with 10,000 athletes 

and coaches visiting North Carolina, and more than 36,000 citizens 

volunteering their services over 10 days of the games. 

Most recently, I was responsible for organizing and leading a trip 

to India with the Smithsonian National Board. We experienced an 

incredible country, visiting many different cities and meeting with 

fascinating people, such as the Dalai Lama. 

These cross-cultural exchanges have taught me the vital importance of people-to-people contacts to improve mutual understanding 

and build trust and friendship. 

Now, let me turn now to our bilateral relationship with Estonia. 

The United States and Estonia have already—are already true 

partners and close allies. President Bush’s visit last November, as 

the first sitting American President to visit Estonia, highlighted 

the strength of our relationship. He and his Estonian host discussed how our nations are cooperating around the world to 

achieve common objectives and promote common values. 

A small country of only 1.3 million people, Estonia is nonetheless 

a world actor with a large footprint. In just 15 years since reestablishing its independence, Estonia made a very successful transition 

to democracy, and its economy was the second fastest growing in 

Europe in 2006. It became a NATO member, and a member of the 

European Union in 2004, and it is now sharing its democratic experience and free-market principles with countries still in transition. 

For example, Estonia is helping to train leaders, government officials, and law enforcement officers in the Ukraine, Georgia, 

Moldova, Armenia. Estonia has an amazing e-governance program 

allowing citizens and leaders to communicate and do business easily and quickly. Estonia’s cabinet room has gone paperless. Ministers review documents on computers and can even vote and send 

comments remotely. Estonia has helped many countries understand and implement e-governance projects to improve government 

efficiency and transparency. 

Estonia’s vital contributions to peace and stability are not limited 

to countries in Europe. We stand side by side in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Estonians are serving part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force and helping in Helmand province, a dangerous province in the south, where the Taliban is very 

active. Estonia has made a long-term commitment to Afghanistan, 

both by contributing troops and by prioritizing development assistance, including poppy eradication. 

The Estonian troops in Afghanistan are serving with no national 

caveats, meaning that NATO commanders have full freedom to use 

them when and how they see fit. Estonian troops are also serving 

bravely in Iraq, having suffered two combat deaths and several 

129 

wounded since deploying in 2003. Estonia is committed to the effort, and recently extended its troop mandate for another year. 

If confirmed, I would do my best to maintain and develop our 

close relationship with Estonia. 

In closing, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Kay, who is 

going to be my partner in this endeavor, and thank her for her love 

and her dedication. I would also like to thank our four daughters, 

three of whom are with us today—Lil, Bo, and Lucy; and Kate, who 

now lives in London. We are filled with pride for their accomplishments and want to thank all of them for their love and support. 

Thank you for granting me this opportunity to appear before you 

this—before this distinguished committee. And, Mr. Chairman, I’ll 

be glad to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Phillips follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STANLEY DAVIS PHILLIPS, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as President Bush’s nominee to be the next Ambassador of the United States 

to Estonia. I would like to express my gratitude to the President and Secretary Rice 

for the confidence and trust they have placed in me. I would also like to thank my 

Senators—Senator Dole and Senator Burr—for introducing me, and very much appreciate their help and guidance. 

It would be a great privilege for me to be allowed the opportunity to serve the 

United States. Throughout my life I have traveled internationally and think there 

is nothing more important than to learn about the world and mankind. 

I began traveling internationally when I was in high school. In 1961, as a member 

of one of the first student exchange programs between America and the Soviet 

Union, I attended the University of Moscow and then for 2 months traveled by 

plane, train, and boat to some regions that have since taken their place as independent countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine. It was an incredible experience. 

I have been involved for my entire professional life in international commerce. For 

more than 30 years, I promoted American business by financing accounts receivables of foreign companies, by building showrooms for foreign exhibitors in High 

Point, North Carolina for the International Furniture Market, and by manufacturing textiles in North America that were exported globally. 

During the 1990s I served as Secretary of Commerce for North Carolina and had 

the opportunity to establish trade and business recruitment offices and lead many 

trade missions to diverse nations in Europe, Asia, and Middle East. I also had the 

unique experience to meet with many different heads of state and government, including Prime Minister Rabin of Israel, Prime Minister Murayama of Japan, President Mandela of South Africa, President Zedillo of Mexico, and even President 

Mugabe of Zimbabwe. 

However, the most exciting international involvement of my life was chairing the 

World Games of the Special Olympics in 1999. One hundred fifty countries participated with 10,000 athletes and coaches visiting North Carolina and more than 

36,000 citizens volunteering their services over the 10 days of the games. 

Most recently, I was responsible for organizing and leading a trip to India for the 

Smithsonian National Board. We experienced an incredible country, visiting many 

different cities and meeting with fascinating people, such as the Dalai Lama. These 

cross-cultural exchanges have taught me the vital importance of people-to-people 

contacts to improve mutual understanding and build trust and friendship. 

Let me turn, now, to our bilateral relationship with Estonia. The United States 

and Estonia are already true partners and close allies. President Bush’s visit last 

November as the first sitting American President to visit Estonia highlighted the 

strength of our relationship. He and his Estonian hosts discussed how our nations 

are cooperating around the world to achieve common objectives and promote common values. 

A small country of only 1.3 million people, Estonia is nonetheless a world actor 

with a large footprint. In just 15 years since reestablishing its independence, Estonia made a very successful transition to democracy, and its economy was the second 

fastest growing in Europe in 2006. It became a NATO member and a member of 

the European Union in 2004, and it is now sharing its democratic experience and 

free market principles with countries still in transition. 

130 

For example, Estonia is helping to train leaders, government officials, and law enforcement officers of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia. Estonia has an 

amazing e-governance program, allowing citizens and leaders to communicate and 

do business easily and quickly. Estonia’s cabinet room has gone paperless; ministers 

review documents on computers and can even vote and send comments remotely. 

Estonia has helped many countries understand and implement e-governance 

projects to improve government efficiency and transparency. 

Estonia’s vital contributions to peace and stability are not limited to countries in 

Europe. We stand side-by-side in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Estonians 

are serving as part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Helmand 

province, a dangerous province in the south where the Taliban is very active. Estonia has made a long-term commitment to Afghanistan, both by contributing troops 

and by prioritizing development assistance, including poppy eradication. The Estonian troops in Afghanistan are serving with no national caveats, meaning that 

NATO commanders have full freedom to use them when and how they see fit. Estonian troops are also serving bravely in Iraq, having suffered two combat deaths and 

several wounded since first deploying in 2003. Estonia is committed to the effort 

and recently extended its Iraq troop mandate for another year. 

If confirmed, I would do my best to maintain and develop our close partnership 

with Estonia. 

In closing, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Kay, who is going to be my partner in this endeavor, and I thank her for her love and dedication. I would also like 

to thank our four daughters, three of whom, Lil, Bo, and Lucy, are with us today, 

and Kate who lives in London. We are filled with pride for their accomplishments 

and want to thank them for all of their love and support. 

Thank you for granting me the opportunity to appear before this distinguished 

committee. I will be pleased to answer any questions. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you. 

Mr. Fox, you can proceed with your opening statement. And, 

again, if you’d like to introduce your family, feel free to do so. And 

if you’d like to summarize your testimony, that’s—would be terrific; 

but, otherwise, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF SAM FOX, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM 

Mr. FOX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee. 

At the outset, I’d like to express my personal appreciation to Senators Kit Bond, Claire McCaskill, Joe Lieberman, Arlen Specter, 

and Jack Danforth, for coming here today to speak in my behalf. 

I am truly honored by their remarks. 

I’m also grateful to you, Senator Obama, for chairing this session 

today. 

I will make my full statement available for the committee record, 

and I will summarize in as short a period as I can. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, it’s 

a tremendous honor to appear before you today as President Bush’s 

nominee to serve as the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom 

of Belgium. I’m grateful to the President and to Secretary of State 

Rice for their confidence in me, and to this committee for its consideration. If confirmed, it would be a privilege to serve as our country’s representative to a valued ally in Europe. 

Before I go any further, please permit me, if you will, to introduce a special team, my family, that are here with me today. First 

and foremost, that beautiful young lady sitting here behind me, 

Marilyn, my partner for more than 53 years—I might say, my managing partner, at that. And we have here—as I call their names, 

if you would please acknowledge yourself—I have my daughter, 

Cherrie, my daughter, Pamela; I have my son-in-law, Allan 

131 

Clayman; I have my son, Jeff, his wife, Lota, three children, Elizabeth, Catherine, and Cici; my son, Greg, his wife, Merle, sons, Matthew, Peter, Megan; son, Steven, his wife, Nancy, and their daughter, Sophia. 

Now, I’m a little short here. We don’t have the team completed, 

because I’m missing one son-in-law, and I’m missing at least six 

grandchildren. [Laughter.] 

Senator OBAMA. I notice you did that without notes, though, 

which is very—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. It’s very impressive. 

Mr. FOX. But ask me for birthdays. [Laughter.] 

Senator OBAMA. All right. 

Mr. FOX. Mr. Chairman, as this committee knows, our country’s 

relations with Belgium are a vital part of our dealings with all of 

Europe, and increasingly with the rest of the world. 

Belgium is important, not only in its own right but also as the 

seat of the European Union and of the NATO Alliance. If Europe 

were to have a capital city, I’m convinced it would most likely be 

Brussels. 

Today, relations between Belgium and our country are robust 

and highly effective, and it’s a tribute to the tremendous work of 

our most recent Ambassador, Tom Korologos, and the talents of our 

fine diplomatic staff there. The first responsibility of any American 

Ambassador in Brussels is to maintain that relationship. And, if 

confirmed, I would take up this assignment in the only way I know 

how, by working tirelessly to build on the successes of those who 

have come before me. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, high on my list of goals as Ambassador to Belgium will be, first, to ensure the safety and the welfare 

of all American citizens, including the employees under my care 

and those working and visiting in Belgium; second, to seek Belgium’s closer partnership in our fight against international terrorism; third, to strengthen our partnership with the Belgian Government; fourth, to increase Belgium’s support of United States positions in NATO and the European Union; fifth, to expand U.S. exports and expand business investment by both nations; and sixth, 

to be a good and faithful steward of the taxpayers’ dollars. 

I hope that the committee will find my own life and career have 

prepared me for these responsibilities. I bring to this position the 

management skills that have served me well all of my life. I feel 

that I’ve been in training for this ambassadorship for a long time. 

My background has taught me how to emphasize common interests 

above points of disagreement, how to assert one’s own interests 

while respecting the views and the interests of the others. And, if 

confirmed, these are some of the skills that I would put to use as 

Ambassador to Belgium. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve also learned a few things about hard work, 

about team work, about running businesses, about managing organizations, and about meeting new challenges. And I’ll regard this 

chance to serve my country as one of the greatest challenges in a 

life full of challenges. The assignment requires hard work and complete commitment on the part of the American Ambassador in 

132 

Brussels. You have my pledge, sir, with the confidence of this committee, with the consent of the Senate, I will give it my very best. 

I want to thank all the members of this committee for your very, 

very kind attention. And now, Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fox follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SAM FOX, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee. 

At the outset, I would like to express my personal appreciation to Senators Kit 

Bond, Claire McCaskill, Joe Lieberman, Arlen Specter, and Jack Danforth for coming here today to speak on my behalf. I am honored, sir, by their remarks. 

I am also grateful to you, Senator Obama, for chairing this session today. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, it is a tremendous 

honor to appear before you today as President Bush’s nominee to serve as the 

United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium. I am grateful to the President and to Secretary of State Rice for their confidence in me, and to this committee 

for its consideration. If confirmed, it would be a privilege to serve as our country’s 

representative to a valued ally in Europe. 

Before I go any further, please permit me to introduce some very special people 

who have also joined me here today. First and foremost, the very lovely woman seated behind me is my wife, Marilyn. For the past 53 years, Marilyn has been my partner—my managing partner, I might add. If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, 

Marilyn will be a gracious and dignified representative of our country to the people 

of the Kingdom of Belgium. I am also pleased to introduce my other family members. 

Mr. Chairman, as this committee knows, our country’s relations with Belgium are 

a vital part of our dealings with all of Europe and increasingly with the rest of the 

world. Belgium is important not only in its own right, but also as the seat of the 

European Union and the NATO Alliance. If Europe were to have a capital city, most 

likely it would be Brussels. Today, relations between Belgium and our country are 

robust and highly effective—a tribute to the tremendous work of our most recent 

Ambassador, Tom Korologos, and the talents of our fine diplomatic staff there. The 

first responsibility of any American Ambassador in Brussels is to keep them that 

way. If confirmed, I would take up this assignment in the only way I know how— 

by working tirelessly to build on the successes of those who have come before me. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, high on my list of goals, as Ambassador to Belgium, 

will be: 

• First, to ensure the safety and welfare of all American citizens—including the 

employees under my care and those working and visiting in Belgium; 

• Second, to seek Belgium’s closer partnership in our fight against international 

terrorism; 

• Third, to strengthen our partnership with the Belgian Government; 

• Fourth, to increase Belgium’s support of United States positions in NATO and 

the European Union; 

• Fifth, to expand U.S. exports and expand business investment by both nations; 

and 

• Sixth, be a good and faithful steward of the taxpayers’ dollars. 

Most people of my generation first came to know of Belgium and its people in the 

war years. And it’s true that the heroic pursuits and democratic values that made 

us allies in those days—as well as the memory of the United States relief effort in 

Belgium during World War I—are still the basis of a lasting friendship. We recall 

how the Belgian people warmly welcomed American veterans to the 60th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge in Bastogne in 2004. And again in 2006, when Prime 

Minister Verhofstadt dedicated a Battle of the Bulge memorial provided by the people of Belgium and Luxembourg at Arlington National Cemetery. 

But it’s much more than nostalgia that makes Belgium the close and valued partner of America today. In the post-war years, Belgium helped to build the framework 

for the West’s lasting security as a founding member of both the European Union 

and NATO. Today, Belgium is working hard to bring the allies even closer together—at NATO, the European Union, and in many other settings—in defense of 

our freedom and human rights. Belgium backs up its talk with action—troops on 

the ground in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Lebanon. In the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo, Belgium has also labored hard to end conflict and to build democracy. 

133 

Belgium, in short, is a force for good in the world, and as much as ever our nations are joined by great and enduring interests—by ties forged on the battlefield 

in pursuit of lasting peace, and in our shared commitments to global prosperity. The 

United States and Belgium are united against terrorist threats that recognize no 

boundaries. And, if confirmed, I will work to expand this cooperation to protect our 

country and our friends from this gravest of dangers. In economic terms, our two nations trade at a value of more than $30 billion a 

year, and we share a common interest in expanding both trade and investment. If 

confirmed, I will encourage Belgium to continue to improve its investment climate 

to attract business. 

As with every other diplomatic outpost, America’s Ambassador in Brussels must 

also be a firm advocate for the fundamental values and ideals of our country—chief 

among them, freedom. 

I have long been in awe of the commitment made by those men and women who 

choose the Foreign Service as a way of life. We entrust in them the highest of honors—to serve as beacons of democracy around the world. Peace and understanding 

guide their noble efforts—their successes rarely make front page news. 

I hope that the committee will find that my own life and career have prepared 

me for these responsibilities. I would bring to this position the management skills 

which have served me well all my life. In fact, I feel that I have been training for 

this ambassadorship for a long time. 

My background has taught me how to emphasize common interests above points 

of disagreement—and how to assert one’s own interests—while respecting the views 

and interests of others. If confirmed, these are skills I would put to full use as Ambassador to Belgium. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve learned a few things about hard work—about teamwork— 

about running businesses—about managing organizations—and about meeting new 

challenges. And I regard this chance to serve my country as one of the greatest challenges in a life full of challenges. The assignment requires hard work and complete 

commitment on the part of the American Ambassador in Brussels. And you have 

my pledge, sir—that with the confidence of this committee—with the consent of the 

Senate—I will give it my very best. 

I thank all of the members of this committee for your very kind attention, and 

now, Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Fox. 

I will start off with some questions, Mr. Phillips. Some of the 

issues were raised by your testimony. 

And, by the way, we’re going to—if it’s acceptable to the members of the committee we’ll do 10-minute rounds, and we’ll—if people have additional questions after that, then we’ll be willing to extend the time somewhat. 

So, let me start with you, Mr. Phillips. You know, Estonia faces 

a number of challenges with its—with respect to its relationship to 

Russia. You know, the two countries are on different sides of 

whether the Soviet occupation of Estonia was illegal. The Kremlin’s 

objected to NATO planes patrolling Baltic airspace. Recently, Estonia has expressed concerns about Russian plans to construct an undersea gas pipeline that would give Moscow greater control over 

Estonia’s energy supplies. 

So, I’m wondering if you’ve given thought to the relationship between Russia and Estonia. If confirmed, what actions would you 

take to address some of the issues that may be arising between 

those two countries? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, the relationship between Russia 

and Estonia is very sensitive and very difficult. It goes back to 

World War II, where the Soviet troops came in and occupied Estonia. Their version is that they liberated Estonia from Naziism, so 

this contentious discussion has taken place since that time. With 

the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia declared their independence and that—since that time, this debate has continued as 

to the terminology. It has found its way into all kinds of situations, 

134 

even symbolism of the bronze statue, the debate over the border. 

But the energy issue seems to be the one that everybody is most 

concerned about, and that is, Can Estonia evolve and deal with 

their energy requirements? It’s interesting to note that imported oil 

and gas is only 30 percent of their energy requirements. Estonia 

has enormous resources of oil shale; therefore, they are able to 

have—approximately 95 percent of their electrical needs are selfproduced. It’s intriguing that they export electricity. They have recently put a line to Finland. So, they are in very good shape from 

an electrical standpoint. Oil and gas, they have the strategy of 

building a nuclear plant in the future, with the other Baltic states 

and Poland. They have the opportunity of going into liquified natural-gas terminal, where they could receive that type of supply. So, 

they are well aware, we are well aware, that energy is a major concern in the future of Estonia. But it seems, right now, with 30 percent of their energy needs only coming from Russia itself, that they 

understand the necessity of diversity, but they are in pretty good 

shape. 

Senator OBAMA. Okay, good. Just a quick follow-up on that, if we 

can answer this briefly. You know, obviously Estonia’s Government’s played an important role in consolidating democracy in eastern Europe, the transition from the cold war. And you had mentioned the work that was done on e-government. Do you see the potential for you to support Estonian initiatives in establishing more 

transparency, greater accountability in their government, and—do 

you see that as having an influence in what other countries in the 

region do? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, it’s a remarkable country. It’s ranked seventh in the Heritage Foundation of Freedom—the Freedom Index, 

higher than United States of America. Their transparency is incredible. They are truly a beacon in Europe, and maybe around the 

world. They have done an incredible formulating e-governance. The 

technology that’s come out of that country is truly remarkable. 

It’s interesting to note that Hotmail, a major part of Microsoft’s 

initiative, was created in Estonia. Skype, that was recently bought 

by eBay here in America for $2.5 billion, was created in Estonia. 

So, their technology is truly remarkable, and that they have permeated their government with this type openness and transparency, and they are talking to other emerging countries in the 

world, and especially in central Europe, to do the same thing. 

Senator OBAMA. Good. Thank you. 

Mr. Fox, you mentioned your managerial skills. And I think 

those’ll certainly come to play, in part because Belgium is the seat 

of not only your ambassadorship, but also missions to NATO and 

the European Union. So, I’m wondering, were you to be confirmed, 

how would you ensure that all the U.S. missions in the country coordinated their efforts to maximize their impact on foreign policy? 

And is this something that you’ve given some thought to? 

Mr. FOX. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know, we have a United States mission to European 

Union, and we also have a United States mission to NATO. And 

both of those have ambassadors, Ambassador Neuland to NATO 

and Ambassador Gray to the European Union. Both of those missions have the primary responsibility for that—for the respective 

135 

relationships. However, I do believe that it is the responsibility of 

the United States mission to Belgium and the ambassador to help 

promote and to persuade the Belgian Government toward United 

States views with respect to both the European Union and to 

NATO. And if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, it is my intention to have regular meetings with both of those ambassadors, 

because they’re doing very, very important work. 

And I’d go beyond that, sir. I would want to make sure that the 

staff of our embassy at all of their levels and in all of their departments, establish and maintain good relationships with their counterparts in those two missions. 

Senator OBAMA. Good. Now, Belgium was one of the leading critics of United States policy during the run-up to the war in Iraq. 

I’m wondering what your assessment is of the current status of 

United States/Belgian cooperation on security issues. Belgium 

doesn’t spend a lot of money on defense, is suspicious, at times, of 

United States military actions abroad. How would you approach 

those conversations with the Belgian Government? 

Mr. FOX. Well, to answer the last question, ‘‘How?’’ I’ve had a lot 

of experience, Mr. Chairman, in negotiations and diplomacy. And 

we’ve built plants all around the world. We’ve maintained operations all around the world; as a matter of fact, all across Europe. 

So, I’ve had a little bit of experience with that. One of the first 

things you learn is, there’s very little you can do until you build 

relationships. And it would be very important for the United States 

Ambassador to first understand the players in Belgium, and then 

go about systematically getting to understand those players and 

making sure that there is mutual respect that’s created between 

the United States Ambassador and his counterpart in the Belgian 

Government. So, that, I think, is step one. 

You ask about terrorism. I think that the Belgian Government 

has done a lot in counterterrorism. First of all, if you go to Antwerp, the Megaport Initiative, and also the Container Initiative, 

they are No. 1 in the world. They spent something like $50 million 

to install the kind of equipment that will pick up weapons of mass 

destruction or nuclear materials. They’ve passed a number of laws 

recently that have got some real teeth in them that—and they’ve 

arrested a number of people. They’ve convicted a number of people. 

I think they’re doing a good job. And I think counterterrorism is 

high on their agenda. There was a meeting here in Washington in 

November on that very subject. 

Insofar as defense is concerned, as you now, they were one of the 

founding members of NATO. And during the cold war, they were 

right there with us, tremendously. They had an armed force of 

something like, oh, 130,000 troops. One thing that is a little disappointing today is the amount of money that they are spending 

on defense. NATO’s guidelines would be 2 percent of gross domestic 

product. They presently are 1.1 to 1.3 percent. So, I think one of 

our goals should be to try to get them to get that budget up a bit. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much. 

Senator DeMint. 

Senator DEMINT. I want to thank you two gentlemen. And from 

what we hear, you’re both very qualified to represent our country, 

136 

and I look forward to assisting you in any way you can—we can 

here. 

I would like to hear both of you just talk briefly about trade and 

the ability of you, as ambassadors, of encouraging business relationships between our country and those countries that you will be 

working with. And I know both of you have extensive business experience, but, as you know—as, Mr. Fox, you just mentioned— 

building relationships is key. Doing business is one way, sports, 

like Special Olympics, another way, bring countries together so 

that we can work together beyond what governments do. And that 

helps us get through government-to-government crises. And we’ve 

certainly found that in South Carolina, doing business with BMW 

and Michelin. It doesn’t matter how much Washington fights with 

France and Germany, we’re doing business with them, and it 

doesn’t bother us that much. But I’d love to hear you both talk 

about how you, as ambassadors, can extend trade relations in this 

country. 

And, Mr. Fox, I’ll start with you. 

Mr. FOX. Well, your question has to do, as I understand it, about 

the ability of the ambassador to assist in trade. I’ll tell you this, 

that Belgium is an excellent trading partner. They’re only 10 million in population, but yet, they are our 12th largest market, 12th 

largest trading partner. They’re very business-oriented. We’ve got 

900 American companies in Belgium. And our exports to Belgium 

are $20 billion. We import $15 billion for them. We have a $5 billion trade surplus. And, as a businessman, I would do everything 

that I could to try to develop trade more by working with the 

United States Government—United States companies in Belgium, 

as well as those in America, who have products that they are exporting, or could be exported, to Belgium. 

They—the Belgian people are very oriented toward business, and 

the—they’re situated in such a place that 70 percent of their—70 

percent of the population of the European Union is within 300 

miles of Belgium, and they’ve got great waterways, roads, and so 

forth. So, in addition to what we can do with Belgium, there’s a lot 

that we can send through the port of Antwerp to other parts of Europe. 

Senator DEMINT. Excellent. 

Mr. Phillips. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Presently, there are approximately 100 American 

companies with a presence in Estonia. I made reference, a few minutes ago, to one that’s very high profile, but the impact on Estonia 

was enormous, that—their creativity of Skype and $2.5 billion of 

purchase power going in to Estonia. It shows you what’s going on 

in Estonia. 

They still have manufacturing, they still have agricultural ass 

well as manufacturing. There are furniture companies. And being 

from North Carolina—and the furniture capital of the world is 

High Point—they are companies that do import furniture from Estonia. They’re still in the textile business. We are aware of certain 

companies in North Carolina dealing with them in the textile business. This is happening all over America. So, these relationships 

are ones that exist, but I would like very much to nurture and 

bring in more relationships. I think it’s very important. This is 

137 

what I did for years for the State of North Carolina all over the 

world, trying to bring companies, but also to export products to 

these countries, and that—I would like to do the same thing for Estonia. 

Senator DEMINT. Excellent. 

Senator OBAMA. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have two extraordinary nominees here. I was actually hoping 

that I could participate in the introduction of Sam Fox, but I 

couldn’t find a seat at the table, so I’m—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Glad to be up here. 

These are two extraordinary individuals. So, I just want to thank 

you for your willingness to serve. 

I had a meeting this morning with Tim Shriver, from Special 

Olympics. We did Special Olympics in St. Paul, Minnesota, where 

I was a mayor for 8 years. And it’s extraordinary, the things, by 

the way, that they are doing. But your service, your business success, has done what—actually, Mr. Fox, I think his quote was that, 

‘‘My life and career has prepared me well for this experience.’’ I believe that to be true of both of you. 

Senator Lieberman said that Sam Fox represents what America’s 

all about. I would say that—I’d change that a little bit, amend it 

to say Sam Fox represents the best of what America is all about. 

Father came to Ellis Island from a shtetl in the Ukraine, with his 

clothes on his back, and—talk about the American success story, 

Horatio Alger’s story, that’s really what we have in front of us. And 

I know Mr. Fox better, but that’s what he’s all about. He—I had 

a chance—Senator McCaskill talked about family—I had a chance 

to be Jerusalem to have dinner with his daughter, and not just his 

daughter; it was the Sabbath dinner, Mr. Chairman, and there 

were a number of American students, young Jewish Americans who 

were kind of tapping into their culture, into their heritage. And it 

was just—it was extraordinary to be part of that. I think the 

daughter is a reflection of the father and of the mother and of the 

family that really understand what it is to give back, what it is to 

nurture and to grow. I think Mr. Fox adheres to what I call the 

‘‘manure theory of money.’’ If you just kind of pile it up, it doesn’t 

smell too good, but if you spread it around, it fertilizes and it 

grows. And Sam has been growing a lot of things in his community, 

in this country. 

And so, I believe the President has made some extraordinary 

choices, individuals whose life experience has prepared them for 

this moment, individuals who are learned, who understand this 

global economy in which we participate. So, I look forward to supporting this nomination, Mr. President—Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much. 

Senator Kerry just joined us. 

Senator Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to welcome both our nominees, and thank you very much 

for appearing here with us today. I apologize for not being here the 

whole time, but I did hear part of the testimony in my office. 

138 

Mr. Fox, you come here with an extraordinary number of distinguished introducers, and some of them good friends of mine and 

people for whom I have great respect. And I have received a number of phone calls from people who vouch for your tremendous civic 

engagement, which is obvious for all to see. And I certainly respect 

the career that you have—that brings you to this position. I think 

I saw you had won the Horatio Alger Award at some point. And, 

as one of the introducers said, you really are sort of the quintessential American Horatio Alger story. So, I tip my hat to the life you 

have led and to the contributions you have made back to the community, which are really significant. And I can understand why St. 

Louis and Missouri are proud of you, and why those who have 

come here are proud of you. 

I think you know that I have some concerns, which I will touch 

on a little. But I want to explore a few things, if I may. 

Let me ask you a generic question about America’s position in 

Europe, and Europe’s view of us that you will be walking into if 

you were to go into this job. What is your sense of where American 

foreign policy overall is with respect to the European community? 

And do you face any particular challenges at this point in time that 

might be unique to this moment as an ambassador? 

Mr. FOX. Thank you, Senator, for giving me the opportunity to 

address that subject. 

I have several thoughts. Well, first of all, as an ambassador, you 

know, I represent—I would—if confirmed, I would represent the 

United States Government. And it’s the United States Government 

agenda that I would be expected to carry out. Having said that, I 

think we have a lot of work cut out for us, particularly in Europe, 

and—because I think that—I think there’s a lot that can be done, 

and should be done, to improve the image of America in Europe. 

And I would hope that I would be able to contribute to that. 

Senator KERRY. What do you think’s happened to the image of 

America in Europe? 

Mr. FOX. Well, I don’t know any more than what I read in the 

papers, but I think that there’s a lot of concern about America, and 

I think the war in Iraq is not well received in Europe, particularly. 

And I think that has affected opinion about Americans. 

Senator KERRY. Are there other issues? What would you say has 

been the Belgian level of concern about the war on terror itself, the 

way it’s been prosecuted? 

Mr. FOX. Well, I don’t have any firsthand information on that. 

The only information that I have is what I have been provided by 

the State Department. And from what I have received from the 

State Department, it seems as if their war on terrorism has been 

very good, very cooperative. I mentioned, before you came in, earlier, Senator, that there was a very high-level meeting here, that 

you probably know about, in November, on counterterrorism. 

They’ve passed a number of laws internally. And there’s more coming. They have really taken a very strong position in being able to 

find terrorist groups and prosecuting them and putting them in 

jail. I mentioned, also, the wonderful job that they did in Antwerp, 

the Megaport Initiative and the Container Initiative, which is designed to identify weapons of mass destruction and also nuclear 

materials and so forth. 

139 

So, what—everything I have learned from the State Department 

is that they’re doing a very good job. But, having said that, you 

know, it’s never enough, because we do face a real threat. Terrorism is not just a problem for America, it’s a problem for the entire world. 

Senator KERRY. So, you have no knowledge, outside of what the 

State Department’s told you, about any concerns or issues that Belgians may have about the way we’ve prosecuted the war on terror? 

Mr. FOX. Other than the newspapers, I haven’t, no. I don’t believe so. 

Senator KERRY. Are you familiar with the SWIFT consortium, 

the bank consortium? 

Mr. FOX. Yes. 

Senator KERRY. Didn’t they express concerns about privacy 

issues? 

Mr. FOX. Yes. The—as you know, Senator, SWIFT is a private organization that is involved with the financial telecommunication of 

information, and they’re quite large, they’re extensive. They represent some 8,000 banks in 200 countries. And with counterintelligence, one of the most important things is to follow the money. 

And in trying to follow the money, there’s a very thin line to follow. 

And that is, following the money without overstepping it and violating the privacy laws of European individuals, or individuals anywhere. And that has been a concern. And my understanding is that 

there’s a number of high-level meetings taking place at this time 

in order to really tighten up those controls. 

Senator KERRY. Is it also fair to say that there’s a tension between the Belgians and us with respect to that flow of information? 

Mr. FOX. I have no personal knowledge of that, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Do you know of any efforts that are being made 

to try to harmonize United States and European data-protection 

standards? 

Mr. FOX. I’m sorry? 

Senator KERRY. Do you know of any efforts that are being made 

to try to harmonize European and United States data-protection 

standards? 

Mr. FOX. Not other than the information that I received concerning the SWIFT organization and the negotiations that are taking place in that respect. 

Senator KERRY. But the commission made a judgment faulting 

the government for, in fact, sharing information with us, correct? 

Mr. FOX. I’m not sure—I’m not sure what the allegations were. 

I just know what the issue is. And the issue, sir, has to do with 

what I said before; that is, on the one hand, trying to track the 

money, trying to get the information that’s necessary, and yet do 

so without violating—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, do you know what the state of relationship 

is between us and Belgium on this? Does the Bush administration 

dispute the assessment of the commission? 

Mr. FOX. I understand from public information that under the 

U.S. Treasury Department’s Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 

(TFTP), SWIFT has produced certain financial transaction records 

in response to lawful subpoenas served on SWIFT’s U.S. operating 

center. European data privacy authorities have raised questions 

140 

about SWIFT’s practice of maintaining global data in the United 

States, where it is subject to U.S. Law enforcement authorities. We 

certainly expect that SWIFT like any other multinational entity 

would follow the applicable laws in the countries in which it operates. The Treasury Department is working with the European 

Union and its member states to try to resolve concerns, so as to 

allow this important counterterrorism program to continue in a responsible way. 

Senator KERRY. Do you know when the elections are going to be 

held in Belgium? 

Mr. FOX. Well, they must be held before October of 2007, and 

there’s speculation it may be as early as June. 

Senator KERRY. What do you see as potential outcome of that 

election? And what is the impact of that on our relationship? 

Mr. FOX. The—well, it’s very difficult to say. I think, from what 

I have heard, most people believe that the Socialist Party in Flanders and the Liberal Party in Flanders, together with the Socialist 

Party in Wallonia and the Liberal Party of Wallonia, will continue 

to form the government. By the same token, the Christian Democracy in Flanders has become more popular, and they’re middle-ofthe-road, as you know. The Liberal Party is more to the right, and 

the Socialists are more to the left. The Christian Democracy— 

Democratic Party is more in the middle. And so, they could have 

a little bit of an impact. Insofar as the far right political party, 

Vlaams Belang, I—it doesn’t appear as if they’re going to have 

much traction. And, even if they do, it’s my understanding that the 

other political parties there would not be interested in forming a 

government with them. 

Senator KERRY. Do you believe that one outcome or another has 

an impact on our current ability to cooperate with respect to NATO 

and European Union issues? 

Mr. FOX. I’m sorry, I missed your first—I’m sorry, sir. 

Senator KERRY. I’ll speak up. Do you believe that the outcome of 

that election would have an impact on our ability to pursue our interests with respect to either European Union defense issues or 

NATO? 

Mr. FOX. I’ve not heard anyone express that. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. What about—— 

Senator OBAMA. Senator—— 

Senator KERRY. I’m sorry, my time is up. 

Senator OBAMA. Your time is up. So, what I’d like to do is—— 

Senator KERRY. I’ll come back. 

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Give the opportunity for Senator 

Coleman, if he has a second round of questions. I do not. Senator—— 

Senator COLEMAN. I’ll—— 

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Coleman—— 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Yield to Senator Kerry, let him 

finish his question. 

Senator OBAMA. Okay. 

Senator KERRY. I’m happy to—you want to—— 

Senator COLEMAN. I have no questions at this time. 

Senator OBAMA. Good. 

Why don’t we start a new round. 

141 

Senator Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

In your view, is there a role that Belgium’s royal family might 

be able to play in managing relations between Flemings and Walloons? 

Mr. FOX. The—you know, you have a constitutional monarchy 

there with King Albert II, but that’s mostly ceremonial. And to the 

best of my knowledge, they’re really not involved politically and 

with governmental matters, other than that. 

Senator KERRY. So, you would say no role with—— 

Mr. FOX. Well, I—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Respect to—— 

Mr. FOX. I would not be aware of any role. 

Senator KERRY. What about the prospect of a split between the 

two communities? I understand recently there was—I think it was 

a radio show or something that was meant to be joke, and turned 

out to send serious alarm bells through the community. What’s 

your readout on that? 

Mr. FOX. Right. It certainly did. Well, I think everyone’s kind of 

amazed as to how Wallonia and Flanders can make up a country 

when they’re so different. They’re different languages. They have 

their own parliaments. But yet, it somehow seems to work. And 

Belgium—or Brussels is right in the middle of all of that. 

I—from everything I’ve heard, there—the consensus of what I’ve 

heard is that there is not going to be a breakup. Now, could there 

be? You know, certainly. But I haven’t heard anything that would 

make it appear that that sort of a breakup was on the horizon. 

Senator KERRY. What is your judgment about where we are 

today in our leverage in Europe, relative to where we were 6 years 

ago? Would you say it’s improved or diminished? 

Mr. FOX. I don’t—that’s difficult to say. I would say that, as I— 

as earlier, the question about the feeling in Belgium toward Americans, about America, I think that that’s probably true across—all 

across Europe. And I think we’ve got a lot of work to do. As a matter of fact, Karen Hughes, who is now Under Secretary of State, 

that’s her whole job, to try to develop that. And she’s come up with 

a number of ways to help those relationships. One is to—— 

Senator KERRY. I think he wants you to pull the mike a little 

closer, Mr. Fox. 

Mr. FOX. Closer? 

Senator KERRY. Yeah. Just pull the whole thing. There you go. 

You can even pull it closer, if you want. 

Mr. FOX. Even closer than that? 

Senator KERRY. Sure. I think it helps him out here. 

Mr. FOX. Okay. 

Senator KERRY. Thanks. 

Mr. FOX. And I think Karen Hughes’ position is that we need to 

be able to more clearly articulate American views and why, the 

background. She also feels that we need to try to make other countries know that terrorism is a worldwide matter, and we’re all subject to it, and we’re really partners. It’s a problem for all of us. And 

she feels, I believe—and I don’t want to speak for her, this is just 

what I’ve read—that we need to do a better job of articulating that. 

Senator KERRY. Have you ever been to Belgium? 

142 

Mr. FOX. Oh, yes, sir. 

Senator KERRY. How many—for business or—— 

Mr. FOX. Business and pleasure. As a matter of fact, I—in the 

middle 1970s, I built an operation in Ireland, in the north of Ireland, and then, in the south of Ireland, we brought a new industry 

there. And one of our large markets was Belgium. 

Senator KERRY. This was under which banner, which company, 

that—— 

Mr. FOX. That was Synthetic Industries. 

Senator KERRY. Okay. And what do you think—I mean, looking 

at these challenges that we’ve just articulated, in terms of where 

we stand in Europe today and, sort of, the problem of Iraq and the 

others issues that are extant, you obviously have a lot of community skills. And I don’t question your business acumen. But you 

don’t have government experience. Do you believe—or foreign policy experience—do you—sort of, help the committee to understand 

what special skills you believe you bring to the table at this point 

with respect to the needs of this relationship. 

Mr. FOX. Yeah, well, first of all, as I said before, I’ve been a businessman all of my life, and it’s kind of in my blood. And the—I 

think managing relationships is not much different than—in the 

government—than it is managing relationships in business, because human beings are involved, and you have to build mutual 

trust and understanding between individuals so that you can then 

communicate. The—I’ve had a lot of—a lot of experience teaching 

organizations, you know, how to think as one, how to work as a 

team. I’ve had a lot of experience in teaching organizations and 

people how to think strategically, how to set objectives, how to 

measure results. And I think I know what it takes to build character and integrity into organizations, and create a reputation for 

fair dealing. And I think it’s the latter that is so very, very important in building a relationship with counterparts in a government. 

I’ve had—because we—our businesses are located all around the 

world, and have been for a long time, I’ve had a fair amount of experience dealing with foreign governments and their agencies. So— 

well, Europe, for instance, I’ve made more than 100 business trips 

to Europe. And so, I think that that experience will help me. I certainly hope it will. 

Senator KERRY. Well, that’s impressive. That’s a lot more than 

some people bring to this table. So, I think it is important. 

The Belgian Prime Minister has called for the transformation of 

the European Union’s security and defense policy into a real military force that could cooperate independently of NATO. What do 

you see as the principal strategic tensions between the ESDP and 

NATO? 

Mr. FOX. Well, I had—again, as a United States Ambassador, I 

would be looking for this Government to come to their conclusions 

on that, and it would be up to me, then, to push that agenda. 

Senator KERRY. So, you don’t want to put forward any independent views on that, at this point. 

Mr. FOX. I don’t think my independent views are that important 

in the role of ambassador. 

143 

Senator KERRY. What about the charge that you’ve—have you 

been specifically charged with respect to that effort? Have you been 

briefed with respect to it? 

Mr. FOX. No, sir—— 

Senator KERRY. Do you have an opinion? 

Mr. FOX [continuing]. I have not. 

Senator KERRY. No? 

Mr. FOX. No. 

Senator KERRY. Let me ask a few questions that go to something 

that I think is important, which is the question of—both a combination of citizenship and judgment, if you will, is the way I might 

phrase it. And I want to try to ask these questions as fairly as possible. I’m not trying to play some kind of gotcha game here, I assure you. But it’s important to me, in thinking through this issue 

of judgment, to explore this a little bit. 

I assume that you believe that the truth in public life is important. 

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir. 

Senator KERRY. And might I ask you what your opinion is with 

respect to the state of American politics, as regards the politics of 

personal destruction? 

Mr. FOX. Senator, I am on record, more than one time—several 

times—being interviewed by the press, and particularly the St. 

Louis Post Dispatch. And I am very concerned with the amount of 

money that’s going into politics. And I’m more concerned about the 

fact that politics has become mean and destructive. And when I 

was interviewed in 2000, I said that I was very—I was for campaign finance reform, because I felt that if less money was going 

into politics, it would turn the whole volume down. I want to turn 

the volume down. I would hope there would be less meanness and 

destructiveness. When 527s came along, I had the very same thing 

to say about them. So, I—that’s the way I feel. 

And, Senator, let me just say this. I’m against 527s. I’ve always 

been against 527s. I think, again, they’re mean and destructive. I 

think they’ve hurt a lot of good, decent people. And, Senator Kerry, 

I very much respect your dedicated service to this country. I know 

that you were not drafted, you volunteered, you went to Vietnam, 

you were wounded, highly decorated. Senator, you’re a hero. And 

there isn’t anybody or anything that’s going to take that away from 

you. But you had 527s try to. And, by the same token, on the other 

side of the aisle, 527s—one 527 went so far as to compare the 

President of the United States with Adolf Hitler. So, I am on public 

record as being against 527s because of all the meanness, and I’m 

against the amount of money that goes into political campaigns, for 

that reason, the same reason—not once or twice, but three or four 

times. And I would just—I wish that Congress could find a way to 

either ban 527s or at least regulate them. 

Senator OBAMA. Senator Kerry, I just want to point out, we’ve 

gone through another 10-minute round. 

Senator KERRY. Yeah. 

Senator OBAMA. I’m sure that you want to continue this line of 

questioning. I don’t have any more questions. I feel obliged to make 

sure that Senator Coleman—— 

Senator COLEMAN. Let Senator Kerry—— 

144 

Senator OBAMA. Okay. 

Senator KERRY. If I could—— 

Senator OBAMA. Let’s just—— 

Senator KERRY. Thanks. I apologize to my colleagues. 

Senator OBAMA. Thanks. Go ahead. 

Senator KERRY. I just want to explore this a little bit. 

I certainly appreciate the comments you just made, Mr. Fox. And 

I’m not looking for anybody to call me a hero. I think most of the 

heroes died, and do die. And those of us who are lucky enough get 

out of here are lucky. 

But notwithstanding the comments you made, you did see fit to 

contribute a very significant amount of money in October to a 

group called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, correct? 

Mr. FOX. Correct. 

Senator KERRY. Why would you do that, given what you just said 

about how bad they are? 

Mr. FOX. Well, Senator, I have to put it into the proper context, 

and bear with me. 

Marilyn and I have lived the American dream. There is no question about it. My father came here with the clothes on his back, 

and the Fox family and the Widman family have truly lived this— 

the American dream, and it’s been very, very good to us. 

I heard a couple of—mention here that we gave to 150 charities. 

I actually went back and had my staff count. In 2005–2006, we 

made more than 1,000 contributions. More than 100 of those were 

political, 900-and-some-odd were charitable and to institutions 

and—of learning and so forth. A great deal of those had to do with 

basic human needs. I think it was Senator Danforth mentioned, 

every time he got a letter that had Harbour Group on it, that he 

shuddered, because it was going to cost him money. Marilyn and 

I both raise a lot of money for a lot of people. 

The point I’m making is this. We ask a lot of people for money, 

and people ask us for money. And, very fortunately, we’ve been 

blessed with being successfully financially. And when we’re asked, 

we generally give, particularly, you know, if we know who gave it. 

Senator KERRY. Who asked you to give to the SBVT? 

Mr. FOX. I can’t tell you specifically who did, because I—you 

know, I don’t remember. I—as a matter of fact, if I—— 

Senator KERRY. You have no recollection of why you gave away 

$50,000? 

Mr. FOX. I gave away $50,000 because I was asked to. 

Senator KERRY. But you have no recollection of who asked you 

to give away $50,000? 

Mr. FOX. No. No, sir. I’ve given away sums much larger than 

that to a lot of other places, and I can’t tell you specifically who 

asked me, no. 

Senator KERRY. Well, you don’t think that it’s important, as a citizen who doesn’t like 527s, to know where your money is going and 

how it’s going to be spent? 

Mr. FOX. Well, I think, with most contributors—and, as a matter 

of fact, you know, if you go to other side of the political campaign, 

and we give to individual candidates, we don’t know how they’re 

going to use that money and how it’s—you know, we don’t—— 

145 

Senator KERRY. Well, at least it’s accountable to an individual 

candidate for whom people have to vote or not vote. As you said, 

527 is mean and ugly and not accountable. 

Mr. FOX. I agree with that. I absolutely agree with that. And 

I—— 

Senator KERRY. So, why would you give—— 

Mr. FOX [continuing]. Accountability would put it—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. $50,000 to a group that you have no 

sense of accountability for? 

Mr. FOX. Well, because if 527s were banned, then it’s banned for 

both parties. And so long as they’re not banned—— 

Senator KERRY. So, two wrongs make a right? 

Mr. FOX. Well, I don’t know. But if one side is contributing, the 

other side ought to—— 

Senator KERRY. But is that your judgment? Is that your—— 

Mr. FOX. I’m sorry? 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Judgment that you would bring to 

the ambassadorship, that two wrongs make a right? 

Mr. FOX. No, I didn’t say that two wrongs made a right, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Well, why would you do it, then? 

Mr. FOX. Well, I did it, because politically it’s necessary if the 

other side’s doing it. 

Senator KERRY. Well, let me ask—did you ever see, on August 

20, 2004, a St. Louis Dispatch editorial wrote the following, ‘‘The 

smear campaign was funded and orchestrated by a coterie of Texans with strong ties to the Bush family and the President’s political 

director, Karl Rove. The President should disown the ads and tell 

his friends that he wants them to stop. Mr. Bush can’t wash his 

hands of the Swift Boat Veterans smear because of his close personal connections with the principals. The Swift Boat Veterans on 

Mr. Kerry’s boat, including the man he pulled from the river, support Mr. Kerry’s version of events. So to the records documenting 

the medals Mr. Kerry received. The attack ads, by contrast, are riddled with inconsistencies. For example’’—and it goes on. 

That was in your own newspaper in your hometown. But, a 

month later, you, nevertheless, contribute to that very group that 

is smearing and spreading lies. 

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir. All of the 527s were smearing lies and—— 

Senator KERRY. So, you see no responsibility, as an individual 

citizen, to try to guarantee that you’re not going to support that 

kind of politics of personal destruction. 

Mr. FOX. I think if one side is giving to, the other side almost 

has to. And I think that the real responsibility should rest with the 

Congress to either ban 527s or to, certainly, curtail and regulate 

them. That’s the problem. 

Senator KERRY. So, you do believe ‘‘anything goes’’ in a political 

campaign. 

Mr. FOX. I’m sorry? 

Senator KERRY. You do believe that ‘‘anything goes’’ in a political 

campaign. 

Mr. FOX. No, sir, I don’t—in fact, I do not involve—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, if you don’t believe it, why would you 

not—— 

Mr. FOX. No—— 

146 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Not fund it? 

Mr. FOX. I’m sorry, sir. I have never gotten involved on the campaign side. I’d raise money, I’d contribute money. I’ve never gotten 

involved on the campaign side, and I’ve never gotten involved in 

the 527 side of looking at script or any of that. 

Senator KERRY.Well, let me ask you, as a matter of judgment, as 

a citizen, don’t you think individuals ought to take some responsibility for making sure they know what they’re giving money to? 

Mr. FOX. Mr. Senator, when we ask lots of people for lots of 

money—and we’re asked by people for lots of money—we just generally give. I mean, we know generally what it’s used for, but that’s 

it. 

Senator KERRY. And you don’t know who asked you. 

Mr. FOX. No, sir, I really don’t. I do not know who asked me. I 

couldn’t—if the—if you were to take our thousand contributions 

and go right down the list, I’d bet you I couldn’t give you 5 percent 

of them—of who asked me. 

Senator KERRY. Do you recall whether it was somebody in Missouri or somebody—was it in person? Was it a—by telephone? 

Mr. FOX. I have no recollection. 

Senator KERRY. No recollection of how that came about. 

Mr. FOX. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Do you recall thinking about it at all? 

Mr. FOX. No more than that somebody must have asked, and I 

gave. 

Senator KERRY.Well, no wonder so many people are here to embrace your—what about now? How do you feel about it now, knowing what you know today? 

Mr. FOX. Mr. Senator, let me say this. Be it 527 or anything else, 

if I thought what they were printing was not true, I would not contribute to it. But I personally have no way of knowing, generally, 

when I give. 

Senator KERRY. Well, let me ask you about that. On August 5, 

2004, John McCain called the SBVT, quote, ‘‘completely nauseating, dishonest, and dishonorable.’’ McCain pointed out it was ‘‘the 

same kind of deal that was pulled on me’’ when he ran against 

Bush in 2000. 

On August 15, John Warner, Republican chairman of the Armed 

Services Committee and former Navy Secretary, said, quote, ‘‘I can 

speak to the process, that we did extraordinary careful checking on 

that type of medal, a very high one, when it goes through the Secretary, so I’d stand by the process that awarded Kerry that medal, 

and I think we’d best acknowledge that his heroism did gain that 

recognition. I feel he deserved it.’’ He was then, incidently, in the 

Navy. He signed my award. 

August 8, 2004, General Tommy Franks called the smear boat 

attacks, quote, ‘‘vitriolic and hyperbole.’’ 

On August 7, 2004, Mike Johanns, Republican Governor of Nebraska, says the ads were trash. 

Now, these are Republican leaders. These are the leaders of your 

own party. President Bush said that he thought that my service 

was honorable and they shouldn’t be questioning it. Yet, even when 

your own candidate does that, you saw fit to put $50,000 on the 

line to continue the smear. 

147 

My question to you is, Why? When you say you couldn’t have 

known, these were people very publicly condemning it. How could 

you not have known? 

Mr. FOX. I just—Mr. Senator, when I’m asked, I just generally 

give. 

Senator KERRY. So, again, I ask you the question, Do you think, 

now, that you and others bear a responsibility for thinking about 

where we put money in American politics and what we’re saying, 

what we present to the American people. Is truth important, or 

isn’t it? 

Mr. FOX. Senator, if I had reason to believe, and if I were convinced, that the money was going to be used to—in any untruthful 

or false way, knowingly, I would not give. 

Senator KERRY. Well, sir, let me ask you this question. Did you 

or did you not in any of the public comments being made at the 

time, which I assume you’re following, hear or read of any of the 

public statements at that point in time with respect to the legitimacy of these charges and these smears? 

Mr. FOX. Mr. Senator, I can say this. 

Senator KERRY. I mean, did you miss this? In September of 2004, 

the Vice Admiral Route, the Navy inspector general, wrote a memo 

to the Secretary of the Navy that was made public—New York 

Times, Washington Post, every major newspaper of the country carried—saying their examination found the existing documentation 

regarding my medals was legitimate. 

Mr. FOX. Yeah. 

Senator KERRY. Did you miss that, too? 

Mr. FOX. I don’t remember those. But I’m certain, at the time, 

that I must have read them. 

Senator KERRY. Do think this should matter to me? 

Mr. FOX. I’m sorry? 

Senator KERRY. Do you think this should matter to me? 

Mr. FOX. Yes, I do. I do. 

Senator KERRY. Do you think it should matter to everybody here, 

who’s a Senator? 

Mr. FOX. Absolutely. And, as a matter of fact, going back to the 

time that—when I said I was on record, when I was interviewed 

a number of times about campaign finance reform and about less 

money going in, I said one of the reasons—one of the big reasons 

was not just the nastiness and so forth associated with it, but the 

abuse that candidates had to take to run for public office. I think 

it’s disgraceful. I think it’s terrible. But that’s the world we live in. 

That’s what it’s come to. It’s unfortunate. I don’t know of a campaign—a political campaign or a 527 that’s ever had anything but 

that as part of it. And I think it’s terrible. I do. I wish there was 

some way it could be changed. And I think the best way to change 

it is to restrict the amount of money that can go into campaigns, 

and to restrict the amount of money that can go into 527s, and regulate both of them even more. 

Senator KERRY. Well, we’ve been trying to do that for the 22 

years I’ve been here. And one of the most effective ways to do it 

would be for people like yourself and others who write the checks 

to know what they’re giving to, and to care about it. 

148 

So, you know, there’s a question here, obviously, of judgment. I’m 

not going to try and be unreasonable about it. I’m not trying to— 

you know, sometimes you go to these hearings, and Senators rant 

and rave and scream. And I’m not a screamer. But I do think this 

is important. And I know your family is here. I’m sure they’re sitting there saying, ‘‘Why are they giving my dad a hard time right 

now?’’ And I understand that. I’m sympathetic to it. But I hope you 

know, it’s not going to make a difference in the outcome where I 

am, but it’s important to the future. I think it is robbing this country of legitimate dialog, of real discussion of important issues that 

we face. And, you know, it’s a tragedy that the American people 

have to put up with that. The last week, alone, in the State of 

Ohio, $4 million was spent on those ads. Four million dollars. 

So, it has profound impact, sir. 

Mr. FOX. Yeah. 

Senator KERRY. And I think it’s a question of judgment, a question of whether we are fighting the status quo or whether we’re 

part of the status quo. So, I’m not sure where this goes with respect to this, but I certainly thought it deserved to be properly vetted. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence, and that of my 

colleague. 

Senator OBAMA. Senator Coleman—— 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank—— 

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. You’d like a couple of minutes? 

Senator COLEMAN. Just a couple of minutes, Chairman. I just 

want to note to my colleague from Massachusetts, this should matter to all of us. And it’s not just a personal thing with Senator 

Kerry, but it’s ugly out there, and we—I would hope we’d figure out 

a way to deal with it, because it’s hurtful and it’s destructive. So, 

I think it should matter to us. 

My concern, as we sit here today, is that I think it would be a 

terrible shame if we were to disqualify folks from service because 

they contributed. I presume, at some point in time, there’ll be a 

Democrat President, and, unless we change this, we’ll have folks of 

also great generosity and great accomplishment and great experience who can add much to—in their service to their country, who 

probably have contributed to similar 527s on the other side. And 

I hope that—first, I hope that we fix it. If we can’t fix it, then we 

look at those individuals and their life experience and what they’ve 

done and what they’ve built, and then we judge them on that. But 

clearly, this should matter to all of us. 

I just have one question for you, Mr. Fox. Did you have anything 

to do with the messaging of—any involvement in the messaging of 

the Swift Boat ads? 

Mr. FOX. No, absolutely none. As a matter of fact, the other 

side—political campaigns—no, I’ve never gotten involved in the 

campaign part at all. Only giving money or raising money. 

Senator COLEMAN. Again, I could imagine a time when we have 

nominees from the other party who have also been very generous 

and contribute a range of things, and I would hope that we’d be 

able to judge them on their life experience, on what they’ve built 

and what they have contributed. And I do think we have before us 

two outstanding nominees here. 

149 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Coleman. 

Let me just take my prerogative as chairman of this subcommittee to just make a comment. I think Senator Coleman is 

right that we get a lot of ambassadorial nominees before us who 

have made political contributions. And political campaigns are 

ugly, and we don’t expect every single person who’s made a contribution to be held accountable for everything that’s said in the 

course of a campaign. 

I have to note that the Swift Boat ads were of a different degree, 

even in the ugly arena of politics. They were extraordinarily well 

publicized, that there was essentially a fraud being perpetrated on 

the American people. It had a profound impact on the election. And 

I have to say, you know, sitting here, Mr. Fox, I found your statement somewhat unsatisfying, to say that you gave because it’s ugly 

out there and people—somebody asked you to give. I mean, it 

sounds to me like you were aware that this was not the best of political practices, and you thought it was okay to go ahead and contribute to them. And, you know, I just would like to make a personal note of the fact that—you know, politics is a rough business, 

and I think we understand that. And no side is pure in this process. There was something particularly insidious and destructive 

about these ads. By the time you contributed, it was pretty widely 

noted—it would have been hard for you to miss the fact that there 

was something particularly nasty and insidious about these ads. It 

had been well publicized at this point. It strikes me that—I don’t 

think you necessarily crafted the message, but you certainly knew, 

at that point, what the message was. And, you know, I think it’s 

important for all of us in public life to take note of that and to examine our hearts and to think about what lessons we draw from 

that. 

I would have preferred you saying, you know, ‘‘In retrospect, 

looking back, contributing to this—the Swift Boat campaign was a 

mistake, and I wish I hadn’t done it.’’ That would have been, I 

guess, the message I would have preferred to hear. I—obviously, 

I’m not responsible for your statements. But I think it’s worthwhile 

to reflect on that, particularly should you get confirmed to an ambassadorship, because part of our task is, I hope, in the war on terrorism and in our efforts to secure this Nation—part of that task 

is to project our ideals and our values. And I can say, knowing a 

lot of people overseas, that those Swift Boat ads did nothing to enhance the world’s view of American politics. And, you know, the— 

I think it’s important for all of us to be mindful that when we’re 

given these positions of responsibility, that we’re carrying forward 

not just our own reputations, but also the reputations of the people 

that we hope to serve. 

So, I’d like to thank the witnesses for testifying today. I thank 

their patience. I thank the families’ forbearance. You know, these 

are always fun, sometimes, but also can be lengthy. I appreciate 

both of you gentlemen’s willingness to serve this country and to 

present yourselves for these positions. 

The record will remain open for 1 day so that the committee 

members may submit additional questions to the nominees. I ask 

that the nominees respond expeditiously if any questions are preVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00157 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
150 

sented to you. I’m sure that the State Department would provide 

you assistance in responding to those questions. 

If nobody has any additional comments, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SAM FOX TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Who asked you to become a member of the Bush Rangers for the 2004 

presidential campaign? 

Answer. No one asked me to become a member. I became a member of my own 

volition. 

Question. Please identify any individual or organization who contacted you, or 

whom you contacted, with respect to making a donation to Swift Boat Veterans for 

Truth. 

Answer. I don’t recall. 

Question. Please describe any and all conversations, meetings, or communications 

regarding the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth that you had with any of the following 

individuals: Karl Rove, Ken Mehlman, or any official or consultant of Bush-Cheney 

2004 and/or the Republican National Committee; John O’Neill; Ann Wagner; and 

William Franke. 

Answer. I don’t know a John O’Neill nor a William Franke. Insofar as any of the 

others, to the best of my recollection I have never had any conversations, meetings, 

or communications with any of the listed individuals or organizations regarding 

Swift Boat. 

Question. Did you receive any acknowledgement or thank you for your contribution to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth? If so, from whom? 

Answer. To the best of my knowledge I have never received any acknowledgement 

or thank you for my contribution to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. 

Question. Do you have any evidence that any of the allegations made by the Swift 

Boat Veterans for Truth about Senator John Kerry are true? If so, please provide 

that evidence to the committee. 

Answer. I have no personal knowledge or evidence as to the accuracy of the claims 

made in the Swift Boat ads. As I testified at the hearing, I did not make an attempt 

to verify the factual basis of the ads at the time I was solicited for my contribution. 

As I further testified, my wife and I made over a thousand charitable and political 

contributions in a 2-year period and it’s simply impractical for me to do any significant due diligence on that many contributions. 

RESPONSES OF SAM FOX TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. You testified that you do not recall who asked you to contribute to Swift 

Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT). At the time of your donation, what was your understanding as to what your money would be used for? What did you understand 

SBVT’s purpose at that time to be? 

Answer. I assumed that my contribution would be used for the SBVT’s general 

purposes, including administrative expenses, fundraising, advertising, but did not 

have any understanding whatever as to how my contribution would be spent. 

Question. At the time of your donation, did you know, for example, that SBVT 

would be airing TV ads? Did you know that these would attack Senator Kerry? 

Answer. I was aware that SBVT aired TV ads and that the content of such ads 

dealt with Senator Kerry. 

Question. You indicated that 527’s were supporting ‘‘parties’’ on both sides. What 

did you mean by this? At the time of your donation, what relationship did you understand SBVT to have had with the RNC, the Bush campaign, or any other Republican party, officeholder, or candidate? 

151 

Answer. I meant that I believed that there were 527’s that were supporting and 

opposing the candidates of both the Democratic and Republican parties. At the time 

of my donation, I did not understand SBVT to have any relationship with the RNC, 

the Bush campaign, or any other Republican party, officeholder, or candidate, and 

believed it to be an independent organization operating under section 527. 

Question. At the time of your donation to SBVT, what was your understanding 

as to the purpose of 527 organizations? What was your understanding as to their 

legality and the place they fit within the campaign finance system? 

Answer. At the time of my donation to SBVT, I had a general understanding that 

527 organizations legally existed as issue advocates that were permitted to solicit 

funds for that purpose. I had a general understanding that 527 organizations were 

separate and distinct from political parties and candidate campaign committees. 

Question. At the time of your donation, did you understand that SBVT would use 

your funds in connection with a particular election? For example, did you understand that it would use your funds to influence the 2004 Presidential election? If 

not, what did you understand the purpose of the organization to be? 

Answer. I had no understanding as to SBVT’s use of my donation. I assumed that 

SBVT’s purposes were to do what it could to publicize the issues that it had been 

pursuing. 

Question. Have you ever been contacted, formally or informally, by the Federal 

Election Commission regarding your donation to SVBT or for any other purpose? 

Answer. No. 

Question. After the election, were you contacted by counsel or other representatives of SVBT or the Bush campaign regarding your donation to SBVT or any other 

527 organization that you may have contributed to? 

Answer. No. 

With respect to Question 5 of the prior list of Questions for the Record, submitted 

on March 2, 2007, to wit: 

Question. Did you receive any acknowledgement or thank you for your contributions to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth? If so, from whom? 

Answer. After my assistant checked my records, we found the attached acknowledgement of my contribution. 

[The information referred to follows.] 

SWIFT BOAT VETERANS FOR TRUTH, 

Alexandria, VA, November 2, 2004. 

Mr. Sam Fox 

Clayton, MI. 

DEAR MR. FOX: Thank you very much for your recent contribution in the amount 

of $50,000.00 to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. The only way we can get the 

truth out about John Kerry is with the help of Americans such as you. 

We are proud to have you with us. 

Very truly yours, 

WEYMOUTH D. SYMMES, 

Treasurer. 

(153) 

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Almquist, Katherine, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development for Africa 

Bonicelli, Paul J., to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency 

for International Development for Latin America and the Caribbean 

Chin, Curtis S., to be U.S. Director of the Asian Development 

Bank, with the rank of Ambassador 

Debevoise, Eli Whitney, III, to be U.S. Executive Director of the 

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 

Kunder, James R., to be Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

Lundsager, Margrethe, to be U.S. Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund 

Menarchik, Douglas, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development for Europe and Eurasia 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez and Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. This hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Relations will come to order. 

Today, the committee will consider the nominations for four administrators at the United States Agency for International Development, and three U.S. representatives at international financial 

institutions. I want to welcome the nominees, as well as their families who may be here, to the hearing. 

I’m happy to be joined by the ranking member of the full committee, Senator Lugar, and also thank Senator Hagel, who is the 

ranking member of the Subcommittee on International Development, Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection—I wish I could get a dollar for every time 

I had to say that, who is unable to join us today. 

I know we have a busy agenda, so I will recognize myself for an 

opening statement. 

154 

While today’s hearing is technically a nominations hearing, in 

my mind it also is a forum to discuss the broader issue of U.S. foreign assistance. Yes, we’re going to examine the qualifications of all 

of these nominees, but, in my mind, equally as important, we’ll be 

asking the question, ‘‘Is each nominee the best candidate for a position where they will be in charge of a key aspect of our United 

States foreign assistance program?’’ 

‘‘Why does U.S. foreign assistance matter?’’ I was asked earlier 

today in an interview. It’s because we care that, globally, 10.6 million children are still dying from preventable diseases every year. 

It is because we care that nearly 2.7 billion people live on less than 

$2 a day. It’s because we care that every 5 seconds, a child dies 

from a hunger-related cause. Yes, it’s also because it is in our national interest and our national security interest to help create a 

stable and secure world around us. 

As President Kennedy said when he signed the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961, creating USAID, he said, quote, ‘‘In enacting this 

legislation, Members of the Congress, of both parties, have, again, 

demonstrated their understanding that it is in our national obligation and in our national interest and security to work for a world 

in which there is a chance for national sovereignty and national 

independence.’’ That’s why this hearing is so important. That’s why 

I plan to carry out a vigorous oversight of our foreign assistance 

programs as chairman of the subcommittee. Our subcommittee has 

been tasked with the job of looking at every aspect of U.S. foreign 

assistance, from the Millennium Challenge Corporation to USAID 

and the international financial institutions. Today’s hearing will be 

the first in a series of hearings that take a close look at these programs. 

As we talk with these nominees, and as we proceed in the 

months to come, I hope to examine at least four major concerns 

that I have with our foreign assistance programs. First, the President has created a vision for transformational development, with 

the head of USAID also acting as the head of all U.S. foreign assistance inside the State Department. And, while I generally support the idea of coordinating all of our foreign assistance to avoid 

duplication, I am concerned that there may be unintended consequences from such a reorganization. I am also concerned that the 

new policy of graduating countries from U.S. assistance, and the 

new framework with a focus on shorter-term strategic issues, may 

take away from some of our long-term core development goals, such 

as poverty reduction. 

My second question is, What’s the future of USAID? By all accounts, the power and influence of USAID, the principal U.S. agency for foreign development aid, is slowly being chipped away, and 

I look at that through a series of signs. The head of USAID now 

sits at the State Department, not USAID. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is clearly taking money, prestige, and power 

away from USAID. And, if you look at the total foreign aid budget, 

State and USAID only had about 53 percent of the total budget in 

2005, with other agencies managing the rest. It seems to me that 

we’re in the process of decimating an agency that clearly has had 

bureaucratic problems, but that is also full of many, many qualified 

and talented people who actually know a great deal about developVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00162 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
155 

ment. And these challenges—changes, I should say, warrant greater security. 

I am also concerned about the Department of Defense’s new role 

in development. According to the Congressional Research Service, 

in 2005 the DoD disbursed about 24 percent of the development 

budget, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan. I question why the Defense Department is playing such a large role in development, particularly when the record in Iraq and the reports from the special 

inspector for Iraq reconstruction have shown they have done a poor 

job of it. 

Finally, an issue I plan to examine at great length is the administration’s foreign assistance budget. Although I support the general concept and goals of the Millennium Challenge Account, I am 

alarmed that the core development accounts have been cut as we 

pursue the MCC. A study last year from the Center for Global Development found that MCA-eligible and compact countries have experienced unequivocal reductions in the development assistance account at the U.S. development aid. We were promised that MCC 

would be additive, but, once again, the administration has proposed 

to cut funding for those core development accounts. I know the administration keeps touting the increase in the overall international 

affairs budget, yet their budget for fiscal year 2008 actually cuts 

funds from the core development accounts across the world. 

In closing, I believe our nominees, if confirmed, will become a key 

part of the foreign assistance agenda. It is the President’s job to 

propose America’s foreign policy agenda, but it is Congress’s job to 

appropriate funding and provide oversight for our development and 

foreign assistance programs. But it’s ultimately going to be your job 

to implement those initiatives on the ground. 

If confirmed to your respective posts, the four of you, as well as 

the three nominees in the second panel, will have a great responsibility of determining priorities, working with neighboring countries, 

representing the United States in vital endeavors. And I know 

none of you take that position lightly. I also would remind each of 

you that you have a responsibility not only to implement the President’s policy, but also to report honestly and completely to Congress. 

I look forward to learning more about your past experience. I’ve 

had an opportunity to speak to each and every one of you, and I 

appreciate those opportunities and they were very helpful. Your visions for the future of America’s role in these important development programs and financial institutions. 

And I will, before I turn to the distinguished ranking member, 

welcome you all formally so that, after Senator Lugar’s statement, 

we can go directly to your testimony. 

Mr. James Kunder is the nominee for the USAID Deputy Administrator. He is acting in that position currently. He previously 

served as Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East. 

Dr. Edward Menarchik is the nominee for USAID Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia, and is acting in that position 

currently. He previously served as Assistant Administrator, Bureau 

for Policy and Program Coordination for USAID. 

Dr. Paul Bonicelli is the nominee for USAID Assistant Administrator of Latin America and the Caribbean. He currently serves as 

156 

the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, 

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance of USAID. 

And Ms. Katherine Almquist is the nominee for USAID Assistant 

Administrator for Africa. She is currently serving as the USAID 

Mission Director for the Sudan. 

Let me now recognize the distinguished ranking member, Senator Lugar, for his opening statements. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

thank the Chairman, and I add my welcome to two impressive panels of nominees, as well as family members and friends who have 

accompanied you. 

Today, the committee will have discussions with nominees for 

important positions at USAID. The United States has strong national security and humanitarian interests in alleviating poverty, 

and promoting development around the world. The efforts of 

USAID are central to this mission, and each of our nominees will 

play a key role in formulating policies that will impact U.S. standing in their regions of responsibility. 

I would take this opportunity to express my hope that the Senate 

will move forward quickly on the nomination of Mr. James Kunder 

to be Deputy Administrator of USAID. Mr. Kunder would be responsible for assisting Ambassador Randall Tobias, the current Administrator of USAID, in executing U.S. foreign assistance programs. In addition, he would be charged with assisting the Administrator in the supervision of all personnel at the Agency in the 

United States and overseas. 

Mr. Kunder currently is the Agency’s Acting Deputy Administrator and continues to serve as the Assistant Administrator for 

Asia and the Near East. In this capacity, Mr. Kunder overseas 

some of USAID’s largest and most important projects. 

Mr. Kunder’s nomination came before the committee last September, and he has been patient and thorough in addressing questions from Senators related to his nomination. He was asked to 

provide answers to nearly 100 detailed questions about reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. In addition, he was asked to provide 

photographs of clinics and schools being constructed, or reconstructed, in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Kunder’s responses are contained in three voluminous binders consisting of some 1,500 pages. The responses incorporate photographs and maps of virtually all USAID projects in Afghanistan, 

including clinics and schools. I appreciate the serious attention that 

Mr. Kunder and his staff have given to congressional concerns. In 

fact, I cannot remember a nominee under the jurisdiction of this 

committee who has provided a greater volume of useful information 

about the projects and programs under his direction. The materials 

in these binders provide an excellent tutorial for any Senator who 

wants to know more about Afghanistan or the functions of USAID. 

The binders have been deposited with the committee staff and are 

available to any members or staff who might wish to review them. 

Ambassador Tobias needs a deputy who is well-versed in the 

Agency’s workings. He strongly supports Mr. Kunder’s nomination 

157 

to the position. I am hopeful we will move forward so that Mr. 

Kunder can more fully contribute to USAID’s vital mission. 

I would also note that this hearing follows a very interesting 

hearing on Afghanistan held last week by this committee. There 

were several points raised at that hearing that I would ask Mr. 

Kunder to consider. 

First, one of the witnesses observed that, unlike in Iraq and Bosnia, there is no civilian contact group in Afghanistan. Such a group 

might be a useful tool in advocating our goals in Afghanistan. 

Second, we discussed whether a coherent United States program 

could be developed for providing United States foreign assistance 

directly to eastern Afghanistan and the federally administered tribal areas in Pakistan, including Waziristan. Such a program would 

acknowledge the ethnic and tribal realities of the area. Obviously, 

this would not be an easy mission, but we should explore whether 

United States foreign assistance could make an impact in that region, given its importance to the outcome in Afghanistan. 

On our second panel, we will hear from nominees to be U.S. executive directors to international financial institutions. During the 

past 4 years, our committee has held six hearings on the operations 

of the multilateral development banks. Those hearings contributed 

to the committee’s understanding of both the value of the banks’ 

work and problems with their operation. 

In 2005, building on this work, I introduced Senate bill 1129, the 

Development Bank Reform and Authorization Act. Most of the provisions of this bill were enacted into law in November 2005. With 

passage of this legislation, Congress made a strong statement that 

recognized the critical role of MDBs in achieving development goals 

around the world, but also that the operations of these banks must 

be transparent and free of corruption. 

The U.S. Government must work hard to ensure that this money 

is spent efficiently, both because of our responsibility to American 

taxpayers and because inefficiency and corruption undermine the 

basic humanitarian and foreign policy objectives of our participation in MDB financing. 

I congratulate all of the nominees, and I thank the Chairman for 

the opportunity to make this statement. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator. 

We are pending a vote, and we hope to get through at least your 

testimony before that vote, before questions. So, we’ll start with 

Mr. Kunder. And the same process, you’re free to make your presentation. We’d ask you to limit it to 5 minutes. Your full statement 

will be included in the record. Should any of you have family members here, please introduce them. And if you summarize your testimony, we’ll get through all of you, and then, hopefully, we’ll have 

an opportunity for questions before the vote and be able to move 

on. 

So, we’ll go from Mr. Kunder, moving from right to left. That’s 

not an ideological statement, it’s just simply physical reality—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. At the table. 

And, with that, Mr. Kunder, you are welcome to present your 

testimony. 

158 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. KUNDER, NOMINEE TO BE 

DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. KUNDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s an honor to be before the committee today as President Bush’s nominee to be Deputy 

Administrator at USAID. 

I would like to introduce to the panel my wife, Robbin, who is 

also a USAID employee, and my son, James, who is here primarily 

to collect Senatorial autographs for Ms. Eaton’s class at St. Stephen’s School in Alexandria. He’s also the beneficiary—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. A worthy cause. 

Mr. KUNDER [continuing]. Of the Squirms that I picked up in 

your office the other day. 

We very much appreciate this panel’s serious attention to 

USAID, the extensive oversight that the panel has provided, and 

also the leadership that the Committee has provided to looking at 

the questions of how the U.S. Government can be better organized 

to manage conflict and post-conflict situations on the civilian side 

of the government. This is an area that Senator Biden and Senator 

Lugar have worked on extensively. We very much appreciate that 

ongoing work, and, if confirmed, I very much look forward to continuing that discussion with the committee so that we can do the 

kind of serious work that the taxpayers expect from us when our 

soldiers are deployed overseas. 

I won’t go through my biography, sir. I worked at USAID previously, and served as director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance there. I’ve also served in Afghanistan, deploying there 

soon after our troops chased the Taliban from Kabul. I also would 

like to mention that I have worked in the private not-for-profit sector as vice president of Save the Children Federation, so I’ve had 

the opportunity to look at these issues of foreign assistance, and 

U.S. taxpayer support for foreign assistance, from several different 

perspectives. I’ve also had the opportunity to serve as an infantry 

officer in the United States Marine Corps, so that I’m able to, I 

think, deal effectively with our military colleagues when we work 

with them, which is often, these days. 

I think USAID has very important contributions to make to U.S. 

foreign policy. First, it is, as the Chairman said, an important tool 

in our national security arsenal. And, second, it meets the taxpayers’ strong interest in a humanitarian presence overseas. I 

think it’s this unique combination of roles that makes USAID an 

important part of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. 

I also want to note that, having worked at USAID now for almost 

10 years in two different iterations, that the men and women of 

USAID are among the most competent professionals and courageous individuals with whom I have had the opportunity to serve. 

They work in dedicated fashion in some of the most difficult places 

on the face of the Earth, and they are an extraordinarily important 

part of the U.S. Government’s effort overseas. 

I do hope that I have the opportunity to serve in this position, 

if confirmed, in order to help Ambassador Tobias move his reform 

agenda forward. We are very interested, as the Chairman has stated, in keeping alive the concept of long-term development—making 

contributions to long-term human progress. What Ambassador 

159 

Tobias is very much interested in doing is establishing a system 

that shows, in concrete terms, to the Senate and to the American 

public, that we are making measurable progress toward the human 

progress for which we all strive. 

I just want to make one other personal comment, in closing, sir. 

I hoped my parents were able to travel from Pennsylvania, but 

they were not able to come down. I mention in my statement that 

my father, who’s a World War II veteran and a steelworker, has 

done his duty over the years as a volunteer fireman, as a civic leader. My mother, who is an immigrant from Italy, who came here not 

speaking a word of English, served in the Pentagon during World 

War II and also was a community leader in our community in 

Pennsylvania. And I just noted in my statement that I hope, if confirmed by the Senate, I will be able to carry out my duties as well 

as they carried out theirs. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. KUNDER, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before the committee today as President 

Bush’s nominee to serve as Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID). 

I have had the honor to serve as the Acting Deputy Administrator for the past 

6 months. This experience has made me acutely aware of the development challenges facing the U.S. Government and the intense interest of the committee in 

meeting them. I have devoted much of my time as Acting Deputy Administrator to 

assisting Administrator Tobias administer the foreign assistance reforms—reforms 

necessary to meet the 21st century’s unprecedented challenges and opportunities. I 

am excited to be part of this change to leverage USAID strengths to support foreign 

assistance as an element of U.S. foreign policy. 

Prior to serving as Acting Deputy Administrator, I was the Assistant Administrator of the Asia and Near East region, which stretches from Morocco to Mongolia, 

is home to millions of impoverished human beings, and is on the front lines in the 

global battle against terror, and against those conditions that allow terrorism to 

flourish. The U.S. Government’s foreign assistance programs are an important 

weapon in the fight against terror, poverty, illiteracy, inequality, and instability. If 

confirmed by the Senate, I pledge that I will do everything in my power—in full 

consultation with the Congress—to assist Ambassador Tobias and Dr. Rice in furthering the goals of transformational diplomacy, and to ensure that U.S. Government development and reconstruction programs are carried out effectively, equitably, and with the oversight that the taxpayers have every right to demand. 

From 1991 to 1993, I served at USAID as Director of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. In January 2002, I returned to USAID to reopen the USAID Mission in Kabul 

immediately after the fall of the Talaban. Subsequent to serving as the Director of 

Relief and Reconstruction in Afghanistan for 5 months, I served as Deputy Assistant 

Administrator and then Assistant Administrator of the Asia and Near East Bureau, 

where I had the privilege to work on a wide range of issues in support of Iraq, West 

Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, and the countries affected by the 2004 tsunami and 2005 

earthquake in Pakistan. 

From these experiences I have learned that designing and implementing sustainable development and reconstruction processes in transitioning nations is a 

daunting, but critically important challenge. I look forward, if confirmed, to continuing to benefit from the committee’s guidance and consultations in USAID’s 

work. 

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will take very seriously my role in representing the 

agency in the many interagency deliberations in which U.S. support for international economic, governance, and social programs are discussed. Under the direction of Ambassador Tobias, we understand now better than ever the key importance 

of our relationship with the Department of State, and our respective staffs are making great efforts to ensure optimal coordination. If confirmed, I expect to devote significant time to addressing questions of budget, strategic priorities, and funding levels with colleagues at the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies. 

160 

I also recognize that we within the U.S. Government do not have a monopoly on 

knowledge of what transforms societies. Having worked in both the for-profit and 

not-for-profit sectors, I look forward to a fruitful dialog with all elements in the development community, including but not limited to the NGOs, universities, and the 

business community, since activities in all these sectors impact human progress. 

After 20 years of working in the development and reconstruction field, I remain 

an optimist about America’s role in the world, and I firmly believe in the importance 

of the role assigned to the U.S. Agency for International Development. Working to 

build democracy and economic prosperity in the poorest countries in the world, 

countries that are in the strategic interest of the United States, as well as those 

countries that are simply deprived, suffering, or experiencing a humanitarian crisis, 

is one of the most inspiring missions of the U.S. Government. If confirmed, I look 

forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, other members of the committee, and 

your staff, in order to help steer this work in the right direction and ensure that 

each tax dollar is used to make a real impact in the world. 

On a personal note, Mr. Chairman, I had hoped that my parents, Jim and Virginia Kunder, from Rochester, PA, would be able to join me here today, but they 

were not able to make the trip. As they have been an inspiration to me, I wanted 

to note their contributions. Over 63 years ago, my father was pushing across the 

beaches at Normandy. Subsequently as a steelworker, volunteer firefighter, and 

community leader, he has continued to serve his country well. My mother was one 

of those millions of Americans who came here as a child from a far country, speaking not a word of English. She pulled herself up by her bootstraps, worked in the 

Pentagon during World War II, forged a career in the nonprofit world, and led numerous civic organizations. I would be proud if I am able to execute my duties half 

as well as they executed theirs. 

This concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any of 

your or the committee’s questions. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Menarchik. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS MENARCHIK, NOMINEE TO BE 

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA 

Dr. MENARCHIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, for this opportunity to appear as President Bush’s 

nominee for Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Europe and 

Eurasia in the United States Agency for International Development. 

I am pleased today to have my family with me, my wife of 38 

years, Debbie Menarchik; my son, Lieutenant Commander Jason 

Menarchik, who has recently returned from a 1-year tour in Iraq, 

and is about to deploy to the Pacific theater aboard the Blue Ridge; 

my daughter, Heidi; my sister, Denise Stepanik; my brother-in-law, 

James Stepanik; and my sister, from Fairchance, Pennsylvania, 

Dede Cole. 

I have submitted a written statement for the record and will provide a very brief oral statement. 

I have been confirmed previously before this committee as the 

Assistant Administrator for Policy and Planning Coordination, 

about 21⁄2 years ago, and, if confirmed again, I would join this 

USAID team at a critical time in the global war on terrorism and 

the critical time for foreign assistance as we work to better synchronize U.S. defense, diplomacy, and development efforts to attain 

our foreign policy objectives. 

Europe and Eurasia remains a critical region in advancing America’s frontiers of freedom. USAID has accomplished much there, but 

much remains to be done, with critical challenges to democracy in 

161 

Russia, remaining instability in the Balkans and the Caucasus, 

and complex development and strategic challenges in Central Asia. 

I pledge that I will continue to work with Congress to meet these 

challenges head-on. 

These past few years with USAID and international development 

have been, in many ways, the most challenging and interesting of 

my 39 years of public service. As Assistant Administrator for Policy 

and Programs Coordination, I have a unique strategic priority and 

budget-setting position for transformational development and an 

understanding of the need to reform our system. My career has 

been both broad and deep in a variety of sectors—national security, 

foreign policy, military operations, international development, and 

executive leadership positions in both academia and business. I 

have served in the White House, the Pentagon, the National Archives, at USAID, and lived and traveled widely overseas. I have 

spent much time in the Europe/Eurasia region, and have done 

much thinking about it. 

Many of my graduate students from the Marshall Center are now 

serving in senior leadership roles. I met with some of them last 

month on my trip to the Caucasus and Turkmenistan, and discussed international development issues with them. 

I am proud to be nominated for this position with USAID, and 

I’m eager to serve the President and to work with Congress in carrying out our joint State/USAID strategy. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me this opportunity to 

present my qualifications for this position and my views on the future of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia. 

This concludes my oral testimony, and I would be pleased to answer any questions, sir, you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Menarchik follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS MENARCHIK, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR EU- ROPE AND EURASIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for this opportunity to 

appear as President Bush’s nominee for Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for 

Europe and Eurasia (E&E) in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 

If confirmed, I would join the USAID team at a critical time for foreign assistance 

as we work to better synchronize U.S. defense, diplomacy, and development efforts 

to attain our foreign policy objectives. The Director of Foreign Assistance and 

USAID Administrator, Ambassador Tobias, has instituted major reforms at the Department of State and USAID to more closely align our strategy and budget processes to achieve President Bush’s and Secretary Rice’s transformational diplomacy 

goals. USAID is also expanding collaboration with the Department of Defense (DoD) 

in civil-military planning, training, and operations to assure optimal use of the development tool within the national security framework. 

United States assistance is particularly critical to achieving United States Government foreign policy goals and in advancing United States national security in the 

Europe and Eurasia region and beyond. USAID programs contribute significantly to 

United States foreign policy goals of consolidating democratic gains throughout the 

Europe and Eurasia region; furthering integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions; 

promoting stability in the Balkans; achieving a peaceful settlement of Kosovo’s future status without isolating Serbia; encouraging Russia to be a responsible member 

of the global community, supporting democratic institutions and the rule of law; 

and, in Central Asia, furthering regional integration through energy, infrastructure, 

and trade linkages, as well as economic diversity and exposure to democratic values. 

As the Assistant Administrator (AA) for the E&E region, I would energetically 

support the efforts of Secretary Rice and Ambassador Tobias to achieve these goals. 

In particular, I will assist Ambassador Tobias in implementing his reform agenda 

162 

at USAID, ensuring that assistance is focused on the highest priority U.S. objectives 

and that it is implemented in a cost-effective and efficient manner, both in Washington and in our field missions. 

I would also like to build on past efforts at USAID to define a vision and identify 

the steps and benchmarks that will lead to the eventual phasing out of U.S. assistance in the region, while leaving behind key institutions to ensure that U.S.-assisted 

reforms are sustained. I recognize that some countries are nearer to this goal than 

others, but I believe that planning for this eventuality will help us achieve it. 

I am also keenly interested in deepening USAID’s engagement with the Department of Defense. We need to coordinate our planning to enhance security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction. Working together, we can ensure that USAID 

assistance in social, political, and economic sectors contributes as effectively as possible to security, stability, and counterterrorism success in the Balkans, Caucasus, 

and Central Asia. 

If confirmed, I will bring to this position a strong background in the foreign and 

security policy arena that will provide an understanding of the strategic context in 

which USAID works. My almost 21⁄2 years as USAID’s Assistant Administrator for 

Policy and Programs Coordination gave me a unique strategic priority and budget 

setting position for transformational development, and an understanding of the need 

to reform our system. I will also bring the experience and knowledge gained from 

operating in complex and crisis settings. Building a cooperative working relationship 

in the interagency process is vital to the success of USAID’s mission, and I believe 

my previous experience will serve me well in this effort. 

Mr. Chairman, I have been a public servant my entire adult life. I believe public 

service is both a noble and high calling. My career has been both broad and deep 

in a variety of sectors—national security, foreign policy, military operations, international development, and executive leadership positions in both academia and 

business. In the White House, I served as then-Vice President Bush’s military assistant in the 1980s, and was specifically involved in Middle Eastern, African, terrorism, and general Defense Department issues. While at the White House, and 

later as Assistant for Terrorism Policy in the Defense Department in the 1990s, I 

helped draft several white papers on terrorism when the public and the Government 

were less focused on this threat. I believe this background makes me keenly aware 

of the challenges USAID faces in keeping its employees and partners safe in areas 

of danger and instability. 

In addition, during my 3 years as a professor at the George C. Marshall Center 

for Security Studies in Germany, I worked with the Partnership for Peace countries 

of the former Eastern Bloc and those of Central Asia. I taught senior officials from 

the former Soviet Union how to operate a military in a democratic society. Many 

of my graduates are now in senior positions in the Europe and Eurasia region. I 

met with some of them last month on my trip to the caucasus, and discussed international development issues with them. 

I have seen the devastation and ruin left behind from failed economic systems and 

dictatorships. And I have seen firsthand the benefits of training others in democracy 

and free market systems. 

Finally, my post-graduate education in both international relations and religion 

has prepared me well for work on the world stage. I believe that I have the skills 

necessary to oversee the allocation of foreign aid budget resources in an efficient 

and objective manner, while remaining sensitive to a region’s religions and cultures. 

All of these experiences as a military commander, director of a civilian war college 

at the National Defense University, presidential library director, and senior executive within USAID, have enhanced my leadership skills. 

I am well-traveled and have lived and worked in many different areas both in and 

outside the United States. I have seen the ravages of war in Vietnam as a pilot, 

and the devastation left behind from fallen political regimes. I know how to start 

up organizations, how to fix broken organizations, and how to make organizations 

run effectively, efficiently, and purposefully. I had been specifically hired in my last 

four jobs to perform these difficult tasks. Should I be confirmed, I believe that my 

diverse operational, foreign policy, international development, and academic and executive leadership positions would serve me well in this important USAID position. 

In conclusion, I am proud to be nominated for this position with the U.S. Agency 

for International Development, and am eager to serve the President and work with 

the Congress in carrying out our joint State-USAID Strategy. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me this opportunity to present my qualifications for this position and my views on the future of the Bureau for Europe and 

Eurasia. This concludes my testimony, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

163 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Dr. Bonicelli. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. BONICELLI, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE 

CARIBBEAN 

Dr. BONICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s indeed an honor 

and privilege to appear before you and the committee today, with 

my colleagues, as President Bush’s nominee. I thank you for considering my nomination to serve as Assistant Administrator for the 

Latin America and Caribbean Bureau at USAID. 

In my current capacity as Deputy Assistant Administrator in the 

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, I 

have become quite familiar with the challenges we, as a government, face in promoting development around the world. Should I 

be confirmed, I would look forward to returning my attention once 

again to this hemisphere, as I have in the past during my academic 

career and during my time here at the Congress working for the 

House International Relations Committee. 

Throughout my career, I have considered this hemisphere to be 

of utmost importance to the United States. We are neighbors not 

only because of geography, but also because of the centuries of 

strong and, even now, strengthening ties of commerce, family, 

friendships, and, importantly, a shared commitment to the democratic way of life. While the region continues to battle poverty and 

other development challenges, we have, together, enjoyed many 

successes, not least of which is that there are elected leaders in all 

but one country in the hemisphere. Moreover, the region boasts 

several countries that have made great strides toward self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, I believe that our task is to redouble our efforts, to consolidate gains, and to achieve more in the hemisphere. 

This is especially true now that democracy is being questioned by 

those who have not yet seen the material gains that are the very 

real results of democracy. We should counter that trend toward instability, populism, and isolationism, which is evident in some 

quarters, with concrete actions that inspire hope for long-term development. 

I believe we are better able to do this now, because we are embarking on an historic reform of our foreign assistance program. 

With the first-ever U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance, Ambassador Randall Tobias, we are crafting the tools to assure that State 

and AID resources are fully integrated both in Washington and in 

the field. This is a strategic change that is creating a more rational 

budgeting process. Having been involved with development and democratization throughout my career, I can say that this is what is 

needed to help us better fight the scourges of poverty, illiteracy, 

tyranny, instability, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. If confirmed, I pledge to do everything in my power, and in consultation 

with the Congress, to ensure that U.S. assistance to our neighbors 

is carried out effectively, equitably, in coordination with our partners around the world, wherever possible, and with concern for fiscal responsibility that are the taxpayers due. 

164 

Over the years that I have been involved with this work, Mr. 

Chairman, I have come to believe that the goal of our development 

work must be to assist countries in their transition to stable, wellgoverned, and prospering democracies. I want to emphasize that I 

believe all those terms are important, but none more important 

than democracy. It is the democratic society that can best promote 

and sustain development. In short, there is no development without 

good governance, but there can be no good governance without democracy. A government that does not have to worry about losing 

power will not have to really care whether poverty, inequality, illiteracy, disease, and violence are remedied. To think otherwise, I 

submit, is to put too much trust in the goodness of a given set of 

leaders to do the right thing. By saying this, I do not mean that 

some of our programs are more important than others. For example, promoting democracy without concern for socioeconomic needs 

is a losing enterprise. I mean only to say that development should 

be seen as a holistic enterprise founded on the idea that dysfunction in any sector is often caused by, certainly compounds and is 

sustained by, dysfunction in the body politic. 

We can no longer spend our foreign assistance dollars on various 

efforts without appreciating the need to encourage transformation 

in all sectors so that improvements in health or education or the 

rule of law can be sustained for the long term by the societies receiving our aid; indeed, so that citizens who have an interest in 

these things can demand that they be sustained or get themselves 

new leadership that is competent and cares about them. 

Further, democracy encourages the outside world to have confidence in a particular society, which increases capital flows and 

mutually beneficial ties between citizens of different countries. Democratization is a catalyst for development, especially when accompanied by assistance in the socioeconomic arena. 

I am heartened by the fact that this administration and this 

Congress appreciate the role that development has in furthering 

our national interests. We help people around the world, and in 

doing so, we are part of making the world better for all nations. 

USAID and its very talented staff of technical experts is the primary implementer of U.S. foreign assistance programs, and therefore has a special role to play, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, where we have been at work for many years and have 

learned many lessons. 

It is a great honor for our country to be asked to aid our friends 

in the region as they build democracy and economic prosperity, not 

simply because it’s in the strategic interest of the United States, 

but also because of the many ties between our peoples that I referred to at the outset. We have accomplished much, each nation 

on its own, and much by working together. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. 

Chairman and the committee, in order to help continue this work 

for the benefit of all Americans. 

Please allow me to conclude my testimony by taking a moment 

to honor my parents and grandparents, who sacrificed so much 

that I might be able to serve our country, Louis and Ernestine 

Bonicelli, Robert and Dorothy Ramsey, and Elizabeth Patterson. 

Only my mother survives, and she is not able to be here. They surVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00172 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
165 

vived the Great Depression, served in two world wars, and had a 

son who cost them seemingly endless education bills. They are 

prime examples of our country’s good people who invest in others. 

They and my brother, Matt, and his family have always supported 

me. 

I’d also like to thank my friends and former students, who have 

been a constant source of encouragement for me, and many of them 

are here at the hearing. I imagine the former students will especially like your questioning me. [Laughter.] 

I’d be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Bonicelli follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. BONICELLI, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN

AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Mr. Chairman, it is indeed an honor and privilege to appear before you and the 

committee today with my colleagues as President Bush’s nominee. I thank you for 

considering my nomination to serve as Assistant Administrator for the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau of the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID). 

In my current capacity as Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, I have become quite familiar with 

the challenges we as a government face in promoting development around the 

world. Should I be confirmed, I would look forward to returning my attention once 

again specifically to this hemisphere as I have in the past during my academic career and during my time here at the Congress as a professional staff member of the 

House. Throughout my career I have considered this hemisphere to be of utmost importance to the United States. We are neighbors not only because of geography, but 

also because of the centuries of strong and even now strengthening ties of commerce, family, and friendships, and importantly, a shared commitment to the democratic way of life. While the region continues to battle poverty and other development challenges, we have together enjoyed many successes, not least of which is 

that there are elected leaders in all but one country in the hemisphere. Moreover, 

the region boasts several countries that have made great strides toward self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, I believe our task is to redouble our efforts to consolidate gains 

and to achieve more in the hemisphere. This is especially true now that democracy 

is being questioned by those who have not yet seen the material gains that are the 

very real results of democracy. We should counter the trend toward instability, populism and isolationism—evident in some quarters—with concrete actions that inspire hope. 

I believe we are better able to do this now because we are embarking on an historic reform of our foreign assistance program. With the first-ever U.S. Director of 

Foreign Assistance, Ambassador Randall Tobias, we are crafting the tools to assure 

that State and USAID resources are fully integrated both in Washington and the 

field. This is a strategic change that is creating a more rational budgeting process. 

Having been involved with development and democratization throughout my career, 

I can say that this is what is needed to help us better fight the scourges of poverty, 

illiteracy, tyranny, instability, terrorism, and illegal narcotics trafficking. If confirmed, I pledge to do everything in my power, and in consultation with the Congress, to ensure that U.S. assistance to our neighbors is carried out effectively, equitably, in coordination with our partners around the world whenever possible, and 

with concern for fiscal responsibility that the taxpayers are due. 

Over the years that I have been involved with this work, I have come to believe 

that the goal of our development work must be to assist countries in their transition 

to stable, well-governed and prospering democracies. I want to emphasize that I believe all of those terms are important, and none more important than democracy, 

for it is the democratic society that can best promote and sustain development. In 

short, there is no development without good governance, but there can be no good 

governance without democracy. 

A government that does not have to worry about losing power does not have to 

really care whether poverty, inequality, illiteracy, disease, and violence are remedied. To think otherwise, I submit, is to put too much trust in the goodness of a 

given set of leaders to do the right thing. By saying this I do not mean that some 

166 

of our programs are more important than others—for example, promoting democracy 

without concern for socioeconomic needs is a losing enterprise. I mean only to say 

that development should be seen as a holistic enterprise founded on the idea that 

dysfunction in any sector is often caused by—and is definitely compounded and sustained by—dysfunction in the body politic. We can no longer spend our foreign assistance dollars on various efforts without appreciating the need to encourage transformation in all sectors so that improvements in health or education or the rule of 

law can be sustained; indeed, so that the citizens who have an interest in these 

things can demand that they be sustained or get themselves new leadership that 

is competent and cares. Further, democracy encourages the outside world to have 

confidence in a particular society, increasing capital flows and mutually beneficial 

ties between citizens of different countries. Democratization is a catalyst of development, especially when accompanied by assistance in the socioeconomic arena. 

I am heartened by the fact that this administration and this Congress appreciate 

the role that development has in furthering our national interests. We help people 

around the world, and in doing so, we are a part of making the world better. USAID 

and its very talented staff of technical experts is the primary implementer of U.S. 

foreign assistance programs and therefore has a special role to play, particularly in 

the Western Hemisphere where we have been at work for many years. 

It is a great honor for our country to be asked to aid our friends in the region 

as they build democracy and economic prosperity, not simply because such is in the 

strategic interest of the United States, but also because of the many ties between 

our peoples I referred to at the outset. We know each other as buyers and sellers 

of goods and services; we know each other as allies in the defense of democracy. But 

millions of us in this hemisphere know each other on a personal, cultural, and sometimes familial basis, with some of those ties stretching back to our common and successful struggle to win our independence. We have accomplished much, each nation 

on its own, and much by working together. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee, in order to help continue this 

work for the benefit of all the Americas. 

Please allow me to conclude my testimony by taking a moment to honor my parents and grandparents for all that they sacrificed so that I might be in a position 

to serve our country: Louis and Ernestine Bonicelli, Robert and Dorothy Ramsey, 

and Elizabeth Patterson; only my mother survives and she is not able to be here. 

Surviving the Great Depression, service in two wars, and a son who cost them seemingly endless education bills, they are prime examples of our country’s good people 

who invest in others. They and my brother Matt and his family have always supported me. I’d also like to thank my friends who have constantly encouraged and 

uplifted me, some of whom attended the hearing today. 

Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the Senators might have for me. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Those must have been the anonymous questions I got. [Laughter.] 

Ms. Almquist. 

STATEMENT OF KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR AFRICA 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

members of the committee. I’m grateful for this opportunity to appear before you as the President’s nominee for Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

I would like to thank President Bush and Ambassador Tobias for 

the honor of this nomination. 

If confirmed, I will be fully committed to working with this committee and the Congress to ensure greater results and accountability for our programming of foreign assistance resources in Africa. 

I’m thrilled to be able to share this occasion today with my parents, Ken and Janell Almquist. I would like to acknowledge their 

role in raising me to care deeply about the world, to appreciate the 

167 

importance of public service, and to understand the responsibilities 

we shoulder as citizens of this great nation. 

I have had the privilege of working at—with USAID for the past 

6 years, first as senior policy advisor to former Administrator 

Natsios, then as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, and, 

most recently, as Sudan Mission Director. 

I am proud of the efforts and accomplishments of the hundreds 

of dedicated professionals serving in Africa and here in Washington 

that I have witnessed during this time; and, if confirmed, supporting their work will be my highest priority. 

The perspectives and management experiences that I have 

gained at both the agency and bureau headquarters level, as well 

as from the on-the-ground reality of reopening and running the 

largest bilateral mission in Africa, I believe have prepared me for 

the challenge of stewarding the agency’s bureau for Africa. 

In addition, my 7 years of service with one of the world’s largest 

nonprofit international relief and development organizations working extensively on African issues gives me an appreciation for the 

nongovernmental partners we rely on to implement so many of our 

programs in Africa. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working not only with the nongovernmental sector, but also with the private sector and other elements of civil society in the United States that care deeply about 

Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, I have been a student of Africa for the better part 

of 17 years, and it has taught me many things. Africa has taught 

me to appreciate the great country that is ours and the freedom 

that most Americans take for granted. It has taught me the true 

value of the system of democratic governance that gives us not only 

the right, but also the ability to hold our Government accountable 

to the people who elect it. Africans, too, deserve to have leaders 

and systems of governance that are credible, capable, and responsive to the needs of the people, rather than regimes which prey 

upon their people and exploit their resources for the benefit of a 

few. 

My experiences in Africa have also taught me to appreciate the 

depth and breadth of diversity that is Africa, to move beyond 

stereotypes and cliches, to see wisdom and value in cultures that 

are foreign to our way of living. The lesson that has perhaps been 

the most difficult of all, particularly as one coming from a nation 

used to solving problems, is to accept humility in not always being 

able to do so. Our responsibility, my responsibility, if confirmed, 

will be to contribute to marshalling the resources at our disposal, 

and to use them in partnership with Africans, who must bear ultimate responsibility for solving the problems of Africa. 

That said, I firmly believe that we have never known a more favorable time than the present to build upon and consolidate the 

progress being made on the continent. Africa offers rich development potential, along with huge challenges, including widespread 

poverty, illiteracy, hunger, disease, environmental degradation, 

conflict, and poor governance. Addressing the challenges facing Africa is critical to U.S. security and regional stability. It is a region 

of great strategic importance to the United States, both in terms 

168 

of emerging markets and as a front in our efforts to stem and reverse the threat of terrorism. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, under the leadership of Secretary 

Rice and Ambassador Tobias the State Department and USAID 

have undertaken a series of reforms designed to improve the effectiveness of our foreign assistance programs and make it easier for 

us to coordinate our assistance and track results. Of course, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa vary widely in terms of their relative 

state of development. If confirmed, I will ensure that assistance 

strategies support United States Government foreign policy objectives, are grounded in the context of the specific country in question, are developed collaboratively with those who have the most at 

stake in their success or failure, our African counterparts, and, 

most importantly, I will ensure that our programs achieve results 

and reach the poorest and the most vulnerable. 

In the words of President Bush, ‘‘We share with Africans themselves a visions of what the continent can become, a model of reform, a home to prosperous democracies, and a tribute to the 

strong spirit of the African peoples.’’ This vision is necessary, realistic, and already on its way to achievement. 

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would like the committee to know 

that I will work tirelessly to make this vision a reality. I would 

look forward to working with the Congress and my colleagues at 

USAID and other agencies in carrying out our foreign assistance 

strategy in Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the committee for 

considering my nomination, and I would be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Almquist follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am grateful for this 

opportunity to appear before you as the President’s nominee for Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and I 

would like to thank President Bush and Ambassador Tobias for the honor of this 

nomination. If confirmed, I will be fully committed to working with this committee 

and the Congress to ensure greater results and accountability from our programming of foreign assistance resources in Africa. I am thrilled to be able to share this 

occasion with my parents, Ken and Janell Almquist. I would like to acknowledge 

their role in raising me to care deeply about the world, to appreciate the importance 

of public service, and to understand the responsibilities we shoulder as citizens of 

this great Nation. 

I have had the great privilege of working with USAID for the past 6 years, first 

as senior policy advisor to former Administrator Natsios, then as Deputy Assistant 

Administrator for Africa, and most recently as Sudan Mission Director. I am proud 

of the efforts and accomplishments of the hundreds of dedicated professionals serving in Africa and here in Washington that I have witnessed during this time and, 

if confirmed, supporting their work will be my highest priority. The perspectives and 

management experiences that I have gained at both the Agency and bureau headquarters’ level, as well as from the on-the-ground reality of reopening and running 

the largest bilateral mission in Africa, I believe, have prepared me for the challenge 

of stewarding the Agency’s Bureau for Africa. 

In addition, my 7 years of service with one of the world’s largest nonprofit international relief and development organizations, working extensively on African 

issues, gives me an appreciation for the nongovernmental partners we rely on to implement so many of our programs in Africa. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

not only with the nongovernmental sector, but also with the private sector and other 

elements of civil society in the United States that care deeply about Africa. 

169 

Americans are perhaps more aware than ever of events taking place in Africa, 

whether as a result of the intense spotlight currently focused on Darfur, or due to 

the interest of celebrities in improving the lives of African children. The challenges 

and opportunities present in Africa today are far greater than we can respond to, 

even with the generous level of official United States assistance to Africa provided 

by American taxpayers. As a result, working with all sectors of American society 

with an interest in improving the lives of Africans is a must. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will see my role as Assistant Administrator as one of building bridges 

between the United States and Africa, working closely with Assistant Secretary 

Frazer, not only to represent the interests of the United States to the people and 

Governments of Africa, but also to represent the issues and concerns of Africa to 

the American people. 

Mr. Chairman, I have been a student of Africa for the better part of 17 years, 

and it has taught me many things. Africa has taught me to appreciate the great 

country that is ours and the freedom that most Americans take for granted. It has 

taught me the true value of the system of democratic governance that gives us not 

only the right but also the ability to hold our Government accountable to the people 

who elect it. Africans, too, deserve to have leaders and systems of governance that 

are credible, capable, and responsive to the needs of the people, rather than regimes 

which prey upon their people and exploit their resources for the benefit of the few. 

Democratic elections were held recently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

Liberia, Benin, Mali, and Senegal, bringing the total number of countries in subSaharan Africa witnessing a peaceful, democratic transition to 33, or about twothirds of the total. Over the past 10 years, civil liberties have improved markedly 

in 21 sub-Saharan African countries; and political rights have shown substantial 

gains in 15 countries. Yet more work remains to be done. 

My experiences in Africa have also taught me to appreciate the depth and breadth 

of diversity that is Africa, to move beyond stereotypes and cliches, to see wisdom 

and value in cultures that are foreign to our way of living. The lesson that has perhaps been most difficult of all, particularly as one coming from a nation used to 

solving problems, is to accept humility in not always being able to do so. Our responsibility—my responsibility, if confirmed—will be to contribute to marshalling 

the resources at our disposal and use them in partnership with Africans who must 

bear ultimate responsibility for ‘‘solving’’ the problems of Africa. Africa must chart 

its own course; we must determine how best to partner with the people of Africa 

to end the unspeakable tragedies and advance the limitless possibilities inherent on 

the continent. 

In this regard, the emergence of the African Union (AU), a considerably more dynamic and forward-looking institution than its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, is one of the most important developments in Africa in recent decades. 

Along with the Regional Economic Commissions, the Africa Union is providing a 

forum for the development of African policies, programs, and strategies to address 

African problems. Africans are also increasingly willing and able to hold themselves 

accountable, as evidenced by the slow but steady progress of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). These and other institutions are gradually making a 

major contribution toward assisting African countries to develop the good governance and stability needed to ensure that their people can enjoy the fruits of democracy, peace, and prosperity. 

Mr. Chairman, as you are well aware, Africa is a region of extreme need and 

great promise. I firmly believe that we have never known a more favorable time 

than the present to build upon and consolidate the progress being made on the continent. Africa offers rich development potential, along with huge challenges, including widespread poverty, illiteracy, hunger, disease, environmental degradation, conflict, and poor governance. Addressing the challenges facing Africa is critical to 

United States security and regional stability. Africa is the world’s second largest 

and most populous continent, after Asia, and is a region of great strategic importance to the United States, both in terms of emerging markets and as a front in 

our efforts to stem and reverse the threat of terrorism. 

In addition, the United States shares a unique heritage and cultural bond with 

the people of sub-Saharan Africa. For these reasons, the United States has assumed 

a leading role in meeting the commitments to Africa the G–8 nations made in 2005 

at Gleneagles, Scotland. The United States is making meaningful progress in several areas critical to the continent’s development such as education, food security, 

trade promotion, environment, and protection of women. In particular, the United 

States Government has committed significant resources and support to fight two of 

the greatest challenges in Africa, HIV/AIDS and malaria. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, under the leadership of Secretary Rice and Ambassador Tobias, the State Department and USAID have undertaken a series of reforms 

170 

designed to improve the effectiveness of our foreign assistance programs and make 

it easier for us to coordinate our assistance and track results. Our shared transformational development goal is to ‘‘help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, 

and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.’’ Of course, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa vary widely in terms of their relative state of development. Consequently, USAID’s strategies begin by taking country context into consideration in each of our strategic objectives, with the goal of helping countries advance 

along the road of development in each crucial sector. If confirmed, I will ensure that 

assistance strategies support United States Government foreign policy objectives, 

are grounded in the context of the specific country in question, and are developed 

collaboratively with those who have the most at stake in their success or failure, 

our African counterparts. Most importantly, I will ensure that our programs achieve 

results. 

While we are making progress, there is still so much to be done in sub-Saharan 

Africa to build upon our accomplishments; we can do even more to address the startling needs of the continent, while, at the same time, take bold steps to increase 

the security and well-being of our citizens here at home. In the words of President 

Bush: ‘‘We share with Africans, themselves, a vision of what the continent can become—a model of reform, a home to prosperous democracies, and a tribute to the 

strong spirit of the African peoples.’’ This vision is necessary, realistic, and already 

on its way to achievement. 

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would like the committee to know that I will work 

tirelessly to make this vision a reality. I would look forward to working with the 

Congress, and my colleagues at USAID and other agencies to carrying out our foreign assistance strategy in Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would like to thank you and the 

committee for considering my nomination, and I would be pleased to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. 

Thank you all for your statements. Since we have a large panel 

here today, I’m going to start, at least in the first round—I don’t 

see other members, but we don’t know if they’ll arrive, and the 

time will expand to 7 minutes, and then if, in fact, there are other 

questions, I’m sure Senator Lugar will be able to pursue that, 

based upon how many people show up and—with votes on the floor. 

So, I’ll start with myself. 

Mr. Kunder, I had the opportunity to talk to you about some of 

the issues I am concerned about, and you have addressed some of 

them. I want to build upon our discussion and ask you, In the process—you had a unique opportunity in Iraq reconstruction, looking 

at Afghanistan, as well—in that process, when the reconstruction 

phase started in Iraq, what role did USAID play in overseeing programs? Was there collaboration between the Department of Defense and USAID? And were USAID officials who had experience 

in development consulted on these major reconstruction initiatives? 

Mr. KUNDER. Well, first of all, as you well know, General Garner 

went out to Irac during the early stages, and it was assumed that 

we were going to have a more or less classic relief and recovery operation, and, during that phase of the operation, the coordination 

with USAID, I would say, was excellent. Once the Coalition Provisional Authority system was established, the USAID team which 

was on the ground in Baghdad continued to play some part in that 

operation, but clearly the central planning was done by the Coalition Provisional Authority, with strong backstopping here from the 

Department of Defense. 

I think our opinions were solicited in many cases, and listened 

to in some cases, but the model that was established at the time 

seemed to make sense in the context of the time. This was before 

171 

the insurgency really started getting some traction, and the model 

was that we were going to take a whole-of-government approach. 

It was not going to be a classic State Department lead, USAID do 

most of the reconstruction; rather, we were going to get a lot of departments and agencies involved, and it was going to look more 

like General McArthur’s reconstruction of Japan at the end of 

World War II. 

So, I would say we played a role, but it was a relatively small 

role during the—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. And the reason I asked you that is because, 

after having sat down with the special inspector general for Iraq 

reconstruction, I’m not sure that that was the appropriate role. 

What lessons do you think we learned from it? 

Mr. KUNDER. We learned the lesson—primary lesson, I believe, 

sir, is that the civilian side of the U.S. Government needs to have 

a standing capacity with the kind of technical experts we need to 

respond quickly if our forces are deployed overseas. We have 

learned an important lesson, I believe, at USAID, in establishing 

the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. There was a time when 

we did not have such a natural-disaster response capability, and 

the U.S. Government tended to operate on a pick-up basis when 

there was a natural disaster. Now we have a group of people that 

are on standby. If there is flooding in Africa tomorrow morning, our 

teams will deploy quickly and we will draw resources from the 

warehouses we have around the world. In my view—and this is 

something that Senator Biden and Senator Lugar have been pushing—we need to have a similar standby capacity to respond in conflict situations. We don’t need to be drawing people from the civilian sector right in the middle of the crisis. We need these folks on 

standby. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me build upon that with a question to 

you, Mr. Menarchik. In your testimony, you mentioned that you’re 

keenly interested in deepening USAID’s engagement with the Department of Defense. And, while I certainly encourage collaboration, I’m concerned, in light of the Department of Defense’s reconstruction efforts in Iraq, whether that is always in the best interest. And so, how do you, if you are confirmed, how do you envision 

that cooperation? How do you envision expanding, specifically, 

USAID’s engagement with the Department of Defense? 

Dr. MENARCHIK. Thank you for that question, sir. In fact, USAID 

and the Defense Department have been working for decades together very closely, especially in humanitarian assistance/disaster 

assistance activities. Oftentimes, however, these were pick-up 

games. USAID would arrive, DoD would arrive, bring in the assets 

and attempt to work together. I argue that we need to be able to 

set up plans, practice together, work together, train together in the 

humanitarian assistance and disaster assistance arenas. We have 

been developing that capability over some time now. I argue it 

needs to be institutionalized. 

Within the conflict and post-conflict situations, as Mr. Kunder 

has explained, I argue that we need a standing capacity on the civilian side to be able to engage in reconstruction efforts in a conflict and post-conflict area. Again, we have a pick-up game in the 

midst of a crisis, bringing elements from the civilian community toVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00179 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
172 

gether, inserting them into a situation in which I believe they are 

not adequately prepared. 

In order to develop this, we should identify folks, train people 

who are specialized in conflict and post-conflict situations; work 

with, train with, all elements of the government who would be deployed in these circumstances so that we have a crisis response development capacity. 

My own experience was looking back in the days of Vietnam, 

when we had USAID and the CORDS program, when, in fact, we 

had 3,000 to 4,000 USAID development folks stationed in Vietnam. 

They were linguists. They were able to deliver development on the 

ground in the midst of a conflict. They were able to work with our 

military counterparts. I would argue that that kind of a model is 

something we should be looking at. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I think our challenge is improving coordination, but, at the same time, not sacrificing independence or integrity in the process. And how one achieves that is incredibly important. 

Dr. Bonicelli, I enjoyed when I was in the House International 

Relations Committee, working with you. The President is in Latin 

America right now, as we speak, so I won’t get into a full discussions of my views about that, in terms of Latin America. But you’re 

going to head a very important part of the world. Our problem is, 

is that it seems to me the Millennium Challenge Account, while 

very worthy, moves us in a direction in which it only takes—at 

least as it relates to Latin America—4 percent of Latin America’s 

poor, which means that nearly 213 million go untouched by the 

Millennium Challenge Account. And yet, some of our core development funding in this respect continues to get cut. How does one 

meet that challenge in the process of heading the Latin American 

and Caribbean division? 

Dr. BONICELLI. Yes, Senator. I think the challenge is to respect 

that the Millennium Challenge Account, that the compacts, make 

all the difference in the world for sustainability—that is the goal— 

but to make sure that the core AID budget is focused on those 

countries that are making gains, making progress, can be ready for 

threshold programs, can then be ready for compacts. That has been 

the purpose over this last year for the fiscal year 2008 budget process, is to find where gains have been made, where countries are 

close to being able to move into another category so that a different 

kind of targeting of aid can be done, resources can be focused on 

consolidating gains, and keeping them. In large measure, many of 

these countries, it is—it’s consolidating the gains in democracy 

more than anything. The OECD indicators have been encouraging 

in several of these countries, in many areas, except for governance. 

And so, that’s why there is an increase in governance in 2008, a 

5 percent increase, to get them ready to go further. 

The process has been to look for gaps where they need core development funds to keep moving them. 

Senator MENENDEZ. It is clearly an enormous part of the world 

in which domestic interests on undocumented immigration, on the 

questions of narcotics trafficking, on the questions of creating 

greater markets for U.S. services and products, on the question of 

making sure that we don’t continue to see the devastation of the 

173 

Amazon and its rainforest, in terms of global warming. Incredibly 

important part of the world, and we look forward to working with 

you. 

Ms. Almquist, my time is up for the moment, so my lack of a 

question to you is not out of disinterest. We had a very good conversation and I am very impressed with your background. But I’ll 

yield to Senator Lugar, and then, if we have time, I have a question for you. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Kunder, please describe the role of USAID in reconstruction 

in southern Sudan, and humanitarian efforts in Darfur. I ask this, 

because I want some idea of how coordination works with the State 

Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, or, for that 

matter, with other agencies. We have an outpouring of American 

citizens who are very hopeful that our Government can be successful in bringing relief to the people there. You are in a good position 

to describe where the procedure is currently, organizationally, because it is multifaceted. 

Mr. KUNDER. Specifically as to CRS, sir? 

Senator LUGAR. Yes, but—in any other agency that—— 

Mr. KUNDER. Yes. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. You see intersecting with your mission. 

Mr. KUNDER. Well, sir, I feel a little hesitant, because I know you 

know a great deal about this topic, but—what the U.S. Government 

recognized when it created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department several years 

ago was that many aspects of the U.S. Government have contributions to make in a humanitarian crisis or in a post-conflict situation. I mean, clearly we deliver food assistance, but the United 

States Department of Agriculture has something to contribute. We 

work on democracy and governance issues, but the Justice Department and its ICITAP police training program has much to contribute, as well—our Commerce Department, our Department of 

Health and Human Services, as well as, of course, many bureaus 

within the State Department. And I think the widely held perception was that these organizations came together in a somewhat ad 

hoc fashion, that there were neither established coordination structures nor standard operating procedures to guide how they came 

together. 

And I should say, in tribute to many dedicated civilian employees 

of the U.S. Government, in all these institutions it was not always 

a catastrophe; people found each other in the middle of a crisis, 

they developed ad hoc, but sometimes effective, ways of working together. But the underlying principle in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was that one entity 

would be established within the State Department to provide ongoing coordination. The State Department was seen to be the logical 

place, because that’s also where we have the institutional ties to 

the U.N. and to the international organizations for the diplomatic 

aspects of crisis management. 

I think, at this point, there has been a very great deal of 

progress made in the last 10 years, in terms of better interagency 

training, certainly between the civilian and the military side of the 

174 

U.S. Government. But I do not yet believe, sir, that we have 

achieved the objectives and the vision that we had when we created 

the CRS office several years ago. 

Senator LUGAR. Now, how does this pertain to Darfur? 

Mr. KUNDER. Specifically in Darfur, now on the ground, we’ve got 

excellent—and, of course, I’m sitting next to the expert on Darfur 

here, Kate Almquist—but we have excellent coordination between 

the Africa Bureau of the State Department and our own USAID Africa Bureau, with Kate on the ground in Khartoum. CRS has 

begun to do some work there, but CRS is not, at this point, providing the overall coordination in Darfur and Sudan that I think 

was envisioned when it was created several years ago. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me ask for the aid of Ms. Almquist on 

Darfur. What iss happening in Darfur, and what should we do 

about it? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Well, Darfur continues to be a very grave situation, as the many daily press reports, I think, back here in the 

United States, tell the story. We are providing massive humanitarian assistance right now inDarfur. We’re the largest bilateral 

donor, by a longshot, and our food assistance and our nonfood assistance are critical to ensuring that the 3 million, or more, conflict-affected people in Darfur continue to survive. We’re actually— 

somewhat contrary to the news reports, frequently we’re surprised 

by the humanitarian indicators in Darfur, which show a better situation for more people in Darfur than in some other parts of the 

country which don’t have the same dynamic going on, in terms of 

the conflict, but also receives less attention in terms of assistance. 

Eastern Sudan, for instance, has worse statistics of malnutrition 

than Darfur does, and that’s thanks, in large part, due to this massive international humanitarian response, largely funded by the 

United States. So, that, of course, is critical to continue for as long 

as this crisis exists. 

But we haven’t yet begun the reconstruction phase in Darfur. We 

are still not post-conflict. And, in fact, we’ll have a donor meeting 

next week, called the Sudan Consortium, where Darfur’s reconstruction will be on the agenda, the possibility of it. But the planning has, in essence, been stopped, because of the worsening security situation last summer and through the fall. 

As soon as the security situation can be improved—and there is 

much work being done by the Special Envoy and the State Department on that front—and as well as on the political process in 

Darfur, then the reconstruction planning can go forward. 

CRS has been critical in filling gaps for the Embassy, in particular, in Darfur. They have provided surge capacity in the form 

of their Active—I think it’s their Active Response Corps—ARC, I 

believe, is the acronym they have. And they have had officers on 

the ground in Darfur supporting the Embassy’s efforts, in terms of 

covering the political process and the reality, working alongside of 

our Darfur field officers from USAID. So, we’re working very handin-hand out in El Fashir and Nyala, on a regular basis in these regions of Darfur, and that will be important as we proceed into reconstruction planning. 

But critical right now: humanitarian response, stepping up the 

political process to bring more people onboard with the Darfur 

175 

Peace Agreement, and, of course, solving the security situation 

through the efforts to improve the peacekeeping on the ground, and 

to bring all the rebels and parties into the cease-fire. Those are the 

three main things. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator. 

I have one or two more questions. Then, if Senator Lugar has 

any more after that—Ms. Almquist, I want to pursue Senator 

Lugar’s line of questioning. In a published report last week, ‘‘A 

high-level mission from the Human Rights Council to address the 

human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of the Sudan described a grave and deteriorating situation.’’ And a conclusion— 

part of the conclusion of their study states, ‘‘Even after the signing 

of the Darfur Peace Accords, war continues, the human rights situation has further deteriorated, millions are displaced, at least 

200,000 are dead, and conflict and abuse are spilling over into the 

border into Chad. Making matters worse, humanitarian space continues to shrink, humanitarian and human rights actors are increasingly targeted, killings of civilians remains widespread, including in large-scale attacks.’’ 

Now, you’ve been the Mission Director in the Sudan, and you’ve 

had the unique experience of working with the region firsthand. Do 

you have the same view as their conclusion? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Senator, I think that’s a very accurate depiction 

of the situation on the ground. I do think that it’s very much a roller coaster, and security goes up and down, and we go through 

phases where it’s much, much worse, and then we go through 

phases where it calms down, for a variety of different factors, 

whether on the rebel side or the Government of Sudan side. We’ve 

just had another visit of the Special Envoy in the past week or so, 

and we traveled extensively through Darfur. I accompanied him 

while he was there. And we heard that the situation at that point 

was calm, but tense. We did intersect with this panel of experts in 

El Fashir, and had an opportunity to exchange notes with them. 

I think, overall, they’ve characterized it very well. But it does fluctuate and move up and down. 

The question of humanitarian space for our partners on the 

ground that we rely on to deliver assistance is vital, at the moment. And so, while we’ve got a very successful humanitarian operation, if the—this humanitarian space—meaning, the bureaucratic 

impediments to their working and operating in Darfur—continues 

to close, that situation will reverse quite quickly, and then we will 

have a much more significant humanitarian disaster on our hands. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me talk one more dimension of this, with 

reference to neighboring eastern Chad. 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. There’s over 100,000 displaced Chadians, 

food assistance is being imperiled by a surge in violence and banditry. Most people in the volatile border area with the Sudan have 

been completely cut off from aid. And a U.N. statement released 

said, ‘‘If the situation continues, the humanitarian operation and 

welfare of the population it aims to support will be irreversibly 

jeopardized.’’ Is that situation truly irreversible? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. I’m sorry—— 

176 

Senator MENENDEZ. Is that situation truly—— 

Ms. ALMQUIST. In eastern Chad? 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Yes—irrevocable? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. It’s not truly irreversible, in my opinion. I think, 

again, things ebb and flow, and if we’re not steadfast in pushing 

back on the different factors that are limiting our ability to get humanitarian assistance out, some things we can affect, like the bureaucratic impediments that the governments impose on humanitarian actors; some things are much more difficult to get at: the behavior of the so-called bandits, the Arab militias, the Chadian 

rebels, the Darfurian rebels. There’s a multiplicity of actors—more 

and more, it feels like, every day, in terms of who’s causing the insecurity in which region, whether it’s in eastern Chad, just across 

the border in western Darfur; the situation in north Darfur and 

south Darfur each have their own dynamics. I think it is very serious, but I don’t think it’s hopeless, so we can certainly still get significant amounts of aid to most of the people who need it. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. With that, we thank you all for your appearance before the Committee, and I’m sure that the Chairman will 

be holding a business meeting of the committee for the purposes of 

reporting your nominations out. 

We thank you all, and we wish you good luck in the process. 

Thank you. With that, you’re dismissed. 

The second panel—let’s turn to our second panel, with nominees 

to serve as U.S. directors at various development banks and multilateral financial institutions. 

As we talk about America’s role in reducing poverty, we should 

recognize that our foreign assistance also extends to supporting 

multinational institutions that will improve the economies of other 

countries and directly aid in development. And that’s why I believe 

that America has to continue to play a strong part in the major development banks and multilateral financial institutions that work 

towards this goal. 

In this hearing, we look forward to specifically discussing the 

work of the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development 

Bank, and the World Bank, as well as what our nominees intend 

to contribute to these institutions. 

Let me—as our other nominees leave the room with their guests, 

let me welcome these nominees: Eli Whitney Debevoise, currently 

as senior partner at Arnold & Porter, who has been nominated to 

be the U.S. executive director tothe International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Meg Lundsager, currently the alternative executive director of the International Monetary Fund, who 

has been nominated to be the U.S. executive director of the International Monetary Fund; and Mr. Curtis Chin, currently working 

as a managing director for the international communications firm, 

Burson Marsteller, who has been nominated to be the U.S. director 

of the Asian Development Bank. 

And I would recognize Senator Lugar, if he has any comments 

he’d like to make at this time. 

Senator LUGAR. No, Mr. Chairman, I think we should proceed. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Absolutely. 

177 

With that, we’ll change the process here, and we’ll start with Ms. 

Lundsager. And if you would—you have up to 5 minutes to make 

a statement. Your full statement will be included in the record. If 

you have anyone you want to introduce who’s with you, we’re 

happy to welcome them. And we will go straight down the line with 

the panel, in that direction. 

Ms. Lundsager. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARGRETHE LUNDSAGER, NOMINEE TO 

BE U.S. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL 

MONETARY FUND 

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez and 

Ranking Member Lugar. 

First of all, I’d like to introduce my family, who’s here with me 

today. My husband, John Baker, and my two children, Andrew and 

Eva Baker, who are out of school early today to join us here, so 

they’re very pleased with that. My son is home from college. And 

my sister, as well, is here, Hanne Denney. I very much appreciate 

that she’s taken off from her job to come join me here. And I would 

also very much like to thank my parents, who brought me to this 

great country many years ago, as you, Senator, and very pleased 

that I have now been nominated by President Bush to represent 

the United States at the International Monetary Fund. 

If confirmed, I promise to work with this committee, the full Congress, the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary Paulson, and the 

rest of the administration, in furthering U.S. foreign economic policy goals. 

After many years at the Treasury Department, I am now serving 

as the alternate executive director at the IMF. In this capacity, I’ve 

sought to achieve U.S. foreign economic policy goals, and, if confirmed, will continue to pursue those reforms at the IMF that are 

a priority for the United States. 

As you know, the mission of the IMF is to promote international 

monetary cooperation and to facilitate the growth of trade in order 

to generate high levels of employment and income in its member 

nations. Toward this end, the IMF has an important role in encouraging increased transparency and public policy, supporting marketbased reforms to generate sustained growth and development, and 

advancing sound fiscal and monetary policies to strengthen government accounts and reduce the risk of crisis. With its near-global 

membership, the IMF is in a position to promote best practices in 

these areas. A good deal has been accomplished in the past few 

years. A strong IMF with a firm U.S. voice is important to continuing this work. 

At the present time, the IMF is also undergoing fundamental 

change as it looks to revise its own tools for assessing a country’s 

economic and monetary policies, including a country’s exchangerate policy. The United States strongly supports this effort; and, if 

confirmed, I look forward to working with my colleagues to realize 

these important reforms. 

Mr. Chairman, throughout my Treasury career I’ve had the opportunity to see, firsthand, the dedication of administration officials and congressional leaders to strengthening the U.S. economy 

through our own domestic policies and our global efforts to foster 

178 

growth and financial stability in other countries. There is much we 

can still do to strengthen the global economy, and, if confirmed, I 

will seek to do my part at the International Monetary Fund to 

achieve further reforms in IMF policies and practices. 

I would be very pleased to answer your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lundsager follows:] 

PREPATRED STATEMENT OF HON. MARGRETHE LUNDSAGER, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Hagel, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored that President Bush has nominated me to serve as the United States Executive Director at 

the International Monetary Fund, and if confirmed, I pledge to work with this committee, the full Congress, Secretary Paulson, and the rest of the administration in 

furthering U.S. foreign economic policy goals. 

After many years at the Treasury Department, I am now serving as the Alternate 

U.S. Executive Director at the IMF. In this capacity, I have sought to achieve U.S. 

objectives and if confirmed, will continue to pursue the reforms that are a priority 

to the United States. 

As you know, the mission of the IMF is to promote international monetary cooperation and to facilitate the growth of trade in order to generate high levels of 

employment and income in its member nations. Toward this end, the IMF has an 

important role in encouraging increased transparency in public policy, supporting 

market-based reforms to generate sustained growth and development, and advancing sound fiscal and monetary policies to strengthen government accounts and reduce the risk of crisis. With its near global membership, the IMF is in a position 

to promote best practices in these areas. A good deal has been accomplished. A 

strong IMF with a firm U.S. voice is important to continuing this work. 

At the present time, the IMF is also undergoing fundamental change as it looks 

to revise its own tools for assessing a country’s economic and monetary policies, including a country’s exchange rate policy. The United States strongly supports this 

effort and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with my colleagues to realize 

these important reforms. 

Mr. Chairman, throughout my Treasury career I have had the opportunity to see 

firsthand the dedication of administration officials and Congressional leaders to 

strengthening the U.S. economy, through our own domestic policies and our global 

efforts to foster growth and financial stability in other countries. There is much we 

can still do to strengthen the global economy, and if confirmed, I will seek to do 

my part at the IMF to achieve further reforms in IMF policies and practices. I would 

be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Chin. 

STATEMENT OF CURTIS S. CHIN, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DIRECTOR OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, WITH THE RANK 

OF AMBASSADOR 

Mr. CHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar. 

It’s really an honor to be here today to be considered for confirmation as the U.S. executive director of the Asian Development 

Bank. I am, of course, also extremely honored to have been nominated by President Bush to serve our Nation at the ADB. 

And I would actually like to take you up on the offer to introduce 

a couple of members of my family and friends who are here. Specifically, I’d like to recognize my father, Moy. He’s a retired career 

U.S. Army officer, originally from the State of Washington, now 

working in healthcare. And my mom, Ethel, originally from Maryland, a retired nurse and, of course, long-time military wife and 

mom, who, with my dad, helped manage our ever-moving houseVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00186 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
179 

hold from California to Arizona to Virginia and overseas U.S. postings in Taiwan, Thailand, and Korea. 

Also here are my sister, Lisa, and her husband, my brother-inlaw, Sam. Of particular note, Sam is a U.S. Army soldier. He arrived last Wednesday from his deployment with the 19th Engineer 

Battalion Headquarters Support Company in Iraq. I thank him for 

taking up one of his afternoons on, no doubt, a well-deserved 2- 

weeks leave before returning to Iraq next week. 

Not here in person is my brother, Mark. He’s also career U.S. 

military, who recently retired as deputy commander for administration at Evans U.S. Army Community Hospital in Fort Carson, Colorado. 

Each of them have, in their own way, set an example of service 

to all of—for our communities and our country. 

If confirmed to the post of U.S. executive director of the ADB, I 

look forward to continuing that tradition of service. 

Over the many years that I have lived and worked in Asia, I 

saw, firsthand, the challenges posed by the tremendous poverty 

that continues to persist in the region. I also saw, as today’s headlines from Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and elsewhere, 

continue to show, how what happens in Asia can have tremendous 

consequences across the Pacific here in the United States. Strong 

continued engagement and involvement in Asia by the United 

States is vital and underscores the importance of a region that, 

while growing and dynamic, is still home to the vast majority of 

the world’s poor, and still continues to face daunting challenges 

ahead. 

The ADB’s core mission is straightforward: promote sustainable, 

economic growth and eradicate poverty in the region. It must do 

this through economic programs that advance human development, 

private-sector growth, good governance, transparency, and the environment. The impact of the ADB, however, extends far beyond its 

basic mission of alleviating poverty and promoting economic development. The bank has played a significant role in promoting and 

financing economic revitalization and institutional development in 

Afghanistan. With U.S. support, it has also been instrumental in 

responding to natural disasters, serving not only as a financier, but 

as regional coordinator of recovery efforts from such devastating 

events these last 2-plus years as the tsunami in Asia and a major 

earthquake in Pakistan. In both cases, ADB efforts to rebuild and 

restore local economic activity have been vital to reconstruction efforts. Additionally, the ADB has provided assistance on antimoney-laundering practices in ways that counter the financing of 

terrorism. The ADB also has been working to combat human trafficking, especially of women and children. 

If confirmed, I will bring the breadth and depth of my regional 

knowledge and management skills to support and advance the 

goals of the United States at this important regional financial institution. These goals include ensuring that the ADB is results-oriented, achieving measurable responsible development outcomes, as 

well as increasing transparency and accountability in the ADB’s 

operations. 

180 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you for the privilege of appearing before the Committee today. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions you or other members of the Committee have. 

Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CURTIS S. CHIN, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DIRECTOR OF THE

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hagel, and members of the committee. I am honored to be able to come before this esteemed committee to be considered for confirmation as the U.S. Executive Director of the Asian Development 

Bank (ADB). I am, of course, also extremely honored to have been nominated by 

President Bush to serve our Nation at the ADB, and I welcome this chance to answer any questions you have. 

Before proceeding, and with the Chairman’s permission, I wanted to take a brief 

moment to thank the many family members and friends who have provided me support and guidance through my years in both the public and private sectors. Some 

of them are here today. In particular, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I wanted to recognize some of my family present. First, my parents: my father, Moy—a 

retired career U.S. Army officer originally from the State of Washington, now working in health care—and my mother, Ethel, originally from Maryland, a retired nurse 

and of course longtime military wife and Mom who, with my Dad, helped manage 

our ever-moving household from California to Arizona to Virginia and overseas U.S. 

postings in Taiwan, Thailand, and Korea. Also here are my sister Lisa and her husband, my brother-in-law, Sam. Of particular note, Sam, a U.S. Army soldier, arrived 

last Wednesday from Iraq where he is deployed with the 19th Engineer Battalion, 

Headquarters Support Company. I would particularly like to thank Sam for joining 

us this afternoon and giving up a day of his no doubt well-earned leave before returning next week to Iraq. Not here in person but offering support from afar is my 

brother Mark, also career U.S. Army, who recently retired as Deputy Commander 

for Administration of Evans U.S. Army Community Hospital in Fort Carson, Colorado. All of them in their own way have set an example of service to our communities and our country. 

If confirmed for the position of U.S. Executive Director to the ADB, I look forward 

to continuing that tradition of service. Over the many years that I have lived and 

worked in Asia, I saw firsthand the challenges posed by the tremendous poverty 

that continues to persist in the region. I also saw—as today’s headlines from Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and elsewhere continue to show—how what 

happens in Asia can have tremendous consequences across the Pacific here in the 

United States. Strong, continued engagement and involvement in Asia by the 

United States is vital and underscores the importance of a region that while growing and dynamic is still home to the vast majority of the world’s poor and still continues to face daunting challenges ahead. 

The ADB’s core mission is straightforward: Promote sustainable economic growth 

and eradicate poverty in the region. It must do this through economic programs that 

advance human development, private sector growth, good governance, transparency, 

and the environment. 

But the impact of the ADB extends far beyond its basic mission of alleviating poverty and promoting economic development. The Bank has played a significant role 

in promoting and financing economic revitalization and institutional development in 

Afghanistan. With United States support, it has been instrumental in responding 

to natural disasters, serving not only as financier but as regional coordinator of recovery efforts from such devastating events these last 2 years as the tsunami in 

Asia and a major earthquake in Pakistan. In both cases, ADB efforts to rebuild and 

restore local economic activity have been vital to reconstruction efforts. Additionally, 

the ADB has provided assistance on anti-money laundering practices and ways to 

counter the financing of terrorism. And, the ADB has been working to combat 

human trafficking, especially of women and children. 

If confirmed, I will bring the breadth and depth of my regional knowledge and 

management skills to support and advance the goals of the United States at this 

important regional financial institution. These goals include ensuring that the ADB 

is results-oriented—achieving measurable, responsible development outcomes—as 

well as increasing transparency and accountability in the ADB’s operations. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the privilege of appearing before this committee 

today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you or the members of the committee have. 

181 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Debevoise 

STATEMENT OF ELI WHITNEY DEBEVOISE II, NOMINEE TO BE 

U.S. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK 

FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. DEBEVOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar. 

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I do not have a long list of family members to present. Unfortunately, my wife and children couldn’t be here, but my wife’s family 

is represented through Spencer Dickerson, who’s an in-law of my 

wife’s. 

If confirmed to this job, I hope to continue a tradition of public 

service in my family. My grandfather worked for John McCloy as 

his chief legal counsel in the American sector of Germany after the 

war. And my father served as attorney general of the State of 

Vermont. 

I’m honored to have been nominated to serve as U.S. executive 

director at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. If confirmed, I will have the great privilege and responsibility to represent the United States at the World Bank Group institutions. I look forward to the opportunity to work with Secretary 

Paulson, the Treasury Department, and other executive branch 

agencies represented in and working through the Office of the U.S. 

Executive Director. 

The World Bank Group is a global leader in economic development and poverty reduction both through its loans, credits, grants, 

guarantees, and investment insurance, and through its development knowhow and policy advice. If confirmed, I intend to strive 

to hold the bank to high standards, and to help the bank develop 

a strong institutional framework and ethos to make those high 

standards sustainable. 

In my professional life, I have grappled with the challenges of 

economic development, whether through the lens of sovereign finance, international trade, cross-border lending and investment, 

debt-reduction operations, infrastructure finance, housing finance, 

development of domestic capital markets, or investor/state disputes. I’ve also worked to combat corruption. For my successful 

global efforts to recover the ill-gotten gains of corruption, I was 

awarded a Brazilian medal, the Order of Rio Branco. 

Finally, I have experience with the International Center for the 

Settlement of Investment Disputes, an important forum for the resolution of investor/state disputes. 

If confirmed, I will apply the lessons learned from these experiences at the World Bank institutions. 

At a time when United States leadership in multilateral institutions is an important as ever, I look forward to the opportunity to 

represent the bank’s largest shareholder. I also look forward to 

building a strong working relationship with this committee as I 

commit my energy and experience to the mission of economic development and poverty reduction in all corners of the globe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Debevoise follows:] 

182 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELI WHITNEY DEBEVOISE, II, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. EXECU- TIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOP- MENT

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity 

to appear before you today. 

I am honored to have been nominated to serve as U.S. Executive Director at the 

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. If confirmed, I will have 

the great privilege and the responsibility to represent the United States at the 

World Bank Group institutions. I look forward to the opportunity to work with Secretary Paulson, the Treasury Department, and other executive branch agencies represented in and working through the Office of the U.S. Executive Director. 

The World Bank Group is a global leader in economic development and poverty 

reduction, both through its loans, credits, grants, guarantees, and investment insurance and through its development know-how and policy advice. If confirmed, I intend to strive to hold the Bank to high standards and to help the Bank develop a 

strong institutional framework and ethos to make those high standards sustainable. 

In my professional life I have grappled with the challenges of economic development, whether through the lens of sovereign finance, international trade, cross-border lending and investment, debt-reduction operations, infrastructure finance, housing finance, development of domestic capital markets, or investor-state disputes. I 

have also worked to combat corruption. For my successful, global efforts to recover 

the ill-gotten gains of corruption, I was awarded a Brazilian medal, the Order of 

Rio Branco. Finally, I have experience with the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, an important forum for the resolution of investorstate disputes. If confirmed, I will apply the lessons learned from these experiences 

at the World Bank institutions. 

At a time when United States leadership in multilateral institutions is as important as ever, I look forward to the opportunity to represent the Bank’s largest shareholder. I also look forward to building a strong working relationship with this committee as I commit my energy and experience to the mission of economic development and poverty reduction in all corners of the globe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer the committee’s questions. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, all. 

Let me start with Ms. Lundsager. The—there have been questions by some countries, suggesting that the IMF have a few richer 

countries not being responsive to the concerns or needs of other 

countries. And there’s been some initial changes that the managing 

director has promoted, and others that have been talked about. The 

administration has said it would support, on an ad hoc—increases, 

if there’s real reform over the overall governance system. 

I would love to hear your sense of where future options for 

change goes, what steps that you think you would support. And do 

you think the concerns of the developing countries are being addressed at the IMF? 

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know, we have been seeking to achieve fundamental reform in the IMF. The first step was taken last fall, in late summer—excuse me—in Singapore, where we agreed to an ad hoc 

quota increase for four of the most underrepresented countries in 

the IMF. But part of our commitment in doing that was to achieve 

further fundamental reform in the governance structure of the 

IMF. And what we are seeking to do is to change the ownership 

shares, the structure of the board, and the membership to give the 

fast-growing emerging markets a larger voice, a larger share of the 

IMF. Doing this, of course, is not an easy process, because when 

you negotiate with a group of a hundred-and—over 180 members, 

and you’re seeking to increase the shares of some, naturally there 

will be some whose shares then, out a hundred, will be going down. 

This is the difficulties—some of the issues we’re facing now, as to 

183 

how to structure a system for determining membership shares that 

would fairly represent countries, represent their role in the global 

economy—we think it’s best represented by a nation’s gross domestic product—and to have enough countries agree, because we do 

need 85 percent of the membership to agree to any change in 

quotas so that we could have a more reflective board of directors, 

a more reflective set of membership shares. I think that the United 

States has received a lot of welcome recognition from the developing world for taking this position. Certainly in Singapore, there 

was much appreciation from many of the other countries, that we 

were willing to take the step, because, of course, we had to approve 

this, given our veto power over quota increases. And so, being an 

early advocate of this, and being a very constructive participant in 

these discussions last summer—and they will continue this year, as 

well, as we try and reach agreement among the membership; I 

hope, sometime this year or by early next year. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you about debt relief. Since 

1996, the IMF has been participating in the Heavily Indebted Poor 

Countries. There are some—that were heralded as a positive thing. 

There are critics now raising concern about the success of debt-relief programs. What do you believe are the successes and failures 

of the program? 

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Mr. Chairman, I think the program has been a 

very big success in a number of the countries that have benefited 

from it, because it has freed up domestic resources that, instead of 

paying back the international institutions, or paying back bilateral 

governments, they have used to devote increasing their domestic 

spending on a lot of basic human needs: health, education, other 

very important services for their own citizens. 

At the same time, as part of the HIPC initiative, we look to countries to undertake a number of reforms. And I think what has benefited a number of them is the measures they have taken along the 

way as they’ve been trying to achieve—get to the completion point 

and achieve the full measure of the debt relief. They’ve undertaken 

a number of domestic reforms, in terms of how they prepare their 

domestic budget. Countries have to prepare a Poverty Reduction 

and Strategy Program, where they reach out to the various segments of their population to develop a national strategy that various members of the population agree on, in terms of how they will 

prioritize domestic spending, how they will allocate domestic resources, as well as the resources provided by the major donors. It’s 

also been a vehicle for helping donors to coordinate better. This has 

been a difficulty in a number of countries, having donors coordinate. And so, it’s—I think it’s been an anchor for many of us, and 

I think we have achieved quite a bit. 

At the same time, we’re facing the challenge now as countries— 

we have—as we have greatly reduced the debt in a number of 

countries—is to try and make sure that they don’t build up the 

debt again. Once the debt has been reduced, they certainly appear 

to be a good credit risk. And so, in many countries, we’ve tried, 

through persuasion and, of course, those countries that are still on 

IMF programs, to greatly limit, if not totally forego, any kind of 

commercial debt—debt on commercial terms—and also to be very 

184 

careful about even concessional debt they undertake so that we 

don’t end up back in another highly indebted situation where we’re 

then asked to reduce the debt again. 

So, this is a very complex effort that we have to work with a lot 

of the other creditors on, so—and the IMF and the World Bank 

have worked closely together in coming up with an agreed debt 

sustainability analysis strategy so that countries can more effectively say to other creditors, ‘‘No, we can’t undertake that project 

with that kind of financing. Can you please reconsider and make 

it concessional financing or grant financing?’’ 

So, this is the challenge, going ahead, is making sure that the 

benefits we’ve reaped in the HIPC initiative are not lost and countries build up debt again. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Debevoise, if you are confirmed, the sole 

voting position, as I understand it, for the United States at the 

World Bank, so it’s obviously rather important. And this always 

happens when people who come from the private sector, you know, 

are asked to perform public service. There are some challenges in 

that process. I understand that you have performed legal services 

for many foreign countries and entities. And I also understand you 

pledge to try to take actions to make sure that all of the ethical 

and legal processes are cleared in that process. Have you considered how—certainly, as being the only voting member, how you’re 

going to avoid the perceptions of personal biases towards countries 

which you have a longstanding relationship with? Let’s say, Brazil, 

as an example. Have you given that thought, as you move forward? 

Mr. DEBEVOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes, I have certainly given that considerable thought. And I 

think it’s important that the nature of the financing work I’ve been 

doing for some countries is understood. It basically consists of writing rather detailed descriptions of their economies in disclosure 

documents that are publicly filed with the Securities and Exchange 

Commission. But, yes, I’m going to abide by all of the requirements. And there is a procedure in place for an alternate to vote 

the shares of the United States in those few cases where I may still 

be subject to a restriction. 

Senator MENENDEZ. A lot of people may not know that the bank 

has actually worked somewhat in Iraq. I don’t know if you’ve been 

briefed on it, but I was wondering about some of the reconstruction 

projects that the bank has undertaken in Iraq. There’s been some 

criticism about it as being too slow, the bank should be doing more. 

I was wondering if you had a view of that, if you’ve had an opportunity to formulate a view on that. 

Mr. DEBEVOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Obviously, that is a critical country, which has many economic 

development needs. And, if confirmed, I look forward to looking further into what the bank is doing there. My current understanding 

is that the bank manages a trust fund, which was established to 

receive funds from donors, and that it is involved in managing 

those resources, as, in fact, the bank does in many other post-conflict situations. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chin, I have questions for you, but I’m 

going to yield to Senator Lugar first, and I’ll come back afterwards. 

185 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Lundsager, my understanding is that the IMF currently is 

running at a loss. What should the IMF do to improve its revenues 

or reduce its costs? Why does it matter? What is the nature of the 

IMF with regard to profit or loss or cash flow? Can you describe 

the current predicament? 

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Thank you. Yes, I can, Senator. 

The IMF is in a situation where you might say it’s a victim of 

its own success, where, because so many countries that were borrowing from the fund previously, and, therefore, paying us interest, 

that enabled us to earn the income we needed to pay our administrative expenses to cover our budget. Well, since many countries 

have greatly improved their debt situations, have been able to reaccess capital markets for years now, and turn to more domestic 

forms of debt, they have paid back the fund. And some of them 

have paid back early. So, we have very low levels of credit outstanding right now; and, therefore, the income we’re taking in from 

loans is less than our administrative expenses, this current fiscal 

year. So, we are running at a loss, this fiscal year, a small loss. 

And, as a result, we are going to be drawing on our reserves. 

Now, during the past several years, while the IMF was lending, it built up reserves, retained earnings of $10 billion. So, we’re in 

a very comfortable position to cover any losses, for the time being, 

the next or two, while we sort out what the situation is. Will these 

countries maintain the good policies that have enabled them to 

avoid borrowing from the fund, or will they come back to the fund 

in the future? We don’t know yet, so we’ll have to see how that 

turns out. 

And then, at the same time, we’re undertaking a very important 

effort, a number of the members of the fund, to try and contain the 

expenditure side. And the managing director has been running a 

very tight budget. I expect, in the next few years, it’ll have to be 

even tighter so that administrative expenses, the increase, is kept 

at a very low level. As a matter of fact, they’re going to—there’s 

going to be a bit of a real contraction at the fund over the next couple of years. But, for the time being, due to a very high reserves, 

it won’t be a problem, and then we’ll have the time to sort out, over 

the longer term, what the right solution is. 

Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, it’s an extraordinary situation that most 

observers had not predicted. For example, the Russians have made 

extraordinary payments to the IMF, and are very proud of that 

fact, that revenues from energy resources have changed the whole 

complexion of that. It is fascinating that because all of this money 

was paid back unexpectedly, suddenly the revenues you had anticipated from the interest are gone, and your—— 

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Exactly. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Portfolio has been reshuffled drastically. I appreciate your response regarding the availability of reserves. 

Ms. LUNDSAGER. Right. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me ask you, Mr. Chin. This committee, as 

perhaps you know, in discussing the Asian Development Bank, has 

186 

cited specific cases in which we believe there had been substantial 

corruption. Witnesses have traced the situation in which monies 

would have gone to projects, but, in fact, the road didn’t get built 

or the river was not dredged or whatever. How do you plan to keep 

a sharp eye out on this? Has the situation materially changed, in 

your judgment? And, if not, how can leadership from the United 

States, through your person, make a difference? 

Mr. CHIN. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for that question. 

Indeed, corruption and fighting corruption are critical issues that 

we’re going to have to continue the push forward. You know, if confirmed, that’s clearly an issue that I’m going to keep focused on. 

You know, today I’ve been briefed by some of the people at Treasury, as well as the previous positions in the role that, if confirmed, 

I would take up, including Ambassador Speltz, who clearly spoke 

about some of the issues that he testified before you and the committee on previously. That’s clearly a critical issue. It will remain 

a priority for me, should I be confirmed for this job. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very, very much. 

I’m going to yield to you, Mr. Chairman. I know the vote has 

commenced on the floor, and perhaps you have additional questions. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Chin, I want to pursue the questions that I pursued with Mr. 

Debevoise, because I just, for the record’s purposes, want to make 

sure we have it clear. You, in your role—as a managing director 

in your present role, I understand that you have worked in, and 

are working, on a team that serves Hong Kong among other items 

promoting Hong Kong’s commercial reputation and encouraging 

foreign investment. I also understand you are currently registered 

as a foreign agent for Hong Kong as part of that work. And I also 

understand that contract’s going to close at the end of March and 

that you’re taking steps to deal with both the legal and ethical 

issues that may be involved with that. And I presume you will do 

all the correct things in that respect. 

Now, having said that, how will your past work, promoting the 

economy and tourism of Hong Kong, be perceived, in your mind, by 

others in the bank? And how will you manage the relationship with 

Hong Kong in order to avoid being perceived as having a bias in 

that context? 

Mr. CHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. 

Yes, indeed, I am part of a team now, at Burson Marsteller, serving the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, a contract that does 

end this March—the end of March. I have been in conversations 

with both the committee members, staff, as well as the ethics officer, and the steps I’ll be taking will include recusing myself for a 

year on all matters related to the Hong Kong Government. Also, as 

a further step, my alternate, if confirmed, Paul Curry—we’ve also 

spoke—and he will be addressing any issues that would come up 

related to Hong Kong, should they be—come before the board. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you—I’m glad to hear that—let 

me ask you, with reference to your very significant resume. I’m trying to see the connection between the development field and your 

resume. And so, why don’t you share with the committee some of 

your insights as to how you believe you’ll be able to meet the chalVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00194 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
187 

lenges of the U.S. director at the Asian Development Bank, because 

obviously its mission is to use the bank’s wherewithal to create development opportunities inside of Asia. 

Mr. CHIN. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If you look at my resume—and I would—just to share a couple 

of highlights of what I—the skills I think I will bring, if confirmed 

to the post, will include a very good understanding of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the management skills that are very important, particularly in pushing our U.S. policy objectives with regards 

to good governance, anticorruption efforts. Some of the specific efforts I’ve been involved with in my present job include work, in 

terms of rollout of codes of conduct, corporate governance issues, 

and particularly leading our efforts in the area of corporate responsibility, exploring that nexus of public-sector and private-sector 

goals and needs, and where do they come together. This work has 

ranged from development issues in Asia to development issues 

based here in the United States, dealing with Asian issues. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And I have one last question for you. In your 

written statement, you mention the firsthand challenges posed by 

the tremendous poverty that continues to persist in the region. In 

your mind, as you move to this position, what’s the greatest challenge to addressing the poverty plaguing many of the people leaving—living in Asia and the Pacific? And how do you see the role 

of the bank coming into play in meeting that challenge? 

Mr. CHIN. Clearly, Mr. Chairman, any dollar that, because of corruption, does not go to help address some of these development 

issues, is a dollar wasted, a dollar lost. And I think the—a key role 

of the exec director, if I were confirmed for that post, is really to 

drive that issue. Where is the money going? And is the ADB being 

accountable to where that money goes? Really, I think that will be 

my—one of my key focuses, if I were confirmed as this position. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So you see that as one of the major challenges for development taking place in the region? 

Mr. CHIN. Absolutely. Absolutely. A dollar wasted, you know, 

does not get to where we want it to be, in terms of either spurring 

private-sector investment or ensuring a system in place that will 

allow for development dollars to go—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. And after that— 

Mr. CHIN [continuing]. Where they need to be. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. What would you say is the next 

biggest challenge? 

Mr. CHIN. One of the challenges also is the issue of cooperation 

across borders. And one of the things that the United States has 

been pushing for is greater regional integration initiatives in the 

region so that, again, that money isn’t spent to duplicate issues, 

whether one institution is funding something and another one 

could also be funding. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar, do you have anything else? 

Senator LUGAR. No, thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. All right. 

Let me thank you, all, for testifying before the committee and, 

of course, your willingness to serve the country. These are important positions. 

188 

The record will remain open for 2 days so that committee members may submit additional questions to this panel of nominees, as 

well as to the previous panel of nominees. And we would certainly 

ask, if any member chooses to submit such questions, that the 

nominees would respond expeditiously to those questions. 

Senator MENENDEZ. With that, with no additional comments, the 

hearing is adjourned. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

RULE OF LAW

Over the past decade, we’ve seen massive human rights violations across sub-Saharan Africa. With some notable recent exceptions, these crimes have gone 

uninvestigated—much less prosecuted—leading to a climate of impunity that encourages future abusers. 

Question. What can USAID do to strengthen the rule of law in Africa? What type 

of support are we providing in the justice and rule of law sectors in countries to 

enhance their capacity to investigate and prosecute crime? 

Answer. Rule of law is essential to democracy and representative government. 

Laws provide the infrastructure that limits the absolute power of the state, ensure 

equal treatment of all citizens, and guarantee rights, such as freedom of speech, 

that are essential to the democratic process. For these reasons, USAID focuses on 

strengthening the rule of law in several key African countries. In Liberia, Nigeria, 

and Ethiopia, for example, USAID works with local universities and bar associations 

to expand legal education for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, as well as supporting 

mobile courts and legal resource centers to provide citizens with greater access to 

justice. In South Africa, USAID has facilitated public-private partnerships between 

key companies and the court system to crack down on white-collar crime. USAID 

also supports the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights in providing legal protection 

and counseling for hundreds of victims of torture, violence, and other forms of statesponsored intimidation by the Mugabe regime. 

In addition, USAID collaborates closely with other United States Government 

agencies to deliver rule of law programs in Africa. Most notably, USAID is implementing components of the Women’s Justice and Empowerment Initiative (WJEI), 

under the leadership of the Department of State and in collaboration with the Department of Justice. The WJEI seeks to raise awareness about gender-based violence, strengthen legal frameworks and judicial systems to enforce women’s rights, 

and provide care and treatment for victims of violence and abuse in four African 

countries: Benin, Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia. USAID expects to issue competitive solicitations for the awareness raising and victim support components in April. 

USAID also collaborates with the State Department to combat trafficking in persons 

in Africa, as well as administer the Democracy and Human Rights Fund, a small 

grants program that provided financial support to approximately 200 African 

human rights organizations in fiscal year 2006. 

RESPONSES OF JAMES R. KUNDER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. In your current role as Acting Deputy Administrator, what are your 

major responsibilities? 

Answer. The Office of the Administrator sets the policy and management agenda 

for the U.S. Agency for International Development’s economic and humanitarian assistance programs, and ensures successful implementation of the agency’s goals. The 

office is responsible for providing leadership, strategic direction, and management 

for the agency, which is managing more than $14 billion in United States foreign 

assistance programs in Latin America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific region. 

My specific responsibilities as Acting Deputy Administrator are to assist the administrator in day-to-day management of USAID. In my Acting capacity, I represent the 

agency at interagency meetings, such as National Security Council meetings on 

189 

issues ranging from Sudan, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to avian influenza and 

PEPFAR. Representing the administrator, I chair the Senior Management Group, 

which oversees the selection and placement process for Senior Foreign Service officers at USAID. At the direction of the administrator, I convene senior managers to 

discuss agency priorities and mechanisms to implement these priorities. 

Question. What are the most important management concerns facing the agency, 

and how are you trying to address them? 

Answer. The U.S. Agency for International Development must both respond to 

major reconstruction and humanitarian challenges, like Afghanistan and the Sudan, 

while maintaining a high priority on sustaining long-term development programs in 

more stable environments. At the direction of the administrator, I have been engaged in ensuring that program and personnel resources are correctly balanced between these two priorities. USAID is also reorganizing many internal procedures to 

ensure the agency is structurally aligned to meet the new foreign aid priorities established by the administrator in his role as Director of Foreign Assistance. In this 

regard, I have been working closely with Ambassador Tobias to examine, in consultation with the Congress, the optimal structures for human resources, budgeting, 

and office structure overseas. Finally, it is likely that USAID will continue to be 

called upon to manage humanitarian, reconstruction, and stabilization activities in 

conflict countries, and ensure the agency has the staff capacity and skill sets to 

meet these challenges. I have been working closely with colleagues at the Department of State (including the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization), the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations, on how best to meet the challenges USAID faces in conflict and post-conflict environments. 

Question. How would you rate morale at the agency? If you consider that it is not 

good, what measures are being taken to improve morale? 

Answer. After 20 years of working in the development and reconstruction field, 

I remain an optimist about America’s role in the world, and about the importance 

of the role assigned to the U.S. Agency for International Development. Most of my 

USAID colleagues feel the same way. According to the 2006 Federal Human Capital 

Survey, 88.8 percent of USAID respondents believe the work they do is important, 

and 83.3 percent like their work. There is, however, a certain level of anxiety among 

agency employees at this time, related to the many changes the agency is experiencing in the context of ongoing foreign assistance reforms. One of my first areas 

of emphasis since being appointed Acting Deputy Administrator has been, at the administrator’s direction, to focus on human resources (HR) reform. Upgrading 

USAID’s major HR systems is a priority, both to improve morale and to build the 

agency to better meet the challenges of the 21st century. In addition to institutional 

reforms, I have been focused on better communicating to USAID personnel, both in 

Washington and overseas, information on the current reform process, and its impact 

on planning, designing, budgeting, and monitoring foreign assistance programs. 

Question. What are your strengths and weaknesses as a manager? What steps are 

you taking to improve areas where you consider that you have weaknesses? 

Answer. In terms of strengths, I would bring, if confirmed, nearly 20 years of development and international crisis management to this position. Eleven of these 

years are with USAID, 3 years with an international nongovernmental organization, 

and 3 years as a consultant to international organizations. This diverse experience 

provides useful perspectives on the problems I am likely to encounter. In addition, 

my service as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps provides useful background for 

the frequent contact USAID encounters with U.S. military forces. Among my management strengths, I care deeply about USAID’s mission as part of the U.S. foreign 

policy process, and about USAID’s staff, many of whom work in most trying circumstances. In terms of weaknesses, I need to understand more thoroughly the financial accountability systems in place at USAID, to ensure the taxpayers’ dollars 

are being carefully programmed and accounted for. I have been working diligently 

to understand these systems in more detail and, if confirmed, plan to devote additional effort to mastering these systems. In addition, although I believe I appropriately delegate responsibilities, I need to ensure I provide clearly documented 

work objectives to subordinate managers. If confirmed, I plan to invest additional 

time in utilizing USAID’s annual evaluation form system to ensure work objectives 

for those I manage are clear, achievable, and measurable. 

Question. In the past decade, the agency has become more reliant on contractors 

and had fewer direct hires. Is this a positive development, in your judgment? What 

190 

measures is the agency taking to ensure that contractors are fulfilling administration and congressional policy objectives? 

Answer. As noted in the question, USAID has limited direct hire resources. In the 

early 1960s and 1970s USAID’s budget and staffing were aligned to allow the direct 

hire workforce to actually implement programs in developing countries. More recently, realignment of U.S. Government budget and program priorities has led to 

a reduction in our direct hire workforce implementing programs, and the increased 

use of contracts, grants, and American Personal Services Contractors. USAID aims 

to strike a balance between limited resources and required expertise with our mix 

of direct hires and contract staff. Our contractors provide cutting edge technical 

knowledge and surge capacity to address increasingly complex and urgent problems 

in increasingly dangerous areas. Our direct hire workforce continues to be responsible for inherently governmental duties, such as policy making and spending decisions. 

USAID follows broader Federal procedures on rule-making and policy development that assure transparency and consultation with the public. Policy is promulgated to our workforce through general notices and training, reinforced with vigilance from general counsel, contracting officers, controllers, and our technical and 

program staff. Contractor compliance is assured by the monitoring of contractor performance and compliance. We also follow up and assess through an Evaluations Division in our Office of Acquisition and Assistance. Our ombudsman is available to 

contractors and grantees to respond to their concerns. As a final check, auditors review costs incurred and compliance as part of an annual review and through the 

close-out process. 

In implementing OMB Circular A–76, USAID is examining whether specific outsourcing arrangements continue to effectively and efficiently serve our implementation needs. The administrator has recently required a review of Washington-based 

institutional contracts and is requiring implementation of efficiency measures as 

these contracts come up for renewal. 

Question. What do you believe is the role of labor programming in advancing the 

promotion of democracy? 

Answer. Labor programming can promote democracy in the following ways: 

• By building the capacity of civil society organizations such as labor rights 

groups, legal advocacy networks, trade unions, and labor nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to promote and monitor core labor standards, which strengthen the rule of law and access to justice. 

• By strengthening the capacity of government institutions such as labor ministries and inspectorates, and labor courts to promote and monitor core labor 

standards and adjudicate labor grievances, which contributes to good governance and the rule of law. 

• By strengthening the capacity of democratic, independent labor unions and organizations for policy analysis, advocacy, organizing, coalition-building, internal 

democratic governance, and membership representation and services; and improving organizational and financial capacity to ensure sustainability of these 

capacities. 

• By supporting the mobilization and organizational activities of trade unions to 

empower people to take their own decisions, ensuring that the voice of the 

working poor is heard when decisions which affect their lives are made, and empowering workers to be active citizens with rights, expectations, and responsibilities. 

• By strengthening the democratic culture of labor unions to act as incubators of 

democratic values, practices, and behaviors, including tolerance, inclusion, electing and holding accountable union leaders, demanding and exercising voice in 

policy, and other decisions which affect the membership. 

• By supporting free and fair elections and political processes through workers’ 

awareness and voter turnout campaigns, disseminating information, education, 

and promoting public debate, especially among women and other disenfranchised groups; participating in observation, monitoring, and external oversight of elections and other political processes; communicating with, contacting, 

and interacting with political parties toward gaining their endorsement of workers’ interests. 

• By supporting the interaction of democratically elected trade union leaders with 

national and local government officials in representative and participative processes (especially tripartite processes) designed to effectively identify and respond to workers’ preferences for government services and policy positions. 

191 

Question. The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2008 shifts funds from the 

DA account to the ESF account, and also shifts alternative development funding in 

the Andean region from the ACI account to the ESF account. What is the rationale 

for this shift? What will be the effect of the Nethercutt amendment related to the 

International Criminal Court, if it is enacted as part of the fiscal year 2008 appropriations act? 

Answer. In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, we sought to maximize the use 

of account authorities and establish clear priorities in support of effective implementation of foreign assistance programs. We, therefore, matched accounts with country 

circumstances and the priorities the county categories are designed to address. 

This means that, overall, funding for Development Assistance (DA), which has 

traditionally supported poor countries that demonstrate performance or a commitment to development, has been prioritized to Developing and Transforming countries. Economic Support Funds (ESF), which focus primarily on providing economic 

support under special economic, political, or security conditions, has been prioritized 

to support activities in the Rebuilding and Restrictive Country Categories. 

The intent in shifting funds from DA to ESF is to draw cleaner lines around their 

use, as identified by country characteristics. These cleaner lines allow us to justify 

to Congress why we have requested amounts for each account. The shift is in no 

way reflective of a reduced prioritization of development activities. To the contrary, 

total funding in the three objectives supporting long-term development increased by 

approximately $100 million from fiscal year 2006 levels in the fiscal year 2008 budget request. In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, we have allocated $192.5 million in ESF 

for Alternative Development, which was previously funded with the Andean 

Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account. This shift provides a clearer distinction between the uses of funds for ‘‘hard side’’ (ACI-funded) and ‘‘soft side’’ (ESF-funded) 

activities in support of our counternarcotics objectives in the Andes. 

If the Nethercutt amendment appears in the fiscal year 2008 appropriations act, 

we will carefully examine programs that might be affected and we will make recommendations to the President to waive this prohibition where necessary. In accordance with this provision, we will notify Congress of the exercise of any waiver authority. 

Question. What is your view on the importance of competition in contracting? 

Please provide information on the percentage of contracts that were subject to full 

and open competition in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006. 

Answer. Full and open competition is the standard for USAID contracting. Competition ensures that USAID programs benefit from the best products and services 

offered at competitive market prices. On occasion, the standard of full and open 

competition cannot be met due to the urgent nature of the technical program requirement. However, in all such cases, USAID requires justification for the level of 

competition used, most frequently accompanied by review and approval by higher 

management in accordance with law and regulation. 

The percentage of contracts, expressed in percent of total dollars, subject to full 

and open competition in fiscal year 2004 was 93 percent, and in fiscal year 2005, 

94 percent. We are still gathering data on figures for fiscal year 2006. 

RESPONSES OF KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REFORM

There has been considerable effort to positively transform the foreign assistance 

budget process in the last year. This effort, spearheaded by Ambassador Randall 

Tobias—the administrator for the Agency for International Development as well as 

the Director of Foreign Assistance—is intended to ensure the experience and assessments of our embassy staff in the field is effectively incorporated in the budget development cycle. Given that this is a new and ongoing reform process: 

Question. What has been your experience with the transformation and reform effort from the field? How might it be improved? 

Answer. Senator Lugar, as Sudan Mission Director during these early stages of 

the reform process, I have already witnessed better policy coherence and budget integration as a result of the foreign assistance reform effort. 

United States Charge d’Affaires in Sudan, Cameron Hume, appointed me as the 

overall coordinator of the fiscal year 2007 Sudan Operational Plan. In that capacity, 

I managed the integration of most State and USAID resources into one plan—inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00199 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
192 

formed by one set of priorities—that the Embassy Khartoum country team shaped 

in detail and ultimately the Charge and I both approved. The process helped to 

identify what United States Government assistance is doing in Sudan (the vast majority of which is programmed by USAID or State). We have already seen further 

efficiencies in program management and more strategic targeting of assistance 

around the overall objectives of consolidating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

and stabilizing Darfur. 

This is the first time both Washington and the field have gone through this operational planning exercise, and there is still room for improvement. In my experience, 

the foreign assistance reforms provide Washington an opportunity to shape country 

strategies and put in place country programs that better promote our foreign policy 

and foreign assistance goals and objectives. At the same time the country teams at 

Post have a greater voice in determining what assistance is given, whether 

Washington- or field-managed, and to what end. In the case of Sudan, and I believe 

many other countries in Africa, this first round of fiscal year 2007 planning brought 

the country teams in Washington and the field closer together in understanding the 

issues and priorities for United States Government assistance. I believe the process 

can be refined and expanded to ensure that our assistance is targeted, but still responsive to locally identified priorities and realities. 

Question. How do you expect this reform to affect United States development initiatives in Africa over time? 

Answer. I fully expect that the reforms we are undertaking will increase the effectiveness of our investments. We are already seeing a greater focus on strategic priorities, a more rational way of allocating resources toward those priorities, and a 

more comprehensive and comprehensible system for tracking and reporting results. 

Because the new integrated budget planning model is based on the totality of 

USAID and State Department resources, it allows us to be more strategic and targeted in our assistance decisions. For example, I believe that the reform further enhances our ability to focus our resources on key rebuilding countries, like Sudan, 

Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are emerging from long periods of conflict, and key regional anchor states like Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, 

and Nigeria. 

We must tailor development programs to the unique needs of each recipient country in reaching the transformational diplomacy goal. This focus on country circumstances is important as we implement programs around the continent. As I discussed in my testimony, I believe that Africans must bear the ultimate responsibility for ‘‘solving’’ the problems of Africa. I am, therefore, encouraged by the focus 

on individual country progress. The ultimate goal of transformational diplomacy is 

to support recipient country efforts to move from a relationship defined by dependence on traditional foreign assistance to one defined by full sustaining partnership 

status. To achieve that goal under the new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance, resources were allocated to the areas that would best support individual country progress. The result was a country-driven allocation for the fiscal year 2008 

budget. Africa is not homogenous, and I greatly look forward to working in partnership with other donors and African nations as we move forward with our development programs. 

Question. How has USAID mobilized to ensure this reform effectively addresses 

recognized weaknesses in the coordination and cooperation of U.S. Government 

agencies in the implementation of our foreign assistance? 

Answer. Under the leadership of the Director of Foreign Assistance, we have developed an integrated budget and operational planning system that brings all 

USAID and State Department players together to program resources and plan and 

coordinate our implementation efforts. 

In most cases, I believe that ambassadors turned to USAID mission directors for 

guidance and advice in planning and implementing assistance. In the field, mission 

directors were recognized as the experts and were given an opportunity to shape our 

strategic plans in each country. 

To improve coherence across all U.S. Government foreign assistance, the fiscal 

year 2008 budget submission was formulated in consultation with the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation and the Office of Global Aids Coordinator. We took their estimated fiscal year 2008 disbursements into account in our country levels to ensure 

that our activities complement theirs. 

With respect to the rest of the U.S. Government, Ambassador Tobias has been 

working with the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve communications and coordination. In addition, our field missions have just finished writing their fiscal year 

2007 operational plans, which describe how they will spend their fiscal year 2007 

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funding and the results they expect to receive. Posts have been requested to account 

for all U.S. Government resources in-country in these plans, which gives us the 

first-ever comprehensive look at U.S. Government programs in a given country. In 

Washington, as the operational plans are undergoing reviews, DoD is participating 

on a case-by-case basis. 

As the reform solidifies, it is my hope that the interagency coordination will increasingly focus on our common goal, using a common framework and common definitions. 

AFRICOM

Question. The Department of Defense has directed that their agency begin to develop a new regional command called AFRICOM. Although its ultimate home is yet 

to be determined, the makeup of this command is mooted to be more innovative— 

to include expertise from other non-DoD agencies. 

What coordination has occurred between USAID and DoD/LTSAID and State on 

the development of AFRICOM? What is planned? 

Answer. The Department of Defense invited USAID to participate in the planning 

for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in November 2006. I understand that within 

several days, the agency dedicated several staff to work with the AFRICOM Implementation Planning Team in Washington, DC. At present, we have several staff 

working on the AFRICOM Transition Team in Stuttgart, Germany, and we have additional staff providing ‘‘reach back’’ support from Washington. The Department of 

Defense has been very supportive of USAID participation. I believe that our staff 

has been able to effectively represent development issues and objectives in Africa. 

This process builds on ongoing cooperation with DoD in the areas of humanitarian 

assistance, disaster response, and security sector reform. 

Question. How might the establishment of an AFRICOM facilitate or hamper your 

assistance efforts in African countries? 

Answer. As the principal United States agency extending assistance to countries 

recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms, USAID recognizes that AFRICOM can play a supporting role for foreign assistance objectives in Africa. We also recognize that the establishment of such a 

command and USAID engagement is consistent with the U.S. National Security 

Strategy (March 2006), which clearly reiterates that, ‘‘Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping 

to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.’’ 

In particular, it is our understanding that an established AFRICOM will include 

interagency civilian positions of substance and responsibility to ensure future coordination and collaboration. Although the planning is still in the early stages, our 

staff is working closely with our colleagues in the Department of Defense and Department of State to ensure that the eventual command has an efficient integrating 

mechanism for interagency staff. An effective organizational structure and full-time 

opportunities for USAID staff can provide an opportunity to enhance coordination 

in Africa; increase overall coherence; leverage resources for greater impact; improve 

communication; and share best practices. For example, when fully capable, 

AFRICOM will provide an ideal platform, when needed, for USAID regional disaster 

officers to coordinate military support to humanitarian crises on the continent resulting in a more rapid and focused U.S. Government response. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with AFRICOM to ensure that our activities are 

coordinated as we all work together toward the goal of transformational diplomacy 

in Africa. 

RESPONSES OF JAMES KUNDER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN REGIONS

Question. Given the limited development on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan 

border, what United States development and humanitarian assistance is targeted at 

the border regions including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 

Pakistan? 

Answer. The United States has developed an integrated strategy for the development of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 

The U.S. mission in Islamabad believes very strongly that all new development 

assistance focused on FATA should be consolidated as part of the ‘‘peace and security’’ objective within the current operational plan. However, despite the close coVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00201 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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ordinating with the GOP on the current program, USAID has been careful not to 

lay down an overly prescriptive set of requirements, as these would adversely affect 

our broader strategic aims. The GOP is central to the success of these initiatives. 

The attached fact sheet gives an overview of current activities in the FATA. 

[NOTE. The information referred to appears at the end of this set of questions and 

answers.] 

In addition to these activities, USAID believes an additional amount of $150 million a year will be available for the next 5 years—pending Congressional approval. 

If so, the following interventions in the FATA, with the exception of item four, will 

represent major expansions of our current development activities in that region. The 

capacity building of the FATA Development Authority and FATA Secretariat would 

be new activities to facilitate more efficient and transparent provision of services to 

the FATA by the GOP. 

• Education.—Increasing scholarships and expanding the school construction program. 

• Health.—Expansion of current maternal and child health interventions and 

HIV/AIDS as appropriate. 

• Economic Growth.—Expansion of the current micro-credit programs and smallscale economic activities such as horticulture or jewelry manufacture. 

• Capacity Building of the FATA Development Authority and FATA Secretariat. 

Question. Does it make sense to consolidate United States assistance in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas to more realistically address cross-border infrastructure requirements such as roads, and greater area development in what is a 

very ethnically homogenous zone? 

Answer. Although the border region is ethnically Pashtun, there are a number of 

fissures within this group—based along tribal and clan loyalties, as well as regional 

perspectives. Even the language spoken on both sides of the border is different— 

Pakistani Pashto shows a strong Urdu influence, while Afghan Pashto incorporates 

that country’s lingua franca, Dari. The language also has two major dialects—eastern and southern variants. Thus, what may appear to be a homogenous group of 

people is often subtly or very obviously fractured. Although there are people who 

have relations or connections on both sides of the border, one cannot assume that 

this is true for the majority of the population. 

Political considerations—especially the strained relationships between the countries—are also a factor in mounting effective cross-border programs. Differing customs and regulatory laws as well as competing national agendas may preclude undertaking certain economic activities. 

Despite these social and cultural challenges, USAID, in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, is maximizing the effect of its development programs by implementing, 

on each side of the border, activities in education, health, economic growth, and capacity building. The practical effect is that these programs complement each other. 

Based on lessons learned over the last several years about implementing development programs in the region, USAID is working to maximize the effect of the U.S. 

Government effort in the current circumstances, and we are anticipating that this 

approach will help to pave the way for consolidation of the region’s development effort. This is our goal. 

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REFORM

Question. What has been your experience with the transformation and reform effort from Washington? How might it be improved? 

Answer. In my time as assistant administrator (AA) for the Asia and Near East 

Bureau (ANE), and then as acting deputy administrator, I have observed increased 

policy coherence, budget integration, and an elevated seat for development at the 

policy table. For the first time under the reforms initiated by Ambassador Tobias, 

State, and USAID officials sat at the same table to plan each stage of the fiscal year 

2008 budget. Input was sought at both the staff and senior management levels. Secretary Rice herself ran the final reviews of the budget by region. In my previous 

experience in leadership roles at USAID, the level of involvement of USAID staff 

and leadership has never been as integrated as it was in setting the fiscal year 2008 

budget request. 

As one would expect, the first time around in any process has kinks and areas 

that can be improved. A thorough ‘‘after-action review’’ is currently underway to assess areas where the process may be improved for fiscal year 2009. If confirmed, 

I look forward to working closely with Ambassador Tobias and members of the committee to improve the process. 

195 

Question. How do you expect this reform to affect U.S. development initiatives in 

general around the world and over the long-term? 

Answer. One of the primary goals of the reform is to focus on country progress. 

It is my hope that, in the future, U.S. development initiatives will be more grounded 

in country need, expected results, and sustainability. One of the ways we are working to achieve this is through the development of the Foreign Assistance Framework, the standard program structure and definitions, and the common indicators. 

These tools will allow us to track consistently across USAID and State the outputs 

of our foreign assistance efforts. Our ability to provide details about who is spending 

U.S. Government funds, what they are spending it on, and what results we expect 

to achieve will allow me, if confirmed, to have greater oversight of our programs 

around the world and to measure what is working, what isn’t, and the opportunity 

costs of shifting funds among programs. 

Our end goal is to work ourselves out of a job. As Ambassador Tobias often says, 

‘‘It is about them, not about us.’’ 

Question. How has USAID mobilized to ensure this reform effectively addresses 

recognized weaknesses in the coordination and cooperation of U.S. Government 

agencies in the implementation of our foreign assistance? 

Answer. Interagency cooperation is essential to the success of implementing foreign assistance. Certainly, we have come a long way in the past couple of years. 

Under Ambassador Tobias’ leadership, the fiscal year 2008 budget request was developed as an integrated process (both USAID and the Department of State) and 

in consultation with the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 

One of the primary tools we are using to improve coordination and ensure accountability under the reform is the operational plan. Our field missions have just 

finished writing their fiscal year 2007 operational plans, which describe how they 

will spend their fiscal year 2007 funding and the results they expect to receive. Missions have been requested to account for all U.S. Government resources programmed by all U.S. Government agencies in-country in these plans, which gives 

us the first-ever comprehensive look at U.S. Government programs in a given country. MCC is also participating in the reviews where they have key programs, with 

the intent of assuring linkages. 

USAID has an Office of Military Affairs, created to liaise with the Department 

of Defense (DoD). As an agency, we are trying to ensure that, despite many organizational and cultural differences, we are able to communicate effectively and coordinate with our colleagues at DoD. Additionally, Ambassador Tobias has been working 

with DoD very closely on a number of issues at a high level. 

One recent development that I believe will greatly enhance the coordination 

among U.S. Government agencies is the strategic alignment of S/CRS and the Office 

of the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA). The alignment of S/CRS and DFA is 

an opportunity to streamline roles, reduce duplication, and strengthen the mandate 

of S/CRS. By combining the S/CRS coordinator’s reconstruction and stabilization 

planning and operational mandate with the funding authorities of the DFA, he will 

better ensure that activities and programs are appropriate and coherent. 

Question. How will this process affect the ability of Congress to conduct its oversight of foreign assistance, particularly that assistance administered by USAID? 

Answer. Under the leadership of Ambassador Tobias, we have developed one 

standard ‘‘development dictionary’’ that links activities to Secretary Rice’s goal of 

transformational diplomacy. Common indicators have been developed for each of the 

programs defined and these indicators track, for the first time, consistently across 

USAID and State the outputs of our foreign assistance funds. 

The definitions and indicators are captured in one system that tracks funding, 

programs, and indicators that will be able to tell us who the implementing partner(s) are, what program is being implemented, and what result USAID expects. 

It is my hope, and that of Ambassador Tobias, that these new systems and new 

transparency of information will allow the Congress to more easily perform its oversight role. 

Question. How is the fiscal year 2008 budget different from previous foreign assistance budgets because of the new strategic framework utilized by the Office of 

the Director of Foreign assistance? How do you think these changes will improve 

our ability to meet our foreign assistance goals? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2008 request reflects a different approach to building the 

budget from previous years’ methods. Most notably, for the first time ever, the $20.3 

billion of U.S. foreign assistance under the authority of State and USAID were integrated into one joint budget submission. This year, USAID delivered its complete 

196 

justification to the Hill just one week after the President released the budget. There 

are six principles that governed the prioritization of the fiscal year 2008 budget request. 

We integrated planning based on the totality of U.S. Government resources 

Over 100 interagency teams, organized by country, were tasked with ensuring 

that all State and USAID resources were coordinated, mutually supportive, and targeted to the achievement of shared objectives. Every member of each team had a 

clearly laid out goal: To allocate funds to programs that would best advance the 

transformational diplomacy goal—to help build and sustain well-governed states 

that meet the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. 

The teams looked at the totality of resources available to a country’s budget and 

made determinations about appropriate and fiscally responsible use of funds to support priorities. Investments from the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

and the Millennium Challenge Account were taken into account when allocating resources. 

We focused on country progress 

The ultimate goal of transformational diplomacy is to support recipient country 

efforts to move from a relationship defined by dependence on traditional foreign assistance to one defined by full, sustaining partnership status. 

In past budget years, much of the budget was built not by country, but by sector. 

Therefore, what drove many country programs wasn’t the specific country need as 

much as a set global amount for a sector that needed to be met. This year, the country teams were given an overall target number for each country, rather than by account or sector. 

These teams had at their disposal data on the status of country progress against 

independent indicators assessing poverty, human capacity, life expectancy, governance, and barriers to economic growth. They had the new strategic framework for 

U.S. foreign assistance, which outlines interventions according to countries’ common 

development situations. They were asked to allocate funds for objectives and programs that would best advance individual country progress. The result was a country-driven allocation for the fiscal year 2008 budget. 

We invested in states critical to long-term regional stability and prosperity 

In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, 51 percent of Department of State and 

USAID program assistance resources are concentrated in rebuilding and developing 

countries. These are the countries that are farthest away from sustaining partnership status as measured by instability, poverty, human capacity, life expectancy, 

governance, and barriers to economic growth. These states can be either critical barriers to regional stability and success in the global war on terror or states that, with 

continuing progress, can serve as anchors for regional stability and prosperity. We 

need to work with these governments to help them strengthen their institutions to 

make their progress permanent. 

We focused on demand-driven interventions that are critical levers for sustainable 

progress and transformation 

Funding is increased to programs targeted to improving governance and democratic participation, programs mitigating diseases that threaten the human and economic capacity of countries to progress on their own, programs that expand access 

to and improve the quality of education, and programs that enhance economic opportunity and the skills needed to participate in the global economy. The request 

is the result of a demand-driven process that asked experts to prioritize limited resources on the basis of the most significant levers that will help countries 

progress—and to focus our resources so we can achieve real impact. When we can 

focus our resources, we enhance the ability of a country to gain enough strength and 

stability in one area to sustain further progress on its own. 

We allocated funds intended for country programs to country-level budgets 

To empower our mission directors and ambassadors to design and implement programs that would have an effective and sustainable impact, the reform process 

maximized resources implemented at the country level into country-level budgets. 

Resources within global or regional budgets that had been planned for specific countries were accordingly shifted to those countries’ budgets and planned together with 

other country-based support. 

Recognizing that not all foreign assistance is most effectively implemented on a 

country basis, and that issues that transcend a single country’s borders are best addressed as part of a global or regional strategy, significant funds remain in regional 

197 

and global accounts, but, across State and USAID, these accounts see an average 

35 percent decrease from this process. 

We matched accounts with country circumstances and the priorities the county categories are designed to address 

In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, we sought to maximize the use of account 

authorities and establish clear priorities in support of effective implementation of 

foreign assistance programs. 

This means that, overall, funding for development assistance, which has traditionally supported poor countries that demonstrate performance or a commitment to development, has been prioritized to developing and transforming countries. Economic 

Support Funds (ESF), which focus primarily on providing economic support under 

special economic, political, or security conditions, have been prioritized to support 

activities in the rebuilding and restrictive country categories. 

The intent in shifting funds from DA to ESF is to draw cleaner lines around their 

use, as identified by country characteristics. These cleaner lines allow us to justify 

to you why we have requested amounts for each account. The shift is in no way reflective of a reduced prioritization of development activities. To the contrary, total 

funding in the three objectives supporting long-term development increased by approximately $100 million from fiscal year 2006 levels in the fiscal year 2008 budget. 

In summary, the fiscal year 2008 budget request reflects a more integrated, systematized approach to the budget than that developed in previous years. I believe 

that the result will significantly enhance our ability to both identify and meet foreign assistance goals. 

Question. Although the Director of Foreign Assistance has authority over all State 

Department and USAID aid programs, some programs, such as the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation (MCC), remain outside the scope of the Director’s responsibility. How does USAID coordinate its efforts with those of the MCC? To what extent will USAID country objectives and projects change in MCC compact countries? 

How have they changed in the past? 

Answer. In the fiscal year 2008 budgeting process, State and USAID country 

teams took into account projected fiscal year 2008 MCC Compact disbursements 

when considering the totality of individual country budgets and to make determinations about appropriate and fiscally responsible use of funds to advance the transformational diplomacy goal. 

In countries with MCC Compacts, USAID resources have been reprioritized to ensure complementary programs with the MCC Compact and amplify results. The 

process is specific to each country. For example, in Honduras, funds for economic 

growth activities have increased, particularly in trade, investment, and private sector competitiveness in order to complement the MCC program. In Ghana, funds 

have been shifted to enhance the capacity of local government responsible for implementing MCC compact programs. 

In countries that qualify for the MCC Threshold Program, USAID plays the leading role in the design and implementation of programs approved by the MCC Board 

of Directors, in close coordination with MCC. USAID and MCC work very closely 

and collegially throughout this process and are currently implementing 11 Threshold Country Programs together. 

Question. I am concerned about the decline in funding for development-oriented 

food aid under Public Law 480 title II, and about our priorities for food assistance 

overall. How will the new strategic framework implemented by the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance affect our food assistance programs? 

Answer. Due to the unpredictable, but large number of major emergencies, we 

have not always been able to fund fully ongoing Public Law 480 title II nonemergency programs. However, in fiscal year 2006 we increased funding for Public 

Law 480 title II nonemergency programs. The new foreign assistance framework 

will help achieve these goals by bringing U.S. foreign assistance resources together 

in a strategic and integrated fashion at the country level, thereby helping to better 

integrate Public Law 480 title II with other U.S. foreign aid funding sources, allowing for more effective and multisectoral interventions that address the overlapping 

themes of poverty and hunger and the underlying factors that cause them. The 

broader set of development programs can thus be more comprehensive in scope and 

complementary in nature, with food aid serving as only one tool of many working 

together to address the chronic causes of poverty and hunger in the most food-insecure countries. 

198 

WOMEN’S JUSTICE AND EMPOWERMENT INITIATIVE

Question. In 2005, President Bush announced the launch of the Women’s Justice 

and Empowerment Initiative, which would set aside $55 million over 3 years to 

fight violence against women in four African countries. What is the status of this 

initiative? How much money has either been obligated or expended for this program? 

Answer. The Women’s Justice and Empowerment Initiative (WJEI) is overseen by 

the Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs (AF) with support from the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and implemented by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and USAID. For the first year’s implementation, $21.9 million has been identified from prior year reprogrammed funds. 

USAID and the DOJ are making progress on solidifying their program designs and 

strategic priorities in the four WJEI countries of Benin, Kenya, South Africa, and 

Zambia. 

INL and DOJ have begun expending WJEI program funds in support of joint assessments to all four WJEI countries. INL is finalizing bilateral letters of agreement 

with host countries on criminal justice and prosecutorial assistance and training 

programs developed as a result of these assessments. 

USAID expects to issue competitive solicitations for increasing awareness and victim support in April. The $5.4 million currently available to USAID will be obligated 

once the competitive solicitation is complete in early summer. 

We are confident that all of the program components will soon be in place to meet 

WJEI program expectations for fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008. 

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN THE FATA 

EDUCATION

School construction and furnishing 

USAID is helping increase school enrollment by constructing and furnishing 65 

primary, middle, and high schools in five agencies within the FATA. With 21 schools 

completed, 31 schools are currently under construction in the agencies of Khyber, 

Bajuar, Kurram, Mohmand, and Orakzai. Construction of 13 remaining schools is 

scheduled to begin in April 2007. Sanitary and drinking water facilities are added 

by a grant from the U.S. Department of Defense for $800,000. The Embassy of 

Japan has partnered with USAID and is responsible for constructing an additional 

65 schools using USAID’s design. USAID has provided $6.5 million to the Pakistani 

firm, Associates in Development, to construct and furnish these boys and girls 

schools. (Beginning Date: May 18, 2004–End Date: May 31, 2007) 

Scholarships for pre-service teacher education 

Forty scholarships are being awarded to females from the FATA to attend a 1- 

year pre-service teacher education program in Khyber agency. This program is expected to help provide trained teachers for girls’ schools located in the FATA. The 

Research Triangle Institute (RTI) was awarded $60,000 to administer the 2006/2007 

scholarship program. Last academic year, 17 USAID-financed female teachers graduated the 1-year program. (Beginning Date: September 1, 2005–End Date: September 30, 2007) 

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Micro-credit 

Through Khushalibank (KB), USAID is establishing stand-alone bank branches in 

all seven agencies within the FATA. To date, two bank branches are operational, 

one in Khyber agency and one in Kurram agency. KB’s expansion into the FATA 

is a 5-year, $4 million program that also includes the provision of approximately 80 

small infrastructure schemes as community development projects valued at approximately $2,500 each; higher education opportunities through the provision of 30 

scholarships for master’s degrees in business and/or management; and, the provision 

of 50,000 loans valued at approximately $250 each. (Beginning Date: September 30, 

2005–End Date: September 30, 2010) 

Competitiveness support 

USAID is providing technical support to private sector-led working groups in the 

marble and granite sector to improve production and increase profits. The program 

also helps the industry identify and implement workforce development initiatives 

through Common Training Facility Centers. Khyber and Mohmand agencies are 

199 

benefiting from the project which is implemented by the U.S. firm Nathan/J.E. Austin. (Beginning Date: February 8, 2006–End Date: February 6, 2008) 

Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) 

An assessment to help inform decision makers on the possible scope and feasibility for future ROZ opportunities in the FATA has been completed. ROZs are proposed to bring investment, employment, and economically viable livelihoods to Pakistan/Afghanistan border areas (FATA, Azad Jammu Kashmir, Balochistan, and 

North West Frontier Province). ROZs may also provide an incentive for Pakistan to 

contribute to regional stability while providing a unique opportunity for the two governments to work collaboratively on economic investment. 

HEALTH

Child health 

USAID is improving the quality and availability of child health services throughout all seven agencies within the FATA by enhancing the knowledge and skills of 

health care providers as well as strengthening existing facility-based and community-based child health facilities. Additionally, USAID is increasing community 

knowledge and acceptance of key child health services and behaviors through introducing behavior change and communication strategies. Resource centers at agency 

headquarter hospitals will be established in the agencies of Mohmand and Khyber 

beginning in March 2007, with roll out to remaining agencies over the coming 

months. In September 2006, Save the Children, U.S. was awarded $11.5 million to 

implement this 3-year program. (Beginning Date: October 1, 2006–End Date: September 30, 2009) 

Water/sanitation 

USAID is improving water and sanitation facilities in 190 girls’ schools in Khyber 

and Mohmand agencies. In addition, activities are underway to provide hygiene and 

sanitation education to community members and parent teacher associations to increase knowledge, attitudes, and practices at the school and household levels. In October 2005, UNICEF was awarded $400,000 to implement this 2-year program. (Beginning Date: October 1, 2005–End Date: December 31, 2007) 

USAID is also partnering with the Government of Pakistan to implement President Musharraf’s Clean Drinking Water Initiative in the agencies of Bajaur, 

Mohmand, and Kurram. With the government responsible for construction of water 

treatment plants, USAID will support these efforts through capacity building and 

training in operations and management of the plants, water resources management, 

cost-recovery schemes, water quality testing technologies, and the promotion of good 

hygiene behavior and safe sanitation practices. In October 2006, Abt Associates was 

awarded $16.5 million for this nationwide, 3-year program. Implementation within 

the FATA is anticipated for mid-2007. (Beginning Date: October 1, 2006–End Date: 

September 30, 2009) 

Infectious disease control and prevention 

As part of a national polio eradication program, USAID supports both UNICEF 

and WHO to implement their polio immunization campaigns and surveillance in all 

seven agencies of the FATA. 

RESPONSES OF JAMES R. KUNDER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET REQUEST

Question. In your last hearing, you said that you believed Ambassador Tobias had 

‘‘a clear cut understanding of both the need to meet immediate U.S. foreign policy 

challenges, but also long-term development challenges’’ in the USAID and State restructuring process. Since your hearing, the President has released his budget request for USAID and State and we have seen what the new budget structure actually looks like. Do you believe that the budget adequately addresses the immediate 

and long-term investments that need to be made to enhance our national security? 

Answer. I believe the fiscal year 2008 budget attempts to strike an appropriate 

balance among development objectives to address immediate and long-term investments to enhance our national security. 

As you are aware, the new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance categorizes each country receiving U.S. foreign assistance based on common traits and 

places them on a trajectory to measure their development progress against standVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00207 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
200 

ardized indicators. The country categories are largely explained by their category 

name: rebuilding, developing, transforming, sustaining partnership, and restrictive. 

In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, 51 percent of Department of State and 

USAID program assistance resources are concentrated in rebuilding and developing 

countries. These are the countries that are farthest away from sustaining partnership status, as measured by instability, poverty, human capacity, life expectancy, 

governance, and barriers to economic growth—all critical barriers to regional stability and success in the global war on terror. 

We have seen the risks that ‘‘ungoverned spaces’’ can pose to our national security 

and to their regional neighbors; we are also very aware of the costs of these 

‘‘ungoverned spaces’’ to their own citizens. States like Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, 

and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are among the poorest in the world. Their 

citizens are among the least able to access basic needs—including security. 

At the same time, to transform the development landscape, we need to focus on 

developing states such as Nigeria, Ukraine, Georgia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Indonesia—states that are on the cusp of transitioning to economic, political, and social 

self-sustenance, and that, with continuing progress, can serve as anchors for regional stability and prosperity. We need to work with them to help them strengthen 

their institutions to make their progress permanent. 

Question. How is USAID preserving the humanitarian and poverty alleviation 

focus of its work while under the new budget and structure? 

Answer. The focus of the Secretary’s transformational diplomacy agenda is to concentrate our diplomatic and foreign assistance resources on helping to build and 

sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, 

reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international 

system. Explicit in the goal is the United States’ commitment to reducing widespread poverty and addressing other barriers to fulfilling human potential, while 

recognizing the central role that good and responsive governance plays in addressing these concerns sustainably. In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, funding for 

the three objectives that support long-term development—governing justly and 

democratically, investing in people, and economic growth—increases by 20 percent 

over fiscal year 2006 levels, the last year for which we have completed allocations. 

When humanitarian assistance is added, the collective goals represent 65 percent 

of the fiscal year 2008 budget, whereas in fiscal year 2006, they represented only 

61 percent of the fiscal year 2006 foreign assistance budget. We are doing more than 

preserving the humanitarian and poverty alleviation focus of our work under the 

new budget and structure; we are enhancing it. 

TOP-DOWN VS. BOTTOM-UP DESIGN

Question. The fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification states that 

USAID intends to focus on demand-driven interventions, but also lists five strategic 

priorities to guide U.S. assistance. How will you reconcile the desire to pursue U.S. 

objectives with a respect for each individual country’s own main concerns? 

Answer. Outsiders cannot, with sustainability, secure citizens’ health and safety, 

educate a critical mass, or create the conditions needed for economic growth—all of 

which are necessary for development, and all of which are primarily the responsibilities of a nation’s own government. The transformational diplomacy goal’s emphasis 

on sustainability heightens the necessity of the on-the-ground coordination that is 

done every day by our embassies and missions with the host government, other donors and local groups. Based on the new country-driven process, we have prioritized 

resources to the areas that we believe will promote and sustain long-term country 

progress. In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, funding is increased to programs 

targeted to improving governance and democratic participation, programs mitigating 

diseases that threaten the human and economic capacity of countries to progress on 

their own, programs that expand access to and improve the quality of education, 

and programs that enhance economic opportunity and the skills needed to participate in the global economy. These resource allocations reflect the wisdom of our 

interagency teams of country experts. 

In areas where there is not agreement between the U.S. foreign assistance goals 

and the host government priorities, most notably in restrictive countries in democracy programs and media freedom programs, an effort is made to work with local 

community groups to build host country capacity. 

POST-CONFLICT ASSISTANCE

Question. During your nomination hearing in the 109th Congress, you said that 

we need to strike a balance between State, USAID, and the Department of Defense 

201 

in the area of post-conflict work. I would be interested to hear more about what you 

think that balance looks like. Specifically, what does USAID need to do to remain 

an equal partner in post-conflict assistance efforts? 

Answer. USAID is pleased that development is receiving the emphasis it deserves 

in the post-conflict arena. This is in recognition of the fundamental role of economic, 

social, and institutional development in promoting stability and combating conflict, 

including insurgency. To remain an equal partner, it is critical that USAID participate at all levels of the U.S. Government civilian-military assistance effort from 

budget formulation and strategy development through operational planning in the 

field. USAID has a particular perspective on economic and social reconstruction as 

well as institutional strengthening that we can only leverage if we are at the table 

where these decisions are made. 

AGENCY OVERLAP

Question. The House report of the fiscal year 2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 5522) expressed concern that the Office of Military Assistance’s 

(OMA) responsibilities would ‘‘overlap . . . with other components of the United 

States Government, including the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization at the Department of State.’’ Please comment about this concern and 

what you’ll do to ensure OMA efforts don’t overlap with other offices. 

Answer. USAID is part of the overall U.S. Government response that may be coordinated by S/CRS. Per the guidance of the Secretary of State, S/CRS has primary 

responsibility among the civilian agencies for coordination with the Department of 

Defense, particularly with regard to larger-scale crisis response. However, USAID 

has a particular requirement for day-to-day coordination with the DoD in program 

implementation. 

The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) was created to focus on specific tasks: training of USAID personnel in preparation for assignment to conflict areas where there 

is a significant military presence; adapting USAID policy and guidance to serve the 

requirements of National Security Presidential Directive-44 spell out; coordinating 

USAID participation in military exercises and joint training; and facilitating DoD 

linkages with field missions in program implementation. Each of these tasks is carried out in close coordination with our S/CRS colleagues and the functions of the 

two offices do not overlap. 

OTI

Question. As I’ve mentioned before in this committee, I am a strong supporter of 

the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). It provides fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs and in my mind delivers a significant value for the small level of resources we give it. I’m concerned 

that we don’t use OTI enough, though, particularly given the nature and number 

of countries facing transition. What will you do to make sure OTI—and other parts 

of USAID—can respond to opportunities to facilitate successful transitions to stability around the world? 

Answer. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has played a crucial role in the 

United States Government response to urgent political transitions in countries all 

over the world, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti. 

When it was created in 1994, it was meant to be a small and agile mechanism 

through which the United States could positively influence transitions in key countries. It has lived up to its mandate, and we are seeing growing utilization of OTI 

and the creative programming it has developed. In addition to managing the Transition Initiatives account, OTI itself has been asked to manage three times more 

program dollars, on average, over the past 5 years—from accounts including the 

Economic Support Fund, Development Assistance, and International Disaster and 

Famine Assistance, among others. This should be seen as a reflection of substantial 

reliance on this critical office. 

With regard to the larger USAID response to democratic transitions around the 

world, there has been a united approach to bolster the agency’s overall capacity to 

respond to these new challenges. As part of this effort, OTI created effective programming (we need an example—see below) that the USAID missions have highly 

valued and adopted into their own portfolios upon OTI’s departure. In fiscal year 

2006, for example, OTI handed over six programs or mechanisms it had created to 

USAID missions, allowing the work to continue in post-conflict environments. In 

Iraq, the OTI program included targeting community improvement work projects in 

poor neighborhoods that had been fertile grounds for recruitment by insurgents. The 

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duced the likelihood of them participating in violence, was adopted as a general 

strategy by the mission when OTI left in 2006. In Haiti, OTI programming focused 

on Port-au-Prince neighborhoods that had experienced high rates of gang-related violence. The OTI activities fostered better community ties among local citizens and 

with the government, and had a direct impact on reducing local violence and buying 

time for democracy to take root. The USAID mission adopted the OTI program upon 

its completion in 2006, and continues community-building activities in order to reduce gang-related violence in vulnerable neighborhoods in and around Port-auPrince. 

RESPONSES OF KATHERINE ALMQUIST TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR AFRICA

Question. While I am pleased that this administration is following through on its 

promise to substantially increase United States assistance to Africa, I am concerned 

that nearly all of the almost $2 billion increase between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal 

year 2008 is going toward health initiatives, specifically PEPFAR and the President’s Malaria Initiative. These additional funds come at the expense of other ‘‘investments in people’’ as you call them—such as education, social and economic services, and protection for vulnerable populations. How will you ensure that United 

States assistance remains balanced to meet the needs of specific African countries 

and populations? 

Answer. One of the primary goals of the foreign assistance reform is to focus on 

country progress. We must tailor development programs to the unique needs of each 

recipient country in reaching the transformational diplomacy goal. The aim of transformational diplomacy is to support recipient country efforts to move from a relationship defined by dependence on traditional foreign assistance to one defined by 

full sustaining partnership status. To achieve that goal under the new Strategic 

Framework for Foreign Assistance, resources were allocated to the areas that would 

best support individual country progress. The result was a country-driven allocation 

for the fiscal year 2008 budget. 

In past budget years, much of the budget was built not by country, but by sector. 

Therefore, what drove many country programs wasn’t the specific country need as 

much as an overall funding level for a sector that had to be met. This year, the 

country teams were given an overall target number for each country, rather than 

by account or sector. As you have noted, some programs like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) 

have established funding levels designed to achieve specific important public health 

targets. Most funding, however, was subjected to the new, country-driven allocation 

process so that the mix of sectors deemed most suitable by those in the field could 

be identified for programming. 

Question. Similarly, health investment in Africa will be unsustainable if it does 

not include local capacity-building. How will you support the development of national heath programs and infrastructure? 

Answer. USAID views local capacity building as a critical part of all USAID programs. In the new Foreign Assistance Framework, all health program elements contain sub-elements that focus on the development of national health programs and 

infrastructure. All USAID missions support capacity building by promoting workforce training, strengthening procurement distribution and management information 

systems, promoting quality assurance, improving financing and financial management, and strengthening surveillance systems. The PMI, for example, works to 

strengthen national malaria control programs, within the context of Ministries of 

Health National Health Plans, and builds capacity for country ownership of malaria 

control efforts. The PMI will soon launch the Malaria Communities Program to 

build independent, sustainable malaria-control projects in Africa by providing grants 

to African Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and faith-based groups to support their malaria-control work. PEPFAR supports similar programs. 

INTERAGENCY ROLE

Question. You have expressed a commitment to interagency cooperation to ensure 

that U.S. assistance is consistent and productive. What do you see as USAID’s comparative advantage within this structure and what potential threats do you foresee 

to USAID’s effectiveness in these areas? 

203 

Answer. Under the leadership of the Director of Foreign Assistance, we have developed an integrated budget and operational planning system that brings all 

USAID and State Department players together to program resources and plan and 

coordinate our implementation efforts. 

In most cases in the field, ambassadors turned to USAID mission directors for 

guidance and advice in planning and implementing assistance. Mission directors 

were recognized as the development experts and were given an opportunity to shape 

our assistance plans in each country. 

With respect to the rest of the U.S. Government, Ambassador Tobias has been 

working with the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve communications and coordination. In addition, our field missions have just finished writing their fiscal year 

2007 Operational Plans, which describe how they will spend their fiscal year 2007 

funding and the results they expect to receive. Posts have been requested to take 

into consideration all U.S. Government resources in-country in these plans, giving 

us the first-ever comprehensive look at U.S. Government programs in a given country. In Washington, as the Operational Plans are undergoing reviews, DoD is participating in many Africa reviews, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation is also 

participating in the reviews where they have key programs, with the intent of assuring linkages. 

As mentioned above, I believe USAID’s comparative advantage is our experience 

on the ground as the premier development agency of the U.S. Government. It is imperative that USAID stays on the cutting edge, remains committed to results, and 

continues to change and develop with world events. If confirmed, I intend to commit 

the Africa bureau to these goals. 

BENEFICIARY CONCENTRATION

Question. Fifty-six percent of the fiscal year 2008 budget request will go to just 

eight African countries; please explain the reasoning behind this rising concentration of U.S. assistance to a few countries singled out as being ‘‘critical to long-term 

regional stability and prosperity?’’ 

Answer. Senator, as I understand it, the fiscal year 2008 budget request was indeed prioritized to states critical to long-term regional stability and prosperity. In 

Africa, the budget request reflects a strategic focus on rebuilding states that are 

emerging from crisis, that present critical barriers to regional stability, and that 

have strategic importance to the region and to the U.S. Government. After Sudan 

and Liberia, other key rebuilding states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo 

and Somalia were given priority. Additional focus was given to regional anchor 

states: Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria. These eight countries, as you 

note, make up 56 percent of the budget request. 

I believe that foreign assistance in the past has been too diffuse. With a thousand 

agendas embedded in our foreign assistance programs, our development impact was 

often diluted and unfocused. It is important to note that we do a great deal of good 

with our development portfolio. Someone, some community, always benefits from the 

services we provide. But that is not the point. The real question is, whether we are 

achieving sustainable impact. We are attempting to give people what they need to 

sustain further progress on their own. 

Question. Do you expect this trend to continue? 

Answer. In consultation with Congress, we’ve made a strategic decision to focus 

our resources for maximum impact. I believe it is appropriate for us to channel the 

greatest proportion of our assistance toward countries that are key U.S. Government priorities, ensuring that we achieve significant results in those key countries. 

GOOD GOVERNANCE

Question. In countries where the ruling government is corrupt and/or undemocratic, how do you intend to balance the competing priorities of fulfilling humanitarian needs while encouraging good governance? 

Answer. USAID distributes humanitarian assistance to save lives in emergency 

situations without regard to the political performance of the government of the affected country. Through USAID and its partners, the U.S. Government remains the 

largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Africa. For example, in fiscal year 2006, 

USAID distributed over $1.043 billion in emergency food aid to Africa, including 

more than $370 million to Sudan. USAID channels most of its humanitarian assistance through reputable international NGOs or through U.N. disaster relief agencies, 

such as UNICEF and the World Food Program. 

Over the longer term, USAID also works to improve governance and promote 

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204 

ance. Often operating against a backdrop of civil strife, USAID programs have provided support for the development and restoration of civil liberties and human 

rights by strengthening the role of civil society, political parties, independent media, 

and other nongovernmental actors to advocate for reform and hold their governments accountable. These goals are compatible with the delivery of humanitarian 

assistance through NGO or multilateral partners. Humanitarian assistance sometimes creates opportunities for dialog with the host country, and allows the U.S. 

Government to operate in countries where our good governance activities would not 

otherwise be welcomed. 

SUDAN

Question. After being involved in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement, you were tasked with supporting the monitoring and implementation of 

this accord on behalf of the USAID. While there has been notable progress, many 

of the most central premises of the agreement remain unfulfilled due to the obstinacy of the National Congress Party. How have you sought to press officials in 

Khartoum to abide by their commitments under the CPA? 

Answer. Although the Department of State has the lead in handling diplomatic 

initiatives with the Government of Sudan and the National Congress Party (NCP), 

as the United States Government representative to the Assessment and Evaluation 

Committee (AEC), I, along with other donor representatives on the committee, have 

sought to hold the NCP to its commitments under the CPA by engaging in frank 

discussions with representatives of the government on the committee, and by using 

the AEC as a means to openly and regularly discuss delays in implementation and 

other challenges to continued progress in CPA implementation. In addition, the 

international community has used the annual convening of the Sudan Consortium 

to take stock of progress on the CPA. 

The consortium met last week for the second time, bringing together 38 delegations from the international community and civil society. At the meeting, participants raised concerns over the slow pace of CPA implementation, specifically pointing toward the lack of clarity with respect to the border separating North and 

Southern Sudan, and the national elections in 2009. Through USAID’s assistance 

program to Southern Sudan, we have sought to strengthen the ability of the Sudan 

People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to be a viable partner in the CPA and to be 

an effective advocate for the agreement in its role both as the party of the Government of Southern Sudan and in its power-sharing role with the NCP in the Government of National Unity. While the international community, including the United 

States, can and will continue to highlight violations, obstructions, and other challenges to the implementation of the CPA, in the long run the most effective force 

for change will be the Sudanese people themselves. We believe that it is critical to 

strengthen countervailing forces such as the SPLM, helping them to fulfill their role 

and bring peace to Sudan. 

(205) 

NOMINATION OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD 

TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED 

NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF 

AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE 

IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE 

UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL 

ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Khalilzad, Zalmay, to be Representative to the United Nations, 

with the rank and status of Ambassador, and the Representative in the Security Council on the United Nations, and to be 

Representative to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the 

United Nations during his tenure of service as Representative 

to the United Nations 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson presiding. 

Present: Senators Nelson, Kerry, Feingold, Obama, Menendez, 

Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, DeMint, 

and Isakson. 

Also present: Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Welcome to the nomination hearing for Ambassador Khalilzad to assume the extremely important post of U.S. 

Ambassador to the United Nations. 

We want to welcome you, Mr. Ambassador, and your family. He’s 

again being called by his country to serve in a critical post at a 

critical time. The United Nations is so important that we have the 

best and the brightest to represent us. With all of the international 

challenges that we have today, his diplomacy will be essential as 

206 

we tackle all of the things that are facing us in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and Sudan, as well as the transnational threats of terrorism, poverty, global warming, and you can go on down the list. 

We’ve moved quickly to fill this post that he is vacating in Baghdad. Ambassador Crocker is assuming that. In the meantime, we’re 

going to turn our attention to the United Nations, now in its 61st 

year under the leadership of the new Secretary General. And this 

Ambassador is going to be at the forefront of our efforts to defuse 

international crises, not the least of which are the challenges facing 

us with a nuclearized North Korea, and a nuclear-ascendant, Iran. 

The Security Council’s actions contributed to North Korea’s recent 

decision to return to the negotiating table. We’re finally seeing 

progress in these negotiations. 

Iran is a huge challenge, but it’s essential that we are successful, 

and it’s going to take a round of tougher sanctions from the Security Council, and our Ambassador’s going to be right in the middle 

of that, with all his diplomatic skill, bringing pressure on Iran to 

come to their senses. 

Recent controversies, such as the Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme, 

the allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, the instances 

of waste, fraud, and abuse by U.N. staff, have led many in the 

international community to support reforms in the United Nations. 

Progress has been slow, but I expect this Ambassador to continue 

that push for a reform agenda as an urgent priority. The United 

Nations is limited by its own internal inefficiencies and failures. 

And, until these are corrected and reformed, the U.N. is going to 

be hampered. 

We are the No. 1 contributor to the United Nations, paying 22 

percent of the regular budget. It’s just under a half a billion dollars 

in fiscal year 2008. Obviously, our voice should carry significant 

weight. We have a big responsibility to the American taxpayer to 

ensure that that money is spent wisely. And that’s just another one 

of the challenges, Mr. Ambassador, that you will assume. 

There are currently 100,000 U.N. peacekeepers deployed in more 

than 18 countries, and despite this presence, the U.N. peacekeeping operations face serious challenges. I just returned from 

Haiti, where we have another one. It is finally having some of the 

success that we wanted, but it’s taken a long time. It’s been over 

a year with that U.N. peacekeeping force. And we expect you, Mr. 

Ambassador, to focus on improving the quality of those peacekeepers and furthering their effort to be successful in this time of 

crisis. I believe that you are the best and the brightest to be representing us in this world community of nations. And I think you’re 

a nominee that we can be proud of. 

We want to have a thorough discussion of the nominee. I want 

to turn to our ranking member before we turn to our colleagues 

who will make the introduction. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join 

you in, once again, welcoming our friend, Zalmay Khalilzad, who’s 

been nominated by President Bush to be our Ambassador to the 

United Nations. 

207 

This post is unique among diplomatic assignments, in that its occupant is responsible not only for conducting diplomacy on many 

of the most critical foreign policy issues of the day, but also for U.S. 

stewardship of a multilateral institution, and plays a central role 

in global affairs. 

This committee and others in Congress have spent much time examining how the United States can work cooperatively with partners at the U.N. to streamline its bureaucracy, to improve its 

transparency, make it more efficient as it undertakes vital missions. We all hope for a United Nations that can fulfill its potential 

as a forum for international problem solving and dispute resolution. 

Often, the United Nations has fallen short of our hopes, but we 

cannot afford to be discouraged. The new Secretary General, Ban 

Ki-moon, of South Korea, has an opportunity to implement reforms 

outlined by the Gingrich-Mitchell report and countless other studies. To date, Secretary General Ban has put forward some important reforms that would raise the accountability of the organization 

and better enable the United Nations to shift resources and personnel to initiatives requiring immediate attention. Additionally, 

he has set an early example of transparency by releasing his personal financial documents. But, as the Foreign Relations Committee knows well, United Nations reform is not an easy task, and 

many diplomats and bureaucrats in New York see almost any 

structural reform of the U.N. as an attempt to diminish their prerogatives. The next U.S. Ambassador must be dedicated to building 

on President Bush’s efforts to support meaningful reform at the 

U.N. 

Performance of the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva continues to be a source of concern in the Congress and among the 

American people. Regrettably, recent sessions of the Council have 

focused almost exclusively on Israel. The United States rightfully 

continues to seek modifications to the Human Rights Council. 

Much less well-known is the role of the United Nations Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Affairs Committee in New York, which 

has voted to condemn the deplorable human rights situations in 

Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and Burma, countries which the 

Human Rights Council in Geneva has inexplicably ignored. I would 

be interested in knowing what options the nominee sees at this 

stage for improving the structure and the credibility of human 

rights advocacy at the United Nations. 

Even with these difficulties, the United Nations remains a key 

component of U.S. foreign policy. In particular, United States 

peacekeeping missions are a cost-effective method of enforcing 

peace and helping shattered nations rebuild. The ability of U.N. 

peacekeeping missions to be a force-multiplier was underscored by 

a 2006 Government Accountability Office analysis of the U.N.’s 

peacekeeping mission in Haiti. The GAO concluded, and I quote, 

‘‘The U.N. budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of that 

mission. A U.S. operation of the same size and duration would have 

cost an estimated $876 million.’’ The report noted that the United 

States’ contribution to the Haiti peacekeeping mission was, in fact, 

$116 million, roughly one-eighth the cost of a unilateral American 

operation. 

208 

With this in mind, I was perplexed to see that the administration’s fiscal year 2008 budget request for approximately $300 million less for peacekeeping than in the previous year has been put 

forward. Little evidence was presented to explain why the current 

16 missions would suddenly require less funding than in previous 

years. Moreover, additional peacekeeping missions may arise in 

Chad and Darfur, further straining the peacekeeping budget. I 

would welcome the nominee’s thoughts on this situation, which require further explanation by the administration. 

The diplomatic challenges that face our nominee include the nuclear confrontations with Iran and North Korea, the spread of HIV/ 

AIDS and other diseases, refugee crises related to Iraq, to Darfur 

and other locations, and numerous problems that confront the 

United Nations every day. I am pleased, and I join the Chairman 

in saying, that the President has nominated a diplomat with such 

wide experience to be our next Ambassador to the United Nations. 

Ambassador Khalilzad has been in charge of two of the toughest 

assignments in American diplomacy, our embassies in Kabul and 

Baghdad. His experiences in these posts will enhance our ability to 

work with the United Nations on issues pertaining to Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and bolster our international diplomacy aimed at stabilizing 

those nations. 

I welcome the nominee and thank him for his continued distinguished service to our country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. I’d like our two colleagues to introduce the 

nominee, and since Senator Hagel is also a member of the committee, Senator Hagel, you go first, and then we’ll have Senator 

Lieberman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to you and all of 

my colleagues on the committee. 

It is my privilege to introduce Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, 

along with my friend and colleague Senator Lieberman. This time, 

for me, is a third time to introduce Ambassador Khalilzad. In October 2003, I introduced the Ambassador as the President’s nominee 

to be the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. In June 2005, I introduced him as the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador 

to Iraq. As has been noted, two easy jobs. Today, following his distinguished service in Kabul and Baghdad, Ambassador Khalilzad 

returns to the committee as the President’s nominee to be the next 

U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. 

It is not surprising that the President has chosen Ambassador 

Khalilzad to lead our efforts at the United Nations at this most 

critical time. In recent years, he has filled two of the most difficult 

diplomatic posts in our Nation’s history. As Ambassador to Iraq 

and Afghanistan, Ambassador Khalilzad served under conditions 

that could have easily overwhelmed even the most gifted diplomat. 

Instead, he has earned a reputation as an agile and credible mediator in a region complicated by tribal, religious, and sectarian divisions. His deep understanding of the Middle East has been a vital 

209 

asset to this country and the world, and we are grateful for that 

past service. 

Though the challenges of Iraq today are daunting and in—its future still deeply uncertain, Ambassador Khalilzad’s tenure in Iraq 

was marked by important milestones. And I think, Mr. Chairman, 

it is important that we review a couple of those accomplishments. 

After arriving in Baghdad in June of 2005, Ambassador 

Khalilzad led our efforts to help the fledgling Iraqi Government 

move forward in the political reconciliation process. He was central 

in facilitating the tough compromises that led to the ratification of 

Iraq’s constitution in October of 2005, and a successful national 

election in December of that same year. 

At the end of his tenure, Iraq’s Council of Ministers approved a 

national oil law that, if adopted by the Iraqi Council of Representatives, will play a key role in Iraq’s future. Ambassador Khalilzad’s 

accomplishments in Afghanistan were equally impressive. During 

his tenure, Afghanistan held its first national free and fair elections in the nation’s history and established a new government. He 

led United States efforts to help establish Afghan security forces 

and oversaw United States reconstruction assistance, allowing the 

Afghan people hope for new economic opportunities. 

Ambassador Khalilzad will now fill a critical role as Ambassador 

to the United Nations. As members of this committee are much 

aware, having been noted already this morning, the United Nations 

has its limitations and is imperfect. Over the past year, some improvements, such as stronger internal oversight capacity and the 

establishment of a U.N. Ethics Office, have been made. But further 

reform is needed. Institutional reform, with the goal of making the 

U.N. more effective and credible, should be one of the top priorities 

of our new Ambassador. It will require building durable consensus 

among member states. This is difficult. It’s hard work, and it takes 

time. But it will not be accomplished without strong, wise, determined, and respected U.S. leadership. 

Mr. Chairman, I am also very proud of the fact that the Ambassador’s oldest son is here today, and he will be introduced by the 

Ambassador, I’m sure, but I take some pride and personal privilege 

in recognizing him, as well, since he served as an intern in my office a few years ago, and he has gone off to do astounding things. 

I take no credit for his shaping and molding. I think his parents 

had much more to do with that than any of us here. 

But I am proud of this nominee, as we all are. I am proud of his 

family. I am proud of his accomplishments. We are also pleased 

that his living conditions will be significantly improved—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. As to the new position he takes in 

New York. 

So, Mr. Chairman and my fellow committee members, I strongly, 

enthusiastically endorse Ambassador Khalilzad’s nomination to be 

the next U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and enthusiastically recommend him to this committee. 

Thank you. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

210 

Senator NELSON. Senator Lieberman, we welcome you to the 

committee. Thank you very much for taking the time to offer your 

comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee. 

It really is a great personal honor and privilege to join my friend 

and colleague Chuck Hagel in introducing Ambassador Zal 

Khalilzad to this committee and to urge the committee to favorably 

consider President Bush’s nomination of Zal to be our Ambassador 

to the United Nations. 

It has been said that the American Ambassador to the United 

Nations is, in effect, America’s Ambassador to the world. And I 

cannot think of anyone more qualified or more appropriate to serve 

in that role than Ambassador Khalilzad, because he represents the 

best of America. He is a true American-Dream success story. Born 

in Afghanistan, in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif. When he finished 8th 

grade, his family moved to Kabul. By the 10th grade, so I hear 

from reliable sources, he was the top student in his class. I have 

not been able to personally verify that, but——[Laughter.]——I 

have it on pretty good source. 

He was given, as a result, a chance to be an exchange student 

in a small town in California, not far from Modesto. He went back 

home, and eventually enrolled in Kabul University. He, while 

there, attended a Fourth of July party at the home of the American 

Ambassador to Afghanistan, and was urged to take a test to enter 

the American University in Beirut. He claims that he did that partly as a prank, and intended not to go. He took the test, he was accepted, and completed his undergraduate education in Beirut, at 

the American University. He then went from there to pursue a doctorate in political science at the University of Chicago. Quite a remarkable story. Stayed in America, and became an American citizen in 1984, going on to serve with great distinction and effect. 

This is in the Reagan administration. Zal is no stranger to difficult 

assignments. While serving in the Reagan administration, he had 

an important role in American policy, both with regard to the IranIraq war and with regard to the war going on in Afghanistan as 

a result of the Soviet invasion, and managed both with remarkable 

skill. He then spent some period of time at RAND, and then was 

called back into public service. 

Over the 5 years since the September 11 attacks, Ambassador 

Khalilzad has been, in my opinion, quite literally America’s indispensable diplomat. In assignment after assignment, he has demonstrated that diplomacy is about more than just talk. It is about 

building personal relationships of trust that lead to concrete accomplishments that advance America’s security and American ideals. 

I have heard it said very often that, in the struggle that we are 

involved in today in the world against Islamist extremism, ultimately our best weapon is America, is the American ideal, American values, the American way of life. And Zal, as a Muslim American, as an immigrant who came here, and, by virtue of his own 

extraordinary skills and hard work, has achieved such success, is 

211 

the personalization of the best response to the challenge we face 

today, and, if I may also add, is a shining example of the increasingly important role that Muslim Americans are playing in all 

phases of American society. 

He has shown, in the words that Ben Bradley once used to described President Kennedy, ‘‘special grace,’’ which is to say courage 

under pressure and under fire, performing, as has been said, in two 

of the most difficult and most dangerous diplomatic assignments in 

the world today, in Kabul and in Baghdad. At the time of—at this 

time, in our country, of bipartisan divisions and disagreement over 

America’s role in the world, Ambassador Khalilzad has won the respect and admiration of foreign policy doers and thinkers and politicians across the political spectrum. He is quite a remarkable 

human being, a great intellect, an informed sense of history, tremendous interpersonal skills, and on top of all that, a wonderful 

sense of humor, which, believe it or not, is occasionally necessary 

in the life of a diplomat. 

I just leave you with this impression that I share. The last time 

I was in Baghdad with a congressional delegation, we were honored 

at a dinner hosted by President Talibani. There are the dinner 

were representatives of all the various factions of Iraqi Government 

and political and societal life. And it was quite something to watch 

Zal, if I may use a term from our political world, as opposed to the 

diplomatic world, ‘‘work the room.’’ It was obvious that, not only 

did everybody know him, everybody trusted him, everybody liked 

him, everybody was glad to interact with him, as America’s Ambassador, quite a remarkable range of talents that he will now bring 

to the United Nations. I hope that the President and the administration will keep Zal as he—when he goes to the U.N., at the center 

of the administration’s foreign policy operation and occasionally, if 

I may respectfully offer some counsel, which I probably don’t have 

to offer, call on him to perform special missions, because he has developed a range of personal contacts and trusting relationships 

around the world, and particularly in the most significant and combative parts of the world today, that I don’t think any other American has. 

So, it is really a great honor, and with a sense of gratitude to 

Zal Khalilzad for all that he has contributed to our country, and 

a sense of confidence about all that he will contribute to America 

in the years ahead, that I proudly urge this committee to confirm 

him as our Ambassador to the United Nations. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator NELSON. Thanks to you, Senator Lieberman and Senator 

Hagel, for your personal comments. 

Mr. Ambassador, we have your statement. We will enter it as a 

part of the record. We would, of course, prefer that you give us a 

condensed version, so that we can get right to the questions. I understand you have a member of your family here, and I’d like you 

to introduce that member. 

Mr. Ambassador. 

212 

STATEMENT OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD, NOMINEE TO BE 

REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE 

RANK AND STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SESSIONS OF 

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING 

HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 

UNITED NATIONS 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

distinguished members. Good morning. 

I would like to introduce my older son, Alex. Alex is my joy and 

pride. He is a law student at Stanford, second year. Unfortunately, 

my wife, Cheryl, and my other son, Max, could not be here with 

us today. But I’m delighted that Alex could make it. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, it’s a great honor to 

come before you as the President’s nominee to serve as the U.S. 

Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I want to thank 

the President for his confidence in nominating me for this mission. 

I wish to thank Secretary Rice, and look forward to continuing to 

work with her, should I be confirmed. 

I also want to take a moment to express my deep gratitude to 

the many great Americans, civilian and military, and coalition 

partners, who have served at all levels in our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. I have been inspired by them. I wish to honor their 

sacrifice, particularly of those who have been wounded or lost their 

lives. 

Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Cheryl, and my two sons, Alex 

and Max, for their love and support, as well as their patience during the past 4 years that I’ve spent abroad. 

Mr. Chairman, the United Nations is an important and valuable 

institution. It has been the most successful collective security body 

in history. Standing up to aggression in Korea in 1950, undertaking scores of peacekeeping operations, endorsing decisions—endorsing decisive action to liberate Kuwait in 1991, and supporting 

the toppling of the Taliban Government after the attacks of September 11. An effective United Nations is in America’s interest. 

From my experience as U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan, I personally know that the United Nations can make a profoundly positive impact if it has the right mandate and if it is properly employed. Our partnership with the United Nations supported the Afghans as they created an interim government at the Bonn Conference, convened two Loya Jirgas, adopted a sound and enlightened constitution, and held national elections for president and 

parliament. None of this was easy, yet all of it was under—all of 

it was made easier by working in partnership with the United Nations. 

Compared to its role in Afghanistan, where it ran the Bonn process to establish the new government, the United Nations played a 

more limited role in the political reconstitution of Iraq. Nevertheless, when I arrived as U.S. Ambassador, in 2005, I consulted with 

the U.N. Special Representative, starting during the drafting of the 

Iraqi constitution, and extending through the national elections in 

2005, the formation of the Government of National Unity and the 

negotiations of key internal agreements on the path toward naVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00220 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
213 

tional reconciliation. I believe that changing circumstances are creating opportunities for the United Nations to play a larger role in 

contributing to progress in Iraq. 

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the United Nations has limitations. When members of the Security Council cannot come to agreement, action is stymied or watered-down. The United Nations has 

struggled to cope with new realities that put respect for state sovereignty in tension with the imperative to address security threats 

emanating from failed states or transnational networks or the humanitarian consequences of massive violations of human rights by 

the governments on their own people. There has been a lack of appropriate dealings, with massive human rights violations, by the 

United Nations Human Rights Council. Also, the United Nations 

itself has had recent failures, including the Oil-for-Food scandal, 

instances of peacekeeping forces sexually abusing members of the 

local population that they are supposed to protect, and weaknesses 

in management and accountability. 

The challenge for the international community is to strengthen 

the United Nations in those areas where it has proven effective, 

and to address shortcomings in the areas where its performance 

has been poor. If confirmed, I will work with the representatives 

of other countries and the new Secretary General to increase the 

contributions of the United Nations, to addressing the central security issues of our time, and to make the U.N. itself a more effective 

institution through much-needed reforms. 

The United States, like all countries, faces the challenge of how 

best to make common cause with others in support of our goals. No 

one should doubt the legitimacy of U.S. decisions to act unilaterally 

when taken through our own democratic processes and in accordance with our rights under international law. Yet, collective action 

is often the preferable course to take, particularly to achieve burden sharing. Also, we can enhance the legitimacy of our actions in 

the eyes of others by enlisting friends and allies to work with us 

and/or by securing endorsement of our actions through the United 

Nations. 

Though events will drive a good deal of the work of the United 

Nations, I will place priority on five key issues, Mr. Chairman. 

First, increasing efforts to stabilize and strengthen Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and Lebanon as immediate objectives in the longer-term 

transformation of the broader Middle East, which is the defining 

challenge of our time. 

Second, achieving compliance with Security Council actions with 

respect to Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs. 

Third, ending the massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur in order 

to save the lives of innocents and fulfill the commitment of the 

United States and the international community to a responsibility 

to protect peoples from atrocities and genocide. 

Fourth, strengthening the capability of the United Nations to undertake and manage peacekeeping operations effectively. 

And fifth, promoting effective approaches to address climate and 

clean energy objectives in a way that supports economic growth in 

the coming decades. 

If confirmed, I will pursue these objectives through two means. 

The first is through the formal channels of U.N. decision making. 

214 

I believe that there is great scope for constructive, collaborative action through results-oriented partnership involving allies and other 

countries, as well as the U.N. Secretariat. I will explore ways to increase cooperation among the world’s democracies through the Democracy Caucus. I will also reach out to friends, as well as encourage like-minded countries to reach out to their friends, in the NonAligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss how we might 

make common cause on issues of mutual importance. 

The second means to advance our national security goals with regard to these issues comes by the virtue of the presence of the representatives from around the world, a setting that enables extensive informal engagement in an opportunity that I will take advantage of to work selected key issues proactively. 

I would now like to turn to the issue of U.N. reform. If confirmed, 

one of my principal goals will be to promote effective, efficient, 

transparent, accountable, and ethical management of the United 

Nations. I wish to applaud the key role that members of this committee, as well as members of the House of Representatives, have 

played in identifying needed reforms and in supporting our mission 

at the United Nations as it pursues change. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you in pursuing further reform. 

It is vital for the U.S. taxpayers to have confidence that we are 

receiving value for the money we pay in dues and assessments. I 

believe that the United States should pay its dues in full and on 

time. However, unless the United Nations takes affirmative steps 

to overcome the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals, 

and improves its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will 

lose support among the American people. Reform is imperative. 

I am gratified that the Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, has 

pledged to make U.N. reform its prime goal. We should support 

him to make the changes he believes are necessary. I look forward 

to working with him in partnership to advance an ambitious reform agenda. 

I will also, Mr. Chairman, take a fresh look at our mission, the 

USUN mission, and come back to you for assistance for the 

changes that might be needed to make our mission an effective 

partner in multilateral discussions and negotiations to advance our 

interests in the United Nations. If confirmed, I’ll take an approach 

at the United Nations that’s similar to the way I’ve worked in 

Kabul and subsequently in Baghdad. I’ll focus sharply on the interests of the United States; at the same time, I am ready to engage, 

to listen, and to work with others in a cooperative spirit. I will pursue our goals by understanding the interests and the concerns of 

others and by working patiently and persistently and in common 

to find a way forward. I will be results-oriented, and I will give it 

my all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Khalilzad follows:] 

215 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD, NOMINEE TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND

THE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO

BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED

NATIONS DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED

NATIONS

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, it is a great honor 

to come before you as the President’s nominee to serve as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I want to thank the President for his confidence 

in nominating me for this mission. I wish to thank Secretary Rice and look forward 

to continuing to work with her, should I be confirmed. I would like to express my 

appreciation to the leaders of Afghanistan and Iraq, with whom I have worked during the past 4 years in the pursuit of our common interests. 

I also want to take a moment to express my deep gratitude to the many great 

Americans, civilian and military, and coalition partners who have served at all levels in our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. I wish to honor their sacrifices, particularly of those who have lost their lives or have been wounded. I also want to recognize the sacrifices of their families, who have to endure long separations and the 

worries of having their loved ones deployed in dangerous circumstances. 

Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Cheryl, and my two sons, Alex and Max, for 

their support, as well as their patience, during the past 4 years that I have spent 

abroad. 

THE VITAL ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is an important and valuable institution. Historically, the 

challenge of creating an effective collective security organization has bedeviled mankind. The United Nations, which was a signal achievement in the great period of 

international institution building after the Second World War, stands as the most 

successful collective security body in history. No other such organization has been 

able to undertake peace enforcement actions comparable to the one in Korea in 

1950, to lead scores of peacekeeping missions over the course of decades, to achieve 

consensus on endorsing such strong actions as the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 or 

the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In light of this record, 

I agree with the view of the Gingrich-Mitchell report that an effective United Nations is in America’s interest. As one of the principal architects of the United Nations, the United States placed at the foundation of the U.N. certain fundamental 

purposes and values—preserving peace, promoting progress, and advocacy of human 

rights. It is therefore vital for the United States to enable this institution to make 

the greatest possible contribution to advance those founding objectives. 

From my experiences as U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan, I personally know that 

the United Nations can make a profoundly positive impact if it has the right mandate and if it is properly employed. I worked closely with the U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and his successor, Jean Arnault. We 

continuously consulted and worked out common approaches as we advanced an ambitious agenda, with the United Nations supporting our interests in stabilizing Afghanistan and helping Afghans set out on a path toward democracy. Our partnership supported the Afghans as they created an interim government at the Bonn 

Conference, convened two Loya Jirgas, adopted a sound and enlightened constitution, and held national elections for president and parliament. We worked with the 

Afghan Government on such key steps as the disarming and reintegrating of militias. The United Nations played a central role in enabling the return of millions of 

Afghans to their homeland in what has become the largest voluntary repatriation 

of refugees in history. It also helped Afghans establish a human rights commission. 

None of this was easy. Yet, all of it was made easier by working in partnership with 

the United Nations. 

In Iraq, the United Nations played a more limited role, due to the history of the 

United Nations and the Iraq issue—rooted in disagreements among the members 

of the Security Council—and the resulting narrow mandate for U.N. operations in 

Iraq. Nevertheless, when I arrived as U.S. Ambassador in 2005, I frequently consulted with the U.N. Special Representative, Ashraf Qazi, starting during the drafting of the Iraqi constitution and extending through the national election in 2005, 

the formation of the government of national unity, and the negotiation of key internal agreements on the path toward national reconciliation. Tomorrow, the Iraqi 

Government and the United Nations will take another step toward concluding the 

International Compact for Iraq, an agreement under which Iraq commits itself to 

key reforms and international donors commit to needed support. I believe that 

216 

changing circumstances are creating opportunities for the United Nations to play a 

larger role in contributing to progress in Iraq. 

At the same time, the United Nations has limitations, resulting from the nature 

of the U.N. Charter, the failure of the members of the Security Council to come to 

agreements on all issues, and the unwillingness or inability of the U.N. system to 

confront the problems of corruption and inefficiency. When members of the Security 

Council cannot come to agreement, action is stymied or watered down. The organization, formed at a time when direct aggression was the principal security concern, 

has not always found effective means to deal with aggression undertaken through 

insurgency or terrorism. It has also struggled to cope with new realities that put 

respect for state sovereignty in tension with the imperative to address security 

threats emanating from failed states or transnational networks or the humanitarian 

consequences of massive violations of human rights inflicted by governments on 

their own peoples. The U.N.’s actions have sometimes been driven by coalitions with 

a myopic focus on a single issue or applying double-standards in judging the actions 

of states, particularly in the area of human rights. Also, the United Nations itself 

has had recent internal failures, including the Oil-for-Food scandal, instances of 

peacekeeping forces sexually abusing members of the local populations that they are 

supposed to protect, and weaknesses in management and accountability. 

The challenge for the international community is to strengthen the United Nations in those areas where it has proven effective and to address the shortcomings 

in areas where its performance has been poor. If confirmed, I will put the weight 

of U.S. influence toward this end. Working with the representatives of other countries and the Secretary General, I will seek to increase the contribution of the 

United Nations to addressing the central security issues of our times and to make 

the U.N. itself a more effective institution through needed reforms. 

EFFECTIVELY ADVANCING U.S. OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

The United States, like all countries, faces the challenge of how best to make common cause with others in support of our goals. No one should doubt the legitimacy 

of U.S. decisions to act unilaterally, when taken through our own democratic processes and in accordance with our rights under international law. Yet, collective action is often the preferable course to take. Some problems cannot be solved alone. 

Others are too costly to solve alone. In still other cases, when we could act alone, 

we can take advantage of the possibility for burden sharing. Also, we can enhance 

the legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of others by enlisting friends and allies to 

work with us. We can strengthen this legitimacy still further if decisions taken 

through the United Nations endorse our actions. 

Though events will drive a good deal of the work of the United Nations, I will 

place priority on several political and security issues: 

• Increasing efforts to stabilize and strengthen Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon 

as immediate objectives in the transformation of the Middle East, which is the 

defining challenge of our time. 

• Achieving Iran’s compliance with Security Council and IAEA requirements regarding its nuclear programs and supporting international efforts to achieve the 

complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear programs, thereby preventing the spread of dangerous weapons and associated technologies to other state or non-state actors. 

• Ending the massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur in order not only to save the 

lives of innocents but also to fulfill the commitment of the United States and 

the international community to a ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ peoples from largescale atrocities and genocide. 

• Strengthening the capability of the United Nations to undertake and manage 

peacekeeping operations effectively. 

• Refocusing the U.N. commitment to human rights—one of its core precepts enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—to address the most 

egregious cases of human rights violations. 

• Promoting effective approaches to address climate and clean energy objectives 

in a way that supports economic growth in the coming decades. 

If confirmed, I will pursue these objectives through two means. The first is 

through the formal channels of U.N. decision making in the Security Council and 

other fora. I believe that there is great scope for constructive, collaborative action 

through results-oriented partnership, involving allies and other countries as well as 

the U.N. Secretariat. I will also explore the possibilities of new ways of working 

within the United Nations. The world’s democracies could increase their influence 

if they work more closely together through the Democracy Caucus. I will engage 

those democratic countries that see promise in this approach and develop with their 

217 

representatives a common agenda and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. 

I will also reach out to friends, as well as encourage like-minded countries to reach 

out to their friends, in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss 

how we might make common cause on issues of mutual importance. Finding new 

ways of working with the countries in these blocs will be a priority during my tenure. 

The second means to advance our national security goals with regard to these 

issues comes by virtue of the presence of representatives from around the world— 

a setting that enables extensive informal engagement and that represents an opportunity that I will take advantage of to work selected key issues proactively. Because 

most countries send senior representatives who have substantial authority to transact business, we can engage in discussions at the United Nations in ways that the 

obstacles of time and distance make more difficult in other channels, particularly 

when resolving issues requires regional approaches. I will seize the opportunity inherent in the setting of the U.N. to explore how we might make progress on these 

issues. 

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.N. THROUGH REFORM

As we discuss the need for reform, it is important to recognize that many organizations and agencies within the United Nations system carry out vital work and 

produce results. U.N. vaccination programs have helped to stem the spread of diseases such as polio and measles. The World Health Program led the global effort 

to eradicate smallpox, helped contain SARS, and focused early on the threat of a 

human pandemic of avian flu. The World Food Program is at the forefront of combating hunger and malnutrition and was instrumental in providing relief supplies 

to millions of victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquakes that have 

recently struck South Asia. In Darfur, U.N. agencies are providing food, water, shelter, and healthcare. The U.N. Democracy Fund has made a promising start in supporting democracy promotion and civic society organizations. 

At the same time, we should recognize that every organization needs to adapt in 

response to a dynamic environment. This typically requires adjustments to ensure 

that the organization maintains mastery of its core business, which involves defining the mission in the right way and keeping a sharp focus on performance. It also 

means ensuring that the organization has the right means to achieve its mission, 

particularly in terms of personnel, management practices, decision making processes, and creating an appropriate balance between ends and means. Only then can 

an organization produce the expected results and use resources in the most efficient 

possible manner. In this regard, the United Nations is no exception: It needs to 

evolve in order to keep its focus on the most pressing challenges and to reform internally to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. 

Adapting to a changing environment. The world has changed tremendously since 

the founding of the United Nations. While the core mission continues to be security, 

the nature of the principal security challenges has changed. Today’s threats emanate less from the risk of wars among the great powers but rather from instability 

in the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the consequences of state failure, and the rise of non-state actors. Though the United Nations has made significant adaptations to meet these challenges, its evolution must 

continue to ensure its relevance to the most pressing challenges of the day. In terms 

of structural change, the United States is open-minded about considering adjustments in U.N. structures to ensure that these reflect current realities, particularly 

in terms of the distribution of effective power. 

Reforming internal processes. If confirmed, one of my principal goals will be to 

promote effective, efficient, transparent, accountable, and ethical management of the 

United Nations. In preparing for this appointment, I have read many well-documented and -reasoned critiques of the United Nations. These highlighted problems 

in its personnel system, ethics and internal oversight, management structure, mission as expressed in mandates, and professionalism and discipline in the area of 

peacekeeping. I wish to applaud the key role that members of this committee, as 

well as members of the House of Representatives, have played in identifying needed 

reforms and in supporting our mission at the U.N. as it pursued change. If I am 

confirmed, I look forward to working with you in pursuing further reform. 

It is vital for the U.S. taxpayer to have confidence that we are receiving value 

for the money we pay in dues and assessments. I believe that the United States 

should pay its dues in full and on time. However, unless the United Nations takes 

affirmative steps to overcome the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals 

and improves its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among 

218 

the American people. In turn, this will understandably erode their willingness to remain one of the principal funders of the organization. Reform is imperative. 

The optimal approach, in my view, is to focus on two or three discrete but meaningful reforms, build consensus for these changes, and implement them before moving on to the next ones, rather than to pursue a long list of major changes all at 

once. If confirmed, I would seek to consult with interested members of this committee with respect to the best starting point and would continue to seek your advice as we proceed. In this sense, reform should be viewed as a continuing, rolling 

process, not an action taken at a single point in time. 

My initial thinking is that we should select our first priorities for action from the 

following areas: 

• Ensuring that professional merit is the standard by which candidates are chosen within the personnel selection processes, while continuing to ensure geographic diversity; 

• Strengthening ethics rules and oversight to root out and deter corruption and 

to establish accountability and transparency; 

• Bringing U.N. management practices up to modern standards, particularly in 

terms of structuring decision making, strategic planning, and measuring and 

assessing performance; 

• Streamlining U.N. mandates to focus the organization on its core missions and 

to avoid diffusion of effort and resources; and 

• Strengthening professionalism and discipline in U.N. peacekeeping forces, particularly by building on the preliminary steps taken over the past 2 years to 

eliminate the sexual abuse of members of local populations by soldiers serving 

in those forces. 

I am gratified that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has pledged to make U.N. reform his prime goal. He has made welcome initial statements, including his willingness to make a personal financial disclosure and his intent to authorize an external 

audit of U.N. funds and programs. He will have a particularly good chance to follow 

up on these statements with strong actions during the first months of his tenure. 

We should support him to make the changes he believes are necessary. I look forward to working in partnership to advance an ambitious reform agenda. 

If confirmed, I will engage like-minded countries to develop political strategies 

that will achieve results. We should examine the lessons, or underlying logic, behind 

the successful performance of many U.N. agencies and explore how these might be 

carried over in other areas. We should examine the reasons motivating some countries to oppose needed changes and explore ways that their legitimate interests can 

be addressed in the context of reform. Progress will require persistent efforts at persuasion and coalition-building, as well as a willingness to bargain for incremental 

steps. 

The question will inevitably arise about whether and how we should use the leverage we have as a major contributor to the U.N. budget. There is a tension here. 

On the one hand, there are missions that we wish the U.N. to perform, which means 

that paying our dues is not only our obligation but in our interest. On the other 

hand, we cannot be indifferent to a failure to step up to needed reforms. This is 

particularly true because the support of the American people for funding the U.N. 

will diminish unless changes take place. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to 

examine how we can best use our leverage, financial and otherwise. I will also work 

to find the right balance between supporting U.N. activities through assessed and 

voluntary contributions. 

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MISSION

If I am confirmed, I will take a fresh look at how we conduct business at the U.S. 

Mission to the United Nations—how well we are organized to engage in multilateral 

diplomacy, what priorities we have set, whether we are attracting the most talented 

personnel, and other issues. I will ensure that we are setting clear goals, prioritizing 

among them, developing realistic strategies, and funding those strategies adequately. I may need the help of the committee, as well as your counterparts in the 

House of Representatives, to take steps that make service at the United Nations 

more attractive, thus ensuring that we get the best possible personnel for the mission. 

If confirmed, I will take an approach at the United Nations that is similar to the 

way I worked in Kabul and Baghdad. I will focus sharply on the interests of the 

United States. At the same time, I am ready to engage, to listen, and to work with 

others in a cooperative spirit. I will pursue our goals by understanding the interests 

and concerns of others and by working patiently and persistently—and in common— 

219 

to find a way forward. I am hopeful that this approach can also produce results at 

the U.N. 

If confirmed, I will work hard to advance the values of the American people. In 

my previous assignments, I have found that while cultures differ, people around the 

world yearn for certain universal values. I will seek to advance an agenda to promote those common interests—a world in which we can take collective action 

against threats to security, in which freedom and democracy are expanding, in 

which the rule of law becomes more widespread, and in which all nations enjoy economic prosperity. I will seek to make the United Nations as effective as possible in 

this mission. I will be results-oriented and give it my all. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

As a courtesy to my colleagues, I will defer my questions until 

the end. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, could I just—I can’t—I don’t—I’m 

not able to stay and ask any questions. Could I just have 60 seconds? 

Senator NELSON. Of course. 

Senator KERRY. I appreciate it. 

I just wanted to welcome Ambassador Khalilzad. I wanted to 

thank him and congratulate him on his service in two, now, of the 

toughest posts in the diplomatic service. And, while I can’t stay to 

ask questions, I appreciate the time he took to come and visit personally. I think he is going to be a terrific representative of our 

country at the United Nations. For all of us who have traveled to 

Iraq, and it’s most of the people on this committee, I’m confident 

my colleagues have had the same experience I’ve had. He was always direct, up front, candid about the difficulties, honest about his 

assessments. And I think that’s exactly what we need in the Diplomatic Corps in our representatives abroad. So, I’m very grateful to 

you for that. 

Yet, while we disagreed, in many cases, on policies that you have 

to implement, I think you did a very skilled and able job of carrying out those policies, and we look forward to working with you 

at the United Nations. And I thank you for your service, sir. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator. I very much appreciate that. 

Senator NELSON. Let’s do 7 minutes in the first round. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, I want to ask you to discuss what is reasonable to 

expect that the U.N. can do in playing a role in Iraq, Afghanistan— 

and as you have mentioned, also, the importance of the U.N. in 

Lebanon? And, although the Security Council is still wrestling with 

Darfur, that seems to be on the horizon. Four extraordinarily difficult situations in which the U.N., for a variety of reasons, has not 

been a major factor, although you, from your experience, could 

probably illuminate the role that it’s played, and you—give credit 

to that. But just following along your term, ‘‘results-oriented partnership,’’ and you will be engaged with the members of a Security 

Council, the Group of 77, with others. One of the great hopes, I 

think, of all of us for your ambassadorship is your unique experience as our Ambassador in Afghanistan, and Iraq, most recently— 

but, likewise, the engagement that you have had in thoughts about 

Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East, and, increasingly, as we 

take a look at Africa—that your diplomacy here may fulfill numerous roles. As has been suggested, we already have you out doing 

220 

special diplomacy, well beyond this ambassadorship, simply because of your unique qualifications. 

Now, having said all of that, I added, in my opening comment, 

that our Government, at least initially, appears to be calling for 

less money for the peacekeeping budget, at the very moment that 

we’re discussing with you how the United Nations might become 

more successfully engaged. The peacekeeping budget also then 

raises the question, once again, of how rapidly we pay our bills to 

the U.N., what kinds of disputes you have behind the scenes among 

others who you’re calling upon to become engaged in ways they 

have not been, multilaterally, and their suggestion that it would be 

very helpful if, in fact, we paid on time, or we paid more. And that, 

of course, intersects in the business of management. But I’ll not go 

into that, for the moment. I think the American people would also 

like to know if more nations would be involved in the stability of 

Iraq and Afghanistan and likewise in Lebanon and Darfur. While 

you’re trying to get to that situation, what kind of budget support 

are you going to require? And if you want budget support, are you 

prepared to come to us, to help as advocates of this? In other 

words, how, within the administration, can you make these foreign 

policy goals real, but, at the same time, have the resources to be 

convincing with your colleagues? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, with regard to resources, I believe that in order to be successful, not only we need to have clear goals, not only we need to 

have a strategy, and not only we need to have a plan, but we need 

the resources to be able to be successful. And with regard to the 

United Nations peacekeeping operations that you mentioned, we 

vote for those. Without our support, affirmative support, they cannot go forward, given our role in the Security Council. So, therefore, I believe that we ought to take a close look at each of the proposed—looking to the future—peacekeeping operations, making 

sure that the goals are clear, that the—there is a good strategy, 

there is a good plan, that the tasks that need to be performed are 

clearly identified, and then that there is a good relationship between the means and the end. And I believe that we want—we 

should pay our fair share of that. 

And, therefore, I favor the removal of the cap, of the 25-percent 

cap that has been imposed, and I favor asking for the resources by 

the administration in relation to those peacekeeping operations, 

since we have supported them. 

So, I will be careful about selection of the operations. I’ll be careful about how the plans are being put together. But I also, once we 

support that, I’ll be an advocate for the resources that are needed. 

Now, with regard to Iraq—of the other issues that you mentioned, I will comment on Iraq—I think there is great opportunity 

for the U.N. to do more. I want to point out that tomorrow the 

United Nations is hosting a meeting, along with the Iraqi Government, of the Iraqi International Compact, bringing people—countries together to move forward with the International Compact, 

where the Iraqis are committed—committing themselves to a set of 

reforms on the economic, political, and security track in exchange 

221 

for support from the international community. I applaud the U.N. 

for that. 

But I think they could do more, in the coming weeks and 

months, with regard to the constitution. There was an agreement 

on a frontloaded amendment process. The U.N., based on its experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere, can bring Iraqis together. 

They need to make progress on the constitution to make that constitution a true national compact for success in Iraq. And the U.N. 

is, I think, the right instrument to assist with that. They are already involved. I think they could do more. They can do more on 

the issue of the local elections. They can do more with regard to 

dealing with militias. They have a lot of experience. I worked with 

them in Afghanistan in a decommissioning demobilization and reintegration program there. They can also, with the agreement of 

others, play an important role in the area of Kirkuk, which is an 

important issue, and the constitution recognizes a potential role. 

So, I believe the circumstances are moving in the direction where 

they can play an important role. And, if I have the opportunity, I 

will comment on some of the other issues that you raised, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much. My time is consumed, but I just thank you for your answer, because, in my illustration at the beginning, we’re paying about one-eighth of the cost 

of Haiti. If we did not have international partners, it would be 

eight-eighths, $700 million more. Now, that’s—could be applied 

again and again in these basic situations. And the burdens upon 

our taxpayers, if we are involved in a unilateral situation, are 

going to be exorbitant. And to the extent to that your diplomacy 

is able to bring others to help us, that could be a significant difference. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, as you know, this is an enormously busy time 

in the Congress right now, and many of us do have other hearings 

we have to go to, but I wanted to make sure that I was present 

here to convey my congratulations to you for this appointment, and 

my appreciation for all the service that you have given. You’re 

truly a national asset, with your background and with the positions 

that you’ve held. 

I was also really gratified to hear your comments about your 

commitment to bringing a more positive tone to our representation 

at the United Nations, and also the way that you described your 

approach to advancing national security goals through constructive, 

cooperative acts, along with other national leaders. Given your two 

positions, one thing that occurred to me as you were talking was 

the difference in the diplomatic approaches that have been taken 

immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan, as opposed to Iraq. 

In Afghanistan, we did convene regional consortia, including the 

participation of Iran; but we postponed this for quite some time, in 

the Iraqi situation. And mindful of your experience in both areas, 

and also that we did make what I was gratified to see as some of 

the first efforts with respect to dialog, bringing in Iran and Syria 

in this conference last week in Baghdad, how you see the difference 

222 

in approaches that we made, and what your thoughts are about the 

follow-on to the conference that took place last week. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you, Senator. I appreciate 

what you said about me. 

With regard to the two approaches, in the case of Afghanistan, 

as you know—and I was involved right from the beginning—after 

the overthrow of the Taliban, we supported the effort to form a government, an Afghan Government, immediately. And I was there, in 

Bonn, and worked closely with the U.N. Representative to bring 

the various Afghan factions together, as well as interested countries with influence and concern with regard to Afghanistan. And 

within a couple of weeks of that—convening that meeting in Bonn, 

we succeeded—the Afghans succeeded, with our support, to form an 

interim government led by President Karzai. And I think the Afghans selected well. President Karzai played a—and continues to 

play—a very important role in unifying Afghanistan, and at representing Afghanistan well. And so, that was the approach that 

was taken. 

With regard to Iraq, I was involved there at the beginning, as 

well, and I convened a set of meetings in London, in Salah al-Din, 

in Iraq, and then in—right after our forces went to Baghdad and 

Iraq, arranged for meetings in Nazariah, and then in Baghdad. But 

then, of course, a decision was made that, rather than going for an 

interim government form, to go for an alternative model, declaring 

our presence/occupation, and sending Ambassador Bremer as the 

CPA, Coalition Provisional Authority; in effect, us becoming the 

government for a period, making decisions. So, that was a different 

model, and I was then, before—when Ambassador Bremer was appointed, I was sent as—nominated to go to Afghanistan as Ambassador, since I was heavily engaged in the—with the effort there, as 

well. 

With regard to the conference that we had a few days ago, and 

I participated in that, it was a good conference, from my perspective, as a conference, with the Permanent 5, neighbors, U.N. And 

three committees were formed, as you know, working groups to 

prepare for a ministerial meeting. We have concerns with regard 

to the behavior of some of the neighbors. We’ll have to see, on the 

ground, what happens. I was frank with regard to our concerns. 

But I believe that a combination of pressure with regard to issues 

of concern, with an openness to engage, with the intent to change 

behavior, to affect behavior, is the right mix, and those two elements of pressure and engagement don’t have to be equal in 

weight. They can vary, depending on the circumstances that is 

available. But I believe those are among—in the toolbox of diplomacy, and we need to have as many tools as we can have, so I believe that engagement is one tool. And, as I said, doesn’t have to 

be tools to other tools, but it can be—I don’t think it needs to be 

taken off the table. 

Senator WEBB. Well, I would agree with you that engagement is 

one tool, but I would also venture that, in that particular situation, 

you can have a lot of tools in your toolbox, but if you don’t have 

that one, we are never going to have harmony in that region, and 

we’re never going to get our combat troops out of Iraq. It’s sort of 

the ultimate tool, in my opinion. 

223 

I’m running out of time. I want to wish you the best. And I hope 

that we can, in fact, have the right kind of cooperative and harmonious relationships in the United Nations from this point forward 

that are equal to the way that our reputation has historically been 

around the world. 

Thank you very much, and good luck. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, again, Mr. Ambassador, welcome. I have expressed myself, 

earlier, on my feelings about your nomination, and about your service to our country, and my enthusiastic support of this nomination, 

and thank you again. 

I’d like to pursue the line of conversation you were having with 

Senator Webb on the regional security conference last week. What 

can you tell the committee specifically about interaction that you, 

representatives of our Government—Ambassador Satterfield, anyone else who represented us at that conference—interaction with 

Iran and Syria? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator Hagel. 

We did have across-the-table discussions on issues, the agenda of 

the conference, with the Iranian representatives. We did shake 

hand and had short conversation with them, in—conversation of a 

general nature. We did—there were groups of representatives at informal discussions when there was a disagreement on the issue of 

the next set of meetings that—the language of the final statement, 

or the Chairman’s statement, we—the Iranians were there, as well 

as our representatives, myself and others, saying, ‘‘What about 

this?’’ kind of considering different options. So, my overall comment 

is that, as a meeting—as far as a meeting goes, a first meeting, it 

was a good first step. 

But I want to emphasize that, while this was a good first step, 

what we will be looking for is—in terms of the impact of the conference and subsequent meetings, is the impact on the ground. Will 

they stop supplying EFPs to Iraqis, extremists who use those 

against our forces? Will they stop supporting militias, training 

them, providing them with resources? Will they encourage the 

groups that they have influence over towards reconciliation? Those 

will be the kind of indicators that I would look to, in terms of the 

real impact. 

But, I think, at the meeting, I think, it was a good first step. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

Where do we go from here with Iran and Syria, as to the followon from that conference? Are we looking at bilateral follow-on 

meetings? I know we are looking at a ministerial level, a followon conference, which, if you have some specifics on where we are 

on that, we would welcome that information. But I’m particularly 

interested in where we go now, in context of Syria and Iran. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, with regard to Iran, as you know, 

Senator, the President granted me the authority that I had in Afghanistan last year, which is to engage Iran in discussions bilaterally in the presence of, perhaps, Iraqis, if we thought it was going 

to be useful to advance the agenda for success in Iraq. And we are 

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open-minded on that issue. If we think it would be useful, we’re 

willing to consider that. 

With regard to the conference itself, the next step is the ministerial meeting, in a formal sense. But there will be preparatory steps 

before the ministerial conference, in terms of the meetings of the 

working groups to prepare for issues—with regard to security, borders, with regard to energy, oil and electricity, with regard to refugees—for the ministers, so there will be discussions among the 

neighbors and—who are the statutory members, if you like, of this 

group, and we could get invited to participate in those by them. 

But the next step is the working groups. 

Senator HAGEL. What about Syria? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, on Syria, we did talk with them, 

as well. 

Senator HAGEL. Did they indicate that they had interest in a follow-on or a follow-up—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. They did express—they did express—of 

course, they’re a member of the regional grouping—they did express an interest, should we be interested, in a bilateral set of discussions, as well. 

Senator HAGEL. And are we? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, that—I have not had an opportunity to discuss this issue with the President and with the Secretary of State. I mentioned the issue of Iran, because that is an 

issue that was dealt with last year, when I asked for the authority, 

and that authority has been there. 

Senator HAGEL. Do you believe it’s important that we see the— 

whether it’s bilateral or multilateral—engagement in a complete 

arc, a comprehensive arc, of interests in Syria, Iran, the regional 

concept, when we are talking about Iraq? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, yeah, I—I know the Secretary of 

State—— 

Senator HAGEL. Which would include Syria. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. And the President approved this regional engagement in the follow-up to the HamiltonBaker recommendations to do this regional conference with P5, 

plus, now, in the next one, the possibility of adding some—the G– 

8 countries to it, as well, and to engage with neighbors, other regional countries, other P5 countries, U.N., and G–8, with regard to 

helping Iraq succeed. 

Senator HAGEL. But you’re saying that that would include the 

Syrian area and Iran—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, they are—— 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Relationship. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. If you like, statutory members of the regional—the neighbors group. Yes, Mr. Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Okay. If you wouldn’t mind—and I know you are 

going to be focusing on other interests, but, for the time being, as 

we all know, you’re still our Ambassador to Iraq, and you have a 

most capable successor coming behind you—but if it would be—if 

it would be important to you—and I think it is to the committee— 

if you could provide the committee an answer to the question on 

where we are with follow-up on Syria, especially in regard to my 

particular question, ‘‘Did the Syrians ask us for bilaterals for folVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00232 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
225 

low-ups?’’ And you mentioned you had not yet had an opportunity 

to visit with the President on this. But we would appreciate a follow-up, when you have that. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, sir. But I can tell you right now 

that they did express an interest in a bilateral, should we be interested. 

Senator HAGEL. No, I—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I can say that. 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. But I’m interested in what our response is. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. When was that talk with Syria that you just 

mentioned to Senator Hagel? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. This was on Saturday, last Saturday, 

Senator, in Baghdad, in a—the conference that was at the initiative of the Iraqis, inviting the neighbors, plus regional countries. 

The reason I say ‘‘regional,’’ because Egypt was also there, and, as 

you know, Egypt is not an immediate neighbor. And Bahrain was 

also there, and Bahrain is not an immediate neighbor. So—and the 

Permanent 5—permanent members of the Security Council and the 

United Nations, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 

they were all there. And, in that context, the discussions involving 

us and others, including Syria and Iran, took place with regard to 

helping Iraq succeed. And the three committees that I mentioned 

were agreed to working groups on those three issues that I mentioned. 

Senator NELSON. Was that the first time that you or your office 

had had contact with Syria? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. With regard to Iraq, since I’ve been Ambassador to Iraq, in a—in Baghdad, yes, that is—that’s right. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to applaud the President for offering this nomination. Ambassador, you have provided this country with tremendous 

service, skilled service. You have a unique ability to generate, I 

think, kind of, the highest level of credibility for America in dealing 

with a very tough region. And I’ve watched you in action in Baghdad, and I’ve been with you at the United Nations. And I’ve— 

strongly support this nomination and look forward to working with 

you when you are confirmed. 

I have three areas, during the short time I have, that I want to 

touch upon. One is U.N. reform, which—I think the steam has gone 

out of that. Second has been Darfur, in which the U.N. has been 

rather toothless in the face of genocide, and we need to move forward more aggressively. And third is the question of Iran and how 

we deal with that. 

Both at the U.N., and perhaps in addition to the U.N., are there 

other, kind of, layers or avenues in which we can deal with the Iranian situation? You mentioned, for instance, Egypt being at the 

conference. Clearly, a number of the Sunni countries in the region 

have as deep a concern about Iran’s hegemony and their activities 

as we do, as anyone else does. And so, in addition to the United 

Nations, are there other avenues? 

226 

Let me just touch upon the U.N. reform. First, I appreciate your 

strong statement in—opening statement, where you said, ‘‘Unless 

the United Nations takes affirmative steps to overcome the legacy 

of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals and improve its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among 

the American people. In turn, this will understandably erode their 

willingness to remain one of the principal funders of the organization. Reform is imperative.’’ Yet reform doesn’t seem to be happening. The Secretary General has stepped forward, but the G77 

does not—at this point, is clearly not committed to reform. So, 

when you have an organization structurally which has that one 

country, one vote, but G77 has great power, and they have consistently resisted a vote that Secretary General Annan’s as well as 

Secretary General Ban’s efforts to reform, can you move them forward without the hammer of funding? And, second—two questions—should we be clear about the hammer of funding, to say 

what you just said, so that the G77 understands that, whether it’s 

us or the Brits or others, that unless reform takes place, there are 

going to be consequences? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, first, Senator, I will work very 

hard with the Secretary General, who—as the new Secretary General has an opportunity to persuade members, this period of honeymoon and—it could be—it should be, in my view, used to advance 

the reform agenda. Two, I will work with the like-minded nations, 

especially the democratic allies, the democratic Caucus, to see how 

we can work together to influence the Group of 77, and work with 

friends within the Group of 77—not only our friends, but friends 

of the other democracies—to use their influence, as well as the Secretary General, to advance the agenda of reform. I believe absence 

of reform is a mortal threat to the United Nations, and United Nations is a common interest to all of its members. I believe that the 

issue of funding, based on analysis, facts of the situation with regard to the American people, if there is no reform, the attitude 

could change in a way that will make funding increasingly difficult, 

and that’s not in the interest of the institution. And, therefore, I 

believe the issue of funding had to be on the table, but it has to 

be, in my judgment, a kind of last resort, to—but the reality of the 

connection between reform and funding is a reality that I will be 

pointing to and making use of in my interactions with others. But, 

as I said, this is something that I would look at as a kind of a lastresort issue. 

Senator COLEMAN. Well, I agree with the ranking member, of the 

cost-effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping. We need multilateral support. The U.N. should be a forum for doing that, but—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. We haven’t done anything, and 

mandate review—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. A thousand U.N. mandates, and 

move forward on that—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Oversight accountability, procurement—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Sure. 

227 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. You’ve got a full plate, Ambassador. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Sure. May I say something? 

Senator COLEMAN. Please. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I’m sorry to interrupt. But I do think 

that, while quite a long list of reforms have been identified, I also 

will do one other thing. And I will be very much in touch with you, 

Senator, in particular, on this issue. If we could choose two or three 

to go after first, and, having accomplished those, then to agree to 

another two or three that we ought to go after, might also be useful 

as part of our approach to advance the reform agenda. Sorry to interrupt you. 

Senator COLEMAN. No, I appreciate it. And I do believe, by the 

way, Secretary Ban is a breath of fresh air. And I’m hopeful that 

his intentions can be converted into action. 

Short time left. Talk to me about Darfur. It is very frustrating. 

Genocide is going on. We’ve said that. The Secretary of State has 

said that. And the U.N. seems incapable of overcoming Darfur—Sudan’s resistance. Can we get something done? What’s it going to 

take? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, it may take other—additional 

more coercive measures, vis-a-vis the Government in Khartoum, to 

get it to cooperate. I think it is unacceptable, the position that government has taken, the back-and-forth with regard to it’s commitment to cooperate. So, I believe that this is very important that 

progress is made on this front. And I will—should I be confirmed, 

will work with the Secretary of State and others here, as well as 

other nations and—to look at options for increasing the pressure 

with the intent to change the attitude of the government. 

Senator COLEMAN. My time is just about expired. Just one comment, and that is, the prospect—I believe that the prospect of Iran 

getting a nuclear weapon is the single greatest threat to peace, to 

stability in the Middle East and the world. And they keep moving 

in that direction, and the U.N., at least, is one form, Security 

Council. But, if not, there needs—we cannot allow Iran to have a 

nuclear weapon. So, I—at some other time and some other place, 

we need to have that conversation. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, sir. I look forward to that. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. What are some of those pressures that you can 

place on the Government of Sudan with regard to Darfur? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, the range of options, of course, is 

considerable. There are the sanctions with regard to the people in 

the government, sanctions with regard to institutions in the government, as—sanctions with regard—more broadly, and so on. We 

can slice it in a variety of ways. But I don’t want to be too specific, 

in terms of which ones I will work for, because, as you know, I’ve 

been very focused on Iraq. I just got back. And, if I am confirmed, 

I’d like to have the opportunity to go up there and talk to others, 

consult with others. But I think, having said that, there is absolute 

need to consider additional options to bring about a change in the 

228 

attitude. And that is my judgment with regard to the situation, 

Senator. 

Senator NELSON. In your opinion, why haven’t we done that before? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I—as I said, in that—from what 

I have read, the State Department, the Secretary of State and others, have stated that we need to look at additional options to bring 

about a change in behavior. And the government has been, sometimes, sending positive signals, the Khartoum Government, and, 

therefore, delaying the consideration of additional options. And I 

think now the signals are going in the opposite direction, pointing 

to going back on commitments made before. So, I think, we, in 

turn, need to look at our options for increased pressure to bring 

about compliance. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

And I want to say, it was quite an opportunity for me to meet 

with you and Deputy Prime Minister Salih in Iraq, about 31⁄2

weeks ago. And, upon hearing that you were going to the United 

Nations, I will say that, on one hand, I knew we were going to be 

represented very, very well; at the same time, I kind of hated to 

see you leave, when you were actually causing things to happen. 

I know you’re entering a different arena where that may be a little 

bit more difficult. 

So, I have two questions. The first is, we’re focusing a lot right 

now on General Petraeus and what’s happening in Baghdad. And 

there have been a lot of dates talked about. Midsummer we’ll know 

whether we’ve been able to turn what has been a downward spiral 

into an upward spiral. And yet, so much of that is dependent upon 

what happens by the government there, by Maliki, Salih, al 

Zawbai, what happens there on the ground. I’m wondering if you 

could help us think through, with the tremendous experience 

you’ve had on the ground there, just what the timetables you think 

are—what the realistic timetables are, as far as the actual implementation of the hydrocarbons agreement and money actually hitting the streets, if you will, the actual spreading around of the $10 

billion that’s going to help create jobs there, and the actual real 

final agreements on de-Baathification reform. 

And then, second, if we have time, I’d love for you to talk about— 

you’re obviously going into a different arena, much like I’ve just 

done, and—talk a little bit about how you truly cause, as one representative going to the U.N., the type of things to occur there. 

You’ve been in a different position, where you’ve been able to 

hands-on negotiate and really create the energy behind the things 

that are happening in Iraq on the ground. Talk to us a little bit 

about how you actually go about implementing some of the changes 

that my colleagues at the U.N. have referred to. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator, for what you said 

about me. I appreciate that. 

With regard to the decisions by the Iraqi leaders, I think one of 

the challenges that remain is how to incentivize them to do the 

right thing for themselves. And I know that they are facing very, 

very big and difficult issues. And their sense of time is not the 

same as ours, really. We tend to be very impatient. And these procVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00236 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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esses and issues that they are dealing with, by historic standards, 

takes—take a long time. If you look at the history of other nations, 

Europe, when you’ve had different groups coming together for the 

first time to try to figure out how to put a nation and a state together. So, while I appreciate the difficulties—the enormity of the 

challenges that the Iraqi leaders face, I do believe that we need to 

continue to incentivize them to move at a faster pace. 

Now, on—there have been, in recent weeks, some progress. I think the budget was passed by the Assembly, of $40 billion. This 

is one of the good things about Iraq. They have a lot of resources. 

Where, in Afghanistan, unfortunately, where I served beforehand, 

they didn’t have that, the amount of resources that Iraq has. They 

have put $10 billion into the development account. They have 

given, I am advised, the—10 percent of the budget already has 

been disbursed, I am advised. They have—we are helping them to 

do better, in terms of budget execution. They have been good at 

executing the budget with regard to paying salaries and retirement 

and subsidies, but not as good with regard to investing in projects 

and—in development projects. 

Now, on the hydrocarbon law, they have agreed, in the Cabinet— 

it was a very important agreement, and it was a—it’s a good law, 

in my view. They have—the Assembly has to approve it. And I believe the timeline for that is the next—they have said until May 

31 is the timeline they have given themselves for approval. So, our 

encouragement that they are setting deadlines and targets to be— 

to incentivize them to move forward. 

De-Baathification, that’s the issue I was working on with them 

when I left, to get them to—the presidency representing Kurd, 

Shia, and Sunni—the president, two vice presidents—to come to a 

compromise agreement to balance reconciliation with accountability, and to adjust the de-Baathification law that Ambassador 

Bremer had imposed, was—which was, in my judgment, too draconian and too broad to refer those who have committed crimes to a 

judicial process, and then to turn and—to reconciliation with regard to the rest. And I hope that, in the coming couple of weeks, 

the presidency will offer that compromise agreement. But it will require us to work with them, continue to encourage them to make 

the compromises that they need to make with each other. And ultimately, of course, it’s the constitution and issues such as what to 

do with militias—those are also critical issues that remain for the 

government and the Iraqi leaders to deal with. And, as I said, it 

will take effort to continue to incentivize them to move in the direction that they need to move. 

Senator CORKER. Do the people on the ground in Iraq feel a 

sense of forward movement that’s causing them to be encouraged 

that their government is actually going to deliver on making these 

things happen? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that there is some optimism— 

increased optimism in recent weeks with the combination of the 

new security plan for Baghdad—the indications are, in the conversations from others talking to Iraqis from the mission, and my 

own conversation with some of the leaders, that there is a more 

positive attitude. And if the security situation improves, if the government makes the decision that they need to make, that would obVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00237 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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viously further increase optimism. But people are wary and uncertain, and they’ve heard a lot of declarations before, so they want 

to see changes on the ground. So, I don’t think one can say there 

is a groundswell of optimism that has happened, but there is increased—I think I would say, compared to 2 months ago or 3 

months ago, there is greater optimism on the streets in parts of 

Baghdad than was the case earlier. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Feingold, I understand you have a time 

problem? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I certainly appreciate being—having the 

chance to speak, and I’ll try to be brief. 

Thank you, Ambassador Khalilzad, for your service and for your 

willingness to work in some of the most challenging and difficult 

positions in the U.S. Government. I am pleased that the administration has chosen such a qualified and talented candidate for this 

position. 

As you are well aware, should you be confirmed, you’ll be taking 

one of the most visible ambassadorships in the United States and 

the world. Your leadership in the U.N. not only affects how the 

American public views the U.N., but how the world perceives the 

United States. 

Unfortunately, I fear that your predecessor did little to advance 

international understanding of the United States or American of 

the U.N. The U.N. is facing major challenges right now as it tries 

to reform itself to meet new global objectives and overcome emerging threats that are beyond the reach of any single country. At this 

pivotal time, strong leadership from the United States is more important than ever. I had hoped that the Human Rights Council 

could bring about a new era of accountability for human rights 

crimes and abuses, and I have been disappointed in the lack of 

U.S. commitment to ensuring that it is robust and effective. We are 

also failing to provide adequate financial support for U.N. peacekeeping missions at a time when the United States is relying more 

and more on multilateral cooperation to act as a force multiplier in 

ending and resolving conflicts throughout the world. So, it strikes 

me as contradictory that the United States should call for more 

and stronger U.N. peacekeeping missions, but fail to provide the 

necessary financial resources to ensure that these missions, which 

are in our national interest, are successful. 

So, I strongly encourage you, Ambassador, to make these issues 

a priority as soon as you are confirmed. Of course, these are only 

a few of the many issues facing you that are important to the longterm security of the United States. I do look forward to working 

with you again in this context to improve the U.N. while protecting 

U.S. foreign policy and our national security interests. 

Ambassador, as the long-time chairman and ranking member of 

the Africa Affairs Subcommittee, I’ve been—become increasingly 

aware of the impact that developments in Africa can have on 

American interests and national security, as well as regional security there. Recognizing that your focus has been on the middle— 

on Middle East issues, I would like to hear what you, at this point, 

231 

consider to be the U.N.’s top immediate and longer-term priorities 

on—in the African continent. 

Ambassador. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you, Senator Feingold, for 

your comments about me. 

With regard to Africa, the immediate focus will be on, dealing 

with the situation in Darfur and connected with Chad and Central 

African Republic, to bring about a change in the behavior of the 

Government in Khartoum to allow for the U.N., the hybrid force 

that has been discussed to be deployed to stop the killing of the innocent in Darfur and to contain the conflict from spreading. 

There are other priorities, as well, of course. We need to, based 

on our conversation yesterday, look at the mandate for Congo and 

see how that needs to be adjusted. There is issues with regard to— 

HIV/AIDS issues that some U.N. organizations—international organizations are involved with. That remains a consistent concern, 

as does the whole issue of development of the continent. 

But, security-wise, I would think that the two immediate areas 

of focus, with Somalia also being there very much, is Sudan, Somalia, and the post-election period in Congo, whether, and how, the 

mandate and the presence of the forces might change. So, those 

would be—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. My response, Senator. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you for that answer, Ambassador. 

You’ve already mentioned, a couple of times, the U.N.-sponsored 

2001 Bonn Agreement that established a framework for postTaliban Afghanistan, that included Iran, Russia, Pakistan, and 

India, as well as the United States. Doesn’t Bonn provide lessons 

about how, through diplomacy rather than bluster, we can get the 

U.N. to act in our best interests? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I think that the U.N., as I said in 

my statement, can play, and has played, an important role, in several crises, that have served our interests. So, I believe that it’s in 

our interest for the U.N. to be effective and for us to strengthen 

the U.N. and to work with it in dealing with problems. I mentioned—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. But specifically on Bonn, though, were United 

States interests compromised by negotiating with Iran at Bonn? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. No, they were not. 

Senator FEINGOLD. How did the U.N. framework for post-Taliban 

Afghanistan help you as U.S. Ambassador? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Oh, I—we were—along with the U.N., 

the architect of the Bonn framework—I was, myself, in Bonn at 

that time, from the National Security Council, there, working with 

Lakhdar Brahimi. So, it was very much of a good road map that 

was developed, a good interim authority, led by a good leader, 

President Karzai was selected in Bonn. And the U.N. played a 

very, very positive role—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. So, it helped you, it did not hinder you. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. It helped me—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. It helped the United States 

a great deal, yes. 

232 

Senator FEINGOLD. I hope that your involvement in these efforts 

in Afghanistan mean that you will—that you understand, as I 

think you do, that we can negotiate with Iran and other nations 

with which we have serious disagreements, and that, notwithstanding what the administration told us in the lead-up to the war 

in Iraq, our national security interests are often best served 

through multilateral efforts. 

As you know, we held a hearing on Afghanistan last week and 

examined Unites States efforts to stabilize the country. And, given 

your tremendous familiarity with Afghanistan, which I’ve seen in 

person in Afghanistan, I would like to hear your thoughts as to 

whether the United States is providing enough assistance, and 

where the U.N. needs to increase its security, stabilization, and reconstruction assistance. What do we need to do? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe success in Afghanistan is 

critical. And I believe we—along with our European allies, particularly the NATO allies, who will also now have a lot at stake, with 

their own forces being engaged, and their reputation and, one 

might say, even the future of NATO being engaged, do all that we 

can to help the Afghan Government succeed, not only in the military domain, but also in terms of building their economic and—situation improving that—building the capacity of the government, 

rule of law, extending the authority of the government. But, at the 

same time, I think it’s critical for success that we work together to 

improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to pursue that in a persistent way. I think that’s in our interest. 

With regard to details of how much we ought to do more of, if 

you would permit me, I will be glad to come back after I’ve had 

time to reengage. I’ve been focused on Iraq, and I’ve not followed, 

in detail, the level of our assistance in—with regard to particular 

areas in the budget. So, I’ll be more than happy to get back to you 

on that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, again, Mr. Ambassador, and good 

luck. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, we want to thank you for your testimony today, 

and especially for your public service. You’ve taken on tough assignments, and we’re grateful for that commitment to the country 

and to public service. 

When you were in my office the other day, we had a chance to 

cover a couple of different areas, one of them being a question, 

which I guess speaks more to the person and the environment 

within which they’re working—in any field of government, at any 

level—and that was the question of personal leadership style and 

how you approach the opportunity that you’ll have to serve as U.N. 

Ambassador. The question I have is, even as you—in that position—even as you support, obviously, and uphold, broad principles 

of American foreign policy and our diplomatic strategy and tactics, 

I would hope that you’d also remain flexible to be able to implement a strategy that’ll be best for the country, even if it deviates 

from a preordained or even an ideological point of view. And I 

think we’ve had, in the past, unfortunately, too much of the latter, 

233 

more of a unilateral go-it-alone approach. And I think it’s high time 

those days end and that we have a different approach. 

And I know, from your experience, and from your service, that 

you’ve approached problems that way, and I just wanted to have 

you comment on that, in terms of leadership style, especially with 

regard to this important position, which is on a world stage, in 

more ways than one. If you could just comment on that, and how 

you approach that. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, thank you, Senator. 

Based on on-the-ground experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, I believe, to achieve our goals, engagement with others, finding common ground to advance our agenda, and listening to others, being 

in the mode of seeking to solve problems that we face, not assuming that we always have the answers, that others may come up 

with approaches that can also work, have been the guideline for 

my—the way I operate. As you say, very much committed to the 

objectives that we seek. And that would be my style in the United 

Nations, as well. I’m going there to—with the aim of making 

progress on issues of concern, both in terms of dealing with real security problems of this new era, but also to help the institution be 

more effective in carrying out its mission, and to engage together 

with others, be respectful, and to listen, but also not shy away from 

pointing out why we think the way we do, and to be persistent, not 

to give up, not to be discouraged in the face of complexity and difficulty. And I hope to have a team with me—because, you know, 

I’m just one person—to—that would be able to be effective contributors, along with me, in advancing our agenda, and that’s why I 

would come back to you, as I mentioned to you when we met, and 

that I would like to go take a look at our mission and see how we 

could organize ourselves or attract the kind of talent that we need 

to attract to be as effective as possible, because I think there is a 

great opportunity, if we are effective in the United Nations, to advance our agenda, generally. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

And with regard to your two previous assignments, both in Iraq 

and Afghanistan—first of all, Iraq, when you look forward—and I 

know—you’re looking to be confirmed and to be at the United Nations, but I’d ask you to look forward, in terms of Iraq, and, in the 

next 6 months to the next year—what do you think is the main 

diplomatic objective when it comes to doing everything possible, not 

just to have a military strategy that works, but all—and a political 

strategy—but also just in terms of diplomacy? What would—if you 

were remaining the next 6 months or the next year—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Senator, it’s critical that we can 

incentivize the Iraqis to do the right thing, to make progress on the 

political issues that divide the Iraqis. The agenda will be completing the oil law, because we’re talking about trillions of dollars 

of resources which Iraq has. How would they share that, develop 

that in a way that unites the various communities? I think a positive step was taken in the Cabinet’s approval. That needs to be 

brought to completion within the timeframe that you talked about. 

There has to be a good reform of de-Baathification, accountability, and reconciliation—accountability going to a judicial process, taking away from a political process, which is—which it is 

234 

now—to a judicial process, but also reconciliation, welcoming people who have not committed crimes and were not very senior in the 

hierarchy of the Baath Party, into the fold. Also, to deal with—to 

have a demobilization, decommissioning, reintegration plan put forward by the government with regard to militias, and set a date for 

the election of—provincial elections, and amend the—to be ready 

with amendments to be voted on in the constitution, to make the 

constitution a true national compact. 

Each of the other things that I talked about, the—if they are 

done, that will make the constitutional referendum—making the 

constitution a compact will be made a lot easier, because those are 

the issues that the Iraqis, with additional one or two issues, are 

the key issues on which they are divided. So, I would think that 

is very important. 

Also, I believe we have—another diplomatic challenge is how to 

get the neighbors to play a positive role, to be helpful to Iraq, not 

to seeing the difficulties of one’s neighbor opportunities, but, rather, to think in new way with them pursuing common—developing 

a set of relationship where they are more helpful than some of 

them have been. And that will be the other big challenge, I think, 

a diplomatic challenge for us. 

Senator CASEY. I am over time, but, just very quickly, if you can 

address this briefly. In light of what you just said about Iraq, going 

forward, what do you think, if any—of an expanded role by the 

U.N., what should that be, if you can define that quickly? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I think the U.N. can play an important role with regard to the constitution, with regard to elections, with regard to the issue of Kirkuk, I mentioned, that’s also 

a timeline beyond the 6 months. I think it’s—by the end of the 

year, there has to be a referendum, see the preparations with that 

referendum, that it takes place in a way that is successful, in terms 

of keeping Iraqis together, that that doesn’t become another fault 

line, this one between Arabs and Kurds. So, I think the situation 

is evolving in Iraq, in terms of issues that are becoming important, 

that is a great opportunity for enhanced U.N. role, and that will 

be one of my objectives, if I am confirmed, when I go up to New 

York. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, welcome, and thank you for your service to our 

country. You have taken on some tough assignments, and we appreciate that. 

I’d like to lay out my questions and then hear your answers, so 

I can get them all in. There are four different ones. 

One is about Iraq. It seems to me that unless we have a datecertain that the Iraqis understand that they have to make the hard 

choices, compromises, negotiations necessary for a Government of 

National Unity to be achieved, that it is possible—and the rest 

other world understands that we are not there indefinitely; it continues to be seen as America’s war, not the world’s interest—and 

so, in your new role that you will hopefully have, the question is, 

How do we get—the tipping point has not seemed to come in which 

other countries believe that they have to be engaged, in meaningful 

235 

ways, in trying to create stability in Iraq, both regionally and beyond the region—how will you pursue that, as the United States 

Ambassador to the United Nations? 

Second, with reference to Iran, I am glad to see that among your 

priorities is compliance with Security Council actions. You know, 

the greater the success that you and we have at the United Nations, through the multilateral efforts, the less likely that we will 

ever have to consider military options. The less success that we 

have at the United Nations, the greater the chances come for that. 

The question is, How do we move other countries to more fully enforce the existing Security Council actions? And, as we try to make 

those actions more pervasive, how do you intend to try to use all 

of the resources—your diplomatic skills, of course, whatever persuasiveness, showing other countries their own interests in pursing 

this, but also other options we have; we have economic levers here 

to pull, as well—how do we get them to understand that containing 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions is one in which there is common cause 

and we have greater success in its enforcement? 

Third, last year I was successful in working with others—Senator 

Obama and others—at getting—Senator Brownback—an additional 

$60 million included in the supplemental appropriations to fund a 

peacekeeping mission in Darfur. I’ve heard some of the answers 

you’ve given to that previously. But I’d like to see how do you intend to, again, and use the wide array of options that exist for us 

to actually get President al-Bashir to submit to what he has gone 

back on, which is a hybrid A.U./U.N. peacekeeping force. People 

continue to die. We talk about it, we anguish about it, but we seem 

to not be able to move forward. I find it incredible. 

And then, lastly, we haven’t had a lot of discussion on this, but 

this is one of my major concerns, and that is the Human Rights 

Council. I know that the Council was supposed to be an element 

of reform. When Cuba and China, some of the biggest human 

rights abusers, are on the Council, I just quite can’t understand it. 

But I am concerned that our absence from it at the same time, 

while a statement that we don’t believe it has reformed the way 

it should, also leaves—cedes the ground to others in some of the 

most consequential issues, people who languish in countries in the 

world, who look to the United States as a beacon of light, of freedom and democracy, and of respect for human rights—when that 

voice is absent in that respect, I’m not quite sure that we’re promoting our interests or giving those people who we want to see 

take the chance to struggle in their own countries to move toward 

democracy in their own countries, and human rights, a type of hope 

and opportunity that they want. And so, I’d like to hear how you’re 

going to be pursuing that course, as well. 

It’s a big agenda, but that’s what the U.N. job is all about, and 

I look forward to your answers on those four topics. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator. 

With regard to Iraq, I believe that that is a delicate balancing 

that—in our approach—that needs to be considered, in my view. 

On the one hand, I think it’s imperative that we incentivize Iraqis 

to move forward, to take on more responsibility and to make the 

decisions that they need to make. And that means there are benchmarks. On the other hand, I also believe we need to be careful that 

236 

we don’t do things that could unravel the situation altogether. And, 

therefore, not to tie our force levels to a particular event happening, or not, in a particular time. So, impatience and—a sense 

of direction, I think, is good. Timeline with regard to benchmark 

is good. But I believe that some flexibility so that we—whether we 

can judge that this—if a timeline has not been met, it’s not because 

of a set of other things that brings us to a judgment that they are 

not going to make the decisions that are needed, and, therefore, 

that will lead one to one conclusion, that perhaps we ought to be 

looking at some other way of doing business with them. But if, on 

the other hand, they are making progress, but yet, they have 

missed a deadline because of good reasons—I mean, we all are familiar with missing deadlines—because of the complexities of the 

process, because the issues are difficult, then I wouldn’t, sort of, 

judge that we ought to enforce what we said we would do because 

we have set a deadline earlier. So, I would like to give the people 

who are in a position of responsibility, such as yourselves, a sense 

of why the progress has not been made. Is it on a single item, or 

is it part of a pattern? 

And I also want you to—want us to be aware that—and take into 

account—that if we—we shouldn’t do something that gives control 

to people who want us to fail, and they say, ‘‘Aha. If we can cause 

a particular deadline not to be met, then the United States will do 

certain thing that brings about a less desirable situation.’’ 

I appreciate the—what you all have to go through and—to balance things, as political leaders, representing our people, and the 

impatience of our people out there. So, I appreciate that. But from 

my experience, I’d like to also think—for your consideration, I 

would put forward that the complexity, in terms of the balancing 

that needs to be taken into account. 

Now, I’m sorry I’ve taken a long time on your first question. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Actually, you commented on what was a 

comment. My question was, How do you get other countries in the 

world—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. To understand that it is their 

interest to engage in Iraq. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Oh. I’m sorry. I thought you said in setting a date-certain—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. So I was—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Mentioned that—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. I was talking to—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. As an observation—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Of my own. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But my question was—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. How do you get other people—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In the world—— 

237 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, other—I think we have to engage 

them. We have to take their interests into account. We have to use 

our friends that work with us to also engage on our behalf. That’s 

why, within the U.N., I’m very much—the preparations that I’ve 

done in the past few days has intrigued me with the concept of 

working and operationalizing the Democratic Caucus there. I will 

be very focused on how we can get that caucus to be effective. And 

I believe that we ought to also use our friends and relationship of 

our friends with—our friends in the NAM and G7. I will engage 

with them. I think the engagement is a tool. It’s not an end in 

itself, but it’s a tool that can shape behavior. But you have to take 

interests of others into account. And in Iraq, I believe, in particular, there is a lot that we—of countries that should have common interests with us there, because Iraq is a rich country in a 

critical region of the world, and its oil resources is of a global interest for the future of energy security. And making sure that Iraq 

doesn’t become a place where terrorists can use to operate against 

the world is a common interest of everyone. Keeping Iraq together 

as a single nation is a common interest of others. So—and this 

Shia/Sunni conflict, not spreading to engulf the entire region, is a 

common interest of others and ourselves. So, I think what we have 

done, in terms of this regional conference with P5 and now bringing G–8, is a—it’s a good adjustment to engage others. And I will, 

in the United Nations, work through the Security Council, with 

other colleagues, and with the regional states, to continue to seek 

cooperation of others, based on common interests, but also listening 

to others’ ideas and suggestions, as well. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Very good. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Ambassador, you talk about—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may, could I—— 

Senator NELSON. Yes. I want to follow up on that point. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Sure. 

Senator NELSON. You talk about the engagement with the other 

nations, but we have been hearing this for 4 years. So, what are 

you going to do different for engagement? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I told you one, in 

that I’ll try to—with—in the U.N., should I be confirmed—work 

proactively with the Secretary General, the new one. He’s new, and 

I will be new, and we both have a task of looking around, seeing 

what’s wrong, what’s working, how do we move forward on fixing 

things that are not right. 

Two, to get the group of democracies that are there to activate 

that, to make it an effective instrument. 

And, three, to also engage with the NAM and Group of 77. 

I also believe that the presence of the diplomats from around the 

world, and many of whom come very well regarded and well connected, provide an opportunity not only to deal with issues in a formal sense with—that are on the agenda of the U.N., but, otherwise, also provide an opportunity to advance our agenda, otherwise. For example, on how to help the Afghan/Pakistan relationship, because that’s critical for success of Afghanistan; or how to 

get the regional countries to be more positively engaged in Iraq. 

These are ideas, at this point, Mr. Chairman. And, should I be 

confirmed, I’ll go and see which ones I think, of these options, will 

238 

be the most effective. And I have promised that, if you will give me 

the opportunity, that, after I spend a bit of time there and I’ve had 

my mind engaging the problems and tactics and the strategy that 

work, that I’d be more than happy to come back, should I be confirmed, a month or 6 weeks later, to tell you, now, based on kicking 

the tires around, talking to people, what I think is going to be likely to be more effective. At this point, I—— 

Senator NELSON. We’ll take you up on that, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I know I asked the Ambassador four questions. And I know Senator Obama’s waiting. So, if 

you could give us, in writing, your answers to the other three—I 

asked you about Iran, Darfur, and the U.N. Human Rights Council—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I’d be happy to. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In an expeditious fashion, 

so—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I’ll do it right away. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Before I have to cast a vote. But 

I—— 

Senator NELSON. Senator Menendez, if you want to, let’s let Senator Obama go, and we’ll continue with your questions. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If I can, Mr. Chairman—I have a Budget 

Committee markup that’s marking up the budget, and I may have 

to be there to cast some votes, so I will hang as long as I can. 

Thank you. 

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Obama. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ambassador, good to see you again. I’ll try to be relatively 

brief. I know a lot of the issues that I was interested in have already been discussed, and I won’t have you repeat them. I’ll look 

at the transcript of the hearings. 

Senator Menendez, who’s been very active on issues of human 

rights, has raised some important questions about Darfur. There 

actually is, right now, an unfolding crisis. It’s a—it’s been an ongoing crisis, but one that’s been in the news recently, and that’s the 

situation in Zimbabwe. You know, President Mugabe’s regime has 

been repressive for some time, has been divisive for some time, but, 

since Sunday, what we’ve seen is not even the pretense of respecting the rights of opposition leaders. You’ve got 50 Zimbabweans, 

who were attending a peaceful prayer meeting outside Harare, 

being brutalized; a protester, shot and killed. You’ve got the leader 

of the Movement for Democratic Change being badly beaten and severe head injuries. So, I’m wondering whether the administration 

has some plan in the United Nations, what other countries are 

thinking about how we might put more pressure on the Mugabe regime. And this speaks, I think, to a larger question, and that is, 

you know, what’s the appropriate role for the United States in advancing human rights issues at a time when our stock around the 

world appears to have fallen? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator. It’s great to see 

you again. 

239 

One, with regard to human rights, generally, this is one of the 

core missions of the United Nations. Security, conflict prevention, 

being number one. Number two being progress, economic development. And third being human rights. And I said, before you came, 

with regard to Darfur, that we need to look at options for 

incentivizing the government in Khartoum to cooperate, including 

more forceful options, from sanctions against elements in the—people in the regime, to institutions, to government as a whole, to 

other issues. Which ones of those I would favor, again, if you would 

allow me, Senator, I’ve been back 3 or 4 days from Iraq, I promise 

to get back with you, if I am confirmed, as to, among the options, 

talking to our experts, see what would produce the desired results, 

and which ones we can do effectively, because some of these will 

require cooperation from others, as well. 

On Zimbabwe, I believe that there is important human rights 

and other considerations with regard to Zimbabwe. As to what the 

administration is doing, if you permit me, I—to provide that for the 

record, as to what the approach is at the present time, and if you 

permit, again—— 

Senator OBAMA. I’m going to be—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. I have been—I go up there, 

and engage my own mind, and then I look forward to having a conversation with you. 

Senator OBAMA. I’m happy to get responses in writing to those 

questions, after you’ve conferred with the State Department and 

others in the administration. 

Senator OBAMA. You may feel the same way about this next 

question, because it’s a broad one, but, I think, one that’s vital and 

that touches on the other—one of the other core missions of the 

United Nations, one you’ve mentioned, and that’s security. It’s my 

view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the structure that 

we’ve set up in the past, is fraying rather badly. I think 

everybody’s in agreement that the NPT needs updating. We’ve got 

regional proliferation problems, like Iran and North Korea, but 

we’ve also got some broader questions arising out of the treaty with 

India, the desire for a variety of nations to look at nuclear power 

as an option to deal with their energy needs. We still need to make 

more progress on securing nuclear materials and enhancing international interdiction efforts. So, I’m just wondering, do you have, 

at this stage, any thoughts, in terms of how the administration 

would approach strengthening that regime? Is it something that 

you’ve already discussed? Is it something that you’d like to get back 

to us on? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I would like to get back to you with regard to initiatives that the administration may be considering. But 

I believe that the issue of proliferation is one of the defining—another defining challenge of our time. And the relationship between 

peaceful nuclear activity—civilian nuclear program and military 

nuclear program, is an issue that I have had a lot of experience 

with earlier in my career. I worked a lot on how to prevent countries to get legitimately very close to nuclear weapons without violating any rules, because of our earlier Atoms for Peace programs. 

And I think some adjustments were made in our approach, on a bipartisan basis. But, moving forward from here on with adjustments 

240 

to the NPT or other nonproliferation regimes on the nuclear issue, 

in terms of the administration’s thinking or approaches, if you 

don’t mind, I will provide that for the record, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. And when you do, Mr. Ambassador, give us information on your opinion of China and Russia, supportive of your 

efforts in the U.N. Security Council on sanctions. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe—with regard to Iran, I will do 

that, but I was briefed that good progress has been made in the 

last 24 to 48 hours with regard to the next step in relation to Iran, 

in New York. But I’ll be happy, Mr. Chairman, to provide a more 

detailed answer for the record. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Well, speaking of that, do you support the 

agreement recently reached with North Korea on the steps toward 

lessening proliferation? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I know that the administration supports 

it, and—I know that the administration, Chairman, supports it, 

and I have not examined the document in detail, but I don’t see 

any reason why I would not support it. Yes, I associate myself with 

the administration, of course. 

Senator NELSON. Why would the former Ambassador be opposed 

to it? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I’m—I wanted to make sure that you 

know that I have not read the details of the agreement, but the administration supports it, and, therefore, of course, I support it, as 

well. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I think it’s just curious that the former 

Ambassador to the United Nations is now coming out opposing the 

very agreement that the administration has reached. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I—you will have to ask him, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Let me quote—you had made reference to the 

Iraq Study Group Report that had been embraced by the administration in a answer to a previous question. And let me quote from 

page 16 of the executive summary, ‘‘By the first quarter of 2008, 

subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the 

ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection 

should be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could 

be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special-operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and 

support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid-reaction and special-operations forces would be to undertake strikes 

against al Qaeda in Iraq.’’ 

Do you generally support that statement by the Iraq Study 

Group? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. In my view, Mr. Chairman, the desire 

to get the U.S. role in combat, sectarian combat between Iraqi 

groups, and to have Iraqis to take on more of a responsibility in 

that area, is a desirable goal, but it has to be done in a way that 

is workable. And, therefore, while I support the sentiment, my concern is that not making that condition-based, but making it absolute, is potentially risky, because the circumstances may be such 

241 

that they’re—that the Iraqis might not be able to do that, and I’d 

rather give our leaders the flexibility to see—to evaluate the circumstances. But the—but I know what’s motivating them, is to 

provide incentives for Iraqis to increase their capability in this area 

as quickly as possible. As the recommendation of a study group, I 

appreciate that. But, as a policy embraced by the President, and 

by our congressional leaders and the administration together, I 

would want, in my judgment at least, for it to—there has to be 

some flexibility for evaluating, rather than sort of tying our hands 

a year ahead of time, in terms of circumstances that we may not 

be able to anticipate at this time. 

Senator NELSON. And, of course, that was one of the qualifiers 

that I just read—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yeah. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Here. But, as a general road map, 

that’s a pretty good road map. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. To—as I said before, it’s very important 

for us to continue to incentivize Iraqis to take on more responsibilities, to do the things that they need to do. I’m—as a diplomat, 

being in Baghdad, I have often made use of such recommendations 

and statements by congressional leaders, to communicate to the 

Iraqis that they need to move. But, as I said, at the same time, I 

would like to maintain the flexibility for the—for our military leaders—of course, the Commander in Chief—to be able to make decisions, adjustments, based on the circumstances. 

Senator NELSON. Well, as a diplomat, you have a unique background and experience with which to advise us. 

Reflect upon the United States entry and subsequent withdrawal, in the early 1980s, in Lebanon, as to how we may draw 

upon that experience in what we are experiencing now in Iraq. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe, Senator, that that was 

not handled well—Lebanon—as a student of the history of that region, and a student of strategy. On the one hand, I believe we declared Lebanon to be vital, which meant that we would do whatever is necessary to succeed; and, on the other, in face of terrorist 

attacks, we were—we had to withdraw—we decided to withdraw, 

which, unfortunately, encouraged some of our opponents in that region to assume that we cannot take casualties, and, therefore, behave in a way that made our diplomacy less effective, and, therefore, had to cause the use of force, because they miscalculated, 

thinking we would not use force, that we would not be—given the 

pattern in Lebanon. So, I believe it’s very important that we are 

careful in how we pronounce ourselves, and that when we—that 

that is a—objectives are clear and there is a good relationship between ends and means, and the strategy is a good one, and the 

planning is good one, tasks are specified, the resources, political resolve, and all that, is there. So, I regard the Lebanon incident as 

a—as having had a very negative effect, in terms of subsequent developments, in terms of assessment of U.S. resolve and staying 

power in that region. 

Senator NELSON. So, the experience of the U.S. in Lebanon, back 

in the early 1980s, we did not succeed. 

242 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that defining in the way that 

I did, it—I would say that that was not a successful exercise and 

use of force on our part, I agree with that. 

Senator NELSON. Would your conclusion be drawn, in part, from 

the fact that the United States was perceived to have sided with 

one faction, one sector, in the use of its force? In Lebanon. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I will have to provide that for the 

record, now, because so long ago. But I was just—what remains 

with me as a kind of a—as an overall strategic sense was the declaration of Lebanon as being vital for us, and then the attacks and 

the withdrawal that happened, and the perception that I—as it 

clearly remains with me, around that region, that we cannot take 

casualties, we cannot sustain. And, therefore, I think, encouraging 

people to draw the wrong lessons that—I think that’s the one that 

I recall. But, in terms of in the politics of Lebanon at that time, 

how we were perceived with the—and the role of Syria and Israel 

and the various Lebanese factions, if you don’t mind, I don’t want 

to say something without checking on the situation at that time, 

so I’ll be happy to provide that for the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I think that the reading of history would 

show that it was when we started using our firepower on behalf of 

one particular group, it was—I can’t remember the name of the 

group—that the perception of the United States as being a neutral 

party went out the window in Lebanon. And I would be curious 

about your ideas, from the experience of that, in and around 1984 

Lebanon. Are we getting into a situation now, in Iraq, where we’re 

being perceived of basically doing the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis for 

the dominant Shiites? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I understand your point, Mr. Chairman. 

You have to know—I think I agree with your point, if I understand 

it correctly, that you know—you have to know what is the situation, what’s the mission. And if the mission is one—as it is, in significant part, now in Iraq—one of sectarian conflict, particularly in 

Baghdad and some of the other areas, that we understand that 

they are sectarian, and I think we do, because that, we think, is 

the biggest issue, competition over political and economic power 

with regard to the future of that region, of that—of Iraq. We understand that. And if we didn’t understand that, in a situation that 

that existed, and we thought it was a situation of extremism versus 

moderation, but, while, in fact, it was a situation of sectarian and 

ethnic rivalry, then our remedy may be not the right remedy. But 

I think we understand, in the case of Iraq, that—that is not the 

exclusive issue, because it is also al Qaeda that continues as a 

problem, then there is the issue of insurgents who are against the 

presence of the coalition, then there is the issue of Shia-on-Shia 

issues. But I think a core—perhaps the most important issue is the 

sectarian issue. And that’s why we’re working very hard, during 

the period that I have been there, to get an agreement, that compact between them, on political and economic power, oil issue, as 

I’ve described, the constitution issue, the de-Baathification issue, 

and that we have got an agreement from the Prime Minister that 

he will be enforcing the law in a balanced way against all those 

who break the law. But this is an issue that’s important, and I understand your point quite clearly, that we need to be very attentive 

243 

to and make sure that that complexity informs our objectives and 

our strategy and our plan. And I appreciate that. 

Senator NELSON. With regard to the sectarian strife, you are 

uniquely qualified, by virtue of your background and experience, to 

explain to the committee how, given the schism that occurred in 

the battle of Karbala of 680 A.D. and the hostilities that have occurred over the centuries between Sunnis and Shiites, of which we 

see that playing out, as we speak, today, in Iraq, particularly in 

Baghdad, how the United States is suddenly going to get all of 

these groups to lay down their arms and participate in democracy, 

when they’ve been at it for 1,327 years? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe, Senator, that, doctrinally, 

there has been, as you say, a difference, dating back over 1,000 

years. And you’re absolutely right about that. But I believe that 

Sunnis and Shias across the Middle East, for the most part in the 

history since Karbala, have lived relatively harmoniously, although 

there have been periods of discrimination of one by the other. And 

in recent past, there has been a period of Shias asserting themselves, and that has been linked with the rise of Iran. But, in the 

case of Iraq, Mr. Chairman, there has been a history of intermarriage between Sunni and Shia. There are tribes that are half 

Sunni, half Shia. But, in the current circumstances, there have 

been a concerted effort to exploit that fault line that exists, sectarian-wise, for political purposes. The terrorist al-Qaeda saw that 

as a fault line and exploited that successfully, especially after the 

attack on Samarra mosque, to increase sectarian tension, and then 

to offer itself as a protector of Sunnis. I believe the countries in the 

area are concerned, on the one hand, about the rise of Iran, but 

also worried about the sectarian tensions that exist, and that’s one 

of the issues that could bring people together, because if they don’t 

come together on this, there is a danger that it could destabilize 

and fragment the entire region, and that, I think, is an area for 

diplomacy on our part. 

Working with others, I don’t think this is something we can do 

alone, given what you mentioned. It’s something that we can assist, 

but it has to be largely done by the leaders of the area and the sort 

of a regional engagement that takes into account Lebanon, takes 

into account Iraq, takes into account the other countries of the area 

we need to focus on. I believe, as I’ve said repeatedly, that what 

happens to this region is now the key issue for the shape of the 

future of the world, as the European balance of power was in the 

early 20th century, and the containment of the Soviets. So—and 

it’s going to take time, and it’s going to require a concerted effort 

on our part and on the part of others to assist this region that’s 

going through a difficult crisis, to come out of it in a way that is 

good for them and good for the world, as Europe came out of its 

crises in a way that now it’s good for them and good for the world. 

This is the issue that is the defining issue for us at the present 

time. 

Senator NELSON. In other words, you’re going to have to be Merlin the Magician——[Laughter.]——as Ambassador, to help bring 

this about. What do you think would happen if we had a phased 

redeployment out of the cities into a perimeter, say, more into the 

244 

countryside, still doing these things that the Iraq Study Commission—if we did that, and pulled out of Baghdad—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. As an example, what do you think 

would happen between the Sunnis and the Shiites? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, it depends in what context. If the 

Iraqi forces were able to control the situation, and all sides considered those forces to be neutral and enforcing the law, then that’s 

a very natural adaptation and adjustment that you’ve described— 

in an orderly fashion, and that’s what we ought to consider doing. 

But if the security forces are not able to control the situation, or— 

and they are seen as being motivated by a sectarian agenda, then 

what you described, should it happen in that context, it would escalate the level of violence. And, frankly, it’s a personal observation 

that is at the—the risks of kind of things happening that I, frankly, 

do not know whether we and others would be able to look the other 

way to let it happen, in terms of humanitarian crises, the level of 

violence inflicted. Given our role, particularly in terms of the situation in Iraq with the change, I think we have geopolitical issues 

from an intensified sectarian violence regionally, but also I believe 

that we have a moral responsibility, given our role, that we do 

what we can to avoid that. 

And so, I would say my comments would depend, in terms of the 

context, what’s going on otherwise, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. Well, as our Ambassador in Iraq, what is your 

observation of the Iraqi Government being able to be successful 

over the course of the next 6 to 9 months in such a redeployment 

out of the city? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe that within the next few 

months, I think the—it would be difficult for it to cope with it by 

itself. Now, I believe if they make the political decision that we discussed earlier in the next few months, and the Iraqi forces are— 

increase in numbers and capability, which is part of the plan, and 

the government continues with its commitment to treat all Iraqis 

the same and no preferences because of sectarian identity or political affiliation, then the prospects for implementing this plan that 

you talked about in a few months would improve. But it very much 

depends on what happens in the next few months, on the political 

calendar, and also in terms of the capabilities of Iraqis to make the 

improvements that we are committed to helping them make. 

I am cautiously optimistic, but it’s a very contingent optimism, 

assuming on these decisions that I talked about, that these decisions are made. 

Senator NELSON. In your opinion, do you think there is political 

will in the Maliki government to get such a unanimity of purpose 

so that the various factions can come together? Do you think 

Maliki has the will? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that he would like to do that— 

Mr. Maliki. I see an improvement in his approach in the last several months. And it’s not only him, however, because it’s a parliamentary system that they have, and the government’s a unity 

government. Other leaders also have to rise to the occasion, and 

that’s why I keep repeating our role, to keep incentivizing them to 

do the right thing, work with them. Ambassador Crocker will have 

245 

his work cut out for him to keep being very proactively engaged 

with them. And, at the same time, I think the regional role is important, because some of these groups are also influenced by some 

of the neighbors. And that’s why I support this adjustment of the 

last week, to get a more active diplomatic engagement, keep pressing the neighbors to do what’s needed, to be a forceful, encouraging 

compromise, rather than encouraging extremism, militancy, and 

sectarianism. 

Senator NELSON. I don’t want to belabor the point, and, of 

course, you’re constrained on a number of things as to what you 

can say, but you bring a rich background of experience to the committee, and we appreciate it very much. You have said that you 

think, in the next few months, it would give us the indication of 

whether or not, to put it in the vernacular, the Maliki government 

is getting it together. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON. Now, that’s what Secretary Gates said to us in 

his confirmation hearing, in January. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON. And now it is the middle of March. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON. He also said, and—not in January, in December, his confirmation hearings, and then his testimony to us again 

in January, as the Secretary of Defense—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. He said 2 months, that we ought 

to know. Well, we’re at the 2-months point. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yeah. 

Senator NELSON. And we keep hearing statements like yours and 

other people, ‘‘Well, in the next several months.’’ 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON. So, when are we going to know? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well—— 

Senator NELSON. Against the backdrop—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Obviously, the American people 

are losing patience with the Iraqi Government getting it together. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. Right. I very much appreciate 

that factor, the patience, the lack of patience, patience running out. 

My message and response, Senator, is twofold. One, that the Iraqis 

are facing very difficult issues, and they’re not an island, unfortunately; they’re also in a very difficult neighborhood, where there 

are people who do not wish them well and do not want them to succeed. Second, that the last couple of months, things have improved 

politically, in my, view, although big challenges remain. So, that’s 

why I’m—I evaluate the last 2 months, positively. A key issue, the 

government decision to treat all sides on an evenhanded way, even 

allowing movement against Jaysh al-Madhi, which had been an 

issue, a problem, in an earlier phase. Second, the agreement on hydrocarbon among the political groups, this is a very big issue—as 

I said, trillions of dollars involved for them to agree. Passing the 

budget, a 40-billion-dollar-plus budget, 10 billion for economic reconstruction, spend—already, I am informed, spending—10-percent 

distribution of that. So, I—and I think if this momentum is mainVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00253 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
246 

tained, and the decisions—the oil law is ratified by the Assembly 

next, de-Baathification is done. Constitutional amendment process 

is done. A date is set. Then, I think, we can build. But I think if 

there—if you wanted to take these 2 months, whether it’s discouraging or encouraging, I would put the 2-months evaluation as encouraging, cautiously optimistic, and it’s—again, I would also emphasize that it’s not only Maliki, but others, too, have to be reminded, other leaders, because it’s a parliamentary system, it’s a 

unity government made of four or five different forces. We need to 

engage all of them, because sometimes we overstate how much 

Maliki alone can do, thinking perhaps it’s like our system, with our 

President is—has got the kind of authority based on our political 

system. Their political system is a little different, and it—for him 

to succeed, it requires cooperation of some of the other key blocs 

in the government. 

Senator NELSON. Over and over, we hear the statement that, 

‘‘It’s going to take a political solution, not’’—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. ‘‘A military solution.’’ 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON. One of the items on the table is a political solution that the regional powers would all support—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Which would basically be to start 

segregating—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. The very—communities, and let 

them have autonomy in the conduct of their own affairs. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON. Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the middle, Shiites in the south. What do you—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. You think of that? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, the issue of federalism is an issue 

that is available as an option for Iraqis, based on their constitution. 

The Kurds have exercised that option. They have their—three 

provinces have become a region and a federal unit, and they have 

a—the constitution allows for substantial degree of authority at the 

regional level. It foresees for Iraq a decentralized system, a federal 

system. There is an issue between the Arabs—among the Arabs of 

Iraq. Some support the idea of federalizing the rest. Everyone 

agrees on decentralization, broadly. Some favor federalism, some do 

not. And this is one of the issues with regard to building this compact, and I think that’s an option of federalizing the rest of Iraq 

for Iraqis to decide on. 

Where I would be cautious, Mr. Chairman, would be that it 

shouldn’t be seen as an American imposition for them, how to organize their units inside Iraq. There are some who see that are—that 

suspect our motives as having come in to divide Iraq, an important 

Arab country, into mini states. That’s why I would be wary of us 

saying, ‘‘Well, this is what we think is the solution, and we’re going 

to impose it.’’ But this is an option that’s available to them. They 

are talking about it. They’re discussing it openly and behind the 

scene among the leaders as to where they will come out. I would 

247 

not rule that out as a possibility for them, assuming they come to 

that decision themselves. 

Senator NELSON. For those who criticize that concept by saying, 

‘‘Well, you can’t do it. You have these mixed neighborhoods,’’ as a 

practical matter, are the mixed neighborhoods now segregating because of the violence? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. There has been a degree of segregation 

that has happened, unfortunately, during the past several months. 

But the government is very much committed to bringing—encouraging people to come back to the areas from which they left. We 

will have to see what happens, but one of the key features of the 

new Baghdad security plan is to encourage a return of refugees to 

their homes. 

Senator NELSON. You described the constitution as a ‘‘true national compact.’’ 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Not yet. It has to become so. And for it 

to become so, I believe, Senator, these amendments that they are 

discussing among themselves, they are—has to be in agreement 

with regard to those. 

Senator NELSON. And the amendments could accommodate the 

federalism that we have just been talking about—— 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. In general. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. An agreement on that. 

Senator NELSON. Uh-huh. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. As one of the issues. And there is oil. I 

think that pillar of the amendment process has been agreed to 

now, at the Cabinet level. The constitution kicked the can down the 

road on that one, so—and left it to future agreements, and that’s 

what we have. 

Senator NELSON. I have a number of other questions which I’m 

not going to go into, and I’ll submit them for the record, with regard to Venezuela, with regard to the United Nations peacekeeping 

force in Haiti. I would just suggest to you, as you go to your new 

post, that we just have a handful of American police officers who 

are Creole-speaking on that force, and they are as valuable as gold, 

and that there ought to be some increase of that capability in the 

MINUSTAH force there. I’ll submit comments with regard to the 

peacekeeping forces in other parts of the world—and Darfur and so 

forth. 

You’ve been very, very kind in all of your questions here, and 

very thorough, and I appreciate it. And I appreciate the delicacy of 

your answers, which have been most diplomatic, which our Representative in the United Nations has to be. So, I want to thank 

you very much. 

The record is going to remain open for 2 business days so that 

members of the committee can submit additional questions. And, 

naturally, we would like for you to respond quickly to those. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you very much. And the meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

248 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Question. Did the Syrians approach the United States in the context of the March 

10 regional conference in Baghdad? Did the Syrians indicate what issues they would 

like to discuss? What was the U.S. response at the time? Did any bilateral discussion occur during the conference? If so, what was the substance? 

Answer. During the Iraq Neighbors Conference hosted by the Iraqis in Baghdad 

on March 10, the Syrians expressed interest in holding bilateral discussions with 

the United States in Damascus. There were no bilateral discussions during the conference itself. We responded that we would get back in touch regarding the possibility of bilateral meetings. 

Question. What are the administration’s intentions for following up on Syria’s 

stated interest for bilateral discussions? When and at what level would such discussions occur? 

Answer. Whether or not we will meet with the Syrians in a bilateral forum is yet 

to be determined. We have made clear that we wish to see the Syrian Government 

cease its destabilizing policies in the region and demonstrate a serious behavior 

change with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, terrorism, and domestic civil society. 

Question. What would be the primary issues the United States would raise in 

such discussions? 

Answer. No decisions have been made on the content of any such discussions. Our 

Charge and Embassy in Damascus communicate presently with the Syrian Government on a range of issues. Assistant Secretary of State Sauerbrey was recently in 

Damascus for bilateral discussions with the Syrians limited to the subject of assisting the Iraqi refugee population. 

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. What, in your view, are the major factors influencing effective U.S. participation in the United Nations? What, in your view, is the perception of the U.S. 

at the U.N.? Can you talk about how you intend to build coalitions, and work with 

other member states to advance U.S. interests? 

Answer. Collective action is often the preferable course to take, particularly to 

achieve burden sharing. Also, we can enhance the legitimacy of our actions in the 

eyes of others by enlisting friends and allies to work with us, or by securing endorsement of our actions through the United Nations. The United Nations offers a 

forum where diplomats from around the world are present, including many who are 

very well regarded and well connected. This provides an opportunity not only to deal 

with issues in a formal sense, if they are on the U.N. agenda, but also an opportunity to advance our agenda in a setting that enables extensive, informal engagement. 

For the most part, other countries’ perceptions of the United States at the U.N. 

reflect the nature of our relationships with those countries generally. There are exceptions to this, mainly involving countries that take leading roles in the Group of 

77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which claim to speak for a wide array 

of countries. I will make a point of working with like-minded nations, especially 

democratic allies, to see how we can work together to influence the Group of 77 and 

the NAM. Finding new ways of working with the countries in these blocs will be 

a priority during my tenure. 

My guidelines for building coalitions and working with other member states to advance U.S. interests include: engaging with others to find common ground to advance our agenda, being respectful and listening to others, but not shying away 

from pointing out why we think the way we do, and being open to others who might 

come up with approaches that work. If we do this, we will be perceived accurately 

as offering leadership. I intend to be persistent, not to give up, and not to be discouraged in the face of complexity and difficulty. Specifically, I will engage democratic countries to increase their influence by working more closely together through 

the Democracy Caucus, and develop with their representatives a common agenda 

and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I intend to try to help the U.N. 

be more effective in carrying out its mission, in ways that help us achieve our objectives. 

249 

Question. I recently visited Haiti and met with the leadership of the U.N. mission 

there—MINUSTAH. Will the United States continue to support MINUSTAH and its 

elevated force levels? How many Americans participate in MINUSTAH? 

Answer. MINUSTAH remains critical to the establishment of a stable and secure 

environment in Haiti, one of the highest peacekeeping priorities for the United 

States. On February 15, 2007, the United States supported a United Nations Security Council Resolution renewing the mandate of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in 

Haiti (MINUSTAH) for an 8-month period with no change in the authorized force 

levels of 7,200 troops and 1,951 U.N. police. Given the ambitious 5-year U.N. plan 

to reform the Haitian National Police (HNP) that commenced in December 2006, it 

is essential that we, along with the other 44 troop-contributing countries in 

MINUSTAH, continue to assess the mission’s force level and mandate in accordance 

with Haiti’s progress in assuming greater control over its security. Our goal and 

that of our international partners remains to field a credible U.N. force to assist 

Haiti in consolidating its restored democracy. 

Fifty-three American military and police officers currently serve in MINUSTAH. 

Three U.S. military officers currently serve on the MINUSTAH military staff and 

50 U.S. police officers serve as United Nations police. In addition, a number of 

American citizen civilians are hired directly by the U.N. to serve on the MINUSTAH 

staff. 

Question. I would like to support more American participation in MINUSTAH— 

particularly Creole-speaking United States police officers. Will you support me in 

this effort? 

Answer. The United States is committed to continued participation in the civilian, 

military, and police components of MINUSTAH and will continue to work to meet 

requests from the United Nations for candidates for any of these functions. Working 

through our contractor for the recruitment and deployment of U.S. police officials 

in U.N. peacekeeping operations, the United States would certainly welcome expressions of interest from qualified Creole-speaking officers. 

Question. How does the United States leverage U.N. peacekeeping operations, 

such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, to address our foreign policy concerns? In your view, 

what is the value of U.N. peacekeeping missions to supporting U.S. interests? Could 

the U.N. do more in places like Haiti to promote stability and address humanitarian 

concerns? 

Answer. U.N. peacekeeping can, and often does, serve U.S. national interests. We 

have a stake in the outcome of events in every region of the world. U.N. peacekeeping missions engage and commit the international community to seek solutions 

to violence and instability. They cost the United States a quarter of what we would 

pay if we were asked to deploy American forces. In the Security Council and 

through our contributions to the U.N., the United States ensures that U.N. peacekeeping mandates are clear, credible, and limited to what is achievable, and that 

peacekeepers are properly prepared. We use our voice and vote to ensure that these 

missions are consistent with U.S. national interests. 

Demands for U.N. peacekeeping have grown substantially in recent years. The 

U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations is currently responsible for around 

100,000 peacekeepers (military, civilian, and police) deployed in 16 peacekeeping operations and two political missions around the world. Since October 2003 the Security Council has authorized five major operations—Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi, and Sudan—and has substantially expanded the missions in Lebanon and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

During the same time we have seen increasing responsibilities for post-conflict 

programs built into peacekeeping mandates, with experts in elections, rule of law, 

human rights, disarmament, security sector reform, and other such critical elements 

being added to what were once mainly military operations in support of peace agreements. This multidimensional approach is in close step with the creation of the new 

Peacebuilding Commission. The mission in East Timor is a good example of the new 

integrated mission, bringing a number of U.N. functions under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and serving a post-conflict need, which is a 

step farther than traditional peacekeeping responses to crisis. Mandates are often 

extended at least a year past elections to allow new governments to establish roots. 

There is a growing trend to following a peacekeeping mission with a political mission to ensure continuing international attention to countries emerging from crisis. 

Question. In our March 13 meeting, you said you were not certain that all the 

forces dedicated to the surge would be used, but mentioned GEN Petraeus’s preference to have them there. 

250 

(a) What do you think about the 20,000–30,000 additional troops we are talking 

about today? 

(b) How long do you give the surge to succeed? What are the benchmarks or milestones that we should expect to be met in the next 2 months? 

(c) How can we better leverage the interests of Iraq’s neighbors? 

Answer. (a) In addition to the build-up of 21,500 troops (approximately five brigades) announced by the President in January, Secretary of Defense Gates announced on March 7 his request for approximately 2,400 military support personnel 

and 2,200 additional U.S. military police to assist with detainee requirements. The 

last of nine additional Iraqi battalions and the second of the five U.S. brigades are 

now operating in Baghdad. These additional forces are needed to partner with Iraqi 

units in this Iraqi-led operation. The purpose of this partnership is to increase the 

capabilities of ISF through combined operations and mentoring. Over 45 Joint Security Stations are being established among the 10 security framework districts to facilitate cooperation between Coalition and Iraqi forces and to build trust and confidence with the local population. This Iraqi-led effort is clearing focus districts and, 

with Coalition support, is working to provide a 24-hour presence in the city to protect the population from hostile reinfiltration. This represents a critical shift away 

from operating out of forward-operating bases. We fully support the Department of 

Defense in its decisions about troop levels to ensure the success of Operation Fardh 

al-Qanoon. 

(b) While some initial results from Operation Fardh al-Qanoon have been favorable, it is too soon to assess or extrapolate a timeline for the military operation only 

in its second month. We are closely monitoring Iraq’s progress. Factors being assessed include trends in violence, whether Iraqi army units are showing up and performing in a nonsectarian manner, whether or not there is Iraqi political interference in military decisions, and whether or not Iraq is making progress on key 

political issues, such as passage of a national hydrocarbon law, preparations for provincial elections, and reform of the de-Baathification laws. We also are examining 

the extent to which Iraq is investing its resources in its own economic future and 

taking the steps necessary to effectively execute its budget. 

While the United States Government will continue to help Iraq, we have made 

it clear to the Iraqi Government that our commitment is not open-ended. That said, 

while we expect to see progress in the aforementioned areas, we are not setting 

deadlines. To do so would in some cases give a veto power to political forces in Iraq 

that are opposed to progress in some of these areas. Thus, while we can encourage 

the Iraqi Government and make our views known about the importance of making 

continued progress, and we are confident progress will continue, we are not in a position to set arbitrary deadlines, nor should we. 

(c) As part of the President’s New Way Forward, and in line with the Iraq Study 

Group recommendations, we have been engaged in a robust ‘‘diplomatic offensive’’ 

to boost international and regional support for Iraq. To this end, the United States 

participated in the subministerial Neighbors Conference in Baghdad on March 10, 

and the Secretary intends to participate in a follow-on ministerial in the region in 

April. The March 10 Neighbors Conference established working groups, which will 

give the United States a seat at the table alongside Iraq’s neighbors in negotiating 

concrete assistance to help Iraq deal with pressing issues such as refugees, fuel supplies, and security (including border security). 

Furthermore, our diplomatic efforts include Secretary Rice’s intensified dialog 

with the Gulf Cooperation Council through GCC+2 (Egypt and Jordan) at the Foreign Minister level. We have similarly stepped up our dialog with the Arab League 

to garner more support for the Iraqi Government. We also note our positive engagement and progress on the International Compact with Iraq, which the Iraqi Vice 

President finalized and presented to U.N. ambassadors on March 16 in New York. 

The Compact enables the Iraqi Government to work directly with its neighbors, the 

international community, the World Bank and U.N. institutions on a 5-year economic development plan that will bolster civilian reconstruction and development efforts crucial to Iraq’s success. Finally, we continue to engage with Iraq’s neighbors 

and other regional players to ensure that Iraq receives the support it needs to succeed. 

Question. Venezuela barely lost its bid to win a seat on the U.N. Security Council. 

How can the United States increase our influence in the U.N. and counteract President Chavez’s influence? What will you do to prevent him from derailing multilateral diplomatic efforts with his antics? 

Answer. The best way to counteract the obstructionist policies of Venezuela is 

through constructive, collaborative, and results-oriented partnerships with allies 

and other countries as well as the U.N. Secretariat. I will work with other democVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00258 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
251 

racies to increase our influence, and the influence of other responsible democracies, 

through a reinvigorated Democracy Caucus. I will work with representatives of 

democratic countries that see promise in this approach to develop a common agenda 

and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I will also reach out to our friends 

and encourage like-minded countries to reach out to their friends in the NonAligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss how we might make common 

cause on issues of mutual importance. Finding new ways of working with the countries in these blocs will be critical to minimizing the disruptions caused by Venezuelan antics. 

Question. Do you support the agreement reached in February with North Korea? 

Why would your predecessor oppose the deal? 

Answer. I support our North Korea policy. President Bush has said that the SixParty Talks represent the best opportunity to use diplomacy to address North Korea’s nuclear programs and reflect the common commitment of the participants to 

a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons. 

I am not in a position to speak for Mr. Bolton, except to note that as a private 

citizen he is entitled to his opinion. 

Question. What is the status of negotiations at the U.N. Security Council on a new 

resolution with tougher sanctions? Are China and Russia supportive of these efforts? 

Answer. Last week, the governments of the P–5 (China, France, Russia, United 

Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany reached agreement on a draft second sanctions resolution, which imposes additional sanctions on Iran. The resolution 

was introduced to the full U.N. Security Council for its consideration on March 15; 

member states are now consulting capitals. We look forward to the rapid adoption 

of the resolution by the full U.N. Security Council and are confident that the U.N. 

Security Council will continue to make clear to the Iranian regime that there are 

costs for its continued defiance. 

As Secretary Rice has reiterated many times, the generous P5+1 package remains 

on the table, including the United States’ offer to engage in direct discussions with 

Iran. Iran’s continued refusal to suspend enrichment—despite the generous incentives package—is a missed opportunity. We urge the Iranian regime to abandon its 

current confrontational course, comply with its international obligations, cooperate 

fully with the IAEA, suspend its enrichment-related activities, and enter into constructive negotiations. 

Question. You agreed that United States intervention in Lebanon in the 1980s 

was not a successful exercise. I suggested the failure was due to a perception of U.S. 

bias in siding with the Maronite Christians at the time. 

What lessons can we take away from our historical experience in Lebanon? How 

can we avoid a similar situation in Iraq, as regards sectarian rivalries and allegations of United States complicity in ethnic cleansing? 

Answer. While there are major differences between Lebanon in the 1980s and 

Iraq in the 21st Century, our Lebanon experience makes clear that while military 

intervention may sometimes be necessary in the face of a crisis, long-term stability 

can best be achieved through development of a strong, functioning democracy in 

which every individual has a voice. Applying that lesson to Iraq, it means that we 

must build on our military successes and press all sides to engage in meaningful 

reconciliation, compromise, and mutual understanding to ensure that the disaffected 

recognize the ability of Iraq’s democratic system to secure their safety, rights, and 

legitimate participation in the political process. In this effort, the United States 

Government does not side with any sectarian or ethnic group in Iraq against any 

others, and is morally opposed to ethnic cleansing in all its forms, whether in Lebanon, in Iraq, or in any other country. 

Question. What will the United States do in the U.N. to help the people of Darfur? 

Answer. The appointment of Special Envoy Natsios, intensified diplomatic engagement at the U.N. and in Khartoum, and our efforts to encourage a political solution 

in Darfur while working towards a more robust peacekeeping operation demonstrate 

continued United States commitment to Darfur. Our first objective in Darfur is to 

achieve a durable peace through a political settlement that is agreed to by all parties voluntarily, and then is actually implemented. The United States believes that 

the U.N. and the African Union, under Special Envoys, Jan Eliasson and Salim 

Salim, should take the lead in mediating a political agreement between the rebels 

and the Sudanese Government, and the United States will do everything possible 

to support them in this process. We also will continue to push for the deployment 

of the three-phase plan for U.N.-led peacekeeping in Darfur and also support the 

252 

potential deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in Chad and the Central African Republic. 

The United States Government remains the leading international donor to Sudan and as of March 2007 has contributed over $2 billion for humanitarian programs 

in Sudan and eastern Chad. In fiscal year 2007, the United States will provide more 

than $1.2 billion in funds for the provision of humanitarian, development, and 

peacekeeping assistance to Sudan. In fiscal year 2008, we have requested a comparable level of funding, and thus look to provide more than $2 billion in assistance 

over the next 2 years. We have contributed over $350 million to the African Union 

Mission in Sudan (AMIS) since its inception, including base camp construction, 

equipment, logistics, and airlift, in addition to the provision of training and 

logistical support. 

We will continue to impose domestic sanctions and support U.N. sanctions against 

the individuals (Government of Sudan and rebels) responsible for the violence or for 

impeding the peace in Darfur, and against the entities that are owned or controlled 

by the Government of Sudan. We are engaged diplomatically with the Sudanese 

Government to urge its full acceptance of the A.U.–U.N.-hybrid force under U.N. 

command and control, which the Government of Sudan agreed to in Addis Ababa. 

We have also continued discussions of ‘‘Plan B,’’ which would be a series of more 

coercive measures aimed at pressuring the Government of Sudan, with our international partners, and made clear to the Sudanese Government that we are prepared to use stronger measures in the event the Government of Sudan continues 

to defy the will of the international community. 

Question. How will the United States delegation deal with Chinese and Russian 

opposition to sanctions and denunciations against the Sudanese Government? 

Answer. We have begun a dialog with Security Council members on next steps. 

We hope that President Bashir will, despite his March 6 letter to the Secretary General, back the heavy support package and the U.N.-led hybrid force in Darfur and 

cooperate with its deployment immediately. Absent such an indication, we believe 

President Bashir has made it clear to the international community that it is time 

to consider coercive actions to pressure Sudan to implement the Darfur Peace 

Agreement (DPA) and accept deployment of the vitally-needed U.N. peacekeeping 

operation in Sudan. We believe that Security Council members have found common 

ground, together with the A.U., in collective impatience with President Bashir’s intransigence, to call for new measures. We will impose additional domestic targeted 

sanctions against those who are impeding the peace and encourage our international 

partners to speedily support U.N. sanctions against the offending parties until there 

is peace in Darfur. We will continue working with China and Russia to pursue 

tough and effective measures in Darfur, since they are aware that the international 

community and world opinion expect effective leadership from the Security Council 

and its members. 

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. And then last—and we haven’t had a lot of discussion on this, but this 

is one of my major concerns, and that is the Human Rights Council. I know that 

the Council is supposed to be an element of reform. When Cuba and China, some 

of the biggest human rights abusers, are on the Council, I just quite can’t understand it. But I am concerned that our absence from it at the same time, while a 

statement that we don’t believe it has reformed the way it should, also leaves— 

cedes the ground to others on some of the most consequential issues. People who 

languish in countries in the world who look to the United States as a beacon of 

light, of freedom and democracy, and of respect for human rights—when that voice 

is absent in that respect, I’m not quite sure that we’re promoting our interests or 

giving those people who we want to see take the chance to struggle in their own 

countries to move toward democracy in their own countries and human rights the 

type of hope and opportunity that they want. And so I’d like to hear how you’re 

going to be pursuing that course as well. 

Answer. We will continue to be a forceful advocate in the promotion of human 

rights around the world and will bring attention to those areas where respect for 

human rights is lacking. We will work to promote human rights in all U.N. bodies, 

such as the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) Third Committee, and where appropriate, the U.N. Security Council. 

The Human Rights Council (HRC) has been a disappointment. The HRC has dealt 

repeatedly with the one issue of Israel, and only weakly with Sudan. The HRC has 

253 

not proven a capacity—as called for in UNGA resolution 60/251—to address urgent 

and serious human rights situations without bias. As you note, we did not run for 

the Council last year and recently announced we will not run again this year, but 

remain as a highly active observer in Geneva, led by our Permanent Representative, 

Warren Tichenor. We believe that the Council should expand its focus from beyond 

issues related to Israel and examine continuing situations of real concern, such as 

Sudan, Burma, North Korea, and Cuba, or the recently emerging crisis in 

Zimbabwe. 

In the final months of its first year, we are committed to building a more effective 

institution. We will continue working with our democratic allies in Geneva to 

change the course of the Council. This means pushing firmly for: (1) a balanced 

agenda that does not include a permanent item singling out Israel and not any 

other nations; (2) any experts appointed to roles in the Council to be unbiased and 

chosen based on their qualifications and not elected by the HRC; (3) renewal of the 

mandates of all of the country-specific Special Rapporteurs; and, (4) increased emphasis on the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights’ field activities rather than politicized conference work in Geneva. 

Question. How do we move other countries to more fully enforce the existing Security Council actions? And as we try to make those actions more pervasive, how do 

you intend to try to use all of the resources—your diplomatic skills, of course, whatever persuasiveness, showing other countries their own interests in pursuing this, 

but also other options we have? We have economic levers here to pull as well. How 

do we get them to understand that containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions is one in 

which there is common cause and we have greater success in its enforcement? 

Answer. We are responding to Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, hegemonic aspirations, support for terrorism, and destabilizing activities with a comprehensive strategy that relies on American diplomatic leadership and a strong multilateral coalition. First and foremost, we have made clear to Tehran that its provocative and destabilizing policies will entail painful costs, including financial hardship 

for its leaders, diplomatic isolation, and long-term detriment to Iran’s prestige and 

fundamental national interests. Second, and equally important, we have worked to 

alter the regime’s behavior and to convince it that a cooperative, more constructive 

course that would better serve its interests is available. 

In December 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted 

Resolution 1737, imposing Chapter VII sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and demanding that Iran completely and verifiably suspend 

enrichment and reprocessing activities, heavy water-related projects and cooperate 

fully with the IAEA. In light of the IAEA Director General’s February 22, 2007 report confirming Iran’s noncompliance with UNSCR 1737, we worked with the permanent five members of the UNSC and Germany on a second draft U.N. sanctions 

resolution to signal to Iran the costs of its defiance. That resolution is now before 

the full Security Council, with adoption expected soon. 

We are also working bilaterally with major governments to curtail business transactions with Iranian companies and individuals tied to Iran’s nuclear activities and 

support for terrorism. The Department of the Treasury has used its authority under 

the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to sanction Iranian 

Bank Sepah for providing support and services to entities involved in Iran’s missile 

programs. Additionally, the Department of the Treasury cut Iranian state-owned 

Bank Saderat off from all access to the United States financial system because of 

its support for terrorism. Banks worldwide have begun to recognize the serious risk 

associated with Iranian business with some beginning to scale back their Iran portfolios. 

We are also working with France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and others to signal our strong support for Prime Minister Siniora’s democratically elected government in Lebanon and to prevent Iran and Syria from rearming Hizballah. We have 

stationed two carrier battle groups in the Gulf to reassure our friends in the Arab 

world that it remains an area of vital importance to us. And at the regional level, 

Secretary Rice last autumn launched a series of ongoing discussions with our Gulf 

Cooperation Council partners, as well as Egypt and Jordan, regarding issues of 

shared concern, including Iran. 

While we are acting vigorously to isolate the Iranian Government, we are also offering to it a diplomatic way forward. Secretary Rice has agreed to join her P5+1 

colleagues in direct discussions with Iran regarding the nuclear and other issues ‘‘at 

any place and at any time,’’ provided Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related 

and reprocessing activities. 

If we continue our skillful diplomatic course and have the patience to see it play 

out over the mid- to long-term, we are confident we can avoid conflict with Iran and 

254 

see our strategy succeed. Our strong hope is that Iran will accept the offer to negotiate with the United States and our P–5 partners so that we can achieve a peaceful 

end to Tehran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. 

Question. But I’d like to see how do you intend to, again, use the wide array of 

options that exist for us to actually get President al-Bashir to submit to what he 

has gone back on, which is a hybrid A.U.–U.N. peacekeeping force? 

Answer. We are strongly encouraging the international community, including Sudan’s major allies, to pressure Sudan for full acceptance of a hybrid A.U.–U.N. 

peacekeeping force. Sudan agreed to this force in November, although in a March 

6 response to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s letter, President Bashir backed 

away from this commitment. The United States and other members of the international community found the response letter unacceptable and expect Sudan to 

honor its prior commitments. The letter is an affront to the A.U. and the U.N., as 

it reneges on agreements with both groups. We, therefore, are moving forward to 

implement additional sanctions against individuals and entities, and will continue 

to examine other coercive options. We will work closely with the international community to ensure maximum pressure on Khartoum. We continue to call on Sudan 

to immediately reverse its position on U.N. deployment, end bureaucratic constraints that hinder the critical efforts by international humanitarian workers, and 

fully cooperate with the A.U.–U.N. led political process. 

RESPONSES OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

Question. I’m wondering whether the administration has some plan in the United 

Nations, whether other countries are thinking about how we might put more pressure on the Mugabe regime. 

Answer. We are deeply concerned about the tragic events that are occurring in 

Zimbabwe. The United States has strongly condemned the recent atrocities committed by the Government of Zimbabwe against a leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change and other opposition activists. 

We are seeking action on the Zimbabwe situation at the U.N. Human Rights 

Council and support the British request at the U.N. Security Council for the Secretariat to provide a report on Zimbabwe. We have discussed the issue with the African Union, which has issued a strong statement. We are encouraged that so many 

nations and organizations around the world have condemned the atrocities in 

Zimbabwe and have called on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the rights of 

its own people. We are also exploring means for broadening our financial and travel 

sanctions, which are targeted at those leaders who are oppressing the people of 

Zimbabwe. 

Question. You may feel the same way about this next question, because it’s a 

broad one, but I think one that’s vital and that touches on the others. One of the 

other core missions of the United Nations—well, you mentioned—and that’s security—it’s my view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the structure that we’ve set 

up in the past is fraying rather badly. I think everybody’s in agreement that the 

NPT needs updating. We’ve got regional proliferation problems like Iran and North 

Korea, but we’ve also got some broader questions arising out of the treaty with 

India, the desire for a variety of nations to look at nuclear power as an option to 

deal with their energy needs. We still need to make more progress on securing nuclear materials and enhancing international interdiction efforts. So I’m just wondering, do you have at this stage any thoughts in terms of how the administration 

would approach strengthening that regime? Is it something that you’ve already discussed? 

Answer. President Bush has a broad strategy for nuclear nonproliferation, as set 

out in the National Strategy to Combat WMD Proliferation. The National Strategy 

to Combat WMD is the first of its kind—a broad strategy uniting all the elements 

of national power needed to counter the full spectrum of WMD threats. Previous 

U.S. approaches had focused almost exclusively on nonproliferation. The Bush administration has dramatically expanded U.S. nonproliferation efforts to prevent acquisition of WMD, related materials, and delivery systems by rogue states or terrorists. The three pillars in the National Strategy of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management do not stand alone, but rather come together as 

seamless elements of a comprehensive approach. 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, 

provides the international legal basis for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 

255 

and is the essential foundation for global nuclear nonproliferation. Additionally, the 

United States supports many programs to increase our ability to prevent, detect, 

and deter the proliferation of nuclear materials. U.S. assistance to other countries 

to reduce and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery 

vehicles—through DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the Department of Energy’s nuclear nonproliferation programs, and the smaller but nonetheless important State Department programs—has been at record funding levels. The 

President has committed an average of $1 billion a year to these critical efforts; we 

greatly welcome the consistent, strong support of the committee for these essential 

programs. Moreover, with the proposal in 2002 for the G–8 Global Partnership 

Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the President 

successfully called on our foreign partners to commit their fair share to the effort 

to meet what is a global responsibility. 

The United States also has led the way to strengthen the International Atomic 

Energy Agency’s ability to detect nuclear proliferation. We instituted a successful 

effort to increase the IAEA’s safeguards budget. We have strongly supported the 

IAEA Additional Protocol, to strengthen the agency’s ability to uncover clandestine 

nuclear programs. The President also successfully urged the creation of a new special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to examine ways to strengthen the 

agency’s safeguards and verification capabilities. 

In addition to the President’s proposals to strengthen the IAEA institutionally, he 

challenged the international community to rectify the greatest weakness in the nuclear nonproliferation system: the ability of states to pursue nuclear weapons under 

the cover of peaceful energy programs. The lesson of Iran and North Korea is clear: 

Some states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty to acquire sensitive technologies to enable them to pursue nuclear weapons 

capabilities—the very capabilities the treaty is intended to deny. To close this loophole, the President has proposed that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities—the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for nuclear 

weapons—be limited to those states that already operate full-scale, fully-functioning 

facilities. In return, he called on the world’s nuclear fuel suppliers to assure supply, 

in a reliable and cost effective manner, to those states which forego enrichment and 

reprocessing. We are working with other fuel provider states and with the IAEA to 

put in place assurances that will convince states with power reactors that their best 

economic interest is not to invest in expensive, and proliferation risky, fuel cycle capabilities. 

The Department of Energy plays a critical part in developing these Presidential 

initiatives and working with other nations to bring them to fruition. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), led by DOE, offers the promise for the longer 

term of enhancing global access to nuclear energy while strengthening nonproliferation. An important emphasis of the initiative is to provide a basis for states to benefit from civil nuclear power while avoiding the costs and challenges of enriching 

fresh fuel on the front end of the fuel cycle and disposing of spent fuel on the back 

end. The Department of State is working closely with DOE to engage international 

partners to participate actively in GNEP. 

In addition, the United States has led the way in the U.N. Security Council to 

broaden the international requirements on nonproliferation. The United States 

spearheaded United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. In adopting UNSCR 1540, the Security Council—for only the second time since its founding—invoked its Chapter VII authorities to require nations to act against a general, 

as opposed to a specific, threat to international peace and security. In particular, 

UNSCR 1540 requires all states to prohibit WMD proliferation activities, such as 

we witnessed with the A.Q. Khan network. It further requires that states institute 

effective export controls, and enhance security for nuclear materials on their territory. We also have led the U.N. Security Council in adopting U.N. Chapter VII resolutions 1718 and 1737, targeting North Korea and Iran, respectively. 

We have worked to strengthen our counterproliferation efforts to ensure that we 

have the capability to work with states around the world to interdict shipments of 

proliferation concern, and to impede the finances of proliferation. The Proliferation 

Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, has been 

endorsed by more than 80 nations. This global initiative seeks to have all nations 

use their existing legal authorities—national and international—to defeat proliferation and applies intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, and other tools at the disposal of nations to impede transfers of WMD-related items to countries and entities 

of concern. 

Additionally, we have worked closely with the Department of Treasury to enhance 

our ability to prevent proliferators from accessing the international financial system. 

President Bush augmented U.S. efforts in this area when he issued in July 2005 

256 

a new Executive Order 13382, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and block transactions of entities and persons, or their supporters, engaged in 

proliferation activities. Currently, entities from North Korea, Iran, and Syria have 

been the focus of our efforts under the Order. These actions have assisted in further 

isolating these regimes from the international community. 

Another key effort of the United States has been the development of international 

cooperation to combat nuclear terrorism. President Bush has described this threat 

as the central national security challenge of our era. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, launched last year by Presidents Bush and Putin, is the first 

initiative of its kind, one that takes a comprehensive approach to dealing with all 

elements of the challenge. The initiative is consistent with, and builds on, existing 

legal frameworks such as the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and U.N. Security 

Council Resolutions 1540 and 1373. It provides a flexible framework that will enable 

sustained international cooperation to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat of 

nuclear terrorism. The central objective of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 

Terrorism is to establish a growing network of partner nations that are committed 

to taking effective measures to build a layered defense-in-depth that can continuously adapt to the changing nature of the threat. While many individual programs 

and efforts have approached one element or aspect of the nuclear terrorism threat, 

the Global Initiative provides a capacity building framework for establishing new 

partnerships with those nations that wish to take similar action. In carrying out 

this new initiative, we will also cooperate with the IAEA and invite them to participate. 

(257) 

NOMINATION 

THURSDAY MARCH 22, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Fraker, Ford M., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Kerry presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Lugar, Sununu, and Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. This is a hearing to hear the views of Ford 

Fraker to be Ambassador of the United States of America to the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And we welcome you, Mr. Fraker. Thank 

you very much for being willing to do this, and we look forward to 

a conversation this morning that shouldn’t take that long. 

We understand that this post is unaccompanied, and I gather 

that unaccompaniment has already begun this morning. [Laughter.] 

The members of your family are scattered around with spring vacations and other obligations. We understand that, but we’re grateful to them for their willingness to see you go off to this complicated part of the world for a year or so. And, we understand, obviously, and are grateful for the sacrifices that families make in 

this process. 

Needless to say, the position that you’ve been nominated for, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, is a very important one to our country, 

and a very challenging one. Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is 

one of the most significant, and complex relationships that we have 

anywhere in the world. 

I was personally gratified to hear that you have such extensive 

experience in the region, that you speak the language, which is an 

enormous benefit to any ambassador going anywhere, but particularly, this part of the world. 

Saudi Arabia, obviously, has played and continues to play a vital 

role in our relationship and throughout the region. When it comes 

to stabilizing Iraq, when it comes to dealing with radical extremism 

within Islam, when it comes to dealing with global terrorism, conflict in Lebanon, or forging a lasting peace between Israel and the 

Palestinians, no country is more important than Saudi Arabia. 

258 

In all of these areas, Saudi Arabia has made important contributions and significant progress, but we all understand there’s also 

more that can be done, and must be done. Iraq is at the top of 

everybody’s agenda, at this particular moment, and for rightful reasons, but it is also part of a larger and complicated series of concerns in the region. The Saudi Government, I might say, made it 

clear at the beginning that they did not support the decisions, the 

administration’s decision to invade Iraq. And the Iraq Study Group 

concluded that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States have been, 

‘‘passive and disengaged since then.’’ 

I have personally traveled to the region, while not to Saudi Arabia in the last couple of years, but other countries in the region and 

that is indeed the conclusion that I would also come to. 

Regardless of what’s happened in the past, we all share an interest in bringing stability to Iraq. Any successful strategy is going to 

require strong support from other countries in the region, and 

Saudi Arabia must play an assertive and positive role in that effort. 

We need to help them and they need to help us in convincing 

Sunni politicians to make the tough compromises necessary for the 

political solution. That is the only solution to the violence. And 

also, their help in cracking down on support for Sunni insurgents 

coming into Iraq from their country. We must also encourage them 

to step up in terms of debt relief and reconstruction assistance. 

But, it’s important to remember that Iraq is only one part of the 

broader Sunni-Shia rift that goes back some 1,300 years. We’re all 

aware of the concerns expressed by the Saudis, and other Sunni 

leaders about the Shia revival and Iran’s growing influence. The 

Saudis can play a key role in our emerging efforts to create a regional security structure that will help to contain Iran and, to that 

end, the administration has approved over $9 billion in potential 

arms sales to Saudi Arabia. 

At the same time, we need to work with our Sunni allies in a 

way that does not exacerbate the Sunni-Shia conflict or give support to Sunni extremist groups, who may one day, turn against us 

and everyone else. 

We’ve recently seen the Saudis step up their efforts to play a mediating role in resolving conflicts throughout the Middle East. 

They’ve worked to bring about a peaceful resolution to the impasse 

in Lebanon. I know that’s been constructive because I was recently 

in Lebanon and heard first-hand from different leaders there of the 

role they were playing. And, that is a crucial assistance in promoting democracy and strengthening the moderates in the region. 

Also, the Saudis willingness to try to resolve the conflict between 

Israel and the Palestinians through the Peace Initiative proposed 

by Crown Prince Abdullah in March of 2002, now King Abdullah, 

which has been getting renewed attention, both in Israel and the 

United States, is commendable. 

At the same time, the recent Mecca agreement, that laid the 

groundwork for the new Palestinian Unity Government, we must 

note, failed to meet the key requirements of the quartet and Israel. 

And we know that Saudi Arabia continues to participate in the primary boycott of Israel. 

259 

When it comes to fighting terrorism, the Saudis, have again, 

made some important progress, but more remains to be done. The 

9/11 Commission put it this way—Saudi Arabia has been, ‘‘A problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism.’’ We know that 

counterterrorism cooperation has increased significantly since 

Saudi Arabia was itself attacked in 2003, and that’s not gone 

unappreciated. But, concerns remain, especially about the role of 

Saudi money in financing terrorist organizations and exporting and 

extremists’ ideology. One area of particular concern, was the role 

of Saudi-based charities funding groups that were linked to alQaeda and terrorist organizations in the Middle East, including 

one prominent charity that apparently used Arab bank branches in 

the Palestinian territories to provide funds directly to the families 

of suicide bombers. 

The Saudis have taken steps to address this problem, including 

creating National Commission to ensure that charitable contributions don’t wind up in the wrong hands. But, that has not yet become operational and the Saudis still need to follow through on 

pledges to crack down on contributions from individuals. 

So, finally, Saudi Arabia’s made steps toward democratization, 

including holding municipal elections in 2005. We do have to note, 

however, that women were not permitted to vote in those elections 

and the State Department’s report on international religious freedom, still lists Saudi Arabia as a country of particular concern. 

So again, while there has been progress in bringing about reforms, there is still a distance to travel. 

So, Mr. Fraker, as Ambassador, these are most of the difficult 

important challenges that you’ll be facing. I look forward to discussing them with you here this morning and hearing what your 

thoughts are and what the State Department’s thoughts are now, 

about how you should approach them. 

Let me turn to Senator Sununu, and I note the ranking member, 

Senator Lugar is here, so, I’ll let you guys sort out who goes first. 

Senator Sununu. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SUNUNU. By previous agreement, Senator Lugar has allowed me to go first, but I’ll try to condense my remarks so that 

he has ample time. 

I’d like to welcome Mr. Fraker. As you’ve indicated, Mr. Chairman, this is an important—a very important—position of great significance, not just to the United States, but to the region, because 

of the role Saudi Arabia plays in regional economics, in politics, the 

influence that they have on all the moderate and leading Arab 

States in the region. 

There are a series of challenges that Mr. Fraker will have to deal 

with in his post as Ambassador. But, I would like to note and underscore a few of the items that you mentioned. 

In particular, the recent leadership role played by the Kingdom 

and trying to move a framework and a process forward on negotiating peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, support for 

participation in recent meetings in Iraq of all of the regional players that have a responsibility to help ensure territorial integrity in 

260 

Iraq, and the movement of weapons, and financing for terrorists in 

the region. And, I hope that that regional framework can continue 

to play an increasing role in improving the situation, not just in 

Iraq, but throughout the region. 

And the third issue I would underscore is that of terrorism financing. I think Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries in 

the Gulf have played a very constructive role in dealing with some 

of the principal institutional mechanisms through which financing 

has moved terrorists throughout the region. But, there’s obviously 

more opportunity for improvement and, in particular, the experience that Mr. Ford Fraker brings to this role, coming out of the financial services community, coming out of the banking community, 

having extensive experience in both global banking and in the Mideast region, provides a great opportunity to further improve the degree to which we’ve been able to stop the flow of funds to terrorists 

in the Middle East, and around the world. 

So, I think by background, by experience, we have a great candidate here, maybe even a slightly unconventional candidate, but 

given the frustration many of us have felt about progress, and process in the Middle East, I think that a different approach, different 

experience, different perspective will be, would be very welcome, 

not just as a member of the diplomatic corps, but also welcome 

within the region. 

I look forward to the testimony of Mr. Fraker and I’m happy to 

yield the floor to the Senator from Indiana. 

Senator KERRY. Thanks, Senator. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I thought your opening statement was very important as a comprehensive compilation of the many ways in which our relationship 

is so important. And, likewise, Senator Sununu has added to that. 

I would just echo the thought that this is an extremely important 

relationship. Our committee has had testimony that is, that resources in the hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent for 

decades, largely to make certain there was security for oil resources 

that would come from Saudi Arabia and adjoining countries to the 

rest of the world, indeed, to ourselves. That relationship has had 

profound significance in terms of war and peace throughout the 

area. Your sophistication on the ground has informed you of much 

of that, and your personal history. 

But, the current situation is one, just as my colleagues have 

pointed out, of intense consultation. A group of Senators met with 

the President and the Vice-President, Secretary of State yesterday 

about Latin American affairs, following the President’s trip to 

Latin America. But, the President informed us that, as he was concluding the meeting, that he was going to be visiting with Prince 

Bandar. And that, obviously we were intrigued about that conversation, as we have been about conversations with Prince Bandar 

and his intercession in our affairs and of our consultation in the 

past. 

261 

I mention this because this is a time in which Secretary Rice’s 

trip to the area is, once again, crucial. Not only in the Israeli-Palestinian process, but given Saudi diplomacy, and the very large role 

the Saudis have played in trying to find other openings. Is there 

going to be help from Saudi Arabia in perfecting the situation so 

there can be proper recognition of Israel and some hope for a twostate solution? 

So, we look forward to your testimony and the opportunity for 

questions this morning. We welcome you to the committee. 

Senator KERRY. Senator, thank you, for all of those observations 

and also your wisdom and leadership on these issues. We appreciate it. 

Mr. Fraker, it’s your chance now, to share with the committee 

your statement. We welcome it, and you can either put the whole 

thing in the record and summarize, or go with it as you please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FORD M. FRAKER, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE 

KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 

Mr. FRAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I come before you 

today both honored and humbled by the trust placed in me by 

President Bush and Secretary Rice. If confirmed as Ambassador to 

Saudi Arabia, I will endeavor to carry out the President’s mandate 

and represent our great Nation to the best of my ability. 

For over 30 years, I have been a banker in the Middle East. I 

have lived in Beirut, Dubai, and Bahrain, and have traveled to the 

region often and extensively ever since. My experiences as a banker 

during this time have included being shot at in Beirut, bombed in 

Riyadh, spat upon in Iran, and interrogated by border guards in 

Syria. 

I have driven the road from Baghdad to Kuwait City, trekked in 

the mountains of Yemen and Oman, and camped in the deserts of 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Over this period, I have come to know 

and appreciate the countries, cultures, people, and language of the 

region. More importantly, I have also come to know how to effectively communicate with, and work with, many Arab groups. 

At a time when diplomacy becomes increasingly vital for safeguarding and furthering American interests in the region, I believe 

it is critical that America’s diplomats know about the countries, 

cultures, and people they are working with. 

While living in the Gulf as a senior U.S. banker, I met and conducted business with various rulers and royal family members, as 

well as government officials, bankers, and businessmen at the 

highest levels. One lesson I learned quickly was, that to be effective, it is necessary to establish relationships on a personal level. 

Once trust and respect are gained, it is then possible to achieve 

specific objectives. This is especially true in Saudi Arabia, where 

we must sustain and deepen a vitally important partnership. 

In my 30-year career as a banker, I have developed many personal relationships in the Kingdom. I believe these relationships, 

and my hard-won knowledge, will strengthen my ability to effectively represent the interests of the United States. 

262 

The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained a strong 

and important relationship since President Franklin D. Roosevelt 

met with King Abdulaziz aboard the USS Quincy on his way back 

from Yalta in 1945. Though tested since the tragic events of 9/11, 

our relationship has remained strong, as together we confront the 

threats of violent extremism, international terror, and regional instability. 

Saudi Arabia has been, and will continue to be, one of our key 

regional partners as together we face the challenges in the region. 

Securing and maintaining Saudi support will be critical to our success in realizing many of our regional objectives. 

In recent years, our cooperation in military, law enforcement, 

and security has deepened. We have supported the Saudis as they 

have confronted their own domestic terror threat from al-Qaeda. 

The Saudis have made, and continue to make, substantial progress 

fighting terror. Hundreds of terrorists have been arrested and 

killed in the last 3 years. I believe the Saudis have come to understand the need to address the roots of extremism that underlie terrorism; especially the need to aggressively deny financial support 

for terrorist organizations. 

If confirmed, I will be committed to expanding and deepening our 

efforts in these critical areas. 

We continue to be concerned with the restrictions on religious 

freedom in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is proud of its responsibility 

as custodian of Islam’s holy sites of Mecca and Medina. However, 

it must also work to ensure that moderation and tolerance triumph 

over extremism and hatred. Working closely with Ambassador at 

Large for Religious Freedom, John Hanford, Ambassadors Jordan 

and Oberwetter have both made the promotion of religious freedom 

a priority, and progress has been achieved. If confirmed, I am determined to build on their efforts and to press for more improvement. 

To defeat extremism, it is important that Saudi Arabia take the 

lead in pursuing economic, political, and social reforms to ensure 

long-term stability. These include the pursuit of increased opportunities for Saudi citizens—especially women—to participate in government and all aspects of society; economic reforms that will make 

the private sector an engine for growth and job creation; and education reforms that prepare Saudi youth for the demands of a modern society. If confirmed, I look forward to working on these critical 

issues. 

The United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog has become an effective mechanism for promoting America’s regional and bilateral interests, including reform, and, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen this important partnership initiative. 

Saudi Arabia has approximately 25 percent of the world’s oil reserves. In order to sustain U.S. and global economic prosperity, a 

steady and reliable supply of energy is essential. Saudi Arabia 

plays a key role in ensuring the stability of world oil markets. 

Saudi Arabia is also an important trading partner for the United 

States in many other areas, and I will be a strong advocate for 

United States business in all sectors. 

There is no responsibility more important in the work of our missions abroad than assisting American citizens in distress or need. 

263 

If confirmed, I will place the highest priority on the security of the 

personnel at the United States mission, and on protecting the safety and welfare of all our citizens in Saudi Arabia. I will also work 

to ensure that American children who have been wrongfully taken 

from their parents may return home, and that any adult American 

woman may freely depart from Saudi Arabia, at any time. 

In conclusion, if confirmed as Ambassador, I will use the skills 

and knowledge I have developed during my career in the Middle 

East to serve the best interests of my country. I will keep your concerns and questions firmly in my mind while I carry out my responsibilities. I hope you will visit the Kingdom, so that together 

we can continue to strengthen this vital strategic relationship. 

Thank you for considering my nomination. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fraker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FORD M. FRAKER, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I come before you today both honored and humbled by the trust placed in me by President Bush and Secretary Rice. 

If confirmed as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, I will endeavor to carry out the President’s mandate and represent our great Nation to the best of my ability. 

For over 30 years, I have been a banker in the Middle East. I have lived in Beirut, Dubai, and Bahrain, and have traveled to the region often and extensively ever 

since. My experiences as a banker during this time have included being shot at in 

Beirut, bombed in Riyadh, spat upon in Iran, and interrogated by border guards in 

Syria. I have driven the road from Baghdad to Kuwait City, trekked in the mountains of Yemen and Oman, and camped in the deserts of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 

Over this period, I have come to know and appreciate the countries, cultures, people, and language of the region. More importantly, I have also come to know how 

to effectively communicate with and work with many Arab groups. At a time when 

diplomacy becomes increasingly vital for safeguarding and furthering American interests in the region, I believe it is critical that America’s diplomats know the countries, cultures, and people they are working with. 

While living in the Gulf as a senior U.S. banker, I met and conducted business 

with various rulers and royal family members, as well as government officials, 

bankers, and businessmen at the highest levels. One lesson I learned quickly was 

that to be effective it is necessary to establish relationships on a personal level. 

Once trust and respect are gained it is then possible to achieve specific objectives. 

This is especially true in Saudi Arabia, where we must sustain and deepen a vitally 

important partnership. In my 30-year career as a banker, I have developed many 

personal relationships in the Kingdom. I believe these relationships and my hardwon knowledge will strengthen my ability to effectively represent the interests of 

the United States. 

The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained a strong and important relationship since President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abdulaziz aboard 

the USS Quincy on his way back from Yalta in 1945. Though tested since the tragic 

events of 9/11, our relationship has remained strong as together we confront the 

threats of violent extremism, international terror, and regional instability. Saudi 

Arabia has been, and will continue to be, one of our key regional partners as together we face the challenges in the region. Securing and maintaining Saudi support will be key to our success in realizing many of our regional objectives. 

In recent years, our cooperation in military, law enforcement, and security issues 

has deepened. We have supported the Saudis as they have confronted their own domestic terror threat from al-Qaida. The Saudis have made, and continue to make, 

substantial progress fighting terror. 

Hundreds of terrorists have been arrested and killed in the last 3 years. I believe 

the Saudis have come to understand the need to address the roots of extremism that 

underlie terrorism; especially the need to aggressively deny financial support for terrorist organizations. If confirmed, I will be committed to expanding and deepening 

our efforts in these critical areas. 

We continue to be concerned with the restrictions on religious freedom in Saudi 

Arabia. Saudi Arabia is proud of its responsibility as custodian of Islam’s holy sites 

of Mecca and Medina. However, it must also work to ensure that moderation and 

tolerance triumph over extremism and hatred. Working closely with Ambassador at 

264 

Large for Religious Freedom, John Hanford, Ambassadors Jordan and Oberwetter 

have both made the promotion of religious freedom a priority and progress has been 

achieved. If confirmed, I am determined to build on their efforts and to press for 

more improvement. 

To defeat extremism, it is important that Saudi Arabia take the lead in pursuing 

economic, political, and social reforms to ensure long-term stability. These include 

the pursuit of increased opportunities for Saudi citizens especially women—to participate in government and all aspects of society; economic reforms that will make 

the private sector an engine for growth and job creation; and education reforms that 

prepare Saudi youth for the demands of a modern society. If confirmed, I look forward to working on these critical issues. 

The United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog has become an effective mechanism for 

promoting America’s regional and bilateral interests, including reform, and, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen this important partnership initiative. 

Saudi Arabia has approximately 25 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. In 

order to sustain U.S. and global economic prosperity, a steady and reliable supply 

of energy is essential. Saudi Arabia plays a key role in ensuring the stability of 

world oil markets. Saudi Arabia is also an important trading partner for the United 

States in many other areas, and I will be a strong advocate for United States business. 

There is no responsibility more important in the work of our missions abroad than 

assisting American citizens in distress or need. If confirmed, I will place the highest 

priority on the security of the personnel at the United States mission and on protecting the safety and welfare of all our citizens in Saudi Arabia. I will also work 

to ensure that American children who have been wrongfully taken from their parents may return home, and that any adult American woman may freely depart 

Saudi Arabia at any time. 

In conclusion, if confirmed as Ambassador, I will use the skills and knowledge I 

have developed during my career in the Middle East to serve the best interests of 

my country. I will keep your concerns and questions firmly in mind while I carry 

out my responsibilities. I hope you will visit the Kingdom so that together we can 

continue to strengthen this vital strategic relationship. 

Thank you for considering my nomination. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Fraker. We appreciate it and again, I think you are enormously qualified on paper, 

and certainly in experience. And, we hope you’re able to have an 

impact on each of the areas that you’ve talked about. 

Let me begin by asking you, has the Department, has the Secretary of State, or the administration, specifically charged you with 

respect to any one component of the portfolio? Have they said to 

you, ‘‘This is our first priority,’’ or ‘‘Here’s where we’d really like 

you to put your major focus?’’ 

Mr. FRAKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the statement that my 

No. 1 priority and concern is the safety and welfare of Americans 

in the mission and American Saudi Arabians in general, is top of 

the list and that is emphasized in all the meetings that I have. 

Senator KERRY. That’s a normal—every ambassador in every 

place is charged with that. Is there something special, with respect 

to the peace process, or with respect to Iraq and the regional security that has been articulated to you? 

Mr. FRAKER. Not specifically, other than to say that there are a 

range of highly important issues, all of which I will be expected to 

address, with counterterrorism being the one that comes up most 

frequently in discussions. 

Senator KERRY. You mentioned in your testimony, you say that 

the threats of violent extremism, international terror, and regional 

instability are things we need to work on together, and you hope 

to advance the relationship with respect to those issues. How do 

you anticipate doing that? 

265 

Mr. FRAKER. Working very closely with our Saudi colleagues—regional stability and security is critical to both the U.S. and Saudi 

Arabia. The attacks in Kingdom in 2003 and 2004 made that crystal-clear to the Saudis, and I believe cooperation in this area has 

been intense and effective. 

Having said that, there’s more to be done. We’ve touched on the 

area of terrorist financing. That’s a particular area, given my background, I believe I can add value to, if confirmed, and look forward 

to working with the Saudis on that, specifically. 

Senator KERRY. Do you have an area where you have a sense 

from your own experience that there’s a particular opportunity for 

progress? 

Mr. FRAKER. I do, I have a particular area that I’m focused on, 

have been throughout my career and, if confirmed, would like to 

spend a lot of time on, and that’s the area of education. I firmly 

believe that, that we best address the underlying issues of extremism and radicalism by, by getting to the students at an early age. 

And, encouraging exchange programs amongst young students, 

Saudis coming here, Americans going there, I think is the best way 

to address that. And, if confirmed, that is an area I’ll be focusing 

on. 

Senator KERRY. How would you describe the degree to which the 

Saudis have concerns about Iran, and how do you see them, how 

do see that particular component of their relationship and ours 

also, sort of dovetailing, or not, over the course of the next months? 

Mr. FRAKER. Historically, the relationship between Iran and 

Saudi Arabia—they’ve been adversaries. And, I think that continues. The Saudis have publicly decried the Iranian efforts to, 

their nuclear program, they’ve publicly said that they’re against 

that. They’ve criticized the Iranians for meddling in Iraq and Lebanon. I think the Saudis will prove to be a good partner for us in 

those issues and in facing off against Iran. 

Senator KERRY. Do you believe that if Iran pursues its nuclear 

ambitions, the Saudis are likely to also? 

Mr. FRAKER. I don’t know. I do know that the GCC has publicly 

stated their interest in exploring the possibility of developing 

peaceful nuclear technology. I don’t know if that’s a shot across Iranian bows or not. It’s something that I’d like more information on. 

Senator KERRY. What do you make of the meeting in Mecca, 

which obviously left the Quartet feeling less than satisfied, but on 

the other hand, within the Arab world, the word I hear is, sort of, 

don’t make too much noise about it, this can help begin to move 

the process forward. 

Mr. FRAKER. I believe that the United States and Saudi Arabia 

both believe that the Palestinians should be speaking with one 

voice, if ever there’s going to be a chance of reconciliation. And, 

that the Mecca conference was an important step towards trying to 

get a one-voice Palestinian, heard. 

The State Department position is that it’s probably still early 

days yet to judge exactly how this unity government will behave. 

Obviously, we were disappointed that the Quartet principals 

weren’t embraced. But, I think many people in the Middle East will 

see this, actually, as a constructive first step in a process to achieve 

this one-voice from the Palestinians. 

266 

Senator KERRY. If the Saudis are, indeed, intent on trying to advance that process, why do they continue the boycott of Israel? 

Mr. FRAKER. Well, there’s a long history here and I think that 

the Saudis should be judged on their efforts to encourage the moderate Palestinian element, in playing a constructive role in this 

whole process. And, I think that we will, we’ll have some success 

in that area and if confirmed, that’s very much an approach I 

would like to take with the Saudis. To have them continue to play 

this moderate role and encourage the moderates on the Palestinian 

side. 

Senator KERRY. And a couple of pro-forma questions. Is there any 

interest that you have, financial or otherwise, that might require 

you to recuse yourself from any issue dealing as an ambassador? 

Mr. FRAKER. The only, the only issue is with regard to a letter 

of undertaking I’ve signed because I have a pension plan that is 

managed by a bank in London, actually by a U.K. pension fund in 

London where the Saudi Government has a 40 percent interest in 

the bank, even though the bank has no interest in the pension 

fund. 

Senator KERRY. Is there any interest you have or asset that you 

have that might present a conflict of interest with respect to any 

of the positions you have to represent in Riyadh? 

Mr. FRAKER. No. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Fraker, I appreciate 

it. 

Senator Sununu. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Senator Kerry. 

You spoke a little bit about education. You mentioned a good 

mechanism for improving that level of education and exposure are 

exchange programs. Any other mechanisms that—or opportunities 

that you see—to improve that exposure, education to a broader set 

of ideas? 

Mr. FRAKER. the United States-Saudi Strategic dialog has presented a very useful framework for dealing with a whole range of 

issues. One of them is, is reform and under that heading, education, as well. There’s significant focus on the schools and the 

mosques, in terms of trying to eliminate extremist language, and 

in the schools, specifically the textbooks. And, that’s a—that’s an 

effort and an initiative that we should pursue very vigorously and 

one that, if confirmed, I would like to spend a lot of time focusing 

on. 

Senator SUNUNU. What about the American institutions in Lebanon and Egypt, specifically, American University of Beirut, Lebanese-American University, and American University in Cairo? 

Those are institutions with very lengthy histories, in which I assume, in different ways you’ve come across in your work, both in 

Lebanon, and throughout the region. 

What has been your personal experience with students from 

those institutions, and to what extent have students from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia taken advantage of their strengths? 

Mr. FRAKER. In fact, when I lived in Beirut, I lived right next 

door the American University in Beirut, so I almost feel like I went 

to college at AUB. I got to know a number of the students there. 

267 

Senator SUNUNU. But, my first question was really an opportunity for you to, for you to emphasize the strength of the institutions. Obviously, you’ve got great personal experience. Go ahead. 

Mr. FRAKER. Just to say, these are terrific institutions for furthering dialog and interaction between Americans and Arabs, 

whether they’re Egyptians or Lebanese, or wherever. All this, in 

my view, should be significantly encouraged. 

Senator SUNUNU. Do you know to what—they have students 

from all over the region—do you know to what extent their student 

body includes students from Saudi Arabia, and, can that be improved? 

Mr. FRAKER. I don’t know precisely. I do know that there are 

Saudi students at AUB, and also American University in Cairo. It’s 

been a traditional college destination for many of them. 

Senator SUNUNU. In the area of terrorist financing, are there any 

particular areas of the Saudi Arabian or Middle East banking system that you think are particularly vulnerable, right now? 

Mr. FRAKER. We’re—I think we’re in the early days, to some extent, given the number of initiatives that have happened recently. 

For example, in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis have increased oversight 

over charities in the Kingdom, but there are real gaps in terms of 

their ability to manage and oversee the foreign branch operations 

of many of these charities. Similarly, foreign charities with 

branches in Saudi Arabia—there are difficulties in oversight there, 

so, that’s a specific area where things can be tightened up. 

They have recently enacted some money-laundering laws, and 

laws that target cash transfers, as well. All of this needs to be, to 

be looked at very carefully and tightened up. It’s only just begun 

to happen. 

So, there are a whole range of areas that, good first steps have 

been taken, but we should be on them and very aggressive in pursuing how they, how they enact the laws they’ve passed. 

Senator SUNUNU. From your perspective, or your experience in 

banking and finance, how would you assess the strengths and the 

weaknesses in the current economy in Saudi Arabia? 

Mr. FRAKER. Well, the Saudi economy at the moment is booming. 

Oil prices where they are have generated enormous amount of liquidity and cash. Locally, the Saudis are investing that in local industry. They have an infrastructure that’s now, maybe 20 years 

old. They’re going to have to reinvest a lot of money upgrading 

that. So, it’s quite an exciting time in terms of being a member of 

SAMO, or the central bank, trying to manage, manage this economy because it is booming. 

Senator SUNUNU. What has been the recent posture of the Saudi 

Arabian Government toward United States investment in the country and which sectors of the economy, do you think, hold the most 

promise for investment by U.S. firms? 

Mr. FRAKER. The government has recently opened up the economy for, for more outside investment. And this is a significant 

event. And we’ve recently seen two major U.S. financial institutions, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, enter into joint venture 

arrangements in the Kingdom, JP Morgan, Chase as well. So, I 

think you will see a rush of financial institutions into the Kingdom. 

268 

I think on the manufacturing side, as well, there will be real opportunities, and it’s one of the areas, if confirmed, I will, I envision 

myself spending a lot of time on, because I think there’ll be terrific 

opportunities for trade and business. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You bring extraordinary qualifications in the banking area to 

this position. And, my questions really come down to, really the 

special talents that you have here. 

You’ve touched upon the fact that there is greater oversight, presumably by the Saudi Government on contributions to charities, 

contributions coming from others to charities, and money laundering. One of the great questions about Saudi wealth and banks 

and transfers, and so forth, is the degree of distribution to alQaeda or to others who are associated with terrorism, not only in 

the Kingdom, but elsewhere, and the ability of the Saudis, or the 

willingness, the political will to monitor this, and indeed to stop it. 

As an American banker, you may have had some experience in 

your previous calling with this type of activity, but what do you believe you are going to be able to do, from the standpoint of the 

United States working with strong Saudi allies to curtail these 

flows, which are critical to the support of terrorist groups? 

Mr. FRAKER. Thank you, Senator. 

As I’ve said, some important steps have been taken—initial steps 

have been taken—both in terms of laws that have been passed, and 

a focus on a greater oversight in a number of areas. The Saudi 

economy, traditionally, has been a cash economy. And, regulating 

cash is a difficult, is a difficult process. Also regulating—any country has difficulty regulating their private sector. And if you have 

a private sector running around with lots of cash, it’s even more 

difficult to regulate. 

Having said that, one of the laws they have recently passed addresses, specifically, the issue of cash in and out of the country. 

And, it really comes down, as you said, to their willingness, the political will to really address the problem, as well as the practical 

problems in a country with enormous borders and enormous traditional trade traffic back and forth across these borders. So, it really 

comes down to pressure, applying the laws that are in place, and 

following through on them. 

From my standpoint, the big plus here is that, the laws are in 

place. So, you do have a mechanism for measuring performance. 

You can hold them accountable to a set of criteria, and I think 

that’s a big step. And, if confirmed, that’s an area that I have experience in and would relish the opportunity to focus on. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, that’s why I raised the question. I think it 

is a special qualification that you have and it comes at a time in 

which our diplomacy has been informed a great deal by such situations. For example, the North Korean negotiations, many feel, have 

progressed largely because of a treasury situation with the Macao 

Bank, and the interdiction of funds or pursuit of fraudulent activity 

there. 

269 

Likewise, it is suggested that this may be one of the more effective sanctions available when compared to cutting off vast amounts 

of trade in the banking system. The flow of, for example, money 

from China to Sudan has been suggested as maybe a critical area, 

unlike almost any other. 

That brings me to the second part of my question. Do you have 

a personal acquaintance with members of the royal family, with the 

previous Saudi Ambassador to the United States, or with any of 

these figures who have come back and forth through our public life 

informing our Presidents, Democratic and Republican, over many 

years? 

Mr. FRAKER. I have met a number of the members of the royal 

family as a commercial banker in the region. However, we were 

taught at a very early age to stay away from most of them, for commercial reasons. But, I look forward to developing those relationships, if confirmed. 

I should also say, that in the last few weeks I’ve had the opportunity to meet with Secretary Polson, National Security Advisor 

Hadley, and FBI Director Muller, specifically, to address the terrorist financing issue. And, I was pleased to be able to hear some 

of the testimony yesterday from Undersecretary Burns and Levey 

to the Banking Committee, where they specifically addressed their 

efforts with regard to Iranian financing, as well. 

Senator LUGAR. Please, while you are still here in Washington, 

enlarge even that circle so that all of the players in our Government are well acquainted with you, and you with them, and therefore the team effort is likely to be enhanced. 

On the other hand, have you also been briefed or have you had 

experience with the many different agencies that work for you in 

the Embassy there in Saudi Arabia? Presumably, as well, you are 

comfident that as the ambassador, you are going to have a looksee into all of that activity as the management principal on behalf 

of our interests. 

Mr. FRAKER. I’ve just finished the two-week Ambassadorial seminar where I was introduced to the range of agencies and activities 

in the Embassy, and have had a chance to have meetings outside 

that environment, as well, with people. So, I’m looking forward, 

again, if confirmed, I’m looking forward very much to getting on 

the ground and really understanding how things are operating, on 

the ground. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, this committee has been helpful, I think, 

to Ambassadors and to the State Department in suggesting that activities of our Government ought not proceed independently of our 

ambassadors, and their knowledge of those activities in whatever 

context they may be. I think there’s a recognition of the importance 

of that principle, but I was curious as a new ambassador in the 

meetings that you’ve had, that this came through. 

Mr. FRAKER. I’ve been assured by all the agencies that as chief 

of mission, these are my responsibilities. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator Lugar very much. 

Just following up on Senator Lugar’s line of inquiry with respect 

to these efforts on the money, a long time ago I was on the BankVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00277 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
270 

ing Committee and this was a major focus of mine. In fact, I wrote 

some of the laws requiring some of the transparency and accountability. 

It seems to me that unless the Secretary of State and the President make it clear, and are prepared to leverage, that your ability 

as an ambassador is going to be somewhat limited, frankly, to lift. 

I mean, you can go in and you can deliver a demarche, or you can 

have these conversations with your ministries and they will sit 

there, look at you, and say, ‘‘Yes, you’re right, we have to do this.’’ 

And the heads will nod, but the situation won’t change that much, 

to be honest with you, unless you have assurances that the administration’s really going to back you, and that this is real. Do you 

have that sense? I mean, has this been put to you in a way that 

you’re convinced that you’re not going to be, sort of, you know, 

sense of us pushing the rock up the hill. 

Mr. FRAKER. I believe I do. I’ve had discussions both with the 

President and the Secretary of State and they’ve assured me of 

their support, specifically in these areas. My meeting with National 

Security Advisor Hadley, was a result of the previous discussions 

with a clear intent to have me onboard with the effort. 

Senator KERRY. Good. And, that’s obviously very important. Do 

you believe we have some levers, beyond those that we’ve used, in 

order to help guarantee the kind of response that we need to get? 

Mr. FRAKER. One of the things that I believe is that my valueadd in this process is very much in the private sector and with the 

financial institutions. I know the bankers, I know the banks, I 

know most of the major merchants. And, I believe that an outreach 

to them, very specifically, could pay real dividends in this effort. I 

believe, up until now, most of the, most of the focus has been getting government signing on to do what’s needed to be done. But, 

again, it’s what’s happening on the ground that will determine our 

success in this area and, if confirmed, that’s very much where I’d 

like to be focused. 

Senator KERRY. We certainly wish you well with that. You’re 

about to enter a different world. We obviously hope that those relationships produce something, and in some cases they may produce 

information and they may produce some efforts here and there, and 

everything to the plus is positive. 

But, the bottom line is, and I think my colleagues would join me 

in saying this, you’re about to enter a world where there are some 

big cultural and historical and even political motivations at play. 

And, the best intentions will not move some of those, unless they 

feel it’s in their interest. 

So, we wish you well on it, but I think that it’s going to be important for you to quickly report back to the State Department and to 

this committee, the reality of your perceptions about those responses, because nothing is more critical than trying to cut off the 

terroroist funding and begin to send a message of the serious alternative course, that’d be important. 

Just very quickly, I don’t want to prolong this, but a last question. Do you have any sense of how the Saudis view the Iraq situation, at this point, and what play they might, you know, whether 

you can have an impact on that? 

271 

Mr. FRAKER. Well, the Saudis, as you know, are a charter member of the Iraq Compact. And, the price to join that elite group is 

a commitment of $450 million to Iraq. The Saudis, I believe, have 

stepped up with a commitment of $1 billion. There’s also about $39 

billion worth of debt to be negotiated. The Saudis have indicated 

a willingness to forgive that debt. So, I believe there’s a real, 

there’s a very positive impact they can play on the financial side 

with regard to helping Iraq. And, I know also, that they have encouraged the Sunni elements to participate in the political process 

in Iraq from a regional stability standpoint. It’s been made clear 

to us and clear to them, it’s in nobody’s best interest to have a fractured Iraq on their border. And, so I think they will be a positive 

force in helping that. 

Senator KERRY. Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In light of my tardiness, I’m not going to run the risk of being repetitive in questions, 

but I welcome the nominee here today and appreciate the opportunity to come, albeit late. 

Senator KERRY. Well, we’re glad to have you here. We appreciate 

it. Thank you very much. 

Senator KERRY. Do any other colleagues have any other questions? 

Mr. Fraker, this could prove unbelievably easy to get over there, 

and difficult once you get there. So, we appreciate your coming before the committee. I think it’s a tribute to the qualifications you 

bring to the table that people are anxious to get you over there. 

And, I’m confident the Senate will move as rapidly as possible to 

confirm you. And, so we look forward to getting you there, and we 

look forward to seeing you over there. 

Mr. FRAKER. Thank you very much. 

Senator KERRY. Good luck to you, sir. Thank you. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

272 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

U.S.-SAUDI DISCUSSIONS ON RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND TOLERANCE SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

RESPONSES OF FORD M. FRAKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. If confirmed, what will you do to encourage religious freedom in Saudi 

Arabia and ensure that the country’s religious minorities are protected? 

Answer. I plan to make religious freedom a priority during my tenure and will 

encourage visits by U.S. officials to press for improvements in tolerance and religious practice. The policies put forth by the Saudi Arabian Government regarding 


new.eps
273 

religious practice and tolerance are public policies, and if confirmed, I will assess 

the government’s record on promoting religious freedom and tolerance based on its 

record on implementing its stated policies. 

If confirmed, I look forward to hosting a planned visit by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom in late spring. I will also continue the 

practice of raising our concerns over the plight of both non-Muslim and Muslim religious minorities with senior government officials. Additionally, I will continue the 

program of exchanges that brings Saudis to the United States to experience firsthand American institutions, societies, and values, including religious freedom. 

Question. To date, what progress has been made in each of the three areas: (a) 

stop using government channels or funds to export or promote textbooks, literature, 

or other materials that advocate intolerance globally; (b) remove intolerant elements 

in its textbooks and curriculum inside the Kingdom within 1 to 2 years; and (c) protect private worship by curbing interference by the religious police? 

Answer. We continue to raise all of these issues at the highest levels of the Saudi 

Government. 

The Saudi Government has told the Department of State that it has ceased sending materials around the world, even when countries ask for such materials, except 

to the 20 official Saudi Academies located in various countries. Textbooks used at 

these schools are undergoing a complete revision along with the textbooks used in 

the Kingdom. Teachers will be retrained and screened for extremist ideologies. 

The Saudi Government has said it is also implementing a regulatory system for 

all of the 72,000 mosques in the country. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs requires 

all imams to undergo training to ensure they have a proper religious education, or 

in some cases, retraining if they are currently espousing intolerant messages. 

We continue to press the Saudi Government to guarantee and protect private worship, and to ensure that the religious police do not interfere with people’s right to 

worship. There were several incidents of apparent violations of this policy in the latter half of 2006 which we learned of early this year, and we have expressed our 

concern to the Saudi Government. There is some indication, based on the decreased 

number of arrests last year, that the Saudi Government is taking steps to curb violations of private worship by the religious police. 

Question. What do you plan to do to make sure that the Saudi Government complies with its commitments? How do you plan on monitoring these reforms? Is there 

a timetable for implementation? 

Answer. I intend to monitor Saudi policies to improve religious freedom closely 

and press for their implementation. In this effort I will work closely with Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, John Hanford, to continue our 

serious discussions with the Saudi Government on improving religious freedom. Our 

interest and goal is to achieve sustained progress toward religious freedom. The 

policies put forth by the Saudi Arabian Government regarding religious practice and 

tolerance are public policies, and if confirmed, I will also encourage others concerned 

with the state of religious freedom in the Kingdom to assess the government’s 

record on its stated policies. Additionally, the Department will continue to monitor 

the government’s actions through the Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 

Question. How will the Saudi public be able to determine if genuine progress is 

being made? 

Answer. The opinions of Saudi citizens living in the Kingdom are the best indicator of whether the government is making progress on religious freedom. The 

United States Mission regularly reaches out to Saudi citizens and will continue to 

make public diplomacy and outreach on this issue an important part of its presence 

in the Kingdom. One positive sign is that the level of debate about religious freedom 

or sensitive religious topics in Saudi newspapers has increased over the last few 

years. For instance, parts of the 2006 Annual Report for International Religious 

Freedom on Saudi Arabia were printed in Al-Watan newspaper. The full report on 

Saudi textbooks by the Center for Religious Freedom was also featured in Al-Watan. 

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to promote the equality of 

women? 

Answer. Women’s inferior status, including restrictions on their rights and opportunities, is a serious problem in Saudi Arabia, and a key issue on the United States 

Government’s human rights agenda with Saudi Arabia. 

If confirmed, I will press the Saudi Government to increase opportunities for all 

Saudi citizens, including women, to participate in the political process. I will also 

urge the Saudi Government to increase private sector opportunities for women, and 

274 

remove legal obstacles that prevent women from fulfilling their potential. I will also 

look for opportunities to mobilize expertise from the U.S. public and private sectors 

in support of women’s empowerment. 

Question. In 2004, Saudi Arabia held a ‘‘National Dialog’’ on women’s issues which 

made a number of recommendations, endorsed by then Crown Prince Abdullah. 

Which if any recommendations have been implemented? 

Answer. The third meeting of Saudi Arabia’s National Dialog took place June 12– 

14, 2004, in Medina, and focused on women’s rights. Since that event, there has 

been progress in opening new employment and educational opportunities for women, 

and in creating greater public awareness and discussion of the challenges Saudi 

women face. 

The Saudi Government has allowed women to play a more active role in business, 

and has opened new job sectors to women, such as law and engineering. Women’s 

empowerment is a key part of the Saudi Government’s 2005 5-year plan. In 2005, 

women participated in the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce elections, winning two 

elected seats and being appointed to two others. However, they were not allowed 

to participate in municipal council elections. 

On March 19–20, 2007, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia held its first conference on women’s empowerment, under the patronage of the King’s daughter, Princess Adela, and 

with the involvement of Saudi Arabia’s best-known businesswoman, Lubna alOlayan. One thousand women participated in the meetings, which highlighted challenges women confront in education, employment, and the legal system. Princess 

Adela urged that more economic sectors be opened to women, and that women be 

given a greater role in ‘‘the decision-making process.’’ 

Much more must be done. Indeed, according to the 2006 World Economic Forum 

Gender Gap Report, Saudi Arabia ranked last in a group of 115 countries in terms 

of economic opportunity and participation, and political empowerment. Our human 

rights report highlights the continuing legal and societal discrimination and violence 

against women. 

Question. Have there been instances in your banking career in the Middle East 

where considerations of human rights and/or democracy have influenced your decisions? What were the impact of these decisions? 

Answer. I believe that Americans and American companies doing business abroad 

play an important role in representing America’s values. As bankers, we take many 

factors into consideration when setting country credit policies, evaluating business 

proposals such as loan applications, and making business decisions. One factor is 

an evaluation of the overall political situation, which implicitly includes human 

rights and democracy issues as these bear on the political future of a country. 

Question. Beyond women’s rights and issues of religious freedom, what are the 

most pressing human rights issues in Saudi Arabia? What are the most important 

steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in 

Saudi Arabia? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. Since coming to the throne in 2006, King Abdullah has pursued incremental reforms that have led to some improvements on key human rights issues. 

However, as noted in the Department’s 2006 Human Rights Report, there continue 

to be substantial problems with human rights in Saudi Arabia. Several of the most 

pressing human rights issues include reports that some authorities practiced physical abuse and torture; a lack of popular participation in Government; denial of fair, 

public trials; lack of a transparent and consistent judicial system; and significant 

restrictions on civil liberties. 

I will forcefully advocate for reform and convey the message that the United 

States places the highest emphasis on improvements in human rights and holds the 

Saudi Government accountable for its commitment to improve human rights. The 

United States Government has an active exchange program with Saudi Arabia that 

brings Saudis to the United States for firsthand experience on many issues, including religious and press freedom, human rights, and more. I will continue efforts 

under the United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog to promote political, economic, and 

legal reform. 

Some elements of Saudi society are conservative and have strongly resisted efforts 

at modernization and reform. However, the Kingdom continues to slowly change 

from the inside, and it is important to strengthen actors that support reform. To 

this end, I will promote programs that expand and strengthen civil society in Saudi 

Arabia, encouraging efforts to expand Saudi political participation and compliance 

with international human rights standards. 

275 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges 

will you face in Saudi Arabia in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. While there are reform-minded individuals, both in government and in 

society, some elements of Saudi society have historically been uncomfortable with 

and suspicious of change. In the past, the Saudi Government has implemented new 

policies, such as girls’ education, often in the face of strong protests from conservatives. This opposition has led the Saudi Government to move slowly and cautiously, 

strive for consensus across different societal groups, and avoid policies that might 

provoke a negative reaction. 

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia must pursue reform and improve its record on human 

rights if it is to defeat extremism and achieve genuine stability and security over 

the long term. It will be my challenge to engage with Saudi society to demonstrate 

that human rights and reform are not a threat to Saudi society or traditions but, 

rather, will strengthen society by offering more opportunities to wider sections of 

Saudi society. Such change will also enable Saudi Arabia to meet the challenges of 

the 21st century with the goodwill and active support of the international community. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post/bureau activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage 

in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior 

service? 

Answer. The advancement of human rights has been, and will continue to be, a 

priority for the U.S. Government. I will ensure that advancing human rights in 

Saudi Arabia remains a key goal in our annual Mission Strategic Plan, which will 

guide our in-country activities throughout the year. The mission will identify goals, 

strategies, and benchmarks for improving human rights in Saudi Arabia through increased and positive engagement with the government, civil society, and the Saudi 

public. This process allows an objective review of the mission’s relative success in 

achieving our goals. We will also continue to use the Human Development Working 

Group of the United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog as a framework to engage the 

Saudi Government on human rights and reform-related issues. 

The mission will also continue to devote substantial efforts to the production of 

required annual reports on various human rights issues, including the Human 

Rights Report, the International Religious Freedom Report, and the Trafficking in 

Persons report. Across the mission, there are several officers with primary responsibility for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues, but reporting on human 

rights issues is an important element of the annual work effort of many other officers of the mission, including mission leadership. Those who perform well in their 

duties receive recognition in their annual evaluations, and for exceptional performance, the Department offers a variety of awards. I will continue to encourage the 

best use of our existing administrative tools to recognize and reward superior performance of duties, including on issues related to human rights and reform. 

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with activists, reformers, and nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Saudi Arabia who are working to promote human rights? 

Answer. The United States continues to strongly promote respect for human 

rights around the world, and I fully support our efforts in doing so. It has always 

been the policy of the United States Mission in Saudi Arabia to meet with a broad 

range of individuals on all aspects of the United States-Saudi bilateral relationship, 

including advocates for human rights and reform. Staff from the embassy and the 

Consulates General meet regularly with concerned individuals and organizations on 

the topic of human rights. Department officials also meet with human rights activists and NGOs in the United States. I support this policy, and it will continue to 

be the policy of the mission in the future. 

Question. In the aftermath of the May 12, 2003, terrorist attacks in Riyadh which 

killed more than 30 people, including at least eight American citizens, did Saudi 

Arabia establish a victims compensation fund? 

If yes, are American victims and other foreign nationals eligible to participate? 

Would we consider urging the Kingdom to establish a fund similar to the September 11 Victims Compensation Fund? 

Answer. The Department of State has no information regarding the existence of 

a victim’s compensation fund for those killed in the May 12, 2003, terrorist attacks 

in Riyadh. There have been no discussions between the United States Government 

276 

and the Government of Saudi Arabia on this issue, and none are planned at this 

time. 

I believe the tragic events of May 12, 2003, were important in pushing the Saudi 

Government to recognize that extremism in general, and al-Qaeda in particular, represented a major domestic threat in Saudi Arabia. It also led to much closer United 

States-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation—cooperation that continues today. 

RESPONSES OF FORD M. FRAKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR F. JOHN KERRY

Question. What specific programs has the U.S. Government implemented to prevent the use of financial institutions to finance terrorist organizations and prohibited activities by foreign governments? 

Answer. The U.S. Government has a variety of tools at its disposal to combat terrorism finance under authorities provided in the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (IEEPA), E.O. 13224, and the USA PATRIOT Act, among others. Under 

these authorities, the Departments of State and Treasury have established a list of 

Specially Designated Global Terrorists, whose assets are blocked, thus preventing 

U.S. persons, including financial institutions, from conducting transactions with designated individuals. 

Question. Is it the U.S. Government’s position that any financial institutions and/ 

or other private entities that have aided and abetted terrorist organizations or prohibited activities by foreign governments should be sanctioned, and that private parties should be able to pursue all available legal remedies against such entities? 

Answer. Sanctions are one of several tools available to punish and deter abuses 

of the international financial system in support of terrorist organizations. Others include diplomatic pressure and law enforcement action. The decision on which tool 

or combination of tools to use depends on a variety of factors, and is based on a 

thorough review of the circumstances of each case. The availability of legal remedies 

to private parties depends upon the particular claims and circumstances of each 

case. This issue can involve complex legal issues, and some of these issues have 

been raised in cases now working their way through the courts. As it would be inappropriate for me to comment on pending litigation, I don’t think I should comment 

further on the last part of your question. 

Question. Is it true that no Saudi Arabian financial institutions have to date been 

designated by the United States Government for Office of Foreign Asset Control 

sanctions? 

Answer. The Department of State believes that this statement is correct, but 

would refer you to the Department of the Treasury for a definitive answer. 

Question. What is the United States Government’s policy regarding Saudi Arabian 

nationals in cases where the United States Government has solid intelligence that 

such persons have given donations or otherwise provided financial support to alQaeda or affiliated organizations? Have all such persons been designated for OFAC 

sanctions? 

Answer. The United States and Saudi Arabia have an ongoing and robust dialog 

on a full range of counterterrorism issues, including regular high-level discussion 

and working-level collaboration on terrorism finance issues. When appropriate, we 

pursue designations of Saudi nationals under pertinent domestic and international 

laws. The United States and Saudi Arabia have cooperated on over 20 designations 

of terrorist supporters at the United Nations. 

Question. When the United States Government has solid information that a Saudi 

Arabian Government official has condoned or ignored the activities of Non-Governmental Organizations and/or NGO representatives that support terrorist or extremist groups, are such individuals always designated for OFAC sanctions? In cases 

where they are not sanctioned, what are the policy reasons for not listing them? 

Answer. United States-Saudi terrorism finance cooperation is generally good, and 

encompasses a wide range of activities, including designations when appropriate. 

We regularly raise information on terrorism finance issues with all levels of the 

Saudi Government, and press for action on a number of fronts. When the U.S. Government comes into possession of solid information that an individual or organization has acted to support terrorism, we can draw from a number of options, such 

as designation or law enforcement actions. 

277 

Question. When the United States Government has solid information that a Saudi 

Arabian financial institution has repeatedly acted to handle funds for Islamic terrorist or extremist groups is it United States policy to impose sanctions on that financial institution? In cases where the institution is not sanctioned, what are the 

policy reasons for not listing it? 

Answer. Our strong cooperation with Saudi Arabia on terrorism finance issues 

has resulted in numerous examples of public designations of individuals and entities, as well as less public actions to address our concerns. When the U.S. Government comes into possession of solid information that an individual or organization 

has acted to support terrorism, we can draw from a number of options, such as designation or law enforcement actions. 

We note that in August 2004 the executive director of the Eastern Province (Saudi 

Arabia) Branch of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), as well as 

IIRO branches in Indonesia and the Philippines, were designated as terrorist supporters by the United Nations and the United States. 

(279) 

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Carter, Phillip, III, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea 

Garvey, Janet E., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon 

Marquardt, R. Niels, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and the Union of Comoros 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold 

presiding. 

Present: Senator Feingold. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you all for being here. This will be interrupted in a few minutes for a couple of votes and I’ll go as quickly as I can, come back and we’ll continue the hearing. 

In any event, I’d like to begin by thanking our three nominees 

for being here today and more importantly, for you many years of 

service and for your willingness to work in some of the more demanding positions in U.S. Government. The countries to which you 

have been appointed, Guinea, Cameroon, Madagascar, and 

Comoros, face distinct, but equally difficult challenges. 

There are also many opportunities, that—if confirmed—I hope 

you’ll be able to seize upon and develop. If you are confirmed, I 

look forward to working closely with you and hope you look to the 

Senate as a resource and to this committee as a source of support 

and guidance during your tenure at your respective posts. I’d also 

like to offer a warm welcome to you families and friends who have 

stood by you and whose ongoing support will be necessary as you 

set off to these new positions. 

As an Ambassador to the United States, you will undoubtedly 

have to juggle conflicting priorities. Security will be a top concern, 

and growing awareness of Africa’s strategic significance means facilitating national and regional counterterrorism will be an important element of your job. It is essential, however, that these security concerns are not used to justify or exacerbate restrictions on 

civil liberties or violations of human rights. The principals of democracy and rule of law are not always entrenched in many African countries, including those you have been assigned to. So, you 

280 

will need to be consistent and persistent advocates of good governments and human rights. 

As you are all aware, diplomacy is an essential component of our 

efforts to define and defend America’s interests and ideals abroad, 

particularly in countries where the United States does not have a 

long history of engagement or much institutional knowledge. Building solid relationships, not just with government officials, but also 

with business, religious, civil society, and other community leaders 

is critical to forming and implementing an effective U.S. policy. If 

confirmed, I trust that each of you will take that responsibility very 

seriously. I’m looking forward to hearing your testimonies and engaging each of you in a brief discussion about your qualifications 

and expectations going into these important positions. 

So, I think we will start the testimony. If Senator Sununu comes, 

he will make his opening remarks. He may be choosing to vote first 

and then come here. But, let’s begin with Mr. Marquardt, to be 

Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and Union of Comoros. 

Mr. Marquardt. 

STATEMENT OF HON. R. NIELS MARQUARDT, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR AND THE 

UNION OF THE COMOROS 

Mr. MARQUARDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin, I’d 

just like to introduce my daughters, Kaia and Kelsey, who have 

come up from the University of Tampa to join me today. Some dear 

friends, Ambassador Ruth A. Davis directly behind me, Ambassador Linda E. Watt, John and Jean Lang, and the Ambassador of 

Cameroon, who’s become my friend over the last several years. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Welcome all. 

Mr. MARQUARDT. Mr. Chairman, I am deeply honored to appear 

before you today as President Bush’s nominee to be the United 

States Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and the Union 

of the Comoros. I am grateful for the confidence and trust that the 

President and Secretary Rice have placed in me. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, my highest priority 

will be the protection of Americans and American business interests, including mission personnel, living and traveling in Madagascar and the Comoros. We will open a new Embassy compound 

in 2010. Until then, I will work to make our existing Embassy as 

safe as possible. 

Under President Ravalomanana’s leadership, Madagascar, while 

starting from a low baseline, stands out among African countries 

in making simultaneous progress in consolidating democracy, developing as a free market economy, combating corruption and trafficking in persons, fighting HIV/AIDS before it takes hold, and protecting its unique environment. In recognition of these accomplishments, Madagascar was the first country to sign a compact with 

the Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC, exactly 2 years ago 

today, and was selected in 2006 as a target country for the President’s Malaria Initiative. Madagascar also has benefited significantly from trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA. However, all of these advances are fragile 

and susceptible to setbacks in a country of heartbreaking poverty 

and shallow-rooted democratic traditions. 

281 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will continue to bolster good governance in Madagascar. I will also continue our leadership in protecting the environment. I think we all know that Madagascar is 

a global biodiversity treasure and the United States must help to 

preserve it. 

Madagascar is also a supporter in the war on terrorism and 

needs continued assistance to prevent exploitation by terrorist networks. 

As a returned Peace Corps volunteer myself, I’m proud that 

Madagascar has one of the most successful Peace Corps programs 

in the world. The Malagasy people embrace the volunteers in their 

communities, reflecting the deep friendship between our two countries. Should I be confirmed, I will continue to support a strong 

Peace Corps presence in the region. 

The Union of the Comoros is a small, poor island country that 

has recently embraced democracy. Its government and people appear determined, finally, to overcome the country’s history of instability. Last May, President Sambi won a free and fair election, 

while campaigning on a platform of economic development and 

clean government. He is interested in working with the United 

States to improve the quality of life for his citizens. The Comoros’ 

balance between the hope of emerging as a responsible member of 

the Community of Nations and the risk of slipping back into instability. If confirmed, I will seek to help the people of Comoros 

achieve the former outcome. 

The Comoros is notorious as the birthplace of Harun Fazul, the 

alleged mastermind of the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. If confirmed, I will work with the Government of Comoros 

to combat terrorism as a top priority and play a positive role in this 

fragile, but friendly, Muslim nation. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that my prior experience, over 27 years 

in the Foreign Service, has prepared me well to serve as Ambassador to Madagascar and the Union of the Comoros. If confirmed 

by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with you and with 

all the other members of the committee and the Senate and would 

hope to welcome you to my region during my tenure. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marquardt follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. R. NIELS MARQUARDT, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR

TO THE REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR AND THE UNION OF THE COMOROS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am deeply honored to appear before you today as President Bush’s nominee to be the United States Ambassador to 

the Republic of Madagascar and the Union of the Comoros. I am grateful for the 

confidence and trust that the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, my highest priority will be the protection of Americans and American business interests, including mission personnel living and traveling in Madagascar and the Comoros. The security of our personnel 

has a direct impact on our ability to represent the United States, protect other 

Americans in the country, and advance American interests in Madagascar and the 

Comoros. We expect to open a new embassy compound in early 2010. Until then, 

I will work with the members of the embassy’s security team to make our existing 

embassy as safe as possible. 

Under President Marc Ravalomanana’s leadership, Madagascar, while starting 

from a low baseline, stands out among African countries in making simultaneous 

progress in consolidating democracy, developing as a free market economy, combating corruption and trafficking in persons, fighting HIV/AIDS before it takes hold, 

and protecting its unique environment. In recognition of these accomplishments, 

282 

Madagascar was the first country to sign a compact with the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation (MCC) in 2005 and was selected in 2006 as a target country for the 

President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI). The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program is already assisting the rural poor by providing titles to their land, easier 

availability of credit, more diverse agricultural products and better access to markets. The PMI will be formally launched in Madagascar at the start of the next fiscal year, but energetic preparations are underway to ensure its success. Finally, 

Madagascar has benefited from trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. However, all of these advances are fragile and susceptible to setbacks 

in a country of heartbreaking poverty and shallow-rooted democratic traditions. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will continue to bolster good governance in Madagascar as one of our top priorities, seeking funds to support anticorruption efforts, 

civic education, and reform of the electoral code. I will also continue our leadership 

in protecting the environment: Madagascar is a global biodiversity treasure and the 

United States must help to preserve it. 

Madagascar is also a supporter of the global war on terrorism. Like many developing countries, it needs continued assistance to build the law enforcement and military capacity required to prevent exploitation by terrorist networks. 

As a returned Peace Corps volunteer, I am proud that Madagascar has one of the 

most successful Peace Corps programs in the world with over 130 volunteers working in health, education, and the environment. The Malagasy people embrace our 

volunteers in their communities, reflecting the friendship between our two countries. Should I be confirmed, I will continue to support a strong Peace Corps presence in the region. 

The Union of the Comoros is a small, poor, island country that has recently embraced democracy. Its government and people appear determined, finally, to overcome the country’s history of instability. Former President Azali Assoumani came 

to power in the Comoros’ 19th coup in 1999, but he later won election and last year 

oversaw the first democratic transfer of power in the nation’s history. In May 2006, 

Ahmed Abdallah Sambi won a free and fair election while campaigning on a platform of economic development and clean government. He is interested in working 

with all countries, including the United States, to improve the quality of life for his 

citizens. As an impoverished developing country with a long history of instability 

and only recent signs of promise, the Comoros is balanced between the hope of 

emerging as a responsible member of the community of nations, and the risk of slipping back into instability. If confirmed, I will seek to help the people of the Comoros 

achieve the former outcome. 

The Comoros is notorious as the birthplace of Harun Fazul, the alleged mastermind of the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. However, the people of the 

Comoros widely reject Fazul and his extremist ideology. If confirmed, I will continue 

to work with the Government of the Comoros to combat terrorism as a top priority, 

including maintaining our cooperation in the Rewards for Justice Program. The 

Comoros offers few opportunities for its young people; if confirmed I look forward 

to working with the Government of the Comoros to play a positive role in this fragile but friendly Muslim nation. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that my prior experience over 27 years in the Foreign 

Service has prepared me well to serve as Ambassador to Madagascar and the 

Comoros. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with you and other 

members of the committee, and would hope to welcome you during my tenure. I welcome your questions. 

Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Marquardt, very much. 

And, now we will turn to Janet E. Garvey, who’s been nominated 

to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JANET E. GARVEY, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 

Ms. GARVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to appear 

before you as the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador 

to the Republic of Cameroon. I am pleased to be joined here today 

by my friends and colleagues. 

283 

Unfortunately, my family could not join us today, but my Foreign 

Service career has been as important and special to them as it has 

been to me and they will be supporting me fully. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States has important interests to protect and to advance in Cameroon. These include: Promoting democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, protecting 

American citizens, advancing American business, promoting sustainable economic and social development, protecting the tropical 

environment, combating infectious diseases, especially malaria and 

HIV/AIDS, ensuring our energy security, and fighting terror. 

If confirmed by the Senate, and following in the footsteps of my 

colleague and esteemed predecessor, Mr. Marquardt, I will seek to 

expand and improve our bilateral cooperation and dialog. Relative 

to much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, Cameroon has been stable and it has a fairly educated population, a decent infrastructure, 

natural resources, strong agriculture, a growing business base, 

many environmental treasures, and a government which wishes to 

have even closer ties to the United States. If confirmed by the Senate, I will work to deepen existing relationships and seek energetic 

new partnerships in government, business, and civil society. 

Cameroon has parliamentary and local elections scheduled for 

July. These elections offer a new opportunity to prepare for the important Presidential elections in 2011. After these July elections, 

and during my entire tour in Cameroon, should I be confirmed, we 

will continue to encourage a democracy that is inclusive, pluralistic, transparent, and free of intimidation. 

The Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline has been in operation for some 

years now and is continuing to contribute to government revenues. 

This, along with debt relief savings, was evident in the latest government budget, probably the most transparent ever. As public 

awareness about revenues and expenditures grows, so will budget 

planning and transparency. 

If confirmed, I will encourage this process, to help Cameroon 

eradicate its endemic corruption. Transparency will materially improve the business and investment climate, particularly for American firms. We want to be certain that American companies investing in Cameroon can compete in an open environment under the 

rule of law that respects contracts and can, when necessary, seek 

redress through the courts. 

Cameroon is rich in natural resources and biodiversity, and its 

ancient tropical forests are home to unique plant and animal species. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue opportunities to support 

local and regional environmental issues within the Congo Basin 

Forest Partnership and as part of USAID’s regional programs. 

Mr. Chairman, I have spent most of my career serving as a public diplomacy officer. I am convinced that people-to-people diplomacy is among the most important task for our embassies and is 

something that I would strongly continue to pursue. I look forward 

to learning more about Cameroonian culture and working to 

strengthen ties between cultural and educational institutions in the 

United States and Cameroon. 

Finally, I look forward to ensuring that the United States Embassy in Cameroon will provide the best possible service on behalf 

of the American people, and I am honored and excited about the 

284 

prospect of applying my experience and knowledge to my new assignment. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Garvey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANET E. GARVEY, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

as the President’s nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon. I 

am pleased to be joined here by my friends and colleagues. My family could not join 

us today, but my Foreign Service career has been special to them as well as to myself, and they will be supporting me fully. 

The United States has important interests to protect and to advance in Cameroon. 

These include: promoting democracy; respect for human rights and the rule of law; 

protecting American citizens; advancing American business; promoting sustainable 

economic and social development; protecting the tropical environment; combating infectious diseases, especially malaria and HIV/AIDS; ensuring our energy security; 

and fighting terror. 

If confirmed, following my esteemed predecessor, I will seek to expand and improve our bilateral cooperation and dialog. Relative to much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, Cameroon has been stable, and it has a fairly educated population, a 

decent infrastructure, natural resources, strong agriculture, a growing business 

base, many environmental treasures, and a government which wishes to have even 

closer ties to the United States. If confirmed by the Senate, I will work to deepen 

existing relations and seek energetic new partnerships in government, business, and 

civil society. 

Cameroon has parliamentary and local elections scheduled for July. These elections offer a new opportunity to prepare for the Presidential election in 2011. After 

these July elections, and during my entire tour in Cameroon, we will continue to 

encourage a democracy that is inclusive, pluralistic, transparent, and free of intimidation. 

The Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline has been in operation for some years now and 

is contributing to increased government revenues. This, along with debt relief savings, was evident in the latest government budget, probably the most transparent 

one ever. As public awareness about revenues and expenditures grows, so will budget and planning transparency. If confirmed, I will encourage this process, to help 

Cameroon eradicate its endemic corruption. Transparency will materially improve 

the business and investment climate, particularly for American firms. We want to 

be certain that American companies investing in Cameroon can compete in an open 

environment under the rule of law that respects contracts, and can—when necessary—seek redress through the courts. 

Cameroon is rich in natural resources and biodiversity, and its ancient tropical 

forests are home to unique plant and animal species. If confirmed, I will continue 

to pursue opportunities to support local and regional environmental issues within 

the Congo Basin Forest Partnership and as part of USAID’s regional programs. 

I have spent most of my career serving in public diplomacy. I am convinced that 

people-to-people diplomacy is among the most important tasks for our embassies. I 

look forward to learning more about Cameroonian culture and working to strengthen ties between cultural and educational institutions in the United States and Cameroon. 

Finally, I look forward to ensuring that the United States Embassy in Cameroon 

will provide the best possible service on behalf of the American people, and I am 

excited about the prospect of applying my experience and knowledge to my new assignment. 

Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ms. Garvey. 

And, finally we turn to Phillip Carter, III, to be the Ambassador 

to the Republic of Guinea. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILLIP CARTER, III, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the honor of appearing before you today. In addition to my two colleagues sitting with 

285 

me at this table, I am also here with my wife Amanda, and my two 

sons Justin and Andrew. Their love and support has been a source 

of strength for me professionally, as well as personally. I can think 

of no better time or occasion than now to thank them for putting 

up with me as I’ve dragged them around the world for the last 26 

years. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take this opportunity to 

thank the President and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence placed in me as the nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea. I am both humbled and honored by the prospect of 

this assignment and the challenges it represents. 

I am aware of these challenges because in my current position, 

as Director of the Office of West African Affairs, I work closely with 

our Embassies in the subregion to promote democracy, good governance, economic growth, and socioeconomic development. 

I’ve also had the privilege to work with the excellent team at the 

United States mission in Conakry to ensure a peaceful resolution 

to the crisis that gripped Guinea during the first part of this year. 

Though the general strike and civil unrest brought Guinea’s economy to a halt and security forces responded with violent repression, 

there is cause for cautious optimism. These tumultuous events signal, in my opinion, the beginning of a democratic political transition, a journey in which the Guineans have taken their first steps. 

It is the task of the United States and mine, if confirmed as Ambassador, to support their efforts. A key part of this task will be 

to continue to work with the regional and broader international 

community to maintain attention on Guinea at this critical juncture. As a result of the Guinean people’s historic movement, the 

new government under Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate, was, for 

the first time, formed through consultations with that country’s 

unions and civil society. 

Looking forward, we hope to work with the new government on 

its stated priorities of promoting youth employment, judicial independence, macroeconomic stability, political dialogue, and good governance. I believe that engaging Guineans as friends and coequal 

partners in their democratic journey has been the key element to 

our successful diplomatic efforts in Guinea. And, if confirmed as 

Ambassador, I would continue that partnership. 

Despite the recent political turbulence, Guinea has seen some 

welcome economic developments over the last few years, however. 

The recent investments by the United States and other international companies represent both opportunities to develop that 

country’s long-ailing economy, as well as support U.S. business and 

economic interests. With rich reserves of bauxite, gold, diamonds, 

and timber, as well as tremendous agricultural and hydroelectric 

potential, even greater opportunities to further our common goals 

remain. 

If confirmed as Ambassador to Guinea, I would continue the mission’s efforts to help the new government meet the demands of the 

people for more representative, democratic, and transparent governance. In addition, I would reinforce our efforts to help the people of Guinea benefit from the fruits of broad-based economic 

growth. Finally, I would stand ready to help Guinea harness its 

286 

rich natural resource base in a sustainable way to serve the needs 

of current and future generations. 

Thank you again, Chairman Feingold, for today’s hearing. And, 

with your permission, I would like to submit my fuller written testimony to the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILLIP CARTER, III, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee—thank you—Chairman Feingold, 

Ranking Member Sununu, and the members of the committee for the honor of appearing before you today. I am not alone. With me are my wife, Amanda, and my 

sons, Justin and Andrew. Their love and support has been a source of strength for 

me professionally as well as personally. I would also like to thank the President and 

Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence placed in me as the nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea. I am both humbled and honored by the prospect 

of this assignment and the challenges it represents. 

Over the course of my 26-year career as a Foreign Service officer, I have had the 

distinct privilege and pleasure of representing the people and Government of the 

United States in Mexico, Canada, Malawi, Bangladesh, Madagascar, and Gabon. In 

my previous Washington assignments, I have had the opportunity to promote U.S. 

economic policies bilaterally and multilaterally, working with colleagues at Treasury, USAID, the World Bank, and the IMF on such issues as the Caribbean Basin 

Initiative (CBI), The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Heavily 

Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt program. In my current position as Director of 

the Office of West African Affairs, I have worked closely with our embassies in the 

subregion in the promotion of democracy, good governance, economic growth, and socioeconomic development. I have also had the privilege to work with the excellent 

team in the United States mission in Conakry to ensure a peaceful resolution to the 

recent crisis that can move Guinea toward greater democratic governance. 

Though the general strike and civil unrest brought Guinea’s economy to a halt, 

and the security forces responded with violent repression, there is cause for cautious 

optimism. These tumultuous events may signal the beginning of a democratic political transition which has also created an opportunity for transformational diplomacy—that is to use ‘‘America’s diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better 

their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures.’’ 

Guineans have taken the first steps on this journey. It is the task of the United 

States and mine—if confirmed as Ambassador—to support their efforts. A key part 

of this task will be to continue to work with the regional and broader international 

community to maintain attention on Guinea at this critical turning point. 

Until the recent political unrest, Guinea was often described as a ‘‘bulwark of stability’’ in a volatile subregion. Guinea opened its borders to refugees from neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone, both of which are only now emerging from bitter 

civil conflicts. Guinea’s achievable challenge is to regain its previous reputation for 

stability and to ensure long-lasting peace in the subregion. 

In the 49 years since independence, Guinea’s leadership has failed to mobilize the 

country’s abundant natural resources to the benefit of its people. Guinea’s history 

of autocratic rule under Presidents Sekou Toure and Lansana Conte has left the 

country without strong democratic institutions that can address the rampant corruption and mismanagement, which have decimated the economy. 

For the first time since independence Guineans have organized en masse to demand political change from the nation’s leadership. As a result of their historic 

movement, the new government under Prime Minister Lasana Kouyate was—for the 

first time—formed through consultations with that country’s unions and civil society. Looking forward, we hope to work with the new government on the stated priorities of promoting youth employment, judicial independence, macroeconomic stability, political dialog, and good governance. I believe that engaging Guineans as 

friends and coequal partners in their journey toward achieving these goals has been 

the key element to our successful diplomatic efforts in Guinea. If confirmed as Ambassador, I will continue this partnership. 

Guinea faces a tough road ahead as the economy recovers from the unrest and 

2-month standstill. To halt the violence temporarily, the previous government 

agreed to economic concessions on rice and fuel which may further skew Guinea’s 

terms of trade. If Guinea is to succeed in normalizing its strained relations with the 

international financial institutions, Guinea’s international partners must engage the 

country’s leadership in a frank, open, and honest discussion about the impact of 

287 

such policies. The recent crisis has also highlighted the fragility of Guinea’s delivery 

systems for health, food, and physical protection. If confirmed, I will build upon the 

excellent efforts of my predecessor to help build the capacity of Guinea’s authorities 

to deliver the benefits of economic and political good governance to the people. 

Despite a turbulent political environment, Guinea has seen some welcome economic developments in the last few years. The recent, and in some cases long-term, 

investments of United States and United States-invested companies such as Alcoa, 

Global Alumina, Hyperdynamics, and others represent both opportunities to develop 

Guinea’s long ailing economy, as well as to support United States business and economic interests. With rich reserves of barite, gold, diamonds, and iron, as well as 

tremendous agricultural and hydroelectric potential, even greater opportunities to 

further our common goals remain. 

If confirmed as Ambassador to Guinea, I will continue the mission’s efforts to help 

the new government meet the demands of the people for more representative, democratic, and transparent governance. The United States has an important role to play 

in Guinea, as a friend, to help the people benefit from the fruits of broad-based economic growth. Moreover, we stand ready to help Guinea harness its rich natural resource base in a sustainable way that serves the needs of current and future generations. 

Thank you again, Chairman Feingold and Ranking Member Sununu, for today’s 

hearing. I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection. All of you can submit 

longer statements if you wish. Thank you very much, all of you, for 

your testimony. I’ll begin the questioning with Mr. Marquardt. 

Mr. Marquardt, what experiences and lessons from your tenure 

as Ambassador to Cameroon will you take with you to your new 

post? 

Mr. MARQUARDT. Well, during my time in Cameroon we focused 

a lot on building democracy and promoting good governance, particularly fighting corruption. Cameroon has been an aspiring Millennium Challenge Account country. We’ve used that, I think, as 

leverage to reinforce changes that the government would like to 

promote, in any case. And, I think they’re moving forward on all 

of these different issues. 

Madagascar seems to be in a different place, with respect to most 

of these issues. Democratization, of course, is a success story with 

the President having been elected twice, most recently in December. And, so I would say that my experience in Cameroon has given 

me some insights into the difficulties involved in these, in these 

issues, but in a different environment. 

With respect to fighting corruption, I think, again, Madagascar 

is further along, having established institutions that are in place 

that have a proven track record that we can support. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Excuse me. Have you ever visited Madagascar or Comoros? 

Mr. MARQUARDT. No, I never have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. As you know, unlike in Cameroon, the United 

States mission in Madagascar is responsible for a large USAID 

mission, as well as United States programs funded by the President’s Malaria Initiative and the Millennium Challenge Account. 

Do you have experience overseeing and coordinating such diverse 

projects? 

Mr. MARQUARDT. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, that you’ve identified the single greatest challenge that awaits me if I am confirmed, 

in Madagascar. Indeed, we do have a large and diverse aid program. I think tallying up all the different programs that we have, 

including the Millennium Challenge Account Program, it comes to 

over $60 million a year. 

288 

Cameroon has a much more modest program, but I was very 

much engaged in overseeing the activities of USAID, of the Ambassador Self-Help Program, the Girls Scholarship Fund, and every 

other program that we had in Cameroon. But, I do see this as a 

challenge to, kind of, go up to the next level and engage with my 

AID Director and the Millennium Challenge Corporation people 

that are on site. I look forward to that challenge. 

Senator FEINGOLD. How will you ensure that U.S. resources contribute to key U.S. policy objectives and do not fall prey to mismanagement or corruption? 

Mr. MARQUARDT. One of the first things that I’ll be paying attention to is how the new foreign assistance coordination process that 

Ambassador Tobias has put into place will play out in the ground. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the objective of this new approach is 

to better align foreign policy objectives with the development objectives. It’s new and, of course, in Madagascar we have the very first 

MCC country. So, there will be certain, certain experiences there 

that will be playing out for the first time anywhere in the world, 

in Madagascar, and I’ll be doing my best to make sure that we do 

that successfully and carefully. 

With respect to the challenge of preventing—avoiding corruption 

and making good use of resources, I think it’s a matter of vigilance, 

asking questions, holding people accountable, turning over the 

rocks, if you will. You can count on me to do that if I’m confirmed. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

As you know, the suspected mastermind behind the 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was 

from Comoros. Could you please provide a brief overview of the cooperation between the United States and Comoros and can you discuss what Comoros’ geographic location means for this cooperation? 

Would you like to alter or amend this cooperation? 

Mr. MARQUARDT. Well, I think we are in a period of opportunity 

with respect to the Comoros. It is a new Muslim democracy. The 

country is, I think, 99 percent Muslim. The President was elected 

in a free and fair election. He has reached out to us here in the 

United States and in his capitol. In fact, this week, we have our 

very first-ever bilateral policy dialog going on between the Ambassador and the Director of East African Affairs on the one hand and, 

I believe, one of the President’s key advisors on the other, to discuss opportunities. 

Presently we have—our assistance is limited to a $280,000 education program, and then we also have FMF support that’s designed exactly to bolster their capacity to deal with counterterrorism challenges in the Mozambique Channel between Tanzania, 

Mozambique, and Madagascar. I’ve become aware that the combined Joint Task Force of the Horn of Africa is operating across the 

lines of PACOM, UECOM, and CENTCOM very effectively in the 

area, including involving Comoran officials in understanding, sort 

of, the state of the art of combating terrorism on a regional basis. 

So, there’s a start there, but I’m afraid that we’re going to have 

to do a lot more with, in view of the potential for other countries 

that don’t share our democratic and free market values, stepping 

in if we do not. 

289 

Senator FEINGOLD. Fair enough. What potential is there for the 

growth of a radical militant Islam in Comoros? 

Mr. MARQUARDT. Well, it’s a deeply impoverished country and to 

the extent that terrorism has its roots in poverty, there’s definitely 

a need to engage in health and education programs that the population will see as responsive to their most, most pressing needs. I 

don’t think, however, that Harun Fazul is representative of the 

people of the Comoros. He seems to have, as many Comorans that 

have sought education have done, he’s left, he left the country at 

an early age and his radicalization took place elsewhere. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. 

The committee will stand in recess until I’m able to return from 

the votes and resume questioning. 

Thank you. 

[Recess at 9:50 a.m.] 

[On the record at 10:25 a.m.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. I call the committee back to order and thank 

you for your patience as we got through those two votes. And, 

thank you, Mr. Marquardt. 

Now, I’ll turn to Ms. Garvey. I see that you have extensive experience working in public diplomacy for the United States and you 

spent a lot of time in former Soviet countries. Can you explain to 

me how that experience will assist you in managing the United 

States mission in Cameroon? 

Ms. GARVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that my experience will be helpful in a number of ways. First, most of the countries I have been in have gone through or are going through transitions. They are countries that, as you said, do not have deeply established roots of democracy, countries that need to work harder on 

promoting human rights and transparency in government, countries that are in need of improving their attractiveness to foreign 

investors. I think these are the kinds of things that will be important, should I be confirmed, in Cameroon as well. 

I also have had the great good fortune of serving in South Africa 

during the time when President Mandela became President, and I 

remain deeply inspired by that experience. Watching Africans take 

control of their destiny and a commitment to democracy that I 

think exceeds many other countries where I have served. 

I did run an Embassy in Budapest that was lucky enough to 

have USAID mission and other programs that will also be present 

in Cameroon. So, I believe that experience will help me as well. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Although Cameroon, as you’ve indicated, is relatively stable, its 

neighbors, particularly Chad and the Central African Republic, are 

decidedly less so. In fact, the unrest in Chad and the CAR has sent 

an estimated 30,000 refugees fleeing into Cameroon whose shared 

border with the two countries stretches 125 miles. What skills and 

experiences do you have that could assist you in dealing with the 

humanitarian needs and conflict-related situations should the circumstances in CAR and Chad persist or worsen? 

Ms. GARVEY. First, I would seek to work with the Government 

of Cameroon to make sure that they have the ability and the resources at hand to help, should they need to house these refugees. 

290 

I know that UNHCR has been involved in setting up some facilities 

for refugees. 

I have in the previous post, in Bosnia for example, worked with 

displaced persons and with refugees and believe that, although the 

situation is very different for these particular people, that the trauma of being forced to leave your home and having to live, for sometimes a very long time, in these makeshift facilities is very hard. 

And, I believe that I will be able to work with our colleagues in 

Cameroon and also the international community to do what we can 

to help alleviate some of that suffering. 

Senator FEINGOLD. How could Cameroon play a positive role in 

the region? What initiatives will you undertake to help Cameroon 

achieve its potential as a stabilizing force? 

Ms. GARVEY. I think that is a very good question, Mr. Chairman. 

I believe that Cameroon is ready and I would like to see us encourage Cameroon to step up to play a more active role. I would like 

to see us working with the Cameroonian Government and military 

to place a larger role in peacekeeping in Africa. I believe that we 

have some resources where we can help with training to make sure 

their, their troops are able to carry out that process. 

I also believe that the experience Cameroon has had with Nigeria 

in solving the Bakassi Peninsula issue peacefully, is a good model 

and a way for them to show to their neighbors that there are ways 

to resolve differences peacefully. 

Senator FEINGOLD. To what degree do you believe that public 

sector corruption—which has long been reported to be a problem in 

Cameroon—still persists? 

Ms. GARVEY. I believe that the problem has not been solved. I believe that there is still a lot of work to be done. I have been very 

inspired by Ambassador Marquardt’s work at raising that issue. I 

think that the Government of Cameroon itself has acknowledged 

that this is an issue. They are working to establish institutions and 

agencies that will help address this problem. I also think it’s important that we work with the media to help develop skills to uncover this, these issues and to make sure that they do it in a way 

that represents responsible coverage of public officials. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, how effective has the government’s 

anticorruption efforts been and what is the impetus behind these 

efforts? 

Ms. GARVEY. A couple of things, I think, Mr. Chairman. I think 

that it’s a good start. I don’t think that we can say that we are, 

have completed the process yet. I think we have seen some good 

first steps. I would like to see the government continue with some 

of the prosecutions that it has begun. I think that that sends an 

important signal to, both the people of Cameroon and to other potential officials who might think of corruption as a way enrich 

themselves. 

I also think that we need to continue to hold out the possibility 

of joining the Millennium Challenge Account Program. These, this 

gives us some standards that we would like to see Cameroon reach. 

And, I know that they’re interested in achieving that so, I think it’s 

a good way for us to encourage them to continue on this path. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your answers, Ms. Garvey. 

291 

Mr. Carter, can you outline for me the current United States priorities in Guinea and whether they’ve changed with the recent appointment of Prime Minister Kouyate? Do you think his appointment was a step in the right direction, and if so, why? 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. Essentially, our priorities in Guinea are rather clear cut in light of what 

we see with the events over the past several months. Primarily, our 

focus is to improve governance, to improve the sense of political dialog that is developing in the country, and to reinforce the momentum that has been developed over the past few months as a result 

of this movement by the Guinean people to address problems of 

corruption, poor governance, and the inability of government to deliver services. Our priority will be and has been to reinforce that, 

has been to reinforce that process. And, if confirmed, I would continue that, that effort. 

In addition, it’s the, tying the issue of governance to other sectors 

is also what we are looking to do. For example, regarding the provision of health services, the poor service delivery has constrained 

what that country can achieve, in terms of reducing problems of illness, child morbidity, and innfant mortality. The problem of poor 

education, the lack of infrastructure or transportation, areall of 

these things, these problems are derived from the lack of governance that has existed in that country for a number of years. 

We’ll also look at improving husbandry of the country’s natural 

resources, looking toward greater accountability by the Government and the private sector in the utilization and exploitation of 

those resources, as well as looking at environmental protection. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I feel very strongly that the United States 

has to be more forward-thinking in developing strategies to prevent, or at least respond, to crises abroad. What steps will you take 

as ambassador to proactively address growing public dissatisfaction 

in Guinea and help officials here in Washington think through 

what might be needed to assist Guinea at this pivotal time? 

Mr. CARTER. That’s a difficult question. If confirmed as Ambassador, I would look to open the channels of communication. What 

I have seen in the context of crises, not just within Guinea, but in 

other parts of West Africa and East Africa, is that much of the 

challenge in resolving these conflicts is the lack of communication. 

An American Ambassador can play a pivotal role in making sure 

that all parties in a conflict understand and appreciate the objectives of the other side. That is something that I would, if confirmed, would try to, try to foster. 

In addition to that, communicating back to Washington, providing a three-dimensional picture of the situation there that goes 

beyond what people may pick up from local or international media 

and press. The three-dimensional image is important to convey because, as you understand, if we look at questions of human rights 

violations, they have to be addressed within a context that also 

looks at the capacity of the Government to respond, the ability of 

civil society to engage, as well as the ability of the people themselves to communicate through an unfettered media. 

292 

Senator FEINGOLD. What do you see as the worst-case scenario 

that could befall Guinea. 

Mr. CARTER. Well, Guinea is in a period of transition right now, 

Mr. Chairman. The greatest crisis would be if the momentum of 

the reform movement that is present now would be stalled. The result of which would be an eruption of violence, and probably, a 

military coup that would simply halt any further political dialog in 

the country. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And of course, related to that, the neighborhood in which Guinea is located is extremely fragile, with Sierra 

Leone and Liberia recently emerging from brutal civil wars, while 

instability continues to plague Cote d’Ivoire. What mechanisms 

exist for you to monitor regional stability and what would you like 

to see put in place? 

Mr. CARTER. Well, I think I bring somewhat of a unique perspective to that, having served as the Director for West African Affairs 

at the State Department. I see the issues as they interconnect. 

What I would like to do is foster greater communication with colleagues at the other American Embassies in the region. I would 

look not just in the Mano River Union Region, but also Mali, for 

example, as well as places which do not necessarily share a border, 

such as Senegal, to gain a greater sense of perspective of what my 

colleagues in other Missions are facing, and to try to see if there 

is a common thread. In that way perhaps, via in my engagement 

with Washington, if confirmed, I could provide a clear justification 

of the kind of resources that can be brought to bear within the context of Guinea which also has a regional impact. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I know that for several years now, the United 

States Mission in Guinea has managed a military assistance program and that more than $330,000 has been allocated to support 

military training for the Guinean Army in 2007. Given the inexcusable brutality the Army displayed in response to the strikes earlier 

this year, I’d like to know more about the scale and nature of 

United States military assistance to the Guinean armed forces and 

whether this includes human rights training? Do you think you 

could talk a bit about that? 

Mr. CARTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the question. 

We have been looking at this issue quite closely, particularly following the violence that occurred in January. Our IMET International Military Education and Training program is there to assist and to develop a better understanding of civil-military relations. 

The type of seminars and training that we’ve provided to the 

military have been to underscore the importance of a military that 

remains apolitical, that remains in their barracks, and does not 

necessarily see itself as a political institution. Believe it or not, that 

type of, those seminars over the past 3 or 4 years have been increasingly important within the military. We’ve been seeing a 

greater participation, increased interest by the military, to participate in these seminars. 

In addition, we have provided professional training to military officers. Within that context, human rights training is fully integrated, both in terms of the civil-military relations seminars and 

in terms of some of the professional training that we provide under 

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IMET. The program is limited to about $500,000 currently, but one 

of the things we will continue to do—and what we are taking stock 

within the Bureau of African Affairs and my office particularly, and 

what our Embassy is looking at—is how do we move forward, given 

what has happened in January? To ensure that participants are 

fully vetted, and that those individuals who perpetuated the violence are held accountable. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Carter. 

I thank all of you for your answers to my questions, and your patience, and I congratulate you on your nomination. We will try to 

move this along as quickly as we can and wish you well in your 

new posts, should you be confirmed by the full committee and the 

U.S. Senate. 

That concludes the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF PHILLIP CARTER, III, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Increasingly frequent reports have revealed that Guinean security 

forces are responsible for widespread abuses against the civilian population, including rape, robbery, torture, and more than 110 killings from mid-January to mid-February 2007. The Guinean Government seems either unable or unwilling to control 

the country’s security forces. If confirmed, what steps will you take to see that the 

Guinean security forces respect the country’s obligations under international law 

and that appropriate action against perpetrators of abuses is taken? 

Answer. The response of the Guinean security forces to the recent public protest 

was unacceptable and the Department of State joined the international community 

in condemning those actions publicly. If confirmed as Ambassador, I would continue 

the efforts of the United States mission in Conakry to push the Government of 

Guinea to conduct a credible and transparent investigation into the violence and to 

hold accountable those individuals responsible for the violence, irrespective of their 

position in the security forces or civil administration. I would also give attention to 

broader allegations of abuse and impunity by members of Guinean security forces. 

The recent events have demonstrated the need for continued and increased United 

States engagement with Guinea’s military. If confirmed as Ambassador, I would 

continue to emphasize the need for Guinea’s security forces to heal the rift in civilmilitary relations, which the recent events have created. Since 2004, the U.S. mission has held a series of seminars to promote civil-military dialog. The objective of 

United States military assistance in Guinea is to encourage the development of a 

military leadership that manages operations honestly and effectively and that understands and promotes the appropriate role of the military in a democracy. 

Through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the 

U.S. mission is providing Guinean military officers with training that encourages 

professional development, leadership, and transparent personnel/resource management, and emphasizes appreciation for rule of law and human rights. 

Question. Civil society was once thought to be a weak voice for change in Guinea, 

but that seems to be changing. Since last February, the country has been paralyzed 

on three occasions by nationwide general strikes initiated by trade unions and other 

civil society groups against corruption, bad governance, and deteriorating economic 

conditions, culminating most recently in the appointment of a new Prime Minister. 

What steps can you take to further strengthen civil society in Guinea and its ability 

to serve as a watchdog against the corruption and impunity that plague the country? 

Answer. The appointment of Prime Minister Kouyate was a victory for Guinea’s 

nascent civil society, which successfully articulated the demands of the Guinean 

people for government transparency, accountability, and effectiveness. However, 

civil society in Guinea continues to lack the capacity to participate actively and effectively in governance. If confirmed as Ambassador, I would increase the mission’s 

focus on democracy promotion and continue to integrate democracy and 

294 

anticorruption efforts with the mission’s work in the education, health, and natural 

resource management sectors. By focusing on anticorruption and consensus building 

mechanisms at the local, regional, and national levels, the mission will have the 

flexibility to support programs relevant to the changing political environment in 

Guinea. Depending on the evolving circumstances, these efforts may involve support 

for multistakeholder dialogs and institutional development assistance for executive, 

legislative, judicial, and independent institutions. Specific actions the mission may 

take would include leadership and management training for civil society leaders, 

strengthening the National Communication Council, providing technical assistance 

and start-up grants to community radio stations and supporting national advocacy 

campaigns that promote citizen participation and democratic governance. In 2006, 

the U.S. Government trained and strengthened over 748 community-based organizations. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts and increase the number of community-based organizations trained. 

Question. When he recently came into office, Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate indicated that one of his highest priorities was strengthening the judicial sector, a sector that has traditionally lacked independence from the executive and suffered from 

allegations of widespread corruption. Indeed, the judicial sector is in very bad shape. 

Most courthouses lack a single computer. The accused often languish for years in 

prison while waiting for a trial. In many cases, those waiting for trial are being held 

based on a confession extracted under torture. What steps can you take to help 

strengthen the judicial sector, this fundamental pillar of the rule of law? 

Answer. Guinea’s judiciary is subject to rampant corruption and undue executive 

influence. It was President Conte’s interference in the legitimate judicial proceedings against alleged corrupt public officials that helped spark the recent protests. Moreover, the government and the judiciary have yet to hold accountable 

those responsible for the bloody response of the security forces to the public protest 

in June 2006 and early 2007. 

To maximize the impact of U.S. assistance on the judicial system, I would focus 

the mission’s efforts on anticorruption to support activities such as technical assistance and training for civil society and government agencies in advocacy and oversight, institutional strengthening for the national anticorruption agency; and capacity-building for judicial institutions focused on corruption. 

If confirmed as Ambassador, I would also continue the mission’s work to combat 

torture and other human rights abuses in prisons. The mission has funded programs, which focus on the judicial process. Through our partnerships with local and 

international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), under my leadership the mission would bring attention to the plight of individuals in the prison system and develop partnerships between the Ministry of Justice, prosecutors, attorneys, and 

judges to improve case load administration and accelerate the adjudication of cases 

involving pretrial detention. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in the 

Republic of Guinea? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy in the Republic of Guinea? What do you hope 

to accomplish through these actions? 

If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific human 

rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will 

you face in the Republic of Guinea in advancing human rights and democracy in 

general? 

In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion of human 

rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage 

in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior 

service? 

Answer. Guinea’s human rights situation remains poor. Security forces unlawfully 

killed, abused, and arbitrarily arrested civilians. Despite continued efforts to improve its capacity to combat trafficking in persons, the problem remains. Though the 

government took significant steps to improve freedom of the press by implementing 

a 2005 media liberalization decree, private media was targeted during the recent 

violence of January and February 2007. While the new government has expressed 

a commitment to human rights, they have yet to hold accountable those members 

of the security forces responsible to the January/February losses of life. 

If confirmed as Ambassador, I would continue to call publicly and privately for 

the restoration of democracy and the respect for human rights. The United States 

mission in Guinea is uniquely positioned to approach the Government of Guinea, 

as a friend, in a frank, open, and honest dialog about the human rights deficiencies 

295 

and successes in Guinea. As Ambassador, I would continue the efforts of my predecessor to further the political dialog among the government, opposition, civil society, 

and the military. Through USAID Development Assistance, the Democracy and 

Human Rights fund, and military assistance, the mission should build upon the 

progress Guinea has made in media freedoms and focus efforts on improving Guinea’s judiciary, accountability, and provision of basic services. 

Despite the installation of the new government, significant challenges to human 

rights remain. The United States mission must continue to encourage that Guinea’s 

political transition remain democratic, civilian-led, and peaceful. Through our dialog 

with the government, opposition, civil society, and unions, we must work to show 

Guinea’s political elite that sustained and substantive political reform are in the 

best interests of all Guineans. Of particular concern in this regard is to ensure that 

Guineans’ political rights, including their right to choose their own government, are 

protected. 

As Ambassador, I would ensure that the Mission Operational and Mission Strategic Plans continue to reflect an integrated, multisectoral approach to promoting 

democracy, human rights, and accountability. To ensure that all of the relevant personnel in the mission are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service, I would include a focus on human rights and democracy promotion in the work 

requirements of Foreign Service officers as well as certain locally employed staff. To 

recognize outstanding achievements in the promotion of democracy and human 

rights, I would work to ensure that qualified candidates in the mission received the 

fullest consideration for the awards the Department offers. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. Between 1989–1992, I served in Malawi during the last years of President Hastings Banda, a dictator who had run the country as a one-party state since 

its independence. Using State funding, I helped develop that country’s legal aid society and several local democracy NGOs. I also supported the development of underground opposition parties and helped initiate a movement that led to multiparty 

elections in 1994. 

As Charge d’Affaires at the United States Embassy in Antananarivo, Madagascar, 

I was the lead foreign diplomat that urged the government of President Ratsiraka 

to hold free and fair presidential elections. When his regime attempted to manipulate the election, I led a group of donors to respond in a coordinated manner. When 

Ratsiraka refused to accept his loss and sought to split the country via civil war, 

I led the donor community in its efforts to mediate the crisis. Ratsiraka finally accepted the polls’ results and fled the country the day after the U.S. Government recognized Mark Ravalomanana as the legitimate head of state. When the 

Ravalomanana administration held parliamentary elections the following year, I led 

the U.S. Government mission in a multidonor support effort that provided financial 

and technical assistance. 

As Director of West African Affairs, I have supported the effort to have democratic 

elections in Liberia, Benin, Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Sierra 

Leone. I also participated as an observer in the Liberian presidential runoff election 

that brought Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Africa’s first female President, to office. 

RESPONSES OF JANET E. GARVEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. There continue to be reports of slavery and trafficking of children for 

the purposes of forced labor in the Republic of Cameroon. If confirmed, what concrete steps will you take to address these issues? What do you hope to accomplish 

through these actions? 

Answer. Cameroon has criminalized child trafficking for all purposes and child 

slavery since 2005, and police have made some arrests in the past 2 years. But statistical data is lacking, and prosecution and conviction efforts are weak. Local and 

national police agencies lack professionalism and investigative capacity. The government operates shelters in all 10 provincial capitals and has an ongoing prevention 

campaign, though its funding is sporadic. If confirmed, one of my key goals will be 

to maintain pressure on the government to continue its prevention campaign and 

to step up enforcement, particularly by increasing its efforts to protect victims and 

encourage them, where appropriate, to cooperate with law enforcement to track 

down their traffickers. As noted above, prosecution efforts are weak and I will encourage the government to accept training and education programs for the judiciary 

296 

to improve sensitivity to trafficking issues. I also believe it necessary to find ample 

funding, including U.S. assistance, to continue and augment the level of awareness 

campaigns aimed at potential victims and their families. Ultimately, this may prove 

more effective in the long run, although short-term results may be obtained by investigating plantation abuses of children. 

I believe such prevention efforts, coupled with constant, steady pressure on the 

government to step up its enforcement mechanisms will ultimately generate real 

and measurable decreases in child trafficking. 

Question. Beyond the issue addressed in the previous question, what do you view 

as the most pressing human rights issues in the Republic of Cameroon? What are 

the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy 

in the Republic of Cameroon? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. Fortunately, the embassy’s current Mission Performance Plan has promoting and strengthening democracy and human rights as its top objectives. This 

gives me the advantage of stepping into an area to which the embassy staff is already committed. The most pressing human rights issues are the government’s lack 

of consistent support of free speech, including freedom of the press, and its intolerance of political opposition. If confirmed, these would be my highest personal priorities in the area of human rights. 

Also, the Cameroonian Government has not always given its minority populations 

equal rights, and I would push officials, both publicly and privately, as my predecessor has done, to realize that this cannot continue if Cameroon is serious about 

seeking closer relations with the United States. The government must consistently 

respect the rights of a free press. I will continue the embassy’s programs providing 

information and training sessions to local reporters and editors, focusing on building 

capacity and improving journalistic professionalism, accuracy, and impartiality. 

I firmly believe that, if I am confirmed, I will have some success in moving the 

Government of Cameroon to be more tolerant of the basic civil rights of free speech 

and free press. This will, in turn, help the battle against corruption and lack of 

transparency in overall governance. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous answers? What challenges 

will you face in the Republic of Cameroon in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. If confirmed, I believe my biggest obstacles in implementing better efforts 

to fight child trafficking will be twofold: The lack of professionalism and investigative capacity of law enforcement agencies, and the lack of consistent funding to support government prevention and victim protection efforts. As for promotion of democracy and human rights, there is the difficulty of overcoming the unwillingness 

of the Biya administration to take controversial actions, even when the President 

sincerely believes they are the right thing to do. Another major obstacle is the government’s tendency to view press reporting as irresponsible, libelous, or seditious, 

and hence seeks to repress freedom of speech and press. 

With regard to democracy and human rights in general, I believe my biggest challenges, if I am confirmed as Ambassador, will be to achieve cooperation from the 

government to loosen its constant unwillingness to take risks that are necessary to 

actively advance human rights and democracy. My predecessor has done this very 

well, and I will continue in his tracks, adapting my approaches as the situation dictates. 

I also believe that there are more direct efforts we can make to overcome resistance to free and fair elections in Cameroon, possibly the biggest obstacle to democratic progress. The upcoming July elections are important, but there are indications that only about one-half of the voting age population is registered, and they 

are mostly in areas considered friendly to the current administration. If confirmed, 

I will make sure that the embassy does everything in its power to take the lessons 

learned from the upcoming elections to assure a better Presidential election takes 

place in 2011. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. As for the first question, I am fortunate that the Embassy in Yaounde 

is already solidly grounded in the importance of human rights promotion, and the 

concept of strengthening democratic systems is the No. 1 goal as formally outlined 

297 

in the Mission Performance Plan. If confirmed, I will ensure the problems and 

issues remain high on the agendas for appropriate team and individual meetings. 

To ensure that all of the relevant personnel in the mission are encouraged and 

professionally rewarded for superior service, I would include a focus on human 

rights and democracy promotion in the work requirements of Foreign Service officers as well as certain locally employed staff. To recognize outstanding achievements in the promotion of democracy and human rights, I would work to ensure 

that qualified candidates in the mission received the fullest consideration for the 

awards the Department offers. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. Human rights promotion and protection has been a vital part of my career in the Foreign Service. 

In Hungary, I supervised our efforts to promote Roma integration into Hungarian 

society. Roma remain subject to significant discrimination, and we targeted much 

of our small assistance program and some of our public diplomacy funding to help 

improve the status of Roma in Hungary. As a result of programs funded and run 

by the embassy, we promoted training for young Roma journalists to help ensure 

that the image of Roma in Hungarian media was fair and accurate. We also worked, 

through USAID grants, to improve the health conditions for Roma women and children. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, I implemented a wide-ranging program of civic education, CIVITAS, throughout the school systems. We created a program that helped 

introduce students to their rights as citizens of a new democracy. We used the 

CIVITAS program to promote interethnic cooperation and to encourage young 

Bosnians to lobby their governments—at all levels—to ensure greater transparency 

and more responsible government. 

In South Africa, we implemented a wide range of programs in townships to promote local democratic efforts. We supported local radio and other media to help promote a free and independent press. We encouraged educational reform to enable all 

South Africans to benefit from economic opportunities through education. We also 

worked with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to support its efforts to document the true history of the apartheid regime. We brought a number of legal and 

judicial experts to work with the commission as it completed its important work. 

RESPONSES OF R. NIELS MARQUARDT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. The 2006 Country Report on Human Rights Practices noted several 

areas in which civil rights are routinely violated in the Republic of Madagascar. 

These violations include the use of excessive force by security forces to disperse 

demonstrators, the arbitrary arrest of demonstrators, and harsh prison conditions. 

If confirmed, what actions will you take to encourage respect for freedom of speech 

and the rights of demonstrators in the Republic of Madagascar? 

Answer. The embassy already hosts a monthly Human Rights Working Group 

with civic organizations to provide a regular forum to discuss human rights topics. 

The group includes several NGOs and community leaders. The embassy often invites Malagasy officials to participate, thus improving communication between government and civil society. 

If confirmed, I will continue my predecessor’s practice of privately and publicly 

making clear to the Government of Madagascar that the United States expects it 

to honor its obligations to protect civic rights including freedom of speech and assembly. In my contacts with the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet, I will emphasize that human rights abuses damage Madagascar’s international reputation as 

a democracy. In public speeches and written statements, I will call on the Malagasy 

public to hold their leaders to a high standard on human rights. 

The State Department’s annual Human Rights Report already catches the attention of Malagasy authorities; I am told the Office of Good Governance at the Presidency includes progress in key human rights areas, as covered in our report, to be 

performance indicators for their work. If confirmed, I will reinforce this powerful 

and explicit advocacy tool, both calling attention to chronic problems and highlighting successes when they are accomplished. 

Question. Beyond the issue addressed in the first question, what do you view as 

the most pressing human rights issues in the Republic of Madagascar? What do you 

view as the most pressing human rights issues in the Union of Comoros? What are 

298 

the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and democracy 

in both of these countries? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. In Madagascar, while force and detention directed at demonstrators are 

significant human rights violations, I would identify prison conditions as the most 

pressing human rights issue. Overcrowded prisons are in deplorable conditions; 

many prisoners are malnourished and some actually die of starvation. More than 

half are incarcerated in pretrial detention, denied due process. The International 

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had to suspend its work in prisons in 2006 due 

to inadequate cooperation from the government. Political ‘‘will’’ and statements are 

not sufficient. Concrete actions to provide humane conditions for all prisoners must 

be taken on an urgent basis. The backlog of pretrial detainees must be cleared to 

reduce overcrowding and to provide due process to alleged criminals. As a democracy and a responsible nation, Madagascar must meet its responsibilities to its citizens who have been accused of breaking the law. 

I have learned that Malagasy public opinion does not support efforts to improve 

prison conditions; that traditionally prisoners ‘‘get what they deserve in the popular 

view.’’ If confirmed, I will embark on a public diplomacy campaign, with our Human 

Rights Working Group and via the media, to educate the population as to why it 

is important to treat criminals (and the accused) with decency and within the rule 

of law. A domestic constituency for prisoner’s rights, NGOs, and church groups, will 

reinforce the international community’s pressure on the government. 

In Comoros, fragile democracy has just begun to take hold since the May 2006 

inauguration of President Sambi. The basic human right to a stable, representative 

government has been elusive for most of Comoros’ 30-year history since independence. Given adequate bilateral resources, I will work, together with multilateral organizations like the United Nations and World Bank, with the Comorans to establish and strengthen basic democratic institutions that are accountable to the people. 

President Sambi has already identified the fight against corruption as a top priority 

for his administration; U.S. assistance and advocacy must support his efforts. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in the Republic of Madagascar and in the Union of Comoros 

in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. In both countries, abject poverty, inadequate government resources, and 

lack of capacity are routinely cited as a justification for inaction. While partially 

true, these claims also reflect insufficient political will to take tough steps to reform 

entrenched practices, demand accountability, and insist that all government officials 

from Minister to clerk and police officer, be held to a high standard. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. The only Superior Honor Award granted in Madagascar in recent years 

went to an officer in recognition of her work advancing human rights and combating 

trafficking in persons. The award acknowledged the effectiveness of that officer, but 

also reflected the high priority the mission assigns to all work in promoting human 

rights objectives. Beyond formal awards, I will create professional development opportunities for staff in promoting human rights. These would include a range of public outreach activities, public speaking, and travel throughout the country. 

If confirmed, I will also lead by example, dedicating a significant amount of my 

own time to advancing human rights issues. I can take part in outreach activities 

at the launching of Human Rights and Trafficking in Persons Reports. With small 

grants for human rights and combating human trafficking, we support local NGO 

efforts—I will participate often in these events with my staff. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. The promotion of human rights has been an important activity throughout my career. As Ambassador to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, my team and 

I consistently raised human rights issues publicly and privately, including at the 

highest levels of both governments. Direct results included strong, new laws on trafficking in persons in both countries. 

As Special Coordinator for Diplomatic Readiness 2001–2004, I contributed indirectly but measurably to our capacity to advance human rights and other key policy 

299 

objectives by overseeing the largest hiring program in State Department history. 

Without this effort, we simply would not have had the human resources necessary 

to promote human rights. 

As Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs in Germany 1996–1998, I contributed 

significantly to securing German support for the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 

which now governs member country anticorruption standards vis-a-vis the developing world. 

As Labor Attache in Bangkok 1987–1990, I was the embassy’s point person in 

combating child labor and sensitizing the Thai Government and public opinion to 

worker rights issues. As Thailand at that time had the fastest growing economy in 

the world, it was important to signal publicly and privately the importance of appropriate balance between promoting economic growth and protecting human rights. 

RESPONSES OF R. NIELS MARQUARDT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. As Ambassador to Cameroon in October 2006, you participated in a 

EUCOM regional ambassadors’ conference for Africa in Stuttgart, Germany. Please 

describe the purpose and value of this conference to United States foreign policy coordination and your role as ambassador. 

Answer. The conference was an opportunity for Chiefs of Mission (COMs) in West 

and Central Africa to meet and coordinate with newly-arrived General William 

Ward, the Deputy EUCOM Commander, and key senior EUCOM staff; to exchange 

ideas and perceptions both with EUCOM leadership and with regional counterparts; 

and to help shape EUCOM plans and capabilities. Both my Defense Attache, who 

also attended the conference, and I found the conference valuable in meeting these 

and other objectives. 

Question. Is there any comparable conference or other vehicle for regional discussions held by the Assistant Secretary for Africa, or another office or bureau in the 

State Department? What are they, where are they held, and how often do they take 

place? 

Answer. Since 2004, I have attended an annual Africa Chiefs of Mission (COM) 

Conference each October in Washington hosted by the State Department Africa Bureau Assistant Secretary. 

Question. Is there any comparable conference or other vehicle for regional discussions of interagency actors in the region held by any other U.S. Government agency? 

What are they and how often are they held? 

Answer. The annual Africa COM Conference has also been the venue for subregional discussions, such as among Gulf of Guinea or Central African COMs, on 

policy issues of common concern. Speakers from other agencies are frequently invited to the COM of conferences. 

Question. As Ambassador to Cameroon, did you have the resources to participate 

in this conference or was your participation funded by the Department of Defense? 

Answer. The Africa COM and EUCOM Conferences were coordinated and sequential, allowing me to attend both during a single trip from Cameroon. Travel was 

funded from the State Department budget. 

Question. Describe the video-teleconferencing capacity you had in Cameroon and 

the ability to VTC with other embassies in Africa, with the State Department, or 

with other agencies. Will you have the capability to VTC when you arrive in Madagascar? 

Answer. Embassy Yaounde has a nonsecure video-teleconferencing capability, 

which we use for communication both with Washington and within the region. In 

Madagascar, Embassy Antananarivo provides secure video-teleconferencing capacity. 

Question. As Ambassador to Cameroon, how would you characterize the resources 

available to most effectively support and implement United States policies in the region? 

Answer. In Cameroon, I found I had adequate staffing and operational funds (including travel and representation) to achieve our mission with distinction. However, 

I could have utilized additional program funding to exploit fully opportunities to advance key objectives, such as promoting democratization, the rule of law, the fight 

against corruption, and advancing human rights. Any additional funding made 

available could easily be put to effective use within the overhead constraints of the 

mission, without requiring any additional staffing. 

300 

Question. Since 2001 there has been a significant increase in attention to Africa 

by the United States Government, for a variety of reasons, including dealing with 

United States interests in international security, economic, and social development, 

as well as health and humanitarian response. 

Given your long experience in Africa, including as Special Coordinator for Diplomatic Readiness, how would you describe the overall changes in the level of attention devoted to Africa across the United States Government? 

Answer. The overall level of United States Government attention being devoted 

to Africa clearly has increased dramatically over my 30-year association with the 

continent. Presidents, Secretaries of State, and other cabinet members regularly 

visit Africa today. United States Government resources devoted to Africa have increased threefold during the Bush administration alone. In terms of staffing, I am 

pleased to report that Mission Cameroon is 100 percent staffed at the authorized 

level with qualified, at-grade personnel. I believe that this change reflects, in part, 

the positive impact of the 2001–2004 Diplomatic Readiness Initiative funded by the 

U.S. Congress. 

Question. Have the resources available to the State Department and the allocations within the State Department adequately met the level of increased United 

States interest and policy implementation in Africa? Are they appropriate to the 

leadership/partnership role expected by other agencies engaging in Africa? 

Answer. In Cameroon, I found that staffing and program resources were adequate 

to meet fully the leadership/partnership role expected of me and my staff by other 

agencies. Where I would argue for more resources is in our small but effective assistance programs—such as the Ambassador’s Self-Help Fund and the Democracy 

and Human Rights Fund, and with respect to ESF for policy objectives like democratization and conservation. 

Question. Can you identify areas that you would consider underserved or underresourced that would otherwise improve State Department leadership in our foreign 

policy-making, interagency coordination, or policy implementation in Africa? 

Answer. Additional staff resources and the flexibility to place staff in emerging 

priority areas would enable the State Department to bring its expertise to bear more 

quickly and effectively. Funding to permit travel with appropriate security support 

to dangerous yet priority environments would improve United States leadership in 

Africa. 

RESPONSES OF PHILLIP CARTER, III, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. As Director of the State Department Office for West African Affairs in 

October 2006, you participated in a EUCOM regional Ambassadors’ conference for 

Africa in Stuttgart, Germany. 

Please describe the purpose and value of this conference to United States foreign 

policy coordination and your role as Director of the Office for West African Affairs. 

Is there any comparable conference or other vehicle for regional discussions held 

by your current office, the Assistant Secretary for Africa, or another office or bureau 

in the State Department? What are they, where are they held, and how often do 

they take place? 

Is there any comparable conference or other vehicle for regional discussions of 

interagency actors in the region held by any other U.S. Government agency? What 

are they and how often are they held? 

As Director for West Africa, did you have the resources to participate in the 

EUCOM conference or was your participation funded by another office or agency? 

If so, which one? 

Describe the video-teleconferencing capacity in your office and that of the African 

Affairs Bureau, as well as at each United States Embassy in West Africa. How does 

the availability and capability to VTC in West Africa compare with other United 

States Embassies in Africa as well as other United States Embassies around the 

world? Are you aware of the ability of EUCOM to teleconference? 

Answer. The EUCOM conference for American ambassadors assigned to West and 

Central African states served as a forum for EUCOM to present its perspective toward developments in Africa and to outline a variety of proposed programs in Africa. The conference was extremely useful in working toward integration of EUCOM 

operations even more closely into United States foreign policy priorities for West 

and Central Africa. The conference resulted in much greater communication between my office and EUCOM at both the policy and operational level. As Director, 

301 

I utilized the travel budget resources allocated to the Office of West African Affairs 

(AF/W) by the Africa Bureau’s executive directorate. Only State funds were used for 

my travel and per diem to this useful conference. 

The Africa Bureau (AF) holds digital video conferences on a routine basis (every 

4–6 weeks) at the working level with EUCOM and West African posts that are part 

of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The Office of West African Affairs (AF/W), the Africa Office for Regional and Security Affairs (AF/RSA) 

and the Office of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (S/CT) participate in those 

DVCs. In addition, AF and S/CT have cohosted a meeting in Dakar, Senegal with 

our ambassadors in TSCTP-participating countries and plan to host a similar meeting in June. Moreover, the Africa Bureau hosts an annual Chiefs of Mission 

conference with interagency participation. AF/W also chairs a weekly interagency 

discussion group on issues pertaining to West Africa. I am unaware of any other 

interagency forum on West Africa that is held by another agency. 

The Africa Bureau has VTC capacity with most of our posts in West Africa. VTC 

equipment is located within my office. The quality of VTCs varies from post to post 

and is largely dependent on telecommunications infrastructure in the country. 

EUCOM has provided virtually each ambassador in West Africa with a teleconference device, though this device does not function fully at every post. 

Question. Since 2001 there has been a significant increase in attention to Africa 

by the United States Government, for a variety of reasons, including dealing with 

United States interests in international security, economic and social development, 

as well as health and humanitarian response. 

Given your long experience in Africa, both in the field and here in Washington, 

how would you describe the overall changes in the level of attention devoted to Africa, and West Africa in particular, across the United States Government? 

Have the resources available to the State Department and the allocations within 

the State Department adequately met the level of increased United States interest 

and policy implementation in Africa? Are they appropriate to the leadership/partnership role expected by other agencies engaging in Africa? 

Can you identify areas that you would consider underserved or under-resourced 

that would otherwise improve State Department leadership in our foreign policymaking, interagency coordination, or policy implementation in Africa? 

Answer. Having worked on African issues for nearly 20 years, I know of no other 

occasion when Africa has drawn so much attention from the United States Government and our leadership. The Bush administration has tripled United States assistance to Africa and is a major, if not the principal, bilateral donor on important 

health issues such as HIV/AIDS and malaria prevention. The creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has brought significant economic resources to 

several well-performing African countries. The ongoing development of the Africa 

Command (AFRICOM) is another example of how Africa looms much larger on 

America’s foreign policy agenda than ever before. 

The foreign assistance resources for Africa reflect the increased attention to this 

continent. However, the tripling of United States assistance to Africa has not witnessed a concomitant increase in personnel (both domestically and in the field). 

United States missions in Africa tend to be small posts with relatively junior staffs. 

To take full advantage of increased attention and assistance to Africa, greater 

human resources are required. 

Improved technological resources and capabilities to facilitate communication between the bureau and posts as well as among posts would be helpful. For example: 

The ability to conduct classified and unclassified instant-messaging discussions 

among ambassadors in a particular region would prove very helpful. Greater attention and resources for language training in specific African languages (Hausa, 

Ligala, Somali, Swahili) as well as Arabic would help increase our ability to engage 

local populations and civil society throughout the continent. 

(303) 

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Hughes, Miriam K., to be Ambassador to the Federated States of 

Micronesia 

Hume, Cameron R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia 

Huso, Ravic R., to be Ambassador to the Lao People’s Democratic 

Republic 

Keith, James R., to be Ambassador to Malaysia 

Klemm, Hans G., to be Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of 

Timor-Leste 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer presiding. 

Present: Senators Boxer and Feingold. 

Also present: Senator Murkowski. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Good morning. The hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. We are very pleased today to 

consider five excellent nominees for U.S. Ambassadorial posts 

throughout East Asia and the Pacific. 

As chairman of the subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to chair this full 

Committee hearing and congratulate each of our nominees for making it to this point, and I predict smooth sailing for each of you. 

Because of our many interests and deep longstanding ties in the 

region, it’s critical for the United States to be fully engaged 

throughout East Asia and the Pacific. Coming from California, I 

absolutely feel very strongly about this. 

If we are to remain the region’s leading power, the effectiveness 

of our diplomatic efforts must match our strong military presence. 

As we’ve learned in Iraq, even our most powerful military leaders 

say that diplomacy is the answer, so we cannot turn our back on 

our diplomatic efforts anywhere in the world. 

On Sunday, foreign policy expert James Mann wrote in the 

Washington Post: ‘‘Over the past decade, U.S. foreign policy has 

been dominated by a school of thought that emphasizes military 

power, and has tied the spread of democracy to the use of force. 

304 

Not only has this failed, it has also undermined support for democracy.’’ 

He went on to say that, ‘‘As the United States has been bleeding 

popularity and influence around the world, China has been gaining 

both.’’ 

So in order to compete with the growing influence of China, it 

seems to me the United States must employ a diplomatic surge in 

East Asia and the Pacific to win the battle of ideas and reassure 

our allies that we are truly committed to the region. 

So I am pleased that the administration has nominated five individuals with impressive credentials to serve as U.S. Ambassadors. 

Cameron Hume, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, has more than three decades of diplomatic experience, most recently as the Charge in Khartoum. That’s not an 

easy assignment. Prior to serving in Sudan, he was the Deputy Inspector General of the Department of State. 

James Keith, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador 

to Malaysia, is the current Deputy Special Representative on Avian 

and Pandemic influenza. Prior to this assignment, he served as the 

U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong. Mr. Keith has been working 

on matters relating to East Asia for more than 25 years. 

Miriam Hughes, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia, currently serves as 

U.S. Deputy Representative to the Economic and Social Council of 

the U.S. Mission to the U.N. 

Prior to this, she served as Director of the Office of Policy, Public, and Congressional Affairs in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs at the State Department. Earlier in her career, she 

served as Chief of the Consular Section in Mexico City. 

Hans Klemm, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to East Timor, currently serves as the Minister-Counselor for 

Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. He joined the Foreign Service in 1981. 

Finally, Ravic Huso, the President’s nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, currently serves as Political Advisor to the Commander of the United States Pacific Command. 

Prior to this, he served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Bangkok, 

Thailand. Earlier in his career, he served as Senior Director of the 

National Security Council. 

I want to thank each of our nominees for their willingness to 

serve our Nation, and I look forward to hearing their testimony. 

This is where I will stop. Now, when Senator Murkowski joins 

us, and perhaps Senator Feingold, I’m going to give them an opportunity to make an opening statement, if they so choose. But in the 

meantime, I’m very interested in hearing from all of you. 

Let’s see. Why don’t we start with the Honorable Cameron Hume 

to be Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia? Again, to all of you, 

my deepest thanks for your commitment to our country. 

Ambassador? 

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much. 

Senator BOXER. I already called you Ambassador. That shows 

you where I am on this hearing. Go ahead. 

305 

STATEMENT OF HON. CAMERON R. HUME, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 

Mr. HUME. It’s a great honor to be here this morning as the 

nominee of President Bush to be Ambassador to Indonesia, and if 

confirmed by the Senate, I promise to serve to the best of my ability. 

I think those qualifications are those of a career Foreign Service 

officer. After university, I was in the Peace Corps in Libya, and 

then I joined the State Department, and I had a number of assignments, both in the Arab world and in Italy. 

I picked up several languages along the way. I consider myself 

fortunate to have had those experiences. I’ve since served three 

times as Chief of Mission in Algeria in the late 1990s, when that 

country was turning away from exceptional violence and toward 

greater respect for the rule of law. 

Then in South Africa, which again was a country which I think 

was on the mend, I spent a lot of time there working on HIV/AIDS 

and trying to promote saner policies in that area. Now, for the last 

18 months in Sudan, which I think was a difficult and challenging 

place to serve. 

Indonesia is a vast and strategically important country. I approach this opportunity with a sense of considerable humility. It’s 

a country that has known a tumultuous past, but fortunately, over 

the last 10 years, gradually its record has gotten better. 

Economic growth has gone back to about 6 percent currently. 

They’ve had a series of elections which Freedom House considered 

to be free and fair. They were able to broker an apparent solution 

to the problem in Aceh, which is so far being respected. 

So I think one looks at that—I’m fortunate at this time to be 

going to a country which is on the mend. The United States has 

important interests there, whether it’s a cooperation in the war on 

terrorism, an area where, again, Indonesia’s made some progress. 

We have supported the formulation of a group in the police called 

Detachment 88, which has done good work in arresting people involved with terrorist acts. 

We also have interest in seeing their economy and growth and 

stability continue. We have an aid program of about $150 million 

in a number of different areas. 

I think Indonesia, as the world’s largest Muslim population nation, is a key when we look at solving some of the geopolitical problems that we confront. How are we able to cooperate with a government which is now formed by a free election, and a majority Muslim, and spreading influence, both in its region and elsewhere? 

They contributed a battalion to the peacekeeping operation in 

Lebanon this year. So those are the—that’s sort of a general abbreviated picture of the issues that will have my concern. I realize 

some of them will be difficult to deal with. Questions of rule of law, 

questions of trying to calibrate the right balance in what relationship we have with Indonesia in the security area. 

But I promise that if confirmed, you’ll get my best efforts. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hume follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CAMERON R. HUME, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Thank you, Madame Chairman, and members of the committee. It is a great 

honor to come before this committee today as nominee for Ambassador to Indonesia. 

I would like to express my appreciation to President Bush and to Secretary Rice for 

the trust they have placed in me by making this nomination. If confirmed by the 

Senate, I promise to represent this country to the best of my abilities. 

My qualifications for this position are those of a career Foreign Service officer. Immediately upon completion of university studies, I joined the Peace Corps as a volunteer and taught in Libya, my first experience in a developing country with a Muslim population. Shortly after departing Libya, I joined the Department of State. 

Early assignments gave me the opportunity to learn several languages and to serve 

in interesting posts, including Italy, Syria, Tunisia, Lebanon, and the Holy See. For 

several years I worked at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, first with responsibility for human rights and then for work in the Security Council. 

Since 1997 I have been fortunate to represent the United States as chief of mission three times. Algeria was a country suffering from a tragic conflict in which the 

victims were ordinary civilians rather than the protagonists in the Islamist dissident forces or in the Algerian military. In part because the United States promoted reconciliation, democracy, and respect for the rule of law, the situation gradually improved. Service in South Africa brought new challenges. In particular, finding 

ways the United States could encourage South Africa to confront the scourge of HIV/ 

AIDS. I would like to pay tribute to many colleagues in USAID, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, and the Department 

of Defense for the ground-breaking work they did to put in place programs that 

helped South Africa to confront this challenge. 

For the past 2 years I have served as Charge d’Affaires in Sudan. Again I had 

the chance to witness, and a unique opportunity to participate in, the programs of 

the United States Government that aim to consolidate the peace in southern Sudan, 

to end the killing and to bind the wounds of the people of Darfur, and to support 

the emergence of a New Sudan. I cannot and would not claim more than partial 

success in any of these efforts, but I know that resources and efforts from the 

United States are having a significant, positive impact. 

With these experiences in mind, I approach the challenge of representing the 

United States in Indonesia with a sense of humility. Indonesia is the fourth most 

populous nation and the third largest democracy. It has the world’s largest Muslim 

population. It is a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and of ASEAN, 

and it is currently a member of the U.N. Security Council. It is a vast country sitting astride strategic sea routes. By any standard, the relations between the United 

States and Indonesia are of vital importance. 

Since independence, Indonesia has enjoyed years of encouraging growth and suffered years of tumult. The political and economic indicators are all rising, particularly since the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004, and Indonesia is becoming a real success story. Problems and challenges remain, and, if confirmed, I would give them my priority attention. But it is worthwhile to recall some 

of the positive indicators: 

• Economic growth has been gradually rising toward the level of 6 percent annually, a substantial improvement since the Asian financial crisis of the last decade but not enough to create the jobs needed by an expanding workforce. • Following the 2004 national election and subsequent elections at the regional 

and municipal levels, and substantial gains for civil society and the media, 

Freedom House has moved Indonesia into the category of Free. 

• Government and military reform have moved forward, including such steps as 

the separation of the Indonesian National Police from the armed forces, the 

adoption of anti-corruption measures, and the devolution of power to regional 

and local governments. 

Today bilateral relations are improving. Indonesia is playing a more assertive role 

on the world stage, and is working as a force for international peace and stability; 

its commitment of troops to the UNIFIL deployment in Lebanon and vote for Security Council Resolution 1747 on Iran are notable recent examples. If confirmed, I’ll 

work to enhance Indonesia’s support for our key foreign policy priorities, including 

ensuring Iran does not develop nuclear weapons, advancing the Middle East peace 

process, and promoting a democratic transition in Burma. Indonesia’s leadership is 

committed to the fight against terror within its borders, as the arrests and prosecutions of hundreds of terrorists in the past few years demonstrates. There have been 

no major terrorist incidents in Indonesia since October 2005, a huge achievement 

for a country that had been devastated by attacks every year since the Bali bombing 

307 

in 2002. Working with the United States, Indonesia is vastly improving its ability 

to protect vital sea lanes from terrorists and piracy. 

Perhaps most remarkable this past year was the election of a former rebel leader 

as governor in Aceh, a province that had been wracked by armed separatist conflict 

for decades. Today we are helping the Acehnese ensure a lasting peace and to recover fully from the deadly tsunami that struck its shores in December 2004. 

While we still have serious concerns with human rights in Indonesia, I would be 

remiss without acknowledging the dramatic and broad progress the country has 

made here too. Notably, in November of last year, a court sentenced the ringleader 

of the deadly attack that killed two Americans and one Indonesian in 2002 in 

Timika, Papua, to life in prison. In this case Indonesia’s criminal justice system 

worked closely with our own law enforcement in building and prosecuting the case, 

and the sentence was just. Despite encouraging developments in Indonesia’s efforts 

to build a strong criminal case in the murder of human rights activist Munir, this 

crime has not been fully resolved. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to continue 

to press the government for a fair accounting of past human rights abuses committed by security forces in East Timor and elsewhere. 

U.S. partnership and friendship can help this critically important country in the 

medium- and long-term. The assistance funds Congress provides address some of Indonesia’s greatest needs, such as education, so tomorrow’s generation will have the 

critical thinking skills that democratic citizens need. Our dollars go to economic and 

justice sector reform because Indonesia still needs to attract more investment, provide more jobs, and build the institutions and respect for rule of law that we hope 

will provide its democracy with a rock-solid foundation. They improve health care 

critically by reducing the spread of infectious diseases. The new Millennium Challenge Corporation program launched this year aims to strengthen the anticorruption 

efforts Indonesia has underway and to provide immunizations. And we are providing 

security assistance that aids in the fight against terror and contributes to the creation of a professional, civilian-run force. 

In less than 10 years, Indonesia has travelled an astonishing distance: from the 

ruin of the Asian financial crisis and fall of a dictatorship to a vibrant democracy 

with solid economic growth. In many ways, though, these gains are fragile. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress and the full array of U.S. Government agencies to promote the success of our policies and of Indonesia’s democracy. 

I would welcome the opportunity to answer questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Hume. I really respect your history, and I think you gave us a very insightful look 

at what you’re going to do. 

I think its summed up very well in your testimony in the last 

paragraph, where you say: ‘‘In less than 10 years, Indonesia has 

traveled an astonishing distance, but in many ways, these gains 

are fragile, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with the 

Congress to promote the success.’’ I think that gives me a sense 

that this is an important time there, and you get that, and I appreciate it. 

If you notice, we do have a 5-minute clock we’re all living by, so 

try to keep your statement under that limit. You left us with plenty 

of extra time. At this point, I would ask Senator Murkowski if 

she’d like to make an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Madame Chair. I don’t have an 

opening statement this morning, other than to welcome each of you 

gentlemen and Ms. Hughes, welcome you to the subcommittee this 

morning, and to thank you for your willingness to serve in the respective areas. 

Very impressive backgrounds and credentials that we have in 

front of us this morning, certainly in some very key parts of the 

308 

globe, as we look to whether it’s political activities that are taking 

place in the region or just the economic activities. 

So again, I welcome you to the subcommittee, and thank you for 

your willingness to serve in this capacity. 

Thank you, Madame Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator Murkowski. You 

know, I neglected to ask each of you to introduce the relatives that 

you may well have brought with you. So why don’t I go back to Mr. 

Hume. Would you like to introduce anyone? 

Mr. HUME. No, I’m here alone today. 

Senator BOXER. Okay. 

Mr. Keith, before you start, do you have anyone you’d like to introduce? 

Mr. KEITH. Madame Chairman, I do, thank you. Since my whole 

family isn’t here, I’ll be able to keep to the 5-minute rule. 

Senator BOXER. Okay. 

Mr. KEITH. I’d like to introduce my wife, Jan, who’s—— 

Senator BOXER. Jan, stand up, please. We want to see you. Yes. 

Mr. KEITH. My son Andrew is sitting to her left, and my son 

John is to her right. 

Senator BOXER. Hi. 

Mr. KEITH. My daughter Elizabeth and my daughter Emily are 

all here today. I have two other sons, Jason and Scott, who can’t 

be here. Jason is a Staff Sergeant in the U.S. Army, serving at 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center, married to an Army veteran, 

Annie, and our granddaughter, Lily, 5 weeks old. 

Senator BOXER. Congratulations on that. 

Mr. KEITH. Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Well, Mr. Keith, why don’t you proceed for up to 

5 minutes? We’ll put all of your statements into the record. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. KEITH, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO MALAYSIA 

Mr. KEITH. Madame Chairman, thank you. I’m honored to be 

here, and thank the committee for considering my nomination. Because you have my statement, I’ll just briefly summarize. 

I’m looking forward, with high aspirations, to going to Malaysia. 

High aspirations for what we can achieve with a country that has 

come a long way, but still has, in many respects, a distance to go. 

I’m pleased to report that we have very good cooperation with 

the Malaysians from both law enforcement and military perspectives in countering terrorism in the region. Like Indonesia, Malaysia is a majority Muslim country, and it’s important that we share 

objectives, both in the region and in multilateral fora, including in 

the U.N. 

I also have very high aspirations for what we can achieve in Malaysia with regard to balancing the benefits of our trade. I think 

that the American market is absolutely critical to Malaysia’s economic success, and I believe we have opportunities to further our 

trade, given the market-oriented focus in Malaysia. 

Our American business opportunities, financial opportunities, in 

particular, in the services sector, I would hope that we would be 

able to expand our interaction and cooperation. 

309 

I think we have not only important security and trade interests 

in Malaysia, in particular, given its strategic location on the Strait 

of Malacca, but also important people to people ties, which I’ll do 

my best if confirmed to advance. 

About 150,000 Malaysians, more than 150,000, have studied in 

the United States over the years. That number has gone down year 

by year, and I’d like to find ways for us to increase our interaction 

along those lines. 

For example, in many areas in Asia, American educational institutions have local programs, such as MBA programs. Others are 

doing this in Malaysia. The American institutions are not there 

yet, but I’d like to promote that. 

We have six American corners throughout Malaysia also. These 

are the areas of focus for our people to people interaction. I’d like 

to make sure that, if confirmed, that both I and my staff at the embassy take advantage of those centers so that we can get outside 

the capital and increase people to people exchanges. 

I think America and Malaysia share a lot, but we have some differences, too, and I certainly will be forthright, if confirmed, in 

speaking about some of those differences, and helping the Malaysians, whether it’s more in the technical areas, such as export control, where we can help with training courses and model legislation, or on a broader cultural front and political front, including 

electoral reform. 

So I look forward to a very exciting time. This is a dynamic region, and Malaysia is part of the fluid situation and change there, 

and could be, I think, more a part of leadership, both in regional 

organizations, as well as globally. 

So I thank you for your consideration of my nomination, and 

would be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keith follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES R. KEITH, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO MALAYSIA

Madam Chairman, members of the committee, I am deeply honored to appear before you today. It is a privilege to be the President’s nominee as the United States 

Ambassador to Malaysia. I am grateful to the President and Secretary Rice for the 

trust and confidence they invested in me as the nominee for this position. I am also 

honored to be in the company of a group of distinguished nominees for important 

posts in the East Asian and Pacific region. 

Madam Chairman, I am a senior member of the Foreign Service with the rank 

of Minister-Counselor. I have, over the course of my 27 years of public service, held 

senior positions at the State Department and the National Security Council in 

Washington, including as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs dealing primarily with China. Overseas I was our Designated Chief of Mission 

and Consul General in Hong Kong and I have served at embassies in Northeast and 

Southeast Asia. 

Prime among the resources that the Department of State and other agencies and 

departments have to offer in any embassy abroad is our people. I look forward, if 

confirmed, to working with a capable and experienced country team at our embassy 

in Kuala Lumpur. We have an active and productive Mission comprising eight U.S. 

Government agencies and Departments working together to cement ties between our 

two nations. We are establishing a one-officer American presence post in Kota 

Kinabalu in Malaysian Borneo and have expanded our embassy staff in several key 

areas over recent years to advance our shared security interests. If confirmed, I will 

take as a priority directing this dedicated team in support of American citizens traveling, working, and residing abroad. 

Malaysia is prominent in the region and globally. It will celebrate, later this year, 

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sary of United States-Malaysia diplomatic relations. It is an important voice for key 

constituencies that matter to the American people. Malaysia is a moderate majorityMuslim democratic state and has successfully managed economic globalization and 

a multifaith, multiethnic society. It has served over the years in leadership positions 

in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 

forum, among others. 

The United States and Malaysia have sometimes had policy differences that required public expression in strong terms. In recent years, Prime Minister Abdullah 

Badawi has set a path forward that promises an increasingly productive relationship and greater congruence between the interests of America and Malaysia. If confirmed, I will devote my energies to improving and strengthening United States-Malaysia relations, while openly discussing issues on which we differ. 

One example of our differing perspectives involves our respective views of Iran. 

We remain opposed to foreign investment in Iran’s oil and gas sector, as a matter 

of law and policy. If confirmed, I will continue to make clear our concerns about 

such investment, and to emphasize that we are vigorously opposed to business as 

usual with Iran and want other nations to join us in dissuading Teheran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. 

Far too few Malaysians hold positive views of the United States. One of my goals, 

if confirmed, would be to build on the embassy’s ongoing public outreach throughout 

the country to provide an accurate basis from which the Malaysian people can form 

opinions about the American people, our values, and our goals in the world. It will 

be critical, in this context, for my country team and for me to speak forthrightly 

about our commitment to fundamental values, including those enunciated in the 

U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We want to be Malaysia’s essential 

future partner, and we need to communicate effectively that sentiment to the Government and people of Malaysia. We should deepen and broaden mutual understanding by promoting people-to-people contacts, expanding upon the more than 

175,000 Americans who visit each year, and increasing from 5,500 the number of 

Malaysians who study in the United States. These direct personal interactions represent an invaluable platform for advancing U.S. interests. 

Our trade and investment ties, already a key component of the relationship, offer 

great promise for further development. We are and have been for more than 40 

years Malaysia’s No. 1 market and we lead the world in total foreign direct investment in Malaysia. Malaysia buys more than $13 billion of American exports each 

year. We are seeking to deepen these trade ties even further through a Free Trade 

Agreement and other mechanisms. Our agenda is ambitious, as befits a relationship 

with our 10th largest trading partner. We have much work to do, but remain committed to promoting the best interests of all Americans. Agriculture, the environment, labor, intellectual property—these are complex sectors that will engage our 

best efforts. If confirmed, I will work closely with our cabinet members and their 

senior advisors to ensure the most productive possible outcomes for the American 

people. 

One clear area of common interest is the growing cooperation between our officials 

working on security and law enforcement issues. Southeast Asia is an important 

front in the war on terror and we depend on Malaysia to be an effective and cooperative player in the region’s vital counterterrorism programs. Malaysian authorities 

have responded vigorously to the threat posed by Jemmah Islamiya and Abu Sayyaf 

groups, contributing to the security and prosperity of both our nations. 

Our bilateral military cooperation is growing and includes exchanges of visits and 

training, equipment sales, combined exercises, and, increasingly, naval ship visits. 

Our attention in the region is focused in particular on the Strait of Malacca, an area 

of vital national interest as it is a major conduit for the world’s commercial shipping. We need to assist littoral states through intelligence sharing and capacitybuilding to take on the primary task of protecting the strait. If confirmed, I look 

forward to working closely with our senior uniformed and civilian military leaders, 

including my colleagues at the Pacific Command in Hawaii, to advance our security 

ties with Malaysia. 

I would also like to mention the ‘‘Heart of Borneo’’ initiative and related bilateral 

environmental programs. The island of Borneo, shared by Malaysia, Indonesia, and 

Brunei, is one of the most biologically diverse habitats in the world. We are working 

with those three governments, NGOs, and others to preserve vast tracts of forest 

and promote sustainable development in Borneo. 

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, I will not attempt an exhaustive list of every priority in United States foreign policy that is embedded in the 

United States-Malaysia relationship. I will commit to you, however, that if confirmed I will do my utmost to ensure that you are kept informed and that your conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00318 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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cerns are addressed. If confirmed, I would be delighted to greet you and your staff 

members in Kuala Lumpur to further our work together to advance the interests 

of the American people. 

I am convinced our longstanding relationship with the Malaysian people will continue to flourish in the years ahead. If confirmed by the Senate, I will commit myself to promoting United States interests by deepening ties to the leadership and 

people of Malaysia to the benefit of both our nations. 

Thank you again for granting me the honor of appearing before you today. I would 

be pleased to respond to your questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Keith. 

Now, Ms. Hughes, do you have anyone you’d like to introduce before you make your opening statement? 

STATEMENT OF MIRIAM HUGHES, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERATED STATE OF MICRONESIA 

Ms. HUGHES. Yes. Thank you very much, Madame Chairman. My 

daughter, Jordana Hughes Tynan, has driven down from New York 

to be with me today. I’m very, very honored. 

Jordana has been with me in all of my Foreign Service assignments, including Mexico City, Santo Domingo, Quito, Bangkok, 

London, and Thessaloniki, at some sacrifice. It’s always a little bit 

harder for the dependents. So it’s a huge honor today. Thank you. 

Regarding—I thought maybe mine would be better as a 3-minute 

rule, since, if confirmed, I’ll go to the littlest country, and I’ve just 

chosen to highlight a few parts of the statement that will be entered for the record. 

Madame Chair and Senator Murkowski, it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss my nomination. In my current assignment at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, I head a section that is dedicated to the full range of economic, social, and humanitarian affairs that consume more than 70 percent of the U.N.’s 

regular budget. 

The global issues that we debate and negotiate particularly concern developing countries. If confirmed, I would look forward 

wholeheartedly to leading our efforts in Micronesia, to implement 

and practice key objectives that we discuss conceptually at the 

U.N., including sustainable development, good governance, and environmental protection and management. 

On a map, the Federated States of Micronesia appear as specks 

of far-flung islands in the vast Pacific Ocean. This is one of the 

smallest countries in the world. Nevertheless, it has sovereignty 

over more than a million square miles of ocean in a strategic region. 

The United States has committed to defend Micronesia as if it 

were part of our own territory. Micronesians serve in the U.S. military, and many have made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan. The friendship, above all, of this nation is vital. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I would look forward to working with 

the members of this committee, and others in the Congress, who 

seek to invigorate our relationship with Micronesia across a range 

of interests. Our ties go back over centuries. 

We have recently entered into a challenging new phase in U.S./ 

Micronesian relations. To promote self-reliance, the U.S. Congress 

approved an amended compact of free association, which went into 

effect in 2004. This amended compact, or Compact 2, targets U.S. 

312 

resources on key areas that are building blocks for economic selfsufficiency, including education, health care, infrastructure, environmental protection, and private sector development. 

The U.S. Embassy in Kolonia has a special responsibility to work 

with the Department of Interior to ensure that this compact is 

well-implemented. Strong leadership and management skills are 

essential. The embassy needs to coordinate with some 40 other U.S. 

Government agencies. 

Many of them are legacies from the days of trust territory status, 

and their programs continue to touch every aspect of Micronesian 

life. Respect and partnership will be the cornerstones of our success. 

Madame Chairman and Senator Murkowski, it would be a profound honor to represent the President and people of the United 

States of America in the Federated States of Micronesia. If confirmed, I would work diligently to promote friendship and a comprehensive partnership to build capacity in a unique and valuable 

region. 

You can be assured of my full cooperation with the Congress, and 

of course, I would be happy to answer your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hughes follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MIRIAM K. HUGHES, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

Madam Chairwoman and members of the committee, it is a privilege to appear 

before you today to discuss my nomination to serve as United States Ambassador 

to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). It is also an honor to introduce my 

daughter, Jordana Hughes Tynan, who came from New York to be with me on this 

momentous day. Jordana accompanied me on all my overseas assignments, which 

was not always easy for a child. She made many sacrifices and adjustments on my 

behalf. 

During a 29-year career in the Foreign Service, I have learned, worked, and 

grown through assignments at our United States posts in Mexico City, Santo Domingo, Quito, Bangkok, London, and Thessaloniki. My specialty has been consular 

management, but I additionally sought broader experience. In Bangkok, I monitored 

and reported on conditions in U.N. refugee camps for Cambodians and Vietnamese. 

The post I headed in Thessaloniki, Greece, focused on efforts to promote United 

States business opportunities and analyze the human rights mosaic in the Balkans. 

In my current assignment at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, I head a 

section that is dedicated to the full range of economic, social, and humanitarian affairs that consume more than 70 percent of the U.N. regular budget. The global 

issues that we debate and negotiate particularly concern developing countries. If 

confirmed, I would look forward wholeheartedly to leading our efforts in Micronesia 

to implement in practice key objectives that we discuss conceptually at the U.N., 

including sustainable development, good governance, and environmental protection. 

On a map, the FSM appear as specks of far-flung islands in the vast Central Pacific Ocean. Although this nation is tiny and scattered, its impact is significant. We 

share a deep connection. Micronesia’s 600 islands encompass a total area of just 270 

square miles. It is one of the smallest countries in the world. Nevertheless, it has 

sovereignty over more than a million square miles of ocean in a strategic region. 

The United States has committed to defend Micronesia as if it were part of our own 

territory. Micronesians serve in the U.S. military at twice the per capita rate of 

Americans, and many have made the ultimate sacrifice for freedom in Iraq and Afghanistan. The friendship of this nation is vital, particularly as we expand our engagement in the Pacific to meet today’s transnational challenges. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I would look forward to working with the members 

of this committee and others in the Congress who seek to invigorate our relationship 

with Micronesia across a range of interests. Although an ocean separates us, this 

recently independent nation has a special place in the hearts of Americans. Our ties 

go back over centuries. 

313 

In the 1800s, American whalers and missionaries entered this region. The American author Jack London found inspiration for some of his most gripping tales in 

the remote Pacific islands. His stories of voyages and adventures capture the translucent beauty of the islands as well as the hazards of typhoons, disease, and poverty. The inhabitants who London brought to life demonstrate extraordinary skill 

in indigenous methods of navigation. They are ingenious, loyal, and resilient. These 

are people who we want to keep as firm friends. 

Soon after the second world war and following severe bombing of some of the occupied islands of Micronesia, the United Nations established the Trust Territory of the 

Pacific Islands under the administration of the United States. Although discontinued in 1991, the trusteeship system remains enshrined in the U.N. Charter as 

a means to promote peace, progressive development, and eventual self-government. 

Under American tutelage, Micronesia fulfilled these aims. The FSM adopted a constitution in 1979. The nation emerged as a sovereign democracy in 1986. A Compact 

of Free Association with the United States helped Micronesia make a smooth transition. This month, Micronesians chose their seventh President in a free and fair electoral process. 

We have entered a challenging, new phase of United States-Micronesian relations. 

To promote self-reliance, the U.S. Congress approved an Amended Compact of Free 

Association, which commenced in 2004. The Mirconesians themselves participated 

in compact negotiations, and they help review its annual performance. The amended 

compact targets U.S. resources in key areas that are building blocks for economic 

self-sufficiency, including education, health care, infrastructure, environmental protection, and private sector development. Compact aid will decrease progressively 

every year and transfer to a capitalized trust fund, which is intended to ensure Micronesia’s transition to economic independence in 2024. 

The United States’ Embassy in Kolonia has a special responsibility to work with 

the Department of Interior to ensure that this compact is well implemented. Strong 

leadership and management skills are essential. The embassy needs to coordinate 

with some 40 other U.S. Government agencies—many of them legacies from the 

days of the Trust Territory—whose programs continue to touch every aspect of Micronesian life. Respect and partnership will be the cornerstones of our success. 

From my experience as a Foreign Service consular manager in some of our largest 

and most complex overseas consular sections, I learned to improve efficiency and accountability based on collaborative strategies. One must engage and train the participants, ensuring that they become part of the process, buy into the goals, and indeed refine and adapt them and make them their own. Once engaged, they will 

dedicate their best efforts, teaching a leader in return and finding creative, new 

ways to achieve mutual objectives. 

If I am confirmed, I will devote my energies to fostering relationships of equality 

and pragmatism with our Micronesian friends. I would also strengthen cooperation 

with regional and multilateral partners and civil society representatives. Such a 

comprehensive approach must be based upon a clear vision of how to nurture a sustainable future in a small island nation that is isolated and potentially vulnerable. 

To be effective at the United Nations, one learns to listen carefully and to focus on 

priorities. The majority of U.N. members are developing countries. They teach us 

the paramount importance of respect for diversity and principles of national ownership. At the same time, the United States has led efforts to establish global acceptance of the responsibility of governments to meet the needs of their own people by 

creating an enabling architecture for a just rule of law and growth that is stimulated by economic freedom. 

Madam Chairwoman and members of the committee, it would be a profound 

honor to represent the President and people of the United States of America in the 

Federated States of Micronesia. If I am confirmed, I would work diligently to promote friendship and a comprehensive partnership to help build capacity in a strategic region. You can be assured of my full cooperation with the U.S. Congress. 

I will be happy to answer your questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Klemm, would you like to introduce any family here before 

you speak? 

Mr. KLEMM. Regrettably, Madame Chair, my wife, Mari, could 

not join us today—— 

Senator BOXER. Okay. 

Mr. KLEMM [continuing]. Due to her professional responsibilities. 

Senator BOXER. I understand. Send our best. 

314 

STATEMENT OF HANS G. KLEMM, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE 

Mr. KLEMM. Thank you. Madame Chair, Senator Murkowski, I’m 

very honored to have the privilege of appearing before you today 

as President Bush’s nominee as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. I’m grateful for the trust and confidence that 

President and Secretary Rice have shown in nominating me. 

I would also like to thank your staff. They have been especially 

helpful and gracious to me during this process. 

Madame Chairman, as you mentioned, I joined the Foreign Service some 25 years ago, and have directed large programs, as well 

as management offices, at the Department here in Washington, as 

well as serving at our missions abroad in Germany, Korea, and in 

other small, developing, oil-rich country, Trinidad and Tobago. 

East Timor achieved its independence on May 20, 2002, becoming the first new nation of the 21st century. As a friend of long 

standing, the United States wants East Timor to succeed in its 

transition to a stable democratic state. 

The United States supports the strengthening of multiparty democracy in East Timor on a foundation of security and the rule of 

law. We support the protection of human rights, including freedoms 

of speech, press, and assembly. 

We support the development of a free-market economy. We support our allies in the United Nations, who have committed both 

human and financial resources to assist East Timor’s democratic 

development, and to recover from the turmoil of the past year. 

We welcome the progress that East Timor has made in recent 

months toward consolidating its democratic institutions, including 

its organization of the first sovereign national election for president. 

The East Timor Government must now redouble efforts to ensure 

that parliamentary elections, to be held next month, are free, fair, 

and transparent, and provide the Timorese people with an opportunity to choose a new government with a mandate to move the 

country forward. 

Security remains essential to restoring political stability and 

building a foundation for a more prosperous future. The police and 

armed forces need to become cohesive, accountable organizations 

that earn the trust of the Timorese people. 

If confirmed, I will work with other donor nations and organizations to provide training and assistance to these institutions to promote professionalism in accordance with principles of human 

rights. 

The violence and unrest that engulfed East Timor last year underscored the urgent need to foster good governance. The crisis 

flowed from institutional weaknesses, such as politicized security 

forces, an inadequate system of justice, widespread absence of reliable information, and a disaffected population. 

If confirmed, I will work with the government and the international community to remedy these serious shortcomings. I will 

also continue to press for addressing accountability for the violence 

of 2006 and the crimes against humanity committed in 1999. 

Recent events also highlight the need to promote economic 

growth, with a particular focus on job creation. If confirmed, I will 

315 

assist the government of East Timor to improve its economic policy 

environment and best utilize the country’s potentially significant 

natural resource wealth. 

Madame Chairman, I firmly believe that the successful establishment of democratic institutions and vibrant free markets in East 

Timor will send a tremendously important signal to the world. 

East Timor is a country that inspired the global community with 

its longing for self-determination, freedom, and democracy. This 

shared commitment to the highest ideals for government makes 

East Timor a natural friend of the United States, and an example 

to others around the world. 

Madame Chairman, Senator Murkowski, thank you again for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be 

happy to answer any questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klemm follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HANS G. KLEMM, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE

Madame Chairwoman, members of the committee, I am honored to have the privilege of appearing before you today as President Bush’s nominee as Ambassador to 

the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (East Timor). I am appreciative of the trust 

and confidence the President and Secretary Rice have shown in nominating me and 

grateful for the opportunity to serve in this position. 

Madame Chairwoman, I am a member of the Senior Foreign Service currently assigned as Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs at our embassy in Tokyo, Japan. 

I have previously served overseas at our missions in Germany, Korea, and Trinidad 

and Tobago. At the Department of State, I have served as the director of large management and policy program offices within the Bureaus of Human Resources and 

Economic and Business Affairs. If confirmed by the Senate, I will work to the best 

of my ability to advance United States’ interests in East Timor and the Southeast 

Asian region and look forward to working with the members of this committee and 

others in Congress to achieve our objectives. 

East Timor achieved its independence on May 20, 2002, becoming the first new 

nation of the 21st century. With the firm backing of the international community, 

the Timorese people set out on a path toward freedom and democracy. Even at that 

time, everyone understood that the country would have to overcome many obstacles. 

Fortunately, East Timor has many partners willing to assist in times of need. As 

a friend of long standing, the United States wants East Timor to succeed in its transition to a stable democratic state. The United States has supported both the deployment of international forces and the establishment of the U.N. Integrated Mission in East Timor (LJNMIT) in response to the political crisis and violence of 2006. 

The United States also supported the international community’s humanitarian efforts by providing food and non-food assistance to address the immediate needs of 

the tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, many of whom remain in 

camps around the country. 

We support the strengthening of multiparty democracy on a foundation of security 

and the rule of law. We support the protection of human rights, including freedoms 

of speech, press, and assembly. We support the development of a free-market economy. We believe that democracy, good governance, and economic growth offer the 

best chance for East Timor to succeed. We support our allies in the region who have 

committed both human and financial resources to assist East Timor to recover from 

the turmoil of the past year. A stable and prosperous East Timor will not only fulfill 

the aspirations of its people arising from the country’s long struggle for independence; but it will also serve as an inspiration to other peoples around the world. 

We welcome the progress that East Timor has made in recent months toward consolidating its democratic institutions. The Government has completed the first step, 

organizing its first sovereign national election for president, with assistance from 

the U.N. Integrated Mission in East Timor and other donors. Our Embassy in Dili 

supported these efforts by publicly promoting peaceful, free, and fair elections in coordination with other diplomatic missions in-country. The parliamentary election 

scheduled for this summer should provide a farther opportunity for the Timorese 

people to choose a government with a mandate to move the country forward. I look 

316 

forward to continuing our support for the Timorese in their effort to put democratic 

government on a solid footing. 

Security remains essential to restoring political stability and building a foundation for a more prosperous future. The police and the armed forces need to become 

cohesive, accountable organizations that earn the trust of the Timorese people. We 

are working with other donor nations and organizations to provide training and assistance to these institutions to promote professionalism and functional expertise in 

accordance with principles of human rights. If confirmed, I will continue to press 

the Timorese Government and international donors on the need for security sector 

reform that is achievable and results in the growing stability of the state and its 

institutions. 

The violence and unrest that engulfed East Timor in 2006 underscored the urgent 

need to foster good governance. The crisis flowed from institutional weaknesses that 

will continue to generate problems if left unremedied. These include weak state institutions, politicized security forces, an inadequate system of justice, widespread 

absence of reliable information, and a disaffected population. The challenge in addressing these issues goes beyond restoring peace and requires laying a solid foundation for good governance in the future. I look forward to supporting our foreign 

assistance programs that seek to redress these root causes. More must also be done 

to promote the rule of law. If confirmed, I will continue to press for addressing accountability for the violence of 2006 as well as the crimes against humanity committed in 1999. 

Recent events also highlight the need to promote economic growth, with a particular focus on job creation. Democracy is often at risk when there is no economic 

opportunity, and lackluster economic performance underlies much of the popular 

frustration in the country. We will assist the Government of East Timor to improve 

the economic policy environment and best utilize the country’s potentially significant natural resource wealth. For example, if confirmed, I look forward to supporting ongoing initiatives to improve the security of property rights, vitalize the 

private sector and increase economic opportunity. These programs promise to encourage private investment and improve private sector agricultural performance, 

where 80 percent of Timorese make their living. 

The Government of East Timor has done commendable preparatory work since 

the country became eligible to propose a compact with the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation (MCC) in 2005. The Government could complete its compact proposal 

as early as the end of this calendar year, if the Timorese are able to complete detailed analyses on program elements, maintain compact eligibility, and conduct serious consultations with civil society and other stakeholders. Early drafts of the proposal suggest that it will focus on much-needed infrastructure projects. I understand 

that after MCC completes due diligence on the proposal, a compact could be signed 

and implementation could begin as early as 2009. 

I look forward to continuing our efforts to reach out to like-minded international 

partners to reaffirm to the Timorese authorities what they must do to lay the foundation for a better future. Australia leads the military peacekeeping force in East 

Timor. Other nations, such as New Zealand, have also contributed. We have close 

working ties with the U.N. Mission in East Timor, which includes over 1,600 U.N. 

police. Portugal, Japan, the European Union, Brazil, Malaysia, and other nations 

also have a significant diplomatic presence in East Timor. 

Madame Chairwoman, I firmly believe that the successful establishment of democratic institutions and vibrant free markets in East Timor will send a tremendously 

important signal to the world. East Timor is a country that has inspired the global 

community with its longing for self-determination, freedom, and democracy. This 

shared commitment to the highest ideals for government makes East Timor a natural friend of the United States and an example to others around the world. 

There are many ways the United States, and particularly our Mission in Dili, can 

help East Timor. Currently over 140 people make up the Mission staff, including 

14 Americans, and over 120 Foreign Service nationals. I look forward to leading this 

team as we meet the challenges ahead. 

Madame Chairwoman and members of the committee, thank you again for granting me the honor of appearing before you today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so very much. 

Mr. Huso. 

317 

STATEMENT OF RAVIC R. HUSO, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 

Mr. HUSO. Madame Chair, thank you very much. My wife, Barbara, who I met when we were both Peace Corps volunteers in Senegal a number of years ago, unfortunately could not come today. 

She’s home with my daughter, Natalie, in Hawaii. I do have some 

dear old friends, Sherman and Jill Hinson, who are standing in for 

my family. 

Madame Chair, Senator Murkowski, thank you very much for 

the opportunity to appear before the committee today. It’s a great 

honor to be nominated by President Bush to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 

If confirmed as Ambassador to Laos, I look forward to working 

with the committee and other members of Congress to advance 

United States interest in Laos. 

The United States and Laos have many shared interests, and 

have cooperated closely in a number of key areas, such as the recovery of the remains of our service members missing in Laos during the Vietnam War, and removing unexploded ordnance leftover 

from that fighting. 

In recent years, our bilateral cooperation has broadened to include combating international threats, such as the traffic in drugs, 

the traffic in persons, and avian influenza, more recently. We’re 

also slowly seeing increased opportunities for some trade and investment between our two countries. 

The United States Government has made a solemn commitment 

to achieving the fullest possible accounting for the Americans still 

missing from the war in Southeast Asia. I deeply respect that commitment, and if confirmed, I will devote my full attention to this 

important humanitarian endeavor. 

Despite the recent progress we’ve made in our relationship, we 

do have significant concerns regarding the Lao Government’s inability to fully adhere to internationally recognized standards for 

human rights and religious freedoms. 

I appreciate and I share the concerns of the many thousands of 

Americans who trace their origins to Laos, in particular, the 

Hmong Americans, over the Lao Government’s treatment of ethnic 

minorities. I will make it a priority, if confirmed, to encourage the 

Lao Government to protect the rights of its minority ethnic groups. 

Finally, Madame Chair, the welfare and safety of American citizens traveling or working in Laos will always be a top priority, if 

I’m confirmed. 

In conclusion, I believe that sustained engagement with the Lao 

Government, supported by a strong public diplomacy program, offers the best prospects for achieving progress on the array of issues 

important to United States interests and to the Lao people. 

Madame Chair, Senator Murkowski, thank you again for the opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Huso follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAVIC R. HUSO, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Madam Chairwoman and members of the committee, it is a great honor to be 

nominated by President Bush to be the U.S. Ambassador to the Lao People’s DemoVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00325 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
318 

cratic Republic. I am grateful for the President’s confidence and to Secretary Rice 

for her support of my nomination. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

the committee today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee 

and other interested Members of Congress to advance United States’ interests in 

Laos. 

Madam Chairwoman, I have served my country as a Foreign Service officer since 

1980 and before that as a Peace Corps volunteer. As the son of a Foreign Service 

officer, I was brought up with a deep sense of the responsibilities associated with 

representing the United States abroad and pride in being afforded that opportunity. 

I also developed a profound appreciation for the characteristics that make the 

United States a beacon of democratic freedom and economic opportunity. 

As a Foreign Service officer, I have always looked for the most challenging assignments, those that offered the most opportunity to make a difference. If confirmed, 

I will devote myself to encouraging the Lao people and their Government to pursue 

a path of positive engagement with friends and neighbors leading to enhanced respect for individual freedoms and rights and shared economic prosperity. 

The United States’ relationship with Laos has developed steadily since the restoration of full diplomatic relations in 1992. The United States and Laos have many 

shared interests and have cooperated closely in a number of key areas, such as the 

recovery of the remains of our service members missing in action from the Southeast Asia war, removing unexploded ordnance from the war, and in reducing the 

scourge of drugs. In recent years, bilateral cooperation has broadened to include 

combating avian influenza and trafficking in persons. We are also slowly seeing increased opportunities for trade and investment. However, despite the recent 

progress in our relationship, we still have significant concerns regarding the Lao 

Government’s inability to fully adhere to internationally recognized standards for 

human rights and religious freedoms. 

If confirmed, I pledge to devote myself to strengthening our existing partnerships 

and exploring new opportunities for cooperation. I also am prepared to address our 

differences directly and constructively. I believe that sustained engagement with the 

Lao Government—supported by a strong public diplomacy effort—offers the best 

prospects for achieving progress on the array of issues important to United States 

interests and the Lao people. 

I am encouraged by progress in several important areas. The United States Government has made a solemn commitment to achieving the fullest possible accounting for the Americans still missing from the war in Southeast Asia. I deeply respect 

that commitment and, if confirmed, I will devote my full attention to building on 

the long history of successful cooperation on this important humanitarian endeavor 

that has been at the foundation of our bilateral relationship. I believe that we can 

achieve even more through increased flexibility in the conduct of joint field recovery 

activities and renewed efforts to examine all available sources of relevant information. 

This collaborative work has also laid the foundation for taking the first steps in 

a process of building military-to-military ties through English-language training, 

educational exchanges, and civic action projects. I believe a phased and graduated 

approach to greater contacts between our militaries has the potential to improve 

mutual understanding and also benefit the Lao people. 

The Congress took a major step in 2004 toward helping Laos to achieve sustainable, free market-based economic development by approving normal trade relations 

(NTR) status. Laos is among the poorest nations in Asia but also has significant economic potential and untapped natural as well as human resources. American investors and companies can play an important role in helping Laos to prosper and to 

diversify its economic and trade relations. If confirmed, I will not only assist United 

States businesses seeking to trade with or invest in Laos but will also look for ways 

to help the Lao Government fully implement our Bilateral Trade Agreement and undertake the reforms necessary to strengthen the essential underpinnings of a market economy: good governance and rule of law. 

I also assess a commitment by the Lao Government to work together toward solving challenges of mutual concern. The United States and Laos have a common interest in combating transnational threats such as terrorism, trafficking in narcotics 

and persons, money laundering and other financial crimes, pandemic diseases and 

environmental degradation. Laos has made great progress in reducing the production of opium and the illicit cross-border trade in heroin but is faced with a rapidly 

growing new threat—the use and trafficking of methamphetamines—known locally 

as yaa baa or ‘‘crazy drug.’’ I will do my utmost to sustain the progress made 

against opium and while also broadening our focus to address the methamphetamine challenge. 

319 

Earlier this year, Laos suffered an outbreak of avian influenza, resulting in its 

first-ever human infections and deaths from this disease. I will pay close attention 

to bolstering United States and international efforts to assist the Lao to develop 

their capabilities to detect, isolate, and control such outbreaks and reduce the threat 

of human pandemic influenza. 

Porous borders and weak state institutions make Laos potentially vulnerable to 

terrorist activity. I will also urge the Lao Government to work closely with the 

United States and other partner countries, as well as within the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework, to take concrete measures to reduce 

the threat of international terrorists using Laos as a base or a target for their 

crimes. 

If confirmed, I would undertake this position with an overall sense of real opportunity to interact with the Lao Government to effect positive change and further expand the solid basis for cooperation. At the same time, I am attuned to and intend 

to forthrightly address the Lao Government’s poor record regarding human rights. 

In particular, I appreciate and fully share the concerns of the many thousands 

of Americans who trace their origins to Laos—in particular, the Hmong-Americans—over the Lao Government’s treatment of ethnic minorities. Many of the 

Hmong in Laos, especially those who live in remote areas in often difficult conditions, are regarded with suspicion and sometimes hostility by officials who suspect 

they may be associated with antigovernment activities. Significant numbers of 

Hmong have entered Thailand in search of economic opportunities or, in some cases, 

out of well-founded fear of persecution, and are now in detention awaiting a determination as to their future. I will make it a priority, if confirmed, to work with the 

Lao and Thai authorities and appropriate international agencies to find durable solutions to the plight of the displaced Hmong. I will also work steadfastly to encourage the Lao Government to respect the rights of its minority ethnic groups and provide those who may return as well as those who have stayed with the protection 

and assistance they need to integrate fully into Lao society. At the same time, I will 

be guided by longstanding United States policy that we do not support or condone 

groups or individuals who advocate or take actions aimed at overthrowing or destabilizing the Lao Government. 

More broadly, if confirmed, I intend to sustain the United States commitment to 

human rights and democratic principles as my primary vehicle for encouraging positive change in Laos. I will press the Lao Government on human rights issues and 

encourage them to adhere to international human rights standards. I will also devote particular effort to building on the progress made in recent years by the Lao 

Government in meeting international standards for religious freedom and tolerance. 

Finally, the welfare and safety of American citizens traveling or working in Laos 

will always be a top priority if I am confirmed. I will ensure that the United States 

mission in Laos provides accurate and timely information on any risks American 

may face in Laos along with advice on precautions they should take. I also intend 

to see through the construction of a new embassy that meets current security standards and provides a safe working environment for the dedicated and highly capable 

American and Lao staff of the United States mission. 

Madam Chairwoman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to address you. I am prepared to respond to any questions you may have. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

I think I will ask unanimous consent to go with seven minutes 

of questions, and then give the same to Senator Murkowski. If Senator Feingold joins us, then he’ll be recognized for an equal amount 

of time. 

First of all, I want to thank all of you for your very good, to the 

point testimony, and as you know, I’m supporting all of you, so 

there’s no trick questions here. 

But I do have one question that I think sort of shows in another 

light what I was trying to get at in my opening statement about 

the need for very aggressive, strong diplomacy and not a reliance 

on the military as a way to make friends. It’s not working. 

One of the things, Mr. Keith, I’d like to discuss is something you 

touch on in your writings. I’ve read some of your writings. They’re 

very strongly supportive of the war in Iraq in as late as 2003, and 

I’m not asking in any way to debate that with you. That was your 

320 

right, and you did rely on Colin Powell’s very aggressive testimony 

at the U.N., which he has since disavowed. 

But what has happened to us in the world as a result of this 

military-centric policy, and neglect, in my view, of diplomacy, is 

that we’re more unpopular than we’ve ever been in the history of 

our Nation, as far as I can tell, just looking through all the past 

polling results. 

I want to talk about something wonderful that this country did 

in 2006, and give you a sense of what I’m talking about. In mid2006, the U.S. Naval Ship, Mercy, a floating hospital ship, was deployed on a 72-day humanitarian mission to Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste—countries home to some 

of the largest Muslim populations in the world. 

The Navy worked closely with the State Department and NGOs 

to identify and treat approximately 61,000 patients. Everything 

from dental and eye care to surgery for sick patients was provided. 

The effort was undertaken, in part, to win the hearts and minds 

of the local populous. It appears to have had an impact. Shortly 

after the trip, an organization known as Terror Free America—excuse me, Terror Free Tomorrow conducted polling. Fifty-three percent of Indonesians said that the activities of the Mercy made their 

opinion of the United States more favorable. 

Terror Free Tomorrow also conducted polling in Indonesia after 

United States aid was delivered to tsunami victims. The percentage 

of Indonesians who reported an unfavorable view of the United 

States dropped from a high of 83 percent in 2003 to 41 percent, and 

the percentage of Indonesians expressing confidence in bin Laden 

dropped from 58 to 12 percent. 

These results were clearly noticed by the Department of Defense. 

Officials involved in drafting the 2006 National Military Strategic 

Plan for the war on terrorism said that ‘‘The American military’s 

effort to aid tsunami victims in Southeast Asia did more to counter 

terrorist ideology than any attack mission.’’ 

This is the military, folks. So I guess what I’d want from each 

of you is just a response to this. I’m trying to get at how strongly 

you agree with that statement of the U.S. military, that when we 

get out there and we really help people, not at the point of a gun, 

but it works. Even though I would say sometimes we have to use 

a military approach. 

I’m not—I voted to go get bin Laden. I voted to go to war in Afghanistan. So where I’m coming from is, yeah, sometimes you 

clearly have to go strongly in that direction. 

But that aside, the fact that we’re not being attacked, all else 

being equal, can you comment on this amazing comment by the 

American military, that it did more to counter terrorist ideology 

than any attack mission? 

I’ll start with you, Mr. Hume. 

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much. First, I’d say that my initial 

takeaway from that is a positive one, and it is that, yes, we do have 

some problems out there, in terms of public diplomacy and public 

relations, but also, yes, we can do things about it. 

I’ve been fortunate enough to spend a fair part of my career in 

places where we’ve had real difficulties, and I’ve been able to see 

that by engaging people, we’ve been able to get a positive view of 

321 

the United States. I can tell you that in the last 18 months, every 

time I went to Darfur, every person I met with thanked me. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. No, that helps, because, well, you’ve 

obviously chosen to go into diplomacy, because I’m sure you share 

these sentiments, but I just wanted to get them out. 

Mr. Keith. 

Mr. KEITH. Thank you, Madame Chairman. I think you raise a 

critical point, and recalling a phrase you used earlier, I think a diplomatic surge is the kind of thing that we’ve been talking about in 

Asia and that is necessary. Looking back, you raise the public diplomacy environment over recent years. 

I think we all run the risk of having to take a step back and realize that we might have used platforms that, as you mentioned with 

then-Secretary Powell, we have to explain. 

I think we’re better off taking that risk and managing the public 

environment than allowing others to put words in our mouth. So 

it was my commitment and remains my commitment that we need 

to be out in front of the camera, so to speak, in print, and making 

our case to the world as best we can. 

We certainly need to be forthright, if we’ve taken a step in the 

wrong direction. I think that’s part of how I dealt with this when 

I was Consul General and Designated Chief of Mission in Hong 

Kong, was to explain to people, when bad news came up, that the 

American way of handling this was transparent, that we would 

never say that we don’t make mistakes, but that we handle them 

in a way that I think encourages people to see the best of America, 

and that when we make a mistake, we are quite open and honest 

about it, and therefore, can learn by it. 

I certainly believe, looking forward, that in Asia, as we anticipate 

the coming Olympics in China and a number of diplomatic events 

that will appear, including in Malaysia, the 50th anniversary of 

diplomatic relations with the United States, as well as the 50th anniversary of Malaysia’s independence, that we have opportunities 

and we need to use them to convey our fundamental beliefs, and 

to use everything at our disposal to try to advance American interests. 

I would enlarge also on the point that you made with regard to 

the Mercy. I think clearly, the pollings show that across Asia, we 

did very well after the tsunami not to dwell on something that was 

clearly tragic for those involved, but we responded in a way that 

showed, I think, the best of America. 

My commitment to you and to the committee would be to try to 

follow-up on that momentum in every way I possibly can. 

Senator BOXER. Good. 

Yes, Ms. Hughes. 

Ms. HUGHES. Madame Chairman, I think most of us joined the 

Foreign Service because we felt we had a mission of friendship. In 

some countries, that’s not always easy. It’s not always easy at the 

United Nations, quite frankly, where we’re dealing with 191 other 

countries and a lot of power politics. 

But even when we disagree, if we can listen and engage, that’s 

what’s exciting about our work. I am fortunate to be going to a 

country, Micronesia, if confirmed, that already has a very deep 

bond of friendship with the United States, but it’s going to enter 

322 

a difficult time, because we’re trying to nudge it toward modernization. 

In that sense, we look at the military for what it can do in a very 

constructive and practical way in a country like this. That can be 

search and rescue missions by the Coast Guard, training of the 

people so they can develop better law enforcement techniques of 

their own. The Pacific Command can do humanitarian assistance 

projects. That’s how we relate to the military, I hope, and that 

would certainly be my intention, if I’m lucky enough to go to Micronesia. 

Senator BOXER. I think that’s a good point, how we can use the 

military, which clearly, we did in these cases. 

Yes, Mr. Klemm. 

Mr. KLEMM. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. You mentioned 

the Mercy visit to the Southeast Asia region last summer. The stop 

in Timor was actually added at the end of its stay in the region. 

It took place just after the breakdown in law and order that occurred in April and May of last year. 

Not only was the visit very, very welcome because of the assistance that the ship was able to provide the Timorese people, who 

suffer from very, very serious health problems across the population, but also, given the timing, it showed the United States commitment to East Timor to our continued intent to assist that country as it consolidates its democratic institution, and gets its economy started, as well as ensuring security and political stability 

there. 

We have a pretty robust aid program in East Timor, due to the 

generosity of the Congress and the people of the United States. Our 

aid is focused on improving East Timor’s governance, as well as improving economic conditions in the country, where the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation continues to negotiate with East Timor and 

hopes once the elections are completed this summer to redouble the 

negotiations on a possible Compact Agreement with the country. 

All these things, in terms of the soft power tools that we have 

available, I think we’ve used them very effectively in East Timor. 

Our popularity there, as I understand it, is very, very strong. 

I don’t want to draw too tight of a correlation on this, but as 

you’re aware, our military to military relationship in East Timor is 

actually at a very, very low level, largely due to the accountability 

problems that arose, both in 2006 and 1999. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Klemm, thank you for your answer. I don’t 

want to get too far afield from the question, which is the way we 

can use diplomacy. I think you’ve laid out a series of issues to boost 

our popularity in the region. I think you did touch on that. 

Mr. Huso, I just—because this is really my only question. I’m 

going to throw you a little curve here. Answer that, but also, if you 

will, in December 2005, reports surfaced that a group of 26 ethnic 

Hmong children and their adult guardian had been detained by 

Thai authorities, and forcibly deported to Laos, a country that has 

committed horrific human rights violations against the Hmong people for the past three decades. 

In response to significant outcry on the issue, including from my 

home State of California, I wrote Secretary Rice in 2006 and asked 

our Government to take all appropriate steps to secure their reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00330 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
323 

lease, and to work with the United Nation’s High Commission of 

Refugees to identify a durable solution for the children. 

So could you please provide a report on the current status of 

these Hmong children? What is being done? If confirmed, will you 

provide me periodic updates on this and other issues related to 

human rights abuses against the Hmong? 

Mr. HUSO. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. With your permission, I’ll answer the first question. 

Senator BOXER. Surely. Surely. 

Mr. HUSO. As you pointed out, I’m currently the Political Advisor 

at U.S. Pacific Command, and I was present during the tsunami. 

When the U.S. Pacific Command responded to that disaster, it 

was clearly recognized that we were facing a disaster on a scale 

that was unprecedented, and that only a quick military response 

was going to be able to deliver the relief and the assistance that 

was necessary in a timely manner. 

There was also a recognition, but it wasn’t the primary motivation, that a U.S. military-led effort of that nature could, in fact, 

provide benefits to us, in terms of how the U.S. military was perceived. But in essence, it was a humanitarian endeavor. 

After the fact, of course, as you pointed out, the polls indicated 

there was a great deal of support for the action that we took, and 

views of America were changed. 

I see this opportunity to cooperate with other countries in the region on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as a very important one. It’s one way that the military can support our diplomatic efforts in the region, and begin to change perceptions of how 

we operate there. 

To answer your second question, Madame Chairwoman, my understanding is that of the 26 individuals that you mentioned, 21 of 

them were returned to their villages by the Lao Government in 

April of this year. There’s a remaining five, who I believe are all 

boys, and one adult, whose whereabouts I do not know. As far as 

I know, the State Department has not been able to ascertain it. 

I certainly will keep you and your staff informed of any developments that may take place in this case, and will follow-up diligently if confirmed. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Huso. 

Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Madame Chair. I will kind of 

pick up a little bit with the public diplomacy theme that you have 

started here. It was a very good question, and I appreciated the responses from each of you. 

This is directed to you, Mr. Keith, and to you, Mr. Hume, recognizing that Indonesia and Malaysia, as two moderate Islamic nations, can play an important role in being a bridge to the Islamic 

community for the United States. 

What steps have you seen from these countries that they are 

willing to be that bridge, and how can we work to improve the relationships, work with these nations to do so? Any suggestions or 

thoughts, Mr. Keith, Mr. Hume? Go ahead. 

Mr. KEITH. Senator, if I may, I’ll go first. Thank you for your 

question. I think it’s one of the most important issues that I’ll have 

to think about on my way to post and after I’m there. 

324 

I know that within the Department, Karen Hughes has designated Malaysia as one of the pilot countries where we need to 

focus our resources in public diplomacy, precisely for the reasons 

that you’ve raised. 

I think what we see with Indonesia and regional—I’m sorry, with 

Malaysia, and regional for, in particular, in ASEAN, in APEC, and 

in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the voice that you 

spoke of a moderate forward-looking perspective influenced by a 

market-oriented perspective on the economy at home is one that we 

can work with, and that we ought to be able to find a way to amplify and in some ways accelerate. 

I think the opportunities will come, and we need to be alert to 

them and take advantage of them. For example, I mentioned a moment ago the upcoming 50th anniversary of Malaysia’s independence and our diplomatic relations. 

This is the kind of opportunity, it seems to me, where we ought 

to, for the Malaysian people and through them, to other members 

of ASEAN, find ways to communicate our fundamental themes in 

the region. 

I think also, working with Malaysia in multilateral for, such as 

the U.N. and its organizations, we can find ways to bring that moderate perspective to bear in the World Health Organization, in the 

Food and Agricultural Organization. 

These are all areas where north-south and third-world kinds of 

issues do arise. We can be working with Malaysia ahead of time 

and throughout the development of breaking or developing perspectives on issues including avian influenza and how samples are 

shared, or biodiversity and how genetic resources are taken care of. 

These kinds of cutting-edge issues, I think, lend themselves to 

Malaysia’s pragmatic approach, which we see in many instances. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. 

Mr. Hume. 

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much, Senator. I think I would start 

from a hope that the Indonesian Government is successful at home 

as a democracy, helping to meet the needs of the Indonesian people. I think in that kind of a context, with respect for the rule of 

law, Indonesia will be a stronger partner for us, dealing with the 

questions of extremism and issues elsewhere. 

I look at the progress that’s been made recently. The dispatch of 

a battalion, for example, to be part of the peacekeeping force in 

Lebanon is a positive example. 

In the briefings I received over the past several weeks, one of the 

points that was talked about that sticks in my mind, we have a 

very active exchange program with Indonesia, and the Voice of 

America began a program of interviewing some of the students who 

were in the United States, and then sharing those programs with 

local stations in Indonesia, which has become a positive and popular program to listen to for many Indonesians. 

I think that that type of mixed exchange and outreach and sharing against a backdrop of a country which is generally improving 

is the right track, in order to be sure that we have a partner for 

counteracting extremism and a kind of rage and dissatisfaction. 

Thank you very much. 

325 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. I’m going to direct a question 

to all of you here this morning, as it relates to energy needs, the 

ability to provide for energy. We’ve had some very interesting hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee on energy and national 

security and that perspective. 

In your—the respective country to which you have been nominated to fill this post, can you just very quickly tell me how you 

see energy issues, the needs and demands impacting each of the 

nations that you work with? I recognize that we don’t have much 

time on this, so if you can try to be brief. 

Mr. Huso, we’ll start with you here. 

Mr. HUSO. Senator Murkowski, thank you very much. Laos is a 

very small, very poor country, and does not have a lot of economic 

activity, but they do have a lot of hydropower potential. As a consequence, there are a number of dam projects under construction 

in Laos that will provide electric energy to neighboring countries, 

primarily Thailand. 

So I don’t see energy requirements as being a serious issue in 

Laos. To the contrary, Laos will be a net exporter of energy. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Klemm. 

Mr. KLEMM. Thank you, Senator. East Timor sits on substantial 

oil and gas reserves that lie along the border with Australia. It’s 

a large net exporter of energy at the present, and I don’t see that 

reversing probably for the next couple of decades. 

American companies are involved in developing the energy and 

oil resources in East Timor. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Are you seeing interest from countries such 

as China, perhaps, coming—offering roads infrastructure, looking 

to perhaps tie up some of that energy reserves? 

Mr. KLEMM. To be very brief, yes, Senator. The Chinese have 

diplomatic relations with East Timor. They have undertaken to 

build a new foreign ministry for the government. They’re also 

building a new presidential palace in Dili, the capital. 

I’m not aware that they’re branching out to other infrastructure 

projects, which are desperately needed in the country. But the Chinese certainly are, of course, aware of East Timor’s oil wealth, and 

probably have that in mind as a result of their activities. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. 

Ms. Hughes. 

Ms. HUGHES. Thank you for raising a question, Senator, that is 

absolutely critical for Micronesia. Micronesia has no fossil fuels. 

Everything is imported. When it was a trust territory, we used to 

pay for their fuel. We don’t now, under the new compact. Their 

very viability, in my opinion, depends upon developing other 

sources of energy. 

If I’m confirmed, I would hope to make this a priority. Certainly, 

they have ample solar radiation, wind, water. It is a key to their 

sustainable development. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do they have geothermal, do you know? 

Ms. HUGHES. There appear to be some very, very rudimentary 

projects. The only thing I have come across in my reading are some 

solar energy projects in outlying islands. 

326 

But in my opinion, this underpins everything that we’re aiming 

for, in the way of economic developments. The small island states 

have a very particular need in this regard. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. 

Mr. Keith. 

Mr. KEITH. Thank you, Senator Murkowski. Very briefly, Malaysia is a supplier nation, of course, and American firms are also involved in Malaysia in a partnership arrangement. 

I guess the one point I would emphasize, in addition to pursuing 

our commercial interests there and helping increase the stock of 

supply globally, is sustainable development. 

We’re deeply engaged with the Malaysians in a project called the 

Heart of Borneo, which is an environmental protection project or 

program, in its essence, but we’re also, as part of that, working in 

particular with regard to palm oil and its application as a biofuel, 

working with the Malaysians to ensure that their perspective is 

one of a country that is committed to sustainable development, in 

particular, as it’s a transit country for logs that are brought to 

China across Malaysia. 

So there are a number of areas where natural resources are key 

to Malaysia’s future economic growth, and we’d like to find a way 

to ensure that this perspective of sustainable development is included in their ambitious modernization plans between now and 

2020. 

Thank you. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. We appreciate you bringing that part of it 

up. 

Mr. Hume. 

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much, Senator. Again, briefly, Indonesia’s the one OPEC member that has become a net importer of 

fossil fuel. So I think there, we see a number of issues. The one 

that stands out above the others is the 10 years of turmoil that Indonesia has seen has also been accompanied by underinvestment 

in the kind of infrastructure that leads to a healthy energy industry. 

I know that during President Bush’s visit last fall, he and President Yudhoyono talked about cooperation on biofuels, but this is 

obviously an area that needs more attention. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Senator Murkowski, I think that was a very good 

amount of questioning from you. 

Senator Feingold, we’re so happy to see you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I thank the Chair for holding this 

hearing, and I’d like to begin by thanking our five nominees for 

being here today, but more importantly, for your many years of 

service, and for your willingness to work in some of the more demanding positions in the U.S. Government. 

The countries to which you’ve been nominated—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Democratic Republic 

327 

of Timor-Leste, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic—face 

distinct, but equally difficult, challenges. 

There are also many opportunities that I hope you’ll be able to 

seize upon and develop if you are confirmed, and I do look forward 

to working with you closely. I hope you’ll look to the Senate as a 

resource and to this committee as a source of support and guidance 

during your tenure at your respective posts. 

I would also like to offer my warm welcome to your families and 

friends who have stood by you and whose ongoing support will be 

necessary as you set off to these new positions. 

In the time I have, let me begin with Ambassador Hume, who 

was kind enough, I think, to make both of my trips to South Africa 

a success, and just did a wonderful job of briefing me and helping 

us along. So it is very good to see you again. 

I understand you were most recently the Charge in Sudan. Welcome back from what must’ve been quite a difficult and rather unforgiving post. Is there anything you’d like—anything you will take 

with you from your time in Sudan—and apply, if confirmed, to your 

post in Indonesia—in terms of running an embassy? 

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much, Senator. Pleased to see you. 

Well, I think there are a lot of things that take away from Sudan. 

In terms of running an embassy, you’re dealing with people who 

are also in a difficult circumstance. You look first to your people, 

and being sure that they’re safe and that they can get a sense of 

satisfaction from their work. 

In general, I think Sudan is an example to never give up. I know 

that there are huge frustrations here, not to mention the frustrations in Sudan at the difficulties, but I think it is a truth that the 

United States has had an enormous positive impact in that country 

over the last number of years, helping to negotiate the peace agreement with the South. 

People are no longer being killed in the South. That war went 

on for 25 years. We, I regret to say, we have not had the same success in Darfur that we had in the South, and that’s business that 

remains to be done. 

Those are the type of lessons that I’d take away. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In justifying the national security waiver that 

ended restrictions on military assistance to Indonesia in fiscal year 

2006, the State Department wrote, ‘‘as a matter of policy, the quality and quantity of our assistance will continue to be guided by 

progress on democratic reform and accountability, and carefully 

calibrated to promote these outcomes.’’ Which elements of accountability and democratic reform would you assign the most weight 

when assessing progress, and what steps will you take to ensure 

that this kind of ‘‘calibration’’ actually ensures real progress? 

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much, Senator. First of all, I’ve become aware during my time in Washington that this is an issue 

which has to get my immediate and personal attention. 

First of all, we vet all of the—as required—all of the people who 

would get IMET training. Second, we have a number of proposals 

to try to encourage the Indonesians in the right path on military 

reform. 

Some steps have been taken. The separation of the police from 

the military was a positive step. The withdrawal of the military 

328 

from civilian positions in the government was a positive step. But 

other programs, we still have to continue to work on. One is a 

question of eventual accountability for the problems, particularly in 

East Timor, but elsewhere, as well. 

The second one is to try to get the Indonesian military on budget, 

and on a budget that is reviewed and approved by their civilian authorities. That’s something we’re working on with them on. It 

hasn’t gone far enough or fast enough, and that’s something I’d 

hope to encourage. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Are there any forms of military assistance 

that the United States will not provide? 

Mr. HUME. I’m sure there are many forms of U.S. assistance we 

wouldn’t provide, but—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. As a matter of policy? 

Mr. HUME. I would have to take that question. I wouldn’t want 

to guess. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Fair enough. I’m extremely interested in Indonesia and its role in particularly our post-9/11 circumstances, so 

I look forward to working—— 

Mr. HUME. Yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ambassador, please. 

Mr. HUME. If I could just say something. One, I know that you 

visited fairly recently in Indonesia, but I’d like to say this to other 

members of the committee, as well. Particularly in an area like 

military reform and human rights, that’s a message that it’s important to be carried not just by the people in the embassy, but also 

by people in Congress. 

I would welcome, as I did in Sudan, visits by Members of Congress who I think could help us get that message across. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Now, every ambassador nominee says this, 

but I want to highlight what he just said. We have members—I’d 

say to my Chair and I’d say to the Senator from last—we have 

members who have talked about having been to Iraq 15 times, 

which is good. But when I went to Indonesia, I was told I was the 

second senator to have visited there in 3 years. The other one was 

Senator Bond. It is the largest Islamic country in the world, the 

fourth largest population in the world, and we need to go there 

more. There’s just no question. It is a fascinating critical place, and 

I wish you well. I also have strong feelings about Timor. Fifteen 

years ago, this was the first issue I ever sort of sunk my teeth into, 

fighting for the independence of East Timor on this committee, so 

I’m awfully pleased to see that the independence exists, that you’re 

going there, but I know that there are difficulties. 

Despite its independence in 2001, security continues to be a critical issue in Timor-Leste, especially in relation to the crisis which 

erupted there a year ago. As I’m sure you’re aware, the Australianled International Stabilization Force is not part of the U.N. Mission, but remains in country. Having separate military forces results in a lack of accountability, unclear lines of responsibility, and 

poor coordination. If confirmed, Mr. Klemm, would you support 

placing the ISF under a unified U.N. command and would you 

push for this directly? 

Mr. KLEMM. Well, thank you, Senator, and before I answer your 

question directly, let me also welcome you and other members of 

329 

the committee and any other Member of Congress to Dili, as well. 

If you’re in Indonesia or any place else in the region, it’s not that 

far away, and your presence—your diplomatic presence there could 

be of great, great assistance in getting our message across. 

I want to—regarding the work that the Australian forces are 

doing in East Timor, their liaison and coordination with the Blue 

Helmets there under U.N. auspices, and our policy on both their 

ability to coordinate and their presence in East Timor, I would 

like—I probably should be prudent and take that question back 

and confirm our policy. 

It is my understanding that last summer, when the current U.N. 

resolution placing police forces—U.N. police forces—in East Timor 

was approved by the Security Council at U.N. We supported this 

division of U.N. forces and Australian forces. 

It’s my understanding, if my understanding is correct, that continues today—that the administration’s view is that the Australians are playing a constructive role in the capacity under which 

they’re there today. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I look forward to your response 

when you’re able to give it. My time’s already gone. If I could—— 

Senator BOXER. Would you like to have another minute? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I just want to ask one more question. 

Senator BOXER. I’ll give you three more minutes, then. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I just want to ask Mr. Huso a question, because just like the Chair, I have a very strong personal interest, 

as well as constituent interest, in the relations with the country 

that you are to represent—the country that you’re going to represent us at. 

As you’re aware, the Hmong have been moving across the border 

to Thailand for years because of continued persecution by the Lao 

Government. You mentioned in your testimony that you will work 

with the Lao and Thai Governments to find ‘‘durable solutions’’ for 

this population. 

Would you expand on what this means? I’m specifically interested to hear about your plans to work with the Lao Government, 

given that they have a longstanding record of persecuting the 

Hmong. 

Mr. HUSO. Thank you very much, Senator, for the opportunity to 

comment on that very, very important issue. As I mentioned in my 

testimony, I share your concerns. I share the concerns of your constituents, and many of your other Senators and Congressmen have 

constituents who are Lao Americans, and particularly, Hmong 

Americans. 

You’re absolutely right, Senator. I have no illusions about the difficulty of the challenge of working with the government on this 

particular issue. It’s one of great sensitivity to the Lao Government. But nonetheless, I’m committed to work on trying to do what 

I can to encourage the Lao Government to protect the rights of all 

its citizens, including the ethnic minorities. 

In terms of a durable solution for those who cross the border into 

Thailand, I think one of the key principles that we need to keep 

in mind is to provide those individuals access to the type of screening necessary to determine who among them has a legitimate fear 

of persecution. 

330 

If that well-founded legitimate fear is established, then a durable 

solution could conceivably include resettlement in the United 

States or other countries willing to accept refugees, and potentially, 

for those who may not be found to qualify for refugee status, some 

sort of assurance of their protection in the event that they are returned to Laos is also extremely important, so I would work to 

achieve that goal. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you foresee a successful resettlement of 

the Hmong back to Laos, and if so, by when? 

Mr. HUSO. Historically, sir, that has happened. There have been 

in the past, U.N. monitored programs for the return of Hmong to 

Laos, with some success. I don’t know at this point whether that 

would be possible with the group that’s currently there now. 

I know this is a topic of discussion between the Government of 

Thailand, the Government of Laos. Its a topic of great interest to 

the United States, and also, to the international community. 

Senator FEINGOLD. You’ve probably already figured this out, but 

I can assure you if you see any Member of Congress from Wisconsin, Republican or Democrat, this is not a passing interest. 

Mr. HUSO. Yes, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. This is dead serious. We’re interested in the 

details. We’re very concerned about this as a delegation, so I wish 

you well. I thank you for the—— 

Senator BOXER. Senator, thank you, because, of course, you and 

I are experiencing similar issues in our States. I wanted to thank 

you, Mr. Huso, because my understanding is that you said to my 

staff you’d be willing to meet with some of the leaders of the 

Hmong community in California. 

Mr. HUSO. Senator, that is my intention, to meet with the leaders of the community there and other States, so that I can understand their concerns and better inform myself, if confirmed. 

Senator BOXER. Very good. I’m going to ask unanimous consent 

to keep the record open for additional questions. Since I’m the only 

one voting, I think we will do that. 

Senator BOXER. There were two things I wanted to say to two of 

you before you leave, just to put some things on your radar screen. 

You don’t have to respond to them, but they’re just concerns coming from me. 

Mr. Keith, we do know about Malaysia’s investment in Iran’s oil 

and gas sector, and I share your concerns that it is something we 

have to keep our eye on. It looks like the total trade between Malaysia and Iran rose from $224 million in 2000 to over $765 million 

in 2005. 

I just want to put on your radar screen that we will be having, 

as you know, the bilateral free trade agreement between the two 

countries, Malaysia and America. I just want you to know that 

there may be some amendments regarding this increasing relationship. 

Also, on antipiracy, that the Congressional International 

Antipiracy Caucus released its annual report on international property rights protections and found Malaysia was one of five countries placed on its priority watch list, singled out for not doing 

enough to protect intellectual property rights. 

331 

So I put that on your radar screen, because you may have colleagues calling you and saying, ‘‘Are you raising this issue?’’ 

Ms. Hughes, even though you are going to a small country, I 

think you have an opportunity to do some really good things. 

You mentioned one of them in response to the question of my colleague and friend, Senator Murkowski, in terms of energy—and I 

want to read to you that last fall, the Vice President of the Federated States of Micronesia said the following: ‘‘The sad irony is 

that those of us who have little to contribute to the causes of climate change and sea level rise are the first in line to suffer the 

consequences.’’ 

He went on to say, ‘‘Exposed to the effects of extreme weather 

events, our livelihood and traditions as island people. In fact, our 

whole civilization are under greater threat than ever before.’’ 

So I know that in conversations with my staff—and by the way, 

my staff was so impressed with all of you—you had mentioned that 

we’re building an embassy in Micronesia, and that you had suggested perhaps putting a solar roof, for example, on that building. 

I wanted to just push you a little more on that, because I think, 

as you pointed out, the abundance of the sun and the wind there 

can really be of great help to this little country, and, by the way, 

to our big country. There’s no question about it. 

I think a few simple steps that you could take just in being a role 

model in that building of the embassy, once you’re confirmed—I 

know you can’t do much at this stage, but once we move these 

nominations, and I hope it will be very soon, if you just take a look 

at the roofs and the bulbs and fixtures and insulation and heating 

and air conditioning systems, we can cut so much energy use, and 

therefore, our carbon footprint, but also, save money for the taxpayers. It’s a win-win for everybody. 

Then the other issue in Micronesia that came to my attention is 

that according to the most recent State Department human rights 

report, ‘‘cultural factors in the male-dominated society limited 

women’s representation in government and politics.’’ 

So I think your going there is a wonderful message to that country, a wonderful message. I can just see by your demeanor, you will 

win them over. I think in doing that, you have a tremendous responsibility, I think, because the women there will at first look at 

you and think, ‘‘Gee, I wonder if she can really do this.’’ 

Of course, you will be able to do it, and I think it’s going to send 

a strong message to the women, empowering them, as well as to 

the men. 

Now, another down side is that reports of spousal abuse, often 

severe, continued during the year. This is in the State Department 

human rights report. Although assault is a crime, there’s no specific laws against domestic abuse, no governmental or private facilities to shelter and support women in abusive situations. 

So I am just laying these issues out there for you. Ms. Hughes, 

you have these two challenges—the energy challenge, which presents as opportunity because we’re building an embassy there, and 

the fact that you’re a woman, it seems to me, is an opportunity on 

this other front. 

Am I putting too much on your shoulders, or are you excited 

about this challenge? 

332 

Ms. HUGHES. I thank you, Madam Chairman, for such an inspirational message. It’s great. I would really look forward to working 

in those particular areas, among many others. 

Regarding the notion of solar energy for the new embassy building, it’s my understanding that ground was just broken on the new 

building last month, so it’s in an early stage. 

Senator BOXER. Good. 

Ms. HUGHES. What I would propose to do, if confirmed, would be 

to call on the head of the Overseas Building Office at the State Department, General Williams, and explore this possibility. 

Everything we do, but particularly in a small environment, is a 

model. I think there’s a lot we can do. The Peace Corps, for example. There are nearly 50 volunteers in Micronesia recently adapted 

all their vehicles to use coconut oil. 

Senator BOXER. That’s great. 

Ms. HUGHES. Setting an example is a wonderful opportunity. 

Women may be one of the best hopes for building leadership in Micronesia, so I’m inspired. Thank you very much for that. 

Senator BOXER. Well, thank you. Thank you very much. 

Well, what we’ll do is we’ll put a call in to the General, and say 

that I raised it with you and encouraged you to move forward, and 

see if we can get some interest there so that you’re not fighting 

that battle alone. Because sometimes, they say, ‘‘Well, we’ve already done the plans.’’ So let’s see what impact we can have. 

I read an editorial the other day just saying that there is a lot 

of talk about global warming, and what are we doing? We’re just 

talking about it. We have to start using the technologies we already have, instead of putting it off for another day. Because it’s 

a problem that’s going to come to a head very soon, and we have 

a window of 5 to 10 years if we don’t act. 

So to all of you, these are little things, but you’re going to be 

managers of a lot of people, and you’ll have opportunities to do little things. If you do them, let us know about them, because we’ll 

make certain that my colleagues know. 

Just in America, buildings are responsible for 39 percent of all 

greenhouse gas emissions. Buildings, 39 percent. So even though it 

may seem like a simple thing to open the curtains in this room and 

shut off these lights, apparently, we can’t, because of the cameras. 

But in some cases, we can. 

There are new technologies now that as the sun comes in, the 

lights dim in the office. We’re doing that in all my offices here as 

a test case. So we hope maybe you can consider that in all of your 

responsibilities, just as a—always have it in your mind that you 

can do that. 

Well, again, we’re just really pleased with this group that sits before me. We thank you for your service, for your love of country, 

for your dedication, and we thank your families and your friends 

who have been behind you every step of the way. 

I know I couldn’t do what I do without that support, and whether 

they’re here or whether they’re working or they’re doing other 

things, we know that they’re rooting for you, and you all accorded 

yourselves so beautifully, and we wish you every good wish. 

333 

I will report to Senators Biden and Lugar that I hope we can 

move these nominations very, very quickly. Thank you very much, 

and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF CAMERON R. HUME TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LUGAR

Question. What is the status of the United States Peace Corps establishing a presence in Indonesia? Do you envision a future Peace Corps presence as a helpful contribution to the overall development of Indonesia? 

Answer. The United States Peace Corps sent an assessment mission to Indonesia 

in February 2007. That mission concluded that the establishment of a Peace Corps 

presence in Indonesia would be fully in keeping with the mission of the Peace Corps 

and would be highly beneficial to Indonesia’s overall development. The Department 

of State shares that view. The assessment mission also concluded, however, that security concerns in Indonesia precluded establishing a program at this time. The 

Peace Corps plans to revisit the results of the assessment in the near future, with 

the hope of achieving more positive results. 

RESPONSE OF CAMERON R. HUME TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FEINGOLD

Question. Are there any forms of military assistance we do not provide to Indonesia? 

Answer. We continue to pursue a calibrated approach as we increase our engagement with the Indonesian military, as part of our broader effort to support Indonesia’s reform effort and to build a strategic partnership with this critically important country. 

Our assistance and training has focused on developing a professional military, 

supporting the reform of the military, and on enhancing the Indonesian military’s 

capacity to respond to natural disasters, to provide maritime security, and to engage 

in international peacekeeping efforts. To date, we have not provided lethal assistance. We have provided spare parts for previously-purchased F–16 fighters and we 

have provided technical assistance for previously-purchased Harpoon missiles to ensure the safety and success of those programs. We also have not engaged in any 

unit training with the Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS). 

As Indonesian democracy continues to move forward, we expect to expand our engagement with the Indonesian military, and will keep Congress informed. 

RESPONSE OF HANS G. KLEMM TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FEINGOLD

Question. Would you press to put the International Stabilization Forces (ISF) deployed in East Timor and led by Australia under direct United Nations command? 

Answer. On October 27, 2006, then-Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta publicly expressed his government’s view that the Australian-led international security force 

continued to be the best fit for the situation in East Timor. We concur that the Australian-led security force is the most appropriate. Under the U.N. military proposal 

considered in August, 2006, East Timor would have had only about 350 U.N. troops, 

half of whom would have been assigned to protect U.N. staff and assets. 

In contrast, Australia has deployed about 1,000 troops to secure East Timor. Australia’s contribution to restoring stability in East Timor underscores the importance 

of our alliance for maintaining peace and security in the region. If confirmed, I 

would engage vigorously with all parties to maintain clear lines of command and 

accountability for the conduct of all security forces deployed in East Timor. 

(335) 

NOMINATION OF HON. REUBEN JEFFERY III 

TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 

ECONOMIC, ENERGY, AND AGRICULTURAL 

AFFAIRS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Jeffery, Reuben, III, to be Under Secretary of State for Economic, 

Energy, and Agricultural Affairs 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:25 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez and Lugar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Today, the committee meets to consider the 

nomination of Mr. Reuben Jeffery. The President has nominated 

Mr. Jeffery to be the Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs. 

We want—as he approaches the witness table, we want to congratulate you on your nomination. We look forward to hearing from 

you this afternoon. I know we’re, shortly, going to welcome our colleague Senator Chambliss, who has joined us, to—who will be joining us, was here a few minutes ago, and is wrapping up, in the Intelligence Committee, some questions that he has in that venue— 

to introduce Mr. Jeffery. 

And, as we wait for him to come back, since I know we have a 

busy agenda, let me recognize myself for an opening statement, 

then I’ll recognize Senator Lugar, and, by then, we should have 

Senator Chambliss here. 

Mr. Jeffery, you’ve been nominated to serve as the Under Secretary for Economics, Energy and Agricultural Affairs. If confirmed, you would be the senior economic official at the State Department, and you will have the challenge of helping to lead the 

Department on a wide range of issues, including investment, finance, agriculture, trade, energy, telecommunications, aviation, 

and transportation. This broad portfolio requires you to work with 

Secretary Rice and others to analyze how our current policies and 

336 

our relationships with other countries can best serve our common 

goals in the areas I’ve just mentioned. 

This position as Under Secretary would give you jurisdiction over 

many important issues facing the Congress and the country today. 

And so, I’d like to take a moment to touch on a few of these matters. 

In this era of globalization, the stability of our economy is intrinsically linked with our trade practices. As transnational business 

continues to expand, the Congress and this administration must 

work to establish trade policies that not only support our economic 

interests, but also ensure that vital labor and environmental protections are secured. It’s my hope that, if you are confirmed, you 

will use your position in the State Department to help achieve 

these goals. 

As an economic powerhouse, the United States must use its economic weight wisely. The position that you have been nominated 

for would include work with our sanctions program in dealing with 

countries like Iran and Sudan. I am a strong supporter of economic 

sanctions as a tool of diplomacy, and I would expect the next Under 

Secretary to be actively engaged in this crucial issue as you work 

with your colleagues at the Treasury Department. 

Over the next 2 weeks, the Senate plans to examine new ways 

to increase our energy self-reliance and promote the development 

of alternative energy sources. As the Under Secretary who has jurisdiction over that area, you would have the responsibility of addressing the economic and political challenges facing our energy security. During this era of record gas prices and conflict in the Middle East, the complexity and importance of this task cannot be 

overstated. I know that the distinguished Senator, full member 

of—ranking member of the full committee, Senator Lugar, has been 

very involved in this issue, and I know that he shares my concern 

that the United States must do more to promote our energy security. 

And, finally, earlier today this subcommittee examined the issue 

of U.S. foreign assistance and the challenges facing the current reform process, referred to as the ‘‘F’’ process. If confirmed, you 

would work in collaboration with other State officials on matters 

such as developing the annual foreign assistance budget, setting 

America’s development agenda, and advising Secretary Rice on the 

Millennium Challenge Corporation issues. The issue of U.S. foreign 

assistance is of importance to many members of this committee, 

certainly to me, and I am hoping that greater leadership will be 

taken on this issue in the future than we have seen in the past. 

Important—it’s very important to reduce poverty as part of the 

work of Multilateral Development Banks, such as the World Bank 

and the IMF. These institutions face many challenges, and I plan 

to take a critical look at the role of these and other multilateral 

institutions in the near future. 

The issues that my subcommittee handles overlap greatly with 

the work of the Under Secretary for Economics, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, and, should you be confirmed, I hope that we 

would have a fine working relationship so as to address some of the 

issues I’ve just discussed. 

337 

And, finally, Mr. Jeffery, I know that you’ve had a successful career in the private sector. You’ve spent the past few years in the 

public sector, and I want to thank you for your service. This hearing will provide an opportunity to not only examine your past work, 

but to learn more about your goals and vision for the position 

which you have been nominated. I appreciate having had the opportunity to speak with you in the past about your nomination to 

this post, and I look forward to exploring more of the issues that 

we previously discussed. 

With that, let me turn to Senator Lugar for whatever statements 

he may have. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I join you in welcoming Reuben Jeffery to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As a member, and former chairman, of the Agriculture Committee, and as a farmer, I’ve had an intense interest 

in the performance of the agency he currently heads, the Commodity Future Trading Commission. I applaud the work Chairman 

Jeffery has done on that post, and I am encouraged that President 

Bush has nominated a candidate with such diverse experience to 

be Under Secretary of State for Economics, Energy and Agricultural Affairs. 

The State Department post requires a range of managerial and 

substantive experience that very few candidates possess. The nominee would be the principal advisor to the Secretary of State on 

matters of economic energy, business, and agricultural policy, and 

would coordinate and supervise implementation of that policy. I’ve 

often spoken of the need to draw talented individuals from the private sector into public service, and, given the potential loss of privacy, the reduction in pay, the financial restrictions, the other complications, government service often holds little attraction for men 

and women who have built thriving careers in the private sector. 

As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the nominee before us is one 

who has made personal and financial sacrifices to pursue difficult 

assignments in the service of our Nation, including time spent in 

Iraq. 

Chairman Jeffery entered Government service from the partnership of Goldman Sachs, where his achievements included managing 

the London and Paris offices. He served as special advisor to the 

president for Lower Manhattan Development, then went to work 

for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, before returning to 

Washington as the senior director for International Economic Affairs on the National Security Council. 

Chairman Jeffery’s impressive experience in the private sector, 

and the versatilities he demonstrated in his public service, led the 

President to nominate him for this position. In my conversations 

with Chairman Jeffery, he has demonstrated a facility for the 

broad range of topics related to international economic policy. In 

my judgment, United States strategic objectives in the world are 

unlikely to be achieved if progress is not made on the policy issues 

that Chairman Jeffery would oversee. We need progress on expanding trade relationships, improving the performance of the multilatVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00345 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
338 

eral development banks, and bolstering international agricultural 

cooperation. These are areas where the United States should be 

leading the world to new accomplishments that strengthen global 

economy. 

Of particular importance is the energy component of the job. 

During the past 2 years, this committee has examined rigorously 

the national security threats associated with the U.S. dependence 

on foreign energy sources, and testimony from 13 hearings in the 

109th Congress pointed to the inescapable conclusion that our energy vulnerability threatens a broad range of United States foreign 

policy goals, including preventing weapons proliferation, overcoming terrorism, promoting international development. Governments control as much as 79 percent of the world’s oil reserves, and 

production-and-supply decisions are often made for political reasons. Meanwhile, high oil prices are emboldening hostile governments. This Congress continues to debate our future role in the 

Middle East, yet our options are limited by the fact that our economy is dependent on steady supplies of oil from that region. 

Despite the centrality of energy to our diplomacy, State Department capacity in this area has often suffered from inattention and 

split authorities across the Department. Yet, there is reason for optimism. I’m encouraged that the full Senate is now set to consider 

legislation I introduced in March 2006, the Energy Diplomacy and 

Security Act, which aims to reinvigorate U.S. energy diplomacy and 

strengthen our security. Already, Secretary Rice has taken the initiative to implement a new international energy coordinator position contained in my legislation, and has embarked on valuable initiatives with Europe and Brazil. The next Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs must play a major role in 

addressing the risks and opportunities presented by the energy 

challenges that confront us. 

I appreciate Chairman Jeffery’s enthusiasm for this part of the 

portfolio, and his eagerness to work with our committee. I’ll look 

forward to an excellent partnership that advances United States 

energy security and diplomacy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m pleased to welcome Senator Chambliss 

to the committee, and recognize him now for his introduction of Mr. 

Jeffery. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez 

and Senator Lugar. I appreciate the opportunity to come here today 

to introduce Reuben Jeffery III, nominee for Under Secretary of 

State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs. 

I’ve known Reuben for several years now, and I cannot think of 

an individual who is more prepared for this position than is Reuben Jeffery. 

He has—as both of you have alluded to, has had many positions 

in this administration, both in very high-profile positions, as well 

as just getting out there and getting work done, as he did with Ambassador Bremer in Iraq. And what a terrific job he’s done everywhere he’s been asked to serve. 

339 

He was nominated to the chairmanship of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission by President Bush on May 17, 2005. 

This nomination was considered by the Senate Agriculture Committee, which I chaired at that time. I’m very pleased to say that 

Mr. Jeffery’s nomination sailed through the committee, and he was 

confirmed by the Senate June 30, 2005. Senator Lugar, obviously, 

as a member of that committee, supported his nomination there. 

I’m certain this committee will also find every reason to move forward expeditiously to confirm this nomination. 

In addition to the issue—to the background that you have both 

alluded to, Mr. Jeffery also spent 18 years working for Goldman 

Sachs, where—and he was managing partner of Goldman Sachs in 

Paris. 

Now let me tell you about Mr. Jeffery, what he did, and the way 

he approached his chairmanship at CFTC. 

He had a background in the financial community, but CFTC operates in a very unusual way because of the commodities and the 

issues that come before the CFTC. What this guy did was to do his 

homework like no other public servant I’ve ever seen. CFTC is extremely complex, and—it doesn’t deal with buying and selling 

stocks and bonds, it deals with commodities, and commodities, 

some of which Senator Lugar grows, and he knows how complex 

this—these issues of commodity trades can be. And not only did he 

have responsibility for regulating the commodity markets, but also 

to make sure that the folks who operated on those markets did so 

in a way that was fair to consumers, because consumers are the 

ultimate beneficiaries of the regulatory process. And this regulatory process at CFTC is just so complex. But Reuben Jeffery really delved into it immediately. He and I had numerous conversations early on, even prior to his confirmation, and he was already 

doing his homework then, to be prepared to take over the chairmanship of the CFTC. And I was just extremely pleased of the 

hard work that I saw going into place before he became chairman. 

As we had the opportunity to work together over the past few 

years, he’s always had the best interest of the CFTC at heart, as 

well as the industry, when considering hearings, rulings, as well as 

other business. It’s been a pleasure working with him, and he’ll be 

missed at CFTC. I’ll have to tell you, when he called me a couple 

of months ago, and told me this was in the works, I wasn’t particularly excited about it at that time, because we’re in the midst of 

trying to get CFTC reauthorized, and he has played such an integral role in helping negotiate and move that process through the— 

through both the House and the Senate. 

But to this position he’s going to bring a broad-based, fair-minded perspective, serving as the Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agriculture. I recommend him highly to this 

committee, and I’m just very pleased that you’re moving his nomination forward today. And I thank you for the opportunity to say 

something about a guy who’s become a dear friend. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. That was a 

very strong recommendation. 

Unfortunately, Senator Schumer wanted to be here today, but is 

not able to be here to give his introduction, as well, of Mr. Jeffery, 

340 

so I’d like to ask unanimous consent to add Senator Schumer’s remarks into the record. Without objection, it will so be entered into 

the record. 

[The information previously referred to appears in the Additional 

Material Submitted for the Record section at the end of this hearing.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, it’s now time to turn to the nominee. 

Chairman Jeffery, you have an opportunity to proceed with your 

opening statement. If you have family members here, we’d love to 

have you introduce them to the committee. And, in the interest of 

time, we’d ask you to keep your testimony to about 7 minutes. 

We’ll include your entire statement, for the record. And the time 

is now yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. REUBEN JEFFERY III, NOMINEE TO BE 

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC, ENERGY 

AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS 

Mr. JEFFERY. Perhaps I could—should begin, Mr. Chairman—Mr. 

Chairman and Senator Lugar, members of the committee, let me 

begin by introducing my family members who are here, and recognizing a couple of other people. 

I’m not sure where they are, but somewhere in here is my wife, 

Robin, my son, Ben, and my father, also Reuben, and I thank him 

for being here. That’s three of us here, Reubens. 

In any event—and I’d also—I’m also particularly touched to have 

with me my two fellow commissioners at the CFTC, Commissioner 

Mike Dunn and Commissioner Walt Lukken, with whom I’ve 

worked extensively over the past couple of years, in the context of 

our ongoing work at the Commission. 

With that, I’ll begin my statement. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank 

you for holding this hearing and inviting me to appear before you 

today. It’s an honor and a privilege to be here as the President’s 

nominee to be Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and 

Agricultural Affairs. 

I’d like to begin by thanking President Bush and Secretary Rice 

for the honor and privilege of being nominated and for the opportunity to serve the American people in this important position. And 

thank you also, Senator Chambliss and Senator Schumer, for your 

remarks and your friendship over the years. 

As the committee is well aware, national security and economic 

well-being are inextricably linked. Helping to develop and promote 

the conditions for economic opportunity internationally is critical to 

the creation of stable, peaceful, and prosperous communities 

around the world. Programs that help the world’s most vulnerable 

and encourage economic and self-reliance must be a core component of U.S. foreign policy. This is especially crucial in vulnerable 

areas, such as Africa and Latin America, where our strong engagement can help break the cycle of poverty and despair. 

Prior to 9/11, I had spent my career in the private sector, including a decade living and working outside of the United States. From 

that experience, I came to appreciate the transformative power of 

open and competitive markets and the relationship between good 

government and economic opportunity. I also learned something 

341 

about how to see our country through the eyes of others. Whether 

resented or respected, awed or envied, the economic well-being of 

the United States is a standard to which most others aspire. We 

are a great country, but—to which much has been given, but from 

which much is expected. As such, we have an obligation not only 

to advance our own economic interests overseas, but also to support 

the growth and development of others. Pursued strategically, these 

two objectives can be mutually reinforcing. 

For the past 5 years, I’ve had the privilege of working in the U.S. 

Government in a variety of capacities, several of which were referred to by Senator Lugar and Senator Chambliss in their very 

kind opening remarks. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will draw 

upon these various experiences in the private sector and in Government in working with my State Department colleagues to focus on 

three principal objectives: 

• First, leverage the resources of the U.S. Government and the 

private sector to encourage pro-growth economic policies and 

create the conditions for economic opportunity and poverty reduction around the world. • Second, promote prosperity and competitiveness through market-expanding trade, investment, aviation, and telecommunications agreements that seek to level the playing field for 

American workers while enhancing conditions for economic development in the economics of our trading partners. 

• And, finally, advance U.S. and global energy security by working with partner countries and the private sector to diversify 

energy sources, manage energy demand, and promote the development and use of innovative, cost-efficient, and environmentally respectful technologies. 

I am acutely aware that time is running short, and my job tenure, if confirmed, will be commensurately brief, but these broad 

policy objectives, to approve the quality of life and economic standing for Americans and people around the world, transcend party 

lines and administrations. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, the job of Under Secretary for 

Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs carries important and 

exciting responsibilities. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

with Secretary Rice, the State—my State Department, and other 

U.S. Government colleagues, and with members of this committee. 

I can assure you that I will need, and welcome, this committee’s 

ongoing support and counsel. 

I’m honored to be here before you today. Thank you, again, Mr. 

Chairman and members of the committee, for giving me this opportunity to be here. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jeffery follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. REUBEN JEFFERY III, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC, ENERGY AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing 

and inviting me to appear before you today. It is an honor to be here as the President’s nominee to be the Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs. 

I would like to begin by thanking President Bush and Secretary Rice for the honor 

and privilege of being nominated and for the opportunity to serve the American people in this important position. 

342 

Thank you also to Senator Chambliss for that very kind introduction. 

I would like to introduce my wife, Robin, and our son, Ben. Our daughter Jocelyn 

just started a new job in New York and could not be here today. Similarly, our son, 

Bob, is away on a long anticipated post-high school graduation outing. I would be 

remiss in not thanking them all, and Robin in particular, for their inspiration, love, 

and support over these many years. 

As the committee is well aware, national security and economic well-being are inextricably linked. Our children’s future depends both on ensuring prosperity at 

home and encouraging prosperous and growing societies overseas. 

Helping to develop and promote the conditions for economic opportunity internationally is critical to the creation of stable, peaceful, and prosperous communities 

around the world. Programs that help the world’s most vulnerable and encourage 

economic self-reliance must be a core component of U.S. foreign policy. This is especially crucial in Africa and Latin America where our strong engagement and support 

can help break the cycle of poverty and despair. 

Prior to 9/11, I spent my career in the private sector, including a decade living 

and working outside of the United States. Through that experience, I came to appreciate the transformative power of open and competitive markets and the relationship between good government and economic opportunity. 

I also learned how to see our country through the eyes of others. Whether resented or respected, admired or envied, the economic well-being of the United States 

is the standard to which others aspire. We are a great country to which much has 

been given, but from which much is expected. As such, we have an obligation not 

only to advance our own economic interests overseas, but also to support the growth 

and development of others. Pursued strategically, these two objectives are mutually 

reinforcing. 

For the past 5 years, I have had the privilege of working for the U.S. Government 

in a variety of capacities. This included helping with the economic recovery of lower 

Manhattan post-9/11 as a special advisor to the President, working in Iraq and at 

the Pentagon in support of the Coalition Provisional Authority, providing leadership 

at the NSC on trade and development issues, and heading the Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission as it deals with financial market regulatory matters. 

In so doing, I have had the opportunity to work alongside an exceptional group 

of dedicated public servants, both civilian and military. These years have been the 

most personally and professionally rewarding of my career. 

If confirmed as Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, 

I would draw upon these varied experiences and perspectives to energize and lead 

the State Department’s team of Foreign Service and civil service officers who are 

all committed to the core mission of building prosperity and economic security at 

home and overseas. 

If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues to focus on four main objectives. 

• First—Leverage the resources of the United States and international business 

communities to encourage pro-growth economic policies and create the conditions for economic opportunity and poverty reduction in support of U.S. and 

international assistance programs. 

• Second—Promote prosperity and competitiveness through market-expanding 

trade, aviation, telecommunications, and investment agreements that seek to 

level the playing field for American workers, businesses, farmers, and consumers while enhancing conditions for economic development at home and in 

the economies of our trading partners. 

• Third—Advance United States and global energy security by working with partner countries and the private sector to diversify energy sources, manage energy 

demand, and promote the development and use of innovative, energy efficient, 

and environmentally respectful technologies. 

• Finally—Maintain and enhance a stable financial system by working with other 

major economies and international financial institutions to implement responsible growth-oriented economic policies. 

While much progress has been made in these areas under the excellent leadership 

of Secretary Rice, former Under Secretary, Josette Sheeran, and Assistant Secretary 

for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, Dan Sullivan, we have the opportunity 

to build on those successes in the coming months and years. 

I am acutely aware that time is running short and my job tenure, if confirmed, 

will be commensurately brief. But these broad policy objectives—to improve the 

quality of life and economic standing for Americans and people around the world— 

transcend party lines and administrations. 

While I look at the next 19 months as a sprint, I would hope to pass the baton 

to the next runner having covered some significant ground. 

343 

I appreciate too that this is a team effort, requiring not just the Department to 

work as one, but also necessitating constructive collaboration among many agencies 

and branches of Government. No one individual, department, or branch has a monopoly on good ideas, nor the resources to take them from conception to successful 

implementation. 

Mr. Chairman, the job of Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural 

Affairs carries important and exciting responsibilities. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working with Secretary Rice, my State Department, and other U.S. Government 

colleagues, and with the members of this committee. I can assure you that I will 

need and welcome this committee’s ongoing support and counsel. 

I am honored to be here before you today. Thank you again Mr. Chairman and 

members of the committee for giving me this opportunity to be here this afternoon. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Chairman Jeffery. And we welcome your family here, as well. I know it’s a great day. 

And, moving forward, let me start off with some questions, and 

then I’ll turn to Senator Lugar and any other committee member 

who may appear later. 

For the record, I think it’s important that, before we get to a 

final vote—and I—you and I had this discussion when you visited 

me, and I appreciate that, and I would like to get your responses 

on the record on some of these things. With reference to the time 

in which you were the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 

in—here in Washington, DC, you held a great deal of responsibility, and you were involved early, under Ambassador Bremer’s 

tenure, in Iraq. And I’m wondering, in—having gone through that 

experience, looking back, what would you have done differently 

during those first critical months of the CPA’s existence? 

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, thank you for that question. 

There are many things, and many lessons learned here, but, 

within the confines of my lane, so to speak, which primarily involved working at the CPA’s so-called Reachback Office at the Pentagon from the period of August 2003 through the duration of the 

existence of the Coalition Provisional Authority, I’d say there are 

two particular lessons that—and challenges—that we bumped into, 

really, on a regular basis. 

One, it’s critically important—and—that this country have some 

kind of database or ability to access competent professional individuals who would be available to act in post-conflict reconstruction 

situations. Thankfully, to many Americans, largely those already 

within the U.S. Government, and some volunteers from the outside, 

the effort in Iraq was staffed, but it was staffed pretty much as we 

were doing—over the course of the endeavor. The legislation that 

has been passed in the operation of the Department, within the 

State Department, related to post-conflict stability operations and 

reconstruction is a very strong initiative in this regard, which I— 

based on my experience, would wholeheartedly support. 

A second issue that we bumped into—and it’s a very complex 

issue for which I have no ready answers, but needs to be studied 

at length, and that is our contracting procedures in wartime situations. This Congress actively enacted, on a very prompt basis, the 

supplemental, the 18.1 billion Iraq supplemental in, I believe, September of 2003. It was well into 2004 between—before the funding 

and the contracting mechanisms under that supplemental could 

flow. All that was done pursuant to U.S. rules, pursuant to the 

FAR, the Inspector General who’s looked at this situation, has, 

opined on it, generally favorably, but the speed and flexibility of 

344 

the contracting mechanism from time to time did pose problems in 

the field. 

But those are the two areas—personnel reserve and contracting—as to which I think we could learn a lot from the Iraq experience. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that. 

Talking about personnel, one of the criticisms that was leveled 

against the CPA was hiring people on their political affiliations 

rather than on their relevant experience. And in that regard, could 

you tell the committee, what was your role in the hiring of staff? 

And did you think that hiring process was carried out fairly and 

effectively? And knowing what you know now, is there anything 

that you would have done differently? 

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, keep in mind that I—my involvement, 

again, in the Reachback Office, began in August of 2003, after 

which many of the CPA staff was long since in place. Our office 

was tasked at the time with, among many other responsibilities, 

helping with other Departments within—other operations within 

the Pentagon with organizing and structuring and scaling up and 

accelerating the CPA deployment process. 

Let me put that challenge in context. One fact, which I think is 

important to keep in mind, is that—is the one I mentioned in the— 

in responding to your prior question, Mr. Chairman, that there was 

no ready reserve to call on, there was no preexisting government 

department and agency that had people ready to do the—act in 

these sort of situations, or outside—outside source. 

Second, in terms of the numbers of—involved, CPA staffing, as 

best I can recall, total head count was something in the area of 500 

people, plus or minus, in the summer, early fall of 2003. That number peaked at something in the area of 1,300 in the early part— 

the winter of 2004. In the interim, due to a variety of factors, including generally short duty tours and changing—ever changing 

mission requirements, there was relatively frequent turnover. So, 

the numbers of people that had to be deployed from their then-existing professional responsibilities, either in government or without, were significant. 

I would be remiss, however, in not taking this opportunity to say 

that, thankfully, there were many competent, professional—in 

many cases, extremely highly qualified individuals, largely from 

within the United States Government, but also outside, who volunteered to serve in Iraq during that difficult period. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate your comment about the database, but certainly—the job of reorganizing Baghdad’s stock exchange, which had not reopened, was given to a 24-year-old, who 

sought a job at the White House. That certainly is not the database 

that we needed, to achieve that goal; and certainly, in pursuit of 

competency and expertise, without a database even, one can do 

much better than that. We would agree on that, would we not? 

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, I—it’s hard to argue with—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yeah. 

Mr. JEFFERY [continuing]. That comment. Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me ask you the last question here on a different topic. 

345 

Should you be confirmed, you will have a relatively short time 

to set and achieve the goals before the administration comes to an 

end. As the Under Secretary—we’ve talked about a lot of the spectrum, you’re going to have a very big portfolio—what would be your 

top priorities in the post? And how would you envision your priorities differing from your predecessor? 

Mr. JEFFERY. Mr. Chairman, in terms of my priorities, I tried to 

articulate them in the broadest terms in my statement; but, specifically, development as it relates to working with our in-place foreign 

assistance process, to work on programs that create economic opportunity and the prospect for economic growth in countries and allies that are important to the United States, where poverty is an 

issue, where there’s a significant need, is a high priority—would be 

a high priority for me, if confirmed to this position, and with respect to which I would plan on working very closely with those involved directly in the foreign assistance department at—the foreign 

assistance process—at the State Department, USAID, and elsewhere in the Government, and, in particular, with the members of 

this committee. 

Second—and I’ll only comment on two priorities for purposes of 

answering this question—the notion of energy security, which is 

front-burner right now on the consciousness of every American, 

and, I could tell you, every Foreign Service officer with whom I 

have spoken, is a very important part of the mission of the Under 

Secretary of State for Energy and Agricultural Affairs. And, in that 

area, I would plan to play an active leadership role in coalescing 

the effort in a variety of fronts. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate those answers. 

Senator Lugar 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

In the category of your responsibilities for agricultural affairs, 

would you comment on the impact in the ability of poorer nations 

to improve their economic conditions that our current agricultural 

subsidies have? And what impact would phasing out our subsidies 

have on the economics of those nations and our own international 

trade relations? 

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, I—talking with a Senator from the farm 

economy who knows this subject cold is an—daunting prospect, but 

I would say, Senator, that our agricultural programs, which are 

rooted in history, are designed to benefit American consumers, 

farmers, and ranchers. This administration, early in the year, 

served up a—made a proposal for the—an agricultural farm bill 

this year, which I know is under consideration in the Senate the 

committee level, and in the House. 

With respect to our international trade policies, the basic principles to which I would try to adhere, if confirmed in this position, 

working with USTR, working with the Congress, working with our 

trading counterparties, is to develop free and open and competitive 

markets on the broadest basis possible, whether it’s bilaterally or 

regionally or ideally in the context of a Doha round, but to do so 

in a way that preserves, maintains a so-called level playing field 

for American farmers and workers, but equally so for our trading 

counterparties, and that firm, specific, understandable, and enforceable rules and sanctions are built in to those agreements. 

346 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I don’t want to jeopardize your nomination 

by getting you embroiled in the 2007 farm bill. [Laughter.] 

Mr. JEFFERY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LUGAR. However, the dilemma, in terms of the State Department, is that the Doha round has been in some difficulty. If the 

Doha round collapses, it could have some tragic consequences. Central to the debate is not only our farm subsidies, but those of European-community friends and, for that matter, other countries in the 

world. So, I am hopeful that you and your colleagues involved in 

these multilateral negotiations, will have success, and perhaps our 

own reforms could be helpful in that respect. 

On energy, currently there has been great interest by Secretary 

Rice in the international aspects of energy. As Secretary Riceand 

out diplomats visits with substantial international actors—such as 

President Putin, of Russia, or Hugo Chavez, or others—they witness the use of energy for political purposes. The Department of 

Energy also has some persons who are engaged in international energy issues. But, recently, my encouragement and that of many 

members, has been that the State Department really needs to step 

up to this. And your role, obviously, will be to do that. Currently, 

there are persons who the Secretary has appointed to work on energy issues, but their duties have always seemed vague. Have you 

conferred with Secretary Rice, or do you have any idea as to how 

your activities, or those of your associates, can be reorganized in 

the Department so that there is a diplomatic impact, particularly 

vis-a-vis those who have very, sometimes, concrete energy objectives in those negotiations? 

Mr. JEFFERY. Senator, the—as you know—and this is, in many 

respects, thanks to your initiation—the Secretary has established 

an international energy coordinator who is an overall coordinator 

for State Department activities in the area of energy and energy 

security. That coordinator reports to the Secretary through the 

Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs. 

Importantly, as you correctly note in your statement, the State Department has to work, and should work, closely with our colleagues 

at the Department of Energy who have the technological and scientific expertise to deal with and understand some of the complexities of the energy security issues that this country faces. 

If confirmed as Under Secretary, I would work closely with the 

energy coordinator, with the relevant ambassadors around the 

world, with the interagency community, particularly the Department of Energy, and interested Members of Congress, on three 

broad fronts: 

• No. 1, assuring the ongoing security of traditional sources of 

energy supply, ongoing bilateral relations with major producing nations, as well as diversifying routes and sources of 

that supply. 

• Second, working with others in the interagency community— 

again, principally Department of Energy—on energy efficiencyenhancing technologies that help us manage more effectively 

our energy demand. The President has cited a goal of a 20 percent reduction in gasoline consumption in 10 years. The more 

we can do on the demand management side, from my personal 

347 

perspective and professional perspective, were I confirmed in 

this position, the better. 

• And, third, working through our diplomatic—the diplomatic 

community at the State Department and elsewhere in the Government in developing alternative sources of energy supply, 

such as, for example, the innovative United States/Brazil 

biofuels cooperation, which I won’t get into here, but offers a 

template for Brazil and the United States and other countries 

to adapt, to reduce their dependence on traditional fossil fuels, 

produce energy to satisfy their own domestic needs. 

Senator LUGAR. I applaud the Brazil initiative, and what that 

could mean to the entire hemisphere. Likewise, I appreciate the beginnings of work with NATO and the European Union to provide 

at least some provisions of security for our friends abroad in Europe with regard to energy supplies. These are new areas for the 

State Department and for our Government, but extremely timely. 

So, I appreciate your taking this leadership, because I think you 

have a very large portfolio ahead, and I wish you every success. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

You’ve obviously done your homework. As you know, Senator 

Lugar is the leader in this regard, and has legislation on this. So, 

I was—it’s—sure it’s music to his ears. 

Let me thank you, Mr. Jeffery, for being here today, for your 

forthrightness in your answers to the questions, for your willingness to serve our country in this most important position. 

The record will remain open for 1 day so that committee members may submit additional questions to the nominee. And, of 

course, we ask the nominee to be expeditious in response to those 

questions, should there be any. 

Senator MENENDEZ. We look forward to a full-committee vote 

soon thereafter. 

And if no one has additional comments, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

Good morning Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hagel. I would like to welcome my friend, CFTC Chairman Reuben Jeffery. I am proud to have an opportunity today to support his nomination. President Bush has nominated Reuben Jeffery to be the next Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Agricultural 

Affairs. I think he is the right choice. 

Reuben Jeffery was sworn in as the 10th Chairman of the Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission. He has done a good job protecting market users and the public 

from fraud, manipulation, and abusive practices related to the sale of commodity 

and financial futures and options. He has also been instrumental in creating policies 

to foster open, competitive, and financially sound futures and option markets. 

I have known Reuben for many years—our daughters even attended nursery 

school together many, many years ago in Brooklyn. He is a smart, thoughtful, and 

committed person willing to give up his private sector career to serve his country 

time and time again. 

In addition to knowing him personally, I have had an opportunity as a member 

of the Senate Banking Committee to work closely with the chairman on capital market and futures issues and market competitiveness issues. And while we will miss 

348 

him greatly in the financial services regulatory community, we know he will do an 

excellent job at the State Department. 

Reuben is highly qualified to lead the State Department efforts to formulate 

sound policies on economic, energy, and agricultural matters. His diverse experience 

has prepared him well. As you all know, prior to joining the CFTC Reuben was the 

Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for International Economic 

Affairs at the National Security Council. He was previously the representative and 

Executive Director of the Coalition Provisional Authority Office (CPA) at the Pentagon, after having served as an advisor to Ambassador Bremer in Iraq. Prior to 

joining the CPA in May of 2003, Mr. Jeffery served as Special Advisor to the President for Lower Manhattan Development. In this capacity he helped coordinate ongoing Federal efforts in support of the longer term recovery and redevelopment of 

Lower Manhattan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. 

He spent many years working on and off in New York, spending 18 years at Goldman, Sachs & Co. At Goldman Sachs he was managing partner of Goldman Sachs 

in Paris (1997–2001) and of the firm’s European Financial Institutions Group 

(1992–1997) based in London. Mr. Jeffery has a broad range of international capital 

markets, corporate finance, and merger and acquisition experience. And, prior to 

joining Goldman Sachs, Mr. Jeffery was a lawyer with the New York firm of Davis 

Polk and Wardwell. 

It is without question that Mr. Jeffery is a tremendously accomplished man and 

for that reason it is no surprise that he has once again been selected to serve the 

country in such an important role. 

His significant finance experience as an investment banker, and regulatory and 

Government experience at the CFTC and the White House, will prove invaluable to 

the State Department as attempts to create sound economic, energy, and agriculture 

policies. These experiences will make him a strong and competent Alternate Governor at the various multilateral development banks and as a member of the board 

of directors of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). 

He knows unequivocally that in order to remain competitive globally, the United 

States must continue to foster their relationships with its trading partners, encourage greater cooperation in the global agriculture and energy community, and improve the functioning of the world’s regional development banks. 

For this reason I support his nomination. I congratulate him, wish him well, and 

believe he will be an outstanding Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy 

and Agricultural Affairs. 

RESPONSES OF REUBEN JEFFERY III TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Development Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC): The Under Secretary chairs this high-level interagency group and has used it in the past as a vehicle for shaping U.S. development policy. This is an important tool for providing senior-level guidance and direction on critical development issues. How do you plan to 

use the Development PCC going forward? Do you expect to raise any specific development issues? What is your view of incorporating environmental concerns into U.S. 

development policy? What will be your priorities for this committee? 

Answer. The Development PCC should provide guidance and ensure coordinated 

U.S. Government follow-up on critical development issues among State, USAID, and 

other U.S. Government agencies that handle development issues. Key issues that 

the Development PCC should maintain as a focus are encouraging trade capacity 

building, investment and innovation, and addressing anticorruption, transparency, 

and aid effectiveness. These are core cross-cutting themes for our efforts to promote 

sustainable economic growth in developing economies. Promoting public-private 

partnerships and business climate reforms, strengthening sustainable health systems, and advancing agricultural reform and food security are also important concerns that the Development PCC should address. 

Going forward, development strategy for rebuilding countries, including economic 

engagement in strategic regions, should be a new focus for the Development PCC. 

In this context, if confirmed, I would like to see how we can use our total economic 

engagement approach—private sector trade and investment and public sector assistance and policy dialog—to promote development in these areas. 

As for incorporating environmental concerns into U.S. development policy, we are 

doing this in a number of ways, and I expect the Development PCC, which includes 

senior representation from State’s environment bureau (the Bureau of Oceans and 

International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES)), to do so on an ongoing 

basis. U.S. assistance agencies as a matter of policy adhere to international best 

349 

practices in ensuring environmental and social concerns are incorporated into U.S. 

development efforts. Certainly, any development efforts we undertake must be sustainable. 

Question. U.N. Issues: Under Secretary Sheeran took a strong interest in issues 

related to the United Nations, not only serving on a high-level reform panel but ultimately being named as the new Executive Director of the U.N. World Food Program. Do you intend to maintain a similar focus on U.N. issues? Would you continue 

to support and champion similar U.N. reform issues, especially those highlighted in 

the 2006 Report of the High-Level Panel on Systemwide Coherence? 

Answer. U.N. reform is a high priority for the administration. Therefore there are 

many elements of the Department of State working on this issue. If confirmed, I 

will be working closely with my colleagues to advance this process. Former Under 

Secretary Sheeran served as a member of the High-Level Panel on Systemwide Coherence in her personal capacity. As part of the State Department’s work on development issues, if confirmed I will continue to focus on assuring that aid is cost effective and goes to the people to whom it is targeted. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) has the lead on following up the High-Level Panel Report, 

and the Secretary General is consulting with member states on next steps. If confirmed, I will be working closely with all my colleagues to continue to ensure that 

our participation in multilateral development assistance through the U.N. system 

is effective, accountable, and consistent with our transformational diplomacy goals. 

Question. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC): The Under Secretary is the 

Secretary’s alternate on the MCC Board and traditionally attends all board meetings. Under Secretary Sheeran became the principal liaison between the MCC and 

State Department. Do you plan to maintain that role? What are some areas in 

which you would like to see MCC focus more attention or put in place policy 

changes? Are you concerned about the focus of the MCC’s compacts? What do you 

see as the relationship between MCC and USAID? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to maintain the role that the previous Under Secretary played with respect to the Millennium Challenge Corporation. As you know, 

the MCC is run by a CEO, who reports to a Board of Directors, chaired by the Secretary of State. Board meetings are usually held quarterly, with each board member 

accompanied and advised by a ‘‘plus one’’ who follows MCC matters closely. If confirmed, I will be the ‘‘plus one’’ for the State Department. 

In terms of focus areas, I hope to work with MCC to deepen coordination and collaboration with respect to our dialog with all eligible and Compact partner countries 

about their policy performance. The MCC board highlighted that MCC should continue to stress that eligibility for MCC funding and ongoing engagement are conditional on countries’ maintaining and improving performance. 

As to the focus of MCC Compacts, it is important that MCC stand by its core principle of country ownership. MCC should pursue work in areas targeted by host governments in meaningful and comprehensive consultation with their civil societies, 

while also ensuring that country-initiated proposals stand up to rigorous due diligence, economic rates of return analysis, environmental and social impact assessments, and—above all—are focused on reducing poverty through economic growth. 

Based on decades of development experience, we have learned that country ownership is critical to effective, sustainable development. 

MCC and USAID have worked well together. In the case of Threshold programs, 

USAID is currently the lead implementing agency for 13 of MCC’s 20 Threshold programs and leading the design of all but one of the others. In the case of Compacts, 

targeted State Department and USAID assistance programs complement and help 

to augment the impact of MCC’s sizable investments. The strategic budget allocation process led by the Director of Foreign Assistance is working to better integrate 

development principles in, and promote coherence of, U.S. foreign assistance. The 

Director of Foreign Assistance and his or her staff review MCC programs and plans 

to ensure they complement and/or support our other foreign assistance objectives to 

achieve our transformational diplomacy goals. 

Question. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was formed to 

ensure that the necessary preconditions are in place to translate large revenues 

from extractive industries into economic growth and poverty reduction. EITI supports improved governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and 

full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and 

mining; 26 of 53 resource-rich countries have either committed to or are actively implementing EITI in Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America. Today, however, the 

initiative is at a critical point to advance to the next stage of implementation and 

U.S. Government support is crucial to ensure the continued growth and success of 

350 

EITI. If confirmed, what diplomatic and bilateral measures would you take to promote and strengthen EITI? What additional steps would you take to ensure transparency in the oil and gas sectors, a critical component of U.S. energy security? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to promote active U.S. Government participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as part of our 

comprehensive efforts to fight corruption, promote transparency, and enhance international energy security. The U.S. Government also supports bilateral 

anticorruption efforts, many of them carried out by USAID; multilateral efforts, including through the World Bank and INIF; and international advocacy, such as 

through the annual G–8 summits. At the recent G–8 summit in Heiligendamm, G– 

8 leaders committed to provide continuous assistance to strengthen EITI, invited all 

stakeholders to provide support for the implementation of the EITI, and encouraged 

further countries to participate in EITI. 

Through its seat on the EITI Board, the U.S. Government is working to assist 

those countries pledging to implement EITI to meet their commitments, and to encourage nations with prominent international hydrocarbon activities, like China and 

Brazil, to join EITI as supporters. 

With respect to additional steps to ensure transparency in the oil and gas sectors, 

if confirmed, I will work to further strengthen the coordination among our efforts 

to foster international energy security, our active support for oil revenue transparency through EITI, and the comprehensive work by the U.S. Government to combat corruption and promote good governance. 

(351) 

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Cook, Frederick B., to be Ambassador to the Central African Republic 

Garvelink, William John, to be Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Green, Mark, to be Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania 

Nesbitt, Wanda. L., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cote 

d’Ivoire 

Nolan, Robert B., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho 

Parker, Maurice S., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland 

Perry, June Carter, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra 

Leone 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Feingold, Cardin, and Sununu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’ll call this hearing to order. 

And I’d like to begin by thanking our seven nominees for being 

here today. But more importantly, for your many years of service, 

and for your willingness to work in some of the more demanding 

positions in the U.S. Government and in some of the most challenging posts in the world. 

The countries to which you have been appointed cover all four of 

sub-Saharan Africa’s distinctive regions: East, West, Southern and 

Central, and are unique in the challenges and opportunities they 

currently face. 

If you are confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you 

in overcoming these challenges and developing the potential of 

these countries in an increasingly important part of the world. 

I would also like to offer a warm welcome to your families and 

friends, whose ongoing support will be necessary as you set off on 

these new positions. 

Given the large number of nominees this morning, I will forego 

an opening statement to allow each of you to present your qualiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00359 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
352 

fications, and objectives for your appointed position as an Ambassador of the United States. 

I’d like to express my sincere gratitude for your willingness to 

serve this country, and emphasize the significance of the role each 

of you—if confirmed—will play in U.S. foreign policy. I believe that 

diplomacy is a crucial element in America’s struggle to combat extremism, defend human rights, and promote stability and prosperity abroad, in a way that is consistent with our values and our 

national—and global—security. 

At this time, I’d like to just see if my friend and colleague, Senator Cardin, has anything he would like to add. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me just also join you 

in welcoming our distinguished guests today, who all have distinguished careers in public service, and are prepared to serve in an 

extremely important part of the world for the United States. And 

I look forward to their testimony, and again, I welcome them to our 

committee. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

At this time, I’d like to invite our first panel of nominees to 

present your statements, after which I look forward to engaging 

each of you in a brief discussion about your qualifications and expectations going into these important positions. 

Thank you, again, for being here, and for all that you do for our 

country. 

Congressman Green, it’s a pleasure to welcome a fellow Wisconsinite and, I might add, a graduate of my older daughter’s alma 

mater, University of Wisconsin Eau Claire. You are welcome to 

begin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK GREEN, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, I am honored to 

be here with you today. 

Please let me begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman—and the 

Committee—for holding this hearing, and for inviting me to appear. Of course, I am grateful to the President, and to Secretary 

Rice, for the trust and confidence that they’ve placed in me as 

nominee for Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take a moment to pay tribute 

to the commitment that you have personally shown to American 

policy in East Africa. As a constituent, I’m proud of the many trips 

that you’ve made to the region, and I’m proud of the fact that 

you’ve taken the time to meet with State Department officers in 

the field for their on-the-ground assessments. 

This region is facing momentous times, and it needs leaders back 

here who honestly care about its future. Mr. Chairman, I share 

your great interest in this part of the world. I’ve been active in foreign policy matters for some years, and I’ve had an especially 

strong interest in Africa. I’ve had the privilege of serving for three 

terms on the House International Relations Committee. I was a 

member of the subcommittees dealing with Africa and human 

rights in both the 108th and 109th Congress. I played a leading 

role in crafting the Millennium Challenge Account—that historic 

353 

commitment to invest in developing nations that are pursuing political and economic reforms. I played an important role in crafting 

the Global Access to HIV/AIDS Prevention, Awareness and Treatment Act, and the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 

Tuberculosis and Malaria Act. 

I worked on legislation covering critically important policy areas 

like human trafficking. Several years ago, I worked with the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, 

and the State Department as an election observer in Kenya. Before 

that—along with Congressman Earl Pomeroy, I traveled to West 

Africa, with the Academy for Educational Development, Oxfam and 

Save the Children, to evaluate programs related to women’s health 

and education in Africa. 

In many ways, though, my interest in East Africa goes back 

much further. Twenty years ago, my wife Sue—and Sue is with me 

here today, she’s the cheering section—Sue and I had the great 

honor as serving as high school teachers in Kenya through a program called World Teach Project, which was based at Harvard University. Though we spent most of our time in Kenya, we had the 

chance to travel in the area of Western Tanzania—rural areas, as 

well. We lived in a small village setting, and taught each day at 

a rural school, struggling to provide rudimentary educational opportunities. As teachers, we faced critical shortages, and watched 

our students’ families struggle with malaria, and malnutrition-enhanced diseases. We, ourselves, were afflicted with malaria and typhoid during our time there. 

In short, we saw first-hand in Kenya, some of the challenges that 

likewise face Tanzania. Just as importantly, like you, we saw the 

strength and the resilience of the people in that region. I know that 

we have to work closely with Tanzania to help it realize its enormous potential. That means working through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief—to lead efforts to fight the spread of 

AIDS, and to provide treatment for those who are infected. It also 

means working with government leaders and NGOs, to bring new 

development opportunities to all parts of the nation. 

As one of the original authors of the Millennium Challenge Act, 

I look forward to the opportunity to work with the Tanzanian Government, as it hopes to conclude an MCC compact, which would be 

the largest compact to date. I hope that our experience in Tanzania 

will serve to help us back here build on the MCA, and make this 

historic initiative stronger and even more effective. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that our dealings with the Government of 

Tanzania must be approached in a regional context. Tanzania is a 

crucial partner in our efforts to stop the spread of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism. We must work with our regional partners 

to provide real economic and educational opportunities for the families there. Hope and opportunity are the best antidotes to extremism. 

In addition to its work against terrorism, Tanzania’s also played 

a constructive role in resolving regional conflicts. Its efforts to 

serve as an honest broker in peace negotiations are making an important contribution to East African development. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, it will be an honor to serve as Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania. I promise to work reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00361 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
354 

lentlessly to strengthen and improve United States/Tanzanian relations, as we push toward our common goals. I’m confident that I 

possess the skills and the experience necessary to lead our embassy 

in Dar Es Salaam, and to represent and advocate for the interests 

of the United States in Tanzania and in that region. 

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, and I’d be pleased to respond 

to any questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARK GREEN, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today. Please let me begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and the Foreign Relations Committee, for holding this hearing and inviting me to appear. And, of course, 

I’m grateful to the President and to Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they 

have placed in me as the nominee for Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the 

commitment you have personally shown to American policy regarding East Africa. 

As a constituent, I know you have made many trips to the region, and you have 

made it a priority to meet with State Department officers in the field for their onthe-ground assessments of the situation. 

Mr. Chairman, I share your great interest in this part of the world. I have been 

active in foreign policy matters for some years, and I have had an especially strong 

interest in our Government’s policies toward Africa. I had the privilege of serving 

on the House International Relations Committee in the 107th, 108th, and 109th 

Congresses, and was a member of the subcommittees dealing with Africa and 

human rights in both the 108th and 109th Congress. 

I played a leading role in crafting the Millennium Challenge Act, America’s historic commitment to invest in developing nations that are pursuing political and economic reforms. I played an important role in crafting the Global Access to HIV/AIDS 

Prevention, Awareness and Treatment Act of 2001, and the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act. I’ve worked on legislation 

covering critically important policy areas like international terrorism and human 

trafficking. 

Several years ago, I worked with the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the State Department as an election observer in 

Kenya. Before that, along with Congressman Earl Pomeroy, I traveled to West Africa with the Academy for Educational Development, Oxfam, and Save the Children 

to look at and work on programs related to women’s health and education in Africa. 

I have also traveled with the International Relations Committee to South Africa, 

Namibia, and Lesotho. 

In many ways, though, my interest in East Africa goes back much further. Twenty 

years ago, my wife, Susan, and I served as high school teachers in Kenya through 

World Teach Project, a development organization based at the Phillips Brooks 

House of Harvard University. Though we spent most of our time in Kenya, we had 

the chance to travel the rural areas in western Tanzania as well. 

We lived in a small village setting, and taught each day at a rural school struggling to provide rudimentary educational opportunities for its people. As teachers, 

we faced critical material shortages, and watched our students’ families struggle 

with malaria and malnutrition-enhanced diseases. We ourselves were afflicted with 

malaria and typhoid during our time there. In short, we saw firsthand in Kenya 

some of the challenges that likewise face Tanzania. Just as importantly, we saw the 

strength and resilience of the people in that region. 

I know that the United States has an important role to play in working with Tanzania to help it realize its enormous potential. That means working through the 

President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to lead efforts to fight the 

spread of AIDS and to provide treatment for those who are infected. It also means 

working with government leaders and NGOs to help bring new development opportunities to all parts of that nation. 

As one of the original authors of the Millennium Challenge Act (MCA), I look forward to the opportunity to work with the Tanzanian Government as it strives to 

move forward from its status as a threshold nation to enter into an MCC compact. 

An important part of this progress will be the continuation of Tanzania’s efforts to 

liberalize its economy along market lines. I hope that our experience in Tanzania 

355 

will serve to help us build on the MCA and make President Bush’s historic initiative 

even stronger and more effective. 

Mr. Chairman, I also know that our dealings with the Government of Tanzania 

must be approached in a regional context as well. Tanzania is a crucial partner in 

our efforts to stop the spread of radicalism and terrorism. I hope to broaden our efforts at counterterrorism in Tanzania and throughout this volatile region. That includes working with our regional partners to provide real economic and educational 

opportunities for families there. Hope and opportunity are the best antidotes to extremism. 

In addition to its work in counterterrorism, Tanzania has also played a constructive role in resolving regional conflicts. Its efforts to serve as an honest broker in 

peace negotiations are making an important contribution to East African development. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, it will be an honor to serve as Ambassador to the 

United Republic of Tanzania. I promise to work relentlessly to strengthen and improve United States-United Republic of Tanzania relations as we push toward our 

common goals. I am confident that I possess these skills necessary to lead our Embassy in Dar es Salaam and to represent and advocate for the interests of the 

United States in Tanzania. 

I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Congressman Green, and again, 

I welcome all of you, but, we’re particularly proud in Wisconsin of 

this appointment. The Congressman and I had an excellent working relationship when I was a Member of the House, and this is 

a very important post. 

I’ve long thought it was a very important post, given my travels 

and work in this area, and it turns out that Congressman Green— 

as he’s indicated—has both a personal and a continuing professional interest in this region that is very genuine. So, somebody 

back home asked me, ‘‘What does Mark Green know about this? 

And why is he appointed?’’ And I said, ‘‘Actually, he knows quite 

a bit. And, frankly, is far more qualified for this post than the last 

two who were approved for this particular post.’’ So, I think this 

is a wise nomination on the part of the administration, and I congratulate you. 

Our ranking member, Senator Sununu, has joined us. And I will 

now move on to Mr. Maurice Parker, Ambassador to the Kingdom 

of Swaziland. 

STATEMENT OF MAURICE S. PARKER, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND 

Mr. PARKER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is 

an honor to appear before you as the President’s nominee, as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland. I sincerely appreciate the 

confidence the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me. 

My wife, Connie, and son, Jeremy, who are here today, have 

helped me represent the interests of the United States for nearly 

33 years. 

My Foreign Service career has been diverse. I have protected 

American citizens abroad, and secured America’s borders. I’ve combated terrorism, justly enforced our immigration law, enhanced 

U.S. commercial interests, advocated for human rights, and provided disaster relief. 

Happily, I am no stranger to the African continent. In college, I 

participated in a Study Abroad program at the University of Guyana at Lagon. Years later, I served as Council General in Lagos, 

Nigeria, during that nation’s arduous transition to civilian rule. 

356 

United States interests and activities in Swaziland currently emphasize three broad areas: Assisting the Government and people of 

Swaziland in their fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic, developing democratic institutions, and fostering economic growth. 

The Swazi governmental structure restrains these basic goals. 

The nation is led by a nearly absolute monarchy, which exercises 

powerful influence over the bicameral parliamentary system. The 

current judiciary remains untested. 

Recently, Swaziland has made progress in the democratization 

process, by signing a constitution into law in July of 2005. Mr. 

Chairman, if confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be encouraging responsive, inclusive, and democratic government for all of 

the people of Swaziland, regardless of gender or social station. 

Swaziland’s HIV/AIDS rate is the highest in the world. Mr. 

Chairman, if confirmed, another major priority will be to help stem 

the Swaziland’s alarming HIV/AIDS pandemic through the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief. 

Vital employment and economic opportunities are key to maintaining regional and domestic economic stability. If confirmed, I 

will also continue to coordinate United States efforts with the 

Swazi Government, to address issues related to the African Growth 

and Opportunities Act. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States seeks a democratic, stable, and 

healthy Swaziland. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to the 

privilege of leading a U.S. Government multiagency approach toward achieving humanitarian, democratic, and economic goals in 

Swaziland. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. 

I will be happy to address any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAURICE S. PARKER, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor for me to appear 

before you as the President’s nominee to serve as Ambassador to the Kingdom of 

Swaziland. I sincerely appreciate the confidence the President and Secretary Rice 

have placed in me by putting forth my name for your consideration. 

My wife, Connie, who is here today, has been part of my Foreign Service journey, 

helping me represent the interests of the United States for nearly 33 years, in six 

countries: Guyana, Spain (twice), Colombia (twice), Scotland, Mexico (twice), and Nigeria. During my career, I have protected American citizens abroad and secured 

America’s borders; combated terrorism and narcotics trafficking; justly enforced our 

immigration law; enhanced U.S. commercial interests; advocated for human rights; 

and provided disaster relief. I have served in leadership positions as Principal Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico—one of the largest Foreign Service posts in the Western Hemisphere; Consul General at Embassy Lagos; 

and Principal Officer at the United States Consulate General in Barcelona, where 

I simultaneously served as United States Representative to the nation of Andorra. 

Additionally, I have had the pleasure of serving at the White House as Director of 

Consular and International Programs on the Homeland Security Council. 

My Foreign Service career has been diverse, and I am no stranger to the African 

continent. As an undergraduate at the University of California, Berkeley, I participated in a study abroad program at the University of Ghana at Legon. Years later, 

as previously stated, I served as Consul General in Lagos, Nigeria, during that nation’s arduous transition to civilian rule. Our Nigerian experience inspired our son, 

Jeremy, to join the Peace Corps and serve 21⁄2 years in Niger. I cite these family 

milestones, because I believe they are an important part of my preparation for the 

leadership and management challenges I hope to undertake in Swaziland. 

An overarching United States policy goal in Africa is the integration of Africa into 

the global economy by promoting economic development, democracy, and respect for 

human rights. Within this context, the United States has clear and attainable forVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00364 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
357 

eign policy goals in Swaziland. United States’ interests and activities in Swaziland 

currently emphasize assisting the Government and people of Swaziland in effectively combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic; promoting the development of democratic 

institutions in order to protect the human rights of its people; and fostering economic growth by instituting economic reform to generate employment and improve 

the local investment climate. 

The Swazi Governmental structure restrains these basic goals. The nation is led 

by a nearly absolute monarchy, which exercises powerful influence over the bicameral parliamentary legislative system and local authority of the regional three 

chiefs. The current judiciary remains untested and the media is self-censoring. 

This governmental structure has slowed the nation’s march toward democracy. 

Nevertheless, Swaziland has made recent progress in the democratization process 

by signing a constitution into law in July 2005. The constitution took effect on February 8, 2006. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be fostering a more responsive, inclusive, and democratic government for the people of 

Swaziland, regardless of gender or social station. 

At 33.4 percent, Swaziland’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the highest in the 

world. United States-Swazi Government cooperation in fighting this pandemic has 

been a bright spot in our diplomatic relations. Several sectors of the Government 

of the Kingdom of Swaziland are dedicated to fighting HIV/AIDS following the 

King’s declaration of a national HIV/AIDS emergency in 1999. The United States 

has provided humanitarian assistance to Swaziland to combat the scourge of AIDS, 

through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, a major priority will be to help Swaziland stem the alarming tide of its HIV/ 

AIDS pandemic. 

Increased employment and economic opportunities for this developing country are 

vital to maintaining regional and domestic economic stability. Other than its admirable people, Swaziland has not been blessed with vast reserves of natural resources. The local unemployment rate stands at approximately 40 percent. Despite 

these devastating economic conditions, the GKOS has been slow to take advantage 

of trade opportunities and regional programs to promote business-friendly economic 

reforms and to utilize the technical assistance resources available from USAID’s regional Trade Hub. If confirmed, I will continue to coordinate United States’ efforts 

with the Swazi Government to address issues related to AGOA and to provide credit 

and business training to Swazi small and medium enterprises. 

Mr. Chairman, The United States seeks a peaceful, democratic, and stable Swaziland with a healthy population. United States-Swazi relations have been strengthened in recent years through the United States Government’s commitment to 

humanitarian assistance programs. The United States’ effort is multiagency, combining the talents and resources of the Department of State, USAID, the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention, the Peace Corps, the Department of Defense, 

and the Department of Labor. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to the privilege 

of leading a cooperative team approach to the pursuit of humanitarian, democratic, 

and economic goals in Swaziland. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I would be happy to address any questions you may have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Parker. 

Now we turn to Robert B. Nolan, to be the Ambassador to the 

Kingdom of Lesotho. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. NOLAN, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO 

Mr. NOLAN. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I am 

honored to appear before you today. I am grateful for the trust 

placed in me by President Bush and Secretary Rice in nominating 

me to serve as the next United States Ambassador to the Kingdom 

of Lesotho. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working 

closely with the committee, and others in Congress to advance 

United States interests in Lesotho. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Nancy Wilson Nolan, as well as my daughter, Meghan, and my friend, Cheryl 

Hodge, who are here with me today. Their support, and that of my 

358 

other children,Ryan and Colleen, and my mother, Mary Nolan, are 

a source of great strength to me. 

Since joining the Foreign Service 31 years ago, I have been responsible for handling a variety of management and policy issues. 

I came to the Foreign Service at the relatively young age of 24, in 

large part because of my experiences living overseas with my father, Bernard Nolan, also a Foreign Service officer, who died in 

Northern Yemen in 1973. 

The United States has a wonderful story to tell concerning the 

significant levels of assistance being provided to Lesotho, a country 

that is cooperating with us on many regional and global issues. 

Our assistance will help to reverse the devastation of the HIV/ 

AIDS pandemic, reduce poverty, and achieve sustainable economic 

growth. It would be an honor for me to be a part of this American 

story. 

Mr. Chairman, Lesotho held in February its second parliamentary elections, since a troubled election in 1998 led to a Southern 

African Development Community intervention to restore order. 

International and national observers declared the February election peaceful and free. Parliament was seated, and a new government chosen. 

Lesotho has obtained much success from the advantages provided by the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Industries were 

attracted by sound investment policies, creating 40,000 jobs currently, and making Lesotho the largest African exporter of apparel 

to the United States. Lesotho anticipates the completion of a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation in the near future. The compact is currently being considered for approval by the 

MCC Board. This investment of more than $300 million for the 

water, health, and private enterprise sectors will continue economic 

growth and poverty alleviation. 

Mr. Chairman, the news is not as good about public health. Lesotho faces an HIV/AIDS crisis with an infection rate of approximately 23 percent of the adult population, the world’s third highest 

prevalence rate. The United States is transitioning from a regional 

platform of assistance, to a robust, in-country presence to manage 

$12.5 million in fiscal year 2007 for the President’s Emergency 

Plan for AIDS relief in Lesotho. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed and 

privileged to serve as the United States Ambassador to Lesotho, I 

would look forward to working with you to further strengthening 

the bilateral relationship, and advance the mutual interests of our 

governments and citizens. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

I look forward to answering any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nolan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. NOLAN, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today. I am grateful for the trust placed in me by President Bush and Secretary 

Rice in nominating me to serve as the next United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working closely with 

the committee and others in Congress to advance United States interests in Lesotho. 

359 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Nancy Wilson Nolan, as well 

as my daughter, Meghan, and my close friend, Cheryl Hodge, who are here today. 

Their support and that of my other children, Ryan and Colleen, and my mother, 

Mary Nolan, are a source of great strength to me. 

Since joining the Foreign Service 31 years ago, I have been responsible for handling a variety of management and policy issues, including most recently, far-reaching reforms of the Foreign Service evaluation, promotion, and assignment systems. 

I came to the Foreign Service at the relatively young age of 24, in large part because 

of my experiences living overseas with my father, Bernard Nolan, also a Foreign 

Service officer, who died in Northern Yemen in 1973. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I will be totally committed to promoting even closer 

bilateral ties and cooperation between the United States and the Kingdom of Lesotho. I will draw upon my experience gained from my previous African assignments 

in Guinea and Madagascar, as well as living in Kenya and Sierra Leone as a teenager. My years of management experience in Washington, DC, and overseas will 

help me to be a careful steward of the resources which United States taxpayers 

have provided to help the people of Lesotho. 

The United States has a wonderful story to tell concerning the significant levels 

of assistance being provided to Lesotho, a country that is cooperating with us on 

many regional and global issues. Lesotho, the current chair of the Southern African 

Development Community (SADC), has demonstrated growing regional leadership on 

issues such as trade and democratization. Lesotho supports anticorruption policies, 

counterterrorism, and women’s equality. Our assistance will help to reverse the devastation of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, reduce poverty, and achieve sustainable economic growth. It would be an honor for me to be part of this American story. 

Mr. Chairman, our relationship with Lesotho is strong. If confirmed as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho, I will have the privilege of serving in an African 

country that, though still poor and with many challenges, has chosen to pursue 

democratic government and economic development, to the benefit of all citizens. Lesotho has focused its efforts on developing its economy, improving the health and 

security of its citizens, and maintaining and strengthening its democracy. Lesotho 

is a clear, constructive voice in southern Africa, and is a progressive leader within 

the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is a worthy partner, providing an important foundation for successful efforts to protect United States’ national interests and security in this region of southern Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, Lesotho held, in February, its second parliamentary election since 

a troubled election in 1998 led to a SADC intervention to restore order. International and national observers declared the February election peaceful and free. 

Parliament was seated and a new government chosen. Disputes remain over the allocation of legislative seats, but are being addressed within the country’s legal system. The governing and opposition parties have accepted mediation efforts from 

SADC aimed at resolving disagreements concerning the method to ensure broad opposition representation in parliament. Despite the progress in institutionalizing democracy, Lesotho still needs and welcomes help in developing its political parties, 

civil society, and governmental institutions. If confirmed, I would seek additional opportunities to help in these areas. Lesotho also suffers from chronic drought, and 

I will endeavor to maintain our leading role in providing food assistance and undertaking efforts to improve food security. 

Lesotho has attained much success from the advantages provided by the African 

Growth and Opportunity Act. Industries were attracted by sound investment policies, creating 40,000 jobs currently, and making Lesotho the largest African exporter of apparel to the United States. And as this workforce is predominantly female, the apparel manufacturing boom is empowering women. Many major United 

States companies source apparel in Lesotho, based on competitive wages and a 

sound and ethical labor environment. 

Mr. Chairman, Lesotho’s democratic Government and its record of good governance and sound fiscal and monetary policies helped it qualify for participation in the 

Millennium Challenge Account. After several years of hard work, the Government 

submitted its compact proposal for review. Now, Lesotho anticipates the completion 

of a compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation in the near future; currently the MCC Board is considering the compact for approval. The investment of 

more than $300 million will spur the economic growth and poverty alleviation started in Lesotho by the African Growth and Opportunity Act. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I will have the responsibility of working with the Government of Lesotho and the Millennium Challenge Corporation to implement and 

carry out the compact. 

Mr. Chairman, the news is not as good about public health. Lesotho faces an HIV/ 

AIDS crisis, with an infection rate of approximately 23 percent of the adult popuVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00367 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
360 

lation—the world’s third highest prevalence rate. The Government of Lesotho’s response has quickened, as has our assistance. We are transitioning from a regional 

platform of assistance to a robust in-country presence to manage $12.5 million in 

fiscal year 2007 approved for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program in Lesotho. As the largest contributor worldwide to the Global Fund, we are 

also working with other donors to ensure efficient use of these multilateral funds 

to fight this disease in Lesotho. We remain committed to supporting the fight 

against the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and related challenges associated with widespread 

tuberculosis, and I would work to continue the excellent work of my predecessors. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed and privileged to serve 

as the United States Ambassador to Lesotho, I would look forward to working with 

you to further strengthen the bilateral relationship and advance the mutual interests of our governments and citizens. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Nolan. 

And now we’ll turn to William John Garvelink to be Ambassador 

to the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM JOHN GARVELINK, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE 

CONGO 

Mr. GARVELINK. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, 

it is an honor to appear before you today. 

I would like to thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for the 

trust and confidence they have placed in me as the nominee for the 

Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo. I am honored by 

the prospects of this assignment, and the challenges and opportunities it presents. 

I am not alone here today. My wife, Linda, is present. Without 

her love and support, I would not have been able to undertake the 

Foreign Service career I have pursued for the past 28 years. 

Over my career in USAID, I served in Bolivia, and as the Mission Director in Eritrea. I served as the Deputy Director of 

USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and in the Africa 

section of the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, 

and Migration. 

Currently, I am the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in 

USAID’s Bureau for Democracy Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. My work, mostly in Africa since the late 1980s, has focused 

on humanitarian response, and post-conflict assistance programs. I 

began in Southern Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique in the late 

1980s, I established the United States Humanitarian Assistance 

Program in Mogadishu in the early 1990s, and accompanied United 

States forces as they moved from Mogadishu into Southern Somalia. I led the first humanitarian assistance assessments in Angola, 

before there was a United States diplomatic presence in that country. I led disaster assistance response teams in the mid- and late1990s into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern Congo—then Zaire. 

I served in Eritrea during the conflict with Ethiopia. 

Today I oversee extensive emergency and post-conflict programs 

in East and Central Africa, including the Democratic Republic of 

Congo. 

The Democratic Republic of Congo stands at a historic point 

today. Last year’s successful elections marked the culmination of 

efforts by various African nations, led by South Africa, and supported by the international community, to bring sustainable peace 

361 

for the Congo. The United States contributed to this effort through 

our active engagement in the peace process, our support for the 

United Nations mission to the Congo, our considerable humanitarian assistance, and our leadership in fostering regional dialog 

among former belligerents through the United States-facilitated 

Tripartite Plus Joint Commission. 

This ravaged nation continues to suffer from violence, human 

rights abuses, hunger, disease, and endemic corruption, and the 

challenges remain staggering. Last year’s elections did not miraculously unite all of the people of Congo, but they marked a crucial 

first step in a long process of recovery and development. For the 

Congolese and their international partners, the hard work begins 

now. We need to seize the great opportunity before us to restore 

the health of a nation that has suffered greatly—over 4 million 

deaths in the last decade. 

With elections behind us, and a new government in place, the 

work has finally begun to rebuild. To avoid squandering Congo’s 

rare opportunity for change, we must continue to press the government to protect the rights of its citizens to engage in open political 

debate, and to guarantee the free speech rights of those who speak 

out against their government. 

We also wanted to bring an end to widespread impunity and corruption, by fostering the rule of law, and a more vigilant civil society. 

I think that it takes a trusted friend to deliver, effectively, the 

frightened messages the Congolese occasionally need to hear. Ambassador Meece has been such a trusted friend, and I hope to earn 

the same kind of trust from the Congolese leadership and the Congolese people, as I work to protect United States’ citizens and interests. Elections launched the nation toward political stability, 

though we are well aware that lasting stability will require the establishment of functional and democratic state institutions to serve 

the needs of the people and encourage economic growth. 

If confirmed, my job will be to do everything I can to foster a culture of democracy, accountable government, human rights, and sustainable economic development. I plan to place primary emphasis 

on restoring the security and stability needed to rebuild the nation. 

Working with our Congolese and international partners, we need 

to invest in establishing—in the establishment of professional military, police, and border security forces. Working with other partners, we need to replicate, in the security sector, the unprecedented 

donor cooperation that enabled last year’s elections to take place. 

I will work to enable Congolese security forces to end threat of 

armed groups who continue to prey on local citizens, and exploit 

Congo’s resources. 

If confirmed as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 

I will continue United States efforts to support the new government at this time of great optimism and opportunity. The Congo’s 

diplomatic, democratic development and its stability are essential 

for its citizens, and critical to the stability of much of Africa. 

I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and 

with the committee in this most important endeavor. Thank you, 

again, Chairman Feingold, and members of the committee for the 

362 

opportunity to appear here before you today, I would welcome any 

questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garvelink follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM JOHN GARVELINK, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sununu, and members of the committee, it is an 

honor to appear before you today. I would like to thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as the nominee for 

Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo. I am honored by the prospect of 

this assignment and the challenges and opportunities it represents. 

I am not alone here today. My wife, Linda, is present. Without her love and support, I would not have been able to undertake the Foreign Service career I have pursued for the last 28 years. 

Over my career in USAID, I served in Bolivia and as the USAID Mission Director 

in Eritrea. Most of my career has focused on providing humanitarian assistance in 

conflict situations around the world. I served as the Deputy Director of USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and I served in the Africa section of the State 

Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration. Currently I am the 

Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, 

and Humanitarian Assistance. 

My work, mostly in Africa since the late 1980s, has focused on humanitarian response and post-conflict assistance programs. I began in southern Sudan, Ethiopia, 

and Mozambique in the late 1980s. I established the United States humanitarian 

program in Mogadishu in the early 1990s and accompanied United States forces as 

they moved from Mogadishu into southern Somalia. I led the first humanitarian assistance assessments in Angola before there was a United States diplomatic presence in that country. I led Disaster Assistance Response Teams in the mid- and 

late-1990s into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and eastern Congo, then Zaire. I served 

in Eritrea during the conflict with Ethiopia. Today I oversee extensive emergency 

and post-conflict programs in East and Central Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

The Democratic Republic of Congo stands at an historic turning point. Last year’s 

successful elections marked the culmination of the efforts of various African nations, 

led by South Africa, and supported by the international community, to bring sustainable peace to the Congo. The United States contributed to this success through 

our active engagement in the peace process, our support for the United Nations Organization Mission to the Congo (MONUC), our considerable humanitarian assistance, and our leadership in fostering regional dialog among former belligerents 

through the United States-facilitated Tripartite Plus Joint Commission. Under the 

leadership of Ambassador Roger Meece, U.S. Embassy Kinshasa has played a leading role in a truly international effort to promote peace in a troubled region and 

foster democracy and economic growth in a nation devastated by a decade of war 

following a generation of mismanagement and decline. 

This ravaged nation continues to suffer from violence, human rights abuses, hunger, disease, and endemic corruption—and the challenges remain staggering. Last 

year’s elections did not miraculously unite all of the people of Congo, but they 

marked a crucial first step in a long process of recovery and development. For the 

Congolese and their international partners, the hard work begins now. We need to 

seize the great opportunity before us to restore the health of a nation that has suffered tragically—over 4 million deaths in the last decade. With elections behind us 

and a new government in place, the work has finally begun to rebuild. To avoid 

squandering Congo’s rare opportunity for change, we must continue to press the 

Government to protect the right of its citizens to engage in open political debate and 

to guarantee the free speech rights of those who speak out against their government. We also want to bring an end to widespread impunity and corruption by fostering the rule of law and a more vigilant civil society. I think that it takes a trusted friend to deliver effectively the frank messages the Congolese occasionally need 

to hear. Ambassador Meece has been such a trusted friend. I hope to earn the same 

kind of trust from the Congolese leadership and the Congolese people as I work to 

protect United States citizens and interests. 

Elections launched the nation toward political stability, but we are well aware 

that lasting stability will require the establishment of functional and democratic 

state institutions to serve the needs of the people and encourage economic growth. 

If confirmed, my job will be to do everything I can to foster a culture of democracy, 

accountable governance, human rights, and sustainable economic development. I 

363 

plan to place primary emphasis on restoring the security and stability needed to rebuild a nation. Working with our Congolese and international partners, we need to 

invest in the establishment of professional military, police, and border security 

forces. We have made a start with the training we are providing to military brigade 

staff officers, and we know that the rebuilding of professional security forces will 

take time. Working with other partners, we need to replicate in the security sector 

the unprecedented donor cooperation that enabled last year’s elections to take place. 

I will work to help enable Congolese security forces to end the threat of armed 

groups who continue to prey on local civilians and exploit Congo’s resources. Consistent with my own professional background, I will continue to place emphasis on 

assisting refugees and internally displaced persons to reestablish homes and restore 

livelihoods. 

If confirmed as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo, I will continue 

United States efforts to support the new government at this time of great optimism 

and opportunity. The Congo’s democratic development and its stability are essential 

for its citizens and critical to the stability of much of Africa. I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and with the committee in this most important 

endeavor. 

Thank you again Chairman Feingold and the members of the committee for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. I would welcome any questions that you 

might have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Garvelink. This is a particularly important post in which I have a lot of interest, so I look forward to pursuing some of these issues with you. 

I thank all of you. 

I’ll now begin a 10-minute round for this panel, starting with 

Congressman Green. 

Congressman, how will you cooperate and coordinate your efforts 

with other United States agencies and officials operating in Tanzania? 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, my view is that one has to operate 

as a team. We have to recognize that, in so many parts of a country 

like Tanzania, the face of our nation, the face of American foreign 

policy may be, for example, the Peace Corps volunteer working in 

that village, working in that clinic, or writing up at the chalkboard. 

It is extraordinarily important that our efforts are coordinated and 

supported amongst each of the programs and agencies that are 

present in Tanzania. 

So, I will work closely, by being in constant dialog with the leaders of each of these programs, and making sure that I am giving 

them the resources and the help that they need to be successful. 

Because if they don’t succeed, then our overall mission doesn’t succeed. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Congressman, I visited Tanzania in the wake 

of the 2002 elections, and was concerned about the fraud and violence that had characterized the polls and by the subsequent opposition demonstrations, particularly in Zanzibar. 

At his confirmation hearing, current Ambassador Michael Retzer 

assured me that he would make it a United States priority to improve and defend the enfranchisement of all Tanzanian people. 

Unfortunately, the 2005 elections were, again, marred by widespread allegations of voting irregularities and intimidation of opposition groups. What steps will you take to raise respect for democratic principles and practices throughout Tanzania? 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it’s a very important question. 

The good news is that with the election of President Kikwete, we 

have seen the third successive, peaceful transfer in Tanzania, as a 

364 

whole. But, as you pointed out, with respect to the elections, particularly in Zanzibar, there were widespread irregularities reported 

by the National Democratic Institute. The opposition party has refused to recognize the election results, and has said that unless 

there is negotiated settlement of some kind, they will boycott the 

elections in 2010. 

President Kikwete has said that reconciliation in Zanzibar is his 

highest domestic priority. I happen to agree that, in many ways, 

unless there is some reconciliation, unless we strengthen the democratic process in Zanzibar, it will hold back the potential of Tanzania. 

On top of that, with respect to the nation as a whole, while 

there’s certainly some very positive signs in democratic development, it’s still true that the country is largely governed by one 

party. It’s also true that an enormous amount of power is concentrated in the executive branch. And so I think for a democracy 

to be vibrant, we need to work with the administration to ensure 

that there are sufficient checks and balances. 

I’m aware of the project of the National Democratic Institute is 

undertaking right now in Tanzania. I support that, I think the 

early results and early reports are very interesting, and I think we 

should work with them, and work with the administration in Tanzania to try to implement some of the reforms and suggestions, so 

that democracy truly is vibrant and widespread. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

Mr. Parker, what programs and policies does the United States 

support in helping Swaziland address the AIDS pandemic? And are 

United States efforts complementary to Swaziland’s national plan? 

And, if not, in what areas do they differ, and why? 

Mr. PARKER. That is a very good question, Mr. Chairman. 

The U.S. Government has been very appreciative of the funds 

that have been made available through the President’s Emergency 

Program for AIDS Relief. This very important program has infused 

almost $5 million—$7 million into USAID’s budget. And, it is combined with USAID, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 

the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of 

Labor. Together, they have been able to develop extremely effective 

prevention, awareness, and treatment programs, and also palliative 

care for people who are suffering from this disease. And they are 

also working hard, particularly with the Peace Corps, to develop 

programs to destigmatize the scourge of AIDS, because many people are afraid to come forward and receive testing for fear of being 

an outcast. 

Fortunately, one of the great programs that we have—one of the 

great successes that the United States Government has experienced recently in Swaziland, has been the work that we have been 

able to do with the Swazi Government. 

In 1999, the King who—as I mentioned before is an absolute 

ruler—declared a national health emergency in Swaziland, due to 

the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As late as January of this year, the King 

made a national appeal to the public on television, requesting and 

advising all Swazi people to be tested for the AIDS virus. This was 

a major step forward. 

365 

The Ministry of Health has been working very closely with our 

embassy, and we find that where—that this is probably the one 

area where the United States Government, and the Swazi Government, are working most closely together to ensure that we are able 

to fight this scourge of AIDS in Swaziland. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Parker. 

Mr. Nolan, most of your career has been spent in administrative 

positions. How have you prepared for the managerial and public 

leadership role you’ll be expected to fulfill as Ambassador to Lesotho? 

Mr. NOLAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that very important 

question. 

The United States has a wonderful story to tell in Lesotho. Currently, we are anticipating a Millennium Challenge Account compact, with approximately $362 million, which will result in building 

96 clinics, 18 HIV/AIDS emergency testing units in hospitals, in 

addition to which two hospitals will be built. Also, we have $12.5 

million through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, 

being spent in Lesotho in fiscal year 2007, and we have a wonderful Peace Corps volunteer program of approximately 100 volunteers. 

From my managerial, as Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, I 

have an extensive experience background in management. I view 

an important part of my role—if I am confirmed in Lesotho—to be 

the management of considerable resources being devoted by the 

United States Government and our taxpayers. And my job there 

would be, in part, to ensure that the various agencies of the U.S. 

Government, we wisely and prudently spend the taxpayers money 

there. 

I would view my management experiences to be very helpful, and 

I would plan on being—if confirmed—a very hands-on manager. 

And I would view it as a wonderful opportunity to help the people 

and the Government of Lesotho. 

Senator FEINGOLD. As I understand it, the majority of your embassy staff will be locals. What experience do you have working 

closely with Africans? 

Mr. NOLAN. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my introductory 

statement, my father was in the Foreign Service, and as a teenager 

I was fortunate enough to live in Kenya and Sierra Leone. And 

then my first two assignments in the Foreign Service were in Africa—in Conakry, Guinea and Antsiranana’i, Madagascar—both as 

the management officer. In both of those assignments, I supervised 

a considerable number of Foreign Service nationals in our embassies in both places. And, I take great—I believe our Foreign Service 

nationals are the backbone of our embassies. They serve us day in, 

day out, in many difficult parts of the world, and I would view the 

opportunity to supervise them in Lesotho—the approximately 60 

Foreign Service nationals that we have there—to be a wonderful 

opportunity, because they are committed—as are the Americans, 

official Americans there—to furthering United States policy objectives. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Nolan. 

Mr. Garvelink, for years Congo has been one of the most disastrous human rights crises in Africa, and perhaps, in the world. But 

366 

at last, as you have mentioned, the fighting appears to be winding 

down. How will you keep Congo near the top of the Humanitarian 

AIDS Assistance Priority List when it’s no longer in the headlines? 

Mr. GARVELINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think there are a number of ways to go about that. I guess, 

first, from my background, it will be a little easier coming from the 

humanitarian community, and having extensive contact throughout 

the U.S. humanitarian community, and the international one, to 

help use those contacts to maintain the focus on what’s going on. 

Not just in the Eastern Congo, but in Congo, in general. The conditions throughout the country are quite dire in other places, as well 

as just the Eastern Congo. 

But I will use my contacts, in confirmed, to maintain the high 

visibility of the situation that continues in the Eastern Congo. I 

think another way that we will be able to do that, and will, is to 

use our public diplomacy tools in the embassy to call attention to 

the situation, and offer solutions, and to identify opportunities for 

the international community to respond to the humanitarian crisis 

throughout the Eastern part of the Congo. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, given the central role that natural 

resources play in DROCs economy and development, the history of 

widespread corruption, and the risk that natural resources can 

pose to peace and security if they’re not properly managed, how 

will you try to ensure that the new Congolese Government 

prioritizes the responsible and transparent management of natural 

resource reforms? For example, in ensuring the upcoming review of 

mining contracts—making sure that that review is meaningful? 

Mr. GARVELINK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would continue the policies that Ambassador Meece has underway right now—he’s working very closely with the new government as it goes through the 

review of the 60 major mining contracts. The Government of Congo 

is a member in good standing of the Kimberly Process. Through 

USAID, there’s a project by the United States, NGO, PACT, that’s 

working with the mining companies in Katanga to ensure that responsible mining occurs, and that the—some of the profits that 

emerged from those mines is used for the social, economic benefit 

of their population. 

There are some other initiatives underway, transparency initiatives underway by the United States in cooperation with the British Government, and the Government of the Congo has endorsed, 

but not signed up yet, to these sorts of activities. 

So, I think the embassy has underway a number of initiatives 

with the government to try to ensure responsible mining, and responsible use of the country’s natural resources. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. 

And, Senator Cardin, thanks for your patience. Your round. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, let me thank 

all of our guests today for their service. 

I would daresay that most of the people in the State of Maryland 

probably know very little about the four countries in which you all 

are seeking to become Ambassador to. And, I think that’s probably 

true in the United States. As I said in my welcome, you’re choosing 

to serve in a part of the world that, I think, is very important to 

the United States. 

367 

I saw that in Eastern Europe, and in Asia, the ties between ethnic communities and the United States and those parts of the 

world developed ties—economic ties, business ties—that help in the 

transformation of those countries and their economies. So, I guess 

my question to each of you is that, I think it’s very important that 

we develop closer economic ties between the four countries that are 

represented by you and our communities. And that’s going to take 

some leadership from the Ambassador, to get interest in the United 

States for—particularly smaller companies and communities to 

take an interest in the part of the world that you seek to represent 

the United States. And, I’m just wondering what strategies you 

have to develop more interest in the United States, in the countries 

that you seek to be the Ambassador? 

Mr. Green, we can start with you. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Senator, thank you for the question. 

First off, I agree with the premise of your question. Unfortunately, I think the level of awareness in many parts of the country 

of the countries represented here, clearly isn’t as great as we would 

like it to be. I agree, it happens to be a very important part of the 

world for United States interests in a number of ways, and on a 

number of fronts. 

With respect to economic ties, with respect to Tanzania, there 

are some positive developments. We have, in President Kikwete, a 

pro-Western President who has indicated publicly that he’d like to 

have even stronger, and warmer relations with the United States. 

He has publicly called for greater investment in Tanzania, and has 

made that pledge. 

If I’m confirmed, what I will do is to continue to help that along 

by helping Tanzania address some of the barriers to increased 

American investment in that country. 

For example, despite the fact that the country is committed to 

the rule of law, there are still problems with corruption in both the 

public sector and the private sector. On top of that, there certainly 

are some infrastructure challenges in Tanzania, particularly into 

the rural areas, that I think holds back American investment. 

Right now, the Government of Tanzania has put forward plans 

for a Millennium Challenge Act Compact, which would be the largest compact, to date. Many of the projects—as far as I know—many 

of the projects that are in their plans would be the kinds of projects 

that I think would help encourage American investment in that nation, because it is aimed at roads, at energy, at infrastructure, and 

in water—some of the very challenges that Tanzania is now facing. 

On top of that, while Tanzania has benefited from AGOA, from 

the African Goals and Opportunity Act, there is still capacity there 

for greater growth involvement. And so, if I’m fortunate enough to 

be confirmed, I look forward to working with leaders in Tanzania 

to help develop better use of that potential. So, those would be the 

steps that I would take. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Parker, you’re going to have a challenge, 

not only because of lack of knowledge in the United States, but the 

slowness of political reform, and concern about the safety of doing 

business. I welcome your thoughts on this. 

Mr. PARKER. Thank you, Senator, and I welcome this question. 

368 

There is a great deal of concern on the part of many American 

investors going into Swaziland. However, we have one example of 

success, and that is with Coca-Cola, the primary American investor 

in Swaziland, where they have been able to set up a factory that 

produces the syrup that is used at the bottling plants within Southern Africa. 

And we can build upon the success of this one industry to, hopefully, bring other investors into Swaziland. And if I am fortunate 

enough to be confirmed, I will assure you that I will work to make 

investment in Swaziland one of my priorities, but for United States 

investors. 

But, at the same—and you are also correct in stating that the 

Swazis are a very traditional and conservative people when it 

comes to business ventures. However, the Swazis have been very 

successful in taking advantage of the African Goals and Opportunity Act passed back in 2000. 

In 2006, Swaziland, Swazi products—United States imported $155 million in Swazi products into the United States, duty free, 

through the American Growth and Opportunity Act. According to 

the Department of Commerce, this is one of the real success stories 

of the Plan. 

If I am confirmed as Ambassador, I will use all of the resources 

of our embassy to ensure that we are able to expand and diversify 

the economy of Swaziland, by having the Swazis draw on the resources provided by the USAID trade hub in Gabaron, Swaziland. 

We also have another program that is AIDs-funded, known as 

the Swaziland Enterprise and Entrepreneurship Program. This is 

a 5-year, $8 million program that will work on both the grassroots 

levels, to educate children about business, and using American 

business models. And also to provide assistance to small and medium entrepreneurs, to ensure that they are also able to have seed 

money, in some instances, and also to teach them how to expand 

their businesses. 

If I am confirmed as Ambassador, I will use all of my resources 

to ensure—in this area—to ensure that we are able to find additional growth in the Swazi economy. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Parker. 

Mr. Nolan, the challenge might be that Americans know South 

Africa, but the country that you’re seeking to represent, the United 

States, is not as well known. 

Mr. NOLAN. Senator, thank you for that very important question. 

The—and I agree with your premise totally. The United States, the 

people of the United States, know the Republic of South Africa 

much better than they know the Kingdom of Lesotho. And one of 

the things I would strive, if I am confirmed, would be explaining 

the story of the United States in Lesotho to a broader audience of 

the American people. 

We have been described—the desk officer for Lesotho told me— 

that the people of Lesotho, the Government of Lesotho, describes 

the United States as their ‘‘best friend.’’ And, we have a wonderful 

story to tell there—Lesotho does not have strategic resources, they 

do not have oil, significant mineral resources, and very modest 

amount of diamonds so far have been discovered. And so, the face 

of the United States in Lesotho is our best face, it is the United 

369 

States and our people doing things for humanitarian reasons, and 

that is a wonderful story, and I would like to articulate that to the 

American people. 

I think we have a wise investment of money through the African 

Growth and Opportunities Act. We have created 40,000 jobs 

through the export of textiles to the United States. Lesotho is the 

largest exporter within Africa under AGOA, and those jobs are 

principally for females, which is critically important in that region. 

In addition to which, under the Millennium Challenge Compact, 

there will be approximately—as I mentioned previously, Senator— 

$360 million. Part of that money—in addition to helping create 

health clinics and HIV, President’s Emergency Program for AIDS 

Relief facilities for the treatment of—part of that will go for creating water facilities, irrigation throughout the country to enable 

people to have clean water, which is obviously very important. In 

addition to which some—a smaller amount of the money will be 

spent on trying to assist the Government of Lesotho in developing 

the basic opportunities, such as check-clearing houses and an investment code, to help them come up to speed in terms of their private enterprise structure. 

We have had a wonderful Peace Corps program there since the 

mid-1960s, the Peace Corps has done a wonderful opportunity, has 

done wonderful things there, and so, Senator, I would view it as, 

we have such a fabulous story to tell there, in terms of Lesotho, 

and what our great country is doing there, and I would welcome 

the opportunity, if confirmed, to explain that to the American people. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, and very briefly to Mr. Garvelink, 

let me tell you, I think the Congo not only represents a huge challenge, as the chairman has pointed out, because of the humanitarian crisis from disease and conflict, but the human rights violations—the failure of the government to deal with the human rights 

concerns. The failure of the judiciary, the use of the military—and 

I must tell you, I do look forward to strengthening the relationship 

between the Congo and the United States, but as you pointed out 

in your statement, human rights has got to be part of that. 

Mr. GARVELINK. Thank you. 

Putting human rights and the humanitarian situation, and all of 

that in the context of also an opportunity for an increase in U.S. 

business is something that’s very interesting to me. And, I think 

there’s a real opportunity here, given the elections that have just 

taken place in the Congo—if we can reinforce open democratic institutions, build a vibrant civil society—there will be bumps along 

the way, this is going to be a very tough process—but, I think by 

doing that, by being open about the human rights violations, and 

dealing with them, there may be a greater opportunity for United 

States investment, a greater interest beyond the extractive industries that are already in Katanga Province, if democracy is seen to 

be working. If opportunities are there, if the basic needs of the general population in health and education are being met, if salaries 

are being paid, and if the embassy—and, if confirmed, I would 

work very closely with the World Bank to secure additional funding 

for basic infrastructure, so that agriculture can get going at its 

basic level. 

370 

I think, if these things can be seen to be starting, than I think 

there begins to become a climate for more U.S. investment there. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

And, my congratulations to all of you, and I’m going to do what 

I can to expedite these nominations through the process. And I now 

dismiss the first panel, and ask the second panel to come forward. 

Welcome, the second panel, and we will begin with June Carter 

Perry to be Ambassador to the Republic Sierra Leone. 

Ms. Perry. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JUNE CARTER PERRY, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE 

Ms. PERRY. Thank you, Chairman Feingold, and members of the 

committee for the opportunity to appear before you today on 

‘‘Juneteenth,’’ which I think is a very important day in the history 

of American ethnic relations. 

I am honored to be President Bush’s nominee as Ambassador to 

the Republic of Sierra Leone. I would like to thank the President 

and Secretary of State, for once again placing their confidence in 

me to serve as an Ambassador of the United States. 

I would also like to thank my distinguished husband, Mr. Frederick Perry, who is here with me today. He is a retired senior Foreign Service officer and without his unwavering support, I would 

not have the opportunity to be where I am at present. 

If confirmed, I look forward to building on the work of my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Thomas N. Hull, III, to support 

Sierra Leone’s heroic efforts to reconstruct society, to strengthen 

democracy, and to promote prosperity. Coming from the Mountain 

Kingdom of Lesotho, and if confirmed, going to the ‘‘Lion Mountain’’ of Sierra Leone, I believe I can bring proactive diplomacy to 

advance United States interests, as well as key development sectors, as Sierra Leone approaches an important transition period. 

In my 24-year Foreign Service career, I have engaged the United 

Nations as Director of the Office in International Organization Affairs, the World Bank, universities such as Columbia, Boston, Harvard, and Howard, African Governments and civil society, to promote United States interests in Africa, including the advancement 

of human rights, working to ensure the effective use of United 

States HIV/AIDS assistance, quadrupling our assistance through 

PEPFAR in Lesotho, and fortunately through my 3 years of service, 

working extremely closely with our Millennium Challenge Corporation Team in Washington, as well as with the Government of Lesotho. 

I also had the opportunity to participate, as indicated, in the further development of AGOA. Certainly, in Sierra Leone, we look forward to promoting AGOA even further as Sierra Leone is scheduled to chair a panel at the AGOA forum in July. 

I have also had the opportunity, Mr. Chairman and members of 

the committee, to promote advocacy for women and children, and 

to contribute to advancing civilian authority over foreign militaries, 

effective counternarcotic measures, results-based economic development policies, and humanitarian assistance in my previous roles, 

371 

not only as Ambassador, but as Deputy Chief of Mission in Madagascar, and in the Central African Republic. 

These issues have remained key objectives during my service. 

However, my most important responsibility has been the safety and 

security of American citizens, including the development of 

counterterrorism measures. If confirmed, I would bring these experiences in dealing with African development issues to enhance the 

already excellent relationship the United States has with Sierra 

Leone. If confirmed, I would also further enhance, through public 

diplomacy, our relationship. 

I noted that this week the reconstructed ship, the Amistad, will 

depart Connecticut on route to the port of Freetown. I would look 

forward, if confirmed, to using the arrival of that ship as a key 

public affairs opportunity, bringing, Mr. Chairman, perhaps yourself, if confirmed, as well as members of the committee. 

Reaching back to my private sector experience with RKO radio 

broadcasting, looking forward to bringing in media sources, as well 

as key individuals, such as we did in Lesotho with Bill and 

Melinda Gates, with former Trade Representative, Ambassador 

Robert Zoellick, with the honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, and working closely with our allies in the international community, who 

have shown such interest in Africa, such as Prince Harry and the 

rock star Bono. 

Five years after the end of a long and brutal civil war, Sierra 

Leone itself, stands at an important crossroads. With the departure 

of U.N. peacekeepers in 2005, the country has resumed control of 

its own security. Earlier this month, the Special Court for Sierra 

Leone began the trial of Charles Taylor for his involvement in the 

conflict. This week the court is expected to deliver a verdict in the 

trial of the former military hunter, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. 

If Sierra Leone succeeds in holding credible, free, and fair elections this August—a process we are actively supporting through 

the National Democratic Institute, as well as local nongovernmental organizations—the transfer of power from President 

Kabbah to another democratically-elected leader would mark an 

important post-conflict milestone, and pave the way for future success. 

Despite the positive developments, Mr. Chairman, significant 

challenges remain, that if not properly addressed, could again 

threaten the country’s stability. Severe poverty and insufficient 

healthcare, especially for women and children, continue to push Sierra Leone to the bottom of the U.N. Human Development Index. 

Widespread youth unemployment, a root cause and catalyst for the 

civil war, continues to endanger peace. To address these serious 

issues, the Government of Sierra Leone must attack corruption. 

If confirmed, I would increase the United States Mission’s focus 

on improving governance and expand our engagement with Sierra 

Leone’s own Anti-Corruption Commission. Our efforts to promote 

transparency in the diamond industry will also continue to be central to our engagement. In this regard, we would draw, as we have 

done in past positions, on U.S. Government expertise, for example, 

from the Treasury Department’s very strong anti-money laundering 

and anticorruption divisions, as well as that of nongovernmental 

372 

organizations. I believe that promoting good governance and improving the government’s capacity to provide basic, sustainable 

services would have a multiplier effect on our already existing 

health and agriculture assistance. 

As a former ACTION Peace Corps official and as the spouse of 

a former Peace Corps Country Director in South America and Deputy Director in Southeast Asia, in Malaysia, I would strongly support the reintroduction of a Peace Corps program in Sierra Leone. 

Looking regionally, we should focus on improving Sierra Leone’s 

peace-building efforts, within the larger context of the Mano River 

subregion. With Guinea’s uncertain political transition and Liberia’s fragile peace, Sierra Leone finds itself in a volatile neighborhood. Porous borders and weak governance have created fertile 

ground for a narcotics and small arms trafficking. 

If confirmed, I would collaborate with our Ambassadors in Monrovia and Conakry and throughout the region, to encourage cooperation to improve the subregion’s capacity to respond to instability, to programs through our various United States agencies that 

have a capacity to strengthen maritime controls, for example, and 

law enforcement border controls. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you and the committee today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Perry follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JUNE CARTER PERRY, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

Thank you, Chairman Feingold and members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored to be President Bush’s nominee as 

Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra Leone. I would like to thank the President 

and the Secretary of State for once again placing their confidence in me to serve 

as an Ambassador of the United States. If confirmed, I look forward to building on 

the work of my distinguished predecessor, Thomas N. Hull, III, to support Sierra 

Leone’s heroic efforts to reconstruct society, to strengthen democracy, and to promote prosperity. Coming from the Mountain Kingdom of Lesotho and, if confirmed, 

going to the Lion Mountain of Sierra Leone, I believe I can bring proactive diplomacy to advance United States’ interests as well as key development sectors, as Sierra Leone approaches an important transition period. 

In my 24-year Foreign Service career, I have engaged the United Nations, the 

World Bank, universities (such as Columbia, Boston, and Howard), African Governments, and civil society to promote United States’ interests in Africa, including the 

advancement of human rights, working to ensure the effective use of United States 

HIV/AIDS assistance, development of Lesotho’s Millennium Challenge Account, and 

promoting equity for women and children. Promoting civilian authority over foreign 

militaries, effective counternarcotics measures, and results-based economic development policies and humanitarian assistance have been key objectives during my service. My most important responsibility has been the safety and security of American 

citizens. If confirmed, I would bring these experiences in dealing with African development issues to enhance the already excellent United States-Sierra Leone relations. 

Five years after the end of a long and brutal civil war, Sierra Leone now stands 

at an important crossroads. With the departure of U.N. peacekeepers in 2005, the 

country has resumed control of its own security. Earlier this month, the Special 

Court for Sierra Leone began the trial of Charles Taylor for his involvement in the 

conflict. This week, the court is expected to deliver a verdict in the trial of the 

former military junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. If Sierra Leone succeeds in holding credible, free, and fair elections this August—a process we are actively supporting—the transfer of power from President Kabbah to another democratically elected leader would mark an important post-conflict milestone and pave 

the way for future success. 

373 

Despite the positive developments, Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain 

that, if not properly addressed, could again threaten the country’s stability. Severe 

poverty and insufficient health care, especially for women and children, continue to 

push Sierra Leone to the bottom of the U.N.’s Human Development Index. Widespread youth unemployment, a root cause and catalyst for the civil war, continues 

to endanger peace. To address these serious issues, the Government of Sierra Leone 

must attack corruption. If confirmed, I would increase the United States Mission’s 

focus on improving governance and expand our engagement with Sierra Leone’s 

Anti-Corruption Commission. Our efforts to promote transparency in the diamonds 

industry will also continue to be central to our engagement. In this regard, we 

would draw on U.S. Government expertise from the Treasury Department, and that 

of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). I believe that promoting good governance 

and improving the government’s capacity to provide basic, sustainable services 

would have a multiplier effect on our already existing health and agriculture assistance. As a former ACTION/Peace Corps official, I would strongly support the reintroduction of a Peace Corps program in Sierra Leone. 

Looking regionally, we should focus on improving Sierra Leone’s peace-building efforts within the larger context of the Mano River subregion. With Guinea’s uncertain political transition, and Liberia’s fragile peace, Sierra Leone finds itself in a 

volatile neighborhood. Porous borders and weak governance have created fertile 

ground for narcotics and small arms trafficking. If confirmed, I would collaborate 

with our ambassadors in Monrovia and Conakry to encourage regional cooperation 

and to improve the subregion’s capacity to respond to instability. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before you and the committee today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. All three of these 

countries have been very complicated and often involved in tumultuous times in the entire 15 years that I have served on this subcommittee. So, I appreciate your willingness to take on these posts. 

I thank you for the connection you made between Juneteenth day 

today, an important occasion in the history of our country and the 

connection it has to what we’re talking about today. 

Now we go to Frederick B. Cook to be Ambassador to the Central 

African Republic. 

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK B. COOK, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 

Mr. COOK. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to be 

the next Ambassador of the United States to the Central African 

Republic. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for entrusting 

me with this important responsibility. If confirmed, I will work 

with the committee and others in Congress to advance the interests 

of the United States in the Central African Republic. 

In the interest of time, with your permission, I’d like to ask that 

my statement be entered for the record. 

My wife, Denise, is with me here today, as she has been ever 

since we met many years ago in Cameroon where she was a volunteer with International Voluntary Service. My daughter, Heather, 

could not be here today. School may be out, but a school teacher’s 

work does not end with the summer, and she is a school teacher 

in New York City. I’m pleased that my son, Trevor, is here from 

college in Florida, as is my nephew, Matthew Pollard of Penn, England. Matt is starting a summer as a Senatorial intern with the 

Budget Committee and has been selected as a participant in the 

Stennis Program. 

At this point, I would comment on the geographic location of the 

Central African Republic, but I have the pleasure, Senator, that, 

Mr. Chairman, that we actually previously met in Dire Dawa, EthiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00381 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
374 

opia, when you traveled there to meet with a distinguished panel 

of Oromo a few months ago. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOK. A distinguished Somalian Oromo elders, so forgive a 

small geographic lesson. But bordered by Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, 

and both Congos, the aptly named Central African Republic is at 

the very center of the continent and faces almost every one of the 

challenges that can befall any African State—rebels, bandits, civil 

unrest, refugees flowing in and out, displaced persons, AIDS, other 

illness, illiteracy, and a plethora of issues involving women, children, and minorities. The Central African Republic has them all. 

These issues arise from a variety of causes, ranging from internal 

political discord, which goes back long before independence, to significant spillover from conflict in neighboring states, including the 

tragic situation in Darfur. 

There is, however, reason for guarded optimism. The President 

and Head of State were elected in elections that met minimal international standards. We thus have a small window of opportunity 

for the United States to engage more deeply in Central African Republic and work to the mutual interest of our two countries. 

The engagement of the United States in the Central African Republic has been and must be multidimensional, ranging from humanitarian relief for the protection of refugees and displaced persons, to efforts to build and strengthen civil and governmental and 

nongovernmental institutions that promote and protect human 

rights and eventually lead to serious economic growth. Absent economic growth, there is no prospect for the situation in the Central 

African Republic to get better any time soon. There is a long way 

to go. 

If confirmed, I will be the first United States Ambassador in 

Bangui since the end of the year 2002. 

As a second generation Foreign Service officer, I’ve devoted my 

entire life to the service of my country. I fully understand the 

meaning of the word service, in Foreign Service. If confirmed, I will 

endeavor to rebuild our Mission in the Central African Republic, so 

that it can better protect the interest of our Nation, as well as the 

citizens that we have who are resident in that country. I have a 

long background in management and a certain expertise in the design and support of small posts. I can assure you that we will be 

proper husbands of the Government’s resources and the taxpayer’s 

money. We will produce a very effective, if very small, embassy. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today and welcome any questions 

that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cook follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK B. COOK, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee to be the next Ambassador of the United States 

to the Central African Republic. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for entrusting me with this important responsibility. If confirmed, I will work with the 

committee and others in Congress to advance the interests of the United States in 

the Central African Republic. 

Joining me here today are my wife, Denise, and my son, Trevor, a student at college in Florida. My daughter, a teacher in New York City, could not be with us 

375 

today. My wife and I met in Cameroon and my entire family has been an essential 

part of my Foreign Service career; without their love and support, I could not be 

here in front of you today. 

One could say that I’ve spent my whole life preparing for this moment. I was born 

into a Foreign Service family and spent many of my formative years overseas. Since 

joining the Foreign Service in 1972, I have had the fortune of serving at several 

posts in Africa and in Latin America, including Botswana, Liberia, Bolivia, and 

Cuba. My first assignment was in Cameroon, where among other duties, I forwarded cargo to Bangui. My most recent assignments include tours as the Foreign 

Policy Advisor to the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa in Djibouti, as Director of the Florida Regional Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and as Deputy 

Chief of Mission in Caracas, Venezuela. I fully understand the ‘‘service’’ aspect of 

the Foreign Service and welcome challenging assignments. 

Mr. Chairman, the priorities of the United States in the Central African Republic 

(CAR) include rebuilding the U.S. Government presence, protecting civilians, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and humanitarian workers, and limiting 

the spread of the Darfur conflict. The essential focus of this process must be fostering security and stability and support for democracy and economic development. 

To meet these goals, we are in the process of rebuilding our official presence in 

the Central African Republic. Operations were scaled back after the violent coup of 

1996–1997 and security concerns led to the closure of the embassy in late 2002. The 

embassy reopened in early 2005 with one American officer and has continued to 

slowly reestablish staffing. If confirmed, I will become the embassy’s fourth American officer. 

The Central African Republic (CAR), like many of its neighbors, has a long history 

of instability and civil war due to a combination of domestic and regional factors. 

The country has been unable to establish a record of good governance, rule of law, 

or democracy, thus leaving it vulnerable to both internal instability and external interference. Positive gains were made, however, in 2005, when President Bozize won 

a presidential election that was determined to be free and fair by international observers. Recent events in the CAR have highlighted the country’s fragile state. Just one 

week ago, Elsa Serfass, a young Doctors Without Borders aid worker, was killed 

when her clearly-marked vehicle came under fire near the town of Ngaoundaye in 

the northwestern part of the country. Ms. Serfass was in the area to assess health 

conditions after receiving reports that a May 30 rebel attack and retaliatory government attacks had destroyed the health infrastructure. Doctors Without Borders, one 

of the few international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in CAR, 

was forced to suspend operations in the region following Ms. Serfass’ killing. Other 

NGOs and the United Nations (U.N.) have followed suit. 

The Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), the group 

responsible for the attack on Ms. Serfass’ vehicle, was one of the rebel groups that 

signed a peace agreement with the government earlier this year. While organized 

rebel attacks have declined, the ARPD and other rebels continue to operate throughout the northwestern part of the country. The government, in turn, continues to 

have difficulty controlling the actions of the military and presidential guard when 

they respond to rebel attacks, resulting in collective punishment and impunity. 

These conditions have led to increased fear and resentment among the general population, and temporarily derailed the national dialog scheduled for the coming year. 

The United States remains deeply concerned by these developments. 

The U.S. response to the situation needs to be, and has been, multidimensional. 

In partnership with U.N. agencies and NGO’s on the ground, we provide substantial 

humanitarian support to 212,000 IDPs, 50,000 CAR refugees in southern Chad, and 

28,000 CAR refugees in Cameroon, and now the recently arrived 2,600 refugees 

from Darfur. Our interventions include emergency food assistance, water and sanitation projects, and seeds and tools to enable Central Africans to feed themselves. 

In international fora, the United States has supported the mandates of the U.N. 

Peace-Building Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) and of the Multinational Force of the Central African Monetary and Economic Community (also 

known as FOMUC) in order to promote stability in CAR. Both BONUCA and 

FOMUC, while constrained by their small sizes and budgets, have contributed considerably to the pursuit of peace in CAR. We also support CAR’s upcoming national 

dialog, in hopes that the CAR government, the political opposition, and the armed 

opposition will be better able to reach peace and move toward security in the countryside and in Bangui. 

U.S. efforts to support democracy and human rights in the CAR have focused on 

strengthening the media and the parliament, both of which are largely inexperienced and remain susceptible to pressure from the executive branch. We have also 

376 

worked to provide voter education. If confirmed, I intend to continue our efforts to 

support democracy and human rights. 

While rebel movements in the northeastern part of CAR have been limited since 

the signing of a peace agreement in April, the recent influx of refugees from Darfur 

highlights the risk that the crisis in Darfur holds for the region and the need for 

robust peacekeeping forces. The U.N. and several NGOs are working under difficult 

conditions to reach and feed these refugees before the rains cut off roads and transport links for the summer. If confirmed, I will work with others in the government 

and international community to support these refugees and others who have fled the 

systemic violence in Darfur. I have read with interest the transcript of the subcommittee’s March 20 hearing on the regional aspects of the Darfur crisis, particularly focusing on Chad and CAR. 

If confirmed, I will continue the work of the embassy and of my colleagues in 

Washington to support the deployment of an international peacekeeping operation 

in Chad and northeastern CAR that will focus on both protecting civilians and deterring cross-border attacks. The CAR government is supportive of such a force. 

I fully understand, and accept, my responsibilities for the safety and security of 

our staff and of the American community in CAR. The American community has 

grown substantially as more United States-based aid and development organizations 

implant themselves in the countryside. These organizations provide welcome relief 

and development opportunities for the population, and I look forward to working 

with and supporting these organizations as they continue to improve the lives and 

health of Central Africans throughout the country. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I welcome any questions you may have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Cook, and that was just a superb meeting in Dire Dawa with the leaders there. I learned a 

great deal from it and look forward to working with you. 

Now turn to Wanda Nesbitt, the Honorable Wanda Nesbitt to be 

Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WANDA L. NESBITT, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF COTE D’IVOIRE 

Ms. NESBITT. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Let me first express my gratitude to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as 

their nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire. I am 

honored to be nominated to serve in this important West African 

country at such a critical time. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe my 26 years of diplomatic service qualifies me for this calling. I have served in a variety of postings 

abroad, including assignments in Madagascar, Rwanda, Tanzania, 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, France, and Haiti. As the 

United States Ambassador to Madagascar, I devoted special attention to promoting democracy and good governance, to environmental preservation and protection, and to increased respect for 

market-driven growth. 

I arrived in Madagascar just after a bitterly contested presidential election in which both candidates claimed victory. I worked 

with our partners in the international community, namely, the European Union, the World Bank, the IMF, and UNDP to help resolve 

the political crisis. 

If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the United States promotes our interest in seeing a stable, peaceful, and democratic Cote 

d’Ivoire. 

Conflict has plagued Cote d’Ivoire for years, but a peace agreement signed this past March gives reason for hope. It is a homegrown initiative, it was drafted and signed by the two key actors, 

377 

and thus far respectable progress has been made. The transitional 

government has been named, and the Zone of Confidence, which divides the country in two, is gradually being dismantled. 

We recognize, however, that the agreement’s success hinges on 

full implementation, and the political will of key Agorian actors to 

maintain their commitment to implement it. 

Currently, United States Government assistance to Cote d’Ivoire 

is restricted by section 508 sanctions. Holding free and fair elections would not only bring Cote d’Ivoire back into the international 

realm of democracy, it would also remove the strict barrier to 

United States aid and cooperation. 

Despite years of crisis, Cote d’Ivoire still has one of the largest 

economies in Africa. It has retained its free market economy, and 

financial and capital markets, and it continues to attract domestic, 

regional, and international capital, including American investments. 

If confirmed, I would work to improve the investment climate for 

American companies, while promoting an economic program that 

helps to reduce poverty, and reduces the poverty that fuels instability in the region. 

As a consular officer in the Foreign Service, I can never forget 

that the number one priority for our Missions overseas is to see to 

the protection of American citizens and their interests abroad. If 

confirmed, I would do everything I can to ensure the safety and 

well-being of every American citizen in Cote d’Ivoire, and would 

lead the efforts of our embassy to enhance homeland security and 

maintain the security of our borders. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for you 

abiding interest in America’s relations with Africa, and thank you 

for giving me the opportunity to speak with you today. I’m happy 

to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nesbitt follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WANDA L. NESBITT, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF COTE D’IVOIRE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today. Let me first express my gratitude to President Bush and to Secretary Rice 

for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire. I am pleased to be nominated to serve in this 

important West African country at such a critical time. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe my 26 years of diplomatic service qualifies me for this 

calling. I am currently the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of 

Consular Affairs. Earlier in my career, I completed assignments in Madagascar, 

Rwanda, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, France, and Haiti. As the 

United States Ambassador to Madagascar, I devoted special attention to promoting 

democracy and good governance, to environmental preservation and protection, to 

increased respect for market-driven growth for private sector involvement in the development of public policies to reduce poverty, and to girls’ education. I arrived in 

Madagascar just after a bitterly contested presidential election in which both major 

candidates claimed victory. I worked with our partners in the international community, namely the European Union, the World Bank, the IMF, and UNDP to help resolve the political crisis. Thus, I have seen firsthand how critical credible, free, and 

fair elections are to the welfare of a nation. If confirmed, I would work to ensure 

that the United States promoted our interest in seeing a stable, peaceful, and democratic Cote d’Ivoire. 

Conflict has plagued Cote d’Ivoire for years, but a peace agreement signed in 

March gives reason for hope. I am cautiously optimistic that the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, although the 13th peace agreement since the crisis broke out in 

2001, may be the best chance for lasting peace thus far. After all, it is a homegrown 

378 

initiative; it was drafted and signed by the two key actors, President Laurent 

Gbagbo, and New Forces leader, Guillaume Soro; and the international community 

did not force these actors to the negotiating table. Thus far, respectable progress has 

been made: A new transitional government has been named with Soro as the prime 

minister, and the Zone of Confidence, which divides the country in two, gradually 

is being dismantled. The agreement’s success hinges on its full implementation and 

the political will of key Ivorian actors to maintain their commitments to implement 

it. 

If a presidential election is to take place by next year, as Soro and the agreement’s mediator, Burkina Faso’s President Blaine Compaore, maintains that it will, 

then the Ivorians must move quickly to implement the disarmament and demobilization of militias; commence disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of 

former combatants; integrate the armed forces; and reestablish civilian administration throughout the country. These measures will allow the government to move forward on the registration of voters and the organization of free, fair, transparent, 

and inclusive elections with the assistance of the international community. Currently, United States Government assistance to Cote d’Ivoire is restricted by section 

508 sanctions. Holding free and fair elections would not only bring Cote d’Ivoire 

back into the international realm of democracies, it would also remove a strict barrier to United States aid and cooperation. 

Despite years of crisis, Cote d’Ivoire is still one of the largest economies in Africa. 

It has retained its free-market economy, and the financial and capital markets 

remain open and continue to attract domestic, regional, and international capital, 

including American investments. If confirmed, I would work to improve the investment climate for American companies, while promoting an economic program that 

helps reduce the poverty that fuels instability in the region. I would also call for 

greater transparency in the natural resource sector in Cote d’Ivoire. 

If confirmed, I would also maintain the dedication of my predecessor, Ambassador 

Aubrey Hooks, in administering the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. 

Cote d’Ivoire is one of 15 priority countries selected for intensive United States’ support. This $84 million program has produced significant results in the fight against 

HIV/AIDS in Cote d’Ivoire, such as providing antiretroviral treatment for more than 

25,700 people, palliative care services to more than 44,000 people, and care and support for more than 24,000 orphans and other vulnerable children. 

As a consular specialist in the Foreign Service, I will never forget that the number one priority for our missions overseas is to see to the protection of American 

citizens and their interests. If confirmed, I would do everything I can to ensure the 

safety and well-being of every American citizen in Cote d’Ivoire, and I would lead 

the efforts of our embassy to enhance homeland security and maintain the sanctity 

of our borders. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for your abiding interest in America’s relations with Africa, and thank you for giving me the opportunity 

today to speak with you. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and other 

Members of Congress to advance America’s interests in Cote d’Ivoire. 

I am happy to answer any questions you may have today. Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Nesbitt, very much. 

And now we’ll begin a series of questions, and we’ll start with 

Ambassador Perry. 

As you know, Sierra Leone’s stability is intertwined with that of 

the neighboring Mano River Union countries, where armed crossborder factions continue to be a destabilizing factor in the subregion. How will you facilitate regional communication and cooperation on security issues? 

Ms. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this question, because it is indeed at the heart of the stability of the subregion. 

My colleagues and I—if I am confirmed, as they have already 

done—plan to communicate directly on a regular basis, concerning 

the border issues which I believe are extremely important. As we 

know, historically there has been a great deal of movement between those borders. Just recently, over 100,000 Liberians, for example, were repatriated from Sierra Leone. We believe that there 

are about 20,000 Liberians who remain in Sierra Leone, and with 

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the situation as indicated in Guinea, it is uncertain as to how the 

border situation will develop there. 

Specifically, I will draw on our international law enforcement 

academy in Gabarone, in Botswana to seek training for individuals—not only from Sierra Leone—but to work closely with my colleagues to see how we might draw on that resource, that very rich 

resource, that the United States Government has established in 

Botswana to include the subregion, the Mano River subregion. 

As I indicated, our communications would be, probably through 

video conferencing at some time, but we have also considered the 

idea, already, of having regular discussions amongst ourselves, as 

well as amongst the key players—including civil society—within 

those three countries. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I think I had a chance to visit the facility in 

Gabarone that you just described, and was impressed with what 

was being attempted there, and I am impressed by your making 

the connection and the possibility of using that for help. 

In your current post as Ambassador to Lesotho, Ms. Perry, you 

persuaded the monarchy of that kingdom to ‘‘invest in its people.’’ 

How will you seek to imbed this social consciousness in Sierra 

Leone? 

Ms. PERRY. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a deep belief that personal diplomacy and proactive diplomacy—as I indicated in my statement—is absolutely essential. Engaging not only the leadership, perhaps the last generation of the 

older leaders of Sierra Leone will be essential to developing a new 

mindset in that group, but looking forward to a younger generation, and I might indicate that the opposition parties, as well as the 

leading party, the SLPP, the Sierra Leone People’s Party—have all 

three indicated that they have a strong youth contingent within 

each of those parties. It is expected that during the general elections in August that a significant number of younger leaders will 

be elected to parliament, as well as a significant number of women. 

I think it will be absolutely crucial to the success of Sierra Leone, 

and I do believe the people of Sierra Leone desire peace and stability at this time, to engage those young leaders. 

I would further seek to increase our public diplomacy and engagement to demonstrate that America cares in Sierra Leone, by 

increasing international visitors, by attracting Fulbright Scholars 

and by having exchange programs to take on this task, which will 

not be accomplished in a short period of time. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Cook, as you know, the United States Embassy in Bangui 

has been closed twice in the past decade as a result of concerns 

over the pace of political and economic liberalization and human 

rights abuses in the Central African Republic. 

As the first U.S. Ambassador to that country in 5 years, what do 

you hope to accomplish with your presence? 

Mr. COOK. Mr. Chairman, that’s a very perceptive question. 

I think the United States occupies a unique position in the world 

today. By sending an Ambassador to the Central African Republic, 

hopefully our intervention can act as a catalyst. The United States 

is already working through international partners, multinational 

organizations, NGOs, nongovernmental organizations and the rest, 

380 

to try to affect change in the Central Africa Republic, which has 

been described as the, sort of, ‘‘forgotten crisis.’’ 

I would hope that my presence there, as an expression of the personal interest of the President and of the people of the United 

States, might serve to underscore and to encourage other nations 

to step up and become more committed in their engagement there. 

That engagement has suffered a reverse with the killing of a young 

volunteer from Medecins Sans Frontieres just last week, and the 

disturbing report of the execution of her murderer. It’s unlikely 

that any kind of full due process could have been followed. 

When I was a child, and first went to the Department of State 

for 1,001 injections, I stood in front of the plaque in the lobby 

which listed our fallen colleagues. It was sobering, even at age 5. 

It’s more sobering now that we’ve filled up at least three more 

plaques. I have no desire to add my name to that plaque, but I am 

very much aware that very little history, or very little foreign policy takes place within the walls of the Chancery. 

In Haiti, I traveled, literally, the length of the country to meet 

with opponents and supporters of President Aristide. I’m very 

proud that in the time that I was in Venezuela, I arranged a meeting between pro and anti-Chavez governors, rather mayors, and in 

fact, had to meet and have breakfast with some Congressional 

staffers. One of them said to me, a very strong Chavista, that this 

is the only place in Venezuela that I would ever meet with these 

people without a gun in my hand. 

I am no stranger to personal diplomacy. I will try to reach out 

and engage with every element of society, where I can, to try to 

first understand, deeply, the problems of that country in a way 

that you can only understand on the ground, and then to mobilize 

the resources of our Government to affect change and protect our 

interests. 

I acknowledge my family. I apologize I’ve been remiss. I should 

also acknowledge there are any number of colleagues, past, 

present, and future from the Department, from the Bureau of African Affairs and other parts, who are with me here today. I didn’t 

know they were coming. I’m gratified that they did. They can expect a call. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What’s your analysis of the root causes driving the home-grown insurgency in the CAR. 

Mr. COOK. The CAR first enters into history about the 7th century as a fertile harvesting ground for slaves. That’s not a part of 

any part of human history that we want to be proud of. 

Before independence, during the Colonial Period, it was distinguished by the excesses of various commercial companies on the 

model of what was happening in the Belgian Congo. 

Since independence, I doubt that there have been any 5 years in 

which the country has had a stable, democratic government. It’s a 

daunting challenge. 

Internally, there is a real traditional of good governance, respect 

for human rights, as we would understand it. 

In addition, neither matron or politics is very fond of vacuums. 

Sitting at the border of Chad, the Sudan and the Congos, the country faces pressure from neighbors who, may at times, prefer that 

the country be weak, and unstable, so that they can—it can either 

381 

serve as a refuge for their rebels or forces, or both. It would be very 

nice to build enough stability in the Central African Republic to 

help them, because it depends on the people themselves. It would 

be nice to help them build enough stability so that their armed 

forces might be a threat to rebels, and not just to their own citizens. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I wanted to ask you just a follow 

up—has the Bozize Government made any good faith efforts to address the grievances that led to this? 

Mr. COOK. Mr. Chairman, I believe there is evidence that they 

have. Those efforts are small. It’s very early to determine how good 

the faith is. In a country where the civil bureaucracy and the military have not been paid, or are months behind in their pay, it’s 

very, very hard to hold them to the standard, to international 

standards. But that is exactly what we must do. We face the challenge of, on the one hand, denouncing violations of human rights 

and abuses, the impunity on both sides. And at the same time, trying to mobilize the resources, the programs that can actually lead 

the government to a state where they can meet those standards. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Cook. 

Ms. Nesbitt, you saw the political reconciliation coalition building 

between perpetrators and victims in Rwanda’s genocide in the late 

1990s. What did you learn from that experience that will help you 

facilitate dialog and good faith commitments by both sides in the 

wake of a 5-year civil war. 

Ms. NESBITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that’s a very important 

question. 

One of the most important lessons, I think, that I learned 

through my time in Rwanda was the important role that the 

United States and other Western countries could play in terms of 

promoting the concepts of tolerance and recognition of the rights of 

minorities, as well as majorities. I am hopeful that, if confirmed, 

I would be able to carry some of those lessons with me to Cote 

d’Ivoire, where the lack of trust among the parties, and the lack 

of recognition of the rights of all involved, continues to be one of 

the major underlying sources of the conflict there. 

Senator FEINGOLD. How likely is it that the current string of 

agreements between President Gbagbo, and the former rebel commander Guillaume Soro, will be affected? 

Ms. NESBITT. That’s a difficult question to answer. I am very cognizant of the fact that this is one in a long string of agreements 

that has taken place, been signed in Cote d’Ivoire in the last 5 

years. But the fact that it is an initiative on the part of the President, and that it has been signed on to by the major protagonist, 

Mr. Soro, who is now the Prime Minister, gives us cautious optimism that they have a level of commitment that has not been there 

in the past. And so, we are hopeful and—as I mentioned a little 

earlier in my statement—there are some signs, already, that 

progress is being made, that they are beginning to integrate the 

commands of their—of the militia and the national forces, that 

there is movement to return civil servants to the Northern part of 

the country, so there are a number of steps in the right direction, 

and we hope that that will continue. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Nesbitt. 

382 

A recent report by the nongovernmental organization, Global 

Witness documents a pattern of mismanagement of revenues, 

opaque accounts, corruption, and political favoritism in the cocoa 

sector of Cote d’Ivoire. It presents detailed evidence showing the diversion of more than $58 million from levies to the government’s 

war effort, which raises serious security, economic, and governance 

concerns. How will you broach this pervasive problem with the 

Government of Cote d’Ivoire, and what specific benchmarks of 

progress will you be looking for? 

Ms. NESBITT. Mr. Chairman, this is a very, very serious issue, 

and it is one that we are concerned about. As you mention, both 

sides in this conflict have used revenues from the cocoa industry 

to support their activities, and this is an issue of great concern to 

us. 

If confirmed, what I would like to do is to work with our partners 

in the international community, to put pressure on Cote d’Ivoire to 

show greater transparency, in terms of letting outsiders see the 

uses that they put their revenue to. We’ve called for greater transparency in the natural resources sector, in cocoa, as well as other 

natural resources, and we would like very much to convince our 

partners in the international community to tie assistance from the 

World Bank and elsewhere to greater transparency in those sectors. And, I’m hopeful that I will be able to work on that, if confirmed. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Nesbitt. 

I thank all of you and congratulate you. And, as I said to the 

first panel, I will do what I can to expedite your nominations, so 

you can get to these important posts. Thanks so much, and that 

concludes the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF MARK GREEN TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Mr. Green, do you believe that you serve under the direction of the 

President and the Secretary? 

Answer. Yes. 

RESPONSES OF MARK GREEN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Tanzania held multiparty elections in 2005, but the country continues 

to experience political dominance by a single party. Additionally, tensions between 

the mainland and the Zanzibar archipelago remain. If confirmed, what steps can 

you take to strengthen civil society and promote political pluralism? 

Answer. With the election of President Kikwete in 2005, Tanzania marked its 

third peaceful democratic transition since it opened the door to multiparty democracy in 1992. These elections gave President Kikwete a landslide victory with more 

than 80 percent of the vote and saw the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party 

make significant gains in Parliament. 

While a number of opposition parties exist in Tanzania, the ruling party is dominant, and governing power is largely concentrated in the executive branch. Obviously, such political dominance increases the vulnerability of continued democratic 

reform. One of our key strategic priorities in Tanzania has been to work with all 

appropriate, willing entities—the legislature, judiciary, press, and civil society organizations—to strengthen democratic checks and balances. If confirmed, I will conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00390 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
383 

tinue to build upon and expand my predecessor’s advocacy for political plurality on 

both the mainland and on Zanzibar. 

The steps I intend to take include the following: First, in my contacts with President Kikwete, I will tirelessly pursue the subject of developing democratic checks 

and balances, and urge him to show demonstrable progress on this front. 

Furthermore, I will support the work of organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI). NDI’s current cooperative project with President Kikwete, in 

which NDI is drawing up recommendations for the modernization of the executive 

branch, shows great promise in helping to build a solid foundation for greater accountability in government administration. 

On a related front, I will support the anticorruption programs launched under the 

Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Threshold Program that foster greater transparency in public expenditures. It is important to make sure that the progress made 

in launching such initiatives as the Financial Intelligence Unit does not lose steam 

as new plans are developed under the MCC Compact Program. 

In addition, I will continue the initiatives being undertaken by our Mission in 

Tanzania to train journalists in investigative reporting and to support NGOs that 

are pushing for greater freedom of the press. 

Finally, I will strongly support the civic education programs and courses funded 

by USAID that enhance public awareness of democratic principles and rights. As 

Tanzania begins to look toward the 2010 elections, this greater awareness can help 

increase both political participation and the legitimacy of the election results. 

The political situation in Zanzibar clearly warrants special attention. NDI’s election mission reported serious irregularities in the 2005 election for Zanzibar’s President and House of Representatives. A grave political impasse has emerged from 

these elections between the ruling party and the chief opposition party, the Civic 

United Front (CUF). The CUF has refused to recognize the election of the Karume 

government, and is calling for a rerun of the elections and a government of national 

unity. The younger members of CUF, in particular, are frustrated by the lack of 

progress by the government in addressing what they feel are ‘‘three stolen elections.’’ We need to be concerned about the potential for them to turn toward more 

radical solutions. 

President Kikwete has proclaimed that political reconciliation in Zanzibar is his 

top domestic agenda item, but the progress has been uneven. Kikwete promised to 

address the ‘‘political tensions’’ in Zanzibar in his December 2005 inauguration 

speech, but it was not until January 2007 that reconciliation negotiations actually 

began. The President’s popularity has been a double-edged sword for him. The Tanzanian people have high, if not unrealistic, expectations for what he and his administration will be able to accomplish. President Kikwete’s first year in office was challenging, marked by a food shortage caused by drought and a power crisis which coincided with the rise of oil prices around the world, and it is not clear if he will 

be able to broker a solution in this case. 

I believe that successful talks on Zanzibar are crucial in setting the foundation 

for free and fair elections in 2010 in Tanzania. The opposition party in Zanzibar 

lacks any trust in the ruling party and has pledged not to participate in the 2010 

election unless an agreement is reached through the negotiations. This would obviously be a significant setback in the progress that the country as a whole has made 

on the democratic path. 

I strongly support our Mission’s plans to expand our public presence in Zanzibar, 

and believe that presence must include clear, unambiguous support for pluralism, 

fair elections, and peaceful political forums. Among other things, I support the Citizen Dialog Program, and would hope to expand it and programs like it, both on 

the mainland and in Zanzibar. 

Question. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and elsewhere are presently living in Tanzania, many 

in camps. In recent months, the Tanzanian Government has expelled persons of 

Rwandan and Burundian origin and there were reports of physical abuse and theft 

by officials and militia members. If confirmed, what steps will you take to see that 

the Tanzanian Government abides by international laws prohibiting the ill-treatment and, pending the determination of their claims, the forced return of refugees? 

Answer. Traditionally, Tanzania has hosted the largest refugee population in Africa. As of June 1 of this year, 273,678 refugees are being assisted in refugee camps 

in mainly the northwestern part of the country. Another 200,000–300,000 refugees 

are estimated to have settled spontaneously (without United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] assistance). The large majority of these refugees originate from Burundi and the DRC. 

384 

Even though the assisted refugee population remains large, for the first time in 

more than a decade, it has dropped below the 300,000 mark. This reduction is first 

and foremost a result of the implementation of repatriation operations to Burundi 

and the DRC in recent years. Local integration of refugees in Tanzania and resettlement to third countries are also durable solutions pursued in the Tanzania operation to solve the situation of the refugees still hosted in the country. 

As Tanzania takes steps to reduce the number of refugees and to prevent the migration into the country of additional refugees, we need to work closely with the 

UNT–ICR to monitor the treatment and living conditions of the populations involved. While Tanzania certainly has the right to stop illegal migrants from coming 

into the country, we must push to see that such operations do not adversely affect 

legitimate political refugees. 

The future of most of the refugees in northwestern Tanzania depends on the continued progress in the peace process in Burundi and the DRC, and the access to 

basic social services in the return areas. President Kikwete has been active in promoting an enduring, peaceful settlement for Burundi, and brokered an oral agreement on June 17, 2007, between the Burundi President and former rebel group leader who both agreed to resolve their differences. Kikwete’s goal has been to facilitate 

peace in order to create the conditions necessary for the return of Burundian refugees. We are assisting these efforts both privately and publicly. In fiscal year 2006, 

the United States Government provided $18.6 million to support Burundi refugee 

repatriation and $16.3 million to support Congolese refugee repatriation. (Note: Our 

fiscal year 2006 assistance for refugees in Tanzania was nearly $10 million.) 

Our Mission in Tanzania has paid close attention to reports of abuse by authorities with regard to the refugees in western Tanzania and has followed up these reports by seeking clarification from the appropriate Tanzanian officials. If confirmed, 

I plan to pay very close attention to these reports and the overall refugee situation. 

I plan to visit the refugee camps myself—eyes on the ground are still the best way 

for us to not only determine the conditions that refugees are living in, but also to 

demonstrate the importance of the refugee issue to our government. Firsthand observations will also strengthen our credibility as I bring the subject up in our contacts with President Kikwete. 

We should also promote the cause of refugee issues in the context of Tanzania’s 

growing international stature. President Kikwete has shown an interest in being a 

stronger voice in regional matters and conflict resolution. How refugees are treated 

in Tanzania will certainly affect the government’s credibility as a legitimate partner 

as well as its international standing. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Tanzania? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Tanzania? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. Although the Government of Tanzania is clearly committed to the rule 

of law and the protection of human rights, there are continuing human rights problems in the country. Recent events probably make the status and condition of refugees the most pressing. My approach to addressing this subject is outlined above. 

One of our most pervasive human rights concerns is the criminal justice system 

and rule of law. Police and prison guards sometimes use excessive force against inmates or suspects, at times resulting in death, and police impunity is a problem; 

prison conditions can be harsh and life threatening; police routinely conduct 

searches without warrants, and at times fail to bring detained individuals before a 

judge in the specified period of time; and the judiciary suffers from corruption, particularly in the lower courts. We need to work with civil society and NGOs that are 

engaged in civic education, and support efforts to, for example, train investigative 

journalists. 

In a similar vein, fighting the inhuman trade of Trafficking in Persons (TIP) has 

been an important cause on the world stage, and must be an important part of our 

foreign policy. Tanzania is a ‘‘Tier 2’’ country, meaning it does not fully comply with 

the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant 

efforts to do so. The government made progress over the preceding year in improving its law enforcement response to human trafficking, in particular through additional training of security personnel. To continue that progress, Tanzania should investigate and prosecute traffickers more vigorously, implement its plans to harmonize all elements of its legal code pertaining to trafficking in persons, and build 

on existing joint government-NGO efforts in education and awareness to result in 

a nationwide campaign. 

Toward this aim, the Governments of Tanzania and the United States signed a 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in May 2006 in order for the Department 

385 

of Justice to work in Tanzania for the next 2 years to assist the development of 

antitrafficking legislation, and to train police and prosecutors in antitrafficking procedures and techniques. If confirmed, I will work to see that this MOU is properly 

carried out, and that Tanzania moves firmly toward meeting international standards. 

Last, but certainly not of lesser importance, is the longstanding, unequal status 

of women. Though Tanzanian law provides for equality for women, inheritance and 

marriage laws do not consistently provide full equality. Discrimination against 

women is most acute in rural areas where women’s careers are limited to subsistence farming and raising children, and they have almost no opportunity for wage 

employment. Thus, in practice, women’s rights often are not respected. 

Civil society activists have reported widespread discrimination against women in 

property matters related to inheritance and divorce. This is especially the case in 

Zanzibar and parts of the mainland where judges bow to concessions demanded by 

customary and Islamic law. Women whose unions were not legalized under Hindu, 

Muslim, or Christian traditions, or under civil marriage laws were particularly vulnerable when they separated from their partners or their partners died. 

Though the ratio of boys to girls in primary and secondary school is nearly equal 

in Tanzania, there continues to be a significant gender gap for girls completing their 

schooling, particularly at the secondary level. Girls are often left in the position of 

caring for siblings, being forced into marriage, or becoming pregnant, leading to a 

greater attrition by females from secondary school. Ensuring that girls are able to 

more fully pursue educational opportunities is both a public health matter (an educated mother is more likely to have a healthy family) and a matter of economic opportunity. President Kikwete and his wife, Salma, have both emphasized the importance of education, and Mrs. Kikwete has been a strong supporter of girls’ education. Basic education for girls is a cause I have pursued as a Member of Congress 

and, if confirmed, would look to strongly advocate as ambassador. 

It would be misleading and inaccurate to talk about human rights in Tanzania 

without noting that the Government of Tanzania (GOT) is making significant 

progress in a number of areas, including TIP and anticorruption. For example, the 

Tanzanian High Court recently outlawed the practice of ‘‘takrima,’’ or the use of 

hospitality gifts and favors to constituents during election campaigns, and the GOT 

established the Financial Intelligence Unit using MCC Threshold Program funds. 

Both actions have been important steps toward fighting corruption. 

Nonetheless, improving human rights conditions is an ongoing process, and if confirmed, I will continue to raise these human rights concerns with Tanzanian officials. In short, I will use all the tools I have available to me as Chief of Mission 

to press for continued reform and support solutions that make sense. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Tanzania in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. Probably the broadest challenge we face in this regard is the lack of capacity in Tanzania to implement many of the reforms, legislative initiatives, and 

other measures the government itself recognizes it needs to do to improve its overall 

human rights situation. But cultural practices too, are very hard to overcome, particularly with respect to women. Such attitudes change slowly, though Tanzania is 

notable for the number of talented women the country can showcase in significant 

positions of power—for example, the appointment of former Foreign Minister Dr. 

Asha Rose Mtengeti-Migiro as U.N. Deputy Secretary General. 

These are challenges that are best addressed when our countries can work together as partners, with mutual respect. My background as a teacher in rural 

Kenya two decades ago certainly sensitized me to the need to be patient, listen, and 

to understand the underlying assumptions that were the motivating factors behind 

the villagers’ actions. Likewise, finding solutions to difficult, sometimes entrenched, 

human rights issues requires not only adequate resources, but also excellent lines 

of communication between those who would be part of the solutions. If confirmed, 

I am looking forward to working with the Tanzanian Government and President 

Kikwete to find these solutions and implement them through the authority I will 

have as the United States Ambassador to Tanzania. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

386 

Answer. The most important thing that an ambassador can do to ensure that the 

promotion of human rights is an integral part of the embassy’s activities is to lead 

by example. In other words, if confirmed, I will use my office to carefully highlight 

human rights conditions and concerns. That would range from activities such as 

taking a firsthand look at refugee camps to publicly promoting the cause of women’s 

education. I believe that an ambassador needs to be constantly on the move . . . 

highlighting issues and demonstrating through deeds American priorities and values. 

Furthermore, as Chief of Mission, I would ensure that human rights issues are 

on the central agenda of my senior staff, and reach out to other officers for their 

ideas and observations. If confirmed, I plan to meet regularly with my staff and look 

for ways to foster their ingenuity and interests. Listening to their ideas, giving them 

the authority to pursue those that are in line with our Mission’s strategic plan 

(which must include human rights priorities), and highlighting successful projects 

will make our embassy a stronger voice for human rights. While I know that Foreign Service officers do not undertake their work in order to receive individual recognition, I also know that such recognition can serve to reinforce their work in the 

eyes of others and perhaps help shape the careers of those involved. 

I also hope to support the work of Peace Corps volunteers and NGOs out in the 

field. Again, highlighting the difference that Americans make in the living conditions of everyday Tanzanians is a way of encouraging others—Americans and nonAmericans—to take up the cause of human rights. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. I have taken a number of steps in my career and throughout my life that 

have served to promote the cause of human rights and democracy, which is a passion that led me to public service in the first place. 

As a law student at the University of Wisconsin, I wrote an award-winning commentary that examined the potential for South Africa’s legal system to improve 

human rights in that country. (‘‘What Role Can South African Judges Play in Mitigating Apartheid?’’ 1987 Wis.L.Rev. 327 (1987)). 

As I have mentioned elsewhere, 20 years ago, my wife, Susan, and I served as 

high school teachers in Kenya through WorldTeach Project, a development organization based at the Phillips Brooks House of Harvard University. While we spent most 

of our time in Kenya, we also traveled in the rural areas of western Tanzania, 

Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda. We lived in a small village setting, and taught each 

day at a rural school struggling to provide rudimentary educational opportunities. 

As teachers, we faced critical material shortages, and watched our students’ families 

struggle with malaria and malnutrition-enhanced diseases. We ourselves were afflicted with malaria and typhoid. In addition to our teaching, we established a library at the school with donations from Americans living in Kenya and from our 

own hometown. 

I believe that our work not only brightened the educational prospects of our students, but also reinforced the value of education in our village. When we returned 

to Wisconsin, we delivered a number of speeches about education and poverty in 

East Africa based on our own personal experience and observations. 

Our experiences in Kenya certainly shaped my political career. I had the privilege 

of serving on the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) in the 107th, 

108th, and 109th Congresses, and was a member of the subcommittees dealing with 

Africa and human rights in both the 108th and 109th Congresses. 

I played a leading role in crafting the Millennium Challenge Act, America’s historic commitment to invest in developing nations that are pursuing political and economic reforms. I played an important role in crafting the Global Access to HIV/AIDS 

Prevention, Awareness and Treatment Act of 2001, and the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act. I have worked on legislation 

covering critically important policy areas such as international terrorism and 

human trafficking, and was a member of the House Human Rights Caucus. I hope 

and believe that each of these initiatives will help lift the daily lives of millions and 

millions of people—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Several years ago, I worked with the National Democratic Institute, International 

Republican Institute and State Department as an election observer in Kenya. I 

watched voting and ballot counting procedures in the Kakamega District of that 

country, and helped the foregoing groups report on the progress of democratization 

in Kenya. In at least a small way, I believe our work reinforced the cause of democracy in East Africa. 

387 

Prior to my election monitoring efforts, I traveled to West Africa along with Congressman Earl Pomeroy with the Academy for Educational Development, Oxfam, 

and Save the Children to look at and work on programs related to women’s health 

and education in Africa. Congressman Pomeroy and I then worked to dramatically 

increase funding levels in the Federal budget for U.S. support to such programs. 

I also traveled to South Africa, Lesotho, and Namibia as a member of a HIRC 

codel that, in part, examined the HIV/AIDS challenges in that region. We met with 

public health officials, and pushed leaders to adopt more open and more aggressive 

policies toward the pandemic. 

In summary, throughout my life and my career, I have worked to support the 

causes of education, democratization, and human rights in Africa. Whether the 

venue be that small village around Makhokho Secondary School in Kenya or on the 

floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, I have been committed to being a strong 

voice for improving the lives of everyday Africans. Whether it be in support of legislation fighting human trafficking, or pushing for our foreign policy to include strong 

support for gender equality in African education, I hope that my work has made 

at least a little bit of a difference. 

I view the incredible honor of being nominated as United States Ambassador to 

Tanzania as a unique opportunity to serve our Government in an area of the world 

I care deeply about. It also represents yet another step in my lifelong commitment 

to Africa and a way to continue the work I love. 

RESPONSES OF MARK GREEN AND ROBERT B. NOLAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State 

Department Relations? 

Answer. State 258893 was sent to all diplomatic and consular posts on December 

4, 2004. State 78240 was sent June 7, 2007 and carries substantially the same message. I have read both. 

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable? 

Answer. Yes. If confirmed as Chief of Mission in Tanzania, I understand these 

policy principles from Secretary Rice and fully intend to carry them out. The Peace 

Corps has a unique role and must remain substantially separate from the day-today conduct and concerns of our foreign policy. 

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must 

remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’ role and its need for separation from the 

day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies’’? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise 

your Chief of Mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much 

autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does 

not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies’’? 

Answer. Yes. As I have indicated above, should I be confirmed, it is my intention 

to follow, fully and completely, Secretary Rice’s directions regarding the Peace 

Corps. 

I respect and honor the mission and activities of the Peace Corps as it conducts 

its work in developing countries all over the world. There are few other U.S. programs—if any—that could duplicate the unique character of this organization as it 

seeks to improve the lives of those less fortunate than we. Peace Corps volunteers 

are the face of America in remote corners of the world, and they reflect the best 

attributes of the American spirit: Roll up your sleeves to tackle the daily challenges 

facing the world’s poor with optimism and hope. Should I be confirmed, that will 

be one of the core messages I will want my team in Dar es Salaam to reflect. 

RESPONSES OF JUNE CARTER PERRY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Although the trial of Charles Taylor for his role in the armed conflict 

in Sierra Leone began on June 4, the process of truth and reconciliation in the country has largely stalled. What role do you see for the United States in ensuring that 

388 

the process of truth and reconciliation in Sierra Leone move forward? If confirmed, 

what will you do to promote the inclusion of justice in this process? What do you 

see as the long-term impact of the efforts of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 

(SCSL) in general and Taylor’s trial in particular? United States support for the 

SCSL has been substantial. How do you see the courts as strengthening rule of law 

and democratization in Sierra Leone beyond the prosecutions of the individuals on 

trial? 

Answer. The United States has an important role to play in supporting Sierra 

Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation process. However, as we support the consolidation 

of peace in Sierra Leone, we must ensure that the reconciliation process remains 

homegrown and that there is sufficient political will to implement the necessary reforms. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has identified corruption 

and the breakdown of the rule of law among the primary drivers of the civil conflict. 

The establishment of the Human Rights and Constitutional Reform Commissions 

create key opportunities for the U.S. Mission to support the TRC recommendations. 

If confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone, I would engage the Government 

of Sierra Leone to ensure that these commissions are empowered to complete their 

goals. In our direct engagement with these commissions, I would seek to identify 

areas in which greater attention is needed. 

In addition to establishing these commissions, Sierra Leone has recently adopted 

key pieces of legislation such as the gender bills and the child rights bills, which 

set the framework to address some of the worst abuses that occurred during the 

civil conflict. If confirmed, I would direct the United States Embassy to continue to 

work with the relevant authorities in Sierra Leone to ensure the full implementation of these important pieces of legislation, and the law enforcement training needed to support their implementation. 

The long-term impact of the Special Court for Sierra Leone reaches well beyond 

Sierra Leone, to the region and to the world as a whole. The Court is a clear expression that the international community will not tolerate the impunity of gross abuse 

of human rights, and that the reach of international humanitarian law extends as 

far as sitting heads of state, as evidenced by the court’s precedent-setting 2003 indictment of then-President of Liberia, Charles Taylor. Additionally, the court’s recent verdict in the case against the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council established 

new international humanitarian case law, such as the first-ever rulings on the 

crimes of recruitment of child soldiers into an armed conflict and forced marriage 

in an armed conflict. These important legal precedents will protect two of the most 

vulnerable classes of victims of the armed conflict that devastated Sierra Leone, 

thereby extending the court’s legacy throughout the region and the world for future 

generations. 

The court’s excellent outreach efforts are a commendable example of its contribution to strengthening rule of law and democratization in Sierra Leone, having 

helped the people of the Mano River subregion take part in the justice process. Additionally, over 50 percent of Special Court personnel are Sierra Leonean, including 

police officers and prison guards, as well as lawyers, judges, court administrators, 

and courtroom personnel. The training these personnel have received while employed at the court, and the experience they have gained there, will have an enduring impact on judicial and law enforcement practices in Sierra Leone, as these dedicated professionals return to their jobs in the country’s national courts and law enforcement agencies. Looking forward, both the Special Court and the Government 

of Sierra Leone should enhance their efforts to use the court’s presence to enhance 

the rule of law and the administration of justice in Sierra Leone. If confirmed as 

ambassador, I would encourage the court to incorporate into its legacy a greater emphasis on improving the delivery of justice in Sierra Leone. 

Question. Military rebellions and coups have historically been a source of instability in Sierra Leone and remain a potential threat to the elected government. If 

confirmed, what steps would you take to help strengthen civil society and the rule 

of law in the country? 

Answer. Sierra Leone already has a strong and vibrant civil society with which 

the United States Mission enjoys a strong and healthy cooperation. If confirmed, I 

would continue the U.S. Mission’s efforts to support and to work with civil society. 

The key challenge to stability in Sierra Leone is corruption. As ambassador I would 

ensure that all U.S. Government programs emphasize transparency, accountability 

and inclusiveness. I would continue the Mission’s strategy to promote democracy 

and human rights awareness to increase citizens’ expectations of transparent, responsive government, as well as to build the government’s capacity to deliver services at all levels. I would continue to direct U.S. assistance to local and international 

NGOs to facilitate programs on improving human rights and democracy, promoting 

389 

reforms in the areas of decentralization, civic education, child labor, and combating 

human trafficking. 

Question. Diamonds played a devastating role in fueling the brutal civil war in 

Sierra Leone. Although Sierra Leone is now a member of the Kimberley Process, 

controls on the artisanal diamond mining sector remain weak and smuggling of diamonds remains a serious problem due to lack of capacity and governance problems. 

If confirmed, what would you do to help promote better controls over the diamond 

sector to prevent diamonds from fueling conflict and to ensure that diamonds benefit 

the people of Sierra Leone? How would you support government and civil society 

in these efforts? 

Answer. A recent Kimberley Process review visit concluded that Sierra Leone met 

the minimum requirements, though internal controls should be strengthened. If confirmed, I would target the Mission’s development assistance to promote transparent 

management of the diamond industry, and transparent governance writ large. Diamond sector reform would remain the primary component of our natural resources 

and biodiversity program, aiming to create legitimate ‘‘fair trade’’ diamonds and the 

establishment of in-country cutting and polishing operations. Our collaboration with 

civil society through USAID and the Peace Diamond Alliance has charted new territory in Sierra Leone by bringing together civil society, the private sector, and local 

communities to monitor alluvial diamond mining, and to ensure that public revenues generated are used for public good. 

Unfortunately, diamond smuggling remains a challenge in Sierra Leone. The 3 

percent export tax, which some have contended may motivate smuggling to neighboring countries, is used to fund the Diamond Area Community Development Fund, 

which aims to enhance social and economic development in mining communities. To 

address the smuggling concerns, USAID and the UNDP are supporting regional efforts to harmonize export and fiscal taxes in the mining sector to eliminate the incentive for smuggling; I would continue to support these efforts, if confirmed. 

Question. What would you do to promote transparent management of natural resources in Sierra Leone so that the revenues from these resources are used to promote economic development and alleviate poverty in Sierra Leone? 

Answer. Sierra Leone is a resource rich country, which, due to poor governance, 

has not succeeded in transforming its natural wealth into prosperity for its people. 

Sierra Leone’s weak economy is heavily dependent on agriculture and mining, and 

is moving steadily toward food security and diversification of rising mineral exports 

from diamonds to gold, rutile, and bauxite. Fishing is another key resource, but is 

heavily impacted by illegal poaching. 

Despite expressing its intent to join the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), Sierra Leone has yet to complete the independent validation necessary 

to implement EITI’s transparency rules fully. If confirmed, I would work with the 

Government of Sierra Leone, civil society, and our international donor partners to 

ensure that Sierra Leone’s vast resources are harnessed for the good of the Sierra 

Leoneans in an open and transparent manner. Looking regionally, we would continue to work on tri-border forestry and wildlife management activities which emphasize good governance, transparency, and accountability. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Sierra 

Leone? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Sierra Leone? What do you hope to accomplish through 

these actions? 

Answer. Abuses by the security forces, domestic and gender-based violence, and 

child labor are the most pressing human rights issues in Sierra Leone. The recent 

passage of the child’s rights and gender equity bills has created a framework to address some of these problems. If confirmed, I would work with the Government of 

Sierra Leone and the country’s active civil society to ensure full and proper implementation of these important laws. For the last several years, my predecessor, Ambassador Hull, has effectively used the State Department’s annual human rights report as a tool to engage Sierra Leone’s Parliament on human rights issues. Following his most recent presentation of the report, the recently established Human 

Rights Commission publicly committed to publishing its own National Human 

Rights reports. Members of Parliament have asked that the Mission increase its engagement with Parliament on human rights beyond presenting the final report. If 

confirmed, I would build on my predecessor’s work and establish an ongoing dialog 

with the new Sierra Leone Parliament to ensure that human rights are given the 

proper attention. 

Abuse by Sierra Leone’s security forces demonstrates the need for enhanced and 

continued engagement on human rights and the rule of law. As ambassador, I would 

390 

publicly call for serious, good faith investigations into abuses by security forces. 

Through our foreign assistance we should provide training that enhances police capacity to combat crime and promote the protection of human rights. In this regard, 

I would investigate training opportunities with the International Law Enforcement 

Academy. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Sierra Leone in advancing human rights and democracy in 

general? 

Answer. Corruption is the primary obstacle to reform and the promotion of human 

rights in Sierra Leone. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also identified corruption as one of the key drivers of Sierra Leone’s decade-long civil conflict. Though 

the Government of Sierra Leone has established an Anti-Corruption Commission 

(ACC) to address official malfeasance, more must be done. To date, the ACC has 

yet to convict officials for their involvement in incidents of high-level corruption. To 

complete the healing process and consolidate peace, Sierra Leone must address impunity. If confirmed, I would continue to incorporate a focus on good governance, 

transparency, and anticorruption into all the Mission’s engagement and assistance 

to Sierra Leone. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would establish a working group on human rights within 

the embassy to address our human rights promotion activities. In addition, I would 

direct Democracy and Human Rights Funds to support local and international 

human rights-focused nongovernmental organizations in Sierra Leone. In public 

fora, I would speak on the importance of human rights and encourage any appropriate legislation through the Mission’s engagement with the government leadership. 

I would seek to recognize officers who actively promote human rights through Superior and Meritorious Honor Award nominations, and acknowledgement in the regular employee evaluations. Their work would be recognized not only within the Mission, but through larger events involving host government, civil society, and private 

entities. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. As Ambassador to Lesotho, I worked closely with the U.N. Development 

Program Representative, a female member of parliament, as well as the Ministers 

of Gender, Local Government, Foreign Affairs, and Culture to encourage the passage 

of a Women’s Equity law. I also met with both the alliance of local NGOs and U.S. 

NGOs to advocate for the rights of all citizens, especially women and orphaned children. Through organizations such as ‘‘Save the Children Lesotho,’’ we were able to 

provide Ambassador’s Girl’s Scholarship funds for tuition and mentors. I also spoke 

on human rights before diverse organizations such as the Homemaker’s Association 

and the Lesotho College of Education. To develop officers, I had the Deputy Chief 

of Mission in 2006 address human rights before a religious organization and had 

the Public Affairs/Political Officer publish articles or letters in the major Englishlanguage daily emphasizing human rights. At the ambassador’s residence, I hosted 

Martin Luther King Day programs featuring panels of the Minister of Justice, 

Besotho alumni of United States exchanges, and professors from the University of 

Lesotho. These programs resulted in opening frank dialog, which were especially important during the pre-electoral period, and encouraged organizations to take advantage of U.S.-sponsored grants. The Mission had not received Democracy, Governance 

and Human Rights Funds for some years. We were able to receive an initial $10,000 

and later $30,000 to address human rights. 

As Deputy Chief of Mission in Madagascar, I chaired the Human Rights working 

group and awarded grants to the Ministry of Justice to attain an integrated computer system that advised citizens of their rights. As a second tour officer in 

Zimbabwe, I supervised the Special Self-Help program, which assisted market 

women in establishing cooperatives to empower them financially. As a desk officer 

in the Department, I worked closely with USAID and NGOs such as Africare to establish bursaries for a total of $20 million for nonwhite South African students during the apartheid era. I consider that effort to be a major achievement as it offered 

391 

an opportunity to young South Africans. As an office director in the International 

Organizations bureau, I was responsible for managing an office that included the 

Economic and Social Commission, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Commission on the Status of Women. In this position, I believe my team and I made 

a major contribution in preparing the United States position against Libya’s bid to 

chair the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Our statement prepared for our 

ambassador was covered internationally and clearly laid out the fundamental beliefs 

that a country with major human rights violations and terrorist links should not 

chair the commission. 

RESPONSES OF WANDA L. NESBITT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. LTNAIDS describes Cote d’Ivoire as suffering from ‘‘a relatively stable 

but serious epidemic,’’ which shows some signs of decline in urban areas. Cote 

d’Ivoire is a PEPFAR focus country. If confirmed, how would you lead the United 

States country team in confronting the HIV/AIDS challenge in Cote d’Ivoire? As ambassador, what steps would you take to promote prevention efforts and to strengthen effectiveness of the Lesotho Government’s response to the epidemic? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would maintain the dedication of my predecessor, Ambassador Aubrey Hooks, in administering the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. The Cote d’Ivoire program—funded at $84 million for fiscal year 2007, with a 

proposed budget of more than $100 million in fiscal year 2008—has produced significant results in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Cote d’Ivoire, including providing palliative care services for more than 44,000 people, care and support for more than 

24,000 orphans and other vulnerable children, and direct and indirect support for 

antiretroviral treatment for more than 36,300 people. I would continue the Ambassador’s support for the PEPFAR interagency team by providing overall leadership 

and guidance at the policy level. To strengthen prevention efforts, I would build on 

the goodwill and solid relationships established by Ambassador Hooks to heighten 

the program’s visibility and reach. I would pursue a systems-building approach and 

encourage the forging of new private- and public-sector relationships to build a sustainable response to the epidemic. In particular, I would focus on strengthening systems of accountability and partnership with decentralized local government and civil 

society. I am aware that I would be inheriting a dynamic and effective program that 

is achieving significant results under difficult circumstances, and I intend to be a 

supporter and advocate for the Cote d’Ivoire program. 

Question. Cote d’Ivoire is the leading producer of cocoa; revenues from the cocoa 

trade have helped fuel armed conflict and corruption in the country. If confirmed, 

what steps would you take to promote greater transparency and accountability in 

the cocoa industry? 

Answer. I strongly agree with proposals made by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which call on the Government of Cote d’Ivoire to enhance 

transparency in the mobilization and use of revenue from the oil, coffee, and cocoa 

sectors and to tie the agreement to do so with accessing World Bank funds for the 

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. I would work 

diligently to ensure that such measures would be durable, effective, and open to 

scrutiny by both the international community and the Ivorian public. I would also 

maintain regular contact with private sector entities who have a keen interest in 

this issue, such as the Chocolate Manufacturers Associations, to ensure that we deliver a consistent message to the Ivorian Government. 

Question. The U.N. and Kimberley Process reported last year that conflict diamonds from Cote d’Ivoire were being smuggled out and making their way into the 

legitimate diamond markets around the world. How will you work to help ensure 

that the Kimberley Process is effectively implemented in Cote d’Ivoire and that controls over diamond mining areas are enforced and revenues from diamond trade are 

managed in a transparent and accountable manner? 

Answer. The U.S. Government strongly backs the Kimberley Process, and if confirmed, I would uphold its principles. It is important to note that with the recent 

peace accord between factions in Cote d’Ivoire, there are no areas of diamond production that meet the U.N. definition of conflict diamonds. Therefore, I believe the 

key to preventing the production of conflict diamonds is to offer the United States 

Government’s full support to the implementation of the Ouagadougou Political 

Agreement and to work with the Government of Cote d’Ivoire to ensure that free 

and fair elections, which would solidify that peace, take place in 2008. The GovernVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00399 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
392 

ment of Cote d’Ivoire is a member in good standing of the Kimberley Process and 

has cooperated fully with the U.N. and the Kimberley Process to eliminate the trade 

in conflict diamonds. Thus, I would encourage the government to continue to take 

constructive steps to mitigate disputes over control of diamonds and to prevent diamond revenues from being used for arms purchases. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Cote 

d’Ivoire? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Cote d’Ivoire? What do you hope to accomplish through 

these actions? 

Answer. The 2007 United States Department of State’s Human Rights Report 

gives the Government of Cote d’Ivoire poor marks for its human rights record. 

Among the most pressing concerns are: a delay in holding presidential elections, arbitrary and unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and torture, exploitative child labor, 

and trafficking in persons. Human rights violations have typically been less documented in the north, but the New Forces militia group has been rightly criticized 

for killings and disappearances of civilians and ad hoc justice. 

If confirmed, I would work with the government, the Ivorian Independent Electoral Commission, and our NGO partners to make sure that free, fair, and transparent elections take place in 2008. This would include advocating for a thorough 

identification and registration process, which would ensure voter lists are as comprehensive and accurate as possible. Obviously, the objective would be to have a 

government that has broad support and, therefore, greater incentive to respect 

democratic practices and human rights principles. In addition, I would also focus on 

the effort to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate former combatants so that this 

process was more than a symbolic gesture. The reunification of the country and the 

return of civil administration in the north should dramatically improve human 

rights throughout Cote d’Ivoire. 

Regarding the worst forms of child labor in the cocoa sector, I would continue the 

United States Government’s consultative dialog with NGOs, the United States cocoa 

industry, and the Government of Cote d’Ivoire. I would encourage the government 

to take steps to ensure children are given a genuine opportunity to attend school 

rather than work in potentially dangerous conditions on cocoa farms. Moreover, I 

would work with the government to meet the benchmarks laid out in the HarkinEngel Protocol. The government has made significant efforts to combat trafficking 

in persons, but it falls short of meeting the minimal standards to eliminate the practice. I plan to work with our international and civil society partners to strengthen 

and train the Ivorian institutions charged with preventing trafficking in persons, 

protecting its victims, and prosecuting the perpetrators. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Cote d’Ivoire in advancing human rights and democracy in 

general? 

Answer. Voter identification and registration as well as demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration are inherently controversial issues in Cote d’Ivoire. The 

former gets at the heart of the conflict: who is entitled to Ivorian citizenship, and 

who is not. I believe that one of the biggest obstacles will be overcoming the angst 

and fear that a number of different interest groups have about a potential change 

in the balance of power if 4 million currently undocumented people are eventually 

added to the voting rolls. The Government of Cote d’Ivoire needs to move on both 

of these issues quickly and decisively. 

Five years of conflict have deteriorated infrastructure and institutions. A culture 

of impunity has cemented mistrust and will be difficult to reverse. Building rule of 

law, fostering reconciliation, and increasing transparency are long-terms goals, 

which I plan to emphasize. Other challenges I believe I would face if confirmed include: holding the Ivorian Government to the commitments it has made; promoting 

greater political dialog with limited United States Government resources; mobilizing 

Ivorian resources to address trafficking and child labor; and seeking better coordination of donor contributions. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. First, if confirmed, I would be honest, open, and forthright with Ivorian 

leaders about my expectations related to human rights. I would make it clear that 

the removal of section 508 sanctions is dependent on Cote d’Ivoire conducting free, 

393 

fair, and transparent elections. Cote d’Ivoire cannot fully integrate into the international community of democracies without holding elections, and I would emphasize this point regularly. Furthermore, I would take advantage of all opportunities 

to intensively engage NGOs dedicated to promoting human rights, and I would use 

public outreach opportunities to engage Ivorian audiences on the subject. 

Within the Mission, I would ensure that we have a good strategy for promoting 

human rights and that every member of the country team addresses this issue in 

their interaction with Ivorian officials. I would hold regular sessions to evaluate our 

progress and to make sure that we stay on track. The State Department has an excellent system for recognizing and rewarding its Foreign Service officers. I would reward an officer who made superior contributions in the field of human rights by recommending him/her for an embassy meritorious or superior honor award, and I 

would nominate an officer who made a truly exceptional contribution for one of the 

Secretary of State’s Department-wide award competitions. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. As the United States Ambassador to Madagascar, I worked with our 

partners in the international community to resolve a 6-month dispute over the results of a Presidential election that resulted in the departure from office of the individual who had ruled Madagascar for 26 years. The leadership role we played in 

that crisis gave Madagascar its best opportunity in a generation to put in place a 

government that is more responsive to its people. Since the transition took place in 

2002, the country has made good progress in terms of improving basic infrastructure, and increasing educational and economic opportunity. Much remains to be 

done but the trend is generally positive. 

In Tanzania, our Mission was one of only a handful that held regular discussions 

with government officials in Zanzibar. Those discussions focused almost exclusively 

on the need for Zanzibari leaders to demonstrate greater respect for democracy and 

human rights. We had excellent relationships with the major opposition parties as 

well, and our open dealings with them sent a clear message to the general public 

that we were talking to—and listening to—both sides. Using our public diplomacy 

Visiting Speaker program, we were able to assist dialog among parties in Zanzibar. 

We invited a well-known Muslim-American academic to speak to a group of 

Zanzibaris that spanned the political spectrum. He talked about conflict resolution 

in an inspiring way. A number of attendees at the event told us it was the first 

time they had been in the same room and spoken to each other in several years. 

We succeeded in getting people to talk to each other even if they were not able to 

immediately resolve their differences. 

In my assignments in Rwanda, Tanzania, and Madagascar I have been a strong 

supporter and proponent of women’s rights and girls’ education. In Madagascar, 

where a very large percentage of girls still do not go to school, we had a vigorous 

program—the Ambassador’s Girls Scholarship Program—that gave hundreds of girls 

the chance to get all the way through high school. It was a program initiated by 

my predecessor and I was delighted to continue it. Thanks to our efforts, hundreds 

of girls, who would not otherwise have had the chance, can read and write because 

of this program; I am certain that they will retain a positive impression of the 

United States and make good contributions to their society for years to come. 

RESPONSES OF MAURICE S. PARKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Tragically, the Kingdom of Swaziland has the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the world: An estimated one-third of its adult population is HIV positive. If confirmed how would you lead the U.S. country team in confronting this 

challenge? As ambassador, what steps would you take to promote prevention efforts 

and to strengthen the effectiveness of the Swazi Government’s response to the epidemic? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would make combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic my top 

foreign policy priority, after the protection of U.S. citizens and their interests. The 

horrible HIV/AIDS scourge devastates families, hampers economic growth, overwhelms health-care systems, and creates thousands of orphans. Stemming the tide 

of this disease in Swaziland will be a long-term effort. 

I would lead the country team by working closely with the Mission’s new office 

for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) that includes representatives of the Center for Disease Control (CDC), the U.S. Agency for InterVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00401 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
394 

national Development (USAID), and the State Department’s Office of the Global 

AIDS Coordinator (OGAC). PEPFAR’s increased funding for fiscal year 2008 will assist the country team in meeting its goals. 

I would urge greater coordination of the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland’s efforts against HIV/AIDS in my discussions with King Mswati III, the Prime 

Minister, the Minister of Health, and by working with officials at Swaziland’s National Emergency Response Council on HIV/AIDS (NERCHA). I would stress the 

need for expanded prevention efforts, increased government capacity for addressing 

HIV/AIDS, including improved drug procurement and drug supply management, 

better palliative care, and greater access to treatment. I would emphasize the importance of a strong message from the King to help de-stigmatize those with HIV/ 

AIDS, as well as leadership from the King and senior governmental officials in altering AIDS-vulnerable behavior. 

Question. As high as Swaziland’s national HIV prevalence rates are, they are even 

higher among young women. If confirmed as ambassador, what steps would you 

take to help the people of Swaziland address the vulnerabilities of women and girls 

to this epidemic and to increase the empowerment of women in this small, conservative kingdom? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would address the special vulnerabilities of women and 

girls to HIV/AIDS in my public statements, discussions with governmental officials, 

and contact with the Mission’s 20 implementing partners on HIV/AIDS programs. 

I would urge the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland to take rapid action in 

bringing to Parliament a draft bill currently under governmental review that addresses the issue of domestic violence and the protection of children. I would also 

underscore to government officials the importance of taking forceful steps to prevent 

trafficking in persons. In my leadership role for the Mission’s PEPFAR Country 

Operational Plan, I would ensure that gender is an integral part of the Mission’s 

PEPFAR programming. 

In February 2006, a new constitution came into effect that provides new rights 

for women. I understand that the U.S. Agency for International Development is preparing to fund a program developed by a local civil society organization that will 

reach out to women throughout the country to explain to them their rights under 

the constitution. I would strongly support that effort as ambassador. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Swaziland? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Swaziland? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. I believe that governmental restrictions on democratic freedoms and serious abuses by security forces are the most pressing human rights issues in Swaziland. Although the new constitution provides for many democratic rights, the people 

are unable to change their government through democratic elections. Governmental 

practice places restrictions on freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of 

assembly, and freedom of association, among others. The police and security forces 

are known to act with impunity, use torture and excessive force, and to make arbitrary arrests. If confirmed, I would press the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland to amend existing legislation to bring it into conformity with the constitution 

and their international human rights obligations. For example, the new constitution 

provides women with fundamental rights and freedoms and these need to be codified in their legislation. I would publicly extol the benefits of a multiparty system 

and political openness. I would speak out against police abuses and press the government to bring the security forces under discipline. I would like to see the incidence rate of police abuse of detainees reduced. 

While change comes slowly in a place like Swaziland, if confirmed, I would hope 

to effect change, ever mindful of my position. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Swaziland in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. The greatest potential obstacle to addressing human rights issues in 

Swaziland is the historically entrenched attitudes and practices. For example, the 

subordinate position long held by women makes it hard for them to assert their 

rights, even though the new constitution specifically provides greater rights for 

women. 

I would like to see political parties recognized officially in Swaziland, yet there 

is a general sense among a large segment of the public that political parties are 

harmful to society. When the previous king banned political parties in 1973, he 

395 

claimed they were divisive and the cause of social discord. Given the tremendous 

respect accorded the previous king, this view of political parties continues to prevail 

in some quarters. 

Civil society typically plays a crucial role in advancing human rights in a country. 

While there are numerous civil society organizations in Swaziland, they lack the cohesion necessary to facilitate their working toward a common end. 

If confirmed, I would deal with these obstacles in a constructive manner in seeking to advance human rights in Swaziland. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. The United States plays a crucial role in advancing human rights 

throughout the world. If confirmed, the advancement of human rights in Swaziland 

would be one of the key objectives of my tenure. I would lead the Mission’s work 

on human rights by speaking out and engaging the country’s leadership and civil 

society community on the issues. I would encourage my staff to do the same by ensuring that addressing human rights is included in the work requirement statements of appropriate Foreign Service officers (FSO) and stressing the importance of 

that work in employee-supervisor counseling sessions. I would note the accomplishments in the field of human rights in annual FSO Personnel Evaluations and would 

look for opportunities to nominate human rights officers for Department of State 

and Mission awards. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. Promoting democratic principals and values and advocating for nations 

to institutionalize respect for human rights has been an important function throughout my career. 

HUMAN RIGHTS

As Principal Officer/Consul General in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, I promoted Human 

Rights by: 

• Advocating for the release from prison of an American citizen and her U.S. permanent resident husband, who were serving life sentences for confessing to having committed a murder as a result of their being subjected to torture. I personally met with the American prisoner; two consecutive governors and attorneys 

general of the state of Chihuahua, Mexico, to advocate on the prisoner’s behalf; 

ensured that the Consular Officers on my staff were always available to assist 

the prisoner, her family members and attorneys, to conduct frequent visits (despite a 300-mile distance between Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua City, where 

the prisoner was imprisoned), and appear at all judicial hearings. I also worked 

with Mexican NGOs and the local media, and kept U.S. congressional officials 

informed of the status of this case. Through an effective combination of our Consulate General’s active efforts against this blatant miscarriage of justice and a 

superb legal team, the couple was eventually released. • As Principal Officer/Consul General in Ciudad Juarez, I strongly advocated for 

the investigation of the murders and disappearance, over a period of 10 years, 

of approximately 300 women in that border city. My efforts included meeting 

personally with two consecutive governors and state attorneys general to urge 

them to conduct intense police investigations (murder in Mexico is a state, rather than federal crime) into the murders. I also met with Mexican federal officials, the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, and municipal chiefs of police; hosted the 

fact-finding visits of two United States Congressional delegations (Representatives Hilda Solis twice and Janice Schakowsky) to Ciudad Juarez; and worked 

closely with Mexican and American NGOs to urge all Mexican authorities to investigate the murders. As a result of my efforts, I helped debunk many myths 

regarding the murders and provided the State Department, Congress, and the 

general public with a clearer idea of the problems facing the Mexican Government, including explanations of why the murders/disappearances were not 

solved. My ongoing discussions of the problem with the mayor of El Paso and 

the special agent in charge of the FBI for El Paso, Texas, led to a local agreement to have the El Paso homicide squad provide basic law-enforcement training to members of the Chihuahua state and Ciudad Juarez municipal police. 

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dence, and conduct a murder investigation. The agreement also established a 

911 emergency telephone number in Ciudad Juarez for Mexican citizens to provide confidential information about possible crimes directly to Spanish-speaking 

members of the El Paso Police Department. This training has resulted in more 

effective investigative techniques for Mexican law enforcement. Unfortunately, 

due to the mishandling of most evidence associated with the murders of the 

women, the fact that the vast majority of cases under review were cold, and the 

general apathy demonstrated by the Chihuahua state officials responsible for 

the investigations, the crimes remain unsolved. • In addition to my specific work on behalf of the disappeared and murdered 

women of Ciudad Juarez, I also worked closely with Ester Chavez Cano and her 

NGO, ‘‘Casa Amiga,’’ a crisis center for battered women in Ciudad Juarez. Besides offering legal and practical assistance to abused women, this NGO has 

also advocated in a broader sense for human rights and full citizenship status, 

with accompanying protection and benefits under law, for women at all levels 

of Mexican society. To support Casa Amiga’s invaluable efforts for the women 

of Ciudad Juarez, I obtained regular funding, a vehicle, and computer equipment from Embassy Mexico City’s Narcotics Affairs Section, part of the Bureau 

of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) at the Department of State. • During my assignments to Barcelona, Spain; Lagos, Nigeria; and Ciudad 

Juarez, Mexico, I was a contributor to each embassy’s annual Human Rights 

Reports. As United States Representative to the Principality of Andorra, I was 

responsible for drafting the Human Rights Reports for that newly-independent 

and democratic microstate. 

DEMOCRACY

I have used the tool of public diplomacy to advance democratic principals during 

the visits of three United States Supreme Court Justices to my posts. In 1985, I 

assisted Chief Justice Warren Burger during his official visit to Edinburgh, Scotland, to meet with senior officials of the Scottish judiciary. In 1995 and 1996, I 

hosted separate visits of Associate Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 

Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsberg, to Barcelona. During each visit, I used 

their presence overseas to meet with local officials, members of the judiciary, key 

legal officials, the media, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and the public to 

discuss the U.S. Constitution, uniqueness of the American democratic system, and 

rule of law. Also, as Principal Officer in Barcelona, in cooperation with the post Public Affairs Officer, I helped to sponsor a highly publicized lecture by former U.S. 

Senator and Presidential Candidate, Gary Hart, on the U.S. Presidential electoral 

process. All of these events helped to educate some of America’s closest allies about 

our unique democratic system and legal practices. 

RESPONSES OF ROBERT B. NOLAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Lesotho has one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the 

world—just under one quarter of the adult population is HIV positive. If confirmed, 

how would you lead the U.S. country team in confronting this challenge? As ambassador, what steps would you take to promote prevention efforts and to strengthen 

the effectiveness of the Lesotho Government’s response to the epidemic? 

Answer. With an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of over 22 percent, Lesotho has been 

in a head-on collision with the HIV virus for well over a decade. Fortunately, the 

Government of Lesotho recognizes this challenge to the nation’s very existence, and 

has been in the forefront of the campaign to fight the war against HIV/AIDS, including the involvement of Their Majesties the King and Queen, the Prime Minister and 

First Lady, and other key leaders in the country’s groundbreaking ‘‘Know Your Status’’ campaign. Now, in my view, this campaign is an important step for Lesotho 

as it highlights knowing your status to keep those who are negative negative, promotes protecting those who are HIV positive from infecting others, and offers a gateway to care and treatment for those in need. That being said, Lesotho needs to scale 

up its prevention campaign and move it to the next level—including the inclusion 

of prevention messages in all current donor HIV/AIDS programs in Lesotho. The 

battle to control HIV/AIDS in Lesotho cannot be won until the rate of new infections 

drops significantly. The key in this regard is ensuring that the general population 

has access to the entire package of HIV prevention interventions, including: quality 

counseling and testing; the prevention of mother to child transmission; ARV treatment as appropriately indicated and thus lowering the risk of HIV transmission 

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mission such as multiple, concurrent sexual partners; regular access to condoms for 

targeted, at-risk populations; and recognition of and assistance with the need to formulate a national policy and implementation program on male circumcision. It is 

clear that there is no magic bullet for prevention, but I am confident that the 

PEPFAR program under my leadership in Lesotho can play a primary role in helping to assure that all of these strategies are part of the national response. 

If confirmed, I will work energetically with His Majesty the King and other members of the Royal Family, Government of Lesotho officials, civil society leaders, and 

all stakeholders to encourage them to engage personally in reaching out to the people of Lesotho and in ensuring that the entire arsenal of prevention interventions 

is universally accessible to the people of Lesotho. I will specifically highlight the behavioral changes needed to prevent the spread of the virus as well as my belief that 

local ownership of behavioral change messages is essential if Lesotho is to win this 

battle. 

Concerning the broader question of improving the effectiveness of Lesotho’s response to the pandemic, I think there is a need for greater coordination both among 

the approximately one-dozen Government of Lesotho entities engaged in fighting 

HIV/AIDS and among the donors, NGOs, and civil society who are working to support the government’s work. This coordination will become more necessary once implementation of the soon-to-be-signed MCA Compact begins. The Compact provides 

approximately $122 million for the health sector to bolster human and physical infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work with the government and others to ensure 

that the considerable efforts to fight AIDS in Lesotho, including the work done 

under the MCA Compact and PEPFAR, are complementary and mutually supportive. The challenge to fight HIV/AIDS in Lesotho, particularly within the context 

of a vast shortage of qualified human resources, is so great that no efforts or resources can be wasted. 

The United States Mission Country Team is the key to ensuring that United 

States Government resources are used to maximum advantage in helping the 

Basotho win the war against HIV/AIDS. In coming months the Country Team will 

expand greatly with the addition of resident representatives of CDC, USAID, and 

MCC. If confirmed, I personally will lead the Country Team in the battle against 

HIV/AIDS. 

Question. The rights of women in Lesotho continue to be limited as well as violated. Despite the advocacy efforts of national NGOs, domestic violence and rape remain common, a fact which compounds the AIDS epidemic. If confirmed, what steps 

will you take to address these issues? 

Answer. The Government of Lesotho has made important progress in safeguarding the rights of women. To advance its eligibility for an MCA Compact, Lesotho enacted ground-breaking legislation that accords Basotho women broad protection under the law, especially concerning their ability to conduct business, acquire 

loans, and possess land. If confirmed, I will direct my efforts to urge that this marriage equality law is fully implemented, as I know there will be considerable resistance from some quarters to according all women their full rights. I would also continue our impressive efforts to provide secondary education to girls from the most 

vulnerable sectors of society, especially orphans. I would continue Embassy 

Maseru’s outreach on trafficking in persons issues so that Basotho women do not 

fall victim to this modern form of slavery. I would also make concerted efforts to 

support the work of some of Lesotho’s leaders on women’s rights, including the First 

Lady, the Speaker of the National Assembly, several women leaders in the government’s cabinet, and many dynamic civil society leaders. Finally, I will encourage the 

PEPFAR and MCC staff to actively continue making linkages between lack of gender equity in basic social relations in Lesotho and the continuing spread of the HIV 

virus. 

Question. Lesotho is considered to be one of the foremost beneficiaries of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), but its AGOA exports are made up almost 

exclusively of apparel. If confirmed, what steps would you take to promote greater 

economic diversity and enhance potential investment opportunities for United 

States businesses in Lesotho outside of the textile sector? 

Answer. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been a success story 

for Lesotho, with 40,000 people employed in the textile industry. The Government 

of Lesotho is indeed cognizant of the vulnerability inherent in having its manufacturing sector wholly devoted to textile production. 

To promote economic diversification in Lesotho, I will work with USAID’s Trade 

Hub (located in Gaborone, Botswana) to maintain critical job-supporting exports in 

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ics and processed food products. The Trade Hub plays a key role in making market 

linkages for exporters from Lesotho, both to regional markets and to the United 

States. 

I will also work with the Trade Hub in conjunction with other donors, such as 

the British-funded ‘‘ComMark Trust’’ based in Maseru, on creating a business environment that is conducive to fostering additional investment to promote economic 

diversification in Lesotho and to create new jobs for the Basotho people. The $362.5 million Millennium Challenge Compact, soon to be signed with Lesotho, will help the country address a key constraint to increased industrial development. Specifically, the Compact will provide funding for a highland dam project intended to resolve water shortages in populated areas. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Lesotho? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights 

and democracy in Lesotho? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy and a vigorous, if young, democracy. 

As reported in the State Department’s 2006 Human Rights Report, human rights 

are generally respected by the government. One of the most serious human rights 

concerns in Lesotho is discrimination toward women, including the prevalence of violence. The Government of Lesotho has made important progress in safeguarding 

the rights of women. To advance its eligibility for an MCA Compact, Lesotho enacted ground-breaking legislation that accords Basotho women broad protection 

under the law, especially concerning their ability to conduct business, acquire loans, 

and possess land. If confirmed, I will urge that this marriage equality law be fully 

implemented, as I know there will be considerable resistance from some quarters 

against according all women their full rights. I would continue our impressive efforts to provide secondary education to girls from the most vulnerable sectors of society, especially orphans, as well as our funding of community self-help projects, 

many of which empower local women’s groups and organizations. I would also support the work of Lesotho’s leaders on women’s rights issues, including the First 

Lady, the Speaker of the National Assembly, cabinet members, and civil society 

leaders. Recent embassy activities publicizing the scourge of trafficking in persons 

and celebrating the history of the U.S. civil rights movement are examples we can 

build upon. 

I will use my position to ensure that the nation’s military and police respect and 

support the Basotho people’s civil and human rights. In this regard, robust democratization efforts, such as the confidence and capacity-building activities which Embassy Maseru and the National Democratic Institute conducted during Lesotho’s 

February 2007 national assembly election, are key to the nation’s continued strong 

human rights record. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Lesotho in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. The greatest obstacle in overcoming lack of respect for women’s rights in 

Lesotho is the difficulty of changing traditional attitudes in Basotho society. Fortunately, those attitudes are changing under the leadership of His Majesty the King, 

the Speaker of the Assembly, the First Lady, and other government and civil society 

women leaders. If confirmed, I will work with Lesotho’s leaders and with civil society groups to help ensure women are informed of their rights and are able to take 

advantage of them. I would like to point out the tremendous positive impact that 

United States policies on women’s issues has had in the Mountain Kingdom, such 

as the advocacy by the United States Embassy and the Millennium Challenge Corporation of Lesotho’s ‘‘Legal Capacity of Married Persons’’ Act. Under my leadership, 

we will steadfastly continue to seek equality for Basotho women so that they can 

fully contribute to the nation’s development. 

Additionally, under my leadership, the United States Embassy in Maseru will 

continue to aid the professionalization of Lesotho’s military and law enforcement entities so that they can serve as defenders of the Basotho people’s rights. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. If confirmed, it would be my intention to make the promotion of human 

rights and strengthening of democracy in Lesotho key elements in our mission strategic plan. Moreover, I will stress to all personnel and agencies under my authority 

399 

my belief that the institutionalization of basic human rights in Basotho society is 

a prerequisite for success in all other endeavors, including economic development 

and efforts to combat HIV/AIDS. I will ask all members of the Mission, regardless 

of their role, to contribute to advancing human rights in Lesotho. If confirmed as 

Ambassador to Lesotho, I intend to encourage and reward—through the Department’s award system and individual performance evaluations—insightful, reporting 

on human rights and democracy, as well as on other issues. I will impress upon my 

team that we are in Lesotho to act as transformational players in fields such as 

human rights and democratization. I will also continue, adapt, and expand upon our 

recent cooperation with the National Democratic Institute to build local capacity 

and confidence among political stakeholders. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. From 2001 until 2006, I served as the Office Director in the Bureau of 

Human Resources for the Office of Performance Evaluation (HR/PE). In this position, I was responsible for the management of the Foreign Service’s performance 

evaluation and promotion systems. 

In HR/PE, I played a leadership role in the creation of the Career Development 

Program (CDP) for Foreign Service generalists. The CDP contains a road map of the 

assignments a generalist must take in order to be eligible for consideration for promotion into the Senior Foreign Service (SFS). In CDP, I helped to make the case 

that operational effectiveness needed to include a breadth of experience over several 

regions and functions. The CDP thus encourages Foreign Service officers to serve 

a tour of duty in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) as a 

mid-level officer in order to demonstrate their operational effectiveness. By creating 

this incentive for an assignment in DRL, we emphasized the importance of working 

to support human rights. In addition, we believe that CDP will result in more midlevel employees working on human rights issues to demonstrate their breadth of experience in order to become more competitive for promotion into the Senior Foreign 

Service. 

While serving in HR/PE, I was also responsible for managing the Procedural Precepts process. The Procedural Precepts establish the scope, organization, and responsibilities of the Foreign Service Selection Boards and describe the criteria to be 

used by the boards in reaching their promotion determinations. In this HR/PE leadership role, I helped to emphasize the importance of human rights in the Procedural 

Precepts. For example, our 2006 Procedural Precepts specifically mentioned human 

rights as being of importance to U.S. interests as a global issue. The Procedural Precepts further added the comment that selection boards should acknowledge expertise and accomplishments of employees in areas such as human rights and give 

these employees full consideration for promotion. The Foreign Service promotion 

process thus helps to encourage employees to work on human rights issues. 

Since 2006, I have served as the Office Director in the Bureau of Human Resources for the Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA). In this 

position, I am responsible for the management of the Foreign Service’s assignments 

system. In HR/CDA, I have led management’s efforts to reform the Foreign Service 

assignments process. Specifically, we have made changes to the bidding process to 

improve the staffing of our most difficult hardship posts overseas. These difficult 

hardship posts are very often dealing with critical human rights issues on a bilateral or multilateral basis. By helping to make certain that positions at these posts 

are filled rather than being left vacant, we are ensuring that U.S. Missions overseas 

have the necessary American staffing to focus on human rights issues. 

RESPONSES OF FREDERICK B. COOK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. The International Criminal Court announced on May 22, 2007, that it 

would open an investigation into crimes committed in the Central African Republic 

by parties to the conflict in the region from 2002–2003. What is your opinion of this 

decision? If confirmed, how will you support the peace process in CAR? 

Answer. In December 2004, the Central African Republic (CAR) asked the International Criminal Court to investigate crimes within the jurisdiction of the court 

committed anywhere in CAR territory since July 1, 2002, the date of entry into force 

of the Rome Statute, which established the court. The CAR Government referred 

this case to the court because the CAR justice system lacks the capacity to carry 

out the complex legal proceedings necessary to try this case adequately. The United 

400 

States is not a party to the Rome Statute, but we respect the rights of other states 

to become parties and to seek the involvement of the ICC in addressing serious 

crimes in their countries as the CAR has done in this instance. The United States 

shares a common interest in promoting justice and accountability for mass atrocities 

and we remain a leading world voice in furthering international criminal justice. 

If confirmed, I will support the peace process in CAR by engaging with both the 

government and the opposition and emphasizing the need for a peaceful and democratic resolution to their differences. I would support the efforts of the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BONUCA) to establish a comprehensive dialog 

and to mediate between political leaders to foster reconciliation. I would encourage 

the government and its mediators to develop peace agreements with the various 

armed rebel groups in a transparent and inclusive manner. Finally, I would urge 

the government to address some of the underlying issues contributing to the conflict, 

such as the lack of rule of law and uneven economic development. 

Question. The United States Agency for International Development does not have 

a development assistance program in the Central African Republic. Under what conditions would you favor initiating an assistance program? 

Answer. While the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

does not have a mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), there is a considerable amount of USAID engagement in the country. The majority of USAID support 

for CAR in fiscal year 2007, approximately $16 million, consists of humanitarian assistance, including emergency food aid, emergency relief supplies, well rehabilitation, nutrition assessments, and seeds and tools distribution. 

The remaining fiscal year 2007 USAID assistance, approximately $1 million dollars, is targeted toward more traditional development programs. Projects include a 

program to develop property rights and increase transparency in alluvial diamond 

mining in CAR in accordance with the Kimberley Process as well as programs under 

the Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) to chart and 

record CAR’s forest resources and to promote conservation. The property rights 

project is managed from USAID headquarters in Washington and CARPE is administered out of the USAID mission in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Presently, the United States Embassy in CAR is not staffed sufficiently to directly 

manage large-scale USAID development assistance, which is why the embassy has 

relied on regional missions and Washington to manage projects. If confirmed, I 

would welcome a mission should USAID headquarters determine that adequate 

operational funding was available to establish such a mission in CAR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in the 

Central African Republic? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to 

promote human rights and democracy in CAR? What do you hope to accomplish 

through these actions? 

Answer. With rebel groups and bandits operating throughout the country, and 

spill over from conflicts in neighboring states, the greatest challenge to the promotion of human rights in the Central African Republic (CAR) is the deteriorating 

security situation. Hundreds of thousands of people have been driven from their 

homes by both rebel attacks and counter attacks by government forces. The general 

condition of lawlessness and impunity, including extrajudicial killings by government agents and rebel groups, has also subjected civilians to increasing acts of banditry and violence. Homes and property have been destroyed or stolen by both sides 

and children have been kidnapped for ransom, resulting in displacement of almost 

8 percent of the population. Displacement means greater exposure to disease and 

dangerously reduced agricultural production, which has led to a humanitarian crisis. 

Not only does insecurity have humanitarian consequences, but it undermines 

long-term economic development as well. Bandit attacks on commercial routes in the 

west and northwestern parts of the country have stifled trade and business, hindering the ability of the Central African people to lift themselves out of a life of poverty. 

Now that a democratically elected government heads CAR after years of conflict, 

we have a small window of opportunity to advance the cause of human rights in 

that country. If confirmed, I will attempt to engage all elements of society and encourage them to cooperate to bring peace and stability to the country. 

To the government, I will deliver the message that the promotion of human rights 

is necessary, not merely to ensure assistance from the international community, but 

to lay the foundation of a strong and stable republic that enjoys the support of its 

own people. Government military forces must no longer act with impunity. To foster 

respect for human rights and civil-military relations, I will urge the government to 

401 

train its forces in these fields in addition to operational training that will make 

them more effective in securing CAR territory. 

To the rebels, I will deliver the message that their grievances can only be resolved 

through peaceful political engagement. Attempts to gain power or leverage by force 

will be condemned by the international community. 

To civil society, I will express U.S. support for their efforts to promote judicial and 

legislative independence and to advance transparency at all levels of government. 

These institutions must pass the laws and establish the procedures necessary to resolve internal conflict and end impunity. 

If the CAR Government and society can make the necessary changes to enhance 

security, there will be a tangible increase in human rights and respect for democracy which will lead to a betterment of the lives of the Central African people. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in the Central African Republic in advancing human rights and 

democracy in general? 

Answer. As the Central African Republic (CAR) has not had a history of democratically elected governments that respect human rights, the greatest challenge to promoting human rights in CAR is the lack of a shared vision of responsible democratic 

government amongst the various factions, be it government, rebel groups and bandits, or even perhaps civil society. 

Thus, the first major challenge is to convince all of the factions that peaceful and 

democratic change is really possible. To do that, if confirmed, I will endeavor to 

meet with all elements of society throughout the country and will encourage my 

staff to do the same. We will, however, be constrained by our small size and the 

prevailing security conditions. 

With a population of only about four million people, the problems of the Central 

African Republic are often overshadowed by those of neighboring countries such as 

Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo. It will be a major challenge to secure 

adequate resources to support the programs and projects we have identified. This 

will require intensive engagement and coordination with our international partners 

and the nongovernmental community to both encourage continued engagement as 

well as to prevent waste or duplication of effort. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. I see support for human rights as the cornerstone of our engagement in 

the Central African Republic. The United States Embassy in Bangui is extremely 

small, with a staff of only three United States citizen employees, (if confirmed, I will 

be its fourth) but, with energy and imagination, we can reach out to all elements 

of Central African society. If confirmed, I will make sure that the promotion of 

human rights remains a priority goal in the Mission Strategic Plan, the document 

in which we outline our major policy goals for each embassy. Similarly, as the rating 

or reviewing officer for every U.S. citizen employee at post, I will be able to assure 

that the promotion of human rights is highlighted in both the work requirements 

and the performance review of every member of the staff. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. One of the most powerful elements of diplomacy is personal engagement. 

I served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Venezuela during the period when President 

Chavez was removed from office and the aftermath. One of our major policy goals 

was to work for national reconciliation. I undertook a long-term campaign to encourage dialog between the various pro- and anti-Chavez mayors of the various districts 

of Caracas. This involved office calls, repeated invitations to my home, and late 

night visits to offices full of people with guns. As one mayor commented to a Congressional staff delegation over breakfast on my patio, ‘‘This is the only place in 

Venezuela where I would ever agree to be in the same room with these people.’’ I 

wish I could tell you that my efforts achieved national reconciliation in Venezuela. 

I cannot. I do believe, however, that my personal intervention prevented violence 

on at least one occasion and I can assure you that both sides acknowledged, if only 

privately, the efforts of the United States to promote reconciliation. 

While serving as interim Deputy Chief of Mission in Haiti, I undertook a similar 

effort to reach out to and meet with an important Aristide partisan who was in hidVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00409 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
402 

ing, thus attempting to model the kind of reconciliation that the Haitians themselves must eventually undertake. Haiti is another country where grinding poverty 

feeds political instability. When I learned that labor disputes threatened to close a 

factory on the other side of the island, near the Dominican border, I traveled overland to the plant and met with union members, the AFL–CIO representative, and 

the Dominican plant owner to reduce tensions and prevent the closure of the plant. 

This saved hundreds of Haitian jobs. 

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM GARVELINK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. One of the many tragedies of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s long 

civil war has been the widespread use of child soldiers. Reportedly, this practice continues, not only among rebel groups but also in the Congolese Army, including children who were serving as rebel combatants who have been integrated into the national army. The chief of staff of the armed forces has issued an order to his commanders to stop recruiting and using child soldiers, but the practice continues. 

What steps can you take to strengthen efforts to professionalize the military and 

eliminate this reliance on children and to assist in the rehabilitation and reintegration of former child combatants? 

Answer. As you noted, the Congolese armed forces banned the recruitment of 

child soldiers in 2006. Approximately 29,000 out of a total of 33,000 child soldiers 

have been demobilized in the Congo, largely through programs funded through the 

World Bank-led Multi-Donor Regional Project (MDRP). That said, it is unacceptable 

that an estimated 4,000 children still serve as soldiers in the Democratic Republic 

of Congo, largely in militia groups but also in Congolese armed forces units that 

have not yet been integrated. Our approach to this serious problem is to support 

the demobilization of all remaining child soldiers, as the first demobilization priority, as we work to assist in the formation of fully professional Congolese armed 

forces. We are planning programs to support the reintegration of former combatants, 

including demobilized child soldiers, both through the U.N. Development Program 

(UNDP) and directly through USAID in areas not covered by the MDRP or UNDP 

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. We are working 

to raise the level of professionalism in the Congolese armed forces by training brigade staff officers. We are also planning to refurbish the Congolese military staff 

college and funding a Defense International Institute for Legal Studies assessment 

of the Congolese military justice system aimed at a designing a proposal for United 

States assistance in reforming the military justice sector. 

Question. Gender-based violence has been another horrific legacy of conflict in the 

Congo, as well as the disintegration of many social norms. If confirmed, what steps 

can you take to help strengthen the rights and security of women and girls, to 

strengthen the rule of law, and to aid the Congolese in their efforts to assist survivors of gender-based violence? 

Answer. Gender-based violence (GBV) is indeed a horrific problem in the DRC. 

The physical consequences of GBV are devastating, and the social and psychological 

consequences can be just as catastrophic. Fistula is also a serious problem for victims of sexual crimes in the DRC, and many lack access to appropriate treatment. 

In addition, an estimated 2 million Congolese are infected with HIV/AIDS, and 

there have been reports that as many as 60 percent of combatants are infected. In 

too many cases, victims of sexual violence will not even report the crime because 

of the social stigma associated with victims. 

If confirmed, I will work to provide counseling and treatment for victims, and to 

remove the social stigma associated with GBV victims. Currently, with USAID funding, including Victims of Torture and Trafficking in Persons funds, international organizations work with local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), health structures, and community based organizations (CBOs) to increase their capacity to provide a package of support to survivors including medical, psychosocial, and socioreintegration services, as well as to promote judicial support and referral when appropriate. Since 2002, USAID has assisted over 40,000 survivors of sexual violence 

in the eastern DRC. 

The battle against GBV must also concentrate on preventative action. If confirmed, I will cultivate civil society partnerships that can augment our effectiveness 

in the struggle against GBV. I will also work closely with the Government of the 

DRC to strengthen the legal mechanisms for bringing the perpetrators of GBV to 

justice. The war-time perception that rape goes unpunished is prevalent, and the 

only way to change this perception is to reject impunity. Men must understand that 

403 

they can and will be punished for GBV, otherwise this crime will continue. If confirmed, I will also work to end impunity for the perpetrators of crimes of sexual violence. 

Question. Given the central role that natural resources play in the DRC’s economy 

and development; the history of widespread corruption; and the risk natural resources can pose to peace and security if not properly managed; if confirmed, how 

will you try to ensure the new Congolese Government prioritizes the responsible and 

transparent management of natural resource reforms? 

Answer. The natural resources of the DRC, if managed properly, have the potential to play a crucial role in improvements of the DRC’s economy and the livelihood 

of the Congolese people. Unfortunately, as your question indicates, the DRC’s 

wealth of natural resources has historically brought much corruption and exploitation. The elections of last year established a foundation of legitimacy from which 

we have an opportunity to reverse this trend, and if confirmed I will push the government on this issue through every possible medium. 

Recent actions in the DRC provide reason for optimism. Parliament recently undertook a review of 60 mining contracts in the DRC. It is my hope that this review 

reflects the will of the entire Government of the DRC (GDRC) to promote a legal 

and fair procedure for negotiating mining contracts. If confirmed, I will work with 

Parliament to develop a transparent and date-limited contract review process. 

President Kabila’s recent actions, such as his visit to South Africa to promote foreign investment in the DRC, show that he is attempting to rebuild the economy 

through capitalist means. It will be my job, if confirmed, to work with him to ensure 

that increased foreign investment in the mining sector benefits the Congolese people. I will also work with those companies in the private sector that invest in DRC 

extractive industries, such as the United States-based Freeport, to ensure fairness 

in contracts and emphasize oversight. If confirmed, I will also work with the GDRC 

to enhance border control in order to reduce illegal resource smuggling. 

If confirmed, I hope to work with and increase cooperation among the GDRC, private companies, and the Congolese people. I will work to strengthen democratic institutions that facilitate communication and transparency. I would note that we are 

already working to foster this change though USAID’s partnership through the 

NGO PACT and several major mining companies in the Extractive Industries Alliance. We also support DRC’s membership in the Kimberley Process and encourage 

the completion of DRC’s candidacy in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in the 

DRC? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in the DRC? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. The DRC’s human rights record remains poor. Unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and detention by security forces, disappearances, rape, and harassment of press and human rights defenders continue. At the core of many of these 

abuses is a corrupt and dysfunctional justice system. The Congo suffers from the 

gamut of human rights problems, exacerbated by widespread poverty, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of transparency. These issues are interrelated. Following last year’s historic elections, the time has come to tackle the problem of impunity and to support the development of democratic institutions to nurture human 

rights to replace the predatory state institutions that have weakened the Congolese 

society. My role, if confirmed, will include working with government leaders and 

parliament to ensure that appropriate internal checks and balances are established 

and respected, enhancing communication among government agencies, supporting 

the development of a free and credible media sector, calling for proper resource 

management that allows profits to reach the Congolese people, and pushing for enhanced governmental transparency. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in the DRC in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. As I see it, there are three key obstacles to addressing these human 

rights issues: the culture of impunity, a lack of political will to effect change, and 

corruption. While impunity and the lack of political will are serious issues in their 

own right, I believe they are also linked to the underlying problem of corruption. 

Corruption in the DRC is a far-reaching problem, extending throughout both the 

government and the private sector. Should I be confirmed, corruption will pose a 

serious challenge to my efforts to work with the government of the DRC to develop 

404 

transparent and sustainable management strategies. If I am confirmed, I will make 

every effort to address these serious challenges. By establishing a functioning justice 

system and the fight against impunity, I believe the DRC can create a climate that 

fosters a genuine desire among the leadership to protect human rights. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. I plan to make the promotion of human rights a major aspect of my engagement with the Congolese host government, diplomatic colleagues, and staff at 

United States Embassy-Kinshasa. My goal would be to lead by example to show 

Foreign Service officers my commitment to the promotion of human rights, and to 

make it clear to them that I believe professional advancement depends in large 

measure on one’s commitment to advance human rights internationally. I will recommend rewards for those officers who are outstanding performers in this area. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. Before joining USAID, I worked in the late 1970s as a human rights specialist for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Organizations chaired by Representative Donald M. Fraser. My interest in human 

rights, particularly as it relates to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, 

continues throughout my career. In 2003, I led the USAID effort to draft a USAID 

policy paper on assisting IDPs. The paper linked human rights and protection issues 

with approaches to assisting IDPs and is the current guidance for USAID missions 

around the world. The paper was approved by USAID and endorsed by the interagency. I presented the USAID strategy to the international community in Geneva 

in 2004. It was the first donor policy paper that linked assistance to IDPs with 

human rights and protection issues and was applauded for that. It is the example 

being used by several other nations in designing their own approach to IDPs, protection, and human rights. 

Within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) 

where I serve as the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, I created in 2003 a 

Protection Unit which develops strategies to ensure that the rights of the IDPs and 

others assisted by USAID are properly protected. The Protection Unit implemented 

projects in Iraq on human rights and reprisal prevention. In 2004–2005, the unit 

oversaw the collection of evidence on human rights abuses in Chad and Darfur that 

supported a declaration of genocide. The unit currently oversees Violence Against 

Women projects in Darfur and Northern Uganda. Through the unit, I provided funding to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to hire 10 additional protection officers for rapid deployment on human rights issues around the world. 

It is essential to integrate human rights and protection concerns with our humanitarian response and development activities if our assistance is to meet effectively 

the needs of the world’s IDPs. The linkage had not been made in USAID programming decisions prior to the adoption of the IDP Policy Paper and the creation of the 

Protection Unit. With the policy paper, IDP assistance has become a USAID 

priority. The Protection Unit within DCHA implements activities and provides guidance to the rest of USAID on methodologies and techniques for integrating protection and human rights concerns into USAID’s IDP and refugee programs. The Protection Unit is the institutional platform to ensure USAID’s commitment to IDPs, 

human rights, and protection. 

(405) 

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Brownfield, William R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia 

Duddy, Patrick Dennis, to be Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 

McKinley, Peter Michael, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Peru 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb presiding. 

Present: Senators Webb, Menendez, and Corker. 

Also present: Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WEBB. The committee will come to order. 

This hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations will now 

come to order, with the precatory words that we are going to have 

some sort of a vote called during this hearing, in which case we 

will have to recess. But we’re going to try to get all the opening 

statements into the record before that happens. 

The committee is meeting to consider the nomination of three individuals for key leadership positions in the administration. The 

President has nominated William Brownfield to be Ambassador to 

the Republic of Colombia, Dr. Peter McKinley to be Ambassador to 

the Republic of Peru, and Patrick Duddy to be Ambassador to the 

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 

I want to congratulate all of you on your nominations. We look 

forward to hearing from each of you this morning. I also welcome 

my colleague, Senator Collins, who has joined us today to introduce 

Mr. Duddy. 

It’s a pleasure to chair my first Foreign Relations Committee 

hearing and to consider the nominations of three Foreign Service 

officers with extensive experience to serve in an often overlooked 

region of the world. Each nominee’s dedication and skill will undoubtedly serve our Nation well in their respective posts. 

With much of our Nation’s attention and resources being taken 

up by the ongoing challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, little concern is paid to what’s going on in what has been called America’s 

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406 

terests and cultures. We also share common problems, such as drug 

trafficking, transnational crime, and the threats of terrorism. 

Strengthening our relationships with countries in the Western 

Hemisphere will increase our level of cooperation to solve many of 

our shared challenges. 

All three nominees possess incredible credentials, training, and 

proven expertise. I am confident that all of you have the skills and 

dedication to represent our Nation at this important yet challenging time. 

I look forward to hearing about how each of you will approach 

your new assignments. I’d like to thank all of you for the years of 

service you’ve given our country and I commend you for your willingness to continue this commitment to serve in the future. 

I’d like now to turn to the distinguished ranking member of the 

committee, Senator Corker, for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome all three of these distinguished gentlemen and the distinguished Senator from Maine, who I know is going to introduce one 

of them. I tell you that I chose to be on this subcommittee because 

of the importance I see the relationship with Latin America, South 

America, Central America to be. I think that the roles you are getting ready to perform, hopefully, are roles that are very, very important to our country. I want to thank you for your interest in 

that regard. 

Dr. McKinley and I were together in Brussels about 3 weeks ago, 

meeting on issues relating to climate change, and I certainly was 

most impressed with him, and I look forward to getting to know 

the other two gentlemen during this hearing. But because of the 

time and the vote and the things that we have upcoming, I know 

that all of us want to hear from you and certainly the distinguished 

Senator from Maine. 

So Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to a very productive hearing. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Senator Corker. 

I would now like to call on Senator Collins for her introduction 

of Mr. Duddy. Welcome to the committee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN M. COLLINS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Corker. I am indeed delighted to appear before you today to introduce one of my constituents, Patrick Duddy, to be the next Ambassador for our country to Venezuela. 

The people of my State are proud of what this Mainer has accomplished during his long and distinguished career of service to our 

Nation. The United States and Venezuela have had a long history 

of friendship and cooperation, but lately that tradition is threatened as never before by the hostile and antidemocratic regime in 

Caracas. The deterioration of democratic institutions and civil liberties under President Chavez, the intimidation and imprisonment 

of political opponents, the corruption and the ties with such terVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00414 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
407 

rorism-supporting states as Iran are all alarming developments. 

That is why it is critical that the President has nominated a diplomat with such extraordinary experience and skills as Patrick 

Duddy. 

This is one of the most critical diplomatic positions in the Western Hemisphere and the President has indeed chosen wisely. 

Throughout his 25-year Foreign Service career, Mr. Duddy has 

demonstrated a deep commitment to our relations with Latin 

America and an expert understanding of the region. In his current 

position as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs, he has played a lead role in recent international efforts to restore democracy and the rule of law in Haiti. 

As a career minister counselor, Mr. Duddy is one of the most experienced senior officers in the Western Hemisphere Bureau, with a 

portfolio that includes the Offices of Brazil and Southern Cone Affairs, Caribbean Affairs, and Economic Policy and Summit Coordination. 

Immediately prior to his current assignment, Mr. Duddy served 

as Consul-General in Brazil, where he directed one of the largest 

consulates general in the world and the largest in the Western 

Hemisphere. Previously he served as Deputy Chief of Mission in 

Bolivia, where he was the chief operating officer of one of the largest embassies in the Americas. 

Earlier in his career, Mr. Duddy served as counselor for public 

affairs in Panama. He has also served in Chile, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Paraguay. It’s probably not a surprise to 

this committee that Mr. Duddy is fluent in Spanish and Portuguese, but it may surprise you to learn that he is also a published poet, but I think only in English. 

Prior to this hearing, he was describing a speech that he had 

given to a group of legislators and he had talked to them for an 

hour in Portuguese. 

To anyone wondering where such energy, dedication, and talent 

come from, the answer I am proud to say is Bangor, Maine. After 

graduating from John Bapst High School, he received his undergraduate degree from another outstanding Maine college, Colby 

College, and a master’s degree from Northeastern University. He 

is also a graduate of the National War College, where he received 

a master’s degree in national security strategy. 

He is married and he and his wife have two children, Sarah and 

Robert. They are here today with him to give him support and I’m 

delighted that they could be with us since we all know it’s not just 

the Ambassador, it’s his family who serves, or her family, who 

serves as well. 

Finally, I want to inform the committee that I’m very fortunate 

that Mr. Duddy’s sister-in-law heads up my Portland office in 

Maine. 

So this is a wonderful family that is very dedicated to public 

service. I strongly endorse Patrick Duddy’s nomination to be the 

next United States Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and I enthusiastically recommend him to this committee. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, for the opportunity 

to appear before you today. I truly cannot envision a better qualified person for this critical diplomatic post. Thank you. 

408 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Welcome again to all of the nominees. We’ve got some really incredible credentials in front of the committee this morning. We’ll 

attempt to keep this bipartisan and not reflect on the fact that a 

family member of his works on your staff. [Laughter.] 

In the interest of time, I think we should go ahead and move forward and see if we can get the testimony of the witnesses before 

us and into the record before this vote is called. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I’d very much appreciate if you 

would excuse me at this point. 

Senator WEBB. I appreciate very much having you with the committee this morning and thank you very much for being here. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator WEBB. I’d now like to turn to the nominees. I would ask 

that you deliver your statements in the order that you were introduced. If you’re summarizing a statement, obviously the entire text 

of your statement would be included in the record. Also, as you testify, I’d be very pleased if you take the opportunity to introduce 

friends or family that you have with you today and we’d like to 

welcome them also. 

So Mr. Brownfield, if you could begin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, NOMINEE TO 

BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator WEBB. You may want to give Mr. Duddy a few words of 

advice in terms of the assignment that he is about to undertake. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Oh, Mr. Duddy and I have already 

had many, many conversations. I’ll not reveal all of the contents, 

other than to say the fact that he’s still here before you today suggests that I haven’t completely terrified him. 

If I could take advantage of your offer, Mr. Chairman, I would 

like to mention a couple of people who are sitting shyly back in the 

back of this hearing room. I believe I spotted as I came in my longterm next door neighbor, Mr. John Sullivan, whose garage has 

housed more Brownfield-Kenney household effects over the last 20 

years than has my own garage. I think seated next to him is John 

Kenney, my brother-in-law, brother of my wife of the last 700 or 

800 years. 

She is not with us this morning, Mr. Chairman. She is actually 

the Ambassador to your Embassy in Manila. She told me this 

morning that she would love to come and talk to the members of 

this committee, but never ever at my side; that was an albatross 

she did not wish to have around her neck when talking to you. 

Senator WEBB. We’ll see if we can’t continue to keep you in different hemispheres. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I think she would be grateful for that. 

I for one would not. 

Mr. Chairman, may I offer you a very abbreviated version of my 

formal statement and ask that you enter my statement in the 

record in its entirety. 

Senator WEBB. So ordered. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I’m honored to appear before you 

today. I am, as you may have gathered, a Latin American hand. 

409 

I have served virtually my entire career in Latin America, most recently as our Ambassador to Venezuela and prior to that as our 

Ambassador to Chile. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States and Colombia have been 

friends for nearly 200 years. We have been close and cooperative 

partners for more than 8 years in combatting the illicit drug trade, 

providing security to our region, building economic and commercial 

ties, supporting judicial reform, providing humanitarian relief, and 

ensuring respect for human, civil, and political rights. 

We have produced real progress and real success. When we compare today with what we saw in 1999, I think all parts of the U.S. 

Government, legislative and executive branch alike, deserve recognition and congratulations for wise decisions skillfully implemented. The key in my judgment was our ability to reach agreement on issues of importance to the American people, assess 

correctly what value we could bring to address them, provide the 

necessary resources, and work with our Colombian counterparts to 

build solutions. 

My task if confirmed by the Senate would be to build on successes of the past, adjust those programs and policies that require 

adjustment, and address those areas where we have concerns. Colombia is a sovereign state with a rich history. There are hundreds 

of bilateral issues linking our two states. We agree on the overwhelming majority of them. As with any two sovereign and independent countries, we will differ on some. When we do, I hope the 

Government of Colombia would find me to be an open and sympathetic friend, honestly expressing the views of the United States 

Government. 

There are two areas, Mr. Chairman, that deserve special mention. The first is the security of employees, their families, and the 

entire American community in Colombia. Colombia remains a 

country with serious security threats. The American embassy and 

the larger American community in Colombia should know that in 

my embassy, security is second to no other issue. To the families 

of Keith Stansell, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes, the three 

American citizens now held hostage for more than 4 years in Colombia, I would like to say that I will not rest and our Government 

must not rest until they have returned safely home. 

The other matter worth special mention is the U.S. business and 

NGO community. The United States-Colombia commercial and investment relationship is a 5-year success story. I hope to continue 

that story should the Senate choose to confirm, and if I am the 

next United States Ambassador to Colombia, the American business community should know that they will have a strong friend 

and advocate in Bogota. 

The NGO community is also a major contributor to the enormous 

progress in Colombia of the past 8 years, and that in turn is a 

product of contact and communication. My door will be open. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, if confirmed I look forward to 

consulting and working closely with you to advance America’s interests in Colombia and the wider region. Your advice and counsel 

are an essential part of our effort to advance programs and policies 

in Colombia. I realize that many members of this committee have 

visited Colombia to see for themselves the reality on the ground 

410 

and I hope that I can entice you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Senator 

Corker, to join them to visit and to judge for yourselves how our 

programs and strategy are taking effect. 

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today and would 

be pleased to answer any questions you might have. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brownfield follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee to be the next American Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia. I want to thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. This is a position for which I hope you will find my professional experience has well prepared me. For most of my 28 years in the Foreign Service, I have 

served in Latin America. Most recently, I have had the honor to serve as our Ambassador to Venezuela, and before that, to Chile. Those two posts taught me something about articulating and defending U.S. interests in a challenging environment, 

as well as finding common ground between two nations with shared interests. In 

my last Washington assignments, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, and then in the same position for the 

Western Hemisphere, I worked closely with the Colombian Government in addressing bilateral and regional issues of great interest to our two peoples. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States and Colombia have been friends for nearly 200 

years. We have been close and cooperative partners for more than 8 years in combating the illicit drug trade, providing security to our region, building economic and 

commercial ties, supporting judicial reform, providing humanitarian relief, and ensuring respect for human, civil, and political rights. We have produced real progress 

and real success. When we compare today with what we saw in 1999, I think all 

parts of the U.S. Government—legislative and executive branch alike—deserve recognition and congratulations for wise decisions skillfully implemented. The key, in 

my judgment, was our ability to reach agreement on issues of importance to the 

American people, assess correctly what value we could bring to address them, provide the necessary resources, and work with Colombian counterparts to build solutions. 

My task, Mr. Chairman, should the Senate choose to confirm me, would be to 

build on successes of the past, adjust those programs and policies that require adjustment, and address those areas where we have concern. Colombia is a sovereign 

state with a rich history. There are hundreds of bilateral issues linking our two 

states. We agree on the overwhelming majority of them. As with any two sovereign 

and independent countries, we will differ on some. When we do, I hope the Government of Colombia would find me to be an open and sympathetic friend, honestly expressing the views of the United States Government. Were I not to do so, I would 

be offering poor service to the Colombian Government, President Bush, the United 

States Senate, and this committee. 

May I take a moment to share with the committee my general views on how to 

manage our largest diplomatic mission in the hemisphere? I believe that a good 

Chief of Mission provides clear guidance, strategy, and decisions to his senior team, 

and holds them to high standards, but then allows them leeway in doing their jobs. 

There are dozens of United States Government agencies represented in Embassy 

Bogota. They are staffed by superbly qualified, highly motivated people. My message 

to them would be that I will give them clear guidance, and I will hold them to high 

standards of accountability, but I will not tell them how to do their jobs. 

There are two areas, Mr. Chairman, that deserve special mention. The first is the 

security of employees, their families, and the entire American community in Colombia. Colombia remains a country with serious security threats. The American Embassy and the larger American community in Colombia should know that in my embassy, security is second to no other issue. And to the families of Keith Stansell, 

Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes, the three American citizens now held hostage 

for more than 4 years, I say that I will not rest, and our Government must not rest, 

until they have returned safely home. 

The other matter worth special mention is the U.S. business and NGO communities. The United States-Colombia commercial and investment relationship is a 5- 

year success story. I would hope to continue that story, should the Senate choose 

to confirm. And if I am the next United States Ambassador to Colombia, the AmerVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00418 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
411 

ican business community should know that they will have a strong friend and advocate in Bogota. The NGO community is a major contributor to the enormous 

progress in Colombia of the past 8 years. That, in turn, is a product of contact and 

communication. My door will be open to both. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, should you choose to confirm, I look 

forward to consulting and working closely with you to advance America’s interests 

in Colombia and the region. Your advice and counsel are an essential part of our 

effort to advance programs and policies in Colombia. I realize that many members 

of this committee have visited Colombia to see for themselves the reality on the 

ground. I hope to entice you, as well as your colleagues in the Senate and across 

the Capitol in the House, to continue to visit and judge for yourselves how our programs and strategy are taking effect. 

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today, and would be pleased to answer any questions you might have. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Ambassador Brownfield. 

I’d like to point out that we are about 8 minutes into our vote 

right now. So I do have some questions that I would like to ask. 

I know Senator Corker also would. And we’re going to recess here, 

take the rest of the testimony, and then come back for questions. 

So we’ll be back as soon as we finish our vote. 

We stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Senator WEBB. The committee will come to order and we’d like 

to continue receiving the testimony of our witnesses. We will again 

thank Mr. Brownfield for having given his and move on to Dr. 

McKinley. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY, NOMINEE TO 

BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF PERU 

Dr. MCKINLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, and thank you for the kind words of introduction. I am 

honored to appear before the committee today as the President’s 

nominee to serve as the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Peru. I am grateful for the trust President Bush and Secretary Rice have placed in me. 

As you consider my nomination, I would like to underscore my 

deep commitment to representing our Nation in Peru. I was born 

and raised in Latin America, studied the region in university, and 

started my Foreign Service career there. My work experience since 

has provided valuable perspectives on the importance of consolidating democracy around the globe, of vigorously confronting the 

transnational threats to our national security, and of strongly promoting economic development, investment, and free trade. These 

objectives are more important than ever in our relations with Peru 

and with Latin America today. 

If I am confirmed, my highest priorities will include the security 

and protection of the 24,000 Americans resident in Peru, as well 

as the 300,000 American tourists who visit annually. 

Bolstering Peru’s democratic institutions—with two democratic 

transfers of power and high economic growth since 2001, Peru now 

has a critical opportunity to achieve a developmental breakthrough. 

Our programs to strengthen growth, civil society, and state institutions will help all Peruvians benefit from their democracy’s success 

and help make Peru a model of development in the hemisphere. 

Third, stemming the production and trafficking of illegal drugs 

in close collaboration with the government of President-elect GarVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00419 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
412 

cia. Peru is the world’s second largest cocaine producer and the ties 

between its narcotraffickers and those elsewhere in Latin America 

are growing. Profits from the narcotics trade feed transnational 

crime and terrorist groups that threaten the security of Peru and 

of this hemisphere. Peru’s Government is willing to confront these 

threats head on and if I am confirmed I will support their efforts 

to expand interdiction, eradication, and alternative development. 

Fourth, if confirmed, I will focus on implementing our bilateral 

trade and economic agenda, recognizing that millions of our citizens derive their livelihood from the export of U.S. products. I will 

work unstintingly to expand Peruvian markets for goods and services, which are already substantial. Deepening trade and economic 

relations with Peru will also support our democratic goals by advancing political and economic modernization. Peru’s strong growth 

in recent years has been facilitated by integration into the world 

economy, but this growth is not reaching the poor in highland and 

rural areas as quickly as we and the Government of Peru wish. 

In keeping with core American values of promoting opportunity 

for all and helping the least fortunate, we will make it a priority 

to work with the Government of Peru through USAID to extend the 

benefits of growth to Peru’s poorest people. 

If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with members of this committee and with your colleagues in Congress to achieve our objectives in Peru. Thank you again for giving me the honor of appearing before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. McKinley follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF PERU

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before the 

committee today as the President’s nominee to serve as the next United States Ambassador to the Republic of Peru. I am grateful for the trust President Bush and 

Secretary Rice have placed in me. 

As you consider my nomination, I would like to underscore my deep commitment 

to representing our Nation in Peru. I was born and raised in Latin America, studied 

the region in university, and started my Foreign Service career there. Since then, 

as Deputy Chief of Mission in postings in Africa and Europe, and as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department, my work experience has provided valuable perspectives on the importance of consolidating democracy around the globe, of vigorously confronting the transnational threats to our national security, and of strongly 

promoting economic development, investment, and free trade. These objectives are 

more important than ever in our relations with Peru and with Latin America today. 

If I am confirmed, my highest priorities will include: 

• The security and protection of the 24,000 Americans resident in Peru, as well 

as the 300,000 American tourists who visit annually. 

• Bolstering Peru’s democratic institutions. With two democratic transfers of 

power and high economic growth since 2001, Peru now has a critical opportunity to achieve a developmental breakthrough. Our programs to strengthen 

growth, civil society, and state institutions will help all Peruvians benefit from 

their democracy’s success, and help make Peru a model of development for the 

hemisphere. 

• Stemming the production and trafficking of illegal drugs in close collaboration 

with the government of President Alan Garcia. Peru is the world’s second largest cocaine producer and the ties between its narcotraffickers and those elsewhere in Latin America are growing. While the majority of Peruvian cocaine 

still goes to Europe, the threat of diversion to the United States is growing. So 

is consumption inside Peru. Profits from the narcotics trade feed transnational 

criminal and terrorist groups that threaten the security of Peru and of this 

hemisphere. Peru’s Government is willing to confront these threats head on 

413 

and, if confirmed, I will support their efforts to expand interdiction, eradication, 

and alternative development. 

• Implementing our bilateral trade and economic agenda. Recognizing that millions of our citizens derive their livelihood from the export of United States 

products, if confirmed, I will work unstintingly to expand Peruvian markets for 

our goods and services which are already substantial. Deepening trade and economic relations with Peru will also support our democratic goals by advancing 

political and economic modernization. Peru’s strong growth in recent years has 

been facilitated by integration into the world economy, but this growth is not 

reaching the poor in highland and rural areas as quickly as we and the Government of Peru wish. In keeping with core American values of promoting opportunity for all and helping the least fortunate, I will make it a priority to work 

with the Government of Peru through USAID to extend the benefits of growth 

to Peru’s poorest people. 

If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with members of this committee and with 

your colleagues in Congress to achieve our objectives in Peru. Thank you again for 

giving me the honor of appearing before you today. I will be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Dr. McKinley. 

Now Mr. Duddy. 

STATEMENT OF PATRICK DENNIS DUDDY, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA 

Mr. DUDDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. 

Before I begin with my formal statement, I would like to take a 

moment to introduce my wife, Mary, my daughter, Sarah, and my 

son, Robert. My wife has accompanied me throughout my Foreign 

Service career. She’s made many, many friends for the United 

States and I know I could not have done the work I’ve done over 

the years without her wise counsel and support. My children too 

have accompanied me through most of my career, though they will 

remain behind this time to finish their studies, and they have also 

been a source of great support and joy everywhere we’ve served. 

Senator WEBB. We welcome your family. Nice to have you today. 

Mr. DUDDY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am honored and 

humbled to be President Bush’s nominee to be the next United 

States Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. I’m 

deeply grateful to the President and to Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the 

members of this committee and the rest of the Congress to advance 

our interests in Venezuela and the wider region. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe my Foreign Service career has prepared 

me for the important position of United States Ambassador to Venezuela. As Senator Collins very kindly mentioned, earlier I am 

presently serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

the Western Hemisphere and I won’t review for you again the particulars of my career, but I would note that if I am confirmed for 

this position it will be my eighth tour in the field in the Western 

Hemisphere. 

Mr. Chairman, for most of our respective histories, the United 

States and Venezuela have enjoyed strong friendly relations based 

on shared democratic values, commercial, and cultural ties. Venezuela’s strategic location, talented people, and abundant resources 

make it a natural friend and partner of the United States. Venezuela and the United States still have an important commercial 

414 

relationship. Bilateral trade totaled $45 billion in 2006. Venezuela 

is one of the top five suppliers of United States foreign oil imports, 

with significant United States investments in the energy sector. It 

is also a major market for U.S. exports, which totaled an unprecedented $9 billion in 2006. 

Today, moreover, the United States is also home to over 600,000 

Venezuelans. Their contributions and accomplishments extend to 

every facet of American life, from academia, journalism, and business, to sports, entertainment, and even fashion design. 

It will not come as news to the members of this committee, however, that our bilateral relationship today is strained. This makes 

it all the more important for me, if confirmed as the next U.S. Ambassador, to redouble our efforts to build on the shared values that 

have always united our two nations—love of freedom and democracy, basic respect for human rights, and the rule of law. The Venezuelan people have time and again demonstrated their commitment to these values. 

Mr. Chairman, there are fundamental differences of principle 

and governing philosophy between the Government of the 

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the United States. There are 

matters on which we will not agree and in some instances where 

we must agree to disagree. Still there are areas where it behooves 

our two governments to cooperate. Counternarcotics, counterterrorism, commerce, and energy are all issues that no one country 

can tackle independently in today’s globalized and interdependent 

world. Drugs and terrorism endanger all of our citizens. 

Addressing these problems effectively requires cooperation. If 

confirmed, I intend to work to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in every arena where the wellbeing of our citizens 

will be advanced by working together. 

As United States Ambassador, if confirmed, I know I will have 

no greater responsibility than ensuring the welfare and security of 

United States citizens in Venezuela. This naturally starts with 

U.S. embassy personnel and their families, who are essential for 

me to do the job for which I’ve been nominated. But this mandate 

also expressly includes private American citizens visiting, residing, 

or doing business in Venezuela. If confirmed, they will be able to 

count on my vigorous support. 

Similarly, United States businesses and investors who face challenges working in Venezuela should know that my door will be always open. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States views our relationship with 

Venezuela from a long-term perspective. We are mindful of the importance of strengthening people-to-people ties, promoting greater 

understanding of the United States. On the diplomatic front, the 

United States works with hemispheric and other partners, both bilaterally and multilaterally, through the Organization of American 

States and the inter-American system to advance our common goal 

of a democratic, peaceful, secure, and prosperous hemisphere. Indeed, our own agenda in Venezuela flows from the hemisphere’s 

stated commitment to a better future for all of our citizens. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would be less than 

candid if I did not acknowledge that Venezuela currently is a 

uniquely challenging post. But I believe my professional and perVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00422 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
415 

sonal experience has prepared me for this very important assignment. If confirmed, I intend to bring all of my experience to bear 

as an advocate for the values to which all of the hemisphere’s democracies subscribe and which are succinctly captured by the 

Inter-American Democratic Charter. 

I look forward to working with you, all the members of this committee, now and in the future, and I thank you very much. I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Duddy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICK DENNIS DUDDY, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am honored and humbled to be President Bush’s nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. I am deeply grateful to the President and to Secretary Rice for 

their confidence in me. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee 

and the rest of the Congress to advance our interests in Venezuela and the region. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe my Foreign Service experience has prepared me for the 

important position of United States Ambassador to Venezuela. For the last 2 years 

I have served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, 

responsible for the offices of Caribbean Affairs, Brazil, and Southern Cone Affairs, 

as well as the Office of Economic Policy and Summit Coordination. In that capacity, 

I have been particularly involved with our substantial efforts to restore democracy 

and the rule of law in Haiti. If confirmed, Venezuela will be my eighth tour in the 

Western Hemisphere. I have served as Consul General in Sao Paulo, Brazil, South 

America’s largest city, as well as Deputy Chief of Mission in La Paz. Earlier in my 

career, I also served in Panama, Chile, Paraguay, Costa Rica, and the Dominican 

Republic. 

Mr. Chairman, for most of our respective histories, the United States and Venezuela have enjoyed strong, friendly relations based on shared democratic values, 

and commercial and cultural ties. Venezuela’s strategic location, talented people, 

and abundant resources make it a natural friend and partner of the United States. 

There is much that brings us together. Venezuela and the United States have an 

important commercial relationship. Bilateral trade totaled $45 billion in 2006. Venezuela is one of the top five suppliers of United States foreign oil imports, with significant United States investments in the energy sector. It is also a major market 

for U.S. exports, which totaled an unprecedented $9 billion in 2006. Today, the 

United States is home to over 600,000 Venezuelans. Their contributions and accomplishments extend to every facet of American life—from academia, journalism, and 

business to sports, entertainment, and fashion design. 

It will not come as news to the members of this committee that our bilateral relationship today is strained. This makes it all the more important for me, if confirmed 

as the next U.S. Ambassador, to redouble our efforts to build on the shared values 

that always have united our two nations: A love of freedom and democracy and 

basic respect for human rights and the rule of law. The Venezuelan people have 

time and again demonstrated their commitment to these values. 

Mr. Chairman, there are fundamental differences of principle and governing philosophy between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the 

United States. There are matters on which we will not agree, and, in some instances, where we must agree to disagree. Still, there are areas where it behooves 

our two governments to cooperate. Counternarcotics, counterterrorism, commerce, 

and energy are all issues that no one country can tackle independently in today’s 

globalized, interdependent world. Drugs and terrorism endanger all our citizens. Addressing these problems effectively requires cooperation. If confirmed, I intend to 

work to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in every arena where 

the well-being of our citizens will be advanced by working together. 

As United States Ambassador, if confirmed, I know I will have no greater responsibility than ensuring the welfare and security of United States citizens in Venezuela. This naturally starts with U.S. Embassy personnel and their families who 

are essential for me to do the job for which I have been nominated. But this mandate also expressly includes private American citizens visiting, residing, or doing 

business in Venezuela. They can count on my vigorous support. Similarly, United 

States businesses and investors who face challenges working in Venezuela should 

know that my door always will be open. 

416 

Mr. Chairman, the United States views our relationship with Venezuela from a 

long-term perspective. We are mindful of the importance of strengthening peopleto-people ties and promoting greater understanding of the United States through 

traditional exchanges as well as newer, more innovative strategies. On the diplomatic front, the United States works with hemispheric and other partners—both bilaterally and multilaterally, through the Organization of American States (OAS) 

and the Inter-American system—to advance our common goal of a democratic, 

peaceful, secure, and prosperous hemisphere. Indeed, our own agenda in Venezuela 

flows from the hemisphere’s stated commitment to a better future for all citizens. 

There have been many successes in the region over the last 20 years, but there is 

still much to do. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would be less than candid if I did 

not acknowledge that Venezuela currently is a uniquely challenging post, but I believe my professional and personal experience has prepared me for this very important assignment. If confirmed, I intend to bring all of my experience to bear as an 

advocate for the values to which all of the hemisphere’s democracies subscribe and 

which are succinctly captured by the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 

I look forward to working with you during my confirmation process and in the 

future. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Mr. Duddy, and thank all 

of you for your testimony. 

I am going to pose one general question that I would ask all 

three of you to respond to. I know Senator Corker has some work 

to do on the floor, and I am going to go ahead and yield to him 

for whatever time he might take, and then we’ll go to Senator 

Menendez. Then I’ll come back and ask some more specific questions. 

We’ve got a chance here with people who have extensive regional 

experience, even though you’re looking to posts in specific countries. One of the strategic considerations of the United States overall has been the expansion of China, economically and otherwise, 

into this particular hemisphere. I would like to take this moment 

to benefit from some of the observations that all three of you would 

have in terms of your impressions of the extent of the Chinese interests in this region, the economic investments that have been 

going on, and other contacts, in terms of how it affects the economics of the region, the security of the United States, and the political 

relationships both inside that region and between the United 

States and the countries of that region. 

Ambassador Brownfield, if you’d begin I’d appreciate that. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure. Why don’t I start, Mr. Chairman. I first bumped into Chinese diplomatic presence in Latin 

America when I was assigned to Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1986. 

The Chinese embassy in Argentina at that time was what I would 

call a second rate embassy in Latin America. They had very little 

ability to speak Spanish. They did not integrate or operate at all 

well with local society. And in fact they were not major players. 

My counterpart today, Chinese counterpart, in Caracas is a first 

class ambassador. He is as good as any other diplomat in Venezuela today, your humble servant included in that group. He 

speaks the language superbly. He speaks well in public. He articulates well in the various sectors and communities of Venezuela. 

The Chinese have arrived in Latin America. 

Now, some of this, Mr. Chairman, I submit is perfectly legitimate, reasonable, and something which we not only should not oppose, but should welcome to a certain extent. They have a right to 

engage in commercial activity in the region. They have a right to 

417 

express their own economic interests in the region, and we’re going 

to have to accept that as their economy, their society, grows and 

expands, we are going to see more of them in the Western Hemisphere. 

We also have a right, I might suggest, to note to them when their 

activities are beginning to cross a line between legitimate normal 

commercial economic business activity and activity that is designed 

to have a political component and to produce a political result. I 

submit that long after I and, for all I know, all of the Senators in 

this committee have retired, I suspect our children and our grandchildren will be addressing the China issue in Latin America for 

many decades to come. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Dr. McKinley. 

Dr. MCKINLEY. If I can comment from the perspective of being 

in Brussels for the last 3 years, China’s emergence on the global 

market is affecting all regions of the world. Just over the last 5 to 

6 years, China has—Europe, for example, has overtaken the United 

States as the principal trading partner for China. 

In the context of Latin America, and specifically Peru, the relationship with China has been expanding quite dramatically in recent years. If I’m not mistaken, China has become Peru’s second 

largest trading partner. Investments in the country are under way. 

China itself is becoming an important market for Peruvian products. 

As we look at Peru as a member of APEC and the upcoming 

summit of APEC in 2008, what may play for all of us is the efforts 

that have been under way for quite a number of years under the 

aegis of APEC to construct transparent economic relations in the 

trans-Pacific economic arena. Peru is certainly interested in pursuing those objectives and I think it will be an important feature 

of the November 2008 APEC summit. 

So in the context that you asked specifically of the extent of 

growing interest in the region, the trade and investment relations 

are growing. But as Ambassador Brownfield suggested, legitimate 

economic ties benefit all concerned. In terms of the impact on the 

United States, I think the APEC forum provides a good place to 

discuss the broader concerns we have. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Mr. Duddy. 

Mr. DUDDY. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues suggest, the commercial presence of China in the Americans is substantially greater 

than it was. It is, I think, worth noting that China has become an 

important market for many Latin American economies, exporting 

largely commodities. Given the size of the Chinese internal market 

for consumption of commodities, this is not surprising and indeed 

has been very much welcomed by many in Latin America. 

As is the case with Peru, China has become one of Brazil’s, for 

instance, most important markets. They’re also investing in the 

Americas, but their investments, compared to U.S. investment 

stock around the hemisphere is of course very, very much smaller. 

That said, the Western Hemisphere Bureau has in fact engaged 

China, and Assistant Secretary Shannon traveled to China for consultations with his counterpart last year. We are following these 

418 

developments. We think they’re natural developments, predictable 

developments, and certainly they have had an economic impact 

around the hemisphere. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I think we have a 

vote at 11:15 and I’m going to try to get down to the floor and do 

something in advance. So what I’d like to do is again welcome you. 

You will have very different roles hopefully very soon in South 

America and we look forward to seeing you on site in your respective places, hopefully, in the very near future. 

But I want to thank you for your service. I know that Senator 

Webb has some more questions along with Senator Menendez. 

They are very bipartisan and you’ll be very well taken care of in 

their hands. But thank you for your service here to our country. 

Thank you for what you’re getting ready to do in a very important 

region to our country, and I look forward to seeing you there. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Senator Menendez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me welcome all of our nominees. I’m particularly happy to be 

at this hearing because the Western Hemisphere is something that 

I have spent my 15 years in Congress, first in the House and of 

course in the last year and a half in the Senate, focusing a lot of 

attention on. It doesn’t always get a lot of attention, and I think 

that inures to the detriment of the United States. 

So your service in this part of the world is incredibly important 

to our Nation. In my mind, one of my biggest challenges when I 

was in the House of Representatives was getting colleagues to focus 

on Latin America and the Caribbean, not just as a good neighbor, 

but in the national interest and national security of the United 

States. So many of the things that we’re debating here in Congress 

today are intertwined with our relationships in this hemisphere, 

from undocumented immigration to the questions of building 

broader and more strong markets for American goods and services 

to the questions of making sure that terrorism doesn’t take a foothold under the cover of chaos, to the questions of narcotic trafficking, to the questions of how do we deal with global warming 

and the Amazon rain forest, and the list goes on and on. 

These are all questions in the national interest and security of 

the United States, not even about being a good neighbor. So your 

services in these countries are going to be incredibly important and 

we certainly salute you for your willingness to pursue them. 

I have a couple of country-specific questions, so let me start with 

Venezuela. We have the benefit of having the present Ambassador 

to Venezuela and the soon to be one. So since one may have greater 

flexibilities than the other in the pursuit of the answers to the 

questions, let me start, Ambassador Brownfield. I know that this 

is where you’re leaving, but maybe not what you want to be talking 

about. 

419 

But I am concerned, and of course while I ask the question of 

Ambassador Brownfield to start, Mr. Duddy, I hope you’ll be listening. I am concerned about where Hugo Chavez is taking Venezuela. 

He, in my mind, continues to erode democratic institutions under 

the cover of constitutionality, but uses the majorities he has in the 

congress to change the constitution and therefore erode the very essence of democracy in Venezuela, and to have a cloak of legitimacy 

in the process of doing so. 

That is a very dangerous proposition, not only for Venezuela but 

throughout the hemisphere that that’s the way in which you ultimately achieve absolute power. Freedom House lists Venezuela as 

only partially free. It ranks it four in political rights out of seven. 

We have seen President Chavez have new laws enabling him to 

pass laws by decree; he plans to eliminate the autonomy of the central bank, changing the constitution allowing him to be reelected 

indefinitely, to nationalize the country’s largest telecommunications 

companies and electricity companies, and to not renew the broadcasting license of Radio Caracas Television. 

Then when you see that and you see the opposition that has generated to RCTV’s, the pulling of that license, and you see the response by students, which is not the traditional opposition within 

Venezuela, and you see the polls that Gatos put out of 600 Venezuelans across social class that said 56 percent of them supported 

the students in this respect, and yet you see President Chavez say 

they are trying to create a soft revolution fired by the United 

States. I look at all of that, I look what Venezuela is using with 

its petrodollars in the hemisphere to try to influence the hemisphere’s policy and largely to try to turn the hemisphere against 

the United States, and I say this is a very significant challenge to 

our national interests and our national security. 

So, Ambassador Brownfield, as someone who is in the post and 

leaving, how do you respond to these concerns? How would you advise your successor, if you were to give him some free advice, to 

deal with these issues? What’s the U.S. role in this conflict as Chavez continuously moves in a way that is undemocratic, but under 

the cloak of constitutionality? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you for this opportunity, Senator, this unexpected opportunity. 

Senator MENENDEZ. We’ll get to Colombia. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. May I open by saying—and I want to 

be very clear on this—not only that I do not disagree with anything 

you have said, but rather that I agree with every single word you 

have just articulated. My position over the last 3 years both in public and in private has been to say that there are some fundamental 

deep-seated differences and disagreements between the United 

States of America and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela that go 

to the heart of concepts such as democracy, philosophy, model, vision for the 21st century. 

We do not agree with many of these fundamental issues and we 

not only have a right, I would say we have an obligation to explain 

and articulate those differences clearly at every appropriate opportunity. 

Then I pause and I say we both exist. The United States of 

America exists and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. 

420 

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela exists. We have to deal with 

that reality. 

My suggestion over the last 3 years, which has not fallen on particularly carefully listening ears down there, has been let us disagree in these important fundamental areas, but see if we can at 

least establish some sort of dialog, some sort of progress in areas 

that history and common sense suggest we ought to be able to cooperate on—drugs, terrorism, international crime, energy, bilateral 

commerce. 

I will tell you honestly and somewhat humbly, Senator, that so 

far my success in that has been roughly equivalent to that of the 

Baltimore Orioles proceeding to win the World Series this year, 

which is very close to zero. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So I take that President Chavez is not interested in finding areas of common ground where we might at least 

have common interests? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Senator, obviously I cannot speak as 

to exactly what is in President Chavez’s mind, although he shares 

his views with us quite frequently and quite publicly. I will say 

that I have obviously been unsuccessful in getting him to accept 

that some sort of pragmatic dialog should be possible even in an 

overall negative relationship. 

My own personal view is that it is difficult for that gentleman 

to separate the criticism that he receives from us on fundamental 

issues—democracy, free press, freedom of religion, freedom of protest, freedom of expression—and our willingness to engage in pragmatic dialog in the other area; that at least so far it has not been 

possible to bridge, if you will, that difference between being negative on one side but still being able to have a positive relationship 

on the other. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I’ll wait for 

the next round. 

Senator WEBB. Would the Senator care to get the views of the 

prospective Ambassador on this before we proceed? 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’d be happy to. 

Senator WEBB. Okay, sure. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You know, Mr. Duddy, I understand—— 

Senator WEBB. Let the record show that the outgoing Ambassador has a rather pessimistic outlook on United States-Venezuelan relationships. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You’re going to try to make the Baltimore 

Orioles win in your new term. My question is, as you approach 

this, having heard from our outgoing Ambassador, what do you see 

the United States Ambassador’s role in Venezuela beyond the 

norm? I know what our roles are and when we send someone to 

represent our country abroad it’s diplomatic, it’s economic, it’s political. It has all of these different elements. 

But this is a very unique case, in which not only is our bilateral 

relationship at stake, but I would argue that increasingly the multilateral relationships within the hemisphere are being affected by 

Chavez. So how do you see dealing with this in your new role 

should you be confirmed by the committee? 

Mr. DUDDY. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

421 

I think I would say in the first instance, returning to something 

I mentioned earlier, we do see this as a long-term relationship. The 

current situation is very difficult. Nevertheless, if confirmed I think 

I would have a particularly important role to play in publicly articulating our values and in looking to build, especially with the 

Venezuelan people, an appreciation for not only our historic ties, 

but the way those ties are reinforced and have developed on a basis 

of shared values. 

The reality is in the hemisphere right now that, notwithstanding 

some difficulties, we have the Inter-American Democratic Charter 

which articulates in very specific ways the commitments of the 

hemisphere’s democracies. And we’ve seen most recently, for instance, in Haiti, the hemisphere coming together in support of 

those values. 

I think it falls to me or it will fall to me if I am confirmed to 

be a spokesman for those values, an advocate for democracy, an explicator of U.S. policy, which is frequently either distorted or misunderstood in some quarters. I think I can be a valid interlocutor 

on that front. And as in the case of my predecessor, I think it falls 

to us to try and induce cooperation in those areas where it is plainly in the interests of both Venezuela and the United States to cooperate, and to build from the shared perceptions of dangerous 

threats as well as opportunities. Things like counterterrorism and 

counternarcotics resonate with the peoples of both of our nations. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you think it’s—Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence. 

Do you think it is appropriate for the United States Ambassador 

to engage with those elements of civil society within Venezuela who 

are seeking to preserve and promote democracy within their country? 

Mr. DUDDY. Senator, I think it’s not only appropriate but essential that we engage them, as we would in any country in the world. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So you wouldn’t be reticent to do that? 

Mr. DUDDY. No, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I’ll wait for the 

next round. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Senator Menendez. Ambassador Brownfield, we’ve spent $5 billion over the past 6 

years following the start of Plan Colombia, which promised to cut 

by half the production of coca, and the amount of coca under cultivation is essentially unchanged and we are told that the price on 

the street has actually dropped. Do you agree with others in the 

United States Embassy on Bogota who say that this program is 

going well, and specifically, do you believe that aerial spraying of 

herbicides, which is costing hundreds of millions of dollars a year, 

can substantially reduce the production of coca? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the truth is I do believe our support for Plan Colombia, as it’s universally referred to, 

has in fact been an overall success story, a success story for Colombia, a success story for the region, and a success story for the 

United States of America. 

I would argue that back in 1999 and 2000 when we up here, both 

you in the legislative branch as well as those of us in the executive 

branch, examined the threats emanating from Colombia that would 

422 

affect the United States of America—drugs, security, and a collapsing economy that was producing pressure on hundreds of thousands of Colombians to come to the United States in an undocumented manner, I think we reached an agreement as to what was 

the best way for us as a government, as a Nation, as a people, to 

address these threats. 

Seven, going on 8 years have now gone by. I was in Colombia on 

short visits in the 1990s and I can assure you that is a different 

country today than it was in 1999. Security on the streets is much 

better. The economy is booming. Unemployment is down. Jobs are 

being created. Security, even in the countryside, is far better now 

than it was then. 

Drug production, is it about the same, down a little, up a little? 

I have seen studies that would support any of those three conclusions. But I have seen no study that suggested it’s continuing to 

explode the way it was through the 1990s. 

Do we need to, could we, should we, review our support for Plan 

Colombia, adjust it in some areas, fine-tune it in some ways, including the issue of eradication, spraying, or in essence how we are 

attacking the issue of drug cultivation itself? Of course it should. 

I think we should do that on a regular systematic basis. And perhaps, if this is your decision, naming a new ambassador is a good 

opportunity to do that in a careful, collective, ideally by consensus 

manner, I’m all in favor of it. 

But before I would say let’s eliminate this part of the program, 

I’d want to make sure we had that conversation, both up here in 

Washington and down there in Colombia, so that we would have 

a clear understanding of what the impact of that decision would be 

and what we would try to replace it with if we made that decision. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Dr. McKinley, I’d like to ask you some questions about the U.S. 

free trade agreement which is going to be considered by Congress 

this year more than likely. What is your view of how the ratification of that agreement would affect the relations between the 

United States and Peru? Are you of the belief that the current 

labor provisions in the agreement are adequate? 

If the United States Congress does not approve this agreement, 

do you have thoughts on what impact that would have on our relations? 

Dr. MCKINLEY. Obviously, bringing the negotiation on the United 

States-Peru trade promotion agreement to a conclusion is an important priority for the administration. In terms of how the agreement as it stands would impact on relations, I would note first that 

economic ties between Peru and the United States have been growing at a very significant pace since 2001, with United States exports to Peru doubling in that time frame and 17 of our United 

States, in particular, seeing a doubling or a tripling or quadrupling 

of their trade and export ties with Peru. 

So already there is an undercurrent of a strong and growing economic relationship with Peru. What the agreement would introduce 

is a reciprocal basis for trade relations between the United States 

and Peru. It would open Peruvian markets more generally to American products. Something like 80 percent of U.S. manufactured 

423 

goods, for example, would enter immediately without duty and 

something like two-thirds of U.S. agricultural products. 

Under the current Andean trade preference agreement, Peruvian 

agricultural products already do have—sorry—exports already do 

have considerable access to the United States, but the advantage 

of the agreement under consideration now is its reciprocal nature. 

The ITC estimates are that the benefits for American business 

would be an increase of over a billion dollars by 2011 or 2012 in 

increased exports. 

The trade and environmental provisions of the FTA have obviously been of considerable concern. These to my understanding 

have been worked on. USTR, I think, has been in negotiation and 

close discussion with Congressional committees and are trying to 

reach a point where adequate labor provisions are worked into the 

agreement. And in any case, as we look to if Congress were to approve the agreement to the implementation phase, there would be 

a strong emphasis on ensuring that implementation was completed 

before enforcement began. 

So while I’m not conversant with the specifics at this stage of the 

labor provisions, there is the suggestion that we would have both 

through the negotiations that USTR is having with Congress, with 

the agreement of the Peruvian Congress, and an implementation 

phase to address the labor concerns that are there. 

In the event of the agreement being approved, I would rather not 

speculate at this stage. I would note that we do have a strong relationship, that free trade agreements, strengthening of trans-Pacific 

market is important. Supporting Peru’s evolution toward free markets and as a model for the Andean region on how free market and 

trade can lead to growth which trickles or provides support for 

broader swaths of the population all underscore the importance of 

focusing on the mechanisms for producing sustained economic 

growth as we look at our goals, not just in Peru but in the region 

and Latin America in general. 

Senator WEBB. I thank you for that very comprehensive response. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have one more Venezuelan question. I am concerned about Venezuela’s engagement with Iran. It has signed an agreement for 

$200 million to finance joint investments in projects in building a 

series of oil explorations in the Orinoco River belt. They also have 

announced recently when President Ahmadinejad came in mid-January that they would use a $2 billion investment fund to fund 

projects in both countries and other countries as well. 

Should the United States be concerned with Venezuela’s growing 

relationship with Iran? 

Mr. DUDDY. Thank you, Senator. Certainly we are following developments with Iran very closely and it is a source of concern to 

us. For the last 2 years, the administration has characterized Venezuela as not cooperating fully in the war on terror. The expanding 

ties with Iran certainly are a matter that we follow very closely 

and is a source of concern for the administration. 

Senator MENENDEZ. We have two countries in the world that 

have a great deal of oil supplies, both at this point in time who 

424 

have adverse interests to the United States. It seems to me that 

within the context of the hemisphere itself to have such a relationship, not that we can necessarily stop it, but ultimately is of concern to us and something that I hope we pay a lot of attention to. 

Ambassador Brownfield, I want to follow up on the chairman’s 

comments about Colombia. I have supported Plan Colombia. I 

voted for it when in the House of Representatives. I’ve been a big 

supporter. But I am growing skeptical as I don’t see the results 

adding up. 

If we looked at the Office of National Drug Control Policy 2006 

survey of cultivation in Colombia, it indicates that statistically 

there’s no change in the amount of coca being grown between 2005 

and 2006. Even if there is no decrease, I fail to see the status quo 

as success, especially when considering how much U.S. money is 

being spent. And I’m not interested in caveats to numbers such as, 

quote, ‘‘confidence intervals.’’ The numbers in the end need to point 

to progress and not to what works best, and personally I’m not seeing progress. 

I can hear myself echoing these remarks and comments when I 

sat in the House on Plan Colombia in 2005. I look at that and I 

look at a briefing before the Senate where we were told that 70 

percent of fields had been reconstituted within 6 months of spraying, to the most recent State Department verification mission. I 

think that’s a serious problem. 

So my question is how we avoid sitting here 2 years from now 

after you’ve been down there asking the same questions when faced 

with the same facts. How do you feel that our current counterdrug 

programs in Colombia are succeeding? Do you have a sense of why 

this number on reconstituting is so high, and how can we say that 

aerial eradication is successful when 70 percent gets reconstituted? 

Last, to keep it all in a package here, you know, one of the problems is if you want poor coca farmers to turn away from coca you 

need to give them sustainable development alternatives so that 

they can sustain their families. I have a problem when in fact not 

only have we not seen an increase in alternative development to 

complement our drug eradication and interdiction program, but the 

alternative development institution-building program in the ACI 

account has gone from $130 million to zero—to zero. 

Now, I know some will say, well, we put it in ESF, but ESF 

doesn’t guarantee that it’s going to go for that purpose. 

So with that as a package, with the realities that we’re not moving numbers ahead, that the fields are getting reconstituted to the 

tune of 70 percent, and that we’re going in the opposite direction 

in terms of alternative development programs, how are we going to 

claim that Plan Colombia is a continuing success? How are you 

going to get people like me to continue to be supportive as I have 

in the past? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Well, let me try right here, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I’m glad you’re smiling, to start off 

with. That was a smile of positive thinking, that’s for sure. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. That was a smile of departure. Now 

I’m giving you the smile of arrival. 

Let me try to—— 

425 

Senator WEBB. He’s smiling because he’s happy to leave the 

other place. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Let the record reflect that it was not 

the nominee himself who uttered those words. 

Senator, let me offer you first 15 seconds of the macro and then 

address specifically the issue that you raise. I said during my statement, I said in response to the chairman’s first question to me, and 

I repeat now, that as we take a look at the entire package that 

Plan Colombia was designed by us, by you in the Senate and at 

that time in the House and by us in the executive branch. What 

it was designed to address, I state again, it has been to date successful. It has delivered a better Colombia on all of these fronts— 

security, narcotics, economic, social justice, human rights, administration of justice. Go down the line, the difference between Colombia in 1999 and Colombia in 2007 is notable and visible in all of 

those areas, thanks largely or at least in large part to our support 

by the United States Congress, by this Senate and that House for 

this program. 

Now, you have correctly pointed out that one area, specifically 

drug production, does not show the numbers that people like me 

were saying to you back in 2000, 2001, we should be seeing now, 

6 or 7 years later. What has happened? First, there’s no such thing 

as a perfect plan. A plan has to be changed, adjusted, revised on 

a regular basis, and that clearly would fall within the responsibility 

of whoever you should decide to confirm as the next Ambassador 

to Colombia. 

Second, those people who engage in narcotics trafficking are neither stupid nor stationary. They also are changing, adjusting. As 

they see what is being thrown at them, they are trying to accommodate to keep their business going. 

Third, people move. In areas that we were focused on in 2000, 

2001, 2002, we now find perhaps are fairly secure, fairly calm, but 

move 200 or 300 miles to the east or to the north, to the west, depending upon what your starting point is, and you find you’ve got 

a brand new area. 

The solution in my opinion is let’s work on the plan. I have absolutely no problem, no objection whatsoever, to the United States 

Congress telling us, you had better rework this plan, you had better start reflecting the new realities and delivering some results 

and some outcomes. I cannot do that overnight. I cannot do that 

for you by breakfast tomorrow. But I think I should be—in fact, I 

think you should require me to tell you on a fairly regular, systematic basis what are we doing to change this current plan so that 

we are going to address what you have described. 

I believe if we do it that way we’ll actually accomplish what we 

all want to accomplish, reduce the production of cocaine in Colombia and reduce the amount of cocaine that is coming into the 

United States of America. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, I’ll make a final remark. The chairman’s been very generous with his time. 

Let me just say two things. One is reconstitution has nothing to 

do about moving to different areas. Reconstitution is about reconstituting the same area that has been eradicated. And that’s a 

problem. 

426 

I appreciate your response insofar as both making you responsible should you be our ambassador, and I think you will be. Second, having some reporting to the Congress, because those of us 

who have been supportive—and I agree with you, Plan Colombia 

is more than about eradication. But when you look at the whole 

element of eradication and interdiction and when you look at the 

sustainable development alternatives which we are not pursuing 

and when you look at the latest set of circumstances as we talk 

about a trade agreement with Colombia, with some of the things 

that have been happening in that respect, where some of the administration’s closest allies in the region have government ties with 

right-wing paramilitaries that have violated human rights, it’s not 

the perfect picture that some in the administration would like to 

promote. 

I think those are serious questions and I hope that, as someone 

who has supported President Uribe, I hope he understands that 

there is still some response necessary here for continuing large investments of the United States and a trade agreement. 

Then finally, Dr. McKinley, I didn’t want you to feel slighted that 

I didn’t have any questions for you, but I will say this. I think 

Peru’s an incredibly important part of our relationship in this 

hemisphere. I know they are planning the free trade agreement 

and the chairman asked about it. I want to tell you this: The Peruvians have to understand that arbitrary and capriciousness in their 

tax laws in SUNAT and others is not going to serve them well in 

the promotion of a free trade agreement. 

I have New Jersey companies that made investments legitimately in Peru, that did it under their rule of law, that followed 

their tax policies, and then the Peruvians arbitrarily and capriciously had in essence a confiscation. Well, that’s not the type of 

country I want to be dealing free trade agreements with, and I 

hope the Peruvians, and I hope you’ll be part of that if you ultimately, and I believe you will, become our ambassador, make a 

very clear statement to the Peruvians that it’s in their own interests—forgetting us, protecting United States companies and interests, which we should—it’s in their own interest at the end of the 

day to have transparency to make sure that the rule of law is observed, because otherwise nobody’s going to go and invest in Peru 

if their investments are going to be taken. 

So I hope we’ll have another opportunity at another time to talk 

about that. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

I’d like to note for the record that another vote has been called 

on the floor. We have about 11 minutes on the vote. I have one 

other question and then, Senator Menendez, if you have any others, and then we can wrap this up. 

For the record, again, Ambassador Brownfield, you’re aware that 

4 years ago three Americans were taken hostage in Colombia by 

forces that are by definition hostile to the interests of the United 

States. Proof of life has been established. Can you provide us an 

update on where that situation is? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure, Mr. Chairman. As you know— 

and let me restate it here for the record—recent proof of life was 

427 

offered within the past 2 months. It was offered by a Colombia national police officer who had also been seized by the FARC and held 

for many years, escaped a little over a month ago, finally found his 

way home, and in debriefings both with the Government of Colombia and with the United States Government personnel did provide 

sufficient detail and evidence to convince both us and the Colombia 

counterparts that he had in fact seen Mr. Stansell, Mr. Howes, and 

Mr. Gonsalves alive within the last 2 months. 

That’s good news because the previous last proof of life we had 

received was nearly 4 years old. 

Let me just make the same simple statement that I made in my 

opening statement. Mr. Chairman, we all have a solemn obligation, 

you, me, and quite frankly everyone in this room, and that obligation is to do whatever we can to get these three United States citizens seized, held against their will, in captivity for 4 years and I 

believe now 4 months, to get them home safely to their families. 

That I take as my responsibility. I am open to considering any 

option, any possibility to accomplish that mission. My door will be 

open to the families, to friends, to anyone who can offer information that would help us accomplish that objective. In my opinion it 

is an absolute outrage that an organization would hold three innocent men as hostages for more than 4 years without offering them 

the opportunity of returning to their families. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, and I’d like to thank all 

of the nominees for your testimony today, for your willingness to 

serve our country in these important positions. I expect from the 

testimony and from all the preparation that you will all soon be 

proceeding to your new positions and I look forward to working 

with all of you to work toward solving some of these problems and 

addressing others that over a time period probably can’t be solved, 

but can at least be mitigated. 

The record will remain open for 2 days so that committee members can submit additional questions for the record, and I ask that 

the nominees respond expeditiously in the event that there are 

such questions. 

If no one else has any additional comments, I thank you for your 

time. I thank you for your full careers, all three of you in this area. 

I think it’s tremendous that our Government can produce people 

with these sorts of backgrounds to address the issues that we have, 

and I look forward to working with you in the future. 

We are now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF PATRICK DENNIS DUDDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. President Chavez has called the students demonstrating against the denial of a license to Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), without any due process even 

through the Government of Venezuela’s own communications authorities, ‘‘pawns’’ 

of the United States. Did the United States play any role in those demonstrations? 

Has the United States had any contact with the student protestors? 

Answer. The United States has played no role in the student demonstrations that 

arose in reaction to the closure of Radio Caracas Television (RCTV). In the normal 

course of diplomatic activities the United States Embassy in Caracas has routine 

428 

interaction with many parts of civil society, including students. The United States 

did not, however, have contact with the student organizers in connection with the 

demonstrations. 

Question. President Chavez says he is a champion of the people. To the best of 

your knowledge, what do current polls reveal about Chavez’s popularity in Venezuela since the closure of RCTV? 

Answer. A June poll by the Venezuelan survey research firm Hinterlaces showed 

41 percent of those surveyed had a favorable rating of President Chavez’s administration or ‘‘gestion.’’ In November 2006, the same pollster found 49 percent of Venezuelans surveyed had a favorable opinion. 

Another poll taken in June by the firm Datos found that over 66 percent of those 

surveyed disapprove of the closure of RCTV. Over 55 percent disapprove of the government’s handling of the issue and matters dealing with freedom of expression, and 

its reaction to the student protests. 

Question. Doesn’t article 23 of the Venezuelan Constitution suggest that the Government of Venezuela is bound by treaties it has signed, and that issues of freedom 

of expression that relate to human rights are under Venezuela’s Bolivarian Constitution, properly the subject of scrutiny by bodies such as the OAS, the United Nations, or other bodies whose enabling legislation in the form of treaties has been 

signed and agreed to by the Government of Venezuela, thereby giving those bodies 

proper jurisdiction in this area? 

Answer. Venezuela and all the democracies of the hemisphere are signatories to 

international instruments that set forth principles and obligations regarding human 

rights and democratic governance. 

In addition, article 23 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 

states that ‘‘Treaties, pacts and conventions relating to human rights that have been 

signed and ratified by Venezuela have constitutional rank and priority in the domestic sphere in so far as they contain norms on the enjoyment and exercise of 

[human rights] which are more favorable than those established in the Constitution 

and the laws of the Republic, and [such norms] are immediately and directly applicable by the tribunals and other organs of the Republic.’’ 

In her remarks before the OAS General Assembly in Panama on June 4, Secretary Rice raised the closure of RCTV and the growing threats to freedom of 

expression in Venezuela. She echoed the United States Senate’s call in Senate Resolution 211 for OAS leadership and action. ‘‘. . . [T]he members of the OAS must 

defend freedom where it is under siege in our hemisphere and we must support freedom wherever and whenever it is denied.’’ 

On June 19, we sent OAS Secretary General Insulza a diplomatic note formally 

reiterating the Secretary’s request that the Secretary General make ‘‘every effort to 

visit Venezuela to consult in good faith with all interested parties in the case of 

Radio Caracas TV (RCTV), or consider other actions to address the situation, and 

to make a full report to the foreign ministers through the Permanent Council at the 

earliest opportunity.’’ 

The administration and, if confirmed, I will make every effort to encourage sustained OAS attention to this matter. The OAS can and should play a key role in 

actively promoting the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Democratic Charter 

and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

The United States and all member states should support and, when necessary, 

instigate its proper involvement. 

Question. Given Venezuela’s importance as an energy supplier to the United 

States, can you provide the latest data on the number of barrels of oil shipped to 

the United States from Venezuela over the last 5 years? Can you please explain 

whether the Government of Venezuela has increased or decreased its shipments? If 

production has decreased, what are the reasons for this decrease? Do you regard 

Venezuela as a reliable energy supplier to the United States? 

429 

Answer. According to the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA), Venezuela’s total gross exports to the United States since 2001 were: 

VENEZUELA OIL EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

(Thousand barrels per day) 

Year Crude oil Refined products Total 

2001 ........................................................................................................................ 1,291 262 1,553 

2002 ........................................................................................................................ 1,201 198 1,399 

2003 ........................................................................................................................ 1,183 193 1,376 

2004 ........................................................................................................................ 1,297 258 1,555 

2005 ........................................................................................................................ 1,241 288 1,529 

2006 ........................................................................................................................ 1,138 270 1,408 

Exports to the United States peaked in 2004 and have declined since, although 

the United States continues to receive over 60 percent of Venezuela’s production in 

direct shipments. In addition, Venezuela ships roughly 300,000 barrels per day to 

a refinery in St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands. 

The Energy Information Administration assesses Venezuelan production at approximately 2.4 million barrels of crude oil per day, or more than 500,000 barrels 

per day less than production before the December 2002–February 2003 oil workers 

strike. Private sector sources estimate oil production to be between 2.1–2.3 million 

barrels per day. This decrease has been caused by a number of factors including the 

strike that effectively stopped all production by the state oil company, PDVSA; production cuts ordered by PDVSA to comply with OPEC quota reductions in late 2006; 

and difficulties in transitioning the 32 fields operated by international oil companies 

under ‘‘operating service agreements’’ to new joint venture companies in 2006. 

Another factor is what we believe is a long-term structural decline in production 

from Venezuela’s mature oil fields. 

Venezuela has been a long-term and reliable supplier of oil to the United States. 

PDVSA’s current 5-year plan indicates that the company plans to maintain its exports to the United States at current levels in 2012. 

Question. Venezuela has shipped oil at discounted prices to various parts of the 

world, including the United States. Can you tell us what Venezuela’s posture has 

been in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) relative to energy prices, and what role Venezuela has played regarding oil prices in the market? 

Could you provide information regarding where Venezuela is providing discounted 

oil? Please provide information regarding where Venezuelan Government-owned refineries are around the world. And please provide an estimate of how much money 

has been lost as a result. Please provide updated information regarding reports that 

the Government of Venezuela is interested in selling CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anonima (PDVSA). If reports are true, 

who are the interested buyers? 

Answer. Under the Chavez administration, Venezuela has been a price hawk in 

OPEC, seeking to maintain high oil prices. The December 2002–February 2003 oil 

strike resulted in the loss of both production and spare capacity. 

The decline in Venezuela’s production capacity prompted the government to intensify its calls for a higher OPEC target price band in order to offset the fall in revenue resulting from lower export volumes. 

Venezuela is currently providing subsidized oil shipments to Cuba as well as to 

members of the PetroCaribe oil alliance. The PetroCaribe signatory nations include 

Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, 

Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and 

Suriname. In fact, however, only Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica have 

received fairly steady shipments from Venezuela, while other countries have received sporadic or no shipments. Private sector sources have indicated that Venezuela may also be providing subsidized oil shipments to China. 

Strictly speaking, Venezuela does not lose money on its financed shipments of oil 

and refined products. Since OPEC rules do not allow members to sell at a discount, 

Venezuela instead offers generous financing terms. These nations pay a certain percentage up front and the remainder can be paid through a 25-year financing agreement at 1 percent interest. Venezuela carries significant currency risk in these payment terms and may lose money on interest-rate differentials. In addition, it carries 

risk related to recipient countries’ ability and willingness to pay these debts. 

430 

Besides the refineries it operates domestically, Venezuela’s state oil company, 

PDVSA, currently has the following refinery investments internationally: 

• CITGO, PDVSA’s wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, operates three product refineries in Lake Charles, Louisiana; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Lemont, Illinois. • CITGO also has two asphalt refineries in the United States in Paulsboro, New 

Jersey; and Savannah, Georgia. • PDVSA also has a 50 percent stake in ExxonMobil’s Chalmette, Louisiana refinery, as well as certain units at ConocoPhillips’ Sweeny, Texas refinery. • PDVSA has a 50 percent stake in the Hovensa refinery in St. Croix, United 

States Virgin Islands and leases the Emmastad refinery in Curacao. • PDVSA participates in two joint refining ventures in Europe: A 50 percent 

stake in AB Nynas, a Swedish company that operates five refineries; as well 

as a 50 percent stake in Ruhr Oel, which has ownership stakes in five German 

refineries. 

Over the past few years, Venezuelan Government officials have made contradictory statements about their intent to sell the CITGO refineries in the United States. 

Last year, former CITGO CEO, Felix Rodriguez, said that the Government of Venezuela did not plan to sell off the company’s assets. Despite this, the company does 

seem to be seeking a buyer for its two asphalt refineries. Rumors of the potential 

sale of other CITGO assets continue to circulate, but we have not seen any concrete 

information about such plans nor who the potential buyers would be. 

Question. Please indicate the frequency and character of engagement between the 

United States Government and the Government of Venezuela on energy issues. Who 

is representing the United States Government to the Government of Venezuela on 

energy issues? What are the U.S. Government priorities in the bilateral energy relationship? 

Answer. While there has been a reduction in contacts between the Government 

of Venezuela and the United States Government on energy issues, we continue to 

look for opportunities to discuss a range of issues. 

The United States Ambassador to Venezuela serves as the principal link to the 

Venezuelan Government, although the current ambassador has not been able to 

meet with the Energy Minister despite our requests. In the past, lower-level United 

States Government officials in Washington and Caracas have maintained contacts 

with Venezuelan Government officials on energy issues. However, Venezuelan Government officials have not responded to repeated requests for appointments by 

lower-level embassy officials in recent months. 

Venezuela, traditionally, has been a reliable supplier and the United States a dependable consumer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure this relationship continues 

to benefit both our nations. 

Question. How much of the Government of Venezuela’s spending is financed 

through oil and natural gas exports? How has that level changed over the past 8 

years? What amount of future income from oil and natural gas exports is necessary 

to meet projected Government of Venezuela domestic expenditure and foreign loans 

and grants? 

Answer. 

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA BUDGETS 

(1999–2006) 

Year GDP Budget (% 

GDP) 

Budget (billions) Oil income (% 

GDP) 

Oil income 

(billions) 

Oil income (% 

of budget) 

1999 ............................................. $103.3 19.8 $20.5 7.3 $7.5 36.9 

2000 ............................................. $121.3 21.8 $26.4 10.6 $12.9 48.6 

2001 ............................................. $126.2 25.1 $31.7 9.9 $12.5 39.4 

2002 ............................................. $95.4 26.1 $24.9 10.9 $10.4 41.8 

2003 ............................................. $82.8 27.8 $23.0 11.8 $9.8 42.4 

2004 ............................................. $109.2 26.5 $28.9 11.5 $12.6 43.4 

2005 ............................................. $127.0 26.9 $34.2 14.1 $17.9 52.4 

2006 ............................................. $174.7 33.8 $59.0 16.9 $29.5 50.0 

As indicated by the table above, approximately 50 percent of the Government of 

Venezuela budget is derived from oil sales (Venezuela does not export natural gas). 

The table demonstrates clearly that this level has increased in the past 8 years. 

In 2005, the Government of Venezuela created a parallel, or off-budget National 

Development Fund (FONDEN), which to date has received over $27 billion from 

431 

Central Bank reserves and in direct transfers from PDVSA. Information about the 

FONDEN accounts is very limited. Thus, the budgetary numbers above do not necessarily paint a complete picture of 2005 and 2006. 

It is difficult to set a number for future income which the Government of Venezuela needs to sustain its domestic fiscal policy much less its foreign loans and 

grants. While the Government of Venezuela has promised over $100 billion toward 

projects outside Venezuela since the beginning of 2005, it is very difficult to say 

what portion will actually be spent. 

Venezuelan oil production is not expected to rise in the near-term and most ana- lysts predict that the price of the Venezuelan oil basket will range between $50– 

$60 per barrel in 2007. This may leave the government with the problem of stagnating revenues and increasing costs. Most analysts believe that the Government of Venezuela has approximately $30 billion in off-budget funds and another $25 billion in foreign exchange reserves although the lack of transparency of government accounts makes these only assumptions. These funds could serve to cushion Venezuelan Government expenditures for 

some time to come. 

A devaluation, while painful to ordinary Venezuelans, would also allow the Venezuelan Government to generate more bolivars for every dollar of oil revenue with 

which to meet domestic commitments. 

Question. Secretary Rice has spoken often of ‘‘Transformational Diplomacy’’; can 

you tell us what your vision is for the implementation of Transformational Diplomacy in Venezuela, and what specific steps you think you can take, while respecting 

the sovereign rights of the Government of Venezuela, and taking cognizance of the 

delicate situation which we find ourselves in regarding our relations with Venezuela? 

Answer. Our efforts in Venezuela have been anchored by an advocacy of the President’s positive agenda for the hemisphere (consolidating democracy, promoting prosperity, investing in people, and promoting the democratic state). With many Venezuelan governmental institutions reluctant or unwilling to work directly with the 

United States Government, our approach has been to take our message directly to 

the Venezuelan people via the media, NGO’s, the private sector, and educational institutions. We have used new mechanisms, including baseball diplomacy and, recently, a major cultural stage show featuring popular American dance in order to 

consistently remind the Venezuelan people that we remain a committed and reliable 

friend of the Venezuelan people and are seeking to maintain United States-Venezuelan ties, despite government hostility to the United States. 

We have also opened four American Corners in Venezuelan public institutions in 

provincial capitals and have launched a microscholarship program for young people 

to learn English. 

If confirmed, I will continue to seek new means to advance our public diplomacy 

goals including the opening of additional American Corners and the expansion of the 

scholarship program. 

Question. Please explain the Government of Venezuela’s interest in closer relations with Hamas? Should this be cause for alarm? If so, why? 

Answer. In general, we have been disappointed in Venezuela’s lack of cooperation 

in global antiterrorism efforts. Publicly, senior Government of Venezuela officials 

have expressed sympathy and moral support for Hamas, which is a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under United States law. The reasons for Venezuela’s 

sympathies for Hamas are not fully clear, though Venezuela’s ‘‘anti-imperialist’’ foreign policy may provide some basis. 

Certainly, this is cause for serious concern. Venezuela’s increasing ties with Iran, 

a state sponsor of terrorism, was an important factor that led President Bush to determine in 2006 that Venezuela was not fully cooperative in United States 

antiterrorism efforts. Absent willingness by Venezuela to cooperate in deterring this 

common global threat, the United States Government will continue to scrutinize 

closely Venezuela relationships with FTOs such as Hamas. 

Question. Please explain the Government of Venezuela’s interest in purchasing 

Russian submarines? What is the military justification for such a purchase? Please 

provide an assessment of neighboring countries’ capabilities in this regard, and 

whether Government of Venezuela’s acquisition of this capability would pose a 

threat that could lead to a regional arms race. How should the United States address this situation in terms of its arms sales policies to the region? 

Answer. President Chavez has stated repeatedly and as recently as June 21, his 

intention to purchase Russian submarines. The acquisition of advanced submarines 

could give Venezuela a military advantage in force projection over that of its neighVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00439 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
432 

bors, though this would depend to a great degree on the Venezuelans’ ability to 

maintain and deploy such a complicated system and the nature of the specific subsystems and weapons with which the submarines Venezuela acquires are equipped. 

We have urged the Government of Venezuela to practice full transparency with its 

neighbors in its arms acquisitions. 

The United States Government has already responded to Venezuela’s ambitious 

arms build-up by imposing a ban on all United States arms sales and services to 

Venezuela. Under this policy, we are also required to deny licenses to third countries that wish to export arms sales and services to Venezuela that involve United 

States munitions list equipment. We repeatedly have urged all major arms suppliers 

to practice restraint in their military sales or transfers to Venezuela given, in part, 

the deterioration of democratic conditions in Venezuela and the effect these acquisitions will have on regional stability. 

Question. There is much concern in the United States Senate for what occurs 

within Venezuela’s borders, as domestic factors play an important role in defining 

Venezuela’s intentions in the region and the world. 

The United States Senate stands firm, as was demonstrated by the overwhelming 

bipartisan support for a recent resolution passed by unanimous consent on May 24, 

2007, and cited by Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, at the recent Organization 

of American States (OAS) Assembly on Panama earlier this month, rejecting the closure of RCTV (S. Res. 211). 

I introduced this resolution with Senator Dodd and one of its intentions was to 

highlight to the citizens of the United States the unfortunate deterioration of democracy in Venezuela. The resolution is proof that when it comes to United States policy toward Venezuela, there is one United States policy, from both aisles of the 

United States Congress and from both branches of our Government. 

Nevertheless, many transnational issues remain that present challenges to our interests and those of other countries in the region, from energy to narcotics and to 

security, especially. In these areas, threats have been made by the Government of 

Venezuela that raise questions regarding our overall policy approach to Venezuela. 

In this regard is there a ‘‘red line’’ in our relationship with Venezuela that if 

crossed would lead to serious consequences for the Government of Venezuela? 

Should there be one? 

Answer. Both President Bush and Secretary Rice have expressed concern over the 

erosion of democratic institutions in Venezuela. We have been firm in reminding 

Venezuela of its obligations to its citizens as a signatory to the Inter-American 

Democratic Charter and other international instruments. It was for this reason the 

Secretary called on OAS Secretary General Insulza to visit Venezuela to investigate 

the vulnerabilities to freedom of speech made evident by the Government of Venezuela’s decision not to renew the RCTV license. The Secretary’s decision also reflected increased concern from other hemispheric partners in the OAS. 

We will continue to take actions to protect our homeland from the scourge of 

drugs and terrorism and will continue to engage and consult closely with key allies 

in the region and beyond to determine appropriate steps required to protect democracy and security interests. Many countries, for instance, are affected by the drug 

flow through Venezuela—we are working with them to press Venezuela to take 

steps to disrupt trafficking organizations. 

RESPONSES OF PATRICK DENNIS DUDDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Venezuela? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Venezuela? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right and essential to democracy. Over the past few weeks, freedom of expression in Venezuela—press freedom in particular—has experienced a worrisome setback. The United States Senate, 

the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, other governments, and countless international human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have expressed their concern over the May 27 closure of RCTV. 

This adds to our growing concerns about the concentration of power in Venezuela, 

the deterioration of checks and balances, and the erosion of respect for human 

rights and the rule of law. 

433 

If confirmed, I will continue to seek to work with our hemispheric and European 

partners and through multilateral and international organizations to support the 

right of all Venezuelans to express their views freely. 

In addition, I will continue the work we are doing in Venezuela, as elsewhere, to 

strengthen civil society, political parties, labor unions, and the independent media 

that play an important role in the democratic process in any country. Our programs 

offer support to NGOs open to Venezuelans of every political persuasion. 

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Venezuela in advancing 

human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. In Venezuela, as elsewhere, much of the embassy’s work on human rights 

and democracy is accomplished through its programs with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Our programs work with NGOs that welcome participation 

from Venezuelans of all political persuasions. The 2006 Country Report on Human 

Rights conditions in Venezuela reported that, although a wide variety of independent domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, several domestic human rights NGOs received threats 

and intimidation by government representatives and supporters. More generally, 

NGOs are increasingly viewed with suspicion by some elements of the Government 

of Venezuela. 

Moreover, an ‘‘international cooperation’’ law under consideration by the National 

Assembly would restrict NGOs’ ability to receive foreign funding and to operate 

independently. The nationalization of several private sector companies earlier this 

year eliminated another important source of funding, particularly for human rights 

NGOs. 

Beyond the threat that they may lose their funding, some NGOs increasingly 

worry that being associated with the United States would compromise them with 

the Government of Venezuela. We will continue to work with those who wish to 

work with us, but will be respectful of the decision that some may make not to do 

so. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. The promotion of human rights is already an important embassy priority 

and is one that I will maintain if I am confirmed. 

If confirmed, I would stipulate that engagement on human rights issues would be 

a requirement in the annual work goals of the relevant embassy political and public 

diplomacy officers. I would ensure that the relevant embassy personnel have access 

to the appropriate training and professional development opportunities, whether 

through courses at the Foreign Service Institute or in venues such as the Bureau 

of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor’s annual Human Rights officer conference. 

I would make it clear to all embassy personnel that advocacy for human rights 

and accurate and timely reporting on such issues is an important embassy reporting 

requirement. I would ensure that such issues would be addressed in the annual performance review of the relevant embassy officers. I would also work to ensure that 

truly exceptional performance receives the attention it merits, for example by nominating outstanding officers for Departmental awards that recognize their efforts. 

I would plan to meet regularly with the appropriate local interlocutors and the 

embassy personnel working on these issues to underline to them that this issue is 

important to me as chief of mission. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. The promotion of human rights and democracy has played an important 

role in my career. Most recently I worked on restoring democracy and the rule of 

law, and diminishing the level of violence in Haiti. I played a personal role in advocating for human rights issues during the period of the interim government and I 

believe my intervention aided materially in the release of one high profile detainee 

for medical treatment. 

When assigned as the Consul General in Sao Paulo, I worked closely in support 

of the establishment of the Sao Paulo state Office on Trafficking in Persons, one of 

the first such offices ever supported at the subnational level. This office helped to 

establish combating human trafficking as an issue in which local and regional government has a legitimate role and responsibility. 

434 

Earlier in my career, I was active in raising levels of concern about human rights 

issues in Paraguay as that country was working to complete its transition to democracy. I believe that United States attention to human rights there helped to establish progress in that arena as an important indicator of the country’s over all 

progress in leaving behind the legacy of Paraguay’s authoritarian past. 

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Colombia? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Colombia? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. The persistence of a complex and violent armed conflict is the greatest 

obstacle to the advancement of human rights in Colombia, resulting in numerous 

homicides, kidnappings, and massive internal displacement of Colombian citizens. 

The majority of human rights abuses are carried out by illegal armed groups, principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and paramilitary organizations. Key to ending these abuses is 

weakening the control of illegal armed groups so that the state may bring the security and stability necessary to protect human rights and consolidate democracy. 

Four decades of violence has hindered the Colombian Government’s ability to consolidate democracy and establish state presence throughout the country and has 

strained the government’s resources. The government has made great strides in taking back swaths of territory from illegal armed groups, has successfully demobilized 

over 30,000 paramilitary members, and continues vigorous operations against the 

FARC, ELN, emerging criminal groups, and the narcotrafficking industry that is 

their primary source of funding. However, major challenges remain in defeating Colombia’s illegal armed groups. 

Throughout this conflict, there have also been allegations of human rights abuses 

by members of the armed forces. The United States has repeatedly raised its concerns over these reports, and the Colombian Government has responded positively, 

instituting changes to try to prevent these alleged abuses. It has also made changes 

in its judicial procedures to ensure civilian control over cases involving the military 

and a change in its criminal code and justice system that allows for cases to move 

much more quickly from arrest to verdict than under the old system. The Colombian 

Government also runs—with United States support—two protection programs that 

together total $34 million (2006 budget) and provide protection to approximately 

10,000 individuals. It has established a special labor sub-unit within the Prosecutor 

General’s Office to prioritize the resolution of cases of violence against trade unionists. However, more remains to be done. 

Central to continued progress on human rights is maintaining a close and constructive relationship with the Government of Colombia. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Colombian Government to improve respect for human rights 

within the military and to improve its capacity to stamp out the illegal armed 

groups that operate within its borders. United States programs will continue to 

focus on the promotion and protection of human rights; the prevention of human 

rights abuses; and increasing the capacity of the Colombian Government to provide 

the social services necessary to assist the internally displaced. 

Likewise, maintaining a strong, supportive relationship between the United 

States Embassy and human rights NGOs in Colombia is critical to ensuring continued progress on pressing human rights concerns. The work of these organizations 

is a vital part of Colombian democracy and, if confirmed, I will continue to work 

with the Colombian Government to ensure their safety. 

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Colombia in advancing 

human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. The primary challenges to advancing human rights and consolidating democracy in Colombia continues to be the four-decade-old armed conflict with illegal 

armed groups financed by narcotics revenues, combined with a slow judicial system 

that has facilitated a culture of impunity. 

The majority of human rights abuses are carried out by illegal armed groups, 

principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and paramilitary organizations. These groups continue to 

hinder the consolidation of democracy in Colombia by preventing the state from establishing presence throughout its territory and bringing the services that accompany a democracy to its people. Until the influence of the illegal armed groups operVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00442 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
435 

ating within Colombia’s borders is diminished, advancing human rights and consolidating democracy will continue to be an arduous task. 

The Colombian Government, with United States support, continues to weaken the 

control of these organizations, but the task is not over. The FARC is weakened but 

not yet defeated. Additional support may be needed to ensure the Colombian Government maintains its momentum in defeating this organization. The Colombian 

Government is talking to the ELN about a possible demobilization, but the outcome 

remains to be seen. If an agreement it reached, the government will undoubtedly 

require international assistance to see it through. 

Over 30,000 paramilitary members have demobilized from over 35 paramilitary 

groups, including the largest of these, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 

(AUC). However, the government faces the triple-headed challenge of (1) vigorously 

implementing the Justice and Peace Law, and thereby taking testimony from approximately 3,000 demobilized paramilitaries eligible for benefits under the law and 

over 60,000 victims; (2) reintegrating the demobilized into society and ensuring they 

do not return to a life of crime; and (3) combating the newly emerging criminal 

groups that are rushing to fill the vacuum left by the demobilization of these groups. 

In addition, Colombia’s judicial system has been slow to adjudicate allegations of 

human rights abuses by Colombian military personnel. Decades of delayed response 

to allegations of such abuses and an almost zero percent conviction rate have fed 

a culture of impunity in Colombia. Recognizing this dilemma, Colombia began—and 

is in the middle of—a historic transition from an outmoded inquisitorial judicial system to a new oral accusatory criminal justice system, with the Prosecutor General’s 

Office leading the charge. The changes are being introduced through a gradual fourphase regional process, which will be completed in 2008. 

The system enables cases to progress much faster from arrest to verdict than 

under the old inquisitorial system, with cases averaging 6 to 18 months to resolve. 

Compared to an average of 3 to 5 years for resolution of cases under the old system, 

this is an average reduction of over 80 percent in the time that it takes to resolve 

criminal cases. The new system has also shown a 60 to 80 percent conviction rate, 

a vast improvement over the 0 to 3 percent conviction rate under the old system. 

The transparency of the new system brings with it an increased need for protection of witnesses, courtrooms, and judicial officers. Colombia’s overburdened Prosecutor General’s Office will need a great deal of international support to ensure it 

successfully completes this transition and to prevent old habits from carrying over 

into new practices. 

The office also faces the challenge of strengthening its Human Rights and Justice 

and Peace Units, and providing additional support to overburdened judges so that 

outstanding cases can be resolved. The 351-person Human Rights Unit has within 

it a sub-unit to prioritize 204 cases of violence against trade unionists. Created in 

October 2006, this sub-unit is an important step toward ending impunity in these 

cases. Similar prioritization needs to be given to resolve outstanding human rights 

cases. The 186-person Justice and Peace Unit faces the enormous task of implementing the justice side of the Justice and Peace Law. This entails taking voluntary 

confessions from 2,812 demobilized paramilitary members, receiving reports from 

and interviewing victims, and exhuming and identifying victims at massacre sites. 

In just over one year, with limited resources, through the 40 versiones libres (confessions from demobilized paramilitary leaders) it has taken to date, the unit has 

attained confessions for 200 murder cases and confirmed the locations of over 90 

mass grave locations, which have resulted in locating over 704 victims (of which, 

42 have been identified and 188 others have been preliminarily identified). After receiving information from over 60,000 victims, the unit estimates an additional 3,200 

bodies have yet to be exhumed. Though the Colombian Congress approved an additional $600,000 in assistance for the unit on May 16, additional resources and personnel are greatly needed. 

As the Colombian Government tackles impunity in human rights cases and implements the Justice and Peace Law, it will also need to increase protection for victims, 

witnesses, and vulnerable groups to ensure that human rights are protected and 

justice is served. The Colombian Government runs—with United States support— 

two protection programs that together total $34 million (2006 budget) and provide 

protection to approximately 10,000 individuals. These programs are vital to preventing human rights abuses and more needs to be done to coordinate the two in 

order to ensure that vulnerable persons receive the protection they need. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Colombian Government and international partners—including NGOs and international organizations—to ensure 

these challenges are met and that respect for human rights and democracy are advanced throughout the process. 

436 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service. 

Answer. The promotion of human rights was at the center of United States Embassy activities in Bogota under Ambassador Patterson and Ambassador Wood. If 

confirmed, I will do all I can to ensure that the widely recognized improvements 

that occurred during their tenures will continue. We seek an end to the cycle of violence, respect for the human rights of all Colombians, especially vulnerable groups; 

expansion of protection programs; and an end to impunity. 

Human rights issues will be at the forefront of my agenda in meetings with Colombian Government officials at every level. In addition, I will continue the periodic 

meetings and consultations with Colombian and international human rights organizations as well as representatives of international organizations such as the Office 

of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bogota and the International Committee of the Red Cross. My door will be open, as will be the door of all key staff. 

In addition, I will certainly continue my practice of meeting often with embassy 

officers who work on human rights issues and to give them my full support. This 

includes making sure that all elements of the embassy understand the importance 

of our human rights concerns and are accurately reflecting them in our activities. 

I will also pay close attention to ensure that the formulation of our proposals for 

U.S. Government programs includes protection of human rights, justice sector reforms, humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons, and attention to the 

situation of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. 

If confirmed, I will continue to mandate that the embassy adhere to Secretary 

Rice’s 10 guiding NGO principles regarding the treatment by governments of nongovernmental organizations. In concordance with the Guiding Principles on NonGovernmental Organizations, we will continue to recognize that nongovernmental 

organizations are essential to the development and success of free societies and they 

play a vital role in ensuring accountable, democratic governments. 

Supporting human rights is a top strategic priority of the political section, USAID, 

NAS and the mission as a whole. If confirmed, ensuring that these mission elements 

have what they need to do their job—support Colombia’s efforts to improve its 

human rights situation, advocate on behalf of our key human rights interests, and 

call attention to lapses and abuses—will be a top priority of mine. The embassy’s 

designated ‘‘Human rights officers’’ generally work in the political section—coordinating closely with other offices and agencies—on portfolios that are among the mission’s most substantive, interesting, and exciting. In that sense, the position generates the kinds of challenging professional opportunities that translate into recognition and advancement. I plan to make sure that that is and remains the case 

in Embassy Bogota. To that end, I would encourage the relevant embassy personnel 

to take advantage of opportunities for professional development and networking, 

such as the annual Human Rights Officer’s Conference run by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. 

In previous posts, I have always tried to recognize Foreign Service officers for superior service, either through their performance reviews or special awards, and intend to continue to do so. One way to recognize outstanding work by our human 

rights officers is to nominate them for the Annual Assistant Secretary’s Award from 

the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for exceptional achievement in 

the field of democracy and human rights. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. During my career, and especially as I moved into more senior positions, 

I have sought to ensure that the promotion of human rights objectives are an integral part of U.S. Embassy activities. In my many years of public service, I have always placed great emphasis on human rights. The following is a review of some of 

the actions I have taken in this area: 

• El Salvador (1981–1983): I worked to bring to justice the murderers of four 

United States churchwomen, two AFL–CIO advisers, and the head of the 

campesino (peasant farmer) union, and several other labor leaders. I also initiated outreach and programs with Nahuat indigenous communities in western 

El Salvador. 

• Argentina (1986–1989): As human rights officer, I worked with the Madres de 

Plaza de Mayo, Nobel Prize-Winner Perez Ezquivel, and other NGO’s to bring 

437 

to account those who had abused human rights during previous years of military rule. 

• Geneva (1995–1998): As Counselor for Humanitarian Affairs, I worked with the 

U.N. and other international organizations to bring initial international relief, 

support, and observation to Bosnia (Srebenijna and Sarajevo), the Great Lakes 

region of central Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire), and the Kurdish provinces 

of northern Iraq, and West Africa. 

• Colombia (as Deputy Assistant Secretary, 1999–2001): Established and initially 

led the quarterly United States Government consultations with United States, 

Colombian, and international NGO’s on human rights, integrated human rights 

programs into United States support for Plan Colombia, and provided input for 

United States policy and operations. This work earlier included consulting with 

NGOs and Congressional staffers on establishment of a certification process 

that would measure Colombia’s human rights progress. While not perfect, this 

process has contributed to the significant improvements we have seen in Colombia since 2000. 

• Chile (2002–2004): As the United States Ambassador to Chile, I established 

public affairs programs in support of Mapuche indigenous communities in 

southern Chile. 

• Venezuela (2004–2007): Most recently, as the United States Ambassador to 

Venezuela, I provided regular, systematic, and public support for all human 

rights, civil society, free speech, and democracy NGO’s in Venezuela, including 

direct and indirect funding for more than 20 such organizations. I defended 

publicly all these NGO’s, which brought a threat of expulsion from the Venezuelan authorities. I visited most of these NGO’s in their offices, in the face 

of violent Chavista mob attacks and protests. I also established support programs for Venezuelan poor indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan communities for 

education and health care. 

RESPONSES OF WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. How would the Government of Colombia react if the United States Congress failed to ratify a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between our two countries? 

What implications would the failure to ratify this agreement have for Colombia and 

for our greater interests in Latin America? 

Answer. Failure to approve this agreement would strain relations with the Colombian people, and would have ramifications for United States foreign policy interests 

throughout the region. The carefully negotiated agreement that we signed with Colombia is widely seen as a mutually beneficial trade pact that will expand economic 

and social opportunity, thereby helping to lock-in Colombia’s hard won gains. If we 

fail to approve the agreement, it will cause others throughout the region to question 

our reliability and the sincerity of our commitment to the human and developmental 

goals that are the cornerstone of our policy in the region. As a result, we would suffer a tremendous setback in securing a prosperous and free hemisphere. 

The Colombian people have worked hard—and paid an enormous human price— 

to achieve a stable, democratic, transparent political system. They have vested their 

hopes in, and given their votes to, a President who is extending his government’s 

authority throughout the country and seeking to deliver security, health care, economic opportunity, and education to all Colombians. Colombia embraces democratic 

governance and open markets as the path to economic opportunity and freedom for 

its people. It shares our belief that the trade agreement will contribute to the overall development and growth of its nation and to bring expanded opportunity to all 

sectors of society. 

The United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) will solidify the 

social and economic reforms that have provided sustained growth over the past 5 

years. It will develop a permanent base on which to boost trade, attract investment, 

create jobs, and further cut poverty. Trade-led growth creates higher-paying jobs, 

and workers in trading industries enjoy improved conditions and benefits. Prestigious Colombian academics and economists predict a minimum 3 percent GDP 

benefit from CTPA passage. 

Question. What are Colombia’s largest export and import markets currently? 

What products? Would an FTA between the United States and Colombia change 

commercial flows for Colombia? How so? 

438 

Answer. Colombia’s largest export markets are the United States, Venezuela, Ecuador, Spain, and Peru. Major exports to the United States include: petroleum and 

petroleum products, coal, coffee, flowers, gold, bananas, and apparel. 

Colombia receives most of its imports from the United States, Mexico, China, 

Brazil, and Venezuela. Major imports from the United States are: corn, chemicals, 

aircraft and aircraft parts, wheat, machinery, and oils. 

According to the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), the United 

States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) ‘‘may have a small, positive effect on the United States economy.’’ United States exports to Colombia will experience an estimated 13.7 percent increase valued at $1.1 billion with full implementation of the TPA, and United States GDP is expected to increase by $2.5 billion (just 

under .05 percent). The ITC projects ‘‘the TPA will provide annual benefits to U.S. 

consumers worth $419 million in the economy of 2007.’’ Because of tariff asymmetry 

(especially the tariff preferences currently provided to Colombian exports to the 

United States under the Andean Trade Preference Act), the commission report notes 

that ‘‘the TPA is likely to result in a much greater increase in United States exports 

to Colombia’’ than vice versa. 

Question. What United States products/markets stand to benefit from increased 

trade and lower tariffs with Colombia? What U.S. States produce these products? 

Answer. Under the CTPA, over 80 percent of United States exports of consumer 

and industrial products to Colombia will become duty-free immediately, with remaining tariffs phased out over 10 years. The phase-out of tariffs and quotas is predicted to create the largest increase by value in United States exports to Colombia 

in the areas of (1) chemical, rubber, and plastic products, and (2) machinery and 

equipment. The TPA will also lead to substantial increases in U.S. exports of motor 

vehicles and parts, electronic equipment, paper products, metal products, ferrous 

metals, and wheat. 

In addition, over half the value of current United States agricultural exports to 

Colombia will enter duty-free upon entry into force of the CTPA, including high 

quality beef, a variety of poultry products, soybean meal, cotton, wheat, whey, and 

most horticultural and processed food products. Furthermore, U.S. agricultural exporters will achieve new duty-free access through tariff-rate quotas, including on 

corn, rice, dairy products, and pet food. 

Colombia’s top 10 trading partners among the 50 States—Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Illinois, Alabama, California, North Carolina, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 

Georgia—all exported $126 million or more in 2006 to Colombia. All 10 States have 

at least one of the previously listed industries in their top five exports. 

RESPONSES OF PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State 

Department Relations? 

Answer. Yes, I have read cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State Department Relations. 

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable? 

Answer. Yes, I understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable. 

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must 

remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’s role and its need for separation from the 

day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies’’? 

Answer. Yes, I understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ 

and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’s role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies.’’ 

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise 

your Chief of Mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much 

autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does 

not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies’’? 

439 

Answer. Yes, I pledge to exercise my Chief of Mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide 

the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations 

as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies.’’ 

RESPONSES OF PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. What are the major problems that Peru is facing? 

Answer. Peru faces a set of interrelated challenges. First and foremost is persistent poverty. Close to half of Peruvians, mostly in the southern highlands and 

the Amazonian lowlands, continue to live below the poverty line. The government’s 

primary challenge is to expand the benefits of economic growth, both in the form 

of jobs and improved social services, to the regions where poverty is most heavily 

concentrated and to the country’s poorest classes, who believe that the country’s economic growth has failed to benefit them. 

This sense of alienation has fueled support for radical presidential candidates, 

buttressed the strength of political leaders who favor coca production, and provided 

the basis for an increasingly fragmented political landscape. The challenge is to consolidate Peru’s democracy, increase social inclusion, and ‘‘lock in’’ and expand recent 

policy gains. 

Another major challenge facing Peru is security, particularly the scourge of narcotrafficking, which is complicated by the increasing internationalization of the drug 

trade and evidence of growing linkages between narcotraffickers and the terrorist 

remnants of Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) providing them protection and 

undoubtedly benefiting from drug trafficking revenues. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you establish goals for assistance in Peru? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to use existing mechanisms, principally the 

Mission Strategic Plan (MSP), for defining and planning our foreign assistance 

goals. I have reviewed the goals in the most recent MSP for fiscal year 2009 and 

it is clear that they address the major challenges facing Peru. These goals are (1) 

improved governance and inclusion of marginalized citizens to strengthen support 

for democracy; (2) ensuring prosperity for all through trade and investment-led economic growth; (3) achieving peace and security; (4) investing the gains from economic growth in human development; (5) effective counterterrorism; and (6) fortifying the foundation of trust in United States leadership and support for Peru 

among the Peruvian public. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with all members of the Country 

Team, drawing on the strengths and expertise of each agency at post, and will consult regularly with Congress and all interested agencies in Washington to define 

whether and how these goals should be revised as the situation in Peru progresses. 

Also, if confirmed, I will meet regularly with all elements of Peruvian society, including public officials, the private sector, civil society, and individual citizens 

around the country to determine how we can best work with Peruvians collaboratively to meet the country’s ongoing challenges and design an appropriate foreign 

assistance response. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you coordinate United States bilateral assistance? 

How will you coordinate with multilateral organizations? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to rely on the comprehensive system of 

interagency thematic group meetings among Embassy Lima staff on a weekly or biweekly basis to ensure that United States foreign policy objectives and assistance 

activities coincide. Under the leadership of the COM, the United States Mission in 

Peru uses interagency groups on counternarcotics, democracy, economic and commercial matters, political-military issues, and health and education to coordinate efforts of the various agencies at post. 

Regarding coordination with other donors, the Government of Peru, through an 

agency within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leads coordination efforts for both bilateral and multilateral assistance. The government’s leadership in coordinating donors is the most effective way to promote the sustainability and efficiency of assistance efforts by ensuring that donor efforts fit within host country strategies and are 

not duplicative. In addition, members of the country team meet regularly with both 

bilateral and multilateral donors. If confirmed, I will ensure that these close coordination efforts continue. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you conduct oversight of foreign assistance? 

Answer. The best means of conducting oversight is to promote close collaboration 

among all United States Government agencies at post so that the broad variety of 

440 

development programs implemented by our Embassy in Peru are integrated and 

have the greatest impact. Specifically, if confirmed, I will continue to use the structure of the five interagency thematic working groups in the areas of counternarcotics, democracy, economic and commercial matters, political-military, and 

health and education. Another important aspect of oversight that I will continue is 

frequent personal visits to the field by me and embassy officers to observe firsthand 

our understanding of political, social, and economic realities and conduct oversight 

of programs to see that they are administered within the parameters of pertinent 

law and regulation, and that they are achieving their stated goals. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you evaluate whether or not goals are being met? 

What will your monitoring mechanisms be? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would rely on a variety of existing mechanisms to measure 

progress toward goals and monitor implementation. Currently, weekly or biweekly 

interagency thematic meetings are used to ensure that U.S. foreign policy objectives 

and program activities coincide. This is an effective coordination and monitoring 

mechanism that I would continue, if confirmed. 

Second, our planning mechanisms establish precise, quantitative results we plan 

to achieve with assistance. Specifically, in the Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) we lay 

out up to two performance indicators per goal and establish targets for three fiscal 

years, currently 2007, 2008, and 2009. Actual results are reported on in subsequent 

MSPs and allow us to judge progress toward the goal and make mid-course corrections as needed. 

Finally, an extensive set of standard indicators in the Foreign Assistance Framework permits more precise target-setting and results measurement, specifically at 

the level of each activity in our foreign assistance portfolio. 

RESPONSES OF PETER MICHAEL MCKINLEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Peru? 

What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and 

democracy in Peru? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. In general, Peru has a strong record on democracy and human rights. 

The Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed in Lima, Peru, on September 

11, 2001. On the fifth anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, Peru 

submitted a voluntary report on its own implementation of the Charter. Freedom 

House ranks Peru 2 out of 7 on political rights and 3 out of 7 on civil liberties, with 

an overall status of ‘‘free.’’ Last year, Alan Garcia of the Popular Revolutionary 

Party Alliance (APRA) won the presidency in elections that were generally free, fair, 

and transparent. The government generally respected the human rights of its citizens, and continued efforts begun during the Toledo administration to expand and 

consolidate labor law and to prosecute those responsible for gross human rights violations. As the annual human rights report makes clear, however, there are a number of areas where the implementation and application of national laws requires 

stronger follow-up. 

Also, Peru still faces several challenges. The terrorist organization, Shining Path 

(Sendero Luminoso), continues to be responsible for killings, kidnappings, and other 

human rights abuses. In addition, prison and detention center conditions are poor, 

and in the past the media has faced attacks by local authorities and organized 

crime. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that the embassy continues its two-pronged approach 

of promoting greater citizen participation in government decision making and improving service delivery. I will support USAID’s work to strengthen the national 

legal framework for decentralization and train regional presidents, mayors, and 

their staff on the use of transparent financial and management systems to facilitate 

active citizen participation and greater accountability. If confirmed, I will work with 

USAID in order to provide technical assistance to political parties to increase their 

representativeness. USAID will also administer MCC funds aimed at complementing Government of Peru efforts to control corruption and strengthen systems 

to improve predictability in the administration of justice. 

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Peru in advancing human 

rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. If confirmed, the primary challenges to consolidating democracy in Peru 

will be building wider relationships with segments of the population who have yet 

to benefit from the country’s strong economic growth and do not feel fully enfranVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00448 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
441 

chised, and reducing a level of poverty which has fueled support for radical political 

alternatives in an increasingly fragmented political landscape. In addition, Peru is 

dealing with a legacy of human rights abuses that are still working their way 

through the court systems. While exceptional rates of economic growth are providing 

the Government of Peru with a budget surplus, these funds must be used for systemic change to demonstrate that democracy can deliver to all citizens. 

I believe that civil society plays a vital role in strengthening respect for human 

rights. Last year, the Government of Peru enacted a law regulating NGOs that is 

vaguely written. NGOs are concerned that it could be applied selectively for political 

purposes. If confirmed, I will build on the strong lead of Ambassador Struble and 

our USAID Mission to urge the Government of Peru to ensure that NGOs enjoy the 

appropriate legal and regulatory freedom to carry out their important work. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. Supporting human rights is a top strategic priority of the political section, USAID, NAS, and the mission as a whole. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure that these mission elements have the support and recognition they 

need to do their job—support Peru’s efforts to improve its human rights situation, 

advocate on behalf of our key human rights interests, and call attention to lapses 

and abuses. The designated embassy ‘‘human rights officer’’ generally works in the 

political section—coordinating closely with other offices and agencies—on a portfolio 

that is among the mission’s most substantive, interesting, and exciting. In that 

sense, the position generates the kinds of challenging professional opportunities that 

translate into recognition and advancement. I plan to make sure that that is and 

remains the case in Embassy Lima. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that the embassy adheres to Secretary Rice’s 10 guiding NGO principles regarding the treatment by governments of nongovernmental organizations. In concordance with the Guiding Principles on Non-Governmental Organizations, we will continue to recognize that nongovernmental organizations are 

essential to the development and success of free societies and they play a vital role 

in ensuring accountable, democratic governments. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. I have spent most of my career working on regions and countries in conflict or in post-conflict transition. The promotion of human rights and a democratic 

outcome have been central objectives of the United States in the work I did during 

the negotiations leading to Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban 

troops in Angola in the late 1980s, during the U.N.-supervised peace process and 

elections in Mozambique in the mid-1990s; and in Uganda in the late 1990s where 

opening the political space for the opposition and consolidating democratic gains 

under President Museveni were important United States goals. In the earlier part 

of this decade, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to work with refugee programs in many parts of the world, to support programming for abused women and 

children in conflict situations, and to be part of the response to the crisis in Darfur 

and the first negotiations of a ceasefire. 

I have rarely evaluated my specific contributions outside the context of the many 

other people I have worked with, both inside and outside the State Department. 

Perhaps the most significant actions I took were as a member of small U.S. Government negotiating teams successfully responding to crises or conflicts causing widespread loss of life, devastation, and atrocities. As Angola/Namibia desk officer between 1987–1989, and as the sole Spanish and Portuguese speaker on Assistant 

Secretary Crocker’s negotiating team, I supported talks which led to Namibia’s independence, its emergence as a democracy, and the end of apartheid in that country. 

Namibia’s independence also ended the long-running conflict which had caused the 

loss of thousands of lives. In Mozambique, I worked closely with my ambassador 

and the U.N. team to ensure that the country’s first-ever democratic elections in 

1994 were a success, to include personally helping convince the former insurgency 

movement not to pull out of the process during an election-eve crisis. The result has 

been more than a dozen years of peace, the return of more than 2 million refugees 

to their homes, and an emerging democracy. 

In Uganda, I personally and successfully lobbied to have additional funding provided to a hospital in northern Uganda that was servicing a displaced population 

442 

of tens of thousands in the wake of the brutal Lord’s Resistance Army insurgency. 

In both Mozambique and Uganda, as Deputy Chief of Mission, I worked with and 

supported nongovernmental organizations on capacity-building for emerging parliaments. In Washington, as the PRM Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for 

African and European programs, I sought to increase funding for UNT–ICR and 

NGO programs specifically aimed at vulnerable populations of women and children, 

to include at camps in Kenya, Guinea, and Chechnya. Working with the Africa Bureau and USAID, I was a member of the team responding to the crisis in Darfur 

starting in late 2003, with trips to the border region with Chad, and produced personal recommendations for much greater resource commitment on the ground at a 

time when consensus on Darfur’s tragedy was still forming. I also took over the 

United States negotiating team to the international talks in Ndjamena which produced the first ceasefire in Darfur in April 2004, but unfortunately the latter did 

not produce the desired results. 

Almost by definition, conflict resolution and post-conflict transitions cannot succeed without human rights and democracy as the core objectives and desired outcomes of our diplomatic efforts. It is also important to work with other interested 

governments, donors, international organizations, and NGOs and civil society. In my 

current position, I have been privileged to be part of the growing dialog with the 

European Union on how to promote democracy and human rights more widely in 

our joint efforts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Middle East. 

(443) 

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Ereli, Joseph Adam, to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain 

Norland, Richard Boyce, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Uzbekistan 

Patterson, Anne Woods, to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic 

of Pakistan 

Powell, Nancy J., to be Ambassador to Nepal 

Seche, Stephen A., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Kerry presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry and Feingold. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. Thank you. This hearing will come to order. I 

apologize to everybody for being a little late. We’re in the middle 

of negotiations on the energy bill, that subject of CAFE standards, 

which we’ve been fighting about for as long as I’ve been here. So 

we’re trying to see if we can get something done on that, and I 

apologize again for being late. 

Thank you all very much for being here. This hearing is to examine the nominations for ambassador of a number of career Foreign 

Service officers: the Honorable Anne Woods Patterson to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; the Honorable Nancy 

Powell, to be Ambassador to Nepal; Mr. Joseph Adam Ereli, to be 

Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain; Mr. Richard Boyce 

Norland, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Uzbekistan; and Mr. 

Stephen A. Seche, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen. 

I might add, having sat on these hearings for a long time now, 

it is really both refreshing and enormously reassuring to see so 

much experience at one time and so many people whose long careers have really, I think, prepared them all so effectively for these 

challenging missions. There isn’t one mission here that isn’t challenging in one way or the other. 

We thank your families also. I certainly personally understand 

the commitment and sacrifices involved in your service and we’re 

444 

very grateful to all of you for that, particularly those of you going 

places where it takes a real toll in a lot of different ways. 

So we welcome all of you here and we welcome any family members who have come to share this hearing with you. 

Let me just speak individually if I can for a moment. Ms. Patterson, thank you. I’m very glad we had a chance earlier to talk personally. I met with the foreign minister just the day before yesterday and we had a good meeting and discussed some of the subjects 

that you and I talked about. 

The position you’ve been nominated for, Ambassador to Pakistan, 

is a central one in terms of our current efforts in struggling with 

terrorism. Pakistan, needless to say, has been a key ally in the region and in the fight against terrorism. It’s one of the most significant and complex relationships we have anywhere in the world. Recent developments there are obviously of great concern to many of 

us on the committee. 

Pakistan clearly has many contributions to make in the fight 

against terrorism and they have also made sacrifices in this effort. 

But we’re also concerned about the current situation in the border 

region with Afghanistan, and particularly in North Waziristan, 

where the deal President Musharraf made with local tribal leaders 

has not worked out, as many predicted. 

Al-Qaeda has reportedly established a base of operations there 

and we know the direct threat that those bases can pose to us and 

to our allies. Most judgments are that Osama bin Laden and top 

al-Qaeda leaders are still likely hiding out somewhere in that region. And the Taliban has been using that area as a base from 

which to launch attacks against coalition forces and the Government of Afghanistan. 

So we need to continue discussing how Pakistan can address this 

problem and show greater accountability for the dollars that we’re 

putting in there. 

Recent political developments are also troublesome. President 

Musharraf’s refusal so far, though I trust that this will be resolved, 

but the question of his living up to his promise to relinquish his 

role as the chief of the military, his unwillingness yet, though I 

think this may also resolve itself, to allow former prime ministers 

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to return to the country for the 

upcoming elections, and the arrest of hundreds of political activists 

from opposition parties, have raised fundamental questions about 

the future of democracy. 

The President’s dismissal of the chief justice of the Supreme 

Court resulted in widespread protests and has raised concerns 

about the rule of law. The temporary crackdown on the media 

could have a chilling effect on free press in the future. So we need 

to reinforce our commitment for both democracy, human rights, respect for the rule of law, and find a way—and this is your task— 

to balance all of that with the complicated mutuality that is needed 

in other endeavors. 

I know that Deputy Secretary Negroponte and the Assistant Secretary have been in Pakistan recently raising these concerns and 

I would be interested in hearing your views on them today. 

Bahrain has long been an ally of the United States. We have had 

a U.S. naval command there for nearly 60 years. The country now 

445 

faces many of the challenges that we see unfolding across the region. It has a majority Shia population with Sunni leadership and 

we know that Iran has attempted to influence, to extend the influence that it’s always had there. In fact, if you go back historically 

to its independence, that independence came about partly as a result of their efforts to separate themselves from Iran. 

They have made some significant progress in implementing 

democratic reforms and respecting freedom of religion, but more remains to be done. Given that their oil reserves might be exhausted 

in the next 15 years, they, needless to say, want to diversify their 

economy, and there are many, many reforms and quite a remarkable level of developments taking place there, as we all know. But 

it’s a key as we try to bring stability to a chaotic region. 

Yemen also presents, similarly, significant challenges for American foreign policy. While it’s the only republic in the region, it’s 

also one of the poorest countries in the area, lacking its own oil resources particularly and other resources. And it has a very high 

population growth. In fact, some have suggested that Yemen is at 

real risk of becoming a failed state in the next decades. 

Even now, significant portions of Yemen are outside the control 

of government and potentially provide a haven for terrorists. We all 

remember that the USS Cole was attacked in the port of Aden. 

It is in the interest of both the United States and Yemen that 

we work together to find sustainable solutions to the challenges 

that we face. 

After nearly a decade of civil war and many years of autocratic 

rule, a place that most people have always thought of as rather 

peaceful, Nepal, finds itself at a critical point in its history. The 

United States and the international community need to help Nepal 

to restore and solidify their democracy. Key to this is moving forward with the process of integrating the Maoist opposition into the 

political process. 

Nepal faces a tough road ahead and we obviously need to give 

them the support they need to succeed. Our ambassador’s relationship and leverage in that process will be critical. 

In Uzbekistan, one of the more powerful of the Central Asian 

former Soviet republics, we are faced with deteriorating relations 

with an increasingly brutal and repressive dictator in Islam 

Karimov. For a brief period after 9/11, we had a more cooperative 

relationship with Mr. Karimov, but subsequent human rights violations have led us to sever our military ties. 

We need to emphasize the need for genuine significant improvement in Uzbekistan’s record on human rights, religious rights, 

press freedoms, NGO rights, and democratic reforms. 

So it’s clear that each of you as ambassadors would be going to 

face some very immediate, complicated, and important challenges. 

And I know the members of this committee will be interested in 

how you’re going to approach them, but also in the progress as we 

go along over the next year and a half or more. 

So we’re slightly under the gun here, but I don’t think this is 

going to be a prolonged hearing, the reason being that we have a 

meeting on Iraq at about 4:00, a little bit after 4:00. So I suspect 

that it will not push us up against the wall, but I just wanted to 

sound that note of alarm. 

446 

So this is the picture. It’s an interesting group of places. This is 

actually enormously challenging when you put it all together, and 

it’s not separate, either. It’s all interconnected, which makes it all 

the more fascinating in terms of our larger interests and goals. 

So thank you again for being here. Why don’t we get into your 

testimony. If I could ask you each summarize your testimony, and 

each of your testimonies will also be placed in the record in full 

and then we can have a dialog, which I think would be helpful. 

So Ambassador Patterson, if you’d lead off and we’ll just run 

down the line. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE WOODS PATTERSON, NOMINEE TO 

BE AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN 

Ms. PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m honored to be 

here today as President Bush’s nominee for Ambassador to Pakistan. I would like to thank the President and Secretary Rice for the 

confidence they have shown by nominating me to serve in this position. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee 

and Congress in furthering our goals in Pakistan. Allow me to 

summarize my written statement. 

U.S. relations with Pakistan were transformed after the September 11 attacks, when Pakistan made a commitment to stand 

with us against terrorism and extremism. I endorse the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to comprehensively support the Pakistan 

Government in its struggle against extremists and am ready to assist Pakistan in its plan to enhance internal security, propel democratic reform, and improve relations with its neighbors. 

The United States must maintain and enhance Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terror and, if confirmed, it will be my most 

urgent task. 

Additionally, I am fully committed to encouraging a democratic 

transition by supporting free and fair elections. The Pakistani people deserve the same right we in the United States enjoy, the right 

to choose their leaders democratically. But we also know that democracy means more than just holding elections. It means building 

respect for the rule of law and reinforcing institutions such as a 

free press that are essential for democracy to flourish. Social and 

economic development programs play an instrumental part in nurturing democracy and we should step up our efforts to assist the 

Government of Pakistan in bettering the lives of its citizens, particularly in ungoverned parts of the country, so that terrorism and 

radicalism will not find fertile ground. 

These goals are not contradictory, but mutually reinforcing. We 

therefore have to move forward together with the Pakistanis on all 

fronts simultaneously. 

Pakistan’s contribution to the war on terror has been significant. 

Since 2001 the Pakistani Government has arrested hundreds of 

terrorist suspects, turning over to the United States such senior alQaeda figures as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, 

and Abu Zubaida. Eighty-five thousand Pakistani forces are stationed on the Afghan border and more than 450 members of Pakistan’s security forces have sacrificed their lives in support of 

antiterror efforts. 

447 

We are committed to supporting Pakistan’s new strategy in the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas with development assistance, 

appropriate aid to the military and police, and new measures to 

promote investment. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of Defense, 

the United States Congress, and our Pakistani and nongovernmental partners on these and other key issues, such as furthering 

legal protection for women and ethnic and religious minorities, and 

combating child labor and human trafficking. Similarly, I intend to 

actively pursue our public diplomacy efforts inside Pakistan to ensure that we reach out to Pakistani citizens. 

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan’s good relations with neighboring states 

are also crucial to its progress toward a stable, peaceful, and prosperous democracy. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the 

Pakistani Government and my colleagues in Embassy Kabul to 

support efforts to build a stable Afghanistan. The joint statement 

issued by President Musharraf and President Karzai in Ankara 

this spring demonstrates growing cooperation between the two 

countries, but very serious tensions remain. 

With United States assistance, Pakistan is working to secure its 

border with Afghanistan to prevent the smuggling of arms, terrorists, and illegal drugs which are fueling the Taliban insurgency. 

The United States and NATO must continue to foster expanded 

Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral dialog. 

On the eastern border, we remain ready to support and assist 

Pakistan and India’s renewed commitment to the Indo-Pakistani 

reconciliation. We recognize the progress made by the Pakistan 

Government in disabling the A.Q. Khan proliferation network and 

the steps taken to ensure that such a network cannot be reconstituted. However, we must continue to be vigilant and, if confirmed, 

I will remain engaged with Pakistan on this vital issue. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed I look forward to working with the 

Congress as we face the challenge of building a strong strategic 

partnership with Pakistan that reflects and protects these interests. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Patterson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE WOODS PATTERSON, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the committee. I am honored that 

the President and Secretary have expressed their confidence in me through this 

nomination. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will do my best to advance the multiple and related 

United States goals in Pakistan. The United States must maintain and enhance 

Pakistan’s invaluable cooperation in the war on terror and, if confirmed, it will be 

my most urgent task. It is my belief that these efforts will help prevent attacks on 

our homeland and on American and allied troops in Afghanistan, and reduce violence against civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States must also 

encourage a democratic transition by supporting free and fair elections, respect for 

the rule of law and the systems that underpin it, and institutions such as a free 

press that are essential for democracy to survive and flourish. We should step up 

our efforts to assist the Government of Pakistan in bettering the lives of its citizens, 

particularly in ungoverned parts of the country, so that terrorism and radicalism 

will not find fertile ground. 

These goals are not contradictory but mutually reinforcing. In my previous assignments, I learned that criminals and insurgents cannot prosper if the government 

has a presence in the villages, provides the population with decent public services, 

448 

and allows them a voice in their own future. We therefore have to move forward 

together with the Pakistanis on all fronts simultaneously. 

United States relations with Pakistan were dramatically transformed after the 

September 11 attacks, when Pakistan made a clear commitment to stand with us 

against terrorism and extremism. The 9/11 Commission recommended the United 

States Government ‘‘support Pakistan’s Government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better 

education . . .’’ As the commission recognized, we have a strong interest in the success of Pakistan’s ambitious program to enhance internal security and propel democratic reform. We also have a strong interest in a Pakistan that is secure in its borders and at peace with its neighbors. I believe we have the right plan in place to 

work with Pakistan on all of these fronts. The challenge is to maintain the right 

balance and implement the plan quickly and effectively. 

There has been a lot of discussion about whether Pakistan can and should ‘‘do 

more’’ in the war on terror. 

Pakistan’s contribution has been significant. Since 2001, the Pakistani Government has arrested hundreds of terrorist suspects, turning over to the United States 

such senior al-Qaeda figures as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and 

Abu Zubaida. Eighty-five thousand Pakistani forces are currently stationed on the 

rough terrain of the Afghanistan border, and more than 450 members of Pakistan’s 

security forces have sacrificed their lives in support of antiterror efforts. Pakistani 

security operations in the tribal areas are disrupting terrorist activities in an area 

where terrorists previously felt secure. One unfortunate indicator of the insurgents’ 

desperation to maintain their hold is the intimidation of the local population 

through targeting tribal leaders. 

In many of these offensives against militants, Pakistani troops are using equipment and training provided by the United States. This assistance has been crucial 

to bolstering Pakistan’s antiterrorism capabilities, and by extension, our own. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of Defense (DOD), with our Pakistani counterparts, and with Congress to ensure that the Pakistani forces have the 

necessary training and equipment to conduct these operations appropriately and effectively. 

Also, much less frequently mentioned is Pakistani cooperation in facilitating the 

logistical support of United States and NATO forces deployed in neighboring Afghanistan. Most of our support for coalition forces in Afghanistan pass through 

Pakistan. Without Pakistani support and cooperation, we would face severe difficulties in supplying, reinforcing, and protecting our and allied troops defending the 

democratically elected Afghan Government. 

The Government of Pakistan is committed to improving living conditions and expanding governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and this 

past February, the State Department briefed you on the United States Government’s multiyear plan to assist Pakistan in this effort. FATA has the worst social 

indicators in all of Pakistan, such as only a 3 percent female literacy rate. We believe this Pakistani strategy, supported by us and other international donors, will 

make these areas less hospitable to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist 

groups, while improving the quality of life for the citizens in FATA. 

At the same time, I am under no illusions concerning the difficulties faced by the 

Pakistan Government in extending its writ into these territories or about al-Qaeda 

and Taliban activities in this area, and the level of commitment required to prevent 

them from finding safe-haven there. I give you my personal commitment that this 

will always be a top priority. 

Mr. Chairman, I also want to underscore to you and to the Pakistani people my 

firm commitment to fostering a fully functioning, sustainable democracy. 

Our partnership with the Pakistanis gives us an opportunity to support Pakistan’s 

own efforts to become a modern, prosperous, democratic state, and a moderate voice 

in the Islamic world. This is the vision for Pakistan that President Musharraf has 

articulated. It is strongly in the United States’ national interest that Pakistan succeeds in realizing this vision. 

President Musharraf has stated that he is committed to holding a free and fair 

election in the coming months. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that we are in position to assist Pakistan in this process and to help the Pakistani people strengthen 

their democratic institutions by participating in an open and honest electoral process. The Pakistani people deserve the same right we in the United States enjoy— 

the right to choose their leaders democratically. 

But we in the United States also know that democracy means more than just 

holding elections, although elections are certainly a necessary component. Democracy means a free and vibrant press, the right to free assembly, a fair and impartial 

criminal justice system, active civil society organizations, and broadly participative 

449 

and responsive political parties. Throughout the world, it is U.S. Government policy 

to back democratic institutions with training, assistance, and moral support, and I 

will look to intensify these efforts in Pakistan. 

Social and economic development programs also play an instrumental role in nurturing democracy. United States development assistance in Pakistan is tailored to 

help build sustainable growth and improve living standards that promote the conditions for good governance, responsible citizenship, and foreign investment. In this 

context, our education programs are particularly important. The United States is 

supporting the Pakistani Government’s efforts to upgrade public education, placing 

emphasis on improving the quality and affordability of Pakistan’s public schools. 

This will allow parents of limited means to pursue educational opportunities for 

their children beyond religiously oriented madrassahs. 

I will also work closely with our Pakistani and nongovernmental partners on key 

issues such as furthering women’s rights and legal protection for ethnic and religious minorities, and combating forced child labor and human trafficking. Women’s 

health appears to be a particular challenge in Pakistan, and my previous posts have 

shown me that the rate of maternal mortality can be lowered significantly with 

properly trained rural health providers. 

Similarly, I intend to actively pursue our public diplomacy efforts inside Pakistan 

to ensure that we reach out to Pakistani citizens to share our own message, and 

help others understand American policies, views, and values. The Pakistanis have 

not always had such a clouded picture of the United States as today; rather very 

early reaction toward American assistance in the 1950s was very encouraging. 

Americans continue to be generous in their willingness to help and reach out to 

Pakistanis. I was impressed and moved by the Pakistani reaction to United States 

earthquake relief, where the immediate and overwhelming support of the U.S. military and the donations of private Americans saved many lives. Nothing could have 

been more effective in demonstrating American values and disseminating a message 

of friendship between our peoples. 

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan’s good relations with neighboring states are also crucial 

to its progress toward a stable, peaceful, and prosperous democracy. 

I will continue to work with the Pakistani Government and my colleagues in Embassy Kabul to support efforts to build a stable Afghanistan. The joint statement 

issued by President Musharraf and President Karzai in Ankara this spring demonstrates growing cooperation between the two countries. But it is obvious that tensions remain. United States and NATO policies must continue to foster expanded 

Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral dialog, stronger economic and trade ties, and deeper 

cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan border security forces. With United 

States assistance, Pakistan is working to secure its border with Afghanistan to prevent the smuggling of arms, terrorists, and illegal drugs which are fueling the 

Taliban insurgency. 

On the eastern border, we have been pleased to see renewed commitment to IndoPakistani reconciliation. Pakistan and India opened the fourth round of the Composite Dialog this past March, a process originally launched in 2004. We continue 

to be ready to support and assist this important endeavor. 

We also recognize the progress made by the Pakistan Government in disabling the 

A.Q. Khan proliferation network and steps taken to ensure that such a network cannot be reconstituted. During President Bush’s visit to Pakistan in 2006, President 

Musharraf committed that Pakistan would take a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related technology and expertise. We currently have a bilateral program 

through the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program 

(EXBS) to help Pakistan bring its export controls in line with accepted international 

standards. In April, Pakistan established a Strategic Export Control Division within 

its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and earlier this month, Pakistan joined the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 

We are gratified by these steps, however, we must continue to be vigilant and if 

confirmed, I will remain engaged with Pakistan on this issue of vital United States 

interest. 

Finally, I am determined and will work to ensure that the substantial resources 

the American people provide to Pakistan are utilized efficiently and effectively. I 

will also work hard to ensure that the dedicated American employees in Pakistan 

have good security and working conditions that faster fight morale. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress as we face 

the challenge of continuing to build a strong, enduring strategic partnership with 

Pakistan that reflects and protects these interests. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

450 

Ambassador Powell, a little deja vu for you in all that? 

STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY J. POWELL, 

NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO NEPAL 

Ms. POWELL. A little bit, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m deeply honored to be—— 

Senator KERRY. Tell me which country you’re here for? [Laughter.] 

Ms. POWELL [continuing]. As the President’s nominee to serve as 

United States Ambassador to Nepal. I thank both President Bush 

and Secretary Rice for their confidence. If confirmed, I will have 

the privilege of returning to a region that has been the focus of 

much of my career and to an embassy where I spent my second 

tour in the Foreign Service. However, much has changed since 

then. 

Nepal is at a critical juncture in its history. Its Government and 

people are simultaneously working to end a devastating decadelong Maoist insurgency and to established sustained, multiparty 

democracy. They are also struggling to emerge from poverty and to 

address the issues of discrimination and inequality that have long 

plagued Nepal. Peace and democracy in Nepal would directly serve 

United States interests in stability and democracy in South Asia. 

The seven-party alliance and the Maoists, who together comprise 

the interim government, have agreed to a political road map that, 

if fully implemented, has the potential to deliver peace and democracy to Nepal. There has been much progress to date, but success 

is far from assured. Although the Maoists joined the government 

on April 1, they continue to violate commitments they have made 

in the course of the peace process. Unrest in the lowlands along the 

Indian border has further complicated efforts to restore law and 

order and the authority of the government throughout the country. 

The security vacuum and the political stalemate precluded free 

and fair constituent assembly elections from being held this month 

as originally planned. They are now expected in November or early 

December. In order to assure these polls are free and fair when 

they do take place, the government must urgently restore law and 

order throughout the country, complete the legislative and 

logistical groundwork for a well administered election, and reach 

out to disaffected groups to ensure their adequate representation 

and peaceful participation in the political process. 

If confirmed, I will continue our active support of Nepali efforts 

to these ends. 

Although democracy and stability are among our strongest interests in Nepal, they are far from the only ones. Nepal’s magnificent 

art and architecture, as well as its scenery, continue to make it a 

favorite destination of American travelers and the provision of 

services to American citizens is a responsibility that comes ahead 

of all others. Also, achieving durable solutions for the 108,000 Bhutanese refugees in Nepal continues to be a United States priority. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Government of 

Nepal to implement current plans for a voluntary resettlement program that would accommodate at least 60,000 of these refugees. 

451 

I will also encourage the Government of Nepal to ensure that the 

rights of all Tibetan refugees resident in or transiting Nepal are respected. 

There remains room for improvement in Nepal’s efforts to prevent and prosecute human trafficking and to ensure its security 

forces uphold the highest human rights standards. If confirmed, I 

look forward to working with the government on these issues as 

well. 

Foreign assistance is and will continue to be the most useful tool 

at our disposal to influence developments in Nepal along the full 

spectrum of our national interests there, from technical support intended to strengthen Nepal’s nascent democratic institutions to 

health programs that improve the daily lives of many Nepalese, as 

well as humanitarian assistance for refugees and conflict victims 

and training for Nepal’s military that is focused on improving its 

human rights record and working under civilian authority. Our aid 

provides a critical programmatic complement to our diplomacy. I 

take seriously the responsibility to ensure that American taxpayers 

receive high returns on their investment in Nepal. 

If confirmed, I look forward to consulting closely with you, Mr. 

Chairman, all members of the committee and your staffs throughout my tenure in Nepal. I appreciate the opportunity to speak before the committee today. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Powell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR HON. NANCY J. POWELL, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO NEPAL

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am deeply honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to 

Nepal. I thank both President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence. 

If confirmed, I will have the privilege of returning to a region that has been the 

focus of much of my career, and to an embassy where I spent my second tour in 

the Foreign Service. In the 25 years since I left Nepal, I have had the good fortune 

to serve in a wide variety of diplomatic assignments, including as United States Ambassador to Uganda, Ghana, and Pakistan. If confirmed, I will rely on the experience I acquired in those postings, as well as in my most recent assignment as National Intelligence Officer for South Asia at the National Intelligence Council, to 

advance United States’ interests in Nepal. 

Nepal is at a critical juncture in its history. Its government and people are simultaneously working to end a devastating, decade-long Maoist insurgency and establish sustained, multiparty democracy. They are also struggling to emerge from poverty and to address the issues of discrimination and inequality that have long 

plagued Nepal. All of these efforts are eminently worthy of United States support, 

since peace and democracy in Nepal would directly serve United States’ interests 

in stability and democracy in South Asia. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue 

to support the efforts of the Nepalese to bring peace, democracy, and development 

to their country. 

The Seven-Party Alliance and the Maoists, who together comprise the interim 

government, have agreed to a political roadmap that, if fully implemented, has the 

potential to deliver peace and democracy to Nepal. There has been much progress 

to date, but success is far from assured. Although the Maoists joined the government on April 1, they continue to engage in criminal behavior and otherwise violate 

commitments they have made in the course of the peace process. In addition, unrest 

in the Terai (the lowlands along the Indian border) has further complicated efforts 

to restore law and order, and the authority of the government, throughout the country. The security vacuum and the political stalemate in Kathmandu precluded free 

and fair constituent assembly elections from being held this month as originally 

planned; they are now expected in November or early December. 

In order to ensure the polls are free and fair when they do take place, the government must urgently restore law and order throughout the country, complete the legVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00459 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
452 

islative and logistical groundwork for swell-administered election, and reach out to 

disaffected ethnic groups to ensure their adequate representation and peaceful participation in the political process. If confirmed, I will continue our active support of 

Nepali efforts to these ends. 

Although democracy and stability are among our strongest interests in Nepal, 

they are far from the only ones. Nepal’s magnificent architecture and art, as well 

as its scenery, continue to make it a favorite destination of American travelers, and 

the provision of services to Americans is a priority that comes ahead of all others. 

The protection of Americans abroad is not just a responsibility, but a privilege. 

Also, achieving durable solutions for the 108,000 Bhutanese refugees in Nepal 

continues to be a United States priority. If confirmed, I look forward to working 

with the Government of Nepal to implement current plans for a voluntary resettlement program that would accommodate at least 60,000 of these refugees. I will also 

encourage the Government of Nepal to ensure the rights of all Tibetan refugees resident in or transiting Nepal are respected. There remains room for improvement in 

Nepal’s efforts to prevent and prosecute human trafficking and to ensure its security 

forces uphold the highest human rights standards. If confirmed, I look forward to 

working with the government on these issues as well. Foreign assistance is and will 

continue to be the most useful tool at our disposal to influence developments in 

Nepal along the full spectrum of our national interests there. From technical support intended to strengthen Nepal’s nascent democratic institutions, to health programs that improve the daily lives of many Nepalese, to humanitarian assistance 

for refugees and conflict victims, to training for Nepal’s military that is focused on 

improving its human rights record and working under civilian authority, our aid 

provides a critical programmatic complement to our diplomacy. If confirmed, I will 

ensure that American taxpayers continue to receive high returns on their investment in Nepal. 

If confirmed, I look forward to consulting closely with you, Mr. Chairman, all the 

members of the committee, and your staffs throughout my tenure in Nepal. I appreciate the opportunity to speak before the committee today, and would be happy to 

answer any questions you might have. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. 

Mr. Joseph Adam Ereli. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH ADAM ERELI, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN 

Mr. ERELI. Thank you, sir. It’s an honor to be here, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the members of the committee for this opportunity and, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you. 

Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years, as you said in your statement, 

the Kingdom of Bahrain and its leaders have been strong allies and 

close friends of the United States in a very dangerous neighborhood. They have stood with us in times of war and in times of 

peace. Their vision for the future of Bahrain and the region is one 

that we largely share—representative democracy, free trade, and 

security cooperation. My priorities, if confirmed as ambassador, 

would be to move our bilateral relationship forward in all three 

areas. 

Bahrain is a major non-NATO ally. It hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet 

and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command headquarters. It sent air, 

ground, and naval assets to Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. Its naval vessels are serving beside ours in ongoing maritime operations in the Arabian Gulf. 

As an ally with a shared security vision for the region, we have 

an interest in helping Bahrain develop its defense capabilities and 

ensuring interoperability with our forces. An increasingly aggressive, assertive Iran makes this cooperation all the more important. 

If confirmed, sir, I will work closely with my Department of Defense colleagues to enhance Bahraini defense capabilities and their 

cooperation with our forces in confronting regional threats. If conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00460 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
453 

firmed, I will also devote considerable attention to counterterrorism 

cooperation. 

The United States and Bahrain have a free trade agreement 

which entered into force a year ago. It has stimulated economic 

growth and is a positive model for other countries in the region. If 

confirmed, I will focus much of my effort on fully exploring the free 

trade agreement’s potential for United States investment in Bahrain and two-way trade that benefits both our countries. 

Another important goal, sir, for the embassy and the United 

States in the coming years will be to strengthen support for democracy and democratic institutions in Bahrain. Bahrain has had two 

successful parliamentary elections since 2002. Political tendencies 

of all stripes have a voice in the affairs of their country. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen political pluralism, civil society, 

and the rule of law. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, should I be confirmed I will have no 

higher priority than the safety and security of the dedicated men 

and women under my charge, both American and foreign national. 

They are bravely serving our country in difficult circumstances and 

I will do everything in my power to see that they have the resources and protection required to accomplish their mission on behalf of the American people. 

Thank you again, sir, for this opportunity and I’d be pleased to 

answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ereli follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH ADAM ERELI, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, it is an honor to be here today, 

Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the members of the committee for this opportunity. 

I am deeply humbled by the confidence that President Bush and Secretary Rice 

have shown in nominating me to be the next United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain. 

As a Foreign Service officer, there is no higher calling than to serve your country 

as the President’s representative and Chief of Mission. If confirmed, I will honor 

that trust by doing everything in my power to advance American interests and represent faithfully the values of our great Nation in this strategically vital region. 

Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years the Kingdom of Bahrain, its leaders and its people, have been strong allies and close friends in a very dangerous neighborhood. 

They have stood with us in times of war and peace. Their vision for the future of 

Bahrain and the region is one that we share: representative democracy, free trade, 

and security cooperation. My priorities, if confirmed as ambassador, will be to move 

our bilateral relationship forward in all three areas. 

In 2001, President Bush designated Bahrain a major non-NATO ally. This was 

in recognition of almost 50 years of close security cooperation and partnership, 

marked by its hosting the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and the U.S. Naval 

Forces Central Command. Bahrain hosted the United States-led Multinational 

Interdiction Force that enforced the U.N. embargo on Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Bahrain deployed naval assets in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. It sent air, 

ground, and naval assets to Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Its naval 

vessels are serving beside ours in ongoing maritime operations in the gulf. 

As an ally and partner with a shared security vision for the region, we have an 

interest in helping Bahrain develop its defense capabilities and ensuring interoperability with our forces. Access to Bahraini facilities, land, and airspace is critical to 

United States Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. An increasingly aggressive, assertive Iran makes this cooperation with Bahrain and the rest 

of the gulf all the more important. If confirmed, I will work closely with my Department of Defense colleagues to enhance Bahraini defense capabilities and their cooperation with our forces in confronting regional threats. 

If confirmed, I will also devote considerable attention to counterterrorism cooperation. Bahrain has implemented new laws addressing terrorism and terror financing. 

454 

Our priorities will be to strengthen Bahrain’s ability to pursue and prosecute terror 

suspects and to enhance further Bahrain’s capability to block sources of funding for 

terrorism and proliferation. 

Economically, Bahrain is among the most progressive countries in the region. The 

United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which entered into force in August 2006, has stimulated economic growth and is a positive model for other countries in the region. If confirmed, I will focus much of my effort on fully exploiting 

the FTA’s potential for United States investment in Bahrain and two-way trade that 

benefits both our countries, particularly through active engagement with the private 

sector. 

Mr. Chairman, political reform and respect for human rights are critical to Bahrain’s future stability and United States interests. Bahrain’s leadership recognizes 

this and has been among the region’s most progressive in introducing democratic 

reforms and strengthening the rule of law. In November and December 2006, Bahrain held parliamentary and municipal elections. Opposition groups that had boycotted Bahrain’s 2002 elections fully participated. Two hundred and seven candidates competed for 40 seats. Seventy-two percent of eligible voters participated. 

Among those winning election was Bahrain’s first elected female Member of Parliament. 

An important goal for the embassy in the coming years, will be to strengthen support for democracy and democratic institutions. In May 2006, the government closed 

the office of the National Democratic Institute. If confirmed, I will work to support 

NDI and the multitude of other NGO’s working in Bahrain to strengthen parliamentary institutions, civil society, and the rule of law. 

Finally, Mr Chairman, should I be confirmed as ambassador, I will have no higher 

priority than the safety and security of all American citizens in Bahrain, including 

the dedicated men and women, American and foreign nationals, under my charge. 

They are bravely serving in difficult circumstances, and I will do everything in my 

power to see that they have the resources and protection they need to do their work 

on behalf of the American people. 

Thank you again for this opportunity and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. 

Mr. Norland. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD BOYCE NORLAND, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN 

Mr. NORLAND. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you here today. I am honored that the President has 

nominated me and I’m thankful to Secretary Rice for recommending me for the position of Ambassador to Uzbekistan. Thank 

you also for the opportunity to introduce my wife, Mary Hartnett, 

who has made it possible for me to serve for 2 years on an unaccompanied tour in Afghanistan and supported me throughout that, 

my son Daniel, who has just graduated from Boston University 

Law School. Our daughter Kate is overseas and can’t be here. 

Senator, thank you also for coming to Kabul, where you will be 

remembered not only for taking risks and working hard, but also 

for being the only U.S. Senator to have a snowball fight with the 

embassy staff. 

Sir, at the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a country that 

presents great—— 

Senator KERRY. Remember who won? [Laughter.] 

Mr. NORLAND. You were outnumbered. 

At the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a country that presents great challenges and great opportunities for the United 

States. The historical center of the famed Silk Road trade, the seat 

of the Emperor Tamerlane’s empire, a traditional center of Islamic 

thought, and the core of former Soviet Central Asia, Uzbekistan 

455 

has developed a very strong identity, which is reflected in its relationships with neighbors and with the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, as I’m sure the committee is aware, the close bilateral relationship we once enjoyed with Uzbekistan on security 

issues, particularly on Afghanistan, has been reduced significantly 

during the past few years. Concurrently, our concern about the 

state of democratic development and human rights in Uzbekistan, 

already great, has steadily increased with every report of actions 

taken against civil society, including press outlets, human rights 

activists, and nongovernmental organizations. 

I strongly believe that, despite the challenges of recent years, the 

United States can and should seek cooperation with Uzbekistan in 

areas integral to our common national security interests, particularly the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction, and the narcotics trade. 

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the policy which has consistently guided our engagement in Uzbekistan and which will bring 

true security to both Uzbekistan and the United States is multifaceted and balanced. Along with pursuing security cooperation, we 

will seek to promote greater respect for human rights and rule of 

law, real political reform, and the expansion of economic opportunity for Uzbek citizens. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed I look forward to drawing upon my 

experiences in the former Soviet Union and most recently as deputy chief of mission in neighboring Afghanistan to seek the reinvigoration of meaningful cooperation with the Government and the 

people of Uzbekistan, as was envisaged when we signed the 2002 

declaration on the strategic partnership and cooperation framework. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I will focus on reversing the deteriorating human rights situation in Uzbekistan, including the decline 

in religious and press freedom. The acknowledged use of torture by 

the security services, for example, is not only a grave violation of 

human rights, but also undermines the government and the country’s security. We must work with Uzbek authorities to put an end 

to this awful practice. 

Although not yet announced, Uzbekistan is likely to hold presidential elections before the end of the year that will determine the 

next phase of the country’s history. If confirmed, I intend to work 

closely with the Government of Uzbekistan and international bodies such as the OSCE to underscore the Uzbek people’s right to a 

free and fair election. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is crucial that we continue efforts already underway to strengthen economic ties between Uzbekistan, 

its immediate neighbors, South Asia, and the United States. Uzbekistan can only be as strong and prosperous as the economic opportunities it provides its people and increasing these will only be 

achieved if the government adopts the difficult changes necessary 

to attract foreign investment, lower its trade barriers, and participate fully in the world economic community. 

Mr. Chairman, Uzbekistan and the United States do not enjoy 

the close partnership we once had, but Uzbekistan’s strategic location, importance and potential require that we remain engaged and 

do our best to return the relationship to where it should be. WorkVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00463 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
456 

ing with you and members of this body, along with our dedicated 

team of American and Uzbekistan professionals on the ground at 

Embassy Tashkent, I believe we can make progress in securing our 

interests and encouraging Uzbekistan to realize its full potential. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity and I would 

be pleased to respond to any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Norland follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD BOYCE NORLAND, NOMINEE

TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you here today. I am honored that the President has nominated me and 

am thankful to Secretary Rice for recommending me for the position of Ambassador 

to Uzbekistan. 

At the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a country that presents great challenges and great opportunities for the United States. The historical center of the 

famed Silk Road trade, the seat of the Emperor Tamerlane’s empire, traditional center of Islamic thought, and the core of former Soviet Central Asia, Uzbekistan has 

developed a very strong identity, which is reflected in its relationships with neighbors and with the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, as I am sure the committee is aware, the close bilateral cooperation we once enjoyed with Uzbekistan on security issues, particularly on Afghanistan, has been reduced significantly during the past few years. Concurrently, our 

concern about the state of democratic development and human rights in Uzbekistan, 

already great, has steadily increased with every report of actions taken against civil 

society, including press outlets, human rights activists and nongovernmental organizations. 

I strongly believe that despite the challenges of recent years, the United States 

can and should seek cooperation with Uzbekistan in areas integral to our common 

national security interests—particularly the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the narcotics trade. 

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the policy which has consistently guided our engagement in Uzbekistan, and which will bring true security to both Uzbekistan and 

the United States, is multifaceted and balanced—along with pursuing security cooperation, we will seek to promote greater respect for human rights and rule of law, 

real political reform, and the expansion of economic opportunity for Uzbek citizens. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to drawing upon my experiences in 

the former Soviet Union, and most recently, as Deputy Chief of Mission in neighboring Afghanistan, to seek the reinvigoration of meaningful cooperation with the 

Government and people of Uzbekistan as was envisioned when we signed the 2002 

Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework. That declaration recognized the indivisibility of global and regional security as well as the importance of consistent implementation of democratic and market reforms ‘‘as a necessary condition for ensuring political, social and economic stability, sustainable 

development, prosperity, and national security.’’ 

I believe those words are even more relevant today than when written. In the 

space of a few years’ time, we have witnessed a tightening of the political climate 

of Uzbekistan. 

Today, our efforts to promote long-term stability and security for partners in the 

region are being challenged by those who view with suspicion our message of prosperity and stability through reform. 

It is therefore, Mr. Chairman, my belief that bolstering Uzbekistan’s independence and stability through genuine democratic reforms, increased trade links with 

neighbors in the region, and security cooperation, is more urgent now than at any 

time since the country’s independence. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I will focus on reversing the deteriorating human 

rights situation in Uzbekistan, including the decline in religious and press freedom. 

The acknowledged use of torture by the security services, for example, is not only 

a grave violation of human rights, but also undermines the government and the 

country’s security. We must work with Uzbek authorities to put an end to this awful 

practice. 

Although not yet announced, Uzbekistan is likely to hold Presidential elections before the end of the year that will determine the next phase of the country’s history. 

If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Government of Uzbekistan and interVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00464 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
457 

national bodies such as the OSCE to underscore the Uzbek peoples’ right to a free 

and fair election. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is crucial that we continue efforts already underway to 

strengthen economic ties between Uzbekistan, its immediate neighbors, South Asia, 

and the United States. Uzbekistan can only be as strong and prosperous as the economic opportunities it provides its people; and increasing these will only be achieved 

if the government adopts the difficult changes necessary to attract foreign investment, lower its trade barriers, and participate fully in the world economic community. 

Mr. Chairman, Uzbekistan and the United States do not enjoy the close partnership we once had, but Uzbekistan’s strategic location, importance, and potential require that we remain engaged and do our best to return the relationship to where 

it should be. Working with you and members of this body, along with our dedicated 

team of American and Uzbek professionals on the ground at Embassy Tashkent, I 

believe we can make progress in securing our interests and encouraging Uzbekistan 

to realize its full potential. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity, and 

I would be pleased to respond to any questions. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Seche, I’m proud to welcome you via the University of Massachusetts and the Berkshire Eagle. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. SECHE, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN 

Mr. SECHE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Good to have you here. 

Mr. SECHE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

the opportunity to appear this afternoon. As each of my colleagues 

have noted, Mr. Chairman, I too am honored to appear before you 

today as President Bush’s nominee to be the next United States 

Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, and I am grateful for the 

trust and confidence President Bush and Secretary Rice have 

placed in me. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I can assure you that protecting embassy staff and the lives of all Americans in Yemen, as well as 

American facilities and other interests, will be my top priority. 

On May 2, following their meeting at the White House, President 

Bush and Yemeni President Saleh each spoke to the strength of the 

bilateral relationship. At the heart of that relationship is a shared 

desire to strengthen democracy, counter extremism, and provide 

economic opportunity and a stable future for the Yemeni people. 

Yemen and the United States have achieved important successes 

together in our common effort to eradicate terrorism. Successes to 

date include joint action against al-Qaeda cells and successful prosecution of the perpetrators of the October 2000 terrorism attack on 

the USS Cole. This cooperation continues today and strengthening 

this partnership will be one of my principal priorities if I am confirmed by the Senate. 

We must be mindful at the same time, as you noted yourself, 

Senator, that Yemen is one of the world’s poorest countries, suffering from high levels of population growth, unemployment, infant 

mortality, and chronic illiteracy. Over 40 percent of the population 

lives below the poverty line and nearly 50 percent is under the age 

of 15. Oil production, which currently comprises two-thirds of government revenue, is expected to decline dramatically during the 

next 10 years. 

458 

Our partnership therefore also must include assistance to help 

Yemen improve the lives of its citizens through comprehensive education, health care, agricultural development, and good governance. 

Our support for Yemen as it addresses these critical needs will in 

turn contribute to the advancement of U.S. interests in the country 

and more broadly in the region. 

Over the past 18 months, the Government of Yemen has undertaken significant democratic reforms. With major support from the 

United States, Yemen in September 2006 conducted presidential 

and local council elections that were judged to be open and genuinely competitive by international observers. Other significant reforms include passage of a much-needed anti-corruption law, judicial and civil service reforms, and the drafting of a new government 

procurement law. 

International donors, led by the Gulf States, responded to these reforms by pledging $4.7 billion towards Yemen’s development in 

November of 2006. In February of this year, these achievements led 

to Yemen’s reinstatement in the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s threshold program. 

United States efforts in support of economic development will 

focus on combating the corruption endemic to nearly every level of 

Government in Yemen, through technical assistance to both government and NGOs that will encourage transparency and increase 

the confidence of international investors and donors. 

Mr. Chairman, over the course of a Foreign Service career that 

is now approaching three decades and has included assignments in 

eight different countries, I have tried to forge relationships that advance American interests by encouraging political stability, economic prosperity, and confidence that the United States can be relied up on as a partner and a friend. Nowhere is this issue of confidence more important today than in the Middle East. I believe 

that in Yemen, thanks to the persistence and professionalism of 

colleagues here in Washington and at our Embassy in Sana’a, we 

have made significant strides in recent years toward a relationship 

that has the potential to serve as a model for the region and the 

world. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I’d be remiss if I failed to publicly thank 

my wife Susan, my daughters Kate, Lucy, and Ariel for their love 

and forbearance in the face of the constant disruptions that they 

have endured in their own lives as I have pursued my career, and 

I’m pleased that, with the exception of Ariel, the women in my life 

are all here with me this afternoon. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity 

to encourage members of Congress and your staff to visit Yemen 

for a firsthand look at the partnership we are building and to ensure that our efforts on the ground reflect the will of this body and 

the American people. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Seche follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. SECHE, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as President Bush’s nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the 

Republic of Yemen, and I am grateful for the trust and confidence President Bush 

459 

and Secretary Rice have placed in me. If confirmed by the Senate, I can assure you 

that protecting embassy staff and the lives of all Americans in Yemen, as well as 

our facilities and other interests, will be my top priority. 

On May 2, following their meeting at the White House, President Bush and Yemeni President Saleh each spoke to the strength of the bilateral relationship. At the 

heart of that relationship is a shared desire to strengthen democracy, counter extremism, and provide economic opportunity and a stable future for the Yemeni people. 

Yemen and the United States have achieved important successes together in our 

common effort to eradicate terrorism. In the aftermath of the October 2000 attack 

on the USS Cole, and with renewed resolve after September 11, 2001, the United 

States undertook important steps in cooperation with President Saleh’s government 

to help Yemen develop its counterterrorism capabilities. Successes to date include 

joint action against al-Qaeda cells and successful prosecution of the perpetrators of 

the October 2000 terrorist attack on the USS Cole. American assistance has helped 

build the capacity of the Yemeni security forces to apprehend, detain and try terrorists, as well as to defend its borders and territorial waters. We have also assisted 

in the professional development of the armed forces, including the Coast Guard, and 

have helped combat the flow of illicit arms through Yemeni territory. That cooperation continues today. Strengthening this valuable partnership will be one of my 

principal priorities, if I am confirmed by the Senate. 

We must be mindful at the same time that Yemen is one of the world’s poorest 

countries, suffering from high levels of population growth, unemployment, infant 

mortality, and chronic illiteracy. Over 40 percent of the population lives below the 

poverty line, and nearly 50 percent is under the age of 15. Oil production, which 

currently comprises two-thirds of government revenue, is expected to decline dramatically during the next 10 years. 

Our partnership, therefore, also must include assistance to help Yemen improve 

the lives of its citizens through comprehensive education, health care, agricultural 

development, and good governance. Our support for Yemen as it addresses these 

critical needs will, in turn, contribute to the advancement of United States’ interests 

in the country and, more broadly, in the region. If confirmed, I will ensure that 

United States assistance in these areas is used effectively, and will also work closely 

with other donors to ensure that foreign-assistance pledges translate into sustained 

progress and a higher standard of living for the Yemeni people. 

Over the past 18 months, the Government of Yemen has undertaken significant 

democratic reforms. With major support from the United States, Yemen in September 2006 conducted Presidential and local council elections that were judged to 

be open and genuinely competitive by international observers. Other significant reforms include passage of a much-needed anticorruption law, judicial and civil service 

reforms, and the drafting of a new government procurement law. International donors, led by the gulf states, responded to these reforms by pledging $4.7 billion toward Yemen’s development in November 2006. In February of this year, these 

achievements led to Yemen’s reinstatement in the Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Program. 

United States efforts in support of economic development will focus on combating 

the corruption endemic to nearly every level of government in Yemen, through technical assistance to both the government and NGOs that will encourage transparency 

and increase the confidence of international investors and donors. If I am confirmed, 

I will also continue our efforts to help the Yemeni Government undertake the measures required for World Trade Organization accession. 

I will, if confirmed, continue efforts to strengthen Yemen’s internal security and 

counterterrorism capabilities. This includes assisting the Government of Yemen to 

take greater action against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, increasing information-sharing on terrorist activities, passing a comprehensive 

counterterrorism law, and continuing to cooperate with the Government of Yemen 

on matters relating to the return of Yemeni nationals currently detained at Guantanamo Bay. 

Mr. Chairman, over the course of a foreign-service career that is now approaching 

three decades and has included assignments in eight different countries, I have 

tried to forge relationships, both official—between governments—and informal— 

among people—that advance American interests by encouraging political stability, 

economic prosperity, and a level of confidence that the United States can be trusted 

as a reliable partner and friend. Nowhere is this issue of confidence more important 

today than in the Middle East. I believe that in Yemen—thanks to the persistence 

and professionalism of colleagues here in Washington and at our Embassy in 

Sana’a—we have made significant strides in recent years toward a relationship that 

has the potential to serve as a model for the region and the world. If confirmed, 

460 

it would be my privilege to lead the U.S. Embassy as we build on these successes 

in the coming years. 

Finally, I would be remiss if I failed to publicly thank my wife, Susan, and my 

daughters for their love and forbearance in the face of the constant disruptions they 

have endured in their own lives for the sake of my career. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to encourage Members of Congress and their staff to visit Yemen for a firsthand look at the partnership we are building, and to ensure that our efforts on the ground reflect the will 

of this body and the American people. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Seche, and thank you 

for your last comments. 

I neglected to say, does any other ambassador-designate have 

family here you want to introduce? 

Yes, Ambassador Patterson. 

Ms. PATTERSON. My husband David. 

Senator KERRY. What’s that? 

Ms. PATTERSON. My husband David. 

Senator KERRY. Welcome. Glad to have you here. 

Ms. PATTERSON. He’s a fellow Foreign Service officer. 

Senator KERRY. Terrific. 

Mr. ERELI. Sir, my wife Marina and stepdaughter Masha, who 

are former residents of Brookline, Massachusetts. 

Senator KERRY. Terrific judgment. [Laughter.] 

Mr. ERELI. And an employee of Newton Free Library. 

Senator KERRY. Beg your pardon? 

Mr. ERELI. An employee of Newton Free Library. 

Senator KERRY. Terrific. We share an alma mater. 

Ms. POWELL. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have my immediate family 

with me today, but I do have members of my Foreign Service family, and I appreciate their support today. 

Senator KERRY. Well, that’s wonderful. Will they raise their 

hands? Where are they all? Thank you, all of you. Thank you all 

for your service. 

I couldn’t help as I was looking through all of your curricula, to 

notice the astonishing the span of experience that’s sitting here, 

the numbers of places you all have served in, from the Caribbean 

to Latin America to Canada, Saudi Arabia, Africa. It’s really quite 

staggering. It’s a great deal of experience and I hope it’s going to 

be really well put to use. 

I know that some people in the Foreign Service can sometimes 

get a little bit frustrated at the bureaucracy and sometimes the unwillingness of Washington to listen. I believe these hearings ought 

to be more than pro forma sessions. We’re going to ask some of the 

questions we need to about your countries, but I want to draw on 

that experience if I can and ask you to just be candid. And if you 

say anything too out there, we’ll make sure the Secretary doesn’t 

hear about it and we’ll still follow through and get this done. 

In fact, sometimes I think that the experience that’s on the 

ground in some of these countries just gets wasted. When I go out 

and visit, as some of my colleagues on the committee do, and we 

sit in the embassies and listen, it’s a great education and you learn 

so much more than here. I think a lot of that experience sometimes 

doesn’t make it all the way to where it ought to and get listened 

to enough. 

461 

So, having said that, let me proceed to ask a few specific questions. Then I want to turn to my colleague, and then I’ll come back 

and perhaps ask some of these others. 

But just to let you reflect on it a little bit, I want to get you beyond your countries. I want you to sharee with the committee for 

the record—you know, we’re really tangled up in Iraq and we’re 

tangled upon the Middle East, and Hamas is stronger and 

Hezbollah is stronger, and Iran is flexing its muscles. You know, 

we’re sort of on the short end more than we’ve been or want to be 

and our leverage and credibility are at risk and at stake. 

I meet a lot of students nowadays who are traveling abroad and 

they tell me they tell people they’re Canadian, not American. I see 

some heads nodding out there. I mean, it burns you up and it 

hurts, but it’s a reality that people face. People tell me they flash 

their American passport, but they put it back in their pocket as 

fast as they can because they don’t want to be identified, and so 

forth. And for business people it’s got to cost nowadays. 

I want you to share with this committee, because you’ve spent 

a lot of time as junior officers, you’ve got friends in these countries, 

you hear what people are thinking and saying, I want you to share 

with the committee ultimately, and we’ll come back to it, some of 

the things you think we ought to be doing to restore that confidence and to rebuild our credibility and to address some of these 

burning issues that are feeding insurgencies and feeding terrorism 

and allowing extreme radical religious zealots to try to somehow 

isolate us in a world where we should be isolating them. 

I think it’s a very significant question for all of us to think about. 

And if we don’t draw on your experience, shame on us; we’re missing something important here. 

So that said, let me just turn to a few of these countries and listen to your views. Why don’t I start with you, Mr. Seche, since we 

just ended with you. First of all, obviously people are concerned 

about al-Qaeda’s operational structure in Yemen. The State Department’s annual report suggests that it’s been weakened and dispersed. But real concerns remain about the organization’s attempts 

to reconstitute operational cells there, as the State Department 

says. 

Can you share with us what the portfolio is that you’ve been 

given or as you understand it and what you think you can do to 

enhance our situation on the ground there? 

Mr. SECHE. I’d be happy to try. Thank you very much, Senator. 

I think that the counterterrorism portfolio, as you rightly point out, 

is among the most important I will have before me if confirmed by 

the Senate and if I get to serve as Ambassador to Yemen. There 

is no greater issue and no greater opportunity for cooperation between our two governments than this presents itself. Certainly, 

thus far we have seen President Saleh commit himself I think 

quite resolutely to efforts to eradicate terrorism through the arrest 

of al-Qaeda suspects, through stemming the flow of fighters to Iraq 

from Yemen, and by arresting the perpetrators of the Cole bombing. 

So there is some success being done there. There is also at the 

same time, again as you pointed out and as I tried to address in 

my statement, some very worrisome political, economic, and social 

462 

indicators in the country that continue to create conditions that one 

might easily argue encourage young men to turn to extremism as 

a way to better their lives and gain goals they may feel otherwise 

are unattainable. 

Senator KERRY. You say you could easily argue it. Is it your judgment that it is or isn’t a factor? 

Mr. SECHE. In my judgment it is a factor. I certainly think in my 

experience I have seen these kind of—— 

Senator KERRY. A significant factor? 

Mr. SECHE. Sorry? 

Senator KERRY. A significant one? 

Mr. SECHE. It depends to some extent on the individual, I think. 

But I don’t think there’s any way to argue against the fact—— 

Senator KERRY. What do you think the other factors are? 

Mr. SECHE. I think possibly there may be an argument to be 

made that there is a cultural element in certain people’s lives, 

there’s religious elements in certain people’s lives. There are certainly economic aspects of extremism that I think we need to address as well. So I think it’s a package, and I think that all of these 

elements together may create a certain kind of a corrosive mix, and 

we find this very much in some of the poorer countries in the region, and that is the most worrisome aspect in Yemen, as I say, 

and one reason why we need to address the internal conditions and 

make sure that Yemenis can find a road to prosperity and democracy that will give them the confidence that their needs will be met 

by their government. 

Senator KERRY. Can you share anything with the committee, do 

you have any view at this point from a distance, or have you been 

informed, about the rumors that President Saleh is grooming his 

son Ahmad for a succession? 

Mr. SECHE. I’ve certainly heard the rumors, and I think that it’s 

important for us as a government and certainly if I am confirmed 

and go to Yemen that will be one of my first tasks, to try to continue the efforts being made on the ground to ensure that a succession process is in place that will be democratic, that will be transparent, that’ll be constitutionally viable, and that will leave the 

Yemeni people with full confidence that their will has been expressed at the polls. 

Senator KERRY. What do you think has been the impact of the 

increased American aid since the attacks of September 11? 

Mr. SECHE. I think it’s had a very positive impact. I think we 

have focused very smartly on the five governorates where the conditions are least propitious economically and politically and perhaps most volatile, and where the conditions are such that we 

might see the kind of extremism take root that we’re trying to 

avoid. I think for that reason alone this sharp focus, the effort 

we’ve made in health care, education, economic reforms, transparency, anti-corruption, all of these are Yemeni society that need 

to be addressed, and I think identifying ourselves with these remedial steps is a very positive element in the relationship. 

Senator KERRY. What do you think is the top priority in terms 

of building the relationship and diminishing the impact of radical 

gains? 

463 

Mr. SECHE. I think we need to be seen as being absolutely true 

to our values. I think this is rule of law, all the constitutional guarantees we take for granted. We need to make sure that around the 

world people see us and say, yes, America can be trusted, can be 

relied upon to bring these values to bear in our own societies. 

Senator KERRY. And what do you think is the biggest craw that 

sticks in their throat with respect to that, and what perception is 

working against us in your judgment in Yemen? 

Mr. SECHE. Well, I suspect that probably, conversely, the fact 

that there is an erosion of this confidence, there is a sense that we 

have not really proven to be true to our values in some sense. They 

look around and they see—— 

Senator KERRY. Tell me in your judgment, what do you hear? 

What is the biggest evidence of that? Is it Guantanamo? Is it Abu 

Ghraib? Is it Iraq itself? Is it some particular thing, or a conglomerate of them? 

Mr. SECHE. I think it’s a basketful of issues. I think Guantanamo 

is one that strikes very closely and very personally to many Yemenis, and I think this is something that we need to resolve with as 

much dispatch as we can. I also think that Iraq, of course, has a 

very negative influence on people’s opinions and perceptions of us, 

and I think the continued protracted inability to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian issue is another issue that has to be addressed. 

Senator KERRY. Share with us just very quickly, and then I’ll ask 

you others, the prospects for improving Yemen’s economic situation 

and this level of poverty? 

Mr. SECHE. I think fundamentally what we need to do is address 

the issue of corruption. I think it’s endemic in the government at 

all levels. I think it’s a real impediment to investor and donor confidence. I think that people are using their own ability to get at 

wealth for their own personal gain. It tends to be a dispiriting element in a society and we need to address that as well. 

I think we’ve done very well with the aid we’ve been able to put 

in the country in very critical areas to ensure that we try to lift 

the boat up a little bit so that everybody can come home and float 

a little bit more safely to harbor. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Norland, did you enjoy Norway? 

Mr. NORLAND. I had the great fortune, sir, to be in Tromso, Norway, before anybody ever used the term ‘‘American presence post,’’ 

and it was a one-person post 250 miles north of the Arctic Circle, 

and it was a marvelous experience. 

Senator KERRY. It must have been. I hope somebody was there 

with you. 

Mr. NORLAND. My wife and kids. 

Senator KERRY. Terrific. 

Mr. NORLAND. Yes. 

Senator KERRY. Uzbekistan presents one of those tricky balances, 

as do a couple of the other places you all are going to represent, 

between advocating for human rights and democracy and the balance of getting day to day cooperation from people to fight terrorism. Give us your assessment of where that balance is and to 

what degree you judge Uzbekistan is in fact cooperating with our 

antiproliferation and antiterrorism efforts? 

464 

Mr. NORLAND. Yes, Senator. I think, sadly, the balance has tilted 

toward a situation where, given a panoply of interests—security, 

economic, cooperation, counternarcotics, human rights—the human 

rights part of that equation needs the most attention. We’re in a 

situation where it cannot be business as usual. But I think that 

one of the ways to approach this is to go back to the idea that we 

share common interests, to try to persuade the Uzbek Government 

that in fact our interests in stability in the region, in peaceful succession, in resolving security and other issues, these are interests 

we share in common and it is very much in the Uzbek Government’s interests to restore its proper standing in the international 

community with respect to human rights and rule of law. 

Senator KERRY. What do you think is the impact of Congress’s 

prohibition on some assistance to Uzbekistan? 

Mr. NORLAND. I think that the role that Congress has played in 

that respect, the role that some of the—I won’t say suspension— 

well, suspension or not doing business as usual in terms of some 

of the executive branch activities with Uzbekistan, have gotten 

their attention. Again, it’s regrettable—— 

Senator KERRY. When you say get their attention, there’s still a 

pretty widespread understanding of torture and abuse and things 

like that. How do you leverage this sort of level of cooperation we 

need? If you start to get pushy on one, you could lose the other, 

can’t you? 

Mr. NORLAND. You can, but I think there have been a couple of 

examples recently where the government has taken actions that 

show that perhaps our approach and condemnation by the international community has an impact. There were a couple of journalists who were first arrested, sentenced to long jail terms. There 

was an outcry by us, by the European Union, and those terms have 

been suspended and the journalists have been released. 

Now, granted this was after kind of a show trial type of confession on their part. It’s not a solution to the problem. But I think 

what it sends—the signal it sends is that they can’t be completely 

oblivious to what we think. 

Senator KERRY. Well, I have some more questions I want to get 

into. But I’ll let my colleague have an opportunity here, and I 

thank him for coming here. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

I just have a couple of quick questions, but I congratulate all of 

you and you’re all going to interesting posts. Mr. Chairman, I enjoyed listening to your questioning, particularly with regard to 

Yemen. It was an interesting conversation. 

Ms. Patterson, with regard to Pakistan, we had a chance to meet 

and I just want to follow up a little bit. Given your extensive history working on drug-related issues, I’m interested to hear your 

thoughts on how to best combat the major drug trafficking problems in Pakistan and along the border countries, especially since 

opium trafficking may be a major source of revenue, as we know, 

465 

for many terrorist and insurgent groups operating out of Pakistan 

or along its borders. 

Ms. PATTERSON. Thank you, Senator Feingold. Actually it’s a 

growing problem, and the spillover effect from Afghanistan is not 

only funding the Taliban, and our intelligence and information on 

that gets better by the day, but it’s also increasing addiction very 

dramatically in Pakistan. I visited a treatment center run by a 

very impressive woman up in Peshawar. They had huge numbers 

of addicts that are not only native Pakistani citizens, but that come 

out of the refugee camps. There are still two million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. 

This is a problem that’s going to have to have enormous crossborder cooperation. It’s going to have to have enormous political 

will on both sides of the border. The Pakistani army has 85,000 

troops on the border. We have—the bureau I work with now has 

funded border stations all along the border. That said, it’s had little 

impact on the flow through Pakistan and into Iran, which also has 

an enormous addiction problem right now. 

We hope that with this new strategy in the FATA, the one the 

Pakistani Government has put forward and that we will support, 

that too will have an effect on drug trafficking. But I am certainly 

not optimistic in the short run, Senator. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Can you tell me about the nature of the 

opium issue in Pakistan as opposed to Afghanistan? 

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, sir. Pakistan actually has quite a good 

record against narcotics in terms of treatment and eradication and 

law enforcement. What’s happening now is they’re simply being 

overwhelmed with the flow from Afghanistan and they’re not able 

to interdict it. 

Senator FEINGOLD. This is opium—— 

Ms. PATTERSON. Opium. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. That’s produced in Afghanistan? 

Ms. PATTERSON. In Afghanistan. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And it flows to Pakistan? 

Ms. PATTERSON. It flows into Pakistan and a lot of it flows into 

Iran in the old Turkish Connection route. But Pakistan has done 

a pretty good job in recent years in controlling its own poppy problem. It just can’t now control the flow in from Afghanistan. 

But the really scary thing from our standpoint is the funding of 

the Taliban. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So the poppy production in Afghanistan is 

much greater than in Pakistan. 

Ms. PATTERSON. Vastly greater. I think Pakistan has a thousand 

hectares of poppy production, which is considered negligible by 

U.N. standards. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you believe the drug eradication efforts in 

Colombia have been effective, and do you intend to implement similar practices in Pakistan? 

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, sir, I do believe they’ve been effective. And 

I entirely realize that many in this Congress have a different view. 

But I firmly believe that if we had not taken this amount of coca 

in this case, cocaine products, off the market, we would have had 

a much more difficult problem in this country. 

466 

When Plan Colombia began, we had so much narcotics coming in 

that it threatened to swamp our treatment programs with cheap 

dope. So I believe that the eradication has had an impact. I believe 

interdiction in Colombia had an impact in its not reaching the 

streets of the United States. 

And no, we have no intention to put in place such a program in 

Pakistan, nor would it be necessary. They have a very modest program. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Okay. Do you think Pakistan is on the verge 

of a state of emergency being declared? And if Musharraf declares 

a state of emergency, how would we respond? What message is the 

administration sending with its unwavering support of President 

Musharraf? 

Ms. PATTERSON. Let me address the state of emergency first, 

Senator. After we spoke I went back and found more detail about 

this and both the Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and President 

Musharraf have said that no state of emergency is intended or 

planned. 

I also found the most astonishing statement by Shaukit, that this 

would be the first time in the history of Pakistan that parliament 

would ever complete a full term. The administration, rest assured, 

is sending the right message on this. I would be fairly confident to 

predict that no state of emergency is going to be imposed. Our policy is to push for free and fair and transparent elections before 

February of 2008, and if I’m confirmed I will pursue that vigorously. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What about the unwavering support of 

Musharraf? What kind of message is that sending? 

Ms. PATTERSON. President Musharraf has been our friend. He is 

our friend. He has been in many respects a modernizer in Pakistan, certainly on issues like the economy and on issues like women’s rights—actually a rather remarkable modernizer. I would not 

say we have unwavering support for Musharraf. I think we have 

pushed for elections. We pushed for institutional development in 

Pakistan. It’s up to the electorate to decide the next steps. That’s 

our policy and that’s the policy I will pursue if I’m confirmed. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What about his giving up his leadership of 

the army? 

Ms. PATTERSON. That’s up to the people of Pakistan, Senator. 

And they have—if elections are free and fair and transparent, they 

will have several opportunities to address this. Certainly the electors can take this into account when they vote on him, and if they 

don’t like the decision, his decision, they can vote for parties that 

have a different view. 

Senator FEINGOLD. But we don’t weigh in on the inappropriateness of him being both president and head of the army? 

Ms. PATTERSON. Let me state our policy very clearly, Senator. 

Our policy is to push for a civilian-elected government in Pakistan. 

But the timing of that is up to the Pakistanis. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold, for an 

important round of questioning, and we appreciate your participation enormously. 

467 

I’m going to come back to you in a moment, Ambassador Patterson. Let me just ask Ambassador Powell, if I can. In your judgment, does the interim government have enough legitimacy and lift 

to be able to pull off the assembly elections? 

Ms. POWELL. They appear to be working very hard at making the 

necessary steps. They’ve taken a very important one this week in 

getting new legislation in that determined the kind of elections. 

They will have a mix of both ‘‘first past the post’’ and proportionate. They have one more piece of legislation they need to pass. 

They are certainly going to have to do much more on the law and 

order front in order to ensure that people aren’t intimidated, that 

the campaigns can go forward in a reasonable manner. 

Senator KERRY. Assuming they did the law and order front, is it 

your judgment that the outcome—and there’s I assume to be some 

kind of international observation for the legitimacy. Let’s say it’s 

signed off on. Do you think that internally within the country there 

will be an acceptance of an outcome? 

Ms. POWELL. I think that’s one of the major questions, particularly with the Nawas Party. They have committed themselves to 

the parliamentary system—— 

Senator KERRY. How committed do you judge they really are? 

Ms. POWELL. I think we will have a chance to see that. They 

have not shown 100 percent commitment, particularly with the 

founding of the Young Communist League. Intimidation, extortion, 

some of the kidnapping has been continuing. This has been recognized both by the U.S. Government representatives, by my predecessor, and also by the prime minister, by other political leaders. 

Senator KERRY. So it’s your judgment or the State Department’s 

conclusion that the likelihood is they may engage in coercive activities during the election? 

Ms. POWELL. That certainly is one of the things that their pattern has shown so far. I believe that the international community, 

certainly the Nepali Government, is going to have to watch this 

and take steps to stop it. 

Senator KERRY. What impact do you believe street demonstrations would have on the election process? 

Ms. POWELL. It’s had a number of impacts already, certainly a 

very devastating impact on the economy. They’ve lost a number of 

work days. They do intimidate those who are opposed to the Maoist 

philosophy and this has served to form the debate in certain ways 

that have not been truly democratic. 

Senator KERRY. Can you comment on what the status of their 

weapons are at this point? 

Ms. POWELL. They turned in approximately 3,000 weapons to the 

U.N. They are under lock and key in the camps. They are monitored by the U.N. It is not clear that that is the entire cache, but 

that has been—— 

Senator KERRY. Is there any judgment at all about the relative 

quantity? 

Ms. POWELL. I don’t believe so. It was also matched by a similar 

quantity from the army being restored. My experience in South 

Asia is that even if they had locked up all those in their possession, 

it isn’t that difficult to get new ones in the region. 

468 

Senator KERRY. Therefore, what judgment, if any, is made about 

what they might resort to in the event they don’t like the outcome 

of the election? 

Ms. POWELL. I think there are two things that we’ll need to 

watch for. One of them is making sure that the elections are as free 

and fair as they can be, so that there is no reason for groups, 

whether it’s the Maoists or others, to reject the results. The international community is trying to work in a coordinated manner with 

the Government of Nepal to provide expertise, to provide assistance 

in the logistics and in the legal framework for those elections. 

There are a number of international bodies, including American 

ones, that are already committed to providing international observers, training Nepali observers to be in the more remote parts of the 

country, so that it can be documented on the conduct of the election, on the conduct of the various parties. I think all of those will 

go a long way. Strengthening the security forces so that they can 

deal with occasions of violence on election day, ensure that there 

is not an outbreak of violence after the elections. 

Senator KERRY. What’s the anticipated date on the constituent 

assembly election? 

Ms. POWELL. They are talking about a Nepali month in the fall 

between mid-November and mid-December. 

Senator KERRY. Is there a role that the United States and the 

international community can play that we aren’t playing? Is there 

anything we should be doing in your judgment? 

Ms. POWELL. I think we need to continue to work with the 

United Nations to make sure that the cantonments in which the 

Maoist fighters have been put are adequately staffed and taken 

care of. We need to look at what we can do to make sure that the 

people who are in those camps receive some kind of training that 

will allow them to rejoin society after having been part of a group 

that has not encouraged support for democratic ideals. 

I think those are key areas. Also the very, very important and 

practical aspects of the elections. They are going to need money. 

They are going to need logistics. Nepal is not an easy country to 

move around in, and to get the ballots out, to get the security 

forces out to the various regions will take a lot of funding and a 

lot of work on the logistics. 

Senator KERRY. Is there a current plan for that? 

Ms. POWELL. I believe the U.N. is working hard on it. We certainly have advisers working with the election commission from 

IFES and others that the USAID has contracted to support the Nepali efforts. 

If confirmed, one of my first topics will be to look at our own 

plans and to see, both for the elections and then what happens the 

day after the elections. Are we prepared to be able to support the 

constituent assembly that is elected and how can we best do that? 

Senator KERRY. Is there a compromise of some kind that you believe could be attained at the ballot box that would sufficiently vest 

the Maoists so they don’t resort to an armed struggle? That is, is 

there some frame of that that you have that you would articulate? 

Or do you think this has to be simply worked through and see 

what the outcome is? 

469 

Ms. POWELL. I think this one is going to take, first of all, a free 

and fair election where people have confidence that they have voted 

for those that they want. There is a certain amount of support for 

the Maoists and that also needs to be respected in an election. 

They have committed to this, although there are divisions, we believe, within the Maoists. We need to encourage those that are 

committed to the democratic process and to make sure that all 

forms, including the court system, that there are ways to encourage 

the ethnic groups and the others who feel disadvantaged that they 

have a role. Right now most of the violence is from those groups 

rather than from the Maoist groups. 

Senator KERRY. What role do you believe India has in this? 

Ms. POWELL. They have a very important role to play. There are 

a large number of Nepali citizens who live and work in India. The 

border is relatively open. This has provided a free flow of ideas and 

goods. It’s also permitted smuggling and other illegal activities to 

take place. They have enormous amounts of influence with the various political groups, including the Maoists, over the years. So they 

will continue to play a very important role. 

Senator KERRY. Do you believe that China has any ability to 

help? 

Ms. POWELL. I do. They have, again, a long border with Nepal. 

They have rejected the idea that these are people that are somehow 

tied to their former leader and have spoken out in favor of the current peace process. I would hope that they would be engaged in 

promoting that. 

Senator KERRY. I assume this will be task number one for you 

the minute you set foot there, that you’re going to focus on what 

we can do to be supportive without being viewed as interfering or 

managing it. 

Ms. POWELL. It is. At the same time, I think our assistance and 

our support has been focused on both the short term, with a very, 

very heavy focus on the peace process and the elections, but also 

on our assistance to ensuring that the government can deliver services. We have concentrated over the years particularly on education 

and health, with the current focus on health, and that very much 

needs to continue. The average Nepali is struck by poverty, with 

a lack of opportunity for education. We need to continue to assist 

the government to address those needs. 

Senator KERRY. Is there any other challenge that the Committee 

ought to be thinking about to be helpful to you? 

Ms. POWELL. I think the Nepalis, in particular, need to continue 

to look at trafficking. We have had a very, very positive response, 

I believe, on the offer to resettle some of the Bhutanese refugees, 

who have been in camps for 17 years, as a humanitarian gesture. 

We’re going to continue to have to look at how to do that. It is not 

easy to implement. But we will continue to work on those issues 

as well. 

Senator KERRY. We wish you well in that. 

What about the strife in Terai? 

Ms. POWELL. I think the security forces have not been deployed 

in a manner to assist the government in ensuring that there is law 

and order. There are a number of groups who have taken the position that the way to get the government’s attention is to take to 

470 

the street, to commit violent acts. This needs to be addressed in a 

way that they can have their grievances heard. There is a roundtable planned with the new minister for reconstruction and they 

will be—I think this is something that we need to encourage, that 

they address these needs, these grievances, more energetically and 

more quickly, so that they don’t feel the need to go to the streets. 

Senator KERRY. I may come back and follow up on a couple of 

those issues. But let me first ask Joseph Adam Ereli a couple of 

things if I can. 

How would you describe the relationship right now between Bahrain, the Shiite community in Bahrain, and Iran? 

Mr. ERELI. I think there are similarities and differences. Obviously, the similarities of the coreligionists. But there are Shia who 

look to Qum for guidance in Iran, there are Shia—in Bahrain there 

are Shia who look to Qum for guidance. There are Shia who look 

to Najaf for guidance. So it would be a mistake to assume just because they’re Shia they share a sympathy and allegiance to Iran. 

I think you need to look, one needs to look beyond the surface 

religious affiliation and dig a little deeper to see where—how people think and where their allegiances lie. But I think, going beyond 

that, obviously Bahrain finds itself on the same religious fault line 

that Iraq does. It goes north to southeast to west, and Bahrain is 

squarely at the epicenter of it. 

Having said that, Bahrain has a long history of peaceful coexistence between religious communities. 

Senator KERRY. Are there any signs now of sectarian divisions 

growing? 

Mr. ERELI. Excuse me, sir? 

Senator KERRY. Are there any signs now of the spillover of the 

Iraqi divide, that sectarian violence spilling into Bahrain? 

Mr. ERELI. Not really. 

Senator KERRY. Or any Sunni-Shia—— 

Mr. ERELI. Obviously, people are thinking about it and people 

are watching for it. But I have not in my consultations and my discussions heard anybody suggest that the kind of sectarian strife 

we’re seeing in Iraq is spilling over into Bahrain. 

Senator KERRY. What level of middle class ‘‘refugeeism’’ is taking 

place in Bahrain out of Iraq? 

Mr. ERELI. Not the way, for instance, in Jordan. I would make 

an important—I would make one point, sir, is that the Bahraini 

leadership has been pretty farsighted in this in the sense that they 

have proactively incorporated or included prominent Shia into the 

cabinet. There are five Shia cabinet ministers in Bahrain, thereby 

giving that community, as I said in my opening statement, a voice 

in the affairs of their country. That’s an important step and I think 

one that recognizes and puts its finger ahead of time on the issue 

that you raise in your question. 

Senator KERRY. What do you see as your biggest challenge? 

Mr. ERELI. There are several, sir. No. 1, I think when you talked 

about what can we do to restore confidence in a region and a world 

that is looking to America for I think consistency and leadership 

is—and this is very true in the Gulf and especially true in Bahrain—we have to stand by our friends. It’s not—in these dangerous 

neighborhoods, being friends with the United States entails risks. 

471 

And Bahrain has been one of the most steadfast and forward-leaning friends of the United States. It’s not without risk, both domestically as well as with very big and brutal neighbors. 

So we need to stand by, we need to stand by our friends. We 

need to, as I said before, promote interoperability, promote cooperation with Bahrain in our regional efforts, both confronting Iran as 

well as promoting regional security cooperation with the other 

members of the GCC. That will serve as a strong signal to other 

states that there’s a payoff to being a friend of the United States, 

that it’s in their interest and it’s in our mutual interest. I think 

that serves American national interests over the long run. 

Democratic development, human rights, sir, is a ball you can 

never take your eye off of. I think what we see in Bahrain as well 

as other countries in the region is that democratic development is 

not constant, it is not linear. There are setbacks. Even though a 

country can be committed to reform and political pluralism and respect for the rights of its citizens, there are always challenges to 

that commitment. There’s always backsliding. As ambassador if 

confirmed, I would keep my eye on that ball. I would be engaged 

with the government constantly to help them move forward in the 

way that they have outlined. And I think, sir, the case of NDI is 

a good example of that. 

Senator KERRY. Just a few more questions if we can. Ambassador 

Patterson, what do you make of the dustup with the chief justice 

in Pakistan? 

Ms. PATTERSON. That is before the—the Supreme Court of Pakistan is reviewing that case right now. I think everyone would say 

that the acting Chief Justice is an honorable individual known for 

his integrity. The Supreme Court itself is well respected. They’re 

going to review his reinstatement on a variety of substantive and 

procedural grounds, and the government has said that they will 

stand by that decision. 

On the issue itself, obviously it was most unfortunate. Certainly 

the violence that was associated with it is to be deplored. But it 

is before the courts of Pakistan now and they have a long and distinguished history. 

Senator KERRY. You’re saying you have confidence that they’ll resolve this appropriately? 

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, we’re confident, and we’re confident that 

the government will stand behind the decision. Like courts everywhere else, it’s hard to predict when they might make a decision. 

Senator KERRY. Do you base that at all on any reporting from 

Under Deputy Secretary Negroponte in his visit? 

Ms. PATTERSON. Certainly from his—I think the government’s 

made public statements to that effect, and we’ve had quite a string 

of high-level visitors there, and the embassy’s reporting. 

Senator KERRY. And that comes from that? 

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Now, what is your assessment of the al-Qaeda 

presence in the tribal areas? 

Ms. PATTERSON. My assessment, sir, is that it’s very alarming. 

When you’ve asked my colleagues here about their highest priority 

that has to be my highest priority, to do everything we possibly can 

472 

to prevent an attack on either the United States or allied countries 

from that. But it is alarming. 

I think reconstitution or resurgence might be too strong a word, 

but they certainly are operating from Pakistan. And they operate 

across—fairly freely in a cross-border way, too. 

Senator KERRY. When I was in Kabul, I heard a lot from President Karzai about his view of what’s happening there. Then obviously when I met with Musharraf also heard a lot. I gather the 

meeting between the two of them was not a good meeting on any 

interpretive level. So we have a difficulty in this relationship. It’s 

hard to get control of that border under those circumstances, isn’t 

it? 

Ms. PATTERSON. It’s extremely difficult, sir. 

Senator KERRY. It sounds to me like a Taliban-al-Qaeda dream. 

Ms. PATTERSON. It’s extremely difficult, not only because of the 

terrain, which is terrible, but also, and terribly difficult to control, 

but also, yes, because of the relationships. But we’re working on 

that. And we’re working on enhanced cross-border cooperation. Our 

embassies cooperate. 

I think the Pakistanis and the Afghans work better on the operational level than you might suspect. As we developed this new 

strategy, it will do things like put in place intelligence centers that 

can fuse the information that becomes available on the border. So 

we have some plans that I think are fairly convincing and impressive. 

Senator KERRY. I was going to ask you what steps you thought 

we could take in order to try to improve the situation. I trust those 

plans are in the making now? 

Ms. PATTERSON. Yes, sir, they’re actually quite well developed, 

and they build on—— 

Senator KERRY. Are they public in any way? 

Ms. PATTERSON. No. Certainly we can provide a briefing for you 

and your staff. I wouldn’t call them public, but they’re certainly 

available. 

Senator KERRY. Well, it’s something we obviously want to try to 

follow up on. I don’t think we need to explore it in a public session 

right now. 

I’ll ask two questions, quickly. Kashmir, India—how do you interpret the current state of that dialog? There’s been a lot of talk 

and a lot of discussion about how things are great and they’re good, 

but on the other hand nothing’s been resolved fundamentally. And 

there seems to be just a continued idea of having talks. Now, talk’s 

better than what we had, I’m not dismissing it, but do you see any 

notion, any sense that they really could get a resolution on Kashmir? 

Ms. PATTERSON. I think, Senator, Mr. Chairman, I think relations are better than they have been in years. This dialog has continued. As you pointed out, at least it’s not a hot situation right 

now. When I was talking to members of the committee staff in 

preparation for this hearing, they suggested, and I would tend to 

agree, that we, the United States Government, have been distracted—not distracted—have been very active elsewhere in the region, and that we might offer to play a more active role in that. 

I certainly took that on board. 

473 

Senator KERRY. Finally, how do you interpret the radical Islamic 

movement in Pakistan and the balance between the scope that 

President Musharraf has to deal with that and the street, maintain 

the independence and sovereignty of his administration and the 

country, and still be our close ally in the war on terror? 

Ms. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, that sort of radical extremist or 

even the very conservative religious parties—and the two are of 

course not necessarily the same—they’ve not had a historically important role in Pakistan. They’ve never had more than 10 or 11 

percent of the vote. I think what is alarming is the increase in Islamic extremism in the Northwest Frontier Province and in the 

FATA. There seems to be some impression that these people live 

very collegially with the tribes up there. That’s not the case either. 

These tribal leaders have been killed by the hundreds. People have 

been intimidated and threatened. And as you know, there have 

been multiple assassination attempts against government—not 

only the president, but a wide range of ministers, including the 

minister of interior. 

So yes, it’s a serious problem, but not one that I think cannot be 

controlled. In other words, Pakistan—and President Musharraf 

talks very eloquently about this in his book—Pakistan largely 

speaking is a moderate and tolerant Islamic country. 

Senator KERRY. Well, Islam honestly speaking is a moderate and 

tolerant religion. But some people have hijacked it around a number of different distortions. We’ve got about 5 minutes to explore 

what I left out in the beginning. I’d just like each of you to share 

with me your experience. You’re about to be Ambassador of the 

United States in a relatively troubled arena. You’re going to have 

unprecedented levels of security. Your embassy personnel are 

working in barricaded fortresses and will have huge levels of security. 

What’s your readout on what we need to do as a country to improve your ability to live, to represent us in a different status, to 

be in a different place in these relationships? Anybody want to take 

that first? I’m going to ask each of you. But share your experience. 

What do we need to do? What do you think would make the most 

difference? Is it simply solving Iraq? Is it bigger than Iraq? Is it 

something we’re not doing well in terms of multilateralism, diplomacy overall? Is there a multiple message? 

What’s your gut tell you when you go home at night some day 

after getting a cable from the State Department and you pound the 

wall and say, they don’t understand? What do you think we ought 

to do? Mr. Norland? 

Mr. NORLAND. Well, maybe I’ll speak as somebody whose father 

was in the Foreign Service and who grew up living partly overseas. 

I would say that there’s both a policy function, but also kind of an 

ironic function of modern life that’s at play here. We’re under the 

illusion that in the age of the Internet and of jet travel that we understand the world better than we actually do. There really is no 

substitute, as you’re suggesting in your question, for actually being 

on the ground and living with people in a foreign country, getting 

to know them, establishing family relationships that last maybe 

longer than just that tour. 

474 

I think one of the challenges we have, as you suggested, is to 

overcome the security and other barriers that exist and really penetrate these societies and establish long-term relationships, both as 

diplomats, also through graduate student exchange programs and 

other kinds of exchange programs. 

From a policy perspective, as a policy function, I think as was 

said earlier, addressing the Israeli-Palestinian issue and applying 

perhaps a little more focus to multilateral diplomacy would probably also help restore our standing in the world. 

Mr. SECHE. If I might follow up, and if Dick hadn’t said it so well 

I would say exactly what he has just said. I think there’s something important here. There will always be policies that create neuralgia between us and other peoples around the world. We will 

never avoid those kinds of controversies and disappointments. It 

may be Iraq, it may be something else tomorrow. We have to understand that and at that level where human interaction becomes 

the key to convincing people they can come back to a level of trust 

and confidence in us, that’s where I think we need to do this. That 

is public diplomacy. That is relationships among people that will 

let us relate to them as individuals and convey to them what our 

values and our principles are. I think there are a lot of common 

bonds that can be forged in that manner. 

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Powell. 

Ms. POWELL. I would add to that that it needs to work both 

ways. We need to be welcoming also of our foreign friends and find 

ways to process their visits to the United States. Particularly, I 

hope for education. I think the universities and the schools in 

America have been a tremendous area for improving understanding 

of America, for having people understand that, and I would hope 

that we can continue to do that, while at the same time we protect 

our borders and make them secure. 

I’m facing a situation in which the Peace Corps has had to terminate its program in Nepal. I truly believe the Peace Corps has had 

a tremendous influence around the world and would encourage additional programs like that where possible. 

Mr. ERELI. Sir, I come from a background in public affairs and 

public diplomacy and have spent a lot of time talking to people in 

the region for a number of years. One of the constant refrains you 

hear is: You know, it’s not that we don’t like America; it’s we don’t 

like its policies. Frankly, I’ve been hearing that refrain for 20 

years. 

I think what’s incumbent upon us as representatives of the 

United States is to represent and advocate and promote the values 

that have made this country the greatest country in the world. It 

is those values, sir, that the people of the region in every region 

I’ve been in largely share with us and largely seek to emulate. It’s 

when they see us as somehow betraying those values or falling 

short of those values that we come in for the greatest criticism. 

So the task before us is to try to establish the mutual understanding and the relationships and the policy convergences that are 

based on values of freedom, of equality, of opportunity, and of the 

rule of law, and at the same time square them with what’s going 

on in the world. That’s not always an easy thing to do, but that’s 

why we get paid the big bucks. 

475 

The other point I would make is I would echo something that my 

current boss, Under Secretary Hughes, talks about quite often, 

which is the diplomacy of deeds. That is that the United States 

does an awful lot of good for the world that goes unrecognized. Our 

support, the President’s support for AIDS funding; the actions 

we’re taking on malaria; what we devote to educational exchanges 

and educational opportunities. These are acts that improve people’s 

lives in a material way. 

Nothing helped us more, sir, than when we flew aid to the people 

of Pakistan after that earthquake. You saw a notable jump in attitudes towards the United States. I would just underscore the importance of the diplomacy of deeds and the importance of doing 

concrete things to improve people’s lives that again provide material support and material expression to our values as a Nation. 

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Patterson, you get a by because I’ve 

just been given a message I’ve got an emergency meeting here on 

CAFE that I’ve got to get to right away. 

But I need to ask each and every one of you, is there any reason, 

is there anything that would act as a potential conflict of interest 

in the performance of your responsibilities as an ambassador that 

we should be aware of? Ambassador Patterson. 

Ms. PATTERSON. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Powell. 

Ms. POWELL. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Ereli. 

Mr. ERELI. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Norland. 

Mr. NORLAND. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Seche. 

Mr. SECHE. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. And is there any holding, asset or interest that 

any of you have that would potentially pose a conflict of interest 

in the performance of your responsibilities? 

Ambassador Patterson. 

Ms. PATTERSON. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Ambassador Powell. 

Ms. POWELL. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Ereli. 

Mr. ERELI. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Norland. 

Mr. NORLAND. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Seche. 

Mr. SECHE. None whatsoever. 

Senator KERRY. Great. 

Well, again let me repeat what I said at the outset: a tremendous 

amount of experience. You are all of you superbly qualified to go 

out there and undertake these responsibilities. We’re going to try— 

I’m going to leave the record open until Monday only because I 

want to move, if we can, Wednesday or Thursday to a business 

meeting, which should allow us to have a vote on the floor of the 

Senate either Thursday night or Friday to get you all out there, 

which we need to do, particularly before we break for the Fourth 

of July recess, so you can all take the ‘‘if I am confirmed’’ out of 

your repertoire and get ready to be confirmed and go to work. 

476 

We appreciate it again and look forward to seeing some of you, 

anyway. I’m not sure I’ll get everywhere that you are, but I look 

forward to getting out there some time. Good luck. God bless. 

Thank you. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF RICHARD B. NORLAND TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Before Islam Karimov severed military ties with the United States, the 

State Department was often at odds with the Department of Defense over the degree to which human rights, political liberties, and other core American values 

should be sublimated to the short-term goals of gaining occasional support for ongoing military operations. If confirmed, will you commit to make human rights, political liberties, and other core American values the centerpiece, rather than merely 

one factor in the equation, when determining United States policy toward Uzbekistan? 

Answer. Human rights and democracy have long been key underpinnings of 

United States policy toward Uzbekistan. During the period of close military ties 

with Uzbekistan, which began soon after the 9/11 attacks, we pursued a strategic 

partnership with Uzbekistan—as agreed to in our 2002 bilateral Declaration on the 

Strategic Framework—which explicitly conditioned our relationship on improvements in Uzbekistan’s human rights and democratic practices, among other areas. 

In 2004, when the Secretary of State could no longer certify that Uzbekistan was 

fulfilling these commitments, we severely restricted assistance, notably including 

both International Military Educational Training and Foreign Military Financing. 

While there is no question that the promise of Uzbekistan’s support in the war on 

terror was of great importance to us, we have not and will not seek to secure this 

at the expense of human rights and basic freedoms. 

In fact, our conscious decision to repeatedly and persistently call for an international investigation into the violent events at Andijon in 2005, together with criticism and condemnation of Uzbekistan’s human rights practices more generally, was 

a factor leading to the expulsion of United States military forces from KarshiKhanabad air base and the overall chill in bilateral relations. 

Our critical task now is to rebuild and reshape the bilateral relationship, emphasizing to the Uzbeks that improving their human rights record is fundamental to 

progress in all spheres. Security, for example, will suffer if moderate Muslims cannot practice their faith and are pushed toward extremism by restrictive government 

practices. Likewise, the positive foreign investment climate needed to boost the 

Uzbek economy is undermined by Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record. At the 

same time, we must make clear that security and economic cooperation, if conducted 

properly, can also play an important part in improving the overall human rights picture for the people of Uzbekistan. If confirmed, I will keep our Mission fully committed to the goal of ensuring that Uzbekistan observes international human rights 

standards. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Uzbekistan? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Uzbekistan? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. Democracy is severely undermined in Uzbekistan by a government that 

stifles debate and punishes those who challenge the status quo. Its human rights 

practices are rooted in its Soviet past, and include the use of torture to extract confessions, unjust imprisonments, life-threatening prison conditions, harassment and 

prosecution of journalists, human rights activists, religious groups, and other members of civil society. 

The United States must continue to emphasize to the Government of Uzbekistan 

that we value human rights and that we, along with other members of the international community, will continue to monitor the country’s treatment of its citizens. 

If confirmed, I will engage in systematic diplomatic efforts to persuade Uzbekistan’s 

current and emerging leaders that democracy and rule of law are essential to 

Uzbekistan’s stability, economic prosperity, and the overall well-being of the Uzbek 

477 

people. I intend to maintain our Mission’s support for human rights defenders with 

training and material support to organizations and individuals. Our Mission will 

support domestic and international efforts to promote a free press and ensure that 

elections are free and fair. Where appropriate, I will also seek out opportunities to 

assist the Uzbek Government in improving its own practices in these areas through 

training, exchange programs, and persistent diplomacy. I would hope that these activities would facilitate improvements in human rights practices and promote stability and prosperity. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges 

will you face in Uzbekistan in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. The chief obstacles and challenges to advancing human rights stem from 

the Uzbek Government’s decision to severely restrict relations with the United 

States, in part as a consequence of United States and international criticism in the 

aftermath of Andijon. Uzbekistan’s Government continues to harass human rights 

activists and journalists and obstruct civil society organizations that cooperate with 

us. If confirmed, my principal challenge will be to establish effective working relationships between our Mission and all levels of government and society, and to use 

these relationships to persuade Uzbekistan that improved human rights is in the 

fundamental interest of both our countries. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, 

what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in 

human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior 

service? 

Answer. Our current team at Embassy Tashkent realizes that promoting human 

rights and democracy extends far beyond the portfolio of a single diplomat, or section of the embassy. Human rights issues are in one way or another the focus of 

all sections and agencies at the Mission. If confirmed, I would institutionalize briefings on the human rights situation in Uzbekistan for all members of the Mission 

team, and see to it that human rights issues and concerns were consistently included in all areas of our policy, including the design and content of any assistance 

program undertaken with the Uzbek Government. 

All Foreign Service officers are trained from the beginning of their careers on the 

importance of human rights diplomacy and programs. In addition, the State Department recognizes outstanding human rights officers with an annual Department-wide 

award. Human rights officers at Embassy Tashkent are regularly nominated for this 

award, and have won it three times in the last several years. If confirmed, I would 

ensure that officers at Embassy Tashkent continue to be recognized for outstanding 

work. 

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Uzbekistan who are working to promote human 

rights? 

Answer. Regrettably, because of actions taken by the Uzbek Government, the 

human rights community in Uzbekistan has dwindled to only a few international 

nongovernmental organizations and many individuals across the country working 

bravely to protect individual rights. Previous Ambassadors to Uzbekistan have made 

a regular practice of meeting with human rights activists and nongovernmental organizations working in this field. If confirmed, I would continue to make these meetings, which are a critical source of moral support to this community, a high priority. 

At the same time, we must bear in mind that interactions with the embassy have 

resulted in harm to several activists in the past. I would take care to work quietly 

with those who wish to do so. I would also make it a priority, before departing for 

Post, to meet with United States NGO’s that are following the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, and to stay in touch with them throughout my tour. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. In seeking to advance human rights in Uzbekistan, I will draw on strong 

support for human rights manifested throughout my career. In addition to the work 

I have carried out over the past 2 years as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul, Afghanistan, where United States efforts alongside those of the international community are helping to prevent a resurgence of the brutal Taliban regime, I would cite 

the following three examples over the course of my career: 

478 

• South Africa: As a desk officer on the South Africa Desk in 1983–1985, I looked 

for ways to ensure that United States policy stood up to apartheid. I crafted 

remarks for Secretary Shultz that drew the ire of the South African foreign 

minister because of their outspoken criticism of apartheid. I personally engaged 

with the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in an effort to ameliorate the 

policy of ‘‘constructive engagement,’’ seen by many as appeasement of apartheid 

and soon overtaken by the Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act. I used my influence to help a deserving black South African get a visa to the United States 

even when other factors worked against this. 

• Soviet Union: As a political officer in Moscow in 1988–1990, during the waning 

days of the Soviet Union, I focused my engagement and reporting on advancing 

United States-Soviet cooperation in support of the Middle East peace process as 

well as conflict resolution efforts underway in eastern and southern Africa. I 

worked to expedite the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Progress 

was made in all these areas, tangibly improving human rights for millions of 

people, and I feel I played a part in these efforts. In addition, as Soviet authority crumbled, I was successful in persuading Russian contacts that they had 

nothing to fear from the United States, and bolstered them in their growing 

awareness that the demise of Soviet Communism would spell a massive advance in human rights on a global scale—which it did. I am proud to have 

played a small part in this, very early and large-scale example of Transformational Diplomacy. 

• Northern Ireland: I worked for 5 years on the Northern Ireland peace process, 

three as political counselor in Dublin (1995–1998) and two as a director for European affairs on the National Security Council staff (1999–2001). I feel this 

was an example of a successful peace process—one where the investment of 

U.S. political capital (by both the executive and legislative branches) paid off 

in terms of bringing the parties to the negotiating table and keeping them focused on reaching a solution. The success of United States, British, and Irish 

diplomacy in this effort has paid off in terms of lives saved and misery averted 

for hundreds of thousands of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and 

the Republic of Ireland. I am proud to have been part of the many-layered team 

that over the years helped shepherd this process to a successful conclusion. The 

trust I established with key players in the Irish and British Governments and 

among the political parties involved, including Sinn Fein and the loyalists, 

helped keep them engaged and committed to the peace process during the 

United States Presidential transition in 2001. The human rights gains have 

been significant. Senior officials on all sides would, I believe, concur in the assessment that I played a helpful role in advancing this process. 

RESPONSES OF ANNE WOODS PATTERSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Do you agree with the opinion expressed by Gen. James Jones at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on September 21, 2006, that in the view 

of many United States military officers the Taliban central headquarters is located 

in or near the Pakistani city of Quetta? 

Answer. The border areas of Pakistan, including Baluchistan, are of great concern 

to the United States and the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan is stepping up security operations that are yielding results, including the death or capture of senior 

Taliban leaders like Mullah Dadullah Lang. Pakistan is also making efforts to extend the writ and benefits of government into areas along the border to eliminate 

territory from which the Taliban and other extremists may draw support. NATO 

military leaders tell us that these efforts are helping disrupt Taliban command and 

control. I believe that we have made good strides, but more needs to be done. 

We will continue to support Pakistan in their efforts: in governance, economics, 

development, education, security, and other areas. The Department can provide a 

classified briefing to you or your staff to further discuss the situation if needed. 

Question. Is it your understanding that the total amount of noncovert aid provided 

to the Government of Pakistan by the Government of the United States since 9/11 

is approximately $10 billion? 

Answer. Yes, the U.S. Government has provided, in round numbers, about $10 billion in foreign assistance and coalition support funds. 

The amount provided to Pakistan by the Government of the United States since 

2001 is approximately $5.6 billion. Of that, $5.1 billion has been directed toward 

socio-economic development, law enforcement, and foreign military financing. The 

479 

Department of Defense has also provided Pakistan with $500 million in counterterrorism and counternarcotics training. 

In addition to the aid described above, the United States has provided Pakistan with approximately $4.9 billion since 2001 in the form of reimbursement for expenses incurred by the Government of Pakistan in its support of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

As I was preparing for the hearing, I realized that determining the precise 

amount provided to Pakistan was not easy. Some have implied that the United 

States Government has promoted this lack of clarity to obfuscate our assistance to 

Pakistan. This is simply false. The funding for Pakistan comes from different appropriations, is designated to different accounts with discrete legal authorities, is provided to different United States Government agencies, and is further complicated 

by continuing resolutions, wartime supplementals, and reprogramming. If confirmed, I will try to clear up this issue by describing our assistance programs on 

the embassy Web site as clearly and completely as possible. 

Question. Do you believe that the Government of Pakistan has made satisfactory 

efforts to dismantle the terrorist groups Lashkar-e Taiba and Jaish-e Muhammad? 

Are you satisfied with the lack of meaningful punishment given to the leaders of 

these groups: Hafez Saed and Maulana Azhar? 

Answer. The government of Pakistan has seen some successes in confronting 

these groups, having captured several senior terrorist leaders—particularly those 

from sectarian terrorist organizations that target victims based on their religion— 

and adopting policies that have dramatically reduced the cross-border movements 

of Kashmir related groups in the last year alone. But we must all do more, including 

Pakistan, if we are to successfully dismantle all terrorist groups in Pakistan and 

elsewhere. 

President Musharraf banned Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e Muhammad, and other domestic terror groups in 2002, recognizing them as a threat not only to Pakistan’s 

development but its domestic and regional security. Since then the Government of 

Pakistan has made considerable efforts to dismantle internal terrorist networks and 

to curb movements of these groups across its borders. 

If confirmed, I will continue to work with Pakistan not only to deepen our cooperation in combating al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but also to ensure that ultimately 

all terror groups, including groups attempting to resurface under new names, are 

subject to the same scrutiny, and to enhance their efforts to prosecute the leaders 

and key members of all terrorist organizations operating on Pakistani soil to the 

fullest extent of the law. 

Question. Do you believe there can be genuinely free and fair elections in Pakistan 

so long as the leaders of the two largest political parties remain barred from returning to the country? 

Answer. I believe that the absence or presence of individual politicians from Pakistan on its upcoming election day will not determine whether Pakistan has held a 

free and fair election. 

The credibility of Pakistan’s upcoming parliamentary election will rest on the ability of Pakistani political parties to campaign and seek votes openly, the ability of 

Pakistani voters to vote for the political parties and candidates of their choice, and 

the ability of those political parties who emerge with a majority of the votes to form 

a democratic government reflecting the will of Pakistan’s electorate. 

If confirmed, I will do everything possible to ensure that the U.S. Government 

supports free, fair, and transparent elections with the widest possible participation 

of political parties. 

Question. What specific metrics would you use to evaluate whether Pakistan’s 

scheduled parliamentary elections can be judged free and fair? 

Answer. Elections will be free and fair if the parties can campaign and seek votes 

openly, if voters can vote for the party of his/her choice, if media is free to cover 

the electoral campaign and outcome, if voters can be sure that his/her vote will be 

properly counted, and if the political parties who win can form a democratic government. 

If confirmed, I will seek guidance from established international experts, such as 

the National Democratic Institute and the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor bureau, to evaluate the electoral process and to suggest where U.S. Government assistance might most usefully be directed. I would 

also expect to be in regular contact with the Elections Commission and opposition 

parties to seek their views. USAID is already working with the International Foundation for Election Systems, UNDP, and the Asia Foundation to improve elections 

procedures; State’s Department of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor is proVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00487 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
480 

viding assistance to local NGOs who will help political parties develop a code on 

conduct and will conduct basic voter education campaigns, particularly targeted at 

women. 

In my view, it is important that both international and domestic observers be 

available throughout the electoral process. For instance, there are real concerns 

about the registration process, which may have excluded millions of eligible voters. 

I have also learned in my previous assignments that there are lots of ways to steal 

elections, some very sophisticated and some fairly crude. International experts and 

domestic monitors on site throughout the process will reduce the chances of a fraudulent election. 

The U.S. Government has made clear that we expect to see a parliamentary election in 2007–2008 that meets broad international standards for transparency. I 

would expect to keep this committee and others in Congress closely informed about 

this process. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Pakistan? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Pakistan? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. Pakistan, a developing country with a population of over 160 million, 

faces significant challenges in ensuring that the human rights of all of its citizens 

are not only legally protected, but practically enforced. 

As noted in the 2006 State Department Country Report on Human Rights and 

International Religious Freedom Report, current human rights concerns include 

treatment of Pakistani citizens by security forces, respect for the rights of women 

and religious minorities, child labor, trafficking in persons, arbitrary detentions, and 

hindrances on freedom of the press. 

The treatment of women in Pakistan, particularly in rural areas, does not accord 

with international human rights standards. Protection of the rights and safety of 

women and children is essential to Pakistan’s social and economic development, and 

if confirmed, I plan to work with the Government of Pakistan closely to identify 

ways that the United States can help Pakistan improve in this area. The passage 

this year by Pakistan’s National Assembly of the first significant women’s rights legislation in decades is an indication that all of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties recognize the importance of moving forward in this key area. Still, much remains to be done. 

It is also imperative for Pakistan’s internal stability and its emergence as a full 

democracy that the rights of Pakistan’s religious minorities be protected, and that 

religious minorities not be subject to discrimination. The Government of Pakistan 

has recently reached out to multifaith leaders at the national and local level in a 

series of interfaith dialogs; this is an initiative that we should encourage as a first 

step toward increasing the understanding and respect amongst Pakistan’s faith communities that underpins freedom of religion. 

Arbitrary arrests, including of opposition political figures, are an issue in Pakistan. We have made it clear to the government that freedom of assembly is not only 

a basic democratic right, but also an essential component of free and fair elections. 

We have also made it clear that we expect candidates and campaigners from all parties, including the opposition, to have freedom and security of movement in this 

electoral season. We need to send a strong message on this issue, and will. 

We also track closely reports of disappearances, or detentions, in which families 

are unable to determine the welfare and whereabouts of their imprisoned relative. 

Transparency is a critical element of justice. The Government of Pakistan has legitimate and serious internal security concerns. But in addressing those concerns, Pakistan needs to balance the imperatives of security with respect for personal freedoms 

and the rule of law. 

Finally, it is important that the United States encourage fuller observance of political rights and encourage Pakistan’s movement toward a civilian-led democracy. 

It is important that the considerable progress made by the Government of Pakistan 

in recent years toward ensuring freedom of the press and of assembly not be halted 

or eroded. I was relieved to see that, following objections from the local media community, the Government of Pakistan recently reversed an initiative to introduce legislation that could have negatively impacted press freedom in Pakistan. 

If confirmed, I will encourage long-term programs, such as female literacy, that 

will gradually improve human rights. The United States Government needs to concentrate on building up Pakistani civilian institutions apart from the military, including the media, political parties, the police, the civilian ministries, and civil society organizations. 

481 

Pakistan has produced several globally-recognized leaders in the human rights 

field, leaders who have gained international prominence through work accomplished 

despite the hurdles described above, through the strength of their own convictions. 

I will work to ensure that we continue to identify and support such individuals, 

whose own work greatly increases Pakistan’s capacity to ask and answer those questions of its own society. 

I believe we already have in place a number of projects to accomplish these objectives, through our assistance to build institutional capacity for government accountability and responsiveness to the needs and interests of Pakistani citizens. If confirmed, I will also carry the message to Islamabad that I believe Pakistan’s record 

on issues such as freedom of the press and freedom of assembly to be key to the 

government’s domestic as well as its international credibility. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges 

will you face in Pakistan in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. As I prepared for this confirmation hearing, almost every expert on Pakistan told me that literacy levels were an impediment to democracy and respect for 

human rights. Illiterate people are easily misled. Individual Pakistanis’ access to information about their own government, their country, and the world beyond their 

borders is key not only to development, but also to the emergence of citizens who 

are well-informed about their rights and able to hold their government accountable. 

For that and other reasons, education remains a key target area of our development assistance to Pakistan. In 2007 we will directly contribute $60.7 million to 

Pakistan’s education sector: $28.7 million in basic education and $32.0 million for 

higher education. Pakistan has acknowledged the need for increased commitment of 

its own resources to education and from 2001 to 2006 has significantly increased 

its spending in the education sector. 

Rigid, politicized interpretations of religious and cultural traditions are also challenges to implementation of international human rights standards. These traditions 

particularly influence the treatment of women and minorities in Pakistan. As in our 

Rule of Law programs in Afghanistan, we will support efforts to modernize these 

tribal and religious interpretations. 

As in many other countries in the world, striking the right balance between our 

security interests and rights of the individual in Pakistan will continue to be a challenge. If confirmed, I will do my best to maintain the proper balance in our relations 

with Pakistan. 

The long history of military rule and the relative importance of the military in 

Pakistani society will present a challenge in moving Pakistan toward a civilian-led 

democracy. Pakistan has a long history of an educated political elite and political 

parties but little experience with democratic transitions. Key to lessening the military role will be the strengthening of civilian institutions such as an independent 

judiciary, robust media, and domestic political parties, while persuading the military that politics is incompatible with a truly professional military. 

The United States Government also faces a challenge of communication on our ongoing dialog with Pakistan about the importance of ensuring respect for basic 

human rights. In many developing countries, legislation and initiatives designed to 

protect human rights are portrayed at the local level by self-interested actors as 

‘‘foreign’’ imports masking hidden agendas. If confirmed, I plan to continue our ongoing work with Pakistani human rights NGOs, civil society members, multifaith 

religious leaders, and local and national politicians who are able to advocate the important role respect for human rights—and for the institutions of democracy—plays 

in Pakistan’s emergence as a stable and prosperous democracy. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, 

what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in 

human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior 

service? 

Answer. Responsibility for promoting respect for human rights is not restricted to 

any one section or function of a U.S. diplomatic mission. Just as protection of our 

basic rights and freedoms is inherent in the United States’ system of government, 

promotion of these basic rights and freedoms internationally is inherent in every aspect of our diplomatic mission. 

Our strong material, technical, and advisory support for Pakistan’s 2007–2008 national election targets one key human right—the right of individuals to select a 

democratic and representative government freely and with confidence. This dedication of resources and attention does not, however, come at the expense of our conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00489 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
482 

tinual and extensive engagement with Pakistani Governmental and nongovernmental actors on other key issues such as the legal protection and enforcement of 

women’s rights, eradication of child labor, and respect for the rights of religious minorities. 

My experience in previous posts has made clear to me that the most important 

human rights messengers are often not the USAID human rights officer, important 

though he/she may be, but our intelligence, law enforcement, and military officials. 

Our military officers convey to their counterparts that a professional military does 

not participate in politics, while our intelligence and military officials reiterate to 

their counterparts that violations of human rights are not only wrong but counterproductive to their objectives. Our law enforcement officials teach professional techniques like forensic evidence collection to secure convictions, thus eliminating the 

perceived need to beat suspects to obtain confessions. Fortunately, the dedicated 

Americans serving in our embassies overseas seldom need prompting to convey 

these messages to their local counterparts. 

Our Embassy in Islamabad and our Consulates in Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar 

are key diplomatic posts in our efforts to promote human rights, and the Department of State greatly respects the service of the officers who staff these critical Missions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that officers engaged in the critical task 

of promoting respect for human rights and freedoms in Pakistan receive full credit 

and professional reward for their vital work. 

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Pakistan who are working to promote human 

rights? 

Answer. Absolutely. 

Our Office of Pakistan and Bangladesh Affairs in Washington, our Embassy in 

Islamabad, and our Consulates in Lahore, Peshawar, and Karachi have close and 

ongoing ties with domestic and international nongovernmental organizations working to promote human rights in Pakistan. 

If confirmed, I commit to strengthening those ties by participating personally in 

this ongoing dialog about how we—the international community, Pakistan’s Government, and Pakistan’s citizens—can better resource and increase our effectiveness in 

promoting the development of a fully-realized human rights regime that protects all 

Pakistani citizens. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. During my tenure as Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement, virtually our entire effort was designed (and largely successful) in professionalizing police, prosecutors, and judges. This is basic to 

promoting human rights and the rule of law. Without professional police, societies 

revert to vigilante or paramilitary justice, which is almost impossible to roll back. 

I am particularly proud of the progress in the rule of law program in Afghanistan, 

including our significant support to the Afghan attorney general, an honest and 

dedicated official who is determined to root out corruption. 

I believe my leadership of our Embassy in Bogota and the interagency implementation of Plan Colombia programs played a role in sharp reduction of violence in 

that country. This was essential for broader improvements in human rights—although Colombia is still struggling to come to terms with its past—as government 

presence was restored throughout the countryside, military ties to paramilitaries 

were reduced, and the insurgents weakened throughout the country. 

Although Colombia still faces enormous human rights challenges, I believe the political and human rights of Colombians have greatly improved because of United 

States assistance. 

In my assignments in El Salvador and at USUN, I believe that human rights 

were an integral part of United States Government policy. 

If confirmed, promotion of human rights will be a key element of our policy and 

of my personal agenda. More than in any of my other posts, identifying the American Government with human rights will be particularly important in Pakistan 

where (unlike in Latin America) the population is more hostile to the United States 

and deeply skeptical of our motivations. 

483 

RESPONSES OF NANCY J. POWELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. In recent years, the United States has been regarded in Nepal (rightly 

or wrongly) as a force that is closely allied with the monarchy, implacably opposed 

to any role for the Maoists in the political process, and only supportive of democratic 

development to the extent that elections produce outcomes agreeable to American 

interests. What concrete steps would you take to reverse this widespread perception? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead a country team review of our current activities 

to ensure that our private and public diplomacy messages are unambiguous in our 

support and respect for the peace process and for free and fair constituent assembly 

elections. My initial schedule will provide numerous opportunities to reiterate this 

stance consistently and clearly and to highlight the extent of United States assistance to Nepal’s emerging democratic institutions as well as our efforts to reach out 

to nongovernmental organizations and work with nonviolent civil society groups. 

Question. As the Maoists have steadily moved from the battlefield to the political 

arena, the United States has been considerably slower than the Nepali populace and 

outside regional actors, to welcome and support this transition. If confirmed, would 

you commit to a full-scale top-to-bottom review of U.S. policy toward the Maoists? 

Answer. As noted above, if confirmed, I will lead a nearly entirely new country 

team in a review of our democracy programs in Nepal with special focus on our ongoing support for the peace process and the upcoming constituent assembly elections. As part of that review, I plan to assess whether the current policy, which restricts contact with the Maoists to official business with those who are officials of 

the interim government, is serving U.S. interests effectively. I will share the results 

of that review with Washington policymakers along with reporting on Maoist compliance (or lack thereof) with basic democratic principles, especially respect for 

human rights and rule of law. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in 

Nepal? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Nepal? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. Nepal faces many simultaneous human rights challenges. The most urgent are increasing respect for the rule of law throughout the country and ensuring 

that the government addresses the expectations and needs of traditionally 

marginalized groups. Continued intimidation through extortion, kidnapping, and violence threatens to roll back the democratic progress that has been made and to 

prevent free and fair constituent assembly elections, leading to more violence. 

If confirmed, my immediate focus will be on support for free and fair elections in 

November, drawing on U.S. resources as well as cooperating with other members 

of the international community. We also need to pre-position assistance for the postelection period to be ready to help the new government establish quickly its governing authority and a transparent constitution-drafting process. 

If confirmed, I will also encourage the Government of Nepal to strengthen the National Human Rights Commission and to establish a truth and reconciliation mechanism that would allow conflict victims to air their grievances and seek redress from 

abusers in an organized, peaceful manner. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges 

will you face in Nepal in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. The biggest obstacles are the continuing Maoist lack of respect for basic 

democratic norms and the unmet expectations of marginalized groups who have resorted to violence as a means to emphasize their demands. 

Nepalis’ lack of education, poverty, and limited experience with democratic governance will complicate efforts to improve the human rights situations. The limited 

capacity and resources of the security forces will challenge efforts to restore rule of 

law. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, 

what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in 

human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior 

service? 

Answer. Support for the establishment of sustained democracy is the No. 1 United 

States interest and priority in Nepal. Respect for human rights is at the very top 

484 

of the agenda. Progress in these areas is vital to a successful democratic transition 

and regional stability. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the promotion of human 

rights continues to be integrated into the activities of all personnel in the Mission, 

from our diplomacy with senior government and party officials, to the planning and 

administration of police and development assistance programs by State and USAID 

personnel, to the military training programs managed by the Office of Defense Cooperation. 

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Nepal who are working to promote human rights? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will meet regularly with nongovernmental organizations— 

both international and domestic—working to promote human rights in Nepal. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. Beginning in 1980 in Kathmandu when I was named the Mission’s 

human rights officer, I have been an active supporter of our human rights goals in 

all of the posts at which I have been privileged to serve. The means of expressing 

that support has changed with my responsibilities, but my interest and dedication 

have been unwavering. 

I am most proud of an effort undertaken under my supervision by junior officers 

in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 1997, to address the trafficking of women and children 

in South Asia. The officers developed an interagency approach that included a 

USAID grant to develop programs to inform women of their rights, a public diplomacy campaign that distributed articles on prevention to law enforcement and other 

government officials, and an outreach effort to other diplomatic missions in Dhaka 

and United States missions in South Asia to encourage coordinated activities to halt 

the trafficking. The program served as a model for later programs throughout the 

region and led to the arrests of traffickers along the border with India. The program 

also provided me with a model for use at posts where I have been ambassador to 

encourage all members of the Mission to be involved in promoting human rights. 

RESPONSES OF STEPHEN A. SECHE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What are the most important actions you have taken in your career to 

date to promote human rights and democracy? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. From 2002–2004, while serving as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge 

d’Affaires of the United States Embassy in Damascus, I directed a robust missionwide effort to publicly associate the United States Government with Syrian NGOs 

and individuals who were—and continue to be—working at considerable personal 

risk to affect important political reforms in that country. 

We met with them whenever possible, invited them to events at our homes, and 

made direct and forceful interventions with Syrian Government officials to encourage the development of an atmosphere in Syria in which their citizens could freely 

exercise their fundamental human rights of expression and association. 

We also worked closely with European and other allies with a presence in Damascus in order to ensure the message that political, economic, and social reforms must 

be undertaken was delivered clearly and repeatedly. 

Question. What are the most pressing human rights issues in Yemen? What are 

the most important steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Yemen? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. In recent years, the Government of Yemen has made a concerted effort 

to address human rights abuses, but significant human rights issues persist in some 

areas. These include limited press freedom and harassment of journalists, allegations of torture and poor prison conditions, prolonged pre-trial detention, pervasive 

corruption within the government and judiciary, and discrimination against women. 

In addition, Yemen’s small Jewish community has recently been targeted and 

threatened by supporters of the al-Houthi group, and requires the continued protection and support of the Yemeni Government—for which the Government is to be 

commended. 

If confirmed, I plan to engage the host government and civil society actors to promote the strengthening of Yemen’s human rights record and democratic and judicial 

reforms. I will also endeavor to use the annual reports on human rights, religious 

freedom, and trafficking in persons to encourage/press for progress in these areas. 

485 

I hope these efforts will enable me to support women’s human rights initiatives, 

advocate for freedom of the press, promote judicial reform, demonstrate U.S. support 

for civil society activists; and investigate reported cases of torture, prolonged pretrial detention, and child trafficking. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges 

will you face in Yemen in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. Although the Government of Yemen has undertaken significant democratic reforms over the past 18 months, many of these reforms have not yet been 

fully implemented and reports of abuse continue, especially in the areas of women’s 

rights, freedom of the press, torture, and police brutality. If confirmed, one of my 

key priorities will be to ensure that the Government of Yemen follows through on 

its democratic reforms and makes continued progress. 

Change comes slowly to Yemen and other traditional countries of the Middle East. 

If confirmed, I will also engage the government, other political actors, and civil society groups in order to promote respect for democracy, fight corruption, and work to 

promote the role of women in government. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, 

what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in 

human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior 

service? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will expect all members of my staff working directly with 

the various facets of Yemeni society to make the promotion of human rights a professional priority of their own. I would like to see language to that effect included 

in the annual work requirements of all embassy staff engaged on these issues. This 

formal identification of human rights and democratic development as a priority of 

the United States Mission to Yemen will enable me, my Deputy Chief of Mission, 

and appropriate section chiefs to recognize the accomplishments of individual officers and support their promotion based, at least in part, on their performance in 

this regard. 

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Yemen who are working to promote human rights? 

Answer. The United States Embassy in Sanaa has a robust program of supporting 

and promoting civil society in Yemen in general, and human rights NGOs in particular. If confirmed, I will continue this trend. 

Embassy officers frequently meet with the NGOs that we fund, as well as many 

others, in order to keep abreast of allegations of human rights abuses, and to update 

our annual human rights report. We raise human rights abuse allegations with the 

Minister of Human Rights and her staff, as well as with the Minister of Interior 

and the President when necessary. Embassy officers also correspond and meet with 

U.S.-based human rights NGOs, including the Committee to Protect Journalists. 

Over the past year, we have expended more than $250,000 in Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funding to NGOs promoting human rights. The bulk of 

this money will go to NGOs that focus on increasing women’s participation in electoral life. We are also funding one of Yemen’s premier human rights NGOs—the 

HOOD organization to write a draft of the Judicial Authority Law. 

In addition to our small grants funding, the embassy has directed larger grants 

to NGOs focused on human rights, including through the Office of the Middle East 

Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Through MEPI, the United States has built a partnership between Italian, Turkish, and Yemeni human rights NGOs as part of the 

Democracy Assistance Dialog. The embassy has also actively supported the Department of Labor in its funding of organizations that fight child labor and trafficking 

in Yemen. 

Question. In November 2005, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) suspended Yemen from its participation in a Threshold Account on concerns about corruption. In February 2007, the MCC reinstated Yemen’s eligibility to participate in 

the program. Please explain the anticorruption efforts of Yemen leading up to the 

MCC’s February 2007 decision on Yemen. How do you see your role in facilitating 

Yemen’s anticorruption efforts? 

Answer. President Saleh focused his successful reelection campaign on reform 

issues, particularly government corruption. The result was an election judged to be 

open and competitive by international observers, with largely unfettered media coverage of opposition candidates. 

486 

Since the election, Saleh has continued to invest his personal prestige in important reforms. For example, when the government’s draft procurement law—written 

with assistance from U.S. Government-funded consultants and World Bank experts—was gutted by reform opponents, Saleh ordered the draft be returned to its 

original version and placed a front-page declaration in the government’s newspapers 

ordering the law to be passed expeditiously. 

Since its suspension from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program in November 2005, the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) has undertaken the following specific efforts to combat corruption: 

• Reshuffled the cabinet (twice); 

• Empowered technocrats to shepherd major legislative and regulatory changes 

through the Yemeni system; 

• Elected a National Supreme Anticorruption Authority (NSAA); 

• Passed anticorruption and the financial disclosure laws; 

• Drafted a procurement law; 

• Drafted a decentralization amendment law; and 

• Crafted a National Decentralization Strategy (to be presented to cabinet in July 

2007). 

If confirmed, I will work to with donors and the ROYG to implement 

anticorruption activities. Support from USAID has played, and will continue to play, 

a key role in providing guidance and technical assistance to the ROYG on its efforts 

to receive MCC assistance and combat corruption. 

Question. As one of the poorest countries in the world, what are the most pressing 

socioeconomic issues facing Yemen? What role can the United States play in addressing them? 

Answer. Yemen will face significant social and economic challenges over the next 

10 years. Oil revenue and water resources are declining. Yemen’s population of 20 

million, nearly half of which is under the age of 15, is exploding. Unemployment, 

illiteracy, and infant mortality rates are all high. 

Ongoing United States assistance to Yemen helps to address these issues in several ways. By providing bilateral development assistance that builds schools, equips 

health clinics, and teaches women to read, we are helping Yemenis prepare to face 

these challenges. By coordinating with other international donors to ensure that foreign assistance pledges are targeted to meet the areas of greatest need, we are ensuring that each dollar of foreign aid is stretched as far as it can go. Finally, by 

encouraging the Government of Yemen to undertake significant political and economic reforms, we are encouraging economic growth and assisting the government 

to become more transparent, more efficient, and better able to respond to the needs 

of its population. 

RESPONSES OF JOSEPH ADAM ERELI TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What are the most important actions you have taken in your career to 

date to promote human rights and democracy? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. As Public Affairs Officer in Yemen from 1996–1998, I was particularly 

active in promoting democracy and human rights. I provided specialists to assist the 

Supreme Elections Commission prepare for Yemen’s first multiparty parliamentary 

election. I helped bring the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to Yemen. I worked 

with the Government of Yemen to facilitate the opening of an NDI office there and 

developed programs to strengthen the institutional capabilities of the newly-elected 

Yemeni Parliament. In a precedent-setting initiative, I brought Yemeni intelligence 

and security officers to the embassy’s English Language Institute and provided 

them with language training that had a heavy human rights and rule of law emphasis. The Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the time, 

Martin Indyk, recognized these efforts by awarding me a State Department Superior 

Honor Award. 

As State Department Deputy Spokesman, I aggressively used the podium to put 

America’s rhetorical and diplomatic muscle behind democratic causes. Perhaps the 

most dramatic example of this was in November 2005, during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The regime was threatening to annul the results of a democratic 

election won by the opposition. In no small part due to very vocal and public warnings from Secretary Powell and the State Department, many of which I authored 

or conveyed, the Government of Ukraine backed off and there was a peaceful transfer of power. 

487 

Question. What are the most pressing human rights issues in Bahrain? What are 

the most important steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Bahrain? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. The most pressing human rights issues in Bahrain are strengthening democracy, the rule of law, protections against trafficking in persons, and support for 

civil society. Through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the United 

States Embassy in Bahrain is funding programs in these fields, which if confirmed, 

I will continue to support and seek to expand. 

In May 2006, the Government of Bahrain expelled the National Democratic Institute (NDI) Director in advance of the November parliamentary and municipal elections. The resumption of NDI activities is among my most immediate priorities, both 

for the important work that the institute has conducted in the country and the symbolic importance of NDI’s return in terms of demonstrating the United States commitment to advancing democracy and human rights in Bahrain. 

Bahrain should take action to protect victims of trafficking in persons. It will be 

my immediate priority, if confirmed, to help the government enact—and implement—meaningful legislation that criminalizes this practice and provides for effective prosecution of those responsible for it. I will focus on this and other actions to 

help Bahrain move forward positively on the question of trafficking in persons. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges 

will you face in Bahrain in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. An issue of great sensitivity for Bahrain—and the United States—is internal stability and the prospect of sectarian conflict. The challenge before all of us 

is how to promote an inclusive, transparent, and participatory democracy in which 

both citizens and government play by the same rules: adherence to the principles 

of freedom of speech and peaceful dissent; tolerance of differences; and equality of 

all before the law. Helping Bahrain’s leaders and people help to manage these different pressures will, I believe, be our greatest challenge. 

The most important thing that America can do to bring about positive changes 

in the human rights practices of other nations is for us to live our values and represent those to other countries. Winning the hearts and minds of the Bahrainis 

must include ‘‘diplomacy of deeds.’’ As the United States takes positive action 

around the world it is important that other countries, like Bahrain, are aware of 

those actions. Likewise, it is important for the United States to take concrete steps 

to improve people’s lives. It is important to remember that Bahrain is a friend and 

ally to the United States and that human rights and democratic development are 

neither constant nor linear—there are setbacks, backsliding, and challenges. Bahrain has continually risen to the challenges of human rights promotion and if confirmed, I will do my part to support them. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of post activities? If confirmed, 

what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who engage in 

human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior 

service? 

Answer. I will also engage the Bahrainis in a dialog about human rights and what 

true respect for human rights entails. Highlighting the importance of NGO groups 

will also be a valuable asset in promoting respect for human rights in the country. 

Also, I would encourage participation in Human Rights Day (December 10) by 

hosting activities and programs at the embassy. 

I believe that human rights should not be relegated to its own section of activities—there should not be a human rights box. Rather, I believe that human rights 

are an integral part of everything else and as such they will be incorporated into 

my discussions on other topics and will remain a focal point of my activities. Bahrain is a key post for United States efforts in transformational diplomacy and if confirmed, I will work to lay the diplomatic foundations necessary to foster respect for 

human rights, equality, and respect for the rule of law. 

I will urge the continued support for invaluable human rights and democratic reform-related programming, much of which is funded through MEPI assistance. Embassy Manama currently supports the following programs: 

• The American Bar Association (ABA) is providing technical assistance to the 

Bahraini Ministry of Justice, including in the areas of judicial education and 

training, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), court management and administration, and development of a Bahraini Bar. The ABA also supports programs 

488 

aimed at reforming Bahraini family law and strengthening networking opportunities for female legal professionals. 

• The Bahrain Transparency Society (BTS) has undertaken a series of activities 

focused on assessing and monitoring Bahrain’s electoral processes; raising public awareness of electoral transparency; and training election monitors, efforts 

which will help to encourage both human rights and democratic reform in Bahrain. 

These programs are only a small sample of the extensive and broad ranging reform efforts supported by Embassy Manama. If confirmed, I will continue to work 

with these institutions, the Government of Bahrain, as well as international and domestic NGO’s to support reform efforts in Bahrain. 

I have discussed with both the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and Democracy 

Human Rights and Labor the possibility of additional funding and staff to expand 

the level of engagement and programming with Bahraini institutions and NGOs in 

the areas of human rights, representative government, and civic education. If confirmed, I will establish a Democratization Working Group in which officers from all 

sections of the embassy will have responsibilities for ensuring that this work is coordinated and effective. I will work with Department of State principals in Washington to ensure that officers engaged in the critical task of promoting respect for 

human rights and freedoms in Bahrain receive full credit and professional reward 

for their important work. 

Question. Will you commit to meeting regularly with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and in Bahrain who are working to promote human 

rights? 

Answer. Under my leadership, if confirmed, United States Embassy Manama will 

endeavor to strengthen support for democracy and democratic institutions within 

the Kingdom of Bahrain. I will work to support the efforts of United States-based 

NGOs, including the National Democratic Institute and American Bar Association, 

as well as the efforts of indigenous civil society organizations dedicated to the advancement of human rights and democracy in Bahrain. To support the latter, I will 

direct embassy political and public affairs officers to continue to engage with local 

NGOs. I will also direct them to continue to fully access all the means and resources 

at the embassy’s disposal to support the efforts of local democracy promoters. 

If confirmed, I plan to begin opening the door to NGO dialog by participating in 

an Ambassador’s NGO roundtable set up by the Bureau of Democracy Human 

Rights and Labor. The roundtable will bring together several NGO groups to participate in a dialog with me. 

(489) 

NOMINATIONS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

English, Charles L., to be Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Kennedy, J. Christian, to be Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues 

Moore, Roderick W., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro 

Munter, Cameron, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia 

Withers, John L., III, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Albania 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barack Obama presiding. 

Present: Senators Obama, Nelson, and DeMint. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS 

Senator OBAMA. The hearing will come to order. The Foreign Relations Committee is convening this confirmation hearing. We have 

Dr. John L. Withers II, to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of 

Albania; Mr. Charles Lewis English, to serve as Ambassador to 

Bosnia and Herzegovina; Dr. Cameron Munter, to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia; Mr. Roderick W. Moore, to serve 

as Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro; and Mr. J. Christian 

Kennedy, for the rank of Ambassador during his tenure as Special 

Envoy for Holocaust Issues. 

Four of these posts are in Southeast Europe, a region that faces 

a dual challenge. As people of this region reconcile themselves with 

a troubled past, they must now chart a shared course toward a better future. If confirmed, these individuals will be called upon to 

build on the best traditions of American diplomacy to facilitate 

these countries’ integration into the Euroatlantic community. 

With respect to Mr. Kennedy, the crimes he will try to rectify are 

not as recent as the genocide in Srebrenica, but the shadows they 

cast across Europe are every bit as dark. Finding justice for victims 

of the Holocaust remains a moral imperative, and I hope Mr. Kennedy will do everything in his power to right the wrongs stemming 

from that unconscionable era. 

I’m pleased that the administration has put forward five capable 

career Foreign Service officers to fill these positions. I welcome you 

all, and your families who are also with us here today. 

490 

In the interest of time, I’ll place my full statement in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Obama follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARACK OBAMA, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

The hearing will come to order. 

The Foreign Relations Committee is convening this confirmation hearing on the 

following nominees: 

• Dr. John L. Withers II to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Albania; 

• Mr. Charles Lewis English to serve as Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina; 

• Dr. Cameron Munter to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia; 

• Mr. Roderick W. Moore to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro; 

and 

• Mr. J. Christian Kennedy to serve as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues; 

Four of these posts are in Southeast Europe, a region that faces a dual challenge—as the people of this region reconcile themselves with a troubled past, they 

must now chart a shared course toward a better future. If confirmed, these individuals will be called upon build on the best traditions of American diplomacy to facilitate these countries’ integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. 

With respect to Mr. Kennedy, the crimes he will try to rectify are not as recent 

as the genocide at Srebrenica, but the shadows they cast across Europe are every 

bit as dark. Finding justice for victims of the Holocaust remains a moral imperative, 

and I hope Mr. Kennedy will do everything in his power to right the wrongs stemming from that unconscionable era. 

I am pleased that the administration has put forward five capable, career Foreign 

Service officers to fill these positions. I welcome them and their families who are 

also with us here today. 

Let me now address some of the issues that some of the nominees will face, if 

confirmed. 

SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HOLOCAUST ISSUES

Mr. Kennedy, you have been serving as the Department’s Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues for some 11 months now, so I know you have already been deeply engaged with the issues your office addresses. But I am pleased to have you come before the committee for confirmation, and I look forward to your testimony. 

As the Holocaust recedes in history, and the generation that survived it begins 

to pass on, it is incumbent on all of us to keep the torch of memory lit. But while 

those brave survivors are still with us, we have an obligation to help achieve a small 

measure of justice for them, where details of crimes against them and their families 

can be documented. 

I know you and your predecessors have been actively engaged in efforts to seek 

restitution for unpaid Holocaust-era insurance claims, to restore stolen works of art 

to their rightful owners, and to negotiate the settlements of other outstanding 

claims. I will be interested in hearing about these efforts, and also about where we 

stand on gaining access for survivors and researchers to the Bad Arolsen archive 

of Nazi records. 

ALBANIA

Dr. Withers, as you know, Albania has been an American ally since the fall of 

communism. Albania began working toward NATO membership in 1993, it supported United States operations in Kosovo in 1999, and it has sent troops to both 

Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The transition from communism to democracy has not been easy for Albania. The 

country went through a terrible economic crisis in 1997, followed by a political crisis 

in 1998. Despite these problems, Albanians have managed to put themselves on the 

right track over the last decade. They have reformed their constitution and stabilized their economy. Growth is high, inflation is low, and unemployment is beginning to edge downward. 

Albania’s progress deserves recognition, but more needs to be done. Albania is 

seeking membership in NATO and hopes, along with Croatia and Macedonia, to get 

a clear signal of support for its candidacy at the NATO summit in April 2008. Before that happens, however, it must consolidate the gains of recent years and stamp 

out the scourge of public and private corruption. 

491 

Dr. Withers, if confirmed, you will be positioned to help shape these events, and 

with them Albania’s future for decades to come. I will be interested in hearing your 

views on the United States-Albania relationship. 

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mr. English, it has been almost 12 years since the signing of the Dayton Accords 

and key issues remain unresolved in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Differences between 

the ‘‘Bosniak and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’’ and the Serbian 

‘‘Republika Srpska’’ continue to diminish the effectiveness of the central government 

and thwart the ambitions of the country as a whole. Failure to engage in constitutional reform—and particularly reform of the police services—has put the process 

of accession to the European Union on hold. Resolving these key issues will be essential if Bosnia is to gain membership in NATO and the European Union. 

Despite the proliferation of new challenges around the globe, we cannot lose focus 

on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Union is planning to close down the office of its High Representative and to end the country’s status as an international 

protectorate. If that process is managed well, Bosnia could emerge as a powerful example to the world—a largely Muslim, multiethnic country that went from civil war 

to European democracy in a single generation. If it fails, Bosnia could remain a hostage to the ethnic tensions that hijacked the region in the 1990s. 

Mr. English, if confirmed, you will face the formidable challenge of ensuring robust United States and international engagement in the country while helping 

Bosnians of all ethnicities address the problems facing their country. I will be interested in hearing how you will face this challenge. 

MONTENEGRO

Mr. Moore, Montenegro is the latest addition to the family of European democracies. Since declaring sovereignty on June 3, 2006, Montenegro has worked energetically to make a place for itself in major international organizations. It joined the 

IMF and the World Bank in January of this year, and it has set its sights on membership in the European Union and NATO as well. 

Despite the country’s early achievements, it still faces many of the hurdles familiar in new democracies. Montenegro successfully held legislative elections last November and yet it still has not agreed on a new constitution to replace the one that 

was drafted in 1992. 

In addition, Montenegro must find a new way to live together with Serbia as the 

two countries finish the process of moving apart. And it must also learn to adapt 

to a final status for Kosovo. 

Mr. Moore, if confirmed, you will participate in the consolidation of this new democracy in the Balkans. I will be interested in hearing your views on how we can 

help Montenegro complete this process. 

SERBIA

Dr. Munter, Serbia has made significant progress since the end of Slobodan 

Milosevic’s reign of terror. However, the country is still struggling to overcome its 

troubled past—both as it relates to Kosovo and its failure to deliver fugitives to the 

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. United 

Nations envoy Maarti Ahtisaari has offered a path forward on Kosovo. Prompt implementation of his recommendations is the best way for Serbia and Kosovo to ultimately realize the European future that their people deserve. However, Kosovo’s 

independence will be traumatic for Serbia and pose a severe challenge for United 

States relations with the country. 

The United States’ Ambassador to Serbia will have to nurture Serbia’s democracy 

and our countries’ bilateral relationship during the uncertain times ahead. I look 

forward to working with you on this undertaking and will be interested to hear from 

you about how you would address the challenges facing Serbia. 

With that, I now call on the distinguished ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee, Senator DeMint, for his opening statement. 

Senator OBAMA. Senator DeMint is not yet here, and so, what I’d 

like to do is to ask all the nominees to begin with their opening 

statement. When Senator DeMint arrives, we may interrupt your 

opening statements to allow him to make his statement. 

492 

And if you would like to introduce your families, feel free to do 

so, because we know that they are signing on, as well, and should 

be congratulated and commended for their public service. 

My wife did not ask me to write that. [Laughter.] 

That was something I thought of all on my own. [Laughter.] 

Senator OBAMA. So, what I’d like to do is—let’s start with Mr. 

Withers. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN L. WITHERS II, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA 

Dr. WITHERS. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by introducing my 

mother and my father, Dr. John Withers, Sr., who is soon to turn 

a youthful 91 years old, and my mother, Daisy Withers. My wife, 

who is a Foreign Service officer, is in Slovenia, where her duties 

as deputy chief of mission have kept her. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I’m privileged to be 

here today. I appreciate President Bush’s and Secretary Rice’s confidence in supporting me as their nominee as the next Ambassador 

to Albania. Should you confirm my nomination, I will do my utmost 

to advance our Nation’s goals and to represent our country well. I 

also promise to work closely with this committee, its staff, and your 

congressional colleagues in pursuing our common objectives. 

Albania, Mr. Chairman, is a country determined to better itself. 

As President Bush, the first President of the United States to visit 

Albania while in office, said in Tirana 10 days ago, ‘‘The Albanians 

are working hard to establish the institutions necessary for a democracy to survive.’’ 

Today, the United States and Albania are partners on the major 

issues of our time. Today, Albanian soldiers stand side by side with 

Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the European Union 

stabilization force in Bosnia. Albania plays a positive leadership 

role on Kosovo and fully supports the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo. 

Albania’s cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism 

is second to none. It is the only country to date that has accepted 

Guantanamo detainees from third-world countries. Albania has 

also made steady progress in combating crime, trafficking, and corruption, although there is more work to be done in these areas. I 

am pleased to say that the United States sponsors programs aimed 

at assisting Albania in these areas. 

Albania now needs to extend these successes to its domestic political program. Although this young democracy has made important strides, its leaders and political parties must demonstrate maturity in the interest of their society, as a whole. This summer’s 

presidential election by the parliament will provide Albania with 

an early opportunity to show that electoral reform is alive and well. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my first and foremost priority as 

Ambassador will be promoting United States interests in Albania 

while maintaining a solid partnership with the host country. I will 

support and work with the Albanian Government as it pursues its 

goals of NATO membership and a Balkans free and at peace. 

I will encourage our thriving development programs which seek 

to assist Albania toward a vibrant market economy. I will focus on 

increasing trade between the United States and Albania, and on 

493 

assisting American companies interested in investing in, and bringing international commerce to this long isolated Balkan country. 

I promise to manage our Embassy responsibly, and, if confirmed, 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working closely with you, the 

members of the committee, and your congressional colleagues to 

make a difference in this vital region of the world. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Withers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN L. WITHERS II, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am privileged to appear before 

you today. President Bush has honored me as his nominee to be our country’s next 

Ambassador to the Republic of Albania. I appreciate his and Secretary Rice’s confidence in supporting me for this assignment, and hope to gain yours as you consider me for this important position. Should you see fit to confirm my nomination, 

I promise to validate your trust by doing my utmost to advance our Nation’s goals 

in Albania and in the Balkans, and to represent our country well. I also promise 

to work closely with this committee, its staff, and your Congressional colleagues in 

pursuing our common objectives. 

Mr. Chairman, I am accompanied today by my parents, John and Daisy Withers, 

and by my dear friends and mentors, Ambassador Johnny and Angie Young. I am 

literally a child of the Foreign Service. My father, who will soon turn a youthful 

91 years of age, made his career in the Foreign Service. My wife, Maryruth Coleman, whose duties as Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy in Slovenia keep her 

from being here today, and I have been diplomats for some 20 years. Mine was an 

upbringing in places as diverse as Laos, Ethiopia, Korea, and India, and a professional career in the Netherlands, Nigeria, Latvia, and Russia. No one knows better 

than I the vital work that our Nation does abroad nor has witnessed more closely 

the contributions that America makes to the world. 

Albania, Mr. Chairman, is a country determined to better itself. Despite decades 

of repression under the most tyrannical of dictatorships and the years of instability 

that ensued, the Albanian people strive to bring a bright future from a dark past. 

They, better than most of us, understand the value of the democracy, economic prosperity, and rule of law so long denied them. They, more than most, know the need 

for peace in a region so often beset by conflict. They, after so many years of enforced 

isolation, uniquely appreciate the importance of integrating their country and their 

region into the broader European and transatlantic communities. And they are, as 

President Bush, the first American President of the United States to visit Albania 

while in office, said in Tirana 10 days ago, ‘‘working hard to establish the institutions necessary for a democracy to survive.’’ 

Today, the United States and Albania are partners on the major issues of our 

times. Today, Albanian soldiers stand side-by-side with Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the international European Union Force’s (EUFOR) stabilization 

force in Bosnia. As Kosovo’s long-awaited final status determination approaches, Albania continues to play a positive leadership role by urging calm and restraint 

among the parties involved. The Government of Albania expressed immediate and 

full support for U.N. Commissioner Martti Ahtisaari’s peace plan for Kosovo. 

Albania’s cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism is second to 

none. The government has moved quickly to freeze terrorist assets and has been 

vigilant in monitoring foreign attempts to radicalize its domestic Muslim population. 

Albania must also be commended for granting political asylum in May 2006 to five 

ethnic Uighurs previously held at Guantanamo Bay and for admitting three additional detainees last fall. Albania is the only country, to date, that has accepted 

Guantanamo detainees from third countries. 

Albania has also made steady progress in combating organized crime, trafficking, 

and corruption. There is more to be done and these issues remain the country’s most 

serious obstacles to economic and democratic development, but it is satisfying to 

note the recent progress. Albania has reduced cross-border crime through joint border monitoring programs with neighboring states, passed key legislation on witness 

protection and criminal asset seizure, mandated asset disclosure by government officials, and implemented the use of special investigative techniques in pursuing organized crime and corruption. I am pleased to say that the United States sponsors 

multiple programs aimed at assisting Albania in the struggle against crime and corVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00501 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
494 

ruption that have helped bring Albania closer to fulfilling its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. 

Albania now needs to extend its successes in these areas—successes built on patient negotiation and open dialog—to its domestic political system. Although this 

young democracy has made important strides in establishing representative government, the lack of clear, consensus-based rules and procedures for voting means its 

democratic institutions are not as robust as they should be. Albania’s leaders and 

its political parties must all work together on this issue and demonstrate the maturity needed for the interest of their society as a whole. This summer’s Presidential 

election by the Parliament will provide Albania with an early opportunity to show 

that electoral reform is alive and well. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States is committed to helping Albanians achieve the 

democracy, free market economy, and rule of law they so desire. Although Albania 

enjoys economic stability characterized by healthy growth, low inflation, and a budget deficit well within targets set by government and international institutions. It is 

still one of the poorest countries in Europe. Endemic corruption, a weak infrastructure, high business registration costs, and an unstable legal environment are serious 

deterrents to foreign and domestic investment. It is an encouraging sign that United 

States investment has recently increased in response to Albania’s efforts to improve 

its business climate. Bechtel’s $550 million highway project and Lockheed Martin’s 

multimillion dollar coastal surveillance system are both positive examples of increased U.S. business engagement—a trend I hope to foster, if confirmed to this position. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my first and foremost priority as ambassador will be 

promoting United States interests in Albania while maintaining a solid partnership 

with the host country. I will strongly encourage the Albanian Government to continue its support of international efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia, and persist in its good work in combating terrorism abroad and in countering extremism 

within its borders. I will continue our efforts to promote democracy and the rule of 

law in Albania, and work closely with the Albanian Government to sustain progress 

in the democratic institution building, electoral and judicial reforms, and 

anticorruption and antitrafficking programs that are so critical to the country’s future. There would be no better way to demonstrate commitment to these changes 

than through several high profile apolitical arrests for crime and corruption. I will 

also encourage Albanian leaders to uphold freedom of speech for both an independent media and individual citizens, and to welcome the open exchange of ideas 

as a crucial component of democratic discourse. And I will maintain open lines of 

communication with all key political actors to encourage dialog and consensus in the 

name of doing what is right for the people of Albania as the hallmark of a mature 

democracy. 

If confirmed, I will support and work with the Albanian Government as it pursues 

its goal of NATO membership. Together, we will do all we can to help Albania be 

the best candidate it can be. Together, we must also work toward our shared goal 

of a Balkans free and at peace. I will encourage our thriving development programs 

which seek to assist Albania as it moves further away from the burdens of poverty 

and closer toward a vibrant market economy through the creation of sustainable 

economic growth. I will focus on increasing trade between the United States and Albania and on assisting American companies interested in investing in, and bringing 

international commerce to, this long-isolated Balkan country. 

As Albania develops politically and economically, our embassy must also develop 

to meet changing circumstances. I promise to manage our Mission responsibly, focusing on the innovation, security, and enhanced quality of life necessary to attract 

a talented workforce and meet the needs of families who choose to serve in this rapidly transforming nation. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, should my nomination be confirmed, I will do my utmost 

to maintain the distinguished record of service of the men and women who have 

held this position before me, especially my predecessor, Ambassador Marcie Ries, 

who contributed so outstandingly to bettering American-Albanian relations. I look 

forward to working closely with you, the members of the committee, and your Congressional colleagues to make a difference in this vital region of the world. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

Mr. English. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. ENGLISH, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

495 

May I also begin by introducing my wife, Patti Espey-English, 

and my daughter, Catie. My son, Matt, unfortunately, was unable 

to be with us today. And I just want to thank them for all the help 

and support they’ve provided throughout my career. 

Mr. Chairman, I am very honored to be before you today as 

President Bush’s nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. I am deeply grateful for the trust and confidence that 

the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me. And, if confirmed, I will look forward to a close working relationship with this 

committee and with all of your colleagues in Congress to advance 

United States interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

If you will allow, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my statement 

and submit a full written version for the record. 

Just to note, Bosnia and Herzegovina has now been at peace for 

over a decade. Twelve years ago, some 60,000 NATO troops, including 20,000 Americans, deployed to secure the peace, and now fewer 

than 5,000 European Union troops remain. The Dayton Peace Accords are now nearly completely implemented, and enormous 

progress has been made. However, much more must be done before 

Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoys lasting stability. 

Broad reforms, including constitutional reform, will be needed for 

the country to advance toward Euroatlantic integration. Ratko 

Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, the architects of the genocide at 

Srebrenica, remain at large. They and the two other remaining fugitives from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 

Yugoslavia must face justice. 

Unfortunately, and despite the urgent need for progress, Bosnian 

politics remains somewhat backward-looking, blocking consensus 

on critical issues, such as police reform, and preventing the conclusion of an—European Union Stabilization and Association Agreement. Our critical challenge lies in convincing Bosnia and 

Herzegovina’s leaders to show leadership through compromise. 

Mr. Chairman, to conclude, if I am confirmed by the Senate, my 

highest priority will be furthering the values, goals, and security 

of the United States and its citizens. If confirmed, I will work in 

partnership with the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to counter 

extremism and terrorism. 

If confirmed, I will promote the reforms Bosnia and Herzegovina 

needs to become a full member of the Euroatlantic family. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m grateful for the opportunity to appear here today, and I await your questions, later. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. English follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. ENGLISH, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to be before you 

today as President Bush’s nominee to be United States Ambassador to Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. I am deeply grateful for the trust and confidence that the President 

and Secretary Rice have placed in me, and if confirmed by the Senate, I will endeavor to serve my country with honor and dignity. If confirmed, I will look forward to 

a close working relationship with this committee and with all of your colleagues in 

Congress to advance United States’ interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 

throughout Southeastern Europe. 

Mr. Chairman, my wife, Patti Espey-English, is here with me today. She has been 

a great source of support and strength for me throughout my career, and I would 

496 

like to take the opportunity to acknowledge that fact here and to thank her for it. 

My children—Catie, who is here, and Matt, who could not be—have handled Foreign 

Service life with grace and humor and I would like to thank them also. 

Mr. Chairman, throughout the course of my career at the State Department, I 

have had numerous opportunities to further the values of the United States. Much 

of my work for the past 15 years has been focused on the Balkans and neighboring 

countries. I believe my experiences are relevant to the responsibilities I seek to assume in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if confirmed by the Senate. I served as Director 

of the State Department’s Balkans office—the Office of South Central European Affairs—and as Deputy Chief of Mission in our Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia. In my 

various roles I have helped broker dialog between Serbian and Albanian leaders in 

Kosovo, in an effort to find compromise and avoid conflict there; pressed Balkan 

leaders to surrender indicted war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal 

for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and worked with officials in the region to help 

refugees displaced by its wars return to their homes. As Counselor for Economic Affairs at our Embassy in Budapest in the early 1990s, I aided successive post-Communist governments in Hungary in their efforts to privatize state-owned assets and 

advance reforms toward a market economy. I believe these efforts have prepared me 

to address, if confirmed, serious challenges still to be met in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina has now been at peace for over a decade. The Dayton 

Peace Accords that ended the brutal 1992–1995 war are nearly completely implemented. The international community, under strong leadership from the United 

States, has helped the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina rebuild their institutions, 

infrastructure, economy, and society. Enormous progress has been made. Today Bosnia and Herzegovina protects its borders, fights terrorism, and combats domestic 

and transnational crime. Soldiers who fought each other 12 years ago now wear the 

same uniform, serve under the same flag, and report to a single Minister of Defense. 

This country that was once a threat to international stability is now a contributor 

to global security, with a multiethnic Explosive Ordinance Disposal unit serving 

with distinction alongside United States forces in Iraq. While just over a decade earlier NATO intervened to halt a brutal conflict, last November, NATO offered Bosnia 

and Herzegovina membership in Partnership for Peace, a first step toward Bosnia 

and Herzegovina’s goal of achieving full membership in the Alliance. 

These reforms are the result of dedicated Bosnians of all ethnicities working to 

change their society with the support of the international community. In the dozen 

years since Dayton, much has been accomplished that, at the time, would have 

seemed impossible. However, much more must be done before Bosnia and 

Herzegovina enjoys lasting stability. Broad reforms, including constitutional reform, 

will be needed for the country to advance further towards Euro-Atlantic integration. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina need to make new efforts to combat high levels of joblessness, to reduce corruption, and to ensure that state institutions are fully staffed and 

functioning in a depoliticized and professional manner. 

Unfortunately, the legacies of war that remain embedded in the Bosnia and 

Herzegovina psychological landscape still must be addressed. Ratko Mladic and 

Radovan Karadzic, the two architects of the genocide at Srebrenica, remain at large. 

They and the two other remaining fugitives from the ICTY must face justice so that 

the people of Southeast Europe can truly put the past behind them. 

Despite the urgent need for reform and progress, Bosnian politics remains mired 

in the past. Zero-sum ethnic nationalism is the norm. Inflammatory rhetoric characterized the October 2006 Parliamentary election campaign and has yet to dissipate 

even now, some 9 months later, blocking consensus on urgent issues such as police 

reform and preventing the conclusion of an European Union Stabilization and Association Agreement. Our critical challenge lies in convincing Bosnia and 

Herzegovina’s leaders to show leadership through compromise and coalition-building, rather than pursuing ethnic advantage through polemics and prejudice. 

The United States has invested great amounts of human, financial, and institutional resources to help rebuild and transform Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have 

seen dividends from those efforts. Twelve years after 60,000 NATO troops—including 20,000 Americans—deployed to secure the peace, fewer than 5,000 European 

Union troops remain. The international civilian presence also continues to evolve. 

The Office of the High Representative has downsized and is focused on concluding 

its core tasks of implementing Dayton. We hope to be in a position to return full 

sovereignty to the Bosnians by the summer of 2008 and replace the Office of the 

High Representative with a customary European Union mission to guide Bosnia and 

Herzegovina through the European Union integration process. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, my highest priority will be furthering the values, 

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497 

sonnel assigned in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as private American citizens living, traveling, and doing business there. If confirmed, I will work in partnership 

with the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to counter extremism and terrorism. If 

confirmed, I will guide the transformation of the international presence, while promoting the reforms Bosnia and Herzegovina need to fully transition to a stable, productive member of the Euro-Atlantic family of nations. 

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this committee 

today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Thank you. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. English. 

Mr. Kennedy. 

STATEMENT OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY, NOMINEE FOR THE 

RANK OF AMBASSADOR DURING HIS TENURE AS SPECIAL 

ENVOY FOR HOLOCAUST ISSUES 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me begin by introducing my wife, Luz Marina, who accompanies me today. Our three children could not be with us. Two of 

them are overseas, and one of them is not in town. 

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you on behalf of 

my nomination for the rank of ambassador. I am very grateful to 

President Bush and Secretary Rice for nominating me for this title 

while I am serving as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues. 

If the Senate confirms me for this rank, I will be better armed 

to pursue the objectives that our two branches of government and 

the American people care so deeply about: To help right past 

wrongs, to bring a measure of dignified justice to Holocaust survivors, and making sure that the world remembers the lessons of 

the Holocaust. 

My own professional contact with Holocaust issues began while 

I was consul general in the city of Poznan, Poland, shortly after the 

fall of the Berlin Wall. Since starting in August of this year, I have 

been, several times, to Poland again, as well as France, Germany, 

Austria, Slovenia, and Romania, all with the objective of pursuing 

property compensation or property restitution for Holocaust victims 

and their heirs. 

Financial restitution has also been a very important component 

of our work. We are in the process right now of transitioning the 

German Slave and Forced Labor Foundation, which has paid out 

nearly 5 billion euros to 1,600,000 victims, to a foundation that will 

focus on Holocaust remembrance and on tolerance education. 

Education is another major focus of our office. I am the delegate 

to the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, a 24-nation international organization that supports NGOs, universities, 

teachers, and academics. 

Remembrance is also one of the reasons why we have worked so 

hard on gaining greater access to archives for Holocaust survivors, 

and, to that end, we are in the process now of helping bring an 

electronic copy of the Holocaust archives at Bad Arolsen, Germany, 

to the Holocaust Museum. That is about 50 million pages of documentation. 

In pursuing these goals of compensation, restitution, education, 

and remembrance as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, the rank 

of Ambassador will be especially valuable, if I am confirmed. 

498 

In closing, I want to thank the members of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee for considering me for this unique position 

and high honor. If confirmed, I will continue to work diligently on 

helping Holocaust survivors and their families obtain the support 

and assistance they deserve. 

Thank you for this opportunity to describe my background and 

review, briefly, the work that I have been doing and the challenges 

that lie ahead. I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY, NOMINEE FOR THE RANK OF

AMBASSADOR DURING HIS TENURE AS SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HOLOCAUST ISSUES

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen. 

It is an honor to appear before you on behalf of my nomination for the rank of Ambassador. I am very grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for nominating 

me for this title while serving as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues. If the Senate 

confirms me for this rank, I will be better armed to continue to pursue the objectives 

that our two branches of Government and the American people share: To help right 

past wrongs, to bring a measure of dignified justice to Holocaust survivors and their 

families, and to making sure that we and the international community remember 

the lessons of the Holocaust. 

My own professional contact with Holocaust issues began while I was consul general in the city of Poznan, Poland, from 1990 to 1994, a tour that everyone in my 

family still looks back on with nostalgic fondness. 

My wife, Luz Marina, had learned Polish with me, and using this new language 

and her own great people skills, she helped establish two NGOs in Poznan. She’s 

always created a positive legacy for the United States in each country where we 

have served during a 27-year career in the United States Foreign Service. Be that 

assignment in Poland or Mexico or Panama. Our three children, Mary Kathryn, 

Veronica, and Jack all attended different schools in Poznan. I thank all my family, 

and especially Luz Marina, for the support and love they’ve given me throughout 

these years. 

My father, Jack, was the Chairman of the Political Science Department at the 

University of Notre Dame for several years and taught there most of his professional life. From him I learned early on that a fascinating and complex world lay 

not just within the United States but also beyond our borders. My mother, Carol, 

taught me fairness is vital in human relations, and I learned from her enormous 

practicality about the need to get things done. 

Let me touch again on Poland where my prior experience has served me well in 

this assignment. Since starting in August 2006 as the Special Envoy for Holocaust 

Issues, I have traveled to Poland several times to meet with members of the parliament and government officials to urge that they take action on a draft private 

property compensation bill. 

Generally, a key focus of my office is encouraging foreign governments to return 

in kind or pay compensation for private property taken by the Nazis and their collaborators. In this regard, I have also worked with officials in France, Germany, 

Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, and Romania to push for concrete solutions for survivors 

and heirs. Besides real estate holdings, art looted during World War II has become 

a more frequent topic in Holocaust-era restitution. On this theme, I recently addressed an international gathering of experts and government officials in Potsdam, 

Germany. 

Financial property restitution has been another important focus for my colleagues 

and me. The German Foundation for Forced and Slave Labor has paid out nearly 

5 billion euros to about 1.6 million victims of these heinous practices. As a member 

of this foundation’s board of trustees, I look forward to working with my foreign 

counterparts and American NGOs on developing the structure of its successor organization. The new foundation, the Future Fund, will work in the areas of Holocaust 

remembrance and tolerance education. 

Education is another major focus of my office. I am the U.S. delegate to the Task 

Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research. This international organization of 24 countries provides a far-reaching platform for academics, researchers, teachers, and NGOs that work in making sure that 

the Holocaust is remembered and that it is taught in schools and universities 

throughout the world. Founded in 1998 by the United States, the U.K., and Sweden, 

499 

it continues growing. Six new countries are in various stages of membership. Like 

my work on the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Council, the Task Force 

provides a clear example of our country’s commitment to honoring victims and survivors of this terrifyingly grim chapter in human history and to ensuring that its 

lessons are never forgotten. 

Remembrance has also driven the United States’ leadership in making the archives of the International Tracing Service (ITS) more accessible to Holocaust survivors and heirs of victims. At the ITS International Council meeting in May, the 

11 member states agreed to make an advance electronic copy available of the collection for countries that need to harmonize their national repository’s computer system with the ITS data—in our case the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. This will 

be the first time that ITS’s archival data will be available outside of Germany, and 

we will continue to encourage the two countries that must still approve the provisions for greater accessibility to data for survivors. 

In pursuing these goals of compensation, restitution, education, and remembrance 

as Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, the rank of Ambassador will be especially 

valuable, if I am confirmed. The rank would underscore clearly the importance that 

the U.S. Government and the American people place on acknowledging the horrors 

of the Holocaust and the respect and dignity owed to its survivors. 

In closing I want to thank the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for considering me for this unique position and high honor. If confirmed, I 

will work diligently on helping Holocaust survivors and their families obtain the 

support and assistance they deserve. I will also strive to promote the study and understanding of the tragedy of the Holocaust and its bitter lessons. 

Thank you for the opportunity to explain my background and review briefly the 

work that I have been doing and the challenges that lie ahead. I look forward to 

your questions. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you. 

Dr. Munter. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CAMERON MUNTER, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 

Dr. MUNTER. Thank you. 

Please allow me to introduce my wife, Marilyn Wyatt, who’s here 

behind me, my son, Daniel, my daughter, Anna. Anna and Marilyn 

will, if I am confirmed, accompany me to Belgrade. 

Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the honor—the opportunity 

to appear before you as the President’s nominee to be America’s 

next Ambassador to Serbia. I’m honored that President Bush and 

Secretary Rice have expressed their confidence in me. And, if confirmed, I pledge to consult closely with this committee, with other 

Members of Congress, on the President’s foreign policy agenda or 

Serbia and for the entire Balkans region. 

I, too, will summarize my statement for the record. 

My top priority, if confirmed, will be to protect the security and 

interests of the United States and its citizens, including all Americans in Serbia. I also look forward to working with the democratic 

government of the people—and the people of Serbia as they seek 

to overcome the difficulties of their recent history and complete 

their integration into a Europe, whole and free. 

Serbia has continued its progress away from the disasters of the 

Milosevic era. It is now led by a democratic coalition. Small ethnic 

populations have been accorded full representative status in parliament. Serbia’s military services continue their positive reforms. 

Serbia’s economy continues to grow at a healthy rate, and reforms 

underpin our efforts to bring stability and prosperity to the region. 

Successive governments in Belgrade have apprehended and 

transferred many war crimes indictees to The Hague, including facilitating, in recent weeks, two major arrests. Four ICTY indictees 

500 

remain at large, including Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, so 

Serbia’s work is not done on this key issue. 

Indeed, our own role in supporting and promoting a democratic 

transition in Serbia is far from complete. More needs to be done 

eliminating corruption, ensuring that privatization continues apace 

with transparent rules and no undue political interference. Our assistance efforts focus on these and other crucial tasks. 

Of course, the imminent resolution of Kosovo’s status remains a 

great challenge, but we and our friends will face it. Kosovo’s independence will bring stability to Serbia and to the region. 

American interests in Serbia are clear. We want a strong Serbia 

as our friend, working with us on a common agenda, integrated 

into the institutions of the West. The challenges for U.S. policy are 

equally apparent. We want to offer our friends in Serbia hope for 

a better future while expressing our expectations very clearly and 

very firmly. I look forward to these challenges and to serving 

American interests and American values if you confirm me. 

Thank you, again, for allowing me to appear in front of this committee, and I, also, look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Munter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. CAMERON MUNTER, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of my nomination by the President to 

be our country’s next Ambassador to Serbia. I am honored by President Bush’s and 

Secretary Rice’s expression of confidence. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting 

closely with this committee and other Members of Congress on the President’s foreign policy agenda for Serbia and the entire Balkans region. 

Mr. Chairman and members, I believe that two decades in our country’s diplomatic service have prepared me and my wife, Marilyn, for this challenge. Marilyn, 

our daughter Anna, and our son Daniel are here today to continue in what has been 

a family affair in the Foreign Service. My top priority, if confirmed, will be to protect the security and interests of the United States and our citizens, including all 

Americans in Serbia. I also look forward to working with the democratic government 

and the people of Serbia as they seek to overcome the difficulties of their recent history and complete their integration into a Europe whole and free. 

Since this committee presided over the nomination of my predecessor over 3 years 

ago, Serbia has continued its progress away from the disasters of the Milosevic era 

and toward integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Having conducted free and 

fair Presidential elections in 2004 and Parliamentary elections in 2007, Serbia is 

now led by a new democratic coalition. Small, ethnic populations have been accorded 

full representative status in parliament and share in the balance of power Serbia 

has normalized diplomatic relations with its neighbors, exchanging high-level visits 

and pursuing regional trade liberalization. When faced with the separation of Montenegro from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro last year, Serbia avoided 

the mistakes of the past and, along with the rest of the international community, 

welcomed Montenegro’s return to independence. Serbia’s military services continue 

apace with positive reforms, making notable progress in modernization, transparency, and civilian control that will help it move forward in NATO’s Partnership 

for Peace. 

Serbia’s economy continues to grow at a healthy rate. Continued economic reform 

is a top priority of the new government. Fostering a business environment that 

creates jobs and encourages the growth of small and medium enterprises is key to 

addressing public dissatisfaction with the economy. Privatizations and institutional 

reforms have led to increases in foreign investment, bringing more jobs to Serbia, 

underpinning our efforts to bring stability and prosperity to the region. In the private sector, the United States is currently the second largest foreign investor in Serbia. 

Cooperation on war crimes continued over the last 3 years, albeit in short bursts. 

Successive governments in Belgrade have apprehended and transferred 17 war 

crimes indictees to The Hague. This includes facilitating the arrest 3 weeks ago of 

501 

Zdravko Tolimir, a close associate of Ratko Mladic, and Sunday’s arrest, in Montenegro, of Vlastimir Djordjevic, wanted not only by the Hague Tribunal but by Serbian courts on charges stemming from the execution of three Albanian-Americans 

in 1999. Due in part to a recent positive trend in ICTY cooperation, the European 

Union last week restarted negotiations with Serbia over its Stabilization and Association Agreement—a necessary step before beginning talks to join the European 

Union. Four ICTY indictees remain at large, including Mladic and Radovan 

Karadzic, so Serbia’s work is not done on this issue. 

The United States plays a crucial role in Serbia in supporting and promoting a 

democratic transition, which is far from complete. Unreformed nationalist parties 

continue to wield considerable influence in the Parliament and regularly block needed reforms. The new constitution brings with it an ambitious legislative agenda that 

will be key in defining democratic standards and the rights of Serbia’s citizens. 

More needs to be done in eliminating corruption and ensuring that privatization 

continues apace with transparent rules with and no undue political interference. 

The media, while generally free and independent, are overly sensationalist and often 

at the service of anti-reform interests who confuse and distort public debate. In 

short, serious challenges remain—the imminent resolution of Kosovo’s status foremost among them, and finding durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons not the least of them. Many Serbs feel that, having overthrown 

Milosevic in 2000, they should not now be penalized for the mistakes of his rule. 

Independence for Kosovo, with its deep historical, cultural, and religious significance 

to Serbia—and as a reminder of the bloody, painful disintegration of Yugoslavia— 

will lead some Serbs to challenge all other aspects of our bilateral relationship as 

well as Serbia’s relations with its neighbors and the rest of Europe. 

While understandable, such emotional responses serve no one, least of all the people of Serbia. In the end, the country will only be ready for integration into the community of democracies when it comes to terms with the unfortunate legacies of its 

past. When it comes to war criminals and even Kosovo, much of the population is 

more forward-looking than public statements from Belgrade would indicate. I am optimistic that the decency and drive of the Serbian people, which have characterized 

our relations as friends and allies for 125 years, will prevail in the end; and that 

Serbia will indeed turn the corner and again look toward Europe. 

By fully and forthrightly dealing with the past, not only by ensuring justice to 

the victims of misguided nationalism, but also by providing recognition to all those 

in Serbia who struggled to bring freedom, democracy, and humanity to their country, Serbia can realize its historic role as a regional leader and constructive member 

of the Euro-Atlantic community. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, American interests in Serbia are clear: 

We want a strong Serbia as our friend, working with us on a common agenda, integrated into the institutions of the West. The challenges for United States policy are 

equally apparent: Offering our friends in Serbia hope for a better future while expressing our expectations clearly and firmly. I look forward to these challenges, and 

to serving American interests and American values, if you confirm me. 

Thank you again for allowing me to appear before this committee today. I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Moore. 

STATEMENT OF RODERICK W. MOORE, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO 

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, Senator, I, also, will provide a brief 

oral summary of the written statement which I’ve submitted for 

the record. 

I, also, am very honored to appear today before you as the President’s nominee to be the first American Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro, the world’s newest independent state. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator, since its declaration of independence last 

year, Montenegro has already quickly established itself as a solid 

friend and partner of the United States. If I am confirmed, it would 

be a great honor to work with the talented team at our new Embassy in Podgorica to strengthen this partnership further. 

Mr. Chairman, it is in our national interest to maintain a vigorous partnership with Montenegro. Having navigated its way 

502 

peacefully to independence, Montenegro has emerged onto the 

world stage as a dynamic democracy committed to the values we 

share with our Euroatlantic allies. 

Moreover, although it is small in size, Montenegro can play an 

outsized role in partnership with us on the global arena, including 

in the war on terror and as a potential member of NATO and the 

European Union. 

A prosperous and democratic Montenegro will also be a key ally 

in strengthening stability in historically unsettled Balkans, our top 

priority in this region. In this direction, Montenegro has committed 

itself to political and economic reform. It is zealously pursuing 

Euroatlantic integration and is building increasingly strong relationships with its neighbors. Montenegro is witnessing strong economic growth and a boom in tourism and real estate along its 

beautiful Adriatic Coast. 

Nevertheless, many challenges do lie ahead for Montenegro. Like 

other transition countries, its youthful democratic institutions are 

still fragile. Montenegro can do more to cement the rule of law and 

to fight corruption and organized crime. Montenegro could do more 

to accelerate broad based economic development and attract more 

American and other foreign investors. 

Although its ethnic groups peacefully coexist, Montenegro could 

do even more to become a model for multicultural harmony in a region too frequently divided along ethnic fault lines. 

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that Montenegro’s rich history, 

demonstrated friendship toward the United States, commitment to 

reform, and keen determination to integrate fully into the 

Euroatlantic community offer fertile ground for cultivating a strong 

bilateral relationship through successful transformational diplomacy. We have a tremendous opportunity at this early stage to root 

into this ground a strong friendship between the peoples of our two 

countries, a friendship that will bear fruit for many decades to 

come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RODERICK W. MOORE, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on the occasion of my nomination by the President to be our 

country’s first Ambassador to the Republic of Montenegro, the world’s newest independent country. 

Mr. Chairman, since its declaration of independence last year, Montenegro has already quickly established itself as a solid friend and partner of the United States. 

If I am confirmed, it would be a great honor for me to work with the talented team 

at our Embassy in Podgorica to strengthen this partnership further. Having worked 

for over 15 years of my 20-year diplomatic career on issues related to Southeast Europe, I believe I could bring a wealth of relevant experience and energy to this task. 

In recent years, I have also had the opportunity to work extensively on issues directly involving Montenegro. Following my arrival in January 2004 as Deputy Chief 

of Mission in Belgrade, then the capital of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, I directly supervised the former United States Consulate in Podgorica, overseeing United States policy and management issues in Montenegro until Montenegro gained its independence last year. 

I am proud that the United States was among the first countries to recognize 

independent Montenegro and welcome it into the family of democratic nations. After 

all, the rich and complex history of our relationship with this remarkable country 

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503 

state by the late 1800s and the United States first established diplomatic relations 

with it just over 100 years ago. Although that official relationship ceased after the 

First World War, Americans and Montenegrins enjoyed strong ties until Montenegro 

again emerged as an independent state in 2006. By way of example, in 1919, the 

United States posthumously awarded Montenegrin-born Sergeant James Mestrovich 

with the Medal of Honor for his heroic service to the United States armed forces 

in World War I. Sixty years later, in 1979, the United States Air Force airlifted 139 

tons of supplies to Montenegro, stricken by a devastating earthquake. 

Mr. Chairman, we all know too well that the 1990s brought great tragedy to the 

peoples of the former Yugoslavia, a tragedy from which the countries that emerged 

from Yugoslavia are still healing. Although Montenegro is the republic of the former 

Yugoslavia that had the least conflict on its territory, its role as both protagonist 

and victim in the Yugoslav tragedy will no doubt be examined by historians for ages 

to come. There can be no doubt, however, that Montenegro played a key role in the 

latter stages of the Yugoslav crisis in helping the United States and its allies bring 

an end to that conflict and to the destructive policies of Slobodan Milosevic. 

Mr. Chairman, our relationship with Montenegro entered a historic new phase on 

August 15, 2006, with the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations between our 

two countries for the first time since 1918. 

Mr. Chairman, it is in our national interest to forge an even stronger partnership 

with newly-independent Montenegro and to help it become an important source of 

stability in the Balkans. Having navigated its way peacefully to independence—in 

a referendum judged free and fair by the international community—Montenegro has 

emerged onto the world stage as a dynamic democracy committed to the values we 

share with our Euro-Atlantic allies. Already a member of the United Nations and 

OSCE, Montenegro will almost certainly have the opportunity, if it so decides, to 

seek membership in NATO, the European Union, and other international organizations in the years to come. Although it is small in size, I am convinced that Montenegro can play an outsized role in partnership with us in the global arena. 

While Montenegro is on the right path, this young state is nevertheless still a society in transition. Many of its youthful, and still fragile, democratic institutions 

continue to be buffeted by challenges that grew out of the tumult of recent years. 

Like other transition countries in the region, Montenegro needs to do more to cement the rule of law. It needs to do more to fight corruption and organized crime. 

It needs to do more to reform and strengthen the judicial sector, steps that will 

build confidence in Montenegro’s judicial processes and make the country even more 

attractive to United States and other foreign investors from a broader range of countries. It can do even more to strengthen interethnic bonds and to make itself a true 

model of multicultural harmony in a region that has too frequently been divided 

along ethnic fault lines. It can do more to accelerate broad-based economic development to ensure that all of its citizens have an equal stake in the success of independent Montenegro. 

Mr. Chairman, Montenegro faces challenges on the foreign policy front as well, 

particularly in its immediate neighborhood. The wars of the former Yugoslavia 

scarred and destabilized the region, leaving legacies that the new countries that 

emerged are still struggling to overcome. Montenegro is no exception, facing challenges in building new relationships with its neighbors—Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, and Albania. Montenegro, host to over 16,000 refugees from Kosovo, 

must also keep a watchful eye on developments in neighboring Kosovo, with which 

it shares a 40-mile-long border. More broadly, the wars, propaganda, and isolation 

of the 1990s have bequeathed public skepticism about the aims of NATO and the 

United States. 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that Montenegro has made great progress 

in meeting these challenges. A new government, elected in free and fair elections 

last year, has committed itself to reform and Euro-Atlantic integration. Montenegro 

is rapidly transforming its economy and is witnessing strong GDP growth, a booming tourism sector along its beautiful Adriatic coast, and substantial foreign investment. In a region that has been racked by interethnic conflict, Montenegro’s rich 

mix of ethnic groups peacefully coexists. 

Montenegro has already made great strides in building political, economic, and security links with its neighbors, including in areas such as antitrafficking and antismuggling. At the highest levels, its leaders regularly work with their counterparts 

in nearby states to resolve disputes peacefully and to seek new forms of cooperation. 

Montenegro has eagerly supported regional initiatives, even recently becoming the 

first country to ratify the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), a free 

trade agreement that will open markets in the region to a degree unprecedented in 

history. Montenegro has established good cooperation with the ICTY and has agreed 

504 

to work with other countries in the region in investigating and prosecuting war 

crimes and organized crime. 

The democratic leadership of independent Montenegro has also embarked on a 

zealous pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration. Invited to join NATO’s Partnership for 

Peace last November, Montenegro is moving swiftly ahead to strengthen its links 

with the Alliance. Likewise, it is moving full steam ahead toward closer association 

with the European Union, rapidly concluding talks on a Stability and Association 

Agreement earlier this year. 

Our nascent bilateral relationship with Montenegro also shows great potential. Already, our two countries have exchanged a series of high-level visits, including separate visits to Montenegro last year by a senior delegation of U.S. Senators and by 

the U.S. Secretary of Defense. More recently, in early May, President Vujanovic conducted the highest-level visit to the United States by a Montenegrin official since 

the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. This visit significantly advanced, inter 

alia, our rapidly developing security relationship. In Washington, President 

Vujanovic signed with Secretary Rice a Status of Forces Agreement and committed 

to send military observers to Iraq or Afghanistan. Just before his visit, on April 19, 

Montenegro also became the 104th country to enter into an Article 98 agreement 

with the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, we have a clear interest in ensuring that this new partner successfully carries out its political and economic reforms. The good news is that the United 

States has much to offer in helping this new country succeed. We have 17 years of 

experience in helping the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe successfully implement political, economic, and military reforms. We have tremendous experience in helping these countries prepare themselves for membership in NATO, 

the European Union, and other institutions. Thanks to the Congress’ continuing 

support for funding under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) and 

other programs, we still have at our disposal substantial resources to help reformers 

in Montenegro overcome the challenges they face in building their post-communist 

society. If I am confirmed, I would be eager to bring fully to bear the experiences 

and resources of the United States to accelerate Montenegro’s process of reform. 

Mr. Chairman, my experience in working on issues relating to Montenegro and 

other countries in the Balkans has left me convinced that Montenegro’s rich history, 

demonstrated friendship toward the United States, and keen determination to integrate fully into the Euro-Atlantic community combine to make it fertile ground for 

a success story in what Secretary Rice calls transformational diplomacy. With the 

appropriate resources, I believe that we have an outstanding window of opportunity 

at this early stage of our young relationship with Montenegro to deeply root into 

this fertile ground a friendship between the peoples of our two countries that will 

bear fruit for decades to come. 

If I am confirmed, I would work hard with my team at the embassy to use the 

tools provided by the Congress and the administration to help Montenegro develop 

into a prosperous and democratic source of stability in South Central Europe. I 

would work hard to stimulate the economic and judicial reforms that will consolidate democracy and open the doors for much greater U.S. trade and investment. I 

would work hard to help Montenegro combat the corruption and organized crime 

that sap its progress and undermine public confidence in its institutions. 

If confirmed, I would also invest great effort to build a partnership in which the 

United States and Montenegro work hand-in-hand in regional, European, and global 

fora to address challenges to international peace and security. I would work to 

strengthen our bilateral and multilateral security relationship and seek ways to 

support Montenegro’s declared interest in participating more actively in the global 

war on terror. I would work hard to support the efforts of the Montenegrins themselves to strengthen their democratic institutions and pave the way for more rapid 

membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

Mr. Chairman, in short, we now have a rare opportunity to implement this vision, 

building our new relationship from the ground floor up. The goals I have laid out 

may sound lofty, but I believe that—with the appropriate amount of energy and attention—they are achievable. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

What I’d like to do before we start a round of questions is to 

allow Senator DeMint to offer greetings and an opening statement. 

505 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize for missing some of your opening statements. I appreciate your willingness to serve at, really, a challenging time for the 

United States. Our image abroad is certainly tarnished, in some 

ways, and, despite our willingness to help so many countries, sometimes that help is very misunderstood. So, your potential positions 

are very important to us. 

I think, as we talk about spreading democracy and freedom 

abroad, I—as all of you know, that freedom involves much more 

than just the right to vote. And you have already referenced the 

importance of institutions and just the importance of rule of law 

and property and free enterprise and freedom of the press and freedom of religion, a lot of things that, in your positions, you’ll need 

to encourage and help to guide. I think the big challenge we have 

as a world is trying to determine the difference between socialistic 

principles, which ultimately lead to big government and the dependency on government—things which often start out with good 

intentions, to help people, ultimately sap freedom, as we even find 

in our own country—and—but to be able to direct a government in 

how to help its people and to help the poor and to provide 

healthcare in a way that ultimately promotes freedom is a challenge to us, and hopefully you can help these countries learn from 

our successes, as well as, perhaps, some of our failures. 

So, I’m very interested in supporting your nominations and hearing any additional ideas as we go through just a few questions, but 

I very much appreciate your willingness to serve our country, as 

well as the countries that you’re looking at serving in. 

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you. 

I would—what we’ll do is, I think I’ll try to restrict myself to one 

question each—for each of you, and then Senator DeMint can ask 

his questions; and if any others join us, then we’ll go with them. 

Let’s start with you, Dr. Withers. You know, international observers have criticized Albania for failing to live up to democratic 

standards, which, as you know, is a prerequisite for NATO membership. What do you think the United States can and should do 

to help sustain Albanian democracy? And, you know, how ready do 

you think they are to join NATO, at this point? 

Dr. WITHERS. Well, thank you very much for that question, Senator. 

I believe that you must say, looking at Albania’s difficult recent 

history and its long experience with the tyrannical regime of Enver 

Hoxha, that it has made important strides. There is a constitution. 

There is a parliamentary democracy. And the government is decided by elections, which, however, as you have said, have been 

flawed. 

But I believe that the progress is such that we have moved away 

from many of the more dysfunctional parts of their electoral system. What we need them now to do really falls into two things. The 

February 7 local elections did not meet international standards. 

The OSCE and other groups have set forth a series of reform recommendations, and we strongly urge the Albanians to take these 

506 

recommendations to heart, to implement them, and to improve on 

the problems which they had recently. 

Another element of their political difficulty is bickering between 

the parties, between the government and the opposition, which has 

prevented the type of rapid forward movement that I think we all 

hope for. And I think that the Albanians should—need to understand that they must begin to work in concordance for the larger 

interests of the society, as a whole. The presidential election, which 

will begin in just a few days, will give us a measure as to how seriously they have taken the advice of their friends to heart, and we 

hope that they can reach a consensus on the next president, and 

move forward in a smooth, fair, and internationally recognized 

manner. 

In terms of NATO, the Albanians, again, have made considerable 

progress. They have modernized the military. They have undertaken many measures in the rule-of-law area. They have taken 

such measures as a joint investigative unit, which brings their 

prosecutors and their police together to investigate crimes. They 

have adopted laws on witness protections, special investigations, 

and many, many other things that are aimed at rooting out the corruption, which is one of the poisons that could affect their NATO 

membership. 

We have made clear to the Albanian Government, as their 

friends and as their supporters, how important NATO is to us and 

how its standards are legitimately tough; and they must meet 

those standards, with our support, and with our help. If they undertake the measures that are required, they will be as strong a 

candidate as they can be, and we encourage them to take those 

steps. 

Senator OBAMA. Okay. 

Mr. English, you know, we’ve made tremendous progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the past decade, but obviously, the parties are still far from fully reconciled. There’s still no integrated national police force, there are still issues with respect to the Republic of Srpska and Kosovo, and how we differentiate between those 

two situations. How do you see your role in a positive resolution 

in the antagonism between these two parts of the country? 

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for the question. 

I—the United States—first of all, Bosnia and Herzegovina has no 

better friend in the world than the United States, and our position 

there is a critically important one. And, if confirmed, I pledge to 

continue the vigorous leadership efforts that my predecessors have 

brought to the office of Ambassador in Sarajevo. 

We do work with other partners in the international community 

very closely. As a matter of fact, our Deputy Assistant Secretary 

just came back from a meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Sarajevo where many of these very critical issues were discussed, and where we worked with our European partners, in particular, to send a very strong message to the Bosnians, that they 

must put differences behind them and move forward. Bosnian politics, we’ve seen in the period since Dayton, are usually two steps 

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nately, they seem to be a bit on the back foot. Nationalist rhetoric 

is very strong. There is no sense of consensus for the way forward. 

If confirmed, I see my job, in terms of relating to the Bosnians, 

as going to them and helping to push them forward, helping them 

to understand that police reform is the path to Brussels. Brussels 

is the path to stability and prosperity for all citizens in Bosnia. 

And one thing that we’ve told them, in particular, to get to your 

comment on Republic of Srpska and Kosovo and Srebrenica, is that 

the—all the questions that relate to Bosnia’s integrity were resolved at Dayton, and we will not permit a reopening of Dayton. 

Dayton established—Dayton was the answer to the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dayton is the answer that we’re going 

to stay with. 

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will take a very firm and energetic 

approach to United States leadership in Sarajevo. 

Thank you. 

Senator OBAMA. Good. 

I’ll take one more question, then I’ll turn it over to Senator 

DeMint. 

But, before we do that, Senator Nelson, do you care to make an 

opening statement? Okay. 

For you, Mr. Kennedy, within the last few months, the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims concluded 

its work to help survivors receive some compensation from insurance companies who had long refused to pay on policies held by 

those who perished during the Holocaust. How do you rate the success of ICHEIC’s efforts? How many survivors received compensation, and in what amounts? I know that some have criticized 

ICHEIC for cutting off the process before all the claims had a 

chance to be adjudicated. Do you share that criticism? And are 

there steps that you think our Government can take to improve the 

process? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much for that question, Mr. 

Chairman. It goes right to the heart of a lot of things that we’re 

trying to do in the Office of Holocaust Issues. 

If I could just put a little historical context on this. When 

ICHEIC was established, in 1997, and became largely a body controlled by State insurance commissioners, Holocaust survivors, 

NGOs, and the state of Israel, they began looking for a way to handle what was probably a large number of potential claims. Working 

with Yad Vashem, they came up with a list of about 500,000 possible policyholders who might have perished in the Holocaust. The 

process was then to publicize that list, notify people that there was 

a possibility of making a claim. 

The total number of claims that were processed—and these are, 

I’d emphasize, claims without documentation, or with very, very little documentation, so people were asking for something they 

couldn’t prove but they suspected was there—the total number 

processed was about 92,000 claims out of that potential list of 

500,000. Roughly 8,000 people received payments, ranging from 

$5,000 to $20,000. Most of these policies were initially rather 

small. They were written as burial policies or dowry policies; some 

cases, education policies for daughters. So, they—the initial 

amounts were not great, but the ICHEIC process, which was an inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00515 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
508 

dividual claims process, located a lot of policies, was able to make 

specific payments on them. 

Another 40,000 people or so had a story that was credible, that 

had facts in it that matched up with a likely policy. And those people were paid about $1,000 each. The total payments were a little over $300 million. When they 

had processed all the policies that they felt were credible, Chairman Eagleburger, last March, announced that ICHEIC would be 

closing its doors. 

I hope that covers the issues you needed, Senator. 

Thank you. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you. 

Senator DeMint, do you want to take a stab at a couple of questions? 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ll start on the other side, since you worked on—starting on the 

right. 

I’d really just—maybe Mr. Moore and Dr. Munter, just a perspective of your role as Ambassadors, to Montenegro and Serbia. I’ve 

often heard, as I’ve talked to people I’ve worked with around the 

world in various countries, that sometimes our State Department, 

regardless of the administration, can do more harm than good in, 

maybe, trying to direct the affairs of other nations. I would guess 

that you would see your role as not only doing the bidding of whatever administration is in power, but understanding and listening 

and trying to direct the policy of the United States in a way that 

would best serve the country that you are in, as well as our own 

country here, back home. 

I would just be interested in your perspective of your role in how 

you would direct us and an administration to really understand 

other countries in a way that would help them—or help us work 

with them, rather than perhaps alienate them, which is apparently 

what we occasionally do. So, Mr. Moore—if that question makes 

any sense. 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Senator. I fully understand the question. 

I appreciate it. 

I think the good news with Montenegro is that we actually have 

a win-win situation. I say that, because I think that success on the 

part of the Montenegrin people, and the Montenegrin institutions 

themselves, to reform and transition their society, equals foreign 

policy success for the United States. I think we’re pushing in the 

same direction. And let me define that a little bit more clearly. 

It’s my view that the United States can play an important role. 

We have 17 years of experience working with countries in Eastern 

Europe, former socialist countries, and we’ve gained a lot of experience and know-how, and we’ve applied, thanks to the generosity of 

the taxpayers and the Congress, a substantial amount of resources 

during these 17 years. 

But I think that we have more work to do, in terms of supporting 

the success of political and economic reforms. And what I mean by 

that is strengthening the economy of Montenegro, creating jobs in 

Montenegro, strengthening democratic institutions, strengthening 

rule of law, fighting corruption, and so forth. These are all issues 

which I think will help strengthen Montenegro and are in the inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00516 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
509 

terest of the United States, for two reasons, primarily—a successful 

Montenegro—a Montenegro which makes it through this transition 

and becomes a democratic and prosperous state in a region which 

has been traditionally unstable, unfortunately, over the last two 

decades or so—will be an important ally of ours in helping to export stability to other areas of this region. 

Second of all, a successful Montenegro, which does make it 

through this transition, also has the potential to be an important 

partner of the United States as we try to advance our agenda, both 

within the region of South Central Europe, in the Euroatlantic 

area, and globally, as well. Montenegro is—if it so decides, is a prospective member of the European Union and NATO. It’s already a 

member of the United Nations and the OSCE. 

So, I think—again, to sum up, I think it’s a win-win situation. 

I think we’re all moving in the same direction. 

Senator DEMINT. I thank you very much. 

Dr. Munter, really the same question. 

Dr. MUNTER. Thank you very much for the question, Senator, 

and I really appreciate it. 

I think that the points Rod made are universal, in the sense that 

we have spent a number of the years, for the last 17 years in the 

transition countries in which many of us have served, gaining the 

experience we believe not only of giving our system—putting it 

forth as a model, but learning from these countries in transition 

what has worked and what has not. And I think this kind of partnership that is not only going out to speak, but also to listen, is 

a key part of our job. And I certainly pledge that, if confirmed, listening, as well as speaking, will be a central part of what I do. 

Specifically, I think we have to create a partnership that bases 

the focus of our relationship with Serbia, which is a much more 

troubled relationship at this point, on our common goals and our 

long-term goals, defining them in a way that we can understand 

that, no matter how the process works getting us there, that we 

agree integration into the West—integration into Western institutions, creating more effective markets, creating the institutions 

that allow for the rule of law—are something that we’re all going 

to be working for, not so much because the Serbs are being told by 

the Americans how to do this, but that it’s a partnership for us, 

as well, that they are also working with us to help us define how 

those partnerships work. 

In a broader sense, partnerships will be not only America, but 

this is a job for our European friends, as well. We’ll work very 

closely with our European allies to make sure that this process of 

building the transition and setting of the long-term goals is a common one, not just something the Americans come up with, but that 

our European allies bear, in fact, a very large part of this burden, 

for this is, actual—after all, their backyard, and we want to work 

with them very closely. 

Ultimately, this will come down, in a specific sense, to our ability 

to practice what we preach in public diplomacy, to make sure that 

the way in which we get our message across, and the way in which 

we understand our colleagues there, is effective, that the entire 

Embassy is mobilized to get the message across to listen to what 

others are saying, so that we are effective in trying to put together 

510 

a long-term plan that isn’t swayed by what are clearly going to be 

some very difficult times that we will go through in the short term. 

Thank you. 

Senator DEMINT. So, you’re comfortable, as far as just the organization and philosophy of the State Department, that you can be 

a true ambassador in the sense—on behalf of the United States, as 

well as on behalf of Serbia to us, and that there really is a twoway system within our structure that you can help direct what we 

do. I mean, do people listen, back home? 

Dr. MUNTER. I would characterize it, Senator, as much more 

that—I’m working for America. 

Senator DEMINT. Yeah. 

Dr. MUNTER. And there’s no doubt about that. What is nice about 

working for America, in my opinion, is that we represent more 

than interests, we represent values that are universal. And—as 

best we can espouse those values with the help of the colleagues 

we’re working with—I think that’s where we get traction, rather 

than simply coming and saying that we represent something, in a 

vacuum. 

Senator DEMINT. Great answer. Great answer. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you. 

Senator OBAMA. Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Kennedy, I want to follow up. In light of what you just testified about ICHEIC and Secretary Eagleburger, the issue has arisen, because of legislation filed over on the House side, that would 

go beyond the International Commission for Holocaust Era Insurance Claims Commission. And, since they have closed up shop, this 

legislation would require disclosure of Holocaust-era policies by insurers, beyond the 500,000 that you mentioned. And it would also 

allow insurers to be sued in Federal court. 

The findings of that legislation, which I think is to be heard in 

a committee shortly in the House of Representatives, criticize 

ICHEIC for inadequate research and for limiting itself only to certain forms of insurance. 

What do you think about that? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much for that question, Senator 

Nelson. 

We have—the Department has been asked to comment on the 

draft legislation that you mentioned, and we are in the process of 

developing a coordinated position within the administration, and 

will certainly get back—I’ll make sure that you’re informed as soon 

as we have that coordinated position. 

Senator NELSON. Well, do you have an opinion, now that ICHEIC 

has closed up business, do you have an opinion about the finding 

in the bill that ICHEIC only paid out less than 5 percent of the 

policies sold to Jews prior to World War II? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, the kinds of policies that ICHEIC looked 

at, I think—I’m not an insurance expert—would be called, probably, ‘‘whole life policies,’’ in a broad category, but they were very 

specialized kinds of policies. They were largely for burial, to ensure 

that the insuree was—would receive a proper burial, or to provide 

a dowry for a daughter. There are other kinds of insurance that 

ICHEIC did not deal with—casualty policies, for example. So, I 

511 

really believe that the goal that ICHEIC set itself, it did a good job, 

it researched thoroughly, and it was an individualized claims process. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator NELSON. So, you think, with what ICHEIC did and what 

it handled, that it did a reasonably good job. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, Senator, I think it basically did. It was—it’s 

obviously sort of ‘‘a glass half full, a glass half empty’’ situation, 

about half the people whose claims could be processed received 

some kind of compensation. And these were difficult claims to process, in—to my understanding, because they—none of them had documents—almost none of them had documentation. This wasn’t 

about processing claims where people had adequate documentation 

to make their claims. 

Senator NELSON. Well, the question now is, as a matter of Federal policy, should survivors be able to go into Federal court? What 

is your opinion on that? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, sir, on that one, I’m going to have to defer 

to the process that we’re engaged in now, within the administration, examining the proposed bill that’s coming up in the House 

committee. 

Senator NELSON. So, basically, the administration is not ready to 

make a statement about whether or not this process ought to stop, 

or whether it ought to go forward and be facilitated in the Federal 

courts. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I believe I received a copy of the bill yesterday 

afternoon, sir, or that was the first time I became aware of it, and 

we’ve tasked it out. 

Senator NELSON. Well, somebody is pretty slow, then, because 

that bill’s been filed for a couple of months. 

Let me ask you—is this true? Now, this is a matter of what 

you’ve been dealing with, because you’ve been active as the Special 

Envoy for Holocaust Issues for—how long? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Ten months, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. It’s my understanding that the German 

Insurance Association has agreed that it would continue to accept 

claims, provided that they’re filed directly with German companies. 

Is that true? 

Mr. KENNEDY. My understanding is that the German companies 

are willing to process claims for which some documentation could 

be provided, that the work that ICHEIC did with undocumentable 

claims was a different story. But I certainly hope that people who 

have some documentation will follow up on this, because I think we 

ought to hold the companies to their statements that they are willing to process claims. But I believe—my understanding is that 

those claims would have to be processed with some kind of documentation. 

Senator NELSON. Does that hold for the Italian company, 

Generali, as well? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Generali has told us the same, that they would 

process documentable claims. And, again, I certainly hope people 

who are not happy with the outcome of the class-action suit that’s 

underway right now, if they feel they’ve got a claim that wasn’t 

handled properly, that they would try to pursue a remedy. 

512 

Senator NELSON. How about the Austrian companies? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, again, you’ve got a willing—an indicated 

willingness to handle claims that can be, as my—as I understand 

it, can be documented, that the undocumentable claims period is 

over, because ICHEIC has finished that—— 

Senator NELSON. So, all of them—German, Italian, and Austrian. 

Mr. KENNEDY. That’s my understanding, sir. But, of course, we’re 

kind of moving into a new period of time here. ICHEIC finished its 

work about—well, a little over 2 months ago, on March 31 of this 

year. 

Senator NELSON. Well, you’re the point man for Holocaust issues, 

so I would think that we would need to know what the policy of 

these companies is after ICHEIC has shut its doors. And, since it 

has shut its doors, what do you think ought to be done to assist 

survivors to be able to proceed with their claims that they feel that 

are unfulfilled? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, my office would certainly be willing to work 

with survivor groups to help them get the information they need 

from the insurance companies to proceed. As I say, this is—we 

have a stated willingness from the insurance companies to proceed 

with documentable claims, and we’re certainly willing to help in 

that regard. We’re not going to drop the issue. 

Senator NELSON. When might I expect a reply from you as to the 

administration’s position on this legislation? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, I would hope, shortly, sir. I don’t have an 

exact timeframe, but we would certainly try to do it in the next few 

days. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator OBAMA. I want to appreciate Senator Nelson for—or 

compliment Senator Nelson for raising some important issues. I 

think it’s—these are issues that all of us share. Obviously, given 

the unprecedented nature of the Holocaust and the fact that survivors are aging, the sooner that we can get some resolution to 

some of these issues, the better. And I think all of us are going to 

share a deep interest in this. So, thank you, Senator Nelson, for 

raising it. 

Senator DeMint, do you have any further questions? 

Senator DEMINT. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator OBAMA. If not, I’d like to thank all the nominees for testifying today and for their willingness to serve our countries in 

these important positions. I want to thank you for your past service, because, as career Foreign Service officers, you all have exemplary records and have done outstanding work. And, you know, we 

know that you’re going to be working in some difficult areas, but 

we also are confident that you will be up to the task. 

So, we’re going to keep the record open. We’re going to—it will 

remain open through Friday, so that committee members can submit additional questions for the record. And I’d ask that the nominees respond expeditiously to those questions, should they arise. 

Senator OBAMA. With that, if no one has any additional comments, then this hearing is adjourned. 

Good luck. 

513 

[Whereupon, at 2:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

CORRECTION TO WRITTEN STATEMENT AND RESPONSE OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY TO

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

In my written statement for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I noted that 

two members of the International Commission of the International Tracing Service 

(ITS) still had not approved the procedures for greater access to the archives. Following my June 21 confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Biden submitted a ‘‘Question for the Record’’ regarding the ITS. 

Based on the same information in my possession at the time, I mistakenly informed 

the Senator that 9 of the 11 signatories to the ITS agreement had already ratified 

the amended ITS protocols, leaving just France and Italy to do so. 

Since then I have received information from the Greek Embassy that Athens has 

not yet completed its ratification procedure. It expects to do so in coming weeks. 

I sincerely apologize to Senator Biden and other members of the Foreign Relations 

Committee for providing this incorrect information. I also would like to reassure the 

Senators that the Department remains steadfast in its efforts to press for expeditious ratification by the remaining three members of the International Commission 

of the ITS so that the amended protocols can enter into force as soon as possible. 

RESPONSES OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR NORM COLEMAN

Question. Could you describe the role of the State Department and in particular 

your office with respect to ICHEIC? 

Answer. As Special Envoy, I and my predecessors participated as observers on the 

board, not only as an advocate of the survivors but also with the responsibility to 

take appropriate steps to contribute to the success of ICHEIC. From the beginning, 

we have supported ICHEIC as an example of a forum for cooperative resolution of 

Holocaust-era claims. Within ICHEIC, we viewed our role as one that would facilitate resolution of issues and provide assistance. In this regard, we conducted 

demarches in European capitals advocating the opening of archives relating to insurance claims, and we sought to mediate any differences among ICHEIC participants, especially when they related to ICHEIC’s interactions with entities created 

in Germany and Austria as a result of United States bilateral agreements. 

Question. What U.S. bilateral and or international agreements govern the restitution of Holocaust-era insurance policies? How do these agreements relate to 

ICHEIC? 

Answer. In July 2000 and January 2001, the United States entered into bilateral 

agreements with Germany and Austria, respectively, that include provisions relating to Holocaust-era insurance policies. The agreement with Germany led to the creation of the German Foundation ‘‘Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future,’’ 

which provided about half of ICHEIC’s operating capital (about $275 million) out 

of funds dedicated for insurance claims and for humanitarian purposes to those with 

unpayable insurance policies. Similarly, the Austrian General Settlement Fund 

(GSF), established pursuant to our January 2001 agreement with Austria, has earmarked $25 million for insurance claims. ICHEIC and the GSF concluded an agreement in December 2003 relating to payment procedures. 

ICHEIC concluded memoranda of understanding with American state insurance 

regulators, leading Jewish and survivor organizations, and European insurance 

companies, as well as with the German Insurance Association, although these are 

not binding international agreements. 

Question. How would you characterize the work of ICHEIC? How would you characterize the cooperation of the insurance companies? Have the insurance companies 

participating in ICHEIC disclosed all of their Holocaust-era policies? If not why not? 

What about non-ICHEIC participating insurance companies? 

Answer. ICHEIC’s mandate was to identify and pay life insurance policies issued 

to Holocaust victims that were never paid to the beneficiaries. With ICHEIC’s board 

consisting of representatives with disparate interests, finding a consensus on some 

issues took years rather than months. These issues included researching and identifying policyholders and establishing appropriate evidentiary and valuation standVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00521 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
514 

ards. Nevertheless, what eventually emerged was a conviction among all parties in 

the process that the process worked as intended and provided meaningful compensation for unpaid life insurance policies from the Nazi period. And it only worked because at key moments all representatives, including insurance company representatives, were prepared to make pragmatic compromises on difficult issues. 

Regarding the disclosure of all Holocaust-era policies, ICHEIC published 500,000 

names of likely insurance policyholders who were also Holocaust victims. The list 

of 500,000 names was produced with the cooperation of European insurance companies and foreign government archives, as well as the German Foundation ‘‘Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future’’ and Yad Vashem, which was established by 

the Israeli Knesset to document the Holocaust. Yad Vashem has over 3 million 

names of victims stored in its electronic database as well as an extensive collection 

of documents. We and ICHEIC’s commissioners believed that this list was a costeffective approach to identifying all of the relevant life insurance policyholders who 

were Nazi victims. At ICHEIC’s concluding meeting in March 2007, the leaders of 

American and Israeli survivor and claims organizations represented on ICHEIC’s 

board expressed great satisfaction with the results of ICHEIC’s work. 

The Austrian General Settlement Fund employed its own researchers, and also 

used the ICHEIC list, to identify policyholders. Other funds in Europe had their 

own system for identifying policyholders and were able to take advantage of 

ICHEIC’s research. The identification of names by insurance companies in cooperating nonmember companies in Belgium or the Netherlands was not an issue. The 

ICHEIC companies, and other companies in the countries cited above, issued the 

bulk of the life insurance policies in Europe. 

Question. How many survivors presently reside in the United States and overseas? How many of the current survivors and or heirs (both United States and foreign) have had their claims paid through ICHEIC? How many have not? What are 

the principle reasons why restitution has not been made to some survivors and their 

heirs? 

Answer. We are aware of one survey that estimated the total number of survivors 

worldwide to be just under 700,000 in the year 2003. If one assumes that 10 percent 

of survivors die every year, than the current number of survivors could be about 

450,000 today. Using the same percentages for the country of residence of survivors 

as in the 2003 study, one would estimate that there are 170,000 in Israel, 70,000 

in the United States, and about 210,000 in the rest of the world. This study, prepared by Ukeles Associates for ICHEIC, is available on the Claims Conference Web 

site (claimscon.org). 

We know that about 90,000 survivors or heirs filed claims and that 48,000 of 

these were eligible for payments that totaled $300 million. Most of those applying 

for and receiving payments could provide no documentation beyond anecdotal information, yet ICHEIC was able to research their claims and submit them to insurers 

at no cost to the claimant. Even those with only credible stories and no documentation were eligible for a small payment. ICHEIC also made available an additional 

$169 million for social welfare and related projects. 

We estimate that $500 million have reached Holocaust survivors and heirs as payments for claims via ICHEIC and via related agreements. No compensation program 

involving 70- or 80-year-old claims could ever be perfect, but ICHEIC’s efforts to 

honor unpaid life insurance policies was thorough and comprehensive. 

(A large category of ineligible claims applications came from countries in the 

former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, because no private sector insurance companies 

existed in that area, and therefore no insurance policies could be issued there during that time, a large number of claims applications from countries in the former 

Soviet Union were ineligible for payment.) 

Question. What is the status of ICHEIC’s compliance with section 704(a) of the 

fiscal year 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (Public Law 107–228)? 

Answer. Section 704(a) is a reporting requirement directed at the United States 

Government not ICHEIC. The Department of State has provided all the information 

called for by the section that is available to it in its biannual reports to the Congress, but not all the information was available at the time of the most recent report, as has been the case in years past. Some information about ICHEIC, including 

statistics on claims and appeals, however, is publicly available on ICHEIC’s Web 

site (www.icheic.org). Moreover, additional information can be found in ICHEIC’s 

Final Report, which is available at the ICHEIC Web site and at www.naic.org. 

[NOTE: Section 704(a) requires, inter alia, a number of detailed questions. For example, whether the participating ICHEIC insurers provided claimants with a status 

report on their claim within 90 days and whether the appeals body of ICHEIC had 

515 

the resources to fully investigate each claim. This section also requested information 

on the adequacy of independent audits and administrative expenses and whether 

the companies complied with ICHEIC evidentiary and valuation standards and provided policyholder lists. Most of these questions were addressed at the end of the 

ICHEIC process in its Final Report.] 

Question. What legal basis exists, if at all, for the preclusion of restitution-based 

lawsuits against insurance companies? 

Answer. Lawsuits face numerous legal hurdles. Some lawsuits against insurance 

companies concerning Holocaust-era claims were resolved through a negotiated settlement of class actions. Those settlements precluded future claims. Other lawsuits 

may be precluded by well-established legal doctrines, such as statutes of limitations. 

United States executive agreements with Germany and Austria concerning Holocaust compensation did not preclude lawsuits against insurance companies or other 

companies. Rather, in consideration of the significant payments those countries 

agreed to make, the United States agreed to file statements of interest in suits 

against German and Austrian companies arising out of the Holocaust urging courts 

to dismiss on any available legal ground, noting continuing litigation would be contrary to United States foreign policy interests and that those companies should instead have ‘‘legal peace.’’ The United States has made these interests clear in numerous courts, all of which have dismissed litigation that would have undermined 

these important policy goals. 

We believe litigation would be acrimonious, expensive, and ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, it would cause significant problems for the foreign relations of the 

United States, especially with respect to countries with which we have bilateral 

agreements. We facilitated and supported ICHEIC and agreements with Germany 

and Austria on Holocaust-related claims because they provided for $500 million for 

insurance claims on the basis of relaxed standards of proof, and without any legal 

costs to the claimants and without any of the litigation risks. They also provided 

$5.5 billion in payments for other losses or damages to Holocaust victims. 

Question. While ICHEIC has provided more than $306 million on Holocaust-era 

insurance policies to 48,000 survivors and their heirs, there are estimates that the 

value of unpaid policies is at least $17 billion? How would you explain this difference? 

Answer. The $17 billion figure is well above the estimates we have seen in other 

studies and raises question about methodology and sources. We informally consulted 

with a historian at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum about these estimates, 

and he was unaware of any data-based and document-based study that produced estimates of comparable size for the insurance assets of the entire Jewish population 

of Europe. 

ICHEIC’s Final Report (available at naic.org and at icheic.org) provides a realistic 

picture of the European insurance industry between World War I and World War 

II, as well as of compensation programs available to Holocaust survivors and heirs 

following the Second World War (pages 6 to 15 and pages 33 to 37 of the Final Report). In addition, there are other experts who have written on the overall wealth 

of the Jewish population of Europe, broken down by country of residence and category of wealth, and the estimates of these experts are substantially lower than 

those cited in the question. One useful study was prepared by Helen B. Junz, who 

wrote at the request of the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons chaired by 

former Federal Reserve Board Governor Paul Volcker. (See appendix S on page A– 

127.) We can provide a citation: http://www.crt-ii.org/ICEP/ICEP—Report—Appendices—A-W.pdf. 

Additional sources of information are the ‘‘Research Reports’’ that can be found 

at the ‘‘Document Center’’ on ICHEIC’s Web site. One of these reports identified 

78,000 life insurance policies belonging to 55,000 Jewish policyholders in Europe 

during the Nazi era. The policyholder lists came from noncompany files such as public archives and repositories, such as the Nazi regime’s tax records and its Jewish 

property declarations. 

In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that ICHEIC’s mandate was to 

pay unpaid life insurance policies on the basis of claims filed by survivors or heirs. 

It is conceivable that the estimates relating to the $17 billion in unpaid insurance 

policies include nonlife policies and policies where there are no survivors or heirs. 

For example, it could be based on the inclusion of property insurance (and possibly 

marine insurance) losses that have not been paid, but seeking to cover such losses 

would be problematic given the widespread destruction caused by military operations that took place during the Second World War and the typical exclusion of 

war-related damages in such policies. 

516 

Question. With the ICHEIC process now completed, what recourse do survivors 

and their families have in the event they should come into possession of information 

relating to Holocaust-era insurance policies? 

Answer. If one has a claim involving an insurer that participated in ICHEIC, and 

that person could not file a claim before ICHEIC’s closing dates of December 2003 

and March 2004, then one can still file the claim directly with the insurance company that issued the policy. The German insurance association representative on 

ICHEIC’s board stated that the association’s members will continue to consider any 

Holocaust-era claim filed directly with a company. 

Statement of German Insurance Association: ‘‘I believe that the process to work 

for a better future needs to continue, even as we hope that we have by now addressed all unresolved insurance policies from the Holocaust era. . . . Therefore let 

me assure you that our member companies intend to continue to address inquiries 

that are sent to a specific company and will honor legitimate claims.’’ 

There is also a way in which one can file a claim with the Italian insurer Generali 

under certain circumstance. More information is available at the claims settlement 

Web site: http://www.nazierainsurancesettlement.com/?lang=en. 

[NOTE: The deadline for filing claims with Generali was also extended by the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The claims Web 

site states the following: ‘‘Claims based on documents obtained from the [Bad 

Arolsen] archive must be submitted no later than six (6) months after the opening 

of the archive, but in no event later than June 30, 2008. If the archive is not opened 

by May 1, 2008, the deadline for claims based on archival documents is 60 days 

after the opening, but no later than August 31, 2008.’’] 

Question. Generally speaking, what sort of information is contained at the Arolsen 

Nazi archives? What can be reasonably expected about documents relating to insurance policies? 

Answer. The archive consists primarily of three major sections: 1) camps, transports, ghettos, and arrest records; 2) forced and slave labor records; 3) displaced person camp records. 

Approximately one quarter of the records deal with Holocaust victims. The remaining material covers non-Jewish forced laborers, political opponents, and other 

persons arrested, detained, or persecuted by Nazi authorities, and displaced persons. In addition, the ITS staff created a Central Name Index which consists of 

some 17.5 million names on approximately 40 million index cards. Some entries are 

redundant. For example, the same name appears on multiple documents and on 

multiple cards. 

The files do not contain information on every survivor or every person who was 

victimized or killed. They only contain information on individuals whose names appeared on lists related to certain—not all—ghettos and concentration camps, forced 

or slave labor camps, or displaced persons camps. The name of someone who fled 

the Nazis or was hidden is unlikely to appear in these records unless the individual 

was registered at a displaced persons camp following the war. Similarly, the name 

of someone killed on arrival at a camp and not registered would be unlikely to appear in camp records. 

There do not appear to be any collections at Arolsen that consist specifically of 

information about life insurance policies, although there may be some information 

within the archives. So far, the ITS staff has not encountered a significant number 

of such references, but the staff has not systematically looked for insurance information. 

A survivor or heir who wishes to pursue this matter should file a request for a 

search of ITS records with the Holocaust and War Victims Tracing Service, American Red Cross, 4700 Mount Hope Drive, Baltimore, Maryland 21215–3231. 

RESPONSE OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Why do you believe the process of opening the ITS archives at Bad 

Arolsen has taken so long? Has the United States done enough to allow Holocaust 

survivors, their descendants, and academic researchers access to these documents? 

What lessons should we take away from the process? 

Answer. The International Tracing Service (ITS) is governed by an International 

Commission (IC) of 11 nations: the United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, 

France, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy, and 

Greece. The International Committee of the Red Cross manages the facility at Bad 

Arolsen. 

517 

Beginning in 1943, the core function of the ITS was to aid in family reunification; 

it has more recently assisted with slave labor settlements. But as a backlog in answering requests for information increased, momentum among survivors and scholars started to grow to open up the archives to the public. The U.S. Department of 

State and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum led the diplomatic charge in pushing for greater openness. 

For several years, however, a number of the other members on the International 

Commission and the ITS Director expressed concern that changes in procedures for 

accessing information would be inconsistent with European privacy practice and 

laws. Their opposition to changing the rules prevented action by the ITS to open 

the archives, despite intense pressure to do so. 

In April 2006, German Justice Minister Zypries declared her country’s readiness 

to accept new access procedures while she was visiting the United States Holocaust 

Memorial Museum. She also called on the other member states of the ITS International Commission to do the same, thereby finally opening up the door for real 

negotiations. 

At its May 2006 meeting, the International Commission proposed draft protocols 

amending the 1955 Bonn Accords that have governed the ITS. By November 2006, 

all countries had signed the protocols and indicated their intention to move rapidly 

to ratify them. Early this year, the United States asked for an extraordinary meeting to assess and accelerate progress, which took place in The Hague in March 

2007. The meeting emphasized the importance of rapid approval of the amendments 

by all IC member states and agreed to put on the agenda for the May 2007 annual 

meeting the authorization to the ITS administration to distribute an advance electronic copy of the Bad Arolsen data. The advance copy meant that repository institutions could harmonize ITS data with their computer systems while the full approval 

process took place. 

In addition to a series of demarches in Washington by the Office of Holocaust 

Issues at the State Department, Germany and the United States made joint 

demarches in the capitals of the ITS countries urging prompt approval of the 

amendments. 

By the time of the May annual meeting of the ITS International Commission, 

seven countries had finished their internal approval procedures. Also at this meeting the commission approved distribution of an advance copy and rules for access 

to the documents at Bad Arolsen. Since May, two more countries have approved 

their own internal procedures; only France and Italy still need to finalize the approval process. The State Department continues to press these countries to expedite 

their ratifications. 

United States leadership on this issue has been vital to advancing greater access 

to the Bad Arolsen data. American-German cooperation helped overcome significant 

hurdles to progress as well. It is also important to note that during these long negotiations, the American Red Cross’ Holocaust and War Victims Tracing Center aided 

survivors and next of kin in accessing information. This center continues to operate 

today. American citizen survivors and heirs can gain access to ITS materials by 

writing to the Holocaust and War Victims Tracing Center, American Red Cross, 

4700 Mount Hope Drive, Baltimore, Maryland 21215–3231. 

RESPONSES OF J. CHRISTIAN KENNEDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. What is your position on H.R. 1746, the legislation introduced in the 

House by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, to require disclosure of Holocaust-era 

policies by insurers and allow insurers to be sued in Federal court? 

Answer. We oppose H.R. 1746. The information requirements set forth in H.R. 

1746 have largely been met by the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC). This was achieved through publication of 500,000 names 

of likely insurance policyholders who were also Holocaust victims. The participants 

in the ICHEIC process, including survivor organizations, did not believe that a list 

of names similar to that required by H.R. 1746 would add further benefit to Holocaust survivors or their heirs. 

ICHEIC has already achieved many of the objectives of the draft legislation. 

ICHEIC has paid $300 million to 48,000 claimants and made available $169 million 

in funds for social welfare projects. We estimate that $500 million has reached Holocaust survivors and heirs as payments for claims via ICHEIC and via related agreements involving other countries, such as the one with Austria, as well as through 

social projects. None of this would have been possible if the foreign governments and 

companies providing these payments believed they would be subject to continuing 

518 

litigation in United States courts over Holocaust-era claims. In return for $6 billion 

in payments to Holocaust victims, including to holders of Holocaust-era insurance 

policies, the United States agreed, with respect to German and Austrian companies, 

that continuing litigation would be contrary to its foreign policy interests and that 

those companies should instead have ‘‘legal peace.’’ The United States has made 

these interests clear in numerous courts, all of which have dismissed litigation that 

would have undermined these important policy goals. 

The proposed legislation would take the opposite course. Its primary effect would 

be to enable and facilitate renewed litigation, even where the claims at issue had 

already been explicitly settled in U.S. courts. We believe such litigation would be 

acrimonious, expensive, and ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, it would cause significant problems for the foreign relations of the United States, especially with respect to countries with which we have bilateral agreements and which will see enactment of this legislation as a repudiation of such agreements. If such legislation 

is enacted, we expect it will be extremely difficult to achieve cooperation from other 

countries in their taking additional domestic steps on Holocaust restitution matters. 

Question. Do you think that it is a good idea, now that ICHEIC has concluded 

its work, for survivors and their families to sue for compensation on World War II 

era policies in Federal court? 

Answer. No. ICHEIC has already achieved many of the objectives of the draft leg- islation. ICHEIC has paid $300 million to 48,000 claimants and made available 

$169 million in funds for social welfare projects. We estimate that $500 million has 

reached Holocaust survivors and heirs as payments for claims via ICHEIC and via 

related agreements involving other countries, such as the one with Austria, as well 

as through social projects. None of this would have been possible if the foreign governments and companies providing these payments believed they would be subject 

to continuing litigation in United States courts over Holocaust-era claims. In return 

for $6 billion in payments to Holocaust victims, including to holders of Holocaustera insurance policies, the United States agreed, with respect to German and Austrian companies, that continuing litigation would be contrary to its foreign policy 

interests and that those companies should instead have ‘‘legal peace.’’ The United 

States has made these interests clear in numerous courts, all of which have dismissed litigation that would have undermined these important policy goals. 

The proposed legislation would take the opposite course. Its primary effect would 

be to enable and facilitate renewed litigation, even where the claims at issue had 

already been explicitly settled in U.S. courts. We believe such litigation would be 

acrimonious, expensive, and ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, it would cause significant problems for the foreign relations of the United States, especially with respect to countries with which we have bilateral agreements and which will see enactment of this legislation as a repudiation of such agreements. If such legislation 

is enacted, we expect it will be extremely difficult to achieve cooperation from other 

countries in their taking additional domestic steps on Holocaust restitution matters. 

Question. Can you give me your assessment of the bill’s disclosure and judicial 

review provisions in light of ICHEIC and the other efforts to address Holocaust insurance claims? 

Answer. See answers to previous questions. 

Question. How likely is it in your opinion that litigation that would be authorized 

under this bill would result in the actual payment of insurance benefits on Holocaust-era policies in a timely manner? 

Answer. We believe such litigation would be highly unlikely to be successful. Particularly in the case of insurance companies that issued policies in Europe to European citizens some 70 or 80 years ago, the legal hurdles for plaintiffs would be numerous and significant. There would also be objections from foreign governments, 

which would argue that bilateral agreements with the United States require the 

United States to oppose such lawsuits. In addition, lawsuits may take years in lower 

courts and on appeal, and can involve huge costs. 

Question. Findings in the bill state that the judicial review provisions of the bill 

would not be limited by any existing international agreements, court decisions, or 

settlement agreements (such as the Generali settlement). Do you agree or disagree 

with this statement? 

Answer. We believe that the provisions of the bill that facilitate lawsuits are in 

direct conflict with existing international agreements, court decisions, and settlement agreements. For example, agreements between the United States and Germany and the United States and Austria commit the United States to oppose litigation against companies from those countries over Holocaust-era claims. Many U.S. 

519 

courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized and given weight to U.S. policy interests in this regard. And there have been settlements of lawsuits involving 

Swiss companies and Generali (Italian) in our courts, and those settlements contemplate an end to litigation. 

Question. If the bill doesn’t override the agreements, what kinds of claims would 

be left to pursue and are Federal lawsuits the way to pursue them? 

Answer. We support dialog, negotiation, and cooperation, not lawsuits, as the 

means to resolve matters relating to any Holocaust-era claims. If one has a claim 

involving an insurer that participated in ICHEIC, and that person could not file a 

claim before ICHEIC’s closing dates of December 2003 and March 2004, then one 

can still file the claim directly with the insurance company that issued the policy. 

The German insurance association stated that its members will continue to consider 

any Holocaust-era claim filed directly with a company. In the case of Generali, one 

should go to the claims Web site for information on filing claims based on new archival research: http://www.nazierainsurancesettlement.com/?lang=en. 

Question. Findings in H.R. 1746 criticize ICHEIC for inadequate research and for 

limiting itself to only certain forms of insurance. Do you agree with these findings? 

If not, why not? 

Answer. We disagree with those findings. ICHEIC’s mission was determined by 

its commissioners, who were American state insurance regulators, leading Jewish 

survivor organizations and representatives from the state of Israel, as well as major 

European insurance companies. The commissioners decided to focus on identifying 

and paying claims on life insurance policies. It is understandable that other kinds 

of policies were not part of ICHEIC’s mission. For example, the inclusion of property 

insurance (and possibly marine insurance) would have been problematic given the 

widespread destruction caused by military operations that took place during the 

World War II and the typical exclusion of war-related damages in such policies. 

ICHEIC established an extensive research apparatus for identifying claims so that 

a claimant could file a claim that was based on limited information, such as only 

the first and last name of the policyholder, and if possible also the dates of birth 

and residence of the policyholder. The list of 500,000 names was produced with the 

assistance of the German Foundation ‘‘Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future’’ and Yad Vashem, which was established by the Israeli Knesset to document 

the Holocaust. Yad Vashem has over 3 million names of victims stored in its electronic database as well as an extensive collection of documents. The ICHEIC names 

list and other archival information was compiled using high technology, such as the 

Soundex system that uses phonetics to incorporate various spellings of names and 

places. 

In addition, ICHEIC sent out researchers to archives in 15 countries throughout 

Europe, Israel, and the United States to compile evidence of insurance policies. 

These archives were located in insurance companies and in government records centers, and the researchers gathered evidence of nearly 80,000 life insurance policies. 

ICHEIC researchers also were able to develop a company-country matrix to track 

the transfer of policy liabilities from one company to the next, as one insurer went 

bankrupt or was sold and responsibility for paying the policy was taken over by another company. 

Question. One finding states that ICHEIC only paid out on less than 5 percent 

of the policies sold to Jews at the beginning of World War II, and that the unpaid 

insurance theft actually is somewhere between $17 billion and $200 billion. Do you 

agree with that estimate? If not, why not? 

Answer. We have not seen the methodology of the authors of these studies used 

to arrive at such figures. The wide range reflected by these figures raises questions 

about methodology and sources for this data. We informally consulted with a historian at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum about these estimates, and he was 

unaware of any serious study that produced comparable estimates for the insurance 

assets of the entire Jewish population of Europe. 

ICHEIC’s Final Report (available at naic.org and at icheic.org) provides a realistic 

picture of the European insurance industry between World War I and World War 

II, as well as compensation programs available to Holocaust survivors and heirs following the World War II (pages 6 to 15 and pages 33 to 37 of the Final Report). 

The ICHEIC report does not support the large estimates of insurance losses cited 

in the question, and certainly not for losses in life insurance. In addition, there are 

other experts who have written on the overall wealth of the Jewish population of 

Europe, broken down by country of residence and category of wealth, and the estimates of these experts are lower than those cited in the question. One useful study 

was prepared by Helen B. Junz, who wrote at the request of the Independent ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00527 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
520 

mittee of Eminent Persons chaired by former Federal Reserve Board Governor Paul 

Volcker. (See Appendix S on page A–127.) We can provide a citation:http://www.crtii.org/ICEP/ICEP—Report—Appendices/A-W.pdf. 

ICHEIC’s mandate was to process the claims of survivors and heirs for unpaid 

life insurance policies. European insurance companies cooperating with ICHEIC 

contributed the funds to pay claims that could be traced to a particular company 

and to establish humanitarian projects. The funds for the humanitarian and related 

projects were intended to honor the millions that perished in the Holocaust and to 

provide for needy survivors, including those who were ineligible to file a claim. In 

addition to paying $300 million for all claims, ICHEIC allocated an additional $169 

million for humanitarian projects. At the outset, it was clear that this amount was 

never intended to cover the value of all insurance assets of those murdered in the 

Holocaust. Obtaining funds from European insurance companies to cover the insurance assets of all who perished in the Holocaust would not have been an achievable 

goal, and such a negotiation would have probably delayed further the possibility of 

elderly survivors receiving a measure of justice in their lifetimes. 

Question. My understanding is that the German Insurance Association agreed, at 

the conclusion of ICHEIC, to continue to accept insurance claims now and forever 

provided that they are filed directly with the German companies. Is it your understanding that the German insurance companies will continue to accept insurance 

claims and if so, will they do so under ICHEIC’s evidentiary standards? 

Answer. German insurance companies through their association are committed to 

continuing to consider claims that are sent directly to the issuing company. However, the research apparatus of ICHEIC and the German Insurance Association will 

no longer be able to assist claimants in verifying a claim. At the concluding meeting 

of ICHEIC in late March, the Association representative did not address the issue 

of ICHEIC evidentiary standards (see his statement below). We intend to contact 

the association in the next few days and ask for a clarification of evidentiary standards. 

Statement of German Insurance Association: ‘‘I believe that the process to work 

for a better future needs to continue, even as we hope that we have by now addressed all unresolved insurance policies from the Holocaust era. . . . Therefore let 

me assure you that our member companies intend to continue to address inquiries 

that are sent to a specific company and will honor legitimate claims.’’ 

Question. Generali also has extended the period during which it will accept 

claims. Do you know if they are doing so under the ICHEIC standards? 

Answer. Yes. We understand that, as part of a court settlement, Generali agreed 

to follow ICHEIC valuation and eligibility standards. One can obtain more information 

by going to Generali claims settlement Web site: http://www.nazierainsurance-settlement.com/?lang=en. 

[NOTE: The deadline for filing claims with Generali was also extended by the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The claims Web 

site states the following: ‘‘Claims based on documents obtained from the [Bad 

Arolsen] archive must be submitted no later than six (6) months after the opening 

of the archive, but in no event later than June 30, 2008. If the archive is not opened 

by May 1, 2008, the deadline for claims based on archival documents is 60 days 

after the opening, but no later than August 31, 2008.’’] 

Question. What is the State Department doing to use its diplomatic leverage to 

get insurance companies, such as the German Insurance Association, Generali, and 

the Austrian insurance companies, to make good on their willingness to accept 

claims and to do so under the ICHEIC standards? 

Answer. As an ICHEIC member company, Generali followed ICHEIC standards 

and paid all eligible claims. There was a separate issue involving the processing of 

claims by an Israeli subsidiary, the Generali Trust Fund (GTF), which failed to 

maintain ICHEIC processing standards. ICHEIC resolved the matter on its own by 

terminating its contract with the GTF and transferring the claims processing to 

Generali’s in-house claims processing operation. In other words, this was a temporary problem that has been completely resolved. One can read a fuller description 

of the matter in ICHEIC’s Final Report available at naic.org (pages 29–30 and 54– 

55). 

We understand that, as part of a court settlement, Generali agreed to follow 

ICHEIC valuation and eligibility standards. One can obtain more information by 

going to Generali claims settlement Web site:http://www.nazierainsurancesettlement.com/?lang=en. 

521 

Regarding the Austrian General Settlement Fund (GSF), an issue that has recently arisen is whether the GSF would cover claims on policies issued by Austrian 

subsidiaries outside the Austrian Republic’s present-day territorial limits. ICHEIC 

believed that such claims were covered under its operating agreement with the GSF. 

Austrian officials cited the precise wording of the July 2001 agreement with the 

United States, indicating that the latter agreement explicitly excluded GSF payment of claims on policies issued by Austrian subsidiaries in such countries as the 

former Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Its reasoning was that the nonpayment of policies by such subsidiaries or affiliates was due to the actions of the post-war communist governments, which also confiscated the assets of the subsidiaries, and not 

the Nazi regime in Austria. At the request of ICHEIC Chairman Lawrence 

Eagleburger, the Department of State raised the matter with Austrian officials. As 

a result, we received a commitment that the GSF would take care to review each 

specific claim on a policy issued outside the present-day territory of Austria with 

the objective of determining whether nonpayment resulted from actions that occurred in Austria or outside of that country, and the GSF would pay the claim if 

actions within Austria led to nonpayment. 

As this proposal was not full satisfactory to Chairman Eagleburger, he raised the 

possibility of Austria reimbursing ICHEIC for the $4.5 million in payments made 

on the claims from outside Austria. The ICHEIC Final Report (pages 48 and 49) 

notes that no such reimbursement was forthcoming and ICHEIC continues to hope 

that the $4.5 million will be made available to the Claims Conference, the entity 

responsible for disbursing ICHEIC’s remaining humanitarian funds. In this regard, 

please refer also to the answer to the last question and response in this section. 

Even following the close down of ICHEIC, the Department of State’s Office of Holocaust Issues remains in regular contact with governments and the insurance companies and will continue to encourage them to meet their commitments regarding 

the further review of individual claims. 

Question. What is your assessment of the humanitarian aid portion of ICHEIC? 

Answer. ICHEIC struck a reasonable balance in dividing the use of its funds from 

insurance companies between evidence-based claims, humanitarian claims, and humanitarian projects. Some claims did not meet evidentiary standards, despite 

ICHEIC’s extensive research and its relaxed standards of proof of a policy’s existence. Nevertheless, these claims could be paid from one of ICHEIC’s two humanitarian claims programs: one to cover claimants who could provide only credible 

anecdotal evidence; the other to pay evidence-based claims against East European 

insurance companies with no present-day successors. (Both humanitarian claims 

programs are covered on pages 46 to 48 of ICHEIC Final Report.) We regard both 

programs as successful. 

The ICHEIC report also refers to $169 million of its funds being allocated to humanitarian projects with the bulk of the funds administered by the Claims Conference. The issue among survivor organizations was which groups and countries to 

focus spending of the humanitarian funds. The consensus among survivor organizations and insurance regulators was to devote the bulk of payments to countries 

which lacked an adequate social safety net and also had a large population of destitute Holocaust survivors. Thus, a large portion went to the needy Jewish population in the former Soviet Union. However, there were also funds allocated to needy 

survivors in the United States. 

Question. A recent op-ed in the New York Times described the fact that there are 

Holocaust survivors who are financially destitute and even homeless. What is being 

done to assist them? Is humanitarian aid that was given out through ICHEIC being 

directed to help these survivors? What is your office doing to help direct aid to these 

survivors? 

Answer. ICHEIC discussed this issue at great length and concluded that most of 

the funds available for humanitarian purposes should be reserved for the benefit of 

needy Holocaust victims worldwide. ICHEIC’s commissioners also believed strongly 

that it also was important to allocate a portion of the funds ‘‘. . . to support the 

strengthening of Jewish culture and heritage in recognition that the Nazis attempted to eradicate Jewish culture as well as the Jewish people. . . .’’ ICHEIC 

contracted with the Jewish Claims Conference to distribute $132 million in social 

welfare benefits, including health care and home-care services, for needy Jewish victims of Nazi persecution. Given the weakness or absence of a social safety net in 

many countries of the former Soviet Union and given that Eastern Europe was 

where the Nazis sought to eradicate Jewish culture, ICHEIC’s humanitarian programs have focused on this area. However, a significant portion of funds for home 

522 

care and for destitute survivors have also been spent in the United States. We recommend contacting the Claims Conference for details in this regard. 

As observers on ICHEIC’s board, we spoke out in favor of ensuring that a portion 

of the humanitarian funds be allocated for needy survivors in the United States. 

Question. ICHEIC recently released its final report and that report contains a section on lessons learned. It is important to look at how ICHEIC worked so that future claims commissions can learn from the ICHEIC experience. What in your view 

are the most important lessons learned from the ICHEIC process and how can they 

be followed in the future? 

Answer. The most important lesson in such matters is to determine whether one 

should have an individualized claims process or a mass claims process, as this decision will determine the cost and the time involved to process claims. 

The ICHEIC process, similar to that for the Swiss bank claims settlement, researched each claim and created a vast research apparatus, including audits, to find 

policies which failed to name an insurance company. This step in turn led to the 

publication of a names list that was thoroughly vetted and a second research step 

to determine from company archives and state archives in Europe whether the claim 

had been paid in the past. The individualized process also created the need to establish a mechanism for valuing claims issued in different currencies, and addressing 

policy losses created by inflation and currency depreciation. There were also translation costs to deal with documents is over 20 languages. Given these requirements, 

it is understandable that the ICHEIC process faced some delays and was relatively 

costly. Administrative costs amounted to $95.5 million, compared to the $300 million 

paid in claims and $169 million in humanitarian projects. 

By contrast, some other Holocaust settlements involved lump-sum payments and 

required only a minimum of research or documentation to establish eligibility. The 

simpler, lump-sum payments processes often had the same level of payment for different levels of loss or suffering, but they also had lower administrative costs and 

made payments somewhat faster. 

The ICHEIC participants determined fairly early in the process that the processing of claims must be handled on an individual basis. This meant that the process depended also on finding a consensus among various board members with different interests: the European insurance companies that contributed the funds in 

exchange for legal protection from further claims; the American state insurance 

commissioners who were strong advocates for the victims and heirs; and, of course, 

the representatives of the survivors and the state of Israel. The United States participated as an observer on the board, not only as an advocate of the survivors but 

also had to view the decision of ICHEIC in the context of other agreements settling 

Holocaust claims. 

Thus, with ICHEIC’s board consisting of representatives with disparate interests, 

finding a consensus on some issues took years rather than months. Nevertheless, 

what eventually emerged was a conviction among all parties in the process that the 

process worked as intended and provided meaningful compensation for unpaid life 

insurance policies from the Nazi period. And it only worked because at key moments 

all representatives were prepared to make pragmatic compromises on difficult 

issues. 

Question. In order to learn from the ICHEIC process, it is essential that members 

of the public have the information they need to assess ICHEIC. Are you doing everything you can to ensure that the records from ICHEIC are preserved and made 

available? 

Answer. ICHEIC has made an excellent decision to send to the U.S. Holocaust 

Memorial Museum its records for safekeeping relating to the 92,000 claims filed and 

decisions regarding payment offers and payments. Following a reasonable period 

and in order to protect privacy, the documents will be open to historical research 

and the public. ICHEIC’s decision documents will eventually also be stored at the 

Museum. 

The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum has also agreed to maintain indefinitely 

the ICHEIC Web site, which contains a valuable record of its key decisions as well 

a wealth of information relating to the claims process. ICHEIC’s complete 66-page 

Final Report appears on the ICHEIC Web site and on the NAIC Web site. Thus, 

we will direct any interested party to these Web sites as part of our continuing efforts to educate the public about the ICHEIC process. 

The Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues and his staff are prepared to brief the 

staff of Senate and House members, and we will be available nation-wide for speaking tours and interviews with local media wherever there are Jewish communities 

523 

seeking information about ICHEIC. It is important that the success of ICHEIC is 

well-known. 

Question. Now that ICHEIC has shut its doors, what more can and should be 

done to assist survivors who have yet to get a measure of justice. What is the State 

Department doing? What can we do here in Congress? 

Answer. Survivor organizations are in an extremely important position to recommend what the greatest continuing needs are for survivors. From what we are 

hearing, it appears that the greatest need remains health care, home care, and longterm care. 

In recent years, the Department of State has facilitated agreements with compa- nies and governments that made available $8 billion in payments related to labor 

claims, personal injury, and property losses, including insurance. All of these agreements have been implemented or their implementation is nearing completion. These 

agreements involved Swiss banks, Germany, Austria, France, and European insurance companies. 

The one area which continues to require the high-level attention of the Department of State is compensation for property claims in the new democracies of Central 

and Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, which had Europe’s largest Jewish community. Poland, and many other countries in this area as well, have not yet implemented an effective compensation law to cover the confiscation of property during 

the Nazi occupation. The Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues has given this matter 

the highest priority. 

In contacts with counterparts, all branches of the government may want to consider how to emphasize the importance Americans place on this issue of fundamental fairness. 

Question. What is the status of the Austrian claims process? 

Answer. After a 4-year delay due to problems in obtaining a dismissal of certain 

lawsuits in United States courts, the $210 million Austrian General Settlement 

Fund (GSF) began making payments to claimants in January 2006. This fund was 

created pursuant to a January 2001 agreement with Austria and covers compensation for property losses, as well as the physical return of some properties that were 

once confiscated from Holocaust victims and recently, through historical research, 

were found to be still in the Austrian Government’s possession. The Austrian Fund 

anticipates making payments on about 20,000 claims and has processed about half 

of the claims to date. The GSF is expected to complete all payments by 2008. 

We should note that the Austrian labor fund of $330 million has completed its 

payments, as has the $150 million special fund for paying compensation to Jewish 

victims for household property, long-term apartment leases, and business leases and 

property. Moreover, the Austrian pension system has been paying nursing home 

benefits to Holocaust victims and Austrian Jewish emigres in the United States 

(benefits over 10 years from 2001 to 2010 are estimated to be some $112 million). 

Question. Do you know if the Austrian claims process has paid 100 cents on the 

dollar for the insurance claims that they have recognized? If not, how much have 

they been paying on the dollar for claims? Is that an adequate level of compensation 

in your opinion? 

Answer. The Austrian payments under the $210 million General Settlement Fund 

(GSF) are regrettably in the range of 10 to 15 percent on the dollar. This is due 

to several factors, including primarily the unexpected high value of claims. 

We have always taken the view that no level of payment can ever be adequate 

to compensate survivors for their suffering and losses during the Holocaust. The 

amount allocated to the GSF in 2001 was negotiated among survivor groups, attorneys, companies, and governments to ensure that the elderly victims of the Holocaust received a measure of justice in their lifetimes. Had this been the only Austrian Government compensation program, the payment amounts would cause much 

greater concern. But one must place the shortcomings of the GSF in the broader 

context of other recent Austrian programs listed below: 

• Austrian National Fund: $150 million to 30,000 victims; 

• Slave and Forced Labor Fund: $330 million; 

• Household and Business Tenancy Rights: $150 million to 23,000 victims; and 

• Nursing Home Care to former Austrian citizens residing abroad: $112 million. 

We should also note that the GSF also provides for the physical return (in rem) 

of several valuable properties confiscated during the Nazi period and held by the 

government or public entities until historical research revealed their rightful owners. We will be able to provide more details on the value of these properties at a 

later date. 

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RESPONSES OF CHARLES ENGLISH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Please describe in detail what steps you plan to take, if confirmed, to 

support the work of the State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina? How will you work to 

facilitate construction of a state prison? 

Answer. Ensuring that the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a fully functional, depoliticized institution capable of efficiently rendering just and fair verdicts 

is a key policy priority for the administration. If confirmed, I will fully support all 

of the efforts already underway to build this institution’s capacity, such as financial 

contributions, technical assistance, and the seconding of talented American judges 

and prosecutors to the court. I will also, if confirmed, seek to improve the court’s 

performance and cement it as the institution capable of delivering domestic justice 

to perpetrators of war crimes, organized crime, terrorism, and other grave offenses. 

For example, the administration is working to enhance the state court’s capacity by 

supporting the development of a prosecutorial strategy that emphasizes better case 

management and makes the process of case prioritization and selection more systematic and transparent. If confirmed, I will seek similar ways to advance the objectives we share with Bosnia and Herzegovina in this area. 

The recent escape of Radovan Stankovic, the first war crimes case transferred 

from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and tried to 

completion in the Balkans, highlights Bosnia and Herzegovina’s need for a state 

prison. The current proposal for a prison is quite expensive and no donors have 

stepped forward to pledge sufficient funds. If confirmed, I will encourage the 

Bosnians to find a way to lower the current 14.4 million Euro price tag without sacrificing security or safety. Additionally, if confirmed, I will work with Bosnian Government officials and members of the international community to develop a realistic 

and sustainable funding strategy. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote 

human rights and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. Despite considerable progress over the last 12 years, there are still significant human rights issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords, which mandates the safe and secure return of all displaced persons to their 

pre-war homes, has yet to be fully implemented. Bosnians who have returned to 

communities where they are not the ethnic or religious majority deserve acute attention. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that minority returnees are a fully 

integrated and thriving part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s multiethnic communities. 

Respect for religious freedom is another urgent issue. Unfortunately, incidents of 

crimes targeting minorities’ religious symbols increased in the run-up to the October 

2006 national elections. To address this, I will, if confirmed, work with the leaders 

of the four main religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote reconciliation, mutual respect, and dialog. I will make clear that disrespecting religious 

property or symbols will not be tolerated by this administration or the international 

community. I will also support the full implementation of the State Law on Religious Freedom. 

Building the capacity of institutions in the law enforcement and judicial sectors, 

and specialty offices such as the Office of the State Antitrafficking Coordinator, will 

serve to further promote human rights and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

These institutions serve as important deterrents to possible human rights violations 

and help to investigate, protect and bring justice to victims when violations do 

occur. If confirmed, I will oversee the development of these institutions, working 

closely with Bosnian leaders and international community partners to point out instances of human rights violations, hold the perpetrators accountable, and build institutional mechanisms to safeguard against future violations. 

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Bosnia-Herzegovina in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. Following the February 26, 2007 decision of the International Court of 

Justice in Bosnia v Serbia, political rhetoric in Bosnia and Herzegovina has seriously deteriorated. The court’s finding that genocide occurred in Srebrenica, while 

at the same time finding that Serbia was not accountable for perpetrating genocide, 

has prompted a focus on the roles played by institutions within Bosnia’s Republika 

Srpska entity, and has led to calls for drastic constitutional change that challenges 

the fundamental principles of Dayton. Reversing this climate of heightened nationalism and refocusing the public conversation on ways to improve the lives of victims 

525 

and all Bosnian citizens will be my first significant challenge, if I am confirmed. The 

victims of the Srebrenica genocide should live safe, secure lives free from any fear 

that they might suffer such tragedy again. They should also be afforded economic 

opportunities to improve their lives. If confirmed, I will focus much effort on ensuring that the conversation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a constructive dialog that 

addresses the horrors of the past while focusing on improving people’s lives in the 

immediate future. 

Establishing accountability for past actions helps establish fundamental acceptance of the rule of law that reinforces all other reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Toward that end, another significant challenge I will face, if confirmed, will be ensuring that the remaining fugitives from the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

Former Yugoslavia are captured and extradited to The Hague. Namely, Ratko 

Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, the architects of the Srebrenica genocide, must face 

international justice. The principles of individual accountability and no impunity for 

war crimes or serious violations of humanitarian law must be a core part of a just, 

democratic, and stable Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. The promotion of human rights objectives under the Dayton Accords has 

been central to this administration’s agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If confirmed, I will ensure that the focus on human rights remains a key element of Embassy Sarajevo’s work. Promoting American values and interests go hand-in-hand 

with promoting respect for human rights and a democratic society in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. Much of the administration’s reform agenda is aimed at creating a stable and just society that will permanently move Bosnia and Herzegovina away from 

the tragic past and toward the community of nations that embraces the United 

States’ key democratic principles such as freedom of speech and the press, rule-oflaw and respect for minority communities. If confirmed, I will use the many tools 

at my disposal to communicate to the leaders and public of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

the benefits of fully embracing democratic principles. 

Public diplomacy opportunities, such as U.S.-funded exchange programs, press 

and media outreach, American celebrity speakers, and civil society events will all 

provide opportunities to engage the local community in conversations about human 

rights, and to press for action on specific issues. If confirmed, I will lead the embassy community by example by constantly returning to human rights principles as 

guideposts for good policy and by being a vocal critic of any abuses. 

If confirmed, I will assure that officers who show commitment to using their diplomatic voice to encourage tolerance, accountability, transparency, and justice 

throughout the institutions and social fabric of Bosnia and Herzegovina receive recognition for their work. If confirmed, I will encourage officers to think creatively 

about how the administration can support local organizations and/or projects aimed 

at providing opportunities and voice to minority communities. If confirmed, I will 

work closely with my officers to identify a handful of immediate changes that, if enacted, would tangibly benefit Bosnian communities and would immediately demonstrate the administration’s commitment to human rights. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. My work over the past 15 years has largely been focused on countries 

in transition, and in particular on the Balkans. Promotion of human rights and democracy has been at the top of our policy agenda, and I have been active in promoting that agenda. 

While I was in Croatia from 1998 to 2001 as Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) and 

as Charge d’Affaires, we sought to help Croatian society heal the wounds from 

Yugoslavia’s bloody wars of secession and return the country to normalcy. Two 

items topped our agenda—promoting return of those displaced by the war, and holding accountable those charged with war crimes. I coordinated embassy assistance 

programs that helped refugees reclaim property and return to their homes. I pressed 

a sometimes reluctant Croatian Government to provide the same reconstruction assistance to the ethnic-Serb minority as they did for ethnic-Croat returnees. As 

Charge, I led the diplomatic community’s concerted effort to push for equal justice 

for minorities seeking redress in Croatian courts. My public message to the Croatian 

people emphasized the need for reconciliation and respect for the rights of all citiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00533 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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zens. I believe my contributions helped push the ‘‘returns agenda’’ toward completion, and thereby advanced Croatia’s efforts to take its rightful place in Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

Full normalcy cannot be restored to the nations of the former Yugoslavia until 

those responsible for the terrible crimes committed in nearly a decade of war there 

are brought to justice. As Director of the State Department’s Office of South Central 

European (i.e., Balkan) Affairs from 2003 to 2006, I met frequently with leaders in 

Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Pristina, and pressed them to cooperate fully with 

the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As DCM and 

Charge in Croatia, I helped to promote a positive climate between the ICTY Prosecutor and the Croatian leadership. 

Restoring rule of law to these societies is a paramount concern. As Policy Director 

for the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs from 1995 to 1998, I directed comprehensive programs aimed at building 

democratic police structures in countries emerging from war or other trauma. Our 

efforts supported the beginnings of such reform in Croatia and in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

These are just a few examples of actions I have taken to promote human rights 

and democracy. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue a vigorous reform agenda in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

RESPONSES OF RODERICK W. MOORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Regarding United States assistance to Montenegro, the President’s 2008 

Congressional Budget Justification states that ‘‘U.S. funding for democratic reform 

will decline relative to security and law enforcement assistance to help Europe’s 

newest nation build capacity to secure its people and its borders.’’ Can you comment 

on the priorities of the administration toward Montenegro? If confirmed as the first 

United States Ambassador to Europe’s newest nation, what will be your top priority? 

Answer. Our top priority in Southeastern Europe is to achieve enduring stability 

in a region that has been racked too often by conflict. In achieving this, we can help 

integrate the countries of the Balkans into the President’s vision of a Europe 

‘‘whole, free, and at peace.’’ 

If confirmed, my top priority will be to ensure that Montenegro succeeds with its 

political and economic transition and continues on the path toward full integration 

into the Euro-Atlantic community. A democratic and prosperous Montenegro that 

fully respects the rights of all its citizens and that meets the requirements for membership in NATO and the European Union will be a stable Montenegro that can also 

act as a reliable partner of the United States on regional and global issues. 

To achieve this success in Montenegro, the administration’s top priorities are the 

promotion of equitable economic growth, strengthening the rule of law—including 

the promotion of human rights and democratic reform, and enhancing regional stability. Progress in all of these areas, including the strengthening of democratic institutions, is critical to success. 

Job creation and balanced economic development will build support for 

Montenegro’s democracy and free market reforms. This is particularly true in the 

impoverished north, where opposition to Montenegrin independence was largely centered. Ensuring the north a greater economic stake in an independent Montenegro 

will be critical to long-term stability. 

Second, we must work with the Montenegrins to strengthen the rule of law and 

to fight corruption and organized crime. We have already spent millions of dollars 

in recent years to strengthen democratic institutions, and we intend to remain engaged in this sector. Although much has been accomplished in terms of democratic 

development, the judicial sector in particular remains weak and will continue to be 

a primary focus for our attention. 

Finally, it is in our interest to help Montenegro, as a potential future NATO ally, 

to reform its military and secure its borders. The Montenegrins have expressed their 

willingness to contribute forces to the war on terror, but require our help in building 

and transforming their military into a capable force. We are also working with the 

Montenegrin police to create a more professional and capable force, in order to combat corruption and organized crime and trafficking. 

Question. Rampant corruption remains a significant obstacle to the consolidation 

of democracy and the rule of law in Montenegro. How do you think this issue is best 

addressed? 

527 

Answer. The United States has many tools at its disposal—and a great deal of 

experience in the region—in helping the new democracies of Central and Eastern 

Europe to combat corruption. If confirmed, my top priority in supporting Montenegrin efforts to fight corruption would be to apply those practices that have been successful elsewhere in ensuring that perpetrators of corrupt practices are investigated, 

prosecuted, and punished. I am convinced that firm enforcement of the law is the 

best deterrent against corrupt practices. 

Another key strategy in combating corruption in Montenegro is to increase transparency, particularly in how Montenegro’s Government, at all levels, takes and 

implements decisions. We will also encourage efforts to strengthen real checks and 

balances and to develop further the oversight role of the parliament. By helping develop strong civil society organizations, we can also ensure that they serve as an 

important check on government and play a key watchdog role. Judicial reform will 

also be important in the fight against corruption. 

Montenegro will have to improve its record of fighting corruption if it is to achieve 

its goal of membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the European Union. These, and other organizations, will require concrete progress in this 

area. 

Question. Local authorities in Montenegro have been accused of torturing several 

United States citizens that are currently in custody of the Montenegrin Government. What steps has the embassy taken to investigate these allegations? If confirmed, what steps will you take as ambassador to assure these individuals receive 

a fair trial? 

Answer. I take these allegations very seriously, and, if I am confirmed, protecting 

the rights of American citizens in this, or any other case, will be a top priority of 

mine. 

In the case in question, the embassy formally requested ‘‘a full and impartial investigation’’ of alleged police abuses by Montenegrin authorities immediately after 

being authorized to do so by the prisoners. The results of the initial internal police 

investigation were inconclusive, but a subsequent investigation by the prosecutor’s 

office continues. From the first days of the American citizens’ detention, embassy 

staff have regularly visited the men in jail, and have assisted the detainees and 

their families who have sought to visit them in every permissible way. During the 

ongoing trial of the three American citizens, embassy observers have been present 

in the courtroom whenever the American citizens were being questioned by the presiding judge. 

If confirmed, the embassy and I will continue to stay in close contact with representatives of the accused American citizens in order to monitor the trial proceedings. I will also continue to send the message—something our Embassy in 

Podgorica has consistently done—that we expect our citizens to receive a fair trial. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Montenegro? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Montenegro? What do you hope to accomplish through 

these actions? 

Answer. As the State Department has documented in the annual Human Rights 

Report, the most pressing human rights issues in Montenegro involve the justice 

system, including occasional abuse of suspects while in police custody, lengthy pretrial detention and delayed trials, and corruption within the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. 

To address these problems I would, if confirmed, support efforts to make 

Montenegro’s law enforcement institutions more professional and competent; support the work of the independent human rights Ombudsman in Montenegro, and 

continue to support and strengthen civil society, which serves as an important 

watchdog over the police and justice system. If confirmed, I will work closely with 

the OSCE mission in Montenegro, which has programs in these areas that complement our efforts. If confirmed, I will also ensure that the embassy continues advocacy on this issue in public and in private, which has proved effective in drawing 

attention to deficiencies and encouraging better compliance with international 

norms. 

Although we cannot expect progress in all of these areas overnight, I firmly believe that Montenegro can—with continued United States and European Union assistance—achieve real progress in all of these areas and further the protection of 

human rights in Montenegro. My hope, if confirmed as ambassador, is to see steady 

progress in making the police and judiciary more professional and accountable, and 

much closer to western standards. 

528 

If confirmed, I would also focus extensive energy on strengthening relations 

among Montenegro’s rich mix of ethnic and national groups. As a diverse society, 

Montenegro has the potential to be a positive model for other ethnically-mixed countries in the region. 

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Montenegro in advancing 

human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to face many of the same challenges I faced in some 

of my previous tours, such as in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sofia. Promoting human 

rights and democracy can be a difficult, but enormously rewarding job, and it is one 

I have relished throughout my Foreign Service career. 

If confirmed, my main challenge in promoting human rights and democracy in 

Montenegro will likely be the fact that truly protecting human rights and promoting 

democratic development usually requires deep-seated changes in societal attitudes 

and mindsets. Simply passing legislation—although important—is not enough. 

Members of the government, parliament, and ordinary citizens must understand 

and embrace the need to advance and protect human rights and democratic norms. 

This is already happening in Montenegro, although more needs to be done. I am 

heartened that recent polling showed that the most respected public figure in Montenegro is a young woman who is the head of an NGO working to fight corruption. 

Montenegro has also had a series of elections and votes, including the May 2006 

independence referendum, deemed to be free and fair by international and United 

States Government observers. The Montenegrin people’s support for a Euro-Atlantic 

future for Montenegro is also having a deep impact on Montenegrin society as 

Montenegrins increasingly embrace our commitment to human rights and democracy. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. Promotion of human rights objectives is already an integral part of Embassy Podgorica’s activities. More importantly, it is a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy and a central pillar of the values our country represents. 

If confirmed, I would certainly continue and strengthen this emphasis. After all, 

we cannot achieve the goal of supporting Montenegrin efforts to create a truly democratic and stable Montenegro without a genuine commitment on their part to human 

and civil rights. To make sure of this, I will make certain that the promotion of 

human rights has a central place in our yearly strategic planning process, when the 

embassy, through its Mission Strategic Plan, lays out its priorities for the coming 

years. Promotion of human rights and democracy is also the central focus of the embassy’s Democracy Commission and is a central focus of our assistance to Montenegro. 

In terms of recognizing those Foreign Service officers who engage in the promotion of human rights, I feel strongly that for any Foreign Service officer to be 

successful, he or she must demonstrate a strong commitment to promoting human 

rights. This is something I have consistently strived for throughout my career, and 

if confirmed it is something I pledge to continue to push for as ambassador. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. During the course of my career, I have had the opportunity to work extensively on human rights issues in a variety of countries facing significant human 

rights challenges. 

In my most recent post, Belgrade, I led a major effort to ensure that the perpetrators of the 1999 killings of three young American citizens—the Bytyqi brothers— 

be brought to justice. When I arrived at post in 2004, the Serbian-led investigation 

had stalled, and no arrests had been made. During the course of the next 3 years, 

I made dozens of public and private interventions to appeal for justice in the case, 

raising it to a high-level bilateral issue between our countries. I also worked extensively with the FBI, the Justice Department, and Serbian law enforcement officials 

to push for an aggressive investigation. Largely as a result of this pressure, six separate Serbian security officials have since been arrested, and one trial is ongoing. 

Also in Serbia, I launched a major effort to increase awareness among the Serbian 

population regarding war crimes committed by Serb forces during the wars of the 

1990s. Widespread denial about Serb crimes distorts public attitudes toward important policy issues (e.g., cooperation with the Hague Tribunal; Kosovo; relations with 

529 

neighboring states), undercutting our efforts to encourage a more constructive Serbian approach on key matters impeding its fuller integration into the Euro-Atlantic 

community. I made numerous nationally-covered speeches, some in conjunction with 

the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, that contributed significantly to 

national debate on this topic. I also coordinated a United States Government effort 

to produce a nine-part, nationally-televised retrospective on Serb war crimes that 

attracted millions of viewers. 

As chief of the political section in Zagreb, Croatia, I devoted a substantial portion 

of my time promoting the return of refugees (primarily Serbs) forced from their 

homes as a result of actions taken by the Tudjman regime. I made dozens of visits 

to areas formerly occupied by Serbs (e.g., Krajina, Western, and Eastern Slavonia) 

to push local and national government officials to facilitate the return of refugees. 

In the embassy, I also played a central role in implementing the Refugee Return 

Assistance Program, a United States Government-funded project that provided incentives to selected municipalities that proved open to the return of displaced persons. On several occasions, I served as the embassy’s chief negotiator in concluding 

formal agreements with the Croatian Government relating to the return of refugees 

and displaced persons. 

Moreover, as a junior political officer in Bulgaria in 1990, I extensively monitored 

efforts by communist authorities to establish unfair advantages over the nascent 

democratic opposition in the run-up to that country’s first democratic elections. I 

also reported on and advocated for the rights of ethnic minorities (Pomaks, Turks, 

and Roma) to be fully enfranchised and worked extensively with representatives of 

those minorities on issues related to human rights in Bulgaria’s new democracy. 

RESPONSES OF CAMERON MUNTER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. The President’s 2008 Congressional Budget Justification states that 

‘‘Serbia’s stability and reform are fundamental to the success of United States 

foreign policy in the region.’’ Yet 2008 requested funding for the country has been 

reduced across the board, and significantly in areas critical to ensuring Serbia’s stability and reform (for example ‘‘governing justly and democratically’’ and ‘‘civil society’’). Can you comment on this? If confirmed, how will you promote democratic reform in the country and what steps will you take to support Serbia’s beleaguered 

civil society? 

Answer. For strategic and fiscal reasons, overall assistance to Southeastern Europe in 2008 will decline. However, funding for projects in Serbia is still at relatively 

high levels. Like many other of the ‘‘new’’ democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, as Serbia moves closer to European integration and receives more European 

Union funding, United States assistance levels will decrease and eventually phase 

out. Nevertheless, there remain at present many opportunities for U.S. Government 

programs to promote the rule of law, fight corruption, strengthen institutions, and 

encourage economic growth, thus keeping Serbia on the path toward Euro-Atlantic 

integration. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the United States Congress 

to ensure that our policy objectives are met and that our assistance is used appropriately to support United States interests in Serbia. 

If confirmed, I will reach out to United States-based civil society organizations before I depart for Belgrade, including the National Endowment for Democracy and 

other groups who have done so much to promote democracy in Serbia. Soon after 

my arrival in Serbia, I will endeavor to establish quickly a solid and productive 

working relationship with in-country civil society organizations and to maintain that 

relationship throughout the duration of my assignment. These NGOs will be key 

partners of the embassy in a common effort to deepen democratic values not only 

for those in Serbia, but for all persons throughout the Balkans. 

Question. The European Union recently reopened SAA talks with Serbia despite 

the fact that the two most wanted war criminals from the wars of the 1990s, Ratko 

Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, remain at large. What is your opinion of this decision? Does full cooperation with the ICTY remain a priority of the administration? 

If confirmed, how will you encourage the serving of justice for those responsible for 

war crimes while discouraging the further isolation of the country? 

Answer. Serbia’s full compliance with its ICTY obligations remains a key goal of 

this administration. Until May of this year, the level of cooperation out of Belgrade 

since early 2005 was unsatisfactory. Since the formation of a new government in 

mid-May, cooperation appears to be improving. The administration’s expectations 

are that compliance will improve and that the remaining indictees will be arrested 

530 

and transferred to The Hague. That means the Serbian Government must do everything practicable to locate, arrest, and transfer fugitive indictees, as well as making 

witnesses and documentary evidence available to the Tribunal. 

While the European Union has restarted SAA talks with Serbia, European Union 

officials have made it clear that a conclusion of those talks and eventual European 

Union membership are contingent upon full cooperation with ICTY. The European 

Union has said that it will not sign the SAA until accused war criminal Ratko 

Mladic has been arrested and transferred to The Hague. Ultimately, however, this 

is a decision for the European Union. 

The administration also has refined our own approach on how to encourage Serbia 

to meet its obligations; if confirmed, I will do my part to further this goal. 

For example, the administration is currently working toward the establishment 

of mechanisms through which each of the four remaining ICTY fugitives will face 

justice regardless of ICTY’s impending closure in 2010. This will send a clear signal 

that fugitives cannot out-wait justice. 

The administration is not waiting for the remaining fugitives to turn themselves 

in. Rather, it is actively encouraging their apprehension. The State Department has 

recently designated a regional liaison officer to assist with war crimes investigations 

and prosecutions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that my embassy leads in this 

effort. I will stress, both in private and publicly, the importance to our shared future 

of ensuring that the indicted fugitives face justice. 

Cooperation with the Tribunal is the key to Serbia’s future integration into the 

Euro-Atlantic community. The administration wants Serbia to become part of a 

united Europe, whole, free, and at peace. If confirmed, I will help design our assistance initiatives and outreach with the ultimate goal of Serbia’s integration into 

Euro-Atlantic structures. While many reforms have been successfully implemented, 

Serbia simply cannot complete the process of integration without fully and openly 

facing up to its war crimes legacy. In the end, the desire of so many Serbs for Serbia 

to have a place in Europe, and even NATO, may be the biggest motivator of all. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Serbia? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights 

and democracy in Serbia? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. The Serbian Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; however, there are problems, including widespread corruption, failure to fully 

cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY) in The Hague, and attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, journalists, 

and human rights defenders. 

The administration is working to ensure that Serbia continues its efforts to commit to international human rights standards, including a fair and efficient judicial 

process, respect for ethnic and religious minorities, a free, independent, and professional media, and the elimination of trafficking in persons. To this end, if confirmed, 

I will continue to assist the government in reforming the judiciary and law enforcement through training and technical assistance to help build an institution capable 

of ensuring a functioning rule of law. The administration will maintain efforts to 

ensure that all persons displaced as a result of the conflicts in the region—of which 

Serbia hosts the largest percentage—have a real choice about their future. Since all 

minorities should be able to live in peace, if confirmed, I will continue efforts toward 

ethnic reconciliation to help the region move beyond the problems of the past, including working to improve cooperation with ICTY and the capacity for domestic 

war crimes adjudication. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage the government 

to address problematic aspects of a law on religion that discriminates against ‘‘nontraditional’’ religious groups, and to pass a law on associations that will comply with 

international standards regarding regulation of nongovernmental organizations. If 

confirmed, I will also continue to work with authorities in Serbia to help them more 

effectively combat trafficking in persons through protection, prevention, and prosecution. 

Ultimately, if confirmed, I will work to bring Serbia closer to integration into 

Euro-Atlantic institutions through United States assistance and continued active 

engagement on these important human rights concerns. 

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Serbia in advancing 

human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. The Balkan region suffered significantly as a result of the events of the 

1990s. Ethnic cleansing, armed conflict, the forced displacement of approximately 4 

million people, and an internationally isolated criminal regime, left a legacy of loosely controlled borders, corruption, and weak rule of law structures. Today, serious inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00538 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
531 

stitutional challenges remain, complicating Serbia’s ability to reform the economy, 

meet the basic needs of its citizens, and combat organized criminal groups. 

Reversing the effects of this difficult legacy by helping to establish functioning 

democratic institutions capable of moving Serbia closer to Europe is the focus of the 

administration’s efforts in Belgrade and throughout the region. While rooting out 

corruption, fighting crime, and moving beyond the ethnic hatreds of the past are 

hard work, they are necessary elements of ensuring a stable, democratic, and peaceful Balkan region. 

Political will in Serbia is key to advancing human rights and democracy in this 

country. While there has unquestionably been progress since the fall of Milosevic, 

there are still noticeable gaps in the government’s commitment to protect and advance the rights of all its citizens—not just those of ethnic or religious minorities, 

but also the rights of those who oppose the government’s approach to the question 

of Kosovo status. The new coalition government formed after January 2007 elections 

is a democratic one, but as the brief inclusion of radical elements into national-level 

government by the Prime Minister’s party highlighted, the coalition may still be 

susceptible to pressure from nationalist parties and Milosevic-era rhetoric. The administration will need to push Serbia’s leaders and continue to work with democratic parties to stand up against the nationalist agenda and to advance human 

rights. 

This is too important to do alone. If confirmed, I pledge to engage our European 

partners to join with us to advance our common human rights agenda. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. The promotion of human rights and democracy is a core objective for our 

engagement in the Balkans. Like other embassies in the region, the United States 

diplomatic mission to Serbia has a Foreign Service officer whose portfolio is dedicated to monitoring and reporting on human rights, which includes our Country Report on Human Rights, International Religious Freedom Report, and Trafficking in 

Persons Report. This officer maintains close contact with human rights organizations in Serbia. If confirmed, I will assure that these duties are highlighted in this 

individual’s performance requirements and ratings. 

In addition, if confirmed, I will make clear to my staff that human rights issues 

are the responsibility of every staff member, regardless of his/her formal work assignment. If confirmed, I will make certain that strong human rights performance 

is given emphasis in rating performance and in the awarding of special commendations. 

If confirmed, I pledge to you that the public stance of the embassy, including my 

own speeches and those of my colleagues, will highlight human rights issues consistently and clearly. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. I have addressed human rights issues—and, I believe, made a difference—through the two decades of my Foreign Service career. Let me provide 

three examples: 

• In 1986–1988 in Warsaw, I served as the embassy’s contact for the still-illegal 

trade union Rural Solidarity. I assisted in its efforts to promote democratic 

ideals and economic freedom by helping activists with publicity and dissemination of informational materials. By paying close attention to the individuals and 

to the issues raised by Rural Solidarity, and encouraging the Western press to 

do the same, I helped protect Rural Solidarity activists from government retribution. 

• In 1997–1998, as chief of staff in the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, 

I worked closely with many Americans (including the Senate NATO Observer 

Group) to ensure that aspirants for NATO membership enshrine key elements 

of human rights practices in legislation as a prerequisite for consideration for 

accession to the Alliance. Thanks to this effort, Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians 

have a high standard of law governing anti-Semitism, discrimination against 

Roma, the heritage of Nazi and Communist dictatorships, and relations with 

neighbors. 

• In 2006, I volunteered to lead the first Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq, 

in Mosul. At that time, Abu Ghraib was shutting down, and Mosul’s Baddush 

532 

prison became the largest in Iraq. Under my PRT’s Rule of Law section, I created a human rights subgroup that had as one of its tasks regular civil-military 

visits to Baddush, often three to four times per week, to ensure that the abuses 

associated with Abu Ghraib would not be repeated at Baddush. In this, we were 

successful. 

I am proud of these and other actions I’ve taken in advancing human rights and 

democracy, and pledge to continue in a similar direction if confirmed to serve as 

Ambassador to Serbia. 

RESPONSES OF DR. JOHN L. WITHERS II TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. Albania has proved itself a loyal ally of the United States. However, its 

governments have not always lived up to international standards of democracy. In 

recent years local watchdog groups have expressed concerns about government encroachment on civil liberties in the fight against corruption. If confirmed, what steps 

will you take to promote such rights as freedom of speech and freedom of association? How would you react if you believe the Albanian Government is exerting inappropriate pressure on human rights groups and other civic associations? 

Answer. The United States Embassy maintains a constant and active engagement 

with human rights groups and civil society organizations in Albania dedicated to 

promoting freedom of speech and freedom of association. For example, the United 

States has supported the Citizen’s Advocacy Office (CAO), which serves as a corruption watchdog and investigative unit, as well as the Albanian Coalition Against Corruption (ACAC), a civil society umbrella network including more than 160 nongovernmental organizations dedicated to democratic freedoms. 

The Government of Albania knows that corruption threatens to derail achievement of its foreign policy ambitions, and it is addressing the problem. Albania has 

made several advances on its democratic agenda this year; however, the country’s 

democratic institutions remain fragile. Media, the judiciary, and civil society are 

independent of government control, but do not provide effective checks and balances. 

A pervasive culture of corruption corrodes independent institutions, as well as political entities. Public awareness of the problem is growing, and Albanian citizens are 

becoming empowered to speak out against corruption. Of course, more progress 

needs to be made. 

Strengthening Albanian citizens’ rights to the fundamental freedoms of expression 

and association is one of the administration’s highest bilateral priorities, and figures 

prominently in our ongoing dialog with top Albanian politicians. If confirmed, I will 

continue the high-level dialog we are engaged in with the Albanian Government in 

support of these freedoms. If there is evidence that the Albanian Government is exerting inappropriate pressure on human rights groups and other civic associations 

I will move quickly to call this to the Albanian Government’s attention. If confirmed, 

I will likewise continue the Mission’s support of human rights groups and civil society organizations dedicated to promoting freedom of speech and freedom of association. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Albania? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights 

and democracy in Albania? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. Although the Albanian Government generally respects the human rights 

of its citizens and is dedicated to the promotion of democracy, there remain significant problems in several areas. Albanian arrest and pre-trial detention conditions 

continue to be concerns, as well as police corruption and impunity. Societal violence 

and discrimination against women and children are a problem, as is trafficking in 

persons and discrimination against minority groups. Corruption and a weak rule of 

law have blocked the prosecution of those who have committed human rights offenses. The United States continues to stress to the Albanian Government that respect for human rights is an integral part of NATO and European Union accession 

standards, and that Albania must continue to improve its adherence to international 

human rights, democracy standards, and the rule of law, including the obligation 

to bring human rights abusers to justice. 

If confirmed, I would work to enhance the effectiveness of the criminal justice system to ensure that human rights abuses are not left unpunished. I would use Mission resources to mentor and train prosecutors, facilitate police reform by promoting 

legislative and policy changes, and boost civil participation by helping Albanian organizations gain more influence in policymaking and implementation. Furthermore, 

I would work to enhance the professionalism of the media in order to focus public 

533 

scrutiny on government practices in the human rights area, fostering transparency 

and respect for law. Through these actions I would hope to focus both government 

and public attention on the issue of human rights violations, thereby facilitating 

change. 

Question. If confirmed, what challenges will you face in Albania in advancing 

human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. If confirmed, the greatest challenges I would face in advancing human 

rights and democracy would be corruption, inconsistent prosecution, and a weak 

rule of law. Corruption among those involved in policing human rights abuses continues to present itself as a major obstacle in the battle against human trafficking, 

arbitrary arrests, and unlawful prison abuse. Similarly, a weak rule of law presents 

challenges in combating organized crime, a major driver of trafficking and other unlawful activities that violate human rights. If confirmed, I will continue the practice 

of my predecessors of raising concerns with senior government officials for the purpose of advancing human rights and democracy in Albania. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. Promoting human rights is central to our overarching objective in Albania, which is to assist Albania in its mission to become a modern, democratic nation 

fully accepted by and integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. If confirmed, I 

would work to ensure that the promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities by making it clear that the human rights, 

including women’s rights, religious rights and minority rights have a major place 

in the Mission’s agenda. If confirmed, I will encourage officers to focus on these 

issues in both their official and unofficial interactions with Albanians and ensure 

that these topics are a key element of discussion and reporting. I will also encourage 

officers to travel throughout Albania to collect information on human rights abuses, 

as well as monitor progress in this area. If confirmed, I will acknowledge, advance, 

and give full consideration to Foreign Service officers who show energy and creativity in promoting U.S. human rights objectives. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. As a political officer in Nigeria (1988–1990), I was deeply engaged in the 

processes that led that country to democracy after a decade of military rule, including serving as the embassy’s point person in working with human rights organizations and fledgling political parties, and in reporting on Nigeria’s Constituent Assembly as it drafted the new constitution. My assignment to Moscow in August 1991 

coincided with an historic moment: the collapse of the communist system, followed 

by the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the emergence of democratic Russia. I 

worked closely with Russia’s emerging political parties and pro-democracy support 

groups such as NDI and IRI, and monitored reform efforts in city governments 

throughout Russia and in the Congress of People’s Deputies. My focus as the Director of the State Department’s Office of North Central European Affairs (which was 

responsible for the new democracies of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia) was on the issues of political pluralism, economic restructuring, social integration, and commitment to individual liberties crucial to any 

nation intent on shedding its authoritarian past. 

Perhaps my most important achievements occurred in Latvia, where I served as 

Deputy Chief of Mission from 1997 to 2000. It was a country striving both to rejoin 

the international community through membership in such institutions as NATO and 

the European Union, and to cope with two crippling historical legacies: a massive, 

stateless Russian-speaking minority and the Holocaust. I played a central role in 

the embassy’s efforts to encourage Latvian social integration, including urging the 

Latvians to meet international standards on citizenship, education, and language 

protections for minorities. In addition, I took the lead on embassy initiatives on 

anti-Semitism, Jewish property restitution, and the formation of an international 

Historical Commission to examine Latvia’s role in the Holocaust. My work in coordinating a joint effort by the Department of Justice’s Office of Special Investigation, 

the Latvian Prosecutor General, foreign diplomatic missions, and international legal 

experts to extradite an accused Latvian war criminal from Australia earned me a 

commendation from the United States Attorney General. 

534 

RESPONSES OF DR. JOHN L. WITHERS II TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State 

Department Relations? 

Answer. Yes, I have read the cable. 

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable? 

Answer. I do understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in the 

cable. 

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must 

remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’s role and its need for separation from the 

day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies’’? 

Answer. I understand and accept these important principles, which govern the relationship between U.S. missions and the Peace Corps. 

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise 

your Chief of Mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much 

autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does 

not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies’’? 

Answer. I pledge to exercise my authorities as Chief of Mission according to this 

guideline laid out by Secretary Rice as Departmental policy. 

(535) 

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

John, Eric G., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand 

Michalak, Michael W., to be Ambassador to the Socialist Republic 

of Vietnam 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer presiding. 

Present: Senators Boxer and Webb. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Good morning. The committee will come to order. 

Today the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets to consider two distinguished nominees for ambassadorial posts in Vietnam and Thailand. So we’re actually sitting as the full committee. 

The reason we’re starting so exactly on time is because we have 

votes scheduled shortly and it is my intention to complete this 

hearing. In my view these are two excellent nominees and there’s 

no need for extended questioning. However, if for example Senator 

Webb wanted to come back and pursue a line of questioning, I 

would give him the gavel to do that. 

So, as chair of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I’m very pleased to welcome our nominees, Michael Michalak 

and Eric John. Ambassador Michalak, the President’s nominee to 

be ambassador to Vietnam, has served his country as a member of 

the Foreign Service for more than 30 years, most recently as the 

senior Foreign Official for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. Ambassador Michalak has extensive experience in Asia, having served 

in both Japan and China, and in a variety of posts in the Bureau 

of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

Eric John, the President’s nominee to be ambassador to Thailand, has also served his country for more than two decades, most 

recently as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs. Prior to that, Mr. John served as political minister 

counselor at the United States Embassy in Seoul, Korea. Earlier in 

his career, Mr. John served at the United States Embassy in Thailand as part of the Orderly Departure Program. 

536 

I’ve enjoyed working with Mr. John on matters relating to East 

Asia, including extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, a matter on 

which Mr. John testified before my subcommittee earlier this year. 

Thank you both for your service to your country. It goes without 

saying that Vietnam and Thailand are important nations in the 

Southeast Asian region. The United States relationship with Thailand is one of the oldest in Asia, dating back to the 19th century. 

The United States relationship with Vietnam, essentially frozen 

after the Vietnam War, has improved significantly this past decade. In fact, the President of Vietnam recently concluded a high 

level visit to the United States, the first such visit since the end 

of the war. 

Our economic relationship with both countries has increased over 

time, and is poised to grow in the coming decades. Vietnam and 

Thailand share our commitment to continued development and security in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. In fact, Thailand has 

even contributed to United States efforts in Afghanistan. 

As you know, there are many here in Congress who want to see 

these relationships strengthened and our ties deepened. My own 

State of California is home to vibrant Vietnamese and Thai communities who want to see these relationships grow in a progressive 

and constructive fashion. But let’s be clear. Both countries have 

their share of difficulties. Thailand was recently rocked by a bloodless coup that derailed its democratic system. While Thailand appears to be on track to restore the democratic process and hold 

elections, its future is far from certain. 

Thai officials may publicly assert that they are moveing to restore democracy, but there is evidence that the current Thai Government is silencing political opponents, taking over media outlets, 

and censoring Internet sites, particularly for those with opposing 

viewpoints. These are serious concerns that can’t go unchecked. 

Thailand also needs to address corruption, which was a serious 

problem under the previous administration. 

Vietnam remains under the control of an authoritarian communist party that wants recognition as a powerful and prestigious 

member of the international community, but still refuses to afford 

its citizens the basic rights and freedoms that are associated with 

such stature. Individuals perceived as a threat to the communist 

party continue to be harassed and imprisoned. In fact, a wave of 

arrests occurred in the months preceding Vietnamese President 

Triet’s recent trip to the United States, a crackdown that was so 

severe it jeopardized the entire visit. 

The Vietnamese Government ultimately released a number of 

important prisoners in advance of the visit, but not before serious 

questions were raised about Vietnam’s commitment to improving 

its human rights record once and for all. 

So with that said, it looks like you both have your work cut out 

for you. I know that you are up to the test. And I look forward to 

hearing from both of you. 

At this time I would ask Senator Webb to make an opening 

statement and see if he can keep it to 5 minutes, and when Senator 

Murkowski comes in I will do the same. Go ahead, Senator Webb. 

537 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES WEBB, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will keep my remarks very brief. I have had extensive opportunities over the past 

several decades to spend time in both of these countries. I have a 

great affection for the people of both of the countries. I’ve been able 

to sit down and have conversations with both of the nominees. I 

would have some questions at the appropriate time, but I would 

prefer to go ahead and move forward in the interest of time and 

proceed with their statements. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

So why don’t we start with Mr. John. 

STATEMENT OF ERIC G. JOHN, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 

Mr. JOHN. Thank you very much, Madam Senator. May I also introduce, take the opportunity to introduce my wife, Sofia, and my 

son, Adam, who was actually born in Bangkok when we were stationed there, and Nicole, our daughter. 

Senator BOXER. Why don’t you stand up. We welcome you all. 

Thank you so much for coming. 

Now, if you can we’ll go back to a 5-minute clock. 

Mr. JOHN. Madam Chairman and Senator Webb, I am honored 

to appear today as the President’s nominee to be Ambassador to 

the Kingdom of Thailand. I am deeply grateful to President Bush 

and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I will 

have the good fortune to represent the United States in a country 

that has long been one of our closest allies and partners. In nearly 

175 years of diplomatic relations, the United States and Thailand 

have stood together in both good times and bad, to the benefit of 

both nations. 

The partnership between the United States and Thailand has 

brought important benefits to both sides. Thailand remains a close 

United States partner in promoting peace and security in Asia and 

in other parts of the world. The foundation of our alliance with 

Thailand does remain strong, but the coup that took place in September of last year represented a rare setback for the relationship. 

There is never a sufficient reason for a military overthrow of a duly 

elected government, and we immediately made that clear to the interim authorities. We scaled back senior level engagements and 

continuously emphasized our expectation that the new government 

would make speedy restoration of democracy its top priority. We 

also suspended a number of assistance programs pursuant to section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. 

At the same time, we decided that our interests in the restoration of democracy and in preserving our long-term bilateral relationship would be best served by continued engagement with the 

interim government. We also have faith that the Thai people will 

not abide anything less than a speedy return to democracy and 

when that return comes it will be to the credit of the Thai people. 

We are confident we have correctly calibrated our response to the 

coup and believe Thailand has made steady progress to date toward restoring democracy. The government has essentially kept to 

its timetable for the political process, with the national referendum 

538 

on the draft constitution scheduled for August 19 and national elections expected by the end of the year. 

If confirmed, I will continue to look for ways that we can address 

still existing weaknesses in Thailand’s democratic structures, such 

as strengthening the judicial system, attacking corruption, and increasing voter participation. 

Ensuring a healthy economic relationship with Thailand is an 

imperative for the United States. Although our free trade agreement negotiations were suspended after the coup and trade promotion authority has lapsed, we need to find ways to reinvigorate 

this vital bilateral economic relationship. If confirmed, one of my 

immediate tasks will be to work with Thailand to address concerns 

about the deficiencies in its intellectual property rights protection 

regime that compelled us to add Thailand to our priority watch list 

this year. If confirmed, I will ensure that we engage the Thai Government constructively but firmly on the full spectrum of intellectual property issues. 

If confirmed, I also intend to continue the work I have undertaken in my capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary to strengthen 

our ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 

Ensuring appropriate protection and assistance for refugees and 

asylum seekers in Thailand is a high priority for the United States 

Government. Thailand hosts more than 150,000 Burmese refugees 

and several thousand asylum seekers from other countries, including Hmong Lao. The burden of assisting these vulnerable populations places a strain on the Thais’ resources and their relationships with some of their neighbors. Significant humanitarian assistance provided by the United States and other countries helps 

to ease the strain, as does third country refugee resettlement, primarily to the United States. 

If confirmed, I also will have the privilege of leading one of our 

largest embassies in the world, including ensuring that both American citizens and foreign visa applicants receive the gold standard 

of treatment in consular services. I very much look forward to 

these opportunities. 

Madam Chairman, Senator Webb, I know you’re on a tight 

schedule today, so I’ll keep my opening remarks short, and I thank 

you for the opportunity to testify and will be happy to respond to 

questions at the appropriate time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. John follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC G. JOHN, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before 

you today as the President’s nominee to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand. 

I am deeply grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence in 

me. 

I am a career Foreign Service officer and have served 22 years of my career in 

the East Asia and Pacific Bureau (EAP). I have lived in Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam for a combined total of 14 years and speak Korean and Vietnamese. For the 

past 2 years, I have had the honor to serve our Nation as Deputy Assistant Secretary in EAP, overseeing our relations in Southeast Asia. East Asia is vital to our 

Nation’s interest, and I hope to continue to help build our bonds with the region. 

If confirmed, I will have the good fortune to represent the United States in a 

country that has long been one of our closest allies and partners. In nearly 175 

years of diplomatic relations, the United States and Thailand have stood together 

in both good times and bad, to the benefit of both nations. 

539 

Ties between Thailand and the United States are multifaceted and run deep. 

From scientific collaboration to joint disaster relief operations, peacekeeping, and 

travel and tourism, United States-Thai interests are intertwined and enduring. 

Thailand was one of the first to offer aid to the United States after Hurricane 

Katrina and lent its air base in Utapao for United States troops to launch humanitarian aid to the thousands displaced after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. 

The partnership between the United States and Thailand has brought other important benefits to the United States As a major non-NATO treaty ally of long 

standing, Thailand remains an important United States partner in promoting peace 

and security in Asia and in other parts of the world. Access granted by the Thai 

Government to facilities in Thailand is critical to executing our highest priority military operations, and the Thai have further supported those missions with their own 

personnel. Thailand also hosts major bilateral and multinational military exercises 

that are essential to maintaining our forces’ readiness and interoperability with allies, and its troops have participated in international peacekeeping missions in 

Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and soon in Darfur. 

The foundation of our alliance with Thailand remains strong, but the coup that 

took place in September 2006 represented a rare setback for the relationship. Our 

deeply held view is that there is never a sufficient reason or circumstance that justifies a military overthrow of a duly elected government, and we immediately made 

that clear to the interim authorities. We underscored our disappointment by scaling 

back senior-level engagement and continuously emphasized our expectation that the 

new government would make speedy restoration of democracy its top priority. We 

also suspended a number of assistance programs pursuant to section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. 

At the same time, we decided that our interests in restoration of democracy and 

in preserving a long-term bilateral relationship critical to achieving United States’ 

goals in Asia and beyond would be best served by continued engagement with the 

interim government. We also have faith that the Thai people will not abide anything 

less than a speedy return to democracy, and when that return comes, it will be to 

the credit of the Thai people. 

We are confident we have correctly calibrated our response to the coup, and believe Thailand has made steady progress to date toward restoring democracy. The 

government has essentially kept to its timetable for the political process, with a national referendum on the draft constitution scheduled for August 19 and national 

elections expected by the end of the year. If confirmed, I will continue to look for 

ways we can address still-existing weaknesses in Thailand’s democratic structures, 

such as strengthening the judicial system, attacking corruption, and increasing 

voter participation. 

A continuing U.S. policy goal is to remove barriers to increased bilateral trade and 

investment. Although our free trade agreement negotiations were suspended after 

the coup, and Trade Promotion Authority has lapsed, we need to find ways to reinvigorate this vital bilateral economic relationship. With two-way trade of over $30 

billion in 2006 and United States companies’ total investments in Thailand estimated at approximately $21 billion, ensuring a healthy economic relationship with 

Thailand is an imperative for the United States. 

We will need to address difficult issues directly with our ally and work to resolve 

them expediently. If confirmed, one of my immediate tasks will be to work with 

Thailand to address concerns about the deficiencies in its intellectual property 

rights protection regime that compelled us to add Thailand to our Priority Watch 

List this year. Piracy of music, movies, and software products has not been meaningfully addressed, and losses to our creative industries continue to climb. Thailand 

now has the second highest rate of movie piracy in the world after China. We also 

remain concerned about the lack of transparency in the Thai Government’s decision 

earlier this year to issue compulsory licenses for three medications. If confirmed, I 

will ensure that we engage the Thai Government constructively but firmly on the 

full spectrum of intellectual property issues. 

Another of my priorities, if confirmed, will be to continue to coordinate closely 

United States and Thai efforts to facilitate a return to democracy in Burma. Although we share that goal, Thailand’s approach to Burma differs from ours. The 

Thai Government shares a nearly 1,200 mile border with Burma and needs to engage with the junta to manage critical public health and border security issues. 

Bangkok does not support economic sanctions, but it has used its engagement to advocate for democratization. It can do more, though, and if confirmed, I will work 

with Thai officials to coordinate our endeavors to help speed a return to democracy 

in Burma. 

If confirmed, I also intend to continue the work I have undertaken in my capacity 

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540 

east Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN is an important regional organization in 

which Thailand and its neighbors work toward common goals. It is a significant vehicle for promoting and strengthening key shared values of democracy, free trade, 

and cultural exchange. I believe that a stronger ASEAN would build an even more 

successful Southeast Asia. If confirmed, I will work with the Thai on developing 

joint initiatives and other policies our two nations can implement to help ASEAN 

realize its potential. 

We also remain concerned about the Malay Muslim separatist insurgency in 

southern Thailand that has cost so many lives and endangers amity between the 

Buddhist and Muslim communities. The Thai Government has maintained a vigilant security posture in the region, but, at the same time, has adopted a conciliatory 

approach to begin addressing issues that have long fueled resentment against central Thai authority. 

Ensuring appropriate protection and assistance for refugees and asylum seekers 

in Thailand is a high priority for the United States Government. Though not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, 

for several decades Thailand has hosted asylum seekers fleeing repression and persecution from countries in the region and elsewhere. Thailand hosts more than 

150,000 Burmese refugees and several thousand asylum seekers from other countries, including Hmong Lao. The burden of assisting these vulnerable populations 

places a strain on the Thais’ resources and their relationships with some of their 

neighbors. Significant humanitarian assistance provided by the United States and 

other countries helps to ease the strain, as does third-country refugee resettlement, 

primarily to the United States. 

If confirmed, the continued care and protection of refugees and asylum seekers 

will be one of my priorities. In particular, I will encourage the Thai Government 

to accede to the Refugee Convention and to work closely and cooperatively with the 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to ensure that refugees and asylum seekers in Thailand are protected and afforded the rights granted to them 

under international law. 

If confirmed, I also will have the privilege of leading one of our largest embassies 

in the world, including ensuring that both American citizens and foreign visa applicants receive the gold standard of treatment in consular services. I very much look 

forward to these opportunities. 

Madam Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for considering my nomination. I would be happy to respond to your questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. John, and we will put 

the rest of your statement into the record if you have further comment. 

Mr. Michalak, welcome. If you can, speak to us for about 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. MICHALAK, NOMINEE TO 

BE AMBASSADOR TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 

Mr. MICHALAK. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, Senator Webb, I too welcome the chance to sit before you as the President’s nominee for Ambassador to Vietnam. I’m just coming from 

an assignment where I worked on the APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. I think the 2 years that I spent there, 

the 2 years that we spent refocusing the agenda, providing more 

resources for that organization and strengthening the institution 

have prepared me somewhat for dealing with Vietnam. I say this 

because 2006 was the year of APEC in Vietnam and during that 

year I saw this country and its officers go from a rather tentative 

bureaucratic stance toward international relations to the end of 

that year, when they turned into some very self-confident and 

forthright spokespersons for their government. 

At this hearing I have already submitted my written remarks for 

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541 

mony. So what I’d like to do is maybe just touch on the three areas 

that I intend to focus on if confirmed and if I do go to Vietnam. 

One of the first areas that we need to work very carefully on is 

going to be actually the physical plant, the United States Embassy. 

It’s somewhat of a disgrace. It’s an old plant and we need to continue, finish up 6 years of negotiations with the Government of 

Vietnam to get a new embassy. 

Turning to more substantive issues, as you mentioned, Madam 

Chairman, human rights and the current performance of the Government of Vietnam certainly have cause for concern. I think, on 

the other hand, there is a good story to tell, particularly in the area 

of religious freedom, where treatment of various religious groups 

over the past 2, 3 years has changed considerably, including using 

diplomatic means to actually get Vietnam removed from the countries of particular concern list in that particular area. 

Economic development, as you correctly mentioned, is one of the 

spotlights, one of the highlights of our relationship with Vietnam, 

as one of the fastest growing economies within ASEAN and indeed 

second only to China in the entire Asian Pacific region. We think 

that there are tremendous opportunities there to improve not only 

the United States-Vietnam economic relationship, but to spill over 

into other areas of human endeavor, including social areas and 

even in human rights. 

Finally, Madam Chairman, what I’d like to do if confirmed is to 

work on education. I believe that the Government of Vietnam and 

the Government of the United States both share the value of improving the educational infrastructure within Vietnam. I think the 

Virginia—‘‘the Virginia’’; I’m thinking of Senator Webb there. The 

Vietnam Education Foundation and other organizations are working to send well over 100 graduate students per year, concentrated 

mostly in science and technology, to the United States for further 

study. If confirmed, when I get to Hanoi I’m going to try to double 

the number of students that we send from Vietnam to the United 

States. 

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, I think that our expanding ties 

with Vietnam in many areas are generating excitement and 

strengthening our engagement with this increasingly dynamic player in Southeast Asia would be one of my highest priorities. I hope 

to be the type of ambassador of which are country and the United 

States Senate can be proud, and I look forward at this time to answering all of your questions. 

Oh, I might mention one other thing. You did mention the fact 

that in your own, your own constituency, there are large Vietnamese-American communities. Earlier on, in discussion with both 

your staff and Senator Webb’s staff I made it clear that I would 

be more than willing to try and sit down and talk with some of 

these folks and to hear their views on our relationship. 

So thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Michalak follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. MICHALAK TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Thank you, Madam Chairman Boxer and members of the committee. It is a great 

honor for me to appear before this committee as the President’s nominee to be the 

fourth Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam since normalization of relaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00549 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
542 

tions in 1995. I am grateful for the confidence and trust that President Bush and 

Secretary Rice have placed in me. 

As a member of the Foreign Service, I have extensive experience in Asia, including a significant amount of recent work in Vietnam. Most of my career in the State 

Department has been spent working on Japan and China with my last overseas assignment having been Deputy Chief of Mission in Japan, our most important bilateral partner in Asia. I believe my work in Asia and in the State Department has 

prepared me well for this assignment. If I am confirmed, I look forward to representing and vigorously advancing the interests of the United States in Vietnam. 

My first direct engagement with Vietnam occurred in 2006 when, as United 

States Ambassador for APEC, I led our delegation through Vietnam’s year-long 

chairmanship of APEC. I visited the country at least five times during that year 

and worked closely with senior officials of the Government of Vietnam. Vietnam’s 

performance was nothing short of spectacular. Over the course of 2006, we were able 

to forge an excellent relationship of trust and honesty. In fact, Vietnam hosted one 

of the most productive leaders’ meetings ever. 

President Bush’s November 2006 visit to Vietnam was a success both bilaterally 

and multilaterally and was reciprocated through President Triet’s visit to Washington and several other United States cities last month. While these high-level exchanges served to advance ties and mutual understanding and overcome our legacy 

of mistrust, they also highlighted the complexities in our relationship and the challenges and opportunities we face to take relations to the next level. If confirmed, 

I will strive to ensure full normalization of relations and the creation of a true partnership between the people of our two great countries. 

Vietnam is clearly a country on the move, leading with its rapidly growing economy and burgeoning export sector; a new Asian Tiger if you will. Starting with the 

Doi Moi program in 1986, Vietnam has built tremendous momentum toward economic reform and opening to the world, culminating in its recent accession to the 

WTO and realizing Permanent Normal Trade Relations status with the United 

States. If confirmed, I can assure you that one of my highest priorities will be to 

work to ensure that Vietnam fulfills its WTO commitments and in the process provides increased market opportunities for United States goods and services. 

Vietnam is also emerging as a regional player. Vietnam has been identified by the 

Asian Grouping as its candidate for a nonpermanent seat on the U.N. Security 

Council in 2008, and its voice is being increasingly heard in ASEAN councils and 

beyond. 

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The economic story in Vietnam deserves praise and encouragement, but it should 

not obscure our very real concerns over human rights and religious freedom there. 

Vietnam’s record of respect for human rights and religious freedoms is decidedly 

mixed. While there have been improvements in religious freedoms over the past 

year, we have seen backsliding on human rights issues since last November. 

Promotion of human rights has been and will remain one of our highest priorities 

in Vietnam, as reaffirmed by President Bush to President Triet during their June 

2007 meeting at the White House. Prior to President Triet’s visit, the Government 

of Vietnam released three persons of concern to the United States: Phan Van Ban; 

former National Endowment for Democracy Fellow Le Quoc Quan; and Nguyen Vu 

Binh. Following the visit, labor activist Bui Kim Thanh was also released. While we 

welcome the release of these individuals, we continue to press for systemic human 

rights improvements in Vietnam. We need to build bridges between the Government 

of Vietnam and the full range of groups in the United States—veterans, Vietnamese-Americans, and human rights and business groups—to convince the Vietnamese that free speech and expression of views strengthens, not weakens, societies 

and economies. If confirmed, I will make advancing human rights one of my highest 

priorities. 

Vietnam made significant progress during the past year on advancing religious 

freedom, leading Secretary Rice to remove Vietnam as a ‘‘Country of Particular Concern’’ last November. Vietnam instituted a new law on religion, including a ban on 

forced renunciations, registered hundreds of places of worship, allowed the majority 

of closed places of worship to reopen, began educating central, provincial, and local 

officials on how to implement the new law, and in some cases disciplined officials 

responsible for violations of religious freedom. Although Vietnam was taken off the 

‘‘CPC’’ list, we still have work ahead of us to ensure full religious freedom for all 

Vietnamese. The Department of State, along with other government and NGO 

stakeholders, will continue to monitor and evaluate the situation and press for continued progress in this area. 

543 

I am strongly committed to the idea that societies are enriched when people are 

allowed to worship freely and express themselves as they wish. Building on the excellent work of my predecessor, Ambassador Michael Marine, I will, if confirmed, 

vigorously push for continued expansion of the civil rights of Vietnamese citizens, 

as well as the release of all those in prison for peacefully expressing their political 

views. These include Father Nguyen Van Ly, lawyers Nguyen Van Dai and Le Thi 

Cong Nhan, and the leaders of the People’s Democratic Party of Vietnam and the 

United Farmers Workers Organization. 

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

One of the best ways to encourage expansion of civil rights and liberties is to ensure strong economic growth. The Vietnamese economy is undergoing a rapid and 

fundamental transformation due, in part, to the rapid growth of foreign investment 

and economic reforms undertaken to meet the requirements of WTO and our 2001 

Bilateral Trade Agreement. 

The wholesale economic restructuring taking place in Vietnam, including new legislation on intellectual property rights, elimination of state supports, and reductions 

in tariff rates, has made its markets more attractive to United States companies. 

U.S. companies have responded vigorously, with two-way trade in goods as rocketing 

up from $1.5 billion in 2001 to $9.6 billion in 2006 and U.S. foreign direct investment increasing $639 million in 2006 alone. United States service providers and 

technology companies in particular are looking to Vietnam—providing capital, technology and management know how, as well as supporting Vietnam’s efforts on education, environment, and combating trafficking in persons. I believe in leading by 

example, and our companies are excellent examples of how freedom and democracy 

can bring real gains to people across the entire economic and social spectrum. 

Nevertheless more work is still needed to liberalize Vietnam’s financial sector and 

reduce the state’s role in the economy. If confirmed, I will work to engage the Vietnamese on still-sensitive topics such as privatization, energy, intellectual property 

rights, environment, and labor. To continue the momentum of economic reform, we 

also need to help Vietnam redouble its efforts to promote transparency, legal reform, 

and good governance. 

EDUCATION

Along with traditional economic development and improvement in human rights 

and religious freedoms, educational reform and development is a priority area that 

we believe could most benefit an emerging nation like Vietnam. We have extremely 

effective Fulbright and Humphrey exchange programs, and through the highly successful Fulbright Economic Teaching Program in Ho Chi Minh City, we train local 

government officials and business professionals annually on economics and public 

policy. 

The Government of Vietnam has explicitly stated that it looks to the United 

States, and our great colleges and universities, to train the next generation of Vietnamese leaders, scientists, educators, and engineers. One of my goals as ambassador, if confirmed, will be to double the number of university students from Vietnam in our colleges and universities over the next 3 years to help train Vietnam’s 

leaders of the future. 

I will also work closely with the Vietnamese Government to establish a Peace 

Corps program in Vietnam, which I know is of special interest to many Members 

of the Senate, a number of whom have written to the Government of Vietnam in 

support of this proposal. 

CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

Resolving the fates of the Americans lost during the Vietnam War remains an 

issue of continuing and profound importance. Our reengagement with Vietnam was 

founded on this effort and I am firmly committed to this mission, which embodies 

principles that remain critical to our men and women serving today. If confirmed, 

I will endeavor to work with the Vietnamese to move our already positive cooperation to a new level through both joint measures and enhanced unilateral efforts on 

their part. 

At the same time, the United States continues to approach other issues that relate to the consequences of war in a constructive manner. We have invested over 

$45 million since 1993 to help Vietnam clean up unexploded ordnance and landmines left from conflicts dating back to World War II. We continue to provide considerable humanitarian assistance, totaling over $43 million since 1989, to Vietnamese with disabilities regardless of cause. This year, the United States contributed $400,000 to assist the Government of Vietnam to develop a plan for environVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00551 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
544 

mental remediation at the Danang Airport, part of approximately $2 million the 

United States has provided since 2002 to increase Vietnam’s capacity to deal with 

the environmental challenges posed by dioxin. The Congress also passed, and President Bush signed in May, supplemental legislation providing $3 million in assistance for remediation and health-related programs. The administration, in consultation with Congress, is now making final decisions on how and where best to spend 

these funds. 

EXPANDING OUR RELATIONSHIP

We are also cooperating with Vietnam on global issues of high importance, particularly on global health issues such as HIV/AIDS and avian flu. I am convinced 

that health cooperation could be a model for United States-Vietnamese cooperation 

on other areas. If confirmed, I’ll also look for ways to apply that model to encourage 

more robust engagement on law enforcement and military-to-military issues. Although United States-Vietnamese bilateral relations have expanded in numerous 

areas, bilateral military cooperation has developed at a slower pace and has gradually expanded to include search and rescue (SAR), medical programs, professional 

seminars, a nascent security assistance program, training, and even some environmental security issues. Law enforcement cooperation is also strengthening, and the 

United States encourages the Government of Vietnam to take the necessary implementation steps to provide meaningful assistance in drug trafficking/money laundering investigations. If Vietnam is elected to the Asia-Pacific Group’s nonpermanent 2008–2009 seat on the United Nations Security Council, I will encourage Vietnam to contribute to regional stability, humanitarian initiatives, and possibly peacekeeping missions. 

Finally, if confirmed, the welfare and safety of American citizens traveling or 

working in Vietnam will always be my top priority. The United States mission in 

Vietnam will provide accurate and timely information on the risks that Americans 

will face in Vietnam. I hope to reenergize negotiations for a new Embassy that 

meets current security standards and provides a safe working environment for the 

United States mission. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, Madam Chairman, our country’s many ties to Vietnam and the excitement generated by its emergence as a young and dynamic player in Southeast Asia 

sparks enthusiasm for engagement. Just 12 years ago, we normalized relations, concentrating our cooperative efforts on dealing with the lasting effects of the Vietnam 

War, especially the fullest possible accounting for Americans still missing. Since 

then, our economic ties have deepened and we have engaged in important discussions on human rights and a host of other issues. At virtually all levels of government and society, the United States and Vietnam are seeing increased dialog and 

cooperation. I hope to be the type of Ambassador of which our country and especially the United States Senate can be proud. 

Thank you. I would welcome your comments and questions. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Michalak, do you have any family with you 

today by chance? Would you like to introduce them? 

Mr. MICHALAK. Yes, let me introduce my wife, Yoshiko, and my 

daughter, Kay. 

Senator BOXER. Hi. Welcome, both of you. We’re very happy 

you’re here. I know the families are very proud of their dad and 

husband, and we’re proud of them too. 

I’m going to ask Senator Webb to lead it off, knowing his deep 

interest in this area. Please go ahead, Senator. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I may, if we’re 

going 5 minutes, I may have a second round just to clarify. 

Senator BOXER. I think I’d like to give you 10 minutes so you can 

take your time, okay. 10 minutes. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much. 

I do have long experience in the region in many different capacities and just returned, as both of you know, from a pretty brief 

trip, but a very interesting trip, where we were in both countries. 

And I’ve had the opportunity to sit down with each of the nominees 

545 

and discuss issues. I’m obviously very inclined to support both of 

them and think they bring great experience to the table. 

A lot of people think that this is your entire career boiled down 

to 5-minute statements, but obviously there’s an awful lot of work 

that goes into this before you sit here. 

Mr. John, you were mentioning about the recent turmoil in Thailand. I had the opportunity to discuss this with government people 

in Thailand from our government, and theirs, and also with a number of people that I’ve known for many, many years—some of them 

are Americans who resided in Thailand for years, some of them are 

Thai—to try to get a true picture of the dynamic of that event and 

how we’re going to move our way through it. 

As a starting point, I would like your thoughts, because you have 

extensive time in Thailand. How would you rank Thailand among 

other Southeast Asian nations in terms of the overall maturity of 

their political structures? 

Mr. JOHN. It’s unique in the sense that it’s very much a constitutional monarchy and the king does play a very significant role in 

that structure. So in that sense it is different because the Thai people do look to the king for overall guidance. I mean, he sets the 

tone of the country. 

But when I referred in my statement to the U.S. Government 

placing a lot of confidence in this process in the Thai people, I very 

much meant that, in that international pressure was appropriate, 

but for the Thais to work their way through the coup and get back 

to a democratically elected government it really is up to the Thai 

people. And I think we’ve seen that the Thai people want very 

much to get back as quickly as possible to a democracy. 

I think the adherence to the timetable is more a tribute to the 

pressures and the demands that the Thais have put on the interim 

government to get back, to get a constitution, to get a democratically elected government in place, than anyone else. And in that 

sense, comparing it to other nations in Southeast Asia, I’d say 

Thailand is at the top with other democracies in terms of deep 

roots for commitment to democratization and maintaining a democracy. 

Senator WEBB. I’m not trying to put words in anybody’s mouth, 

but do you think it’s fair to say that the Thai movement toward 

democracy was only partially interrupted by this coup? Is it fair to 

say that local elections still have remained as a function even after 

the coup? 

Mr. JOHN. Yes, I’d say that—yes, the coup was a significant 

interruption, but I would define it as that, an interruption. And I 

think that people remain optimistic in Thailand and outside of 

Thailand that there is an end to this coup and that at the end of 

this coup there will be a government back in place that truly was 

elected and put in place by the Thai people. 

Senator WEBB. My understanding of this coup is it did not interrupt local government. This was a coup of national offices. 

Mr. JOHN. Right. 

Senator WEBB. Not a total coup. To the extent that it existed beforehand, freedom of press, freedom of religion, freedom to speak 

out remained in place, which you don’t always see in other countries in Southeast Asia. Is that fair to say? 

546 

Mr. JOHN. Yes, I think freedom of the press, freedom of expression has largely remained in place. I think Senator Boxer was correct that there have been disturbing interruptions, and nobody 

likes to see that. But the foundation of freedom of expression has 

remained throughout the coup and you’ll see there are demonstrations against the coup, there are demonstrations for the coup. 

There’s a very free debate in print, on television, and to a large degree I think it’s been a very healthy debate that’s gone on in Thailand. And in the end I hope it would strengthen democracy. 

Senator WEBB. Well, it was certainly my impression that the repair of this unfortunate incident was well on its way in Thailand. 

Would you have any thoughts on the emerging relationship between Thailand and China? 

Mr. JOHN. It’s largely a—it is growing stronger and I think that 

it’s largely healthy. I think we, all of us, feel comfortable if—if you 

look at a very stark difference, whether it’s good or bad for China 

to have healthy relations with its neighbors, I think all of us would 

agree that it’s good. 

The Thai economy in large degree benefits from a rising Chinese 

economy. So trade relations are strong. I think there are concerns 

about certain sectors or industries that might be threatened by 

Chinese economic growth. There are areas where I think that we 

need to be wary. Obviously, Chinese values and what they place an 

emphasis on in their relationships with other countries oftentimes 

is starkly different than what the United States places an emphasis on in our bilateral relations. 

Senator WEBB. Ambassador Michalak, we had a pretty extensive 

discussion about the Vietnamese community in the United States 

and how it is unique in many ways among expatriate communities 

and immigrant communities because of the way that the Vietnam 

war ended. When the communists took over in China most of the 

Chinese who had opposed the communist takeover remained in 

Asia, particularly Taiwan, northern Thailand, et cetera, while a 

very, very large percentage of the Vietnamese who had stood with 

us—I think that’s an important distinction that we lose when we 

talk about the history of the Vietnamese before 1975—ended up 

here in the United States, and that creates a great challenge, probably the greatest challenge in terms of community diplomacy, in 

building a bridge and repairing that damage as we all move to the 

future. 

I was very gratified to hear you indicate that you wanted to have 

discussions with the Vietnamese community here in the United 

States. I think it’s too often not discussed as one of the key barriers 

for a full, totally full cultural normalization with Vietnam. 

I would ask you a question about a couple of incidents that happened outside the ambassador’s residence earlier. The chairman, 

chairwoman, mentioned this in her opening statement. But I would 

sort of like your thoughts on this. This is a little bit of a disturbing 

situation. I’ve been contacted by a number of overseas Vietnamese, 

Vietnamese Americans, about the incident, because it was an action apparently of the Vietnamese Government itself intercepting 

individuals who had been invited to the ambassador’s home. 

547 

It’s kind of a unique situation and I’m wondering about your 

thoughts on that and how you would be dealing with similar situations if they occur on your watch. 

Mr. MICHALAK. Well, Senator, yes, these kinds of incidents are 

absolutely unacceptable. I certainly would immediately call the 

highest level of the Vietnamese Government that I could get and 

protest in as strong a way as possible to try and change the situation. We have since been in touch with all of the women involved 

and we have managed to contact I believe three out of the five of 

them, and the other two were just unavailable at the time. 

I think since then the ambassador, sitting ambassador, has been 

able to meet with most of them and I think he is still seeking to 

meet with some of the other ones. But this kind of situation in general, I think, shows definitely an overreaction on the part of the 

Government of Vietnam. If confirmed, I think one of the things 

that I will try to do is to try again to encourage the government 

to look at how freedom of speech, freedom of expression, particularly political expression, are not disruptive and can in fact be constructive and be a positive force for societal growth within Vietnam. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you for saying that. Just a final closing 

statement. My time is running out here. As I mentioned to you, I 

started going back to Vietnam in 1991 and spent a great deal of 

time from that period forward. It’s been quite a journey for both 

of our countries, but also I think in terms of the Vietnam Government itself, moving from a government that was completely dominated by people who economically and politically had been trained 

in Eastern Europe and who step by step had been learning how to 

deal with other environments, other political environments. 

I am very optimistic when I see a number of the people who have 

moved through the system since those days. I think it’s been a 

struggle, but I think we’ve laid the groundwork for a very strong 

and very important relationship, and I wish you well. 

Mr. MICHALAK. Thank you, Senator. The only other additional 

comment I might add to that is that I think you’re absolutely right; 

if you look at some of the makeup of the new government, you’re 

beginning to see people who have been educated overseas and the 

Vietnamese are looking to the United States to be the educators of 

an awful lot of the next generation of businessmen and government 

leaders. 

Senator WEBB. There are also a lot of Vietnamese who have not 

had the opportunity to be educated—or who have not been educated overseas; they may not have wanted the opportunity to, but 

who have learned through the interactions that took place during 

normalization with western countries and seeing different points of 

view and just becoming more sophisticated in terms of a lot of nuance that wasn’t there before. 

I will give you one example. Mr. Foke, who I had mentioned to 

you during our meeting, who I have known for 14 years now, since 

he was an economics minister down in Danang, who really is 

among this group of people who are looking for solutions based on 

mutual respect rather than the bitterness of history and those sorts 

of things. So I’m very optimistic that we can continue to make this 

relationship grow. 

548 

Thank you very much. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

I want to just welcome the Ambassador of Thailand serving in 

the United States, His Excellency Mr. Crit Garjana Gunjorn, and 

I invite him to stand up. We thank you, sir, for being here. We welcome you. 

I’d ask unanimous consent to place into the record an introduction of Eric John by Senator Lugar. It’s very glowing—I’m sure 

you’ll be glad to know that—and I ask that it be placed into the 

record at this time. I’ll give that to you to make sure that happens. 

[The statement from Senator Lugar appears at the end of this 

hearing, in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section.] 

Senator BOXER. I want to ask a question about Thailand. Thailand’s been a magnet for hundreds of thousands of refugees from 

throughout Southeast Asia, many of them Hmong. You may know 

we have a very large Hmong community in California. While Thailand has generally been cooperative in helping refugees, there have 

been a number of high profile incidents of forced deportations that 

have raised international concern. 

Last month the State Department expressed regret over the Thai 

Government’s deportation to Laos of about 160 ethnic Hmong who 

had sought diplomatic asylum in Thailand. Specifically, State Department spokesman Sean McCormick said in a statement, and I 

quote: ‘‘We urge the Thai Government to live up to its traditions 

and international standards and to ensure that those with a genuine claim to refugee status are not returned to an uncertain fate.’’ 

Just yesterday, the Bagh—the Bangkok Post—I almost said 

‘‘Baghdad’’ because I have Iraq on my brain 24–7. Yesterday the 

Bangkok Post reported that nearly 7,700 Hmong currently living in 

a makeshift camp in Thailand’s Shabung Province will be deported 

to Laos, 7,700 Hmong. Mr. John, have you seen this report in the 

Bangkok Post? And if it’s accurate, what is the United States planning to do to prevent it? 

Mr. JOHN. I haven’t seen that specific report, but we’re aware of 

this refugee community of about 8,000. I have not—I am not aware 

of reports that they are going to be deported any time soon. But 

it’s a serious issue that we have been following for quite a while. 

There are sort of three components, I think, to the refugee situation that we have to work on, and Thailand is one of those critical 

components. The first component I think we would all agree is that 

Laos needs to integrate, treat its ethnic Hmong better, give them 

equal rights, integrate them into the society, and that’s something 

that our embassy is working on there, that we worked on here as 

well. And that’s I think the foundation for the problem. 

The second, as you mentioned, is that we are working with the 

Thais so that they do not deport back to Laos refugees who have 

not been screened yet by a competent international organization 

such as UNHCR. And of course, the 7,700 or 8,000 group that’s in 

Shabung Province should not be returned if they are deemed refugees and have been screened as refugees, and at that point we 

would need to work with the Thai Government for third country resettlement. 

549 

The third leg, I think, of this stool in working on the Hmong 

issue is to again work on the pull factor, and Thailand is very concerned that there’s no end to this, and we need to be cognizant of 

those concerns, that, working with the Lao Government to make 

sure they’re settled there back into Laos or that legitimate refugees 

can move on to third countries is something that’s important. 

So, if I were confirmed, it’s something I would work very closely 

with the Thai Government. 

Senator BOXER. Well, let me say, I want to show you the article 

because I think you need to take this to the folks there and whether this is true. We don’t have a lot of time if this report is true— 

maybe you can talk to the ambassador about it on your way out 

the door. But I hope that you’ll provide me with periodic updates 

on this and other issues related to human rights abuses against the 

Hmong, because these are good, decent people. Would you do that 

if confirmed? Would you give me regular updates? 

Mr. JOHN. Absolutely. We owe a great debt as a Nation to the 

Hmong. 

Senator BOXER. We do, yes. 

Mr. JOHN. And it’s something that we take very seriously. 

Senator BOXER. Okay. 

Mr. Michalak, as you well know, the Vietnamese Government instituted a wave of crackdowns against democracy and human 

rights activists that began in 2006 and peaked in the spring of this 

year. A number of prominent activists were imprisoned, including 

Father Nguyen Van Ly and Le Quoc Quan, a lawyer who recently 

completed a fellowship with the National Endowment for Democracy here in Washington, DC. 

These arrests caused significant international outcry, particularly since they occurred in the run-up to the first visit to the 

United States by a Vietnamese head of state since the end of the 

Vietnam War. Many question why the crackdown occurred when it 

did and whether or not Vietnam is truly committed to ending its 

record of human rights abuses and fully integrating into the international community. 

First and foremost, can you explain why the crackdown occurred 

when it did? Was the Vietnamese Government trying to send some 

type of message? As ambassador how will you engage with the Government of Vietnam to improve its human rights record? And I 

would also ask—and this is the same question I asked of Mr. 

john—would you please make available to us on a regular basis 

how we are working to advance the cause of human rights in Vietnam? 

Mr. MICHALAK. Thank you very much, Madam Senator. Yes, I already wrote that down, periodic reports. Yes, be happy to do that. 

The number of people that you mentioned that were under detention, mainly Father Nguyen Van Ly—I think Le Quoc Quan has 

been released, the National Endowment fellow has been released, 

and I believe is now with, has been reunited with his family. 

But in general, as to why the crackdown occurred, there are several theories. Unfortunately, the inner workings of the Government 

of Vietnam are not as transparent as we would like, and if confirmed that’s one of the things I would work on, is transparency 

and anticorruption there. But many have said that this is part of 

550 

a general crackdown on dissidents prior to the May 20 elections to 

make sure that the elections went smoothly and in a stable fashion. Some people believe that it is after the—I guess ‘‘outburst’’ 

may be too strong a word, but the continued improved human 

rights situation that took place during 2006, there is some thought 

that certain hardliners within the government thought that the 

pendulum had swung too far toward freedom and liberalization, so 

they wanted to sort of again send a message that, yes, the central 

party still is in charge. 

I think that we have a multipronged way in which we want to 

deal with human rights in Vietnam and I certainly, if confirmed, 

will support that. We have a human rights dialog which is chaired 

by Assistant Secretary Lowencron and which last year set out a 

good work plan for the coming year. We have several programs 

which we use under our public diplomacy rubric where we actually 

teach journalists how to do investigative journalism and take steps 

to try and improve journalistic freedom. We also have under our 

improvement, development, economic development program programs to improve transparency, to improve anticorruption and good 

governance programs. We believe that these work not only within 

the economic sphere, but there is a significant spillover and demonstration effect that takes place in the human rights sphere as 

well. 

So I think in all of these programmatic fashions we can work to 

try to improve the situation there. On a personal level, I think that 

I personally would certainly take every opportunity that I can to 

work especially hard, particularly for the release of detainees like 

Father Ly, lawyers Nguyen Van Di and Li Thi Qong Yan, who also 

have been detained recently. I think President Bush, in his meeting with President Triet, also raised the issue and laid down a 

marker that we’re going to continue to work for improvement in 

this situation over there, and if confirmed I’ll certainly continue 

that effort. 

Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, sir. I think obviously our hope, all 

of us, is that these detentions don’t happen in the first place. I 

think a lot of nations around the world make a mistake, specifically 

the developing nations, when they think it shows strength to put 

your opponents in jail. It’s the opposite. It’s the opposite. I think 

we’re never stronger as a country as the times that we’re having 

vigorous debate, yes, in the Senate. A lot of people decry: It’s mean. 

It’s not mean. It’s the way it has to be in a free society. If you feel 

strongly, it’s an obligation. 

Now, obviously these things could be taken too far, but it’s the 

right tone. And I think the message that you can give these countries is that if they want to be viewed as strong, then they should 

allow dissent through speech that doesn’t hurt anybody else. Anything other than that makes them look weak, impotent, and not 

worthy of emulation. I do feel it’s kind of a nuanced message, but 

I know both of you will be very fine at getting that message across. 

I don’t have any other comments, but I know that Senator Webb 

wanted to make some closing comments, so I will call on him, and 

then we’ll adjourn. We both feel that you should have a good confirmation process from here on out. 

551 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Ambassador Michalak, I just wanted to add on 

something to what you said about the issue of human rights in 

Vietnam, because it’s an issue that very rarely makes it to the national discourse and yet it’s a key element of fully repairing our relations. That is the issue of the people who were with us during 

the war who remain inside Vietnam and their families. There has 

been a great deal of progress on this issue inside Vietnam, but we 

need to remember that a lot of the anger in the Vietnamese community here came about not simply because of the war, but because of what happened after 1975, where a million mostly South 

Vietnamese were put in reeducation camps—240,000 of them 

stayed longer than 4 years, 56,000 of them died in the reeducation 

camps. 

When they came back—some of them stayed as long as 18 years. 

They did it by rank, generally. I see Mr. John nodding. He was a 

big part of the processing of people out when they started processing a lot of them back here in the United States. But a lot of 

them remained. 

When I first was returning to Vietnam for visits, I can get 

around pretty well in Vietnamese and talk to people without having to have a government interpreter with me, and there basically 

was a situation where the people who had been with the South Vietnamese military and government, and in some cases intellectuals 

who had basically supported the cause of democracy, were precluded from working. Their families were kept—their children were 

kept out of advancement in schools. There were truly roadblocks. 

One of the things that I was working on for many years starting 

back in the early 1990s with this normalization process was trying 

to get a formula in place so that all Vietnamese could move forward together regardless of their past affiliations. This is not a 

negative shot at today. It’s just trying to affirmatively deal as best 

we can with the consequences of history. 

As I said, my feelings from having returned to Vietnam many 

times is that the government has begun to do that. They’ve been 

listening to that call, but that it still really is a challenge to make 

sure that all the Vietnamese, the children of the people who were 

with the Vietnam Con Hua, are allowed the same access to these 

benefits that we are going to be bringing to Vietnam with our emphasis on trade and cultural exchanges and these sorts of things. 

So I would just express my hope that you’ll keep your eye on 

that. And again, I wish both of you the best of luck in your new 

positions. 

Senator BOXER. Gentlemen, I made a mistake. There was one 

more point I wanted to raise with you, Mr. Michalak, because an 

issue that’s been very important to me—and we actually set up a 

POW memorial in California, and it’s a beautiful site in the San 

Bernadino area. So my constituents have great concerns about the 

POW–MIA recovery efforts in Vietnam. 

According to the CRS, there were 1381 Americans unaccounted 

for in Vietnam as of August 2005. While I understand Vietnamese 

cooperation on POW–MIA recovery efforts has improved since the 

normalization of relations, much work remains to be done. Families 

are still waiting for their loved ones to be brought home, and I unVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00559 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
552 

derstand that many families would like more searches along the 

coastline of Vietnam. 

If you’re confirmed, can I get your commitment that you will 

work to ensure that POW–MIA recovery efforts are conducted in a 

robust fashion? Would you let me know if you need additional assistance to help you with this effort, because I can assure you on 

this committee you would have broad support? 

Mr. MICHALAK. Madam Chairman, absolutely. You have my assurance and you certainly have my commitment on trying to get 

the fullest accounting for all missing American service members as 

a result of the Vietnam War. That is one of the pillars upon which 

our reengagement with Vietnam began. If confirmed, I would certainly support that and certainly do everything that I can to try to 

get access to archives that we have not been able to do and to try 

to get permission to do some of these searches along the coast, 

which I know that we have been attempting, with some progress. 

But you’re absolutely right; there is much more that can be done. 

And yes, I’ll definitely do that. 

Senator BOXER. My hope is that you will be honest and let us 

know if you need any help in that regard, because we will get that 

help for you. 

Mr. MICHALAK. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator BOXER. If there’s no other business to come before the 

committee, we stand adjourned, and we wish you well. 

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Chairman Boxer, today I am pleased to endorse the nomination of Mr. Eric G. 

John to serve as United States Ambassador to Thailand. A native of New Castle, 

IN, Mr. John has served with distinction since 2005 as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Previous postings include 

the United States Embassy in Seoul as Political Minister and Counselor, the Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City, as Deputy Principal Officer, and the United 

States Embassy in Thailand, where Mr. John served as Vice Consul and Second Secretary of the Orderly Departure Program. Mr. John has received numerous awards 

for outstanding service in the Department of State. 

Senator Boxer, as you are aware, the Thailand-United States relationship is held 

in high regard by United States officials and the American people. However, in recent years, the situation has grown complex. Under the regime of former Prime 

Minister Thaksin, traditional democratic institutions, freedom of the press, and rule 

of law came under stress. On September 19, 2006, a military coup was orchestrated 

by the country’s military leaders, who have continually promised since then to return the country to democratic rule. 

This is all to say that the next American Ambassador to Thailand will face a situation of special complexity. DAS John is particularly well-qualified to serve at this 

crucial time as the President’s representative to the people of Thailand, who have 

long shown their commitment to democracy, and to promote sustained relations between our two countries. 

(553) 

NOMINATION OF HON. HENRIETTA HOLSMAN 

FORE TO BE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

Fore, Henrietta Holsman, to be Administrator of the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Nelson, Casey, Lugar, Hagel, and 

Corker. 

Also Present: Senator Hutchison. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. This hearing will come to order. 

Secretary Fore, let me welcome you to the committee, as well as 

on behalf of Senator Lugar, who I’m sure will be with us shortly, 

and our—the ranking member of the full committee, and Senator 

Hagel, the ranking member of the subcommittee. 

I know, Madam Secretary, that you know—that you have stated, 

in both past hearings and in writing to me, that you have made 

improving and expanding communications in consultation with 

Members of Congress one of your key goals. And I think you’re to 

be commended for trying to forge a new alliance with Congress, 

and I want to thank you for and your staff for your responsiveness 

throughout this process. 

I’d also note that today’s nomination hearing, of course, is only 

the first step in what may be a long journey. This hearing today 

provides members of the Foreign Relations Committee the opportunity to ask you key questions about USAID and the ‘‘F’’ process, 

as well as questions relating to your position as Under Secretary 

of Management. 

Obviously, how the nominee responds to the questions posed to 

her today, and questions submitted for the record, will help determine when and if the full committee schedules a vote on her nomination. Assuming that vote is scheduled and the nominee is voted 

554 

out of committee, her nomination would then go before the entire 

Senate. So, I say, again, today’s nomination is only the first step 

in that journey, but an important one. 

We’ve already had an entire hearing on the foreign assistance reform, or ‘‘F’’ process, so I’m not going to restate everything that 

we’ve already discussed in that hearing, but I want to reiterate 

that the administration’s foreign assistance reform, in my view, is 

in need of serious reform, itself. Mr. Tobias created a top-down secretive process that continued the decimation of USAID, did not actually put all of U.S. foreign assistance under one umbrella, and 

tried to shift funding away from the long-term development goals 

like poverty alleviation. 

So, Madam Secretary, as I told you at our last hearing, I believe 

you had a window of opportunity to make some serious changes to 

the ‘‘F’’ process. In both your hearing and in the subsequent letter, 

I asked for commitments from you in many areas, including repairing morale at USAID, focusing on poverty alleviation, providing for 

real consultation on the ground, rethinking the shift of funds from 

development assistance to more flexible accounts. I’m not going 

into detail about your responses to my letter on each of these 

issues at this time, although I and my staff will be closely following 

how you handle each of them. 

I also know that you’re aware that one of the most contentious 

issues we discussed was the possible closing of a number of USAID 

missions. Frankly, when it comes to the issues of closing USAID 

missions, I’m faced with a very strange situation. On the one hand, 

I have numerous experts and insiders coming to me, telling that 

there is a list of possible USAID missions to be closed. In fact, 

some of the USAID staff believe they were not going to certain 

USAID missions, because they were going to be closed, and outside 

organizations had been told that their projects were ending. On the 

other hand, USAID staff, in meetings with the Senate staff, have 

clearly stated that there was no list of USAID missions to be 

closed, and they have explained that there is only a, quote, ‘‘exercise’’ carried out to take a look at the issue, and never a determination that any missions should be closed. 

I know, however, that this exercise did produce a list, which included Panama, Guyana, Namibia, Mongolia, Brazil, and Cyprus. 

USAID staff have promised us that there are no current plans to 

close these USAID missions during fiscal year 2008, and that the 

list I just read is not a list of missions to be closed. If you are confirmed, however, you may be faced with a decision about whether 

to close such missions, and let me be absolutely clear—at least for 

myself—I do not expect USAID to close any missions without intense consultations with Congress. An intense consultation with 

Congress does not mean that you come up here and tell us about 

the decision after you have made it. 

Now, for many years I have been talking about the importance 

of increasing minority representation at the State Department, especially in the Foreign Service. I believe we need to make the face 

of America to the world look like America at home, and I’d like to 

take a moment to commend my colleague, Senator Obama, for 

being a leader on this issue. I know he wanted to be here, and he 

555 

will be submitting some statement and questions for the record in 

that regard. 

Finally, Madam Secretary, as I said in the beginning of my statement, this hearing is the beginning of a long process. Right now, 

although I appreciate your efforts to be responsive to the committee, I don’t know whether or not I’ll support your nomination. 

In making my determination, I plan to look closely at your responses to my questions and those of other members of this committee. I also would like to see a true commitment to fix the failing 

foreign assistance reform process. 

And, with those introductory words, let me turn to Senator 

Lugar, the ranking member of the full committee, for any remarks 

he may have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I join you in welcoming Henrietta Fore for her confirmation hearing before the committee today. I appreciate the presence of the 

distinguished Senator from Texas, Senator Hutchison, by her side. 

I appreciate, also, the cooperation shown to the committee 

throughout her tenure at the State Department by our nominee 

today. Ms. Fore is before the committee to be considered for confirmation as the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development. She’s already serving as the Director of U.S. Foreign 

Assistance at the State Department, a position created by Secretary Rice. 

If confirmed for this dual-hatted role, Ms. Fore will be tasked 

with overseeing and coordinating our Government’s multifaceted 

outreach to countries where poverty and suffering create both a humanitarian imperative and a new security risk. Obviously, Secretary Rice has the highest regard for the nominee’s abilities. 

She has also received a sterling endorsement from the Foreign 

Affairs Council, an umbrella group of 11 organizations that focus 

on foreign policy management. I ask that the letter written by the 

Council’s president, Tom Boyatt, be inserted in the record. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Without objection. 

Senator LUGAR. I thank the Chair. 

[The information previously referred to appears at the end of this 

hearing in the Additional Material Submitted for the Record section.] 

Senator LUGAR. Americans have long supported their Government’s work to save lives and alleviate human misery. Since 9/11 

and the harboring of terrorists in Afghanistan, we have acquired 

new insights into how failing states can provide fertile ground for 

nurturing global terrorism. This administration has taken on the 

challenge by making new commitments to international economic 

development. It has increased foreign aid spending and created 

new funding mechanisms. It has boosted America’s focus on crises, 

such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, that can set developing societies 

back decades. It is preparing a response capability to rush civilians 

and reconstruction expertise to countries devastated by conflict. 

And it has sought to promote good government, sound economic 

556 

policies, and strong social programs focused on human development 

in all poor countries around the world. 

Secretary Rice’s instinct to seek greater coordination and clarity 

in the new firmament of foreign assistance is on the mark. We 

need to meld new activities in a constructive way with our traditional approaches. We need to prioritize our goals and design our 

strategies in a way that is transparent to policymakers, legislators, 

and recipients, alike. We need to be able to measure, analyze, and 

assess outcomes so we can tell if we’re making a difference. 

Every dollar of foreign assistance needs to count toward our 

hopes for a more peaceful and prosperous world. 

In the two key areas of USAID Administrator and director of the 

process of foreign aid coordination that Secretary Rice initiated a 

little more than a year ago, the Congress is looking for leadership 

that strikes the appropriate balance between the need for strategic 

direction from headquarters and the flexibility in the field to address the unique challenges posed by each recipient country. 

To inform our own views, I directed the Republican staff of the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee to undertake a field-based 

study of our foreign assistance efforts. Now ongoing, we are looking 

at assistance funded by the State Department, USAID, the Defense 

Department, and other agencies, in more than 20 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, and we’re paying particular attention to the new coordination process to see how it is 

mirrored in the field. We’re looking at USAID programs, section 

1206 security assistance, Millennium Challenge Corporation, the 

Middle East Partnership Initiative, and the President’s Emergency 

Plan for AIDS Relief, known as PEPFAR, as well as how programs 

run by such U.S. Government departments as Agriculture, Treasury, and Homeland Security are coordinated at the embassy level. 

In a previous staff report, ‘‘Embassies as Command Posts in the 

Campaign Against Terror,’’ it was recommended that the Secretary 

of State should insist that all security assistance, including section 

1206 funding, be included under her authority in the new foreign 

assistance coordination process. Ms. Fore, the committee today will 

be interested in how you view your own role in making certain that 

our response to violent extremism is calibrated, supported by an 

appropriate mix of civilian and military foreign aid. 

I plan to share the findings of our current study with you as it’s 

completed. I welcome you to the committee, and I look forward to 

your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Hagel, would you care to make some remarks? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I do have a statement, which I will ask to be submitted—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Without objection, all of the members’ statements will be submitted to the record. 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. For the record. Thank you. 

Senator HAGEL. I add my welcome to Secretary Fore and to our 

distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from Texas. And I 

557 

await Secretary Fore’s testimony, and then I would be very pleased 

to pursue questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary Fore back to the committee as 

the President’s nominee to be USAID Administrator. [As the Chairman has noted,] 

if confirmed, Secretary Fore would also serve as the State Department’s Director of 

U.S. Foreign Assistance—a position created by Secretary Rice to oversee long-needed and unfinished reform of U.S. foreign assistance programs. 

Since August 2005, Secretary Fore has served as the Under Secretary of State for 

Management, a position critical to the State Department’s operations. In the last 

few years, the State Department has faced new, more difficult, and in many ways, 

unprecedented personnel and staffing challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the growing number of unaccompanied posts around the world. 

Focused attention to the stewardship of the State Department and its Foreign and 

Civil Service employees must remain a top priority for Secretary Rice and her team. 

As USAID Director, Secretary Fore will need to devote considerable attention to the 

management of USAID’s personnel. 

Before serving at the State Department, Secretary Fore held significant positions 

in government and the private sector, including Director of the U.S. Mint, and 

chairman and president of Stockton Products. She also served 4 years at USAID 

from 1989 to 1993, including as the Assistant Administrator for Private Enterprise 

and the Assistant Administrator for Asia. 

The dual-hatted position of USAID Administrator and Director of Foreign Assistance is one of the most vital foreign policy positions in the U.S. Government—and 

one of the most challenging. The responsibilities include the billions of dollars of 

U.S. taxpayers money that go to the core of our efforts to address many of the fundamental challenges of the 21st century—easing crushing poverty, creating economic opportunities, tackling corruption, rebuilding war-torn societies, and fighting 

pandemic disease. Basic development and growth in economic opportunities for the 

billions who have not enjoyed the prosperity of the 20th century must remain a central tenet guiding our foreign assistance. 

This position is also charged with reforming America’s foreign assistance system. 

I welcomed the Secretary’s decision last year to conduct a fundamental overhaul of 

U.S. foreign assistance—a significant undertaking. While there have been changes, 

the results are mixed and the process has not enjoyed a satisfactory level of transparency. In a recent study by the Hudson Institute, it noted that the private sector 

devoted over $33 billion in assistance to developing countries in 2005, compared to 

about $28 billion in U.S. Government foreign assistance. Public-private partnership 

on assistance to developing countries enhances, rather than undermines, the effectiveness of the U.S. Government’s foreign assistance programs. There should be 

more effective consultation between the public and private sectors and more effective harnessing of resources where possible. 

The war in Iraq has incurred an overwhelming cost to America’s attention, leadership, and resources, which I believe has undermined our attention, resources, and 

efforts in Afghanistan. Secretary Fore, I will seek your commitment that United 

States assistance for Afghanistan will be among your top priorities. We cannot allow 

Afghanistan to slide backward. This area represents the real, central front in our 

war against al-Qaeda and terrorists. 

Finally, Madam Secretary, you cannot accomplish your responsibilities by relying 

on Washington-based advisors. Our field-based diplomats, development specialists, 

and experts on the ground must play a central role in guiding our foreign assistance. You must be committed to seeking and welcoming their advice and recommendations. 

I would like to acknowledge your family—husband, Richard, and children, Jonathan, Jessica, Rebecca, and Richard—for their support and contributions. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important nomination hearing. I look 

forward to questioning Secretary Fore, and to the committee’s upcoming consideration of her nomination. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator. 

Well, with that, I see that the senior Senator from Texas is here 

with you, Secretary Fore, so I would welcome the Senator’s reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00565 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
558 

marks on behalf of the nominee, and then we will turn to you, 

Madam Secretary. We’ll ask to keep your opening statement to 

about 7 minutes. Your entire statement will be included in the 

record. 

And, with that, Senator Hutchison. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, and Senator 

Hagel. 

I am very pleased to introduce to you Henrietta Holsman Fore 

for the position—the permanent position of Administrator of the 

USAID. 

She is highly qualified for this post, and I know all of you know 

her outstanding record in government service, and she is the Acting Administrator, right now. 

In 2005, she became the Under Secretary of State for Management, and, in that role, has been responsible for the people, resources, facilities, technology, and security at the Department of 

State. Prior to her service at the Department of State, she served 

as the 37th Director of the U.S. Mint in the Department of Treasury. She served as a presidential appointee at USAID back in 1989 

to 1993, as Assistant Administrator for Private Enterprise and 

then as Assistant Administrator for Asia. During that period, she 

founded, and served as the first chairman of, the United States 

Asia Environmental Partnership, a coalition of business, government, and community organizations in the United States and 31 

Asian nations. She also was a founder of the Financial Services 

Volunteer Corps. 

She has been recognized for achievements with the Department 

of Treasury’s highest honor, the Alexander Hamilton Award. She 

also received her bachelor of arts degree in history from Wellesley 

and a master of science degree in public administration from the 

University of Northern Colorado. She studied international politics 

at Oxford and at Stanford University Graduate School of Business. 

She is married and lives in Washington, DC, and Nevada. 

Mr. Chairman, just on a personal note, I want to say that I have 

known Henrietta Holsman Fore since before she was in this administration. We are both members of an organization of women entrepreneurs called Committee of 200. She has been an outstanding entrepreneur. And I think you can see from her record that she has 

also tried to give back in public service. I recommend her highly. 

I’ve known her for a long time. And I know that she has the capability to manage, and she also has the heart to do the right thing 

for our country in USAID. 

I have traveled extensively in foreign countries where USAID 

can make a huge difference in the image of America and in the actual help that is given. And sometimes I find USAID is the best 

thing that we have going. And I know that she believes that, as 

well. And I want to make sure that we do keep it strong, that we 

keep it doing the right things and helping developing nations 

learn—the people of these nations learn how to become self-sufficient in their own right. And I hope that, while you have all of your 

559 

questions, that are certainly legitimate, I hope that, in the end, you 

will see that she is a qualified nominee for this very important job 

for our country. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Hutchison. 

With that, Secretary Fore, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRIETTA HOLSMAN FORE, NOMINEE 

TO BE THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. FORE. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez. Senator 

Lugar, Senator Hagel, it’s good to see both of you. 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today as the 

President’s nominee to lead the United States Agency for International Development, USAID. 

As you are aware, I have served this administration proudly 

since 2001—as Senator Hutchison mentioned, first as the 37th Director of the United States Mint in the Department of Treasury, 

and, since August 2005, as Under Secretary of State for Management. Since May 7, 2007, I’ve served as Acting Administrator of 

USAID and Acting Director of United States Foreign Assistance in 

the Department of State. 

If I have the honor of being confirmed, I will be returning to an 

agency of remarkable and extraordinarily capable people, where I 

first served from 1989 to 1993. This committee has made it clear 

that we can, and must, use foreign assistance more effectively. You 

have also indicated that reform must be a substantially consultative process. I take this mandate seriously. In fact, the process 

began the day after I was nominated. 

I have spent much of the last 21⁄2 months listening. The message 

that I have heard from Congressional Members, from your staffs, 

from our stakeholders in the humanitarian and development community, from educators and businesspeople, from our host countries and recipients of our assistance in the field, other U.S. foreign 

assistance implementors, from the Secretary of State, and, of 

course, from USAID itself, is a remarkably consistent one. They 

share with me a perception of foreign assistance importance in 

America—to America and the developing world, and they see 

USAID as central to the success of this Nation’s development mission. 

In short, USAID’s unique, long-term development focus is an invaluable instrument for U.S. foreign policy, for U.S. economic policy, and our Nation’s humanitarian outreach. I am encouraged by 

this consensus, but I want to make clear that listening is not an 

end in itself. If confirmed, I intend to build on this consensus and 

use it as a basis for scaling up the Agency for International Development. For this, I will need your counsel, your guidance, and your 

support. 

I firmly believe that our people are our most important asset. If 

confirmed, I will support the Secretary’s transformational diplomacy goal by ensuring that we have the people who can work on 

the complex tasks that the 21st century foreign assistance requires. 

With the active support and backing of Congress, we can stem the 

tide of declining numbers of USAID employees in our Foreign ServVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00567 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
560 

ice and in our civil service ranks. I will also upgrade skills and 

training for USAID’s employees already in place, and will put in 

place a new capacity to work for America. We will increase our 

training and career development opportunities. 

The economic, political, social, and technological developments of 

recent years have brought with them a need for new nontraditional 

approaches that embrace transnational concerns involving a range 

of nontraditional and nongovernmental foreign assistance providers. To ensure that we are not working at cross-purposes, but 

for shared purposes, we will need to engage these new partners 

and stakeholders and prepare them for the challenges ahead. 

USAID needs employees with diverse backgrounds and broad substantive expertise. My goal is to hire, not just recruit, diverse employees. And, if confirmed, I will work hard to ensure a professional 

environment at USAID, where every employee feels valued. 

The United States leads as the largest donor country and with 

the largest private donor community in the world. USAID should 

be leading, both intellectually and programmatically. So, first and 

foremost, we must replenish our core workforce and our core skills. 

In recent years, Congress has appropriated less for our operating 

expenses than the agency has requested. And, as you know, OE is 

what makes our footprint in Washington and the field possible. If 

confirmed in the coming months, I will explore with you what options we might have to address our 2008 OE stringency. 

I’ve asked USAID leadership to engage with me in analyzing how 

we might position USAID for the future by addressing the composition of our workforce and determining how the workforce might be 

more effectively repositioned, trained, and deployed. The Secretary 

and I believe that U.S. interests would be well-served by a strong, 

well-trained, and well-deployed USAID. If confirmed, I intend to 

work very hard to find ways to achieve this result. I will engage 

the Congress in this issue as my first order of business. 

As we align and harmonize our administrative services at USAID 

and the Department of State, I will be asking Congress to consider 

new investments in information technology for USAID. The greater 

transparency and openness that I pledge requires modern information and communications systems at USAID and at the Department of State. Substantial investments will be required to bring 

USAID up to a level that will sustain our 21st-century vision. The 

payoffs will be substantial. They will benefit the United States over 

the long run by increasing effectiveness and efficiency of our programs, enabling us to report to you with much greater detail and 

timeliness, and to integrate more closely with the programs of 

other United States Government agencies. 

Additionally, such investments will enable subsequent administrators to be more responsible stewards of the United States taxpayers’ dollars. These people and these tools will help, each in their 

own way, to reach our aim, which is to significantly improve the 

human condition. Our foreign assistance programs save lives and 

lift individuals from poverty. We want to lift nations and their citizens to permanent prosperity. We want to create more donor nations. We want countries to build their own schools and train their 

own teachers. We want healthy young children, with bright futures 

561 

ahead. We want to partner with public and private organizations 

and individuals throughout the world. 

In conclusion, if I have the honor of being confirmed by the Senate as Administrator of the United States Agency for International 

Development, it will be a pleasure to work with you once again in 

the service of our great country. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fore follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HENRIETTA HOLSMAN FORE, NOMINEE TO BE

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Hagel and other members of 

the Foreign Relations Committee. 

I am honored to appear before you today as President Bush’s nominee to lead the 

United States Agency for International Development as its Administrator. I am 

proud to have served in two other positions in this administration. From 2001 to 

2005, I served as the 37th Director of the United States Mint in the Department 

of the Treasury. Since August 2005, I have held the position of Under Secretary of 

State for Management. 

I have been Acting Administrator of USAID since May 7, and have been very active since then in preparing myself to lead the agency. If the Senate approves my 

nomination, it will mark a return to the agency for me, where I served from 1989— 

1993, as Assistant Administrator for Private Enterprise and as Assistant Administrator for Asia. 

Several weeks ago, I appeared before this committee and pledged to you a new 

openness in the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and at USAID. If 

I am confirmed as Administrator, I said that I would endeavor to improve communications, enhance collaboration, and bring greater simplification and transparency 

to decision making in foreign assistance and for the agency. I see USAID as the intellectual and operational leader of Foreign Assistance for the United States Government and with your assistance, will assemble the resources necessary for that 

leadership. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have spent the last several weeks 

working to make good on this pledge. I began within the agency itself, the day after 

my nomination. On average, I spend about half of my day at USAID. Much of this 

time has been spent listening to the leadership and staff at USAID as well as doing 

‘‘walk throughs’’ to speak with all my colleagues in the agency. 

I have also consulted extensively with the humanitarian and development assistance community here in Washington seeking their counsel on how USAID can better focus its resources to have the greatest impact on the challenge of poverty and 

instability around the world and to more effectively pursue opportunities for longterm development, spreading democracy, fostering economic growth, and investing 

in people through education and health. 

I also intend to be fully engaged in the United States and abroad in public diplomacy outreach efforts to build greater understanding of U.S. foreign assistance and 

the role it has played in building a more peaceful, prosperous world. In this regard, 

I was privileged to travel to Africa last week as part of the United States delegation 

to the African Growth and Opportunity Forum and to visit several USAID programs 

with our field staff. 

Outreach is important to helping build understanding of U.S. foreign policy here 

in this country and the role of USAID’s development efforts around the world. There 

is no better public diplomacy for the United States than a diplomacy of deeds, providing effective foreign assistance through effective communications about these efforts to host country audiences. 

Finally—and most important—I pledge to improve communication with Congress. 

I will come to you earlier and more often, seeking your views on what we propose 

to do. I want to make sure that we answer your calls and provide full and timely 

answers to your questions. I will, if confirmed, consult fully with the Congress on 

the major issues facing the agency. 

The fiscal year 2008 budget is now in your hands and early next year we will be 

coming to you to present the President’s request for fiscal year 2009. Should I be 

confirmed, I pledge to work with you to make our consultation closer and more effective. 

The Secretary’s goal of transformational diplomacy is in the forefront as I consider 

the issues facing me, if I am confirmed. We are helping people to better their lives, 

562 

to build their own nations, and to transform their futures. The administration’s foreign assistance reform is critical to that goal in that it moves us toward a single, 

more coherent, and better integrated foreign assistance budget, making the best use 

of the resources that you appropriate for foreign assistance. It allows program and 

resource allocation decisions to be based on a comprehensive view of all accounts 

and resources flows. 

This committee has made it clear that we can, and must, use foreign assistance 

more effectively. You have also indicated that reform must be a substantially more 

consultative process. I agree and take this mandate seriously. 

During my tenure as Acting Administrator these past 21⁄2 months, I have sounded 

out a number of ambassadors and mission directors for their views on how to 

strengthen U.S. foreign assistance and to make it more effective and visible in the 

countries they represent. I am soliciting similar suggestions from the field to make 

the voices of those who actually implement our programs more prominent in their 

formulation. I have charged the agency’s Chief Operating Officer to convene a conference of mission directors in Washington, now tentatively scheduled for October. 

We are reviewing the after action report on the reform process to date and will be 

considering the suggestions of internal working groups in the agency that have been 

charged with adapting agency practices to better meet the Secretary of State’s 

transformational diplomacy goals. I would like to underscore the fact that we are 

in the early stages of the reform process. I will work closely with you to strengthen 

and improve the process as we move forward. 

Much has changed since my last tour at USAID. The demise of the Soviet Union, 

the integration of global communications and markets, the growing menace of global 

terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and transnational crime, the surge of HIV/ 

AIDS, and the threat of other infectious diseases—all these are hallmarks of a significantly altered 21st century landscape for development. 

As the National Security Strategy underscores, the locus of our concerns has shifted from great power rivalries to failed and failing states. Americans now understand 

that security in their homeland depends, as never before, on bringing security, freedom, and opportunity to the underdeveloped regions of the world and to countries 

far beyond our borders. 

In short, the challenges that America now faces have significantly increased the 

importance of development to security and well-being. This in turn has prompted 

a rethinking and redesigning of foreign assistance mechanisms as well as unprecedented commitment of resources to foreign assistance, which has nearly tripled over 

the last 7 years. Development is now recognized as comparable in importance to diplomacy and defense as key to U.S. national security. In fact, foreign assistance is 

one of our most powerful assets. In addition to reducing poverty, foreign assistance 

shapes ‘‘hearts and minds’’ abroad and it shapes our quality of life and prosperity, 

here at home. 

Let me turn to our people. Our people and our partners around the world are now 

operating in more areas of conflict and unstable post-conflict environments. This is 

far more demanding and difficult work, and more often we are working side-by-side 

with the military. 

USAID is staffed by remarkable and extraordinarily capable people, both here in 

Washington and in over 80 missions around the world. As Americans, we are wellserved by the hard work and dedication of all these fine individuals who stand 

ready to respond to humanitarian emergencies anywhere they arise, and willingly 

accept personal hardship and separation from family in some of the most remote 

and deprived areas of the world. 

USAID boasts an impressive track record of success that has rightfully earned it 

a reputation as the world’s premier development agency. In over 60 years of development and humanitarian work, it has been instrumental in dramatically reducing 

infant and child mortality, raising agricultural production through scientific innovation, spurring economic growth and helping build democracies. In those years we 

have created a great number of friends—from students to Government Ministers 

who have come to study and travel in the United States—and we have created a 

reserve of goodwill. 

If confirmed as Administrator, I intend to build on these successes. My goal is to 

reinvigorate USAID and to help build a platform for my successors which will position them to better meet the unprecedented challenges and opportunities of today’s 

world. 

I am greatly encouraged by what I have heard in my ‘‘listening tour.’’ The message I have heard—from you in Congress as well as from your staffs, from our 

stakeholders in the humanitarian and development community in Washington, from 

educators and business people, from our host countries and the recipients of our assistance in the field, other government agencies within this administration, from the 

563 

Secretary of State, and, of course, from within USAID itself—is a remarkably consistent one. Everyone I have consulted shares with me a perception of foreign assistance as more important than ever to the welfare of the world and to this Nation’s 

security. And they see USAID as central to the success of this Nation’s development 

mission. In.short, USAID is unique both in its reach and the flexibility of its programming. And it is a valuable instrument of U.S. foreign policy, U.S. economic policy, and our Nation’s humanitarian outreach. 

I want to make clear that the ‘‘listening mode’’ I have adopted these last several 

weeks will continue. In this regard, I am encouraged by the consensus I have found. 

I also want to make clear that ‘‘listening’’ is not an end in itself. It is my intention 

to build on the consensus I have found as the basis for an action plan for the agency. And for this I will need the counsel, guidance, and support of the Congress during the time I am Administrator, should I be confirmed, as well as the support of 

USAID’s other key stakeholders. 

If a revitalized USAID is to make its contribution to the success of our foreign 

assistance mission and to this Nation’s security, first and foremost, we will need to 

replenish a core workforce that has been dramatically reduced over the course of 

several decades. 

The trend lines in this regard are as disturbing and have reached a critically low 

level. In 1980, there were approximately 4,000 direct hires in the USAID workforce; 

today there are 2,000, managing comparable amounts of programming dollars. 

The reservoir of experienced personnel that existed a generation ago no longer exists. We have lost a cadre of development experts, versed in the myriad facets of 

foreign assistance, who are long-term, institutionally bound to the agency and closely identified with it. While today it is both common and appropriate for the agency 

to contract for much of the expertise to carry out its mission, current staffing levels 

are not adequate to lead and manage the programs and projects effectively. Moreover, that the agency faces the retirement bow wave common to much of the rest 

of the Federal Government, and that can only exacerbate these problems. 

In recent years, Congress has appropriated less for our operating expenses (OE) 

than the agency has requested. OE is what makes possible our ‘‘footprint’’—our people and where we deploy them. In the coming months, should I be confirmed, I will 

be exploring with you the implications of this OE situation. I can assure you that 

the agency is analyzing in detail how we might position USAID for the future by 

addressing the composition of our workforce and determining how it might be more 

effectively repositioned, trained, and deployed. I believe that U.S. interests would 

be well served by a strong, well-trained, well-deployed USAID. I intend to work very 

hard to find ways to achieve that result, and, should I be confirmed, I would plan 

to engage the Congress as a first order of business on these and related matters. 

As we improve administrative services at USAID and the Department of State, 

I will also be asking Congress to consider significant new investments in the Information Technology at the agency’s disposal. The greater transparency and openness 

that I am committed to requires a modern information systems architecture at 

USAID and the Department of State. That will take substantial investments and 

time, but will pay off dramatically over the long run by helping us manage our programs and activities much more efficiently and effectively. 

Last, you have asked me about morale at USAID and how I will address what 

is perceived to be a lingering problem there. I want you to know that I am a handson manager and will establish a very visible and accessible presence at the agency, 

should I be confirmed. I have already done so as an Acting Administrator. I believe 

in our USAID people and our programs. Our people are enormously dedicated and 

rightfully proud of the work they accomplish every day in small and large areas of 

the world. USAID needs employees with diverse backgrounds and broad substantive 

expertise. My goal is to hire, not just to recruit, diverse employees. If confirmed, I 

will work hard to ensure a professional environment at USAID where every employee feels valued. 

In conclusion, if I am confirmed by the Senate as Administrator of USAID, it will 

be an honor to work together with you once again in the service of our great country. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your 

statement. 

We’ll start off with 7-minute rounds, and then I’m sure there’ll 

be other opportunities for further follow-up beyond that. And the 

Chair will recognize himself to start that conversation. 

Madam Secretary, the committee has learned that, on two occasions in the past 12 months, some 20 to 30 employees of AID reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00571 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
564 

ceived briefings by the Office of Political Affairs at the White 

House. One of those briefings was held at AID headquarters. One 

of these was at the old executive office building. And I understand 

that Senator Biden, the chairman of the full committee, wrote you 

a letter last week seeking additional information about these briefings. 

I’d like you to tell the committee what you know about these 

briefings. 

Ms. FORE. I know what I have read in the newspaper, and I have 

read the letter from Senator Biden. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You know nothing independently of the 

newspaper or Senator Biden’s letter? 

Ms. FORE. I was not present at either event, and, as you know, 

I have been only involved with USAID for approximately 21⁄2

months. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, you had no previous knowledge about 

this, either in your acting capacity or in your previous capacity in 

the role that you’ve had at the State Department, until now? 

Ms. FORE. I have been aware that a number of informational 

briefings have been taking place over the years, but I have not 

been aware of these two particular instances, and I was not present 

at either one. 

Senator MENENDEZ. When you say ‘‘informational briefings,’’ 

these have been described by public accounts, as well as a copy 

that has been received by the committee of what the informational 

briefing was, and I think that the informational briefing could be 

described as nothing else as a political briefing. Is that what you’re 

referring to as ‘‘informational briefings’’? 

Ms. FORE. I have not—I was not present at these briefings. I believe that they are informational briefings, and—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let’s look at the information. But you 

did say you weren’t at these two briefings, but you did say you 

were aware of what you describe as ‘‘informational briefings.’’ Have 

you ever been at any one of these informational briefings, outside 

of these two briefings? 

Ms. FORE. When I was at the Department of Treasury, the— 

there were informational briefings for senior individuals in the Department of Treasury, and I was one of those individuals. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And what was the centerpiece of that informational briefing the essence of politics, the political landscape in 

the country? 

Ms. FORE. Yes, it was the political landscape, to try to make sure 

that we were aware of issues that were relevant to legislation or 

activities that were going on that might better inform us, as individuals. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, the memo that we have, that was used 

at these meetings, that—the two that you were not at—talks about 

not legislation, but talks about ‘‘race is extremely close,’’ talks 

about ‘‘split districts represented by Democrats,’’ talks about 

‘‘Democrats having a precarious hold on power,’’ talks about ‘‘targeting House races in the year 2008,’’ talks about ‘‘battle for the 

Senate,’’ and talks about where there is a ‘‘GOP defense’’ and 

where there is a ‘‘GOP offense,’’ including my home State of New 

Jersey. 

565 

Do you think it is appropriate, as you are up for the nomination 

of this Department, that AID employees be spending their time 

being briefed on the electoral landscape? 

Ms. FORE. I think it is important that we follow all regulations 

and appropriate legal procedures. And I would be very pleased, 

Senator, to relook at what our guidelines are in the U.S. Agency 

for International Development, because there are very strong 

guidelines about not being involved with political candidates and 

other activities, to make sure that our people are well briefed and 

really understand what the guidelines are. 

Senator MENENDEZ. To the extent that you went to some of these 

briefings, how did the invitation get extended to you? 

Ms. FORE. I believe that the invitation would have come through 

our White House liaison. As you know, most departments have a 

White House liaison, and that would generally be how such invitations would come to us. 

Well, from my own view, I don’t think that it is appropriate. I 

think it is a corruption of the process to have employees—and, I’m 

not sure, do you know whether the 20 to 30 employees of AID that 

received briefings, were they all political appointees or were some 

of them civil servants? Have you looked at that yet, since Senator 

Biden sent you the letter? 

Ms. FORE. I have not yet looked at that, but we will look at that 

and respond. 

[NOTE. The information requested above appears at the end of 

this hearing in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ 

section.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I hope that’s a high priority for you, 

because it certainly, in my mind, is the inappropriate use of the 

time of the men and women of AID, to be being informed about 

where the battleground States are and which are targeted House 

races and which are targeted Senate races. I’m not quite sure how 

that promotes the development agenda abroad, the foreign policy 

agenda of the United States, to be using the time of USAID employees for the purposes of what is, in essence, a political strategy 

program. And, to me, that seem—clearly seems a corruption of a 

process that we should and I would hope that, if you were to receive the approval of this committee, that you would have a strong 

opposition to. I heard you say you’re going to look at the regulations. I would want the Assistant Secretary to be telling me, ‘‘I will 

not be having my employees at USAID spending their time on the 

domestic politics and political landscape of the country. I’m going 

to have them developing the best programs to put America’s best 

foot abroad, in a development context.’’ 

Ms. FORE. Well, Senator, I, too, would like to see our people 

spending their time on creating the best programs overseas for development and for foreign assistance, because that is their main 

mission, and that is what they are to spend their time on. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, we look forward to your response to 

Senator Biden’s letter. 

With that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking member, 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

566 

For the 28 years I’ve served on the committee we’ve had Republicans and Democrats leadership, different administrations, and the 

age-old battle goes on as to how many of our ambassadors should 

be so-called political people, as opposed to Foreign Service. Ditto for 

under secretaries and others down the line. Roughly, in all administrations, a quarter to a third have been so-called political people. 

By that, it means many of them were vigorously involved in the 

election of whoever was elected President of the United States. Vigorously. Now, it’s inconceivable these people never had a thought 

about partisan politics. They thought about it all the time, trying 

to elect whoever was going to be President—probably didn’t forget 

about it after they went out to their posts. 

Now, without trivializing the matter, I suspect it is not appropriate to have charts of candidates coming and going in an official 

function attributed to Karl Rove or anybody else. I would hope that 

the administration would cease and desist from that, but, likewise, 

the subsequent administrations would cease and desist from activities of that variety. Within this committee we’ve had members on 

both sides of the aisle who rant and rave about political appointees, 

who berate these poor souls who come before our committee, under 

that guise. Most of them, somehow or other, are confirmed, and 

many are distinguished in their service. 

But I hope—and I take the point of the Chairman today—that 

you will not have any briefings, if you are confirmed, that have 

lists of candidates, either prospective or past, or political reminiscence on the job. There is a time and a place for that, and not inside the Department. 

Now, having said all that, let me ask you, What are your plans 

for the so-called ‘‘F’’ process? And I want to define ‘‘F process,’’ the 

reform effort that Mr. Tobias headed at the State Department to 

try to bring into the fore the foreign policy programs examined at 

the country level by those who were administering, those experiencing them. Can you give us some comment about that process 

and how you would forward it? 

Ms. FORE. Yes, thank you very much, Senator. 

I think it’s been a very interesting time. This is a bold goal, to 

try to gather together all of the foreign assistance that we, as the 

United States Government, invest on behalf of the American people. And it is very complex. It is not easy. But we have begun. And 

I have spoken to Senator Menendez before about the fact that we’re 

really at the beginning; we’re not at the middle, and we’re not at 

the end of this process. 

So, the first area that I began to look at was, How much was our 

involvement with the field? Because the field, in the end, is where 

all of our programs are carried out, it’s where our implementing 

partners are doing their good work and reaching out and helping 

others to help themselves. And I do not think that we have involved the field enough. And in our after-action report, one of the 

key findings was that we needed to involve the field more. 

So, we’ve started involving the field more. We are now involving 

the field before the Secretary makes her decisions on country-level 

programs. We are now making sure that the field can make some 

choices, in terms of implementors of the programs in the field. And 

I’ve had very instructive discussions with our ambassadors and 

567 

mission directors in the field on the things that they see that we 

should be working on, and how we could improve the process. I am 

hearing that our process, this year, for fiscal year 2009, is much 

improved. I would anticipate, for next year, that the process will 

be even more improved. But, starting with the field, that is where 

we began. 

Second, I very much want to streamline and simplify the process, 

and I would also like to get greater transparency into the system, 

for USAID, for State Department, and for implementing partners; 

everyone needs to be able to see into the system, so they know 

ways that they can improve it and how they can see themselves as 

a part of a larger whole in a country-development program. 

So, I think we have a good start, but there’s much to do. This 

will be a continuing process. And, with your help and your counsel, 

I think we can leave this in even better shape in 18 months’ time. 

Senator LUGAR. In this administration, there’s been debate, 

among friends and critics, as to which has been paramount, 

counterterrorism efforts in the field or alleviation of extreme poverty. The two are not necessary exclusive, but some would charge 

that one has taken precedence over the other. 

What is your observation, at least initially, of what has been occurring in the field as people from the field come forward and give 

the testimony that you’re encouraging? 

Ms. FORE. Yes, it’s a very interesting question. It’s one that has 

wide ramifications for how the United States policies are seen 

abroad, as well as how we invest our resources. There are many 

instances where counterterrorism, or the peace and security portfolio, is the most important area to attend to first, because, without 

some basis of security, it’s very hard for people to begin lives that 

are at all normal. Their quality of life is very poor. And yet, one 

can never forget the humanitarian and development side. So, we 

are trying to find a balance. It is something that the new foreign 

assistance framework—the Secretary and I have been very committed to, to find a balance between these areas, but also to find 

a balance between short-term and long-term development needs, 

because they are all important. 

What we are hearing from the field is that some ambassadors 

and mission directors and implementors, nonprofit organizations in 

the field, feel very strongly that we should be doing more of this, 

or more of that. But, in the end, almost everyone, as we begin to 

talk at roundtables, begins to see that there has to be a very strong 

balance. But it is a difficult world. It is a less secure world. It is 

a world with many more countries in conflict and in post-conflict. 

And thus, it is the world that we have. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much for your answers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And we’re going to alternate both sides, so I’d recognize Senator 

Nelson now. 

Senator NELSON. Good afternoon, Ms. Fore. 

We have talked privately about the passport fiasco that occurred 

under your watch. And I want to ask you a few questions about 

that with regard to how it will relate to your management capabilities with regard to this new position that you are nominated for. 

568 

As you have heard me describe, Ms. Hardy was here, about a 

month ago, and there were a lot of frustrated Senators. And they 

expressed the frustration of thousands of the folks back home. 

There have been angry phone calls. It’s forced the State Department to immediately try to react. And the State Department has 

had to divert resources. Do you consider this a management failure? 

Ms. FORE. Well, I consider it a challenge, and one that we must 

overcome, because we have American citizens, who are our customers, that need to have passports. And so, our job, our sole focus, 

is how to make sure that every American who comes forward and 

who applies for a passport gets it in a timely manner. 

Senator NELSON. Indeed, it’s a challenge, but I’m trying to focus 

on the management. Now, Mrs. Hardy, who was here a month ago, 

she took the entire blame for this, and, as recently as, I think, yesterday, she, as Assistant Secretary, accepted—and I use her 

words—‘‘complete responsibility,’’ end of quote, for the passport fiasco. And what I would like to understand from you, since you 

were her boss, as Under Secretary for Management in the State 

Department, do you bear some of this responsibility? 

Ms. FORE. Yes. I think we all bear the responsibility whenever 

we are not able to meet the expectations of the American people. 

The good news, Senator, is that passports are much desired by the 

American public, and that we will be better off, as a Nation, with 

more Americans carrying passports. 

Senator NELSON. Well, share with the committee—what was 

your role in preparing for the excess demand for the passports 

under the new Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative? 

Ms. FORE. In looking forward to what sorts of demands that we 

thought that we would have, a group of advisors were gathered, in 

Consular Affairs, which included outside private consultants and 

individuals from private industry, from travel and tourism, and individuals who have been working in Consular Affairs, with decades 

of experience. And they gathered to think through and look forward, for the next 1 year, 5 years, what sorts of demand we could 

anticipate as a department. And their sense was that it was perhaps a 33 percent increase in demand. And then, all of us begin 

to work to try to gather the resources. These are both the contractors, the funds, the people, the training, and the raw materials, 

like passport books. We try to gather them, to be able to fulfill that 

estimate. 

The estimate was low. And what happened this spring, in January, February, March, and April, was that the requests, the applications, came in at double the rate that had been anticipated. It’s 

unprecedented in history, and it just was not seen. 

So—— 

Senator NELSON. The estimates, originally, for excess demand, 

were last fall. Why, for example, would you—as a manager overseeing Mrs. Hardy, why would you allow the outside contractor to 

go all the way until the month of May of this year in order to hire 

additional personnel to handle the backlog, when, in fact, it was 

known last fall? 

Ms. FORE. Senator Nelson, we have a number of contractors who 

are helping. We have contractors who work the call centers. We 

569 

have contractors who are working the lockbox. We have a number 

of types of contractors who are by our side in manning the windows 

and doing much of the work for creating passports. And we tried 

to work with every one of these contractors to get the service and 

to make sure that they understood the increasing demands that we 

were seeing in this entire supply chain. 

So, I and others were on the phone talking to contractors, making sure that we were getting all of the authorities we needed to 

bring back retirees, to get volunteers, to put everyone to work, to 

get enough training programs going, because we have to do this 

thoughtfully; it is not something that we can do lightly. We bear 

a responsibility to do this properly and well—— 

Senator NELSON. In this case—— 

Ms. FORE [continuing]. But to gather these resources. 

Senator NELSON. In this case, there was only one contractor. It 

was Citibank that was the lockbox, and the ones that—it was way 

on up until May that they did not start hiring additional personnel, 

and they just got more and more behind the eight ball. 

Well, let me ask you—I have two remaining questions, and not 

much time left—how many Foreign Service officers have been 

brought home from their current post, or taken out of the Foreign 

Service Institute, to help process passports? 

Ms. FORE. Well, at this moment, we have 273 Foreign Service officers, who are volunteers, who are working around the country. 

We have another 350 Department employees, who are volunteering 

to work on the telephone task force. So, these could be customer 

service. We now have the ability to use our IT systems and remotely adjudicate renewals of passports, so they are staying in 

place, and they are in London and New Delhi and Chennai. So, we 

also have people who are offshore, our Foreign Service officers, U.S. 

citizens, who are remotely adjudicating passports. 

Senator NELSON. Well, taking them out of their existing jobs and 

having them meet this, has this had an effect upon our foreign diplomacy? 

Ms. FORE. Well, we are all working very hard. And, for most of 

us, we are working very long hours. You know we’re working 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week, at our passport centers. So, for many 

of our people, they’re working a full day, plus then they work another 4 hours on passports. So, everyone’s trying to pitch in. I cannot tell you how hard everyone is working. They are just trying to 

make sure that there is not one American citizen that is without 

a passport and that—whose travel plans need to be delayed. 

Senator NELSON. And for the $60 expedited fee, are you going to 

make sure that those who did not get it expedited are going to have 

a refund of their money? 

Ms. FORE. Yes. We have several options for you on that, Senator, 

which maybe we can speak about with you later. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I’d be just as happy to hear it now. I don’t 

want to take the time—— 

Ms. FORE. All right. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Of the committee members. Let’s 

go on with you all, but, in the course of this hearing. 

Senator MENENDEZ. All right. Thank you. 

570 

Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And welcome, again, 

Secretary Fore. 

Speaking of passports, as you no doubt saw in Sunday’s Washington Post—rather significant story about a report that our Ambassador to Iraq, Ambassador Crocker, if I have this correct, sent 

you a cable, and, according to the paper, the cable urged the 

United States to offer United States immigrant visas to all Iraqi 

employees who worked for the United States Government in Iraq. 

You may know that this is part of a Kennedy-Hagel bill that is 

larger and more substantial than just the visas, but deals with 

Iraqi resettlement here in the United States, those who have assisted the United States Government over the last 5 years. 

I think this committee would be interested in your response to 

that story. What is the current status of Ambassador Crocker’s 

cable, and anything else you can tell us about that issue? 

Ms. FORE. Thank you, Senator Hagel. 

We think this is a very important issue. There is a special responsibility that we bear for those brave Iraqi nationals who have 

been working by our side, and we feel it most acutely in USAID 

and Department of State and Department of Defense, because they 

are often by our sides. As you know, there is some legislation which 

allows us to have special immigrant visas for translators. And we 

certainly welcome legislation which would allow this to be broader, 

so that it could cover more of the Iraqi nationals who would like 

to be covered under the special immigrant visas. 

There is a second route that Assistant Secretary Ellen Sauerbrey 

has spoken about quite frequently and well, which is that of the 

refugee status. Our Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration has processed, and looked at, a number of opportunities and 

ways for Iraqi nationals to come to the United States. 

And there is a third area that we have worked on, which is for 

internally displaced persons, and ways that we, whether it’s United 

States Agency for International Development, can help with Iraqi 

nationals who have moved to either the borders along Jordan or 

other countries, and ways that we can help in education or with 

humanitarian assistance for those individuals. 

But we do feel that there is a responsibility, and we certainly 

like to encourage legislation that would help these individuals. 

Senator HAGEL. Well, if I read that story correctly—I’ve not seen 

the cables, incidentally—Ambassador Crocker is putting some rather significant urgency on this issue. And if I interpret at least the 

story correctly, without having read the cables—and, by the way, 

this is an issue he brought before this committee last week, and 

it’s an issue he has discussed with me privately—I definitely got 

the sense that he felt that the State Department should be making 

this as a high a priority as there is, and doing something about it. 

So, what are we doing about it? 

Ms. FORE. Well, we, in the State Department, can’t do everything 

alone; we just don’t have enough authorities. So, all of the chiefof-mission authorities that he can exercise, he has, because we 

agree with him that he should have those authorities. So, he has 

those. We are looking to see if there are any additional authorities 

571 

which he might be able to have, and we do not have a full answer 

on that, as yet. 

Senator HAGEL. When will we have an answer? 

Ms. FORE. I would think, shortly. 

Senator HAGEL. Well, I would like for you to get back to the committee on that. My vote may well hinge on that. 

Senator HAGEL. I would like to know, also, how many Iraqis have 

we resettled in the United States? 

Ms. FORE. I don’t know the answer to that question, sir. 

Senator HAGEL. Well, the answer is about 60 or 70. Now, if this 

administration is putting this kind of urgency on this issue, and we 

are saying all the things, from the President on down, that we 

owe—just as you have said, Madam Secretary—we owe this to 

these good, faithful Iraqis who have supported us, at great risk. To 

your point, it seems we’re not matching our words with our actions. 

And I would like a better answer to this question. And I would expect that. And certainly, my vote would very much depend on that, 

because there’s a disconnect, in my mind, somewhere. If our Ambassador is saying one thing, in rather urgent tone—at least that’s 

the way the story in the paper reflected it; and if I saw the cables, 

I might have a different interpretation—but is that your interpretation, that Ambassador Crocker was rather urgent and serious 

about this? 

Ms. FORE. Absolutely. And we feel that same urgency in the Department, which is why every chief-of-mission authority that we 

can give him, we have given him. What we are looking into whether there are additional authorities? Beyond that, we will need help 

from Congress. 

Senator HAGEL. Well, why would he send it to you? The cable. 

Ms. FORE. Because I am Under Secretary of State for Management. 

Senator HAGEL. For management. So, that tells me that we’ve 

got some bottleneck somewhere; to some extent, focused on what 

Senator Nelson was talking about. So, I will leave that issue where 

it is, and you know my sense of that. 

Let me move to the issue of Afghanistan. What’s your assessment of our assistance programs in Afghanistan? 

Ms. FORE. I have not, as yet, visited to see the USAID programs 

within Afghanistan. I have visited Kabul to visit the embassy, and 

also have been out to a PRT in Panjshir. And my sense is that 

there is a strong sense of partnership, and that there is real 

progress. 

As I read my briefing papers on how we are faring in Afghanistan, there are some real successes in school, and attendance by 

girls in school in Afghanistan. There is also real success in building 

of roads, of irrigation; thus, of other livelihoods. There are successes in the north, in eradication of poppies. There are successes 

that can be found throughout the country. There are also some 

areas that are real challenges, and, I think, will need increasing attention by all of us, but I will look forward to taking a look on the 

ground and talking to the people and seeing how they feel about 

our foreign assistance programs with USAID, but also with our 

other foreign assistance entities. 

572 

Senator HAGEL. All right, just before—my time, I know, is up— 

but I would just make this last comment. On eradication of poppy, 

Madam Secretary, the poppy crop in Afghanistan is at a historical 

high. It was the largest poppy crop in the history of Afghanistan. 

So, I’m not sure you’d want to list that as a success story. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Hagel. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Madam Under Secretary, I want to thank you for being 

here. 

I wanted to speak to a couple of things that pertain to recent reports in the press, as well as your jurisdiction, should you be confirmed, and some of the statements you made in your prepared remarks. 

I want to refer, just as a predicate, to a couple of things. First 

of all, a story I’m sure you’ve seen this Sunday in the Washington 

Post, that talks about—the headline is, ‘‘Hill Aid Groups, One 

Opaque System Replaces—Replaced Another.’’ It talks about Secretary Rice asking, in 2005, quote, ‘‘How much does the United 

States spend each year on promoting democracy overseas?’’ Nine 

months later, I guess, she gets the answer of 1.2 billion. It goes on 

to talk about 23 overlapping programs. The assertion in the article, 

that there’s still—that one opaque system, as opposed to transparent, replaced another. At the beginning of about the fifth paragraph, ‘‘Rice’s foreign aid approach, sadly, bears the hallmarks of 

our failed early assistance efforts in Iraq,’’ unquote, and it goes on 

from there. 

And I say that as a predicate. And I also say, as a predicate, I’ve 

got a chart here that was presented in this room—I believe it was 

this room, in another hearing not too long ago by Dr. Lael Brainard 

of the Brookings Institute. And what she has here, that it’s hard 

to see, even when you’re close, but she had a better copy of this— 

the headline on this—the title, I should say, is, ‘‘U.S. Foreign Assistance Legislation Objectives and Organizations.’’ And it’s a 

mind-numbing chart which is almost difficult to trace. It would 

take you hours, probably, to trace every line. So, it’s a picture of 

what—unfortunately, what too many people who watch a hearing 

like this—too many people will follow the work of government, especially the Federal Government, are concerned about. And they 

have a right to be concerned, and a right—and a right to be disturbed by overlapping jurisdictions, wastes of money, bureaucracy 

that is not only confusing, but, in the end, is a barrier or an obstacle to getting, in this case, aid to countries and people that should 

get it, not to mention what it does in the context of our overall 

budget. 

And I’ll quote a President, also—and I’ll be done with my predicate in a second—quote, ‘‘No objective supporter of foreign aid can 

be satisfied with the existing programs. Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward, and slow, its administration is diffused over a 

haphazard and irrational structure,’’ unquote. Well, unfortunately, 

that wasn’t made recently. The President was President Kennedy. 

It was in 1961. So, we haven’t made much progress. 

573 

But I ask you, in light of that—the predicate to my question, and 

in light of your testimony—I know you spoke, in your prepared remarks, about simplification and transparency, neither of which, I 

would argue, are possible, or in any way possible, if we don’t do 

something about the maze that is these series of programs, initiatives, and objectives. And I’d ask you to outline for us—and supplement and amplify it for the record, if you need to—but tell us, as 

best you can, in the few short minutes, about what you’re going to 

do, and what—the plans you have that are already developed to 

deal with this mess that is the overlapping set of lines that I just 

showed you in that chart. 

Ms. FORE. Senator Casey, it is, indeed, a very complex field. And 

your chart, with your set of lines, does show that it is fragmented 

and that it can often lead to one entity not understanding what another entity is doing. And that is within the United States Government, but it’s also in the donor community at large with other 

countries. It’s also with the private sector. 

So, what I would hope to do with the Director of U.S. Foreign 

Assistance portfolio is that we can gather, that we can focus, and 

that we can really place all of our assets of the United States Government in a country in areas that will have the greatest impact. 

It is something that is a challenge, something that Senator Lugar 

has spoken about in years prior. It remains a challenge. But I am 

committed to begin that process. It is a process that has now 

begun, on the budget side, where we gather all of the departments 

around a table and talk about countries and regions, so that you 

will see Department of Defense and Department of Treasury and 

Department of Commerce and USAID and HIV/AIDS, the PEPFAR 

program, and others around a table and talking about what the development programs should be. We also now have some beginnings 

of definitions for what is democracy, for example. 

And all of these are good starts, but we’re just at the beginning 

of this process. And what I would hope to be able to do in coming 

months is to try to simplify this, but also to try to better coordinate 

that which currently exists so that we can really have a strong impact, and the best impact possible, for the American people, as well 

as for the people around the world that we are serving. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you for your answer. I’d—I would ask you 

to—and I appreciate the answer, and I appreciate the commitment 

that you’ve made today, but I’d ask you also to submit for the 

record a game plan for this, and a rather detailed game plan, about 

how you’re going to go about this. I realize it’s difficult. Those of 

us who have been in government—I was in State Government—it’s 

hard to break through, and it’s important to identify where efficiencies are and where overlapping jurisdictions prevent us from 

reaching our goal. So, I’d ask you to supplement in—for the written—a written version of what you’ve said, and amplify it for the 

record. 

[The requested information appears at the end of this hearing in 

the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section.] 

Senator CASEY. I’d also ask, Mr. Chairman, that the chart I just 

showed you—we’ll submit a larger and more understandable and 

color version of that chart—I’d ask that that be submitted as part 

of the record. 

574 

Senator MENENDEZ. Without objection. 

Senator CASEY. And, finally—I wanted to make one last point— 

the paragraph I talked—that I referred to, in the Washington Post 

story of this Sunday, talks about the failed early assistance efforts 

in Iraq, but here’s something else that I think is very important 

with regard to transparency. And this is a challenge for you, not 

just in the context of going forward, but, of course, even in the context of your confirmation. It says that—and I’m picking up in the 

middle of a line—‘‘. . . one opaque system has replaced another.’’ 

And then it follows with these words, which I should have read before, quote, ‘‘. . . with a small group of people deciding how (a) dollars are divvied up, what countries they reach, and who controls 

them,’’ unquote. That’s a recipe for, not just disaster in the erosion 

of confidence that the American people feel and that Congress 

would feel in the work that you’re doing and will continue to do if 

you’re confirmed, but I think that would be the wrong path to take, 

to have a small group of people who may be driven by ideology— 

or even if they’re not—if they’re driven by narrow interests, to 

make these decisions. So, I would urge you to be a leader in the 

transparency which I think people have a right to expect, and I 

think that’s going to be a key indicator of your stewardship, if you 

were to be confirmed. 

Thank you. 

Ms. FORE. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here today, and for your service. 

Along with some of the things that have been mentioned coming 

up to your nomination, there have been other things, maybe some 

policy conflicts between your personal thoughts and those of the 

State Department. My assumption is that you would stay within 

the guidelines that are laid out in the State Department, and that’s 

not an issue. Is that correct? 

Ms. FORE. Correct. 

Senator CORKER. One of the things that—I know you’ve been 

having a 2-month listening tour, if you will, to kind of understand 

what’s going on in the Department as you, hopefully, prepare to 

move ahead—Iraq, I’m sure, is a place you’ve spent a focused 

amount of time, because of its importance—and one of the things 

that I think has been most noticeable, and that is that our military 

has been absolutely outstanding in what they have done, and yet, 

we really have lacked so much progress on the civilian side in, really, coordinating with them properly, whether it’s—and not, by the 

way, because people aren’t committed and dedicated that are there, 

but certainly we’ve had trouble staffing the PRTs. There’s a lot of 

categories there that we have not complemented properly. And I’d 

like for you to speak to that, because it seems to me that, from the 

standpoint of the things that are urgent for you to deal with, if confirmed, that has to be one of those, and I’d just love to hear you 

expand on that. 

Ms. FORE. Yes. Thank you, Senator Corker. It is, indeed. I am 

on a weekly call with our Iraq mission, because I do think it is so 

very important. 

575 

Let me talk to you a little bit about PRT staffing. I think it is 

important that—as the military has done such an excellent job that 

we are sure that we are there with the civilian resources coming 

in behind them. We have been working on the civilian surge and 

we have done very well. I’ve just received a report this morning. 

Phase 1 ended March 31 and we have all of our individuals fully 

deployed, but phase 2 was to be completed August 31, putting 12 

more technical experts that would go out to the field. And that has 

been readied 2 months early. So, that’s good. That means that, for 

USAID, we are meeting the staffing goals for the PRTs. Phase 3 

is coming along. With phase 2 already complete, we should be able 

to move quite quickly into phase 3. 

It’s going to be very important that we have the right technical 

expertise in the PRTs; that they are cohesive units; that USAID 

and Department of State, as well as other agencies and DOD, work 

together in the field. 

Senator CORKER. You know, I—just, sort of, building off Senator 

Casey’s comments—I think all of us—and this certainly has nothing to do with you—but the sense that there’s just this abyss, if you 

will, to deal with, as it relates to foreign aid, as it relates to so 

many things that we try to deal with in our foreign relations. 

Could you talk a little bit about just how those relationships seem 

internal to the organization, and what you might—whether it’s 

with State or Defense—and how you see, if there’s deficiencies 

there in the ability for you all to communicate and work together 

and actually get something done, what your thoughts are about improving that. 

Ms. FORE. Yes. It’s a very interesting area, and it’s a very important area for the United States. Our national security strategy lists 

diplomacy, development, and defense as the three legs of the stool. 

And it is very important that they be integrated and coordinated. 

We now have an Office of Military Affairs within the U.S. Agency 

for International Development, so that there is good liaison with 

the military—within the Department of State, the same—so that 

we have links in with combatant commanders, we have links in 

with the field, that we begin to cross-train our people—it’s one of 

the most important things—so that our people in USAID and State 

have a chance to train with the military, that we have a chance 

to train with each other, so that we understand how we can have 

more synergy as a trio. 

But it is a constant challenge. We have enormous goodwill. People are really trying to work hard on it. One of my areas of focus, 

as the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, is to think through how 

we can coordinate even better. 

The Reconstruction and Stabilization Teams that we have begun 

discussing, I think, are one of the ways that we can look at that, 

because it means that there are more civilians who can be mobilized on short notice, and that they are able to move out to the 

places they are needed. And that will be a very important new tool 

for all of us. 

Senator CORKER. Moving back to Iraq, when you—looking at 

some of the difficulties that have been sustained, if you will, in trying to have appropriate personnel in place in civilian positions— 

has been more of the different types of responsibilities that are 

576 

being taking on—taken on in Iraq, or has it been more the security, 

if you will, of the people—or the perceived security—in going to 

serve in that way? 

Ms. FORE. Well, more of our resources go toward security than, 

I think, any of us had originally planned. Security has become such 

an overwhelming need for us to plan for so that people can do their 

work. But we identify individuals based on their technical expertise. So, whether it is agriculture, or whether it is municipal election systems, or whether it is some other part of civil society, it is 

those technical skills that are the ones that we look for—engineering capacity, for instance. And that’s how we then fill these positions in the PRTs. 

Once they are there, it is then our responsibility and our mission 

to be sure that they are able to do their jobs and that they have 

the tools that they need to do their jobs. But it is a constant challenge, in many of these posts, to have a secure enough environment 

so that they get their work done to the maximum extent possible. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

We’re going to start a second 7-minute round of questions. 

Let me—and I’ll recognize myself—let me go back to where I left 

off with you, Madam Secretary. I appreciate Senator Lugar’s comments about ambassadors who are political appointees. I didn’t 

even reference those, although I don’t believe, once you are an ambassador, that you should be using your time for the purposes of 

the political landscape. What I was referencing was the 20 to 30 

employees of AID, who are not ambassadors, who clearly should 

not be spending their time at political briefings. 

In that respect, let me ask you two final questions. How many 

of these political briefings have you attended in your time in the 

administration? 

Ms. FORE. Let’s see, when I was at the Department of Treasury, 

one, perhaps two. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Is that the totality, in that and the present 

position? 

Ms. FORE. I believe so. I have not attended any in the Department of State. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And who conducted those briefings? 

Ms. FORE. Individuals from the White House, whose names, at 

this moment, escape me. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You don’t remember any of the people who 

conducted them, they must not have been very impressive. [Laughter.] 

It wasn’t Mr. Rove—I think you would have remembered him. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. FORE. But, Senator, I could come back to you on that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I would love to see it, for the record. 

Ms. FORE. All right. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. 

Second, let me change to a different issue. As I discuss in my 

statement, I’m deeply concerned about the possibilities of closing 

USAID missions. We have been assured that there are no plans to 

577 

close the list of USAID missions that I mentioned in my opening 

statement in fiscal year 2008. Is that correct? 

Ms. FORE. That is also what I have been told. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Can you tell us if there are any plans to 

close these or other missions in fiscal year 2009? 

Ms. FORE. I do not have any plans and I have been told that 

there are no other plans, to close missions in 2009. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. 

Ms. FORE. There are missions that open and close on a regular 

basis and I believe you know about the three that Congress had intended to close in Europe. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yeah, I am. Can you tell us, then, as we 

move forward, exactly what criteria you would use, if you were permanently given this position, in the context of closing missions? 

Ms. FORE. I’ve been thinking about this, but I do not yet have 

a complete answer, because I feel that it’s very important for us to 

talk to our mission directors. We will have the mission directors 

coming in for a mission directors conference in the fall. And I 

would like to hear their thoughts on what criteria we should use 

as an agency. 

I also think that we should consider the notion of a good strategy 

for USAID. And I would like to do that with our leadership in 

USAID, as well as with the mission directors. 

One of the areas that is a constant challenge for us is our operational expense level. I know that people have struggled with it 

and they have come up with a number of possible ways to deal 

with it. One of them is to close missions, or to reduce missions, or 

to reposition our people. In the Department of State, I’ve been seeing the benefits from repositioning people and I think that that is 

an area that I would like to encourage at USAID. The world 

changes and we need to change with it. But that does not necessary mean that you close a mission. It means that you may 

change your profile, because our programs change from country to 

country, from year to year, and from decade to decade. So, I would 

like to consider, as part of those criteria, in those situations when 

we are drawing down the capacity of a mission, if we are bringing 

it up in other areas, as well as a better use of regional missions, 

because the regional capacity allows you to have technical skills 

and surge capacity so that you do not have to have every skill at 

every mission in every country. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, but can you make a commitment to the 

committee, that, if confirmed, you would consult closely with Congress before closing any USAID mission? 

Ms. FORE. I would. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Let me turn to poverty alleviation. As you know, many of us believe this should be at the core of development assistance. And I 

asked you, in a letter, if you would commit to ensuring that the fiscal year 2009 budget process substantively implements the top-line 

goal of poverty alleviation. I appreciate your response to my question and your statement that poverty reduction is a part of the Secretary’s transformation diplomacy and development initiatives. You 

also went on to say, quote, ‘‘. . . that an appropriate balance must 

be struck among development objectives in order to bring about 

578 

lasting change in a case-by-case basis, and I look forward to consulting with you and other members regarding that balance as we 

move forward.’’ 

Now, while I appreciate that comment, and that we have to 

strike a balance—that’s obvious, I think—I’m also concerned that 

poverty alleviation will get lost in your calculations, particularly 

since it was only added to the transformational development goal 

after considerable urging from Congress and outside groups. 

So, my questions are these. Exactly what are you doing differently in the fiscal year 2009 budget process than in the 2008 

process to make sure that poverty alleviation is included, No. 1? 

And, No. 2, what—do you have specific metrics that are being 

used? Are you tracking what percentage of the funds for a specific 

region or a country are targeting poverty alleviation? And, No. 3, 

since the Secretary of State and your predecessor included poverty 

alleviation in the top-line goal for the ‘‘five by six’’ strategic framework, it still remains unclear how this additional goal has since 

been integrated into the ‘‘F’’ reform process and structure. Could 

you, with some explicit reference, clarify how poverty alleviation 

has, or is being, integrated into the ‘‘F’’ reform process, including 

the objective in country categories? 

Ms. FORE. Yes. Thank you, Senator. 

Having been at USAID before, I have a long-standing strong 

sense that poverty alleviation and poverty reduction are among the 

main purposes of the Agency for International Development. It’s 

what people count on us for. That old saying that often proves so 

true, that, ‘‘If you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day; if you 

teach him how to fish, you’ll feed him for a lifetime,’’ is part of that 

balance between short-term and long-term poverty reduction and 

alleviation. And this 2008 and 2009 process made sure that people 

are now gathered around the table who support all of these interests. And I think that will be the most important asset that we 

bring to the budgeting process. 

The second part is that I’ve begun outreach to nonprofit organizations, and I’ve begun to hear the areas that they feel that they 

have not seen enough in the way of either funds or attention or 

policies, so that we are beginning to see the landscape of the things 

that we want to be sure we are including in these budgets. This 

is ongoing for the 2009 process and we will try to weave as much 

of that in as possible in 2008. As you know, there is limited movement for 2008, but we will do our best to include these. 

In terms of how one can move forward in these areas, I would 

anticipate that we will find ways to make outreach ongoing. I don’t 

feel that we have had as much involvement by our outside advisory 

groups, many of whom represent the best among the implementers 

of our poverty alleviation and poverty reduction portfolio. This ongoing dialog will lead to changing people’s hearts and minds as 

well as changes in budgets and programs. 

So, I anticipate having more continuous, more regular meetings 

with all of our outside entities. And I think that that will help everyone. Some of this is just a training process, making sure that 

everyone sees all parts of development. It is not something that you 

can learn in a week, or that you can learn in a year. The best of 

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579 

ment, and we need to pass this information along. This is why I 

made my initial plea that we be able to begin to staff up and train 

people. We need the next generation to come along and carry this 

banner for poverty alleviation and reduction. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate your answer. I want to follow 

up with you, but let me turn to Senator Lugar for—— 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, what comment could you make about section 

1206 funding—The train-and-equip security assistance that comes 

through the Pentagon? This arises, as you know, from the general 

desire of our country to become more involved in nation-building, 

but particularly on the security side. Some of the countries that 

we’re trying to rebuild had extraordinary problems, and sometimes 

it was expedient for the Department of Defense, that had a much 

larger budget for this, simply to take things in its own hands and 

to move ahead, sometimes even without the knowledge of the ambassador of the country. Now, that became worrisome, at least in 

our oversight capacity. Our staff members went to embassies, and 

that report has been made public. And it was not to embarrass the 

Pentagon or the security people. Many did a very good job—but the 

need for at least the ambassador in the country to have cognizance 

of what was going on in the country, so that, as protests arose, or 

various other difficulties, is apparent. 

Now, we’ve had these fledgling efforts of our staff in oversight, 

but what I wanted to inquire of you was, as a part of your ‘‘F’’ process, of heading out to the embassies, interviewing the personnel involved, and so forth, will this section 1206 set of issues also be a 

part of your purview? 

Ms. FORE. Yes. And the very good part of section 1206, that the 

Secretary concurs in the use and the placement of these funds, 

they are very useful. They were used in Lebanon after the hostilities in reconstruction. And this has been a very powerful tool for 

integration and linkage between the Department of Defense and 

Department of State. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I appreciate that assurance, and we look 

forward to that result, as well as the composite of all of the results 

that you will have from those examinations. 

One of the issues that lies before, certainly, the committee and 

the administration is the continuation of the MCC program. The 

problem with the MCC program is that it has not expended very 

much money, in the judgment of many members—and the directors 

would point out, ‘‘Just as well’’—because, in the case of Millennium 

Challenge, the countries themselves try to determine what their 

priorities will be. There’s a nation-building, policy-building process, 

and that takes time for some countries that have not had experience in doing that, and it takes time for our administrators to 

make certain that the expenditures have some checks and balances, and are valid uses of American taxpayer money. Now, probably it’s a good idea to have criteria such as we have for the MCC 

program, of democracy-building and human rights, the rights of 

women, and a number of things—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar, if—— 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. 

580 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. If I may just briefly interrupt 

you. On the floor right now there is a moment of silence being observed—— 

Senator LUGAR. Oh, yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. For the officers, Chestnut and 

Gibson, who were killed in the line of duty defending the Capitol. 

If I may interrupt you for just one moment—— 

Senator LUGAR. Of course. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. And I would ask the committee 

to observe a moment of silence, as well. 

[A moment of silence was observed.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for reminding us of 

that very important time on the floor that we have observed now 

in the committee. 

In any event, the problem with the MCC, is that things have 

moved along slowly and the Congress has become impatient on occasion. Within this committee we’ve had debates. In what ways will 

you evaluate and help the Congress interpret the value of the program, which I think is considerable? But, if it is not, what kind of 

procedure can you have for giving us good counsel on MCC? 

Ms. FORE. Yes. This is an area I’m very interested in, because 

it is a very interesting new model for delivering foreign assistance. 

AID is a model, and the new GDA is a model, and the new Millennium Challenge Corporation is a model. And there are other 

models in other donor countries around the world. I would very 

much like to look at these models, see which are the most effective, 

which might hold great promise for the United States, and ways 

that we can improve this system. 

This is all exactly what we want to try to do with a Director of 

U.S. Foreign Assistance, because, if we can gather and focus our 

resources, as the United States, it will have greater impact. But we 

also should use the most effective and efficient models. 

So, I would love to get back to you on that, Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Madam Secretary, let me just pick off—where I left off with you. 

And I appreciate what I think is part of the answer to my threepart question. Let me reiterate two parts. 

You talked about putting people around the table. Maybe you 

could tell me—when I asked you, ‘‘What’s different in the 2009 

budget process than in the 2008 budget process, to make sure that 

poverty elimination’’—or alleviation, I should say—hopefully, ultimately, alleviation—elimination—but ‘‘alleviation is achieved and 

included?’’ You said, ‘‘Putting people around the table.’’ What exactly does that mean? What people? What level of individuals? And 

I appreciate the conversations you’re having with NJOs—NGOs. I 

think those are perfect, and to be applauded. But what people are 

you putting around the table that are going to make a difference 

in the 2009 budget process? 

Ms. FORE. There are interagency roundtables in the budget process itself for 2009. These include individuals at the senior level, but 

most often it is at a mid-level—who are talking by country, about 

581 

the programs that their agency is carrying out; and thus, what 

sorts of synergies are possible between their programs. Let us say, 

for example, the Department of Education and a USAID program 

on education. We have enormous challenges in Africa, for instance. 

One would wish this to be well integrated. If these individuals, in 

their agencies, begin to talk and see what their programs are, there 

will be less duplication, less overlap, but there will also be more 

of a commitment to the issue that they are discussing. And these 

issues can deal with humanitarian assistance, maternal and child 

healthcare, the environment, agriculture. It can be on any number 

of issues, but they are all around a table and they are talking 

around a country program. So, how we integrate and mesh these 

country programs is what is being discussed. 

I think it is a very good model for sharing interagency knowledge 

and training and being able to build on each other’s efforts, as well 

as for building on each other’s budgets, because many of these programs are being funded separately out of separate committees in 

Congress. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And as you do this interagency process, the 

question is, Are they actually required to look at poverty reduction? 

You know, you could have an interagency process that can look at 

a lot of different issues within the development assistance question. 

The question is, Are they actually being asked to look at poverty 

reduction, and are there any specific goals that they are trying to 

achieve? 

Ms. FORE. Yes. Every roundtable looks at poverty reduction. And 

they will look at it through a number of lenses. Take, for example, 

micro enterprise. They will all be discussing poverty—poverty reduction—because, as you know, the reduction of widespread poverty is one of the goals that is overarching for the entire foreign 

assistance process. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, I asked you about metrics, and I didn’t 

hear you respond to that. Do you have any metrics in mind, at this 

point, as to—in addition to—so, you have an interagency process 

which is supposedly going to actually look at poverty reduction, 

look at goals for poverty reduction, you have the outreach to the 

NGOs—that’s good, okay—so, what are the metrics that we’re 

going to be able to look at and judge by? 

Ms. FORE. The metrics that are currently used cover a range, so 

that, for example, in the use of the number of people in poverty— 

an economic measure will be used. One of the things that we have 

begun talking about with our nonprofit organization community, 

the community at large, is: Are we measuring the right things? Are 

we measuring results in the right way? Are we putting them into 

our programs in the best possible way? We have a number of studies and reports coming out of our advisory committees that I think 

will help inform this discussion, so that the metrics for getting the 

results that we wish in reducing and alleviating poverty will be 

there in years to come. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you—going to Senator Hagel’s 

conversation with you about Ambassador Crocker’s request, and it’s 

also an interest that Senator Kennedy has expressed to me—can 

you provide us with a copy of Ambassador Crocker’s cable to you? 

Ms. FORE. Yes, sir. 

582 

[The information follows:] 


cable1.eps
583 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. And, in response to that, what were 

your instructions to the Consular Affairs Office on the cable? What 

was your instructions to them, in terms of—in pursuit of what was 

trying to be achieved in the cable? 

Ms. FORE. We consider this a top priority for the Department. So, 

it’s not just the Bureau for Consular Affairs, it’s also the Human 

Resources Department, as well as our legal office, that looks at 

what our capacities are and what we are able to give to a chief of 

mission. It is very important that we be sure that our ambassadors 

are armed with all of the authorities that they can have. But we 


cable2.eps
584 

cannot give away authorities we do not yet have, so this link with 

Congress is a very important part of this, if we are to make sure 

that we have the right authorities to delegate to our chiefs of mission. 

We’ve asked Consular Affairs to look at the special immigrant 

visa. As I mentioned, there is also the refugee question, so the Population, Refugee, and Migration Bureau is also looking at it. 

But, as a whole, we, as a Department, are looking at ways that 

we can help facilitate things for these Iraqi nationals who are 

working with us, for us, beside us, in ways that would be helpful 

for them and for their families. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, we’ll look forward to seeing the cable, 

as well. 

Senator Nelson asked me—he had to go to an Intelligence meeting, but he would like for the committee to hear your response to 

his expedited-fee issue. What is your plan to reimburse that to 

those individuals who paid, but got no expediting, at the end of the 

day? 

Ms. FORE. For individuals who have requested expedited service, 

and who have indicated when they are traveling, and for whom we 

did not return their passport within the timeframe that we had 

promised, if they apply to us, we would return their expedited fee. 

There are several options that we can discuss with Senator Nelson 

which might also help. He—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. But right now, your—— 

Ms. FORE [continuing]. And his staff—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Your—— 

Ms. FORE [continuing]. And his constituents. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Right now, your plan is simply that, ‘‘If you 

apply, you get the reimbursement; if not, you don’t’’? 

Ms. FORE. Yes, with the proviso that it has to be people that 

were using the expedited-fee process, and that they also have indicated that they were traveling. Many people who have used the expedited process did not have travel plans, so, if people did not indicate when they were traveling, then that was—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. But if you apply—but if you applied and 

paid an expedited fee, the whole purpose of paying an expedited fee 

is to have your application expedited, whether that was, in fact, because you were going to travel, or whether it was for whatever reason you chose to pay the expedited fee. If, in fact, you didn’t get 

an expedited process, does the Department take the position that 

it should keep the money, even though it didn’t provide the process—the expedited process that was paid for? 

Ms. FORE. Well, there are a number of options here, Senator 

Menendez. And so, what we—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Are you pursuing those options, or are 

you—— 

Ms. FORE. We’re—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Are you just—— 

Ms. FORE [continuing]. Considering them. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Thinking? You’re considering 

them. 

Ms. FORE. Right. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And can you tell us what those options are? 

585 

Ms. FORE. Perhaps I could take that question and come back to 

you with those options? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay, if you would—if you would submit the 

options in writing for the committee. 

Ms. FORE. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you two last questions, because 

I appreciate your forbearance of the committee. We’re doing a little 

work here for others, as well, so—but these last two questions are 

questions I am particularly interested in. 

You know, when the administration proposed the creation of the 

Millennium Challenge Corporation, they promised that this initiative would be in addition to our current development programs. 

However, there is an emerging trend of cuts in aid to countries that 

have signed MCC compacts, as we have seen. And, in fact, all the 

MCC compact countries have had cuts in other USAID funding between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2008’s budget request, except 

for one. So, in light of the administration’s pledge, which so many 

of us who supported MCC pointedly asked to make sure this was 

not supplantive, but in addition to, not to cut foreign aid at the expense of MCC, how do we explain these numbers? And I would 

urge you, before you answer, if our argument that we’re going to 

hear is that we have increased the total foreign assistance budget, 

as well as MCC—but that doesn’t answer the question on the impact of specific countries that have seen their development assistance cut while they have signed an MCC agreement. 

So, give me a sense of what is happening in this respect. 

Ms. FORE. In this past 21⁄2 months, I’ve heard about this. And 

one of the issues, I believe, is the bridge between a USAID program 

and the MCC program. So, as an MCC program coming online or 

scaling up into full usage, the USAID programs are scheduled to 

link into this, or to dovetail into it. Sometimes, as the USAID programs are coming down, or their linkage is coming down, too soon, 

before the Millennium Challenge Corporation money and programs 

begin to come online. So, there can be a gap between the two. It’s 

one that Ambassador Danilovich and I have begun to talk about. 

We are seeking ways that can bridge that gap so that there is a 

seamless process when USAID programs and other foreign assistance programs work in cooperation with MCC programs and they 

begin to add additional resources in the country. 

There is cooperation in trade capacity-building and other areas, 

but we need to be sure that this is integrated, and that’s part of 

the challenge that we have. But it’s one that we have identified 

and will look at. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, we would love to see—if you would 

look at the realities of how this is taking place—I’d love to hear 

‘‘integration’’—what’s happening is that we’ve had ‘‘disintegration’’ 

of those programs that were funded by USAID, and we see them— 

it’s not that they were already on their natural downward curve because they were moving toward the fulfillment of their goals, it 

seems to me, from what I’ve been able to review; but, as the MCC 

monies were assigned into—and the monies began to flow, then we 

see a reduction of the USAID. That ends up not being additive, it 

being—it ends up being supplantive of those funds. That is not— 

586 

that is not what I think Congress supported when it supported the 

MCC. So, you know, we’d like to see a response to that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, I appreciate, in today’s statement 

and in past conversations, that you have said that you are committed to sustaining and strengthening the State Department’s minority recruiting efforts. And, in your written statement, you specifically discussed the need for hiring USAID employees with diverse backgrounds. I appreciate that. 

I know that there are those who have concerns about statements 

made in the past, and it relates to—this regard, but what I’m concerned is—in the actions, and here’s where I want to go to. I’m not 

particularly impressed with the State Department’s representation 

of minorities, in general. And I’m not impressed with it under your 

watch. And I have a particular concern, when I see that—when we 

finally make some improvement, particularly in the Senior Executive Service, that then we lose it. 

Minority employment in the senior executive service increased by 

2.7 percent over the course of 6 years, from 2000 to 2006, but, 

under your tenure, minority employment in the Senior Executive 

Service actually decreased by 2 percent in 2005 and 2006, so we’ve 

virtually wiped out the increase that it took us 6 years to achieve. 

Many of us in Congress who have been—in my days in the other 

body, and continuing since last year here—have been saying—and 

you and I met and talked about this in your previous role—and so, 

what took 6 years to have a marginal gain in the Senior Executive 

Service has been erased. How do we claim that that is a management success? 

Ms. FORE. Well, I share your frustration, but also share your desire about this—that we be able to move forward positively and 

strongly in this area. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But, Madam Secretary, if—— 

Ms. FORE. It’s—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I appreciate that—words, but 

the proof is in the pudding. If it took us 6 years to make a 2.7-percent increase, and we eliminate 2 percent of it in the scope of 1 

year, boy, that’s not powerful and positive and moving forward. 

Ms. FORE. Well, as you know, we are moving forward throughout 

the Federal Government. Approximately one-third of our workforce 

is eligible for retirement, so, when you are in the Senior Executive 

Service, or in the Senior Foreign Service, we lose people to retirement. And you know our systems within the Senior Foreign Service—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Are you suggesting—— 

Ms. FORE [continuing]. And the Senior—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. All of that loss—— 

Ms. FORE [continuing]. Executive Service—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Is because of retirement? 

Ms. FORE. Well, from the Senior Executive Service and the Senior Foreign Service, it’s either for retirement or taking a position 

in another agency. But what we have put in place, sir, in this last 

year and a half, is a very strong program in recruiting, training, 

mentoring a diverse workforce. We are really reaching out everywhere to try to encourage both the recruitment, as well as the retention, of a diverse workforce. And sometimes these things take 

587 

time. I know that they never occur fast enough. But it is important 

that we have an environment of inclusion. I think that, with our 

new Diversity Council, with our new Diversity Officer position, we 

really have a changed sense of commitment. And it starts at the 

top. It starts with Secretary Rice. It is certainly a commitment that 

I have, very strongly; the Director General, very strongly. I mean, 

we have—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. All right, but—— 

Ms. FORE [continuing]. This as a—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. If you have a—— 

Ms. FORE [continuing]. Strong commitment—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. If you have a strong commitment, then let 

me ask you why it was that there was no minority promotion at 

all among the Senior Executive Service while you were there. 

Ms. FORE. I believe you are looking at the 2006 numbers, and the 

2007 numbers, which is this fiscal year. We will actually have the 

data for you September 30. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. I look forward to those numbers, as 

does Senator Obama. I mean, we—you know, it is important, in a 

world which is ever more diverse, that the power of what comes 

through men and women who represent the fullness of America is 

represented in the Foreign Service and in the Senior Executive 

Service. And, in my view, this is the worst department of all of the 

departments of the Federal Government, in the reflection of those 

minorities in the service of any one of our Federal departments. It’s 

got to change. It’s got to change. 

And so, you know, I appreciate all he high-sounding words. The 

problem is, I don’t see the concurrent actions to make it happen. 

And there are many of us who are disturbed that we continue to 

see this reality. And so, I hope that you’re going to make, if you 

are given the opportunity, a action plan that is very aggressive, 

that is transparent to all of us, so that we can judge whether or 

not this is going to produce results, because, so far, it just simply 

has not. And that is simply not acceptable. 

Ms. FORE. I would look forward to having such an action plan 

and talking with you about it, Senator Menendez. This is an area 

that we share a strong commitment to. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I appreciate the time that you have 

shared with the committee. 

There will be other questions. We will leave the record open for 

2 days for all members to ask questions, so they may submit additional questions to the nominee. Of course, we ask you to respond 

to those as expeditiously as possible. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And, seeing no other member before the 

committee, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARACK OBAMA, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the nomination of Henrietta 

Holsman Fore to be Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International DevelopVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00595 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
588 

ment. I appreciate Ms. Fore’s willingness to discuss her credentials for this important position and her goals for the agency if she is confirmed. 

In 2005, this committee considered Ms. Fore’s nomination for the position of 

Under Secretary of State for Management. At the time, I expressed my serious concerns about disparaging remarks she made about minorities while she was a trustee 

at Wellesley College. I appreciated Ms. Fore’s willingness to meet with me during 

that period to respond to my concerns. 

As a result of our conversations, I voted to approve her nomination in 2005, after 

receiving her assurances that she was committed to expanding diversity at the State 

Department. Now that she has been nominated to be Administrator of USAID, it 

is important to look carefully at her record over the last 2 years to see if she has 

followed through on these assurances. 

In June, Senator Menendez and I sent a letter to Ms. Fore asking for detailed 

information on recruitment, promotion, and retention of minority employees from 

2005 to the present. We also asked Ms. Fore to demonstrate that she had taken tangible steps to recruit and promote minorities and that she has met with the Congressional Black Caucus and Congressional Hispanic Caucus to address their concerns. 

I am pleased that, according to her response, she has implemented a minority outreach strategy and has met several times with members of the Congressional Black 

Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus on minority recruitment and retention issues. I am also pleased to hear that she has created a position of Chief Diversity Officer at the State Department, with a mission to integrate diversity principles 

into the practices of all of the Department’s operations. 

I have concerns, however, about the data on recruitment, promotion, and retention of minority employees provided by Ms. Fore. The data seems to show some 

progress in some areas, but in other areas, there has been no progress. Minorities 

have been hired during Ms. Fore’s tenure, but the fraction of minority employees 

at State has decreased slightly instead of increasing. The overall promotion rate for 

African Americans and Hispanics decreased from 2005 to 2006. Between 2005 and 

2006, the number of African American employees in the SES decreased, and the 

number of Hispanic employees in the SES remained unchanged. 

I am interested in hearing more from Ms. Fore about her plan to promote diversity in her new position. 

I am also concerned about evidence that White House aides conducted political 

briefings for U.S. diplomats that included, among other things, analyses of congressional and gubernatorial races in this country. In one instance, according to press 

reporting, State Department officials attended a meeting at the White House at 

which political officials discussed key House races for 2002 and media segments that 

were deemed important for President Bush’s reelection in 2004. 

For the life of me, I cannot understand why the administration decided to invest 

taxpayer-funded resources and time in this clearly political effort. 

These types of briefings are an inappropriate politicization of the State Department, which should be carrying out its diplomatic mission without involvement in 

domestic political activities. I would like to know what Ms. Fore thinks about the 

appropriateness of these briefings and how she will ensure such briefings do not 

occur again at USAID if she is confirmed as the next administrator. 

In addition to promoting diversity in the workforce and ensuring proper conduct 

relative to political activities, the next Administrator of USAID will face a host of 

challenges in improving the agency’s ability to carry out its critical mission. We 

need the world to know that we are fully committed to supporting economic growth, 

global health, and democracy. We need to ensure that people around the world can 

live with dignity and have an opportunity to make a better life. And because weak 

states and countries mired in poverty provide a breeding ground for disease, terrorism, and conflict, providing foreign assistance has a direct benefit from a national 

security standpoint. 

At a time when the global challenges facing the agency are daunting, there are 

reports that the capabilities of USAID are lagging, that the agency’s technical expertise has eroded, and that the morale of its employees is low. It is essential that the 

new administrator provide the leadership necessary to rebuild the capabilities of the 

agency, hire and retain an exceptional and diverse workforce, and make a significant improvement in our ability to provide foreign assistance to those in need. 

I will be looking very carefully at Ms. Fore’s qualifications for this critical position 

and her potential to make real improvements in the operations of the agency. 

Thank you. 

589 

ENDORSEMENT LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 

Washinton, DC, June 23, 2007. 

Senator Richard G. Lugar, 

Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR: I am writing to inform you of the reasons why my colleagues and I on the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) believe that Under Secretary 

Henrietta Fore has a mix of qualities and experience which uniquely qualify her to 

serve as Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator. 

The Council (FAC) is a non-partisan umbrella group of the CEO’s of 11 organizations concerned about the processes of diplomacy and the management of the people 

involved therein. We do not address foreign policy issues. We are dedicated to the 

most effective possible management of the Nation’s foreign policy business of which 

foreign aid is an important part. 

The FAC has just issued its third biennial assessment of the Secretary of State’s 

stewardship of the State Department from the management perspective. Given our 

interests and objectives, we have worked very closely since 2005 with Under Secretary of State for Management, Henrietta Fore, and have observed firsthand her 

management successes as outlined in our report. Ms. Fore’s attributes include: 

• Years of experience in the Government and the private sector enabling her to 

bring the best practices from both sectors to bear on the problems; 

• Previous service in AID as an Assistant Administrator which means she will 

‘‘land running’’; 

• Intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the Department of State and Foreign Service at the highest levels which is critical to the implementation of development which—at the end of the day—happens overseas; 

• The strong strategic sense necessary to put all of the development pieces (AID, 

Millennium challenge Account, HIV—AIDS, Coordinator for Reconstruction & 

Stabilization, etc.) into a coherent whole; and 

• Leadership qualities which have brought to the State Department two (of only 

four) Presidential Awards for Management Excellence, a second place ranking 

in the 2007 list of best (Federal) places to work, and an additional Presidential 

Award for retiree services. 

In addition to the above, Henrietta Fore has consistently demonstrated a genuine 

concern for all employees—protecting their interests and maximizing their potential. 

One of the FAC’s member organizations, The Association of Black American Ambassadors, has strongly endorsed Secretary Fore in this regard. 

Senator Lugar, the next 2 years will be critical for U.S. development assistance. 

Subcommittee Chairman Menendez’s recent hearings on foreign assistance, which 

you attended, have gotten the discussion off to a terrific start. The FAC will put 

the evolution of assistance at the center of our 2008 report and we hope to work 

with you in that effort. Given the need for strategy, structure, and implementation 

in U.S. development efforts, we believe Henrietta Fore has all of the necessary 

qualities and abilities to manage development with the same excellence she demonstrated as Under Secretary of State for Management. 

Thank you for your consideration in these matters. 

Warmest Personal Regards, 

THOMAS D. BOYATT, 

President. 

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

Question. Do you agree with the longstanding policy that CRSPs are long-term research programs that are designed for 10 years, with initial funding provided for 

5 years and then a second 5 years if the 5-year review, based on performance with 

respect to the cooperative agreement, is satisfactory? 

Answer. USAID’s procurement policy is to award cooperative agreements for an 

initial 5 year period. In the case of agricultural research, USAID recognizes and appreciates the long-term nature of these programs. Therefore, when USAID awards 

a new CRSP to a university, the initial agency commitment is for 5 years. A 5-year 

extension is provided based on three criteria: (1) a record of good performance during the first 5-year period; (2) continued relevance of the CRSP subject area to the 

overall agency development priorities; and (3) the availability of agency funding. 

590 

Question. Are you aware that it has been proposed within USAID that renewal 

of the Integrated Pest Management and Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management CRSPs would be based not on the performance goals specified 

in their cooperative agreements, but rather on the following: 

For IPM: How well the other CRSPs are addressing IPM. 

For SANREM: How well SANREM is addressing the goals of a proposed Soil, 

Water, and Ecosystem Services CRSP that did not exist when the SANREM CRSP 

research program was designed and implemented. 

Can you provide an explanation of what the renewal process for these CRSPs will 

actually entail, if not performance based on their current agreements? 

Answer. A 5-year renewal of all CRSPs will be based on three criteria: (1) a record 

of good performance during the first 5-year period; (2) continued relevance of the 

CRSP subject area to the overall agency development priorities; and (3) the availability of agency funding. External reviews of the CRSPs will be conducted to evaluate performance. The Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resources Management (SANREM) CRSPs’ external reviews 

are scheduled for early 2008. 

In the case of the IPM CRSP, in addition to evaluating performance, the review 

will determine whether the new commodity-oriented CRSPs (peanut, sorghum, and 

pulses) have taken on substantial IPM issues related to their targeted commodities. 

The review will also inform USAID on the need for a stand alone IPM CRSP that 

broadly deals with IPM issues apart from the IPM activities of the commodity-oriented CRSPs. 

In the case of the SANREM CRSP, the review will only consider the performance 

of the CRSP. The review will not look at how well SANREM is addressing the goals 

of a proposed Soil, Water, and Ecosystem Services CRSP. 

Question. The USAID Web site pages listed below, describing the Revised CRSP 

Portfolio, currently indicate that the IPM and SANREM CRSPs are to be eliminated. Does the Web site reflect current USAID intentions concerning IPM and 

SANREM? If not, why has it not been changed? 

http://www.usaid.gov/our—work/agriculture/crsp/index.html#over 

http://www.usaid.gov/our—work/agriculture/crsp/major—changes.htm 

Answer. The information on the Web site was meant to document an evolving 

process of review and consideration of a CRSP portfolio, in consultation with the 

Board for International Food and Agricultural Development (BIFAD) that aligns 

with development needs. The current information needs to be updated to reflect 

more recent discussions and decisions, such as the evaluation process for IPM and 

SANREM discussed above, and it is a good reminder to update our Web site. To 

avoid further confusion the CRSP portfolio information on the Web site will be removed until it has been updated. 

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. Under Secretary Fore, on July 16 I, along with a number of other Senators, wrote to Secretary Rice in reference to the United States-Ukraine Foundation. 

We expressed our concerns over USAID funding for the Foundation and its programs. The Foundation, the longest serving American presence in Ukraine, is highly 

respected by all political factions in that country and has done fabulous work 

throughout the country. As a result, every year since 2000 Congress has expressed 

its support for the funding of the Foundation. Foreign Operations Appropriations 

Conference Reports and/or the reports of the respective Appropriations Committees 

have ‘‘urged’’ increased funding, ‘‘directed’’ increased funding or in some other unequivocal way made it clear that Congress knows and has followed the Foundation’s 

activities in Ukraine and had determined the funding for those programs needed to 

be continued, indeed, increased. Last year, the Senate report language for this fiscal 

year called for USAID to bring its level of funding for the Foundation to $10 million. 

And, yet, despite this clear expression of Congressional purpose and policy, 

USAID has cut the Foundation’s budget each and every one of those years. In fact, 

I understand that USAID has told the Foundation that it will receive no further 

funds unless Congress either enacts a specific line item as part of its future Foreign 

Operations Appropriations Bills or a decision to fund the Foundation is made at the 

very top of this administration. Such actions exhibit an unsettling disregard for congressional intent. 

591 

Under your stewardship of USAID, if confirmed, how do you intend to handle 

clear expressions of Congressional intent on funding and policy priorities relating 

to the United States-Ukraine Foundation? 

Answer. I am told that USAID has funded the United States-Ukraine Foundation 

(USUF) since July 1997, when USUF was awarded a 3-year, $7 million noncompetitive grant. The original grant was extended several times and the total amount 

awarded to USUF by the time the grant ended on July 14, 2007 was $23,145,918. 

During the 10-year period of the grant, USAID’s funding level in Ukraine dropped 

fourfold, from $163 million in 1997 to $41 million in 2006. Nevertheless, USUF’s 

average funding level has remained fairly consistent at about $2.3 million per year 

and has thus in recent years accounted for an increasingly larger percentage of the 

total USAID technical assistance budget. 

I am also told there is a good opportunity for USUF in our partnership programs. 

USAID recognizes the importance and value of Ukrainian Diaspora groups and we 

hope to continue benefiting from their participation in the USAID assistance program. We have encouraged USUF in writing to partner with USAID in the future 

through a new mechanism that specifically encourages Ukrainian-American organizations to apply for funding. This mechanism is the Annual Program Statement for 

Global Development Alliance (GDA) partnerships, issued on March 16, 2007. An explicit statement in that solicitation notes that USAID welcomes proposals from Diaspora groups. Since there are currently many active and experienced Ukrainian Diaspora groups, we expect to select a future program implementer via a competitive 

process.To date USUF has not submitted a proposal in response to the APS. The 

solicitation remains open until November 15, 2007, and USAID would welcome 

USUFs participation in this competition. 

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Question. Do you believe that the executive branch can successfully develop a 

comprehensive, effective, transparent, and efficient country-focused foreign assistance framework without changing the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act? If so, please describe how a ‘‘reformed’’ U.S. foreign assistance process would operate. If not, what 

legislative changes will you seek? 

Answer. The reforms that have been proposed so far—including the creation of 

the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance—are an attempt to ensure that we make 

every effort within current statutory authorities to fulfill our responsibilities to 

maximize U.S. foreign assistance activities. With the reform process still in the 

early stages, we are taking time to review carefully, with input from a wide range 

of participants and stakeholders, what has been accomplished to date and how we 

might strengthen or adjust our processes. If as part of these ongoing assessments, 

we determine that successful reforms will require legislative changes, we will consult with you and other members of our authorizing committees to work together 

toward necessary change. 

Question. What will be the staffing structure and size of the Director of Foreign 

Assistance office? Will you bring in new staff into the ‘‘F’’ bureau? Who will be your 

key advisors on foreign assistance reform? 

Answer. To coordinate the entire gamut of activities associated with managing the 

approximate $25 billion foreign policy programs of the United States, I will have 

about 80 direct hires. I plan to have a very lean administrative support mechanism 

and will rely as much as possible on existing State Department support mechanisms 

to manage my office. 

I am pleased to inform you that Richard Greene will act as my Deputy in the Director’s office. He is experienced and committed, and I believe you will find him to 

be very responsive. At USAID, Jim Kunder will be acting as my Deputy, and I am 

confident that you are familiar with his excellent work. In addition, my key advisors 

will be USAID Assistant Administrators, State Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries, and I will actively seek suggestions from colleagues at the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation (MCC), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

(PEPFAR), the National Security Council (NSC), the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB), and, of course, Congress and the nongovernmental organization 

(NGO) community. 

Question. In response to my question, you stated that 80 percent of U.S. foreign 

assistance is under the direct control of the Director of Foreign Assistance. However, 

Dr. Radelet testified on the second panel that only 55 percent of U.S. foreign assistVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00599 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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ance is controlled by State or USAID. Please provide a breakdown of the amounts 

and percentages of U.S. foreign assistance that are under the direct control of State 

and/or USAID, under ‘‘policy guidance’’ of State and/or USAID, and not under any 

type of control of State and/or USAID. How much U.S. foreign assistance is controlled by the Defense Department? 

Answer. Attached please find a summary chart of the fiscal year 2008 International Affairs Request, which appears in the Congressional Budget Justification 

on pages 12 and 13. Section 1 of the chart, ‘‘Department of State and USAID Bilateral Economic Assistance,’’ lists the accounts and programs under the approval authority of the Secretary of State, which amount to approximately 80 percent of the 

entire Foreign Operations request. The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and 

USAID Administrator has direct approval authority over roughly 60 percent of all 

foreign assistance in the Foreign Operations request, and has robust coordinating 

authority over assistance provided under the Global HIV/AIDS (GHAI) and Millennium Challenge Corporation accounts (at which Corporation the Administrator 

serves on the Board). 

The Department of Defense is an important implementing partner of the Department of State, implementing both Foreign Military Financing and International 

Military Education and Training programs. The Department of Defense also implements programs with foreign partners that are authorized under Defense Authorization Acts using funds appropriated in the Defense Appropriations Acts. Some of 

those programs provide training and equipment for foreign forces, similar to that 

provided under the Department of State’s foreign assistance authorities. Thus, for 

example, the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund are 

used to provide training and equipping to a range of security forces in those countries. Both of these authorities must be exercised with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. In addition, pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, the President is authorized to direct the Departments of Defense 

and State to jointly develop programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces 

to be funded from Department of Defense appropriations in an amount up to $300 

million in this fiscal year. Likewise, pursuant to section 1207 of the same act, the 

Departments of State and Defense may concur on the provision of reconstruction 

and stabilization assistance to be funded through DoD appropriations up to $100 

million per fiscal year. These authorities have proved effective in addressing rapidly 

evolving security situations. DoD has certain other authorities that they rely upon 

in specific circumstances to provide assistance to foreign countries in support of 

their mission, e.g., the Commanders Emergency Response Fund and authorities to 

respond to humanitarian emergencies. 

Question. Also in your testimony, you highlight ‘‘detailed country-level operations 

plans that describe how resources are being used’’ and that such plans have been 

developed for 67 countries already. Will you make these plans available to this committee? Will these plans be available to the public? 

Answer. I am committed to providing as much information on our foreign assistance activities as possible to our oversight committees and Congressional partners. 

We are currently looking at ways to make the information obtained from the fiscal 

year 2007 Operational Plans as user friendly and available as we can. We are likewise exploring formats for future years’ Operational Plans with an eye toward the 

same goal. In the meantime, if there is particular fiscal year 2007 country or other 

information that you would like to discuss, we would be happy to meet with you. 

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RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Madam Secretary, during your nomination hearing on July 24, 2007, 

you testified that, during your career with the current administration, you have attended one, or perhaps two, political briefing which took place during your tenure 

at the Department of Treasury. 

• What are the names and positions of the individual(s) who conducted this briefing? 

• When were those briefings? 

• Exactly what was discussed at those briefings? 

Answer. There were two Treasury Senior Staff Retreats that I attended. The 

agenda for the Senior Staff Retreat on January 12, 2004, listed a 1-hour presentation entitled Political Overview and listed Barry Jackson, Deputy Assistant to the 

President and Deputy to the Senior Advisor, and Matt Schlapp, Deputy Assistant 

to the President and Director of Political Affairs as presenters. The agenda for the 

Senior Staff Retreat on January 4, 2005, listed a 45-minute presentation entitled 


tabp2.eps
595 

Political Overview and listed Barry Jackson, Deputy Assistant to the President and 

Deputy to the Senior Advisor, and Matt Schlapp, Deputy Assistant to the President 

and Director of Political Affairs as presenters. My recollection is that the briefings 

were about the political landscape at the time. 

Question. During our question and answer period I asked you if you thought it 

was appropriate that USAID employees be spending their time being briefed on the 

electoral landscape. You responded that you would re-look at what your guidelines 

are in USAID, because, ‘‘there are very strong guidelines about not being involved 

with political candidates and other activities.’’ 

• Did these briefings on the U.S. electoral landscape comply with USAID and 

guidelines and Federal law? 

• Were the 20 to 30 employees of AID that received these briefings all political 

appointees? Can you tell us what positions they held? 

Can you commit to not holding such briefings if you are confirmed? 

Answer. As you know, the briefings for USAID staff were conducted prior to my 

appointment as Acting Administrator. I believe that those invited to the briefings 

were Presidential appointees confirmed by the Senate, administratively determined 

employees (the USAID equivalent of Schedule C), or Non-Career Senior Executive 

Service. The White House has expressed the view that it is appropriate for White 

House officials to provide informational briefings about the political landscape and 

its potential impact on our legislative relations to Federal agency appointees whose 

job it is to implement the President’s policies. 

I certainly commit to reviewing and, if need be, revising, existing guidelines and 

policies at USAID, and to ensuring that any similar activities proposed to me are 

acceptable under all appropriate laws, regulations, and policies before I would approve them. I will also ensure that political appointees at USAID are thoroughly 

briefed by our Agency Ethics Officer on the Hatch Act and its requirements. 

Question. Madam Secretary, in your testimony, you discussed some of the barriers 

preventing Iraqis from gaining United States immigrant visas. You also said that 

you would be supportive of legislation that would expand the scope of current law 

to allow more Iraqi nationals to be allowed to enter the United States under special 

immigrant visas. 

• What legislative measures would you recommend to address this issue? 

• Do you support the current legislative proposal introduced by Senator Kennedy, 

S. 1651, the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act? 

• In the meantime, what are you doing to respond to the concerns expressed by 

Ambassador Crocker in his cable to you? 

Answer. In February of this year, we identified the issue of assisting Iraqis who 

work for the embassy as a top priority for the Department and as a matter of urgency. We took immediate steps to address the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their association with the United States Government. We asked Congress 

to assist us in providing relief to these brave Iraqis by expanding the coverage of 

Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) to include more of the Iraqi nationals who are serving the American people. 

Secretary Rice set up the interagency task force on Iraqi Refugees and Internally 

Displaced Persons led by Under Secretary Dobriansky, which continues to meet regularly. The interagency task force has a specific focus to address the humanitarian 

situation, including the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their association 

with the United States Government. I have attended two such meetings and can assure you that those involved are dedicated to securing the best solution. 

The interagency task force drafted and cleared the administration’s legislative 

proposal to provide a mechanism to lower, in ‘‘extraordinary circumstances,’’ the 

years of service required for SIV eligibility under the Immigration and Nationality 

Act. Embassy Baghdad was consulted often during the drafting process and its recommendations, which included years of service, were integrated into the administration’s SIV proposal. 

In April, we sent to Capitol Hill the legislative proposal as an administration position which allows SIVs for LE Staff who have served in ‘‘extraordinary conditions’’ 

as determined by the Secretary and have fewer than the minimum years of service 

otherwise required. Through meetings and briefings, we are working actively to get 

support in both the Senate and House to secure introduction, consideration, and 

passage of the proposal. We are working simultaneously to find a germane legislative vehicle for the legislative proposal or a sponsor to introduce it as a free standing bill. We are set to send another letter to all members regarding the urgency for 

the legislative proposal. 

596 

While the United States Government agencies involved in the management of 

United States refugee and immigration programs overseas appreciate the support 

for the many Iraqis who have worked in support of American efforts in Iraq that 

is contained in the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act introduced by Senators Kennedy and 

Smith, we believe the administration’s SIV proposal is a more comprehensive and 

practical vehicle for addressing the dangers that local employees of the United 

States Government confront in a manner that will ensure continued effective operation of our diplomatic operations in Iraq and of our worldwide administration of 

the SIV program. 

The Department and Embassy Baghdad have communicated to LE staff the processes by which locally employed interpreters and translators under Chief of Mission 

authority can take immediate advantage of the Special Immigrant Visa opportunities offered by Public Law 110–36. Embassy Baghdad has also acted to accelerate 

the access of LE staff to the United States Refugee Admissions Program. 

The Department and the administration recognize that a solution must be secured 

to assist those LE staff in extraordinary conditions who are serving the American 

people. We very much appreciate your support and interest in this matter as we 

seek to partner with the Hill to implement the legislative changes that are required. 

Question. USAID funding to countries that have signed an MCC compact has decreased in every country except one. This is not what Congress supported when during the birth of the MCC we were promised it was to be additive and not replace 

USAID funds. You responded in the testimony to this discrepancy by saying that 

linkage issue where USAID programs were changing to close the gap between MCC 

and USAID. I fail to see how this is not replacing funds to USAID. 

In light of the administration’s pledge to us to not cut foreign aid at the expense 

of MCC, how do you explain these numbers? 

Answer. As the attached table and chart indicate, the President’s request for the 

three largest ‘‘traditional assistance accounts—Child Survival and Health, Development Assistance and Economic Support Fund—has risen from approximately $4.6 

billion in fiscal year 2002 to some $5.9 billion in fiscal year 2008, an increase of 

nearly 30 percent. At the same time, the President’s request for the Millennium 

Challenge Account has grown from zero in fiscal year 2003 to $3 billion in fiscal 

year 2006 and since. The total for these two categories has grown from the $4.6 billion of fiscal year 2002 to nearly $9 billion for fiscal year 2007 and 2008, a near 

doubling. This is an indicator of the administration’s intentions. 

The Congress has modified these requests in a variety of ways, but in most of 

those fiscal years, appropriated less to overall foreign operations accounts than has 

been requested. We have had to adjust individual country programs in response to 

these and other Congressional changes, in an environment of limited resources. 

It is not appropriate, however, to conclude that in no individual country will ‘‘traditional’’ assistance programs remain unchanged when that country signs an MCC 

Compact. Countries develop at different rates and in unique patterns. Some may require emphasis on economic growth programs, some on investing in people, some on 

infrastructure, still others on good governance, and still others on security or rule 

of law. These complex requirements change over time in each country, and the goal 

of our assistance efforts needs to be the most effective possible mix of programs 

given each country’s unique circumstances. I would emphasize, however, that it is 

not the policy of the administration to automatically reduce ‘‘traditional’’ assistance 

flows when countries begin MCC Compacts. 

Development funding 

Requests 

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 

Child Support and 

Health Programs (CSH) .... 1,011,000 1,374,000 1,495,000 1,420,000 1,251,500 1,433,000 1,564,279 

Development Programs (DA) ...... 1,325,000 1,365,500 1,345,000 1,329,000 1,103,233 1,282,000 1,041,248 

Economic Support 

Fund (ESF) ...... 2,269,400 2,290,000 2,535,000 2,511,500 3,036,375 3,214,470 3,319,567 

Subtotal .. 4,605,400 5,029,500 5,375,000 5,260,500 5,391,108 5,929,470 5,925,094 

597 

Development funding 

Requests 

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 

Millenium Challenge Account 

(MCC) .............. 0 0 1,300,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,000,000 3,000,333 

Total ....... 4,605,400 5,029,500 6,675,000 7,760,500 8,391,108 8,929,108 8,925,094 

GRAPH INFORMATION 

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 

Subtotal* 4,605,400 5,029,500 5,375,000 5,260,500 5,391,108 5,929,470 5,925,094 

Total** ... 4,605,400 5,029,500 6,675,000 7,760,500 8,391,108 8,929,470 8,925,094 

Question. As soon as they’re available, please provide the numbers for the minority recruitment data for the Senior Executive Service and the Foreign Service for 

fiscal year 2007. 

Answer. Through July 31, 2007, the Department has hired one minority at the 

Senior Executive Service (SES) level. In addition, one minority employee was promoted into the SES after participating as the Department’s only nominee in OPM’s 

2006 SES Candidate Program. There have been a total of seven promotions into the 

SES in fiscal year 2007. 

To date in fiscal year 2007, minorities have comprised 14.1 percent of Foreign 

Service Generalist new hires and 19.6 percent of Foreign Service Specialist new 

hires. These percentages may underestimate actual minority hiring in fiscal year 

2007, as we have seen an increase in the number of new hires who choose not to 

self-identify their racial or ethnic status. In addition, the percentage of minority registrants for the Foreign Service Written Exam (FSWE) increased from 34.2 percent 

in 2005 to 36.3 percent in April 2006, the second highest percentage of minorities 

registering for the exam since 1980. Registration for the September 2007 Foreign 

Service Officer Test, the only offering in fiscal year 2007, is currently underway at 

this time and we will not have statistics on minority registrants until registration 

is closed in September. 

Question. As I said in my statement, I do not support the idea of development 

attaches or development counselors if they are used as a way to demote USAID Mission Directors. In your letter to me, you said that the concept was going to be used 

for countries that could manage and finance their own development process but 

‘‘may not yet have the capacity or experience to put together partnerships that bring 


graph.eps
598 

together host country government, private sector, and other public or private donor 

interests to address development issues.’’ 

Which current USAID missions are on the list to lose their Mission Director and 

receive a mission attache or development counselor? 

Answer. The concept of using a development counselor builds on the recognized 

value of USAID to not only provide a formal voice on country development issues 

and manage appropriated funds, but also to facilitate partnerships between host 

country governments, the private sector, NGOs, and other public and private donors. USAID’s thinking has been that the placement of development counselor 

might be appropriate in situations where USAID’s experience and capabilities in facilitating partnerships will enhance the United States Government’s engagement 

within a country. Generally, this would be in countries that do not receive bilateral 

USAID funding or in which USAID manages limited development programming 

with support provided from another location (e.g., a regional center or platform). We 

have not reached any decisions to replace Mission Directors with development counselors. Our consideration of how the ‘‘development counselor’’ concept would affect 

current USAID roles or staffing, if at all, will continue and we look forward to consulting with you on this once our concept has been further refined. 

Question. How much control over the money would these development counselors 

have compared to mission directors? 

Answer. The amount of control over funds will be addressed and determined as 

we continue to refine and discuss the concept. Factors to consider would include size 

and orientation of the program, development goals and objectives, and availability 

of regional support. 

Question. How is a ‘‘development counselor’’ not simply a demotion for the USAID 

Mission Director? 

Answer. We do not envision the concept involving a ‘‘demotion’’ of a mission director to a development counselor, but rather the placement of a development counselor 

in countries in which we have programs but do not currently have a resident USAID 

direct hire, or in countries where we no longer have an active development program. 

For example, as we close out USAID programs in Eastern Europe, a development 

counselor could be placed on the United States Embassy country team for the purpose of advising the United States Ambassador on ongoing country development 

issues, coordinating with other donors, and facilitating public private partnerships. 

There are no plans to replace Mission Directors with Development Counselors in 

any country where we have a Mission. 

Question. Freedom House recently released an analysis of the administration’s fiscal year 2008 budget request for Democracy and Human Rights. I am deeply concerned over the administration’s proposed decreases of 9 percent in funding for 

human rights and 7 percent for civil society in the fiscal year 2008 budget request. 

Can you explain why these funds were cut? What was the rationale? 

Answer. The administration is committed to enhancing democracy and the rule 

of law as part of our foreign assistance efforts. The fiscal year 2008 budget request 

reflects an overall increase in democracy and governance programs of $215 million 

or 17 percent over fiscal year 2006 levels. From fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008, 

this increase was focused in an additional 33 percent for Rule of Law and Human 

Rights and an additional 46 percent for Good Governance. 

The fiscal year 2008 request is based on an assessment of needs and opportunities 

to advance and consolidate democratic progress in specific priority countries. An 

interagency team determined funding levels through a country-driven process which 

prioritized areas most critical to promoting and sustaining long-term country 

progress—a process which naturally required making tough trade-offs in a resourceconstrained environment. The Department’s fiscal year 2008 request thus reflects 

significant increases for countries with the potential to serve as democratic 

lynchpins for regional stability. The largest increases were targeted at strengthening government capacity and rule of law in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

While funding for Civil Society and Political Competition did decrease overall, the 

fiscal year 2008 request includes a significant increase in these areas for key restrictive countries, including large increases for Cuba ($32 million) and Iran ($75 million). Other countries with increases for Civil Society include Bolivia, Pakistan, 

Sudan, Yemen, Nigeria, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Countries with increases for Political Competition and Consensus Building included Afghanistan, 

Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kosovo, Liberia, and Sudan. 

Funding for Human Rights as an element under the broader area of Rule of Law 

and Human Rights decreased 9 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008. 

599 

However, human rights funding increased in the restrictive and rebuilding country 

category, and held steady overall for the developing country category. 

Question. After receiving reports that USAID was supporting programs in occupied Cyprus without consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, 

the Senate Appropriations Committee included in its fiscal year 2006 report the following: ‘‘The committee is concerned that funds made available for bicommunal 

projects on Cyprus have been obligated without appropriate notification and participation of the Government of Cyprus. The committee believes that if such funds are 

to improve the prospect for peaceful reunification of the island, they must be allocated transparently and in full consultation with the Government of Cyprus and 

other interested parties.’’ 

In this year’s fiscal year 2008 report, the Appropriations Committee again expressed concern with the lack of transparency and consultation: ‘‘The committee is 

aware of concerns that some projects on Cyprus have been funded without advance 

consultation with the Government of Cyprus. The committee recommends that such 

consultation occur whenever practicable in the interest of transparency in the allocation of funds.’’ 

How will you engage and consult with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus 

as Congress directed? What will you do to address the concerns expressed by Congress? 

Answer. The United States Government is committed to consultation and transparency with the Government of Cyprus on the United States Government foreign 

assistance program for Cyprus, in accord with the fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 

2008 Senate Appropriations Committee reports. Since 2005, Embassy Nicosia has 

made it a priority to increase the frequency and breadth of consultations. The Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Public Affairs Officer, and USAID Representative have had numerous meetings with Government of Cyprus officials to discuss 

United States Government foreign assistance in Cyprus. Concerns expressed by 

Government of Cyprus officials at these meetings have been taken into account in 

our programs. For example, United States Government foreign assistance programs 

are highly sensitive to recognition, property issues, and contractor office locations, 

all of which have been raised as concerns by Government of Cyprus officials in our 

consultations. These are examples of productive results of our consultations with the 

Government of Cyprus. 

Unfortunately, Government of Cyprus officials do not always accept consultation 

meetings sought by embassy officials and have indicated that they are not satisfied 

with the detailed information provided by USAID and its partners on the island. 

In fact, the Government of Cyprus has increasingly sought to exercise control over 

our projects directed at the Turkish Cypriot community. Acceding to such Government of Cyprus demands would effectively undo the basic premise of over 30 years 

of bicommunal programming in Cyprus and clearly would discourage Turkish Cypriots from participating in our programs, which would defeat the intent of the 

United States Government. To summarize, we seek and welcome consultations with 

the Government of Cyprus and other interested parties. However, the U.S. Government cannot allow any foreign government to control U.S. assistance programs, in 

accord with the instructions in the fiscal year 2008 Senate Appropriations Committee Report, which stated: ‘‘The committee understands that United States assistance does not go to the Government of Cyprus, but rather to private and nongovernmental organizations, and therefore the committee intends that with respect to the 

provision of such assistance, the organizations implementing such assistance and 

the specific nature of that assistance shall not be subject to the prior approval of 

any foreign government.’’ 

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. In your testimony you note: In 1980, there were approximately 4,000 

direct hires in the USAID workforce; today there are 2,000, managing comparable 

amounts of programming dollars. 

Please provide for the record the number of direct hires at each USAID bilateral 

mission as of July 24. Please note the number of personal service contracts working 

at these same missions. Finally, please provide the dollar value currently managed 

by each mission based on fiscal year 2007 dollars figures. 

Answer. The attached table contains the information on the staffing levels for 

each country by the categories requested with the information verified for the end 

of September 2006. USAID is in the process of converting to a new comprehensive 

600 

personnel tracking system for each country by each employee type. The country 

disaggregated data will be available shortly. The dollars managed are for the fiscal 

year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification levels broken out by country, and include not only funds appropriated to USAID, but funds managed by USAID on behalf of MCC, PEPFAR, the State and Agriculture Departments, and other agencies 

of the U.S. Government. 

MISSIONS, FUNDING, FSOS AND PSCS AS OF 9/30/2006 

[PSCs include all nondirect hire U.S. citizens] 

Region/Organization unit 

Total FY 08 

CBJ program 

funding 

FSO PSCs/other 

Total ........................................................................................................... $10,613,910 755.0 530.0 

AFR Angola ........................................................................................................... 25,786 4 0 

AFR Benin ............................................................................................................ 10,360 4 2 

AFR Botswana (RCSA) ......................................................................................... 79,000 13 10 

AFR Burkina Faso ................................................................................................ 4,675 0 0 

AFR Burundi ......................................................................................................... 27,977 0 0 

AFR Cameroon ...................................................................................................... 1,000 0 0 

AFR Cape Verde ................................................................................................... — 0 0 

AFR Chad ............................................................................................................. 5,200 0 0 

AFR Comoros ........................................................................................................ — 0 0 

AFR Cote d’Ivoire ................................................................................................. 96,000 0 0 

AFR Democratic Republic of the Congo .............................................................. 71,088 7 7 

AFR Djibouti ......................................................................................................... 3,240 0 0 

AFR Equatorial Guinea ......................................................................................... — 0 0 

AFR Ethiopia ........................................................................................................ 443,346 16 8

AFR Gabon ........................................................................................................... — 0 0 

AFR Gambia ......................................................................................................... — 0 0 

AFR Ghana ........................................................................................................... 38,994 15 9 

AFR Guinea .......................................................................................................... 13,969 5 7 

AFR Guinea Bissau .............................................................................................. 600 0 0 

AFR Kenya ............................................................................................................ 489,124 9 12 

AFR Kenya (REDSO–ESA) ..................................................................................... 24,320 17 19 

AFR Lesotho ......................................................................................................... 7,500 0 0 

AFR Liberia ........................................................................................................... 90,838 5 1

AFR Madagascar .................................................................................................. 32,213 5 5 

AFR Malawi .......................................................................................................... 59,277 10 6 

AFR Mali ............................................................................................................... 28,399 11 4 

AFR Mauritania .................................................................................................... 6,520 0 0 

AFR Mauritius ...................................................................................................... 190 0 0 

AFR Mozambique .................................................................................................. 271,180 13 7 

AFR Namibia ........................................................................................................ 92,775 5 4 

AFR Niger ............................................................................................................. 18,405 0 0

AFR Nigeria .......................................................................................................... 509,770 16 8 

AFR Rwanda ......................................................................................................... 120,530 7 7 

AFR Sao Tome ...................................................................................................... — 0 0 

AFR Senegal ......................................................................................................... 33,303 12 5 

AFR Seychelles ..................................................................................................... — 0 0 

AFR Sierra Leone .................................................................................................. 15,983 0 0 

AFR Somalia ......................................................................................................... 10,000 0 0 

AFR South Africa .................................................................................................. 533,809 22 9 

AFR Sudan ........................................................................................................... 600,913 12 3

AFR Swaziland ..................................................................................................... 7,500 0 0 

AFR Tanzania ....................................................................................................... 256,604 14 4 

AFR Togo .............................................................................................................. 120 0 0 

AFR Uganda ......................................................................................................... 312,138 13 16

AFR West African Regional Program (WARP) ...................................................... 40,100 5 15 

AFR Zambia ......................................................................................................... 315,409 10 5 

AFR Zimbabwe ..................................................................................................... 21,010 7 4 

ANE Afghanistan .................................................................................................. 1,016,513 26 51

ANE Bangladesh .................................................................................................. 106,218 15 8 

ANE Burma ........................................................................................................... 4,630 0 0 

ANE Cambodia ..................................................................................................... 37,421 8 7 

ANE China ............................................................................................................ 9,290 0 0 

601 

MISSIONS, FUNDING, FSOS AND PSCS AS OF 9/30/2006—Continued 

[PSCs include all nondirect hire U.S. citizens] 

Region/Organization unit 

Total FY 08 

CBJ program 

funding 

FSO PSCs/other 

ANE East Timor .................................................................................................... 8,640 2 2 

ANE Egypt ............................................................................................................ 415,000 29 17 

ANE India ............................................................................................................. 71,005 17 8 

ANE Indonesia ...................................................................................................... 152,083 27 7 

ANE Iraq ............................................................................................................... 1,070,000 19 20 

ANE Israel ............................................................................................................ — 0 — 

ANE Jordan ........................................................................................................... 284,751 16 6 

ANE Laos .............................................................................................................. 1,521 0 0 

ANE Lebanon ........................................................................................................ 40,688 1 0 

ANE Mongolia ....................................................................................................... 6,200 2 1 

ANE Morocco ........................................................................................................ 21,500 3 4 

ANE Nepal ............................................................................................................ 20,636 7 10

ANE Pakistan ....................................................................................................... 440,418 11 2 

ANE Philippines .................................................................................................... 66,106 16 6 

ANE Regional Development Mission—Asia ......................................................... 20,400 15 16 

ANE Sri Lanka ...................................................................................................... 1,703 4 8 

ANE Thailand ....................................................................................................... 1,040 0 0 

ANE Vietnam ........................................................................................................ 93,400 0 0 

ANE West Bank and Gaza ................................................................................... 73,500 18 10 

ANE Yemen ........................................................................................................... 12,833 2 0 

E&E Albania ......................................................................................................... 15,865 4 8 

E&E Armenia ........................................................................................................ 34,965 6 8 

E&E Azerbaijan .................................................................................................... 17,698 0 0 

E&E Belarus ......................................................................................................... 9,999 0 0 

E&E Bosnia and Herzegovina .............................................................................. 22,900 5 5 

E&E Bulgaria ....................................................................................................... — 3 3 

E&E Croatia ......................................................................................................... — 2 3 

E&E Cyprus .......................................................................................................... 11,000 1 0 

E&E Georgia ......................................................................................................... 50,381 13 10

E&E Hungary (RSC) ............................................................................................. 21,204 7 12 

E&E Ireland .......................................................................................................... 1,000 0 0 

E&E Kazakhstan ................................................................................................... 14,397 21 14 

E&E Kosevo .......................................................................................................... 151,246 4 4 

E&E Kyrgyzstan .................................................................................................... 23,790 0 0 

E&E Macedonia .................................................................................................... 18,665 5 6 

E&E Moldova ........................................................................................................ 11,814 0 0 

E&E Montenegro ................................................................................................... 7,572 0 0 

E&E Poland .......................................................................................................... — 0 0 

E&E Romania ....................................................................................................... — 5 3 

E&E Russia .......................................................................................................... 49,872 19 4 

E&E Serbia ........................................................................................................... 51,300 6 11

E&E Slovakia ........................................................................................................ — 0 0 

E&E Tajikistan ..................................................................................................... 26,880 0 0 

E&E Turkey ........................................................................................................... 850 0 0 

E&E Turkmenistan ............................................................................................... 5,466 0 0 

E&E Ukraine ......................................................................................................... 70,430 20 4 

E&E Uzbekistan .................................................................................................... 8,460 0 0 

LAC Argentina ...................................................................................................... — 0 0 

LAC Belize ............................................................................................................ 200 0 0 

LAC Bolivia ........................................................................................................... 106,745 10 3 

LAC Brazil ............................................................................................................ 2,947 2 2 

LAC Caribbean Regional Program ....................................................................... 9,062 0 0 

LAC Central America Regional Program .............................................................. 10,700 0 0 

LAC Chile ............................................................................................................. — 0 0 

LAC Colombia ....................................................................................................... 506,468 10 9 

LAC Costa Rica .................................................................................................... — 0 0 

LAC Cuba ............................................................................................................. 45,700 0 0 

LAC Dominican Republic ..................................................................................... 28,542 13 4 

LAC Ecuador ......................................................................................................... 19,988 4 5 

LAC El Salvador ................................................................................................... 17,449 15 5 

LAC Guatemala .................................................................................................... 43,826 11 4 

602 

MISSIONS, FUNDING, FSOS AND PSCS AS OF 9/30/2006—Continued 

[PSCs include all nondirect hire U.S. citizens] 

Region/Organization unit 

Total FY 08 

CBJ program 

funding 

FSO PSCs/other 

LAC Guyana .......................................................................................................... 23,393 1 3 

LAC Haiti .............................................................................................................. 203,196 15 7 

LAC Honduras ...................................................................................................... 35,149 10 6 

LAC Jamaica ........................................................................................................ 8,536 9 8 

LAC Mexico ........................................................................................................... 14,768 4 10

LAC Nicaragua ..................................................................................................... 25,579 9 3 

LAC Panama ........................................................................................................ 976 2 0 

LAC Paraguay ....................................................................................................... 5,985 3 0 

LAC Peru .............................................................................................................. 89,786 21 6 

LAC South America Regional ............................................................................... 1,500 0 0 

LAC Uruguay ........................................................................................................ — 0 0 

LAC Venezuela ...................................................................................................... 3,000 0 0 

AFR Summary ....................................................................................................... 4,719,164 257 177 

ANE Summary ...................................................................................................... 4,065,496 238 183 

E&E Summary ...................................................................................................... 625,755 121 95 

LAC Summary ....................................................................................................... 1,203,495 139 75 

Question. As a follow-up to the question regarding the number of officers who are 

being pulled away from their current assignments to adjudicate passports, please 

provide the committee with a list of those currently serving in this temporary capacity and any that have been identified by: Foreign Service/Civil Service or Presidential Management Fellow, Grade of the Individual, Current Location (Main State/ 

FSI/Overseas Post), Current/Onward Assignment, Date of Assignment to Passport 

Office, Which Office, Duration of their temporary assignment. 

Answer. We have provided the information requested in the attached a spreadsheet listing the status, assignment, and grade of the officers assisting with passport adjudication along with the length of their respective passport assignments. 

Some of the WAE (When Actually Employed re-employed annuitants) personnel 

have open-ended assignments or are working intermittently in Washington. We 

have noted precise assignments when available. Those listed as ‘‘ELOs’’ are entry 

level officers who are doing passport adjudication full-time. The ELOs’ onward post 

of assignment is listed, and in many, but not every case, their arrival at the post 

of assignment will be delayed by the length of their passport assignment. In Washington, 363 Department volunteers have self-scheduled for intermittent 4-hour adjudication shifts. 

Furthermore, 271 other employees (including Civil Service, Foreign Service Specialists, WAEs, CA contractors, and Eligible Family Members currently employed by 

the Department) have been assigned full-time to customer service details in various 

agencies. These details range from 3 to 8 weeks. Additionally, 337 have voluntarily 

scheduled themselves for customer service work and another 324 for shifts on the 

Passport Phone Task Force. (Note that volunteers for the Customer Service and 

Passport Phone Task Force may overlap). These are primarily after duty hours and 

weekend hours. 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FO–03 ..... Washington ............ 10-Jul ..................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–01 ...... New Orleans .......... 9-Jul ....................... 4 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–01 ...... New Orleans .......... 9-Jul ....................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... New Orleans .......... 10-Jul ..................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... New Orleans .......... 10-Jul ..................... 2 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... New Orleans .......... 10-Jul ..................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 2 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... New Orleans .......... 10-Jul ..................... 4 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... New Orleans .......... 11-Jul ..................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... New Orleans .......... 10-Jul ..................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 10-Jul ..................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 10-Jul ..................... 3 

603 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–04 ...... New Orleans .......... 9-Jul ....................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–04 ...... New Orleans .......... 10-Jul ..................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ FS–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 11-Jul ..................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 9-Jul ....................... 3 

Advanced Consular ................ ........................................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 9-Jul ....................... 3 

Civil Service ........................... AF/S ................................ GS–08 ..... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Civil Service ........................... CA/FPP ........................... GS–13 ..... Philadelphia ........... 27-Aug ................... 2 

Civil Service ........................... CA/FPP ........................... GS–14 ..... Portsmouth ............ 19-Aug ................... 2 

Civil Service ........................... CA/PPT ........................... GS–13 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 2 

Civil Service ........................... CA/VO/L/A ....................... GS–13 ..... Seattle ................... 4-Aug ..................... 2 

Civil Service ........................... EB/ESC ........................... GS–08 ..... New Orleans .......... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Civil Service ........................... EB/IFD ............................ FS–03 ...... Los Angeles ........... 6-Aug ..................... 4 

Civil Service ........................... EUR/AGS ......................... FS–03 ...... Portsmouth ............ 26-Aug ................... 1 

Civil Service ........................... IIP ................................... FS–03 ...... Los Angeles ........... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Civil Service ........................... IIP/AF .............................. FP–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Civil Service ........................... INR/GGI .......................... GS–12 ..... Chicago .................. 3-Sep ..................... 4 

Civil Service ........................... NEA/SCA/EX .................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Civil Service ........................... Nogales .......................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Civil Service ........................... PRM/MCE ....................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Civil Service ........................... RM/GFS .......................... GS–09 ..... Charleston ............. 23-Jul ..................... 1 

Civil Service ........................... S ..................................... GS–11 ..... Houston .................. 5-Aug ..................... 6 

Civil Service ........................... S–EX–IRM ...................... GS–13 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 2 

Civil Service ........................... Tijuana ........................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic ................................ HR/REE ........................... FE–MC ..... Washington ............ 15-Aug ................... 4 

Domestic ................................ HR/REE ........................... FE–OC ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... AF ................................... FS–02 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... CA/CST ........................... FS–01 ...... New Orleans .......... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... CA/FPP ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 11-Jul ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... EAP/MTS ......................... FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 9-Jul ....................... 1 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... EUR/SE ........................... FP–04 ...... Honolulu ................. 27-Aug ................... 1 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... HR/REE ........................... FE–MC ..... Washington ............ 14-Jul; 21-Jul ........ 1 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... M .................................... FO–02 ..... New Orleans .......... 14-Jul ..................... 2 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... OBO ................................ FS–02 ...... Philadelphia ........... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... OBO ................................ FS–02 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... OES ................................ FS–02 ...... Portsmouth ............ 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... OES ................................ FS–03 ...... San Francisco ........ 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... OES/ENV ......................... FO–02 ..... New Orleans .......... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... PD .................................. FP–04 ...... Boston .................... 25-Jul ..................... 3 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... PM/WRA .......................... FS–02 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... PPT deployment ............. FP–05 ...... Colorado ................. 8-Jul ....................... 8 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... S/ES ............................... FE–MC ..... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 8 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... S/ES–S ........................... FS–03 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... S/ES–X ........................... FS–02 ...... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... Training .......................... FS–02 ...... Chicago .................. 12-Aug ................... 2 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... Training .......................... FS–02 ...... Houston .................. 22-Jul ..................... 1 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... Training .......................... FS–03 ...... New Orleans .......... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... Training .......................... FS–04 ...... New York ................ 29-Aug ................... 1 

Domestic Foreign Service ...... Training .......................... FS–02 ...... Seattle ................... 16-Jul ..................... 1 

ELO ......................................... Abu Dhabi ...................... FP–04 ...... New York ................ 5-Aug ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Abuja .............................. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 22-Aug ................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Accra .............................. FP–04 ...... New Orleans .......... 9-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Accra .............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Addis Ababa .................. FP–05 ...... New Orleans .......... 3-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Amsterdam ..................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Ankara ............................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Athens ............................ FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 29-Jul ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Athens ............................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 25-Jul ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Bangkok ......................... FP–04 ...... New Orleans .......... 30-Sep ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Beijing ............................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Beirut ............................. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Beirut ............................. FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 15-Oct .................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Berlin ............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Berlin ............................. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Bogota ............................ FP–04 ...... Miami ..................... 30-Sep ................... 7 

604 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

ELO ......................................... Bogota ............................ FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 14-Oct .................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Bogota ............................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Bogota ............................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Bridgetown ..................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Bridgetown ..................... FP–05 ...... Houston .................. 4-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Bucharest ....................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 10-Sep ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Bucharest ....................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Canberra ........................ FP–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 16-Sep ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Canberra ........................ FP–04 ...... Seattle ................... 14-Oct .................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Caracas .......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Caracas .......................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Caracas .......................... FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Chengdu ......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Chennai .......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Ciudad Juarez ................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Ciudad Juarez ................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 22-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Ciudad Juarez ................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Ciudad Juarez ................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Ciudad Juarez ................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 10-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Ciudad Juarez ................ FP–04 ...... Houston .................. 8-Oct ...................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Ciudad Juarez ................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Copenhagen ................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Dakar ............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 10-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Dakar ............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Dar es Salaam ............... FP–04 ...... Houston .................. 3-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Dhaka ............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Dhaka ............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Djibouti .......................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Djibouti .......................... FP–06 ...... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Doha ............................... FP–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 5-Aug ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... EUR/RPM ........................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Geneva ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Georgetown .................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 22-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Guangzhou ..................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Guatemala ..................... FP–04 ...... New Orleans .......... 29-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Guayaquil ....................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... HCMC ............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Hong Kong ..................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 2 

ELO ......................................... INR ................................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 24-Sep ................... 2 

ELO ......................................... Iraq Desk ....................... FP–05 ...... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Islamabad ...................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 10-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Islamabad ...................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Islamabad ...................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 27-Aug ................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Islamabad ...................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Jakarta ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 9-Aug ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Jakarta ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 1 

ELO ......................................... Jakarta ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Jakarta ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 0 

ELO ......................................... Jerusalem ....................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Jerusalem ....................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Jerusalem ....................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 17-Sep ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Johannesburg ................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 26-Sep ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Johannesburg ................. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Kampala ......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Kampala ......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Kampala ......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Kampala ......................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 22-Aug ................... 2 

ELO ......................................... Kathmandu .................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Kathmandu .................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 24-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Khartoum ....................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Kinshasa ........................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Kuala Lumpur ................ FP–04 ...... Seattle ................... 13-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Kuwait ............................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 24-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Kyiv ................................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 4 

605 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

ELO ......................................... Kyiv ................................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Kyiv ................................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Kyiv ................................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 3 

ELO ......................................... La Paz ............................ FP–06 ...... New Orleans .......... 12-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Lagos ............................. FP–04 ...... New York ................ 22-Jul ..................... 9 

ELO ......................................... Lagos ............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 9 

ELO ......................................... Lagos ............................. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Lagos ............................. FP–06 ...... New Orleans .......... 5-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Lima ............................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Lima ............................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 18-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Lima ............................... FP–05 ...... New Orleans .......... 28-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Lima ............................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 11-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... London ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 24-Sep ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Madrid ............................ FP–06 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Managua ........................ FP–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 9-Sep ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Managua ........................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 3-Sep ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Manama ......................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 27-Aug ................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Maputo ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 9-Oct ...................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Mexico City ..................... FP–04 ...... New Orleans .......... 16-Sep ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Mexico City ..................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 11-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Mexico City ..................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Mexico City ..................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Mexico City ..................... FP–06 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Minsk ............................. FP–06 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Monrovia ........................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Monterrey ....................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Moscow .......................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 11-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Mumbai .......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Mumbai .......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Mumbai .......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 26-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Mumbai .......................... FP–05 ...... San Francisco ........ 16-Sep ................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Mumbai .......................... FP–06 ...... New Orleans .......... 3-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Nairobi ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 17-Sep ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Nairobi ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 27-Aug ................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Nairobi ........................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... NEA/I .............................. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... NEA/I .............................. FP–06 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 1 

ELO ......................................... New Delhi ....................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... New Delhi ....................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... New Delhi ....................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 2 

ELO ......................................... Nogales .......................... FP–06 ...... New Orleans .......... 14-Oct .................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Nuevo Laredo ................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 21-Sep ................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Nuevo Laredo ................. FP–05 ...... New Orleans .......... 23-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Onward Pending ............ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 11-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Ottawa ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 9 

ELO ......................................... Ottawa ........................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Panama .......................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 19-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Panama .......................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Paris ............................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Port of Spain ................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Port of Spain ................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 2-Oct ...................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Quito .............................. FP–05 ...... Los Angeles ........... 3-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Riga ............................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Rio de Janiero ................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Rio de Janiero ................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Riyadh ............................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 11-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Riyadh ............................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 1-Sep ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Riyadh ............................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Riyadh ............................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Riyadh ............................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 3 

ELO ......................................... S/CRS ............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 10-Sep ................... 4 

ELO ......................................... San Jose ......................... FP–04 ...... San Francisco ........ 4-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... San Jose ......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... San Salvador ................. FP–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 26-Aug ................... 8 

606 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

ELO ......................................... San Salvador ................. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Sanaa ............................. FP–04 ...... New Orleans .......... 22-Sep ................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Santo Domingo .............. FP–04 ...... Miami ..................... 16-Sep ................... 3 

ELO ......................................... Santo Domingo .............. FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 19-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Santo Domingo .............. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Santo Domingo .............. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Sao Paulo ....................... FP–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Sao Paulo ....................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Sao Paulo ....................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Sao Paulo ....................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Sarajevo ......................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 29-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Seoul .............................. FP–05 ...... San Francisco ........ 2-Sep ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Seoul .............................. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 2-Aug ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Singapore ....................... FP–05 ...... San Francisco ........ 19-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Sofia ............................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Surabaya ........................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 3 

ELO ......................................... Sydney ............................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 23-Oct .................... 4 

ELO ......................................... Sydney ............................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 24-Sep ................... 3 

ELO ......................................... Taipei ............................. FP–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 13-Aug ................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Tallinn ............................ FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 8 

ELO ......................................... Tegucigalpa ................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 3 

ELO ......................................... Tegucigalpa ................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Tel Aviv .......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 6 

ELO ......................................... Tijuana ........................... FP–04 ...... San Francisco ........ 22-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Training .......................... FP–06 ...... San Francisco ........ 16-Sep ................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Training .......................... FP–06 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 5 

ELO ......................................... Vancouver ...................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 17-Sep ................... 2 

ELO ......................................... Vatican ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 27-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Vatican ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 7 

ELO ......................................... Vienna ............................ FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 3 

ELO ......................................... Sao Paulo ....................... FP–04 ...... San Francisco ........ 12-Aug ................... 8 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... (End of tour) Kabul ....... FS–02 ...... Houston .................. 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... (End of tour) Kabul ....... FS–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Abidjan ........................... FP–5 ........ New Orleans .......... 10-Aug ................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Abidjan ........................... FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 19-Jul ..................... — 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Accra .............................. FP–03 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Amsterdam ..................... FS–01 ...... Portsmouth ............ 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Amsterdam ..................... FS–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Antananarivo .................. FS–04 ...... Washington ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... APP Toulouse ................. FS–03 ...... Portsmouth ............ 13-Aug ................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Athens ............................ FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Azerbaijan ...................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 16-Sep ................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Beijing ............................ FP–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 16-Aug ................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Berlin ............................. FE–MC ..... New Orleans .......... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Buenos Aires .................. FS–04 ...... San Francisco ........ 23-Sep ................... 6 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Cairo .............................. FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 24-Aug ................... 6 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Ciudad Juarez ................ FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Ciudad Juarez ................ FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Dar es Salaam ............... FS–02 ...... Boston .................... 17-Jul ..................... 1 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Frankfurt ........................ FE–OC ..... New Orleans .......... 12-Aug ................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Frankfurt ........................ FS–03 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Geneva ........................... FP–05 ...... Seattle ................... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Guadalajara ................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Guadalajara ................... FP–05 ...... Portsmouth ............ 9-Jul ....................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Guangzhou ..................... FP–04 ...... Chicago .................. 6-Jul ....................... 1 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Guatemala ..................... FP–05 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Guatemala ..................... FP–05 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Guayaquil ....................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Hanoi .............................. FA–MC ..... Portsmouth ............ 13-Aug ................... 6 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Harare ............................ FS–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Hermosillo ...................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Hermosillo ...................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Ho Chi Minh City ........... FP–03 ...... Washington ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Ho Chi Minh City ........... FS–02 ...... Chicago .................. 17-Sep ................... 3 

607 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Ho Chi Minh City ........... FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 23-Jul; 6A .............. 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Home Leave ................... FP–03 ...... Washington ............ 12-Jul ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Home Leave ................... FP–04 ...... Los Angeles ........... 2-Jul ....................... 2 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Hong Kong ..................... FP–04 ...... Philadelphia ........... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Jakarta ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Jakarta (R&R) ................ FS–02 ...... Seattle ................... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Johannesburg ................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 13-Jul ..................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Kinshasa ........................ FO–03 ..... New Orleans .......... 26-Aug ................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Kinshasa ........................ FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 19-Jul ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Kuwait ............................ FP–01 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 2 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Kyiv ................................ FS–04 ...... Chicago .................. 16-Aug ................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... La Paz ............................ FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 26-Jul ..................... 2 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... London ........................... FP–05 ...... Washington ............ 26-Jul ..................... 2 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Manila ............................ FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Melbourne ...................... FS–02 ...... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Melbourne ...................... FS–02 ...... Washington ............ 2-Jul ....................... 1 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Mexico City ..................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Mexico City ..................... FP–05 ...... Portsmouth ............ 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Monterrey ....................... FP–02 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Monterrey ....................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 31-Jul ..................... 2 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Moscow .......................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Munich ........................... FP–04 ...... Houston .................. 5-Aug ..................... 4

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Nairobi ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 28-Jul ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Nassau ........................... FS–02 ...... Washington ............ 5-Aug ..................... 1 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... New Delhi ....................... FS–01 ...... Philadelphia ........... 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Nogales .......................... FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Panama .......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 21-Jul ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Paris ............................... FE–MC ..... Colorado ................. 6-Aug ..................... 8 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... RCO Frankfurt ................ FS–01 ...... Portsmouth ............ 2-Jul ....................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... RCO Frankfurt ................ FS–02 ...... Portsmouth ............ 13-Aug ................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... RCO Johannesburg ......... FS–03 ...... Chicago .................. 11-Jul ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Seoul (R&R) ................... FP–04 ...... Seattle ................... 20-Aug ................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Singapore ....................... FS–02 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Singapore ....................... FS–04 ...... San Francisco ........ 6-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Skopje ............................ FS–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Surabaya ........................ FP–03 ...... Washington ............ 9-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Taipei (R&R) .................. FP–02 ...... Miami ..................... 23-Jul ..................... 1 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Tegucigalpa ................... FP–07 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Tel Aviv .......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Tijuana ........................... FS–02 ...... Seattle ................... 30-Jul ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Tokyo .............................. FP–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Tokyo .............................. FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 3-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Tunis .............................. FP–09 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Vienna ............................ FS–02 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Warsaw .......................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 26-Aug ................... 1 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Warsaw .......................... FP–07 ...... Portsmouth ............ 4-Aug ..................... 3 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Warsaw .......................... FS–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 4-Aug ..................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Yaounde ......................... FS–04 ...... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

Overseas Foreign Service ....... Yerevan .......................... FS–02 ...... Washington ............ 10-Aug ................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. A ..................................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 12-Aug ................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. A/EX/HRD ....................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. A/EX/HRD ....................... GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EX/PTS ............................ GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. A/ISS/IPS ........................ GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. AC .................................. GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 13-Aug ................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. AF ................................... GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. AF/E ................................ GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. AF/E ................................ GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. AF/SPG ........................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Sep ................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. AF/SPG ........................... GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. AF/W ............................... GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. CA/OCS ........................... GS–12 ..... Los Angeles ........... 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. CA/VO/L/A ....................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. Colombo ......................... GS–09 ..... Seattle ................... 6-Aug ..................... 7 

608 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL ................................ GS–07 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL ................................ GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 27-Aug ................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL ................................ GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 16-Sep ................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/AE ........................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 30-Jul ..................... 3 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/AW .......................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRI/INF ........................... GS–12 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/MLGA ...................... ? .............. Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/MLGA ...................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 15-Jul ..................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/MLGA ...................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 7-Aug ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/NESCA ..................... GS–07 ..... San Francisco ........ 19-Aug ................... 7

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/NESCA ..................... GS–09 ..... Chicago .................. 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/NESCA ..................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 29-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/P ............................. GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/P ............................. GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. DRL/SCA ......................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. DS/IP/OPO ...................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. DS/MGT/HRM .................. GS–09 ..... Los Angeles ........... 15-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. DS/MGT/HRM .................. GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 24-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. DS/MGT/HRM .................. GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. DS/T/TPS ........................ GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP ................................. GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 30-Sep ................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP ................................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP ................................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 10-Sep ................... 3 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/CM .......................... GS–11 ..... Boston .................... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/CM .......................... GS–11 ..... San Francisco ........ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/EP ........................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 9-Sep ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/EX ........................... GS–07 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/FO ........................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/K ............................. GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/K ............................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/K ............................. GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/P, EAP/AWP ............. GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. EAP/RSP ......................... GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 12-Aug ................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. EB .................................. GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 14-Aug ................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. ECA ................................ GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 21-Aug ................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. ECA/A/E .......................... GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. ECA/PCE ......................... GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. ECA–IIP/EX/BF ................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. ECA–IIP/EX/BF ................ GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EEB ................................ GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. EEB ................................ GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 22-Sep ................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. EEB ................................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EEB/IPE .......................... GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EEB/TPP ......................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Aug ................... 6 

PMF/CEP ................................. EEB/TPP/MTA .................. GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 2-Aug ..................... 7

PMF/CEP ................................. EUR/ACE ......................... GS–12 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EUR/NB .......................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 3 

PMF/CEP ................................. EUR/NB .......................... GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 3 

PMF/CEP ................................. EUR/PPD ......................... GS–12 ..... Los Angeles ........... 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. EUR/PRA ......................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 14-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EUR/RPM ........................ GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. EUR/RUS ........................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 9-Aug ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. EUR/SCE ......................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. F ..................................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. F ..................................... GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. G/TIP .............................. GS–11 ..... Houston .................. 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. G/TIP .............................. GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. G/TIP .............................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. H .................................... GS–07 ..... San Francisco ........ 23-Jul ..................... 9 

PMF/CEP ................................. H/EX ............................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 17-Sep ................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. HR/CSP ........................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. HR/ER ............................. GS–07 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. HR/ER ............................. GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. HR/ER ............................. GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 8 

609 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

PMF/CEP ................................. HR/REE ........................... FP–04 ...... Washington ............ 27-Aug ................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. HR/REE ........................... GS–07 ..... Portsmouth ............ 20-Aug ................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. HR/REE ........................... GS–12 ..... San Francisco ........ 22-Jul ..................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. HR/REE/REC ................... GS–07 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 3 

PMF/CEP ................................. HR/RMA .......................... GS–12 ..... New Orleans .......... 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. IIP/NEA–SCA ................... GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. IIP/P ............................... GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. INL .................................. GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 9-Sep ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. INL .................................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 9-Sep ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. INL .................................. GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 14-Aug ................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. INL/AAE .......................... GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. IN/LAP ............................ GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. IN/LAP ............................ GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. IN/LAP ............................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. INL/CIV ........................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 6-Aug ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. IN/I ................................. GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 29-Oct .................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. INL/LP ............................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. INL/LP ............................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 9 

PMF/CEP ................................. INL/LP ............................. GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 23-Jul ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. INR ................................. GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 26-Jul ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. INR/INC .......................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. INR/IRE ........................... GS–12 ..... San Francisco ........ 29-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. INR/NESA ........................ GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. INR/R/EUR ...................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. INR/R/EUR ...................... GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. INR/TNC .......................... GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. IO/MPR ........................... GS–12 ..... San Francisco ........ 4-Aug ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. IO/OIC ............................. GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. IO/PSC ............................ GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. IO/RHS ............................ GS–12 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. IO/UNP ............................ GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. IRM/OPS/MSO ................. GS–05 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN ................................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 11-Sep ................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN ................................. GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 18-Sep ................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/CATR ........................ GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/CPI ........................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/CTR .......................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 23-Jul ..................... 6 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/RA ............................ GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/RA ............................ GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/RA ............................ GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 23-Jul ..................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/RA ............................ GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/WMDT ....................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/WMDT ....................... GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. ISN/WMDT ....................... GS–12 ..... New York ................ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. L ..................................... GS–07 ..... Washington ............ 4-Sep ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. L ..................................... GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 29-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. L/AN, L/T ........................ GS–07 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. L/CA, L/EMP ................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 6-Aug ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. L/CA, L/WHA ................... GS–07 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. L/DL ................................ GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. L/HRR ............................. GS–07 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. L/HRR, L/LEI ................... GS–07 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. L/LFA, L/PM .................... GS–07 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. L/NPV ............................. GS–07 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. L/WHA ............................. GS–07 ..... New Orleans .......... 30-Jul ..................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. M/P ................................. GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. NEA ................................ GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 4-Sep ..................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. NEA/ELA ......................... GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. NEA/I .............................. GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. NEA/I .............................. GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. NEA/IPA .......................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. NEA/PI ............................ GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 8-Oct ...................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. NEA/PI ............................ GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 21-Jul ..................... 6 

PMF/CEP ................................. NEA/RA ........................... GS–09 ..... New York ................ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

610 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

PMF/CEP ................................. OBO/HR .......................... GS–05 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OBO/PE/MEB .................. GS–11 ..... New York ................ 26-Aug ................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES ................................ GS–07 ..... Portsmouth ............ 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES ................................ GS–07 ..... Portsmouth ............ 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES ................................ GS–07 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES ................................ GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 23-Sep ................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES/EGC ......................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES/EGC ......................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES/ENV ......................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 6-Aug ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES/ETC ......................... GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES/IHB .......................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES/STC ......................... GS–07 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. OES/STC ......................... GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PA ................................... GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. PA/FO ............................. GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PA/RMO .......................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 5 

PMF/CEP ................................. PA/RMO .......................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 25-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PIU/RSAT ........................ GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PM/DTC .......................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. PM/PPA ........................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PM/RSAT ......................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 7-Aug ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. PM/RSAT ......................... GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. PM/WRA .......................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PRF/AFR ......................... GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PRM ................................ GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 29-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PRM/ANE ........................ GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 20-Aug ................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PRM/MCE ....................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. PRM/PRP ........................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 6 

PMF/CEP ................................. PRM/PRP ........................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. PRM/PRP ........................ GS–12 ..... New Orleans .......... 20-Aug ................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. RM/BP ............................ GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. RM/BP ............................ GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. RM/BP ............................ GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 10-Sep ................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. S ..................................... GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 10-Sep ................... 3 

PMF/CEP ................................. S ..................................... GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 13-Aug ................... 3 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/CRS ............................. GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 13-Aug ................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/CRS ............................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 10-Sep ................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/CRS ............................. GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/CT ............................... GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/ES–S ........................... GS–07 ..... San Francisco ........ 23–Jul .................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/GAC ............................. GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 23-Jul ..................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/GAC ............................. GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/I .................................. GS–12 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/OCR ............................. GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 6-Aug ..................... 6 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/OCR ............................. GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 6 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/WCI ............................. GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. S/WCI ............................. GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. SCA ................................ GS–09 ..... Chicago .................. 23-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. SCA ................................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 21-Aug ................... 6 

PMF/CEP ................................. SCA/A ............................. GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 7-Sep ..................... 6 

PMF/CEP ................................. SCA/A ............................. GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 16-Jul ..................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. SCA/CEM ........................ GS–09 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 4 

PMF/CEP ................................. SCA/INS .......................... GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. SCA/PPD ......................... GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 16-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. SCA/RAO ......................... GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 2 

PMF/CEP ................................. USAID/GC ....................... GS–09 ..... New York ................ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. VCl/CCA .......................... GS–07 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. VCl/FO ............................ GS–09 ..... Portsmouth ............ 30-Jul ..................... 7 

PMF/CEP ................................. WHA/AND ........................ GS–09 ..... New York ................ 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. WHA/CAR ........................ GS–11 ..... Washington ............ 6-Aug ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. WHA/CCA ........................ GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 15-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. WHA/CEN ........................ GS–11 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. WHA/CEN ........................ GS–12 ..... New Orleans .......... 6-Aug ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. WHA/EX .......................... GS–07 ..... Portsmouth ............ 16-Jul ..................... 7 

611 

Status Office Grade Agency Start Weeks 

PMF/CEP ................................. WHA/PDA ........................ GS–09 ..... New Orleans .......... 22-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. WHA/USOA ...................... GS–12 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 8 

PMF/CEP ................................. WHA/USOAS .................... GS–11 ..... Portsmouth ............ 23-Jul ..................... 2 

R&R ........................................ ........................................ FS–03 ...... Washington ............ 20-Aug ................... 2 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Houston .................. 5-Aug ..................... 6 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Houston .................. 15-Aug ................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Houston .................. 5-Aug ..................... 6 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Houston .................. 5-Aug ..................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Houston .................. 5-Aug ..................... 6 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Houston .................. 19-Aug ................... 6 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul; 8-Aug ........... 6 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 8 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 7/16/2007 .............. 2 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 8-Jul ....................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 5-Aug ..................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Seattle ................... 18-Sep ................... 4 

WAE ........................................ CA .................................. GS–13 ..... Seattle ................... 22-Jul ..................... * 

WAE ........................................ CA/FO ............................. GS–14 ..... Portsmouth ............ 28-Jul ..................... 2 

WAE ........................................ DS .................................. GS–13 ..... Portsmouth ............ 15-Jul ..................... 7 

WAE ........................................ DS .................................. GS–13 ..... Washington ............ 7/25/2007 .............. * 

WAE ........................................ INL .................................. GS–13 ..... Washington ............ 26-Jul ..................... * 

WAE ........................................ NEA ................................ GS–13 ..... San Francisco ........ 7/23/2007 .............. * 

WAE ........................................ NEA ................................ GS–13 ..... San Francisco ........ 26-Aug ................... 9 

WAE ........................................ NEA ................................ GS–13 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 9 

WAE ........................................ NEA ................................ GS–13 ..... Washington ............ 17-Jul ..................... 4 

WAE ........................................ OIG ................................. GS–14 ..... San Francisco ........ 12-Jul ..................... 2 

WAE ........................................ WHA ................................ GS–13 ..... Washington ............ 30-Jul ..................... 3 

WAE ........................................ WHA ................................ GS–13 ..... Washington ............ 23-Jul ..................... 2 

* Indefinite. 

Question. The so-called ‘‘F process’’ through which the Secretary intends to provide strategic direction and priorities for our multiple foreign aid programs has been 

met by considerable resistance. The loudest complaints have centered on the lack 

of transparency of the process but the unspoken complaint is that a number of actors—certain bureaucrats, congressional earmarkers, NGOs, and others—have lost 

some of their say over how individual pots of money will be spent. What can or 

should be done to overcome such resistance? 

Answer. The past year’s budget process focused on looking at the full picture of 

funding and programs going into a particular country or region. This brought additional understanding to a wider group of actors about what the U.S. Government 

is trying to accomplish in a particular country or region and the interests and resources each were contributing. However, this also brought a new set of challenges. 

Many programs have supporters—some with vested interests—whether they be in 

the field, within the Department of State or USAID, in Congress, or in the NGO 

community. Within a constrained budget environment there is never sufficient funding for all programs that everyone would like to do in a country or might be nice 

to do in a country, nor is there enough funding to continue all projects in the same 

levels in all countries. Real, strategic choices have to be made. 

One of the goals of establishing the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and the 

reform process is to make it clear what we seek to accomplish in a country using 

foreign assistance, not just to identify worthwhile programs to fund. By establishing 

these strategic goals, we can then identify which programs, out of a myriad of 

worthwhile programs, are most likely to accomplish our foreign assistance goals. I 

would therefore argue that it is better for the U.S. Government and other stakeholders and partners to understand the full picture of what the U.S. Government 

is achieving in a country rather than only focusing on their own programs; often 

not realizing how they are impacting other sectors and the overall objectives. It is 

beneficial to make the tough decisions to ensure that our foreign assistance funding 

is coordinated, coherent, and used to the maximum impact. I believe that with the 

612 

intensive consultations that I have embarked on, and will continue to do, we will 

be able to move forward taking all of this into consideration. 

Question. As you may know, there are many of us who believe that decisions on 

foreign assistance fall within the realm of foreign policy and should be made by the 

Secretary of State. Do you intend to include section 1206 funding, train-and-equip 

security assistance from DoD, in the ‘‘F process’’ deliberations? 

Answer. Pursuant to section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, the 

President is authorized to direct the Departments of Defense and State to jointly 

develop programs to build the capacity of foreign military forces to be funded from 

Department of Defense appropriations in an amount up to $300 million in this fiscal 

year. This authority has proved effective in addressing rapidly evolving security situations. 

Senator, this is a new authority and we are still working with the Department 

of Defense (DoD) on the best way to coordinate and plan. Our understanding of Congressional intent of the section 1206 authority is that it is to provide supplementary 

urgent funds (outside of the normal budget cycle) and not replace normal programming. Therefore, it is a challenge to incorporate the section 1206 authority in the 

planning stages of the budget preparation, but we must be including it in our thinking the 1206 authority as a possibility in emerging situations. The authority requires that all funding proposals be jointly developed by DoD and the State Department. Staff in the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance are involved in 

this joint development process along with the other key stakeholder bureaus in the 

Department. This joint development process ensures that the Secretary’s foreign 

policy views are incorporated into the decision process. 

Question. We should expect to see some shifting of funding as countries develop 

and can begin to take responsibility for pockets of extreme poverty that may still 

exist despite economic progress. U.S. foreign assistance cannot be seen by recipient 

countries or those working in them as an entitlement and it would be good to see 

more not fewer graduates. How do you judge when a country is ready to ‘‘graduate’’ 

from U.S. assistance? As funding has increased to the Middle East and northern Africa, for example, some funding to countries in Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador, and 

Peru) and Europe and Eurasia has decreased. Is this a function of a finite budget 

or has a conclusion been reached that the countries with aid cuts in these regions 

are graduating from U.S. foreign assistance? 

Answer. We closely monitor the composition and type of U.S. assistance provided 

to ensure it is carefully matched to a country’s needs and our shared interests. 

‘‘Graduation’’ should be viewed in the context of becoming, to use the terminology 

in the Foreign Assistance Framework, a Sustaining Partner country. For example, 

Slovenia is a ‘‘Sustaining Partner’’ country where U.S. assistance is provided to support NATO interoperability and to help position Slovenia to participate in international peacekeeping missions. But, since Slovenia performs well against the economic and democratic measures we monitor, it does not need and does not receive 

substantial foreign assistance. South Africa is another example. Despite 28 successive quarters of economic growth and well-developed financial, legal and transport 

systems, South Africa has been unable to realize fully its capacity, due largely to 

a range of social issues (most prominently, high rates of HIV/AIDS). Our assistance 

to this sustaining partner is therefore targeted to that specific obstacle to success, 

with the largest proportion of U.S. funds directed to combat HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. 

In Europe and Eurasia, development assistance is provided under the Support for 

Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act and FREEDOM Support Act (FSA), which 

address the transition goals of helping post-Communist states become stable, market-oriented democracies. While some of the decline in development assistance funding for Europe and Eurasia can be attributed to critical needs in other regions of 

the world, more notably, we are also able to lower SEED and FSA assistance to the 

region due to the success of sustained efforts since 1989. Eleven SEED countries 

have graduated from dependence on development assistance, and now only receive 

security assistance (Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education Training). Of these, 10 have joined the European Union (E.U.) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the only exception, Croatia, is on track to 

join both organizations. The remaining six SEED recipients appear headed toward 

eventual NATO and E.U. accession, although it may take a decade or more in some 

cases. SEED programs are directed toward joining these Euro-Atlantic institutions, 

which will go hand in hand with graduation from U.S. assistance. In Eurasia, FSA 

assistance has played a substantial role in supporting reform, dramatically illustrated by the democratic breakthroughs in 2003–2005. For Russia, Kazakhstan, and 

613 

Azerbaijan, U.S. funding has been reduced in acknowledgement of the increasing 

energy wealth these countries can bring to bear in addressing their development 

challenges. Nevertheless, progress across Eurasia has been uneven and a number 

of difficult challenges remain to completing FSA’s transition goals, most notably in 

democratic reform, that will necessitate the continuation of development assistance 

to the region for the foreseeable future. 

Similarly, in the Western Hemisphere region, of 26 bilateral country programs in 

Latin America, over half (14) are either in the Transforming or Sustaining Partnership categories. Using a strategic country based approach, we gave priority to key 

anchor states in the region—notably Colombia and Haiti—where strategic and development interests are most salient. Colombia, Haiti, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador 

account for more than 71 percent of the United States assistance resources request 

for the Western Hemisphere in fiscal year 2008. 

In short, a range of factors affects graduation, well as the degree and timing of 

graduation, and the concomitant shifting of U.S. foreign assistance recourses. 

There is no doubt that we are working in a constrained budget environment. 

Tough choices have to be made and fair and appropriate rationales were developed 

for making those choices. 

Question. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention serves as a partnering 

technical agency in collaboration with USAID in many areas of global health programs. Please describe how this works. How would you describe the relationship between USAID and CDC? How can we ensure that these collaborations, including 

work on PEPFAR, the Presidential Malaria Initiative, and the focus on TB, are best 

taking advantage of each agency’s strengths? 

Answer. I am told that USAID has a strong relationship with CDC that capitalizes on the independent strengths of each agency. 

In PEPFAR, both agencies serve as Deputy Principals of the PEPFAR implementation committee. As a disease control and prevention agency, CDC focuses primarily on clinical and laboratory delivery. As a development agency, USAID focuses 

primarily on service delivery outside of the clinic, including community outreach, 

prevention, orphans, and sustainability. 

In the President’s Malaria Initiative, USAID and CDC interact at both the country level and at headquarters, under the direction of a White House appointed coordinator based at USAID and a deputy coordinator detailed to USAID from HHS. 

Both USAID and CDC have put considerable effort into making this partnership 

productive, to the benefit of the recipient countries. Each recipient country is staffed 

by a team that includes one CDC and one USAID technical advisor, supported by 

short-term technical assistance from both Atlanta and Washington. Annual country 

plans are jointly developed by these interagency teams. 

In TB, USAID and CDC have been working closely together over many years and 

have an extraordinarily good working relationship, which ensures that U.S. Government resources for TB and TB/HIV are used in the most effective and efficient manner possible. The agencies have worked together to outline the roles and responsibilities for each agency, with USAID taking the lead on international TB, and CDC 

leading on domestic TB. 

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. I have been a long-time supporter of the Cooperative Association of 

States for Scholarships (CASS) program, which has a pending application for a new 

cooperative agreement. While I understand that a decision on the application may 

not be forthcoming soon, could you please advise as to when a decision will be made 

on the agreement? Are there budgetary barriers that are preventing a decision from 

being made? 

Answer. USAID has received an unsolicited proposal for the amount of $50 million to extend funding for CASS another 5 years beyond fiscal year 2007. The CASS 

program has been in effect for over 20 years; generally it is USAID policy that assistance awards to U.S. organizations should not be extended beyond 10 years from 

the original award without full and open competition. Therefore, should resources 

be made available, USAID policy would favor an award based on open competition. 

Question. I applaud the administration for recognizing the critically important 

role basic education plays in reducing widespread poverty as well as in the achievement of all transformational diplomacy goals. However, of the 52 countries with existing basic education programs, 22 countries are seeing cuts to basic education in 

the administration’s fiscal year 2008 request; and an additional seven countries’ 

614 

basic education budgets are being zeroed out (East Timor, Guinea, India, Madagascar, Mexico, Nepal, and South Africa). Please explain the justification for zeroing 

out basic education in these seven countries. Why does the administration’s fiscal 

year 2008 request eliminate basic education funds to India, which is home to over 

1/3 of the world’s illiterate people, and a country where 4.6 million children do not 

have access to school? 

Answer. Funding for basic education has increased more than fivefold since fiscal year 2000, from less than $100 million to more than $500 million. As a founding 

member of the Education for All—Fast Track Initiative and as a signatory to the 

Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 

and Development Agreement on Aid Effectiveness, the United States is committed 

to aligning its assistance with that of other donors in support of country-driven education strategies. The decision making process used to determine the fiscal year 

2008 funding request for basic education involved country teams in Washington and 

the field. These teams are knowledgeable about each country’s mix of donors and 

what U.S. Government assistance is required to stimulate and sustain transformational development, including whether U.S. Government resources would best 

be used to support basic education or for other high priority programs in the country. 

Our evaluation, based upon suggestions from experts in Washington and in the 

field is that basic education funds have been spread too thin in some cases. Better 

and more strategic results may be achieved by supporting more robust programming 

but in doing so we will need to focus on fewer countries. Under this approach, we 

will focus our technical attention on fewer countries but will have greater resources 

to leverage host country commitment to change. For instance, basic education programs were prioritized in Indonesia to provide a positive alternative in basic education in the world’s most populous Muslim nation (increased $19 million from fiscal 

year 2006). 

Overall, USAID feels that our requested fiscal year 2008 budget will not be detrimental to lasting transformational change in these seven countries, and in each case 

there was a sound rationale for the decision, often based on the local will and capacity to help their own education system. We certainly want to maximize our investments to-date, and we will actively work toward this in each of these countries. 

In the case of India, this is precisely the type of difficult question that we have 

focused on in designing our foreign assistance reforms and in trying to make the 

most strategic use of limited resources. We recognize that India does have significant education needs. Because of the large population size, limited foreign assistance resources, and extreme and growing needs in health, we determined that focusing the majority of United States foreign assistance in the health sector will have 

a greater impact reducing poverty and transforming India than spreading limited 

resources across many sectors. According to the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

indicators, India has improved in education this year, while health indicators have 

declined. Therefore, over 90 percent of the fiscal year 2008 request for India will 

be used to integrate health services and nutrition to improve survival of children 

and their mothers, stem global disease threats, and help India manage the growth 

of its rapidly increasing population. 

In line with the administration’s commitment to basic education, the President 

announced a new initiative on basic education which will provide $525 million over 

5 years to educate an additional 4 million children. The initiative would provide approximately $425 million for additional basic education activities to help partner 

countries meet concrete needs identified through the Fast Track Initiative process 

and $100 million for a new Communities of Opportunity program that will provide 

after school language and skills training for at-risk youth in the 8–14 age group. 

Question. The U.S. Government currently funds basic education programs in 25 

African countries. Why does the administration’s fiscal year 2008 request cut or 

eliminate funds for basic education programs for 13 of these 25 African countries? 

Answer. The administration’s total basic education request for Africa for fiscal 

year 2008 of $155.6 million represents a $26.5 million (21 percent) increase over the 

fiscal year 2007 request. This request demonstrates our commitment to basic education as a critical component of the U.S. Government’s transformational diplomacy 

goal of building strong democratic states equipped to meet the needs of their people, 

reduce widespread poverty, and engage responsibly in the international community. 

The fiscal year 2008 budget was built on an assessment of where assistance could 

be most effective given the overall strengths and challenges associated with a country rather than a more fragmented sector approach. Resources were prioritized to 

the interventions that would serve as critical levers for development. In some countries, therefore, country portfolios were realigned to provide additional funding in 

615 

support of other objectives, including, in some countries in Africa, activities relating 

to strengthening democracy and governance. 

Notably, the fiscal year 2008 request contains $100 million for President Bush’s 

Africa Education Initiative (AEI), a $600 million multi-year initiative that focuses 

on increasing access to quality basic education in Africa through scholarships, textbooks, and teacher training programs. This $100 million request represents a $45 

million (82 percent) increase over AEI funds provided in fiscal year 2006. 

Question. Both the President and Congress have indicated through budget and appropriation commitments their interest in supporting education for African and 

other developing countries. At the same time, however, the commitment to funding 

a strong education officer staff in USAID missions and at central and regional headquarters education offices seems to be decreasing. How will you address the need 

for more staff in both the field and headquarters in education? 

Answer. USAID recognizes the education staffing shortage and will announce very 

soon the recruitment of 10 Foreign Service officers in the education sector who will 

be placed in regional offices and missions over the next 2 years. Additional education officers for high priority education countries and at USAID headquarters are 

part of a proposal that would complement the increased budget and appropriation 

commitments from the President and Congress. 

Question. President Bush recently spoke about the importance of basic education 

in the developing world, identifying education as one of the top 3 priorities for U.S. 

foreign assistance and acknowledging its vital role in achieving sustainable development and global stability. How will you ensure that basic education remains a priority throughout the structural reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance? 

Answer. Education is an important driver for poverty reduction, social empowerment, and gender equality, and the administration has made significant strides in 

expanding the amount of foreign assistance resources devoted to basic education 

programs in particular, and targeting these resources effectively. In fiscal year 2008, 

the President’s budget requested $535 million for basic education programs, up from 

$126 million in fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year 2006, the United States provided 

$521 million. 

Currently, most of USAID’s basic education programs support teacher training, 

scholarships, textbook distribution, and policy reforms. These metric-focused efforts 

have helped to address financial obstacles to schooling and availability of quality instruction. Empirical evidence illustrates that school enrollment, performance, and 

the development of employable skills are tied to a range of factors. This demands 

a more comprehensive approach. On May 31, 2007, the President announced an Expanded Education Program for the world’s poorest targeting up to 4 million more 

children. This initiative will build upon existing efforts with a bold and innovative 

plan to: (1) provide an additional 4 million children with accountable and quality 

basic education; (2) deliver technical training for 100,000 at-risk youth; and (3) coordinate with child health programs that impact educational attainment. 

The President’s initiative would provide approximately $525 million over 5 

years—roughly $425 million for additional basic education activities to help partner 

countries meet concrete needs identified through the Fast Track Initiative process 

and $100 million for a new Communities of Opportunity program that will provide 

after school language and skills training for at-risk youth in the 8–14 age group. 

Additionally, the administration will establish a new high-level position—located at 

the U.S. Agency for International Development—for international basic education 

programs to carry out this initiative and improve program coordination and support 

greater policy coherence at the global level across U.S. Government agencies. 

As a founding member of the Education for All—Fast Track Initiative and as a 

signatory to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Agreement on Aid Effectiveness, the United 

States is committed to aligning its assistance with that of other donors in support 

of country-driven education strategies. The decision making process used to determine the fiscal year 2008 funding request for basic education involved country 

teams in Washington and the field. The goal of this country-focused process was to 

determine the appropriate U.S. Government assistance in each sector, including 

education, required to stimulate and sustain transformational development in that 

country. 

The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance provides coordination and 

guidance to all foreign assistance delivered through all agencies and entities of the 

U.S. Government through the Operational Plan process. Operational Plans provide 

a comprehensive, interagency picture of all foreign assistance resources planned for 

implementation in-country and the utilization of those resources in support of transVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00623 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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formational diplomacy. Developed by the Country Team under the leadership of the 

Ambassador, the Operational Plans ensure that all U.S. foreign assistance resources 

in that country are coordinated, appropriately linked to foreign policy objectives, and 

supportive of an integrated country strategy. They strengthen the link between 

funding, activities, and results and collect standardized data about foreign assistance programs. 

Question. In that speech the President also announced a new initiative on basic 

education which will provide $525 million dollars over 5 years to educate an additional 4 million children. What countries will receive funds through this new initiative? How are they selected? 

Answer. No countries have been selected yet as we are still finalizing the criteria 

for country eligibility. While the criteria have not been finalized, some proposed criteria include: (a) demonstrated country need; (b) the availability of any Fast Track 

Initiative endorsed plan; (c) Millennium Challenge Account program eligibility to 

help guard against corruption; and (d) country commitment to improving education 

quality. We anticipate making a significant budget request to Congress for this new 

program fiscal year 2009. In addition, we anticipate reprogramming $14 million in 

fiscal year 2008 funds for this program. 

Question. What types of basic education programs will be funded under this initiative? 

Answer. The types of basic education programs to be funded under this initiative 

will be tailored to each country’s specific needs based on an assessment. The overall 

focus will be on supporting a comprehensive, systematic approach to improving education. Activities could include teacher training, education finance and governance, 

effective measurement of student achievement, education management information 

systems and public-private partnerships. 

Question. It is now early August and USAID still does not have an approved 

budget for fiscal year 2007. Country level programs have been unable to make decisions and have delayed program activities. What has been the impact of the delay 

in finalizing the budget on program activities? 

Answer. As you know, once we receive our appropriation from Congress, we provide a notification to Congress as to how the funding will be allocated by country 

and account. Prior to submitting such a notification, the Department engages in intensive consultations with Congress. Due to the delayed passage of the Continuing 

Resolution, these consultations began later than expected. 

After productive and intensive consultations, we reached agreement with the appropriations committees on final fiscal year 2007 budget levels for countries and 

specific programs during the week of July 23. Operating year budgets are considered 

final once this agreement is reached. I am transmitting the 653(a) Report summarizing the allocations to Congress and money is moving rapidly to the field. 

Over the course of this fiscal year, we made partial funding available to the field, 

after appropriate notification to Congress. I recognize, however, that not releasing 

the full appropriation has been a challenge for our field missions especially with regard to negotiating implementing mechanisms. I am fully engaged in this matter 

and believe we are now in a position to ensure that programs are moving forward 

in the most expeditious manner possible. We shall aim to have funds to the field 

much earlier next year. If you or your staff would like us to provide a briefing on 

the 653(a) final levels, we would be more than happy to do so. 

Question. Why was USAID management contemplating cutting back operating expenses and shutting down some USAID offices in Africa despite the President’s stated commitment to Africa? Would new offices be opened or would the funding be absorbed by existing programs? What is the status of this possible cutback? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2008 USAID budget request is our bare minimum requirement for operating in an overall scarce budget environment. The USAID budget is a reflection of the many competing demands on taxpayer resources. 

USAID operates in some of the most difficult circumstances in the world and adequate resources are critical to implementing successful programs. USAID has been 

reviewing its budget and structure to ensure that operations are appropriately funded to continue its mission and support our national security interests abroad. 

USAID currently anticipates no additional mission closings beyond what has been 

planned for several years. These include several Eastern European missions that 

are phasing out (Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania) and the Botswana regional mission, which is relocating into the Pretoria regional mission. 

617 

Question. How do you intend to proceed with the ‘‘F’’ process when most Hill committees are working on appropriations using the old standard methods? 

Answer. Since its establishment in June 2006, the Office of the Director of U.S. 

Foreign Assistance has developed new, integrated strategic planning, budget planning, program planning, and results monitoring tools. These tools are designed to 

provide senior leadership with the necessary information to assess progress and 

trade-offs, and improve decision making that supports policy goals, including our 

goal of achieving transformational diplomacy. 

We think it is valuable to look at all the resources going to a country rather than 

considering each account in isolation. At the same time, we utilize the account 

structure established by our appropriations act. Thus, in the fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification we requested funds both by account and in the context of the Foreign Assistance Framework. Our objective is to ensure that the process we establish can accomplish both the goal of creating a strategic view of foreign 

assistance in a country while working within the account structure of our appropriations acts. 

We are at the beginning of this important reform process, not in the middle and 

not at the end. There are many aspects of the foreign assistance apparatus that 

have to be carefully examined; for example, whether the current authorities and account structures are equipped to meet the evolving needs of a post 9–11 world. I 

am committed to fully engaging with our committees in a collaborative manner regarding further steps and improvements to the foreign assistance process and our 

reform efforts. 

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE

TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY VARIOUS SENATORS

Question from Senator Hagel. What are you doing to answer the concerns raised 

by Ambassador Crocker in his cable about United States Government Iraqi employees? 

Answer. In February of this year, we identified the issue of assisting Iraqis who 

work for the embassy as a top priority for the Department and as matter of urgency. 

We took immediate steps to address the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of 

their association with the U.S. Government. We asked Congress to assist us in providing relief to these brave Iraqis by expanding the coverage of special immigrant 

visas (SIVs) which would enable us to include more of the Iraqi nationals who are 

serving the American people. 

Secretary Rice set up the interagency task force on Iraqi Refugees and Internally 

Displaced Persons led by Under Secretary Dobriansky, which continues to meet regularly. The interagency task force has a specific focus to address the humanitarian 

situation, including the needs of those at risk in Iraq because of their association 

with the U.S. Government. I have attended two such meetings and can assure you 

that those involved are dedicated to securing the best solution. 

The interagency task force drafted and cleared the administration’s legislative 

proposal to provide a mechanism to lower, in extraordinary conditions, the years of 

service required for Special Immigrant Visa eligibility under the Immigration and 

Nationality Act. Embassy Baghdad was consulted often during the drafting process 

and its recommendations, which included years of service, were integrated into the 

administration’s SIV proposal. 

In April, we sent to Capitol Hill the legislative proposal as an administration position which allows SIVs for LE Staff who have served in extraordinary conditions as 

determined by the Secretary and have fewer than the minimum years of service otherwise required. Through meetings and briefings, we are working actively to get 

support in both the House of Representatives and the Senate and to secure introduction and consideration of the proposal. We are working simultaneously to find 

a germane legislative vehicle for the legislative proposal or a sponsor to introduce 

it as a free standing bill. We are set to send another letter to all members regarding 

the urgency for the legislative proposal. 

The Department and Embassy Baghdad have communicated to LE Staff the processes by which locally employed interpreters and translators under Chief of Mission 

authority can take immediate advantage of the Special Immigrant Visa opportunities offered by Public Law 110–36. Embassy Baghdad has also acted to accelerate 

the access of LE Staff to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. 

The Department and the administration recognize that a solution must be secured 

to assist those LE Staff in extraordinary conditions who are serving the American 

people. 

618 

Question from Senator Casey. Submit a detailed game plan on simplifying and 

making more transparent the foreign assistance process and dealing with the mess 

of overlapping jurisdictions? 

Answer. Senator, clearly there is a great deal of work to be done to ensure that 

our foreign assistance dollars are used efficiently and to the maximum impact. To 

work toward accomplishing these goals, Secretary Rice has established umbrella 

leadership for foreign assistance resources under a new position of the Director of 

U.S. Foreign Assistance, which is at the rank of Deputy Secretary of State. And to 

more fully align the foreign assistance activities carried out by the Department of 

State and USAID and demonstrate that we are responsible stewards of taxpayer 

dollars, she has appointed the Administrator of USAID to serve concurrently in this 

position. The USAID Administrator and the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has 

direct approval authority over roughly 60 percent of all foreign assistance in the 

Foreign Operations request, and has robust coordinating authority over assistance 

provided under the Global HIV/AIDS (GHAI) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) accounts which includes 80 percent of all foreign assistance. Additionally, the USAID Administrator serves on the Board of the MCC. 

Since its establishment in June 2006, the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign 

Assistance has developed new, integrated strategic planning, budget planning, program planning, and results monitoring tools. These tools are designed to provide 

senior leadership with the necessary information to assess progress and trade-offs, 

and improve decision making that supports policy goals, including our goal of 

achieving transformational diplomacy. 

While all these steps have led to improvements, clearly much remains to be done. 

If I am confirmed, I will engage in transparent and simplified detailed strategic 

planning which will outline improvements and next steps needed in the reform process. I have listed some of the key issues I plan to address and a corresponding tentative timeline. 

• I will work to consult closely and on a regular basis with key stakeholders such 

as Congress, NGOs, and the foreign aid and development community. I have already started this as I indicated in my testimony and I plan to continue this 

during my time as administrator, if confirmed. I strongly believe that robust 

communication, transparency, and buy-in to the Secretary’s foreign assistance 

reforms are essential to its success. 

• I will streamline the budget process over the next 6 months. We are working 

to ensure that the budget process includes regional and functional viewpoints 

as well as participation from other U.S. Government agencies such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Department of Defense. Additionally, 

we are formalizing field suggestions throughout the process and reducing the 

number of decision points in the budget process to relieve staff requirements. 

I am also working to establish clear guidelines on communication with the field 

and USAID and state bureaus to ensure transparency. To help me in doing this, 

I will be holding a series of conferences with USAID Mission Directors starting 

in October. 

• Over the next 8 months, I will work to improve the Operational Plan process 

so that it is less labor intensive while still capturing the key data. Operational 

Plans are integrated interagency implementation plans for foreign assistance 

funding. Operational Plans are intended to strengthen the link between funding, activities, and results, and collect standardized data about foreign assistance programs. This data provides a basis for comparing and evaluating country, program, and partner progress in helping to achieve the transformational 

diplomacy goal. 

• Over the next year, I will improve the core foreign assistance data systems. 

Through upgrading and enhancing the key budget and planning data systems 

we will be able to ensure that the systems are user-friendly, accessible, reliable, 

and flexible. 

• Within the next 6 to 12 months, I will launch a strategic review to look at how 

we can ensure full coordination with agencies other than the Department of 

State and all of the foreign assistance programs and dollars they manage. 

• Finally, over the next 3 to 6 months I will develop options for ensuring increased field involvement in the reform process to enable our foreign assistance 

to remain field driven and needs based. This will involve developing additional 

input points throughout the budget process and starting all budget discussions 

with field input. 

I appreciate your and the committee’s interest in helping us to ensure that we 

have the appropriate tools in place which will improve our foreign assistance decision making and effectiveness. The reforms proposed so far, including the creation 

619 

of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance position, are vital steps to ensure that 

we make every effort within statutory authorities to provide assistance strategically 

and effectively. Together with the Secretary, we will continue to evaluate the process and look to make improvements to the process and our reform efforts, as I mentioned in my testimony. I look forward to engaging with all stakeholders as we identify additional changes and improvements that will maximize the use of the foreign 

assistance dollars appropriated by Congress. Again, I very much welcome the opportunity to work with Congress on this and other matters relating to the foreign assistance reform going forward, and, if confirmed I would plan to come back to the 

committee periodically with more detailed discussion of our plans and progress. 

Question from Senator Menendez. Who conducted the one or two political briefings 

you attended at Treasury? 

Answer. There were two Treasury Senior Staff Retreats that I attended. The 

agenda for the Senior Staff Retreat on January 12, 2004, listed a 1-hour presentation entitled Political Overview and listed Barry Jackson, Deputy Assistant to the 

President and Deputy to the Senior Advisor, and Matt Schlapp, Deputy Assistant 

to the President and Director of Political Affairs as presenters. The agenda for the 

Senior Staff Retreat on January 4, 2005, listed a 45-minute presentation entitled 

Political Overview and listed Barry Jackson, Deputy Assistant to the President and 

Deputy to the Senior Advisor, and Matt Schlapp, Deputy Assistant to the President 

and Director of Political Affairs as presenters. 

Question from Senator Lugar. What will you weigh in on as you take a look . . . 

giving us good counsel on MCC? 

Answer. Among the more important innovations that Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has brought to the table is a greater capacity to concentrate resources toward the specific areas that have the greatest leverage in a country’s 

growth agenda. In my view, the focus on country progress and country ownership 

is an essential element of the MCC model; the focus on country progress is also a 

corner stone of the foreign assistance reform. However, MCC is in a unique role to 

focus significant resources on the highest priority requirements for each country’s 

growth and development. This is an essential tool in the U.S. Government’s foreign 

assistance portfolio. I would like to take a thoughtful look at the advantages and 

disadvantages of the existing foreign assistance models. 

Second, MCC’s emphasis on measuring outcomes is important in the delivery of 

foreign assistance, and something on which we need to focus to improve the quality 

and quantity of our results both at MCC and in the rest of our foreign assistance 

portfolio. 

Third, I would note that I am particularly interested in the fundamental linkage 

of MCC—USAID collaboration. The MCC is starting to build its capacity in the field 

in order to oversee implementation, and measure and evaluate results. In many 

cases, the MCC leans on USAID, whose capacities are stretched thin, while the 

MCC is still in the process of building. I want to explore opportunities for synergy 

and not duplication in our closer collaboration. There are others, and as I learn 

more about the issues and opportunities we face, I will look forward to consulting 

closely with you and others in the Congress on the best way forward. 

Question from Senator Menendez. Submit the options (about refunding expedite 

fees) in writing for the committee. 

Answer. After we examined several options to determine when and if to provide 

refunds for certain expedited applications, I determined that the most effective policy would be to continue to have applicants apply for refunds when they have reason 

to believe that they did not receive expedited service. The State Department will 

then address each refund request carefully on a case-by-case basis. 

As of July 18, 2007, a total of 3,829,913 expedited passport requests have been 

received and acted upon in calendar year 2007; our passport agencies and passport 

centers have issued 2,716,448 expedited passports, 71 percent within 3 business 

days of receiving the applications. A total of 3,286,751 passports (86 percent) were 

likely to have been in customers’ hands within 3 weeks of them having applied, the 

period outlined on the State Department Passport Web site. 

A total of 543,162 expedited passports out of 3,829,913, approximately 14 percent, 

were not processed within 3 weeks. Even then, these individuals still received expedited treatment and most had their passports in hand by the date they specifically 

requested on their application. In the face of unprecedented demand (more than 40 

percent increase over last year), those who requested expedited service did receive 

priority over the millions of other Americans who applied for passports at the same 

time. The expedited applications were automatically given a higher priority in the 

queue; these individuals received much faster service than the applicant who did 

620 

not pay for expedited service and whose wait climbed at one point to twelve weeks. 

To further ensure expedited service, the Department has been paying for expedited 

passports to be mailed via FEDEX and has not, unlike past practice, asked customers to cover this additional cost. 

In reaching the conclusion to refund on a case-by-case basis, there were several 

options. 

The first would be to issue no refunds at all given the unprecedented demand. 

This option did not merit consideration. 

The second would have been to refund the fee paid by every applicant who requested expedited passport service, regardless of how fast the requester received the 

passport. We do not believe that providing a blanket refund automatically to all applicants would be either appropriate or equitable. 

A third option is to provide refunds to applicants who did not receive their passports by the date they requested on their application. The Passport staff was constantly re-sorting and queuing applicants in order to provide those with the greatest/earliest need the fastest service. Thus, while some applications were not processed within 3 days, the passport was still received prior to the date the applicant 

requested. 

A fourth option could be to have those who paid the fee and believe they did not 

receive expedited service request a refund. Our Web site already contains instructions on how to apply for a refund via e-mail. We will review each request thoroughly and provide timely refunds to those who meet the requirements. 

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. I understand that during your first few weeks as Acting Administrator 

and Acting Director of Foreign Assistance you reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the ‘‘F’’ reform process to date. 

(a) What are some of the lessons learned about this process to date? 

(b) How will the change in leadership at the F Bureau affect the plans that Ambassador Tobias put in motion? 

(c) Do you plan to follow the timelines he laid out? If not, how will they differ? 

Answer. During my tenure as Acting Administrator these past 21⁄2 months, I have 

sounded out a number of ambassadors and mission directors for their views on how 

to strengthen U.S. foreign assistance to make it more effective and visible in the 

countries they represent. I am soliciting suggestions from the field to make the 

voices of those who actually implement our programs more prominent in their formulation. We are reviewing the After Action Report on the fiscal year 2008 budget 

formulation process and will be considering the suggestions of internal working 

groups in the agency that have been charged with adapting agency practices to better meet the Secretary of State’s transformational diplomacy goal. I would like to 

underscore the fact that we are in the early stages of the reform process. I will work 

closely with you to strengthen and improve the process as we move forward. 

Through my listening tour, I have taken away several key lessons and corresponding improvements that I think need to be made. First and foremost is that 

we must increase and regularize consultations with key stakeholders and increase 

collaboration and buy-in to the Secretary’s reform. Second, we must streamline the 

budget process, while also increasing field involvement and transparency. Third, we 

must improve the Operational Plan process to be more effective and to make it less 

labor intensive while still collecting the necessary data. Fourth, our budgetary and 

financial systems must be strengthened to allow them to be user-friendly and flexible. And finally, communication and transparency must be enhanced. I take this as 

a serious mandate, and if confirmed, I assure you that my active listening tour will 

not end. 

What I hope to do is capitalize on and reinforce what appears to be working and 

make changes to those elements which are not proving useful. I am particularly interested in simplifying the processes, making them more effective for all stakeholders, and considering attendant timelines in that regard. 

Question. I understand there are plans to reformulate the process and the Strategic Framework. Please discuss what changes are being contemplated and what we 

can expect to unfold. 

Answer. The Secretary and I believe that as we increase the quantity of our foreign assistance, which is critically important, we must also work to improve its 

quality. This is a driving factor behind her foreign assistance reform initiative. In 

my role as Acting Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, I am charged with helping 

621 

the Secretary to identify and realize new means to constantly improve our foreign 

assistance programs and activities. Having assumed this role but a short while ago, 

one of the first things I am doing is to listen to people’s concerns and to consult 

with stakeholders about what we might improve. I will take all the ideas and suggestions I have received under advisement and continue to gather more as I think 

about the best ways to move forward. I want to reiterate that we are only at the 

beginning of the reform process, and I do intend to make changes taking into account what I have heard from all our stakeholders. I am especially interested in any 

thoughts and suggestions you might have about the reforms, including the processes 

and tools, and I would seek an opportunity to consult with you before making any 

significant changes. 

Question. The State Department conducted an after-action review following the 

development of the fiscal year 2008 budget that solicited input from personnel at 

USAID, the State Department, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other 

Federal departments and agencies. Please outline the findings of this review, and 

your plans for responding to the identified weaknesses. 

Answer. With a view toward improving the fiscal year 2009 process, an After Action Review (AAR) was conducted of the new budget formulation process. AAR sessions were attended by a mix of people from State and USAID regional and functional bureaus, including both working and senior-level individuals. It was especially important that the field’s views were heard, therefore, mini-AAR sessions 

were held with at least one USAID mission and one embassy representative from 

every region of the world. Feedback was also solicited from key stakeholders such 

as the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation, and Congressional staff and members of the NGO community. This 

feedback was incorporated into a number of recommended changes to the fiscal year 

2009 budget process to make the use of foreign assistance resources more transparent, efficient and effective. 

Refined Roles: In an effort to formalize the field’s input, as well as to empower 

them at the beginning of the budget process, the fiscal year 2009 process began with 

the Mission Strategic Plans (MSP), a joint State-USAID field submission of budget 

and allocation levels down to the program element. Washington direction will remain at the strategic, or program area level, with the field making necessary adjustments to program elements throughout the budget request process. This is an essential change in my view, as it gives the field a very prominent and defined role in 

formulating their budget request. 

Strategy Development: In recognition that country strategies should guide strategic budgeting and consensus building, each MSP includes brief country strategies. 

Additionally, early in the process, regional assistance strategy sessions and functional roundtables were held to ensure that everyone agrees on the strategic direction for that region/functional area. 

Initial Budget Levels: In an effort to minimize the last minute changes that often 

need to be made, the fiscal year 2009 budget process will incorporate into initial 

budget guidance levels consideration of likely Congressional and Presidential priorities identified through regional assistance strategy sessions and functional 

roundtables. 

Efficiency: While we don’t want to compromise participation and transparency, 

there was concern over the staff time requirements involved in setting the fiscal 

year 2008 budget. Therefore, in fiscal year 2009 we will reduce the number of decision points in the budget process and improve overall coordination in F. I am currently looking at ways the F organizational structure can be improved so as to maximize coordination with all relevant parties. 

Communication: I am working to establish clear guidelines on communication 

with the field and the bureaus here in Washington through weekly updates, and the 

distribution of the fiscal year 2009 timeline including responsibilities and tasks. Additionally, to further increase transparency, I am working on ways to communicate 

to the bureaus as changes are made throughout the allocation process and in the 

budget negotiations with the Office of Management and Budget. 

Question. An ongoing criticism has been that USAID missions were not adequately involved during the budget writing process, and that it was a Washingtondriven exercise. Before Ambassador Tobias’ departure, he had stated that field staff 

would be involved to a greater extent in the future. To what extent will you implement this commitment? 

Answer. This is a commitment I fully intend to carry out. During my tenure as 

acting administrator these past 21⁄2 months, I have consulted a number of ambassadors and mission directors for their views on how to strengthen U.S. foreign asVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00629 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
622 

sistance to make it more effective and visible in the countries they represent. I am 

soliciting suggestions from the field to make the voices of those who actually implement USAID programs more prominent in their formulation. I have charged the 

agency’s Chief Operating Officer to convene a conference of mission directors in 

Washington, now tentatively scheduled for October. 

With a view toward improving the fiscal year 2009 process, an After Action Review (AAR) was conducted of the new budget formulation process. AAR sessions 

were attended by a mix of people from State and USAID regional and functional 

bureaus, including both working and senior-level individuals. It was especially important that the field’s views were heard, therefore, mini-AAR sessions were held 

with at least one USAID mission and one embassy representative from every region 

of the world. 

In an effort to formalize the field’s input, as well as to empower them at the beginning of the budget process, the fiscal year 2009 process will begin with the Mission Strategic Plans (MSP), a joint State-USAID field submission of budget and allocation levels down to the program element. Washington direction will remain at the 

strategic, or program area level, with the field making necessary adjustments to 

programs elements throughout the budget request process. This is an essential 

change in my view, as it gives the field a very prominent and defined role in formulating their budget request. 

Question. I understand that AID mission staff have observed that the F process 

reduces their flexibility to transfer funds from one activity to another without the 

USAID Administrator’s approval. Previously, such decisions could be made by the 

USAID Mission Director. Why is this level of oversight needed? 

Answer. In my time as Acting Administrator, I have worked to ensure that we 

are respecting long standing criteria regarding levels and amounts for programs and 

activities that can be transferred by the field without further approval from the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. I have done this to make certain that 

the appropriate balance between the field and Washington is maintained. 

The important balance I refer to is the one between ensuring fiscal integrity and 

accountability of taxpayer funds and overall coherence of foreign assistance programming while permitting the field to respond rapidly to programming needs especially near the end of the fiscal year. Many USAID programs are subject to crosscutting earmarks and the independent decisions of mission directors moving funds 

can result in our inability to fund programs at earmarked levels. That said, we are 

working to provide mission directors with sufficient flexibility to reprogram funds 

to address the realities in the field while ensuring our ability to meet Congressional 

and administration priorities. 

Question. How do you plan to coordinate foreign aid programs outside the DFA’s 

jurisdiction, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Coordinator for 

the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)? To what degree will 

State and USAID programs complement MCC and PEPFAR programs? 

Answer. The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance provides coordination and guidance to all foreign assistance delivered through all agencies and entities of the U.S. Government through the operational plan process. Operational plans 

provide a comprehensive, interagency picture of all foreign assistance resources 

planned for implementation in-country and the utilization of those resources in support of transformational diplomacy. Developed by the country team under the leadership of the ambassador, the operational plans ensure that all U.S. foreign assistance resources in that country are coordinated, appropriately linked to foreign policy 

objectives, and supportive of an integrated country strategy. They strengthen the 

link between funding, activities, and results, and collect standardized data about 

foreign assistance programs. In fiscal year 2008, all recipient countries will complete 

operational plans. In fiscal year 2007, our pilot year, a total of 67 countries submitted integrated operational plans. 

As you know, the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 

Act (Public Law 108–25), enacted in 2003, provides the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator with primary responsibility for the oversight and coordination of all resources 

and activities of the U.S. Government to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance was subsequently established by the Secretary to 

make every effort within existing statutory authority to ensure that U.S. assistance 

writ large was programmed in support of our foreign policy goals. The Director’s responsibilities accordingly include providing overall coordination and guidance to 

U.S. foreign assistance delivered through other agencies and entities of the U.S. 

Government, including the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. 

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The Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (Sec. 604) as an independent entity with its own board of directors. 

The Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID sit on that board. In addition to the Secretary’s authorities as a member of the MCC board, the Foreign Assistance Act directs that the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance to ensure that such 

programs are integrated and the foreign policy of the United States is best served. 

In building the fiscal year 2009 budget, therefore, we are receiving input from MCC 

about projected expenditures in countries in which we are working. In MCC threshold and compact countries, teams considered proposed U.S. Government resources 

in light of the specific gaps and obstacles impeding country progress, as well as how 

best to coordinate these resources in such a way as to both facilitate the success 

of MCC programs and to amplify results. For example, in the fiscal year 2008 request for Ghana, we shifted funds to enhance the capacity of local government as 

the responsible party for implementing the MCC compact program. In El Salvador, 

State/USAID funds increased for programs to strengthen specific obstacles impeding 

country progress—the rule of law and justice sector, and other programs to address 

gang-related violence. In Honduras, economic growth funds actually increased overall, particularly in trade and investment and private sector competitiveness to complement MCC program. 

Question. What do you think is an appropriate division of labor between the U.S. 

military and civilian agencies, particularly USAID, in development activities? Under 

what circumstances, if any, do you think that the U.S. military should take the lead 

in economic and political development activities? What sorts of mechanisms are 

there to coordinate activities where the U.S. military and USAID are involved? 

What further mechanisms might be useful? Do you believe DoD will, or should, 

maintain a role in foreign assistance after the completion of military action? 

Answer. Wherever possible, U.S. development assistance should be carried out by 

civilian agencies. But exceptions to this rule can and do arise, as we are witnessing 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Where there is active combat, or in extremely insecure environments, the security situation may not permit the exclusive deployment of civilian personnel. In these highly threatening environments, the presence of civilians 

depends on adequate force protection (provided by the military or by private security 

contractors) to enable their work on the ground. The support systems required to 

effectively staff missions, and meet the personal security requirements of our officers in hostile environments, is a significant strain on USAID resources. 

The unique division of labor between civilian-led and military-assisted missions 

(or vice versa) is often environmentally dependent. The greater the threat of violent 

conflict or armed hostilities, the higher the likelihood that the military will have a 

role to play in ensuring economic and political stability. As we move along the continuum of conflict, from hostile to permissive environments, the military may play 

a less significant role. With relatively limited human resources, in proportion to the 

scope of the stabilizing mission we are pursuing in many of these insecure countries, 

whenever practicable civilian agencies have opted to yield operational control to the 

military in areas beyond our reach, while either continuing to maintain or enhancing intellectual control of the development space. 

In those circumstances where the civilian agencies are significantly stretched by 

the human and financial requirements of operating in high-threat environments, the 

military may take on additional responsibilities to facilitate economic and political 

development. 

In hostile environments, USAID staff often serve alongside military personnel on 

integrated civil-military platforms such as the Provincial Reconstruction Team 

(PRT) construct in Afghanistan and Iraq. In concept, these constructs allow for synchronization of civilian and military activities. Synchronizing various quick impact 

resource streams, such as DoD’s Commanders Emergency Response Program 

(CERP) funds and USAID’s quick impact funds to further security, economic, and 

political goals is one example of successful civil-military coordination. At a minimum, USAID officers seek to ensure that military-led and resourced activities are 

conceived and implemented in a way that furthers the country’s economic and social 

development, and that the activities are aligned with and complement national development strategies. The transferability or sustainability of CERP-like funds as 

control begins to shift from military to civilian leadership and control is an ongoing 

challenge. 

There is an emerging institutionalization of collaboration frameworks in the U.S. 

Government. USAID has begun working with the various regional Combatant Commands to develop a system for synchronizing their respective theater security cooperation plans with USAID’s operational plans. 

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What we could practically use now is a new framework that dictates civilian-military coordination of all foreign assistance engagements from the national to the tactical level. Theater security cooperation guidance and foreign assistance guidance 

should be published and promulgated simultaneously. Country plans and theater security cooperation plans should be produced and executed in concert. In the field, 

activity coordination is orchestrated by the country team, chaired by the ambassador. The EUCOM initiated Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership is one recent example of such cooperation and collaboration which will eventually lead to a 

better understanding of each others’ planning systems and procedures. 

As you know, we now have an office within USAID, staffed with Foreign Service 

officers and military liaison officers, with a mission to institutionalize the USAID– 

DoD relationship through formalized training and education programs and collaborative policy development that will ultimately lead to a process that mitigates the 

current challenges to unified planning and implementation. 

USAID has developed memoranda of understanding governing the placement of 

USAID Senior Development Advisors in the U.S. Central Command, Special Operations Command, and European Command, and memoranda with other Combatant 

Commands are currently being negotiated. Four Combatant Commands have placed 

Military Liaison Officers with USAID, as well. These officer exchanges have proven 

invaluable in coordinating civilian-military activities, training and joint planning exercises. 

Once military objectives have been achieved in a given conflict, we believe that 

DoD should continue to support and sustain foreign assistance efforts in whichever 

way may be appropriate, to include the development of a civilian-controlled security 

sector. These activities however should be limited to the security sector and should 

not expand into traditional civilian development activities. But adequacy of funding 

on the civilian side remains a challenge. 

Question. Does USAID have enough people to carry out its mission? If not, what 

measures do you expect to take to address shortfalls in personnel? 

Answer. USAID’s staffing situation is facing a crisis. This is to due to impending 

retirements and to lack of funds to recruit new officers. The impending retirements 

is a predicament similar to that facing the U.S. Government as a whole; years of 

restricted hiring at or under attrition and an anticipated wave of retirements as the 

‘‘baby boomer’’ generation approaches retirement age has had a negative impact on 

USAID’s ability to carry out its mission. This generation carries enormous experience and expertise that will take decades to replace. Unfortunately, we have been 

hiring under attrition. However, we will be proactive, hoping to make the case by 

launching a robust junior officer program and putting in place a comprehensive recruitment/hiring/training/mentoring/assignment program that will effectively double 

the size of the Foreign Service staff (from 1,100 to 2,200) in the fiscal year 2009- 

2011 timeframe. This will be a very important start. These projections assume that 

we obtain sufficient funds and staff to lay the necessary groundwork to begin to implement a hiring plan from fiscal year 2008 and beyond. 

Question. Please describe what steps you would take to ensure that the agency 

is able to recruit top-level staff. Please also discuss what steps are needed to provide 

opportunities for rising junior officers, improve morale, and increase junior officer 

and overall staff retention rates. 

Answer. While we expect to bring on board most of our FSOs through junior-level 

entry programs (as required by the Foreign Service Act), we recognize that a certain 

percentage of hiring will have to take place at the higher levels, as well. We expect 

to address the quality of life for staff at both levels through expanded training, mentoring, and assignment opportunities, which will complement our outreach recruitment, and targeting minority-serving institutions to increase the diversity of the applicant pool. If our budgets for these activities can increase, we can ensure the 

matching of increased overseas positions in our USAID missions. By ensuring adequate positions overseas and placement of our junior officers in assignments that 

will allow them to both build a solid base as well as learn the intricacies of USAID’s 

business, we hope to quickly grow a cadre of young officers able to take on increasing levels of responsibility. This will be important in improving morale of the workforce as well as overall retention rates. 

Question. Please describe opportunities for foreign language training for USAID 

personnel. Do USAID Foreign Service officers have access to the same language 

training opportunities as Foreign Service officers from the State Department? How 

does the agency determine which officers qualify for language training? If confirmed, 

would you seek to increase training opportunities for staff? 

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Answer. I do not believe our training, including language training, has been reflective of the demands of our work. Foreign language USAID language training is 

linked to the requirement for professional level competency in a foreign language 

for career tenure. This policy is the same as with the State Department. Many overseas positions are ‘‘language-designated’’ and competency requirements are established by the missions themselves, in consultation with the geographic bureau and 

the Office of Human Resources. If employees are assigned to language-designated 

positions, they are enrolled in appropriate language programs until the required 

proficiency is achieved. 

Most USAID language training is done at the Foreign Service Institute, although 

online training is also widely available. Underway now is an initiative to expand 

Arabic competency in USAID’s staff. 

I would like to review language proficiency requirements for all overseas positions, and to review the funding situation. This training cycle can be greatly improved if we can achieve a training float of 10–20 percent and funding necessary 

to ensure we give our officers the language training they would need to effectively 

carry out their jobs. 

Question. What do you regard as your three most significant management challenges at USAID? 

Answer. At present, I believe we have four significant management challenges: 

the need to increase, train, and reposition our staffing; to streamline our procurement; secure and improve the quality of life in our facilities around the world; and 

invest in technology to bring the agency into the 21st Century and onto shared U.S. 

Government platforms. 

As program dollars have increased over the last two decades, our direct hire staff 

numbers have significantly declined from over 7,000 in the 1970s to just over 2,000 

today. Human resource reforms are vital to transforming the delivery of USAID assistance and we must right size our overseas presence and headquarters support. 

In addition, we must ensure we have the right people on staff. We must be able 

to access the technical and professional talent that is required to carry out transformational diplomacy. We will focus on enhanced recruitment processes, increased 

staff training, and improved staff retention measures. We must also position our 

people in the right places. 

Second, the management challenge of streamlining procurement and grants remains for our agency a great challenge. 

The third management challenge facing USAID is the need to provide adequate 

and secure overseas facilities. Secure facilities will protect our people and vital 

records. We must continue to move forward with efforts to secure our facilities and 

co-locate at the new embassy compounds, and improve the quality of life for our people. 

Our fourth management challenge is the need to invest in improved systems, 

equipment, and knowledge management to allow USAID to accurately account for 

and report on the use of taxpayer dollars. We must ensure that our investments in 

technology continue so that we can both effectively manage our programs and clearly explain our programs and their impacts to the Congress and the American people. 

We must, without doubt, find effective and near-term solutions to integration with 

the Department of State and Director of Foreign Assistance technology. 

Question. Until the fiscal year 2008 budget request, USAID annually submitted 

a budget justification document that included program notifications for every country with sectoral funding breakdowns and detailed descriptions of proposed project 

activities. Under the new ‘‘F’’ process, budget requests are combined with the State 

Department’s, generalized by objective rather than by agency, and there is little or 

no substantive detail on proposed projects. What is your view of this new method 

of budget request? Do you think the interests of USAID are well-served by not having your own Congressional presentation document with which to inform Congress 

of your activities? 

Answer. In February 2007, the President submitted the very first joint StateUSAID International Affairs Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) to Congress 

that was on time, focused, strategic, and prioritized to shared foreign assistance objectives. The fiscal year 2008 CBJ is unique in a number of ways, both as a matter 

of structure and substance. In terms of structure, it was significantly revised based 

on consultations with Congress, and provides easier referencing. For example, it begins with a full layout of all State and USAID bilateral assistance, by account, then 

breaks the request down by region and finally offers a series of user-friendly tables 

with accounts and sectors. This CBJ has account comparative information including 

introductory statements identify the purpose of funds; a ‘‘snapshot’’ of fund allocaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00633 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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tion outlining top funding priorities; and a statement of changes which compares fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2006 by account. There is also a complete explanation 

of the context and purpose of the fiscal year 2008 budget. The CBJ carries an overview section which identifies the strategic principles upon which the budget was 

based; summarizes regional priorities; and analyzes macro-level budget information 

for State and USAID bilateral assistance. The revised format addressed a number 

of the key criticisms levied on earlier CBJs. The new format, in combination with 

a number of other foreign assistance reforms should facilitate improved oversight. 

With all State and USAID resources directed towards any given country now requested and justified together, reviewers can see how all U.S. Government accounts 

and programs in the 150 account are working together to further transformational 

diplomacy. For example, in the fiscal year 2008 CBJ, country narratives included 

a discussion on Millennium Challenge Corporation programs as they related to the 

requested assistance programs. Next year, we hope to be able to include additional 

information from other U.S. Government agencies expending their own resources in 

these countries. With budget information presented both by funding account and by 

program, reviewers can make comparisons to previous CBJs and understand support for various programs from different funding accounts. As an additional new feature, each country and program narrative highlighted key changes in fiscal year 

2008. With the new operational plans submitted by field missions and operating bureaus, more programmatic detail than was found in previous CBJs is now available 

to reviewers, including detail on management of various programs. 

USAID staff fully participates in the interagency working group guiding the development and improvement of the CBJ and the notification process, and participates 

in consultations with Congress. USAID interests remain well served by integration. 

We are reviewing all formats to ensure they are user friendly and will seek continuous improvements for fiscal year 2009 and after. 

Question. Under the reform process, annual operational plans are being written 

for every country that receives U.S. assistance. The level of detail previously provided in the above-mentioned Congressional budget request is reportedly provided 

now in the operational plans, but State’s F Bureau has said these will not be made 

public. To what extent will these plans be made available to Congress or the public? 

Answer. I am committed to providing as much information on our foreign assistance activities as possible to our oversight committees and Congressional partners. 

We are currently looking at ways to make the information obtained from the fiscal 

year 2007 operational plans as user friendly and available as we can. However, the 

plans themselves contain predecisional and procurement sensitive information that 

cannot be disseminated widely. We are therefore exploring formats for future years’ 

operational plans with an eye toward making some information more readily and 

widely available. In the meantime, if there is particular fiscal year 2007 country or 

other information that you would like to discuss, we would be happy to meet with 

you. 

Question. Overall, how does the agency determine the proper balance between 

shorter-term foreign policy objectives and longer-term development considerations 

when allocating resources? How is this trade-off managed when formulating an assistance program, for example, for strategically-important countries such as Pakistan? 

Answer. With proper focus and coordination, we can achieve both our development 

and diplomatic objectives without sacrificing the principle of long-term development 

for shorter term objectives. In the past, there was a perception that development 

policy and foreign policy objectives were entirely separate and typically at odds. Poverty reduction, good governance, and capacity building for sustainable long-term 

success are long-held development goals. Foreign policy goals also now recognize 

that lasting peace and prosperity cannot be achieved unless we expand opportunities for all citizens of the global community to live hopeful and prosperous lives. A 

driving purpose behind the establishment of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance was to strengthen the U.S. commitment to long-term development. 

One of the key principles of foreign assistance reform has been to ensure that State/ 

USAID resources support shared goals, and that our planning, budgeting, management, and implementation processes for foreign assistance capitalize on the respective strengths of State and USAID. 

In Pakistan, the U.S. Government aims to help Pakistan become a moderate, stable, democratic country, at peace with itself and its neighbors, while reducing the 

appeal of violent extremism. This strategy benefits both long-term and short-term 

development goals. Over the long term, the United States is focused on strengthening the education system, improving health care for families, promoting economic 

627 

growth and opportunities, and building accountability in governance. Over the short 

term, we have used U.S. assistance to respond to immediate needs from the 2005 

earthquake and threats in the war on terrorism. 

More generally, as evidence of the Secretary’s commitment to long-term development, you will find that 51 percent of the fiscal year 2008 request for Department 

of State and USAID program assistance resources is concentrated in rebuilding and 

developing countries. 

Question. Are we on track to meet the President’s goal of doubling aid to Africa 

by 2010? How will our programs address what many see as Africa’s limited aid absorption capacity? How would you ensure that increased U.S. aid to Africa results 

in qualitative development improvements? 

Answer. Taking into consideration all United States Government funding, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium 

Challenge Account, and assuming large increases in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 

2010, we can double aid to Africa by 2010. Relying heavily on PEPFAR to achieve 

a doubling of aid to Africa, however, tilts our program toward investing in people, 

primarily in the health sector, rather than the more broad-based assistance that is 

necessary to help lift African countries from poverty. 

In Africa, the United States Government works with a broad range of partners: 

host country governments in which there is adequate capacity; civil society, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations; and contractors and grantees in every sector 

to ensure that our funds are effectively utilized. 

In each country, we ensure that development results are achieved by relying on 

our field staff, who are most familiar with conditions on the ground. They design 

programs whose aim is to move countries along the development continuum, which 

typically involves programming in a variety of sectors, including economic growth, 

democracy and governance, education, and health. 

Question. Please comment on how USAID plans to work with countries to mitigate 

the present and future impact of climate change in the developing world. What will 

USAID do to help countries implement international conventions, such as those 

dealing with desertification and climate change? 

Answer. Economic development and economic resilience are fundamental to efforts 

aimed at addressing climate change and desertification in developing countries. 

Many developing countries are dependent upon climate sensitive economic sectors 

for employment and growth: agriculture and forestry, fishing, and tourism; there are 

pressures on food security in many countries already. At USAID, we recognize that 

specific activities to support economic development can contribute to reducing emissions and increasing resilience to a changing environment. Actions to promote sustainable forest management both reduce emissions and increase resilience to climate 

change. 

USAID’s programs include actions to address implementation of these two international conventions (such as improved agricultural productivity, sustainable forest 

management, integrated coastal zone management, revegetation of degraded lands, 

and access to environmental data and decision support tools) in its bilateral development assistance efforts. In turn, USAID also applies the lessons learned from these 

development assistance efforts into the evolution of the international conventions. 

For example, USAID has developed a Climate Change Adaptation Guidance Manual that will enable project planners to understand the potential impacts of climate 

change and to build resilience into development projects. The Adaptation Guidance 

Manual provides a step wise process for evaluation of climate change impacts applicable in the field; including a primer on climate-related risks, a framework for determining if a specific project is vulnerable, and guidance on interventions to increase 

project resilience. USAID is developing a map-based tool to facilitate the assessment 

step in adapting projects to climate change. This simple interface will include detailed data and projections in the background to ease assessment and adaptation. 

In Central America, USAID and partners support SERVIR, (an acronym in Spanish for Regional Visualization and Monitoring System), a hub to collect and process 

climate information, test new and innovative tools, and then apply that information 

to development problems such as weather prediction, fire monitoring, red tides, and 

disaster response. USAID has recently begun an enhancement effort to be able to 

apply the SERVIR model to other regions to support climate resilient development. 

Another example of a development program that promotes resilience to climate 

variability and climate change is the Famine Early Warning System Network 

(FEWS NET). This system is the product of collaboration among U.S. Government 

Agencies (USAID, NASA, USGS, USDA, NOAA) and local, regional, and international partners, and provides early warning and vulnerability information on 

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emerging or evolving food security issues. Professionals in the United States and Africa monitor remotely-sensed and ground-based data on meteorological, crop, and 

rangeland conditions to identify early indications of potential threats to food security. Operating in 27 countries in Africa, Asia, and South America, the program provides decision makers with the information to respond effectively to drought and 

food insecurity. 

Furthermore, applied agriculture research will help the vital agriculture sector in 

developing countries to adapt to climate change and desertification. USAID is a 

major donor to the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research 

(CGIAR), which is developing heat and drought tolerant varieties of cereal crops, 

improving natural resource management and soil protection in semi-arid, subhumid, and high-rainfall agriculture ecosystems through conservation agriculture 

and agroforestry. 

• Drought tolerant maize and rice developed through both biotechnology and conventional breeding hold enormous promise for achieving economic growth and 

insulation from shocks (e.g., droughts, floods) in developing countries in South 

Asia and Africa. • Improving productivity mitigates the impacts of agriculture on tropical forests 

and biodiversity by providing alternatives to clearing tropical forests, which reduces emissions and helps adaptation. • The CGIAR is helping Middle East countries through development and deployment of drought- and salinity-tolerant crops and more strategic management of 

land and water resources in countries such as Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen. 

To address desertification, USAID’s Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program ‘‘GOBI FORAGE’’ is applying forage and animal monitoring technology to pastoral communities in Mongolia. The project addresses rural business 

development by adapting proven monitoring technologies so that they can be used 

by Mongolia’s livestock producers. These technologies provide timely information on 

forage conditions to increase lead time for making risk mitigation decisions by herder groups and policy makers. Nutritional profiling to assess and manage livestock 

performance are being integrated with the forage monitoring technology via other 

funding sources (Mercy Corps and USDA) to enable herders to make business decisions that enhance profitability within an array of livestock enterprises. Formation 

of herder alliances for marketing is also being pursued in collaboration with Mercy 

Corps. 

Question. At present, there is no high-level leadership accountable for gender 

analysis within the new foreign assistance structure which would have responsibility for ensuring that gender analysis is fully integrated into foreign strategies and 

country operational plans, as well as to ensure that specific strategies are directed 

to improving women’s status. Can you tell us how the F Bureau intends to remedy 

this problem? Could you please outline the concrete steps the F bureau will take 

to ensure that gender analysis will be incorporated throughout all stages of country 

program planning, project implementation, and monitoring and evaluation? 

Answer. The contributions that women make to the economic, social, and political 

lives of their nations, communities, families, and the next generation make them 

key actors in effective development, and we are committed to recognizing and encouraging their inclusion in our assistance activities. I am personally interested in 

encouraging this area. 

Promoting a stronger and more productive role for women in development is a priority which demands a broad and flexible approach. The Office of the Director of 

U.S. Foreign Assistance has taken a number of steps to ensure that gender is considered at each stage of the assistance process. To that end, staff consulted with 

gender-based advocacy groups in the NGO community about the appropriate integration of gender considerations into our planning and practices. The Foreign Assistance Framework definitions, used to account for and evaluate programs and activities, correspondingly highlight women and girls distinctively where possible and 

appropriate. For example, one program element on justice systems addresses whether innovations toward equitable access to the justice system are specifically in place 

for women. With regard to monitoring and evaluation overall, people-level indicators 

are being disaggregated, to the extent possible, by sex, to best track the inclusion 

of women and girls in foreign assistance programs. 

Question. I understand that, under the new reforms, USAID planning and implementation is conducted primarily on a country level. How does that affect planning 

and budgeting for important programs that often have a regional or global focus, 

such as environmental or human rights and democracy programs? 

629 

Answer. With a view toward improving the fiscal year 2009 process, we conducted 

an After Action Review (AAR) of the new budget formulation process. In response 

to AAR feedback, we are making a number of changes to the fiscal year 2009 process. In advance of setting initial guidance levels by country and by global/regional 

program, roundtables are held by objective to provide an opportunity for functional 

experts to highlight priorities and needs, and to provide input helpful to determining whether programs should be funded out of country, regional, and/or global 

budgets. In addition to each country submitting a mission strategic plan (MSP) 

budget and narrative, global bureaus and regional missions will be asked to submit 

a budget and narrative for their proposed programs. Each of these inputs will feed 

into budget setting and allocation. Functional bureaus which are champions for such 

cross-cutting issues as the environment, human rights, and democracy will participate in regional strategy sessions, assistance working groups, and senior reviews. 

Question. When disasters require immediate emergency relief, the administration 

may fund pledges by depleting most worldwide disaster accounts. However, these 

resources need to be replenished so as not to curtail U.S. capacity to respond to 

other emergencies. Please prioritize the current top humanitarian crises. What are 

your views on the major trends in the humanitarian area? Is the agency adequately 

funding and emphasizing disaster mitigation and prevention instruments that will 

forestall many humanitarian disasters from occurring? What percentage of the agency’s humanitarian resources is dedicated towards prevention-related programming? 

Answer. The top humanitarian crises are focused primarily on internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are victims of natural disasters and internal national 

conflicts. The top recipients, in priority, of humanitarian assistance from USAID for 

on-going crises so far in fiscal year 2007 are Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, and Congo. 

TRENDS

Continued Increase in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 

While refugees have crossed an international border and live outside of their own 

country, the internally displaced are fleeing within their own country. The number 

of refugees in the world has been falling steadily since the beginning of the 1990s 

when it was about 18 million, but the number of internally displaced people has increased exponentially. At present approximately 12 million people are living as refugees while between 20 and 25 million are internally displaced. The major reasons 

for this are conflict and attempts at ethnic cleansing. As an example, while the crisis in Darfur has generated 234,000 refugees it has created 2.2 million internally 

displaced persons. (If the many people who are internally displaced following natural disasters such as flooding or earthquakes are included in the total figure, the 

estimated number of internally displaced people is higher.) 

The two groups, refugees and internally displaced people, share many similarities. 

Both have been forced to leave their homes, and their welfare depends to a high 

degree on assistance from the international community. While well-established 

frameworks exist for international protection and assistance in the case of refugees, 

the internally displaced are in principle dependent on the will and ability of their 

own governments to respect and enforce their rights. 

Protection and the USAID IDP Policy 

Among international donors, USAID is at the forefront of the humanitarian community’s effort to place greater emphasis on protection across all levels of relief 

planning and implementation. Vulnerable populations—including women, children, 

widows, elderly, disabled, and displaced persons—often bear a heavy burden in natural disasters and complex emergencies, having lost family and community support 

structures and burdened with the effects of poverty and low social status. In insecure environments, women and girls in particular are at risk of sexual exploitation 

and abuse. Since USAID adopted an agency-wide policy for IDPs in 2004, USAID 

has worked with the U.N. and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) partners to 

implement and strengthen protection activities for vulnerable populations in emergencies. The United States was the first donor government to have a policy on IDPs. 

Increasing Food Insecurity 

Related to food aid, the frequency and magnitude of major food crises is increasing 

due to growing chronic vulnerability. Devastating wars, civil strife and natural disasters have often brought in their wake food problems. But over the last 5 to 10 

years, we have seen a significant increase in the numbers of people who are affected 

by these events, who face total destitution, a loss of household assets and livelihoods, and a chronic exposure to even the most minor of these shocks. Droughts in 

Africa are becoming more frequent. Where they used to come once every 10 or 20 

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years, they have recently begun appearing several times in a 10-year period, and 

more recently still, once in every 2 or 3 years. Emergency food aid needs are increasing and becoming less predictable, due to the fact that conflict and natural disasters regularly afflict and undermine the survival of a growing number of destitute 

and chronically food insecure people, who are often subsistence farmers, or herders 

and pastoralists. Despite all that is being done to win the war on hunger, the number of chronically malnourished people in the world continues to rise and stands at 

more than 850 million today. While the prevalence of undernourishment has fallen 

in 30 developing countries since the early 1990s, poverty and conflict have contributed to its growth elsewhere. Hunger-related deaths currently run to more than 

25,000 each day. 

Security of Humanitarian Assistance Workers 

Another major trend with respect to security is a shift in the paradigm used by 

aid organizations to protect their staff and programs. Traditionally, aid organizations have relied on the ‘‘acceptance’’ model, whereby they rely on local populations 

who understand and appreciate their activities to provide a level of protection 

against attack. Organizations are increasingly adopting additional defensive measures to augment their acceptance strategies. Examples include strengthened security management capacity and protocols, more attention to properly equipping and 

training humanitarian personnel, and enhanced physical security. 

USAID continues to be a leader in initiatives to systematically assist NGO and 

U.N. agencies to enhance their capacity to address security challenges. Examples include funding a Security Coordinator shared by NGOs, security training, support to 

the U.N. to strengthen their ability to support NGO security in the field, and requiring safety and security plans in grant proposals. 

New Technologies To Save Lives 

USAID is supporting innovative approaches to assist those affected by disasters. 

For example, malnutrition kills thousands of children either directly or indirectly 

through disease each year. USAID is leading a trend in treating malnourished children through home therapeutic care. Therapeutic home care is called community 

management of acute malnutrition. With the use of community management of 

acute malnutrition, thousands more malnourished children will be able to be 

reached. 

Disaster Risk Reduction/Prevention 

Among international donors, there are increased efforts to identify natural hazards and reduce risks in areas that are prone to recurring disasters. Worldwide, 

USAID is engaged in efforts with the international community to identify and reduce risks of recurring hazards such as floods, drought, volcanoes, and earthquakes. 

USAID believes that disaster preparedness and planning provide a high benefit/ 

cost ratio for areas which have recurrent natural disasters. Currently, USAID provides for capacity building, preparedness, and planning activities to disaster prone 

countries as contingencies allow. The majority of these programs are in the Asia and 

Latin America region. USAID is working with NGOs and local institutions in Africa 

as well. Historically, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has funded capacity building and preparedness activities at a level of about 10 to 15 percent of 

core International Disaster and Famine Assistance funds. In addition, some P.L. 480 

Title programs have disaster and mitigation components. For example, in Ethiopia, 

USAID has worked closely with other donors and the Ethiopian Government to help 

develop and implement a national Productive Safety Net Program targeted at 8 million vulnerable individuals to reduce current food security while building assets so 

as to reduce chronic food insecurity. 

In order to better utilize our finite resources, USAID’s Office of Food for Peace 

has a new strategy that encompasses both emergency and nonemergency programs 

within one strategic objective to reduce food insecurity in vulnerable populations. 

The target groups under the new strategy are populations at risk of food insecurity 

because of their physiological status, socioeconomic status or physical security and/ 

or people whose ability to cope has been temporarily overcome by a shock, disaster 

or setback. In addition, over the past 4 years, USAID has used the resources available under the Famine Fund to support innovative investments targeted to the root 

causes of famine. 

Question. Why, as the SIGIR has reported, did USAID have only one contracting 

officer and one technical officer to oversee 20 Iraq projects worth $1.4 billion? What 

is USAID doing to ensure adequate oversight of its Iraq activities? 

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fessionals tasked with monitoring Bechtel’s activities and providing recommendations to both the contract officer and the cognizant technical officer—far more than 

the two referred to in the audit report. This team was composed of United States 

expatriates, local Iraqi engineers, and staff from the United States Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE) who were co-located with USAID. 

Bechtel’s contract required that it provide USAID with weekly and monthly 

progress reports on each job order, with detailed information on their status and financial implications. USAID personnel reviewed these detailed reports vigorously. 

USAID also maintained a schedule of weekly monitoring trips to the field sites despite the security challenges. The Defense Contract Auditing Agency (DCAA) questioned less than 1 percent of Bechtel’s costs on its completed audit. 

USAID agrees with SIGIR that there are a number of valuable lessons that can 

be drawn from USAID’s experiences managing the Bechtel contract. As SIGIR states 

them in the report, USAID has no argument, in principle, with any of these three 

‘‘lessons learned’’ which states that strong contract administration and adequate 

staffing are critical to success, that a clear understanding and review of costs are 

important to contract management and that minimizing support costs makes more 

money available for reconstruction. 

Question. One problem faced by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 

Iraq has been staffing them with experts in agriculture, local government, and economics—the types of skills that USAID normally provides. What is the current status of USAID staffing of the PRTs? Is USAID responsible for providing these specialized technical skills? If so, what is being done to ensure that current deficiencies 

are addressed? 

Answer. USAID has completed Phase I and II of its commitments for the civilian 

surge 2 months ahead of schedule and has already proceeded to recruit and deploy 

PRT staff for Phase III originally scheduled for December 2007. 

USAID PRT staff currently comprise of 10 USAID senior Foreign Service officers, 

12 technical experts, and 20 technical specialists in local governance and economic 

development, all on the ground in Iraq. We will reach our commitment to provide 

a total of 55 experts and senior staff for the PRTs well before the end of the year 

deadline. 

USAID has been very fortunate in attracting a cadre of very talented development 

professionals to work in Iraq. USAID draws on a number of sources for its staffing: 

our cadre of Foreign Service officers, the civil service staff from Washington, missions around the world, a large pool of retired USAID employees, and experts from 

the private sector willing and able to contribute to our efforts. As people leave Iraq, 

we recruit through our internal assignment process, through appeals to other 

USAID missions, and through public solicitations for services. The interest in our 

programs is strong, as demonstrated by the number of applications we receive for 

each position advertised. 

Question. What role did you have in planning for implementation of the Western 

Hemisphere Travel Initiative? Why do you think the Department was unprepared 

for the volume of passport applications that resulted? 

Answer. In my role as Under Secretary for Management, I followed planning for 

implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), and ensured 

that the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) had the resources necessary to meet the 

challenge. 

Long before I began my current position in the summer of 2005, CA had begun 

preparing for an anticipated increase in passport demand that would result from 

provisions included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed 

in December 2004. To better analyze the likely demand, CA held consultations with 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal agencies, analyzed 

our historical data and projections, and requested a study by an independent management consulting firm. Based on that analysis and review, we predicted that we 

would receive approximately 16.2 million passport applications in fiscal year 2007. 

Through 2005 and 2006, we steadily expanded our capacity to process applications 

and issue passports. We hired over 2,500 employees in passport services in less than 

3 years. Those include passport adjudicators, fraud prevention managers, line supervisors, and the contractors who perform nongovernmental support functions. We 

opened a fourteenth public counter passport agency in Denver in 2005 and expanded 

the physical capacity of our agencies in Boston, Chicago, Houston, New Orleans, and 

Seattle. Our two large passport production centers in New Hampshire and South 

Carolina ramped up and increased their hours dramatically. Today they work three 

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cies. Finally, in March 2007, we opened a third large facility in Arkansas, which 

will be able to print 10 million passports per year. 

We projected we would receive 16.2 million passport applications in the course of 

fiscal year 2007, but we are now on pace to receive approximately 17.5 million— 

almost a million and a half more than we projected. This experienced group did not 

predict the record-setting, compressed demand that began last January, when applications increased dramatically in a very short time frame. In the final months before WHTI implementation in December 2006, we received approximately 1 million 

applications. Then receipts spiked sharply: 1.8 million in January, 1.7 million in 

February, 2 million in March-5.5 million applications in a very short period of time. 

This is approximately double any historical levels experienced. Our receipts far exceeded our ability to keep pace with them in the traditional timeframe. As a result, 

our average processing time lengthened from 6 weeks in December to 10 to 12 

weeks. We are at 9 to 10 weeks today. 

Question. When were you first alerted to the significant increase in passport applications and the fact that processing times were increasing? What measures did 

you take in response? 

Answer. I followed planning and implementation of WHTI, and, when processing 

times had increased to ten weeks, Secretary Rice and I worked to meet the current 

challenge. Secretary Rice contacted DHS Secretary Chertoff to work out the modalities of the flexible accommodation for re-entry into the United States. In addition, 

Deputy Secretary Negroponte and I on several occasions have publicly exhorted Department employees to volunteer for passport task force duty. 

The root of our current situation is the workload that built up when 5.5 million 

applications arrived within about 10 weeks. This far exceeded our ability to keep 

pace within our traditional timeframe. Average processing time lengthened from 6 

weeks in December, to 12 weeks in late spring. 

I was personally involved in the efforts to manage this unanticipated workload 

to help CA work on every part of our supply chain. I made calls to OPM and secured 

approval to waive restrictions that impeded the return of civil service annuitants 

to help process the work. I have had numerous conversations with our partners at 

Citibank and at AT&T to ensure that, at the highest level of their organizations, 

the urgent need to address the problem was clearly communicated. I personally engaged the Public Printer last year to request extra shifts to allow GPO to meet our 

need for a higher volume of passport books. Within the Department I took every 

step needed to ensure that CA had the funding and support it needed to hire, train, 

and rapidly expand workspace for new employees. 

The Department is committed to return to a predictable 6-week process while 

maintaining the security needs of our nation. Over the past several months we have 

brought on hundreds of extra passport adjudicators and passport staff, set up 

around-the-clock operations at passport processing centers, and added telephone 

lines to respond to passport queries. The statistics of the past month are positive, 

and we expect to meet our objective of returning to normal processing time for routine applications (6–8 weeks) in September. 

Question. What do you regard as your top three achievements as Under Secretary? 

Answer. The three achievements that I am most proud of are the technology gains 

the management team has brought to the personnel of the Department at home and 

overseas, the successful Global Repositioning launch and continuation, and the new 

Foreign Service selection process. All of these initiatives reflect our future, and they 

are the strong foundations on which we will build our future. 

On the technology gains, we have worked hard to bring the Department of State 

into the 21st Century so our people can access information they need and communicate anytime and from any where. Technology is essential to how American diplomacy will operate worldwide in the 21st Century. One innovative way to expand our 

presence is what we call a Virtual Presence Post, or VPP. A VPP is more than just 

a Web site, it is a tool for mobilizing available diplomatic resources (travel by mission officers, programs, media, and technology) to build our engagement with a target community where we have no permanent facilities. To date we have established 

40 VPPs worldwide, with more than 20 more currently in the planning phase. 

In addition, because diplomacy entails travel and mobility 24/7/365 in a global enterprise, our vision is to provide full, reliable access to all needed knowledge and 

computing resources at anytime from anywhere in the world. Today over 8,000 Department employees are mobile computing users, able to access our global unclassified network via standard end-user devices such as laptop computers and Personal 

633 

Digital Assistants. This is a number that is increasing daily. Two years ago, only 

a handful had access to these mobile computing tools. 

We are also taking advantage of technology in our training program. Distance 

learning allows us to provide cost effective, just-in-time training to our workforce, 

anywhere/anytime training in 24 time zones. In the past 4 years the number of distance learning completions has grown from 1,697 in 2002 to over 11,000 in 2006— 

a more than fivefold increase. This number will grow even more in 2007. 

Second, global repositioning of personnel is at the heart of Secretary Rice’s bold 

Transformational Diplomacy initiative. The post cold war world we live in is changing rapidly and we must confront new global challenges at an accelerated pace. In 

particular, transnational threats such as terrorism, disease, climate change, international criminal cartels, drug trafficking and trafficking in persons have become 

important elements of international relations. 

Global repositioning is a comprehensive, long-term plan for a phased repositioning 

of more personnel and resources to our posts overseas; once fully implemented it 

will change 10 percent of our overseas presence. We have begun the phases of global 

repositioning out of the resources we currently have and thus far we have shifted 

largely from Washington and Europe 285 positions, 82 percent of which are core diplomatic positions. About half of the overseas positions are distributed throughout 

East and South Central Asia, principally in China and India, but there were also 

significant increases for the Near East, African, and Latin American regions. These 

positions focus on transformational issues such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, democracy-building, and getting the United States message out to local Muslim communities. 

Our repositioning plans include positions for a number of American Presence 

Posts, which are one person posts with only a few local employees and located in 

important cities outside national capitals. These smaller posts allow the Foreign 

Service officer to communicate closely with people of the host nation and get involved with carrying the American message to local regions and communities. 

Third, the Department of State has inaugurated an improved process for selecting 

Foreign Service officers who staff our embassies around the world. The process is 

now a year round multi-step recruiting system that evaluates the total person 

through a streamlined online written exam, personal evaluations, and interviews, 

thus retaining or even raising current high recruitment standards that will help us 

bring in new officers quickly and eliminate the 1–2 year waiting period. The first 

online exams under this new system will take place in September. 

To begin the registration process, the candidates go online and fill out an application form that gathers basic personal data, including education and employment history. The second part of the online registration is the personal narrative, in which 

candidates respond to six questions, each linked to one of the competencies necessary to perform Foreign Service work. The competencies are leadership skills, 

managerial skills, interpersonal skills, communications skills, intellectual skills, and 

substantive knowledge. 

After completing registration, candidates will be authorized to schedule a Foreign 

Service Officer Test appointment on a first-come, first-served basis according to 

when their registration package was received. The test will be computer-based and 

administered at proctored test sites across the country. The nature and difficulty of 

test questions remain unchanged from the pencil-and-paper test of past years, and 

the test still includes a written essay. The test will be given four times a year beginning this September. 

Consideration of the candidates who pass the written exam will be carried out by 

the qualifications evaluation panel (Panel). Complete files of each candidate that include their application form, responses to the personal narrative questions, written 

test score, and essay scores, will be reviewed and evaluated by panel to determine 

which candidates will be invited to the oral assessment. The oral assessment process will remain unchanged. 

We anticipate these changes will bring in the rich diversity of America which is 

a requirement in our new global engagement. We also anticipate those changes will 

bring the speed and modernization necessary for top recruiting in today’s world. 

Last, I would like to add one more accomplishment that gives me immense personal satisfaction. I am very proud of the dedicated women and men of the Department who worked around the clock at home and overseas and assisted 15,000 Americans to depart safely and without injury from Lebanon last summer in the wake 

of accelerated tensions that resulted in conflict. We did not lose one American and, 

in fact, we gained a brand new one in the process, born on board a ship. The Bureau 

of Consular Affairs, teamed up with a number of Department functional and regional bureaus, and the Department of Defense to successfully transport our citizens 

home to safety and their loved ones. 

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Question. What do you regard as the top three issues where you have failed to 

complete or fulfil the objectives you set out? In your judgment, why did these efforts 

fall short? 

Answer. The three things on which I have been working hard to accomplish, but 

we have not yet completed are getting Foreign Service pay reform passed, closing 

the shortfall in resources for State Department operations, and ending the passport 

backlog. 

On Foreign Service pay reform, the State Department and I personally made a 

strong effort within the administration to have the funding included in our fiscal 

year 2007 budget request (and now again in our fiscal year 2008 budget request) 

and to get the authorization language approved. We worked closely with other agencies, Senate and House staffers, and the American Foreign Service Association for 

months in 2006 to reach a proposal acceptable to Congress, the administration, and 

AFSA. 

However, despite this effort, we were unable to get the pay reform authorizing 

legislation passed late last year. We are trying again this year, and I very much 

hope we can achieve this goal. The officers of the State Department, USAID, and 

the other foreign affairs agencies below the senior level who now take, in effect, an 

18.6 percent pay cut when serving overseas deserve better, especially given the difficult and dangerous conditions in which many of them work. 

One of my top goals has been to get the necessary resources for State Department 

operations, in particular for staffing aimed to support Secretary Rice’s Transformational Diplomacy initiative and related training, especially in critical languages such as Arabic, Chinese, and Farsi. The Department needs the resources requested by the President to pursue diplomatic solutions to challenging national security issues around the world. Moreover, our diplomatic platform—which supports 

more than 70,000 United States Government employees from more than 40 agencies 

at over 260 posts worldwide carrying out America’s diplomatic and foreign assistance mission—must be properly staffed, fully trained, and adequately supported 

with the critical infrastructure, including IT, personal security, and secure facilities 

required to get the job done. 

We have not successfully convinced Congress how essential this funding is. The 

annual appropriation for the Department’s principal operating account—Diplomatic 

& Consular Programs (D&CP)—has been underfunded, relative to the President’s 

request, by more than one-half billion dollars altogether over the past 4 years, including the last 2 years while I have been Under Secretary. This—plus annual inflation and exchange rate losses—has had a significant impact on the Department’s 

operations worldwide. 

Third, this year we have not fulfilled our promises to American citizens to provide 

them with passports within the traditional 6 to 8 week standard. In fact, our average processing time had doubled to about twice that. The Bureau of Consular Affairs, based on consultations with other United States Government agencies and a 

study by an outside management consultant, began preparing for an expected increase due to the provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act which was passed in December 2004. Since becoming Under Secretary in August 

2005, I have followed the planning and implementation of the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative and our preparation to deal with the expected increase in passport 

demand. Many steps have been taken over the past 21⁄2 years to deal with what 

was projected to be a 33 percent increase over fiscal year 2006, including hiring over 

2,500 employees in passport services, adding to our physical capacity, and increasing the hours of work substantially. Nevertheless, with an increase for fiscal year 

2007 now projected at 45 percent and a large spike in applications in the first 3 

months of this calendar year—double any historical levels experienced for that period—our passport offices were unable to keep up with the surge of applications and 

have seen a substantial backlog develop. We have been taking many steps to get 

passport processing time back to our traditional standards, and we are now seeing 

good progress toward that goal. 

Question. What are the most pressing human rights issues on which you think 

USAID should work? What are the most important steps you expect to take to promote human rights and democracy? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. USAID’s democracy and governance programs address four global democracy challenges: promoting freedom and political competition in authoritarian states; 

preventing or addressing democratic backsliding; assisting governments in consolidating democracies; and strengthening democratic legitimacy and stability in conflict and post-conflict states. Human rights is a key component to addressing these 

challenges, especially in authoritarian states where the state regularly denies its 

635 

citizens’ fundamental rights like personal security, freedom of expression, and the 

right to dissent. Therefore, human rights is addressed throughout the USAID portfolio. In the more narrow sense, $90.3 million was spent in fiscal year 2006 to support a wide variety of human rights activities: public awareness campaigns; civic 

education, promoting tolerance and religious freedom; increasing access to justice for 

women, the poor, indigenous groups and the disabled; reducing government repression of nongovernmental organizations; increasing the sustainability of human 

rights organizations and improving their ability to monitor, report and advocate 

against abuses; providing legal defense for human rights defenders and victims of 

human rights abuses; caring for victims of torture; training the judiciary to respect 

human rights; and combating violence against women and children. 

The specific steps that USAID will take to promote democracy depend on the context of the countries in which we work. The same is true of human rights, as human 

rights protections are only as strong as a nation’s political institutions as a whole. 

Political change happens at the country level, so USAID democracy programs are 

strategically designed to address the most significant impediments to democratic 

progress. 

In authoritarian states, this would mean a focus on supporting civil society, independent media, and democratic political movements. For example, in Egypt, USAID 

is building the management capacity of human rights organizations, helping civil society organizations campaign for greater freedom, strengthening independent media, 

promoting freedom of expression, and facilitating dialog on opening the political system to independent, democratic political parties. 

In consolidating democracies, the bulk of the assistance would be geared to 

strengthening democratic government institutions like the courts, parliaments, and 

local governments. In Albania, for example, USAID is promoting judicial 

inspectorates as a means for courts to check abuses of power and working to deter 

official corruption by professionalizing and reforming prosecutorial units. USAID 

also is facilitating local government decentralization and anticorruption reforms to 

improve government accountability. 

In complex emergencies and post-conflict settings, an urgent concern is the protection of civilians against targeted violence. In Darfur, USAID is combating the widespread use of rape as a weapon of war through programs to improve physical safety, 

monitor and investigate violations, hold perpetrators accountable through the justice 

system, and address the root causes of the violence. 

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often particularly vulnerable to human 

rights abuses. USAID supports a wide range of programs for IDPs and other highly 

vulnerable groups including combating sexual exploitation and abuse, protecting 

children, delivering counseling and health services to survivors of violence, and conducting training and advocacy. In order to address human rights issues at the onset 

of a complex crisis, USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) include 

Protection Officers alongside the traditional humanitarian relief specialists. In cases 

where widespread human rights abuses threaten to derail critical transitions toward 

peace or democracy, USAID offers rapid, short-term, flexible assistance to promote 

security and respect for human rights and the rule of law, and to help transitioning 

societies establish accountability for past or ongoing atrocities. 

In post-conflict settings, reconstruction and the development of basic governance 

would also be a priority. In Afghanistan, USAID, in cooperation with other United 

States Government agencies, is strengthening nascent democratic institutions at the 

national and subnational levels including the executive branch, Parliament, the judicial and correctional systems, the police, and civil society. Some programs are 

linking the formal justice sector with informal customary justice systems, and improving justice at the provincial level. Other programs focus on stabilizing the country and integrating conflict mitigation, peace, and reconciliation initiatives into 

rural reconstruction programs. 

Like democracy programs, the specific results we hope to achieve depends on the 

country context. Most generally, we aim for broad democratic progress of the type 

that is measured by Freedom House, but our specific programs are often more narrowly focused. Democratic development is often a long-term process because success 

means challenging powerful entrenched interests in the countries were we are working. However, a recently completed study by Vanderbilt University has shown that 

every $10 million of USAID Democracy and Governance funding produces a fivefold 

increase in the amount of democratic change in a given country, in any given year, 

as measured by the Freedom House Scale. Rapid change is the exception, rather 

than the rule. However, USAID is able to directly impact the long-term democratic 

progress in countries where we work. The work that USAID does is complemented 

by others within the U.S Government, such as Department of the State Bureaus of 

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forcement. USAID also closely coordinates its democracy work with bilateral and 

multilateral donors. 

Question. If confirmed, how will you assure that providing long-term assistance 

in the areas of democracy and governance continues to be an organizational priority 

in all regions where USAID works? What will you do to advance and expand the 

mission of the Office of Democracy and Governance? 

Answer. Since the second inaugural address and the launch of the Freedom Agenda, the promotion of democracy and governance has been a top priority of the 

United States. Subsequently the National Security Strategy of the United States 

and Secretary Rice’s Transformation Diplomacy Goal both highlighted the importance of democracy. USAID is a vital part of the successful implementation of the 

National Security Strategy and Transformational Diplomacy, so I will ensure that 

USAID will continue to support democracy and governance for those reasons. Moreover, experience has shown that USAID’s broader development goals such as poverty reduction, basic education, etc., will not succeed without functioning and accountable governments in the countries we work. Therefore, we will try to not just 

focus on country or regional budgets, but also provide adequate program and operating resources for democracy programs. As of 2005, USAID had approximately 400 

democracy staff worldwide and we currently manage approximately 75 percent of all 

U.S. Government democracy assistance coordinated by F. The total fiscal year 2008 

request for democracy and governance is 17 percent greater than the fiscal year 

2006 actual appropriation. Moreover, USAID constantly seeks to innovate in its democracy work. USAID was the first donor to focus on corruption, which is now acknowledged as perhaps the central development issue for democratic and economic 

governance. We are now beginning to expand our work in security sector reform and 

community policing. USAID also is managing large Millennium Challenge Corporation threshold programs. Finally, USAID is leveraging its democracy work by building elements of democracy into the work done in other sectors, with a particular 

focus on transparency, accountability, and participatory government. 

Central to the success of USAID democracy promotion efforts is a strong Office 

of Democracy and Governance. This Office is charged with providing technical support to USAID missions and embassies with the design, measurement, and implementation of democracy programs; conducting cutting edge research; training and 

development of the USAID democracy cadre; and managing global democracy programs. The staff of the Democracy and Governance Office have played a vital role 

in the development of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Framework, as well as with the 

establishment of country-level democracy strategies and budgets. I am fully committed to ensuring that the office receives all of the resources it needs to do its job 

and I will continue to rely on this office to inform the decisions I make as both administrator, if confirmed, and Director of Foreign Assistance. 

RESPONSES OF HENRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

PASSPORT PROCESSING

Question. In response to Questions for the Record from her June 19 testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee about refunding the expediting fee to passport 

applicants who applied for expedited passports but did not receive expedited service, 

Assistant Secretary Maura Harty assured the committee that: ‘‘The Department is 

currently reviewing procedures to refund expedite fees. We are evaluating the best 

process for returning funds to applicants. We anticipate we will be able to publicize 

the new procedures on our Web site in the next several days. Everyone who requests expedited service had their application moved to the front of the line. Regrettably, that did not always result in completion in the stated timeframe. As our Web 

site states, anyone who paid the expedited fee and does not believe they received 

expedited service can apply for a refund.’’ 

Despite Ms. Harty’s response to my question, the Department has still not publicized new procedures for refunding the expedited fee. You testified to the committee that you have ‘‘several options’’ for refunding these fees. 

• What options is the Department considering for processing the refund? 

• How and when will the Department choose which option to implement? 

• Why, despite Assistant Secretary Harty’s testimony that this would happen 

within several days of the passport hearing, has the Department not yet publicized new procedures for processing refunds? 

637 

Answer. After we examined several options to determine when and if to provide 

refunds for certain expedited applications, I determined that the most effective policy would be to continue to have applicants apply for refunds when they have reason 

to believe that they did not receive expedited service. The State Department will 

then address each refund request carefully on a case-by-case basis. 

As of July 18, 2007, a total of 3,829,913 expedited passport requests have been 

received and acted upon in calendar year 2007; our passport agencies and passport 

centers have issued 2,716,448 expedited passports, 71 percent within 3 business 

days of receiving the applications. A total of 3,286,751 passports (86 percent) were 

likely to have been in customers’ hands within 3 weeks of them having applied, the 

period outlined on the State Department Passport Web site. 

A total of 543,162 expedited passports out of 3,829,913, approximately 14 percent, 

were not processed within 3 weeks. Even then, these individuals still received expedited treatment and most had their passports in hand by the date they specifically 

requested on their application. In the face of unprecedented demand (more than 40 

percent increase over last year), those who requested expedited service did receive 

priority over the millions of other Americans who applied for passports at the same 

time. The expedited applications were automatically given a higher priority in the 

queue; these individuals received much faster service than the applicant who did 

not pay for expedited service and whose wait climbed at one point to 12 weeks. 

To further ensure expedited service, the Department has been paying for expedited passports to be mailed via FEDEX and has not, unlike past practice, asked 

customers to cover this additional cost. 

In reaching the conclusion to refund on a case-by-case basis, there were several 

options. 

The first would be to issue no refunds at all given the unprecedented demand. 

This option did not merit consideration. 

The second would have been to refund the fee paid by every applicant who requested expedited passport service, regardless of how fast the requester received the 

passport. We do not believe that providing a blanket refund automatically to all applicants would be either appropriate or equitable. 

A third option is to provide refunds to applicants who did not receive their passports by the date they requested on their application. The Passport staff was constantly re-sorting and queuing applicants in order to provide those with the greatest/earliest need the fastest service. Thus, while some applications were not processed within 3 days, the passport was still received prior to the date the applicant 

requested. 

A fourth option could be to have those who paid the fee and believe they did not 

receive expedited service request a refund. Our Web site already contains instructions on how to apply for a refund via e-mail. We will review each request thoroughly and provide timely refunds to those who meet the requirements. 

COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF STATES FOR SCHOLARSHIPS (CASS)

Question. The Cooperative Association of States for Scholarships (CASS) has operated—with USAID support—for over 20 years bringing students from the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico to study at a network of United States community colleges and other postsecondary institutions. The program includes three institutions in Florida (Hillsborough Community College, Florida Community College, 

and the University of South Florida) with which I am very familiar. Foreign students receive technical training in fields particularly relevant to the development 

needs of their home countries. 

Last November, USAID received from the Center for Intercultural Education and 

Development, a proposal for a new 5-year cooperative agreement for the program’s 

continued operation. As I understand it, because of the lead time necessary to work 

with USAID missions to identify quality candidates in the various countries and to 

proceed with selection and placement at U. S. institutions, renewal needs to be complete by the fall to avoid unnecessary costs associated with entering a close-down 

mode and then restarting. 

Could you provide me your insights as to the status of the CASS renewal proposal? 

Answer. USAID has received an unsolicited proposal for the amount of $50 million to extend funding for CASS another 5 years beyond fiscal year 2007. While 

CASS has been an outstanding program, the global need for educational support demands that the United States invest its education resources elsewhere. Even within 

Latin America and the Caribbean, competing and higher strategic priorities in the 

region, such as Colombia, Haiti, CAFTA–DR directives, Cuba, and the Andean program absorb our limited resources. Further, the CASS program has been in effect 

638 

for over 20 years; generally it is USAID policy that assistance awards to U.S. organizations should not be extended beyond 10 years from the original award without 

full and open competition. Therefore, even if resources were made available, USAID 

policy would favor an award based on open competition. 

IMPROVING USAID’S CAPACITY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Question. We recognize that USAID has constraints on the number of technical 

staff as a result of its OE budget, yet we also recognize that lack of sufficient technical staff is one of the key drivers of the over-use of umbrella contracts and forprofit contractors . . . with the result that contractors manage programs that 

USAID does not have the staff capacity to manage directly. We understand USAID 

provided an estimate of the number of technical staff it would need in order to reduce its dependency on contractors. 

How can we use the opportunity presented by the larger issue of restructuring 

to remedy USAIDs overdependence on inexperienced contractors? 

Answer. This is an excellent question that reflects one of the real challenges to 

our reduced operating budgets. USAID determined, based on information contained 

in the 2004 Annual Report, that the best performing project had a ratio of $1.3 million of funding per USAID permanent technical staff. On the other hand, average 

performing projects had a ratio of over $3 million per person. 

USAID is moving to reposition and assign Foreign Service officers to understaffed 

missions and missions in strategically important countries as well as to better utilize regional platforms based on the principles of USAID’s Workforce Planning 

Model. While this will not alleviate the broader concern of insufficient staff to completely reduce involvement by contractors, it will better position the USAID talent 

pool to meet the critical management and leadership needs of the foreign assistance 

program. 

Question. Microcredit has helped millions of very poor people move out of severe 

poverty. Microenterprise legislation passed in 2004 required that USAID ensure 

that at least 50 percent of microenterprise funding benefits the very poor (people 

living on less than $1 a day). The law mandates that USAID create, or certify, poverty-measurement tools in order to ensure this allocation of resources. I am pleased 

to learn that USAID has certified some poverty-measurement tools in the beginning 

of this year and is working to certify more. 

Can you please tell me how you will work to make certain that USAID successfully implements the Microenterprise Results and Accountability Act of 2004? 

Answer. Since passage of the legislation, USAID has been working vigorously to 

develop and certify accurate, practical, and low-cost poverty assessment tools, in 

consultation with both technical specialists and microenterprise organizations. 

USAID has now certified poverty assessment tools for 17 countries, and is on the 

verge of issuing guidance to all USAID-funded microenterprise organizations in 

those countries and to the USAID Missions that will help coordinate their efforts. 

All affected organizations will report the results of their poverty assessments 

through the Microenterprise Results Reporting system, with which they are already 

familiar. 

Country coverage will be expanded as additional tools become available. One 

emerging challenge is that many countries do not publish the household survey data 

needed to calibrate poverty assessment tools. Developing tools for those countries 

will require USAID to collect its own household survey data—a much more expensive and time-consuming proposition than analyzing existing data. 

USAID has also conducted four intensive training sessions in the use of the 

tools—one for U.S.-based microenterprise networks, and the remainder in Africa, 

Latin America, and Asia. Through the FIELD-Support cooperative agreement, 

USAID will sponsor training in October at the SEEP annual conference in the 

Washington, DC, for implementing partners. Further, USAID is developing an 

Internet-based training program, which will be free and accessible worldwide. This 

Internet-based training will be added to the Internet-based help desk providing assistance to partners in English and Spanish. 

By requiring our partner organizations to use the certified poverty assessment 

tools, USAID will obtain a clear idea of how effective our programs have been at 

targeting individuals who are very poor. Based on those results, USAID will then 

be able to consider what programs have best been able to achieve our goals and 

what programmatic changes, if any, may be needed. 

639 

Question. Also, can you please discuss how USAID might translate such povertymeasurement tools into its other programs in order to help track and ensure that 

appropriated development funds reach the very poor? 

Answer. USAID has already considered the application of poverty assessment 

tools to other programs and will continue to look for cases in which the benefits of 

doing so outweigh the costs. Poverty assessment tools may well be applicable in certain humanitarian relief or social protection programs, in which food or commodities 

are distributed directly to households. In such cases, poverty assessment tools might 

be useful to verify that program benefits are reaching the intended households. In 

contrast, poverty assessment tools may be less useful as a means to target program 

resources: targeting such benefits on the basis of answers to survey questions raises 

considerable risk of misreporting, thereby undermining the reliability and integrity 

of the results of the poverty assessment tools. 

I should also like to point out that, in addition to poverty assessment tools, 

USAID is actively working with its partners to develop broader measures of social 

performance. Social performance provides a holistic means to support USAID’s efforts to reach the poor. Social performance considers not only the poverty level of 

clients, but also how well products are designed to meet the needs of the poor, how 

well organizations reach out to communities, and if staff members of partner organizations are well trained to serve poor and very poor clients. Social performance 

measures are broadly applicable both for microenterprise programs and for programs of other types. 

RESPONSES OF HARRIETTA H. FORE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

Question. I am concerned about evidence that White House aides conducted political briefings for U.S. diplomats that included, among other things, analyses of Congressional and gubernatorial races in this country. In one instance, according to 

press reporting, State Department officials attended a meeting at the White House 

at which political officials discussed key House races for 2002 and media segments 

that were deemed inportant for President Bush’s reelection in 2004. 

• What do you think about the appropriateness of these political briefings? 

• How will you ensure such briefings do not occur again at USAID if you are confirmed as the next administrator? 

Answer. As you know, the briefings for USAID staff were conducted prior to my 

appointment as acting administrator. The White House has expressed the view that 

it is appropriate for White House officials to provide informational briefings about 

the political landscape and its potential impact on our legislative relations to Federal agency appointees whose job it is to implement the President’s policies. 

I certainly commit to reviewing and, if need be, revising, existing guidelines and 

policies at USAID, and to ensuring that any similar activities proposed to me are 

acceptable under all appropriate laws, regulations, and policies before I would approve them. I will also ensure that political appointees at USAID are thoroughly 

briefed by our agency ethics officer on the Hatch Act and it’s requirements. 

(641) 

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Brinker, Nancy Goodman, to be Chief of Protocol 

Kimmitt, Mark, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs 

Siegel, Ned L., to be Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas 

Thomas, Harry K., Jr., to be Director General of the Foreign Service 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SD–423, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson presiding. 

Present: Senators Nelson, Casey, Coleman, Corker, and Isakson. 

Also present: Senators Warner, Hutchison, and Martinez. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Good morning. In the interest of time, I’m going 

to enter the opening statement into the record, and I would turn 

to Senator Coleman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just, very briefly, 

I know two of the individuals here very well and I know of the 

third. These are—they’re all extraordinary candidates. Ned Siegel 

has been a friend of mine for many years. He is—he’s an extraordinary community citizen, he’s a man of great integrity. I think it’s 

wonderful that he’s willing to serve. And, I wholeheartedly endorse 

and support the President’s nomination. I hope it moves forward 

quickly. 

Ambassador Brinker, I’ve also known. She is an extraordinary, 

just an extraordinary individual who has already given great service to this country at the highest level and I’m thrilled that she’s 

willing to continue to do so. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I know we have a large panel and a lot of 

work to be done, but I just want to give my wholehearted endorsement and support for these two individuals who I know, and then, 

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642 

gether and I hope these nominations move forward very quickly 

and that they are confirmed by the full Senate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator. 

I’m going to call on our colleagues for their statement. I’m going 

to call on you in order of seniority and then if you would like to 

be excused, that will enable you to go ahead and attend to the duties of the Senate and the House. 

So, Senator Warner, why don’t we start with you? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. WARNER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WARNER. Well, thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senators 

Coleman and Corker. 

I believe Tom Lantos has about 2 years on my 29. Let’s check 

it out. How long you been here, Tom? 

Mr. LANTOS. I would yield to you. [Laughter.] 

Senator WARNER. All right. If you say so. 

Mr. Chairman and colleagues on the committee and all in attendance, these are joyous occasions. And, I’ve had well over 100 opportunities to come before my colleagues and place my credibility 

against a nominee of a President, Democrat as well as Republican. 

But this is a most unusual one. 

I first would like to say that this fine man I’ve known for many 

years, as well as his family. And, I’d like to ask the Chair if he 

could take a minute to introduce his family and then I’ll abbreviate 

my remarks. 

General KIMMETT. Senator, thank you. I’d like to introduce the 

guests that I brought today, the members of my family. My wife, 

Cathy, my brother, Jay, my sister, Judy, all who have had, in some 

way or another, a significant association with the United States 

Senate. All—— 

Senator WARNER. I will deal with that. [Laughter.] 

You can stand down now. 

General KIMMETT. Thank you very much. [Laughter.] 

Roger. 

Senator WARNER. Years ago when I came here, Mark’s father, 

Stan, after a 26-year career in the military, rising through the 

ranks from a draftee Private to Colonel and fighting in both World 

War II and Korea, went on to spend 15 years serving the United 

States Senate. First as Secretary for the majority under Mike 

Mansfield and then as Secretary of the Senate until 1981. 

And, having had brief tours of service myself, both in World War 

II, at the end, and in Korea, we formed a very strong friendship. 

And, he was a remarkable individual, remarkable. And, those of us 

that were privileged to serve with him here in this institution remember him with great fondness. 

And then, the nominee’s mother, Eunice, served in World War II 

as a Red Cross volunteer in France and occupied Germany in 1945 

and 1946. His brother, Bob, graduated from West Point in 1969, 

served a combat tour in Vietnam, went on to serve on the staff of 

the National Security Counsel, as General Counsel to the Department of Treasury, Undersecretary of State for Policy, United States 

643 

Ambassador to Germany, and currently Deputy Secretary, United 

States Treasury. 

His sister, Kathy, worked for the National Park Service in Washington, DC, and for Senator John Melcher in Billings, MT. His 

brother, Jay, graduated from West Point in 1972, served overseas 

tours in Korea and Hawaii, and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 

the Army. His sister, Mary, served 15 years with the National Park 

Service and is currently a Physician Assistant, having returned 

from serving as a Physician Assistant to United States troops and 

families in Bamberg, Germany. His sister, Judy, served 30 years in 

support of the U.S. Senate, working for the Sergeant of Arms and 

Senators Rockefeller, Kerry, and Carper, and currently serves as 

Deputy Chief of Staff to Senator Frank Lautenberg. 

Mark’s wife, Cathy, has served 31 years as a full-time elementary school teacher, including teaching military dependants in Germany and Belgium. 

Now, we really don’t have to know much about this nominee. His 

family speaks for the integrity, which was given him by his distinguished mother and father and his siblings. 

So, I’d like to say from the outset, that most of my statement can 

go into the record. Nevertheless, the nominee’s a life-long Virginian. He attended grade school and high school in Virginia, left 

Virginia for West Point in 1972, graduating in 1976. His 30-year 

military career included service in Bosnia, Germany, Belgium, and 

a combat tour in Iraq from 2003 to 2004. Upon retirement from the 

Army, he returned to reside in Arlington, VA, and currently serves 

as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. And, 

in that capacity and his previous capacities, I have met and worked 

with the nominee on a number of occasions. 

I particularly recall when he served with General Abizaid, 

CENTCOM, and more recently during many meetings I’ve had at 

the Pentagon here in the last couple of years with the intelligence 

briefings. 

He has absolutely the proven qualifications to move on to his 

new position. So I would like, at this point, to simply conclude, ask 

that the balance of my statement be placed into the record. 

And we as Americans are grateful to you, General, and your family for all the service they’ve done. Good luck, you’re on your own. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Congressman Lantos. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM LANTOS, 

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA 

Mr. LANTOS. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to 

yield to Senator Hutchison. 

Senator NELSON. Well, you—we’re going by seniority, so we 

would certainly invite you for your comments. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Be my guest. Since I don’t have all the seniority, I can’t order people around like Senator Warner. So, I 

would just say, please proceed. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thanks very much. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I believe this is the 

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644 

fairs Committee is eagerly and happily here to endorse the nomination of a very distinguished Republican. 

Nancy Brinker is an extraordinary human being. My wife, Annette, and I have had the pleasure of watching her firsthand during a very difficult period of Hungarian-American relations, perform magnificently as the American Ambassador to Budapest. It 

was a complex, difficult, very impressive assignment, and she discharged it magnificently. 

Her achievements in the private sector are well known to all of 

us. She has created an organization, global in scope, in honor of her 

sister who lost her life at a very early age to cancer. And, this organization has provided millions of people across the globe help and 

hope. I don’t think the President could have picked anybody better 

qualified and more suited to the very difficult task that she’s about 

to undertake. And, as a Democrat, I am proud to support this nomination and I look forward, with total confidence, that we she will 

discharge this new responsibility magnificently. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Congressman. 

Senator Hutchison. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, am here to introduce Nancy Brinker, who is my lifelong 

friend. I so appreciate Congressman Lantos coming over and making this gesture and I know that Ambassador Brinker relied on 

Congressman Lantos for advice and counsel throughout her term 

as Ambassador to Hungary. So, I so appreciate his endorsement of 

her. 

I want to say about Nancy Brinker, that she is a dynamo, a powerhouse, someone who never takes ‘‘no’’ for an answer. I was in her 

living room in 1982 when she started the process of fulfilling the 

promise to her dying sister, Susan G. Komen, that she would do 

everything in her power to end this disease. And, Nancy had a few 

of her friends in her living room and said, ‘‘We’re going to start a 

foundation and we’re going to raise money for breast cancer research.’’ 

Since that time in 1982, the Susan G. Komen For The Cure has 

a network of over 75,000 volunteers, 100 staff members, affiliate 

groups in 120 cities in the United States and three in other countries, including Hungary. And, they have raised $1 billion for 

breast cancer research. That really shows you the organizational 

skills of Nancy Brinker. 

She has served on Government panels under three U.S. Presidents. And of course, President Bush appointed her to be U.S. Ambassador to Hungary. I think she did a great job there and showed 

her diplomatic skills in that post. And, I can tell you, she has an 

instinct for the diplomatic. I know that she will do this job so well. 

She’s organized, which you certainly need as Chief of Protocol. She 

has attention to detail, which you must have when dealing with 

foreign visitors of all countries that will come here. And, she will 

be a superb representative of the United States of America, which 

of course, is the role that she will serve in the State Department. 

645 

So, all of those things I think show that she is the best person 

for this job. And, I hope that we will have an expeditious confirmation hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Hutchison. 

Senator Martinez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MEL MARTINEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am— 

find myself in an unusual position of being on the wrong side of 

the aisle. I’m not sure why this was chosen to be today, but I’m 

delighted to be here. 

I’m very proud to be here to—I just want to make sure my 

friend, Ned Siegel, didn’t think something had transpired. [Laughter.] 

But I’m here, very proud and honored to have the opportunity to 

present to the committee a good friend and a great Floridian, Ned 

Siegel. 

Ned is someone who has distinguished himself in his professional 

life as a law clerk, an attorney, and one of our most successful and 

distinguished developers in the State of Florida. I know, that in addition to that, he’s also had a great calling for public service. He 

has offered himself and from time to time has answered the call 

to duty. 

He served Governor Bush, when the Governor called on him. He 

also had the opportunity to serve President Bush and this administration when he served on the Board of Directors of the Overseas 

Private Investment Corporation, OPIC, which does a terrific job of 

helping United States businesses invest overseas. 

President Bush also appointed Mr. Siegel to serve in a diplomatic 

role at the United States mission to the United Nations, where he 

served as a senior advisor. 

As the Chair knows, Florida and the Bahamas are interlinked. 

We’re very connected. It’s a very important post for us and Florida, 

to have an Ambassador to the Bahamas that be a Floridian, that 

be one of us, that understands our State, but also understands the 

very special relationship between our State and the nation of the 

Bahamas. 

We have issues, whether it be tourism, economic development 

and cooperation, or drug interdiction, issues of migrants that we 

have to deal with. All of which are very, very important. And, I 

know that in the past we’ve had a close working relationship, you 

and I, with our Ambassadors to the Bahamas. 

I believe Mr. Siegel is the right man for the job. I’m delighted 

that the President chose to appoint him. And, I look forward to his 

swift confirmation so that we can have him serving us in this very 

important post, in Nassau. I look forward to his confirmation and 

working with him as our ambassador. 

Mr. Chairman, if I might just take an additional moment to join 

the Nancy Brinker fan club. Ms. Brinker, we sort of claim her in 

Florida, too. I know the Senator from Texas proudly talked to her 

about being a Texan, but we think of Ambassador Brinker as a Floridian, and we’re extremely proud of all that she’s done and look 

646 

forward to her service in this new post where I know she’ll distinguish herself, as well. 

General, I’m sorry, but I don’t have anything else to add on your 

nomination, but I’m sure it will go well as well, and congratulations and thank you for serving. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to address the committee. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Martinez. 

Now, Mr. Thomas, if you would join the folks at the table. We’re 

going to do something a little different today. Because of the length 

that has been consumed by the Senators and the Congressman, I 

am going to have your statements entered into the record, so that 

that will be—your written statement will be—a part of the official 

record and we’re going to turn right to questions. So, I would turn 

to Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you—thank you, Mr. Chairman. Have 

the nominees had a chance, Mr. Siegel, did you have a chance to 

introduce your family? Could you do that, that would—— 

Senator NELSON. Yes. Any of you who have family that you 

would like to introduce, please go ahead. 

Mr. Siegel. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, I would like to introduce my life partner 

and wife of 31 years, Stephanie, who, has given her support and 

love and the ability to make sure that I see things correctly. She 

is sitting right behind over there. Thank you very much. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Ms. BRINKER. And, Senator, I would like to introduce my son, 

Eric Brinker, who is just an amazing young man and has always 

been there for me. Thank you Eric. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Thomas. 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, Senator. I’d like to introduce my wife, Erica 

Smith Thomas, a musician, and my mother, Mrs. Hildonia 

McCleary Thomas, a retired school teacher and social worker, and 

my first cousin, Ray Boyd, who has been my guide and mentor and 

is a Senior Executive Service Member of the Department of Defense. 

Senator NELSON. Welcome to all the members of the family. This 

is a proud day for you and it’s an important in the lives of your 

loved ones. It’s an important day in the conduct of the business of 

the United States. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

again, I think this is an extraordinary panel of nominees and I welcome Ambassador Thomas—thank you for being part of this. This 

is a good group. 

For the audience, if there are not a lot of folks here, it usually 

there are not a lot of problems, so that’s a very good thing, by the 

way. But this is an extraordinary group here. 

Let me turn to Mr. Siegel. I just have a couple questions for a 

couple of the nominees. I think far too often we are—I shouldn’t 

say ignore, but don’t reflect enough—on the importance of the Caribbean, in terms of our relationship with our neighbors in the 

hemisphere. And, I’m hopeful Mr. Siegel, should you be confirmed, 

and I would hope that would happen quickly, that we’ll have a 

647 

chance to work together to kind of raise the level of the relationship. 

One area of concern that I do have has to do with energy and 

with Venezuela. Clearly, our Caribbean neighbors have energy 

needs. I believe the Bahamas was signatory of the Petro Carib 

agreement with Venezuela. I don’t think they have received oil 

under it, but I’d be interested in your reflections on whether their 

participation in that would have any impact on the United StatesBahamian relations? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, to answer the question specifically, the Bahamas did, in fact, sign Petro Carib, but in fact, have rescinded 

that agreement. It’s important to work with, if confirmed, the Bahamas in looking for alternative energy sources. They are dependent upon oil. Their economy is such, that to continue to grow in its 

investments and its trade, to look at alternative energy sources. 

And, I think they understand that a required economic platform 

will be required. 

So, I look forward to working with them to look for alternative 

energy sources. And, to answer your question again specifically, 

they have not followed and have rejected the Venezuelan influence. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. 

In addition to our personal relationship, and I’ll state publicly a 

friendship with you and your family for many years, we also had 

a chance to work together professionally. I served as a delegate to 

the United Nations, as Senate representative, and you served as a 

advisor to the U.N. mission. How has this experience helped you 

to be prepared for this new opportunity that you have? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, that’s a wonderful question, because it 

gives me the opportunity to share with you that that experience 

truly gave me the ability to understand what it meant to engage 

and listen to the needs of foreign countries. Being involved in the 

Security Council vote between Venezuela and Guatemala. The ability to reach out to other missions and listen to their concerns, gave 

me the ability to understand what it was or what it is, to how to 

interact in initiatives and strategies on multidimensional and bilateral relationships. That experience, I think, will serve me well as 

I deal with the Government of the Bahamas. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would hope, not a question here, but that in 

this capacity, should you be confirmed, that you would work with 

the Senate on the issue of continuing to push U.N. reform. It remains a high priority and it would be very helpful if our Caribbean 

neighbors were involved, working with us to ensure greater accountability and transparency in the United Nations. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, I agree with that. If I just can add, the Bahamas was one of the few Caribbean countries that voted with us 

in the vote with Guatemala. 

Also, I think we see a change in 2006 in the new government, 

to vote more in our, aligned with our human rights issues than 

they have in the past and in alignment with the NAM, the NonAligned Movement countries and CARICOM. 

Senator COLEMAN. Let us continue to work on that. 

General Kimmitt, just two more questions, one for you. I’ve been 

very much concerned about the role of IMET. It’s been a tremendous tool. We’ve got some new security assistance authorities out 

648 

there. Could you reflect on the role of IMET? Does it remain a useful tool? 

General KIMMETT. Senator, it really does. As you take a look at 

the relationships that we build with nations around the world, one 

of the primary methods that we do that, is through our IMET program. We take a look at nations as they send their officers back 

to our countries. They not only learn subjects of military applicability, but they get an opportunity to see what the United States 

is all about. 

These are young officers, in many cases, who we have identified 

as having significant potential in our relationships in the future. 

We take a look at the relationships that have been fostered over 

the years, and frankly, in those years where we have not brought 

students from different countries back to the States, and the difficulties we have with those nations. 

So, if confirmed, I will continue to be a strong proponent for the 

IMET program, and do everything in my capacity to improve that 

program over the years. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, and a last question. 

Ambassador Brinker, in your opening statement which I read— 

you talked about the difference in lives of other people, other cultures, you can make if you can reach out to them, and you go on 

to say that your experience as a foreign Ambassador has prepared 

you for the position that the President has now entrusted you to 

undertake. 

Would you just briefly, for the record, articulate how that has 

prepared you? 

Ms. BRINKER. Senator, thank you. The opportunity to serve overseas, I think, and live in another country always adds another dimension in understanding the greatness of our country, and at the 

same time, all that we can do to create better relationships, better 

bilateral relationships. 

I’m very excited, if confirmed, to take on this role, because I feel 

that there are many, many opportunities to develop friendships— 

deeper, more lasting—and enhance the relationships we already 

have with other countries. By being personally engaged with the 

diplomatic community, by doing a lot of outreach, introducing, 

where I can, what they would like to hear and know about our 

country—both in the business community, the professional communities, education, healthcare, and certainly the NGO community. 

And anything I can do to expend the base of knowledge that the 

diplomatic community has, serving in our country. 

Senator COLEMAN. I think you’re extraordinarily well-prepared 

for this position to which you’ve been nominated. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Corker, you have a time problem and 

wanted to make a statement? 

Senator CORKER. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for 

that courtesy. I just want to thank the four nominees for offering 

themselves. We are very, very fortunate to have people of your 

backgrounds willing to do what you do. I thank you for coming before our committee, and I thank you for what you’re getting ready 

to do again for our country. 

Thank you very much. 

649 

Senator NELSON. Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank everyone who’s with us today, the four nominees, and reiterate what’s 

already been said about your service, your commitment to service, 

your presence here today, and your commitment to continue to 

serve our country. 

I wanted to direct my questions to General Kimmitt, as well as 

Mr. Thomas, but I did want to say to Mr. Siegel, we appreciate the 

fact that you’re here with us today. You had a great introduction 

by Senator Martinez, and we appreciate the fact that you’re serving. 

And, to Ambassador Brinker, we’re grateful to your service. And 

I have to add a personal note—we get to do this once in a while. 

Where the Susan G. Komen Foundation that you founded, in honor 

of your sister—as I heard the testimony from Senator Hutchison, 

has 120 chapters, I guess, across the country. One of them is in my 

home area of Northeastern Pennsylvania, and as a young lawyer, 

I drew up the incorporation papers for that, and I’m proud to say 

that I played a small role. 

But I have to say, to give you a sense of how successful you’ve 

been, and how successful the Foundation has been. I live in a county, my home county of about a little more than 200,000 people, and 

we’ve had thousands—literally thousands—of runners and walkers 

every September. And, I think per capita—I’ve said this to people 

without being able to prove it—I think per capita, it might be the 

biggest race in the country. But, if not, probably in the top 10 per 

capita. 

So, we’re proud of that, and we’re proud of what you’ve done for 

the whole country in your public service, but in particular, if I can, 

personally highlight the work on breast cancer. Thank you. 

Ms. BRINKER. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that very much. 

Thank you for your help. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

First of all, General Kimmitt, I wanted to focus my questions at 

the role that the bureau plays. The Bureau of Political and Military 

Affairs. Just in terms of highlighting, PM as it’s sometimes called— 

Political/Military Affairs—has important roles in four strategic 

areas—I want to make sure I’m right about this—counterterrorism, 

regional stability, humanitarian response, as well as homeland security. Is that correct? 

General KIMMETT. Yes, Senator, it is. Less of a impact on homeland security than in the other three areas, but you are correct. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, and I know if we had more time, 

you’d be able to develop this more in your, in an opening statement, which I know will be part of the record. 

I want to ask you two or three questions. First of all, a question 

about the Portable Surface-to-Air Missiles, known by the acronym 

MANPADS. As you know, and as so many of us know, they continue to pose, I should say, a serious terrorist threat to civilian aircraft around the world. We saw that—we saw a version of that, I 

should say—in the report by the Associated Press, when a couple 

of members of the United States Senate were leaving Baghdad. It 

may not be the same technology, but the same threat that is out 

there. 

650 

There’s been a concern raised over the years about the funding 

of programs in this area, in particular, that the funding of these 

programs has been limited to millions of dollars per year, instead 

of more than that. 

Fiscal year 2008, the administration requested nearly $45 million 

for destruction of small arms light weapons, including the so-called 

MANPADS, which present a direct threat—as you well know—to 

homeland security. I guess I’d ask you about the funding levels, 

whether or not you’re satisfied that with the current level of funding to buy back or destroy excess MANPADS? Do you believe that 

more can and should be done in this regard? 

General KIMMETT. Senator, I would agree with you that the 

threat that MANPADS have around the world, not simply in this 

country, but anywhere where our troops operate, where our civilians operate as well, continues to be a threat. That is one of the 

questions that I have asked the PM Bureau to look at. They have 

assured me that they have, not only the capacity, but the energy 

to increase this program if properly resourced. 

So if, in fact, there is an opportunity to expand the budget and 

the resources placed against that, the PM Bureau can certainly 

take good use of those resources, and expand this program. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, and I guess as a way of follow-up, in 

terms of your work upon confirmation—how do you think our government should measure, measure progress in dealing with these 

small arms and light weapons? And if confirmed, how would you 

measure—in particular—the Bureau’s progress in destroying these? 

If you can outline that, I think that helps us in terms of evaluating 

the role that you’ll play. 

General KIMMETT. Senator, as you know, PM Bureau has worked 

with over 25 countries up to this point, they’ve destroyed over 

21,000 MANPADS, 90 million rounds of ammunition. But that— 

first of all, I think we need to understand what the net amount of 

product is out there. I’m not certain from my own intelligence briefings, that we certainly have a good feel for what’s out there. 

But part of this is diplomacy—working with those countries, 

where those MANPADS exist, making sure that those countries are 

is—as concerned about the problem as we are. 

Number two, if additional resources were to be made available, 

making sure that those resources are working with the right people, the right organizations to get these out of public domain. Some 

of the metrics, I think, are the right metrics—sheer numbers, 

90,000—90 million rounds of ammunition, 21,000 MANPADS— 

that’s a huge number. 

But, I think it’s, it’s only going to reach the numbers that we 

really want to reach if we have those countries that we’re working 

with, have as equal a concern about the fact that these present a 

threat—not only to American interests, but their interests as well. 

So, part of the way we would measure it would be, how many of 

the countries are actively participating along with us, how many of 

the countries are acquiescing, and how many countries are preventing us from working with them? Those would be the metrics 

I’d be interested in. 

Senator CASEY. Could you restate those numbers, in terms of 

what the estimate is? 

651 

General KIMMETT. Yes, sir. Since 2002, PM assesses that they 

have been responsible for destroying 90 million rounds of ammunition, and 21,000 Man-Portable Air Defense devices. 

Senator CASEY. Twenty-one thousand. Is there any way, I mean, 

is there a resource that your bureau—or any bureau or office in our 

government can turn to for any kind of inventory, or an estimate—— 

General KIMMETT. Senator—— 

Senator CASEY [continuing]. Of how many that are still out 

there? 

General KIMMETT [continuing]. Senator, Jane’s is typically a good 

source for approximate numbers. Our intelligence services are the 

ones that can give us more specific numbers. 

Senator CASEY. Do you think, if we’ve destroyed—you’re saying 

we’ve destroyed 21,000 since 2002, is there any estimate—that’s 

not classified—that’s out there now? Are we talking about tens of 

thousands of these? Or thousands? Is there any ballpark figure you 

can give that’s not classified? 

General KIMMETT. Senator, let me take that question for the 

record, and we’ll get an answer back to you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

And I know I’m a little bit over time, but I’ll just quickly ask Mr. 

Thomas a question. The first one being a very important question 

about what undergraduate institution did you attend? 

Mr. THOMAS. College of the Holy Cross. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. I did, too. [Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY. We both believe, of course, it’s the number one 

higher education institution in the United States of America, is 

that right? 

Mr. THOMAS. Without a doubt, Senator. 

Senator CASEY. We have a great sense of agreement here. 

Just very quickly, I know I’m over, I will try to get one question 

in. And this is something that all of us, as Americans, are deeply 

concerned about. 

A series of articles recently in USAToday, as well as a recent 

hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Near East, 

South and Central Asian Affairs, raised the issue of foreign service 

personnel suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, especially 

after tours in Iraq. I’d ask you, Mr. Thomas, about how you plan 

to overcome concerns that—and obviously they’re understandable 

concerns, that foreign service personnel would have, that their careers would be negatively affected, if they come forward to seek 

help for a very real concern that they have about their own lives? 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you for that question, Senator. The Secretary and all of us are concerned about the health of all of our employees. 

According to a recent survey that we conducted, about 2 percent 

of those who served in Iraq and Afghanistan believe they have 

PTSD. Perhaps another 15 percent have it, but require a diagnosis. 

To assist these officers, we’ve mandated a high-stress assessment 

health brief for people who’ve served in Iraq and Afghanistan, so 

that no one would have fear of being tarnished. 

We’re also looking at a Deployment Stress-Management Program 

that would look to assist people before they go out. Senator, that 

652 

has yet to be funded, but we hope that we’ll be able to do that. 

We’re also work with their families. We have a coffee klatch program one Sunday each month. If confirmed, I hope to attend one 

in October or November. We have a program to assist children— 

because they’re often concerned when their family members are 

overseas—where we try to assist their children. So, we have a comprehensive program to assist our officers, and we’ll look to do more, 

sir. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

I’m over, I’m sorry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. That’s an excellent question, because no matter 

where you are in a theater, the old battlefield lines don’t apply to 

the battlefield of today. In addition to PTSD, what we are finding 

is that traumatic brain injury manifests itself—not necessarily immediately but later. So, any State Department personnel, for that 

matter—any U.S. personnel—because we have these provisional 

teams that have many, across many different agencies—if they’re 

within the proximity of a blast, the traumatic brain injury may not 

manifest itself right away, it may be later on. So that, Mr. Thomas, 

you’re going to have to look out for as well. In addition to the 

PTSD. 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, Senator, we wholeheartedly agree with you. 

And we have—working with our medical staff—we’re in the process 

of developing a program. We understand that 3 to 5 years hence, 

people might be affected. We’re working closely with the Department of Labor and the Department of Defense to have a comprehensive program where we can assist these Americans. Whether 

they’re affected today, 3, 5, or 20 years from now, so—— 

Senator NELSON. Well, one thing you may consider—we have 

very good TBI facilities, but it’s in the veteran’s healthcare system. 

Now, the question is, how could you access that for nonmilitary 

personnel? 

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, that’s something I’ll have to get back to you on, 

but we will clearly investigate that. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Let me, on that subject, just as Senator Casey’s 

question is a great question. 

Just last Tuesday, I held a field hearing at the Augusta Veteran’s Hospital in Augusta, GA, where they had the first seamless 

transition from DoD to the VA for a wounded warrior, and where 

a lot of the PTSD and traumatic brain injury patients from the 

Southern Region come. And your statement is so correct, because 

I met a young lady—Sergeant Harris—who was in Iraq, suffered a 

brain injury. She was let out of the military because of her injury, 

went to the VA hospital, and they cured the injury, and she went 

back in the military. 

So, there are tremendous breakthroughs being done at the VA 

treating both PTSD and traumatic brain injury, and we should look 

to find some way for the State Department to be able to access the 

experience that those soldier were having in the Veterans Administration. 

Senator NELSON. And there’s a good example on traumatic brain 

injury, if you can identify it quickly enough, you can treat it. The 

653 

real problem is, when it’s not identified, and the person goes on 

and on, then it’s very difficult. 

Senator ISAKSON. And the Wounded Warrior amendments and 

bill that we did, did a great job of broadening the number of people 

who can identify PTSD in soldiers for the purpose of referrals like 

optometrists, and ophthalmologists, and people like that, who can 

sometimes recognize the symptom that might have been missed in 

just a pure medical hospital. 

Ambassador Thomas, first of all, of all of the things that have 

impressed me, being a member of Congress and the Senate, nothing has impressed me more than the dedication of the Foreign 

Service officers of this country. And every place that I have traveled, I have seen the remarkable sacrifice that they make, and the 

passion that they have for their business, and I know that includes 

you, as well. 

So, congratulations to you on this nomination, and on the job 

you’ve done. 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator ISAKSON. I have one question of you. In 2002, 6 months 

after the 9/11 attack, I went to Ethiopia and Egypt, to follow up 

on NGO contractors using foreign aid of the United States in the 

education area, because we learned, post-9/11, that some of our foreign aid had actually gone to schools that wouldn’t allow Muslim 

women to go to school. And part of the whole mission was to be 

sure the NGOs and the people receiving benefit understood that 

our money was conditional upon men and women receiving education. Which leads me to my question—what role do the foreign 

service officers perform in ensuring that U.S. foreign aid that goes 

to NGOs is used in precisely the way we, as America, would want 

it to be used? 

Mr. THOMAS. Senator, thank you for that question. We work very 

closely with USAID and other agencies to make sure that all of our 

foreign assistance adheres to American law. And we are very committed to ensuring that boys and girls—in whatever society—have 

the opportunity to go to school. 

I was Ambassador to Bangladesh, where we had several programs to obtain scholarships for poor boys and girls. We worked in 

boys and girls madrassas, also educating them. And I do not believe that it was a lone program. I’m sure that these programs are 

replicated throughout our embassies. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, the reason I ask the question is, I have 

been supportive of our foreign aid programs, because I think—invested, in the right way, that money can bring tremendous benefits, in terms of understanding America better, by raising the education level, and the standard of living of people in foreign countries. But my constituents and I are steadfastly opposed to that 

money getting in the wrong hands. Which is why it’s so important 

to have a good flow of information back from the field to the State 

Department or to USAID, if we, in fact, find out that some of it 

is being spent less than judiciously. 

Mr. THOMAS. We 100 percent agree with you, Senator. 

Senator ISAKSON. General Kimmitt—one quick question for you, 

I was in Kosovo in January, after the initial incursion of the 

654 

United States back in 1999 or 2000. I know there was a tremendous problem with land mines left in Kosovo and people dying. 

Would your job, in terms of political military affairs have anything to do with the removal of those, or efforts to remove those? 

General KIMMETT. Senator, the PM Bureau does, in fact, involve 

itself with humanitarian mine—de-mining operations. And, to my 

recollection, Kosovo was one of the first countries, very quickly 

after the war, after the conflict—I served in that conflict, as well— 

to declare itself landmine free, to the point where it is, they are no 

longer a threat to the local Kosovars. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, that’s important, because when I was 

there early on, there were a lot of innocent people losing their lives 

in the field, because of the land mines spread across the countryside. 

Congratulations on your appointment, as well, and that’s all of 

the questions I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Well, I’ll start with you, Mr. Thomas. As we go around to see our 

embassies, the new construction standards of set-backs and so 

forth, I was struck by Ambassador Crocker, our Ambassador in 

Iraq having stated recently that sometimes diplomats are not able 

to do their jobs because of the security requirements in place. It is 

what it is, we have to protect our people. 

Why don’t you share for the committee, what you think is an appropriate balance between ensuring that the diplomats and their 

families are safe, and them being able to do their jobs. 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you very much, Senator. We do agree that 

the safety of our diplomats and their families must be paramount. 

However, we also agree with Ambassador Crocker that our people 

must get out into the streets and villages and talk with people and 

assess the situation. That is very much part of Secretary Rice’s vision of Transformational Diplomacy, that we do go out. 

We advise all of our ambassadors to work very closely with their 

regional security officers to, on a daily basis, assess the security 

situation, and then make a decision whether their people should be 

able to go out into the streets and villages. 

Senator NELSON. It’s just extraordinary, some the security requirements. For example, perhaps the highest security outside of 

Iraq and Afghanistan, that we have for a United States Ambassador is Lebanon. A huge security package, that envelopes the ambassador, at all times. On the other hand, you go to a country, for 

example, from which I just returned—Vietnam—the necessity of security is a lot less there. Same in Thailand, same in Malaysia. 

Needless to say in Hong Kong, same thing. 

So, and yet, the constant threat of an ambassador, and an ambassador’s family, as a representative of the United States, that 

ambassador is a target, no matter where they are. 

Mr. THOMAS. Senator, I’d like to give an example of when I 

served in Bangladesh at all times, in terms of vehicles, police and 

resident security. I did not let that deter me from going out into 

villages, into streets. 

But, what I also did was take advantage of the talented Foreign 

Service, and civil service, and locally-employed staff that we had, 

where I had them go to libraries, go to villages, go to hospitals, and 

655 

appear on television. I think that what we must do is take advantage—not only of the ambassador—but of everybody who belongs to 

that mission, to go out and reach the people. We even took our embassy, twice a year, on the road to different villages, where we set 

up all aspects of the embassy, including the Peace Corps, to show 

what we were doing. And I think that’s what we have to do while 

we still assess security. 

Senator NELSON. The call is out for the need for personnel in 

Iraq in the State Department. Is that need being met voluntarily? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. We have met that need every year, 

through volunteers. We have not had to go to directed or identified 

assignments. We salute the brave men and women who have volunteered to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Senator NELSON. So, there’s not a shortage that is needed in 

Iraq? Because of the lack of volunteers? 

Mr. THOMAS. Not to date, sir. However, if that did come, and we 

had to identify or direct assignments, we would do that. But we 

have not had to. In fact, among our junior officers, we have more 

junior officers applying to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan then we 

have spaces for junior officers. 

Senator NELSON. What about the drain on personnel, since 

there’s been a call out among consular officials to come in and help 

with the passport fiasco? 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, Senator, I think we all need to participate. 

And, what I did—when I left my job as Executive Secretary—I 

spent 2 weeks adjudicating passports—a few blocks from here. I 

wasn’t the only one. Former Ambassador Mike Marine of Vietnam, 

and several other senior officers pitched in. And last week, I spent 

time in London, doing consular work, adjudicating passports, and 

assisting American citizens. 

So, we were able to meet that challenge through the great efforts 

of our civil servants, Foreign Service officers. Even retirees came 

out to assist us. And we’re very proud that we’re at 1.3 million 

passports and are meeting the requirements and the needs of the 

American citizens. 

Senator NELSON. One point three million? 

Mr. THOMAS. One point three million requests. 

Senator NELSON. Requests? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes. 

Senator NELSON. How many in backlog? 

Mr. THOMAS. That’s 1.3 million in backlog. 

Senator NELSON. In backlog? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes. 

Senator NELSON. And when do you think that’s going to be 

cleared? 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, we hope by September 30, that we are down 

to our normal 4–6 week window. 

Senator NELSON. And how many is that? 

Mr. THOMAS. That would be probably about 1 million. If we can— 

if we’re at a million, we can probably get people their passports in 

4 to 6 weeks. But really, Senator, when I was working there, we 

were—people were working overtime, unpaid, to meet this need. 

And if you had an extraordinary need, where you needed to travel 

immediately, or within a day, we were meeting that, in August. 

656 

Senator NELSON. And you’re familiar with this because of your 

previous position? 

Mr. THOMAS. I’m familiar with this because, as a Foreign Service 

officer, I did consular work 20 years ago. But having spent the last 

3 weeks working in passports, I learned much more than I had remembered. 

Senator NELSON. Refresh the committee’s memory here. You 

worked in the past 3 weeks in passports, why? 

Mr. THOMAS. I thought it was important that a senior officer who 

had been the Special Assistant to the Secretary show that we all 

need to volunteer and pitch in. But again, Senator, I was not the 

only one. We had many senior officers, ambassadors, and retirees 

who pitched in. 

Because we believe that the State Department, we’re often the 

front line of defense against terrorism, but this is something that 

we can show that we can do for the average American, and we 

wanted to meet that need. 

Senator NELSON. Well, that’s admirable on your part, to have 

pitched in like that. It’s almost too bad you had to pitch in like 

that. Do you have any thoughts about why we got ourselves in the 

mess that we got ourselves in? 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, Senator—we estimated that we would need a 

slight increase over last year, and we had a tremendous increase 

over last year. And we know the history. But the important thing 

to us, sir, is that we have met that, and we’re working to ensure 

that this does not happen again. We’ve opened new passport centers in Arkansas and expanded our facilities in Florida and New 

Hampshire. We’ve hired new adjudicators. So, we are confident 

that we will not have to go through this again, sir. 

Senator NELSON. I can certainly speak for all of the members of 

this committee in hoping that you are correct on that, because of 

the cries of anguish of our constituents, with regard to passports. 

I have checked with consular officials around the globe, and I 

find that they feel very sanguine, very supportive of Mrs. Hardy, 

who is the head of that—I don’t remember the title, but—— 

Mr. THOMAS. Consular Affairs, sir. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Consular Affairs. And they feel 

that she has done a great job. Do you know her? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. In fact, we’re long-time colleagues, but I 

had lunch with her yesterday to report on my 2 weeks working 

here and my 1 week in London, to give her an assessment. And I 

told her that she really is a true hero to the people that work for 

her. She inspires them on a daily basis. And I was very much impressed by the work we were doing here and in London. 

Senator NELSON. She has appeared in front of this committee 

and places the blame on herself for not anticipating the extra surge 

in the passports. Do you think that’s fair to her? 

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, it’s not for me to assess blame or damage. I 

think the important thing is that Assistant Secretary Hardy has 

led the effort to meet the needs and requirements of the American 

people in terms of the passports. 

Senator NELSON. Except that it’s the responsibility of this committee in its oversight capacity, to make sure that this never happens again. And, it’s interesting to this committee that she places 

657 

the blame on herself and no one above her in the chain of command 

will take any responsibility for the passport fiasco having occurred. 

Does that strike you as odd? 

Mr. THOMAS. I think it’s selfless, sir, that she has decided to assess the blame to herself. The Secretary of State is responsible for 

everything that happens in the State Department. And, Secretary 

Rice has been very supportive of all of our efforts to meet these 

needs. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I don’t want to put you on the spot too 

much, but she has a boss, who is the Assistant Secretary for Administration of the State Department, a Mrs. Henrietta Fore. 

Mr. THOMAS. Undersecretary for Management, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Okay, Management. 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes. 

Senator NELSON. Mrs. Hardy reports to her? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Mrs. Fore does not take any responsibility. She 

has stated that to this committee. Do you think that’s fair to put 

it on Ms. Hardy? 

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, I can not assess Undersecretary Fore’s opinion. 

I think that this is a State Department-wide challenge. Just like 

last year when we met the effort to get people out of Lebanon, 

when I worked very closely with Ambassador Hardy and Undersecretary Fore to get 15,000 Americans out of Lebanon. That was a 

State Department response. This too, assisting Americans with 

passports, is a State Department response, not an individual person or an individual bureau’s response or duty, sir. 

Senator NELSON. I appreciate your forthrightness in answering 

these questions. I can tell you the sentiment of this committee is 

that, some of us who have served in the military, is that the captain of the ship is responsible for everything that happens on that 

ship. And members of this committee do not like the fact that Mrs. 

Hardy has been the one who has had to assume all of the blame. 

Enough said of that. 

Let me ask you about—we’ve got a tremendous number of retirements that are coming in the Foreign Service. It looks like, that in 

May, between January and May of this year, the retirement office 

of the Department of State processed a total of 238 Foreign Service 

retirements, which was an increase of 54 percent over the same period last year. Do you have a sense about these kinds of figures? 

Are they correct? 

Mr. THOMAS. Senator, I think those figures are incorrect. I think 

they mean Foreign Service, they are combining Foreign Service and 

civil service retirements. We did have slightly over a hundred Foreign Services officers retire. We projected it at 22 percent, and it 

was about 23 percent. And, this was—these people who were retiring were people who met their time and class. Foreign Service, just 

like the military, has an up or out system. If you do not get promoted, you are congratulated and you must retire. And the great 

bulk of people who are retiring now are the people who have served 

to the full Colonel equivalent level. And, their time is up. 

Senator NELSON. Your predecessor, Ambassador Staples, has 

been saying that he is noting the changing nature of what it means 

to be a Foreign Service officer and I’ll quote, ‘‘Be prepared to spend 

658 

more time in more difficult posts with higher differentials, including perhaps those with danger pay or that require them to be separated from their families.’’ Give us your view about what the career 

of a Foreign Service officer will be like in the future, where there 

may be tours that are hardship tours and danger posts and family 

separations. 

Mr. THOMAS. Senator, Secretary Rice likes to refer to those of us 

who spent the majority of our careers in tough places as her Hellhole gang. Well today, perhaps 70 percent of the Foreign Service 

is her Hell-hole gang, because 70 percent are serving in hardship 

tours. More than 750 are at unaccompanied posts. 

We live in a post-9/11 world, and what we want to ensure now 

is that everyone not only serves at hardship posts, but has the opportunity to serve at other posts. We believe that if you do one of 

every three tours at a hardship post, then everyone will serve at 

hardship posts and other posts. We want and we’re committed to 

a fair and transparent system that takes advantage of everyone’s 

talents in all posts. 

As I said previously, sir. We are very concerned about families. 

We have many programs to assist families who are, whose spouses 

are at unaccompanied posts and we’re going to continue to make 

them more robust. 

Senator NELSON. Will the hardship post be a requirement for 

promotion in the Foreign Service? 

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, it will be a requirement to serve at hardship 

posts to enter the Senior Foreign Service. But practically now, it’s 

almost impossible to come out of junior officer orientation without 

having to serve at a hardship post in one of your first two assignments. 

Senator NELSON. And, is the ratio, that you mentioned just a moment ago, three to one. Is that rule of thumb in the Foreign Service? 

Mr. THOMAS. We believe that that will have to be the new rule 

of thumb, one out of—one out of three, to ensure that everyone has 

the opportunity to serve in hardship and nonhardship posts. However sir, there are people—have colleagues—who prefer only serving in hardship posts because that is where their passion is. They 

are very much interested in the Horn of Africa or China or Central 

America. And, we will not discourage these people from serving in 

the tours where they’re—in the places where they’re interested. 

Senator NELSON. It’s been this Senator’s experience that we really have some extraordinary talent that is serving us in the Foreign 

Service. The career Foreign Service people have been exceptional. 

That I have had the pleasure of getting to know and visiting in 

their posts scattered around the world. So, the kind of quality that 

you’re getting, I think if fairly self evident. And, congratulations to 

you and I hope that continues. 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Thomas. 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. General, let me ask you, the President is signing a Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty with Australia. This committee was not informed of the negotiations. And, that negotiations 

which he, I think, is just signing or has just signed. This committee 

659 

was not informed until yesterday after the press stories appeared. 

Now, you’re going to be heading up a bureau that is responsible for 

those negotiations. Do you have any comment about that? 

General KIMMETT. Senator, I will ensure that, to the extent possible within the PM Bureau, that there will be ongoing and active 

consultation with this committee, with the United States Senate, 

with regards to these types of consultations in the future. 

Senator NELSON. That’s the way it’s supposed to work and it 

hasn’t been working that way. And, it’s the obligation of this committee to point that out to you and to thank you for the commitment that you just made. Thank you. 

Foreign military financing—in the budget request for 2008, there 

is a proposed sharp cut in the foreign military financing for countries in the Western Hemisphere. The administration in the western hemisphere has only sought FMF for Columbia and El Salvador. And, those are all at levels less than fiscal year 2007. And, 

it’s proposed to zero out FMF for all other countries in the region 

of the Western Hemisphere. What do you think about that? 

General KIMMETT. Senator, I don’t and am not as familiar with 

the FMF for the Western Hemisphere as I am with the region that 

I currently deal with, which is the Middle East. And, I take a look 

at those same arguments for countries such as Bahrain, which 

hosts our Fifth Fleet, that are such a critical supporter of United 

States policies and United States operations. I made those same arguments about the country of Bahrain, but this is a matter of the 

administration dealing with those highest priority items, those 

highest priority countries. And, in the Western Hemisphere the determination was made that the significant return on our investment, with regards to Plan Colombia as well as to reward, probably 

one of our strongest western hemisphere coalition partners inside 

of Iraq, that that’s where the priorities would be placed. 

So, it is a matter of prioritization. I know these decisions aren’t 

taken lightly at the State Department nor within the interagency. 

We would all like to have more resources for every country that is 

a benefit to the United States, but I think, at the end of the day, 

it is a matter prioritization and rewarding those countries that not 

only need the most help, but those that have offered the most help 

to us as well. 

Senator NELSON. I’m going to enter in the record a table that will 

show in the Western Hemisphere what is the 2006 actual funding, 

what was the 2007 request, and what was the 2007 appropriated 

amount for foreign military financing in the Western Hemisphere, 

and then what was the 2008 request by the administration. 

Senator NELSON. And just to give you an idea: Argentina, 

$40,000, this is 2007, Bahamas, $80,000, Belize, $175,000, Bolivia, 

$25,000, Chile, $500,000, Dominican Republic, $725,000, Eastern 

Caribbean, $990,000, Ecuador, $25,000, Guyana, $75,000, Haiti, 

$990,000, Honduras, $675,000, Jamaica, $500,000, Nicaragua, 

$500,000, Panama, $775,000, Peru, $25,000, Surinam, $80,000. 

And everyone of those are zeroed out. And only Colombia at a level 

of $78 million, it’s a drop from $85 million and El Salvador, 

$4,800,000, a drop from $7.2 million, in an area of the world that 

we are increasingly having some problems. 

660 

So, I would—it’s one of the areas where we have the most drug 

trafficking and the threat of terrorism. What’s happening is terrorism is coming out of Arabia into Africa, primarily through the 

Horn of Africa, moving across the Sahel and Sahara and is now 

being introduced into Latin America. Do you have any comments? 

General KIMMETT. Senator, all I would say is that—that particularly at DoD and now in my potential future job at State, we have 

spent, I’ve spent many, many hours, days working on the issue of 

counterterrorism and the spread of a number of these groups. We 

are concerned about the trans-Sahel area in particular, the Horn 

of Africa, and, as you note, in the Western Hemisphere as well. 

And I pledge to you that in this next job I will be mindful of the 

responsibilities, not only for the source countries of terrorism, but 

also those countries as well, that could potentially be fertile 

ground, ungoverned spaces, perhaps responsible places that might 

be prone to this type of extremist ideology and the effects on the 

nation’s security as a result. 

Senator NELSON. Well, at the same time the administration is 

seeking to conclude a new 10-year $30 billion military assistance 

agreement with Israel, a 10-year $13 billion military assistance 

agreement with Egypt, and Secretary Burns has stated, that for 

the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 

and the U.A.E., that the administration, after having informal discussions with those countries, wants formal negotiations on the 

size and structure of new, major arms sales. What do you think 

that those military sales will serve in political and military purposes? 

General KIMMETT. Senator, thank you for that question. I would 

note the distinguishing between foreign military sales, which most 

of that program will encompass, and for military financing, which 

would only affect the country of Bahrain, and possibly Oman. But 

I think we all are aware of the growing influence of Iran as a hegemonic player in the region. Its attempts to use all of its elements 

of national power, ranging from terrorism to a developing nuclear 

program, as a way to extend their influence in the region. 

It remains our view at the Department of Defense that the 

growth of the Iranian, the expansionism of the Iranian influence in 

the region should not go unchallenged, that this should not solely 

be the responsibility of the United States, but the active participation of those countries in the region to help themselves, to stand, 

to deter, to contain Iran, is the best method by which we can ensure that Iran, in the future if we can not completely eliminate 

Iran as a threat, at least is not able to extend its capabilities, it’s 

capacities and influence into the countries of such significance as 

those that you have noted. 

Senator NELSON. In your experience as a military officer—so you 

think that there are gaps in security that these arms sales will fill 

for those countries in the Gulf region? 

General KIMMETT. Senator, yes I do. I take a look at the acrossthe-border review that was conducted by our own United States Air 

Force. That across-the-board review identified gaps in the Saudi capability, which are being addressed with the proposed Saudi arms 

sales package. As we have worked at CENTCOM and a number of 

the institutions that I have worked with, Department of Defense, 

661 

the intent has been to make these countries in the region capable 

of self-defense and capable of standing—to be contributors to regional stability, not necessarily either affected by instability or 

causes of instability themselves. 

You take, for example, Lebanon recently—their victory over 

Fatah Islam at the Nahr el-Bared Camp, I think is—is a significant 

victory that is not very well reported. This is a country, the only 

Arab democracy in the region that has stood up against an alQaeda threat and is not negotiated itself into a position where that 

organization could continue to perpetuate. 

The Lebanese Armed Forces made a very, very tough decision recently, that they were going to fight this threat to the end. And, 

as we saw over the past couple of days, they have ended up eliminating, they have not only treated the cancer, but they have ensured that it does not metastasize. That was done in many ways 

through United States assistance, 1206 in particular, where we 

have been able to give the Lebanese Armed Forces additional capability, so that they stood up to this threat themselves. 

That wasn’t just Lebanese soldiers that defeated Fatah Islam, it 

was also United States sniper rifles, it was United States artillery, 

it was—it was tank ammunition provided by a number of countries 

in the region. These countries can contribute to their own defense, 

they can hold back this scourge of extremism, if they’re given the 

capacity, if they’re given the confidence, if they’re given the training. 

And, with regards to the arms sales packages that you referred 

to earlier, that is a larger example of helping these countries help 

themselves. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Siegel, you’re going to the Bahamas and we’ve had an extraordinarily successful Bahamian-United States cooperation on 

drug smuggling. Do you think this new Bahamian Government will 

be able to continue to cooperate in the antidrug efforts? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, thank you for asking that question, because 

the operation between the Bahamian Government and the United 

States has been a close operational partner in the drug counternarcotic initiative. 

To answer your question specifically, the Bahamas and the new 

government recently has shown a desire to increase its defense 

force spending in its base in Great Inagua, not only to support the 

maritime initiatives and also the OPAT initiatives, but also to 

reach out to Haiti and Haiti National Police to try to bring them 

into the process in combating the narcotics issue. 

So, the relationship that we share with the Bahamas only grows, 

and if confirmed, I look forward to working with the government, 

because preventing narcotics from reaching this soil is very much 

interdicting it on the 50- yardline in the Bahamas, as opposed on 

our goal line here when it reaches the shores of Florida, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. As you know, the Army is insisting that it removed the Blackhawk helicopters that are headquartered at 

Georgetown. Do you think that’s going to undermine the progress 

that we’ve had in the antismuggling? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, as of yesterday, I’m glad to report that next 

week the DEA and the Department of Defense representatives will 

662 

meet in Georgetown to finalize plans to have the DEA Aviation Division, to assume the U.S. Army’s role as a rotary wing provider 

at the Hawknest facility. In fact, the three helicopters that have 

been redeployed to Iraq, there has been an understanding and 

agreement and not a hiatus provided. There will not be a step 

missed in the prevention and OPAT’s operations. Three Bell-412 

helicopters, and one long-range surveillance platform, with DoD 

funding, will be in place at the end of this month. 

Also—it also has been decided, that come October 2009, the DEA 

will provide—as those helicopters leave—three additional helicopters will be provided. So, Senator, as you know, you have yourself been very, very active in making sure that DEA and the Department of Defense work together to make this possible. And, I 

would like to thank you for your assistance and help, so that when 

I do, if confirmed, arrive in Bahamas, we can work closely and 

have the infrastructure continued in place to fight this war against 

narcotics. 

Senator NELSON. Well, that’s welcome news. You have just 

brought us some new news, because until what you just stated that 

was decided yesterday, there was going to be a gap in the period 

of time in which they shut down the three Blackhawk helicopters, 

until you could get the new DEA helicopters in to replace them. 

And, you’re saying a decision was made yesterday, that there will 

be no time gap? 

Mr. SIEGEL. That’s true, Senator. I was told, as of yesterday, 

there was a meeting September 10 in the Hawknest facility in 

Georgetown. And, that the transference will be of a timely nature. 

So, no gap will, in fact, occur. 

Senator NELSON. Well, that is certainly welcome news, because 

of covering—the ability that we’ve had in the northern Bahamas, 

the central Bahamas, and the southern to cover all of that vastness 

of space with Coast Guard helicopters, Blackhawk Army helicopters, and DEA helicopters, have diminished the drug trade, substantially. And, our concern was that there was going to be this 

huge gap in the middle. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Yes, correct, Senator. And, to add to the arsenal, 

Southern Command’s Operation Enduring Friendship, at the end of 

this year in December, will provide $2.5 million of equipment and 

communications training, personnel, maintenance, and four go-fast 

boats for maritime to support the air efforts, which only adds to the 

ability to interdict drugs. 

Senator, if I may, I was given, also, recent OPAT statistics to 

date, which are very—quite impressive of the operation. And to 

date, 427 pounds of marijuana have been interdicted, along with 

193 plants, 190 kilos of cocaine, so far, this year have been interdicted, and 32 drug arrests, as a result of OPAT, have occurred. So, 

your point, Senator, is well taken that the necessity of these helicopters are integral in the continued fight against drugs that we, 

at the embassy, work with the Bahamian Government. 

Senator NELSON. That is good news. Thank you for bringing that 

to the committee. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. We—the Bahamian Government has a real 

problem in Haitian out-migration. And, they’ve been trying to repaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00670 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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triate as many as they pick up. You want to give us some of your 

comments on the, how the Bahamian Government would cope with 

this large migrant population? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, the facts are pretty staggering. It costs the Bahamian Government approximately $1.5 million a year to expatriate migrants. Close to 5,000 migrants, a majority of them Haitian, are interdicted every year at sea. It’s also interesting to note, 

that in a population of 300,000 people in Bahama, 20 percent, 

50,000 to 60,000 are of Haitian nationality, some legal, some illegal. 

The strain that it does put on the Bahamian Government is real. 

We work closely with the Bahamian Government because the Bahamian Government is a transit point, not for these illegal migrants to land in the Bahamas, but also with the ultimate goal, to 

reach the shores of America. I think that, again—Enduring Friendship, the Southern Command’s involvement in providing go-fast 

boats—we will be working, and if confirmed, one of my roles will 

be to work with the Bahamian Government to try to outlaw, the 

way other governments and we have, the wooden sloops that provide for these illegal migrants trying to arrive on the shores of the 

Bahamas. So, it is a constant situation, Senator, that needs to be 

worked and looked at and continued diplomacy. And, I look forward 

to doing that if I’m confirmed. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I’m sure you’re going to be confirmed and, 

as I am sure that all of you are going to be confirmed. And, I wish 

you well. 

I might note, as I have shared with you privately, that we had 

one of our best ambassadors that we’ve ever had to the Bahamas 

and your immediate predecessor, John Rood of Jacksonville. And, 

he succeeded one of the worst ambassadors that we have ever had, 

that the State Department had to request his resignation. 

And so, the good news is that there is a very good taste in the 

mouth of the Bahamians about the United States representation, 

as a result of Ambassador Rood. And, I am sure that’s going to be 

the same case with you, Mr. Siegel. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator NELSON. Ms. Brinker, thank you for being so patient. 

You had wanted to make some comments about diplomatic immunity. That, as among the responsibilities of the Chief of Protocol, 

is your determination of the eligibility of diplomatic immunity. 

When those issues of diplomatic immunity come to the attention 

of the public, it’s often because some visiting diplomat has transgressed the law, some way. And, then diplomatic is invoked, sot 

that they don’t have to go in front of the American jurisprudence 

system. You want to share with us, in your opinion, who is covered 

by the diplomatic immunity, and does it extend to their families? 

Ms. BRINKER. It generally, it covers the diplomatic community in 

Washington, Senator, as you know, with the ambassador, the first, 

second—the deputy—the first, second, and third officer and their 

families. However, let me say that this is a subject that, if confirmed, I will be spending a lot of time, since it’s a very serious 

subject. And, I believe that we’ve just circulated some important 

documents to the different embassies. Diplomatic immunity is not 

meant, as you know, so that people can avoid the law. It’s simply 

664 

meant—it was simply meant to be offered to people to do their— 

be able to do their jobs. And, in the Vienna Convention, a hundred 

other countries feel adamantly, as we do, that foreign diplomats, 

though they’re not subject to U.S. criminal or civil jurisdiction, 

these are opportunities and privileges extended to individuals, not 

for their personal benefit or to shield them from obligation as a 

law. 

And, by the time a charge of whatever a diplomat, unfortunately, 

might do reaches a level of the Office of Protocol, you know, and 

if we hear from the prosecutors that, but for immunity, they would 

be charged. This is when we ask to waive the immunity by the 

host—their host country. 

Now, if the country refuses to do this, then we often ask the offending diplomat to leave. Diplomatic—full diplomatic immunity is 

not, of course, given to a lot of service personnel or down the line 

or to consular officers in different cities. But we take it very seriously and want very much for people to understand the laws that 

govern our land as we try to respect the laws that govern their 

countries, as we serve overseas. 

Senator NELSON. The flipside of that. When have we requested 

diplomatic immunity for our Foreign Service officers in other countries? 

Ms. BRINKER. On a case-by-case basis. And, I can certainly give 

you the back-up of that over the last several years. 

Ms. BRINKER. But, you know, it’s handled by the Office of Legal 

Affairs in the State Department on a case-by-case basis. 

Senator NELSON. Okay. For the record, if you could provide that 

to the Committee. 

Ms. BRINKER. Yes. 

Senator NELSON. I think that would round out this subject matter and be very helpful. And, you might also give the circumstances 

where the sending country has waived the right—— 

Ms. BRINKER. Yes. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Of diplomatic immunity. And, that 

would be good information in the repository of this committee. 

Let me ask you—Blair House will be under your jurisdiction. Is 

that right? 

Ms. BRINKER. That’s correct. 

Senator NELSON. What does managing Blair House involve? 

Ms. BRINKER. There is a very able, able staff of 13, who manages, 

really a complex historical—it is almost very close to being a museum. It is a—it is a President’s guest house. And, it is a 200-yearold house, which does not have a recurring budget, Senator, which 

often faces the problem, the staff does, of keeping up this really 

magnificent historical property. And it is done at a very, very low 

cost. In other words, a visiting dignitary—and this is, of course, one 

of the high points of the visit for many visiting dignitaries—to stay 

there, staff, all meals included, all services included, probably 

equals about $250 a day, which is almost unheard of in a hotel setting in Washington, to be able to have that kind of atmosphere and 

experience. 

And I just think that, though there is a private endowment in 

place, often times Blair House staff is faced with having to go to 

many different sources to keep the paint from peeling. And, I find 

665 

that disturbing. The needs aren’t that huge that there shouldn’t be 

some recurring budget. And, I have to commend Randy 

Baumgarten and his staff at the Blair House for doing such a fine 

job of maintaining this residence. 

Senator NELSON. It was restored in the 1980s. 

Ms. BRINKER. Right. 

Senator NELSON. What is its condition today? 

Ms. BRINKER. It’s—they do an absolutely outstanding job of keeping it in presentable condition, but frankly, it is going to be facing, 

at least in the next few years, significant—significant repair and 

refurbishment in some of the outdated equipment that is there. 

And, it’s heavily used. There were several hundred visits there last 

year, several, you know, thousands of meals served over the last 

few years. Every time there’s a change in visit, it requires a movement of furniture, sometimes it requires heavy use on carpeting 

and—and the facilities. So, it does require, it is going to require 

quite a bit more support in the future. And, I would be happy to 

also give that to you, Senator. We’ve created a small paper, which 

we feel should be viewed by your committee. I think you’d be very 

interested to see it. 

Senator NELSON. And what you might also do is come forth with 

a plan—— 

Ms. BRINKER. Okay. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Of renovation and the needed annual maintenance that will be supplied by the private sector that, 

you said there’s a Foundation, and what, in your plan, would be 

required by the Federal Government budget. 

Ms. BRINKER. I’d be happy to. 

Senator NELSON. Because it is a national treasure and we want 

to make sure that we keep it. 

Ms. BRINKER. Yes, Senator, I’m planning a—if I’m confirmed— 

we’re planning on being able to host several, sort of, events, talks, 

meetings with our international and diplomatic community. And 

it’s an important setting in which to do that. Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Tell us about your position as Protocol officer. 

What’s the proper observance of protocol? Why do we need a protocol officer? 

Ms. BRINKER. The Protocol, the Chief of Protocol supports the 

President, Vice President, First Lady, Secretary of State, as needed, in all official functions that have to do with ceremony, visits— 

visits to the United States by key leaders, Prime Ministers, Presidents. And also supports the—as mentioned—the Blair House and 

the large, rather diplomatic affairs division, which is responsible 

for all the credentialing of foreign officers who come here. And 

keeping track of an ever-expanding, Senator, foreign community. 

There are a 150,000 diplomats living in the United States. And 

Diplomatic Affairs is responsible for tracking all of them, issuing 

identity cards, making sure that their arrival in the United States 

is secure and goes with a very—in a smooth way. And increasingly, 

this is becoming a difficult, an ever-more difficult job as the mission expands and as the resources of the office have not in several 

years. 

666 

Senator NELSON. How does the President have time to receive 

every ambassador when he presents—he or she presents—their 

credentials? 

Ms. BRINKER. That’s our job. And we group the ambassadors into 

credentialing ceremonies to make it more—more palatable, certainly, and time-efficient for the President. We work very hard to 

make sure that each arriving ambassador has separate reception at 

the State Department, and provide for as many ceremonial opportunities, as well as visitations for the—for the diplomatic community. 

And again, using a, almost a time-motion study to make sure 

that that happens. As I said earlier, if confirmed, I’d like very 

much like to see the diplomatic community even brought into more 

of our official events and opportunities to visit with more of our 

members, more of the Congressional members and key leaders and 

individuals in the United States. 

Senator NELSON. Well, thank you to all of you. Do any of you 

have any questions of us? 

[No response.] 

Senator NELSON. Well, thank you for a most substantive hearing. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. The United States’ arms export controls are widely regarded as some 

of the most rigorous in the world, and the United States is often held up as an example for other countries to follow. Our failure to keep track of the small arms we 

provided to security forces in Iraq has not only increased the likelihood of diversion 

of United States weapons to terrorists and insurgents but has also undermined this 

reputation. If confirmed, what steps will you take to prevent problems like this recurring? Do your plans include a comprehensive, systematic overview of current controls—including end-use monitoring and restrictions—on all U.S. arms exports and 

export programs? 

Answer. We are proud of our record on export controls and share your concerns 

over reports of the loss of weapons transferred to Iraq. Under the International 

Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), all 

export authorizations are subject to restrictions against any re-export, retransfer, or 

change in end-use. The Blue Lantern program is used to perform postshipment enduse checks to confirm that no unauthorized changes in end-use have occurred. PM, 

along with several other bureaus in the Department, is supporting the Department 

of Defense Inspector General’s efforts to ensure accountability of weapons provided 

to our friends and allies in Iraq, and we will quickly act on any recommendations 

they identify regarding the Department’s export control procedures for Iraq. 

Question. Preventing the misuse and diversion of U.S. weapons and military 

equipment is a critically important part of your mission. Do you think that the enduse monitoring currently performed by the State Department is adequate? If so, how 

did you arrive at this conclusion? If not, what do you plan to do to strengthen these 

controls? 

Answer. The Department and the PM Bureau have done an exceptional job managing the Blue Lantern end-use monitoring program. Initiated over 20 years ago, 

Blue Lantern was the first program in the world to routinely check end-use of defense exports. The office that manages Blue Lantern is regularly called upon to brief 

the program to foreign governments, international organizations, and defense industry symposia. In the last 3 years, the Blue Lantern program has greatly increased 

both the number and quality of end-use checks. Since 2004, the number of new Blue 

Lantern checks per annum has increased over 75 percent, and the annual number 

667 

of unfavorable cases—indicating better targeting of checks—has hit record highs 3 

years in a row. Although we could always do more with more resources, it is important to note that the vast majority of defense trade is wholly legitimate and only 

a small fraction of defense licenses warrant end-use monitoring. 

Question. As Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, one of your main 

tasks will be to oversee U.S. efforts to help foreign governments build up their military forces, police, and other internal security forces to ‘‘combat terrorism and enhance stability.’’ As you know, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 gives the Department of State primacy over how and when to provide military assistance to foreign 

governments. However, in recent years the Department of Defense has assumed a 

larger role in this area. A December 2006 report by the majority staff of the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee concluded that this trend risks ‘‘weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries,’’ and cautioned that ‘‘some foreign officials question what appears to be to 

them a new emphasis by the United States on military approaches to problems that 

are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions.’’ As Assistant Secretary of 

State for PM you will be placed right in the center of this debate. Do you see the 

growing role of the Pentagon in providing military assistance, as witnessed by programs such as 1206 assistance, as a threat to the primacy of the State Department 

in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries? 

Answer. The State Department welcomed the Congress’s authorization of 1206 

and other similar Defense Department-funded military assistance programs as important assets in our efforts to increase the capacities of key international military 

partners in our common struggle against terrorism. Since the authorization’s inception, it has met key United States foreign policy objectives such as improving the 

capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to respond to terrorist threats; expanding 

our southeast Asian partners’ abilities to secure their strategically important waterways; and equipping key nations in Africa’s Trans-Sahel to battle violent extremists 

emerging in their midst. 

Although 1206-funded programs draw on Defense Department resources, funding 

the programs requires the Secretary of State’s full concurrence. This requirement 

ensures the programs’ complete fidelity to U.S. foreign policy objectives. In practice, 

this has meant close coordination between U.S. Ambassadors and Combatant Commanders in the field, as well as between the Departments of State and Defense in 

Washington. This collaboration has produced programs that closely match the military needs of our partners to the over-arching goals of U.S. foreign policy. 

If confirmed, I pledge to continue the State Department’s efforts to ensure that 

1206 and other similar programs are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals, as 

the State Department determines them. 

Question. What are the proper roles of the Departments of Defense and State, respectively, in building the capacity of foreign military forces? What is the role of the 

ambassador or chief of mission? 

Answer. Our security assistance programs are among the most valuable foreign 

policy tools we have for building partner capacity. Given that the vast majority of 

our security assistance funding is traditionally implemented by the Department of 

Defense (DoD), as well as our shared strategic interest in building partner capacity, 

DoD should continue to play an important advisory role in security assistance policy. However, security assistance policy, as an integral element of U.S. foreign policy, remains the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs will continue to serve as the primary interface between DoD and 

the Department of State. Our ambassadors have an important role to play in making recommendations as to which countries should receive military assistance as 

well as in providing oversight over the execution of programs, end-use monitoring 

and human rights vetting. 

Question. Do you believe that the Foreign Assistance Act provides enough flexibility in the area of capacity-building? Would some revisions be helpful? If so, in 

what areas? 

Answer. There are several targeted revisions that the State Department has requested that would improve security assistance authorities and permit greater flexibility in building the capacity of important international partners in our battle with 

terrorism. For example, the State Department supports amending certain sections 

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to allow the provision of peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds to law enforcement units such as gendarme forces to supplement 

military peacekeepers in peace support operations. The State Department has also 

requested an amendment to section 506 drawdown authority to increase the annual 

drawdown limit, expand the purposes for which drawdowns are authorized, and 

668 

allow the Department of Defense (DoD) to drawdown funds to procure new defense 

articles and services (vice having to rely on DoD stocks). This would enable quicker 

and more substantial responses to emergent capacity building needs. 

Question. When military assistance is granted through traditional areas, your division of the State Department and DoD perform checks to ensure that weapons 

provided to foreign governments are used in accordance with any transfer agreement. Who performs end-use checks in military equipment granted through 1206 assistance? 

Answer. All countries receiving assistance through section 1206 authority must 

enter into an end-use and re-transfer agreement with the United States pursuant 

to section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act. This agreement commits the recipient 

government to use equipment/training in a manner that is consistent with the purposes for which such assistance was furnished. In addition, the 505 agreement provides assurances that the recipient government will safeguard the equipment and 

technology, and allows for end-use inspections of U.S.-origin defense equipment. As 

with all assistance provided through the foreign military sales system, end-use monitoring will be conducted as needed by the United States Government under the 

auspices of the Golden Sentry program. 

RESPONSE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMETT TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. How many MANPADS have been produced worldwide? 

Answer. We estimate that over 1,000,000 MANPADS have been produced worldwide since the 1960s. Many of those already have been expended or destroyed because of technical obsolescence. Of the remaining systems, we assess that the majority are properly accounted for or safeguarded, but unfortunately a substantial number still remain in weak or loosely secured state stockpiles. Where we can, we work 

with countries to destroy surplus systems and to improve the security of those retained for legitimate national security. We also work on a multilateral basis, such 

as through the Wassenaar Arrangement, Organization of American States (OAS), 

and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to strengthen MANPADS control 

guidelines. 

A still smaller, but significant number of MANPADS are outside of national controls, either already in terrorist and insurgent hands or on the international black 

market. These are obviously our top priority. The number of these unregulated 

MANPADS is classified, but has been carefully considered in interagency planning 

activities. 

To date the Department has helped destroy over 21,000 foreign-held MANPADS 

and has commitments from other states to destroy another 6,500. 

RESPONSES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMETT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What are your views on the proper relationship between the Department of Defense and the Department of State in determining security assistance 

policy and in approving particular programs and operations? 

Answer. Our security assistance programs are among the most valuable foreign 

policy tools we have for building partner capacity. Given that the vast majority of 

our security assistance funding is implemented by the Department of Defense 

(DoD), as well as our shared strategic interest in building partner capacity, DoD 

should continue to play an important advisory role in security assistance policy. 

However, security assistance policy, as an integral element of U.S. foreign policy, 

remains the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The Bureau of Political-Military 

Affairs will continue to serve as the primary interface between DoD and the Office 

of the Director of Foreign Assistance. 

Question. Given the need to coordinate diplomatic and military activities, how are 

responsibilities best apportioned? As Assistant Secretary, what will be your role in 

that, as you see it? 

Answer. I believe my role will be to continue the inroads my predecessors have 

made in recent years, where the Departments of State and Defense have benefited 

from unparalleled cooperation and coordination on diplomatic and military activities. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs engages the Department of Defense 

(DoD) on political-military policy issues and coordinates strategic and operational 

political-military planning between DoD, State, and often USAID. The Bureau coVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00676 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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ordinates State’s input to DoD planning efforts to ensure they fully consider and are 

consonant with U.S. foreign policy objectives. The Bureau coordinated State’s unprecedented participation in DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as well as the 

ongoing development of DoD’s new Guidance for Employment of the Force and the 

Defense Planning Scenarios. The Bureau also continues to lead the whole-of-government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative. 

Question. What steps do you plan to take to improve the planning and coordination of security assistance programs, so that funds are used most effectively and so 

that foreign policy concerns and objectives are taken into account in the planning 

and implementation of these programs? 

Answer. Security assistance remains first and foremost a foreign policy tool. 

Therefore, foreign policy concerns and objectives take primacy in the planning and 

implementation of all foreign assistance programs, including security assistance. 

The State Department has made significant reforms regarding all aspects of foreign 

assistance, most notably with the creation of a new Director of Foreign Assistance. 

The Director of Foreign Assistance relies heavily on the expertise of functional bureaus such as the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs for guidance on how best to 

achieve our national security goals through foreign assistance. Additionally, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, as the principal departmental link with the Department of Defense, helps facilitate an interdepartmental dialog through which the 

advice of our principal partner in security assistance can be considered. If confirmed 

I will ensure that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs continues to work closely 

with the Director of Foreign Assistance, as well as other State bureaus and the Department of Defense, in achieving our common goal of enhancing peace and security. 

Question. You have served 30 years on active duty in the military and another 

year as a civilian official at the Department of Defense. What key insights or practices will you take from those experiences in managing interagency relations at the 

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs? What, if any, major challenges do you anticipate in representing the State Department in interagency discussions on security 

assistance and other matters? 

Answer. I believe strongly that State and the Department of Defense (DoD) need 

to continue to strive to improve the ways in which we communicate and coordinate 

political-military activities and policies. These two departments, along with the rest 

of the interagency, must operate as one team in their service to the American people 

in creating a stable and secure international environment that is hospitable to 

American interests and values. The current program through which senior officials 

in both State and the Department of Defense serve exchange tours goes a long way 

in facilitating a closer relationship by providing senior foreign policy and military 

policy advice at the most senior levels of departmental leadership. Additionally, we 

currently have a robust personnel exchange program between mid-level active duty 

military and State Department officers, and I would look to expand it to provide a 

greater reservoir of interagency experience in both departments. One of the principal goals I will set for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is to leverage new 

interagency planning and security assistance initiatives to better coordinate the 

complementary capabilities and resources that are needed to address the diverse 

threats and opportunities we face as a nation. 

Question. What actions do you anticipate taking to fulfill Acting Assistant Secretary Mull’s July 26, 2007 pledge to improve the interagency jurisdictional dispute 

mechanism for export control classification? 

Answer. I understand that Acting Assistant Secretary Mull has taken steps to energize an existing working-level group that reviews and discusses disputed cases 

and will establish a Deputy Assistant Secretary-level group to convene and resolve 

commodity jurisdiction cases that rise to that level. I pledge to review these processes to ensure that timelines, established in long-standing guidance issued by the 

National Security Council, are met. 

Question. What administrative or organizational improvements, if any, do you 

plan to make in the current Directorate of Defense Trade Controls or bureau frontoffice structure regarding defense trade licensing? 

Answer. It is my understanding the PM Bureau is in the process of delayering 

the Bureau’s management hierarchy, to include restructuring the Directorate of Defense Trade Control’s Management Office and adding to the responsibilities of the 

Deputy Assistant for Defense Trade Controls. I also understand that the Bureau has 

instituted a series of process reforms in the Defense Trade area, which have resulted initially in more efficient processing and a reduction in the overall backlog. 

If confirmed, I intend to review these efforts and determine what additional actions 

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should be taken to optimize the defense trade licensing process. The ultimate goal 

will be to ensure that the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls is configured and 

equipped to get the job done. 

Question. What steps do you think need to be taken to reduce the backlog of cases 

pending before the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls? 

Answer. I understand the importance to U.S. national security and foreign policy 

interests of efficiently adjudicating license applications to export defense articles 

and services from the United States. The PM Bureau is experiencing an annual 8 

percent increase in license applications and went through a period of short staffing 

in 2006 that led to a backlog of some 10,000 nonadjudicated license applications. 

I understand this staffing shortfall has been largely addressed and the Bureau has 

instituted a series of measures, including the streamlining of referrals to DoD and 

a mandatory management review of cases over 45 and 90 days, to reduce the backlog, which now stands at 6,000 cases. The implementation of the Defense Trade 

treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia, should the Senate provide its advice and consent, also will reduce the number of license applications to the Bureau. 

If confirmed, I will make further reforms to the licensing process a priority. 

Question. Are staffing levels in the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls appropriate, given that they are at such low levels relative to other agencies with similar 

responsibilities and fewer licenses to process? Would higher numbers of full-time 

employees better enable the directorate to meet its licensing processing goals and 

ensure the best protection possible of U.S. national security equities to commercial 

arms sales? 

Answer. The Department recognizes the disparity between agencies with export 

licensing responsibilities and I understand is making progress toward reducing the 

number of license applications per licensing officer inline with Congressional mandates. For the first time in several years the Directorate has fully manned its military billets and continues to fill all civil service positions. If confirmed, I will make 

the best use of available resources to meet license processing goals, while protecting 

U.S. national security equities. 

Question. Does the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls have sufficient financial 

resources to carry out its mission? 

Should exporters pay greater license fees to increase the resources available to the 

directorate to process all or particularly time-sensitive cases? Or would that give 

undue influence to those exporters with the resources to subsidize State Department 

operations? 

Should exporters assume, or be required to assume, a greater burden in inquiring 

about end users (and end uses) prior to the export of a defense article or defense 

service? 

Answer. The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls is currently about 40 percent 

self-financed through the collection of registration fees. If confirmed, I intend to explore if the Directorate can benefit from increasing their level of self-financing and, 

if so, how best to collect additional fees (e.g., instituting a fee for license applications 

or changing the structure of fees paid by registrants). As the Department of State 

is charged with the regulation of defense trade to protect our national security and 

foreign policy interests, any fee collection process implemented must be equitable 

and transparent. We cannot institute a fee collection process that unfairly benefits 

one exporter over another. 

Knowing the end user and end use of an export is a fundamental obligation of 

an exporter and is essential to the Department’s review and consideration of any 

export application request. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations currently 

requires all parties to an export to be identified in the export application and this 

obligation is underscored in the regulations which explicitly make exporters responsible for the use and disposition of any exported defense article. Exporters have long 

understood this obligation and routinely perform due diligence on their defense 

trade partners and on their exports. The Department also plays a key role in this 

process by bringing to bear information from various sources, including classified information, to vet all the parties to an export application prior to approval. This vetting is done by screening applications against a watchlist of ineligible, unreliable, 

or suspicious parties. This watchlist includes information gathered from classified 

and other reporting not generally available to companies and private parties. 

Question. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has expanded widely its use of 

private contractors to train foreign militaries and carry out other missions, and it 

has approved the transfer of arms directly to such private contractors. What are 

your views regarding the advantages and risks associated with this trend? 

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Answer. Broader policy questions regarding the expanded use of private contractors to train foreign militaries and to carry out other missions would be better addressed by the Department of Defense. Pursuant to the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, PM Bureau must approve any exports of military equipment needed to support these contractors. In deciding whether to approve such exports, the 

PM Bureau consults closely with DoD and other interested agencies to ensure that 

they are in keeping with U.S. foreign policy. 

With regard to its own limited use of contractors engaged in demining operations 

in Afghanistan and Iraq, the PM Bureau has required its contractors to take adequate measures to safeguard personnel and protect property. In support of this effort, the PM Bureau has authorized the procurement of weapons and military equipment by the Department of State for use by the contractors. Through the contract, 

these weapons are considered government furnished equipment and are the property of the Department of State, to be used by the contractors in the performance 

of the contract and returned to the U.S. Government at the end of the contract. 

Question. Earlier this year, the executive branch amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations to permit more radiation-hardened computer chips to be 

sold to, or manufactured in, countries like China. The justification was that chips 

for commercial applications were becoming more radiation-hardened, like it or not, 

and that maintaining existing controls would only damage the competitiveness of 

U.S. firms. The Defense Department said that although more capable chips might 

be usable in spacecraft, they would still be behind the standards for U.S. spacequalified systems. Members of this committee warned that the new policy might 

help other countries to build space-based or nuclear systems, even if they were second-rate. The executive branch said that wasn’t a problem yet, but that the regulation on rad-hardened chips might have to be amended again in a few years. So this 

issue could emerge again on your watch. 

What are your views on the risks posed as computer chips get more capable and 

more radiation-hardened? 

What steps will you take to address this concern before industry comes back with 

a new request to ease the ITAR regulations on radiation-hardened chips? 

Answer. It is my understanding that the revision in the parameters of the ITAR 

reflected the fact that improved chip design, shrinking size, and the use of new materials in their manufacture resulted in improved radiation tolerance as well. Chips 

designed for civilian uses such as cell phones and laptop computers were approaching ITAR thresholds for radiation hardness that signified military application. Had 

the administration not acted, the end result would have been control of commercial 

chips as military items, with a significant impact on the next generation of consumer electronics. The interagency, including DoD space and missile experts, looked 

at this problem and proposed the revisions that were ultimately published. 

I understand that the recent revisions on radiation-hardened chips is considered 

by all to be an interim solution. The review of the United States Munitions List is 

ongoing, and administration experts continue to examine the question of appropriate 

controls for radiation-hardened chips as well as other technologies. If confirmed, I 

will ensure that our review and any proposed solutions will take into account the 

possible use of radiation-hardened chips by our strategic competitors. 

Question. If you are confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, you will be responsible for U.S. transfers of weapons or of weaponsrelevant technology to other countries. Will you divest any holdings you or your wife 

may have in companies that manufacture weapons or computer chips? 

Answer. Yes. If I am confirmed, I have agreed to divest my holdings in certain 

companies where it was determined there would be a substantial likelihood of a conflict of interest with my duties as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. These included companies that manufacture weapons or computer 

chips. I also agreed to provide appropriate officials in the Department of State with 

a list of those interests that I may acquire in order to support my efforts to avoid 

conflicts of interest. 

Question. The United States has recently signed defense trade treaties with the 

United Kingdom and Australia. What other countries have expressed interest in negotiating such treaties, and what answers have they received? What other defense 

trade negotiations are in progress, have been approved in the C–175 process (11 

FAM 724), or are awaiting such approval? 

Answer. To my knowledge, no other country has sought negotiation of a treaty 

similar to those signed with the United Kingdom and Australia. I am not aware of 

any plans to negotiate further treaties; no negotiations are in progress, and there 

are no other proposed treaties at any stage in the Circular 175 process. 

672 

Question. The Bureau for Political-Military Affairs is responsible for liaison with 

the Department of Defense, and one important aspect of that liaison is planning and 

implementing disaster relief efforts when there is a major earthquake, tsunami, or 

hurricane. The United States is famous for the extent and the efficiency of its humanitarian efforts, but we are rarely the first country to provide assistance. Sometimes weeks go by, before significant U.S. help begins to arrive. 

Why is U.S. assistance often so slow to get started? Are our logistical resources 

stretched too thin? Are there bureaucratic roadblocks to quick, effective action, in 

either the Departments of Defense or State? 

If you are confirmed as Assistant Secretary, what will you do to improve U.S. disaster response performance? 

Answer. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is one of several coordinating 

agencies involved in determining the level of U.S. Government assistance to nations 

following humanitarian disasters. USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

(OFDA) and DoD also have a major role in the assessment and response. 

There is a process to obtain U.S. Government assistance. Following a disaster, the 

U.S. Government, through its embassy country team, works directly with the affected nation. The ambassador has authority to make an immediate disaster declaration and can make an offer of financial assistance. 

Additionally, USAID provides assessment teams to determine if local, nongovernment organizations, and international organization contributions are insufficient for 

disaster relief. In cases of slow-onset natural disasters such as the approach of hurricanes, the U.S. Government is able to place assessment/response teams in multiple 

countries in advance of the disaster. 

If the assessment team and the host nation determine additional assistance is required either due to the overwhelming nature of the event or if the required assistance is unique to the military, the ambassador works closely with USAID, the State 

Department, and the Department of Defense to identify the needs and ensure the 

flow of U.S. Government assistance is immediate and rapid. USAID has authorities 

to provide assistance and, as appropriate, identifies whether DoD assistance is required. 

While this process may sound complicated, in fact the communication between the 

embassy, USAID, and the Departments of State and Defense begins immediately, 

or in some cases even before the disaster’s onset. The Bureau of Political-Military 

Affairs’ role is to facilitate the request for disaster assistance between agencies. 

In consultation with our colleagues at USAID, and as an illustrative example of 

my points, I have included a timeline of the ongoing response to the aftermath of 

Hurricane Felix in Central America. My understanding is that the response to Hurricane Felix occurred while USAID was also responding to the effects of Peru’s devastating earthquake. 

In response to the second part of the question, I believe there are no roadblocks 

or delays to the U.S. Government’s foreign disaster response. I hope to use my position as Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs to ensure that communications lines among DOS, DoD, and USAID remain open and clear as to intent (U.S. 

Government interest) and timeliness of a U.S. Government response. 

HURRICANE FELIX TIMELINE: 

Prior to the hurricane season: 

• USAID pre-positioned approximately $45,000 in relief supplies with the Nicaraguan Red Cross to respond to emergency needs. 

August 31: 

• Tropical depression six formed in the Atlantic Ocean. The U.S. National Hurricane Center began issuing public advisories at 5 p.m. Atlantic Standard Time. 

USAID/OFDA began monitoring the storm. 

September 1: 

• Tropical depression six reached tropical storm, and then hurricane strength. 

September 2: 

• USAID/OFDA began sending out regular hurricane update emails on Hurricane 

Felix. 

September 3: 

• USAID pre-positioned 23 disaster response specialists Nicaragua, Honduras, 

Guatemala, El Salvador, Belize, and Mexico in advance of Hurricane Felix. 

Some of these disaster specialists were repositioned from their previous deployment to respond to Hurricane Dean. 

September 4: 

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• After making landfall on September 4 as a category five hurricane, Felix moved 

inland over northeastern Nicaragua and Honduras. • USAID/OFDA provided $75,000 to support emergency preparedness activities in 

Nicaragua, Belize, and Honduras. 

September 5: 

• On September 5, the hurricane severely impacted Honduras and Nicaragua, 

and resulted in heavy rainfall in Guatemala and Belize. 

• On September 5, U.S. Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli declared a disaster due to 

the effects of the hurricane. In response, USAID/OFDA provided $150,000 to 

support the local procurement and transportation of emergency relief supplies 

to affected populations. 

September 6: 

• On September 6, the first of two USAID/OFDA first relief flights arrived in 

Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, with 120 rolls of plastic sheeting, 1,500 blankets, 

and 1,536 hygiene kits. 

• On September 6, a member of the USAID emergency team traveled to three 

municipalities in Cortes Department, Honduras, as part of a joint assessment 

mission with U.N. staff. 

September 7: 

• In coordination with the Nicaraguan Red Cross, USAID emergency teams are 

conducting assessments of four of the most affected communities in Nicaragua 

on September 7. The teams are reaching the impacted areas via U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) helicopters, which will return to the assessed areas with 

relief supplies. 

• A second relief flight, carrying 120 rolls of plastic sheeting, 1,500 blankets, and 

1,536 hygiene kits, is scheduled to arrive in Nicaragua on September 7. The initial distribution of the USAID/OFDA relief supplies will begin on September 7 

in Sandy Bay and surrounding communities. 

• On September 7, DOD aircraft delivered essential supplies, including a water 

purification system, and provided air support for USAID/OFDA assessments of 

the affected areas. DOD is also assisting with search and rescue efforts for Nicaraguan fishermen who are missing due to the hurricane. 

RESPONSES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMETT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BARACK OBAMA

(Military assistance programs have traditionally been funded in the Department 

of State and Foreign Operations budget and overseen by the Political-Military Affairs Department of the State Department. But section 1206 of the fiscal year 2006 

National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of State, to equip, supply, or train foreign country military forces to build their capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations or participate in or support stability operations in which the U.S. military also participates.) 

Question. In your view, should the statutory restrictions on military assistance 

programs included in the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act or the State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriations apply to the program authorized in 

section 1206? 

Answer. Section 1206, by its terms, incorporates other statutory restrictions as assistance cannot be provided if it is otherwise prohibited by any provision of law. 

Thus, the Department of State currently applies statutory restrictions on military 

assistance programs to programs executed under section 1206 authority. Since section 1206 is designed to be a flexible tool to respond to meet urgent or emergent 

requirements, the administration has sought more flexibility, such as the ability to 

waive certain restrictions when provision of section 1206 assistance would be in the 

national security interests of the United States. Clearly, where such assistance 

would not support our foreign policy goals for the country, it would not be provided. 

Question. If you are confirmed, will Political-Military Affairs apply such restrictions to the program authorized by section 1206? 

Answer. Since application of these restrictions is required under the law, the Department of State, working with the Department of Defense, will continue to apply 

such restrictions to programs executed under section 1206 authority. 

Question. Please explain the procedures Political-Military Affairs currently follows 

to ensure that individuals or units trained and equipped in the program authorized 

in section 1206 meet statutory requirements for the respect of human rights. 

674 

Answer. Section 1206 includes provisions that effectively require that the assistance be provided consistent with other requirements of law. Accordingly, we apply 

the Leahy amendment requirements set out in the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts to the provision of section 1206 assistance. The State Department 

takes its responsibilities under the Leahy amendment very seriously. Diplomatic 

posts overseas are fully informed about the legislative requirement that foreign security units receiving training or assistance must be vetted. The embassy begins the 

process by reviewing its files and databases on units and/or individuals for human 

rights violations. The embassy then cables the regional bureau at the State Department providing its search results and requesting a similar review of the Department’s files and databases. Information on the unit and/or individual is circulated 

for review by appropriate personnel in the Department, including the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); Intelligence and Research (INR); and Political-Military Affairs (PM). If no credible derogatory information is found, the regional bureau sends a reply cable to Post indicting that the training or assistance 

may proceed. 

Question. Do you believe those steps are adequate? 

Answer. The Department began human rights vetting 10 years ago as a way of 

implementing the Leahy amendment which was first added to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act at that time. Since then the process has been refined and 

improved; currently the Department vets over thousands of names every year, and 

those numbers continue to increase. The Department has established a working 

group which meets frequently on Leahy issues, and the Office of the Inspector General regularly inspects Leahy vetting procedures at posts. Nonetheless, the Department continues to look for ways to improve the vetting process, particularly in chaotic and violent environments. 

Question. Knowing what you know about this program authorized in section 1206, 

do you believe that other Military Assistance Programs—including those not overseen or administered by Political-Military Affairs, like the training and equipping 

of Iraqi Security Forces—have effective procedures for ensuring that individuals 

trained and equipped with taxpayer resources meet certain minimum standards as 

they relate to respect for human rights? 

Answer. In accordance with the Leahy amendment, the Department of State is 

responsible for ensuring that where there is credible evidence that a unit of security 

forces has committed gross human rights violations, that unit does not receive training or assistance. The State Department applies the Leahy amendment, which has 

been annually reenacted for many years in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (FOAA), to security assistance programs for military forces funded by Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International 

Military Education and Training (IMET), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and certain Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) 

funds. The State Department also applies the Leahy amendment to comparable 

training and equipping programs for national military forces under section 1206, 

which is funded with DoD funds. A modified version of the Leahy amendment found 

in the FOAA is also found in the Defense Appropriations Act and applies to DoDfunded training programs. While dynamic operational environments pose additional 

challenges to vetting, the goal remains unchanged in implementing Leahy such that 

no security assistance will be provided to any units of military security forces where 

there is credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human 

rights. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY GOODMAN BRINKER, NOMINEE TO BE CHIEF OF

PROTOCOL, AND TO HAVE THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR DURING HER TENURE OF

SERVICE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today as the President’s nominee to serve as Chief of Protocol of 

the United States. I’m grateful to the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they have placed in me by nominating me for this position. 

I thank Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison for her gracious introduction and support 

and Congressman Tom Lantos for his support during this nomination process. I am 

proud today to be joined by my son, Eric Brinker, from Peoria, IL—as well as by 

close friends and colleagues. 

It was my privilege to appear before this committee 6 years ago, and I thank the 

members and the Senate for their support of my nomination as U.S. Ambassador 

to the Republic of Hungary. I am honored and excited by the opportunity to return 

675 

to public service and to work on issues important to the United States and the diplomatic community. 

During my time in Hungary, we were able to advance a broad range of United 

States security and economic interests. We promoted United States trade and investment in Hungary, built significant cultural ties between the United States and 

Hungarian communities and worked with the Hungarians on the war on terror in 

the wake of 9/11. 

Specific successes include expanded security cooperation, development of a closure 

strategy for the Hungarian Fund, resolving commerce transparency issues, and for 

the first time, holding a conference on the trafficking and exploitation of workers 

that health ministers from the neighboring Balkan States attended. 

Following my assignment to Budapest, I returned to the Susan G. Komen for the 

Cure, which is named in memory of my sister, and is the world’s largest breast cancer foundation. As its founder, I understand the challenge of leading and coordinating complex organizations. 

Another challenge that I have taken on is promoting ‘‘medical diplomacy’’ for the 

State Department. This effort focuses on the global breast cancer and women’s 

health movements from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. In this position, I have 

witnessed the ability of our Nation to strengthen bilateral relations by connecting 

with local communities. 

Throughout these three decades of experiences, Mr. Chairman, I have learned a 

simple truth that, if confirmed, will guide my service as Chief of Protocol: You can 

make a difference in the lives of people from other races, religions, or cultures if 

you simply reach out to them with respect, learn their needs, and share the lessons 

of your own experience and then support them in theirs. 

This truth and my experience have prepared me for the position that the President has entrusted me to undertake. 

The Office of the Chief of Protocol advises, assists, and supports the President, 

the Vice President, and the Secretary of State on official matters of diplomatic procedure. During this administration, the Visits Division has supported over 2,300 visits by foreign dignitaries. This division also plans and executes Presidential delegations abroad to represent the President at events. In addition, the Chief of Protocol 

accompanies the President on official visits overseas. 

The ceremonials division arranges official ceremonies and events for the Secretary 

of State, organizes the participation of the diplomatic corps in special events, and 

maintains the order of precedence of the United States, coordinating over 130 ceremonial events this fiscal year. 

A vital part of the office of the Chief of Protocol is handled by the Diplomatic Affairs division, which oversees the credentialing of foreign bilateral ambassadors to 

the United States and accreditation of foreign government personnel posted here. 

If confirmed, I look forward to serving the President as a liaison to the 184 ambassadors accredited to our country. Protocol is also the action office for matters relating to diplomatic and consular immunities. 

The office also manages Blair House, the President’s guest house. All of this is 

accomplished by a staff of 63 people, comprised of civil and Foreign Service officers, 

as well as political appointees. 

President Bush and Secretary Rice have highlighted transformational diplomacy 

as part of the White House’s global democracy agenda. I therefore see this assignment as an opportunity to help our foreign dignitaries experience the full fabric of 

American society, beyond traditional diplomatic circles, and in doing so strengthening the mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the 

people of the world. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity 

to appear before you today and for your consideration of my nomination. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staffs to advance our agenda 

with the diplomatic community. 

RESPONSES OF NANCY GOODMAN BRINKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What are your top priorities for this position, if confirmed? At the end 

of the Bush administration, what do you hope to be able to report that you have 

accomplished? 

Answer. If confirmed, I hope to strengthen and achieve mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of the world by helping our 

guests experience the rich foundation, culture, and history of America, beyond traditional diplomatic circles. I would like to bring together leaders in business, eduVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00683 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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cation, government, cultural organizations, and not-for-profit organizations to help 

advance the principles of diplomacy. 

Through personal contact with visiting foreign leaders and the diplomatic community throughout the United States, I plan to achieve a better understanding between 

the American people and our international community which I hope can have a positive impact on bilateral ties. 

Question. I am concerned about allegations of abuse or mistreatment of workers 

present in the United States under A–3 and G–5 visas. Diplomats have failed to 

provide promised compensation to such worker, and in some cases have physically 

abused or mistreated these workers. Are you familiar with this issue? Do you have 

any views on what measures the Department might take, consistent with U.S. obligations on diplomatic immunity, to strengthen protection for such workers? 

Answer. I am aware of this issue and wish to confirm that the Department of 

State takes this matter very seriously. As the United States seeks to be a leader 

in the global effort to combat trafficking in persons, we are deeply concerned by 

these reported abuses, some of which also suggest the possibility of trafficking. We 

are working to ensure the fair and humane treatment of all domestic workers who 

come to the United States, including those employed by persons with full immunity. 

It is essential for all members of the diplomatic community to fully respect U.S. 

laws. Not only is the welfare of the domestic workers of great concern, but our effectiveness in addressing problems like this, domestically, has the potential to affect 

the authority with which we speak globally. 

The Department recently transmitted a circular diplomatic note to all missions 

emphasizing the importance of providing fair treatment to domestic workers and requiring the registration of all foreign domestic workers assigned to mission personnel. Given the gravity of the allegations, we are also exploring other possible approaches. 

While serving as the United States Ambassador to Hungary, one of the successes 

of my tenure was that we held, for the first time, a conference on trafficking and 

exploitation of workers that was attended by health ministers from the neighboring 

Balkan States. If confirmed, it is my intention to bring together the Chiefs of Mission here in Washington to underscore the fact that the Department takes this matter seriously and to explain our policy and practice in cases that are brought to our 

attention. 

RESPONSES OF NANCY GOODMAN BRINKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Is there a ‘‘Buy American’’ rule in place regarding gifts that are given 

to foreign dignitaries? If not, please explain how gifts are selected. What is the average annual total amount spent for such gifts? 

Answer. There is no official ‘‘Buy American’’ rule in place regarding gifts. Members of this administration generally choose to purchase products that have been designed, crafted, and manufactured in the United States, when possible. 

The Office of the Chief of Protocol, which is responsible for foreign gifting on behalf of the President and First Lady, the Vice President and spouse, and the Secretary of State, offers various gift options on the occasion of visits by foreign dignitaries or officials, foreign trips, special events, and Presidential delegations. The 

principal makes the choice from the options provided. 

The average yearly amount spent on gifts is approximately $500,000. This amount 

includes special order gifts as well as the amount spent for the purchase of standard 

gifts maintained by Protocol for use during the ordinary course of official interaction 

with foreign visitors. 

Question. In your responses to Senator Nelson, you mentioned issues related to 

the funding of the cost of Blair House operations. Please provide a more detailed 

breakdown of the costs and funding sources used to cover the costs for both maintenance and accommodations. 

Answer. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for the opportunity to respond to your question. 

Blair House is currently maintained using funds available from the Department 

of State, the General Services Administration, and a not-for-profit 501(3)C organization, the Blair House Restoration Fund. The Department of State currently spends 

approximately $1.3 million annually in operations and maintenance costs and smallscale capitol improvements and repairs. Annual payments to GSA are approximately 

$960,000 annually of which a portion is also utilized to fund maintenance costs. 

677 

Blair House Restoration Fund provides approximately $250,000 exclusively for use 

to repair and refurbish decorative elements of Blair House. 

The expenses of visits by foreign chiefs of state or heads of government are paid 

through the Department of State allocation known as the Emergencies in Diplomatic and Consular Affairs (K Fund) which reports directly to Congress on an annual basis with an itemized accounting of expenses that includes the cost of guests 

at Blair House. Recent examples include: In 2006 Blair House hosted a record number of 25 world leaders over a period of 75 days at a cost of $395,725.07. In 2005, 

Blair House hosted 18 world leaders in a period of 50 days at a total cost of 

$285,453.42. 

If confirmed, I plan to seek a complete and full evaluation of Blair House funding, 

maintenance, and operating costs. There must be a comprehensive maintenance and 

repair plan to avoid an increase in building deficiencies and unanticipated mechanical and electrical failures. A band-aid approach to operations is risky and shortsighted, putting the structure itself at risk and creating uncomfortable or even hazardous conditions for visitors and guests. 

Some of the building systems and parts of the infrastructure of the Blair House 

have been renovated or repaired, but many of the piecemeal upgrades are no longer 

viable and new problems are developing as the building continues to age and settle. 

RESPONSES OF NANCY GOODMAN BRINKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. Please describe circumstances where sending governments have waived 

the immunity of their diplomats? 

Answer. Immunities are provided to diplomats in order to ensure the efficient performance of diplomatic missions in the representation of states. Sending states typically consider on a case-by-case basis requests to waive the immunities of diplomats. 

While there are many instances in which states do not waive diplomats’ immunities, 

there are also instances in which they do. In a few very serious incidents such as 

vehicular manslaughter in Washington in 1997, and an earlier homicide in Florida 

in 1989, the sending states granted requests by the Department of State to waive 

the diplomatic immunity of their mission members. In these cases, the individual 

stood trial and was sentenced in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction. 

In some lesser criminal incidents sending states often have not waived their diplomat’s immunities. They have occasionally, with prosecutors’ agreement, participated in diversionary programs, for example counseling. For driving offenses, if a 

sending state does not waive a diplomat’s immunities and permit the diplomat to 

appear in court or otherwise reach an agreement with a prosecutor, the Department 

of State imposes points on the diplomat’s driver license (issued by the Department 

of State) and will suspend or revoke a license as appropriate. 

Question. When have we requested waiver of immunity for our persons overseas? 

Answer. We receive requests from host governments to waive immunity for U.S. 

Government personnel in criminal and civil cases very rarely. The only recent case 

was Russia requesting, in 1998, that we waive immunity for the Consul General in 

Vladivostok who was involved in an auto accident resulting in a young man becoming a quadriplegic. In response, we asked Russia to provide more details about the 

charges that would be brought and the evidence indicating our employee was at 

fault. Russia did not respond and so we did not waive or refuse to waive immunity. 

This is not to suggest that we have never waived immunity for our overseas employee, but we do so without a formal request from the host State. A common example is a request from local prosecutors for a DEA or other law enforcement agency 

to testify in a criminal prosecution (which happens almost once a month). All of our 

accredited embassy and consular personnel have testimonial and jurisdictional immunity regarding their official acts. This immunity must be (and almost always is 

to assist prosecutions) waived before the individual can subject him or herself to the 

jurisdiction of the local court. 

Similarly, our employees sometimes receive notification that they are the subject 

of proceedings in local criminal or civil courts. Because they are members of a diplomatic or consular mission, they all have immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction for official acts. Diplomatic agents have complete criminal and civil immunity 

for any conduct, while members of an embassy’s administrative and technical staff 

have criminal immunity for all off-duty acts. In response to these notices of litigation, the embassies are instructed to prepare a diplomatic note either asserting or 

waiving immunity. The notes and original documents are transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Generally speaking, we do not waive immunity for foreign 

678 

court litigation against our employees or their family members (when they are covered by immunity). On average, an assertion of immunity takes place about once 

a month. 

There have been two recent occasions where we have waived criminal immunity 

for a covered individual without formal requests from the host State. In both, our 

ambassadors weighed in strongly urging that the immunity be waived. One case involved drunk driving where the embassy had issued clear guidance precluding such 

behavior. The other involved an embassy dependent who’d gotten into a fight along 

with several military dependents. Since the military dependents had no immunity 

in that situation, the ambassador felt that it was unfair that the embassy dependent 

(who had been equally involved in the altercation) was not punished. In both cases, 

immunity from criminal jurisdiction for adjudication of guilt was waived and the 

issue of whether execution of a criminal sentence (i.e., jail or fine) would be permitted was reserved. In both cases, however, there were plea agreements so no further waivers were issued. 

Question. What is the condition of Blair House today? Can you send me a paper 

on Blair House? 

Answer. Thank you, Senator Nelson, for the opportunity to inform you of the condition of Blair House. Because of its age, Blair House needs significant reconditioning in order to function properly as the President’s official guest house for visiting foreign dignitaries. Extraordinary efforts have been put into keeping this historical house looking as good as it does, but sustained annual support is required. 

What today is known as Blair House is actually four private 19th century residences that have been combined and interconnected to operate as one unit. In addition, a new wing was added to the complex in the 1980s. The oldest home was completed in 1824, another in 1859, and two others in 1860. The Federal Government 

purchased the earliest homes in 1942 and 1943 to create a guest house for the Nations distinguished foreign guests. The two later homes were added to the complex 

in 1970. The entire facility was renovated between 1982 and 1988. Seven million 

dollars were allocated from Congress for structural work and an additional $7 million were raised privately to cover decorative expenses. Today, the facility contains 

approximately 70,000 square feet—a full 5,000 square feet larger than the executive 

mansion. 

Question. I would like you to send me a renovation plan and needed annual maintenance supplied by private sector and what is required by the Federal budget. 

Answer. Thank you, Senator Nelson, for the opportunity to provide a renovation 

plan and report which outlines details needed for annual maintenance. If confirmed, 

I plan to seek a complete and full evaluation of Blair House funding, maintenance, 

and operating costs. There must be a comprehensive maintenance and repair plan 

to avoid an increase in building deficiencies and unanticipated mechanical and electrical failures. A band-aid approach to operations is risky and short-sighted, putting 

the structure itself at risk and creating uncomfortable or even hazardous conditions 

for visitors and guests. 

Some of the building systems and parts of the infrastructure of the Blair House 

have been renovated or repaired, but many of the piecemeal upgrades are no longer 

viable and new problems are developing as the building continues to age and settle. 

Blair House is currently maintained using funds available from the Department 

of State, the General Services Administration, and a not-for-profit 501(3)C organization, the Blair House Restoration Fund. The Department of State currently spends 

approximately $1.3 million annually in operations and maintenance costs and smallscale capitol improvements and repairs. Annual payments to GSA are approximately 

$960,000 annually, of which a portion is also utilized to fund maintenance costs. 

Blair House Restoration Fund provides approximately $250,000 exclusively for use 

to repair and refurbish decorative elements of Blair House. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NED L. SIEGEL, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to come before you 

as the President’s nominee to serve as the Ambassador of the United States of 

America to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. I want to thank President Bush 

and Secretary Rice for their confidence and support in nominating me for this position. I also wish to thank the members of the Senate and, in particular, this committee, for the opportunity to come before you today. 

I would like to introduce and acknowledge my family members who are here with 

me today—my wife and partner in life for 31 years, Stephanie. I am also honored 

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to have my brother, Marc, and my nephew, Robert, joining us. I have been extremely fortunate to have had the love and support of my family in all of my endeavors, and I realize I would not be here today without them.Over the years, I 

have had the opportunity to visit the Bahamas to celebrate various special family 

occasions. I have always considered the Bahamas as a special place, and my family 

and I have many fond memories of the Bahamas over the years. If confirmed, I look 

forward to creating many, many new ones. 

The opportunity to appear before you today in this exceptional process can only 

be described as a privilege. This is not my first time to appear before a Senate confirmation committee, but I would like to share with the members of this committee 

my qualifications to serve as the United States ambassador to the Commonwealth 

of the Bahamas. 

From 1999 to 2004, I served as an appointee to the Board of Directors of Enterprise Florida, Inc. (EFI), a public-private partnership that acts as Florida’s primary 

organization for statewide economic development. The mission of EFI is ‘‘to diversify 

Florida’s economy and create better-paying jobs for its citizens by supporting, attracting, and helping create business in innovative, high-growth industries.’’ I traveled to Israel on the Governor’s Trade Mission in 1999 and worked throughout my 

tenure to bring Israeli companies to Florida. 

In 2003, I was nominated by the President and appointed to serve as a member 

of the board of directors of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a position 

I currently hold. Throughout my tenure as an OPIC director, I have been able to 

evaluate and approve projects that mobilized U.S. capital to provide people in developing countries with first-time access to credit for new small businesses and lowand moderate-income housing. These efforts have had a tangible effect on job creation and economic growth, helping to lift people from poverty—all carried out in 

cooperation with the private sector. 

In September of 2006, I was again honored by the President to serve as a Public 

Delegate to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and as a United States Representative to the 61st General Assembly. This was a unique opportunity to serve 

at an exceptional time in our efforts to build international support for U.S. policies 

through the United Nations. Through my experience at the U.N., I gained a greater 

appreciation for the strategy and preparation necessary to advance U.S. interests 

on the world stage. I also experienced firsthand the tremendous impact that small 

countries can have through their ITN votes on the United States’ ability to carry 

out its foreign policy and enhance our national security. Without a doubt, my time 

as a delegate to the United Nations provided me an opportunity to gain exposure 

to the conduct of our Nation’s international affairs at the highest level, and thereby 

to sharpen my own diplomatic skills. 

Through my experiences at Enterprise Florida, OPIC, and the United Nations, I 

have acquired a broad knowledge of the political sensitivities of promoting sustainable investment while advancing U.S. foreign policy and development initiatives. 

That knowledge, coupled with my extensive business experience has prepared me 

to serve effectively as the United States Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the 

Bahamas, should I be confirmed. 

The United States and the Bahamas enjoy a close and productive bilateral partnership built on all four pillars of the President’s Western Hemisphere Strategy: 

bolstering security, strengthening democracy, promoting prosperity, and investing in 

people. Our shared interests, common commitment to the rule of law, and geographic proximity make the Bahamas one of our closest operational partners in the 

Western Hemisphere. 

The Bahamian public is broadly committed to the values that we as Americans 

hold dear—democratic governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. 

These shared values provide a firm foundation to build a productive partnership, 

but it is up to the embassy to ensure that our message is heard and our actions 

are understood. If confirmed, my embassy team will step up efforts to explain, promote, and defend U.S. policies and actions in order to build support for U.S. strategic goals in the region: We will focus our outreach efforts to support our 

counterdrug and crime efforts, promote greater public awareness of HIV/AIDS, encourage a stronger Bahamian international role on human rights and democracy, 

and promote improved education. 

Should I be confirmed, I will work to improve the United States’ vital, cutting 

edge efforts to combat international crime, drugs, and illegal migration. We will do 

this by maintaining full U.S. support for Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos in 

a coordinated multinational, multi-agency effort to combat international drug trafficking into and through the Bahamas. As a result of OPBAT’s success, we have dramatically reduced the percentage of cocaine destined for the United States that 

680 

flows through the Bahamas from a high of 70 percent in the 1980s to the current 

level of less than 10 percent. 

Working together, the Royal Bahamas Defense Force and the U.S. Coast Guard 

monitor Bahamian and international waters for illegal migration. Our Comprehensive Maritime Agreement (CMA) allows Bahamian officials to ride on U.S. vessels 

while they patrol in order to be in position to authorize the boarding of vessels in 

Bahamian waters to pursue illegal migrant and drug traffickers. Our efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and shut down illegal migration also serve to close off pathways that could be used by terrorists. Last year alone, the United States and the 

Bahamas together interdicted 5,762 illegal migrants. 

Second, I will ensure that Embassy Nassau’s Consular Section continues to provide first-rate assistance to United States Citizens in the Bahamas and the Turks 

and Caicos Islands—a protectorate of the United Kingdom, over which we have consular jurisdiction. Over 4 million United States citizens travel to or reside in the 

Bahamas every year, and I will work to expand outreach programs that educate 

both Bahamians and United States residents residing or visiting within the Bahamas so they have the information, services, and protection they need to live, conduct 

business, or travel between our countries. To protect the most vulnerable, we will 

intensify our dialog with Bahamian authorities on sexual assault cases and work 

with police to prevent assaults, care for victims, and ensure effective prosecutions. 

Third, I will work to further improve United States efforts to work with the Bahamians to prevent and respond to terrorism. Cruise ships, vacation resorts, passenger 

jets, and commercial shipping vessels could all become potential terrorist targets if 

not secured and screened. The Freeport Container Port is one of the largest in the 

world and one of the closest foreign ports to the United States. In 2004, the United 

States signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Bahamas to include Freeport in the United States Megaports Initiative to screen United States-bound cargo 

for radiological materials. In 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding for a Container Security Initiative (CSI) was concluded. Through CSI, over 90 percent of the 

cargo moving through Freeport—one of the 25 busiest transshipment ports to the 

United States—will be screened and suspicious containers will be segregated and 

searched. To expand our joint efforts to combat the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we will seek to conclude a Proliferation Security Initiative 

(PSI) Ship Boarding Agreement. The Bahamas has the third largest ship registry 

in the world, and their participation in PSI is vital to its success. 

Finally, should I be confirmed, I am looking forward to using my business experience and acumen to promote the prosperity that is essential to the Bahamas’ continued stability and its ability to take on greater responsibilities as a multidimensional 

partner for the United States. The Bahamas has the highest per capita income in 

CARICOM and its consumer market is attuned to United States products. Over 80 

percent of Bahamian imports come from the United States, but competitors such as 

China and Brazil are working to increase their market shares. My embassy team 

will seek to increase United States trade and investment in the Bahamas by linking 

Bahamian importers to United States suppliers, fostering Bahamian business development, and promoting United States-Bahamian business connections, including 

through our outstanding National Guard State Partnership Program with the State 

of Rhode Island. We will continue to work with the Bahamas to promote energy diversification and sustainable tourism, fishing, and agriculture. The embassy will 

continue to promote legal and regulatory changes that will promote sustainable development, an important goal of United States policy. 

Our relationship with the Bahamas is strong and vibrant. The Bahamas will continue to be an active partner in our efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics, prevent illegal migration, ensure the safety and security of American citizens abroad, 

combat potential terrorism, and promote prosperity and security in our hemisphere. 

Should I be confirmed, I look forward to building new areas of cooperation with one 

of our closest neighbors and to deepening one of our closest bilateral partnerships 

in the hemisphere. 

Throughout my life, the same threads have woven the successes in my family life, 

my business life, and my philanthropic service life—those common threads being the 

ability to assess and understand situations, and to listen and manage people to 

achieve acceptable and positive results. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and if confirmed, I look 

forward to working with you as the United States Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT, NOMINEE TO BE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing 

today. I am deeply honored to have been nominated by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice to serve as the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military 

Affairs and I wish to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

THE PM MISSION

At this particular time in our Nation’s history, I am honored to have been offered 

the opportunity to lead an organization that plays a critical role in our foreign policy 

and national security. With the mission of integrating diplomacy and military power 

to foster a stable and secure international environment, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs serves not only as the primary bridge between the Departments of State 

and Defense on operational military matters, but also as an interface between two 

of our most important instruments of national power. As a career Army officer with 

service in peace and war, I fully appreciate the paramount importance of skillfully 

coordinating the use of these two instruments to meet the challenges facing American interests around the world. 

In the few minutes that I have, I would like comment on some of the ways in 

which the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is helping to meet the challenges we 

face. In broad terms, the Political-Military Affairs Bureau provides policy direction 

in the areas of international and regional security, security assistance, military operations and exercises, defense strategy and policy, and defense trade—all of which 

involve the integration of diplomacy and military power. These can be further categorized into three major areas of responsibility: counterterrorism, regional stability, 

and humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict. 

COUNTERTERRORISM

In meeting its counterterrorism responsibilities, the PM Bureau is playing a key 

role in the war on terror in several ways. First, the Bureau provides diplomatic support and foreign policy guidance to U.S. military forces for military and humanitarian operations and maritime threat response. PM also negotiates base access 

agreements and provides legal protections to our soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen through the negotiation of Status of Forces and Article 98 agreements. To expedite this diplomatic support, the Bureau maintains a 24/7 operations center designed to facilitate communications between commanders in the field and the State 

Department and other agencies here in Washington. PM also enhances coordination 

and communication between State and military commanders through its Foreign 

Policy Advisors (POLAD) program which currently has 21 senior State Department 

officers assigned to the four Service Chiefs, the Combatant Commanders, and other 

senior commanders in the field. Efforts are underway to expand this program in the 

next several years. 

PM also plays a key role in coordinating the participation of other countries in 

coalitions such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. After 

initially working to enlist the participation of other countries, the PM Bureau now 

maintains regular contact with troop contributing governments to ensure that they 

are kept abreast of operational matters and that their needs for logistical support 

are met. 

In the policy realm, PM is working closely with the Department of Defense to better coordinate our national military strategy through its work in the Quadrennial 

Defense Review process and similar high-level defense planning efforts. One particularly noteworthy development in this regard is PM’s Counterinsurgency or COIN 

Initiative which seeks to do for the civilian side of the Federal Government what 

General Petraeus has done for the military—to craft counterinsurgency working documents for use by State, USAID, Agriculture, and other nonmilitary agencies. 

A final aspect of PM’s counterterrorism efforts that I will discuss is the Bureau’s 

program to keep excess small arms and light weapons, to include man-portable air 

defense systems or MANPADS, out of the hands of terrorists and insurgents who 

would threaten U.S. interests and destabilize other parts of the world. Since its inception in 2002, PM’s Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program has destroyed over 1 million weapons, 90 million rounds of ammunition, and over 21,000 

MANPADS in over 25 countries. The Bureau, working with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has also assisted countries in properly securing their stocks 

of weapons and ammunition to keep them from inadvertently falling into the wrong 

hands. If confirmed, I will seek to further expand this very important program. 

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REGIONAL STABILITY

The Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program also contributes directly to 

PM’s second major area of responsibility, regional stability. In addition to eliminating weapons that could be used to create unrest, the PM Bureau promotes stability around the world by fostering effective defense relationships. 

Each year PM conducts high-level regional security discussions with friends and 

allies that address a variety of security-related issues of mutual interest including 

military assistance, combined training, and, when appropriate, the basing of U.S. 

military forces. In the past year, these discussions have enhanced important relationships in South America, Europe, and Asia. 

Another key component of PM’s regional security role is the Gulf Security Dialog 

(GSD), a regional security coordination mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. This dialog, co-lead by the PM Bureau and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is a reflection of our broader commitment to Gulf security and 

is part of our larger strategy to deal with the interconnected conflicts in the Middle 

East. The GSD addresses conventional as well as nonconventional, asymmetrical, 

and terrorist threats to Gulf security. To counter these threats, the GSD is focused 

on six distinct, yet interconnected pillars: regional security, enhanced defense capabilities and cooperation, critical energy infrastructure protection, counterterrorism, 

counterproliferation, and developing a shared assessment on Iraq. If confirmed, I 

will continue this fruitful dialog and other efforts with our Gulf partners to improve 

Gulf security under each of the six pillars. 

Related PM efforts to promote regional stability through security dialogs with friends and allies include its management of nearly $5 billion in security assistance. 

This funding, which includes the Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the International Military Education and Training (IMET), and the Peacekeeping Operations 

(PKO) programs, provides resources necessary to ensure that our partners are 

equipped and trained to work toward common security goals. They also deepen our 

military-to-military relationships as well as increasing understanding and cooperation. 

One program that is funded under the PKO program that I would like to highlight is the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which seeks to increase the 

number of properly trained and equipped peacekeepers available for peace support 

operations around the world. GPOI’s goals include training 75,000 additional peacekeepers, providing transportation and logistics support for peace operations, and, in 

partnership with the Government of Italy, establishing an international training 

center for gendarmes to help fill the security gap between military forces and civilian police. This program is an important means of offsetting the need for U.S. military support for peace operations and if confirmed, I will make it one of my priorities. 

Finally, PM promotes regional stability and builds the partnership capacity of our 

allies through its regulation of U.S. defense trade. Through its export licensing, enduse monitoring, and compliance programs, the Bureau plays a key role providing the 

military hardware necessary for our allies to fight the war on terror, while ensuring 

that U.S. defense equipment and technologies do not fall into the wrong hands. This 

is no small task as the volume of license applications submitted for adjudication is 

growing 8 percent annually and is expected to reach 80,000 at the end of fiscal year 

2007. Although processing the growing number of applications is of great importance, equally so are the PM Bureau’s efforts to monitor the end use of exported 

military equipment. Through its ‘‘Blue Lantern’’ program, PM checks the bona fides 

of potential recipients and makes sure that defense equipment that is exported is 

used only for approved purposes. PM also supports the efforts of Federal law enforcement agencies in criminal actions initiated pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. If confirmed, I will make 

it a priority to meet these responsibilities fully. 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF CONFLICT

PM’s third major area of responsibility is the provision of humanitarian assistance 

to victims of conflict. Since 1993, PM has been responsible for the management of 

U.S. humanitarian mine action programs around the world and since that time has 

committed over $1 billion to assist in the removal of landmines in over 40 countries. 

In addition to removing landmines that threaten the well-being and livelihood of 

millions, these funds have been used to educate children as to the dangers of landmines and to assist landmine victims. 

I am pleased to say that this is an area in which we are truly making a difference. 

Landmine casualties are decreasing and several countries have been declared landmine ‘‘impact free’’—a designation that means they are no longer suffering social 

683 

and economic dislocation due to landmines. This is a program we can all be proud 

of and one that if confirmed, I will be most happy to provide leadership to. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, while I have only touched of a portion of PM’s many responsibilities, I think they attest to the important contributions that the Bureau is making 

to our national security and to the furthering American foreign policy objectives. 

Given the magnitude of these responsibilities, I am truly honored to have been 

nominated by the President and Secretary Rice to lead the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. 

If confirmed, I will do my utmost to demonstrate to the President and the Secretary—and to the more than 300 men and women who serve in the PM Bureau— 

that their trust in me was fully justified. 

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARRY K. THOMAS, JR., NOMINEE TO BE

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear 

before you today. 

I would like to introduce my wife, Ericka Smith-Thomas, a musician, and my 

mother, Mrs. Hildonia Thomas, a retired social worker and teacher. Our daughter, 

Casey, is away at Guilford College. 

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to President Bush for nominating 

me as Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources at 

the Department of State. I am grateful for the confidence that the President and 

Secretary Rice have shown in selecting me for this position. I must also thank Father Brooks, his fellow Jesuits, and my College of the Holy Cross professors who 

first opened my eyes to the importance of global issues. 

I have traveled a long way from the Harlem of my birth to this day, as has our 

great country, which has given me the opportunity to appear before you today seeking, if confirmed, the opportunity to take charge of human resources for the world’s 

finest diplomatic service. The State Department’s primary mission is to take care 

of American citizens and American interests abroad, and I welcome the opportunity 

to help prepare our employees to do so. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will continue Secretary Rice’s and former Director 

General Staples’ work to implement transformational diplomacy. We are transforming our overseas presence to meet 21st century demands. We are stressing the 

efficient management of our team of employees. We are sending officers beyond foreign capitals to run one person American presence posts and opening American corner libraries in rural villages and urban areas alike to give people a chance to learn 

about America and become more educated. We are taking advantage of new technologies with virtual presence posts, training and development opportunities for our 

worldwide workforce via digital video conference, and ‘‘Diplopedia,’’ our version of 

wikipedia. 

We have introduced an improved Foreign Service selection process, including a 

shorter, computer-based exam that will be offered several times a year. The new 

process will allow us to consider applicants’ leadership and foreign language skills, 

as well as global work and study experience, and should reduce the time it takes 

to bring on new hires. We expect to have nearly 20,000 registrants for this examination annually and are very proud that we are the number one choice in the public 

sector for college students seeking to serve our country. 

Today’s State Department employees are eager to serve our country. Many work 

in hazardous and challenging environments. Over 25 percent of the Foreign Service 

has served in Iraq or Afghanistan. A number of civil service employees have also 

stepped forward. More than 750 of our overseas jobs are at unaccompanied posts. 

And some of our colleagues have made the ultimate sacrifice in service of our Nation. We are offering and expanding the counseling available to employees before 

and after they serve in dangerous environments. We must ensure that spouses and 

children receive full support. We must have safe and secure facilities for our employees. 

We recognize the importance of a modernized performance-based pay system that 

compensates fairly our men and women working abroad and will ask your help, Mr. 

Chairman, in authorizing this system. 

Mr. Chairman, I share the Secretary’s commitment to a diverse and merit-based 

State Department. The Department has made tremendous strides during my 23 

684 

years of service, but we can and must continue with aggressive recruitment, development, and retention strategies. If confirmed, I will work toward that goal. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I am humbled and honored to have the opportunity 

to appear before you and the members of the committee. I ask for your assistance 

and support in ensuring that we are able to safeguard American citizens, defend our 

ideals and values, and manage the Department’s greatest resource: our civil service, 

Foreign Service national, and Foreign Service specialist and generalist corps. 

And, if confirmed, I look forward to helping the Secretary make certain that we 

are prepared for future opportunities and trials. 

Thank you. 

RESPONSES OF HARRY K. THOMAS, JR., TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. What are your top three priorities for this position? By the end of the 

Bush administration, what do you hope to be able to report that you have accomplished? 

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to continue the efforts of the Secretary, other senior 

Department of State officials, and my predecessors to ensure that the Department 

is prepared to take on the challenges of our critical foreign policy mission in the 

21st century. Ongoing issues, such as addressing the Department’s personnel shortages, ensuring adequate training and development for all State employees, and securing critical legislative changes, including Foreign Service pay modernization, are 

critical to maintaining the Department’s operational readiness. 

In addition to pursuing these ongoing challenges, one of my top priorities as the 

Director General will be to continue the Secretary’s commitment to a diverse and 

merit-based State Department. The Department has made tremendous strides during my 23 years of service, but we can and must continue with aggressive recruitment, development, and retention strategies. I plan to work closely with the Office 

of Recruitment, Employment, and Examination, as well as the Office of Civil Rights, 

toward that goal. 

I would also like to expand the opportunities for civil service employees at the Department of State. I hope to do more to support, develop, and take full advantage 

of the skills and capabilities of the 8,500 civil service employees who form the backbone of the Department’s domestic operations. I plan to meet with the Office of Personnel Management, as well as to expand existing initiatives within the Department, to see what more can be done for civil service employees during my tenure 

as the Director General. 

My third priority would be to improve the customer service provided by the Bureau of Human Resources to all State Department personnel. I hope to take advantage of online capabilities and other technology to simplify and speed up check-in/ 

check-out procedures for transferring employees, eliminate unnecessary paperwork, 

and consolidate operations, as needed, to better serve our internal customers. 

If I am confirmed as the Director General, I look forward to pursuing these three 

priorities within the scope of my greater mission of managing the Department’s 

greatest resource: our civil service, Foreign Service national, Foreign Service specialist and generalist corps, and eligible family members. 

Question. What measures is the Department taking to address the shortfall of officers at the mid-levels? Are these measures sufficient to fill staffing gaps? If not, 

what measures will you consider recommending to address these gaps? 

Answer. The Department will continue to deal with staffing shortfalls by eliminating or not filling some less critical positions, considering ‘‘stretch’’ assignments 

on a case-by-case basis, seeking qualified civil service volunteers and eligible family 

members to fill vacant Foreign Service positions, and waiving language requirements for certain assignments. In conjunction with the third phase of the global 

repositioning exercise in fiscal year 2007, we eliminated several domestic Foreign 

Service and civil service positions to provide a small number of positions for language training. This small increase notwithstanding, the Department will continue 

to be faced with the choice between not training sufficient numbers of Foreign Service officers in our most critical needs languages, such as Arabic, or continuing to 

increase our language training enrollments and leaving more vacancies at overseas 

and domestic locations. 

Of particular concern is the potential for overseas vacancies at a time when the 

Department is striving to increase its overseas presence and more actively engage 

nongovernmental organizations, foreign media, and host country populations outside 

of capital cities. The Department’s fiscal year 2008 budget request emphasized posiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00692 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
685 

tions to meet increased overseas mission requirements, not in place of our global 

repositioning initiatives, but in addition to what has been repositioned to our most 

strategic locations. 

The Department is also faced with the critical task of fully implementing the Secretary’s vision of enhanced U.S. Government civilian capacity to act in situations of 

reconstruction and stabilization following natural or manmade crises. Without resources dedicated to this endeavor, the Department will be limited in its ability to 

lead, coordinate, and institutionalize the U.S. Government’s capacity to prevent or 

prepare for post-conflict situations, and help societies in transition. 

Question. Where do you believe are the most significant gaps, in terms of capabilities, in the Foreign Service? What should be done to close these gaps? 

Answer. The Department faces structural personnel deficits, as well as shortages 

of officers with particular language capabilities. Our most significant structural deficit is at the FO–02 level in the public diplomacy and management cones. The total 

deficit at the FO–02 level is 210 officers. This structural deficit is largely due to 

underhiring at USIA in the 1990s prior to the merger with the Department of State. 

As the new Foreign Service personnel hired under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative in 2002–2004 work their way through the system, the gap between positions 

and available officers should narrow significantly. In the meantime, the Department 

is encouraging officers from other cones to consider public diplomacy and management positions, utilizing qualified civil service employees and eligible family members to fill vacant Foreign Service positions, eliminating some domestic Foreign 

Service positions so that officers can serve overseas in these positions, and leaving 

some less critical positions vacant. 

The Department is also working to address training shortfalls, particularly of Foreign Service personnel with proficiency in particular languages. Increasing demands 

since 9/11, as well as the lack of an adequate training complement, have stymied 

the Department’s ability to train personnel, particularly at the pace that additional 

language-designated positions have been created overseas. Since 2001, the number 

of language designated positions that require proficiency in critical needs languages, 

including Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, and Korean, which are often the hardest to teach 

and can require upwards of 2 years to gain working proficiency, have increased by 

170 percent. There has not, however, been a concurrent increase in the Department’s training complement. The Department’s fiscal year 2008 budget request included 94 new Foreign Service positions specifically for training, and while many 

will be devoted to foreign language training we must also train to meet the other 

requirements of transformational diplomacy. The increasing need for training will 

also be taken into consideration as we develop the Department’s fiscal year 2009 

budget request. 

Question. A recent inspection report of the Bureau of Human Resources by the 

State Department Inspector General concludes that the ‘‘civil service system may 

not be adequate to meet the needs of the Department. It fails to develop the knowledge, skills and abilities of Civil Service employees to the best advantage of the employees and the Department . . . The Department needs a domestically based service that can develop personnel who can manage global political, military, economic, 

and social issues and provide administrative support to the Department.’’ 

(a) Do you agree with this assessment by the Inspector General? If so, what measures would you propose in response? 

(b) The report recommended a high-level external review on the future of the civil 

service. Do you know if that recommendation has been accepted by the Under Secretary for Management? 

Answer. If confirmed as Director General, one of my priorities will be to expand 

the opportunities for civil service employees at the Department of State. I hope to 

do more to support, develop, and take full advantage of the skills and capabilities 

of the 8500 civil service employees who form the backbone of the Department’s domestic operations. Working together with the Under Secretary for Management and 

within the context of other management reforms underway at the Department, I 

plan to meet with the Office of Personnel Management to see what more can be 

done to best utilize the Department’s civil service corps. 

The Department has a number of new and ongoing initiatives aimed at developing 

the knowledge, skills, and abilities of our civil service workforce. Some examples of 

these initiatives include: 

• Civil Service Mid-level Rotational Program.—This program is designed to provide developmental assignments for Department of State civil service employees 

at the GS–12 and GS–13 grade level in order to broaden their skills, increase 

686 

their knowledge, and enhance their personal and professional growth. The program, started as a pilot in 2007, will be expanded in 2008. 

• Training Continuum for Civil Service Employees.—The Department’s Foreign 

Service Institute has recently updated and expanded training and professional 

development guidelines by job series. The continuum addresses required, recommended, and suggested individual development needs at the basic, intermediate, and advanced level. 

• SES Development Program.—The Department is offering an SES training program to highly skilled, high performing GS–14 and GS–15 employees. Upon 

completion of the 1 to 2 year individually-designed training program, the graduates will be noncompetitively eligible for SES positions as they become available. 

• Civil Service Mentoring Program.—Now in its fifth year, the civil service mentoring program includes formal mentoring partnerships and situational mentoring on an as needed basis. To date, 1,681 employees have participated. 

• Career Entry Program (CEP).—The Department’s version of the Federal Intern 

Program actively addresses hiring and employee development specific to mission-critical occupations as determined by the Domestic Staffing Model (DSM). 

The 2-year structured career ladder program is designed to fast-track high potential employees to address future staffing needs. 

• Upward Mobility Program (UPMO).—This program has just undergone a major 

policy and guideline review to address employee develop needs at the GS 7–9 

levels. A shorter version of the CEP program, UPMO also represents a careerladder program with specific training and experiential requirements to qualify 

and advance employees specific to a job series. 

• Career Development Resource Center (CDRC).—The CDRC provides comprehensive career development services to help individuals make effective career decisions and improve on-the-job performance. The services offered by the 

CDRC include confidential career counseling, assistance with planning and implementing Individual Development Plans (IDP), assessment and interpretation 

of interests, skills and abilities, help in negotiating change and barriers to career success, group workshops on career related topics, and customized presentations for bureaus and employee groups. 

• Civil Service Excursions.—Civil service employees have the opportunity to bid 

on and serve in vacant Foreign Service positions overseas. These excursion assignments, often at dangerous and difficult posts including Iraq and Afghanistan, broaden the participants’ view of the State Department’s mission and benefit the Department by filling positions that might otherwise have been left vacant. 

If confirmed as the Director General, I plan to closely monitor these initiatives 

and expand or revise them, as necessary, to ensure they are most effectively serving 

the Department and the civil service. 

Question. Some 2,000 Foreign Service members have volunteered to serve in dangerous jobs in Iraq since 2003, but the size of the U.S. Mission there appears to 

be straining the Foreign Service personnel system. Do you expect that, in future 

years, the Department will run short of volunteers? If so, what measures would be 

taken? Do you expect that it will be necessary to use directed assignments? Are 

there other alternatives? 

Answer. To date, the Department has relied on volunteers to staff positions in 

Iraq. We are grateful to the dedicated men and women who, in the finest tradition 

of the Foreign Service and the Department in general, are committed to serving the 

needs of America and have answered the call to serve in Iraq. The Department cannot, however, sustain current levels of Iraq staffing over many years within our current personnel and assignments structure without asking employees to serve multiple tours or directing assignments. The challenge of staffing more than 250 1-year 

Foreign Service positions in Iraq with our relatively small corps of Foreign Service 

generalists and specialists is further exacerbated by the Department’s structural 

personnel shortages in the Foreign Service mid-levels and among Arabic speakers. 

To meet the challenge of staffing Iraq, we will continue to review the incentives 

for service in Iraq, including a new initiative to link some assignments in Iraq to 

onward assignments elsewhere, offer opportunities to qualified civil service employees and eligible family members to fill vacant Foreign Service positions, and, depending on which positions do not attract volunteers, we may also be able to utilize 

shorter-term employees hired under 5 U.S.C. 3161. If and when we run out of volunteers for positions in Iraq or elsewhere, we are prepared to direct assignments. 

687 

Question. What have been the effects of the requirements to staff Iraq and Afghanistan on United States diplomatic posts elsewhere, both in terms of personnel 

and the resultant impacts on mission objectives? 

Answer. We are doing all we that we can to maintain operational readiness at 

all of our missions around the world and effectively carry out the Department’s critical foreign policy mission. We are proud of our success to date, including our ability 

to staff Iraq and Afghanistan, but we also acknowledge that, despite our best efforts, 

the Department’s staffing needs exceed our current resources. The recent reports 

from the GAO, the Foreign Affairs Council, CSIS, and other groups have highlighted 

the Department’s deficit of mid-level Foreign Service officers and the need for an 

adequate training float. 

The requirement to staff missions in Iraq and Afghanistan is just one aspect of 

the personnel issues facing the Department. We must also balance our changing 

needs and requirements with the limited number of positions set aside for training 

and determine when it is in the Department’s long-term interest to leave some positions temporarily vacant to allow for training or to fill other higher priority jobs. 

At the same time, we are realigning our personnel resources around the world to 

better reflect emerging policy priorities and reach population centers beyond foreign 

capitals. These challenges, as well as the increasing number of positions at unaccompanied and limited accompanied posts, have required that we adapt our assignments processes, prioritize positions, and fill some Foreign Service positions with 

qualified civil service employees and eligible family members. While there are some 

vacancies overseas and domestically, we feel that our efforts and planning to date 

have enabled our missions to continue to maintain operational readiness and implement the Department’s critical priorities around the world. 

RESPONSES OF HARRY K. THOMAS, JR. TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The Department recently introduced changes to the exam process for 

Foreign Service generalists. Along with the performance on the examination, an applicant’s educational background and work experience, including overseas experience, will be taken into account. 

What aspect of the recent McKinsey study led the Department to conclude that 

it needed to alter the Foreign Service exam process? 

At what point in the process is a candidate’s resume examined? How will you 

guard against politicization of the process—political jobs held, knowledge of influential people, etc? 

Answer. Although McKinsey found the Department’s use of a written test and an 

oral assessment to be best practices for identifying candidates with the greatest potential, their study recommended that we make our Foreign Service selection process faster and more accessible. For this reason we have put the Foreign Service selection process online and will be offering the test four times a year. 

More importantly, McKinsey recommended we adopt more of a ‘‘Total Candidate’’ 

approach, a best practice used by many other employers, in our Foreign Service selection process. This approach uses a structured resume to explore candidates’ full 

range of knowledge, skills, and abilities. Our new process retains the best-practice 

elements of a merit-based test and an oral assessment, and introduces the application form and personal narrative, our equivalent of a structured resume, and the 

new qualifications review panels to review them. The result is that we now will look 

at many facets of candidates, not just test scores, to decide who advances to the 

orals. 

Candidates’ resumes—that is, the information conveyed in candidates’ application 

forms and personal narratives—are examined after candidates pass the Foreign 

Service Officer Test (FSOT) and the essay. To assess this information, we have established the Qualifications Evaluation Panels (QEPs). There are several QEPs, 

each consisting of three career Foreign Service officers from the mid- and senior 

ranks. The QEPs will evaluate the information in the application forms (principally 

education and work history) and the personal narratives (principally qualifying experience and skills), along with candidates’ FSOT Test scores and scores in critically 

needed languages. By thus evaluating much more information than test scores 

alone, the QEP will be better able to identify the most promising candidates to invite to the orals. As the result of four pilots monitored by an outside expert, we have 

a well-structured QEP system that exceeds benchmark standards for reliability. 

QEP members are drawn from the same group of FSOs that conduct the oral assessment, and they will carry out their duties with the same insulation from outside 

influence that has always applied to the oral assessment process. As an added precaution, QEP members are expressly forbidden to communicate with persons outside 

688 

the QEP about candidates and are instructed to report any attempts to communicate about candidates to the Director of the Board of Examiners. 

Question. (a) Please provide the total FTE, by grade, for each fiscal year since fiscal year 2000 for both FS and GS. 

(b) Please provide for the committee a list of the total FS and GS personnel working for each fiscal year from fiscal year 2000, by grade. 

(c) For each year, please provide the number, by grade, of FS and GS who departed (this can combine retirement, resignation, time in class, and termination) 

since fiscal year 2000. 

(d) For each year, please provide the number, by grade, of FS and GS who were 

hired since fiscal year 2000. 

Answer. Notes: 

• The data in the following charts reflect totals at the end of each fiscal year, except fiscal year 2007 (which is as of 7/31/07). 

• Civil service totals include General Schedule as well as other equivalent pay 

plans (including EX, AD, WG, etc.). Political appointees are included in the civil 

service personnel totals, except when on limited noncareer Foreign Service appointments. 

(a) Number of Foreign Service and civil service positions: 

FOREIGN SERVICE 

Class FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 

FECM ........................... 37 48 46 41 42 41 42 43 

FEMC ........................... 393 389 394 410 417 416 418 424 

FEOC ........................... 457 462 475 487 513 518 547 553 

FS01 ............................ 1,114 1,142 1,177 1,209 1,249 1,286 1,347 1,359 

FS02 ............................ 2,048 2,099 2,196 2,283 2,401 2,448 2,521 2,518 

FS03 ............................ 2,262 2,219 2,305 2,388 2,442 2,545 2,669 2,682 

FS04 ............................ 1,679 1,781 2,222 2,446 2,657 2,756 2,775 2,823 

FS05 ............................ 792 817 836 841 859 862 801 797 

FS06 ............................ 418 397 397 407 418 418 407 412 

FS07 ............................ 96 90 80 78 75 87 88 79 

FS08 ............................ — 1 — — — — — — 

FS09 ............................ — — — — — — 2 — 

F* 00 .......................... 27 11 8 6 12 8 6 6 

Total .............. 9,323 9,456 10,136 10,596 11,085 11,385 11,623 11,696 

The F* 00 grade level includes positions that are at various grades for training and overcomplement. 

CIVIL SERVICE 

Class FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 

SES .............................. 252 235 241 247 242 253 258 248 

GS 15 .......................... 712 706 734 769 785 838 893 900 

GS 14 .......................... 904 976 1,032 1,121 1,169 1,284 1,375 1,422 

GS 13 .......................... 1,544 1,657 768 1,889 968 2,077 2,168 2,155 

GS 12 .......................... 1,145 1,176 1,258 1,345 1,436 1,493 1,511 1,541 

GS 11 .......................... 1,052 1,082 1,183 1,235 1,301 1,258 1,351 1,258 

GS 10 .......................... 64 64 56 50 44 46 48 41 

GS 09 .......................... 859 896 928 847 805 846 868 911 

GS 08 .......................... 424 397 366 382 357 342 352 327 

GS 07 .......................... 792 735 722 729 733 694 788 835 

GS 06 .......................... 311 269 260 231 219 171 151 138 

GS 05 .......................... 242 202 207 165 130 114 123 181 

GS 04 .......................... 61 51 51 41 27 20 26 19 

GS 03 .......................... 49 45 20 15 15 12 16 12 

GS 02 .......................... 34 43 5 6 3 1 4 2 

GS 01 .......................... 28 3 1 2 1 — 6 2 

AD05* ......................... — — — — 257 308 359 475 

Total .............. 8,473 8,537 8,832 9,074 9,493 9,757 10,297 10,467 

*AD05 includes positions in the Iraq Transition and Assistance Office (ITAO). 

(b) Number of Foreign Service and civil service employees: 

689 

FOREIGN SERVICE 

Class FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 

FECM ........................... 92 55 83 33 29 28 27 28 

FEMC ........................... 329 361 358 424 438 425 439 438 

FEOC ........................... 459 463 470 463 468 480 477 504 

FS01 ............................ 1,147 1,123 1,142 1,154 1,173 1,209 1,245 1,297 

FS02 ............................ 1,853 1,930 1,960 2,005 2,040 2,069 2,054 2,122 

FS03 ............................ 1,882 1,788 1,876 1,888 1,929 1,983 2,193 2,476 

FS04 ............................ 1,563 1,912 2,256 2,501 2,883 3,268 3,239 3,134 

FS05 ............................ 1,250 1,028 1,322 1,276 1,077 1,020 921 

FS06 ............................ 484 563 871 661 612 569 576 531 

FS07 ............................ 197 102 102 127 139 130 126 89 

FS08 ............................ 27 1 1 1 — 1 2 

Total .............. 9,283 9,326 10,089 10,579 10,988 11,238 11,397 11,542 

CIVIL SERVICE 

Class FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 

SES .............................. 212 167 198 201 212 208 214 205 

GS 15 .......................... 617 595 650 679 680 715 736 788 

GS 14 .......................... 757 808 884 967 1,015 1,078 1,151 1,220 

GS 13 .......................... 1,264 1,340 1,491 1,621 1,700 1,771 1,849 1,806 

GS 12 .......................... 931 961 1,043 1,114 1,169 1,250 1,234 1,273 

GS 11 .......................... 892 906 1,034 1,090 1,125 1,069 1,092 1,090 

GS 10 .......................... 52 52 49 45 36 41 39 37 

GS 09 .......................... 712 745 734 700 665 698 660 767 

GS 08 .......................... 375 343 317 335 317 299 292 267 

GS 07 .......................... 620 588 559 599 594 574 642 680 

GS 06 .......................... 243 204 185 185 162 139 113 100 

GS 05 .......................... 188 149 159 130 102 98 100 153 

GS 04 .......................... 43 43 41 43 37 24 28 33 

GS 03 .......................... 35 26 19 18 16 10 11 11 

GS 02 .......................... 14 14 4 3 1 1 1 1 

GS 01 .......................... 3 2 1 1 — — — — 

AD05* ......................... — — — — — 117 108 139 

Total .............. 6,958 6,943 7,368 7,731 7,831 8,092 8,270 8,570 

*AD05 includes positions in the Iraq Transition and Assistance Office (ITAO). 

(c) Number of Foreign Service and civil service employees who departed: 

[NOTE. Includes employees who departed due to resignation, retirement, removal, 

death, and termination.] 

FOREIGN SERVICE 

Class FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 

FECM ........................... 6 63 6 10 6 7 5 2 

FEMC ........................... 31 35 43 29 49 68 61 35 

FEOC ........................... 22 29 31 31 37 46 46 18 

FS01 ............................ 76 72 63 82 90 110 93 44 

FS02 ............................ 67 81 93 70 85 96 103 56 

FS03 ............................ 88 101 71 87 79 101 78 45 

FS04 ............................ 88 118 113 128 149 155 213 104 

FS05 ............................ 40 42 35 33 56 67 56 17 

FS06 ............................ 21 22 18 21 24 21 25 20 

FS07 ............................ 8 6 0 5 5 2 1 1 

FS08 ............................ 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Total .............. 448 570 473 496 580 673 681 342 

CIVIL SERVICE 

Class FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 

SES .............................. 16 84 14 29 17 43 30 19 

690 

CIVIL SERVICE—Continued 

Class FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 

GS15 ........................... 23 76 40 57 71 77 78 41 

GS14 ........................... 37 58 43 55 64 89 82 69 

GS13 ........................... 44 90 63 95 114 161 121 108 

GS12 ........................... 27 48 55 56 98 105 101 61 

GS11 ........................... 34 52 33 48 64 71 86 34 

GS10 ........................... 2 4 4 2 5 5 4 2 

GS09 ........................... 31 48 38 38 52 47 61 28 

GS08 ........................... 17 12 16 13 23 14 18 18 

GS07 ........................... 21 38 31 29 48 42 42 27 

GS06 ........................... 11 13 16 12 14 20 14 7 

GS05 ........................... 18 14 6 15 9 11 7 10 

GS04 ........................... 7 2 2 6 3 3 1 1 

GS03 ........................... 5 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 

GS02 ........................... 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 

GS01 ........................... 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 

AD05* ......................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 35 

Total .............. 293 541 367 456 586 689 722 460 

*AD05 includes positions in the Iraq Transition and Assistance Office (ITAO). 

(d) Number of Foreign Service and civil service employees hired: 

FOREIGN SERVICE 

Class FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 

FECM ........................... 14 — 25 — 1 — 1 — 

FEMC ........................... 32 17 3 4 21 16 24 9 

FEOC ........................... 89 1 2 1 2 1 2 — 

FS01 ............................ 201 11 14 4 22 11 11 13 

FS02 ............................ 224 16 13 13 13 7 6 3 

FS03 ............................ 176 38 70 62 51 26 32 23 

FS04 ............................ 128 448 217 296 322 261 224 159 

FS05 ............................ 289 14 377 343 282 259 255 95 

FS06 ............................ 145 36 437 221 255 171 202 103 

FS07 ............................ 38 6 45 64 73 71 51 19 

FS08 ............................ 8 — — — — — — — 

Total .............. 1,344 587 1,203 1,008 1,042 823 424 

Categories above include personnel on limited noncareer appointments (LNAs). 

CIVIL SERVICE 

Class FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 

SES .............................. 24 31 27 13 16 26 22 8 

GS15 ........................... 98 26 55 45 51 41 46 39 

GS14 ........................... 147 56 44 55 49 66 78 47 

GS13 ........................... 348 130 143 119 107 141 128 76 

GS12 ........................... 191 75 133 126 121 126 102 66 

GS11 ........................... 109 57 76 55 59 60 59 54 

GS10 ........................... 7 — 4 1 — 3 2 — 

GS09 ........................... 177 33 100 102 76 104 87 58 

GS08 ........................... 73 11 14 20 4 9 14 8 

GS07 ........................... 126 38 91 126 120 126 211 169 

GS06 ........................... 60 5 32 22 16 21 6 10 

GS05 ........................... 55 8 27 28 12 13 33 49 

GS04 ........................... 5 1 2 6 14 2 7 8 

GS03 ........................... 1 1 1 1 1 — 2 — 

GS02 ........................... 1 — — — — — — 1 

GS01 ........................... 3 — — — — — — — 

AD05* ......................... — — — — — 99 58 73 

Total .............. 1,425 472 749 719 646 837 855 666 

*AD05 includes positions in the Iraq Transition and Assistance Office (ITAO). 

691 

Question. What is the current representation of minorities in the Foreign Service? 

What initiatives is the Department undertaking to address this issue? 

Answer. The breakdown of Foreign Service generalists and specialists, as of May 

31, 2007, is as follows: 

Foreign Service Employees 

Number Percentage 

White ............................................................................................................................ 9,457 82.2 

African American ......................................................................................................... 764 6.6 

Hispanic ....................................................................................................................... 611 5.3 

American Indian .......................................................................................................... 38 0.3

Asian ............................................................................................................................ 633 5.5 

Total ............................................................................................................... 11,503 100 

NOTE. Employees who did not identify a racial category (less than 50 employees) were not included in any category. 

If confirmed, I will continue the Department’s efforts to attract the most talented, 

diverse applicants to our exciting foreign affairs career opportunities. The Department’s Strategic Recruitment Plan is modeled on successful recruitment efforts of 

private industry and the public sector. It seeks to achieve the long-term objectives 

of a workforce that meets the Department’s skill needs and that represents America’s rich diversity. One important focus of the plan is aggressive minority recruitment and outreach. 

Key elements of our minority outreach strategy are the 17 diplomats in residence 

(DIRs), senior Foreign Service officers assigned to university and college campuses 

throughout the United States. We also have 10 full-time DC-based recruiters who 

cover every region of the country. The mandate of DIRs and recruiters includes recruiting, informing, and mentoring potential applicants for Foreign Service and civil 

service employment at the Department of State. Of the 10 recruiters, one is a fulltime Hispanic Recruitment Coordinator and another is a full-time African American 

Recruitment Coordinator. 

At the core of our minority recruitment and outreach are 59 targeted schools, 10 

targeted professional organizations, and 41 targeted constituency organizations with 

which the DIRs and recruiters work on a regular basis to find minority candidates 

with the knowledge, skills, and abilities that the Department is seeking. DIRs and 

recruiters conduct active programs to develop and present workshops regarding employment, internship, and fellowship opportunities to minority students and professionals throughout the United States. DIRs and recruiters attend approximately 800 

recruiting events every year, in addition to hundreds of one-on-one personal contacts 

via e-mail, telephone, and office meetings. 

Working with the Minority Professional Network (MPN), the Department of State 

conducted special State Department networking nights in major metropolitan areas 

including Los Angeles, Anaheim, Atlanta, Chicago, Raleigh, San Diego, San Antonio, 

and Miami. The networking nights are often on the margins of conferences such as 

the National Society of Hispanic MBAs and the National Black MBA conferences. 

Through leveraging MPN and U.S. Department of State relationships with local 

partner organizations, these cost-effective turnkey events resulted in media recognition and interviews. 

The State Department works with the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU), the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEO) and the American Indian Science and Engineering Society (AISES), 

to provide opportunities for summer interns in Washington or in one of the embassies and consulates overseas. This is a unique opportunity for students interested 

in international careers to obtain hands-on experience. Two needs-based student fellowship programs, the Pickering and Rangel programs, have also been important 

sources of minority recruitment for the Foreign Service. 

Question. What specific changes have been made at FSI to address the new skills 

highlighted in the Secretary’s Transformational Diplomacy proposals? 

Answer. Training is key to the success of the Secretary’s Transformational Diplomacy (TD) framework. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) has developed a variety 

of stand-alone courses and seminars to support that framework and has incorporated TD themes throughout its curriculum. Examples include: 

692 

TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY COURSES

• FSI developed a new online course, ‘‘Transformational Diplomacy Overview,’’ to 

help employees at every level understand what TD means and how they can 

practice it. To date, 345 employees have completed the course. • All Orientation Division courses (generalist, specialist, and civil service orientation courses and Washington Tradecraft) include specific sessions on transformational diplomacy. Senior level speakers (including the Deputy Secretary 

and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs) and subject matter experts are 

urged to include practical references to and examples of transformational diplomacy in their presentations. Secretary Rice explained her vision of transformational diplomacy in February 2007 to all three orientation classes (generalists, specialists, and civil service). The text and/or video recording of that 

speech have been presented to each subsequent orientation class. • The Political/Economic Tradecraft course is a 3-week course that trains about 

275 new Foreign Service officers per year. In line with transformational diplomacy themes, the course includes skill-building sessions on public speaking, 

public diplomacy, trafficking in persons, human rights, commercial advocacy, 

environmental issues, working with the military, and working with nongovernmental organizations. A full-day exercise featuring transformational diplomacy 

best practices has been added to each of the 10–12 annual offerings of this 

course. The exercise provides many specific ideas for ways officers can implement TD initiatives related to democracy promotion, political-military roles, 

counterterrorism, economic development, foreign assistance, conflict analysis, 

and stabilization and reconstruction work. 

LEADERSHIP TRAINING

• All levels of FSI’s mandatory leadership training courses—from mid-grades 

through senior levels, including new ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission—now incorporate discussions of transformational diplomacy. These discussions are built around the skills that leaders use to build teams and produce 

results and about how the leadership challenges we face today differ from those 

of the past. 

AMERICAN PRESENCE POSTS

• FSI has developed a 3-week training program for American Presence Post (APP) 

officers. Expanding the number of APP posts is a core TD priority of the Secretary and this course focuses on the responsibilities and skills needed to set 

up and effectively function in an APP. 

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING

• Language proficiency is critical to successful transformational diplomacy. Language enrollments at FSI continue to increase, including a record-breaking 565 

in the September 2007 intake. • FSI has undertaken a broad range of initiatives to enhance Arabic and other 

language training in support of transformational diplomacy. These include: A 

pilot program of internships with Arabic satellite media (our first student interned with a pan-Arab television station in Dubai in June 2005); Arabic media 

workshops have been held in Tunis for advanced Arabic students as part of 

their training program and special training workshops held for officers from Arabic-speaking posts throughout the region. Both target on-camera and ‘‘ambush’’ 

interview skills; Spanish-language media workshop provided to five outgoing 

DCMs at the conclusion of the July 2007 DCM course; A Spanish-language 

media training workshop is scheduled to be held in Mexico City from Sept. 18– 

20, 2007 for all principal officers currently serving in Mexico, and another workshop for several WHA region Public Affairs Officers is planned for January 

2008. We are exploring expanding this model to other languages such as 

French, Russian, and Chinese;FSI has added 14 additional distance learning 

language courses in seven languages since 2004. A total of 27 courses in 13 languages are currently available online. FSI has increased opportunities for advanced language training, including ‘‘Beyond-3’’ training in Chinese, Arabic, 

Japanese, and Korean. 

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

• Public Diplomacy training courses are constantly updated to keep pace with 

transformational diplomacy and to reflect the Department’s current priorities 

and initiatives. FSI has added new courses on ‘‘Advocacy through the Media’’ 

693 

and ‘‘Engaging Foreign Audiences,’’ and included PD modules in the new-hire 

Foreign Service officer orientation, the ambassadorial and DCM/principal officers seminars, plus seven other tradecraft courses (political, economic, consular, 

administrative management, information management, APP and PRT). 

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

• FSI’s new National Security Executive Leadership Seminar, which includes participants from the State Department and other foreign affairs agencies, builds 

the kind of networking skills that are a central aspect of transformational diplomacy. 

• Transformational diplomacy seminars also bring together leaders from across 

the interagency community to apply transformational leadership skills to specific policy challenges that affect fundamental American interests. Policy topics 

have included democracy building, fighting corruption, and countering pandemic 

disease. Nine such seminars have been held thus far, with over 180 State and 

other agency participants. Five seminars are planned for the next fiscal year. 

RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

• FSI also has developed a slate of nine reconstruction and stabilization courses, 

intended for interagency audiences, focusing on how the U.S. Government can 

better respond to global situations of instability and conflict. 

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

• As a key element in reaching our transformational diplomacy goals, more State 

officers and employees overseas are being required to assume responsibility for 

designing, implementing, and managing a wide range of foreign assistance 

awards at their embassies. A new FSI course on Managing Foreign Assistance 

Awards Overseas directly supports transformational diplomacy in its effort to 

give officers the skills they need to better align our assistance awards with our 

foreign policy priorities. 

RESPONSE OF HARRY THOMAS TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Question. How can the Department of State work to access military facilities, the 

ones for veterans, to get treatment and information on PTSD? 

Answer. The Department of State’s Office of Medical Services (MED) has had excellent experiences working with the Uniformed Services University of Health 

Sciences on PTSD and other issues. MED is currently in discussions with them 

about further assistance in the form of educational materials and training. The Department will continue to explore other options for cooperation and collaboration 

with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA) to better support State Department employees who may be experiencing Post 

Traumatic Stress Disorder or Traumatic Brain Injuries. Legislative changes would 

be required to allow nonveteran State Department employees to access DOD or VA 

medical facilities. 

(695) 

NOMINATION OF CHRISTOPHER F. EGAN TO 

BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 

DEVELOPMENT, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Egan, Christopher F., to be Representative of the United States to 

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 

with the rank of Ambassador 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:43 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Kerry, and Sununu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will now come to order. 

Today, the committee meets to consider the nomination of Mr. 

Christopher Egan. The President has nominated Mr. Egan to be 

the United States Representative to the Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development, with the rank of Ambassador. 

Mr. Egan, I want to congratulate you on your nomination, and 

welcome your family and friends who may be with you today. 

I also want to welcome our colleague Senator Sununu, who will 

be introducing Mr. Egan shortly. And I believe there are others, as 

well, who would like to join in the voices of support for the nominee. 

Let me start off, before I recognize myself for an opening statement, Senator Kennedy asked me, on the floor while we were voting, to ask unanimous consent to enter his statement in support of 

Mr. Egan into the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy appears at the end 

of this hearing in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the 

Record’’ section.] 

696 

Senator MENENDEZ. Certainly, it is a glowing statement. And, 

while I won’t read it all, it certainly says, among other things, that 

he is impressed with your ability, your commitment to service, and 

you—he believes you have the personal and collaborative skills necessary for this position, and cites your great work in the private 

sector and your career and relationships in the great State of Massachusetts, and is strongly supportive of the nominee. 

With that, let me recognize myself for an opening statement, and 

then we’ll turn to the introduction of the nominee. And if there are 

any members who come in, in between, we’ll try to recognize them, 

as well. 

Mr. Egan, you have been nominated to serve as the U.S. Representative to the OECD. If confirmed, you’ll have the challenge of 

working with 30 market-oriented democracies from North America, 

Europe, and the Pacific Rim. The democracies of the OECD 

amounts—account, I should say—for approximately 59 percent of 

the world’s GDP, 76 percent of world trade, and 54 percent of the 

world’s energy consumption. And, though it is less visible than 

some of its global counterparts, the OECD plays a very important 

role in an increasingly globalized world. Clearly, this position is 

much more than a nice apartment in Paris, it represents the best 

of United States-European cooperation and partnership, with its 

origin as that of an organization that carried out the Marshall Plan 

after World War II. That plan showed the best of the American 

spirit, our willingness to help our allies devastated by war, and our 

commitment to build new democracies and economies in our vanquished enemies. As it evolved the organization took on new challenges, expanding from working in Europe to working around the 

globe. 

I believe it’s imperative that the OECD continue this expansion, 

opening its door to the developing world and other countries. For 

example, right now Mexico is the only Latin American country in 

the OECD, but Chile has just been invited to join, and Brazil was 

invited to enhance its engagement with the OECD, with hopes of 

membership in the future. I certainly hope we see more Latin 

American countries joining in the OECD. It is in the national interests of the United States to see Latin America continue on a democratic path, with strong market economies and economic growth. 

The United States has always been a leader at the OECD, from 

the days of the Marshall Plan to today. We are the largest contributor to the organization and a key voice on issues from trade to 

economic policies. So, if you are confirmed, you will become the 

leading U.S. voice on a wide range of issues, including the promotion of trade and investment, the efficient use of resources, and 

the higher sustainable economic growth we seek. 

We look forward to hearing your plan for how the United States 

should use its influence with the OECD to improve the work of the 

organization and advance our own national interests. The issues 

that my subcommittee handles overlap with the work of the OECD. 

If you are confirmed, I hope that we will have a positive working 

relationship so we can address some of the issues I’ve just raised. 

I know you’ve had a successful career in the private sector, and 

this would be your first experience in the public sector. This hearing will provide an opportunity to not only examine your past expeVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00704 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
697 

rience, but to learn more about your goals and vision for the 

OECD. 

You have been nominated for a crucial position, a position that 

demands multilateral solutions to crucial international problems, a 

position that requires an articulate U.S. voice on complex issues, 

a position which represents the best of United States-European cooperation, and which could, once again, represent the best of the 

American spirit. 

With that, and seeing no other members before the committee 

now, let me recognize Senator Sununu to introduce Mr. Egan. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

It is a great pleasure to be here to introduce Christopher Egan 

at his nomination to be Representative of the United States to the 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. As you 

noted in your opening statement, the OECD is a unique forum, including—or comprised of 30 market democracies working together 

to address economic, social, and governance challenges of 

globalization, as well as to help chart the groundwork for increasing prosperity, not just in those countries, but around the world. 

And I’d like to join with you, as a member of the Foreign Relations 

Committee, in emphasizing the value and the importance and opportunity of expanding that membership to include additional countries from Latin America. 

I’ve known Chris very well for 7 years, and I strongly believe 

that his educational background and the breadth of his experience 

will serve him extremely well in this important role. He’s one of 

the founders of Carruth Capital, one of New England’s top 10 commercial real estate investment and development firms. As you mentioned, he has great private-sector experience, but he also has been 

very active in the community in a number of roles that probably 

are best described as public service. Notably, he’s currently a member of the board of directors of the Fallon Community Health Plan, 

a not-for-profit organization that provides health insurance for over 

170,000 Massachusetts residents. He chairs the board’s finance 

committee, which oversees investment strategy for the $230 million 

operating fund account. He’s also served as a board member of 

MassDevelopment, the State of Massachusetts Finance and Economic Development Authority, and has been a trustee of UMASS 

Memorial Healthcare, the largest healthcare provider in central 

Massachusetts. 

Finally, Chris and his wife, Jean, have also founded and direct 

Break the Cycle of Poverty, a nonprofit foundation dedicated to lifting families out of poverty by focusing on education. 

Finally, I’d like to mention—and there’s a little bit of bias here— 

personal bias, as I am the only engineer in the United States Senate—Chris holds a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering from the University of Massachusetts, and I continue in my—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. That explains it all to me now. [Laughter.] 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. I continue—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I didn’t know that, but it—— 

698 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. At my lonely, but very important, 

effort to expand the power of engineers around the world. 

Chris understands organizational management. He understands 

economic development. He understands the importance of strong 

diplomatic and economic ties with our key trading partners. He’ll 

bring energy, focus, and a little bit of youth to this very important 

role. And I’m confident that, if he’s confirmed, Chris will make an 

outstanding Ambassador of the United States to the OECD. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this time, for this hearing, and I hope my Senate colleagues—and not just those from 

Massachusetts, Senators Kennedy and Senators Kerry, who have 

been terrific friends of the Egan family—I hope all of our Senate 

colleagues can support this nomination. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Sununu. 

And I know Senator Kerry has told me he wants to be here, as 

well, and will be making a statement when he comes. 

But, to move things along, in view of—in view of that there’s no 

other members here, Mr. Egan, I invite you to give your opening 

statement to the committee. I’m pleased to have you recognize any 

of your family members who may be here with you today. We ask 

that you keep your statement to about 7 minutes, and we will include your entire statement for the record, without objection. 

Mr. Egan. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER F. EGAN, NOMINEE TO BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE 

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR 

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I’m honored to be here before this distinguished committee 

today to be President Bush’s nominee to represent the OECD. 

I’d like to pause here, introduce my friends and family. With me 

is my beautiful wife, Jean, my—two of my three children, Mary 

Catherine, who’s 5, and Christopher, who’s 3. Mr. Chairman, forgive me, our third child, little Michael, who is 18 months old, 

couldn’t make the hearing. He had a very important nap to attend 

to, sir, and it’s best if he has that nap, sir. Also is my mother and 

father, Ambassador Richard and Maureen Egan, are nice enough 

to be here today. And my lovely sister and my brother-in-law, 

Catherine and Rod Walkey, with their beautiful daughter, Isabel. 

I also want to thank a lot of my friends from Boston who came 

down here, plus a lot of my colleagues from the Kennedy School of 

Government that decided to join me today. I really feel surrounded 

and welcome by Red Sox nation here this afternoon. 

Senator MENENDEZ. As a Yankees fan, the Chair won’t hold that 

against you. [Laughter.] 

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As a son who helped his family build the largest company in 

Massachusetts, and as an entrepreneur who built a successful company of my own, I feel I have the leadership and negotiating skills, 

if confirmed, to represent and advance the United States interests 

at the OECD. I believe my service as a board member at 

MassDevelopment, my home State’s Finance and Economic DevelVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00706 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
699 

opment Authority, and as a founder and board member of the I– 

495/Arc of Innovation, a public-private partnership to foster environmentally smart economic development in central Massachusetts, 

has prepared me in a significant measure for the duties I hope to 

undertake. 

The work my wife and I do with Break the Cycle of Poverty, the 

foundation we started and direct, has done much to educate economically challenged individuals and families so that they can elevate themselves from poverty. 

The OECD is particularly valuable to the United States as a 

forum for working with our major partners to promote effective polices across a range of economic and social issues that confront us 

all. Through the OECD and its affiliates, like the International Energy Agency, the IEA, the United States and other members 

strengthen corporate governance principles, environmental standards, development of energy efficient technologies and guidelines to 

safeguard the public in the development of cutting-edge science and 

technology. The OECD is of particular value, as well, in areas that 

require multilateral cooperation to solve transnational problems, 

like antibribery convention, the model tax convention, and agreements on export credits and capital markets. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I share the President’s commitment to the great work of the OECD, and understand 

its role in promoting economic growth and better governance. 

America’s prosperity and national security are enhanced by the efforts of the OECD to advance these goals and to integrate emerging 

market economies into a strong and healthy global economy. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States has turned to the OECD repeatedly for accurate and reliable data on numerous topics for best 

practices in combating, say, counterfeit goods, and as locus for dialog with countries from the Middle East on reforming public governance. 

Mr. Chairman, in my discussion to date with officials throughout 

the administration, I have gained a sense of United States priorities for the OECD, and I am committed to support, if confirmed, 

the critical work ahead, which includes bringing more countries 

into compliance with the OECD antibribery convention, which has 

been so important in leveling the playing field of our U.S. companies abroad. We also seek to strengthen economic growth through 

the OECD’s expert economic research and analysis. Other priority 

work includes promoting electronic commerce, fostering good governance, and working on sensible trade policy. 

Let me also cite three key objectives I will focus on, if confirmed 

by the Senate. 

First, an outreach to other major economies. The United States 

and a number of fellow OECD members believe the future and 

long-term relevance of the organization depends on reaching out 

beyond the OECD’s current membership of advanced industrialized 

countries. To that effect, the members authorized a program of enhanced engagement with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and 

South Africa to steer them toward better policies and practices and 

invite them to undertake the disciplines that underpin our shared 

prosperity. If confirmed, I will work to move that engagement forward with those vital and emerging economies. 

700 

Second, the enlargement of the organization. Mr. Chairman, the 

OECD Ministerial Council decided, in May, to invite Russia, Israel, 

Slovenia, Estonia, and, as you mentioned, sir, Chile, to the—to 

begin discussions leading to membership. Our representatives at 

the OECD made clear that the United States is concerned about 

Russia’s readiness to join the organization, in terms of its government’s commitment to democracy and to maintaining an open-market economy. However, the United States and other member countries were willing to begin the process that would advance Russian 

reforms. And, if confirmed, sir, I will work, together with other 

OECD members who share our concerns, to maintain the OECD’s 

high standards of like-mindedness and help set clear benchmarks 

for all five candidate countries, including Russia, on their paths toward membership. 

And, third, reform the organization’s financial structure. The 

United States is the largest computer—contributor to the OECD, 

as you mentioned, sir, covering almost 25 percent of its costs. The 

financial structure has its roots in a period when Europe was recovering from war, but today’s—all members are well off. So, in a 

sense, a few large companies—countries, like the United States, 

are effectively subsidizing the few—the many European countries 

and other countries. 

The United States is working to negotiate a fair scale of contributions in which all members will cover the costs of their own participation. And, in May, the members agreed, in principle, that each 

member should cover most, if not all, their costs. And, sir, if confirmed, I will work to see that agreement implemented. 

Mr. Chairman, these are some of the important challenges facing 

the OECD. But, coming from a background in business, I am interested in the management aspects of the organization. The United 

States has worked hard in recent years to push through reforms 

in the way that the OECD makes decisions, sets priorities, allocates its budgets, and audits its own performance. With my real estate development experience, I can appreciate, for example, that 

the project to renovate its existing facility and build a new OECD 

conference center in Paris is on schedule, within budget, and due 

for completion in 2009. As these reforms are being successfully implemented, the OECD is becoming a model among international organizations. But, of course, there’s a lot more that needs to be 

done. And, if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that our work 

on strengthening good management of the OECD stays on track. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward, if confirmed, to representing the 

United States in this key industrial—international organization. It 

helps ensure our economic well-being and security. I am humbled 

to be before you today, and I am grateful for the confidence President Bush has placed in me. I look forward to continued consultations with, and advice from, this committee and its staff, both here 

in Washington and from congressional delegations we will certainly 

welcome to—in Paris. 

I am pleased to answer any questions that you and the members 

of the committee have. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Egan follows:] 

701 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER F. EGAN, NOMINEE TO BE REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO- OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am honored to appear 

before this distinguished committee today as President Bush’s nominee to represent 

the United States at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 

the OECD. I am grateful for the confidence and trust that the President and Secretary Rice have placed in me. 

As a son who helped his family build the largest company in Massachusetts, and 

as an entrepreneur who has built a successful company of my own, I feel I have 

the leadership and negotiating skills, if confirmed, to represent and advance U.S. 

interests at the OECD. 

I believe my service as a board member at MassDevelopment, my home State’s 

finance and economic development authority, and as a founder and board member 

of the I–495/Arc of Innovation, a public-private partnership to foster smart, environmentally friendly economic development in central Massachusetts, has prepared me 

in significant measure for the duties I hope to undertake. The work my wife and 

I do with Break the Cycle of Poverty, the foundation we started and direct, has done 

much to educate economically challenged individuals and families so that they can 

elevate themselves from poverty. 

The OECD began as a successor to the Marshall Plan, the economic counterpart 

to NATO, to promote democracy and market economies in Europe. The Marshall 

Plan, which celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, was rooted in a magnificent 

act of American generosity. In 1947, Europe lay in ruins, and through Secretary 

George Marshall’s vision, over $13.3 billion, over 4 years, poured into offering Europe a hand up, not a hand out. 

Today, the OECD is comprised of 30 advanced economies from North America, the 

Pacific Rim, and Europe. The United States administration has been encouraging 

the OECD’s outreach to the emerging economies in Asia, Latin America, and Africa 

to advance the principles of open markets and good governance that the organization promotes among its members. 

The OECD is particularly valuable to the United States as a forum for working 

with our major partners to promote effective policies across the range of economic 

and social issues that confront us all. Through the OECD and its affiliates like the 

International Energy Agency, the United States and other members strengthen corporate governance principles, environmental standards, development of energy-efficient technologies, and guidelines to safeguard the public in the development of cutting-edge science and technology. The OECD also affords an opportunity to collaborate in areas that require multilateral cooperation to solve transnational problems 

such as the antibribery convention, the model tax convention, and agreements on 

export credits, open investment regimes, and capital markets. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I share the President’s commitment to the great work of the OECD, and understand its role in promoting economic 

growth and better governance. America’s prosperity and national security are enhanced by the efforts of the OECD to advance these goals and to integrate emerging 

market economies into a strong and healthy global economy. The United States has 

turned to the OECD repeatedly for accurate and reliable data on numerous topics 

(for example, how much our economy could benefit if transatlantic trade barriers 

were reduced), for best practices in combating counterfeit goods, and as the locus 

for dialog with countries from the Middle East on reforming public governance. 

Mr. Chairman, in my discussion to date with officials throughout the administration, I have gained a sense of U.S. priorities for the OECD that I am committed 

to support, if confirmed. The critical work ahead includes bringing more countries 

into compliance with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which has been so important in leveling the playing field for our U.S. companies abroad. We also seek to 

strengthen economic growth through the OECD’s expert economic research and 

analysis. Other priority work includes promoting electronic commerce, fostering 

good governance, and working on sensible trade policy. 

Let me also cite three key objectives that I will focus on, if confirmed by the Senate: 

• First, outreach to other major economies. The United States. and a number of 

fellow OECD members believe the future and long-term relevance of the organization depends on reaching out beyond the OECD’s current membership of advanced industrialized economies. To that effect, the members authorized a program of enhanced engagement with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South 

Africa, to steer them toward better policies and practices and invite them to undertake the disciplines that underpin our shared prosperity. If confirmed, I will 

702 

work to move that engagement forward with those vital and emerging economies. 

• Second, enlargement of the organization. The OECD Ministerial Council decided 

in May to invite Russia, Chile, Israel, Slovenia, and Estonia to begin discussions 

leading to OECD membership. Our representatives at the OECD made clear 

that the United States is concerned about Russia’s readiness to join the organization, in terms of its government’s commitment to democracy and to maintaining an open, market economy. However, the United States and other member 

countries were willing to begin a process that would advance Russian reforms. 

If confirmed, I will work together with other OECD members who share our 

concerns, to maintain the OECD’s high standards of like-mindedness and help 

set clear benchmarks for all five candidate countries, including Russia, on their 

paths toward membership. 

• And third, reform of the organization’s financial structure. The United States 

is the largest contributor to the OECD, covering almost 25 percent of its costs. 

The financial structure has its roots in a period when Europe was recovering 

from war, but today, the members are all well off, and many members are effectively ‘‘subsidized’’ by us and a few other large contributors. The United States 

is working to negotiate a fairer scale of contributions, in which all members will 

cover the costs of their participation. In May, the members agreed in principle 

that each member should cover ‘‘most, if not all’’ of its costs. If confirmed, I will 

work to see that agreement implemented. 

Mr. Chairman, these are some of the important challenges facing the OECD. But 

coming from a background in business, I am also interested in the management aspects of the organization. The United States has worked hard in recent years to 

push through reforms in the way that the OECD makes decisions, sets priorities, 

allocates its budget, and audits its own performance. With my 13 years of business 

experience, I can appreciate, for example, that the project to renovate its existing 

facilities and build a new OECD conference center in Paris is on schedule, within 

budget, and due for completion in 2009. As these reforms are being successfully implemented, the OECD is becoming a model among international organizations. But 

of course there’s a lot more that needs to be done, and if confirmed, I look forward 

to ensuring that our work on strengthening good management of the OECD stays 

on track. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward, if confirmed, to representing the United States of 

America in this key international organization that helps ensure our economic well 

being and security. I am humbled to be before you today, and I am grateful for the 

confidence President Bush has placed in me. 

If confirmed, I look forward to continued consultations with and advice from this 

committee and its staff, both here in Washington and from the congressional delegations we will certainly welcome to Paris. 

I am pleased to answer any questions that you and the members of the committee 

have. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you for your statement and we welcome your family here today. 

Let me start off with a 7-minute round, then we’ll see if—I know 

Senator Kerry is on his way here, and we’ll acknowledge him when 

he arrives, after the first 7 minutes. So, let me start off with some 

questions that I think are important. And you’ve touched upon 

some of them in your statement. 

This is a large international organization. It is complex, in terms 

of its entrenched bureaucracies, and the countries with which you 

will be dealing with have widely varying interests. In recognition 

of that, and some of even your stated goals about reforming the financial structure, we don’t always get our way, even though we are 

the largest contributor. The question is, what, in your background, 

you believe will assist you—prepares you to meet that challenge? 

And, second, how do you plan on using diplomacy or persuasion to 

further U.S. interests within the organization? 

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Senator. 

In regard to my background, my over 20 years of private-sector 

experience, building my own company, I’ve learned the negotiate— 

703 

negotiation—skills of negotiation and diplomacy to help build a 

leading real estate commercial in New England. Also in my background is working within the government as a board of 

MassDevelopment, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Economic Development Organization, we had to—we had to use not only the— 

we had to work with the legislature, but also with private developers, to accomplish the goals of economic development set forth by 

the Speaker of the House and the Governor. 

Also, in regard to my background is starting as one of the founding members of the Arc of Innovation, 495 Initiative, which was a 

quasi-public-private. On the board, we had elected officials and 

business leaders to spur smart economically developed—smart economic development projects in central Massachusetts. 

In regard to the U.S. Government’s agenda through the OECD, 

that is my No. 1 goal. Using diplomacy, it is my goal to help accomplish the United States objectives. There are many members, other 

than the United States, sir, that look to reform the financial structure of the OECD. And, if nominated, sir, I’m going to continue the 

efforts to work with those groups, those countries, in order to reform the financial structure of the OECD. 

Sir, I am happy to report, though, in the last ministerial at the 

OECD in May, the entire ministerial agreed that the financial 

structure of the OECD needs to be reformed. So, we’re off to a very 

good start. And, if confirmed, sir, I’m going to continue that good 

work and look for the conclusion of that project. 

Senator MENENDEZ. How do you build common cause with the 

United States position with other countries? When we say, ‘‘Well, 

we’re going to use diplomacy,’’ how do you go about creating common cause? You cited some of your personal experiences, your professional experiences, back in Massachusetts. Why don’t you give 

me examples of how you get people to do, sometimes, what is in 

their interests, but they don’t necessarily feel it is in their best interests, and sometimes to get people to do what is not necessarily, 

from their point of view, in their interests, but is necessary for the 

organization. Give me a sense of how you would go about it. Recognizing you do not have a diplomatic career in—as your background, 

but give me a sense of how you bring people into common cause. 

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, sir. 

That’s where personal relationships come in. The OECD is more 

like a club where 30 ambassadors representing the member states 

are there. There’s only 30 ambassadors. My wife and I are—I will 

personally meet and develop a personal relationship with each one 

of those ambassadors. The Secretary General, Guirra, is also a very 

major factor at the OECD. He has been—he—Guirra has the 

strong support of the United States Government, and the current 

ambassador, Morella, at the OECD, is a good supporter of him. 

Using our relationship with Guirra and the major—some other 

major countries within the OECD, I plan to create allies and a 

sense of collegialness in order to help promote the United States 

agenda throughout the OECD. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, one of the things I’d like to hear your 

views on as you try to do that is, looking at the OECD as a—it’s 

clearly a strong proponent of increasing world economic growth and 

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704 

ices, and capital, and it’s a leading proponent of free trade, open 

markets, and globalization, which, generally, I think we all are. 

The question, however, for some of us, is, how does an organization 

like the OECD balance the economic impact of globalization, particularly how free trade impacts poor and rural populations in developing countries? And so, my question to you—and I see that, 

from your background, you and your wife’s foundation and the 

Break the Cycle of Poverty, this is a—this is a noble concern of 

yours. The question is, how do you make sure that the OECD is 

not pursuing trade policies at the expense of the poorest and leastdeveloped countries? And how do we protect poor, and often rural, 

populations in the process of doing that? And, for someone who’s 

very interested in Latin America, one of Latin America’s greatest 

challenges is the disparity of wealth, which is huge. How don’t 

we—how do we go about not exacerbating that in the pursuit of our 

policies? 

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

From my consultations with State Department and with U.S. 

Government agencies that work with the OECD, I’ve learned—a 

very important committee at the OECD is called the Development 

Assistance Committee, the DAC. The OECD is an incredibly economic think tank that is open to any country who wants to read 

its information and learn from it. Not only are there 30 countries 

that make up the OECD, but the OECD shares its expertise with 

more than 30—with more than 70 other countries. 

The Development Assistance Committee assists developing countries and evaluates best practices, and prepares guidelines and 

toolkits on issues like poverty. For example, aid foreign assistance 

is giving to emerging countries—Latin America, and other emerging nations—through the OECD and through the Development Assistance Committee, it is studied on what is more effective, how aid 

is spent, and what the tangible results are. And the important 

thing about the OECD is, in terms of—it’s able to compare and contrast what one country does versus what another country does, and 

what is more successful. In Africa, the OECD is doing incredible 

work studying how aid is given in Africa and how best—what results happen from it, what strategies worked well, and what strategies didn’t. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the OECD is not, itself, an aid organization, does not have funds in which to give out to it, but it 

does have an incredible peer-review process, and, through the Development Assistance Committee, it is able to see what programs 

are working well in developing worlds, what programs aren’t working well, and to share that knowledge, sir, not only online, through 

an incredible Web site that our current ambassador, Connie 

Morella, helped spearhead, but through over nearly 300 working 

groups and other bodies at work in the OECD. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, will you have as one of your concerns, as 

our ambassador there, looking at how—as we pursue our policies, 

how do we deal with the question of our policies’ effect on the 

whole question of poverty and on this disparity of wealth and not 

exacerbating it? 

Mr. EGAN. Yes, sir. Yes. It is a big concern of the U.S. Government. And the U.S. Government, in terms of its national security, 

705 

a prosperous and economic world is a safe world. And the OECD 

is a unique forum in which best practices of economic policy can be 

discussed, debated, and refined. That information is shared with 

the policy leaders, not only of our 30 member countries, but of any 

country willing to participate within the OECD—not as full members, sir, but as participants of the committees. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. I have one or two other questions, but let me turn to someone who is a Boston Red Sox fan— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MENENDEZ.—Senator Kerry. 

Mr. EGAN. Thank you. 

Senator Kerry: Mr. Chairman, you’re suffering a miserable 

misfortunate life not to be a Boston Red Sox fan. [Laughter.] 

Senator KERRY. I apologize for being late—I wanted to come by 

to support the nomination of Chris Egan to be our U.S. Representative to the OECD. And I’d just emphasize a couple of things, if I 

may, quickly. 

First of all, the OECD, as we all know, is an extraordinarily important organization, formed after President Truman had the foresight to commit to the Marshall Plan, and the then-Economic Cooperation Initiative was transitioned, in 1961, into the OECD, and 

it’s been, really, the principal forum for the United States—and 

mostly what are called developed countries—to advance issues of 

sustainability, transparency, economic, peace, and so forth. So, it is 

a major forum, and, I think, today, is playing an important role on 

a host of trade issues, as well as the larger challenge of global climate change, which is very much front and center to it. 

It now stretches from North America to Europe to the Pacific 

Rim, and it has 30 countries in it, which is a pretty large forum. 

So, you’ll have a major scope of responsibility as you undertake this 

job, Mr. Egan. And we, on this committee, obviously care enormously, as I think you know, because of the role it can play to promote peace and stability and bring countries together to have an 

important dialog on a lot of issues of significance to us. 

We appreciate your qualifications—UMASS grad and Kennedy 

School grad, and, I think, most significantly, frankly, the privatesector experience that you’ve had, building a strong real estate 

company, Carruth Realty, one of the strongest in our State. And I 

think those qualifications will give you important credentials in 

talking to people about these kinds of economic development issues. 

So, in addition to your being an avid sailor and a Red Sox fan 

and all those important qualifications for living in Massachusetts, 

we’re going to be glad that you’re out there representing the country. And I see that you’ve got the best side of your life with you 

here——those three kids and your wife here. So, we’re delighted. 

I assume they’re yours. 

Mr. EGAN. Two out of three are. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Have any children that don’t belong 

to you, or—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. EGAN. Mary Catherine, in the pink, and Christopher, in the 

necktie, and my niece, Isabel, in the blue, sir. 

706 

Senator KERRY. Well, we’re delighted to welcome them here, and 

happy to have ’em. I see we’ve got a tired one here already. Wait’ll 

she travels with you. 

Let me just take one moment, also, Mr. Chairman, to clarify 

something, because I want it to be an important part of the record. 

The delay in proceeding to Mr. Egan’s nomination had absolutely 

nothing to do with Mr. Egan’s personal qualifications or appropriateness of the nomination, it had to do with a, sort of, breach 

of relationship, if you will, and understanding between this committee—the full committee. And I agreed with the Chairman and 

with other members of the committee who felt very strongly that 

a recess appointment, after the formal withdrawal of a nomination, 

which nomination was about to be voted on and defeated, and the 

purposes of withdrawing it was to avoid that, and, after statements 

to the effect that there would be no recess appointment, to have 

made that appointment was fundamentally a constitutional challenge to the authority of this committee and to how it might have 

proceeded under normal circumstances. 

That has now been worked out with the administration. We’re 

glad it’s been worked out with the administration. And so, we proceed appropriately. 

But I wanted to emphasize, importantly, that your nomination, 

and some others, became, regrettably, tied up in the effort to try 

to clarify that constitutional point, which I, and we all here, think 

is an important one. 

So, we thank you for your patience, and I’m sorry for anybody 

who’s been caught up in that, unfortunately. But I think we have 

now worked it out. I just noticed—is your father here? 

Mr. EGAN. Ambassador Egan and my mother, Maureen, are here. 

Senator KERRY. That’s what I thought. I’m delighted to see you 

here, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you. Good to see someone else following in the footsteps. The apple doesn’t fall far from the tree. 

And so, we’re proud and grateful for your service, as well. 

So, thank you for taking time to go away from private sector for 

a while and serve the country. We appreciate it. And I’m pleased 

to support your nomination. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few questions. I assume 

you’re going to leave the record open—they’re very simple, straightforward, but it would good, for the record, just to have some answers to them. We’ll submit them in writing. 

Mr. EGAN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Thanks. 

[The information previously referred to appears at the end of this 

hearing in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Kerry. 

I have one or two more questions, and then we’ll have the record 

open for any member who wishes to ask questions, and get your 

responses as soon as possible. 

And I want to echo Senator Kerry’s remarks, as the chairman of 

the subcommittee made it very clear to me that he was supportive 

of your nomination, but the broader issue was involved, and so he’s 

made that clear to me from the very beginning, and I just want to 

echo what he had to say. 

707 

I have just two other lines of questioning that I would love to 

hear your thinking about. And you touched upon them in your 

opening statement. The OECD has five priority areas that they’ve 

identified for study and emphasis: trade and investment liberalization, public—excuse me—policy reform and development, managing 

new and evolving technologies, public governance, and social protection. That’s what they’ve established as their five priority areas 

for study and emphasis. Of those, what areas do you believe are 

the highest priority for the United States? And how can the United 

States best influence the priorities of the OECD in achieving the 

goals and objectives that are important to the United States within 

those goals? 

Mr. EGAN. Thank you, Senator. 

As you know, sir, the OECD is a unique forum where like-minded countries can get together and talk about what’s important for 

economic development. In terms of the United States and how I 

feel about the United States, and we all do, is our economic and 

national security. And, through the OECD, trade—as you know, 

trade—global trade is very important to the United States. It’s just, 

sir, that every—seems like every U.S. agency sends the best and 

brightest people through the OECD to work on the best policies, 

whether it’s the Food and Drug Administration, Department of 

Education, Department of Labor—any agency could get their—the 

best economic policy ideas to not only help the United States and 

the OECD member countries, but also the world. 

So, if you ask me, sir, in terms of what the U.S. Government’s 

priorities are on that, you know, I’ve been briefed, sir, on all the 

issues, and they seem to important to us. I’d have to say, sir, from 

my edification as what’s gone on in the last 21⁄2 months, it’s the 

trade. But in my brief tenure at the OECD, if confirmed, sir, the 

pressing issues are to increase the membership of the OECD and 

make sure that all countries joining the OECD are like-minded and 

believe in the rule of law and democracy, and also to reach out, sir, 

to the impoverished nations, or the emerging economies, and make 

sure that they understand the—how countries who join the OECD 

became successful, the economic priorities and the rule of law that 

made the OECD countries so successful in this world. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I—— 

Mr. EGAN. Those are my—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I appreciate that answer. I 

gather, from what I hear you say, trade and liberalization—investment liberalization is No. 1. 

Mr. EGAN. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I really would urge you to spend some time, 

as our representative, should you be confirmed, on the public governance and social protection aspects of those five priorities. Part 

of our challenges in security is social unrest, and people have social 

unrest because their desires, hopes and dreams, and aspirations 

are frustrated. And public governance is critical in many parts of 

the world to being able to fulfill—to act in a way in which they 

hope to work to fulfill the hopes and dreams and aspirations of 

their people that create the social protection, and, I would broaden 

that to the opportunities to move people in a better direction. So, 

I hope that you’ll move those upward—— 

708 

Mr. EGAN. Okay. 

Senator MENENDEZ [CONTINUING]. AS YOUR—AS PART OF YOUR

FOCUS IN THOSE FIVE PRIORITY AREAS. 

The last question, at least for the purposes of asking, although 

there’ll be some submitted for the record, is—the agency you’re 

going to go to is comprised of 30 different countries. They’re classified as developed economies, as you talked about. Some have been 

invited to open discussions for membership, others have agreed to 

begin a process that potentially could open membership—Brazil, 

China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. The question, for me, is: 

should the OECD adopt a different set of criteria for membership 

for such developing countries as Russia, China, and India? And 

what objective should the agency have as its main goal in broadening its membership? 

Mr. EGAN. Thank you—thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What makes the OECD relevant is the fact that it’s made up of 

a group of nations that are like-minded, and to—the U.S. Government’s policy and thinking on this matter is, if you allow exceptions 

to that rule, you let people in who don’t believe in the rule of law, 

aren’t market-based economies, and the organization quickly will 

become irrelevant. 

Sir, if I’m confirmed by the Senate, I will continue to work the 

U.S. Government’s policy and the other members of the OECD to 

continue to keep the OECD relevant, in terms of its like-mindedness. So, for certain exemptions for, for example, Russia, no, sir. I 

would think that every country joining the OECD should have the 

same high standards as the current nations that belong to it. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, I take your words of ‘‘like-mindedness’’ 

to be translated to ‘‘the criteria should not differ.’’ 

Mr. EGAN. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. Very good. 

And our objective in broadening its membership should be what, 

exactly? 

Mr. EGAN. The membership—to broaden the number of nations 

that belong to the OECD, sir? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Right. 

Mr. EGAN. In the past—even currently, sir—the OECD has 

seemed to be in—a Eurocentric organization. But, as other countries throughout the world have become developed and believe in 

free trade and our democracies and rule of law, they’ve joined the 

organization. It doesn’t matter where you are on the planet anymore with the OECD. The U.S. Government’s thinking is that if 

you are like-minded, such as—you know, all the way to Korea, Australia, New Zealand—it doesn’t have to be Europeancentric anymore, which is what it was in the roots, when the Marshall Plan 

first kicked in, in the late 1940s. So, to be allowed access into the 

OECD, sir, it could be anywhere on the planet, which is why I’m 

happy to see Chile being—looking to join the OECD in the near future, which is why Brazil, in terms of enhanced engagement, a 

very, very important emerging economy. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. 

709 

Let me thank the nominee—seeing no other members at the 

hearing, at this point—for testifying today, for his willingness to 

serve the country in an important position. 

The record will remain open for 2 days so that the committee 

members may submit additional questions to the nominee. I ask 

that the nominee respond expeditiously to these questions, should 

there be some. And I’m sure, as you’ve heard, there will be some. 

[The information previously referred to appears at the end of this 

hearing in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the 

Record’’section.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Without that—without any other member 

seeking to ask questions, if no one has any additional comments, 

the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a privilege to be here to introduce Christopher 

Egan of Massachusetts, the President’s nominee to be our Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 

The OECD is an organization created in the finest of the American internationalist tradition. Its goal is to promote economic progress and development throughout 

the world. It’s an outgrowth of the Marshall Plan, which transformed Western Europe after the devastation of World War II, and helped rebuild the economy of an 

entire continent. 

Today, OECD has 30 member nations, many of which are among the most economically advanced in the world. Membership is granted only for those nations that 

aspire to building strong democracies, establishing market economies, and improving the standard of living of their people. 

OECD will undoubtedly have an essential role in the coming decades, as all nations wrestle with the challenges and opportunities of the new global economy. How 

we engage—or choose not to engage—other nations will have enormous implications 

for our own economic health and well-being. 

Working with other nations to establish cooperative approaches to trade, environmental standards, science and technology, and openness in government is essential 

for the United States, and for every nation that aspires to leadership in the 21st 

century. 

It’s an honor to support Chris Egan’s nomination to be our ambassador to this 

important international organization. I’m confident he will serve our Nation well at 

OECD. 

An able son of Massachusetts, Chris is an entrepreneur who’s helped to build a 

very successful business, Carruth Capital, in our State. He’s a graduate of our flagship University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and recently earned a master’s degree 

in public administration at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. 

He began his career working side-by-side with his father, Richard Egan, at the 

famous EMC Corporation, which helped teach him how to build and maintain enduring institutions. 

I’m impressed with Chris’s ability and his commitment to service, and I believe 

he has the personal and collaborative skills needed for this position. 

I know how excited he is at the prospect of serving his country at OECD and how 

deeply he feels that the United States must provide strong leadership in international development. He’s ready to begin tomorrow, and to bring some of that Red 

Sox fighting spirit to OECD. 

I’m delighted to support his nomination, and I’d also like to acknowledge his wife, 

Jean, and his three wonderful children who are here today as well—Mary, Christopher, and Michael. I’ve been assured they haven’t missed any important classes 

by being here, and that they’re ready to start making new friends in Paris. I wish 

them all well in this impressive new experience. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

710 

RESPONSES OF CHRISTOPHER F. EGAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What are your thoughts about the policy role the OECD can play toward promoting and facilitating economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries? Some have suggested that the African Growth and Opportunity Act 

(AGOA) should expand beyond the United States and be adopted by the OECD as 

a whole. Do you believe this idea, or other similar proposals, have merit? 

Answer. AGOA has achieved considerable success, and I believe it is a worthy 

model for other donor countries to adopt. Restrictive rules of origin employed in 

some other countries’ programs fail to provide the broad scope of market access that 

AGOA does. Broader trade preferences would provide additional incentives for Africa to integrate itself into the world economy. 

The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is already carrying out an 

important role as a coordinating body for international assistance policy. The United 

States works closely with the DAC to develop and promote best practices. 

The OECD hosts the G–8 Africa Partnership Forum (APF) Support Unit and also 

provides support to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) through 

a Mutual Review Mechanism. 

The international community is making progress. According to a joint report by 

the WTO and the OECD, the amount of trade-related technical assistance and capacity building)—to help developing and least-developed countries to participate 

more efficiently in international trade—has increased by 50 percent since the Doha 

Ministerial Declaration in November 2001. 

Question. What are other ways the OECD can positively affect and support developing countries? For example, what role can OECD play in fostering improved donor 

coordination on the ground, using a model such as the Three Ones approach on HIV/ 

AIDS and global health? 

Answer. The OECD is advancing donor coordination through the Paris Declaration endorsed in March 2005 by over 100 countries and agencies, including donors 

and recipients, and is hosting an international partnership to encourage and monitor its implementation. The Paris Declaration embodies the ‘‘Three Ones’’ logic in 

its principles, which encourage donor harmonization and alignment with country 

needs and policy, stress country ownership of the development process, mutual accountability, and results. 

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) affords a useful venue for 

the United States and other donor countries to review best practices and discuss 

ways to strengthen donor coordination. The DAC conducts periodic assessments to 

review donor coordination performance on the ground. These assessments also identify good practice and provide a framework for gauging progress, which is then disseminated throughout the DAC member network. In addition the DAC is engaged 

in pilot efforts in developing countries to improve country capacity to manage donor 

coordination and to improve country administrative systems in ways that will justify 

greater donor reliance on those systems. 

The United States is working with other donors to ensure that aid empowers recipients and is used effectively, and to improve donor coordination. When donor coordination efforts are successful, it is nearly always due in large part to U.S. leadership. 

Question. The 2006 DAC peer review of U.S. foreign assistance provided many 

recommendations on ways to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. aid program, 

ranging from how the United States can more effectively implement the Paris Declaration principles to better coordination of the three pillars of U.S. foreign policy 

(defense, diplomacy, development). What are the main lessons that you take out of 

the peer review? Which recommendations will you prioritize if confirmed as ambassador to the OECD? 

Answer. The primary lesson I draw from the 2006 DAC Peer review is that the 

long-established OECD practice of conducting peer reviews is a valuable exercise 

that provides timely feedback to the member being reviewed. The DAC Peer Review 

was done at the time the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was focusing 

on accelerating the implementation of its compacts. The Peer Review encouraged 

broader replication of MCC lessons and offered some useful suggestions of how MCC 

could work more closely with other donors. It also reviewed the initial reforms 

launched by the newly created Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance and the 

unified foreign assistance budget. The Peer Review stimulated interagency discussion of the foreign assistance reforms and encouraged broader coordination around 

the new foreign assistance framework. The Office of the Director of Foreign AssistVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00718 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
711 

ance has already addressed one of the main recommendations of the Peer Review— 

making poverty reduction a more explicit aim of the strategic framework. That has 

been implemented and is reflected in the revised framework. More effective aid is 

at the core of current U.S. reforms of foreign assistance so the Peer Review’s recommendations on this score were especially timely. 

The responsibility for following through on the DAC peer review recommendations 

rests with the Director of Foreign Assistance and the USAID Administrator, along 

with other agencies delivering U.S. assistance. As U.S. Ambassador to the OECD, 

I will have the opportunity, with my staff, to support OECD and U.S. preparations 

for the third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness to be held in Accra, Ghana, 

September 2–4, 2008, which will take stock of the progress made so far in implementing the Paris Declaration and identify an action agenda for further implementation. This forum will be an opportune time for the United States to show how it 

has reformed and made its foreign aid more effective. 

(713) 

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Boulware, Mark M., to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of 

Mauritania 

McGee, James D., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe 

McMullen, Ronald K., to be Ambassador to the State of Eritrea 

Nigro, Louis J., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chad 

Sanders, Robin R., to be Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria 

Wells, Barry L., to be Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold 

presiding. 

Present: Senator Feingold. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Good morning and thank you for coming. I’m 

Senator Russ Feingold, Chairman of the subcommittee. As a freshman Senator in 1992, I had the opportunity to sit on the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, and some people said to me that I 

would, ‘‘Probably get stuck with the Africa Subcommittee.’’ This insinuation, of course, was that work concerning the continent was, 

in some people’s minds, not interesting or important. 

I disagreed and became determined to take advantage of membership on this subcommittee to make the case that the United 

States must become more aware of, and engage with, the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. 

These diverse countries offer some of the world’s most daunting 

challenges from terrorism and endemic corruption to humanitarian 

emergencies and the AIDS epidemic, as well as a wealth of possibilities from natural resource development and economic growth to 

new tourism destinations and democratic progress. In my 15 years 

on the subcommittee, I’ve advocated a more active U.S. role in addressing these challenges and developing these possibilities. Some 

progress has been made, but obviously much more remains to be 

done. 

Some of you may have gotten similar advice when you received 

your first Foreign Service posting to an African country or even 

714 

your present nomination, but I hope that you also embraced the opportunity to advance broad U.S. interests and objectives in this increasingly critical part of the world. I know that each of you rose 

to the challenge, because you’re here today. You’ve chosen to represent the United States Government’s ideals, interests, and citizens as ambassadors to a wide-range of African nations. 

If confirmed, each of you will become not only the in-country 

hands of the United States working to implement U.S. policy, but 

also the eyes and ears of our Government, myself included, who 

will rely upon you to keep us informed of developments on the 

ground and what role we here in Washington can and should play. 

This is a significant responsibility, particularly when many of the 

countries you are headed to are mired in conflicts that have implications beyond their own nation’s borders. 

On our first panel, we will hear from the nominees to Nigeria, 

the Gambia, and Mauritania, an increasingly strategic part of the 

world, particularly in terms of energy and security. I look forward 

to hearing from Ambassador Renee Sanders, Mr. Barry Wells, and 

Mr. Mark Boulware, respectively, about their priorities and plans 

for addressing both the obstacles and opportunities each will face, 

if confirmed, to serve as ambassadors to these countries. 

On our second panel, we will have three individuals who have 

proven themselves willing and able to lead U.S. missions in several 

of the world’s most challenging posts. Ambassador James McGee 

has been nominated to serve in Zimbabwe, Mr. Ron McMullen to 

Eritrea, and Mr. Louis Nigro, Jr. to Chad. 

I admire all six of you for embracing these responsibilities and 

I want to thank you all for being here this morning. At this time, 

I wouldd like to invite our first panel of nominees to present their 

statements. We will begin with the Honorable Robin Sanders. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBIN R. SANDERS, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 

Ms. SANDERS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and 

members of the committee, I am deeply honored today to appear 

before you as the President’s nominee to be the United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 

I grew up in a family that underscored the importance of public 

service. My father is a veteran of two wars. I come from a long line 

of family members who are principals and teachers, and who have 

worked for other U.S. Government agencies, such as a my aunt. 

They are all here with me today. 

Given that my historical U.S. ancestry, like many African-Americans, links back to Africa, Nigeria’s future and the quality of life 

of its people are important to me. 

With that backdrop, Mr. Chairman, and if confirmed to serve the 

people of the United States of America, this nomination is truly a 

blending of everything I am—personally and professionally. 

The people of Nigeria and the people of the United States of 

America are connected in many, many ways. The Nigerian people 

want good governance, rule of law, and respect for global human 

values. They desire an evolving democracy that advances these 

goals and they see us as partners in this effort. Mr. Chairman, we 

715 

are partners, we must be partners, and we should continue to be 

partners with the Nigerian people on these issues. 

Turning to the immediate policy issues, the Nigerian elections 

were deeply, deeply flawed and we were highly disappointed, as 

were the Nigerian people. But the Nigerian people are giving this 

administration a chance; they are watching it more closely, expecting greater things, and more results, so that the elections of the 

past are not the mark of Nigeria’s future. 

We also need to watch, be engaged, but also wait to see if this 

new Nigerian Government lives up to what it is saying. We are encouraged, however, by the steps taken thus far by this administration and will continue to urge President Yar’ Adua to allow the tribunals to complete their work unimpeded. 

Our post-election priorities are election reform, democracy, and 

human rights, and having a partnership with stewardship, meaning a propitious engagement on all of these fronts, including the 

rule of law, transparency, and poverty alleviation. 

I have not yet had the opportunity to meet President Yar’ Adua. 

From what I have read and heard about him and many of his actions to date indicate that he is interested in reestablishing Nigeria’s progress on political, economic, and governance issues, addressing the problems in the delta, and most importantly, election 

reform, so that flawed elections do not happen again. Not only is 

he the first college-educated President of this nation of incredibly 

talented and diverse people, but he has voiced his recognition of 

the challenges at hand, challenges that must be addressed in order 

for Nigeria to move forward and truly become an active member of 

the communities of democracies. We must work with President Yar’ 

Adua and his administration as partners to achieve these goals for 

the Nigerian people. 

If confirmed, I will be dedicated, along with the interagency team 

of Americans and Nigerian staff already there, to a partnership 

with stewardship that works toward realizing the aspirations of 

this nation of 140 million people for a better quality of life, a life 

which respects global human values, and a life that has an enabling environment with policies and programs that provide the 

framework for the Nigerian people to thrive. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I stand ready and 

welcome the opportunity to respond to any questions that you may 

have. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanders follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBIN R. SANDERS, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning. 

I am deeply honored today to appear before you as the President’s nominee to be 

the United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 

Every now and again, one has the remarkable opportunity to be a part of a profession that makes one proud to get up each day. That is how I have felt every day 

of my Foreign Service career. I grew up in a family that underscored the importance 

of public service. My father is a veteran of two wars, and I come from a long line 

of family members who are principals and teachers, including my younger sister, 

and family members who have worked for other U.S. Government agencies, such as 

my aunt. They are all here with me today. 

Given my ancestral links to Africa, Nigeria’s future and the quality of life of its 

people are important to me. 

716 

With that backdrop Mr. Chairman, and if confirmed to serve the people of the 

United States of America, this nomination is truly a blending of everything that I 

am personally and professionally. 

The people of Nigeria and the people of the United States of America are connected in many ways. The Nigerian people want good governance, rule of law, and 

respect for global human values. They desire an evolving democracy that advances 

these life goals and they see us as partners in these efforts. Mr. Chairman, we are— 

and must continue to be—partners with them in this regard. The Nigerian elections 

were deeply flawed, and we were highly disappointed, as were the Nigerian people. 

They themselves have spoken out on the deeply flawed elections. But the Nigerian 

people are giving this new administration a chance; they are watching it more closely, expecting even greater things and more results from it so that this past election 

is not a harbinger of a bleak future for Nigeria. We are encouraged by the steps 

taken thus far by President Yar’Adua’s administration. We will continue to press 

him to allow the electoral tribunals to complete their work unimpeded and to reform 

dramatically the electoral commission so flawed elections do not happen again. I believe our role is to have a ‘‘partnership with stewardship,’’ meaning a ‘‘propitious 

engagement’’ on all democracy and human rights fronts in support of the Nigerian 

people. 

While I have not yet met President Yar’Adua, what I have read and heard about 

his actions to date indicates that he is interested in reestablishing Nigeria’s 

progress on political and governance reforms. Yar’Adua has voiced his recognition 

of the challenges at hand including the development and security needs of the Niger 

Delta; alleviating poverty; combating corruption; improving the educational and 

health care sectors, particularly in regard to HIV/AIDS; and instituting election reform. 

These are all significant issues that must be addressed in order for Nigeria to 

move forward and truly become an active member of the community of democracies 

and a true regional leader. We must work with the Yar’Adua administration as 

partners to achieve these goals for the Nigerian people. 

If confirmed, I will be dedicated, along with the interagency team of American and 

Nigerian staff at our embassy, to a ‘‘partnership with stewardship’’ that works toward realizing the aspirations of this nation of 140 million for a better quality of 

life in an environment that respects global human values and has policies and programs that enable the people of Nigeria to thrive. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I stand ready, and I welcome the 

opportunity to respond to any questions you may have. Thank you very much. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. The Nigerian elections were a real setback, in my view, and I appreciate your words. 

So I just want you to be aware of how disappointed I was and I 

think others were in the way that was conducted. 

Mr. Wells. 

STATEMENT OF BARRY L. WELLS, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA 

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m honored to appear before you today. I wish to express my gratitude to the President and 

the Secretary of State for the trust and the confidence they’ve 

placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of 

the Gambia. 

I come from a family that has proudly served our Nation in the 

uniforms of our military services and in civilian agencies, including 

my wife, Winsome, and daughter, Judy Ann, who joined me here 

today. 

I’ve been—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome to all the guests of the Ambassador 

and Mr. Wells and everybody. I appreciate your being here. 

Mr. WELLS. Thank you. 

I’ve enjoyed a career that has provided me the opportunity to 

serve at both the local and the Federal levels. And, if confirmed, 

717 

I will be honored to accept the responsibility to represent the interests of our Nation, as U.S. Ambassador. 

The Gambia has a history, despite troubling recent developments 

of multiparty democracy. Presidential elections in 2001 and 2006 

and legislative elections in January of this year were judged as free 

and fair, although with some shortcomings. I believe that firm and 

positive engagement with the Government of the Gambia will 

produce further progress on both democracy and development 

fronts. 

Trafficking in persons in the Gambia remains a problem, but the 

Government of the Gambia has taken significant steps to address 

the issue. The Gambian National Assembly has just passed a comprehensive antitrafficking law that meets international standards. 

Passage of this law, in addition to the law in 2005 outlying child 

trafficking, and the establishment of a victim shelter in 2006, show 

willingness to engage with us on this issue. In order to foster continued progress, if confirmed, I will work with the Gambia in its 

efforts to enforce its new legislation and to rescue and rehabilitate 

victims. 

Prior to June 2006, the Gambia was a Millennium Challenge Account-eligible country. The Gambia’s eligibility was suspended in 

response to what the MCC Board of Directors saw as a troubling 

pattern of deterioration in 8 of the 16 indicators, most notably in 

the area of political rights. If confirmed, I intend to engage the host 

government to reinitiate discussions centered on improving these 

indicators, with a view that moving The Gambia back toward MCC 

eligibility will ultimately benefit its people. 

As well, continued engagement with Gambian authorities on 

human rights, particularly in the areas of press freedom and civil 

liberties will constitute a central piece of our bilateral relationship. 

In addition, the U.S. Embassy must work to continue to help the 

government and the private sector to facilitate exports of food, textiles, garments, and other commodities to the United States under 

the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. The Gambia has been 

AGOA-eligible since 2003 and the government and the people are 

very interested in the great opportunities for trade this excellent 

program offers. But more engagement is needed to help them 

take—make efficient use of these opportunities. 

The Gambia has benefited from an active Peace Corps presence 

since 1967. Approximately 118 volunteers serve in health, 

agriforestry, and education sectors. Peace Corps is a central component of our person-to-person diplomacy and will remain a cornerstone of United States development assistance within the Gambia. 

The Gambia has been cooperative in the global war on terror and 

this plays a positive role in regional peace efforts. The Gambia is 

currently a contributor to the United States mission in the Sudan. 

Continued cooperation against terrorism and in support of regional 

stability will be another important focus of our diplomatic efforts 

in the Gambia. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for you abiding interest in America’s 

relations with Africa and for holding this hearing. If confirmed, I 

look forward to working with the committee and other Members of 

Congress to advance the interest, United States interests in the 

Gambia, and I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

718 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARRY L. WELLS, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today. I wish to express my gratitude to the President and to the Secretary of State 

for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia. 

I come from a family that has proudly served our Nation—in the uniforms of our 

military service and in civilian capacities. I have enjoyed a career that has provided 

me the opportunity to serve at both local and Federal levels of government. My interest and involvement in the international arena dates back 30 years when as an 

associate professor at Howard University School of Social Work I was instrumental 

in establishing summer field placements for graduate students with the University 

of the West Indies in Jamaica. I subsequently served as Country Director for the 

U.S. Peace Corps in Belize followed by a tour in Jamaica. Those experiences as an 

American serving our Nation abroad were some of the most rewarding of my career, 

and shaped the continuing interest I have to this day in working on behalf of our 

national interests in other nations. For the last 19 years at the Department of State, 

I have continued to dedicate myself to that end. I believe these experiences have 

well prepared me to carry out the responsibilities of a United States ambassador. 

The Gambia has a rich and remarkable history. A diverse set of linguistic, ethnic, 

and cultural groups have coexisted with minimum tension within The Gambia’s borders since independence. The Gambia has a history, despite troubling recent developments, of multiparty democracy. Presidential elections in 2001 and 2006, and legislative elections in January of this year were judged as free and fair, although with 

some shortcomings. The Gambian Government continues to make progress on government transparency, and has directed national resources toward health, education, and other endeavors that better the lives of The Gambian population at 

large. I believe that firm and positive engagement with the Government of The 

Gambia will produce further progress on both the democracy and development 

fronts. 

Trafficking in persons in The Gambia remains a problem, but the Government of 

The Gambia has taken significant steps to address the issue. The Gambian National 

Assembly has just passed a comprehensive antitrafficking law that meets international standards. Passage of this law, in addition to recent steps such as passage 

of a law against child trafficking in 2005 and the establishment of a victim shelter 

in 2006, show a willingness to engage with us on this issue. In order to foster continued progress, I will work with The Gambia in its efforts to enforce its new legislation and rescue and rehabilitate victims. 

Prior to June 2006, The Gambia was a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) eligible country. The Gambia’s eligibility was suspended in response to what the MCC 

Board of Directors saw as a troubling pattern of deterioration in 8 of the 16 indicators, most notably in the area of political rights. Joint efforts on the part of the U.S. 

Mission and the host government to reinitiate discussions centered on improving 

these indicators, with a view that moving The Gambia back toward MCA eligibility 

would go far to improve our bilateral relationship as well as increase the prospects 

for The Gambia’s continued economic development. Continued engagement with 

Gambian authorities on human rights, particularly in the areas of press freedom 

and civil liberties will constitute a central piece of our bilateral relationship. 

In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Banjul must continue to work with the government and the private sector to facilitate exports of seafood, textiles and garments, 

and other commodities to the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The Gambia has been AGOA-eligible since 2003 and the government and people are very interested in the great opportunities for trade created by 

this excellent program, but more engagement is needed to help them make efficient 

use of these opportunities. 

The Gambia, a moderate majority-Muslim nation, has been cooperative in the 

global war on terror, and has played a positive role in regional peace efforts. The 

Gambia is currently a contributor to the U.N. Mission in the Sudan. Continued cooperation against terrorism and in support of regional stability will be another important focus of our diplomatic efforts in The Gambia. The Gambia has benefited 

from an active Peace Corps presence since 1967. Approximately 118 volunteers 

serve in health, agro-forestry, and education sectors. Peace Corps works in cooperation with the Government of The Gambia and regularly reassesses its programming 

strategy in order to ensure that programs are in line with the domestic development 

strategy. In recent years, volunteers have focused on training primary and secVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00726 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
719 

ondary school teachers in the use of information technology; coordinating international donor and community initiatives on deforestation, agricultural diversification, and improvement of The Gambia’s natural resource base; and working with village-level health authorities to promote immunizations, malaria prevention, HIV/ 

AIDS education, and child nutrition and growth monitoring. The Peace Corps is the 

central component of our person-to-person diplomacy and will remain a cornerstone 

of United States development assistance within The Gambia. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for your abiding interest in America’s relations with Africa and for holding this hearing. If confirmed, I 

look forward to working with the committee and other Members of Congress to advance United States interests in The Gambia. I would be pleased to answer your 

questions. Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Wells. 

Mr. Boulware. 

STATEMENT OF MARK M. BOULWARE, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA 

Mr. BOULWARE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and 

members of the committee, it’s an honor to appear before you today 

as President Bush’s nominee to serve as United States Ambassador 

to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. I thank the President and 

Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they’ve shown by nominating me for this position. 

Let me also introduce my wife, Nora Jean Boulware, who has 

been a full and tireless partner during my 32 years of public service. And I’d also like to acknowledge the presence of our nephew, 

Lieutenant Lance Beckley. 

Bridging the Sahel and the Sahara, Mauritania faces a cruelly 

challenging environment. Ethnic tensions have at times exploded 

into violence, as they did in April 1989. As I saw firsthand while 

posted in the Gambia, ethnic violence in Mauritania and in Senegal, followed by reciprocal expulsions, displaced hundreds of thousands, including many Afro-Mauritanians, who were expelled from 

their own country. 

The United States has always responded generously to the humanitarian needs of the Mauritanian people, and we continue to do 

so. This year, for example, we are providing about $7.5 million in 

food aid. The Peace Corps is carrying on a tradition, nearly 40-year 

tradition, of doing exceptional grassroots development under the 

most austere conditions imaginable. If confirmed, I would work to 

ensure the continued success of these invaluable programs. 

The United States has also responded to assist Mauritania and 

its neighbors through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, a program designed to confront this threat through an integrated approach linking counterterrorism assistance, development, 

and public diplomacy. To manage this program I will, if confirmed, 

draw on my experience as a U.S. Army officer and a Foreign Service officer, who has both studied and taught at senior military 

schools and who managed political military programs in Cameroon, 

El Salvador, and Brazil. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Mauritania’s decision to take a constructive approach in dealing with the ArabIsraeli conflict and its recognition of Israel in 2000, relieved a longstanding irritant in our relationship. Mauritania remains one of 

only three Arab League members to recognize Israel. 

720 

Mauritania, Mr. Chairman, turned an exciting new page in its 

history last March when the transitional military junta made good 

on its promise to establish democracy. This, the world’s newest democracy, under the leadership of President Abdallahi has moved 

boldly to address problems facing the country. Perhaps most dramatically, his government has acted, not merely to declare again 

that slavery is illegal, but for the first time in Mauritania’s history, 

to make it a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment. It has 

added penalties for government officials who fail to implement the 

law. These strong actions address concerns that have historically 

tempered improvement in our bilateral relations. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as it moves to 

meet these monumental challenges, this new government looks to 

the United States for concrete support. The security relationship is 

important and we should maintain it. Mauritania also seeks our 

help in building democratic institutions, establishing the rule of 

law, and above all, promoting economic development. The success 

of democracy in a developing country that is both Arab and African 

is indeed important to our interests. 

If confirmed, I would work to bring appropriate resources to bear, 

including restoring a modest USAID presence so that multiple assistance programs are informed by genuine development expertise. 

I would also work with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to 

lay out a road map for Mauritania to achieve threshold status as 

quickly as possible. 

Finally, I’m keenly aware of the Chief of Mission’s responsibility 

for the safety and welfare of all Americans and U.S. Government 

employees. If confirmed, Mauritania would be my tenth overseas 

hardship posting. I understand the obligation to ensure the fair 

treatment and high morale of mission staff and family members. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I look forward, if 

confirmed, to working with you, your distinguished colleagues, and 

members of your staffs to advance our agenda with Mauritania. I 

would be happy to answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boulware follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK M. BOULWARE, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today as President Bush’s nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for the 

confidence and trust they have shown by nominating me for this position. 

I would also like to introduce my wife, Nora Jean Boulware, who has been a full 

and tireless partner during my 32 years of public service. Mauritania is a fascinatingly diverse country with a rich history, but it has not been a place from which 

we were accustomed to receive good news. Bridging the northern reaches of the 

Sahel and the heart of the Sahara, Mauritania faces a cruelly challenging natural 

environment. Less than 1 percent of the land is arable, and large segments of the 

population are vulnerable to desertification and to cyclical droughts that can quickly 

lead to critical levels of malnutrition. 

Beyond hardship and suffering, such conditions worsen economic and ethnic tensions that have, at times, exploded into violence as was the case with the terrible 

events of April 1989 when news of a minor episode on the Senegal border produced 

spontaneous acts of violence against both foreign black Africans and AfroMauritanians inside Mauritania, as well as attacks on Mauritanians in Senegal. As 

I witnessed firsthand while posted in The Gambia, ethnic violence followed by reciprocal expulsions displaced hundreds of thousands, including a substantial number 

of Afro-Mauritanians who were expelled from their own country. 

721 

The challenges of a harsh climate and geography, sparse natural resources, and 

an uneasy ethnic mix would be daunting for any government, but the unbroken 

string of authoritarian governments that ruled Mauritania since independence were 

incapable of making meaningful progress in dealing with Mauritania’s internal 

problems. Meanwhile, in the neighboring Maghreb, an Algerian terrorist group 

found a new lease on life as well as regional ambitions as an al-Qaeda franchise. 

This group, calling itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, attacked a Mauritanian 

military outpost in June 2005, killing 17 soldiers. It still represents an active threat 

to stability in the region and to Mauritania, specifically. 

The United States has always responded generously to the humanitarian needs 

of the Mauritania people and we continue to do so. This year, for example, we are 

providing about $7.5 million in Public Law 480 title II food aid. 

The Peace Corps is carrying on a nearly 40-year tradition in Mauritania of doing 

exceptional grass roots development work under some of the most austere conditions 

imaginable. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the continued success of these invaluable programs. 

The United States has also responded to assist Mauritania and its neighbors 

through the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a program designed to confront the threat in the Sahel through an integrated approach linking 

counterterrorism assistance, targeted development assistance, and public diplomacy 

outreach to prevent terrorist groups from using Mauritania or its neighbors as a 

safe haven. In managing this complex program, I will, if confirmed, draw on my long 

experience with the military as a U.S. Army officer and as a Foreign Service officer 

who has both studied and taught at senior military schools and who managed political-military programs in Cameroon, El Salvador, and Brazil. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Mauritania’s decision to take a 

moderate and constructive approach in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict relieved a long-standing irritant in our relationship. That decision took concrete form 

with Mauritania’s recognition of Israel in 2000. Mauritania remains only one of 

three Arab League members to recognize Israel. 

Notwithstanding these improving fundamentals in the United States-Mauritanian 

relationship, we were quite skeptical when a coup brought to power a military junta 

that promised a transition to democracy. We strongly urged a prompt return to constitutional government via free and fair elections and suspended most forms of assistance. 

Mauritania turned an exciting new page in its history in March of this year when 

the transitional military junta did indeed make good on its promise to establish democracy. That democracy, now the world’s newest, under the leadership of President 

Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, has moved boldly to address the problems facing the 

country. Working closely with Parliament, he has acted to increase transparency 

and accountability in the management of public resources, particularly those deriving from new and modest, but potentially growing, oil revenues. His government is 

working with the United Nations and Senegal to return expelled Afro-Mauritanians, 

thereby correcting an historical injustice while eliminating an obstacle to closer relations with an important neighbor. Perhaps most dramatically, his government has 

acted not merely to declare again that slavery is illegal, but for the first time in 

Mauritania’s history to make it a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment. It 

has added penalties for government officials who fail to implement the law. These 

strong actions address concerns that have historically tempered any significant improvement in our bilateral relations. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as it moves to meet these monumental challenges, this new government looks to the United States for concrete support for a democratic Mauritania. The security dimension of our relationship is an 

important one and we should certainly maintain our robust security assistance. 

Mauritania also seeks our assistance in building democratic institutions and mechanisms of good governance, establishing the rule of law, and, above all, promoting 

economic development. 

The success of this new democracy in a developing country that is both Arab and 

African is indeed important to our interests. If confirmed, my job would be to work 

with all of the relevant agencies of government to bring appropriate resources to 

bear. This would include, in particular, working to restore a modest USAID presence, so that multiple development and assistance programs are rational, sustainable, and informed by genuine development expertise. It would also include working 

with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to lay out a clear roadmap for the 

Mauritanian Government to achieve threshold status as quickly as possible. I will 

also work with the Mauritanians to help them take full advantage of the opportunities offered by AGOA. 

722 

Finally, let me note that I am keenly aware of the often difficult conditions of 

service for our personnel in Mauritania as well as the Chief of Mission’s personal 

responsibility for the safety and welfare of all Americans and United States Government employees in country. If confirmed, Mauritania would be my tenth overseas 

posting to a hardship assignment. I understand very well an ambassador’s obligation to ensure the well-being, fair treatment, and high morale of mission staff and 

family members. If confirmed, I pledge to play such a role. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I look forward, if confirmed, to 

working with you, your distinguished colleagues, and members of your staffs to advance our agenda with Mauritania. I would be happy to answer any questions you 

might have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. I regret that we only 

have time to ask a few questions. I certainly do not want it to reflect a lack of interest in learning more because these are all important posts, in particular with regard to Nigeria. There are many 

issues that I’d like to pursue, but we need these posts filled and 

we do have a vote at 10:45, so I can only ask a couple of questions 

of each of you, but I look forward to future opportunities to continue our interactions. 

Ambassador Sanders, the recent elections in Nigeria failed in 

large part because of deep patterns of corruption and political violence and impunity that purvade Nigeria’s political system. Beyond 

the obvious issue of electoral reform, what should the United 

States be doing to press the Nigerian Government into addressing 

these underlying issues in a meaningful way? 

Ms. SANDERS. I understand your concern, Senator, and we have 

the same concerns. In addition to election reform, we are looking 

at urging the Nigerian Government to focus on the underlying 

causes, such as rule of law, transparency, democracy, and human 

rights. We have several activities that are ongoing that we will look 

to strengthen during that period. First and foremost, there seems 

to be a commitment from the Yar’Adua government to look at these 

issues. He has announced several things that encourage us, particularly looking at fiscal responsibility. He has a Fiscal Responsibility Act that he is not only hoping for the Federal Government, 

but certainly for the states to support. 

On the corruption issue specifically, Nigeria is certainly 146 on 

the transparency international list of 163 countries, so corruption 

is a key issue. We have several programs that we will continue. I’d 

like to highlight two of them quickly for you. The Nigerians have 

established a commission called the Economic and Financial 

Crimes Commission. It, to date, has recovered $5 billion in illicit 

funds, $500,000 of that has gone back to American citizens, and 

there’s another $1 million in the pipeline to come back to American 

citizens. 

They have also had 150 convictions that include one former governor. And the resources of the United States have been a part of 

that. We have helped them with money laundering techniques and 

counterfeit techniques. We provided training to the Financial 

Crimes Commission in a lot of areas. Treasury has sent technical 

assistance representatives out there to help them improve their 

ability to catch kingpins, to identify money trails, and to certainly 

help with setting up cases for convictions. 

The other interesting thing that they have done is the Drug and 

Law Enforcement Agency—their version of the Drug Enforcement 

Agency. They have also fired people for corruption and for smugVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00730 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
723 

gling. We are getting ready to put in place a series of x-ray machines and sensors. We have programs with all the law enforcement agencies, as well as the military, because they play a role in 

security there. We’re retraining, not only on techniques and law enforcement principles, but we’re also including a human rights component in what we are providing in the training. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Last week, militants in the Niger Delta kidnapped 11 State officials, alleging that the governor had reneged on an agreement to 

pay them for helping rig the April election. Hundreds of foreign oil 

workers and Nigerians have been kidnapped, including three young 

children and the elderly mother of a local politician. How will you 

work with national and local governments to stop these violent 

practices and to encourage greater attention and political will from 

the central government toward addressing the economic, environmental, and political conditions underlying the escalating unrest in 

the Niger Delta? 

Ms. SANDERS. Currently, Senator, we have a Gulf of Guinea Energy and Security Initiative. It is a framework for dialog with the 

Nigerians and the oil majors regarding energy issues and security 

issues. We have programs now that help and train security in the 

riverine area of the Niger Delta. We are working on the underlying 

issues, in terms of development, looking at exchange programs that 

bring disparate groups together so they have an understanding of 

respect for diversity and they understand the need for civic responsibility, as well as focusing on some of the economic issues. We’re 

looking at offering agricultural incentive programs, income generating programs like we do in other places in Nigeria. Because without addressing the underlying causes of the problems in the Delta, 

the problems will continue. So, we have an active ongoing dialog 

with the Nigerian Government, with the oil majors, and with other 

civil society and a local government organizations in the Delta to 

address some of these underlying issues. 

The last person that was kidnapped was released in early August, and there have not been any kidnappings since then. But the 

security and welfare of Americans are very much high on my agenda, and as we move forward in the Delta, we will ensure that their 

security is paramount in terms of what we do in the Delta, in protecting our people. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

Mr. Wells, you emphasized your proven leadership skills, but 

you’ve never served in a United States Embassy and have no real 

experience in Africa. Why do you believe you’re qualified to manage 

the Embassy in Banjoul? If confirmed, how do you plan to gain 

credibility among your staff and diplomatic counterparts from other 

embassies and with Gambian officials? 

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and an excellent question. 

I’ve had the opportunity in my 20-year career at the Department 

of State, in addition to having served as a Peace Corps Director for 

two tours overseas, to be involved in a number of change initiatives 

and development of leaders, including ambassadors and deputy 

chiefs of mission. I think leadership of a chief of mission requires 

several things, one of which is certainly a knowledge of the interest 

724 

of our country and our citizens. Second, an awareness of the resources available to us to accomplish those ends. 

And finally, I think the ability to articulate a vision that is both 

motivating and is results-driven, in order to provide your team 

with a sense that accomplishment is possible under that kind of a 

leadership. 

I believe that my experiences, both with the Peace Corps and the 

State Department and other venues have well prepared me to accomplish that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I think you alluded to this next 

subject, but if you could comment some more. Since the alleged 

coup attempt on March 2006, the Jammeh government has engaged in a number of practices that raise serious human rights 

concerns, including the harassment of journalists. Nearly a dozen 

journalists are in jail and many others are in exile, while countless 

unsolved murders of supporters of the President are suspected of 

responsibility contribute to an almost permanent climate of fear. 

It’s no wonder that The Gambia is ranked 149th out of 168 countries on Reporters Without Borders annual Press Freedom Index. 

What measures will you take to restore personal security to media 

professionals and press freedom to the citizens of the Gambia? 

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We, as a matter of necessity, must continue to engage the Government of the Gambia on 

these issues. First and foremost, I think it is essential that we continue our efforts to promote dialog, to support National Democratic 

Institute programs, to engage the legislature in their own efforts 

to monitor elections, and to provide seminars on civil military relationships. In addition, I think we need to exercise the leverage that 

we may have, in terms of assisting in additional economic development efforts. The loss of the MCC eligibility, for example, and the 

potential to regain that opportunity, may bode well as some leverage to gain President Jammeh’s confidence in our ability to assist 

them in moving forward. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, sir. 

And now, Mr. Boulware, Mauritania has a long history of corruption in the public sector. The recently elected government is taking 

a number of positive reforms toward transparency in the oil sector. 

What concrete steps is the United States taking to, first, encourage 

the anticorruption reforms, and second ensure that these reforms 

will be implemented and enforced? 

Mr. BOULWARE. Certainly we’re working with the government to 

continually engage them on the issue of corruption, and we do applaud the strong moves that the government has made, in terms 

of working with transparency and oil revenues. They’re working 

closely, not only with the United States, but with the IMF and the 

World Bank to address these issues. 

If confirmed, I will continue to seek ways in which we can bolster 

their capacity to govern justly and honestly. I think, ultimately, 

that’s one of the limiting factors, is that the capacity to pool 

trained and qualified individuals is not as deep as it might be in 

some other places. And, that’s an area where I think we can—we 

could reinforce that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you. I thank all of you very much, 

and I wish you well as we go forward through the confirmation 

725 

process, and of course ultimately, assuming everything goes well, 

with you new posts. Thank you very much. 

I dismiss this panel and ask the second panel to come forward. 

Thank you very much and appreciate this panel coming forward. 

Let’s begin with the statement of Ambassador McGee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES D. MCGEE, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE 

Mr. MCGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s an honor and a privilege for me to appear before you today as President Bush’s nominee 

to be Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe. I appreciate the 

confidence that the President and Secretary Rice have in me by 

putting my name forth for another ambassadorship. If confirmed, 

I look forward to working with the administration, this committee, 

and Congress in advancing United States interests and in helping 

our efforts to put Zimbabwe back on the path of democracy and 

economic prosperity. 

Although Zimbabwe once enjoyed a sound economy and vibrant 

democratic institutions, the country today is suffering under authoritarian misrule. The government continues to commit unspeakable human rights abuses, while enforcing policies that have produced economic collapse, food shortages, and the destruction of a 

once strong judicial, financial, and educational institutions. Regional stability is threatened as the people of Zimbabwe flee their 

rapidly deteriorating country for neighboring countries. 

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would continue our Government’s 

efforts in assisting the people of Zimbabwe in their pursuit of a 

democratically elected government that respects human rights and 

the rule of law. Such a government could promote the welfare of 

its people by implementing the economic reforms needed to bring 

prosperity to Zimbabwe and contribute to regional growth and stability. 

Mr. Chairman, it must be stated, that while the prospects for 

democratic transformation in Zimbabwe are very challenging, we 

remain strongly committed to facilitating peaceful change. Our goal 

must be that the presidential and parliamentary elections take 

place as scheduled for next year and meet international standards. 

However, unless the Government of Zimbabwe quickly establishes conditions for a free and fair election and rigorously implements a level playing field, the presidential and parliamentary 

elections scheduled for next year, will not reflect the will of the 

Zimbabwean people. It is imperative that there be a substantial period of time for all candidates to campaign on a level playing field. 

I feel that we in the United States must continue our efforts. 

Abandoning the people of Zimbabwe to the worst affects of their 

government’s misrule, is not in America’s interest. It is essential, 

now more that ever, for the United States to continue to support 

its support for civil society and pro-democratic elements in 

Zimbabwe. We need to play a major in ensuring that these organizations survive the current repression, to participate in Zimbabwe’s 

eventually recovery. 

We must also continue our humanitarian assistance to the 

Zimbabwean people and ensure that it reaches the people in need. 

Resolution of Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis would stem 

726 

the flow of migrants seeking a better life outside of the country. It 

would restore Zimbabwe’s contribution to regional economic 

growth, enable the country to feed itself, rather than depending on 

international handouts. Would a democratic and prosperous 

Zimbabwe, SADC, the Southern African Development Community, 

would be in a stronger—would be a stronger instrument of regional 

economic development, providing opportunities for African growth 

and for United States private investment. 

Mr. Chairman, Zimbabwe is at an increasingly difficult point in 

its history. I welcome the opportunity to take on the challenge that 

will be faced by the next United States Ambassador to Zimbabwe. 

If confirmed, I will do my best to protect Americans and American 

interests, while working to help the people of Zimbabwe restore 

their country to a democratic and prosperous member of the international community. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear before 

you today and I’m happy to answer any questions that you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McGee follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES D. MCGEE, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor and a privilege for me 

to appear before you today as President Bush’s nominee to be Ambassador to the 

Republic of Zimbabwe. I appreciate the confidence that the President and Secretary 

Rice have in me by putting my name forward for your consideration. If confirmed, 

I look forward to working with the administration, this committee, and the Congress 

in advancing United States interests and in helping our efforts to put Zimbabwe 

back on the path of democracy and economic prosperity. 

Although Zimbabwe once enjoyed a sound economy and vibrant democratic institutions, the country today is suffering under authoritarian misrule. The government 

continues to commit unspeakable human rights abuses while enforcing policies that 

have produced economic collapse, food shortages, and the destruction of once strong 

judicial, financial, health, and educational institutions. Regional stability is threatened as the people of Zimbabwe flee their rapidly disintegrating country to neighboring countries. 

If confirmed, I would continue our government’s efforts in assisting the people of 

Zimbabwe in their pursuit of a democratically elected government that respects 

human rights and the rule of law. Such a government could promote the welfare 

of its people by implementing the economic reforms needed to bring prosperity to 

Zimbabwe and contribute to regional growth and stability. 

In undertaking this assignment, I would call on my years of experience in Africa 

and elsewhere, representing the United States and working to promote democratic 

values. During my 26 years in the Foreign Service, I have served as Ambassador 

to Swaziland, Madagascar, and the Comoros. In these and other assignments, I 

sought to strengthen our bilateral relations while advancing U.S. interests by pressing for democratic reforms. I worked closely with pro-democracy civil society organizations in Swaziland to help write and eventually enact the first constitution that 

country had seen in over 30 years. In Madagascar, I helped the country to prepare 

for and implement successfully free and fair elections following the election crisis 

of 2001. I would work diligently to strengthen pro-democracy organizations in 

Zimbabwe. I strongly believe that there is a deep reservoir of democratic knowledge, 

capacity, and desire in Zimbabwe that needs continuing support to challenge the 

government to enact democratic reforms and to keep hope alive that change is possible. 

Mr. Chairman, it must be stated that while the prospects for democratic transformation in Zimbabwe are very challenging, we remain strongly committed to facilitating peaceful change. Our goal must be that the presidential and parliamentary elections take place as scheduled for next year and meet international standards. However, unless the Government of Zimbabwe quickly establishes conditions 

for a free and fair election and rigorously implements a level playing field, the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for next year will not reflect the will 

727 

of the Zimbabwean people. It is imperative that there be a substantial period of 

time for all candidates to campaign on a level playing field. 

Still, we must continue our efforts. Abandoning the people of Zimbabwe to the 

worst effects of their government’s misrule is not in America’s interests. Returning 

Zimbabwe to a democratic state with a strong economy is necessary to promote regional stability and economic growth. Therefore, we must use the tools at our disposal to achieve the results we seek. The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act and our targeted sanctions program have increased the pressure on those 

individuals that have undermined democracy and prosperity. We are working with 

like-minded members of the international community to increase this pressure. We 

must continue to lend our support to regional efforts to pressure the Government 

of Zimbabwe to enact needed reforms. The United States strongly supports the 

Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) initiative to resolve the political and economic crisis, but the Government of Zimbabwe continues its repression 

and intimidation of civil society, religious organizations, businesspeople, and political groups. It is essential now more than ever for the United States to continue 

its support for civil society and pro-democratic elements in Zimbabwe. We need to 

play a major role in ensuring that these organizations survive the current repression to participate in Zimbabwe’s eventual recovery. 

We must also continue our humanitarian assistance to the Zimbabwean people 

and ensure that it reaches the people in need. In fiscal year 2007, United States 

food aid amounted to over $170 million. Today the United States is helping to feed 

nearly one-in-five Zimbabweans. Nonfood aid humanitarian assistance is approximately $5.1 million, and HIV/AIDS programs were increased to $31 million in fiscal 

year 2007. This funding is helping to deliver antiretroviral treatment to 40,000 

Zimbabweans. These actions demonstrate the generosity and compassion of the 

American people. 

Resolution of Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis would stem the flow of migrants seeking a better life outside Zimbabwe. It would restore Zimbabwe’s contribution to regional economic growth and enable the country to feed itself, rather 

than depending on international handouts. With a democratic and prosperous 

Zimbabwe, SADC could be a stronger instrument of regional economic development 

providing opportunities for African growth and for United States private investment. 

Zimbabwe is at an increasingly difficult point in its history. I welcome the opportunity to take on the challenges that will be faced by the next United States Ambassador to Zimbabwe. If confirmed, I will do my best to protect Americans and American interests while working to help the people of Zimbabwe restore their country 

to a democratic and prosperous member of the international community. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity 

to appear before you today. I am happy to answer any questions you might have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. I appreciated the 

strength and candor of your statement. The situation in Zimbabwe 

is one of the biggest disappointments that I’ve witnessed in 15 

years, when so many other countries in Africa have had real positive development. So it is enormously important that that signal be 

sent and that, of course, that you follow through with what you 

said you were going to do with regard to this very challenging post. 

Dr. McMullen 

STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD K. MCMULLEN, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE STATE OF ERITREA 

Dr. MCMULLEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you hear today. I’m honored that President Bush is 

nominating me for the position of Ambassador to Eritrea, and I’m 

grateful to Secretary Rice for her confidence and trust. 

With the Chairman’s indulgence, I’d like to acknowledge the 

presence of my wife, Jane, and our son, Owen, another son—excuse 

me, Wyatt, is here—Owen is in Australia and could not be here 

today. 

Over the years as an American diplomat, I’ve developed a deep 

appreciation for the hardships and sacrifices faced by Foreign ServVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00735 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
728 

ice families around the world. The support I have received from my 

wife and sons has been invaluable. They have made important contributions, in their own right, to enhancing Americas standing 

abroad. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work to promote U.S. interests, drawing on nearly 25 years of diplomatic service, much of 

it in hardship posts in the developing world. 

As Deputy Chief of Mission in Rangoon, Burma, I strongly supported persecuted ethnic minority groups and the oppressed democratic movement, headed by Nobel Peace Lauriat, Augn San Suu 

Kyi, while maintaining a relationship with the ruling Hunta. If 

confirmed by the Senate, I will do my best to advance America’s 

multiple goals in Eritrea amid a very difficult environment. 

Eritrea once cooperated with the United States on regional stability in the Horn of Africa. The cooperation was important and appreciated. Today, the unresolved border dispute between Eritrea 

and Ethiopia poses a threat to regional stability. A repeat of the 

bloody 1998 to 2000 war would be ruinous to all involved and 

would undermine a number of U.S. objectives in the region and beyond. Reports of air train support for militant extremists in Somalia, including some with alleged links to terrorism, are very concerning. If confirmed, I will work to advance our national interest 

to reestablish cooperation with Eritrea on these issues and to ensure that the message of strong U.S. opposition to terrorism and 

its sponsors is consistently and unambiguously sent to all. 

Mr. Chairman, we have grave concerns about human rights 

issues in Eritrea, including democracy, rule of law, freedom of the 

press, and religious freedoms. If confirmed, I will seek to promote 

greater respect for human rights, the establishment of democratic 

political cultures, and conditions conducive to addressing the country’s diverse human development needs. 

I strongly believe that the national interest of both the United 

States and the state of Eritrea would benefit from a return to a 

more cooperative bilateral relationship that characterized the early 

years of Eritrean independence. If confirmed, I will ensure that we 

undertake a strong public outreach program, emphasizing mutual 

respect, shared interest, and obligations in our common humanity. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, while the United States and Eritrea do 

not enjoy a close cooperative relationship, as we have in the past, 

Eritrea’s strategic Red Sea location, its active regional role, and its 

economic and human potential require us to remain engaged. 

Working with you and other members of Congress, in conjunction 

with the dedicate employees of Embassy Asmara, I trust we can 

move toward achieving key American objectives, while encouraging 

Eritrea to realize its considerable potential. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look 

forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. McMullen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD K. MCMULLEN, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE STATE OF ERITREA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you here today. I am honored that President Bush has nominated me 

for the position of Ambassador to Eritrea and am grateful to Secretary Rice for her 

confidence and trust. 

729 

With the Chairman’s indulgence, I would like to acknowledge the presence of my 

wife, Jane, and our son, Wyatt. Our son, Owen, who is studying in Australia, could 

not be with us here today. During nearly 25 years as a career diplomat, I have developed a deep appreciation of the hardships and sacrifices faced by Foreign Service 

families around the world. The support I have received from my wife and sons has 

been invaluable; they have also made important contributions to enhancing America’s standing abroad. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work to promote U.S. interests, drawing on 

nearly 25 years of diplomatic service, much of it hardship posts in the developing 

world, and in particular on my experience as Deputy Chief of Mission in Rangoon. 

In Burma I strongly supported persecuted ethnic minorities and the oppressed 

democratic movement headed by Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, while 

maintaining a working relationship with the ruling junta. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I will do my best to advance America’s multiple goals 

in Eritrea amid a very challenging environment. The cooperative bilateral relationship we once enjoyed with Eritrea has grown strained over the last decade. 

Eritrea once cooperated with the United States on regional stability in the Horn 

of Africa. This cooperation was important and appreciated. However, the unresolved 

border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia poses a threat to regional stability; a 

repeat of the bloody 1998–2000 war would be ruinous to all involved and would undermine a number of United States objectives in the region and beyond. Reports of 

Eritrean support for militant extremists in Somalia, including individuals and 

groups with links to designated terrorists, are very concerning. If I am confirmed, 

I will work to advance our national interests, to reestablish cooperation with Eritrea 

on these issues, and to ensure that the message of strong United States opposition 

to terrorism and its sponsors is consistently and unambiguously sent to all. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we have grave concerns about 

human rights issues in Eritrea, including democracy, rule of law, freedom of the 

press, and religious freedoms. Thousands of individuals have been imprisoned, including two Eritrean employees of the United States Embassy detained since 2001. 

Several thousand prisoners of conscience are being held without charge in indefinite 

and incommunicado detention. If confirmed, I will seek to promote greater respect 

for human rights, the establishment of a democratic political culture, and conditions 

conducive to addressing the country’s diverse human development needs. 

I strongly believe that the national interests of both the United States and the 

State of Eritrea would benefit from a return to the more cooperative bilateral relationship that characterized the early years of Eritrean independence. If confirmed, 

I will ensure that we undertake a strong public outreach program emphasizing mutual respect, shared interests and obligations, and our common humanity. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, while the United States and Eritrea do not enjoy the close 

cooperative relationship of the past, Eritrea’s strategic Red Sea location, its active 

regional role, and its economic and human potential require us to remain engaged. 

Working with you and other Members of Congress, in conjunction with the dedicated employees of Embassy Asmara, I trust that we can move toward achieving key 

American objectives while encouraging Eritrea to realize its considerable potential. 

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. McMullen, I appreciated your statement 

very much. 

And Dr. Nigro. 

STATEMENT OF DR. LOUIS J. NIGRO, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD 

Dr. NIGRO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I’m deeply honored to appear before you today. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice 

for entrusting me with this important responsibility. If confirmed 

by the Senate, I would work with the committee and others in Congress to advance the interest of the United States in Chad and its 

troubled region. 

Mr. Chairman, permit me to introduce to you my wife, Tarja, my 

brother, Robert, and his wife, Anita, who are here with me today 

before you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome to all of you. 

730 

Dr. NIGRO. Thank you. 

My wife and I met in Chad, where I served from 1988 to 1990 

and we were married in Haiti in 1994 while serving in our embassy 

there. She has been an essential part of my Foreign Service career. 

Without her love, support, and counsel I could not be here before 

you today. 

Mr. Chairman, United States interests in Chad have expanded 

considerably in the past few years. Chad today is the scene of a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. In eastern Chad, Darfur refugees and Chadian displaced persons flee violence in their homelands, while refugees from the Central African Republic seek safety 

in southern Chad. The country’s vast spaces and porous borders 

leave it vulnerable to infiltration by terrorists. And Chad is now 

home to the largest—largest single United States private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa, the Cameroon-Chad oil pipeline 

project. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States has three key strategic goals 

in Chad. First, to maintain adequate levels of protection and assistance to all Sudanese and Central African refugees and displaced 

Chadians, and to encourage Chad to contribute to a durable solution to the Darfur conflict. Second, to strengthen Chad’s capacity 

to deal with terrorist threats. And third, to support Chad’s political 

evolution to democratic governance that respects human rights and 

upholds the rule of law. 

This last is essential. A more democratic, and therefore more stable Chad, would be a more effective partner in addressing regional 

problems, including the Darfur conflict, chronic instability in the 

Central African Republic, and foreign terrorist threats. 

There is much I hope to accomplish in Chad, if the Senate confirms—were to confirm my nomination. First and foremost, I would 

commit myself to ensuring the continued safety and welfare of the 

American community there. Second, I would reinforce our efforts on 

the ground to provide humanitarian relief to refugees and displaced 

persons and to expedite the deployment of peacekeeping forces to 

protect them and the humanitarian workers assisting them. Third, 

I would focus the embassy’s work in support of multilateral efforts 

to restore peace and stability in Chad and in the region, to permit 

all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes safely. 

Fourth, I would maintain bilateral and multilateral cooperation on 

counterterrorism efforts. And finally, I would continue our efforts 

to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, while 

helping Chad to deliver better health, educational, and other social 

services to its people, and promoting increased trade, investment, 

and economic growth. 

With these as my goals, should the Senate decide to confirm my 

nomination, I would hope to help Chad to be more secure, more 

prosperous, and more democratic, as well as a more effective partner for the United States in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before 

you and I welcome any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Nigro follows:] 

731 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. LOUIS J. NIGRO, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee to be the next Ambassador of the United States 

of America to the Republic of Chad. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for 

entrusting me with this important responsibility. If confirmed by the Senate, I will 

work with the committee and others in Congress to advance the interests of the 

United States in Chad and the region. 

Joining me here today are my wife, Tarja, my brother, Robert, and his wife, Anita. 

My wife and I met in Chad where I served in 1988–1990; we were married in Haiti 

1994 while serving there. She has been an essential part of my Foreign Service career; without her love, support, and counsel, I could not be here before you today. 

Since joining the Foreign Service in 1980, besides my service in Chad and Haiti, 

I have served overseas in Guinea, Cuba, the Holy See, and the Bahamas, as well 

as in Washington in the Department of State’s Policy Planning Council and Operations Center, and in the offices of Western European Affairs and of Canadian Affairs. I have also represented the Department of State at the U.S. Army War College and as Diplomat in Residence at the University of Houston. 

Mr. Chairman, the Republic of Chad is situated in the heart of Africa and shares 

borders with six other countries, including Sudan, Libya, and the Central African 

Republic. Chad affects and is affected by events in all of its neighbors. Most of its 

estimated 10 million people—who form a rich mosaic of languages, religions, and 

ethnic groups—are herders or farmers, suffering levels of poverty, illiteracy, disease, 

and infant mortality that are among the highest in the world. 

Chad, for many years, was synonymous with isolation and civil disorder. The 

USAID Mission was closed in 1995; the Peace Corps suspended operations indefinitely in 2006. But United States interests in Chad have expanded considerably in 

the past several years. Chad, today, is the scene of a humanitarian crisis of epic 

proportions. In Eastern Chad, Darfur refugees and Chadian displaced persons flee 

violence in their homelands while refugees from the Central African Republic seek 

safety in southern Chad. The country’s vast spaces and porous borders leave it vulnerable to infiltration by terrorists. And Chad is now home to the largest single 

United States private-sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa, the Exxon/Mobilmanaged Cameroon-Chad oil pipeline project; Chad and the World Bank have 

agreed to an innovative system for monitoring and managing the revenues it produces. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States has three key strategic goals in Chad. First, to 

maintain adequate levels of protection and assistance to the hundreds of thousands 

of Sudanese and Central African refugees and displaced Chadians, and to encourage 

Chad to contribute to a durable solution to the Darfur conflict. Second, to strengthen Chad’s capacity to deal with terrorist threats. And third, to support Chad’s political evolution to democratic governance that respects human rights and upholds the 

rule of law. This last is essential. A more democratic Chad would be a more stable 

and more effective partner in addressing regional problems, including the Darfur 

conflict, chronic instability in the Central African Republic, and foreign terrorist 

threats. 

There is much I hope to accomplish in Chad, if the Senate decides to confirm my 

nomination as ambassador. First and foremost, I would commit myself to ensuring 

the continued safety and welfare of the American community. Second, working 

closely with my counterparts in the region and beyond, I would reinforce our efforts 

on the ground to provide humanitarian relief to refugees and displaced persons and 

to expedite the deployment of peacekeeping forces to protect them and the humanitarian workers assisting them. Third, I would focus the embassy’s work in support 

of multilateral efforts to restore peace and stability in Chad and in the region, to 

permit the refugees and displaced persons to return home safely. Fourth, I would 

maintain bilateral and multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism efforts. Finally, 

I would continue our efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of 

law, while helping Chad to deliver better health, educational, and other social services to its people and promoting increased trade, investment, and economic growth. 

With these as my goals, should the Senate confirm my nomination, I would hope 

to help Chad to be more secure, more prosperous, and more democratic—and therefore a more effective partner for the United States in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I welcome any questions you may have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor. 

732 

None of these are easy posts. They are tough and they are also 

very interesting and complex. I spent a fair amount of time in each 

of these countries and I certainly believe that each is very important, not only to security and issues within the region, but to the 

security of the United States. So I again thank you for your willingness to serve. 

Ambassador McGee, the reality is that the United States has little positive influence with President Mugabe. Which nations or organizations do you think have the most weight in Harare and how 

can the United States actively engage with an affect their messages to the Zimbabwean Government? 

Mr. MCGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that the regional 

platforms in southern Africa, such as the Southern Africa Developing Community, has tremendous amount of weight. They have 

influence, but unfortunately I do not believe that they’ve brought 

all of this influence to bear on the situation in Zimbabwe. I think 

it’s incumbent upon the United States Government to continue to 

work with groups, such as SADC, to improve civil societies ability 

in Zimbabwe to prepare for the upcoming elections. 

SADC has done this before. I can’t say that they’ve done an excellent job on it. President Imbeke in South Africa has taken on a 

leadership role and to date, that leadership role still remains uncertain in our mind on how effective it has been. I do believe that 

we should continue to reach out to these organizations, as well as 

civil society elements within Zimbabwe to prepare the country for 

the upcoming elections. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I too have had some concerns about the 

strength of SADCs approach with regard to Zimbabwe and appreciate your saying that. As you know, your predecessor, Ambassador 

Christopher Dell, was known for his persistent public criticism of 

the Government of Zimbabwe. Do you think that this was effective, 

and how would your approach resemble and how would it differ 

from that of Ambassador Dell? 

Mr. MCGEE. I think Ambassador Dell’s approach was absolutely 

necessary. The excesses of the Government of Zimbabwe had to be 

made known to the international community. And the fact that 

Ambassador Dell was willing, at a very personal price, to continue 

to put these excesses front and center reflects his long history of 

service to—and excellent service—to the United States Government. I think he was very effective in what he did. 

My approach, if confirmed Mr. Senator, would be somewhat different. I believe that we still need to continue to make certain that 

any excesses are presented so that the international community is 

aware of them. At the same time, I think that we need to develop 

contacts within the existing government, looking for the day that 

there is regime, peaceful regime change within Zimbabwe. I think 

that we need to reach out and make certain that we do have interlocutors—that we have people that we can deal with in a new representative Government within Zimbabwe. And to that end, if confirmed by the Senate, I will work diligently to establish those types 

of contacts, looking for the day that we will have a government in 

Zimbabwe that’s representative of the people of Zimbabwe. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. 

733 

Dr. McMullen, a humanitarian crisis is unfolding in the Somali 

region of Ethiopia as the Ethiopian military intensifies its offensive 

against the Ogaden National Liberation Front rebels, which the 

Ethiopian Government claims is being backed by Eritrea. This crisis is linked to the simmering conflict in Somalia, which many say 

is a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As United States Ambassador to Eritrea, what approach and specific measure would you 

use to manage the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, at a time when the United States views the Ethiopians as an 

ally in the war on terror, and essential to ensure minimal stability 

in Somalia, but also, considering that Ethiopian troops are being 

accused of committing horrendous human rights abuses in both Somalia and in Southeastern Ethiopia. 

Dr. MCMULLEN. It’s a—the Horn of Africa right now is a very 

tangled web. And Eritrea has long had a practice of supporting opposition groups in the region, insurgent groups as well. They’ve 

done so in Ethiopia, in southern Sudan, in Darfur, eastern Sudan, 

where they were—played a key role in the recent eastern Sudan 

peace accord, also in Somalia. 

Now, we need to make sure that they understand there’s a clear 

distinction from the United States, between supporting opposition 

groups and being a state-sponsor of terrorism. Some of our concerns and public officials comments recently about reports of support for Islamic—the Islamic Courts in Somalia, other more extreme groups with alleged links to terrorist groups is something 

that is very concerning. One of my jobs is to make sure that the 

message of American opposition to terrorism and supporters of terrorism is loud and clear. And that should Eritrea decide to go that 

route, they do so with their eyes wide open. 

Now, the border with Ethiopia, the bloody terrible war from 1998 

to 2000, could reignite, and we hope to work closely with the other 

witnesses to the Algiers agreement that ended the 2000 war. That’s 

the United States, Algeria, the African Union, European Union, 

and the United Nations, to help find ways to have both parties, 

Ethiopia and Eritrea, meet their obligations under that peace accord. We are strongly supportive of Secretary General Ban Ki 

Moon’s offer of—to work, to develop mechanisms that will help 

build confidence between the two parties and lead to an implementation of the Algiers Accord, which right now both sides are not fulfilling their obligations. So, we hope that the border tensions can 

be diffused and we’ll be very clear in our opposition to sponsors of 

terrorism and terrorism acts in the Horn. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Doctor, in September 2004, Eritrea was designated as a ‘‘Country of Particular Concern’’ under 

the International Religious Freedom Act. 

Dr. MCMULLEN. Yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What has been the impact of this designation 

on United States relations with Eritrea and on United States interests in the region? 

Dr. MCMULLEN. The designation of being a country of particular 

concern brings with it the possibility of sanctions. The United 

States has imposed sanctions on Eritrea, in terms of some defense 

sales. Right now we have been working on the International Freedom of Religion’s report. The Embassy in Asmara is one of the key 

734 

sources of information about that. We are concerned, not only 

about the—right now the Government of Eritrea allows four religions or denominations to practice religion there. There are others 

who are seeking to become registered, and even those four registered denominations or religions find that their freedom to operate and to worship as they wish are being imposed and encroached 

upon by the Government of Eritrea. As, if confirmed as ambassador, I will meet with religious leaders of all varieties in Eritrea 

and with government leaders in Eritrea, to continue to make them 

aware of our strong interest and support for international religious 

freedoms. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

Dr. Nigro, while much attention has been focused on the refugees 

from Darfur and eastern Chad, instability in Chad itself is longstanding and worsening. In fact, in addition to 230,000 refugees 

from Darfur living in eastern Chad, there are now 180,000 

Chadians who have been displaced from the internal conflict. There 

are currently no peace negotiations being conducted that include all 

armed opposition groups and there are no mechanisms in place to 

address and resolve the inter-ethnic conflict that has caused much 

of this internal displacement. What would you do as ambassador 

to work toward a comprehensive peace in Chad and what incentives would you offer—or consider offering—to all parties? 

Dr. NIGRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is of course an important subject. If confirmed as Ambassador to Chad, I would continue to encourage all Chadians to engage in dialog aimed at bringing about political stability in Chad. Specifically, there are three 

paths to this end that are being pursued. Just last month, the Government of Chad, the ruling party, and most of the opposition parties agreed to an electoral reform program that could lead to free, 

fair, and credible legislative and communal elections in 2009. This 

would be an excellent first step on Chad’s evolution toward sustainable democracy. 

Also, we support fully the idea of a European Union-United Nations joint peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad, which would be 

aimed at protecting the refugees and displaced persons and would 

have the side-effect, the additional effect of reducing tensions in 

the region. 

And finally, we support the African Union and United Nationssponsored Darfur peace talks that should resume next month, as 

a way of reducing tensions in the area and giving Chad a chance 

to work more seriously on a transition to democracy. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor, in 2006 the Chadian Government 

substantially changed its much-heralded petroleum revenue law, 

which was designed to ensure a high-level of antipoverty spending. 

According to the IMF, Chad is now spending around 12 percent of 

its gross domestic product on the military, which makes it nearly 

impossible that the government will meet its target of spending 70 

percent of its revenues on poverty-reduction activities. In your position as ambassador, how would you work to see that oil revenues 

are spent efficiently towards poverty reduction in Chad? 

Dr. NIGRO. Thank you. If confirmed, I would work in at least two 

areas with the goal of encouraging Chad to do just that. Chad and 

the World Bank are still working under their agreement for levels 

735 

of government spending—70 percent on poverty reductuio sectors, 

and 30 percent on all other sectors. Now, the Chadians have not 

met that fully, but they are working toward it. So, we would encourage the World Bank and Chad to continue collaborating seriously under this agreement, as a way of helping the Chadians arrive at a reasonable level of spending in both sectors. 

Second, I would urge the Chadians to arrive at full participation 

in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. They’ve gone 

part of the way. They need to go all the way to be able to access 

the assistance and the support that they would need to ensure that 

their petroleum revenues are managed in a responsible way and in 

conformity with recognized international standards. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor. 

I want to again apologize for the necessarily limited time we had 

for this hearing today, and I again encourage you as you go forward. The only other thing I want to say is, having just returned 

from a trip to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where we went 

to Northern Uganda, what you people do with the support of your 

families and staff is a tremendous contribution to our country. The 

places many of you are going are very challenging, so I sincerely 

wish you the best. 

So thank you again , and I look forward to working with you as 

this process continues. 

That concludes the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 10:23 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. ROBIN R. SANDERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Nigeria? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights 

and democracy in Nigeria? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. There are several areas of concern regarding human rights in Nigeria. 

They range from addressing unequal treatment and violence against women; improving prison conditions and the welfare of children, particularly trafficking in persons; fostering respect and appreciation for the strength that diversity brings to a 

nation; and better civil-military/police relations throughout the country so that the 

population does not feel intimidated. 

If confirmed, I would seek to work with the United States Government interagency team at the United States Mission in Nigeria, the private sector, and NGOs 

to not only partner with the Nigerian Government and encourage its leadership and 

visibility on these issues, but also to provide United States stewardship and expertise in addressing the key issues noted above through dialog and programs. 

On the democracy front—human rights and good governance to me are pillars of 

this—improving the rule of law, combating corruption, and increasing transparency 

with regard to the use of Nigeria’s strategic resources are key challenges. If confirmed, I will work with ‘‘U.S. Team Nigeria’’ and a range of stakeholders on these 

issues. It will be important to ensure the new government’s commitment to addressing these issues from both a policy and programmatic perspective, and for the 

United States to have a fluid approach to our activities that includes capacity building in key sectors, particularly justice, election reform, anticorruption, education, 

and health. All of these things must work in concert with good Nigerian Government leadership in order for Nigeria’s evolving democracy to progress. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Nigeria in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

736 

Answer. Nigeria and its people are in a phase where the new government is finding its footing in a range of sectors connected to better and just governance and improved human rights. The legacy inherited by the new government includes such 

major challenges as high unemployment, rampant poverty, health issues (HIV/ 

AIDS, malaria), poor education, security challenges, and a crumpling infrastructure. 

Our ‘‘partnership with stewardship’’ and our ‘‘propitious engagement’’ will aim to assist Nigeria in addressing these fundamental challenges to improved human rights, 

economic growth and development, and a better way of life for the Nigerian people. 

If confirmed, I believe that our current operations plan which has specific focus on 

these areas will play a key role in supporting the government’s efforts to move the 

nation forward. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all employees of Mission Nigeria (Abuja 

and Lagos) promote not only the importance of, but also respect for, human rights. 

I see human rights issues as the core of a democratic society. I will not only encourage a human rights focus in what we say but also in what we do outwardly as well 

as within the Mission itself (among our own employees). 

One of the things I hope to do—if confirmed—is develop an ‘‘embassy on the road’’ 

type activity where officers get out of the Mission and travel throughout the country 

to talk about U.S. values and human rights at the people-to-people level, not just 

with the government at the policy level. We need to do both. I believe in recognizing 

and highlighting superior service and certainly will do so in the area of human 

rights. I will provide leadership in ensuring that all are recognized for their important contributions toward advancing our human rights objectives in Nigeria. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. In virtually every assignment as a Foreign Service officer, I have been 

involved in promoting democracy and human rights. My engagement has ranged 

from the very personal to the policy level. 

In my 28 years in the Foreign Service, I have mostly worked in countries in transition—fragile or nascent democracies that were addressing human rights, rule of 

law, and struggling with the principles of freedom of speech and association. In particular, in the Republic of Congo (ROC)—a post conflict country—I worked with the 

NGOs, academics, women’s groups, and journalists on civil-military/police relations 

(training and workshops); respect for ethnic diversity (programs for at-risk pygmy 

to breakdown stereotypes via ethnically diverse ‘‘school garden projects’’); 

participatory democracy (strengthening the capacity of the national assembly); and, 

encouraging dialog and inclusion of the opposition. In addition to working in the 

war-torn Pool Region of ROC, which in many ways is similar to the Niger Delta, 

Embassy Brazzaville focused on community and grassroots organizations to help restart microenterprise programs; design excombatant training and education programs for youth, young women, and child soldiers; and workshops on freedoms of 

speech and association. In other posts such as Namibia and Senegal, we developed 

activities that highlighted respect for ethnic diversity; the importance of an independent judiciary and media; and the role of a robust national assembly. In all 

cases, the groundwork we laid played a role in where these countries are today. 

Question. Oil companies operating in Nigeria have been severely criticized for alleged environmental destruction resulting from their operations. At the same time, 

immense oil profits from the Niger Delta region have certainly not flowed back in 

to the people living there. If confirmed, what steps would you take as ambassador 

to promote environmentally sustainable development and the equitable distribution 

of resources and to help Nigeria avoid the ‘‘resource curse’’? 

Answer. The environmental problems and lack of equitable distribution of resources in the Niger River Delta are amplified by poor infrastructure, lack of transparency in allocating oil revenue for development by local governments, poor education, high unemployment, security issues, and criminality. The Delta’s wetlands 

face serious environmental problems, but there are few modern empirical studies 

that fully document and detail the damage. Since oil majors have made some 

progress in preventing accidents, pipeline sabotage has emerged as the significant 

cause of environmental damage. Many of the oil companies do provide resources to 

state governments for development under the umbrella of the Niger Delta DevelopVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00744 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
737 

ment Corporation (NOGG), but there are transparency issues within NDCC as to 

how these funds are used. We will continue to push for transparency in this area. 

In addition, the United States regularly meets Nigeria and its international partners, including the oil majors. In fact, there is a framework for dialog called the 

‘‘Gulf of Guinea Energy and Security Initiative,’’ under which we are discussing various ways to bring our ‘‘partnership with stewardship’’ to these issues. For example, 

we have offered to provide training to strengthen customs enforcement and border 

security, raised the need for improved transparency in state and local budgets so 

that more resources can be directed to Niger development, and USAID is looking 

at options for addressing agricultural challenges in the region. We will continue to 

offer programs under this framework to address both these issues. We also are cooperating with the Government of Nigeria on coastal surveillance and on ‘‘train and 

equip’’ programs for a Nigerian riverine unit that could address fisheries violations, 

oil theft, piracy, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and environmental damage from 

unauthorized pipeline tapping. We encourage U.S. private sector partnerships in the 

Delta to focus on profitable agricultural livelihoods, technology transfer, constructive 

use of currently ‘‘flared’’ natural gas, creating more domestic refining capacity, developing biofuels for domestic use, building greater public access to telecommunications networks and health care, and curbing oil theft. From the United States 

Government side, both Ex-IM and TDA are focused on providing their products to 

address both the ‘‘flared gas,’’ refining, and waste management issues. 

Nigeria’s federal government has an important role to play in addressing the challenges in the Delta, but we believe that the support of the powerful and wellresourced state governors is the key to any durable solution. USAID has worked 

with the governors and legislatures of several states to improve coordination, accountability, on development funding on poverty alleviation programs, and to 

projects to address agriculture challenges in the region with the hope of expanding 

some of its income generating projects to the area. These initiatives now must be 

implemented and incorporated into a regional strategy. There remains a widespread 

lack of transparency of budgets, particularly at the state and local level. The federal 

government must establish and empower more effective auditing and inspector general functions. Overall, Nigeria needs to radically refocus its efforts to use oil revenues in a transformative way to promote development and address poverty, and by 

all indications the new government has taken some steps in that direction by seeking to put in policies to address these revenues. Continued use of oil revenues to 

build patronage and personal wealth is a recipe for serious instability in the country. Consequently, we are funding participation by local Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to 

promote transparency in the oil sector. Nigeria is the only country in the EITI that 

has to date invited NGOs in as stakeholders in this process. 

If confirmed, I will continue to press the Nigerian federal and state governments, 

as well as the oil majors, to follow through on these efforts, particularly under the 

framework of the ‘‘Gulf of Guinea Initiative,’’ and further cooperate with us through 

its Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and other institutions, to combat 

corruption, smuggling, and other illegal acts. 

Question. Sadly, corruption is almost a hallmark of business and government in 

Nigeria. At the same time, HIV/AIDS has hit Nigeria with massive force: an estimated 3 million Nigerians are HIV positive. Through PEPFAR, United States assistance to Nigeria to help fight HIV/AIDS has dramatically increased in recent 

years, from $163.6 million in fiscal year 2006 to $304 million in fiscal year 2007, 

and will likely climb still higher next year. If confirmed as ambassador, what do 

you envision would be the particular challenges of fighting HIV/AIDS in a country 

so known for corruption? How would you address those challenges and others associated with managing such a large program? 

Answer. The potential impact of HIV/AIDS is indeed a major security and health 

issue both for the country and the region as a whole. Issues of governance and accountability in Nigeria create specific challenges in the fight against HIV/AIDS in 

programming with either public or NGO sectors. The management of U.S. Government PEPFAR assistance on the ground is highly cognizant of this challenge and 

has a solid strategy to ensure accountability and results. 

Although they coordinate many of their activities with the Government of Nigeria 

to ensure that there is a link with country’s national HIV/AIDS plan, the Departments of State (DOS) and Defense (DoD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) generally do not fund the 

Government of Nigeria directly, but rather have almost all of their funds going primarily through international implementing partners either via contracts or cooperative agreement grants. 

738 

There are some limited exceptions. During fiscal year 2007, DoD provided $100,000 to the Nigerian Ministry of Defense for HIV/AIDS activities. 

In fiscal year 2008, CDC is planning to issue a Request for Applications that 

would make available significant resources to the Ministry of Health’s National 

AIDS program. The U.S. Government supports institutional capacity-building within 

the Government of Nigeria to improve its systems for greater transparency and accountability. 

United States Government PEPFAR programming decisions are run through the 

interagency United States Government Nigeria Country Team for management and 

strategy development, which ensures that there is full transparency and communications regarding the selection of implementers and in the funding allocations, 

and types of programs to ensure they are in line with our goals and objectives for 

PEPFAR resources. Of note, the interagency United States Government team in Nigeria most recently won the PEPFAR ‘‘Best Program’’ award for their effectiveness 

in advancing the goals and objectives of PEPFAR. 

It is critical to the success of the PEPFAR program that partners implementing 

HIV/AIDS programs adequately meet the management standards, including financial management standards, set by the U.S. Government. While it is PEPFAR policy 

worldwide to engage with and expand the capacity of local organizations, there is 

a dearth of local organizations in Nigeria that can meet these high standards. The 

United States Government has engaged with local and international partners to 

strengthen the management capacity of Nigerian civil society organizations. U.S. 

Government agencies generally conduct comprehensive and extensive pre-award 

surveys for all local partners, as well as direct monitoring and supervision by cognizant technical officers with regular and in-depth site visits to ensure that expenditures match activities and results on the ground. 

Given the security situation in the Niger River Delta, PEPFAR funds are not 

being used directly there. However, the United States continues to engage with the 

Government of Nigeria on addressing the challenges in the Delta. 

U.S. Government funding decisions and programmatic initiatives are shared with 

other key bilateral and multilateral donors to ensure that proposed activities are additive and harmonized with other donor-funded efforts. The U.S. Government team 

is actively involved in several initiatives to expand the breadth of donor coordination, with both CDC and USAID sitting on the Development Partners Group for 

HIV/AIDS whose mandate is to maximize efficiencies in donor funding for the HIV 

response. 

RESPONSES OF BARRY L. WELLS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps—State 

Department Relations? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable? 

Answer. I fully understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable in order that the Peace Corps may maintain its independent posture from the 

concerns and strategy of our foreign policy. 

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must 

remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’ role and its need for separation from the 

day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. Government agencies’’? 

Answer. I fully understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ 

and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’ role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. Government agencies.’’ 

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise 

your chief of mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much 

autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does 

not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies’’? 

Answer. Per Secretary Rice’s requests in 3.B of the cable, I pledge to exercise my 

chief of mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does not 

739 

conflict with U.S. objectives and policies.’’ Autonomy and flexibility are essential to 

the Peace Corps’ ability to work effectively at the grassroots level, and the U.S. Mission under my leadership, if confirmed, will not interfere with the day-to-day operations of the Peace Corps so long as they do not conflict with U.S. foreign policy 

objectives and policies. I believe my experience as a Peace Corps country director 

and as a State Department employee will help me understand and follow the guidelines if I am confirmed as ambassador. 

RESPONSES OF BARRY L. WELLS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in The 

Gambia? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in The Gambia? What do you hope to accomplish through 

these actions? 

Answer. The recent deterioration of press freedom and political rights are the 

most pressing human rights issues in The Gambia. The negative human rights 

trend has been particularly evident since the failed coup in March 2006, as authorities have cracked down on the media and other forms of public dissent. Many of 

the suspects arrested for participation in this plot have received hefty sentences, 

and the fairness of their trials and respect for their rights remains questionable. 

Press freedom in The Gambia has deteriorated significantly in recent months. Several journalists have been arrested arbitrarily, and the Committee to Protect Journalists ranked The Gambia as the No. 1 country for press freedom deterioration in 

May 2007. 

If confirmed as United States Ambassador to The Gambia, I will ensure that engagement with the Jammeh government on these slippages remains a central priority of the United States Mission. I will pay close attention to developments in this 

area and continually stress to the Government of The Gambia (GOTG), at both ministerial and working levels, that press freedom, civil liberties, and transparency are 

essential pieces of functional multiethnic state. To promote human rights within the 

government and amongst the population at large, I will use all of the diplomatic 

tools available. I will encourage the GOTG to improve its human rights and civil 

liberties records in order to reestablish Millennium Challenge Account eligibility. I 

will encourage democracy assistance by organizations such as the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute utilize other available 

funds to support trainings for journalists. It is my hope that as a result of these 

actions, the GOTG will make measurable progress toward respecting the political 

rights of its citizens and nurturing an independent press. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in The Gambia in advancing human rights and democracy in 

general? Gambia appears to be engaged in a downward slide in terms of increasing 

human rights abuses, restrictions on political rights and liberties, and corruption. 

If confirmed as ambassador, how would you seek to reverse this downward trajectory or respond to it if it continues? 

Answer. Lack of resources, training, and institutional capacity in The Gambia 

limit our ability to address human rights in The Gambia. The United States and 

other donor nations have programs in place to assist in overcoming these challenges. 

The U.S. Embassy works with both national and international NGOs that monitor 

press freedom and seek to improve institutional capacity. If confirmed, I will continue this cooperation. 

Another potential obstacle to addressing the recent decline of The Gambia’s 

human rights record is an adverse reaction by the Jammeh government. If confirmed as ambassador I will engage the Gambian Government on human rights in 

the most sensitive of possible manners. I will emphasize that The Gambia is a sovereign state but at the same time, I will urge the GOTG to increase government 

transparency and to protect its peoples’ political and press rights as a means of furthering its legitimacy and resultant long-term stability. On a personal level, I will 

seek to mend the United States’ tense relationship with President Jammeh while 

making clear that the U.S. Government holds human rights and government transparency in the highest regard. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

740 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. Promoting democracy and human rights in The Gambia is a top priority 

for the country team in Banjul. Promoting human rights is a key element of the 

job description of several country team members. Their efforts to promote human 

rights are evaluated in the annual review process, and I will recommend awards for 

those embassy staff who have performed in an exemplary manner. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. For the last 17 years I have been a member of the Board of Directors 

of the National Multi-Cultural Institute (NMCI) which is dedicated to promoting 

human rights and cultural awareness. A core agenda for NMCI has been bringing 

attention to and the eradication of human slavery. As part of NMCI’s semiannual 

conferences, a 2-day workshop is dedicated to antislavery issues—‘‘Cultural Considerations in Assisting Victims of Slavery.’’ Under board leadership, NMCI has also 

established one of the most comprehensive Web site search engines on resources related to human trafficking. I personally moderated a panel discussion on ending 

trafficking at one of our semiannual conferences. I believe my efforts on behalf of 

victims of slavery have brought much needed attention to this inhumane practice. 

Question. Please explain, in what manner has the Jammeh government ‘‘provided 

steadfast, tangible support for the global war on terrorism,’’ as reported by the Bush 

administration in its fiscal year 2008 budget request? If confirmed as ambassador, 

how would you seek to strengthen this relationship and to balance security interests 

and concerns about human rights and democratization? 

Answer. The Government of The Gambia has, over the last several years, cooperated closely with United States security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies 

to guard against the spread of extremism in The Gambia and to ensure that The 

Gambia does not become either a recruiting ground or a transit zone for international terrorist organizations. 

If confirmed, I would seek to continue this cooperation, and help to strengthen 

The Gambia’s technical ability to both control its own borders and prevent the flow 

of funds to terrorist organizations. 

I firmly believe that, in the long run, stable democracies are our best and most 

dependable allies in the war on terror. Promotion of human rights and democratization is thus a long-term investment in our own security. Conversely, security is necessary for democracy and human rights to flourish. I therefore see our security and 

human rights goals as complementary, rather than in competition, and believe we 

can pursue both simultaneously in The Gambia. 

RESPONSES OF HON. JAMES D. MCGEE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view are the most pressing human rights issues in 

Zimbabwe? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Zimbabwe? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. The Government of Zimbabwe has engaged in a systematic campaign of 

violence and intimidation against the democratic opposition, labor unions, university 

students, and others, coupled with the use of repressive legislation, designed to 

abridge freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, political organization, and access 

to the media. Government security forces have engaged in killings, abductions, torture, beating, and unlawful arrests and detention. With much of the population facing critical food shortages, the government has also used food distribution to manipulate support for the ruling party. 

If confirmed, I would speak out against regime injustices and work diligently to 

support and strengthen pro-democracy civil society organizations. I would also work 

to identify additional members of the regime responsible for developing and implementing Zimbabwe’s antidemocratic policies and coordinate with Washington to isolate them by including them on the list of regime supporters subject to U.S. economic and travel sanctions. 

I would also urge the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to seek 

an end to the Government of Zimbabwe’s political repression and violence, and to 

ensure that conditions are put in place to allow a free and fair election to take place 

in Zimbabwe in 2008. 

741 

In taking these steps, I would hope to increase United States and international 

pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe to implement the reforms needed to conform to internationally recognized human rights standards. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Zimbabwe in advancing human rights and democracy in general? Please explain your understanding of why the administration’s fiscal year 2008 

Congressional Budget Justification for Zimbabwe does not include funds for human 

rights or rule of law programs, given the systematic violation of human rights by 

the Government of Zimbabwe and its apparent lack of respect for the rule of law? 

Answer. The biggest obstacle to addressing human rights issues in Zimbabwe is 

the Mugabe regime’s determination to stay in power, regardless that Zimbabweans 

are suffering and the economy is dying. The authoritarian Mugabe government’s 

dominant control of the political process and the impunity with which its security 

forces suppress efforts to promote democracy are challenges that must be faced in 

advancing human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe. 

The administration’s fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) includes funds to promote human rights and the rule of law through the work of partners within Zimbabwean civil society. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. The United States plays a crucial role in advancing human rights 

throughout the world. If confirmed, the advancement of human rights in Zimbabwe 

would be one of the top priorities of my tenure. I would lead the Mission’s work on 

human rights by speaking out and engaging with the country’s civil society community on human rights issues. To the extent possible I would encourage Government 

of Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) officials to urge the implementation of needed reforms. I would encourage my staff to 

engage on human rights issues by ensuring that addressing human rights is included in the work requirement statements of appropriate Foreign Service officers 

(FSO) and stressing the importance of that work in employee-supervisor counseling 

sessions. I would note the accomplishments in the field of human rights in annual 

FSO personnel evaluations and would look for opportunities to nominate for Department of State and Mission awards those officers who excel in promoting human 

rights. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. During my 26 years in the Foreign Service, I have consistently sought 

to advance U.S. interests by pressing for human rights and democratic reforms. The 

most significant actions were in Swaziland and Madagascar, where I had the honor 

of serving as United States Ambassador. In Swaziland, I worked closely with prodemocracy civil society organizations to help write, and eventually enact, the first 

constitution that country had seen in over 30 years. This effort was an important 

achievement in a country that has a deeply ingrained traditional society, ruled by 

an absolute monarch. The new constitution, while largely confirming the king’s authority, specifically delineated some basic rights for the people. 

In Madagascar, I helped the country prepare for and successfully implement free 

and fair elections following the election crisis of 2001. 

These elections have proven to be an important event in the country’s democratic 

development. 

In each case, the advance of democracy has strengthened U.S. relations with those 

countries and improved the lives of the people. 

Question. In your statement before the committee, you offered a forceful condemnation of the Zimbabwean Government’s economic policies and political repression. If confirmed as ambassador, what would you do to monitor and seek to improve the economic and humanitarian plight of the people of Zimbabwe, given a limited range of available tools? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would place special importance on monitoring the accelerating economic collapse and humanitarian tragedy wrought by the Mugabe regime’s politically inspired policies. With both Zimbabwean and multilateral interVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00749 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
742 

locutors, I would press publicly and privately for the political and economic reforms 

needed to restore democracy and economic prosperity. 

As ambassador, I would seek to ensure that United States programs providing humanitarian assistance and HIV/AIDS treatment were sustained with strong support 

and sufficient resources in an effort to relieve the suffering of those left vulnerable 

by the Government of Zimbabwe’s misguided policies and poor governance. I would 

pay particular attention to the delivery of legal, medical, and psycho-social assistance to human rights defenders and members of civil society who have suffered 

abuse and torture at the hands of the government. 

Question. In your opinion, what are the most important steps that the international community should take within the coming months to promote a greater 

chance at free and fair elections in Zimbabwe in 2008 or, at least, to provide a 

broader foundation for democratization as a whole in the country? 

Answer. I believe the international community should strongly support the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) efforts to resolve the political and 

economic issues confronting Zimbabwe. 

The international community must impress upon SADC and the Mugabe regime 

the fact that the next elections will not be accepted unless a level playing field is 

established, and the Government of Zimbabwe rigorously implements the reforms 

that result from the SADC talks between the ruling and opposition parties. International monitoring of the pre-election electoral environment, as well as election-day 

voting will be critical to certifying the legitimacy of the upcoming elections. 

In the meantime, the international community should lend its weight to supporting democratic elements in Zimbabwe and pressing the Government of 

Zimbabwe to end regime-sponsored violence against its critics. 

RESPONSES OF MARK M. BOULWARE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corp-State Department Relations? 

Answer. Yes, I have. 

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable? 

Answer. Yes, I understand and agree to abide by the principles in this cable that 

guide the Department’s dealings with the Peace Corps. 

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must 

remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’s role and its need for separation from the 

day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies’’? 

Answer. Yes. I understand and accept this. 

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise 

our chief of mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does 

not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies’’? 

Answer. Yes, I pledge to do so. 

RESPONSES OF MARK M. BOULWARE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Mauritania? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Mauritania? What do you hope to accomplish through these 

actions? 

Answer. President Abdallahi has already begun to address the two most pressing 

human rights issues—the eradication of slavery and the repatriation of Mauritanian 

citizens unjustly expelled from their own country. The United States is contributing 

$500,000 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist 

with the repatriation effort and, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the success 

of this project. 

The Government of Mauritania’s decision to criminalize slavery is a welcome 

move and an imperative first step. Criminalization is a necessary tool for instances 

743 

of outright slavery but is less useful for addressing passively accepted hereditary 

servile relationships based on caste. In order to make real progress in establishing 

equality, educational outreach will be required to erode the traditional myth that 

dependency relationships are the natural order. Additionally, it is essential that viable economic alternatives exist both for those trapped in servitude and those grown 

dependent upon the exploitation of others. If confirmed, I would use the tools of public diplomacy to assist the government in its efforts to educate the people. I see our 

development assistance as a necessary component to promote economic growth. 

Democracy itself is the most powerful tool for the promotion of human rights. The 

former regime of President Taya had a poor human rights record. Succeeding governments have attempted to improve respect for human rights generally in the 

country. The recently elected government has generally created a more tolerant atmosphere in Mauritania. Parliamentary elections in 2006 coupled with the Presidential elections in March, have created a situation where numerous parties are 

becoming involved in the political process. Recognized and unrecognized political 

parties and NGOs are operating freely. Freedom of expression has generally been 

respected. Most political prisoners (primarily Islamic radicals) have been released, 

although prisoners charged with suspected terrorist ties remain incarcerated. 

Consolidating Mauritania’s new democracy will require both robust economic 

growth and the development and strengthening of mechanisms of good governance. 

If confirmed, I will work with all of the appropriate agencies of the U.S. government 

to bring the necessary human and financial resources to bear in support of these 

objectives. I believe that through these actions the United States can contribute to 

the long-term flourishing of democracy in Mauritania while also assuring that it remains resistant to extremism and the destabilizing efforts of terrorists. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Mauritania in advancing human rights and democracy in 

general? 

Answer. As noted above, the hereditary dependency relationships that give rise 

to the worst abuses of human rights are rooted in longstanding tradition reinforced 

by economic hardship. Convincing Mauritanians to break with these traditions will 

be a significant challenge to the new government and those who seek to assist it 

in this historic endeavor. As Americans, we have considerable experience in dealing 

with similar problems. If confirmed I would seek opportunities to share that experience in order to help Mauritania chart a course toward genuine equality, social and 

political inclusion, and economic opportunity. Advocacy and education alone, however, will not be sufficient to end dependency relationships and their attendant 

abuses unless there are viable economic alternatives. For that reason, achieving sustainable economic growth is an imperative but difficult challenge. 

Drought, desertification, sparse resources, and a generally low level of education 

are complicating factors that must be addressed. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the entire mission understands that democratization and promoting human rights are key priorities on our agenda in Mauritania and are essential elements in our effort to counter terrorism in the Sahel. 

I would spearhead a robust public diplomacy effort to raise these issues in public 

forums to mirror our similarly themed engagement with the government and civil 

society. I would ensure that these goals are clearly articulated and included in the 

work requirements statements of officers engaged in human rights activities. If confirmed, I would use counseling, evaluation, and recommendation of awards for outstanding performers to promote active engagement on human rights and the promotion of democracy. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. As Deputy Chief of Mission in Cameroon and El Salvador and as Consul 

General in Rio de Janeiro, I had significant responsibilities for the promotion of 

human rights and democracy. I monitored the developments relating to human 

rights and oversaw human rights reporting, frequently engaging host governments, 

political parties, and representatives of civil society on these issues. 

744 

In Cameroon, for example, I organized the embassy’s comprehensive election observation program for legislative and presidential elections. These efforts demonstrated the strong U.S. interest in democratization and helped to preserve political space for opposition parties. When the editor of an opposition newspaper was 

jailed, I made a public visit to the newspaper’s office to underscore U.S. concerns. 

I maintained personal relationships with the principal opposition party leaders to 

learn of their concerns and to demonstrate U.S. support for political inclusion. I 

managed our use of democracy funding to foster emerging civil society groups such 

as a young journalists association and an NGO advocating for the rights of the 

handicapped. 

In El Salvador, I coordinated efforts to foster mature and productive relations between the party in power and opposition parties composed of former rebels. I worked 

closely with USAID to strengthen the professionalism of the legislative branch and 

to build infrastructure for effective outreach to constituents. I oversaw the implementation of programs to support workers’ rights in the garment industry, personally calling on the manager of one factory to underscore U.S. concerns about antiunion activities. 

In Rio de Janeiro, I worked closely with public diplomacy colleagues to address 

issues of racial inequality by sharing U.S. experience with this challenge through 

a robust speakers program. The U.S. Consulate collaborated with the Library of 

Congress and a local university to highlight the achievements of Afro-Brazilians. 

Working with the Motion Picture Association and local artists, we sponsored an African American/Afro Brazilian film festival. 

These activities and others were important for a number of reasons, not least 

among them the goal of ensuring that foreign publics knew that the United States 

stood squarely on the side of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. 

Similarly, foreign governments and officials knew that our close monitoring of these 

issues ensured that lapses or abuses would not go unnoticed and would affect our 

bilateral relations. 

While my actions were not always as completely transformative as I might have 

hoped, I believe that their impact was nonetheless significant and useful. Although 

elections in Cameroon were seriously flawed, our active engagement helped to deter 

some abuses and helped to preserve some political space for opposition parties and 

candidates. Similarly, our very close monitoring of workers’ rights in El Salvador 

and our active engagement with employers and the host government contributed to 

concrete improvements in working conditions. Our efforts in Brazil contributed significantly to the initiation of a public dialog about racial equality and inclusion and 

subsequent policy decisions to promote affirmative action. 

Question. Mauritania is a country with a deep and ongoing history of ethnic and 

social segregation, discrimination, and even slavery. If confirmed as ambassador, 

how would you seek to promote social, political, and economic inclusion and the 

elimination of the caste system? 

Answer. In addition to the enforcement of laws criminalizing slavery, educational 

outreach, and economic development are essential tools for the effective promotion 

of social, political, and economic inclusion. If confirmed, I would draw on my experience in Brazil of sharing America’s history of successfully confronting similar issues 

in our own national development. I would seek to set a positive personal example 

by reaching out to all segments of Mauritanian society to ensure that all activities 

of the Mission demonstrate the kind of inclusion that we want to promote. I would 

continue and seek to increase our support for girls’ education. Above all, I would 

seek to bolster the efforts of the Mauritanian Government to ensure that democracy 

brings meaningful improvement to the lives of all Mauritanians. 

Question. What are the key steps that Mauritania must take to consolidate its reportedly successful democratic transition? How can the United States most effectively support this process? 

Answer. The successful March elections mark the first time since independence 

that a regime has been brought to power by free and fair elections. Mauritania is 

in the midst of what looks to be one of the most successful democratic transitions 

in recent African history. 

Consolidating democracy in a country where four of the last six governments were 

brought to power by military coups will require working to ensure that the military 

understands its proper role in a democracy and is subordinate to civilian authority. 

Political party development is important to democratic consolidation as is the development of responsive and transparent government. Democracy also requires a judicial system that is not only independent but also capable, and a press that is both 

free and responsible. 

745 

The United States can effectively support all of these objectives. The emergence 

of a still small but real terrorist threat in the subregion provides the military with 

a legitimate role in defense of the nation. Our military engagement under the Trans 

Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership provides the United States with the means to 

assist Mauritania’s military in playing that role while simultaneously providing 

complementary training to promote respect for human rights and subordination to 

civilian leadership. Moreover, the growing development component of the partnership will increasingly provide the United States with the means not only to assist 

Mauritania in building the institutions that are essential to good governance but to 

promote sustainable economic growth as well. 

RESPONSES OF DR. RONALD K. MCMULLEN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Eritrea? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights 

and democracy in Eritrea? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. The Government of Eritrea’s human rights record is abysmal and getting 

worse. Fourteen years after independence, national elections have yet to be held, 

and the constitution has never been implemented. The government has severely restricted civil liberties, and arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture are serious problems. Security forces detain and arrest parents and spouses of individuals who have 

evaded national service or fled the country, despite the lack of a legal basis for such 

action. Religious freedoms are restricted, and the United States has annually designated Eritrea as a Country of Particular Concern since 2004 and has imposed 

sanctions accordingly. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that human rights remain a fundamental focus and an 

essential element in all of our activities. I will raise these issues in frequent discussions with Eritrean authorities, the press, opinion makers, and civil society. Public 

diplomacy efforts offer a mechanism to raise the profile of human rights issues and 

stress the importance the United States places on human rights in Eritrea. Despite 

tight government control of all media outlets in Eritrea, external media and the 

Internet still provide mechanisms for disseminating our human rights messages 

within the country. I will also seek out opportunities to engage Eritrean Government officials on a broad spectrum of human rights issues. If confirmed, I will work 

diligently to persuade key officials that upholding international standards of human 

rights is in the best interest of the country and the government. 

If confirmed, I will also seek to build bridges to the islands of civil society allowed 

to function in this single-party state and engage the Eritrean public, private, and 

official spheres on human rights issues. Religious leaders, teachers, the business 

community, and farmers’ cooperatives play a key role in the lives of many Eritreans. 

If confirmed, I will work to persuade Eritrean officials to adhere to their commitments under the Vienna Convention and allow American diplomats to travel outside 

Asmara to visit churches, mosques, schools, hospitals, prisons, police stations, military facilities, businesses, civic associations, and farm cooperatives to listen and to 

send the message that the United States is committed to working with those who 

seek to promote international standards of human rights in Eritrea. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Eritrea in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. There are numerous serious obstacles to addressing specific human 

rights concerns in Eritrea. The travel restrictions imposed by the Eritrean Government on embassy staff make it very difficult to move about the country and meet 

with people from different regions and backgrounds. Eritrean nationals may not 

leave the country without permission from their government, making free participation at workshops, seminars, or educational activities difficult. Individuals can be 

pressed into national service for decades on end, with little warning or compensation. All land and most productive assets are state controlled. 

If confirmed, I face the prospect of being declared ‘‘Persona Non Grata’’ by Eritrean officials for the vigorous pursuit of human rights objectives, as do all American members of Embassy Asmara. The embassy’s Eritrean employees face even 

more imposing obstacles, including arrest and imprisonment. The arrest of locally 

engaged staff, such as the two Foreign Service nationals detained since 2001, may 

intimidate and discourage some staff members from vigorously pursuing our strong 

human rights agenda and may cause potential contacts to avoid meeting with us. 

746 

When Americans are arrested or in trouble in Eritrea, the Government of Eritrea 

rarely informs the embassy and rarely allows access to American citizens, particularly if the American citizen has some family or historic tie to Eritrea or the region. 

The lack of press and other media freedoms means that local news is state-controlled and often anti-American. In short, the Eritrean Government’s draconian controls on all aspects of society make our efforts to promote human rights extremely 

difficult—and all the more important. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. Upon my arrival in Asmara, if confirmed, my first country team meeting 

will include a request for a detailed briefing on Mission activities in support of our 

human rights objectives and an invitation to a brainstorming session on how we, 

as a team, could better achieve these goals. Further, I will ensure that each officer’s 

Work Requirements Statement includes the promotion of human rights, as appropriate. If confirmed, I will insist that a sizeable portion of our discretionary funding 

is available for public diplomacy, travel, and other activities that directly support 

human rights goals. Likewise, these goals will be included in the Mission Strategic 

Plan and other important planning documents. The timely completion of a comprehensive Human Rights Report will be one of my top priorities. I believe in the 

old adage, ‘‘an organization becomes what it rewards.’’ If confirmed, I will ensure 

that the embassy’s awards committee is informed of the high value I place on the 

vigorous promotion of human rights. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. While serving as Deputy Chief of Mission for 3 years in Rangoon, Burma, 

I was personally involved in numerous activities to promote human rights and democracy in that Orwellian society. Working with oppressed ethnic minorities, religious leaders, former political prisoners, and members of Burma’s hard-pressed democracy movement, I provided life-sustaining assistance, hope, and a clear signal 

of American commitment to democracy in Burma. I had very close personal and professional relations with key leaders of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. I met with leaders of the Democracy 1988 generation and ethnic minority 

groups struggling for their rights. Many of these activities I undertook without the 

knowledge or consent of the junta. Some of those with whom I interacted would be 

sent to prison should the details of these activities be made public. I would be willing to provide details in a classified briefing if desired. 

A couple of nonsensitive incidents can be made public without repercussion. When 

the junta decided to build a military-owned condo complex on the site of a large 

cemetery, family members were given just 48 hours to exhume and move the remains of their loved ones. I went to the cemetery to express my outrage, personally 

paid the exhumation expenses for a number of families, and listened to the life stories of many of those being exhumed—a large number of whom were from the oppressed Karen ethnic minority group. Many of the families expressed gratitude for 

my presence and moral support. 

I also supported Rangoon’s Free Muslim Hospital, an impoverished facility that 

provided service to Rangoon’s destitute of all religions and was the caregiver of first 

and last resort for many sick former political prisoners, including Buddhist monks 

imprisoned for their anti-junta activities. I gave excess medicines and supplies from 

the embassy’s medical unit whenever possible. After one Fourth of July celebration, 

I brought two vans full of floral bouquets (donated to the Independence Day reception by other embassies and companies) and distributed them to patients in the 

Muslim Free Hospital. Many destitute young mothers and elderly patients in the 

hospice ward seemed particularly grateful. This also angered the junta, and their 

press lackeys speculated for days about this strange act of American goodwill to the 

dregs of Burmese society in a Muslim hospital. 

While serving as Charge d’Affaires in Suva, Fiji, I played a role in keeping that 

country from descending into a racial civil war. During an armed take-over of parliament that lasted 58 days, an American reporter was seized by armed rebels inside Parliament. Using local contacts, I obtained the cell phone number of the rebels 

spokesman and persuaded him to release the American journalist within 20 minutes. A few days later, after receiving a call for help, I drove an embassy car around 

rebel and military roadblocks, through a ditch, and over a rugby field to evacuate 

747 

two American missionary families who were trapped when a bloody firefight broke 

near their homes. 

Several months later, when the subsequent government agreed to a U.N.-monitored election to resolve fundamental issues, powerful chiefs of the central highlands threatened to disrupt the elections. I went on a week-long trip to call on many 

of the powerful chiefs to convince them that this was against their best interests. 

I drank gallons of kava—a traditional drink made from the ground root of a pepper 

plant—as I persuaded the chiefs not to disrupt the elections. The Foreign Service 

Institute now uses this experience in a training segment called ‘‘Kava Diplomacy.’’ 

Question. Bilateral relations between the United States and Eritrea are currently 

very poor. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, has 

indicated that the United States Government is considering designating Eritrea as 

a ‘‘state sponsor of terrorism’’ for its alleged support of al-Qaeda-linked Islamist 

militants in Somalia. How do these developments shape your approach to preparing 

for a potential post as Ambassador to Eritrea? 

Answer. As I prepare for a potential posting to Eritrea, I will continue to meet 

with United States officials who can offer insights on Eritrea’s actions in the region 

and on the potential impact of designating Eritrea a state sponsor of terrorism. 

To date, the United States has not designated Eritrea a state sponsor of terrorism, but we are very concerned about its support for armed opposition groups, 

some with reported links to terrorism. We will continue to monitor Eritrea’s behavior and interaction with suspect groups. Eritrea’s actions have contributed to instability in the region, and it is critical for Eritrea to understand that there are consequences to this policy. If confirmed, I will seek to influence the Eritrean Government on counterterrorism, democratization, and human rights, despite uncertain 

prospects for immediate Eritrean policy change. Along with my team at Embassy 

Asmara, I will monitor and assess developments, provide advice on effective means 

to engage the Eritrean people and leadership, and ensure that the message of strong 

United States opposition to terrorism and its sponsors is understood by all. In the 

event that Eritrea takes overt and explicit action to reverse its past practices, I will, 

if confirmed, seek an appropriate, renewed bilateral relationship with robust engagement to advance American objectives in the Eritrea and the region. 

Question. Tensions over the Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute are again rising 

alarmingly. In your opinion, how can the United States most effectively assist efforts to prevent such tensions from escalating into direct conflict? 

Answer. We, along with the other witnesses to the Algiers Agreement (Algeria, 

African Union, European Union, United Nations, and United States) and other interested actors, have been encouraging both parties to agree to resume cooperation 

with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). We are disappointed that 

no progress was made at the September 6–7 meeting of the EEBC. We are also urging the parties to accept the offer of U.N. Secretary General Ban Kimoon to engage 

with them to help lessen tensions along the border and move toward normalized relations. 

We will continue to stress to the parties that the boundary impasse is a potential 

flashpoint that could further destabilize the entire region. Close cooperation with 

other governments and international institutions is essential to this effort. 

RESPONSES OF DR. LOUIS J. NIGRO TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Chad? 

What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human rights and 

democracy in Chad? What do you hope to accomplish through these actions? 

Answer. Chad’s human rights record remains poor. The root cause of most of 

Chad’s human rights deficiencies is lack of democratic governance with credible 

elections, alternation in power, and respect for the rule of law. If confirmed as ambassador, I would continue to urge all Chadians to engage in dialog to address political grievances; work with the European Union and the United Nations to encourage 

the Government of Chad to adhere to its electoral reform agreement with opposition 

parties; focus limited mission assistance resources on activities that support credible 

legislative and communal elections in 2009; and work closely with Chadian human 

rights groups and lend support wherever possible and as resources allow to help 

build their capacity. I would also work with the European Union and United Nations to encourage Chad’s full support for deployment of a multilateral peacekeeping 

operation to protect Darfur refugees and Chadian displaced persons in eastern 

748 

Chad, and other vulnerable populations in northeastern Central African Republic, 

as soon as possible, which would reduce tensions and include measures to professionalize Chadian police forces. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous response? What challenges 

will you face in Chad in advancing human rights and democracy in general? 

Answer. Chad has no history of peaceful and democratic political change; every 

leader since independence has come to power through force and none has demonstrated sufficient commitment to enforcing respect for human rights or the rule 

of law. Chad’s sharp ethnic and regional diversities have not contributed to the development of a tradition of peaceful and legal conflict resolution. Chad’s human 

rights record remains poor, as our Human Rights Report makes clear. The only durable solution to Chad’s human rights deficiencies is a democratically elected government—executive and legislature—that takes human rights and respect for the 

constitution and the rule of law seriously and that denies impunity to official and 

nonofficial law breakers. 

If confirmed as ambassador, I would work with all Chadian parties to increase 

awareness of human rights, to facilitate a level political playing field, and to convince all parties that a democratically elected government that rules in the interests 

of all Chad’s people is the only hope for increased respect for human rights, social 

peace, and sustainable development in Chad. I would encourage all Chadians to engage in dialog to address political grievances and, in particular, I would work with 

the European Union and the United Nations to help the Government of Chad to adhere to its electoral reform agreement with opposition parties, which could lead to 

credible legislative and communal elections in 2009, the essential first step on the 

road to democratic governance. 

Question. In your new position, what steps will you take to ensure that promotion 

of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? 

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign Service officers who 

engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for 

superior service? 

Answer. Embassy N’Djamena is a small mission with one officer specifically 

charged with analyzing and reporting on human rights in Chad. However, one of 

the major interests of the Mission under my direction would be the promotion of 

human rights. If confirmed, I will nominate for awards those officers who qualify 

for them and who oversee self-help, civil society, and public diplomacy projects that 

promote human rights and democracy. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. I have served in a number of countries where promotion of human rights 

and democracy was a key element in our policy. In Cuba, as Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), I supervised our human rights and public diplomacy programs, which 

was important because the former offered assistance and support to Cuban dissidents struggling against a totalitarian regime and the latter sought to deny a monopoly of information to that same regime. Our assistance and support helped to 

make the dissidents more effective and to increase scrutiny of the regime’s repression. We also were able to provide a continuous stream of accurate and unbiased 

information and diverse opinion to the Cuban people. 

In Guinea, as DCM, I met regularly with opposition party leaders and human 

rights activists, and I managed our monitoring of presidential elections, which was 

important to demonstrate to the Government of Guinea that the United States did 

not seek regional stability at the price of stifled democracy and disregard for human 

rights and the rule of law there. We succeeded in encouraging continued participation in the electoral process on the part of the opposition and in focusing international attention on the Guinean elections. 

In Haiti, as political counselor, I participated in efforts to resolve the political crisis created by the military overthrow of the legitimate President, which was important because the military junta ruled with impunity and presided over massive 

human rights abuses. Our efforts resulted in eventual multilateral military action 

to force the military junta to step down and led to return of the legitimate President 

to power under the constitution. 

Question. Chad is the site of both internal and external displacement crises: hundreds of thousands of refugees from Darfur and the Central African Republic have 

crossed into Chad and large numbers of Chadians have been internally displaced 

749 

or crossed into Darfur. If confirmed as ambassador, what role would you seek to 

play in resolving this regional humanitarian, military, and political crisis? 

Answer. If confirmed as ambassador, I would work with the European Union and 

the United Nations to encourage Chad’s full support for deployment of a multilateral peacekeeping operation to protect Darfur refugees and internally displaced 

Chadians in eastern Chad, and other vulnerable populations in northeastern Central African Republic, as soon as possible. I would also continue to focus the work 

of the embassy on the provision of humanitarian assistance to at-risk populations 

in Chad. I would also continue to encourage the normalization of Chad-Sudan relations and urge Chad to deny support for Darfur rebel groups on its territory. 

I would as well continue to advocate full Chadian Government support for a 

Darfur Peace Agreement supported by all the stakeholders involved in the Darfur 

crisis as the only hope for a durable solution to the refugee crisis in eastern Chad. 

Finally, I would continue our policy of engaging President Deby and other political 

players on the need for inclusive democracy in Chad. 

Question. As it seeks to develop its oil sector, can Chad avoid the ‘‘resource 

curse?’’ If confirmed as ambassador, what steps would you take to help the government promote sustainable development that will benefit the Chadian people? 

Answer. Chad’s innovative Oil Revenue Management Agreement with the World 

Bank provides an opportunity for it to avoid the ‘‘resource curse,’’ by the terms of 

which it is committed to spending 70 percent of its royalties investing in its people 

and on social and economic development. If confirmed as ambassador, I would work 

with the World Bank, the IMF, and other lenders to help Chad to implement fully 

and faithfully this agreement. I would also urge Chad to meet all the benchmarks 

for full participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Additionally, I would work with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 

(IMF) to assist the Chadian Government to make doing business in Chad easier, 

faster, and safer, in order to attract trade and investment beyond the oil sector. 

(751) 

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Fannin, P. Robert, to be Ambassador to the Dominican Republic 

Johnson, David T., to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

Simons, Paul E., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chile 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin Cardin 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Cardin, Menendez, Corker, and Vitter. 

Also present: Senator Kyl. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Today the committee meets to consider the 

nominations of three individuals for key leadership positions in the 

administration. The President has nominated David Johnson to be 

the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs, Robert Fannin to be Ambassador to the 

Dominican Republic, and Paul Simons to be the Ambassador to the 

Republic of Chile. 

I want to congratulate all of you on your nominations, I want to 

thank you for your public service, and I want to extend a warm 

welcome, not only to you, but to your families. And I know this is 

a family effort, and the sacrifice made by the members of the family, and we welcome all of you to the committee. 

It’s also nice to have Senator Kyl with us today, our colleague 

and distinguished member from Arizona. He will be introducing 

Mr. Fannin. 

First let me, let me take this time to commend you for your dedication to public service, and your willingness to sacrifice so much 

to represent our country in a senior administrative position, and 

the two ambassadorships. 

Mr. Johnson, you have been nominated for a very important and 

difficult assignment—the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement must monitor a broad 

range of problems, old and new. Whether it’s preventing international narcotics trafficking, or trafficking in people, international 

752 

organized crime groups must be deterred from crossing international borders to violate human rights and international law. 

As the U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE mission, you already have 

had a breadth of experience and contacts, and your nomination 

seems to be a good fit. It’s good to see you again, and I enjoyed 

working with you when you were in the OSCE, and I held a position in the House on the OSCE Helsinki Commission. 

Mr. Fannin, I’m happy to see that you’re joined by my colleague, 

Senator Kyl, as the United States and the Dominican Republic 

maintain a very good economic and political relation. The small 

Caribbean nation contributed 300 troops to the Coalition Force in 

Iraq until May of 2004. This participation demonstrates the Dominican Republic’s commitment to maintaining strong ties with the 

United States. 

Nevertheless, there are challenges. Venezuela’s desire to play a 

stronger role in the region is worrisome. Bolstered by the petro-dollars and grant ambition, Venezuela’s leadership would benefit from 

a strategic regional relationship with the Dominican Republic. 

Illegal immigration and corruption are two issues the United 

States has sought improvements on from the Dominican Republic 

Government. With your background as a highly-respected and 

skilled lawyer, it appears that you are well-suited to have a positive impact in the Dominican Republic, and I look forward to your 

testimony. 

Following, Mr. Simons, you have the distinction of being nominated to one of Latin America’s great economic and political success stories. Thirty years ago, few could have known Chile would 

have undergone such a miraculous turnaround. Chile has reduced 

its poverty rate from 39 percent to 14 percent. Chile has been invited to discuss membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 

Chile has graduated to a middle-income country, and does not receive economic assistance from the United States. The only notable 

assistance Chile received recently from Washington was a small 

grant to help facilitate Chile’s military participation in the U.N. 

stabilization mission, Haiti, an assistance to aid in international 

law enforcement and counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts. 

Also, Mr. Simons, I appreciate you taking the time out of your 

schedule last week to pay a courtesy visit to our staff. I thank you 

and I look forward to your testimony. 

Before I recognize Senator Kyl, let me recognize Senator Corker 

for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s customary here 

in the Senate that we give opening statements, I rarely do that. 

And I just want to say to Senator Kyl, who I know had to wait a 

few minutes for me to get here, that I’m putting us right back on 

time by not making one. 

I want to thank you for coming today, and thank all of you for 

your public service. I look forward to a great hearing, and thank 

you for putting yourselves forward to represent our country in this 

way. 

753 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Menendez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to 

today’s hearing. By someone who has spent 15 years both in the 

House, and now here in the Senate focused on our relationships 

abroad, but particularly as it relates to Latin America, I’m looking 

forward to hearing from our two nominees for the Dominican Republic and Chile—two very different countries, with a very different set of challenges, and important in our hemispheric policy. 

I’ve had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Fannin yesterday, so 

we had a little sense of what he’s thinking about, I look forward 

to speaking with Mr. Simons. And, of course, Mr. Johnson, on the 

whole question of international narcotics and law enforcement, 

that’s far beyond this hemisphere, but nonetheless a good part of 

the hemisphere’s challenges are intertwined with that, and I look 

forward to hearing some of his remarks. 

And I’ll save the bulk of my time, Mr. Chairman, for the questions. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Kyl, it’s a pleasure to have you on our 

committee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator KYL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the opportunity to introduce my friend, Bob Fannin, to you. 

And with your indulgence, I’d like to begin by reading a very short 

letter from our colleague, Senator McCain, ask that that be inserted in the record, and then I’ll make some brief concluding remarks. 

Senator CARDIN. Without objection. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. 

Senator KYL. He says, ‘‘To the committee, thank you for holding 

today’s hearing. I would like to express my strong support for the 

swift confirmation of Mr. Robert Fannin as United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. 

‘‘I’ve been privileged to know Bob for over 25 years, and I can 

personally attest that he is a natural leader, a man of integrity and 

a true patriot. I commend the President for nominating such an 

outstanding candidate for this important post. 

‘‘Bob has a long history of service to Arizona and our Nation. 

From his early days as an officer of the United States Air Force, 

to his current position as a respected attorney in Phoenix, Bob has 

distinguished himself as a leader in both civic and business communities. 

‘‘He’s served on the boards of local charitable organizations, financial institutions, and played an essential role in the region’s 

economic development through his involvement with the Arizona 

Chamber of Commerce. 

‘‘His professionalism, thoughtfulness, and experience will make 

him an effective diplomat and a wonderful representative of the 

United States abroad. I have every confidence that, if confirmed, 

754 

Bob Fannin will contribute immensely to the continuation of our 

warm relations with the Dominican Republic. 

‘‘I urge the committee’s expeditious action in moving this nomination to the full Senate, and ask all of my colleagues to support 

his prompt confirmation.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, my colleague, John McCain—I can not say better 

than his statement, why I believe Bob Fannin would make an excellent Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. 

Let me just add two things, however. I’ve known Bob for well 

over 30 years, and we’ve worked together in a variety of civic and 

community and even political activities in the community. I know 

of no one—Democrat or Republican—that does not respect Bob 

Fannin. 

He follows a tradition of service. His father served as Governor 

of the State of Arizona from 1958 to 1964, and served in this body, 

as a Member of the United States Senate from 1964 to 1976. I 

don’t know of anybody that didn’t respect his father, Paul Fannin, 

during his service here in the United States Senate. Because they 

are both highly decent, respectful of others’ positions, and—as Senator McCain said—natural leaders. 

So, I am confident that as he serves, representing our Nation in 

the Dominican Republic, our friends there will see him the same 

way that we’ve seen him in the State of Arizona—as someone who 

is enjoyable to be with, who you can trust completely, who will always give it to you straight, who will work very hard on matters 

of mutual interest, and who—at the end of the day—you know that 

you were glad you were able to work with. He will represent our 

country very, very well. And I know this, as I said, from over 30 

years of personal experience in working with my friend, Bob 

Fannin. 

And, a final note, his wife, Lisa, is here. She is a prominent surgeon, recently—sort of—retired in Phoenix. But, she has served at 

the Barrow Neurological Institute in Phoenix—one of the finest 

neurological institutions in the country. And Bob, among his many 

activities in serving as charities, is emeritus on the board, and was 

chairman of the board of the Barrow Neurological Institute. 

So, his experience in the community goes far beyond policy involvement, but to the eleemosynary activities that are so important 

to a community, as well. 

Thank you, and I thank all three of you for being here. Having 

been in your position before, it is very important that Senators 

take the time to learn about our nominees for various positions. 

And I respect the fact that all three of you are here today doing 

this. Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Senator Kyl, we appreciate you being 

here, and your willingness to help, as far as expediting this nomination. Thank you very much. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. We will now hear from the nominees, first starting with David Johnson. 

755 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, NOMINEE TO BE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL 

NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, it’s a privilege to appear before the committee 

today, as the President’s nominee as Assistant Secretary of State 

for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. I’m honored by 

the confidence placed in me by the President and the Secretary. 

Mr. Chairman, no one arrives at any good point in their life 

without a great deal of help and encouragement from others, and 

I’ve been blessed by much more of that than I deserve. 

I’m joined today by my mother, Dixie Johnson, without whom, 

literally, none of this would have been possible. And, I’m also 

joined by my wife, Scarlett Swan, with whom I share a wonderful 

life, three children, and a partnership both at home and abroad. 

Without her, none of it would have been worthwhile. 

I also wish to thank my colleagues and mentors in the State Department in the Foreign Service, as well as throughout our Government. Ours is a collegial profession. No one accomplishes anything 

themselves, and I wish to acknowledge their friendship, their patience, and their patriotism. 

Mr. Chairman, the portfolio I’ve been nominated to discharge is 

unique in our Nation’s government, or indeed, in any government. 

What began in the 1970s as an effort to confront a prospect that 

narcotics from outside our borders could undermine our own society 

has grown and it has changed. And what once was a very difficult, 

but narrowly-focused effort, has mushroomed for two reasons. 

First, as the instruments of international commerce, communication, and transportation have grown, so have the opportunities 

grown to undermine our society, and to destabilize friendly, as well 

as unfriendly, governments. 

Second, we’ve come fully to recognize that ungoverned and illgoverned territories are a threat, not just to their own citizens, but 

to ours as well. 

The State Department’s Bureau that, if confirmed, I will lead, 

has unique skills, talents, and resources to address these threats; 

to help contain them, and to give our partners abroad the wherewithal to help keep Americans secure by working with us. 

Our challenge is to spend our Nation’s treasure wisely in both 

senses of that thought—to be prudent and economical in the programs we craft, and the efforts we undertake, but also to ensure 

that we stay ahead of the problems of narcotics, crime, and ill-governed and ungoverned societies, so as to limit the threats which 

Americans face. 

You and your colleagues have entrusted us with significant resources, but also given us significant challenges. The almost $4 billion in taxpayer funds for which, if confirmed, I will be responsible, 

is an extraordinary sum. But the challenges these monies must address are daunting. 

First, we face a continued threat to American society from uncontrolled narcotics, as well as the chemicals to make synthetic drugs. 

While Plan Colombia has shown what our resources can do when 

combined with a partner’s political will, much remains to be done 

756 

in Colombia, as well as elsewhere in Latin America, where problems continue. 

Second, we are working along with allies and partners, to help 

provide Afghanistan and Iraq with the civilian police that can give 

these war-torn countries the security needed to establish the rule 

of law. And, in the case of Afghanistan, also to deal with a troubling narcotics problem that, if unaddressed, could undermine 

every success we’ve had there. 

Third, we face a threat to ourselves, our allies, and our partners 

from the uncontrolled growth of public corruption, organized crime, 

and elicit trade in people and in goods. These threats often bound 

together with terrorism in the same criminal enterprise, may pose 

the greatest long-term challenge to our society. 

In none of these efforts are we working alone. Our partners in 

the law enforcement community, as well as our diplomatic and 

military partners, confront the same issues, and are working with 

us to deal with them. These are long-term threats, sometimes easily ignored in the short-term, but very costly if left unmet. If confirmed, it will be my task to lead an extraordinary group of men 

and women to confront them, with the goal of making our country 

safer, and its future more secure. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve been fortunate in my diplomatic career to 

have been a manager of people and resources quite early. But nothing compares in scope to the challenge which, if confirmed, you will 

entrust me in this position. If I am confirmed, I will make myself 

available to this committee, to your colleagues in both Houses, and 

your staffs, soliciting your views and support. 

I’m grateful for your patience in hearing this statement, and I 

look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a privilege to appear before you 

as the President’s nominee as Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The position for which I have been nominated 

is one of significant responsibility, and I am honored by the confidence placed in 

me by President Bush and Secretary Rice. 

Mr. Chairman, no one arrives at any good point in their life without a great deal 

of help and encouragement from others, and I have been blessed by much more of 

that than I deserve. I am joined today by my mother, Dixie Johnson, without whom, 

literally, none of this would have been possible. And I am also joined by my wife, 

Scarlett Swan, with whom I share a wonderful life, three children, and a partnership both at home and abroad. Without her, none of it would have been worthwhile. 

I also wish to thank my colleagues and mentors in the State Department and the 

Foreign Service. Ours is a collegial profession. No one accomplishes anything by 

themselves. And I want to acknowledge their friendship, their patience, and their 

patriotism. It has been my privilege to have worked with them in my more than 

30 years as a public servant. 

The next several years are certain to be a challenging period for the Department 

and for the Bureau I have been nominated to lead. In addition to the ever-evolving 

threats of drug trafficking and international organized crime, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is playing an increasingly 

important role in stabilizing post-conflict societies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, through criminal justice sector development. Continued high levels of drug 

production and trafficking in Latin America and in Afghanistan will continue to 

warrant United States attention and support, and INL remains in the forefront of 

efforts to confront these threats. If I am confirmed by the Senate, I will seek to build 

757 

upon the successes of my predecessors while also bringing a fresh perspective to 

these challenges to see where improvements might be made. 

INL’s core mission is to combat international narcotics production and trafficking, 

reduce international crime and terrorism, and strengthen international criminal justice institutions. To accomplish these goals, INL relies on a broad range of bilateral, 

regional, and global assistance programs designed to strengthen the law enforcement capacity of foreign governments. INL also works through the U.N. and other 

international organizations to set international standards for combating drugs, 

crime, and terrorism and develop programs and to implement these standards. 

To carry out its mission and meet these challenges, INL supports programs at 80 

posts. The Bureau maintains a domestic staff of 188 direct hire and an additional 

54 Foreign Service officers and 428 foreign service nationals overseas. INL also employs approximately 4,600 contract employees supporting domestic and overseas operations, including aviation support and international peacekeeping operations. In 

keeping with its increased responsibilities over the past decade, INL’s budget has 

grown from $130 million in the mid-1990s to over $2.6 billion in fiscal year 2007, 

largely due to pressing demands for criminal justice programs in Iraq and Afghanistan and new counternarcotics challenges in Afghanistan. 

In addition to bilateral programs, the Bureau also supports four regional International Law Enforcement Academies around the world, as well as a specialized facility in Roswell, New Mexico, that provides advanced training for mid-level and 

senior foreign law enforcement officials. Applying U.S. and international standards, 

U.S. law enforcement agencies such as DEA, the FBI, and the Secret Service, as 

well as state and local law enforcement as needed, provide training keyed to address 

regional issues and problems. 

INL maintains an aviation fleet of 295 rotary and fixed-wing aircraft operating 

in seven countries (Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) that assist foreign government counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and border 

security efforts in support of United States’ objectives. INL has recently implemented numerous changes to improve the management of this fleet in terms of 

standardized policies and procedures, planning, budget formulation and transparency, and use of best business practices. 

The Bureau works closely with a broad range of other United States Government 

agencies that have expertise and interests in these areas, including the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Departments of Justice, including FBI and DEA; Defense; Homeland Security, including the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Secret Service; Treasury, and 

Commerce; and our Nation’s intelligence community. 

COMBATING NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

U.S. counternarcotics assistance in the Western Hemisphere is focused on confronting drug production at its source. Targeting resources at the initial stages of 

the drug trafficking chain reduces the amount of drugs that enter the system, allowing enforcement and treatment efforts to be more effective. Through Plan Colombia, 

and subsequently the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), we have employed a 

comprehensive regional approach of eradication, interdiction, alternative development, extradition, and judicial reform. 

The greatest focus of these efforts has been and remains Colombia—the source for 

approximately 90 percent of the cocaine consumed the United States. Prior to Plan 

Colombia, Colombia was under siege by major narcoterrorist organizations and some 

believe it was in danger of becoming a failed state. Car bombs, kidnappings, and 

political murders were a daily occurrence as these illegally armed groups openly defied the government in many areas of the country, including in some key cities. In 

2001, rapidly growing coca and opium poppy cultivation in Colombia reached an alltime high. 

Since that time, Colombia has achieved remarkable progress. Public safety has 

greatly improved, with kidnappings, massacres, and murders down significantly. 

For the first time ever, the Colombian Government has established a functioning 

security and police presence in each of its 1,099 municipalities or country seats. Colombia’s economy, which was so battered during the 1990s, is now growing at a 

healthy rate and attracting foreign investment. The Colombian people are now more 

optimistic about a lasting peace in their country, and the paramilitary AUC, which 

has been responsible for drug trafficking and human rights abuses, has been largely 

disarmed and demobilized. Clearly the American taxpayers’ investment in Colombia 

is paying significant dividends. 

A key component of INL’s efforts in Colombia is eradication. In 2006, manual and 

aerial eradication programs in Colombia covered over 200,000 hectares of coca, 

758 

thereby preventing about 320 metric tons of cocaine from reaching the United 

States, Europe, and other parts of Latin America. Coupled with the seizure of 178 

metric tons of cocaine, our joint efforts have taken about $850 million in 1 year 

alone out of the hands of drug trafficking organizations, including the AUC and the 

FARC. Recent intelligence indicates that the FARC’s drug profits may have fallen 

by about 25 percent from 2003 to 2005 because Colombian security operations, bolstered by Plan Colombia, have increased their costs of doing business. 

Despite this marked progress, major challenges remain. Coca growers have embarked on an aggressive replanting campaign to counter eradication. The United 

States and Colombia are looking now at strategic, technological, and legal changes 

to address the resilience of coca cultivation. Another goal is having Colombia take 

greater responsibility of the counternarcotics programs. As Colombia has doubled 

the share of GDP devoted to security over the past few years, it has also begun to 

take responsibility for some key programs. Training and maintaining sufficient 

numbers of qualified Colombian pilots and mechanics key to successful nationalization—has proved difficult for a variety of reasons. Our challenge will be to ensure 

that eventual reductions in United States assistance are gradual and closely coordinated with Colombia, so that the overall level of effort is maintained as needed. 

Colombia’s Government continues to address human rights abuses and impunity 

and has made considerable progress in this area. If confirmed, I will continue to 

make these issues a priority and will work to see that those who commit serious 

abuses or are involved in drug trafficking are held accountable, and the rights of 

victims and their families are protected. 

We remain concerned about increased coca cultivation in Bolivia and the corresponding increase of cocaine production by criminal traffickers. As the President 

indicated in the annual ‘‘Major’s List’’ determination this month, Bolivia’s cooperation in interdiction and voluntary eradication are not enough to counter this trend. 

We will continue to urge Bolivian authorities to make the reduction and eventual 

elimination of excess coca crops its highest priority. 

Coca cultivation is also increasing in Peru, where remaining members of the 

former Shining Path terrorist group continues to support coca growers and drug 

traffickers leading to violent resistance to counternarcotics efforts. Despite these increases, cultivation in both Bolivia and Peru remains below the highpoint of the 

mid-1990s, when these countries were the world’s primary producers. 

INL is also working with countries that are heavily impacted by cocaine that 

originates in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. By some measures, Brazil is the world’s 

second-largest consumer of cocaine. Much of this consumption is driven by violent 

gangs that traffic in drugs and weapons, and terrorize cities such as Rio de Janeiro 

and Sao Paulo. INL is beginning to work directly with states and cities in Brazil 

to enable them to combat these gangs more effectively on the streets and in prisons. 

Counternarcotics cooperation with Venezuela has declined significantly under the 

regime of President Chavez. Venezuela’s role as a transit zone for cocaine trafficking, particularly to Europe via West Africa, is growing, and Venezuela is, and 

has been, a conduit for arms and other equipment destined for antigovernment 

groups operating in Colombia. Evidence also suggests Mexican drug cartels are exploiting Venezuela as a transshipment point for Colombian cocaine. Poor border enforcement has permitted some of these groups to operate with impunity from inside 

Venezuela. For these reasons, the President determined that Venezuela had ‘‘failed 

demonstrably’’ to adhere to its obligations under international and bilateral drug 

control agreements for the third consecutive year. 

Mexico is a major transit and source country for illicit drugs. Roughly 90 percent 

of South American cocaine reaching the United States market transits Mexico. Mexico is also a source and transit zone for the majority of marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine consumed in the United States. 

Our law enforcement cooperation with Mexico is well integrated, and President 

Calderon has taken unprecedented actions against organized crime networks. Since 

January, the Government of Mexico has deployed joint law enforcement/military 

antidrug operations in 10 key states in Mexico, extradited 64 fugitives to date, already ahead of last year’s record figure of 63, and taken strong measures to root 

out corruption and to reform the federal police. We have initiated a series of expertlevel discussions with the Government of Mexico to follow up on a commitment 

made by President Bush to President Calderon to improve bilateral cooperation concerning public security, law enforcement, border security, and counternarcotics. This 

is an historic opportunity to confront criminal organizations that work across our 

border and through the region. As a strategy is finalized, we intend to stay in close 

contact with Congress and this committee. 

The nations of Central America are also struggling with drug trafficking and associated gang-related crime, corruption, and insecurity. In July of this year, the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00766 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
759 

partment announced the Strategy To Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America 

and Mexico. Under this comprehensive strategy, the United States will work with 

partner countries to combat transnational and other gangs that commit crimes in 

Central America, Mexico, and the United States. It will help prevent youth—beginning with children as young as 9 years old—from entering gangs and strengthen 

enforcement against gang-related violence and other crimes. 

In Haiti, INL is supporting U.N. efforts to transform the Haitian National Police 

into an institution capable of ensuring stability, public security, and human rights, 

and working with the entire justice sector to promote the rule of law. To combat 

the corrosive effects of drug trafficking through Haiti, the Bureau is providing 

equipment and technical assistance to improve the capacity of Haitian law enforcement to conduct drug interdiction operations and to investigate and prosecute traffickers and money launderers. 

BUILDING STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA

Building stability and democracy in South Asia is one of the President’s highest 

priorities. The United States has embarked on an ambitious and historic mission 

to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a haven for terrorists or a source of regional instability or repression against its citizens. Combating the drug trade and 

standing up a professional civilian police force in Afghanistan are critical elements 

of this mission. Although very little Afghan heroin reaches the United States, the 

drug trade has undermined virtually every aspect of the Government of Afghanistan’s drive to build political stability, economic growth, rule of law, and its capacity 

to address internal security problems. Proceeds from narcotrafficking are fueling the 

insurgency and corruption that undercut international reconstruction efforts. In 

order to lock in Afghan progress against these threats, a national police force is essential to secure the rule of law. 

The United States has committed itself to a major, multi-year counternarcotics effort in which INL plays a leading role. This effort centers on a five-pillar program 

designed to attack the drug trade on several fronts and at several levels. 

These pillars include: 

(1) A public information campaign emphasizing the social and health threat 

posed by the drug trade. 

(2) An alternative development pillar to establish viable, licit economic alternatives to poppy cultivation. 

(3) An eradication pillar that focuses on reducing poppy cultivation by providing both incentives for farmers not to plant and disincentives for those who 

do. 

(4) An interdiction pillar that aims at destroying labs, seizing precursors and 

refined drugs, and arresting high value targets. 

(5) Law enforcement and justice sector reform to build an effective police, corrections, and court system capable of delivering justice and rule of law. 

This five-pillar program is in its third year and has struggled in an environment 

of significant insurgency. The results, thus far, have been mixed, with some localized success. We have seen declining poppy cultivation in the northern half of the 

country, where central government authority is strong, that could make the region 

virtually free of poppy by 2009. This is a major turnaround for an area that has 

been a traditional source of opium poppy. 

At the same time, there has been a tremendous surge in cultivation in the southern province of Helmand, where the insurgency is strong and government authority 

weak, and the rest of southern Afghanistan that more than offsets the successes in 

the north. 

If Helmand were a separate country, it would be the world’s second largest producer of opium poppy, after Afghanistan itself. Contrary to the myth that poppy is 

grown by poor farmers with no other economic choices, Helmand is Afghanistan’s 

richest province, and receives more United States foreign assistance than any other. 

Much of the poppy farming there is new in the last couple of years and carried out 

by larger growers who are relatively well off. The illegal activities of these relatively 

wealthy individuals must be confronted by Afghan authorities and the international 

community with greater determination, including through forced eradication where 

necessary. 

To better address changing trends in cultivation, the security situation, the political climate, and requirements of economic development, the United States has 

made adjustments in strategy which will be carried out over the next several weeks 

and months. These refinements to the current strategy include three main elements. 

First, we aim to dramatically and simultaneously increase the scope of both the incentive of development assistance and the disincentives of stepped up interdiction, 

760 

eradication, and law enforcement, including expansion and improvement of the Good 

Performers Initiative. Second, working with our NATO allies, we intend to improve 

coordination of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency information sharing and operations. Finally, we must develop consistent, sustained political will for the counternarcotics effort among the Afghan Government, our allies, and international civilian and military organizations. This will include working with the international 

community on a coordinated strategy to ensure that government officials in Kabul 

and the provinces appoint strong, law abiding officials and remove weak or corrupt 

ones to carry out interdiction and eradication programs. 

In Afghanistan, it is important to differentiate between our long- and short-term 

goals. Based on the experiences of states such as Thailand and Laos, we will need 

staying power to achieve the goal of an Afghanistan free from all opium poppy cultivation. This long-term effort must be broken down into incremental steps. For the 

short- to medium-term, if we can succeed in reducing the cultivation of poppy to a 

more manageable level that would be less of a threat to the Afghan Government, 

that would be a genuine, if incremental, victory. I believe that within the next 2 

years, it is possible to move from uncontrolled cultivation in Afghanistan to a situation where the drug economy could be a more manageable problem. 

To achieve this reduction, we must achieve greater success in eradicating poppy 

crops. This is an essential prerequisite in order to achieve effective results with our 

sustainable livelihood assistance. Until Afghan poppy growers are convinced that 

they face the credible threat of forced eradication, they will not embrace legal alternatives. Based on surveys that it has conducted, the U.N. estimates that the eradication threshold we need to reach in order to successfully convince growers to abandon poppy cultivation is 25 percent of the overall crop. Currently, we are achieving 

an eradication rate of approximately 10 percent or less. This needs to improve, and 

in order for this to happen, the Afghan Government and our other international 

partners need to demonstrate greater political commitment toward pursuing forced 

eradication. 

Eradication is an essential component of the strategy, but it must be accompanied 

by economic and institutional development to achieve sustainable results. The 

opium trade is deeply embedded in Afghan society and dominates a small economy 

with only limited economic options. Institutional development—critical for establishing rule of law—is also at a low level following two decades of civil war and 

Taliban rule. This is in contrast to Colombia, where cocaine trafficking is of more 

recent vintage and plays a relatively smaller role in its more diversified economy 

and where justice sector and related institutions are more resilient. 

In cooperation with DOD, INL has helped train more than 81,000 Afghan National Police (ANP) to date. ANP training includes selected specialized training initiatives, such as literacy, domestic violence, and anticorruption, in addition to the 

basic training program. In the near future, INL intends to focus more heavily on 

the development of advanced capabilities such as criminal investigative skills, 

records management, computer skills, internal affairs, professional responsibility, 

intelligence gathering and analysis, and counternarcotics skills. 

I am confident that we can achieve our goals in Afghanistan. We know that a 

comprehensive, long-term approach can and does work, as it has elsewhere in 

Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Afghanistan is not more predetermined to becoming a failed state with a narco-economy than Colombia was in the late 1990s. 

Colombia is now a stable democracy with a thriving economy and a strong state 

presence across its territory; Afghanistan can achieve similar progress, given sufficient political commitment, international support, and time. 

Next door to Afghanistan, Pakistan is playing an increasingly important role as 

a front line state in the war against both terrorism and the drug trade. Pakistan 

is a major transit zone for Afghan opium. Its 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan 

remains open to cross-border movement and operations by Afghan insurgents and 

other armed groups and uncontrolled areas along the border serve as sanctuaries 

for those groups. 

To help secure Pakistan’s border region, INL is helping open up inaccessible areas 

through road projects and by providing vehicles and aviation support to increase 

mobility, monitoring, and interdiction by border and other police. INL programs are 

also helping to modernize and professionalize the Pakistani national police, including the development of a national database of terrorists, traffickers, and other criminals. In this respect, our counternarcotics program is directly assisting counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan. 

761 

STABILIZING IRAQ

INL is playing an important role in the stabilization of Iraq through assisting in 

the development and enhancement of Iraq’s criminal justice sector. Establishing an 

effective criminal justice system in which the Iraqi people have confidence is essential to providing the Iraqis a reliable alternative to militias, sectarian groups, and 

other extra-governmental forces to resolve disputes. INL is providing support to all 

aspects of the criminal justice system—police, justice sector, and corrections. 

In support of Central Command’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team 

(CPATT) efforts to develop and professionalize the Iraqi police, INL is providing 

close to 1,000 International Police Advisors who, under the Coalition Forces’ direction, train, assess, and mentor Iraqi police personnel, including border police. 

INL is working with United States Government interagency partners to develop 

and strengthen the Iraqi justice sector by training judges, investigators, and court 

personnel, to help the Iraqis secure their judges and courts, to improve coordination 

among police, courts, and prisons, and to help the Government of Iraq strengthen 

legislation governing the judiciary and criminal codes. INL’s support for an FBI-led 

interagency Major Crimes Task Force is helping Iraqis investigate and process the 

most serious, high-profile cases such as the murder of the Chief Justice’s son and 

attacks on Coalition and Iraqi security forces. 

Since 2004, INL has also implemented a program to professionalize the administration of prisons in Iraq and help ensure that prisoners are held securely and humanely. Several thousand Iraqi Corrections Service personnel have been trained 

and mentored through this program. The Bureau is also funding and managing a 

large prison construction program that will increase Iraq’s prison capacity by over 

6,500 beds over the next 2 years. Stepped up security efforts are straining existing 

Iraqi corrections capacities and our challenge over the coming months will be to 

help the Iraqis manage this growth. 

Iraq’s security situation seriously complicates implementation of INL programs, 

but tangible progress is being made. Helping Iraqis create a system that is sufficiently effective and fair, and inspires trust so citizens turn to it instead of militias 

and other destructive actors, is essential to stabilizing the country and securing our 

national interests. If I am confirmed, this challenge will be among my foremost priorities. 

INL EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Following a spate of destabilizing terrorist assassinations in 2005–2006, Lebanon 

sought United States assistance to strengthen its security forces. The INL program 

there, which includes training and other technical support for Lebanon’s Internal 

Security Force is designed to bolster efforts by the democratically elected government to establish full sovereignty within its borders. 

INL will soon begin implementation of a program designed to help moderates 

within the Palestinian Authority enforce law and order, and stability in the West 

Bank. Through this program, the United States will provide nonlethal equipment, 

police training, and construction or rehabilitation of police training facilities, and 

will support institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Interior, which oversees 

security forces. As with other INL programs, this program will include a significant 

and meaningful vetting process to screen participants and exclude any with possible 

terrorist ties or human rights violations. 

THE THREAT FROM SYNTHETIC DRUGS

The Department shares the strong concern of Congress about the growing threat 

of synthetic drugs, particularly of methamphetamine. These drugs offer enormous 

potential profits to drug trafficking organizations, and unlike coca or opium poppy, 

their production is not easily contained to specific areas. Recent history shows us 

that when faced with law enforcement or regulatory pressure in one country, producers and traffickers can quickly adapt to new to find new precursor chemical supplies, new production sites, and new smuggling routes. Methamphetamine, in particular, is distinct from other illicit drugs because its production requires no specialized skill or training, and instructions on how to produce it are easily available on 

the Internet. This is a true global challenge, and INL is committed to working aggressively in both bilateral and multilateral settings to enhance international chemical control regimes to prevent the illegal diversion of chemicals needed to produce 

methamphetamine. 

Most of the methamphetamine consumed in the United States today is controlled 

by Mexican drug trafficking organizations producing the drug in ‘‘superlabs.’’ Smaller amounts are produced here in ‘‘small toxic labs,’’ but these have been declining 

762 

in recent years due in large part to U.S. efforts to control the sale of those pharmaceuticals and chemicals that can be used to produce methamphetamine. 

Because Mexico is the principal foreign supplier of methamphetamine to the 

United States, INL is working with Mexico to strengthen border security and enhance counterdrug operations, including providing specialized mobile equipment and 

establishing a Chemical Response Team to detect and raid drug labs and lead investigations into chemical diversion. With a growing methamphetamine abuse problem 

of its own, Mexico has taken this problem very seriously and has recently announced that it will take the unprecedented step of banning all methamphetamine 

precursors, pseudoephedrine, and ephedrine, beginning in January 2008. This is an 

unprecedented step, and shows Mexico’s commitment to address this issue. 

INL has been working closely with multilateral organizations, including the U.N. 

and OAS, to make international chemical controls a priority. In 2006, the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution requesting that 

states provide the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) with estimates of 

their domestic, legitimate requirements for chemicals precursors that can also be 

used for the manufacture of synthetic drugs. Over 100 countries did so in 2006, establishing a new baseline that allows exporting and importing countries to quickly 

check whether the chemicals and quantities proposed in commercial transactions 

would indicate possible diversion. These checks enable authorities to determine 

whether further law enforcement scrutiny is warranted. To help the INCB carry out 

this reporting responsibility, INL has doubled its annual financial contribution to 

the organization since 2006. 

In March 2007, the Department issued its first report under the 2006 Combat 

Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA) identifying the major importers and exporters of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine coupled with a Presidential determination 

backed by sanctions on whether such countries are fully cooperating with the United 

States on counternarcotics. The CMEA has helped focus international attention on 

this issue, and is a valuable tool in confronting this challenge. 

MANAGING INL RESPONSIBILITIES

INL’s global responsibilities have grown substantially over the last several years. 

The Bureau’s overall budget has grown from approximately $130 million in the mid1990s to over $2.6 billion in fiscal year 2007, including supplemental funding. INL 

is also responsible for managing programs funded by the Department of Defense for 

police training in Iraq and Afghanistan. This dramatic expansion has presented INL 

with certain challenges in ensuring that our management and oversight controls are 

equal to the scope of our program work. INL has already devoted considerable effort 

to right-sizing and reorganizing our staffing to better reflect the priorities of the Bureau’s expanding mission. In this effort, our work has been guided by inspections 

by the OIG, GAO, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. INL 

has benefited from this input as well as from the concerns and recommendations 

expressed by Members of Congress and their staffs. I believe that the Bureau is well 

on its way to meeting the expectations of both Congress and the public. If confirmed, I fully intend to continue this reform process and ensure that we have the 

personnel and oversight mechanisms in place to fulfill our mission. 

The greatest challenge facing INL have been the enormous growth of its programs 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Last year, INL increased staffing for program, contract 

and asset management in both countries. Concurrently, INL also established a 

United States-based contract management support group that provides additional 

contract oversight and technical support. This dual effort has resulted in contract 

savings, cost avoidance and recapturing contract expenditures. More recently, the 

Bureau also established a separate Iraq office to focus specifically on civilian police 

operations and rule of law programs for that priority country. With the support of 

the Department, INL has been steadily increasing its full-time staffing to meet the 

requirements of these programs, and this is a process that, if confirmed, I will take 

a very direct interest in continuing. We need to find the best people available to 

manage these high-priority initiatives, and we need to place them where they are 

most needed—both overseas and here in Washington. 

INL has also improved its financial and asset management by establishing and 

implementing an improved financial reporting tool; conducting its own program reviews, audits, investigations, and verifications; improving field support and training; 

and placing greater focus on outputs and metrics to better align the Bureau’s financial resources with its program performance. As a result, INL is implementing and 

standardizing improvements for ensuring strong management controls. 

763 

Finally, as noted by GAO, INL revamped the Bureau’s aviation management by 

centralizing all aviation planning, reporting, and administrative responsibilities, 

leading to a more transparent resource decision making process. 

These are the kind of efforts that, if confirmed, I will continue and build on to 

ensure that the extensive resources under the Bureau’s responsibility are managed 

appropriately. 

CONCLUSION

Again, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to address these 

diverse challenges that directly impact us here at home. Please be assured that I 

will strive to keep you fully informed of our progress and our setbacks, and I certainly welcome your thoughts and advice. I look forward to answering any questions 

you may have. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. Fannin. Yes, please, and also if you would introduce your 

family, we would appreciate that. 

STATEMENT OF P. ROBERT FANNIN, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Senator Kyl for his introduction, and I’d also like to introduce my wife, Dr. Lisa Fannin, 

and my son Paul, and his wife, Sharon, who have been very supportive during this process. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I’m honored to be 

the President’s nominee to be the next United States Ambassador 

to the Dominican Republic. I would like to express my gratitude to 

President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have 

shown in me. 

Mr. Chairman, I see this nomination as a unique opportunity to 

serve my country. I come from a family which deeply values and 

respects the call to public service. My father’s service as Governor 

of Arizona and United States Senator inspired all of his children. 

I have sought to follow his example with my own dedication to public service. 

The Dominican Republic and United States have a special relationship with economic, cultural, and social ties that are strong and 

growing. Indeed, only last week, President Fernandez had a very 

cordial meeting with Deputy Secretary John Negroponte at the 

State Department. 

Dominican-Americans in the United States are a growing, thriving community. The ties of music, baseball, art, and literature 

bring our two countries closer every year. We face the challenges 

of the world together, a fact never more clear than when some 41 

persons of Dominican descent lost their lives on September 11, 

2001. 

Many persons of Dominican descent proudly serve in our Armed 

Forces. Approximately 100,000 Americans live in the Dominican 

Republic. Over a million Americans visited the Dominican Republic 

in 2006. If confirmed, one of my chief priorities will be the wellbeing and security of both official and nonofficial Americans in the 

Dominican Republic. 

I hope to utilize the leadership skills I have learned as a military 

officer, as chairman of many nonprofit organizations, as a leader 

promoting intelligent economic development, and as a managing 

764 

partner of a law firm. I would use these leadership skills to bring 

together the many agencies of the U.S. Embassy into one cohesive 

country team. 

My experience as a lawyer would provide me with the background to assist in the implementation of many reforms in progress 

in the Dominican Republic. These include programs promoting a 

more transparent, accountable, and effective judicial system. My 

experience in the law and military would help me work effectively 

with the United States and Dominican military, intelligence, and 

law enforcement agencies in the areas of anticorruption, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, countertrafficking in persons, extradition, illegal migration, legal migration, and others. 

Mr. Chairman, I recognize that as the United States Ambassador 

to the Dominican Republic, I would have the duty to promote and 

protect America’s values and interests. America has a paramount 

interest in promoting social justice in this hemisphere. If confirmed, I will work to advance the cause of social justice in the Dominican Republic. This would include the continuation of our Government’s cooperation with the Dominican Republic in the areas of 

education, healthcare, housing, economic freedom, human rights, 

good governance, and democracy. As Senator Kyl mentioned, I’m 

particularly interested in the health sector because my wife is a 

physician and a board member of a health-related nonprofit, and 

a philanthropic foundation. 

I hope to use my experience in the banking industry—including 

serving as an officer and as a director of two major financial institutions—to assist with the implementation of the Central American 

Free Trade Agreement in the Dominican Republic, CAFTA–DR. My 

experience as an officer and a board member of Chambers of Commerce would also be very helpful in the areas of trade and economic development. 

I would also work to assist United States businesses in the Dominican Republic, in particular, by encouraging Dominican efforts—through CAFTA–DR framework—to create and enforce laws 

and regulations that are pro-business, and pro-investment. I would 

work to resolve existing commercial and investment disputes involving U.S. interests. I would encourage stronger Dominican support for intellectual property rights, particularly in light of Dominican efforts to attract high-tech investment. 

At the same time, I recognize that growth in the economy and 

trade would mean little, if not accompanied by improvement in the 

lives of all of the people. Economic liberty must not mean that business rules at the expense of the poor, the middle-class, and of the 

environment. If confirmed, I would work to maximize the benefits 

of our development assistance, targeting labor rights and the environment. 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you, Senator 

Cardin and this esteemed committee. If confirmed, I hope to work 

with you and your colleagues on the committee and in the Congress, on a full range of issues. I am looking forward to your questions. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fannin follows:] 

765 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF P. ROBERT FANNIN, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to be the President’s 

nominee for the next United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. I would 

like to express my gratitude to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence 

they have shown in me. 

I would like to thank Senator Kyl for introducing me. I would also like to introduce my wife, Dr. Lisa Fannin, my son, Paul, and his wife, Sharon, who have been 

very supportive during this entire process. 

Mr. Chairman, I see this nomination as a unique opportunity to serve my country. 

I come from a family which deeply values and respects the call to public service. 

My father’s service as Governor of Arizona and U.S Senator inspired all of his children. I have sought to follow his example with my own dedication to public service. 

The Dominican Republic and the United States have a special relationship with 

economic, cultural, and social ties that are strong and growing. Indeed, only last 

week, President Fernandez had a very cordial meeting with Deputy Secretary John 

Negroponte at the Department of State. Dominican Americans in the United States 

are a growing, thriving community. The ties of music, baseball, art, and literature 

bring our two countries closer every year. We face the challenges of the world together, a fact never more clear than when some 41 persons of Dominican descent 

lost their lives on September 11, 2001. Many persons of Dominican descent proudly 

serve in our Armed Forces. Approximately 100,000 Americans live in the Dominican 

Republic. Over a million Americans visited the Dominican Republic in 2006. If confirmed, one of my chief priorities will be the well-being and security of both official 

and nonofficial Americans in the Dominican Republic. 

I hope to utilize the leadership skills I have learned as a military officer, as a 

chairman of many nonprofit organizations, as a leader promoting intelligent economic development, and as a managing partner of a law firm. I would use these 

leadership skills to bring together the many agencies of a U.S. Embassy into one 

cohesive country team. My experience as a lawyer would provide me with the background to assist in the implementation of many reforms in progress in the Dominican Republic. These include programs promoting a more transparent, accountable, 

and effective judicial system. My experience in the law and military would help me 

work effectively with United States and Dominican military, intelligence, and law 

enforcement agencies in the areas of anticorruption, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, countertrafficking in persons, extradition, illegal migration, legal migration and others. 

Mr. Chairman, I recognize that as the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, I would have the duty to promote and protect America’s values and 

interests. 

America has a paramount interest in promoting social justice in this hemisphere. 

If confirmed, I will work to advance the cause of social justice in the Dominican Republic. This would include the continuation of our Government’s cooperation with 

the Dominican Republic in the areas of education, health care, housing, economic 

freedom, human rights, good governance, and democracy. I am particularly interested in the health sector because my wife is a physician and board member of a 

health related nonprofit corporation and a philanthropic foundation. 

I hope to use my experience in the banking industry, including serving as an officer and as a director of two major financial institutions, to assist with the implementation of the Central America Free Trade Agreement in the Dominican Republic, CAFTA–DR. My experience as an officer and board member of chambers of commerce would also be helpful in the areas of trade and economic development. 

I would also work to assist United States businesses in the Dominican Republic, 

in particular by encouraging Dominican efforts through the CAFTA–DR framework 

to create and enforce laws and regulations that are pro-business and pro-investment. I would work to resolve existing commercial and investment disputes involving United States’ interests. I would encourage stronger Dominican support for intellectual property rights, particularly in light of Dominican efforts to attract hi-tech 

investment. 

At the same time, I recognize that growth in the economy and trade would mean 

little if not accompanied by improvement in the lives of all the people. Economic liberty must not mean that business rules at the expense of the poor, of the middle 

class, and of the environment. If confirmed, I would work to maximize the benefits 

of our development assistance targeting labor rights and the environment. 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before Senator Cardin and this esteemed 

committee. I hope to work with you and your colleagues on the committee and in 

766 

the Congress on a full range of issues. I also look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Fannin. 

We’ll now hear from Mr. Simons. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL E. SIMONS, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE 

Mr. SIMONS. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, members of 

the committee, it is an honor to appear, once again, before this 

committee on this occasion, as the President’s nominee to be our 

next Ambassador to Chile. 

I’d like to introduce my wife, Victoria, who is with us today. We 

are very much a multicultural family, with very strong Latin roots. 

Victoria is originally from Colombia, while our daughters, Andrea 

and Camila, were born in Ecuador. All three have been my most 

stalwart supporters, interrupting careers and studies to serve our 

country. All of us look forward to representing United States interests in Chile, if I am confirmed. 

Mr. Chairman, this is an exciting moment to be considered for 

a leadership role in United States-Chile relations. As you, yourself, 

pointed out in your opening statement, Chile is a notable success 

story in the hemisphere, and our bilateral relationship is particularly strong across three principal areas. 

Politically, Chile is a thriving democracy with resilient institutions, and a proven record of support for democratic principles. Economically, Chile’s record of trade-driven growth is generating concrete benefits for its own citizens—as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the decline in the poverty rate—as well as opportunities for 

United States companies, under our bilateral free trade agreement. 

And, our security relationship, finally, is very solid, with bilateral 

military cooperation among the very best in the hemisphere. 

Mr. Chairman, we are fortunate to have a valued partner in 

Chile to work with, to promote our shared vision of democracy and 

free markets in this hemisphere. 

I’d like to lay out three priority areas which, if confirmed, I 

would propose as major themes to pursue. 

First, providing strong leadership to the United States’ community in Chile, from residents and tourists, to American businesses. 

My experience in Israel reinforced the importance of uniting the 

American community, while much of my 30-year professional career has been spent advancing United States business interests 

around the globe. 

Second, broadening and deepening our bilateral partnership. 

Building on our very successful bilateral free trade agreement, and 

our new education initiative, I would look for ways to deepen our 

links with Chile across the range of issues—from energy to environmental cooperation, from innovation, to law enforcement. 

Third, working with Chile on broader hemispheric and global 

challenges where we share common interests. Drawing on my background in multilateral diplomacy, I would hope to find ways to 

work with our partners in Chile to share their successful experiences with economic and political freedom with a broader regional 

and global audience. 

767 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by thanking President Bush and 

Secretary Rice for their vote of confidence in proposing my candidacy for this position. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with 

you, the members of this committee, and other members of Congress to deepen the very strong partnership the United States enjoys with Chile. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simons follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL E. SIMONS, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear once again 

before this committee, on this occasion as President Bush’s nominee to serve as our 

next Ambassador to Chile. 

Let me introduce my wife, Victoria, who is with us today. We are a multicultural 

family with strong Latin roots—Victoria is originally from Colombia, while our 

daughters, Andrea and Camila, were born in Ecuador. All three have been my most 

stalwart supporters, interrupting careers and studies to serve our country. All of us 

look forward to representing United States interests in Chile if I am confirmed. 

Mr. Chairman, this is an exciting moment to be considered for a leadership role 

in United States-Chile relations. Our bilateral relationship is particularly strong 

across three principal areas: 

• Politically, Chile is a thriving democracy, with resilient political institutions 

and a proven record of support for democratic principles in the Organization of 

American States and other multilateral fora. 

• Economically, Chile’s record of trade-driven growth is generating concrete benefits for its citizens and opportunities for United States companies. Poverty has 

been cut by more than two-thirds in the last 15 years, while two-way trade with 

the United States has increased by over 150 percent in the 3 years that our 

bilateral Free Trade Agreement has been in effect. Continuing these successful 

economic policies will help Chile meet the remaining economic and social challenges it is currently looking to address. 

• Our security relationship is very solid, with bilateral military cooperation 

among the best in the hemisphere. Chile supports a number of important security initiatives, from the Proliferation Security Initiative to peacekeeping in 

Haiti. 

Mr. Chairman, we are fortunate to have a valued partner in Chile to work with 

us to promote our shared vision of democracy and free markets in this hemisphere. 

I would like to lay out three priority areas which, if confirmed, I would propose as 

major themes to pursue: 

First, providing strong leadership to the United States’ community in Chile. During my tenure in Israel, the American community bonded closely to sustain morale 

during a challenging period. If confirmed, I intend to provide equally active leadership to the resident American community in Chile and quality consular support to 

United States residents and visitors there. 

That leadership would extend as well to strengthening bilateral business ties— 

a natural fit for me, as much of my 25-year Foreign Service career has been spent 

advancing U.S. business interests around the globe. I am a firm believer in working 

with the U.S. private sector to introduce American corporate values and innovation 

to our partners around the world. 

Second, broadening and deepening our bilateral partnership. Building on our successful bilateral free trade agreement, I would look for ways to deepen our links 

across the range of issues, from energy to environmental cooperation, innovation, 

and law enforcement. Chile and the United States have already launched an innovative educational exchange program that could well be a model for cooperation in 

other sectors. Drawing on my policy experience, I would hope to develop creative 

tools to deepen our cooperation, working with our Chilean partners, United States 

agencies, and our respective private sectors. 

Third, working with Chile on broader hemispheric and global challenges where we 

share common interests. Chile is an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and is a candidate country for entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Drawing on my own multilateral background, 

I would hope to find ways to draw Chile into sharing its successful experiences with 

economic and political freedom to a broader global audience. 

768 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by thanking President Bush and Secretary Rice 

for their vote of confidence in proposing my candidacy for this position. If confirmed, 

I pledge to continue to work closely with you, the members of this committee, and 

other Members of Congress to deepen the very strong partnership the United States 

enjoys with Chile. 

Senator CARDIN. Once again, let me thank all three of you for 

your willingness to come forward, and for your testimony today. 

Mr. Johnson, if I might start with you. We had a chance to work 

together when you were at OSCE, and I appreciated the relationship that we had. I thought it was always one of trust and mutual 

respect, and I thank you for that service. 

I want to talk to you about two countries that you mentioned in 

regard to our war on drugs—one being Colombia, and the other 

being Afghanistan. You mentioned both in your statement. In Colombia, we’ve spent $5 billion alone—90 percent of the cocaine coming into the United States is estimated to come in from Colombia. 

And, our objective of Plan Colombia was to reduce coca cultivations 

by 50 percent, and we have not reached those goals. 

So, I guess my question to you is, how do you intend to try to 

refocus our efforts, to have a successful program in Colombia to 

stop the cocaine coming into the United States—reduce it? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You’re quite correct— 

the American taxpayers invested significant sums in Colombia, and 

the Colombians themselves in the plan that we developed, have invested even more. 

While the goal that we set for ourselves has clearly not been met, 

I think that we also should recognize just how far Colombia has 

come during this period of time. It’s a different place than it was 

when President Clinton proposed Plan Colombia back in the late 

1990s, and it’s in significant measure because of the monies that 

have been put forward by our taxpayers and the programs that 

have been undertaken by my predecessors. 

I think it’s—where we are focused now as we look forward, is to 

try to work with the Government of Colombia to make this more 

of a national program—to have them take over, take it over piece 

by piece, and in a manner where it can be sustained by them, and 

be taken on as their own program, if you will. But, I think that 

we’re going to have to have a pretty long time horizon for that, it’s 

not something that we can do, effectively, over the course of a very 

short time. 

We’re working with the Colombians on this, we have a very seasoned and senior diplomat whose project is to come to terms with 

this issue, and to make a recommendation about how we can recast 

things. But, I think we also shouldn’t forget, while we haven’t had 

as much of a success in terms of the elimination of the cocaine 

trade from Colombia as we would have liked to, it’s been significantly cut over what it otherwise would have been. 

Where we would have, I think we can do things forward is that 

the traffickers themselves have adapted. They’ve changed the way 

they’ve done business, they’ve changed where they’ve tried to grow, 

and so I think, working with the Colombians, we’re going to have 

to have a—if I could borrow a phrase from Toyota—a kind of a continuous product improvement, so that we can adapt as well, and do 

better than we have in the past. 

769 

Senator CARDIN. Well, was the plan objective right to reduce cultivation by 50 percent? Is that doable? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think, I would hesitate to issue a quantity. I 

think that we can do better than we have in the past, I think we 

can work more effectively with the Colombians—taking nothing 

from all of the hard work that’s been done before—but I think we 

can learn from what we’ve done by adapting further. But I think 

that we also have to be modest in what we can, in fact, achieve. 

This is a very difficult problem. And a very—in a place that’s hard 

to work. 

Senator CARDIN. You’re suggesting that we have to be flexible to 

modify the plan strategies as those who are participating in drug 

trafficking are adjusting toward our strategies to try to counter 

them? Is that what you’re basically—? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we can make some adjustments. I think 

that we can be even more effective than we have been in the past. 

I’m not sure that the measure of 50 percent is—was necessarily the 

correct one to aim at. But, what we would like to do is be more 

effective in curtailing the amount that’s grown, and more effective 

in the interdiction effort. 

And really, what this plan is all about, is not just interdicting 

drugs, or stopping them from being grown, an eradication program, 

it’s about extending the writ of the Colombian Government further 

into its own country, and where people are more secure, where we 

can help provide the security that is needed, the alternative development programs that we have, and can take hold. And I think 

that’s the kind of traction that we need, as we look into the future. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me quickly turn to Afghanistan. We had a 

hearing in this committee on Afghanistan, and the poppy crop, and 

the failures of our policy, to date, to eliminate the poppy trade coming in from Afghanistan. At that time, there were many issues that 

were raised in our committee, including economic opportunity for 

the people of Afghanistan. I’m wondering how high of a priority Afghanistan will have. Obviously, this is a country that has incredible importance to the United States efforts. And the poppy crop is 

obviously one of the areas that are preventing us from achieving 

our objectives in that country. You’ll have a key role, I hope, to 

play in a strategy to deal with that problem. Could you elaborate 

a little bit more as to how you intend to make this a priority? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, we have just 

come forward over the course of the last several months, where an 

invigorated program in Afghanistan, one that has multiple prongs, 

if you will, public information, alternative development, which is 

the key I believe, that you were referring to there, in terms of providing a livelihood for people who might otherwise be in the drug 

trade. 

But it also has to have a law enforcement element, which we are 

developing, as well. As well as elimination and eradication. The 

U.N. estimates that in order to really deter individuals from wanting to grow poppy, we’re going to have to make them believe that 

about a quarter of their crop is at risk, and we have not reached 

that level yet. 

But I think what we’ve found in Afghanistan is that security is 

the key here. In the provinces in Afghanistan, which are relatively 

770 

secure, a significant number of them are poppy-free. Where violence is more prevalent—particularly in the South—that’s the area 

which has had the burgeoning poppy growth over the course of the 

last couple of years. So, I think it’s going to require a combined effort on the counternarcotics side, as well as the security side. I 

think one of the things we’ve learned over time in Afghanistan, in 

particular, is that if you can’t create security on the ground, none 

of these programs can really be successful. 

And so we have to work in close partnership with our military, 

as well as the NATO operation, there on the ground. I think this 

is going to—can be a successful program, but it’s going to require 

a great deal of patience, and a lot of work in a broad array, not 

just focused exclusively on eradication, but having that element as 

part of it. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. I appreciate our Chairman asking the questions 

he did about Afghanistan and Colombia, and obviously those are 

the two areas where there’s been—how that drug trade going unhampered, if you will, but continuing to flourish, as it is today. 

How that affects us as a country, overall, and affects those two 

countries themselves, as they continue to evolve? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I think I speak with a little more confidence about Afghanistan, because it’s an area that I’ve worked on 

before. And I think that it represented a different kind of threat 

to us than Colombia does. The threat of the narcotics trade in Afghanistan is really a threat to the stability that we are trying to 

promote there. The narcotics themselves are largely destined for 

other parts of the world—the heroine on the streets that is sold in 

the United States, largely, does not come from Afghanistan. That’s 

a threat to its neighbors, to the Russian Federation, as well as to 

Europe, more than it is us in terms of a direct narcotics threat. 

But if we’re unsuccessful, if we do not address narcotics in Afghanistan, the efforts that we have undertaken there to create a 

stable environment for a government to grow won’t take hold. The 

money that sloshes around, the opportunities for corruption, the 

money that flows in the direction of the insurgency, will just be too 

much to overcome without addressing this problem, as well. 

So, I think when we’re talking about Afghanistan, we’re talking 

largely from our selfish point of view about a stability issue that 

we have to address. 

In terms of Colombia, there is an element of stability threat 

there, because I think that the level of violence, the threat to the 

government itself in Colombia that has been in significant measure 

addressed over the course of the last 7 years, genuinely threatened 

that government, genuinely threatened to make Colombia a place 

where people could not live in safety. 

But it is also a direct threat to the health of Americans, with cocaine, with coca flowing out of that country, across the Caribbean, 

or up into Mexico, and into the United States. So, it is both a crime 

and a social and health threat, to the United States, as well as one 

potentially of stability. But, I think that when we are looking at 

Colombia today, we have to recognize that the progress that we’ve 

made over the last several years, has put it in a much different catVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00778 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
771 

egory. You cannot even, you know, think about Afghanistan and 

Colombia in the same pocket, in terms of the stability of the State 

and the institutions there. 

Afghanistan—one of the first countries on the planet—the literacy rate, maybe 20, 25 percent, 30 years of war, and Colombia, 

a significant threat from the narcotics area from a group of insurgents on the left and the right, but not in the same category, I believe, as Afghanistan. 

Thank you. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

Mr. Fannin, I enjoyed hearing about your background. And, it’s 

obviously very diverse and seems most applicable to the changes 

that are taking place in the Dominican Republic with CAFTA. And 

I wondered if you might address how you see the Dominican Republic adapting to these changes, some of the things that you think 

you’ll be focused on when you first hit the ground there? 

Mr. FANNIN. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the question, because I think one of the things that I can help with is the implementation of CAFTA. The—most importantly, I think the laws and 

the regulations that are required by CAFTA to improve the economic system in the Dominican Republic are very important, and 

still there needs to be a lot of work done to enact those laws and 

regulations. And it would be my—if confirmed—it would be my job 

and I hope to have that opportunity to ensure that those laws are 

passed, the regulations are passed, and that the United States 

companies have the opportunity to take the full benefit of those 

laws, and that Dominican companies share in those same benefits 

in terms of transparency, accountability, and the like that is necessary to have a better economy. 

As I was mentioning to Senator Menendez yesterday, many investors in the Dominican Republic have complained that there are 

laws or rules that are unclear, and lacking in enforcement. And it 

would be my job, as a lawyer, I think, to help with that situation 

and others. But I think I can be a value in that regard as a lawyer, 

and as a person who has led an economic development in Arizona. 

Same kind of thing—attracting businesses, and I hope I can use 

that experience as well. 

Senator CORKER. Now, I know you haven’t, aren’t there yet, and 

hopefully will be there very soon, but have you sensed, like in our 

country, when we enact new trade agreements, there’s always concern about loss of jobs and concern about how it affects the economy, based on the limited research you’ve done prior to being 

there—is there that same type of dilemma, if you will, that exists 

there, on the ground, in the Dominican Republic? 

Mr. FANNIN. Well, Senator, I think that from what I’ve read in 

the newspapers and some of the reports I’ve seen, there have been 

some complaints about the loss of jobs in certain areas. On the 

other hand, there is a lot of excitement and hope that all of the 

new technology, efficiencies, and so forth, that inure because of 

CAFTA, it will be far more a spread of benefits, more efficiency, 

more accountability, laws that American—other, not just American 

companies, U.S. companies, but people from all over the world— 

will seek to do business in that country, and thus improve their situation, not only in the major urban areas, but in the rural areas. 

772 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Simons, Chile is one of our major trading 

partners, and yet only 15 percent of their exports make their way 

into our country. I know they have a strong relationship with 

China and I’m wondering if there’s, there are any issues there that 

you see on the horizon that are affecting our lack of trade, if you 

will, with them, or their growth in trade with China in a way that, 

somehow, creates a rub, if you will, with their own country? 

Mr. SIMONS. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Let me say just a couple of words about how Chile has approached the trade issue worldwide. 

Chile has entered into free trade agreements with virtually all 

its major trading partners, and has been willing to expose its economy to the benefits and vagaries of free trade, and has benefited 

substantially. Chile’s total trade is running something on the order 

of 65 percent of GDP, if you add imports and exports, it’s a very 

high reliance on trade. So, Chile itself is very comfortable and confident that it can succeed on the trade front. 

With respect to the U.S. FTA, I think we’ve done quite well with 

the bilateral free trade agreement in the 31⁄2 years it’s been in existence. We’ve had total trade increase by about 150 percent, and 

during that period U.S. exports also have gone up by about 150 

percent—from about $3 billion a year to about $7 billion last year— 

and I think that’s a significant increase. 

Chile is our fifth largest trading partner in the hemisphere. So, 

we’ve seen good growth on the United States export side, and this 

has been very positive, I think, for United States’ businesses. 

We’re also making some inroads. Our market share in Chile is 

going up after many years of decline as a result of the FTA. 

Now, with respect to China, China clearly has a voracious appetite for inputs of all sorts—raw material inputs, energy inputs, copper inputs from Chile—and China is now the major importer of 

Chilean copper. But, of course, China needs that copper to fuel its 

economy, its economic growth. I think it’s natural that China would 

become a larger purchaser of Chilean copper, and I think it’s to be 

expected that two-way trade with China will increase. 

But I think it’s important that the United States maintains its 

market share, and that we get our businesses down there competing effectively, using the tools that we have under the bilateral 

FTA. And, if confirmed, I will be pushing very hard—I have a background with the business sector, I served in the private sector, and 

I’ve done a lot of work helping U.S. businesses over the years, and 

I would pledge to continue and intensify that, if confirmed. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

all of the gentlemen who are here before us for their willingness 

to serve, and their families for their willingness to have what is 

also a degree of sacrifice in some respects, in terms of moving and 

being displaced, and sometimes interceding in their own professional lives. So, we appreciate their sacrifices, as well. 

Let me start with you, Mr. Fannin. I appreciate your opening 

statement. I think it reflects a lot of the things we talked about 

yesterday, and I appreciate, obviously, you listened well, and that’s 

773 

a good sign of an ambassador who starts out by—if you can do it 

here, you can do it in the Dominican Republic, so I appreciate your 

statement, incorporating some of the things. 

And I just want to say, I know from our conversation yesterday 

you have not been able to visit the country yet, and are stopped 

from doing so until you get through this process. You’re going to 

be able to go to a—if you are successful, which I believe you will 

be—a great country with an incredibly warm and hardworking people. From a historic city in Santo Domingo, to a great places like 

Cenemal which has a mountainside that leads to a bay where there 

is a whaling season, to Santiago, which was the first capitol of the 

Dominican Republic and is the heart of tobacco growing, to Punta 

Cana which must have been still how Columbus discovered it, except for all of the hotels that are being added to the area, and 

where most Americans go to travel. 

So, it’s an idyllic place. And yet, it has some very significant 

challenges. And so, I heard your statement, and I hope that you 

will add to your portfolio while you are there—certainly the economic component is very important to us, as it is to the 

Dominicans. But I hope that there are two other items, one which 

you did touch upon, and I appreciate that. 

I just want to say, you know, it was President Bush who declared 

the Dominican Republic last year as one of the four major drug 

transit countries in the hemisphere. And our own United States 

Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South said that the number of drugsmuggling flights from Venezuela to Haiti and the Dominican Republic increased by 167 percent. A hundred and sixty-seven percent, between the years 2005 and 2006. 

So, I hope that as part of your portfolio you’re going to continue 

to press this issue with President Fernandez. I think it’s in their 

interests, obviously such transiting is corrosive in their own society, but certainly it’s a concern to us in our own country. 

And the flip side of that is Transparency International 2006 Corruption Perception Index, which listed Dominican Republic as 

‘‘rampant.’’ I know of U.S. companies that have provided services, 

products or investments, and who arbitrarily and capriciously have 

seen either their nonpayment, or interference in their investments. 

It’s bad for the Dominican Republic, because it sends the wrong 

message about the ability and the desirability of United States 

companies to go and make investments, and certainly to lend services. 

So, I hope that that will be also part of your portfolio. Can I expect you to include that, as well as the economic aspects? 

Mr. FANNIN. Yes, sir. You sure can. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Simons, you’re going to a great country, as well, as I’m sure 

you know. And I listened to the three points that you talked 

about—I agree with you. The third point on economic and political 

freedoms and using Chile as a place that is an example of that at 

a time in which we are challenged within the hemisphere. I believe 

that is true, except that Chile, under President Bachelet has been 

hailed as a modern leftist government, but recent protests do not 

bode well for the future of her administration, at least as it would 

seem now. 

774 

I’m wondering what your view is, given the success story that 

Chile has been—what explains for the unrest within Chile? And in 

that context, how will we be able to get the Chileans to play a role 

that is more significant in the hemisphere, particularly with Chavez being a next-door neighbor with a lot of—trying to—exert a lot 

of influence in the hemisphere that I personally don’t believe is in 

our national interest. 

Mr. SIMONS. Thank you, Senator Menendez, it’s a very thoughtful question. With respect to—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I only ask thoughtful questions. [Laughter.] 

No, I’m just kidding. Thanks for the compliment. 

Mr. SIMONS. With respect to President Bachelet’s internal situation, I would just point out that Chile is a strong, vibrant democracy, it’s had four successful changes of government in the past 17 

years, and as it has matured, in any kind of open democracy with 

free expression, you have people that are speaking out and expressing their views. And so you have poll numbers that fluctuate. 

But, we have had an excellent relationship with the Bachelet administration across a broad range of areas, and the fact that Chile 

is a vibrant democracy, I think, helps us work with the Chileans. 

Now, with respect to Venezuela, I think you point out rightly, 

Venezuelan relations are a challenge for many of our friends in this 

hemisphere. President Bachelet has, herself, used the expression, 

‘‘A different path’’—Chile is pursuing a different path. It’s a path 

that involves freedom of expression, political pluralism, obviously a 

different economic path. 

Undersecretary Hughes in the State Department has used the 

expression, ‘‘diplomacy of deeds.’’ She’s charged many of us career 

officers with pursuing that. And to some extent, Chile is pursuing 

a diplomacy of deeds in the hemisphere—is showing what the results are of this different path. 

And so, I think this is something that, if confirmed, I would work 

to encourage Chile to do, pursue this path, and to find ways to 

demonstrate that this different path yields improved results for the 

publics of Chile, and other countries. So, I would definitely work 

on that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that. I don’t mean for my comments to be misunderstood on President Bachelet. I actually think 

she’s doing a good job, but it’s within the success that Chile has 

had economically and politically, opening up, that you see these 

protests, and you wonder—what are the underpinnings of that? 

Outside of the—little bit of the transportation fiasco that they had 

there for awhile. 

It is—if one chalks it up strictly to the fulfillment of democracy, 

that’s great. But I’m, you know, I’m concerned that there are other 

underpinnings, and you know, we’d look forward to, as you get on 

the ground, getting a sense from you whether it’s strictly the fulfillment of democracy, and a boisterous democracy, or whether there 

are other issues there that are involved, as well. 

Finally, Mr. Johnson, let me—I have the toughest questions for 

you. But then, you have one of the toughest assignments here, and 

I recognize that. 

I have been, since my House days, a strong supporter of Plan Colombia. But I have to be honest with you, my support is—I am inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00782 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
775 

creasingly becoming skeptical of that support. I look at the results 

of the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s 2006 government 

survey of cultivation in Colombia that indicates that statistically 

there was no change in the amount of coca being grown between 

2005 and 2006. 

In a recent briefing before the Senate, we were told the startling 

fact that, ‘‘70 percent of fields that have been reconstituted within 

6 months of spraying, according to the State Department’s most recent verification mission.’’ I think that’s a pretty serious problem. 

If we’re going through all of this effort, and that after we spray a 

field, 70 percent is reconstituted in some way, shape, or form, 

makes me wonder about the nature of our policy there. 

And then, when I look at that, I put that on the side for a 

minute, I’m going to let you answer all of this in a holistic way— 

then I understand the administration is in the midst of some negotiations with Mexico about a cross-border efforts on drug gangs 

that operate on both sides of the United States-Mexico border. I’d 

love to know where we’re headed there, because the administration 

ought to come to this Congress to ask for that money. This is a key 

issue, but what’s that policy going to be, and I don’t know if you 

know what it is at this point, or what you think it should be from 

your experiences, but I’d like to hear that. 

And last, Guatemala. You know, the—sort of like the sexy parts 

of this are Colombians, the Andean Region, Afghanistan, and others, but I am concerned that we are not looking at Guatemala. 

From what I understand, entire swaths of the country are run by 

drug traffickers. Not only do they control the area where they transit their planes, they try to control the people. They do everything 

from pay for a deala la huela, to soccer fields, they try to buy the 

government off at the local level, and I feel that often Guatemala 

is forgotten in our discussion of the hemisphere, particularly when 

we see crime and violence levels that are startling, a judicial system that is weak, and impunity remaining a serious problem. 

So I’d like you to give me—because none of these things, this is 

like Jell-O in my mind. You push it in one place, it pops out in another, when it’s within the hemisphere—and so I’d like to hear 

your views on all of that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator. 

First of all, when you started out with the first question, you 

said some kind things about our families, and it reminded me that 

I had neglected to note that my son, Andrew is with us today, 

and—but my daughters, Carrie and Rachel, couldn’t make it, 

they’re in school—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. We’ll correct the record. [Laughter.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. I need to correct the record so I can go home tonight. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You can go home. [Laughter.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. With respect to those very difficult questions that 

you raise, eradication of coca is not like poppy. When you knock 

down a poppy field, whether you do it manually or chemically, it’s 

done for the year. The coca can be reconstituted more easily, you 

can grow multiple crops a year, so I’m not sure how to balance the 

70 percent reconstitution against the art of the possible, but I 

would note that as part of the issue that we’re dealing with. And 

776 

that while—if you can grow multiple crops in a single year, if you— 

some of the counting rules have to be rethought there just a little 

bit. 

But our main goal there remains not just to spray crops, or to 

manually eliminate them for its own purpose, we want to extend 

the writ of the Colombian Government. And, I think your support 

and the support of your colleagues over the last several years for 

the resources for Plan Colombia and now its successor, have been 

key in essentially making Colombia a different place than it was 

when Undersecretary Pickering would come up here and testify on 

behalf of Plan Colombia. This is a—I think we shouldn’t over-do 

the challenge we—I mean, we shouldn’t underestimate how far 

we’ve come here, even though the statistics are very, very difficult. 

I also feel a little bit, when I’m looking at these statistics, like 

someone who is trying to deal with financial statements where the 

rules have been changed, where the way that we’ve estimated this 

has changed during the period of time. Now, that says one thing 

in terms of what you’re trying to do. But, if you’re the investor, 

what you’re asking yourself are, which rules are correct? I mean, 

am I making money, or am I not? Are we eliminating this problem, 

or are we not? And I think we’ve made some progress there, but 

I think that we still have a long way to go. 

And so, as you consider where you wish to be as a legislator on 

the future appropriations for Colombia, I think that I’m going to 

have to be asking for your generosity to continue. Because I think 

it remains in the selfish interest of our country. But, I think it is 

still with—not just legitimate, but it’s the thing you ought to do, 

to push us to see if we can craft better, more effective ways to confront this problem, always bearing in mind that what we’re trying 

to do is deal with the problem itself, rather than the accounting, 

perhaps, that we may be focused on here. 

In the case of Mexico—I understand that sometime, perhaps, as 

early as later this week there may be some further information on 

this issue. I know that the State Department has been working 

during the course of the summer with the Mexican authorities to 

try to come up with a program which will, indeed, be effective. I’m 

not in a position to announce that, if you will. 

But the question that I think that you are raising is to whether 

this will be a good idea, whether we will be effective here. I think 

it’s—it is appropriate to reflect on the new situation politically 

we’re faced with in Mexico, with President Calderon, and his very 

clear determination to make a difference in his country. 

I think it is in our own interest to take advantage of this opportunity and to see if we can find ways to work together. Because 

this—anything going on in Mexico, particularly in this case, because it is, these are issues that are really on the border—affect 

our citizens quite quickly and quite clearly. So working together to 

see if we can craft a program which is in our own interest and in 

the interest of the people of Mexico, I think, makes a great deal 

of sense. 

With respect to Guatemala, you are quite right that our efforts 

in this, in the Caribbean Basin, are going to have potential for displacement if we push the balloon in one direction that has the potential, at least, for popping out someplace else. 

777 

And so, I think if you—as we work on the initiative for Mexico, 

it will be combined with one for all of Central America, so that we 

can address this in a more complete manner. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Mr. Fannin, if you need someone to 

promote domestic, Dominican Republic for investment by United 

States companies, you might want to take Senator Menendez with 

you. It seems like he has a good understanding of the Dominican 

Republic. 

Mr. FANNIN. Yes, sir, Senator, I agree. Thank you very much. 

Senator CARDIN. I have one or two more questions, if I might. 

You talked about the CAFTA–DR free trade agreement, and we 

have—we are the major trading partner for the Dominican Republic, and it’s somewhat balanced. The trade agreement has not been 

confirmed yet by the Dominican Republic, there appears to be some 

concerns locally about revenue loss and other issues. 

I was very encouraged by your comments and your statement 

about working to implement the CAFTA–DR agreements including 

dealing with labor and environmental issues. I’m just interested in 

your commitment or understanding as to where the Dominicans 

are in the enactment of the necessary laws to implement the free 

trade agreement? 

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Chairman, I think that there are—I couldn’t 

give you a percentage, because I am not knowledgeable as to what 

has—all of the things that have passed in terms of regulations and 

laws. I do know that there has been an effort to cooperate with the 

efforts of USAID, in terms of those things that we talked about 

earlier that are really important to business. One, that we would 

have people who are trained judges, trained prosecutors, public defenders—people where we have a reliable judicial system. 

In fact, I think one of the people that I talked to indicate that 

there still needs to be some things done to get the full benefit of 

this, in terms of the enactment of regulations and laws. I couldn’t 

tell you exactly what those things are, but I know there is a real 

effort on the part of the government and President Fernandez to 

make it work. And his conversations with the Deputy Secretary recently, I know that was mentioned—he wants to do everything he 

can to make it work, and is working hard on that. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me just, you—I think you mentioned this in 

your statement, but let me just underscore it. We have tried to 

monitor, very carefully, corruption issues within countries that we 

have business with, and the Dominican Republic has not ranked 

very well in fighting public corruption. 

Unfortunately, in too many countries they think it’s somewhat of 

a way of existence. And, I think that the U.S. presence, through 

the ambassador, can play a very important role in making it clear 

that a country that intends to continue progress must fight public 

corruption—all corruption—but clearly needs to deal with it within 

the governmental sector. 

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. Chairman, I hope—if confirmed—to be very 

much a part of trying to help with that situation. I think that’s the 

thing that Senator Menendez talked about drugs and corruption 

are really problems—serious problems. And as Mr. Johnson was 

778 

saying, the impact on our country from the drugs being transited 

through there, really has a lot to do with the corruption—the 

money that’s available that comes through for the transiting of 

drugs through the country. 

So, I would do—I use my legal background—to make sure that 

they are doing what they’re supposed to be doing, in terms of the 

training of prosecutors and judges, in providing them with the 

technical systems to ensure that those who violate the law are, in 

fact, prosecuted. And effectively prosecuted. 

Senator CARDIN. I would add also, the independence of the judiciary, which is critical if you’re going to fight public corruption 

issues. 

Mr. FANNIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Simons, I want to come back to the free trade agreement 

with Chile for just one moment. Chile has been—had a growing 

economy, so we do expect that there would be increased economic 

activity between the United States and Chile. We’ve seen that—I’m 

not sure I would credit all of it to the free trade agreement—but 

clearly the free trade agreements opened up opportunities, there’s 

no question about that. 

At the same time, as you point out, Asia—particularly China— 

has been very aggressive in its relationships with Chile. Seems to 

me that we need to increase our attention to Chile, as far as Chilean trade is concerned, and that the competition—particularly with 

Chile being so aggressive internationally—is one that could be a 

challenge to the United States. I would appreciate your views on 

that. 

Mr. SIMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I agree with everything that you’ve said. The free trade 

agreement, our bilateral free trade agreement, does provide us a 

unique platform to bring different kinds of American businesses 

down to Chile. We have a very strong investment chapter, for example, of our free trade agreement, that provides features that are 

commonly found in bilateral investment treaties. 

We have strong intellectual property rights provisions of the FTA 

that we’re working with the Chileans to get implemented. This is 

an area where we need to devote some more work. 

And, we have openings in our agricultural sector, for additional 

exports there. And, I think, services is a very interesting area, as 

well. As you pointed out in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, 

Chile has now reached middle income status, but it’s still realized, 

largely, on the export of primary products, and it does some processing of those primary products and sells them abroad. 

But, to take the next leap, to leap into the knowledge-based kind 

of society where our services, exports, will be a lot more competitive is something that we need to work on together. I think the free 

trade agreement provides us a platform to do that. And clearly, 

this is an area where we have a competitive advantage over the 

Chinese or others. 

So, I think we need to look at the sectors in which we have comparative advantage, and work closely with the business community. 

I agree, Washington needs to pay attention to Chile. It would be 

779 

terrific if we could get some visits from Members of Congress, as 

well. If confirmed I would love to see that, and your staffs. 

But, I agree with you, and it will definitely be an issue of priority, attention to me, if confirmed. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson, I’ve got to put my Helsinki hat on just for a moment, and ask you about trafficking of human beings. As you know, 

the United States took the leadership in sensitizing the international community to our collective responsibility to stop the trafficking of people. And that comes under some of your work, and I 

just wanted to make sure that that will remain a very high priority, in working to combat trafficking. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, it certainly will. That’s a 

multipronged effort in the United States Government, and one 

where I think our greatest contribution in the Bureau that I will 

lead, since the primary responsibility for the center on that, I 

think, is going to shift from us to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in the next few months—is to help them and to help the other 

elements here, to work with finding out where these organizations 

are, and where the trafficking in persons is—fits with trafficking 

in other illicit products, in particular, narcotics—so that we can attack this together. 

So that will very much remain something that I am interested 

in, and working on, if I am confirmed. 

Senator CARDIN. I just want to make sure that any transfer of 

responsibility is not to diminish the importance of the issues, but 

to work more effectively to combat it, and continue U.S. international leadership in that area. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, I’ll do my best to do so. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I think we have three excellent 

candidates, I really think the questioning has been very good. I appreciate you having this meeting, and I want to thank their families for being here in support of them. I know it means a lot to all 

of us when that occurs, and for their sacrifices. And I hope we have 

a very speedy approval process so that these men can begin some 

great work on behalf of our country. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Senator Corker, I’m going to agree. I’ve 

been through several confirmation hearings, and normally you get 

somewhat prepared, recorded replies. I was impressed by all three 

of you, and the depth of your knowledge of the subjects, and your 

commitment to the priorities of your post. And, I thank you very 

much for your candor here today, they’re extremely difficult assignments, all three, with real challenges and opportunities, and we 

thank you very much for being willing and prepared to serve your 

country. 

The record will remain open for 2 days, so the committee members may submit additional questions for the record. I’ve asked 

that each nominee respond quickly to those questions, if they are 

submitted, so that we can move forward on the confirmation process as quickly as possible. 

If there’s nothing further, the committee will stand adjourned. 

Thank you all very much. 

780 

[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. You have never worked in the INL Bureau, and you have never served 

in a country that is a major drug producer or transit country. What qualifies you 

for this position? Have you ever administered programs overseas of this size and 

scope? 

Answer. During my almost 30 years in the Foreign Service, I have held several 

positions with responsibility for significant resources—both human and monetary. 

That is particularly the case with my assignments over the last 10 years—United 

States Ambassador to the OSCE, Coordinator for Afghanistan, and Charge ́ and Deputy Chief of Mission in London. 

London’s 800-plus person Embassy engages in almost every aspect of American 

policy, including our multiple joint efforts with the United Kingdom in Latin America, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where INL’s programs are working to advance American 

interests. During my tenure there, I worked directly on every one of them. As Coordinator for Afghanistan, I worked to ensure that INL programs were properly executed by the interagency community and fully integrated into our overall national 

and multinational efforts. The large-scale efforts INL is now supporting in Afghanistan date their beginnings to this period. 

As U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, I played a key, personal role in the integration 

of INL programs into that organization’s significant conflict prevention and postconflict reconstruction efforts in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The 

OSCE Police School in Kosovo is the international community’s most successful police training effort. The OSCE Senior Police Advisor program provides emerging democracies with advice and training on modern, service-focused policing. And the 

OSCE has integrated police training and advice into most of the OSCE Missions. 

All of these initiatives were driven by the United States with firm, personal backing 

from me. 

Finally, my first Foreign Service assignment, on the United States-Mexican border at Ciudad Juarez, gave me a firm grounding in the extraordinary challenges and 

opportunities that arise from our border relationship, especially the challenges of 

cross-border crime and narcotics trafficking. It is a grounding one never forgets. 

Question. What are your top three objectives, if confirmed? A year from now, what 

do you hope to be able to report that you have accomplished? 

Answer. If confirmed in this position, I will strive to achieve the following top objectives: 

• An effectively crafted, effectively implemented program of cooperative law enforcement and counternarcotics with Mexico that enhances Mexico’s ability to 

confront narcotics-related violence and trafficking within Mexico and along our 

shared border and strengthens Mexican ability to cooperate more effectively 

with United States, state, and local law enforcement agencies working along 

that border. 

• In Colombia and Afghanistan, measurably lowering the quantity of narcotics 

available for market and, in the case of Colombia, placing ever greater levels 

of responsibility in the hands of the Colombians. 

• Developing and supporting civilian law enforcement and justice sector reform 

programs—both large, as in Iraq and Afghanistan and smaller, as in Lebanon 

and Kosovo—that provide both greater value for the taxpayer’s dollar and a 

more effective partner in providing public safety in ungoverned or inadequately 

governed territories. 

Reaching these objectives will require sustained, long-term approaches, some of 

which are already underway. Within the next year, if confirmed, I would like to be 

able to report the following near-term accomplishments:* A more effective counternarcotics program in Afghanistan, including an improved eradication effort in 

Helmand and other southern provinces in Afghanistan, that will slow or even halt 

the rapid growth in opium poppy cultivation there in recent years. 

• In Colombia, continued reductions in the level of civil violence and consequent 

increases in public safety as a result of United States counterdrug and counterterrorism support for Colombia over recent years. I would also like to report 

that nationalization efforts have begun to reduce the need for U.S. financial 

781 

support for certain aspects of aviation programs as described in the answer to 

question No. 4. • Enhanced law enforcement and counternarcotics cooperation with Mexico. President Calderon has stated his commitment to continue the close cooperation between Mexican and United States law enforcement agencies begun under his 

predecessor. Over the next year, I hope to see this enhanced cooperation beginning to pay dividends through improved security along our shared border and 

further progress in our ongoing programs to modernize and professionalize the 

Mexican federal police and court systems. • To ensure that INL can manage its increasing responsibilities around the world, 

if confirmed, I plan over the first several months to complete the restructuring 

of the Bureau begun by my predecessor, to expand the Bureau’s new web-based 

local financial system to include more posts, and to continue to strengthen oversight mechanisms, especially for larger programs such as the civilian police programs in Iraq and Afghanistan and the INL aviation program. 

Question. In April 2007, the administration submitted a report to Congress on the 

next phase of assistance to Colombia. This report suggests that United States assistance to Colombia will continue at substantial levels, though slowly decrease between 

fiscal year 2007 and 2013. Do you think that the strategy it outlines takes the right 

approach, and if so, why? 

Answer. The strategy outlined in the administration’s report was one based on 

continued support for the accomplishment of United States’ goals and the development of a sustainable nationalization of our programs in Colombia. This is the right 

approach and one that also recognizes the need to reduce United States funding in 

Colombia, while guaranteeing the sustainability of the successes in this important 

bilateral program with a key regional partner. Much has been accomplished in Colombia in the areas of counternarcotics, governability, democracy, and progress in 

human rights, economic development, and counterterrorism. We cannot afford to let 

this progress be reversed by withdrawing support too quickly. 

INL is in the process of reviewing its programs in Colombia and our nationalization efforts to ensure that we are on the right track. If adjustments are necessary, 

I look forward to working to strike an appropriate balance. 

Question. For several years, the United States has worked with Colombia toward 

the objective of having that government manage and operate its aerial eradication 

and other counterdrug programs. Why have we not yet achieved this goal and when 

can we expect to meet it? 

Answer. Every year the Colombian Government has taken over additional responsibilities for its counternarcotics programs, and we are actively accelerating this 

process. Since the beginning of Plan Colombia the Government of Colombia has invested over $7 billion in its fight against narcoterrorism and for control of its territory. However, nationalization of complex aviation programs that are, in effect, only 

5 years old is challenging. For example, it takes 4 years to select and train a pilot 

to command a helicopter, and even longer for a master helicopter mechanic. The administration’s plan is to have successfully completed nationalization by 2013 and to 

reduce the annual United States Government investment accordingly, as outlined 

in the April 2006 Report to Congress on United States Assistance Programs in Colombia and Plans to Transfer Responsibilities to Colombia. In the time since that 

report was submitted, we have made further progress in nationalization. For instance, we are moving forward on the nationalization of the program for the protection of the Can ̃ o Limo ́n pipeline and the Air Bridge Denial program. We are also 

in discussions for Colombia to assume counternarcotics fuel costs beginning in April 

2008. In the area of aviation support, K–MAX helicopters are being returned to the 

United States as of October 2007 and the Government of Colombia will assume complete support for 13 selected Colombian National Police aircraft in March 2008. Also 

under discussion is whether to withdraw or hand over the UH–1N helicopters presently under the Colombian Army program in April 2008. Possible reductions in 

funding from the amounts projected in that report, and a subsequent one sent to 

the Congress in April 2007, may mean additional adjustments to our plans. 

Question. The 2007 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime World Drug Report indicates 

that Afghanistan’s share of global opium poppy cultivation grew by 59 percent in 

2006. Did the United States and other coalition partners in Afghanistan wait too 

long to address the drug problem after removing the Taliban from power? What do 

you see as the major obstacles to achieving any meaningful reduction in drug cultivation, and what can be done to remove those obstacles? 

Answer. Ever since coalition forces overthrew the Taliban, the United States has 

worked with the United Kingdom, which assumed the lead in counternarcotics in 

782 

Afghanistan, and with other coalition partners to address this difficult problem. 

Since then, there have been setbacks as well as gains in this effort. In the past year, 

the number of poppy-free provinces increased from 6 to 13, poppy production in the 

center and north of Afghanistan is rapidly decreasing, and the Afghan Eradication 

Force and the provincial governors eradicated 19,047 hectares of poppy, 24 percent 

more than last year. 

Unfortunately, the gains in the north have been more than offset by setbacks in 

the southern and eastern provinces, where the security situation is the principal obstacle to lowering drug cultivation. For example, more than half of all poppy cultivation is in Helmand province, where the security situation makes most nonmilitary 

activities impossible. The United States counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan is 

an interagency effort specifically designed to confront opium production in the current security environment. 

Improved counternarcotics-counterinsurgency coordination along with a plan to 

conduct forced eradication in areas where negotiated eradication has been unsuccessful will help us to overcome the problems presented by the lack of security, especially in Helmand. Forced eradication is necessary in some areas where farmers believe the Taliban will protect their fields. In addition to improving the speed and 

efficiency of eradication, forced eradication will allow us to go after the wealthiest 

farmers who are profiting the most from poppy and send a signal to poor farmers 

that eradication is performed equitably. Additionally, the Good Performers Initiative 

is designed to incentivize provincial leaders by rewarding provinces that are poppy 

free or have made significant reductions in poppy cultivation. We must also improve 

Afghanistan’s ability to take down high-level traffickers to demonstrate that our effort is not exclusively focused on eradicating drug crops and that anyone along the 

supply chain is vulnerable to prosecution. 

Question. A recent joint report of the Inspectors General of the Departments of 

State and Defense (issued July 2007) found that the ‘‘priority granted to counternarcotics and concomitant responsibilities of various United States Government elements is not sufficiently clear and specific. Interlocutors, both in Washington and 

Afghanistan, were unable to point to a clear, overarching strategy.’’ The report recommended that the State Department take the lead in developing a policy document 

on roles and responsibilities, a recommendation with which INL disagreed. Have 

you reviewed this report? What is your view about this recommendation? 

Answer. INL concurred in part with the Inspectors General recommendation in 

its July 2007 report but disagreed as to rank-ordering priorities. In January of this 

year, when we received information that the 2007 poppy harvest would likely exceed 

the previous year’s record high, Office of National Drug Control Policy Director John 

Walters and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, asked that an interagency 

group be convened to evaluate all aspects of the counternarcotics strategy and to 

propose recommendations to achieve better results. As a result, a high-level interagency group, comprised of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Agriculture, 

and Treasury; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy; and the U.S. Agency for International Development, labored over 

many months to ensure long-term success, while looking for ideas to also achieve 

successes in the short-term. The President also appointed a Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform with the rank of ambassador to oversee this effort, 

and in July 2007, the interagency U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan 

was adopted as United States policy. 

This document provides greater guidance with regard to respective United States 

Government roles and responsibilities. However, providing a precise rank-ordering 

of the priority of counternarcotics vis-a-vis other U.S. objectives is complicated by 

the interrelated nature of our top four policy priorities in Afghanistan—democracy 

building, counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and rule of law. For example, there 

is mounting evidence of the linkage between the insurgency and narcotics trafficking. The counternarcotics/counterinsurgency nexus also feeds corruption and diminishes democratic governance, illustrating the interconnectedness of these issues. 

In this context, seeking to assign a rank-order priority to objectives would undermine current efforts to integrate United States Government activities in a way that 

is most productive and cost-beneficial, and best advances our policy interests. 

Question. In August, the State Department issued a new counternarcotics strategy 

for Afghanistan. What is new about this strategy? Why, in your judgment, will it 

make a difference? 

Answer. There are three significant pieces of the updated counternarcotics strategy that will make a difference both in the near- and long-term in Afghanistan. An 

enhanced ‘‘carrots and sticks’’ approach will dramatically increase development asVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00790 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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sistance to provide incentives for licit development while simultaneously amplifying 

the scope and intensity of both interdiction and eradication operations. The Good 

Performers Initiative will provide development assistance to provinces that have 

made dramatic reductions in poppy cultivation or that are poppy-free. The United 

States has committed $35 million dollars so far to this effort. The strategy also 

seeks to improve counternarcotics and counterinsurgency planning and operations 

in a manner not previously accomplished, with a particular emphasis on integrating 

drug interdiction into the counterinsurgency mission. Finally, the strategy encourages sustained political will for counternarcotics efforts among the Afghan Government, our allies, and international civilian/military organizations, and strengthens 

public information efforts at the grassroots level. 

I believe the refined strategy will certainly improve the coordination of our overall 

counternarcotics efforts and is likely to make a positive impact as many of these 

elements have already proven successful in parts of Afghanistan. 

Question. It has been reported that the United States Government and the Mexican Government are in discussions about a substantial package of assistance by the 

United States to help Mexico’s counternarcotics efforts, as well as the countries of 

Central America. Is such a package in development? When do you expect that it will 

be announced? What level of funding, and what types of assistance, do you expect 

will be requested? 

Answer. The Governments of the United States and Mexico are discussing cooperative steps to address what President Bush described as a ‘‘common problem on our 

shared border’’—drug and other illegal trafficking, and the violence associated with 

it. We are also considering the best way to support the countries of Central America 

in confronting the transnational threats we share, including narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and criminal gangs. 

President Bush first discussed security cooperation with then President-elect 

Calderon in November 2006. These discussions continued during the President’s 

visit to the region in March 2007, as outlined in the joint United States-Mexico 

Communique ́ of March 2007. In May, the Government of Mexico approached the 

United States with suggested areas for greater cooperation, and technical experts 

from both governments subsequently began meeting to define needs and areas 

where we might usefully work together. At the North American Leaders’ Summit 

in Montebello, Canada, on August 20–21, Presidents Bush and Calderon agreed to 

address the drug trafficking and narcotics-related violence affecting both countries. 

Separately, in August, the member countries of the Central American System for 

Integration (SICA) held internal discussions about developing their own regional 

strategy to combat crime. United States Embassies in Central America have also 

advised on the types of projects that could assist the Central American initiative 

and support our policy goals. 

Our continuing discussions with the Governments of Mexico and Central American countries are focusing on three broad areas: counternarcotics and border security; public security and law enforcement; and strengthening institutions and rule 

of law. Possible areas of joint work could include strengthening Mexico’s southern 

border, enhanced computer and database networks to make Mexico’s law enforcement agencies more efficient and transparent, and measures to professionalize 

Mexico’s federal law enforcement personnel. The administration is also considering 

programs that would help law enforcement and court institutions to ensure due 

process, transparency, proper oversight, responsiveness to citizen complaints, and 

protection of human rights. For Central America, a number of options are being considered, including the provision of tools, training, and technical expertise. 

The nature and extent of cooperation with Mexico and Central America have not 

been finalized, so no official announcement has been scheduled. The administration 

is assessing how to fund any resulting programs in a fiscally responsible manner 

as well as which accounts might be appropriate to execute these programs. The administration intends to continue its dialog with the Congress as the outlines of our 

proposed cooperative effort take shape. I look forward to providing additional details 

to you and your staff as soon as possible. 

Question. INL funds and supports several International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) around the globe. What is the utility of these academies? What have 

they accomplished? 

Answer. The ILEAs help advance U.S. interests through international cooperation 

while promoting social, political, and economic stability by combating crime. To 

date, ILEAs have trained over 21,000 officials from over 75 countries. They have 

promoted unprecedented law enforcement cooperation with U.S. and regional counterparts and have enhanced the technical expertise of investigators in practically 

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every corner of the world. The primary purpose of the ILEAs is to build strong institutions and bring order and stability to emerging democracies and countries afflicted by endemic criminal problems. To accomplish these goals, ILEA graduates 

have either directed or been instrumental in a wide range of effective actions, such 

as: 

• Enactment of new laws and regulations. 

• Changes in curricula at national academies. 

• Enhancements in land border and airport security. 

• Identification of terrorist groups and sympathizers. 

• Improvement in community relations. 

• Changes in methods and procedures regarding human rights and fair treatment 

of the public. 

• Effective measures against organized crime. 

• Improvement of cooperation with U.S. authorities. 

• Creation of task forces and other specialized groups. 

• Participation in transnational investigations. 

• Apprehension and successful prosecution of notorious criminal figures. 

• Seizures of drugs, firearms, explosives, and dangerous materials. 

• Prevention of human trafficking and child exploitation. 

Listed below are a few of the many accomplishments of ILEA graduates worldwide: 

• Philippines—Seized a major methamphetamine super lab using techniques 

learned at ILEA Bangkok. 

• Malawi—Thwarted a terrorist event as a result of having developed sophisticated explosives investigatory skills at ILEA Gaborone. 

• Georgia-Participated in and greatly contributed to the successful AmericanGeorgian investigation concerning the assassination attempt on President Bush 

during a visit to Georgia in 2005. The perpetrator was arrested and convicted, 

and the investigation was instrumental in the interdiction and seizure of smuggled highly enriched uranium in Georgia. 

• Ukraine—Set up the first witness protection program in the country. 

• Nicaragua—Formed the core group of a specialized vetted unit of law enforcement and prosecutors working on an anticorruption and money laundering task 

force. 

• Lesotho—Conducted several high-profile arrests at ports of entry for suspected 

money laundering. 

• Tanzania—Replicated the training received at ILEA Gaborone to instruct 100 

park rangers and 20 other officers involved the in protection of wildlife and natural resources. 

• Hungary—Established an unprecedented United States-Hungarian cooperative 

task force targeting international organized crime. 

• Mozambique—Started the development of an antiterrorism task force within 

the Ministry of Interior. 

• El Salvador—Worked with Mexican counterparts to capture and prosecute two 

Salvadoran murder suspects who had kidnapped two young girls in San Salvador. The suspects were detained in Mexico and extradited to El Salvador. 

Question. A State Department Inspector General report (an inspection report of 

INL, issued in 2005) noted that the ILEA graduate facility in Roswell, NM, has 

‘‘trained only about a quarter of the number of students envisioned in the original 

5-year cooperative agreement (with the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology).’’ Why has that ILEA fallen short in its efforts? 

Answer. The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Roswell, NM, is 

administered pursuant to an agreement between INL and the New Mexico Institute 

of Mining and Technology (NMT). NMT is the primary entity in an effort involving 

a consortium of subcontractors, including Sam Houston State University, Eastern 

New Mexico University-Roswell, New Mexico Tech Energetic Materials Research 

and Testing Center, and the University of New Mexico Survey Research Center. 

Original plans for ILEA-Roswell were optimistic. The Request for Proposal (RFP) 

for ILEA-Roswell, published August 16, 2000, in the Federal Register, specified that 

12, 4-week classes of 50 students (600 students per year) would be conducted during 

the initial year of operation. Planned program expansion in the second year of 

ILEA-Roswell operation envisioned that two simultaneous classes held concurrently 

would increase the number of students to 100 per class (1,200 students per year). 

Unfortunately, ILEA-Roswell expenses have strained the resources made available 

to support the program and has resulted in an agreement modification to reduce the 

number classes to 10, 4-week classes of 35 students (350 per year). 

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Question. INL programs have grown substantially in the last decade. In fiscal 

year 1996, just over a decade ago, INL’s programs totaled about $115 million. A 

State Department Inspector General report (an inspection report of INL, issued in 

2005), stated that procurement officials in the Bureau of Administration do not believe that INL has sufficient managers to administer its programs, and that ‘‘most 

INL program managers are inexperienced and not well informed about government 

contracting requirements.’’ Have you reviewed the staffing and experience of program managers in INL? Does the bureau have the personnel necessary to manage 

these programs and oversee the many contractors involved in implementing them? 

Answer. INL increased its domestic staffing by 35 personnel subsequent to the 

2005 OIG inspection report. The personnel increases focused on improving INL’s 

program, resource, and contract management. In 2006, INL established an Afghanistan, Iraq, and Jordan contract management support group located in the United 

States and, working with Embassies Baghdad and Kabul, increased program and 

contract management staffing at these posts by a total of 20 personnel. Within the 

past year, INL increased the number of in-country contract officer’s representatives 

by 10. INL continues to hire specialists to strengthen program and contract management efforts for both overseas and domestic operations. In addition, personnel involved in contract management are required to take the Department’s contract officer’s representative course. I believe that INL has made significant progress in improving its program and contract management functions. The Department’s Office 

of the Inspector General and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

have also noted the improvements made in their reports. 

If confirmed, I will continue efforts to improve INL’s program and contract management operations. 

RESPONSES OF P. ROBERT FANNIN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps-State Department Relations? 

Answer. Yes, I have read 04 STATE 258893. 

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable? 

Answer. Yes, I understand the content of this cable and, if confirmed as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, will execute United States policy as requested and 

directed by the Secretary of State. 

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must 

remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’s role and its need for separation from the 

day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. Government agencies’’? 

Answer. Yes, I understand, and if confirmed will execute all applicable U.S. policy 

with regard to the Peace Corps. 

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise 

your chief of mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much 

autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does 

not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies’’? 

Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will exercise my chief of mission authorities as requested and directed by the Secretary of State. 

RESPONSES OF PAUL E. SIMONS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has been in force 

for over a year. By most accounts, it has been of major benefit to both countries, 

increasing bilateral trade by 30 percent in 2006. The United States remains Chile’s 

No. 1 trading partner with two-way trade in merchandise topping US $8 billion. The 

FTA also encourages foreign investment in Chile, another component of Chile’s economic success. 

How will you improve upon this FTA’s success? Describe the outreach activities 

you would lead in order to introduce Chilean business officials to investment opportunities in the United States. Describe the outreach activities you would lead in 

786 

order to introduce United States business officials to investment opportunities in 

Chile. 

Answer. In the 3 years since it has been in place, our bilateral Free Trade Agreement with Chile has been successful in helping to expand two-way trade between 

our countries. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure a level playing field for United 

States firms and investors already doing business in Chile. I will place a high priority on expanding United States Government engagement with the business sectors 

in both Chile and the United States, working with my strong Embassy team. I am 

planning to counsel United States firms regarding the advantages and new opportunities for American products and services in Chile as a result of the FTA. I intend 

to deepen our work with the already active United States Chamber of Commerce 

chapter in Chile, as well as local Chilean chambers, in order to leverage and expand 

our outreach to increase both trade and investment flows. If confirmed, I will encourage more bilateral trade missions between Chile and the United States. I also 

hope to lead and participate in targeted ‘‘Ambassador Tours’’ to key United States 

cities, both individually as well as with my colleagues from other United States Embassies in Latin America. Regarding investment in the United States, I want to 

work proactively with individual states, as appropriate, also developing relationships with state offices in Chile and other parts of the Southern Cone. If confirmed, 

I will lend the embassy’s support in welcoming individual and sectoral investment 

missions from the United States to Chile, as well as working to disseminate details 

of individual investment opportunities in Chile throughout the United States. 

Question. Some aspects of the FTA with Chile are still below expectations. In the 

area of intellectual property, differences of interpretation have arisen between the 

Chilean Government and Washington regarding the fulfillment of some commitments, and some in Santiago have expressed disappointment regarding access to the 

United States Government procurement market. If confirmed, what initiatives will 

you pursue to address these concerns? 

Answer. United States Government agencies, including the Departments of State, 

Commerce, and Treasury, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), 

are working through our Embassy in Santiago to encourage Chile to improve its protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), including by fully implementing its FTA 

intellectual property commitments. In January 2007, United States agencies placed 

Chile on the Priority Watch List as a result of the 2007 Section 301 Review Process, 

in recognition of weaknesses in Chile’s patent protection and copyright regimes. 

Currently, our Embassy in Santiago is engaged in a close dialog with the Chilean 

Government as well as with stakeholders in the private sector, media, and academic 

circles on intellectual property issues. The embassy has sponsored seminars and 

training on IPR issues and has coordinated closely with U.S. companies and sectors 

most directly affected by IPR violations. The Department of State also approved 

$200,000 in fiscal year 2007 funding to provide IPR law enforcement training to 

Chilean border and customs enforcement officials. Along with Commerce and USTR, 

we are also working with Chile to ensure antipiracy legislation before the Chilean 

Congress is in keeping with Chile’s obligations under our bilateral FTA. 

If confirmed, I will intensify these efforts and seek to enhance the constructive 

dialog we have with Chile on IPR by drawing in United States private sector and 

Chilean stakeholders. Drawing on my experience with this issue in previous assignments in Ecuador and Israel, I will look for opportunities to deepen public outreach 

on intellectual property issues, highlighting its importance to Chile’s efforts to build 

a knowledge-based economy. I will also reach out to partners such as the European 

Union and Japan, which also have FTAs with Chile and similar concerns about its 

IPR protections. 

As for accessing the United States Government procurement market, if confirmed, 

I will work with our team in the embassy to ensure that Chilean companies have 

the same transparent opportunities to access our official procurement procedures as 

do United States companies. In this regard, I will work with our embassy team and 

Chilean authorities to improve Chilean companies’ understanding of the United 

States Government procurement market and their preparation to participate in it. 

Question. Chile is nearly ready to announce its decision on which digital television 

standard it would choose—the Japanese, European, or American one. Officials at 

Chile’s Telecommunications Sub-Secretary have stated that they are waiting for 

final test and consultant reports and hoped to announce the decision sometime in 

November or December 2007. 

President Michelle Bachelet said recently the standard chosen would be the one 

that best fits the country’s needs and allows the best access to viewers of nonpaid 

787 

broadcast television. How does the U.S. meet those standards better than its competitors? 

Answer. Working closely with the industry association representing the companies 

behind the Advanced Television Systems Committee (ATSC) digital television broadcast standard, the United States Embassy in Santiago, in cooperation with the Departments of State and Commerce, has been actively working to promote selection 

of ATSC by the Chilean Government for over a year. As you noted, Chile is currently evaluating the three competing standards—ATSC, Europe’s DVB, and Japan’s ISDB. The European standard is considered the ATSC’s main competitor in 

Chile, as Japan has had limited success in promoting its standard, with the important exception of Brazil. 

Chile’s Government has consistently noted that ‘‘social’’ considerations will factor 

into its decision making process on digital television. The ATSC Standard fully 

meets this consideration by providing much better picture quality via high-definition 

television, plus a much greater quantity of program options and a limitless variety 

of new information services. These new services can help bridge the digital divide 

by delivering health care, education, training, government information, and the 

most popular Internet content to the poorest segments of society, including people 

who may never own a personal computer. 

The ATSC Standard meets Chile’s social objectives better than the competing 

standards from Europe and Japan, because the ATSC system can reach many more 

viewers with the same transmitted power. ATSC also delivers a substantially higher 

data payload, which translates directly into a greater quantity, and higher quality, 

of services. 

Of course, certain costs associated with any country’s termination of analog television broadcasts and beginning digital-only broadcasts are unavoidable, irrespective 

of which standard is chosen. In addition to broadcasters having to purchase and install new studio and transmission equipment, consumers also need to adapt by buying either new digital television sets or a set-top converter that will enable them 

to continue using their existing analog TV sets. One of the Chilean Government’s 

primary concerns has been the cost to consumers, particularly the poor, as they 

transition from analog to digital. 

The ATSC Standard offers the lowest prices both for integrated digital televisions 

and digital set-top converters, because of the economies of scale that flow from using 

the same standard that is already widely deployed in North America and South 

Korea. This is demonstrated regularly in the United States as prices for new digital 

televisions continue to drop. Thirty to forty million ATSC digital converter boxes are 

expected to be sold in 2008 in the United States, ensuring the availability of lowcost converters ($50 or less) in Chile. 

While there are very real economic costs associated with transitioning to digital 

television, the choice of the broadcast standard can have important consequences in 

terms of minimizing those costs. In addition to the economies of scale argument, the 

ATSC standard also requires less powerful transmitters and much less energy than 

its competitors to deliver larger amounts of data to wider or remote geographical 

areas. The European and Japanese standards both require transmitters that are 

four times more powerful than ATSC to achieve the same coverage area, increasing 

the acquisition and operating cost for broadcasters. 

In summary, the ATSC standard offers Chile a world-class television system with 

full access to high-definition television, multiple programs of standard-definition television, and new information services, including interactive services. It provides the 

lowest cost solution for both consumers and broadcasters, while fully meeting the 

Chilean Government’s objectives for social inclusion. Especially important for developing countries, ATSC has the greatest reach, ensuring that even people in isolated 

areas can benefit from the new services and superior performance provided by digital television. 

Question. Chile has limited domestic energy resources and is heavily dependent 

on imports for its energy needs. Chile currently imports almost two thirds of its primary energy consumption. In 2005 Chile imported 98 percent of its oil, 96 percent 

of its coal, and 75 percent of its natural gas. As a result, it is extremely vulnerable 

to the volatility of international prices and/or supply interruptions. 

Please explain what role the United States can play, working in concert with the 

Chilean Government and private sector in both countries, to help insulate Chile 

from risks posed by its heavy energy import dependence. 

Answer. Like many other countries around the world, Chile faces substantial challenges identifying and securing the energy resources necessary to support its remarkable record of economic growth. As noted in the question, Chile is heavily deVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00795 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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pendent on imported fuels to support both its transportation, as well as its power 

generation needs. 

A strong interagency team in Washington works closely together on a variety of 

international energy challenges. For the past 4 years, I have had the privilege of 

working as a member of that team. It includes officials from the Departments of 

State, Energy, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Environmental Protection Administration, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, with overall coordination 

provided by the National Security Council. I have also worked closely with the 

International Energy Agency and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, 

multilateral bodies which handle energy issues, as well as with U.S. private sector 

firms and think tanks active on international energy issues. 

If confirmed, I would hope to draw on that body of experience to identify areas 

of cooperation that the United States could pursue, either bilaterally, multilaterally, 

or through our respective private sectors, to advance energy sector cooperation. 

Among the areas we might explore for further work are energy efficiency, renewable 

energy (including wind, solar, and geothermal power), liquefied natural gas infrastructure, biofuels, clean coal technologies, nuclear energy, and other energy technologies. 

Question. Chile’s Government is implementing an ambitious Energy Security Action Plan that seeks to diversify Chile’s energy matrix and encourage efficient use 

of energy. This effort pays particular attention to biofuels and renewable fuel options. In April 2007, I wrote to Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, Thomas Shannon, to encourage closer ties with Chile regarding biofuels and 

other energy concerns. A delegation of United States Government officials recently 

signed a biofuels research and development cooperation agreement with Chile. 

If confirmed, how will you seek to ensure successful cooperation on energy issues 

between the United States and Chile? What will be your primary areas of focus for 

such cooperation? Do you believe that energy cooperation with Chile should be central in United States foreign policy to that country? 

Answer. President Bachelet has recognized Chile’s need to improve its energy security. Earlier this year, she announced that Energy Minister Tokman would be responsible for implementing an ‘‘energy security plan.’’ 

If confirmed, I would draw on the expertise of the U.S. energy-policy community 

to identify areas of potential cooperation in the energy sector, through some combination of bilateral, multilateral, and private sector initiatives. On the transportation side, potential areas of cooperation include energy efficiency and biofuels. 

With respect to power generation, some areas we might explore include energy efficiency, renewable energy (including wind, solar, and geothermal power), liquefied 

natural gas infrastructure, nuclear energy, clean coal technologies, and other energy 

technologies. 

Question. Your duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Energy, Sanctions 

and Commodities covered a wide range of issues, including energy. As DAS of State 

for Energy, Sanctions and Commodities, what percentage of your time do you estimate was spent on energy issues? What were your primary responsibilities? Last 

year Secretary Rice created an International Energy Coordinator. Please describe 

how that position affected operations of your office. 

Answer. As Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy, Sanctions and Commodities 

for the past 4 years, I have divided my time among three principal issues: energy, 

sanctions, and conflict diamonds. While the workload has fluctuated considerably 

during this period, on balance, I spend approximately two thirds of my time on energy issues, with the remainder devoted to sanctions and diamonds. 

My primary responsibilities on the energy front include managing the U.S. relationship with the International Energy Agency, including serving on the IEA Governing Board and as chairman of the principal policy committee of the IEA, the 

Standing Group on Long-Term Cooperation. I am also heavily involved with United 

States-China energy issues, G–8 energy policy, the opening of Libya to United 

States energy investment, and energy policy issues with Russia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, among other countries. 

On the sanctions front, my office is responsible for coordinating the State Department’s role in the interagency terrorist financing policy process, and we have primary responsibility for implementation of the Iran Sanctions Act. On conflict diamonds, I lead the interagency delegation to the annual Kimberley Process plenary 

meetings and coordinate interagency policy. 

The EEB energy office works very closely and productively with the newly created 

position of International Energy Coordinator; areas of particular coordination inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00796 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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clude biofuels, other new energy technologies, and innovative public/private partnerships. 

Question. Earlier this year, Secretary Rice signed an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) on biofuels cooperation with her Brazilian counterpart, and President 

Bush announced the initiatives with the President of Brazil. 

What role do you believe that cooperation on biofuels and other energy security 

issues can have on improving United States relations with countries of the Western 

Hemisphere and standing amongst the general public? 

What role do you believe that Chile should play in the United States-Brazil led 

biofuels initiative? 

What impact would reducing or removing current United States import restrictions on biofuels have on United States relations with Chile and other nations of 

the Western Hemisphere? 

Answer. Cooperation on biofuels has already had an important, positive influence 

on U.S. relations with countries of the Western Hemisphere. Biofuels cooperation 

demonstrates our desire to work with other governments that share institutional, 

democratic values toward the improvement of the daily lives of people in our hemisphere. Our partnership with Brazil is recognition of that nation’s important role 

in the hemisphere and its innovative record in the area of renewable energy. Additionally, our work to help develop viable biofuels industries in specific countries in 

the Western Hemisphere—the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and St. Kitts 

and Nevis—reflects our interest in promoting economic development and energy diversification. 

While Chile is not a target country of our biofuels initiative with Brazil, that initiative has the potential to benefit Chile. The initiative has three parts: (1) helping 

target countries establish biofuels industries for domestic consumption; (2) research 

and development of cellulosic ethanol technology; and (3) harmonizing international 

standards for ethanol. Our efforts on research and development should benefit Chile 

and other countries over time by bringing down the costs of cellulosic ethanol production, a development of potential value to Chile given its prospects for developing 

a cellulosic ethanol industry. The international standards harmonization efforts 

should also assist all countries interested in biofuels production and trade. 

While Brazil would clearly welcome the removal of import restrictions on biofuels, 

such action would have minimal impact on Chile, which currently is not a biofuels 

producer. 

If confirmed, I would plan to explore with United States agencies and the Chilean 

Government other concrete steps we could take to strengthen bilateral cooperation 

on biofuels with Chile. 

Question. Chile has become an important transshipment country for cocaine destined for Europe; economic prosperity and increasing trade have made Chile more 

attractive to traffickers seeking to launder drug profits, especially through the 

Iquique Free Trade Zone. 

If confirmed, how will you work with the relevant Chilean authorities to improve 

controls on money laundering and tracking and halting the importation of precursor 

chemicals for the manufacture of cocaine, especially those passed on to Bolivia? 

Should the United States Government consider developing a major cooperative 

agreement with the Chilean Government centered on stemming the transit of drugs 

through the north of Chile? Should the United States Government enter into talks 

with the Chilean Government regarding establishing a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office in Chile? 

Answer. Antinarcotics cooperation with Chile is strong. DEA’s office in Chile 

works closely with the two national police agencies and with prosecutors nationwide. 

DEA cooperation with the investigative police’s money laundering unit recently led 

to the disruption and dismantlement in Chile and the United States of a money 

laundering ring. 

Chile is aware of the increase in drugs flowing through its northern border. DEA 

has helped establish a multiagency Chilean law enforcement initiative in Arica, 

Chile’s northernmost city. Chile’s investigative police, coast guard, and customs 

agents now work together to fight land and sea shipments of drugs. If confirmed, 

I will pursue increased cooperation between Government of Chile law enforcement 

agencies and members of the embassy’s law enforcement community, and support 

Government of Chile efforts to improve interagency cooperation. 

State Department International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funding 

has been used to train police, prosecutors, and members of Chile’s Financial Intelligence Unit in anti-money laundering efforts. INL funding has also provided needed 

equipment to counternarcotics police. The training and professionalism of Chilean 

790 

law enforcement are commendable. However, resources are insufficient to expand investigative initiatives. The issue of cooperation with Chilean authorities to improve 

anti-money laundering efforts is discussed in the answer to Question 10. 

All companies exporting precursor chemicals must register with the Government 

of Chile. Chile’s police investigate all exports of precursor chemicals to Bolivia, and 

pass on real-time intelligence on suspicious shipments to Bolivian police that have 

been DEA-vetted. Both Chilean police forces participate in DEA-sponsored enforcement initiatives to coordinate monitoring of precursor chemicals all over South 

America. The embassy continues to emphasize and develop communication between 

Chilean and Bolivian police. 

The Government of Chile has recently begun formulating a national security plan. 

One focus of this plan is securing Chile’s northern borders from drugs and increasing interagency cooperation in counternarcotics efforts. The Government of Chile 

has been in regular communication with the embassy (State, FBI and DEA) about 

their plan. 

Question. In 2005, Peru’s Congress voted to unilaterally redraw the maritime 

boundary with Chile, claiming more than 10,000 square miles of ocean space now 

under Chilean control. Chile claims the disputed area quoting a 1929 treaty, whereas Peru says the treaty established land limits but not maritime boundaries. In 

June 2007, Peruvian President Alan Garcia declared that he would take Peru’s case 

to the International Criminal Court at The Hague, and relations have deteriorated 

since. Early last month, Peru published an official map with the new marine boundary, provoking a diplomatic protest from Chile. The Atacama border dispute was a 

border dispute between Chile and Bolivia in the 1800s which ended in Chilean annexation of all of the Bolivian Coast and the southern tip of Bolivia’s ally Peru during the War of the Pacific 1879–1883. 

Over a century later, for some, these border disputes remain unresolved. What 

should the United States Government position be regarding these border issues 

(Peru and Bolivia)? Should the United States mediate if the situation deteriorates? 

Answer. The United States Government first and foremost considers these border 

disputes between Chile and Peru and Chile and Bolivia as matters to be resolved 

between those respective nations. 

Fortunately, we have seen on the part of all three nations a willingness to discuss 

the issues cordially and frankly and in accordance with international law and practice. This reflects the good relations extant between Chile and Peru and Chile and 

Bolivia, respectively. 

While we do not seek a role in mediating these disputes, the United States’ good 

offices are always available to our friends. 

Question. Reports submitted to the United States Congress by relevant United 

States Government agencies highlight an increase of activity to support Islamic terrorist groups in the tri-border region of South America (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay). This support is happening mostly in the form of money laundering and transfers to and from regions overseas. 

Is cooperation between the United States and Chile regarding international terrorism satisfactory? Are Chilean laws and financial sector monitoring sufficiently 

strong to insulate it from being used by terrorist groups to launder money and 

transfer money to and from regions overseas? In what areas can you work with the 

Chilean Government to help strengthen their response to terrorist threats? 

Answer. Cooperation between the United States and Chile on money laundering, 

including that related to international terrorism, is excellent. Chile’s relative geographical isolation and reputation for probity have for some time lessened Chile’s 

vulnerability to money laundering, drugs, and terrorism. But its integration into the 

global economy has changed that, and the Government of Chile has come to recognize these new threats. Many United States Government agencies work with Chilean law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, financial intelligence unit (FIU), and government officials to combat these crimes. 

A few examples: 

Chile has a special unit, the Grupo de Operaciones Especializadas (GOPE), a 300- 

person unit of the Carabineros police force, which serves as Chile’s primary counterterrorist reaction force. GOPE participates each year in Exercise Fuerzas Comando, 

a SOUTHCOM-sponsored special operations seminar designed to refine the tactics, 

techniques, and procedures used by special operations counterterrorism forces. 

The State Department and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) run 

regular seminars to train police officials in counternarcotics investigative techniques. A unit trained by one of these seminars produced Chile’s first-ever arrest 

for trafficking crack cocaine. 

791 

Inside the judicial system itself, the State Department and Treasury Department 

have trained police, prosecutors, and members of Chile’s FIU in how to develop and 

successfully prosecute complex money laundering cases. Prosecutions of money laundering have increased in the last year. 

The United States Government continually shares information about criminal activity with appropriate authorities within the Chilean Government. In sum, Chile 

has shown itself to be a reliable partner interested in working with us to address 

these global challenges. 

The embassy cooperates with Chilean police and prosecutors in monitoring possible terrorist finance activity, and is currently examining with the Chileans the 

possibility of prosecuting one of these cases. 

With regard to financial sector monitoring, Chile passed anti-money laundering 

laws in December 2003 and August 2006, but we believe there is still room for improvement. The FIU, prosecutors, and police are hindered in investigations by 

Chile’s strict bank secrecy laws. Draft legislation that would facilitate lifting bank 

secrecy for the FIU and public prosecutors is currently sitting in Chile’s lower house 

of Congress. If confirmed, I will emphasize to the Government of Chile the importance of enacting legislation that fully meets international standards and doing everything possible to facilitate investigations. Terrorist financing legislation appears 

to be solid, but has yet to be tested. 

We have a positive and constructive relationship with Chile’s Treasury Department, Central Bank, and Financial Intelligence Unit. Chile’s FIU requires additional institutional support and capacity-building to be more effective. Additionally, 

nonbank financial institutions, such as money exchange houses and legal cash couriers, currently do not fall under the supervision of any regulatory body for compliance with anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing standards. 

Our next area of focus will be the judiciary. Police and prosecutors have benefited 

from United States Government training in the last 2 years, but are finding that 

many judges have an insufficient understanding of these relatively new crimes to 

effectively adjudicate cases. Additional training of judges in financial crimes would 

strengthen Chile’s ability to protect itself from being used by drug traffickers and 

terrorist financiers. 

Question. The potential onslaught of the increase in sea level that is expected to 

result from a global warming of the atmosphere is of chief concern to countries with 

long coast lines like Chile. In what areas could the United States work with the 

Chilean Government jointly in this regard? 

Do you believe that the United States should encourage Chile to participate in 

negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 

with the intent of agreeing to binding agreements to limit greenhouse gas emissions? 

Answer. In association with the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 

we negotiated an Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA) that established a 

framework for United States-Chile cooperation on environmental issues. Under the 

FTA and ECA, we have worked with Chile on a number of projects that could help 

combat climate change. For example, we have worked together to promote the development and use of clean energy. In addition, the 2007–2008 ECA Work Plan calls 

for us to consult with Chile on approaches to clean energy. Under the umbrella of 

the ECA Work Plan, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency has funded a ‘‘reverse 

trade mission’’ on geothermal power for a delegation of Chilean officials from the 

private and public sectors. The group will be in the United States September 28- 

October 1, meeting with U.S. Government officials as well as U.S. company representatives. Other specific activities contemplated in the plan include promoting 

other renewable energy opportunities and sharing prospective policy, regulatory, 

and financial models for the adoption of renewable energy technologies. Additionally, the plan calls for binational consultations on ways to improve energy efficiency 

in selected industry and construction sectors; exploration of establishment of a program on appliance standards and labeling; and support for the Clean Fuels Partnership initiative to help reduce pollution in the transport sector. 

Question. Chile and the United States enjoy an excellent relationship. Today, 

more than ever, our countries work together on a range of important issues, not the 

least of which is promoting free trade. In that regard, Chile is a noteworthy success 

story. Nevertheless, political relationships and cooperation between our two countries could be deeper—Chile’s coalition government did not support Guatemala’s 

candidacy to be a member of the Security Council of the United Nations over Venezuela and does not support United States efforts to condemn human rights abuses 

committed by the Cuban Government. 

792 

What are your suggestions to deepen political ties between our two countries? Is 

there interest in the United States Government to award Chile with Major NonNATO Ally status? If so, if confirmed, what initiatives will you develop to meet this 

objective? 

Answer. Since President Bush’s meeting with President Bachelet in the White 

House in June 2006, the United States and Chile have exchanged several high-level 

visits designed to deepen consultations on a wide range of bilateral and multilateral 

issues, including promotion of democracy, human rights, regional security, nonproliferation, free trade, energy, science and technology and, most recently, education. In this context, we have boosted military exchanges and exercises, and 

strengthened consultations between senior-level officials at the State Department, 

Defense Department, and U.S. Southern Command and their Chilean counterparts. 

Chile and the United States share a common vision on the importance of working 

in multilateral fora. Chile has a proven record of support for democratic principles 

in the Organization of American States and is an active participant in the Community of Democracies, which it chaired in 2005. 

We have a vigorous military-to-military relationship with Chile, which includes 

several annual exercises and bilateral agreements. Secretary Gates is planning to 

visit Chile in early October to further that relationship. There is no current proposal 

on Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status; however, we are not opposed to pursuing 

MNNA if it is in the best interests of both the United States and Chile. 

If confirmed, I will work with the administration, Congress, and the Chilean Government to identify additional opportunities for cooperation in the political and security spheres. 

Question. Chile and the United States enjoy an excellent relationship, but in recent times the United States’s image in Chile has suffered. 

Different ambassadors have taken interest in promoting activities to advance understanding between our two countries. Ambassador Craig Kelly promoted Little 

League baseball in Chile during his tenure with positive results. If confirmed, in addition to the traditional issues that make up our foreign policies to Chile, what new 

initiatives will you pursue to enhance the United States’s image by means of public 

diplomacy? 

Answer. As the question indicates, the overall relationship between Chile and the 

United States is excellent. Surveys indicate that the majority of Chileans consider 

the United States to be the country’s most important partner in economics, trade, 

defense, security, and other areas. The United States is the country of choice for 

Chileans who pursue academic and research programs (particularly at the graduate 

level), and the United States is a very popular destination for Chileans who can afford recreational travel. American films, television, and other media are immensely 

popular in Chile. Nevertheless, some aspects of United States politics, culture, society, and values are not as well understood in Chile as they might be, which underlines the need for effective public diplomacy activities that will bring the ambassador, other embassy officials, and visitors from the United States into direct contact with a variety of audiences throughout Chile. 

I believe it is important that our public diplomacy programs in Chile reach a 

broad variety of audiences—from influential policymakers in Santiago to young people, men, and women from diverse cultural groups, and those in economically disadvantaged communities throughout the country. 

If confirmed, I will look for ways to work with embassy staff and visitors to reach 

out to diverse audiences in Chile with a positive message of United States engagement. In this regard, I would expect to draw on a variety of existing and new exchange initiatives, including our flagship Fulbright academic exchange program, our 

bilateral environmental agreement, various English language teaching programs, 

our active network of 10 Binational Centers, and 5 American Corners, and sports 

diplomacy programs. One of the most promising developments in this area is our 

new Equal Opportunity Scholarship program with Chile, which will support doctoral 

study in the United States by a diverse group of up to 100 Chilean students annually, in fields addressing Chile’s priority national needs. Participating students will 

come from all walks of life and from all parts of Chile; they will be placed in a wide 

range of United States’ universities with high-quality graduate programs in their 

fields, including science and technology, public policy, education, environmental 

studies, and public health. 

793 

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. It has been reported that the United States Government, the Mexican 

and Central American Governments are in discussions about a bilateral cooperation 

program of assistance by the United States to help Mexican and Central American 

counternarcotics efforts. Is such a package in development? When did dialog on the 

Mexico/Central America aid package begin? Please give specific dates. What are the 

aid package’s components? When do you expect that it will be announced? What 

level of funding, and what types of assistance (what accounts), do you expect will 

be requested? 

Answer. The Governments of the United States and Mexico are discussing cooperative steps to address what President Bush described as a ‘‘common problem on our 

shared border’’—drug and other illegal trafficking, and the violence associated with 

it. We are also considering the best way to support the countries of Central America 

confront the transnational threats we share, including narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and criminal gangs. 

President Bush first discussed security cooperation with then President-elect 

Calderon in November 2006. These discussions continued during the President’s 

visit to the region in March 2007, as outlined in the joint United States-Mexico 

Communique ́ of March 2007. In May, the Government of Mexico approached the 

United States with suggested areas for greater cooperation, and technical experts 

from both governments subsequently began meeting to define needs and areas 

where we might usefully work together. At the North American Leaders’ Summit 

in Montebello, Canada, on August 20–21, Presidents Bush and Calderon agreed to 

address the drug trafficking and narcotics-related violence affecting both countries. 

Separately, in August, the member countries of the Central American System for 

Integration (SICA) held internal discussions about developing their own regional 

strategy to combat crime. United States embassies in Central America have also advised on the types of projects that could assist the Central American initiative and 

support our policy goals. 

Our continuing discussions with the Governments of Mexico and Central American countries are focusing on three broad areas: counternarcotics and border security; public security and law enforcement; and strengthening institutions and rule 

of law. Possible areas of joint work could include strengthening Mexico’s southern 

border, enhanced computer and database networks to make Mexico’s law enforcement agencies more efficient and transparent, and measures to professionalize 

Mexico’s federal law enforcement personnel. The administration is also considering 

programs that would help law enforcement and court institutions to ensure due 

process, transparency, proper oversight, responsiveness to citizen complaints, and 

protection of human rights. For Central America, a number of options are being considered, including the provision of tools, training, and technical expertise. 

The nature and extent of cooperation with Mexico and Central America have not 

been finalized, so no official announcement has been scheduled. The administration 

is assessing how to fund any resulting programs in a fiscally responsible manner 

as well as which accounts might be appropriate to execute these programs. The administration intends to continue its exchange with the Congress as the outlines of 

our proposed cooperative effort take shape. I look forward to providing additional 

details to you and your staff as soon as possible. 

(795) 

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Mathieu, Gail D., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia 

Mozena, Dan, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Angola 

Reddick, Eunice S., to be Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic, 

and to serve concurrently and without additional compensation 

as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and 

Principe 

Steiger, William R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Mozambique 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold, 

presiding. 

Present: Senator Feingold. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. I call the committee to order, and thank you 

very much, everyone, for being here. 

In the past 6 months, more than a dozen distinguished individuals have appeared before this committee to discuss their nominations to be U.S. Ambassadors to African countries. Some were on 

their way to countries that regularly make headlines, albeit usually 

buried far back in the world section, and usually for the wrong reasons, like Nigeria and Zimbabwe and Chad, while others move 

their lives and their families to places that a lot of people would 

have trouble finding on a map, like the Gambia, Swaziland, or 

Comoros. Each of these positions was important, and the same is 

true for today’s nominees, who make up the last four of this year’s 

Foreign Service rotation. 

Despite five coups since independence in 1975, the people of Sao 

Tome and Principe have established a relatively functional 

multiparty democracy that is working to overcome internal political 

divisions. On my way to Kinshasa this summer, I made a brief 

overnight stop in Sao Tome. I was able to meet with the foreign 

minister, with whom I discussed regional and maritime security 

implications in the Gulf of Guinea, a relevant and timely issue, to 

say the least. So, Ms. Reddick, I look forward to discussing your 

nomination to be Ambassador to Gabon and Sao Tome and PrinVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00803 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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cipe. And I assume you already know that when you go to Sao 

Tome, the sign says, ‘‘Welcome to Sao Tome, and Don’t Forget Principe.’’ That’s what it actually says on the sign. 

Just down the coast is one of Africa’s largest countries, an unfortunate example of the so-called ‘‘resource curse,’’ which enjoyed a 

14 percent GDP growth last year, while more than 40 percent of 

its population struggles to survive on less than one dollar a day. 

When Mr. Dan Mozena was sent to neighboring Zambia for his 

Foreign Service tour in 1982, Angola was embroiled in a full-blown 

civil war. When he returned as Deputy Chief of Mission in 2001, 

Mr. Mozena was a witness to the final resolution of this conflict 

and the extensive healing and reconstruction that followed. So, I 

look forward to hearing how Mr. Mozena, if confirmed, will apply 

lessons learned from those previous tours to help address the problems and possibilities that Angola faces today. 

Angola’s southern neighbor, Namibia, is noted for having one of 

the lowest levels of corruption on the continent. It also has some 

of the world’s greatest income inequality. This will present a challenge for Ambassador Gail Dennise Mathieu, if confirmed as 

United States Ambassador to Namibia. Her most recent overseas 

posting, as Ambassador to Niger, the world’s poorest country, will 

surely be useful for devising innovative ways the United States can 

contribute to enhanced development and more even distribution of 

Namibia’s resources. 

On the opposite coast, Mozambique is recovering, with notable 

success, from the devastations of civil war, natural disasters, and 

the HIV/AIDS epidemic, thanks, in part, to assistance from the 

United States. The country has received more than $350 million in 

United States funding as a focus country for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is home to USAID and Peace Corps 

programs, and recently accepted a Millennium Challenge Compact 

worth $507 million designed to reduce poverty in Mozambique by 

promoting sustainable economic growth. If confirmed, Dr. William 

Steiger will have the responsibility to oversee the use of these 

funds and ensure that they contribute to the objectives for which 

they were intended. Dr. Steiger’s 6 years of experience as the director of the Office of Global Health Affairs at the Department of 

Health and Human Services, would be very useful in this regard. 

I’d also like to point out that we have two nominees today with 

ties to my home State of Wisconsin. Of course, Dr. Steiger is a native Wisconsinite, and served as education policy advisor for Wisconsin’s Governor Tommy Thompson in the 1990s. Dr. Steiger’s father, whom I remember well, was a respected member of the Wisconsin State Assembly before a very distinguished tenure as a 

Member of the United States House of Representatives for 11 

years. 

Although not originally from Wisconsin, Mr. Dan Mozena earned 

his master’s of public affairs at my alma mater, the University of 

Wisconsin at Madison. Football team is 5–0, and fifth in the Nation, just for the record. [Laughter.] 

It is nice to have our State so well represented here this morning. 

At confirmation hearings, I’m consistently struck by how professional, knowledgeable, committed, and enthusiastic the nominees 

797 

are. It is when I encounter diplomats in their posts, however, that 

I am really able to appreciate that individual and collective contribution to the achievement of critical U.S. objectives on the continent. 

So, I’d like to thank each of you for not just accepting, but embracing the responsibilities of serving as United States foreign ambassadors. I’d like to thank you for coming here today, and extend 

a warm welcome to your families and friends who have come with 

you. I know that these people play a very important role in enabling you to do your jobs well, so they also deserve recognition, and 

I’m glad they’re here. And, when you make your remarks, if you 

want to introduce anybody—family or friends—please do. 

So, I now invite each of you to deliver your testimony, beginning 

with Ms. Reddick, to be followed by some questions about your priorities and plans, if confirmed to these positions. 

Ms. Reddick, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF EUNICE S. REDDICK, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE GABONESE REPUBLIC, AND TO SERVE CONCURRENTLY AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AS 

AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SAO 

TOME AND PRINCIPE 

Ms. REDDICK. Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before you 

today. I wish to express my gratitude to the President and to Secretary Rice for the trust and confidence they have placed in me as 

their nominee for Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic and the 

Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress to advance the interests and values of the American people in Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe. 

I would like to take this time to introduce my husband, Marc 

Wall, who recently returned from Chad, where he served as Chief 

of Mission, my daughter, Sarah, and son, Gregory. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I remember the Ambassador when I 

went to Chad, now that I look at him. Welcome. 

Ms. REDDICK. Gabon is one of Africa’s most stable countries, and 

it has been a helpful partner to the United States in the central 

Africa region, and Africa as a whole, and in multilateral bodies 

such as the U.N. United States military engagement with Gabon, 

which has developed in several areas, is crucial to promote the security of the strategic Gulf of Guinea region. If confirmed, I will 

work closely with the Gabonese civilian and military leadership, 

our military, notably the new Africa Command, to ensure our relations with Gabon help contribute to a safe and secure Gulf of Guinea region. 

Gabon is one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most prosperous nations. 

Although oil earnings have given Gabon one of the highest per capita GDPs in sub-Saharan Africa, income distribution is extremely 

skewed, and 60 to 70 percent of Gabonese live below the poverty 

line. Transparency, accountability, and corruption must be addressed if Gabon is to surmount its economic challenges. 

To increase economic opportunity for its citizens, Gabon has 

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798 

sification efforts by encouraging good, transparent governance, 

sound economic management, and private sector-led development. 

I will encourage greater us of measures provided under the Africa 

Growth and Opportunity Act to increase Gabon’s trade with the 

United States and spur American investment in Gabon. I will also 

support Gabon’s efforts for environmentally responsible management of its rich and diverse forest resources. 

Let me now turn to the other country to which I am nominated 

to serve as ambassador. The island state of Sao Tome and Principe 

is the second-smallest and one of the poorest countries in Africa. 

Nevertheless, as you mentioned earlier, it is a vibrant multiparty 

democracy, and, since the democratic reforms of the early 1990s, 

has had a history of free and fair elections. Sao Tome and Principe 

is now at the threshold of a dramatic change, with prospects for development of oil resources. Carefully managed, impending oil revenues could build infrastructure and reduce poverty. Mismanaged, 

an oil boom could threaten Sao Tome and Principe’s young democracy, security, and stability. The United States is committed to assisting Sao Tome and Principe to improve institutional capacity 

needed to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. If confirmed, I will support the recently approved Millennium Challenge 

Corporation threshold program for Sao Tome and Principe and 

other efforts to improve economic performance and efficiency. I will 

support U.S. business interests and find ways to encourage U.S. investment. I will also work with the government and the donor community to ensure that Sao Tome and Principe is prepared to invest 

oil revenues wisely in the country’s development and its people. 

If confirmed as ambassador, no goal will be more important than 

protecting the lives, interests, and welfare of Americans living and 

traveling in Gabon, in Sao Tome and Principe. In addition, I will 

work with the leadership and peoples of the two nations to foster 

stability throughout the region, support good governance and democratization, and increase economic prosperity. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed I look forward to serving as our next 

Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic and the Democratic Republic 

of Sao Tome and Principe. I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions you might have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Reddick follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EUNICE S. REDDICK, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE

GABONESE REPUBLIC, AND TO SERVE CONCURRENTLY AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL

COMPENSATION AS AMBASSADOR TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SAO TOME AND

PRINCIPE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today. I wish to express my gratitude to President Bush and to Secretary Rice for 

the trust and confidence they have placed in me as their nominee for Ambassador 

to the Gabonese Republic and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress 

to advance the interests and values of the American people in Gabon and Sao Tome 

and Principe. 

I would like to take this time to introduce my husband, Marc Wall, who recently 

returned from Chad where he served as Chief of Mission, my daughter Sarah, and 

son Gregory. 

Gabon is one of Africa’s most stable countries despite its location in a volatile region. When nearby conflicts have threatened the safety of American citizens, Gabon 

has provided safe haven for evacuees. Gabon has been a helpful partner to the 

799 

United States in the Central Africa region, in Africa as a whole, and in multilateral 

fora such as the U.N. President Bongo’s seniority among African leaders and his 

knowledge of regional issues have allowed him to play an important role in attempts 

to resolve regional conflicts. The United States has trained Gabonese forces under 

the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, and 

today Gabon leads the peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic, providing the majority of deployed forces there. Members of the Gabonese armed forces 

receive professional training under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. To promote the security of the strategic Gulf of Guinea region, origin of a growing share of United States oil imports, Unitedf States military 

engagement with Gabon has developed in several areas, including training exercises, ship visits, and high-level exchanges. If confirmed, I will work closely with the 

Gabonese civilian and military leadership, our European Command and the new Africa Command to ensure our relations with Gabon help contribute to a safe and secure Gulf of Guinea region. 

President Bongo has held office since 1967, and in December 2005 he was reelected for a new 7-year term. Although the 2005 Presidential election was marred 

by irregularities, legislative elections in December 2006, in which the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) won two-thirds of the seats, were deemed free and fair 

by independent observers. However, a single party—the PDG—has remained in 

power since 1968, and democratic institutions, particularly civil society, remain 

weak. There are some restrictions on press freedoms, and the legal and judicial system is weak and susceptible to government influence. Of particular concern is trafficking in persons, and child labor resulting from trafficking. Gabon has taken steps 

to address the problem of trafficking of children from neighboring African countries, 

such as arresting alleged traffickers and providing facilities for victimized children, 

but more must be done to combat this problem. The United States has worked with 

Gabon on this issue mainly via a regional, Department of Labor-funded project. If 

confirmed, I will continue to engage the government to do more to halt child trafficking; I will also continue to engage leaders from government, opposition parties, 

and civil society to increase respect for human rights issues, and further strengthen 

democratization. 

Gabon is one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most prosperous nations, thanks to its oil 

wealth. Oil accounts for 77 percent of Gabon’s exports, 56 prcent of government revenues, and 45 percent of GDP. Although oil earnings have given Gabon one of the 

highest per capita GDPs in sub-Saharan Africa, income distribution is extremely 

skewed. Gabon’s ranking on human development indicators is not commensurate 

with its per capita GDP ranking. Recent high oil prices have increased production, 

but oil production and revenues are expected to continue their gradual decline. To 

increase economic opportunity for its citizens, Gabon must move from a single-resource petroleum-based economy to a diversified economy driven by the private sector and focused on poverty reduction. There is the potential for economic diversification and growth in ecotourism, natural gas, fishing and aquaculture, timber, minerals, and palm oil production. However, diversification efforts will face significant 

challenges in terms of the lack of skilled laborers, and the lack of infrastructure. 

Transparency, accountability, and corruption must be addressed if Gabon is to 

surmount its economic challenges. Although much work remains to be done regarding implementation, the Government of Gabon has publicly committed itself to the 

principles and criteria of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 

which leverages multi-stakeholder partnerships to encourage governments and companies to publish what they pay and what they receive in relation to extractive industries. We hope that Gabon will take full advantage of its new 3-year program 

approved by the International Monetary Fund to move ahead with necessary economic reforms. If confirmed, I will support Gabon’s economic diversification efforts 

by encouraging good, transparent governance; sound economic management; and 

private-sector led development. I will also encourage greater use of measures provided under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to increase Gabon’s 

trade with the United States and spur American investment in Gabon. 

Nearly 85 percent of Gabon is covered by forests with rich and diversified resources. In 2002, President Bongo set aside 10 percent of Gabon’s territory to create 

a national park system, but the nation’s continued commitment to environmentally 

responsible management requires support. Gabon seeks to develop ecotourism as 

part of its economic diversification strategy. However, high raw material prices have 

spurred interest in exploration and resource extraction in many new areas, and 

these sometimes generate conflicts with conservation projects. Continued political 

and financial support from the United States and continued engagement by international NGOs will be required to sustain progress in this area. In 2002, the United 

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tainable Development, recognizing the importance of the world’s second largest tropical forest. Since then, the United States has worked closely with Gabon and five 

other countries of the Congo Basin, other donor countries, private sector entities, 

and NGOs to help conserve and sustainably manage the Congo Basin forests. The 

United States Government-funded Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) plays a pivotal role in implementing United States Government 

programs on the ground. If confirmed, I will continue to support this important 

work. 

Let me now turn to the other country to which I am nominated to serve as ambassador. Sao Tome and Principe is an island state located off the west coast of Africa. 

It is the second smallest and one of the poorest countries in Africa. Nevertheless, 

it is a vibrant, multiparty democracy and since the democratic reforms of the early 

1990s has had a history of free and fair elections. A coup attempt in July 2003 and 

a near collapse of the government in 2005 challenged the country’s fragile democracy, but successful presidential and legislative elections in 2006 created a foundation for long-term stability. 

Sao Tome’s economy historically centered on cocoa exports, but production today 

is weak and the government depends heavily on foreign donors to meet its obligations. Despite scarce resources, the government has done a relatively good job of 

meeting its people’s needs, and Sao Tome and Principe ranks as a ‘‘medium human 

development’’ country in the U.N. index. 

Sao Tome and Principe is now at the threshold of a dramatic change with prospects for development of oil resources. Carefully managed, impending oil revenues 

could build infrastructure, fund education and training, and reduce poverty. Mismanaged, an oil boom could threaten Sao Tome and Principe’s young democracy, security, and stability. 

The country is already experiencing the impact of oil money through multi-million 

dollar oil contract signature bonuses that have recently been agreed. Corruption 

presents a growing threat in this environment. To address this threat, the Government of Sao Tome and Principe has adopted an exemplary oil revenue management 

law designed to combat corruption and promote the sound management of oil revenues. In addition, the Government of Sao Tome and Principe has publicly committed 

itself to the principles and criteria of EITI. Furthermore, in January 2005, Sao 

Tome and Principe set a new standard among EITI-committed countries when the 

government signed a production-sharing contract with three oil companies that included a clause on transparency that makes specific mention of the EITI principles. 

U.S. oil companies have already established a presence and are investing in the development of Sao Tome and Principe’s potential offshore petroleum resource. 

The prospect of oil wealth is increasing expectations among the nation’s citizens, 

but production is not expected for at least another 5 years. Whether or not oil revenues flow in the future, broad and sustainable development requires the creation 

of a business climate that can attract private investment. Today, high taxes, poor 

public services, and onerous business regulations compound the disincentives inherent in Sao Tome and Principe’s small market size, with a population of less than 

200,000 people. 

The United States is committed to assisting Sao Tome and Principe to improve 

institutional capacity needed to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. On 

September 12, the Board of Directors of the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

(MCC) approved a 2-year, $8.66 million Threshold program to help the Government 

of Sao Tome and Principe to increase revenues through improved tax and customs 

administration and enforcement as well as to reduce the time and costs associated 

with starting a business. The MCC Threshold program will complement a World 

Bank-funded project to enhance public expenditure management. 

If confirmed, I will support the MCC program, and other efforts to improve economic performance and efficiency. I will support U.S. business interests and find 

ways to encourage U.S. investment. I will also work with the government and the 

donor community to ensure that Sao Tome and Principe is prepared to invest oil 

revenues wisely in the country’s development and its people. 

The United States is engaged in increasing the capacity of the security forces of 

Sao Tome and Principe with an emphasis on maritime security forces in the Gulf 

of Guinea. We are working together closely to help develop a Coast Guard. Sao 

Tome and Principe welcomes our ship visits, and participates in high-level military 

exchange programs and training exercises. The purpose of these programs is to enhance the professionalism of the Sao Tome and Principe armed forces. 

Since the early 1990s, Sao Tome has been the home of a $50 million transmitting 

facility for Voice of America. The island’s location makes it ideal for transmitting 

and relaying programs over long distances. 

801 

If confirmed as ambassador, no goal will be more important than protecting the 

lives, interests, and welfare of Americans living and traveling in Gabon, and Sao 

Tome, and Principe. In addition, I will work with the leadership and peoples of the 

two nations to foster stability throughout the region, support good governance and 

democratization, and increase economic prosperity. While terrorists have not focused 

on either country, I will work with both governments to seek to deter and prevent 

terrorist activities and maintain counterterrorism cooperation. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed, I look forward to serving as our next Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic and the Democratic Republic 

of Sao Tome and Principe. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might 

have. 

Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ms. Reddick. 

Ambassador Mathieu. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GAIL DENISE MATHIEU, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA 

Ambassador MATHIEU. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased and honored 

to appear before you today as President Bush’s nominee to serve 

as Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia. I sincerely appreciate 

the confidence that the President and Secretary Rice have shown 

in me by putting forth my name for your consideration. I am here 

this morning with my husband, Erick. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome. 

Ambassador MATHIEU. Mr. Chairman, during my assignments 

over the past 10 years, I have been committed to strengthening 

democratic processes, advancing economic development, trade, and 

investment, and building law enforcement and security cooperation 

in Africa. If confirmed, I will continue this work with dedication. 

Since independence from apartheid South Africa in 1990, Namibia has pursued a path of democracy and free-market economics. 

As Namibia struggles to address multiple challenges, unexpected 

events and historical ties could lead it down a very different path 

in the future. Sustained well-tailored American engagement will 

help ensure that Namibia remains on a positive course. 

Today, I would like to focus on three areas where the United 

States can play a critical role in the success of Namibia’s future. 

First, I am pleased to note that funding for Namibia under the 

President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, also known as 

PEPFAR, is projected to grow to $104 million, up from $91 million 

in fiscal year 2007. Namibia’s estimated HIV/AIDS prevalence rate 

of 19.7 percent dramatically undermines economic growth and social progress. If confirmed as ambassador, I will ensure that all 

mission activities are complementary and mutually reinforcing in 

order to maximize the effective use of PEPFAR funds, as well as 

other available resources, for the prevention, care, and treatment 

of HIV/AIDS. 

Second, it’s in our interest to promote economic growth to help 

Namibia reach its full potential as a stable partner for the United 

States and the region. Conclusion of the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation Compact Agreement currently under negotiation could 

lead to the investment of approximately $275 million that will positively transform the Namibian agricultural, tourism, and educational sectors. 

Namibia has seized some opportunities offered by the African 

Growth and Opportunity Act, and, if confirmed, I will work to asVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00809 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
802 

sist Namibia diversify its exports and derive even greater benefits. 

I would also focus on activities to advance the empowerment of 

women in an effort to accelerate Namibia’s economic development. 

Third, it’s essential that Namibia, a maturing democracy, consolidate its democratic gains and ensure that economic development 

takes root in a society that is justly ruled. If given the opportunity 

of leading our mission in Windhoek, I will work to foster free and 

fair elections, good governance, and continued respect for human 

rights. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will use every opportunity to 

strengthen United States-Namibia cooperation, roll back the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, bolster democratic institutions, and promote 

economic prosperity, including opportunities for American businesses. I will also fully commit myself to the protection of American citizens and interests in Namibia. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Mathieu follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GAIL DENISE MATHIEU, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased and honored to appear before you today as President Bush’s nominee to serve as Ambassador to the 

Republic of Namibia. I sincerely appreciate the confidence in me that the President 

and Secretary Rice have shown by putting forth my name for your consideration. 

I am here this morning with my husband, Erick. 

Mr. Chairman, During my assignments over the past 10 years as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Niger, Deputy Chief of Mission in Accra, and Deputy Director of West African Affairs, I was committed to strengthening democratic processes; 

advancing economic development, trade, and investment; and building cooperation 

on law enforcement and security matters in Africa. If confirmed, I will continue this 

work with dedication. 

Since independence from apartheid South Africa in 1990, Namibia has pursued 

a path of democracy and free market economics. As Namibia struggles to address 

multiple challenges, unexpected events and historical ties could lead it down a very 

different path in the future. While our cooperative efforts and assistance programs 

are essential, our diplomatic skills are also needed to keep Namibia’s doors open to 

the United States and our interests. Sustained and well-tailored American engagement will help ensure that Namibia remains on a positive course. 

Today, I would like to focus on three areas where the United States can play a 

critical role in the success of Namibia’s future. First, I am pleased to note that funding for Namibia under the President’s Emergency Plan for SIDS Relief, also known 

as PEPFAR, is projected to grow to $104 million, up from $91 million in fiscal year 

2007. This funding will continue to support Namibia’s own efforts to mitigate the 

suffering and enormous cost to society caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Namibia 

has an estimated 19.7 percent HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, one of the highest in the 

world, which dramatically undermines economic growth and social progress. While 

tuberculosis is the leading direct cause of death in Namibia, an estimated 60 percent of TB patients are co-infected with HIV/AIDS. If confirmed as ambassador, I 

will ensure that all mission activities are complementary and mutually reinforcing 

in order to maximize the effective utilization of PEPFAR funds and other available 

resources, for the prevention, care, and treatment of HIV/AIDS. 

Second, it is in our interest to promote economic growth to help Namibia reach 

its full potential as a stable partner for the United States and the region. 

Conclusion of a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact agreement, currently 

under negotiation, could lead to the investment of approximately $275 million that 

would positively transform the Namibian agricultural, tourism, and educational sectors. Namibia has seized some opportunities offered by the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and if confirmed, I would work to assist Namibia diversify its exports 

and derive even greater benefits. I would also focus on activities to advance the empowerment of women in an effort to accelerate Namibia’s economic development. 

803 

Third, it is essential that Namibia, a maturing democracy, consolidate its democratic gains and ensure that economic development takes root in a society that is 

justly ruled. The current government has expanded the political space for civil society to participate in shaping public policy and deterring corruption. If given the opportunity of leading our mission in Windhoek, I would work to foster future free and 

fair elections, good governance, and continued respect for human rights. A strong 

democracy in Namibia would serve as a regional model. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, if confirmed, I will use every opportunity to strengthen United States-Namibia cooperation, roll back the pandemic of 

HIV/AIDS, bolster democratic institutions, and promote economic prosperity, including opportunities for American businesses. I will also fully commit myself to the protection of American citizens and interests in Namibia. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you may have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Ms. Mathieu. 

And now, Mr. Mozena. 

STATEMENT OF DAN MOZENA, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 

Mr. MOZENA. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. 

I am honored to appear today as the President’s nominee as 

United States Ambassador to Angola. I am grateful to the President and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. If confirmed, I 

look forward to working with you and your staff to advance United 

States’ interests in Angola. 

If I may, I wish to introduce my wife, Grace—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome to you. 

Mr. MOZENA [continuing]. My daughter, Anne, who’s here from 

Milwaukee, my cousin, Sean Coleman, and also Mahmud, my 

friend from Bangladesh, who’s taking advantage of his presence in 

Washington to see American democracy in action. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Welcome to all of you. 

Mr. MOZENA. For the past 36 years, Grace and I have journeyed 

far from our roots in rural Dubuque County, Iowa, where I was 

raised on a dairy farm and where we both attended one-room country schools. We began our public service as Peace Corps volunteers 

in then-Zaire, helping villagers raise chickens more successfully. 

That experience made clear that the capital city might not be representative of the country. Thus, at each posting—Zambia, Zaire, 

India, Pakistan, Bangladesh—I sought to understand the country 

beyond the capital. If confirmed, I will work hard to know Angola 

beyond Luanda. 

As director of Southern African Affairs, I visited Angola and I 

worked from the Washington perspective to further our interests 

there. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts. 

United States relations with Angola are good, and improving. 

Angola matters to American interests. A stable, democratic Angola 

is essential to stability in central and southern Africa. Its military 

can help keep the peace on a troubled continent. Angola is an important supplier of oil. It could also be a major food exporter in a 

food-insecure region. If confirmed, I would foster dynamic trade 

and investment links between our countries. 

Ending over four decades of conflict in 2002, Angola has achieved 

much: resettling over 400,000 refugees, reintegrating former soldiers into society, and removing thousands of land mines. Angola’s 

GDP grew, as you rightly noted, at a very high rate in 2006. The 

804 

budget is in surplus; reserves are growing; inflation is down from 

triple-digit figures only a few years ago to 12 percent today. 

Nonetheless, much remains to be done. Angola ranks near the 

bottom of social and development indicators. The people of Angola 

are not benefiting from the nation’s wealth. Thanks to high oil 

prices and increasing oil production, Angola has money, but money 

alone does not build a country. Corruption remains a challenge as 

Angola seeks to bolster the institutions of good governance. 

Angolan President dos Santos announced legislative and Presidential elections in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The country has 

registered 8 million of its citizens to vote, paving the way toward 

elections that could signal Angola’s emergence as a democracy. If 

confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would promote democracy, respect for 

human rights, and good governance. I would work to jumpstart agriculture, bolster Angolan peacekeeping capacity, and fight HIV/ 

AIDS and malaria. 

In my comments for the record, I have expanded on these challenges. 

There are no quick fixes. Perseverance is needed to help Angola 

build institutions and human capabilities. Mr. Chairman, should I 

be confirmed, I will work hard to build a strong, bilateral relationship with Angola for the betterment of both America and Angola. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address you, 

and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mozena follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAN MOZENA, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee to serve as United States Ambassador to Angola. 

I am grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for their confidence in me. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your staff to advance United 

States interests in Angola, especially in the promotion of a stable, democratic, and 

transparent Angola that uses its rich resources to better the lives of its citizens. 

If I may, I wish to introduce my wife, Grace, and my daughter, Anne. For the 

past 36 years, Grace and I have been on a journey that has taken us far from our 

roots in rural Dubuque County, Iowa, where I was raised on a dairy farm and where 

we both attended one-room country schools. 

Grace and I began our careers of public service as Peace Corps volunteers in what 

was then called Zaire, where we helped village farmers develop better methods of 

raising chickens. Although Peace Corps life in remote Zaire was far removed from 

the world of diplomacy, those experiences taught us that life in developing country 

capitals is hardly representative of the situation in the nation as a whole. Thus, at 

each of my postings—Zambia, Zaire, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—I reached 

out to know and understand the host country beyond the capital city. If confirmed, 

I will work hard to know Angola beyond Luanda. My most recent assignment as 

Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs enabled me to work from a Washington perspective to further our interests in Angola. As Director, I visited Angola 

to see firsthand the challenges Angola faces and our role in helping the Angolan 

people have hope for a brighter future. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts. 

United States relations with Angola are good and improving. Angola matters to 

United States interests. A stable, democratic Angola is essential to stability in central and southern Africa. Its effective military has great potential to provide forces 

for peacekeeping in Africa. It is an important supplier of oil, and it has potential 

to become a major food exporter in a region that is often food insecure. Angola can 

be a more dynamic partner for United States trade and investment, and if confirmed I would seek to bolster trade and investment links between our countries. 

Since the end of four decades of war in 2002, Angola has achieved much: bringing 

home and resettling over 400,000 war refugees; disarming and reintegrating former 

soldiers into Angolan society; and removing thousands of land mines, thus restoring 

805 

vital transportation routes and reopening rich farm land. Angola’s GDP grew at a 

rate of 19.5 percent in 2006; the budget is in surplus, and reserves are growing. Inflation is down from triple digits only a few years ago to 12 percent today. 

Nonetheless, much remains to be done. Despite its wealth, Angola ranks near the 

bottom of most social and development indicators. Angola must address this disparity to ensure its people benefit from the nation’s natural wealth. Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos publicly announced legislative and Presidential elections in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The country also just concluded a successful 

electoral registration campaign in which over 8 million citizens registered, paving 

the way for elections. Free and fair elections would signal Angola’s emergence as 

a democracy and bolster its claims to regional leadership. 

Thanks to high oil prices and increasing oil production, Angola has financial resources, but money alone does not build a country after decades of war and centuries of colonization. Corruption remains a challenge as Angola seeks to build and 

strengthen the institutions essential to good governance. If confirmed, I would use 

modest levels of United States assistance to help create greater capacity within the 

Angolan Government, civil society, and private sector to consolidate democracy, respect for human rights, and good governance. I would also use this assistance to 

jumpstart agriculture and other non-oil sectors of the economy, bolster Angolan 

readiness to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and defeat the diseases that limit Angola in utilizing its best resource—its people. 

I believe the United States can play an important role in facilitating Angola’s successful transition to democracy before and after elections. Before elections, we 

should continue our work strengthening civil society’s ability to organize and participate fully in local and national decision-making. We should help political parties 

build their capacity to ensure full, vigorous consideration of the issues important to 

Angolans. We should provide requested technical assistance to Angolan authorities 

to assist them in ensuring that national elections take place over a vast and diverse 

territory, and are free and fair. Democratic transitions do not end with elections, 

of course, so we should continue to foster the growth of a vibrant independent media 

and civil society. Both are essential to fostering government institutions that are responsive and accountable to their people. 

Democracy’s enduring success must be complemented by broad-based economic 

growth. Angola’s mineral wealth is finite, employs few people, and will not create 

long-term opportunities for the next generation. 

Instead, a better future for Angola lies in a return to its former proud status as 

a breadbasket of Africa. The United States is already helping promote the growth 

of the agricultural sector through an innovative public-private partnership. If confirmed, I would deepen this partnership. 

Angola seeks to be a regional leader in southern and central Africa and the Gulf 

of Guinea. It could assist in peace support operations on the continent. Because we 

share many security interests, such as in the Gulf of Guinea, if confirmed, I would 

work closely with the Department of Defense and others to improve our militaryto-military cooperation and Angola’s maritime security. 

Angola’s success in tackling the challenges of democratic transition, broad-based 

economic growth, and continental leadership depends upon the health and well 

being of its people. If confirmed, I would work hard to realize the President’s goal 

of reducing malaria deaths among Angolan children by half before 2010. Malaria is 

the number one killer of Angolan children under 5, but with a sustained effort toward education, prevention, and treatment, we can help Angola beat it, and indeed 

we are already achieving notable success. A more ominous and rising threat is HIV/ 

AIDS. This disease has ravaged much of southern Africa, but, until now, has largely 

spared Angola due to the severing of commercial and transportation links during 

Angola’s 27-year civil war. However, with the country finally at peace, those links 

are being reestablished rapidly, and thus we must act preemptively to help Angola 

avoid the scourge of double-digit HIV/AIDS infection rates present in most of its 

neighbors. Already, rates of HIV/AIDS are three to four times higher in border areas 

than in central Angola. 

Contemplating these challenges, I see few quick fixes. We will need patience and 

perseverance in helping Angola build institutions and human capabilities. Our view 

must be long-term in order to be effective as we help Angola join the international 

community of democracies. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, should I be confirmed, I will work hard 

to build a strong, mutually beneficial relationship with Angola for the betterment 

of Americans and Angolans. Thank you for this opportunity to address you. I look 

forward to answering any questions you might have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Mozena. 

806 

As we turn to Mr. Steiger, let me just say I noted the presence 

in the room, previously, of Congressman Petri, who succeeded Mr. 

Steiger’s father, I believe, with the untimely loss of Mr. Steiger’s 

father, who was a superb Congressman. And I want to say that 

Congressman Petri has been a distinguished and very independent 

Congressman in the Wisconsin tradition, and I am sure he was 

here to lend his support to the nomination of Mr. Steiger. 

Mr. Steiger. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. STEIGER, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE 

Dr. STEIGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I can say, I think, without fear of contradiction, that I’m probably 

the most pleased of the four nominees at this table to be here this 

morning, and I want to thank you for your efforts to make that 

possible. 

It’s a great privilege and an honor to appear before you as you 

consider my nomination to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of 

Mozambique. I am most grateful for the President’s nomination, for 

the support of Secretary Rice, and I want to thank you and the 

committee for granting me this hearing. 

I’d also like to thank former Secretary Tommy Thompson and 

current Secretary Mike Leavitt for their personal and professional 

support in this process. And I’d like to recognize a number of my 

friends and staff who are here with me, behind me. And I do greatly appreciate, as you pointed out, that Congressman Petri, from the 

6th District of Wisconsin, who did, indeed, succeed my father in the 

House of Representatives, stopped by to lend his support, as well. 

If confirmed by the Senate, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to 

working with this committee and the many others in Congress who 

are interested in Mozambique’s progress. Ever since the United 

States helped broker the 1992 Peace Accords that ended 16 years 

of civil war, relations between our two countries have been excellent. Now our relationship is even closer and more robust, as demonstrated by the June 2007 visit of First Lady Laura Bush, then 

the signing of a Millennium Challenge Compact in July, and, finally, the August visit of Health and Human Services Secretary 

Leavitt. That staff members from this very committee have visited 

Mozambique in recent weeks further emphasizes the increasing importance and dynamics of our relationship. 

The past 15 years, Mr. Chairman, have seen real democratic advancement in Mozambique. The country is a functioning multiparty 

democracy that has provincial elections planned for January of 

next year, to be followed by municipal elections and then Presidential and legislative balloting in 2009. Recent elections in Mozambique have been judged as generally free and fair by international observers, and, if confirmed, I pledge to help ensure that 

future elections are transparent and open to all political parties so 

Mozambique can secure and enjoy a position among the world’s democracies. 

Additionally, Mozambique has enjoyed remarkable economic 

growth in the past decade by pursuing policies that have earned it 

the respect and support of international financial institutions. Despite remaining one of the world’s poorest countries, Mozambique’s 

807 

gross domestic product per capita has more than tripled since 1992. 

If confirmed, I will work to encourage an open and favorable business climate necessary to attract foreign direct investment and to 

encourage responsible economic stewardship that will bring further 

prosperity. 

Although, Mr. Chairman, Mozambique has enjoyed political and 

economic improvement, it must also aggressively address the devastating reality of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Nationwide, HIV prevalence is now greater than 16 percent within the 

adult population, and it is extremely troubling that the number of 

new infections each year still appears to be increasing. Malaria 

also takes a huge economic and human toll in Mozambique. And, 

for those reasons, helping the country fight AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are among the U.S. Government’s highest priorities. 

Mozambique is currently one of only two nations in the world, 

along with Tanzania, that is a focus country for both the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President’s Malaria 

Initiative, and has also signed an MCC Compact. Because of the 

size of these investments, the United States is the largest bilateral 

donor to Mozambique, and Mozambique is among the top recipients 

of United States Government assistance in Africa, and one of the 

top 10 recipients of United States assistance around the globe. 

Since the year 2000, Mr. Chairman, I have gained much experience coordinating our international programs and policies at HHS, 

and such experience has provided me with the knowledge and insight to advocate for our Government’s goals in Mozambique, while 

helping to fortify and expand the successes we’ve already achieved. 

My service on the Interagency Steering Groups for the President’s 

Malaria Initiative and the President’s Emergency Plan, as well as 

my time as the United States Representative on the Board of Directors of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, 

have given me an intimate understanding and knowledge of our 

largest investments in Mozambique and the challenges associated 

in realizing them. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, my fluency in Portuguese will enable me 

to interface with Mozambicans on a more personal level than a 

non-Lusophone, although I’m sure my Brazilian accent will be the 

source of a lot of good-natured humor at my expense. 

If confirmed, in addition to those top priorities, I will work diligently with the Mozambican Government on the transnational and 

regional issues most important to the United States; among them, 

human trafficking remains a serious problem in Mozambique, and, 

if confirmed, I will advocate for the legal and administrative reforms necessary for the government to address this challenge. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, I will maintain a 

sense of perspective on our excellent bilateral relationship with the 

Government of Mozambique and its international relations, while 

continuing to rigorously press our national interests in health, economic opportunity, democracy, and the preservation of human dignity. 

Thank you, again, for this opportunity to address you. I’d be 

pleased to answer any question you and your colleagues might 

have, and I look forward to your assistance, and that of your staff, 

808 

in helping to find takers for my Packers season tickets, if I am confirmed. 

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s a little more challenging than I can 

handle. [Laughter.] 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Steiger follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM R. STEIGER, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of this 

committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as you consider 

my nomination to serve as Ambassador to the Republic of Mozambique. I am grateful for President Bush’s nomination,and for the support of Secretary Rice, and I 

want to thank the committee for granting me this hearing. 

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working with this committee and 

the many others in Congress who are interested in Mozambique’s progress. Ever 

since the United States helped broker the 1992 peace accords that ended 16 years 

of civil war, relations between our two countries have been excellent. Now our relationship is even closer and more robust, as demonstrated by the June 2007 visit of 

First Lady Laura Bush, then thesigning of a Millennium Challenge Compact in 

July, and, finally, the August visit of Health and Human Services Secretary Leavitt. 

That staff members from this very committee have visited Mozambique in recent 

weeks further emphasizes the increasing importance and dynamics of United StatesMozambique relations. 

The past 15 years have seen real democratic advancement in Mozambique. The 

country a multiparty democracy under the constitution of 1990, and in 1994 Mozambique held its first democratic elections. Provincial elections are planned for January 2008, to be followed by municipal elections, and then Presidential and legislative elections in 2009. Recent elections in Mozambique have been judged as generally free and fair by the Carter Center and international observers, and if confirmed I pledge to help ensure future elections are transparent and open to all political parties, so that Mozambique can secure and enjoy a position among the world’s 

functioning democracies. 

Additionally, Mozambique has enjoyed remarkable economic growth by pursuing 

policies that have earned it the respect and support of international financial institutions. Despite remaining one of the world’s poorest countries, Mozambique’s gross 

domestic product per capita has more than tripled since the conclusion of the peace 

accords. If confirmed, I will work to encourage an open and favorable business climate necessary to attract foreign direct investment and responsible economic stewardship that will being further prosperity to the country. 

Although Mozambique has enjoyed political and economic improvement, it must 

aggressively address the devastating reality of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Nationwide, HIV prevalence is now greater than 16 percent within Mozambique’s adult population. It is extremely troubling that the number of new infections 

each year still appears to be increasing. 

Malaria also takes a huge economic and human toll in Mozambique. The disease 

is responsible for an estimated 40 percent of all outpatient visits to health facilities 

and for some 60 percent of admissions to hospital of children. There are as many 

as 6 million cases of malaria each year in Mozambique—a country with a population 

of just under 20 million. 

Helping Mozambique fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria, and tuberculosis are 

among the United States Government’s highest priorities. Mozambique is currently 

one of only two nations in the world that is a focus county for both the President’s 

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) and 

has also signed a Millennium Challenge Compact. Mozambique’s MCC compact includes a $204 million water/sanitation project over 5 years, aimed at providing fresh 

drinking water and curbing the incidence of malaria, and also includes a 5-year 

$176 million project for road construction and rehabilitation. Because the MCC and 

our Mozambican partners realize that improved roadways mean greater movements 

of people, the road construction and rehabilitation project will also develop HIV/ 

AIDS awareness programs along heavily traveled routes to educate people in disease prevention. In brief, because of the size of these investments, the United States 

is the largest bilateral donor to Mozambique. Mozambique is among the top recipients of United States Government assistance in Africa, and is also one of the top 

10 recipients of United States assistance worldwide. 

809 

Mr. Chairman, since 2000, I have gained much experience coordinating our international programs and policies at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Such experience has provided me with the knowledge and insight to advocate 

for our Government’s goals in Mozambique while helping fortify and expand the successes we’ve already achieved through our considerable efforts. My service on the 

interagency steering groups for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and 

the President’s Malaria Initiative, as well as my time as the U.S. Representative 

on the Board of Directors of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, have given me an intimate understanding and knowledge of Mozambique 

while continuing to vigorously press our national interests. Thank you again for this 

opportunity to address you. I would be pleased to answer any questions you and 

your colleagues might have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Steiger. 

Thanks, all. 

As we turn to the questions, let me just say—and I know you’ll 

have the same experience—when you’ve actually visited one of 

these countries, it stays with you for life, and it turns out that I 

had been to Namibia, Mozambique, Angola twice; I have not been 

to Gabon, but, as I indicated, I’ve been to Sao Tome. So, my interest in these places is genuine, and I want you to know that, as you 

proceed, I am very interested in learning from you about these 

places, should you go through this whole process and achieve these 

posts. 

Ms. Reddick, Gabon hosts a United States Cooperative Security 

location and participates in the African Contingency Operations 

Training and Assistance Program, ACOTA. EUCOM is active in 

Sao Tome and Principe, with projects to bolster coastal and maritime security, and both countries receive United States military 

training. What does this bilateral cooperation entail, and what 

positive effect has it had for security in Gabon and Sao Tome, the 

region, and the United States? 

Ms. REDDICK. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have very good relations 

with both countries, Sao Tome, Principe, and Gabon, in terms of 

our security strategic interests in the region; and I mean the central Africa region and also the Gulf of Guinea region. 

You mentioned the ACOTA program, the African Contingency 

Operations Training Assistance program. We have been able to 

train peacekeepers that Gabon has deployed regionally. Gabonese 

military now lead the peacekeeping operation in Central African 

Republic. So, we’ve been able to assist Gabon in taking on the responsibility in assisting and maintaining the peace and stability of 

the region. 

We have also provided training, through our Navy resources, actually on the waters of the Gulf of Guinea, both Sao Tome and 

Principe, and Gabon have taken advantage of that training, which, 

again, allows them to improve their capacity to secure the region. 

So, it’s a valuable partnership for us. The Gulf of Guinea is a strategic area, because of the oil resources. We’re almost at the point 

of the Gulf of Guinea region providing about 15 percent of the 

United States’ oil supply. 

So, this is an area of close cooperation. And, if confirmed, I look 

forward to continuing that in a dialog with the military and civilian leadership in both countries, in conjunction with our military. 

Again, the new Africa Command has just been stood up. But, I 

think, for—it will still include, to a certain degree, the European 

Command. 

810 

Senator FEINGOLD. On that issue—I mean, using this as a specific example, as well as a broader point—what would be your role, 

as ambassador, in coordinating with United States and Gabonese 

military personnel involved in these programs? 

Ms. REDDICK. I expect to be engaged at the highest level. We 

have a defense attache and, of course, our embassy officers, who 

will be engaged in a dialog at the working level, but I think it’s 

going to be very important to maintain those contacts at the highest levels of both governments. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’m pleased to hear you say that, because I 

think the Chief of Mission authority is extremely important, and 

should be preserved while we pursue other important interests of 

the United States. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, I’ve spent a little time 

in Sao Tome, and learned, during my recent stay, of our efforts to 

bolster their maritime capacity. Can you say a bit about these efforts and how you see them fitting into the larger Gulf of Guinea 

security effort? 

Ms. REDDICK. Through programs such as IMET, the IMET program has trained military in both countries. In San Tome and 

Principe, our efforts focus on improving the professionalism of the 

small military, working at a very basic level, and also on improving 

the capacity of Sao Tome and Principe to patrol its coasts. We are 

also providing some assistance to the Government of Sao Tome and 

Principe to be able to monitor its waters, to know what’s happening 

there, where are the ships and what they’re doing. Again, it’s a 

very basic level, at this point. But our assistance is very important 

for Sao Tome and will contribute to our ability to shore up the capacity of the governments in the Gulf of Guinea region to monitor 

its waters and to know what’s happening. There are problems with 

illegal fishing, smuggling, and it’s certainly of concern to the governments in the region, and to the United States, as well. 

Senator FEINGOLD. China is a major investor in the volatile extractive industries in both Gabon and Sao Tome. Drawing on your 

knowledge of these countries, and perhaps your previous posting in 

Beijing, what is your perspective on China’s involvement in, and 

impact on, these two countries? 

Ms. REDDICK. China has brought economic interests, in Gabon, 

in particular, in the extractive industries, fishing, aquaculture, timber, and wood. The Chinese oil company, Sinopec, has rights to explore near a protected area—Loanga National Park. And this is of 

concern. Again, it’s important for Gabon, which has set aside 10 

percent of its land for national forests, to be able to protect those 

forests. On the other hand, it wants to be able to diversify beyond 

oil and forest products—timber, wood—could provide needed revenue in another sector. But it’s going to be a delicate balance, so 

it will be important to monitor what companies like Sinopec are 

doing in or near a protected area. Again, that’s an area of concern. 

I know the organizations such as World Wildlife Fund, the World 

Conservation Society, are also engaged in a dialog that the U.S. 

Government is participating in, along with other donors. So, with 

China’s large needs for resources, you know, sometimes that could 

come into conflict with other interests, such as forest conservation. 

811 

I think it’s going to be important to make sure that governments 

like Sao Tome and Principe and Gabon, that have laws that protect 

its resources and encourage environmentally sound investment, not 

only ensure these laws are implemented, but also respected by the 

commercial interests that come into both countries. And, if confirmed, I expect to be part of this dialog with NGOs and the governments. I also hope that we can include the Chinese into this dialog concerning environmentally sound commercial enterprises in 

the two countries. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your answers, Ms. Reddick. 

Ms. Mathieu, the Legal Assistance Center has reported that 

rapes more than doubled between independence in 1990 and 2005 

in Namibia. Civil society organizations have termed the high level 

of child rape a national emergency. What will you do to press for 

education on gender-based violence, as well as police and justicesector reform in Namibia? 

Ambassador MATHIEU. Mr. Chairman, since independence, Namibia generally has maintained a good human rights record, but 

the issue of child abuse and sexual abuse against women remains 

a very serious concern. Using the resources at the embassy, if confirmed, for example, our public diplomacy tools, we will try to raise 

public awareness of this issue, and we will also work with civil society and nongovernmental organizations, as well as advocate with 

the government to implement programs that would provide protection and shelter for these children; and, again, raise public awareness. And I would ensure, if confirmed, that the entire mission 

would be involved in this effort. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me switch to the relationship between 

Namibia and Zimbabwe. What explains the close relationship between these two governments? And what concerns, if any, does this 

relationship raise for the United States? 

Ambassador MATHIEU. Mr. Chairman, due to historical ties, the 

Government of Namibia continues to publicly support the Government of Zimbabwe. But Namibia has taken a very different path 

within its own country, particularly with regard to land reform. 

Namibia is following a constitutional path, ensuring that all farmers have been compensated for land, either purchased outright or 

either taken by eminent domain or, as they call it, expropriation. 

I believe that this, if continued—and certainly if I were confirmed, 

I would encourage the Government of Namibia to follow this course 

of action—that this could serve as a model for the region and for 

Zimbabwe. Also, if confirmed, I would encourage the government to 

take a more active stance against the actions and policies in 

Zimbabwe. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Mozena, Angola was the first country that I spent any real 

time in, in Africa, in 1994, and I was just struck by how richly endowed it is with oil and diamonds and gold and timber and other 

natural resources, despite the enormous tragedy that I witnessed 

then and when I returned in 1999. Last year, Angola recorded 14 

percent GDP growth, largely due to oil exports. Unfortunately, the 

World Bank has identified major problems in the management of 

Angola’s oil sector: a general lack of fiscal transparency and the 

fact that the government maintains off-budget financing through 

812 

the National Oil Company, Sonangol, in violation of Angola’s own 

financial legislation. What actions will you take to ensure that the 

Angolan Government implements concrete measures and policies to 

bring about greater transparency in the oil sector and in the management of oil revenues? 

Mr. MOZENA. Mr. Chairman, first, with your indulgence, earlier 

I failed to mention the two people who helped so much in preparing 

me to come here. And I would like to do that. And that would be 

Angola desk officers, Matt Shields and Chris Karber. 

Thank you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Duly noted. 

Mr. MOZENA. Your question really gets to the nub of the issue 

in Angola. Why is such a rich country filled with people who are 

so poor? Corruption is a key part of that, as you rightly point out. 

Some progress has been made in Angola in increasing transparency. I’m pleased that our Government has played an important 

part in those measures. For example, the government now has engaged the World Bank’s integrated financial systems process, 

which tracks, transparently, the flow of the oil revenues. That is 

now visible. You can now go online, and you can see transactions, 

you can see revenues coming in. The bidding process—the most recent bidding process in Angola was fully transparent. It was quite 

impressive. These are all positive steps. But there’s so much more 

to do. 

And you cited what I would have cited as a major concern, and 

that is that the oil company, Sonangol, is still engaged in 

quasifiscal activities. And, as ambassador, I will deepen United 

States efforts and those of international organizations, and those of 

other donors, to work aggressively with the Government of Angola 

to bring ever-greater transparency, to shine the light in the corners. If Angola wants to succeed in creating a stable democracy, its 

people have to benefit from its rich wealth. And that is in the interest of the Government of Angola, and I will work with that government to help them better appreciate that reality. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. And how do you plan to work 

with the various domestic and international human rights advocates on key issues facing Angolan nationals, including police brutality, forced evictions, and threats to freedom of association and 

freedom of the press? 

Mr. MOZENA. Mr. Chairman, in our annual Human Rights Report, we have spoken to the human rights situation in Angola. It 

remains poor. There have been areas of progress. There have been 

increased prosecutions of police. A human rights ombudsman has 

just been activated. The number of police violations is down. 

They’ve announced a new campaign of zero tolerance toward domestic violence, which I intend to engage on personally, should I 

be confirmed. These are improvements. 

Nonetheless, the situation there is serious, in terms of human 

rights abuses. We have very active programs right now—I’m very 

proud of these programs—working with human rights organizations to improve their ability to monitor and report on the human 

rights situations, especially in the Lundas, the diamond-producing 

area where there have been serious human rights problems, and in 

Cabinda, as well. I think those are concrete measures that will 

813 

shed more light on what is going on, and I certainly intend, if confirmed, to deepen those efforts. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In particular, will you be encouraging the authorities to clarify, publicly, the legitimacy of independent NGOs in 

Angola? 

Mr. MOZENA. Yes. You may recall that, earlier this year, there 

was an incident involving an international NGO, Global Witness. 

I think incidents such as that are unfortunate, and they show the 

need for the Government of Angola to understand better the key 

role that NGOs play—domestic NGOs, international NGOs—the 

key role that they play in a democracy, and I intend to work toward that end. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir, for your answers. 

Dr. Steiger, as I know you’re aware, some questions relating to 

your service at HHS have come to the attention of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And the committee staff are looking into 

these issues. But I wanted to give you a chance today to address 

them now, on the record. 

On July 29, 2007, the Washington Post reported on a draft Call 

to Action on global health issues that then-Surgeon General Dr. 

Carmona commissioned on 2006, but was never released. The article alleges that you had some role in preventing its publication because the report did not promote the Bush administration’s policies. What was your role in this matter? And, if you were involved, 

what concerns did you have with regard to the draft that Dr. 

Carmona had produced? 

Dr. STEIGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the 

opportunity that you’ve given me to speak to this issue here in this 

forum. 

As you know, I have supplied members of the staff with six binders full of materials for them to review concerning this and other 

questions that they have about my time at HHS. 

I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that no one was more surprised or 

disappointed with the Surgeon General’s recent statements than I 

was. I believed we had quite a good relationship, and I took him 

at his word when he said, in his farewell e-mail to the members— 

fellow members of the Commission Corps at the Public Health 

Service, that he had operated in his term without any political interference. 

On the question, more specifically, of the draft Call to Action, a 

couple of things, Mr. Chairman. First, it is important to realize 

what a Call to Action is, and what it isn’t. It’s not a full peer-reviewed Surgeon General’s report. The reports that the Surgeons 

General put out are, as I suggest, reviewed very rigorously by scientific peers in a process much akin to the publication of scientific 

and technical articles, and they are meta-analyses of scientific and 

technical data on an important scientific or medical or public 

health question that breaks new ground and draws new conclusions. Calls to Action are policy documents informed by the best 

possible science, but, nevertheless, not subject to peer review. They 

are, however, as all publications are in the Department, subject to 

an interagency clearance process, and the draft that the Surgeon 

General prepared of his Call to Action—an idea, by the way, which 

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eral’s term—went into an interagency clearance process that suggested that it, as a document, had serious flaws, factual errors, a 

weak—weaknesses in technical depth and breadth, and that is was 

not ready for publication. And that was the consensus of 10 of our 

operating and staff divisions, including the National Institutes of 

Health and the Food and Drug Administration. 

In fact, Mr. Chairman, by June of 2006, the Surgeon General 

himself recognized that that draft was not ready for prime time. 

And I have in front of me an e-mail from the Surgeon General, 

dated June 12 of last year, which suggests that it needed more 

work. He said, ‘‘Normally, these Calls to Action are expected to 

have revisions and may take a few drafts. In this case, more input 

may be needed.’’ He says, further, that his staff is ‘‘passionate 

about moving this forward when it is ready,’’ the last four words, 

in capital letters. 

So, Mr. Chairman, the normal processes of review of these kinds 

of documents brought to light significant technical and factual 

flaws in the Surgeon General’s draft, and that is what prevented 

publication of that document at the time last year. My understanding, though, is that there are elements within our Department, particularly the National Institutes of Health and others— 

and I stand ready to do what I did with the Surgeon General, and 

provide my staff to help out in this process, should the new Surgeon General wish it—that, if confirmed, the new Surgeon General 

would have an opportunity to revisit this document, and perhaps 

publish it at a later date. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Steiger. 

Also in 2004, I understand the Department of HHS limited the 

number of scientists who traveled to the International AIDS Conference in Bangkok. Press reports say the number was 50, as compared to 236 at the 2002 conference, although documents you submitted to the committee show the number may be higher than 50. 

Nonetheless, the result of the limitation, at least according to the 

information you sent to the committee, was that accepted presentations by HHS scientists were withdrawn, including presentations 

on testing options for measuring HIV incidents and advancing HIV 

prevention and care in the Asian context. I don’t really want to get 

into all the exact numbers, as I am sure there was a reason these 

limitations were imposed, including saving the taxpayers money, 

something that I and the people of Wisconsin are very supportive 

of. Nonetheless, Dr. Steiger, could you explain what led you to 

make this decision, and particularly given that the travel restrictions included U.S. scientists who had, presumably, relevant presentations to make? 

Dr. STEIGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I appreciate your 

question and your commentary. 

I think, if you or your staff were listening, this morning, to National Public Radio, you heard another—yet another story about 

travel abuses in the Federal Government, and calls for further 

scrutiny of international travel expenditures. And I’m proud to say 

that we, at HHS, have never been involved in one of those stories, 

since 2001. This particular one, I believe, involved the Department 

of Agriculture. 

815 

So, our policy, Mr. Chairman, on international travel and on examining very closely the number of delegates or scientists or other 

staff who go to any international meeting, is based on balancing 

the interests of presenting our work in public health and science 

with the best possible value for money for the taxpayer. 

In the case of the conference in Bangkok, and similar ones that 

have been put on by the International AIDS Society, I do wish to 

stress that they are not the only places that our scientists go to 

present their work, and, in fact, are not even the most important 

ones, and that much of the work that our technical experts consider to be their most cutting-edge and their most important, they 

choose to reserve for other meetings that are really the heart of the 

scientific interchange on HIV/AIDS, and they have chosen, as Laurie Garrett suggests in a column that she wrote after the—during 

the Bangkok Conference in 2004, to present that work at other 

places, because they found that the value of those particular meetings, sponsored by the International AIDS Society, has been eroding over time. 

So, we made a decision, in consultation, Mr. Chairman, with our 

interagency partners, including the State Department and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, to limit our participation to a 

number, around 50, in order for us to strike that balance, and that 

our scientists and others would have other opportunities to present 

their work, as they did. And we now believe that the annual Implementers Meeting, organized by the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator and sponsored by a number of international organizations, 

is, in fact, the premier place to present exactly the kind of work 

that you suggested. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your candor, Dr. Steiger. 

And now I’d like to just spend a minute or two on more substantive issues relating to your nomination to be United States 

Ambassador to Mozambique. 

President Armando Guebuza promised to fight corruption, but 

Transparency International has given Mozambique progressively 

worse ratings. And a USAID-funded study clearly indicated that 

the average Mozambican feels the impact of corruption most when 

dealing with public service providers. How would you maintain the 

beneficial relationship we have with Mozambique, while, frankly, 

pressuring them to tackle corruption more aggressively? 

Dr. STEIGER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Corruption does remain a major concern in Mozambique. As in— 

as you have pointed out, international observers are—and 

Mozambiquans themselves—are increasingly worried about it. So, 

if confirmed, this would be one of our major areas of interchange 

with the government at the embassy in Maputo, without a doubt. 

We, as you know, spend an extraordinary amount of money—of 

United States taxpayer money through our foreign assistance programs in Mozambique. If we—depending on how well the Millennium Challenge Corporation implementation goes this next year, 

we could be spending as much as $300 million a year on foreign 

assistance. And, as I say, we’re the top donor there, and Mozambique has jumped into the top 10 recipients of aid from the United 

States around the world. 

816 

We do fund government institutions, and we also fund a large 

number of nongovernmental institutions. And in all cases, we must 

be ever vigilant about the possibility of corruption. But what I 

think is most important is making sure that—not just at the central government level, but down at the village level, where people 

are receiving health and education and other social services from 

the government and other partners—that corruption is not affecting the implementation of our major programs there at that level. 

And one of the challenges we face in Mozambique, as you know, 

on this and every issue, is the inability of the United States Government, given the great geographic size of the country and understandable budgetary constraints, to be everywhere in that country, 

watching what’s going on. So, in connection with fighting corruption and other things, I would, if confirmed, encourage and find 

creative ways for our embassy personnel to be out in the field 

more, so that we had better eyes and ears about what—and a better read about what’s going on, on the ground. 

Senator FEINGOLD. When G–8 countries and the IMF canceled 

Mozambique’s debt in 2005, the president of Mozambique promised 

the savings would be used for education, for getting water to the 

population, and for improving health services. Instead, his government has been pursuing capital-intensive showpiece mega-projects. 

How would you use your leverage as U.S. Ambassador to encourage 

more government attention and resources for social infrastructure 

and programs? 

Dr. STEIGER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

You’re absolutely right, this is not a new story, as you know, in 

Africa, but it’s one that is recently—has recently come to light in 

Mozambique, as you say, because of the debt relief. 

If confirmed, I would make a great priority on pushing the government toward being transparent and open in its own investments, and increasing its investments in the social sector; in health 

and education, in particular. Mozambique has not, like many of its 

neighbors, met the 2001 Abuja target that governments agreed to 

in 2001 to increase the spending of their own domestic budgets— 

the share of their own domestic budgets spent on healthcare to 15 

percent. They’re not close yet. That would be part of our goal. 

In addition, we would have to work at the embassy with all of 

the other major donors because, even though we’re the largest, 

every major foreign assistance provider in the world has a presence 

in Mozambique, and some of them are quite significant—the Europeans, the Japanese, the Chinese, as you referred to earlier. And 

all of us, as a donor community, not just the United States, need 

to work together, to send those messages about the importance of 

transparency, getting rid of corruption, and increasing the domestic 

social investments from the government itself. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Dr. Steiger. 

Thank you all. I wish you all well as this nomination and confirmation process goes forward. And, should you be confirmed, I, of 

course, wish all the best to you and your families in your new 

posts. 

The hearing is concluded. 

[Whereupon, at 9:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

817 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DR. WILLIAM R. STEIGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. What, in your view, are the most pressing human rights issues in Mozambique? What are the steps you expect to take—if confirmed—to promote human 

rights and democracy in Mozambique? What do you hope to accomplish through 

these actions? 

Answer. The strong Mozambican law enforcement response to a major surge in 

crime in 2007 has led to accusations of abuse on the part of police and other security 

forces, including allegations of torture and unlawful killings. Separately, prison conditions in Mozambique are harsh. An understaffed and inadequately trained judiciary system has resulted in cases of arbitrary arrests and detention, and in lengthy 

pre-trial detentions. There continue to be occasional reports of the harassment of 

journalists in Mozambique, many of whom practice some form of self censorship. In 

addition, societal problems such as domestic violence, discrimination against women, 

the abuse and exploitation of children, trafficking in women and children, and discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS remain widespread problems. 

If confirmed, I would increase our dialog with Mozambican Government Ministries 

and the Parliament, to reiterate the U.S. Government’s commitment to human 

rights and remind the Guebuza administration that United States lawmakers pay 

attention to the issue when considering how much aid a country receives. I would 

undertake outreach activities to the dedicated Mozambican civil society groups that 

focus on human rights issues, such as the Mozambican Human Rights League, by 

speaking publicly on the issue, as well as by hosting and attending roundtable discussions and working groups. I would also continue to support other organizations 

in Mozambique that are working on human rights, democracy, and civic participation through the embassy’s small Democracy and Human Rights Fund grants. 

Question. If confirmed, what are the potential obstacles to addressing the specific 

human rights issues you have identified in your previous responses? What challenges will you face in Mozambique in advancing human rights and democracy, in 

general? 

Answer. Many of the above-named human rights concerns share a common 

cause—lack of resources. Most of the problems with the Mozambican police and security forces, the prison system, and the judiciary stem from a general shortage of 

trained/qualified personnel (police officers, prison guards, judges, and judicial workers), and an overall lack of funding directed at these problems. 

Another big challenge to overcome is precedent. Before independence, colonial authorities used ruthless tactics to control and subdue the population; in some cases, 

Mozambican police inherited these tactics, and have not completely evolved their 

procedures to incorporate respect for human rights into their everyday practices. 

Providing sporadic training to officers, prison workers, and judges on human rights 

is not enough—there needs to be constant, reinforcing engagement. 

If confirmed, one of my first goals as ambassador in the area of human rights 

would be to press for the Mozambican Parliament to pass pending legislation to 

criminalize human trafficking, which has been a goal of the embassy and the office 

to monitor and combat trafficking in persons at the United States Department of 

State for some time. The State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report 

this year has placed Mozambique on the Tier Two Watch List, which reflects concerns that the Government in Maputo is not paying sufficient attention to the welldocumented trafficking problem. 

Changing long-held Mozambican social practices and traditions in the areas of 

child labor, trafficking in persons, domestic violence, and discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, however, is another challenge. Because half of Mozambique’s 

adult population is illiterate, and the majority of Mozambicans live in rural areas, 

without regular access to information and news sources, achieving behavioral 

changes in these areas is extremely difficult. 

Question. If confirmed in your new position, what steps will you take to ensure 

that promotion of human rights objectives will be an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s activities? If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that Foreign 

Service officers who engage in human rights activities are encouraged and professionally rewarded for superior service? 

Answer. If confirmed, I would begin an initiative right away to make the subject 

of human rights part of every discussion I have with Mozambican Government officials, so they know the United States Government is taking the issue of fundaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00825 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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mental human freedoms in their country seriously. Ambassadors should not be discussing human rights in earnest only once a year, following the release of the U.S. 

Department of State’s annual Human Rights and Trafficking in Persons Reports, 

but rather should make the matter a focal point of our ongoing, everyday bilateral 

agenda with countries around the world. I would also work more closely with the 

public affairs section of the Embassy in Maputo to ensure that, when we host a 

luncheon or roundtable on human rights, or when we provide grants to nongovernmental organizations that focus on human rights, the Mozambican public knows 

about these efforts. 

If confirmed, I would make sure that embassy officers engaged in human rights 

reporting receive the full support of the Mission, and are duly rewarded for superior 

performance through the embassy awards program and their yearly evaluations. 

Question. What are the most significant actions you have taken in your career to 

promote human rights and democracy? Why were they important? What was the impact of your actions? 

Answer. Throughout my time at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, I have played a role in promoting human life, dignity, and fundamental freedoms in international fora, and in our bilateral relationships. I was the lead HHS 

representative on the U.S. Government negotiating teams for the United Nations 

General Assembly Special Sessions on HIV/AIDS (in 2001, and its follow-up in 2006) 

and on Children (in 2002), which produced groundbreaking documents that promoted human rights. Over the course of 2005 and 2006, I managed the participation 

of HHS staff, under the leadership of the U.S. Department of State, in the negotiations that produced the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which 

should encourage developing countries to raise their standards of legal protection for 

the disabled to the levels we have afforded them here in the United States. 

I have also supported Secretaries Thompson and Leavitt as they carried out an 

aggressive agenda to combat human trafficking, a violation of human rights that is 

tantamount to modern-day slavery. I have been an active participant in the Senior 

Policy Operating Group that manages the inter-agency implementation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and its reauthorization, and have planned 

and executed anti-trafficking events for both Secretaries on their overseas trips, including in Ukraine, Cambodia, and Mozambique. 

Question. Mozambique is, of course, one of 15 focus countries under the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). How can PEPFAR be most 

effectively integrated in the country team environment? The PEPFAR budget in the 

country has rapidly climbed from estimated $34 million in fiscal year 2004 to $162 

million in fiscal year 2007 and is expected to climb substantially higher in 2008. 

What are the challenges in managing such a significant scale-up? Please evaluate 

the success of PEPFAR’s efforts in Mozambique to date. What are the particular 

challenges in combating HIV/AIDS and other health problems in the country? 

Answer. The President’s emergency plan in Mozambique has been very successful 

to date, and is a testament to the commitment of the in-country emergency plan 

team, the host government’s efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, and the presence of strong, 

nongovernmental and faith-based implementing partners. As of August 2007, more 

than 75,000 persons were receiving anti-retroviral therapy (ART) in Mozambique 

through the President’s Emergency Plan; the country will likely achieve its emergency plan phase I treatment target of 123,000 persons on ART by September 2009, 

and will come close to meeting its own national treatment targets. The Government 

of Mozambique has now made ART freely available in all 128 districts in the country, a remarkable achievement that stems, in large part, from strong emergency 

plan support, as the United States provides direct financing to 103 of the 198 sites 

that currently offer ART. Mozambique is also on track to achieve HIV-related care 

targets in nearly all emergency plan program areas. 

In addition, upstream (indirect) emergency plan support to the Mozambican Ministry of Health and Women and Social Action, the National AIDS Council and other 

agencies in the government helps ensure a comprehensive, national response. This 

indirect emergency plan support includes substantial funding for training, physical 

infrastructure, the procurement of medicine and supplies, and the strengthening of 

distribution systems. 

There are several challenges to the rapid scale-up of the emergency plan in Mozambique, however. Three pressing issues I should highlight are the following: (1) 

ensuring the adequate staffing of U.S. Government departments and agencies and 

implementing partners to support the expansion of the emergency plan; (2) ensuring 

close communication between U.S. Government staff, with the host government, and 

819 

with other donors; and (3) the paucity of physical infrastructure and human resources in Mozambique. 

As the principal for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on the 

Policy and Strategy Group for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, I 

have been intimately involved in conceptualizing and defining ‘‘Staffing for Results,’’ 

a priority initiative under the emergency plan for 2007. ‘‘Staffing for Results’’ seeks 

to ensure that, as U.S. Government country teams on the ground in an emergency 

plan define their priority areas of intervention, they optimally align the staffing and 

skills across all U.S. Government departments and agencies that are supporting 

HIV/AIDS in the country in a way that ensures the most effective implementation 

of these priorities. This ‘‘One U.S. Government’’ approach is particularly important 

for ensuring the clear and effective management of partners as the emergency plan 

scales up with expanded budgets. The United States Embassy in Maputo is currently putting into practice two components of ‘‘Staffing for Results’’: restructuring 

its cross-agency emergency plan team to create a more effective, efficient, crossagency implementation of the program; and, better integrating this structure into 

the embassy overall, and aligning it with other U.S. Government priorities, including the President’s Malaria Initiative and the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

Compact with Mozambique. 

The Mozambique interagency emergency plan team includes active participation 

from all agencies at post: the U.S. Departments of Defense; HHS; State; Peace 

Corps; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The team won 

the Emergency Plan Spirit Award during the first 2 years of implementation of the 

program, and has continued strong, interagency collaboration, despite staffing turnover in recent years. New coordination structures recently implemented in Maputo 

include: (1) the establishment of a full-time emergency plan coordinator position; (2) 

weekly meetings between the front office and the principals of each U.S. Government emergency plan implementing department or agency at post; and (3) regular 

interagency emergency plan task force meetings, in addition to strong technical 

working groups. These different fora and groups assist the team to reflect upon, discuss, and make recommendations on the overall vision, strategy, and major programmatic directions for the emergency plan in Mozambique. In addition, the interagency emergency plan team in Maputo organizes both regular meetings and ad hoc 

retreats with partner agencies in-country; the next team retreat is scheduled for 

January 2008. 

Mozambique is a country with very limited physical infrastructure and human resources. It has one of the lowest ratios of health care workers (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, laboratory technicians) to population in the world. In addition, the World 

Health Organization estimates that less than 50 percent of the population in Mozambique has access to health facilities. Mozambique has a high burden of many 

infectious diseases (malaria and tuberculosis) in addition to HIV/AIDS. All of these 

realities make the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in Mozambique more difficult, but the emergency plan strategy and country 

operational plans managed by the United States Government team in Maputo contain elements to address infrastructure deficits. 

A key activity in this regard is the training of health care workers (especially 

community health workers, care extenders, technicians, and the equivalent of physician assistants) in an effort to get around the shortage of doctors and nurses 

through ‘‘task-shifting,’’ or appropriately training and supervising lay people to perform many aspects of basic medical care. 

The emergency plan has also helped to finance the education of students at the 

Catholic University of Beira, the first medical school to open in Mozambique since 

independence. Innovative ‘‘twinning’’ relationships funded by the emergency plan 

with institutions in Brazil and the United States have contributed to the training 

of local health workers and laboratory technicians, as well. Emergency plan funds 

have also helped in the renovation and refurbishment of medical facilities across 

Mozambique, including hospitals, clinics, and laboratories. 

Question. What are the most positive and the most challenging aspects of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mozambique? What would be 

your chief goals as Ambassador to Mozambique? 

Answer. Mozambique and the United States have had a close and positive relationship since the United States helped broker the peace accords in the early 1990s, 

and we have only strengthened that relationship further in the intervening years, 

as reflected by the recent visit to Mozambique of First Lady Laura Bush and United 

States Secretary of Health and Human Services, Mike Leavitt. Additionally, in July 

of this year in Washington, we signed a $507 million MCC compact with Mozambique, an event attended by Mozambique’s President Armando Guebuza. The MCC 

820 

compact underscores the United States Government’s commitment to alleviating 

poverty in Mozambique through promoting just governance, investing in people, and 

economic growth. The United States is the largest bilateral donor to Mozambique, 

and Mozambique has now become one of the largest recipients of United States foreign assistance on the African continent. 

However, the investment climate for United States and other foreign investors in 

Mozambique is less than ideal, and as I have noted above, there are many human 

rights concerns. If confirmed, I would work to ensure Mozambique continues on the 

path towards becoming a vibrant, multiparty democracy that aggressively addresses 

the health challenges of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, that has an energetic and 

free press, and that has an ever-improving environment for doing business. 

RESPONSES OF DR. WILLIAM R. STEIGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps-State Department Relations? 

Answer. I have read 04 STATE 258893, as well as 07 STATE 78240, dated June 

6, 2007, which both concern relations between Peace Corps and the U.S. Department of State. 

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable? 

Answer. Yes, I understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in 04 

STATE 258893 and 07 STATE 78240. 

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must 

remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’s role and its need for separation from the 

day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. government agencies’’? 

Answer. I fully understand that Peace Corps activities must remain substantially 

separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy. I also understand the mission of Peace Corps is not comparable to other government agencies. However, where Peace Corps itself has agreed to establish linkages with other 

U.S. Government-funded programs, such as the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, I 

will endeavor, if confirmed, to support those ties. The Peace Corps implements 

Emergency Plan programs in 9 of the 15 Emergency Plan focus countries, including 

Mozambique. Peace Corps posts in these countries are using Emergency Plan resources to enhance their HIV/AIDS programming and in-country training; field additional Crisis Corps and Peace Corps volunteers specifically in support of Emergency 

Plan goals; and provide targeted support for community-initiated projects. As I saw 

during a visit to the CAPRISA site in rural KwaZulu Natal Province in the Republic 

of South Africa on a trip led by Secretary of Health and Human Services Mike 

Leavitt this summer, Peace Corps volunteers who work with the Emergency Plan 

provide long-term capacity development support to nongovernmental, communitybased, and faith-based organizations, with particular emphasis on ensuring that 

community-initiated projects and programs provide comprehensive support to people 

who are living with and affected by HIV/AIDS. Peace Corps volunteers also aim to 

develop the necessary management and programmatic expertise at organizations 

that are recipients and beneficiaries of Emergency Plan financing to ensure longlasting support, particularly in rural communities. 

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise 

your Chief of Mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much 

autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does 

not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies’’? 

Answer. If confirmed, I pledge to exercise my Chief of Mission authorities to provide Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations 

as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies. 

RESPONSES OF HON. GAIL D. MATHIEU TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

Question. Have you read the cable ref: 04 STATE 258893—Peace Corps-State Department Relations? 

821 

Answer. I have read 04 STATE 258893, as well as STATE 78240 dated June 6, 

2007—Peace Corps-State Department Relations. 

Question. Do you understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in this 

cable? 

Answer. Yes, I understand and agree to abide by the principles set forth in 04 

STATE 258893 and 07 STATE 78240—Peace Corps-State Department Relations. 

Question. Specifically, do you understand and accept that ‘‘the Peace Corps must 

remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy’’ and that ‘‘the Peace Corps’s role and its need for separation from the 

day-to-day activities of the mission are not comparable to those of other U.S. Government agencies’’? 

Answer. Yes, I fully understand that Peace Corps activities must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of our foreign policy. I also 

understand that the mission of Peace Corps is not comparable to those of other government agencies. In coordination with other government agencies, the Peace Corps 

plays a key role in planning and implementing activities under the President’s 

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) as well as participating in activities to 

improve Namibia’s basic education system. 

Question. Do you pledge, as Secretary Rice requests in 3.B of the cable, to exercise 

your Chief of Mission ‘‘authorities so as to provide the Peace Corps with as much 

autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations as possible, so long as this does 

not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies’’? 

Answer. I pledge to exercise my Chief of Mission authorities, if confirmed, to provide Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility in its day-to-day operations 

as possible, so long as this does not conflict with U.S. objectives and policies. 

(823) 

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Obsitnik, Vincent, to be Ambassador to the Slovak Republic 

Speckhard, Daniel V., to be Ambassador to Greece 

Stephenson, Thomas F., to be Ambassador to the Portuguese Republic 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Casey, Feingold, Menendez, and DeMint. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. This Committee on Foreign Relations will come 

to order. 

The committee today will consider the nominations for three key 

U.S. Ambassadorships in Europe. President Bush has nominated 

the Honorable Daniel Speckhard to be Ambassador to Greece, Mr. 

Thomas Stephenson to be the Ambassador to Portugal, and Mr. 

Vincent Obsitnik to be the Ambassador to Slovakia. 

I want to congratulate all of you on your nominations, and express the gratitude of the Senate at your willingness to engage in 

public service on behalf of the Nation. 

The relationship that we have—the Trans-Atlantic relationship, 

while somewhat neglected, in my judgment, in recent years—remains paramount to our national security interests. 

Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia are all NATO allies, and NATO 

continues to bind the United States together with its partners in 

Europe, and still constitutes the most important alliance for the 

United States. NATO today plays a crucial role in supporting our 

objectives in Afghanistan for a representative government that can 

exert sovereign control, and ensure that al-Qaeda never again uses 

its territory as a launching pad for terrorist activities and acts. 

NATO, along with the European Union, continues to facilitate 

the consolidation of democratic reforms, and economic prosperity in 

Eastern Europe, one of the last areas of the world where regard for 

America remains very strong. We stand together with our European allies against any effort by Russia to intimidate its neighbors 

or otherwise engage in hostile acts. 

824 

So, there’s a broad agenda for the United States and Europe to 

undertake together in a spirit of cooperation and partnership. 

And, of course, Greece, Portugal, and Slovakia will play crucial 

roles in the evolution of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in coming 

years. So, it is especially important that the United States be represented by our finest public servants in Athens, Lisbon, and 

Bratislava. 

Greece, of course, remains central to hopes for political and economic stability in the Balkans, especially as the talks on Kosovo’s 

final status come to a conclusion at the end of this year. While the 

Greek Government will not always agree with aspects—or every aspect of American foreign policy, our two nations share cherished 

democratic values and retain a common heritage of liberty and 

freedom. Three million Americans call Greece their ancestral home. 

The Honorable Daniel Speckhard, the nominee to be the Ambassador to Greece, has cultivated a distinguished civil service career 

in the United States Government that dates back to 1982; from 

1997 to 2000, he ably represented the United States as Ambassador to Belarus, even as relations between the two nations deteriorated over antidemocratic behavior of the Lukashenko regime. 

From 2000 to 2005, he served in a vital leadership position within the NATO Alliance, as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 

Political Affairs, and the Director of Policy Planning. 

For 2 years—for the past 2 years, I should say—Ambassador 

Speckhard has served in an especially important position in Baghdad, first as Director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management office, 

and more recently, as Deputy Chief of Mission at our embassy. He 

is an accomplished public servant, and I’m grateful he’s been nominated for this vital position in Athens. 

Next, Portugal has long been a steadfast ally to the United 

States. Portugal’s contributions to NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have been significant, especially in light of the modest size of its military. The American air 

base in the Azores Islands remains essential to our military deployments around the world. 

As a current holder of the rotating presidency of the European 

Union, Portugal has maintained its 500-year-old tradition of leadership as the center of the trans-Atlantic relations. 

The nominee who’s with us today for the post of Ambassador to 

Portugal, Mr. Thomas Stephenson, is an accomplished venture capitalist, and investment banker. For the past 19 years, he’s been a 

prominent member of the business community in Silicone Valley as 

a venture capitalist there. He has served on, I should say, dozens 

of private and public corporate boards, including the Hoover Institution, and the Woodrow Wilson Center. 

Although this position would represent his first opportunity for 

government service, Mr. Stephenson has shown an admirable commitment to public service through his community and volunteer activities. 

Finally, Slovakia is a recent addition to NATO, having only entered the alliance in 2004. Today, Slovakia is governed by a ruling 

coalition that is quite outspoken in its criticism of United States 

foreign policy. The United States and Slovakia must continue to coVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00832 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
825 

operate on a range of issues, ranging from energy security in Central and Eastern Europe, to the final status of Kosovo. 

My home State of Pennsylvania happens to be one of those 

States that can boast the largest population of Slovak-Americans in 

the United States, and I might add, so is our nominee. 

Mr. Vincent Obsitnik can speak the language, possesses a special 

understanding of the Slovak culture, he’s an equally qualified to 

make an immediate and positive impact on popular perceptions in 

Slovakia of the United States and the actions we undertake, and 

he’s a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, and a veteran 

submariner. His post-naval career saw him become a senior executive in the information and telecommunications systems industry. 

And with Americans dying in combat in foreign lands today, and 

our international prestige, in my judgment, at an all-time low—this 

country demands capable representatives to advocate for our interests overseas. And I speak to each of you when I say this, as well: 

If you are confirmed for your respective positions, I trust you’ll 

dedicate yourselves fully to your positions, even as this administration enters its final months in power. 

I look forward to hearing your views, and how you intend to 

serve as ambassadors of our great Nation. 

At this time, I will turn to my colleague, Senator Feingold, for 

his introduction, and then I’ll go back to Senator DeMint when he’s 

here, and also Senator Menendez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Senator Casey, for 

chairing this hearing and thanks to all of the witnesses for your 

willingness to serve the U.S. Government overseas. These are challenging positions, and I have great admiration for those who are 

willing to spend years abroad, serving as the eyes and ears—and 

sometimes mouth—of the U.S. Government. 

Senator Casey, I’m especially pleased to be here today to introduce Ambassador Dan Speckhard, the nominee for the position of 

Ambassador to Greece. As I’m sure you will know from his resume, 

Ambassador Speckhard and I share a number of commonalities— 

we are both Wisconsinites, we share the same great alma mater, 

and we believe we can serve U.S. citizens by working in the Federal Government. 

Ambassador Speckhard—it’s good to see you again. 

Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity to meet with the Ambassador when I traveled to Iraq in 2006, when he was taking on a 

very challenging responsibility involving the reconstruction of Iraq. 

As always, I was pleased to encounter a Wisconsinite so far from 

home. But I was even more pleased to know the Ambassador was 

following a long and proud tradition of Wisconsinites committing 

their lives to public service, and I could tell from his presentation 

how, not only dedicated and capable he was, and is. 

Senator Casey, I don’t know whether you’ve ever visited Wisconsin, but if you have, your time was more than likely in Madison 

or Milwaukee. Well, the Ambassador, here, grew up in Wausau, a 

north-central town that is a little bit less known than those other 

two cities. Wausau is not only one of the most scenic towns in our 

826 

State; it is also vibrant, and eclectic members of the Wausau community strongly believe in the importance of community service, 

and understand the impact world affairs plays in their day-to-day 

life. I am proud that the Wausau community has generated such 

a committed and dedicated public servant. 

Given his long history with the Department of State serving in 

a range of offices and embassies, I am confident that Ambassador 

Speckhard will dutifully and effectively represent our interests in 

Greece. 

Thank you, Ambassador, for your ongoing commitment to public 

service. I would also like to thank your family—and I see your wife, 

Ann—for the sacrifices they have made to support you and your career. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for chairing this hearing, 

and thank you to all the nominees here today. I wish you all the 

best of luck. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Feingold, and I appreciate 

that introduction. I haven’t been to Wisconsin yet, but I apparently 

have to get there now. [Laughter.] 

Thank you. 

Senator Menendez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate all of our nominees coming before the committee, I appreciate their willingness to 

serve, and I’m looking forward to the question and answer session. 

I have several questions, particularly to Ambassador Speckhard, 

who I had the privilege of meeting the other day. 

United States-Greece relationships are something I’ve followed 

for the last 15 years in the Congress, I think it’s an important post, 

particularly what’s happening in the Balkans, our relationships 

with Turkey, a whole series of issues there, so I look forward to 

some of his answers. 

As well as Ambassador Stephenson—we have a very large Portuguese-American community in New Jersey who have done exemplary things, and Portugal has played a very constructive role in 

Europe for us, and with us, so they’re both very important assignments, as well as, of course, Mr. Obsitnik, who is going to be the 

Ambassador to the Slovak Republic. 

But those are two interest points, and I’ll have an opportunity 

to ask questions at that time. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator. 

We’ll turn to our nominees now, and I’d ask you to deliver your 

statements in the order you were introduced, so I guess we’re going 

right to left, if I’m correct. And I’d encourage you to keep your remarks as brief as you can, and succinct, so we can move to questions. If you’re summarizing your statement, of course, the full text 

of your statement will be included in the hearing record. 

But, I have to say, because of where you sit today, I know this 

is a very proud moment for each of you, and I would hope that, if 

you’re able to do it, when you’re making your statements today 

that you would introduce your family in whatever way is suitable 

for you. Because it’s an important day for you and your families we 

827 

want to make sure that we give you that opportunity, or a reminder—I’ve been in places where I should have introduced my 

family and didn’t, so—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY. If you want to take that as part of your statement, we’d certainly encourage that. 

Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL V. SPECKHARD, 

NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO GREECE 

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

Senators. It’s an honor to appear before you as the President’s 

nominee for the United States Ambassador to the Hellenic Republic. 

I would like to thank Senator Feingold for his generous introduction, and taking the time to be here today. I’m proud to be a fellow 

Wisconsinite and appreciate the personal devotion and attention 

that he’s given to representing our State, and I’m proud to be a colleague in that respect. 

I would like to introduce—and thank you for the reminder—my 

wife, Ann, who is sitting here behind me, and she’s with me here 

today. And, unfortunately, my children—Leah, Jessica, and Daniel, 

who weren’t able to be here—because they have made a lot of personal sacrifices to support me in my public service career, most notably over the last 2 years when I was in Iraq, and was not able 

to live with them. Ann carried much of the burden of the family 

during that period, and has done so, actually, during much of my 

public service career. 

So, any small contribution that I’ve been able to make to public 

service, and to my country, really starts with the support they’ve 

given me. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m humbled that the President and Secretary 

Rice have placed their confidence in me for this important post. If 

confirmed, I will put all of my energy towards strengthening our 

relations with Greece, and working together to promote regional 

stability and tackle global problems. 

I believe my career has helped me prepare for this important assignment. For 25 years as a public servant, and nearly a decade 

of that overseas as Ambassador of Belarus, Deputy Chief of Mission to Iraq, and a Senior Official at NATO, I have honed my diplomatic and leadership skills. And, I’ve worked closely during those 

periods with Greek diplomats and have spent time working on trying to promote stability in the Balkans, and consolidating democracy across Europe. And I think that experience will put me in a 

good starting point to begin work, if confirmed, in Athens. 

Our partnership with Greece stems from our close ties that our 

nations share as allies and members of the Euro-Atlantic community, and from the millions of Americans who can trace their ancestry to the Hellenic Republic. Both Greeks and Americans share a 

common heritage, based on a belief in values such as liberty, freedom, and equality. We have stood together with the Hellenic Republic time and time again to defend those values across the globe. 

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828 

tegration of all of the countries into the region, and Euro-Atlantic 

institutions. 

The unresolved nature of the future status of Kosovo remains a 

barrier to development of the region, and in the coming months it 

will be critical to see a resolution as envisaged by the special U.N. 

Envoy Antisaari. 

As an anchor in the region, Greece has an important interest in 

seeing this resolved. Greece is one of the largest investors in Balkan economies, and its leadership will be crucial to seeing history 

there unfold on a positive course. 

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Government of Greece 

to increase our cooperation to bring stability to this critically-important region. 

Greece also has an important interest and role to play in bringing diversified sources of energy to the European market. The 

United States wholeheartedly supports these efforts to diversify 

and to introduce true market competition to this vital economic sector. 

Development of the Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline is a significant 

step in that direction, and as well as a sign of the improved relations between Greece and Turkey. Both countries recognize the 

vital interests they share. Greece’s support for closer bilateral relations with Turkey, as well as its support for Turkey’s integration 

into the European Union, is further recognition of their common interests. 

By bridging the divides that are left between those two countries, 

the conditions can be created to solve other longstanding problems. 

In the case of Cyprus, I hope a just and lasting resolution and settlement acceptable to majorities in both communities, can be 

achieved through the efforts of Cypriots, and the support of the 

international community. 

Greece’s location at the crossroads of Asia, the Middle East, the 

Balkans and Europe, along with its preeminent global shipping industry, make it a crucial ally in combating terrorism, and trafficking in persons. It is also well-situated to be an important partner in the international communities’ effort to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to fight trafficking in 

drugs and illicit arms. 

But cooperation should not be limited to regional or global matters. My family and I were deeply saddened, along with our fellow 

Americans, while watching the wildfires ravage Greece. I’m pleased 

that the United States provided $1.9 million to assist the Government of Greece, and improving firefighting capabilities, meet humanitarian needs, and for rehabilitation and reforestation efforts. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Greek 

Government, other United States agencies, Congress and the 

Greek-American community in strengthening our cooperation in 

what is a common threat and challenge for both our countries. 

I would like to close, Mr. Chairman, by mentioning the important 

role that Greek-Americans play, both in our own country’s history, 

and in ensuring that our relationship with the Hellenic Republic is 

strong. In my career as a diplomat, I’ve come to realize that nothing is more important, or effective, in presenting the best face of 

829 

America than the personal ties and connections that private Americans establish every day on their own. 

Mr. Chairman, it’s been an honor to appear before you today, and 

if confirmed, I want to assure you that I look forward to working 

with you, members of the committee and the Congress in representing my fellow Americans as the Ambassador to Hellenic Republic. 

Thank you, and I welcome any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Speckhard follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL V. SPECKHARD, 

NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO GREECE

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, it is an honor to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee for the United States Ambassador to the Hellenic 

Republic. I am humbled that President Bush and Secretary Rice have placed their 

confidence in me for this important post. I look forward to earning the confidence 

of this committee and the Senate as you fulfill your important responsibilities as 

part of our democratic system. If confirmed, I will put all of my energy and experience toward strengthening our relations with Greece and working together to promote regional stability and tackle some of the global problems that we face together. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know Greece is a strategic partner of the United States. 

Our partnership stems from the close ties our nations share as members of the 

Euro-Atlantic community, as NATO allies, and from the millions of Americans 

whose ancestry can be traced back to the Hellenic Republic. Both Greek and American people share a common heritage, based on a belief in values such as liberty, 

freedom, and equality. The concept of democracy originated in Ancient Greece and 

the ideals the Ancient Greeks embodied profoundly influenced the founders of our 

great Nation. Since then, we have stood together with the Hellenic Republic time 

and time again to defend democracy across the globe: in both world wars, on the 

Korean Peninsula and in the Balkans. Today the Greek people are allied with us 

in combating terrorism, including in Afghanistan where they have contributed 

troops and resources. 

While humbled by the prospect of representing our country, I believe my career 

has helped prepare me for this important assignment. I have spent 25 years as a 

public servant—nearly a decade of that overseas. As Ambassador to Belarus, the 

Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq, and a senior official at NATO, I have honed my 

diplomatic and leadership skills in both bilateral and multilateral affairs. At NATO, 

I worked closely with senior Greek diplomats to promote stability in the Balkans 

and strengthen and consolidate democracy across Europe as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and NATO enlargement. This experience provides a good 

basis to begin my work in Athens should the Senate confirm me in this position. 

Our country’s relationship with Greece clearly is important for our interest in stability in Southern and South Central Europe. The Balkans, in particular, require 

continued attention in the coming years to ensure peace, economic transformation, 

and integration of all countries in the region into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The unresolved nature of the future status of Kosovo remains a barrier to the development 

of the region, and in the coming months it will be critical to see a resolution as envisaged by the U.N. Special Envoy, Maarti Ahtisaari. As an anchor in the region, 

Greece has an important interest in seeing this resolved. Greece is one of the largest 

investors in Balkan economies, and its leadership will be crucial to seeing history 

there unfold on a positive course. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Government of Greece to increase our cooperation to bring stability to this critically important region. 

Greece also has an important interest and role to play in bringing diversified 

sources of energy to the European market. The United States wholeheartedly supports these efforts to diversify, and to introduce true market competition to this 

vital economic sector. 

The inauguration of the Turkey-Greece-Italy Pipeline (TGI) between Greece and 

Turkey will allow Caspian gas to be directly transported to the European market 

via a new, diversified route. It is a positive step in the development of relations between Greece and Turkey, reflecting the constructive relations they have developed 

in recent years. By recognizing the vital interests they share in the 21st century 

and displaying strong political will, the Government of Greece has supported closer 

bilateral relations with Turkey as well as championing Turkey’s integration with 

830 

the European Union. If confirmed, I will strongly support Greece as it continues to 

increase its engagement with Turkey. 

By bridging the divides that are left between these two countries, we can create 

the conditions in the region to resolve other, longstanding problems. In the case of 

Cyprus, I hope a just and lasting settlement, acceptable to majorities in both communities, can be achieved through the efforts of Cypriots and the support of the 

international community. 

I also look forward to working with Greek officials on issues of global importance 

which threaten the safety and well being of all. Greece’s location at the crossroads 

of Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans, and Europe, along with its preeminent global 

shipping industry, make it a crucial ally in combating both terrorism and trafficking 

in persons. Greece is also well situated to be an important partner in the international community’s efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to fight trafficking in drugs and illicit arms. These are some of the greatest challenges of our world today, requiring diligence and significant effort from all 

countries. 

In the same vein, the stability and health of the environment and the challenge 

of climate change will become increasingly important in the next few years. Greece’s 

natural beauty is well known the world over, and to ensure it remains a treasure 

for Greeks and all those who visit, we need to work together to find new and creative ways to sustain the soundness of global and local environments alike. 

Cooperation on issues should not be limited to regional or global matters though. 

The recent, devastating wildfires that ravaged Greece remind us that natural disasters can strike anywhere and at any time. As a good partner and friend, I am happy 

to say that the United States has provided over $1.9 million in assistance, including 

cash donations to the Hellenic Red Cross, nonperishable commodities, and funding 

for a team of experts to provide technical assistance and build the foundation for 

robust cooperation in the future. I have met with the members of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and United States Forest Service who traveled to Greece 

to offer technical assistance to their Greek counterparts. The team’s message to me 

was clear: Greek firefighters are some of the best in the world, and they performed 

admirably under rigorous conditions. Our common experience in dealing with forest 

fires and the similarity between the landscapes in Greece and the western United 

States means that there is a great benefit to continued cooperation and mutual support. My hope is that the constructive dialog between Greek and American firefighting and burned-area experts, initiated as a result of this tragedy, continues to 

deepen as Greece begins to focus on vital reconstruction, reforestation, and rehabilitation. 

In that vein, I would like to mention the important role that Greek-Americans 

play, both in our own country’s history and in ensuring that our relationship with 

the Hellenic Republic is so strong. In my career as a diplomat I have come to realize 

that no matter what we, in our capacity as public servants, do to represent this 

great country, nothing is more effective at presenting the best face of America than 

the personal ties and connections Americans establish every day on their own. I 

would note the beneficial role Greek-Americans have played by contributing to all 

sectors of our own society, and the continuing role they play in strengthening relations between the United States and Greece. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been an honor to appear before you today, and it would be 

a privilege to represent my fellow Americans as the United States Ambassador to 

the Hellenic Republic. 

Thank you again and I welcome any questions. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Stephenson. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. STEPHENSON, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC 

Mr. STEPHENSON. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 

thank you. I would like to introduce my wife, Barbara, and my son, 

Alexander, who will be going with me to Portugal, who are very excited about the prospect, and doing it as a family. 

I am honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to be the next Ambassador to Portugal. I want to express my 

deep appreciation to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the 

trust and confidence they have placed in me to perform this imporVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00838 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
831 

tant job. If confirmed, I will work hard to promote and defend 

American interests in Portugal. 

In some ways, I have been preparing to be an ambassador for 

many years. I am an avid student of foreign policy, and have had 

the great advantage of being actively involved at the Hoover Institution for some time. Frequent exposure to, interaction with, and 

in some cases, close friendships with many Hoover Fellows, have 

provided me with a wonderful opportunity to learn from some of 

the brightest minds in their fields. 

I feel particularly fortunate to be close to former Secretary 

Shultz, and current Secretary Condoleezza Rice, and have had the 

great opportunity to learn about and see through their eyes, so 

many of the important issues of the day. In addition, several outstanding economists and former administration officials now at 

Hoover have had a huge impact on my understanding of both domestic and international economic issues. I’m currently working 

with Secretary Shultz to mobilize an energy task force at Hoover 

that will explore all aspects of what we hope will be a comprehensive and coherent set of recommendations for policy makers. 

Portugal and its fellow European Union members are wrestling 

with many of the same complex energy and climate issues that we 

face in this country, and I hope to be better able to contribute in 

various ways to that important dialog, as a result of my engagement with the Hoover Energy Taskforce. I’m also hopeful that my 

almost 40 years in the venture capital business, working mostly 

with technology companies, will enable me to make a meaningful 

contribution as an ambassador for United States business and commercial interests in Portugal. 

Portugal and the United States share a long tradition of close political and cultural ties. Uniquely placed on the far western edge 

of Continental Europe, Portugal has demonstrated in word and action, its solid commitment to the trans-Atlantic relationship. Portugal has personnel serving in Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Balkans, 

Timor-Leste, and Iraq. In addition, thousands of United States aircraft annually transit Portugal’s largest airbase in the Azores, in 

support of our armed forces around the world. 

Portugal has been an outstanding partner in the war on terror, 

and collaborates actively with us, as a member of the Proliferation 

Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 

Last month, Portugal ratified the United States-European Union 

Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance agreements. These agreements will markedly improve our counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation. 

I come before you during an opportune time in our bilateral relationship. Portugal’s 6-month European Union presidency, Lisbon 

has traditionally exhibited its strongest influence over the European Union agenda when it serves in this capacity. If confirmed, 

I will use the time remaining in Portugal’s presidency—and afterwards—to continue the outstanding work of Ambassador Hoffman 

and his embassy—his U.S. Embassy team, to promote our interests 

in Lisbon, both bilaterally, and in the European Union context. 

We congratulate Portugal on the excellent work it is doing as European Union president—it is no easy task. In holding the EuroVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00839 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
832 

pean Union presidency, Portugal is working hard to help resolve 

the situation in Kosovo, and bring long-term stability to this volatile region. It also widely recognizes that some of the European 

Union’s biggest foreign policy concerns are along its southern and 

southeastern borders, which are threatened by radical Islam and 

poverty. The Portuguese are reaching out to develop a strategic 

partnership with Africa, and strengthen European Union ties with 

Brazil, India, China, Russia, and Ukraine, through high-profile 

summits. 

With the European Union, Lisbon’s primary goal is to secure endorsement of a final text of the European Union treaty by December. 

Both before, and during, its presidency, Portugal has kept open 

the lines of communication. Prime Minister Socrates’ meeting with 

President Bush in September maintained this excellent record of 

close collaboration. 

As United States Ambassador to Portugal, I will continue to 

deepen and broaden our dialog. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. If confirmed, I look forward 

to working with you and your colleagues in Congress to serve the 

American people, and advance our national interests overseas. I 

look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stephenson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. STEPHENSON, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to Portugal. I want to express my deep appreciation to President Bush and Secretary Rice 

for the trust and confidence they have placed in me to perform this important job. 

If confirmed, I will work hard to promote and defend American interests in Portugal. 

In some ways, I have been preparing to be an ambassador for many years. I am 

an avid student of foreign policy and have had the great advantage of being actively 

involved at the Hoover Institution for some time. Frequent exposure to, interaction 

with, and, in some cases, close friendships with many Hoover fellows have provided 

me with a wonderful opportunity to learn from some of the brightest minds in their 

fields. I feel particularly fortunate to be close to former Secretary George Shultz and 

current Secretary Condoleezza Rice, and have had the great opportunity to learn 

about and see through their eyes so many of the important issues of the day. Outstanding economists and former administration officials have had a huge impact on 

my understanding of both domestic and international economic issues. 

I am currently working with Secretary Shultz to mobilize an Energy Task Force 

at Hoover that will explore all aspects of what we hope will be a comprehensive and 

coherent set of recommendations for policymakers. Portugal and its fellow European 

Union members are wrestling with many of the same complex energy and climate 

change issues that we face in this country, and I hope to be better able to contribute 

in various ways to that important dialog as a result of my engagement with the 

Hoover Energy Task Force. I am also hopeful that my almost 40 years in the venture capital business, working mostly with technology companies, will enable me to 

make a meaningful contribution as an ambassador for United States business and 

commercial interests in Portugal. 

Portugal and the United States share a long tradition of close political and cultural ties. Uniquely placed on the far western edge of continental Europe, Portugal 

has demonstrated in word and action its solid commitment to the transatlantic relationship. Portugal has personnel serving in Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Balkans, 

Timor-Leste, and Iraq. In addition, thousands of United States aircraft annually 

transit Portugal’s Lajes Air Base in the Azores in support of our Armed Forces 

833 

around the world. Portugal has been an outstanding partner in the war on terror 

and collaborates actively with us as a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 

Terrorism. Last month, Portugal ratified the United States-European Union Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements. These agreements will markedly 

improve our counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation. 

I come before you during an opportune time in our bilateral relationship: Portugal’s 6-month European Union Presidency. Lisbon has traditionally exhibited its 

strongest influence over the European Union agenda when it serves in this capacity. 

If confirmed, I will use the time remaining in Portugal’s Presidency—and afterwards—to continue the outstanding work of Ambassador Hoffman and his United 

States Embassy team to promote our interests in Lisbon, both bilaterally and in the 

European Union context. 

1We congratulate Portugal on the excellent work it is doing as European 

Union President. It is no easy task. In holding the European Union Presidency, Portugal is working hard to help resolve the situation in Kosovo and 

bring long-term stability to this volatile region. It also wisely recognizes 

that some of the European Union’s biggest foreign policy concerns are along 

its southern and southeastern borders, which are threatened by radical 

Islam and poverty. The Portuguese are reaching out to develop a strategic 

partnership with Africa, and strengthen European Union ties with Brazil, 

India, China, Russia, and Ukraine through high-profile summits. Within 

the European Union, Lisbon’s primary goal is to secure endorsement of a 

final text of a new European Union ‘‘treaty’’ by December. 

Both before and during its Presidency, Portugal has kept open the lines of communication with us. Prime Minister Socrates’ meeting with President Bush in September maintained this excellent record of close collaboration. As United States Ambassador to Portugal, I will continue to deepen and broaden our dialog. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your 

colleagues in Congress to serve the American people and advance our national interests overseas. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

STATEMENT OF VINCENT OBSITNIK, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 

Mr. OBSITNIK. Thank you, Senator Casey, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the honor to appear before 

you, as President Bush’s nominee to represent the United States in 

Slovakia. 

I would also like to express my appreciation to the President and 

Secretary Rice for the confidence they have showed in me, by putting my nomination forward. 

With me today is my wife, Anna Marie, whom I would also like 

to thank for her support and encouragement throughout our over46 years of marriage and the raising of our four sons, who are not 

here because they are out making a living. Without doubt, but with 

some humility, I would like to say that I have been privileged to 

live the American dream, and I’d like to take a minute just to address that. 

Although I was born in Slovakia, my roots go back to Western 

Pennsylvania. My grandparents immigrated there in the late 

1890s, where my father was born in 1901. A year later, his parents 

returned to Slovakia, where he grew up and married. My parents 

then decided that America was the country in which they wanted 

to live and raise their family, and in March 1938, 2 months after 

I was born, we immigrated to the United States. I give great credit 

to my parents for the wisdom of this decision, so that I could appear before you today, especially back at that time in 1938, of approaching crisis and war in Europe. 

834 

We settled in Nanty-Glo, Pennsylvania, where my father worked 

as a coal miner. In 1946, we moved to Lilton, New Jersey, where 

I graduated from high school, after which I received an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy which was, for me, a life changing 

experience. 

After graduating from the Academy, I had the honor of serving 

in the U.S. Navy for 5 years as an officer, and my time in the Navy 

taught me about service, and the true meaning of duty, honor, and 

country. 

After serving the Navy, I went out to have successful corporate 

careers with the IBM, Unisys, and Lilton/PRC Corporations, after 

which I established my own consulting firm. At these corporations, 

I was involved with providing electronic systems for our armed 

forces during the cold war, and also had international responsibilities in manufacturing and marketing. 

As you can see, I truly have lived the American dream from an 

early age and throughout my career. I believe that my personal 

background and professional experience have prepared me well for 

the duties of United States Ambassador to Slovakia, should I be 

confirmed by the Senate. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States-Slovak relationship is a strong 

one that has weathered challenges over the years, but continues to 

move forward on a range of key issues of importance to the United 

States. It is a relationship that is also enriched by generations of 

Slovak-Americans, and the enduring ties they maintain with their 

land of origin. 

United States-Slovak relations are defined, to a large extent, by 

our common membership in NATO, and by the fact that Slovakia 

is part of the European Union. One of our key challenges, however, 

is to underscore to the government and the people of Slovakia, that 

as allies with shared values and thriving democracies, our national 

interests do coincide. 

The United States-Slovak relationship does have its challenges. 

A new leftist coalition government in Slovakia has taken slightly 

different directions than the previous government. Our foreign policy, in particular, the Iraq war, has caused disagreement, and Slovaks are increasingly looking to travel and study in the European 

Union, rather than the United States. 

Despite our differences, however, I believe that the United States 

and Slovakia can and must work together on our disagreements, 

thus maintaining our strong relationship. 

If confirmed, my No. 1 priority will be to foster and sustain such 

a relationship, by reaching out personally to the Slovak Government and people, to explain the United States’ perspective, to promote United States policy interests, to remind the young people of 

our common history and the support that we provided to the Slovak people during Communism, and to ensure that—above all— 

American goodwill is understood. 

In addition, I will continue to support our embassy’s efforts to expand academic, scientific, and cultural exchanges, all of which will 

serve to bring our people closer together. 

Slovakia has been a proud European Union and NATO member 

since 2004, with all that this implies with privilege and obligation. 

It has approximately 525 troops deployed overseas in NATO, EuroVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00842 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
835 

pean Union, and U.N. missions. Slovakia has joined us and sacrificed with us in the war on terror. Its troops have been deployed 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Kosovo. 

If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to continue strong 

Slovak and United States cooperation in the fight against terror, 

and to encourage the Slovak Government to further deepen its 

commitment to NATO by increasing its participation in NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan. 

And, I’d just like to add that we’ve just received a cable this 

morning from our Embassy in Bratislava, and apparently the Slovak Government, under Prime Minister Fico, has agreed, and decided to increase their participation substantially in Afghanistan, 

which still must be approved by their parliament, so that is a step 

in the right direction. 

One of the difficult issues that affect United States and Slovak 

relations is admission to the visa waiver program. Slovakia is 

working constructively to meet the list of requirements that will 

enable us to join the visa waiver program. 

Should I be confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to assist 

the efforts of the Slovak Government to meet these standards as 

soon as possible. In my public outreach, I will reinforce the administration’s commitment to facilitating travel between our two countries while, however, maintaining the security of international 

travel. Such a development, I’m convinced, will enhance understanding between our peoples, and serve our bilateral relations. 

On the economic front, Slovakia’s economy is the fastest-growing 

in Europe, with a growth rate of 9.4 percent in the second quarter 

of 2007. Economic reforms and a corresponding influx of foreign investment have led to impressive growth. A dramatic decrease in 

unemployment, and a healthy macroeconomy that has put Slovakia 

on target to adopt the Euro on January 1, 2009. 

Despite these positive developments, corruption continues to be 

a problem, and just recently, the embassy cohosted an 

anticorruption conference that was opened by the Prime Minister 

of Slovakia, Mr. Robert Fico. If confirmed, I will continue to work 

diligently with our Slovak partners on anticorruption initiatives 

and efforts, to benefit not only the people of Slovakia, but also 

American businesses. 

There are, today, approximately 120 United States companies 

with investments, and/or sales offices in Slovakia, and it is estimated that United States investments total more than $3 billion. 

There are various efforts underway to deepen our economic cooperation, and just last month, Commerce Assistant Secretary Hernandez led a trade mission on renewable energy and alternative 

fuels to Slovakia, and other countries in Central Europe. 

If confirmed, I will work to increase opportunities for U.S. companies, and further expand our trading and investment relationship, resulting in benefits to both our peoples. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to pursuing these and 

other goals, to leading an embassy that represents the finest values 

of the United States, and do everything that I can to increase the 

friendship, warmth, and strength of our ties with Slovakia. 

I thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Obsitnik follows:] 

836 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VINCENT OBSITNIK, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the honor to appear before you as President Bush’s nominee to represent the United States in Slovakia. 

I would also like to express my appreciation to the President and Secretary Rice 

for the confidence they have shown in me by putting my nomination forward. With 

me today is my wife, Annemarie, whom I would also like to thank for her support 

and encouragement throughout our over 46 years of marriage and the raising of our 

four sons. 

Without doubt but with humility, I would like to say that I have been privileged 

to live the American dream. Although I was born in Slovakia, my roots go back to 

western Pennsylvania. My grandparents immigrated there in the late 1890s, where 

my father was born in 1901. A year later, his parents returned to Slovakia, where 

he grew up and married. My parents then decided that America was the country 

in which they wanted to live and raise their family and, in March 1938, 2 months 

after I was born, we immigrated to the United States. I give great credit to my parents for the wisdom of this decision, especially at a time of approaching crisis and 

war in Europe. 

We settled in Nanty-Glo, PA, where my father worked as a coal miner. In 1946, 

we moved to Linden, NJ, where I graduated from high school. I then received an 

appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy which was, for me, a life-changing experience. After graduating from the Academy, I had the honor of serving in the U.S. 

Navy for 5 years as an officer. My time in the Navy taught me about service and 

the true meaning of duty, honor, and country. 

After serving in the Navy, I went on to have successful corporate careers with the 

IBM, Unisys, and Litton/PRC Corporations, after which I established my own consulting firm. At these corporations, I was involved with providing electronic systems 

for our Armed Forces during the cold war and also had international responsibilities 

in manufacturing and marketing. 

As you can see, I truly have lived the American dream from an early age and 

throughout my career. I believe that my personal background and professional experience have prepared me well for the duties of United States Ambassador to Slovakia, should I be confirmed by the Senate. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States-Slovak relationship is a strong one that has 

weathered challenges over the years but continues to move forward on a range of 

key issues of importance to the United States. It is a relationship that is also enriched by generations of Slovak-Americans and the enduring ties they maintain with 

their land of origin. 

United States-Slovak relations are defined to a large extent by our common membership in NATO and by the fact that Slovakia is part of the European Union. One 

of our key challenges is to underscore to the Government and people of Slovakia 

that, as allies with shared values and thriving democracies, our national interests 

coincide. The United States-Slovak relationship does have its challenges: a new leftist coalition government in Slovakia has taken slightly different directions than the 

previous government; our foreign policy, in particular the Iraq war, has caused disagreement; and Slovaks are increasingly looking to travel and study in the European Union, rather than the United States. Despite our differences, I believe that 

the United States and Slovakia can and must work together on our disagreements, 

thus maintaining our strong relationship. 

If confirmed, my No. 1 priority will be to foster and sustain such a relationship 

by reaching out personally to the Slovak Government and people to explain the 

United States’ perspective, to promote the United States’ policy interests, remind 

young people of our common history and the support that we provided to the Slovak 

people during Communism, and to ensure that American goodwill is understood. In 

addition, I will continue to support our embassy’s efforts to expand academic, scientific, and cultural exchanges, all of which will serve to bring our peoples closer 

together. 

Slovakia has been a proud European Union and NATO member since 2004, with 

all that this implies in privilege and obligation. It has approximately 525 troops deployed overseas in NATO, European Union, and U.N. missions. Slovakia has joined 

us and sacrificed with us in the war on terror. Its troops have been deployed in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and in Kosovo. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to continue 

strong Slovak and United States cooperation in the fight against terror and to encourage the Slovak Government to further deepen its commitment to NATO by increasing its participation in NATO missions, particularly in Afghanistan. 

One of the difficult issues that affect United States-Slovak relations is admission 

to the Visa Waiver Program. Slovakia is working constructively to meet the list of 

837 

requirements that will enable it to join the Visa Waiver Program. Should I be confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to assist the efforts of the Slovak Government to met VWP standards as soon as possible. In my public outreach, I will reinforce the administration’s commitment to facilitating travel between our two countries, while maintaining the security of international travel. Such a development 

will enhance understanding between our peoples and serve our bilateral relations. 

Mr. Chairman, Slovakia has a unique set of experiences in democratization and 

economic reform that its vibrant and talented NGO community is now sharing with 

countries in transition, from Ukraine to Belarus to Cuba and the Balkans. Consistent with our transformational diplomacy goals, we will continue to support the 

NGO community in Slovakia by offering diplomatic support, grants, and other resources to the extent United States Government funds are available. 

On the economic front, Slovakia’s economy is the fastest growing in Europe with 

a growth rate of 9.4 percent in the second quarter of 2007. Economic reforms and 

a corresponding influx of foreign investment have led to impressive growth, a dramatic decrease in unemployment, and a healthy macroeconomy that has put Slovakia on target to adopt the euro on January 1, 2009. Despite these positive developments, corruption continues to be a problem. Just recently the Embassy cohosted 

an anticorruption conference that was opened by the Prime Minister of Slovakia, 

Mr. Robert Fico. If confirmed, I will continue to work diligently with our Slovak 

partners on anticorruption initiatives and efforts, to benefit not only the people of 

Slovakia but also American businesses. 

Slovakia’s strong economy presents many opportunities for United States businesses. There are approximately 120 United States companies with investments 

and/or sales offices in Slovakia and it is estimated that United States investment 

totals more than $3 billion. There are various efforts underway to deepen our economic cooperation. Just last month, Commerce Assistant Secretary Hernandez led 

a trade mission on Renewable Energy and Alternative Fuels to Slovakia and other 

countries in Central Europe. If confirmed, I will work to increase opportunities for 

U.S. companies, and further expand our trading and investment relationship, resulting in benefits to both our peoples. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to pursuing these and other goals, to 

leading an embassy that represents the finest values of the United States, and to 

doing everything I can to increase the friendship, warmth, and strength of our ties 

with Slovakia. I thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, sir, very much. I appreciate all of the 

statements that were made. 

I’ll turn now to my colleague, Senator DeMint, who is the ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

all three of you for your willingness to serve our country in this 

way, and I know it involves sacrifices of your family, and we very 

much appreciate it. And I, frankly, heard what I wanted to hear 

today. I appreciate the mention of American interest—I think 

there’s sometimes a perception that, because the United States is 

the largest and most powerful country that—whether it’s our State 

Department or trade office, we tend to give more than we get 

back.I21And, to know that—while building good relationships, and 

supporting other countries, that your job is to represent American 

interests in these countries, is very important. 

I also appreciate the emphasis on economic ties—that we know 

that many times government gets in the way of good relations, but 

businesses—doing business together and people doing business together, often is the best way to grow that relationship and it’s 

probably a true statement that when products cross borders, armies don’t have to. So, I appreciate the emphasis on economic ties, 

and hopefully you can—as ambassadors—be a part of facilitating a 

838 

growing trade. It’s a way to create a win-win situation for both 

countries. 

I think if I have a question of the three of you, and I’ve only had 

a chance to meet with Mr. Speckhard about this—around the 

world, we found out in person as we visit other countries and we 

hear the perception of the United States is not as positive as we 

would like, on many fronts, particularly in Europe. 

And I would just maybe ask each of you to briefly, just comment 

on things we need to do in each of your respective countries that 

might help develop the respect of other countries and cooperation 

and maybe in addition to what we’re already doing. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today and 

moving the process forward on these important nominations. 

Nominees, good afternoon to all of you, I appreciate you being 

here today and for your willingness to serve our Nation as ambassadors. I know the role of an ambassador is daunting; I am humbled by your desire to serve, and your families’ support to go 

through this process. 

Without a doubt, there are many challenges and opportunities in 

Europe and each of the countries you have been nominated to lay 

at the crossroads on many of these issues. You will be in very crucial positions to help foster the trans-Atlantic relationship. Your 

willingness to listen and be passionate advocates is crucial. 

Despite the diplomatic issues and political posturing that occurs 

in the international arena, economic relations are always an undercurrent that makes progress possible. 

Often European leaders express how the United States and Europe share a common set of values. I agree with them; we have a 

long history of common values that include the ideals of freedom 

and economic opportunity. 

European societies and their economies currently face many hurdles that we may face in the future. There are lessons we can learn 

from them, but also ideas we can share. The ideas of free markets 

and free societies can unleash creative solutions. 

I believe the three countries we are discussing today have incredible potential to grow and be even more productive. However, it requires a willingness to draft policies that unleash their people and 

trust what they are capable of. 

Mr. Obsitnik, the structural reforms and economic success of Slovakia is something to be applauded. However, it will be important 

that they know economic freedom cannot be separated from other 

freedoms. And that the road to success is not through the welfare 

state. 

Maintaining a similar path of reform in Portugal is just as important. And with their leadership of the European Union right 

now, Mr. Stephjenson, you will be in a unique position to advocate 

for issues including Sudan and Western Sahara. 

Mr. Speckard, as you know, recent developments in the region 

will put even more importance on the United States-Greek relationship. You will have important matters to address the second 

839 

you arrive. I found our discussion a couple weeks ago very enlightening and believe you will do well. 

As ambassadors, it is important you share and advocate the values that serve as the foundation to our prosperity. With your influence, Europe can be an even larger driving force in the world economically and socially and that would benefit everyone. 

I also hope you will spend more of your time outside of the embassy and government offices in Brarislava, Lisbon, and Athens 

than inside. American culture is loved in Europe, but the same is 

not always true of American policy. However, the two cannot be 

conveniently separated. 

And successful diplomacy is no longer an activity just between 

heads of state, but between the people of each nation. If you are 

committed to fostering even stronger relations and be successful 

American advocates, you will need to deliver your messages to the 

Slovak, Portuguese, and Greek public directly. 

I look forward to working with each of you. 

And, I’ll start with Mr. Speckhard, and just a brief comment 

would be helpful. 

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thank you, Senator. I think we did have a 

chance to talk before, and wanted to emphasize, again, that I think 

one of the most important things I can do, if confirmed as ambassador, is to try to start changing some of those perceptions, which 

have been a legacy of some of the more modern history between our 

country and Greece and, I think don’t actually fairly reflect some 

of the fundamental values that we share. 

So, I guess, to be real brief, I would focus on trying to move the 

understanding between our countries beyond just the foreign policy 

issue of the day, or the particular problem or challenge that we 

face, that we have different perspectives on how to address, and try 

to get our attention back to the fundamental relationship, and 

what is in common between our countries, which are some of those 

common values, and the strength of the U.S. system in, sort of, 

dealing with issues in a democratic fashion, which we share a lot 

with them. 

And I would focus, in particular, on the young generation—there 

and here—in terms of building that dialog, because I do believe 

that in Greece, that’s where, oftentimes, change starts. And I think 

that’s where you have the most opportunity to start—generating 

new thinking. 

Thank you. 

Senator DEMINT. Excellent, excellent. 

Mr. Stephenson. 

Mr. STEPHENSON. Senator, our current Ambassador, Ambassador 

Hoffman, I know has focused very much on outreach for—— 

Senator DEMINT. Is your microphone on? 

Mr. STEPHENSON. Sorry. Thank you. Ambassador Hoffman, our 

current Ambassador, I know has placed a lot of emphasis on reaching out to a cross-section of communities within the Portuguese 

community, specifically students. He’s had a number of programs 

at the embassy where he’s gone out, given a lot of speeches to a 

lot of different groups, worked with some of the charitable institutions in Portugal, worked with a number of the, strictly the small 

business groups, and with a number of minorities, as well. 

840 

He’s particularly focused on an outreach to the Muslim community. There are 35,000 or 40,000 Muslims in Portugal, and he specifically has reached out to them. 

So, it’s an important part of his agenda, and I certainly hope to 

be able to build on the efforts that he’s made to create an openness 

and a perception, a different kind of perception on the part of the 

Portuguese people about what a wonderful country and what a 

wonderful people we are, and how we reach out and will try and 

help all those we can. 

Thank you. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you. 

Mr. Obsitnik. 

Mr. OBSITNIK. Yes, thank you, Senator. I think that in addition 

to all the efforts that are currently ongoing in the embassy to reach 

out to the Slovak people, of which there are a number of efforts in 

place. I think, if confirmed by the Senate, that my ability to go 

there, given my background, given my ability to speak the language, should give me some leverage to meet people very aggressively, very directly, which I plan to do. I plan to be, if confirmed, 

very visible in the country, to explain United States policy, to make 

them understand that our policy really is for the benefit of Slovakia, as well. It’s not, we’re not looking there to take anything out 

of there for our own interests. We’re there to serve the—to work 

with that country. 

So I think, with my unique background, I can add a lot to that 

and add to all the efforts that are currently going on in the embassy with the, such things as public diplomacy, ensuring that all 

people in the embassy get out and have contacts with the local people, to make sure that they understand America at every level. 

Senator DEMINT. I thank you all. 

And Mr. Chairman, I’m very satisfied with my answers, so I’ll 

yield the rest of my time. 

Senator CASEY. Senator, thank you very much. 

I wanted to move into a round of more questions. And I, we’ll try 

to limit ourselves to 10 minutes on each round. I’ll start and turn 

it over to Senator Menendez and Senator DeMint for any questions 

they might have. 

Mr. Speckhard, I think I’ll start with you. Just in terms of the— 

some of this is redundant ground that you’ve plowed a little bit 

today already—but the relationship between the United States and 

Greece today. We’ve seen some evidence, I guess,—which has been 

referred to before—as some anti-Americanism. What’s your sense of 

that, generally, the relationship itself, but also that particular concern that we have? 

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thank you, Senator. I do think that it reflects 

some of the recent history between our two countries. And it has 

its roots there, which are, from the Greek perspective, understandable, and sometimes there are also differences, honest differences 

of opinion over foreign policy approaches and problem solving. 

At the same time, I think that’s sort of a latent anti-Americanism, that needs to be addressed again. Because if you look at 

our interest, both the long-term ones and the values that I talked 

about earlier, in terms of common values on democracy, liberty, 

freedom, and so forth, and then you compare it with also our real 

841 

interest today, in terms of stability in the Balkans, the stability or 

insecurity of the international community, and against the threat 

of terrorism, global challenges, energy issues, and so forth, we really do share common challenges and common interests. 

So, my sense is that if we can start improving the dialog and 

having people take a step back and saying, ‘‘Why do they think 

that and how much of that is due to a particular approach to a particular problem, and how much of that is something more significant?’’ we’ll find that perhaps we can bridge some of that gap. 

So, I hope over the three years, that I can make, start to make 

a turn in that particular challenge with our Greek partners. 

Senator CASEY. And just in terms of your own experience, especially as a diplomat, but also your work with NATO, what in your 

experience do you think will help you deal with that—that kind of 

fundamental question, about how our two countries relate to each 

other? 

Mr. SPECKHARD. Well, I think being a diplomat, the starting 

point has to be to understand the arguments and views of the other 

partner that you’re dealing with. And so, having worked in NATO, 

I’ve had an opportunity to understand the views of the Greek Government many times. And more generally, I’ve come to understand 

that once I understand where they’re coming from, I’m a better— 

better presenter of the U.S. interests and the U.S. position on 

issues. And then I can find, oftentimes, more common ground than 

one would have thought at the beginning of the process. 

We do have very strong interests that are common in the Balkans. We have some differences on some specific issues, but the 

fundamental issues in the Balkans are the same. We have common 

interest in the broader region more generally, and in the Middle 

East, where Greece is really at the front lines of some problems 

that are emanating from that area. 

And so, again working together with them on that issue, I think, 

is one we’re going to find a lot of common ground, even if sometimes we disagree on the approaches. 

So, my experience, I think, will help me to develop that as I go 

along, when I get to Athens. 

Senator CASEY. I may have a chance to come back to you about 

energy dependence on Russia and also the question of Kosovo, but 

I’ll move on because I’m going to try to get, in this round, to each 

of our nominees. 

Mr. Stephenson, I guess one of the concerns that we all have, beyond just the fundamental concern we have about terrorism, is how 

we relate to, interact with, work with, and establish working relationships with countries around the world to combat the worldwide 

threat of terrorism. 

What’s your sense of where that relationship is with Portugal 

now, in terms of our cooperation on terrorism? And if it’s not where 

it ought to be, what steps do you think we need to take and what 

steps would you take to try to strengthen or develop that relationship? Just on the question of terrorism. 

Mr. STEPHENSON. Senator, my sense is that the—the relationship 

with regard to those issues with Portugal is outstanding. They are, 

as I mentioned in my remarks, a signatory to most of the critical 

842 

agreements that we have around the world today, dealing with various elements of security and terrorism and so forth. 

Portugal is arguably one of our best friends and most loyal allies 

and supporters in Europe. They have been very responsive, overall, 

to everything that we have asked of them. They have budgetary 

constraints that are a constant hurdle or obstacle for them to do 

all the things we’d like them to do. But I think that there is very 

little that we have asked them to do, that they haven’t taken a lot 

of the initial steps. 

There will always be ways to improve that. Our relationship with 

the—with this government are excellent, hope to be able to build 

on the dialog that Ambassador Hoffman has helped create with 

this—with this government. I have every reason to believe that 

they will continue to be responsive, whether it’s drug enforcement 

issues, whether it’s port security, or whether it’s illegal transportation of human beings. 

The whole list of issues that are high on our agenda have been 

very—we’ve had excellent response from the Portuguese Government. 

Senator CASEY. I know that from the reports we all see from Europe, over many, many months now, many years actually, the last 

several years especially, that several countries have had trouble 

just within their own population, with regard to Islamic extremism. 

We’ve seen it in Spain and Great Britain and others. What’s your 

sense of that within Portugal? Do you think they’re having similar 

problems when it comes to Islamic extremism, or have they dealt 

with it in a way that’s been more effective, or do you think there’s 

still a significant problem there? 

Mr. STEPHENSON. Senator, I think they start from a better situation, certainly than their neighbors to the east. There is not as 

large an Islamic or a radical population in Portugal as there is in 

Spain. There has been, in recent months, some concerns that some 

of the Basque elements in Spain, have sought refuge and are using 

Portugal as a—as a base to stay away from some of the threats 

that they face in Spain. So, I think it something that we have to 

continue and they have to continue to be diligent on, but I think 

if you compare Portugal—not only with Spain, but some of its other 

neighbors in Europe—I think the situation is much less dire today 

than it is in many other countries. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. And I want to try to come back too. 

But Mr. Obsitnik, we’re—talking earlier, and your testimony referred to it and others have as well, the membership in the European Union for Slovakia and how that’s impacted their economy. 

Can you comment on that, with regard to just the economic impact 

and how you think that’s proceeding? 

Mr. OBSITNIK. I think the economic impact from joining the European Union has been tremendously positive. There’s no question 

about that. I—it’s opened up markets to them that were not there 

before. They’re a member of the European Union family of nations 

and they’re working cooperatively together. It’s done nothing but 

help—help that economy. 

Senator CASEY. And I know you had tremendous experience as 

a naval officer, and in addition to your own experience as a citizen 

and as a business person, what do you point to in your own emVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00850 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
843 

ployment history or your life history that you think will help you 

be an effective Ambassador to Slovakia? Beyond the obvious ties of 

your ancestry. 

Mr. OBSITNIK. Right. Well beyond the fact that I know the country well, I know the people, I know the history. In my career, I’ve 

had the good fortune of dealing with the international community 

in South America and the Far East and the responsibility I had 

with IBM International Manufacturing. We’ve been involved with 

countries that were developing and we negotiated with them, relative to what we wanted to do, in terms of putting manufacturing 

operations there, developing our business there. So, that experience, I think, has been tremendous and gives me a good sense of 

understanding what developing countries need and what directions 

they need to go in. 

Relative to my experience working with IBM during the cold war 

years, I think I picked up a good sense of the geopolitics of the 

world, in terms of the threat, in terms of responses by—by the 

America to that threat. And I think it will help me very well to explain our foreign policy and our point of view to the Slovak people. 

Senator CASEY. And I have to, before—I’ve got 10 seconds—but 

I’ll just say, I wasn’t aware of your roots in Western Pennsylvania. 

I think you mentioned in your opening, Nanty-Glo, Pennsylvania? 

Mr. OBSITNIK. Nanty-Glo, yes sir. 

Senator CASEY. Cambria County, right? 

Mr. OBSITNIK. Cambria County, yes sir. 

Senator CASEY. And I—how long did you live there? 

Mr. OBSITNIK. We lived there about 8 years, 1938–1946. And 

then the great garden state of New Jersey attracted us away. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CASEY. Well, as I turn to Senator Menendez for his questions, I have to ask you today—your confirmation will not be dependent upon this—but I’d ask you to come back to Nanty-Glo, 

Pennsylvania, if you can. 

Thank you. 

Mr. OBSITNIK. I will. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Obsitnik, I see you’re covering all of the bases, are 

there any other members that you’ve lived in the States here? 

[Laughter.] 

But, we’re glad to see you’ve had success. 

Ambassador Speckhard, I have several questions for you. First, 

the Balkans: would you agree with me that it’s still a place where 

we’ve made progress? It’s still a place of instability, a challenge for 

us? 

Mr. SPECKHARD. I would, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And, would you agree with me that NATO 

is particularly—from your experience at NATO—is particularly important to us, both in a security context, as well as stability in the 

Balkans, and throughout Europe? 

Mr. SPECKHARD. I would, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And, with that as a premise, you’re going to 

a country which I think is incredibly important in both of those 

contexts. There is—I think it’s fair to say, there is probably no 

844 

other country that invests more in the Balkans, than Greece. And, 

at the same time is part of NATO. 

And so, if the Balkans is a place of instability and a challenge 

to the United States as one of its foreign policy challenges, and if 

NATO is very important to us for both security purposes and stability in Europe, and particularly the Balkans, then part of my 

challenge of understanding administration policy and an assignment that you’re going to have, is puzzling. 

And that’s with the whole issue of Skopje, and the position the 

administration has taken, in November of 2004, to refer to FYROM 

as the Republic of Macedonia which, in essence, undermined the 

whole process of the Nimetz Proposal. And has placed a very serious issue forward for the United States and its relationships with 

Greece, and certainly with Greece’s own national view, as to what 

is in their national interests. 

How do you see yourself, as the nominee to be the United States 

Ambassador to Greece, playing a role in this regard, and what do 

you believe that role will be? 

Mr. SPECKHARD. Well, thank you, Senator. I agree with you on 

all of those points in terms of the importance of the Balkans and 

the stability there, the challenges that remain, the importance of 

NATO as an institution that can help—and, I would add, the European Union, as well, in terms of promoting stability there. 

I do understand the concerns of the Government of Greece, and 

the people of Greece, in terms of their desire to both be a stabilizing force in the region, as well as to protect some of their cultural patrimony, which they have such a rich background in. 

So, in terms of the starting point on this particular issue, I would 

take where we are today as the starting point, and the issues that 

we’re facing. I think the first point would be to help try to facilitate 

and promote direct dialog between the parties involved, and the 

name dispute. That is, in fact, part of the basis of the 1995 interim 

accord that was worked out between those two countries, in terms 

of the importance of direct dialog, and not looking to others to try 

to find the solution. 

At the same time I would emphasize the importance to the Greek 

Government of finding a solution, while not doing anything to destabilize the situation in the Balkans, and I think that’s why the 

administration has placed an important emphasis on the process of 

moving towards membership for the countries—in NATO—for the 

countries in the Balkan region. That there is a sense that membership in NATO in the future is a way to solidify that stability. That 

it’s actually in Greece’s interests, probably, as much as anyone’s, 

that their neighboring countries become part of NATO, because in 

that way—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. But you understand that you are going in as 

have been given a challenge right off the bat. Because we are trying to promote the NIMITS proposal, and then we undermine that 

by having our government unilaterally call Skopje and FYROM the 

Republic of Macedonia. 

This would be like if some people describe this as emotion, I 

think it’s far beyond emotion, I think there are legitimate issues 

here. This would be like the United States facing Mexico, describing in its classrooms large swaths of the United States belonging 

845 

to Mexico. Or, for that fact, Canada. That’s what happens in 

FYROM. Where large swaths of Greece are taught in Skopje as 

being part of what they consider Macedonia, their country. 

Now, if I was living next door to that country, I’d have a real 

concern. I’d have a real concern if what you’re teaching the next 

generation of FYROM schoolchildren is, in essence, an expansionist 

view, as you want me to vote—me, a country—to vote to let you 

into NATO, and to give you certain privileges and power, by virtue 

of doing so. 

So, I know you didn’t devise this policy, so my purpose here is 

by, via your nomination, to send a message to the State Department, that I think we’re on a perilous course here. 

President Karamanlis has not said that Greece will use its veto 

in NATO, but I’ve got to be honest with you, from my—as part of 

the Hellenic caucus in the House for 13 years, and the House International Relations Committee, I’ve spent a fair amount of time 

here in the Senate on United States-Greek relations. I have to be 

very honest with you—my sense of talking to members of their parliament, talking to their foreign ministers, talking to their ambassadors, talking to a wide cross-section of Greek society, it would be 

very hard for Greece to just simply accept FYROM into NATO 

without some accommodation on those names. 

And, I think that’s going to be an enormous challenge for you. 

I hope that you will tell the Department that there are Members 

of Congress who feel this way. 

Mr. Stephenson, I know that you, various times in your testimony, cited the Hoover Institution as background. One of—the 

Mission Statement of the Hoover Institution, among other things, 

says ‘‘Ours is a system where the Federal Government should undertake no governmental, societal, or economic action, except where 

local government or the people cannot undertake it by themselves.’’ 

And, I’m just wondering—it’s considered a very influential, conservative think tank on foreign policy—I understand the private 

sector aspects of this—but you do know that you’re going to a government—to a country whose government has a ruling socialist 

government. And you, I hope, are bringing an open mind. Because 

economic questions are one thing, but certainly the U.S. Ambassador has many other roles to play beyond the economic engagement between our respective countries. 

Mr. STEPHENSON. I’m well aware of that, Senator, and the overall views of the Hoover Institution may not necessarily be what 

mine are on certain issues. My particular focus and interests at the 

Hoover Institution have been in the areas of foreign policy, on economics on a worldwide basis, and particularly, in the energy area 

in recent years. 

But, I am fully aware of the current government in Portugal. I 

have no philosophical problems or worries about my ability to work 

with them on a reasonable basis, and what my views of what the 

role of government are on a spectrum that’s not the area of Hoover 

activity that I happen to be particularly interested or focused upon. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that answer. 

Mr. Speckhard, let me go back to—in addition to the FYROM 

issue, and the NATO enlargement issue, that Greece is going to 

play a very important role in—Greece is involved, obviously, in the 

846 

Aegean, the United States relationships in that part of the world, 

with Turkey—which right now is strained for a variety of reasons— 

but also the relationship between Greece and Turkey, the issue of 

Cyprus and the reunification of Cyprus are important issues. I’d 

like to hear your perspectives on that part—clearly there has been 

a historical basis under which our U.S. Ambassadors to those countries have all interplayed with each other because of the interrelationship of these issues. I’d like to hear how you’ll approach 

that, should you be successful in your nomination. 

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thank you, Mr. Senator. I’m actually looking 

forward to the opportunity to support Greece, as it tries to improve, 

to further its relations with Turkey, and as it also plays an important role in the issue related to Cyprus. 

I think the elections that recently took place, both in Greece and 

Turkey, do provide an opportunity for renewed momentum in the 

Greek/Turkish relationship. It allows them, in both countries, to set 

aside or diminish some of the effect of domestic politics, in terms 

of the bilateral relationship, and work toward the interests of both 

their communities. 

I am pleased that what I’ve seen over the last few years is improved mechanisms for dialog, and diffusing of potential crises 

when they occur. I think NATO, again, is a key point, as you mentioned earlier, in that framework for how you resolve things between Greece and Turkey, as allies they’ve committed themselves 

to resolve disputes peacefully. 

And, I guess, as an ambassador, I would be working closely with 

my counterparts in Ankara and Nicosia, to make sure that we’re 

talking and working together in a mutually reinforcing way to 

allow the parties involved to have the most progress possible. I 

really see this as centering in Ankara and Athens, in terms of their 

bilateral relationship, and in Nicosia in terms of Cyprus, and think 

that the success is going to come from there, and the United States 

really can only play a helping and facilitating role when asked. 

But, I’m going to be ready to do that, and I look forward to acting 

very energetically in that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I have one final question and 

then I’ll wrap up. 

Do you foresee the, Greece being able, for example, to support 

Turkey’s entrance into the European Union without a solution of 

the Cyprus question? 

Mr. SPECKHARD. I would hate to speculate on that at this point. 

What I can say, is that Greece has been one of the most, as you 

know Senator, proactive supporters of Turkey’s aspirations into the 

European Union, with recognition that Turkey needs to take additional steps to meet the criteria. I think that’s been very helpful 

to that bilateral relationship, it’s very helpful to the region, and it’s 

a very enlightened policy on their part. 

I think in part, how this all plays out, is that if they make 

progress on some of the bilateral issues, I think it will facilitate 

and help promote a resolution of the Cyprus issue. And vice versa, 

even in spite of some of the challenges that remain, they can, as 

well, work to support the Cypriots find a solution to their challenges. 

847 

So, my sense is that if we work on all fronts simultaneously, they 

will help each other and you’ll get to success sooner than if there’s 

some conditions involved in this process. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your answers. I think we should have a before and after picture, before 

your assignment there and after your assignment there. 

Between the FYROM issue, the NATO enlargement issue, the 

issue of the cross-border Aegean issue, and the issue of Cyprus, 

that’s a full plate and I find it very difficult for the Greek Government, at the end of the day, to deal with the FYROM issue, because it has, within its own country, a very significant part of 

Greek citizens who consider themselves Macedonians. 

And second, for Greek Cypriots to believe that the Greek Government will not stand by them in an effort to reunify the country. So 

this assignment is very, very important and that’s why I’ve pursued these questions with you, to get a sense of understanding administration policy, where you’ll be on it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

I have a few more and I’m sure we can wrap up soon. 

Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to ask you about the question I left 

on the table but didn’t have a chance to ask you, and that’s the energy question as it pertains to Russia, and especially in light of the 

pipeline deal. What’s your sense of how our administration in 

America views that—the relationship between Greece and Russia 

as it pertains to energy and the recent deal that’s been entered 

into? And how do you perceive that yourself? I guess I’m looking 

for both what the administration thinks and whether or not you 

have a difference of opinion on that or not. 

Mr. SPECKHARD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think the starting 

point is that the United States actually welcomes the close ties between Greece and Russia on the energy sector. I think there’s an 

understanding that, both for Greece and the European Union in 

general, the importance of Greek, of—excuse me—of Russian energy supplies is critical to the economic success of Greece and the 

European Union at large. 

So, we welcome the development of those ties, the development 

of the strengthening of the gas produced, and developed for those 

markets, and the ties between Russia that make that happen. 

Where sometimes we have a view that we try to make sure is 

understood, is that our sense is that the best way for Greece and 

the European Union to be successful in their economic future, is to 

ensure that they have diversified energy supplies. So, while it’s important for them to have Russian supplies, it’s important, as well, 

that those supplies are diversified beyond Russia, and that there 

are other producing states that also should be able to contribute to 

the needs and demands of the European Union and Greece. 

So, the key point for Greece as they move forward, is to ensure 

that economic deals they conclude on the energy sector side, are 

done in a transparent way, and in a fair, market-based way, because that will be, in the long term, in their interest, and in the 

European Union’s interest. 

But there is no attempt on our part to try to develop a zero-sum 

game, in this respect. We feel that the market is large enough, and 

848 

the needs are great enough, that there should be plenty of room for 

multiple suppliers and multiples routes. 

Senator CASEY. And just, by way of follow-up, how would you 

characterize the Bush administration’s response to that deal, I 

mean, in a word or two? 

Mr. SPECKHARD. I think, our sense is that it’s important that this 

is done, as I said earlier, in a transparent way, and that we understand that it’s going to be done, as it carries forward, in a marketbased way. That there is some concern that, if this is done in any 

other way, it could jeopardize existing opportunities that, on a fair 

basis, perhaps would do better. 

Senator CASEY. So, you think the administration is concerned 

mostly about how it’s implemented, as opposed to the relationship 

itself? I just want to—— 

Mr. SPECKHARD. Absolutely, you know, absolutely. I honestly believe that the issue here is not the relationship. We recognize the 

importance of the Greece-Russia relationship in the energy sector, 

and it’s a good one in the context of what the interests of Greece 

are, and the European Union. Our concern is that it does not become a monopolistic relationship. And, I think that would not be 

in the interest of Greece, or the European Union, and we think 

there’s plenty of room for Russia, as well as other suppliers. So, 

this should not be seen as a competition between the United States 

and Russia, but, in fact, a regular market-oriented type of approach 

to ensuring diversified supplies of energy. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, and I know we’re almost out of time, 

but I wanted to first of all, let everyone know that the record will 

be open, and it’ll be open, actually for 2 days. Committee members 

can submit additional questions for the record. 

I’d ask each nominee for your help in responding in as prompt 

a way as possible to these questions. I may have others, and I’m 

sure members of the committee who are not here today will have 

questions. 

But, I mostly want to express our gratitude for, not just your testimony today, and your willingness to go through this process, but 

especially for your willingness to commit yourself to public service. 

In some cases, continued public service, and in other cases, beyond 

military and other civic engagement that you’ve had. 

But this is a particularly notable and distinctive—and, I think 

important, kind of public service. And it comes at a time where we 

live in an increasingly more dangerous world, which both makes 

the service all that more admirable, but at the same time heightens or increases the responsibility that each of you will have if 

you’re confirmed. And, I appreciate that and recognize that, and 

appreciate the commitment that you are making individually, and 

that your families are making and, in some cases, have already 

made. 

Thank you very much. 

Unless there’s any additional comments, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(849) 

NOMINATIONS 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Heath, Daniel D., to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the 

International Monetary Fund 

Kennedy, Patrick F., to be Under Secretary of State for Management 

Mulvaney, Sean R., to be Assistant Administrator for Management 

of the U.S. Agency for International Development 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez and Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ.: The hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Relations will now come to order. Today, the committee meets to 

consider the nomination of Mr. Patrick Kennedy to be the Undersecretary of Management at the State Department, Mr. Sean R. 

Mulvaney to be the Assistant Administrator for Management at 

USAID, and Mr. Daniel D. Heath to be the U.S. Alternate Executive Director to the International Monetary Fund. We welcome 

them, as well as any of their family members and friends who have 

accompanied them. 

I’ll start off with an opening statement, and then recognize the 

distinguished ranking member of the full committee, and ask unanimous consent on behalf of Senator Hagel to have his opening 

statement be included in the record, which without objection will 

be included. 

[NOTE. The prepared statement of Senator Hagel appears in the 

‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section at the end 

of this hearing.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. The United States plays a crucial role in 

promoting development and alleviating poverty around the world. 

USAID, the State Department, and the IMF make a significant 

contribution to this work, and each nominee before us will play a 

key role in these organizations. We look forward to the witnesses’ 

testimony in hearing how they will contribute to these missions. 

850 

We are at a decisive moment for the future of USAID as an agency. I strongly believe that this year may very well make or break 

USAID. The Foreign Assistance Reform Process, or as it is known 

as the F Process, has been in place for over a year, but as I said 

in a hearing I chaired on June 12 to examine this issue, this new 

foreign assistance process is, in my view, flawed, and may be in serious trouble. 

As I stated then, if USAID and State simply move full speed 

ahead and make only minor changes around the edges, then the 

administration will have significant problems with Congress. 

Tragically, one of the consequences of this reform process has 

been the decimation of USAID resources as its funding, role, and 

mission have been reduced. As a result, USAID faces serious morale problems and questions about its future. And this, in turn, 

cripples our ability to expand democracy and improve the lives of 

the citizens of the developing world. Again, as I’ve said before, I 

refuse to preside over a slow death of USAID. 

It’s important to note that USAID has been, is, and should continue to be the backbone of our foreign assistance. AIDS mission 

dates back to the Marshall Plan reconstruction of Europe after 

World War II. In 1961, the Foreign Assistance Act was signed into 

law, and USAID was created. It is the one agency inside the 

United States Government that was designed with development 

and fighting poverty around the world as its core mission. And, at 

a time when international development and U.S. credibility are so 

needed, it does not make sense to take money, power, control, and 

expertise away from this agency. What is needed to revitalize the 

mission and health of USAID is strong leadership. 

That’s why, Mr. Mulvaney, your nomination today is so important for the future of the USAID as you and I have had that conversation. I hope you’re prepared to make some hard decisions, 

along with Henrietta Fore, who has been before the committee, and 

to work to make sure that the expertise that USAID does have, is 

valued and fully utilized. And, we look forward to discussing today 

how you would try to accomplish this. 

Mr. Kennedy, there is no question that you’ll be assuming a large 

amount of responsibility. Simply put, you’ll be responsible for overseeing the people, financial resources, training, information technology, and security of the Department of State in support of our 

foreign policy objectives, and as recent years have documented, and 

there will be no shortage of challenges. We look forward to hearing 

your assessment of them, as well, as you come before the committee in this nomination and how you might very well proceed to 

tackle them, should you achieve the success of being confirmed. 

And as we talk about America’s role in international development, we should recognize that our foreign assistance also extends 

to supporting multinational institutions that will improve the 

economies of other countries, and direct the aid and development. 

That’s why I believe that America must continue to play a strong 

role in the major development banks and multilateral financial institutions that work toward this goal. In this hearing, we look forward to specifically discussing the work of the International Monetary Fund. 

851 

In the interest of time, I’ll leave specific issues for the questioning, and with that, I’m proud to recognize the distinguished 

ranking member of the full committee, Senator Lugar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I 

thank Chairman Biden for scheduling this timely hearing. I thank 

you especially for your eagerness and willingness to chair it. These 

hearings are extremely important—one of the features about the 

Foreign Relations Committee not often known as in the last Congress, this committee had more hearings than any other committee 

in the Senate. And it was largely because we had the scope of the 

whole world, but likewise, because we have so many distinguished 

nominees. 

From the roles that you are fulfilling, each of our ambassadors 

to other countries abroad, a lot of international groups that we 

name members to—that’s why these hearings are especially important, because they offer an opportunity for you, as witnesses, to 

make statements to clarify your own intentions, with regard to the 

offices that you seek, and it gives an audience and a forum to the 

groups that you’re talking about, today, three very important ones: 

the Department, USAID, and the International Monetary Fund. 

And so, it’s a privilege to be a part of the hearing. I look forward 

to the testimony. And I thank you, again, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

We will now hear the testimony of our nominees, we’d love to 

have you introduce family members that may be in attendance, and 

when you start your testimony, please do so. In the interest of 

time, we ask you to keep your statement to about 5 minutes. Without objection, your full statements will be included in the record. 

And with that, Mr. Kennedy, you may proceed with your opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK F. KENNEDY, NOMINEE TO BE 

UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Lugar. 

I’d like to introduce my wife, Mary Elizabeth Swope, who is a retired State Department Foreign Service officer, who joins me today. 

Mr. Chairman, it’s a distinct honor to appear before you today, 

as President Bush’s nominee to be Undersecretary of State for 

Management. I want to thank the President and Secretary Rice for 

the confidence they have placed in me. 

As a career Foreign Service officer who has worked in the administrative and management field for over 35 years, I regard this as 

a unique opportunity to serve our Nation. Over the years, my service at the Department of State and on loan to the Department of 

Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, has 

given me perspective on the many and varied challenges that 

America faces internationally. 

Also, working and living abroad as part of a Foreign Service couple, I know well what it takes for our Foreign Service colleagues 

to live and work in foreign cultures, have assignments in different 

852 

countries, and experience the changing profile of American diplomats over the last three decades. 

As a management officer, and as Assistant Secretary of State for 

administration, I worked on the full spectrum of management 

issues needed to support our diplomatic presence around the world, 

and—I can tell you sincerely—serving our country is a privilege in 

any capacity, and a career in the State Department is one of the 

best opportunities there is. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working on the numerous challenges that lie ahead. I believe the State Department can meet 

those challenges only by working with the Congress, and other U.S. 

Government agencies. 

I believe wholeheartedly that we cannot implement successful 

foreign policy without addressing the management and infrastructure issues on which it depends. 

It is often said that an institution’s major asset is its people, and 

I think this is no where more true than with the Department of 

State. 

With a few important exceptions, we are not a programmatic 

agency. The Department advances the U.S. national interests 

through policy formulation and execution, public diplomacy outreach, consular support, and management services. We serve the 

American people through the men and women of the Civil and Foreign services, and our foreign national colleagues abroad. 

They’re our most powerful and scarcest resource, representing 

the United States abroad is an honor and a challenge in today’s 

international environment. To do it well, our people must be deployed, recruited, trained, provisioned, and safeguarded. They must 

be sent to those assignments and posts where they can make the 

maximum contribution, including some of the most dangerous 

places on earth. They must be trained in languages and professional skills so that they can perform their diplomatic and consular 

roles effectively. They must be provided with the proper tools and 

best possible support to operate at peak efficiency, and they must 

have safe and secure facilities from which to operate. 

I want to underline my strong commitment to recruiting, developing, and retaining a highly skilled workforce representative of 

America’s diversity. To recruit the people the country needs, the 

Department must continually expand its outreach to all parts of 

American society. We cannot afford, and morally must not leave 

any stone unturned in seeking out the people that we need to advance our national interests. 

Our Civil and Foreign Services provide a dynamic workforce to 

accomplish the Department’s missions in 170 countries abroad, and 

at the United Nations and also around the United States. 

I am pleased today that the Department fully participates in the 

President’s Management Fellows program, and has developed its 

own Career Entry Program to bring in and set on the right track, 

the next generation of Civil Service employees. The Department 

has also begun an innovative program to provide Civil Service rotational opportunities. 

The Foreign Service continues to recruit entry-level personnel 

from around the country. They must also receive additional trainVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00860 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
853 

ing, especially in hard languages, and in working with other agencies on various national security issues that face our country. 

The National Foreign Affairs Training Center is critical to fully 

developing the skills we need for our entire workforce. Among the 

many training opportunities offered are leadership and management training at the entry, mid- and senior levels, which provides 

employees with essential skills throughout their careers. And we 

must look forward to ways to leverage the significant skills that 

family members bring when they accompany employees overseas. 

There are enormous challenges ahead, and we are not a perfect 

organization. Just recently, the surge in passport applications resulted in unacceptable waiting times for the American people we 

serve. Systemic changes have been made to forestall that happening again. The extremely dedicated and competent employees 

who worked incredible hours to reduce the backlog of applications 

are now being supplemented by additional staff and additional facilities. The Department also benefited from numerous other employees and retirees who were mobilized. 

We can never lose sight of the fact that there are always new 

and better ways to carry out our responsibilities—these must be 

constantly pursued, and it is equally important that we engage in 

contact and vigorous oversight and accountability. There will always be missteps, but if we are honest and forthright, and display 

the dedication that has been the hallmark of the Department, we 

can catch problems early, and fix them. 

The American people have entrusted the State Department with 

many responsibilities in carrying out our diplomatic mission. Accomplishing them requires the full commitment of all of our employees, and also requires the continuing support of the Congress, 

particularly our committees of jurisdiction. 

If confirmed, I pledge to lead the Department’s management 

team in carrying out our assigned tasks. I will take it as the number one goal to provide the Secretary of State with the management advice and management support she needs. 

Thank you very much, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK F. KENNEDY, 

NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee. 

It is a distinct honor to appear before you as President Bush’s nominee to be 

Under Secretary of State for Management. I want to thank the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have placed in me. As a career Foreign Service 

officer who has worked in the administrative and management fields for almost 35 

years, I regard this as a unique opportunity to serve our Nation. 

Over the years, my service at the Department of State, and on loan to the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, has given 

me perspective on the many and varied challenges that America faces internationally. 

Also, working and living abroad as part of a Foreign Service couple, I know well 

what it takes for our Foreign Service colleagues to live and work in foreign cultures, 

have assignments in different countries, and experience the changing profile of 

American diplomats over three decades of service. 

As a management officer and as Assistant Secretary of Administration, I worked 

on the full spectrum of management services needed to support our diplomatic presence around the world. In all of this, I can tell you sincerely that serving our counVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00861 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
854 

try is a privilege in any capacity and that a career in the State Department is one 

of the best opportunities there is. 

If confirmed, I look forward to working on the numerous challenges that lie 

ahead; but I believe that the Department of State can meet those challenges only 

by working with the Congress and other U.S. Government agencies. I believe wholeheartedly that we cannot implement successful foreign policy without addressing the 

management and infrastructure issues on which it depends. 

It is often said that an institution’s major asset is its people, and I think that 

is nowhere more true than with the Department of State. With a few important exceptions, we are not a programmatic agency. 

The Department of State advances the U.S. national interest through policy formulation and execution, public diplomacy outreach, consular support, and management services. We serve the American people through the men and women of the 

Civil and Foreign Services, and our foreign national colleagues abroad. 

They are our most powerful, and scarcest, resource. Representing the United 

States of America abroad is an honor and a challenge in today’s international environment. To do it well, our people must be deployed, trained, provisioned, and safeguarded. 

They must be sent to those assignments and posts where they can make the maximum contribution, including some of the most dangerous places on earth. 

They must be trained in languages and professional skills so that they can perform their diplomatic and consular roles effectively on behalf of the President and 

the American people. 

They must be provided with the proper tools and best possible support to operate 

at peak efficiency. 

And they must have safe and secure facilities from which to operate. 

I want to underline my commitment to recruiting, developing, and retaining a 

highly skilled workforce representative of America’s diversity. To recruit the people 

the country needs, the Department must continually expand its outreach to all parts 

of American society. We cannot afford—and morally must not—leave any stone 

unturned in seeking out the people that we need to advance our national interests. 

Our Civil and Foreign Services provide a dynamic workforce to accomplish the Department’s mission; in addition to our diplomatic presence in over 170 countries 

abroad and at the United Nations, they are also deployed around the United States 

in passport agencies, visa offices, diplomatic security field offices, and dispatch agencies. 

I am pleased that the Department fully participates in the Presidential Management Fellows Program and has developed its own Career Management Entry Program to bring in, and set on the right track, the next generation of Civil Service 

employees. The Department has also begun an innovative program to offer rotational opportunities to Civil Service employees. 

The Foreign Service continues to recruit entry- level officers from all around the 

country. They must also receive additional training, especially in hard languages 

and in working with other agencies on various national security issues facing our 

country. 

The National Foreign Affairs Training Center is critical to fully developing the 

skills we need for our entire workforce—Civil Service, Foreign Service, and Foreign 

Service Nationals. Among the many training opportunities offered, our leadership 

and management training at the entry, middle, and senior levels provides employees 

with essential skills throughout their careers. 

And we must look for ways to leverage the significant skills that family members 

bring when they accompany employees overseas. 

There are enormous challenges ahead and we are not a perfect organization. Just 

recently, the surge in passport applications resulted in unacceptable waiting times 

for the American people we serve. Systemic changes have been made to forestall 

that happening again. The extremely competent and dedicated employees who 

worked incredible hours to reduce the backlog of applications are now being supplemented by additional staff and additional facilities. The Department has also benefited from numerous other employees and retirees who were mobilized from all over 

the United States and overseas, to complete the mission of getting us back to the 

timely processing of passports. 

We can never lose sight of the fact that there are always new and better ways 

to carry out our responsibilities. These must be constantly pursued. And it is equally important that we engage in contact and vigorous oversight and accountability. 

There will always be missteps, but if we are honest and forthright, and display 

the dedication that has been the hallmark of the Department, we can catch problems early and fix them. 

855 

The American people have entrusted the Department of State with many responsibilities in carrying out our diplomatic mission. 

Accomplishing them requires the full commitment of all our employees and it also 

requires the continuing support of the Congress, particularly our committees of jurisdiction. 

If confirmed, I pledge to lead the Department’s management team in carrying out 

our assigned tasks in support of American diplomacy throughout the world. I would 

take it as my No. 1 goal to provide the Secretary of State with the management 

advice and management support she needs. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. Mulvaney. 

STATEMENT OF SEAN R. MULVANEY, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED 

STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. MULVANEY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator Lugar, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee. 

On July 16, 2007, President Bush nominated me for the position 

of Assistant Administrator for Management of USAID. I am honored by his confidence in me, and am appreciative of the support 

that has been given me, during the nomination process. 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you, Senator 

Menendez, and this esteemed committee. If confirmed, I hope to 

work with you and your colleagues on the committee and in the 

Congress, on a full range of issues. I am looking forward to your 

questions. Thank you very much. 

At this time, I would like to recognize and acknowledge my family for their support. Without their love and encouragement, I 

wouldn’t be here today. 

This is my wife, Susan, my daughters, Kate and Rachel, and my 

sisters, Sue and Lisa, are here today. My mother was unable to attend. I’d also like to recognize and thank my deceased father. 

As a former staff member in the House of Representatives, I understand the importance of this hearing, and the role it plays in 

our constitutional process. If confirmed by your committee, I pledge 

my best in helping the agency modernize, to keep it the world’s 

premier development agency. 

In his National Security Strategy of 2002, the President stated 

that including the world’s poor in an expanding circle of development and opportunity is one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy. Since then, the President and the Congress have 

nearly tripled the resources allocated to development. Secretary 

Rice has reaffirmed the President’s desire to elevate development 

as a foreign policy objective. It now plays a key role in our national 

security architecture as part of the three D’s—defense, diplomacy, 

and development. 

The humanitarian and development mission of USAID has, and 

will continue to be, a moral imperative of this country. Post-9/11, 

it is also a national security imperative. 

If confirmed as Assistant Administrator for Management, I will 

hold a position that is critical to the functioning of USAID, because 

the management bureau provides the tools with which our development professionals work. The position oversees 6 major operational 

units that include financial management, acquisition and assistance, information technology, overseas management support, adVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00863 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
856 

ministrative services, management, policy, budget, and performance. 

Generally speaking, the position and the Bureau are responsible 

for strengthening and maintaining agency management systems. 

The management function is so critical because every other operational unit within the agency relies on it, as a service provider, 

an enabler, and a facilitator in the pursuit of U.S. foreign assistance objectives. 

Without good logistical support, USAID’s efforts would be stymied, as it tries to catalyze the full range of America’s public and 

private capabilities, and the resources it allocates to development. 

If confirmed for this position, I see myself as playing a small but 

pivotal role to improve the lives of countless individuals, by improving the management practices of the agency. 

I can assure you that I am energized and I’m exhilarated by the 

tasks that lie before me, and the opportunity to bring my professional experience to bear in the service of my country. 

In my professional career to date, I have had a set of experiences 

that have drawn upon many different skills. I worked on Capitol 

Hill for 10 years, in several positions covering a range of office, 

committee, and leadership functions, with a focus on foreign policy, 

international economic policy, budget, and appropriations. 

Five of these years were dedicated to assisting a former Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. That experience enabled me to build a solid knowledge of the 

U.S. foreign assistance process and development practice. 

I also developed a clear understanding of executive branch operations, and the special role that Congress plays in the design and 

implementation of U.S. development policy abroad. 

As a complement to this public policy experience, I obtained a 

master’s degree from Thunderbird, the American Graduate School 

for International Management. I’ve also worked in brand management for a worldwide consumer products and pharmaceutical firm, 

Glaxo Smithkline. 

The combination of my public policy experience, particularly in 

the legislative area of foreign assistance, as well as my private sector management experience, I believe has prepared me for the serious responsibilities I would assume as Assistant Administrator for 

Management. 

Should the Senate choose to confirm me for this position, it 

would be an honor to serve side-by-side with the roughly 8,000 

dedicated USAID employees who—at great risk and personal sacrifice—answer the development challenges around the world. I will 

endeavor to serve them with the same distinction and purpose that 

they serve the American people. 

In closing, I would like this committee to know that, if confirmed, 

I intend to make myself fully available. I’d like to consult with interested staff and members on the management challenges that the 

agency faces, or any proposed decisions that it would take. This is 

part of my own personal policy of pursuing communications with 

all major stakeholders interested in improving the management of 

the agency. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement for the committee, 

and I welcome any questions at the appropriate time. 

857 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mulvaney follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN R. MULVANEY, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ADMINIS- TRATOR OF MANAGEMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator Lugar, and other Senators of the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

this afternoon. I respectfully request that my remarks be included in the record. 

On July 16, 2007, President Bush nominated me for the position of Assistant Administrator for Management at the U.S. Agency for International Development. I 

am honored by his confidence in me and am appreciative of the support that has 

been given me during the nomination process. 

At this time, I would like to acknowledge and thank my family for their support. 

Without their love and encouragement, I would not be here. I would like to recognize my wife, Susan, and our two lovely daughters, Kate and Rachel, as well as my 

sisters, Sue and Lisa, who are all here today. I would also like to thank my mother, 

Kay Mulvaney, who was unable to attend, and my deceased father, James. 

As a former staff member in the House of Representatives, I understand the importance of this hearing and the role it plays in our constitutional process. If confirmed by your committee, I pledge my best in helping the agency modernize to keep 

it the world’s premier development agency. 

In his National Security Strategy of 2002, the President stated that ‘‘including the 

world’s poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is one of the 

top priorities of U.S. international policy.’’ Since then, he has nearly tripled the resources allocated to development initiatives. Secretary Rice has reaffirmed his mandate to elevate development. It now plays a key role in our national security architecture as part of the three ‘‘D’s’’—defense, diplomacy, and development—and is 

vital to her vision of ‘‘transformational diplomacy.’’ 

The humanitarian and development mission of this country has been and will be 

continue to be a moral imperative of this country. Post 9/11, it is also a national 

security imperative. 

If confirmed as Assistant Administrator for Management, I will hold a position 

that is critical to the functioning of USAID because it provides the tools with which 

our development professionals work. It oversees six major operational units that include Financial Management, Acquisitions and Assistance, Information Technology, 

Administrative Services, Overseas Management Staff, and Management Policy, 

Budget, and Performance. Generally speaking, the Bureau is responsible for 

strengthening and maintaining agency management systems. 

The management function is integral to every other operational unit within the 

agency. It is a service provider, an enabler, and a facilitator in the pursuit of U.S. 

foreign assistance objectives to advance democracy, prosperity, and human wellbeing in the world’s developing countries. Every other operational unit of the agency 

is a customer of the Management Bureau. Without good logistical support, USAID 

is stymied in its efforts to catalyze the full range of America’s public and private 

capabilities and the resources it allocates to the cause of development. 

If confirmed for this position, I see myself as playing a small but pivotal role in 

helping to improve the lives of countless individuals by improving the management 

practices of USAID. I can assure you that I am energized and exhilarated by the 

tasks that lie before me and the opportunity to bring my professional experience to 

bear in the service of my country. 

In my professional career to date, I have had a set of experiences that have drawn 

upon many different skills. I worked on Capitol Hill for 10 years in several positions 

covering a range of office, committee, and leadership functions with a focus on foreign policy, international economic policy, appropriations, and budgeting. 

Five of these years were dedicated to assisting a former chairman of the House 

Appropriations Subcommittee on State Department and Foreign Operations. That 

experience enabled me to build a solid knowledge of the U.S. foreign assistance process and development practice. I also developed a clear understanding of executive 

branch operations and the special role that Congress plays in the design and implementation of U.S. development policy abroad. 

As a complement to this public policy experience, I obtained a masters degree 

from Thunderbird, the American Graduate School for International Management. I 

also worked in brand management for a worldwide consumer products and pharmaceutical firm, Glaxo Smithkline. The combination of broad public policy experience, 

particularly in the legislative area of U.S. foreign assistance, as well as my private 

sector management experience, has prepared me for the serious responsibilities I 

would assume as Assistant Administrator of Management at USAID. 

858 

Should the Senate choose to confirm me for this position, it would be an honor 

to serve side by side with the roughly 8,000 dedicated USAID employees who at 

great risk and personal sacrifice answer the development challenges around the 

world. I will endeavor to serve them with the same distinction and purpose that 

they serve the American people. 

In closing, I want this committee to know that, if confirmed, I intend to make myself fully available to consult with interested staff and members on management 

challenges at USAID and proposed decisions. This is part of a personal policy of 

mine to pursue communications with all major stakeholders interested in improving 

the management of the agency. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement before the committee. I now welcome 

any questions that you and the other Senators here today may have for me. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you very much. 

Kate and Rachel decided when you started to speak to pay attention, so you must have a lot of influence there. 

Let me turn to Mr. Heath now, for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL D. HEATH, NOMINEE TO BE UNITED 

STATES ALTERNATIVE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE 

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 

Mr. HEATH. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Lugar, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored 

that President Bush has nominated me to serve as the United 

States Alternate Executive Director at the International Monetary 

Fund, and if confirmed, I pledge to work with this committee, the 

full Congress, Secretary Paulson, and the rest of the administration 

in furthering U.S. international economic policy goals, and the 

well-being of the American people. 

I want to thank my wife, Jane Allman Heath, and our sons, 

Jared, Ken, and Nathan, who are here today a couple of rows back. 

I want to thank them for their support of my commitment to public 

service. 

Unable to be present in person today, unfortunately, are Jane’s 

parents, Charles and Gwen Allman, who have become parents to 

me, as well. 

For much of the past 6 years, I have served as Associate Director 

of the White House National Economic Council. In this capacity, it 

has been my privilege to promote policies leading to economic 

growth and stability for the good of all Americans. Throughout my 

previous roles in Federal Government and in the private sector in 

Europe, I worked to expand international trade and investment of 

benefit to our country. 

If confirmed, I look forward to bringing my skills, knowledge, and 

experience to help pursue policies that are a priority for the United 

States. 

As you know, the IMF is entering a new period, one that’s 

marked by new leaders, recent credit market turbulence, and the 

growing strength of emerging market countries. Its mandate to promote international monetary cooperation and to expand job-creating trade will require the IMF to intensify its own leadership toward transparency in public policy for market-based reforms that 

will generate sustained growth, and on fiscal and monetary policies 

that strengthen government accounts and reduce the risk of crises. 

With its near-global membership, and effective U.S. guidance, I 

believe the IMF is well-positioned to set standards in these imporVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00866 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
859 

tant areas. The United States strongly supports recent IMF decisions to better assess countries’ economic policies, including exchange rate activities. And, if confirmed, I look forward to working 

with my colleagues and with this committee to implement these 

vital reforms. 

Mr. Chairman, dedicated administration officials and Congressional leaders, over many years, have helped to expand economic 

opportunity in the United States through domestic policies, and the 

policy fundamentals for economic growth and stability in other 

countries. 

There are new challenges now to global economic performance. 

And, if confirmed, I will demonstrate enthusiasm and good judgment in doing my part to improve IMF policies and practices that 

are needed in our time. 

I’m grateful to have the privilege of your considering my nomination. I’d be pleased to answer any questions, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heath follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL D. HEATH, NOMINEE TO BE UNITED STATES

ALTERNATE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Hagel, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored that President Bush has nominated me to serve as the United States Alternate Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund, and if confirmed, I pledge to work with 

this committee, the full Congress, Secretary Paulson, and the rest of the administration in furthering U.S. international economic policy goals and the well-being of the 

American people. 

First, I would like to thank my wife, Jane, and our sons for their support of my 

commitment to public service. For much of the past 6 years I served as Associate 

Director of the National Economic Council. In this capacity, it has been my privilege 

to promote policies leading to economic growth and stability for the good of all 

Americans. Throughout my previous roles in Federal Government and the private 

sector in Europe, I worked to expand international trade and investment of benefit 

to our country. If confirmed, I look forward to bringing my skills, knowledge, and 

experience to help pursue policies that are a priority for the United States. 

As you know, the IMF is entering a new period, marked by new leaders, credit 

market turbulence, and strength of emerging market countries. Its mandate to promote international monetary cooperation and expand job-creating trade will require 

the IMF to intensify its own leadership toward transparency in public policy, market-based reforms to generate sustained growth, and fiscal and monetary policies 

that strengthen government accounts and reduce the risk of crisis. With its near 

global membership, and effective U.S. guidance, the IMF is well-positioned to set 

standards in these important areas. The United States strongly supports recent IMF 

decisions to better assess countries’ economic policies, including exchange rate activities. If confirmed, I look forward to working with my colleagues to implement 

these vital reforms. 

Mr. Chairman, dedicated administration officials, and Congressional leaders over 

many years have helped to expand economic opportunity in the United States 

through domestic policies and the policy fundamentals for economic growth and stability in other countries. There are new challenges to global economic performance, 

and if confirmed, I will demonstrate enthusiasm and good judgment in doing my 

part to improve IMF policies and practices needed in our time. 

I am grateful to have the privilege of your considering my nomination. I would 

be pleased to answer any questions. 

Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. We welcome your 

families, as well. We understand the sacrifices that are engaged, 

not only for those who serve, but also for their families. And, so we 

appreciate them being with you, and they all look great—I’m sure 

they’ll look different on Halloween, but they all look great today. 

Let’s start with 7-minute rounds, and I’ll recognize myself. 

860 

Mr. Kennedy, first of all, I’ve had several people tell me of your 

distinguished service, so the questions go toward the position 

you’re going to be taking more than—I understand that you’re not 

necessarily at the heart of these issues, but you will be dealing 

with these issues. So, I want to get a sense of how you’ll be dealing 

with them, as you approach the positions—I want to create under 

why these questions come to you. 

I read with interest the Washington Post article that talked 

about FSO forced assignments. That has not happened since 1969, 

as far as directed assignments. I’m wondering why is it that, I 

mean, obviously this is a tough theatre, so it’s understandable, why 

is it that, having not seen those direct assignments in the Foreign 

Service since 1969, we’re seeing them now, and do you believe that 

continued forced assignments in the future are something that’s 

going to be more commonplace? 

If you would put your microphone on. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Since 2003, the State Department has been dispatching people to 

Iraq, first as individuals on loan to the Department of Defense 

under the Coalition Provisional Authority and then since 2004, as 

part of the American Embassy there. And the number of people we 

have had serving in Iraq continues to grow every year. 

This year we will be adding close to 50 additional Foreign Service personnel to serve, not only in Baghdad, but on the Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams, as well. And, I think we have reached the 

point, sir, where the number of people who simply have it as their 

first choice on their Foreign Service assignment list, no longer 

keeps pace with the demands of the State Department diplomatic 

surge, which is mirroring the military’s own surge. 

And so, we have a process that—as you note, sir—has been in 

place for many years, and has been clarified, and I believe that 

State Department people will step up, once we go through the identification process, and I think it is logical, sir, that since we’re serving 1-year terms, that this might happen again next year. But I 

have every confidence that when the individuals who are identified 

in this process will serve well and honorably. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I don’t doubt they’ll serve well and 

honorably, but they’re serving not as their choice. And so, the question is, do you believe that, in fact, this is—what I gathered from 

your answer was that this is a result of growth? Is it a result of 

growth only? Do you believe this is a one-time set of circumstances? 

Or do you believe that this may be a continuing set of circumstances? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I think, sir, that if it is the national policy to continue to deploy 250 or more Foreign Service personnel in Iraq every 

year, that it is possible that we would have to use directed assignments again next year, yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you about diplomatic security, 

it’s one of the areas that you will have jurisdiction over. Certainly, 

recent reports regarding activities in Iraq of the private security 

contracting firm Blackwater, USA, have been covered extensively 

in the news. In my mind, the incident points to a larger management issue. 

861 

As the government seeks to privatize U.S. Government activities 

and control personnel costs, contractors have often been turned to 

to deal with those responsibilities. The Secretary’s panel on personnel protective services in Iraq recommended that, ‘‘When the 

FBI investigation into the September 16 shooting incident involving Blackwater is completed, the United States Embassy in Iraq 

should submit its recommendation as to whether the continued 

services of the contractor involved is consistent with the accomplishment of the overall United States mission in Iraq.’’ 

Now, that statement, which I’m quoting, is that a reference to 

Blackwater itself? Do we believe that Blackwater’s presence in Iraq 

ultimately would be curtailed? Is additional contracting staff needed to monitor and audit these contracts? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That 

statement is a reference to Blackwater. I was a member of the 

panel, and participated in the review in Iraq, at the Secretary’s direction, and in the writing of that report. 

The four members of the panel felt that since there was an ongoing investigation by the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it would be inappropriate for us to prejudge 

the result of that investigation, but should the results of the investigation go in one direction, we called upon the United States Ambassador to make a recommendation to the Secretary, whether or 

not we should, at that point, change contractors or not. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. Go ahead. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Going to the second point, one of the points that 

the panel was very strong on in its long series of recommendations 

is we thought that we had in place various policies and procedures 

that were relatively robust. At the same time, you can always improve a policy or procedure. One has to keep an open mind in looking at those things. 

But the most important issue was that we had to increase oversight and accountability. We simply did not have enough special 

agents—Federal officers in the Diplomatic Security Service, to accompany each convoy which was moving someone with State Department personnel, and therefore, one of the recommendations 

that we made was that additional special agents should be deployed. The Secretary has accepted that recommendation, and 

those agents are either in Iraq now, or more are being moved 

there, as we speak, literally. 

And, therefore, we will have significantly increased oversight and 

accountability by placing a diplomatic security special agent as the 

agent in charge on every move that takes place by one of our contractors. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, talking about oversight, today’s article 

talks about the possibility that the FBI investigation into the 

Blackwater incident may have been compromised, because guards 

received immunity for statements that they made to State Department officials investigating the incident. Now, it seems to me that 

how we act in terms of giving immunity grants to individuals, and 

the process under which we give immunity grants to individuals, 

if it is as reported, shows that either it’s procedurally flawed or 

substantially problematic. 

862 

Mr. KENNEDY. When the Secretary took steps after the incident 

on September 16, she—after talking with the Prime Minister of 

Iraq—set three parallel channels moving. One is a joint United 

States-Iraq Commission to look at issues there. 

The second is an investigation which the FBI is heading now, to 

look into the facts on the ground of the specific incident and whether or not there was any activity involved which would be a violation of law. 

The third action that she took was to commission a panel, of 

which I was a part, to review the processes that we use—the oversight and accountability. Our groups was specifically walled off 

from looking at the specifics of the investigation that the FBI was 

involved in. We did not wish to do anything that would potentially 

render a prosecution more difficult. 

And so, I can only tell you, sir, that the investigation by the FBI 

is still ongoing, but I did not participate in that investigation. 

Senator MENENDEZ. My time is up, but I don’t want to leave this 

dangling, so I’ll just take one more minute here, and then I’ll turn 

to Senator Lugar. 

Is there a clearly-defined process under which a person of Protective Services ultimately are told when they can and when they cannot offer grants of immunity, and is there a chain of command that 

is well-established, as well as documented, in terms of standard operating procedures. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, can I get that answer for you for the 

record? Because my responsibilities, to date, have not involved 

that. But, I can assure you that, should I be confirmed by this committee, that is an issue that I would find within my jurisdiction to 

immediately address, because the Secretary does seek to ensure 

that there is the utmost accountability and control and responsibility for the State Department for the actions that take place 

under its jurisdiction. 

Senator MENENDEZ. We’ll look forward to your written answers. 

Clearly, this is a field you will be dealing with. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to above follows:] 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

Washington, DC, October 31, 2007. 

Hon. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection,Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing in response to questions you posed to Ambassador Patrick Kennedy at his October 30 confirmation hearing. You asked for information about news accounts that the Department of State has promised employees 

of Blackwater USA immunity from prosecution in connection with a September 16 

incident in Baghdad. 

The Department of State is not in a position to immunize individuals from Federal criminal prosecution. The kinds of statements that the press is writing about 

would provide limited protection that does not preclude prosecution. The Department would not have asked FBI to investigate this case unless we and they thought 

that they could investigate the case and potentially prosecute individuals if warranted. I have attached a statement issued by the Department of Justice confirming 

that Blackwater employees have not been given immunity from prosecution and 

that the FBI’s criminal investigation of this matter continues. 

Without regard to whether particular statements may be used in a criminal proceeding, cases like the one currently under investigation are complex given that the 

863 

applicability of U.S. criminal law to the activities of private security contractors 

overseas is not always clear and may depend on the facts at issue in any particular 

case. The administration is currently working with the Congress on legislation to 

ensure that we have the laws we need to hold private security contractors overseas 

accountable where appropriate. 

Sincerely, 

JEFFREY T. BERGNER, 

Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs. 

Attachment: As stated. 

STATEMENT BY JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN DEAN BOYD ON THE BLACKWATER

INVESTIGATION

‘‘The Justice Department and the FBI cannot discuss the facts of the Blackwater 

case, which is under active investigation. However, any suggestion that the 

Blackwater employees in question have been given immunity from federal criminal 

prosecution is inaccurate. The Justice Department and the FBI continue the criminal investigation of this matter knowing that this investigation involves a number 

of complex issues. We are unable to comment further at this time.’’ 

Senator MENENDEZ. If you are confirmed, and I have real concerns that the immunity claims that I understand that arrests, apparently are called ‘‘Garrity Warnings,’’ and ‘‘Calkine Warnings’’ 

both named for Federal court cases from the 1960s and 1970s that 

recognize the special circumstances of Government employees in 

criminal cases involving their jobs. 

And it seems to me that we have to, you know, we want to promote the rule of law throughout the world, and it starts with observing it at home, so that, in fact, you can hold that standard to 

the rest of the world. But, if we have a process that allows immunity grants to be given without the appropriate authorities, including the appropriate law enforcement authorities being advised before that grant is given, then we are giving immunity to people 

that ultimately may very well, and should be, subject to prosecution. And that is fundamentally wrong. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Though I know as you go into this, I know 

that you don’t have this job now, but the reason I’m raising these 

questions now is, you may very well have this job, and this is not 

going to be, unfortunately, in my concern, an isolated incident and 

how we proceed in the future is going to be very important. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, I absolutely agree. In addition to providing information in writing, I believe that we could arrange for 

a representative of the Department of Justice, which has control of 

this investigation at the moment, to call upon you or one of your 

counsels to review the material that they are in charge of. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And I fully agree that responsibility and accountability and the rule of law are paramount. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that, I don’t want the other 

nominees to think I don’t care about them. I will return to you 

after Senator Lugar. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Just following through on the accountability side of, sort of, past 

business with your predecessor, what is the latest information regarding passport production numbers? How many new adjudicators 

have you hired, and what is the current backlog, if there is one? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

864 

There is no backlog at the moment. The normal waiting time for 

a passport has historically been approximately 6 weeks. We believe 

we are actually under that number. I check the figures every Friday, and on Friday, the number of applications in-process were 

around 500,000, and we are moving through those with regularity. 

We’ve done some spot-checking, and people are telling us they 

are receiving their passports in as little as 2 and 3 weeks. 

We have been able to accomplish this partially because we’ve already brought on board some 300 new employees, and we believe 

we will hit 500 by the end of the calendar year. These are adjudication personnel, because Senator, there’s a two-part process for a 

passport: physical production of the book, and the adjudicator who 

takes a governmental act to say, ‘‘You are who you say you are, 

and the documents you represent establish that you are an American citizen.’’ 

We have capacity to produce over 25 million passports, including 

a new facility we just opened in Arkansas, which will have the ability to produce 10 million passport books a year. So, we have the 

physical capacity to print the books. What we were short on, Senator—and it was our failing, absolutely our failing—we did not 

have enough human adjudicators to do that. We mobilized State 

Department personnel, retirees, other officers, and we have 300 

new people, and are heading for 500. 

So, we believe we have addressed this systemically with new production facilities and new personnel, but we will, however, monitor 

it weekly to make sure we don’t see any adverse trends. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I’m sure the American people appreciate 

that good report. I trust that these employees are sustainable, that 

is, this is not a so-called surge capacity that may tailor off, but that 

you’re geared up now, both in the production side, the Arkansas 

plant, for example, plus the human side, adjudicators. 

Are you in touch, do you believe, coordinating with the Department of Homeland Defense or others who may—in the course of 

their affairs, plus some of us—bring up new requirements for various Americans to have passports, or to have other documentation 

so that, if these early warning signals come along, you’re in a position to surge prior to the avalanche hitting you? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Absolutely, Senator. The individuals we are hiring 

now are permanent, full-time employees. We negotiated an arrangement with the Office of Management and Budget that permitted the State Department to retain additional fees that citizens 

were paying for their passports, and made the appropriate notifications to the Congress. With these additional fees, we were able to 

add to our physical plant, and add the additional personnel. 

Our Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs is in daily contact 

with the Department of Homeland Security, and should I be confirmed, I know the Undersecretary at DHS well, and my plan 

would be to establish full and open communications with him so 

that if there are any changes that they feel necessary, to make sure 

that we have secure borders, that the State Department has the 

time and is well-positioned to respond to those new requirements. 

Senator LUGAR. Excellent. 

Let me ask, what is the role that the Office of the Coordinator 

of Reconstruction and Stabilization should play in post-conflict staVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00872 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
865 

bilizations and reconstruction, and do you anticipate more budget 

resources being requested by the Department for this function? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, I think you’ve touched on a very important area. The State Department has, essentially, no surge capacity 

inherent to it. When we need to surge, we take people from within 

the Department and shift them from one important mission to 

what is, at that moment, a higher mission. 

We need to establish a reserve corps—not exactly equivalent to 

the National Guard or the military reserves—but we need that inherent capability. 

CRS, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, is 

now working with other Government agencies, and we are awaiting 

final passage of authorizing legislation which we welcome. It will 

formalize this. We have set aside funds in the supplemental that 

was passed last year that covers fiscal years 2007 and 2008, so 

those funds are still available, and we will be seeking additional 

funds to turn this into a permanently staffed ‘‘on-call’’ mechanism, 

staffed by professionals in fields as diverse as agronomy and veterinary sciences and law enforcement, so that we would be prepared 

to work with our colleagues at AID and at other agencies, and deploy those personnel to regions in need. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, that’s good news, also. As you know, many 

members of this committee are very strongly supportive of this, 

and feel that this is a requirement for United States diplomacy 

when, in fact, we may have taken the position in the past, we’re 

not going to do nation-building, but now we’re doing a lot of nationbuilding. And the personnel resources to do this aren’t there. So, 

the surge capacity, or what have you, is required, but I appreciate 

the progress reports, and your cognizance of this. 

One final question, and that is—what is the status of the Department’s embassy construction program at this time? These come 

along from time to time, but how many new embassies have been 

replaced, and how many remain to be replaced, or to be built to 

begin with? And when will the program end? Do you have any flow 

chart of embassy-building? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, let me get you a complete flow chart for 

the record, but I am pleased to report that, to date, we have completed 53 embassies, there are another 37 which are in the process 

of design or construction, and we plan 11 more construction awards 

this year. 

[The information referred to above follows:] 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF OVERSEAS BUILDINGS OPERATIONS—STATUS OF

EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM, NOVEMBER 14, 2007

After the 1998 East African embassy bombings, the Department was faced with 

an unprecedented challenge of having to replace approximately 195 embassy facilities as a result of security concerns. 

Since 2001, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has: 

• Built 53 new facilities with 37 more underway; see attached list. 

• Moved nearly 15,000 United States Government employees to safer facilities. 

• 11 more construction contract awards are planned for fiscal year 2008. 

As of October 2007, OBO manages $ 5.1 billion in construction projects compared 

with $ 0.7 billion at the beginning of fiscal year 2001. The typical project delivery 

time has been reduced from 4 to 5 years to approximately 2 years. The Department 

is very appreciative of the Congressional support we have received for the program. 

866 

OBO has two New Embassy/Consulate Compound (NEC) construction programs— 

the Capital Security Construction Program and the Strategic Capital Construction 

Program. The Capital Security Construction Program is restricted by Congress to 

projects on a list of 80 (in bands of 20) of the most vulnerable posts. The Strategic 

Capital Construction Program involves projects not primarily undertaken for security reasons and not on the ‘‘Top 80 list’’ (e.g., a functional requirement or structural 

deficiencies). However, the Strategic program follows the same discipline and oversight as the Capital Security program. 

NEC construction is funded by: 

• Congressional appropriations for the Department of State’s Embassy Security, 

Construction, and Maintenance Account.– 

• Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program (levy on other agencies occupying U.S. 

facilities on a per capita basis). 

• Proceeds from the sale of excess property and/or underutilized property holdings. 

The Capital Security Cost-Sharing (CSCS) Program was developed in 2001–2002 

in accordance with the President’s Management Agenda Initiative on Rightsizing 

and the 1999 Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, and was included in 

the President’s fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 budgets. Fiscal year 2005 was 

the first year that the Department and other agencies contributed to the CSCS Program. 

The Department, with OMB oversight, manages the Program, which will generate 

a total of $17.5 billion over the 14 years from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 

2018 (beginning with a 5-year phase-in period) to fund approximately 150 NECs in 

the Capital Security Construction Program. The time to construct these 150 NECs 

is reduced from 26 to 14 years with CSCS in place (compared to the pace of construction under pre-CSCS budget levels). 

OBO Capital Construction Projects 

Completed since 2001: Kampala NEC, Doha NEC, Lima USAID (Annex), Bogota 

USAID/NAS (Annex), Tunis NEC, Dar es Salaam NEC, Dar es Salaam (USAID), 

Nairobi NEC, Zagreb NEC, Istanbul NEC, Sao Paulo NAB, Abu Dhabi NEC, Kabul 

ARG CMP, Baghdad IOB (Supplemental), Dili IOB, Sofia NEC, Yerevan NEC, 

Abidjan NEC, Luanda NEC (Strategic/Asset Mgt), Frankfurt NAB, Abuja NEC, 

Cape Town NEC, Phnom Penh NEC, Kabul NEC (Strategic/Asset Mgt), Kabul Cafeteria, Tbilisi NEC, Tashkent NEC, Yaounde NEC, Dushanbe NEC (Strategic/Asset 

Mgt), Conakry NEC, Tirana Annex, Phnom Penh USAID, Kampala USAID, Nairobi 

USAID, Bamako NEC, Astana NEC, Conakry USAID, Freetown NEC, Belmopan 

NEC, Lome NEC, Bridgetown NAB, Kingston NEC, Accra NEC, Athens Annex, Bogota Annex, Kathmandu NEC, Kathmandu USAID, Panama City NEC, Managua 

NEC, Rangoon NEC, Algiers NEC, Managua USAID, Accra USAID. 

In Design or Construction: Bamako USAID, Baghdad NEC (Supplemental), Kingston USAID, Port-Au-Prince NEC, Ciudad Juarez NEC, Berlin NEC (Strategic/Asset 

Mgt), Taipei (Strategic/Asset Mgt) (design), Kigali NEC, Mumbai NEC, Quito NEC, 

Skopje NEC, Skopje NOX, Beijing NEC, Khartoum NEC, Khartoum NOX, Jerusalem Annex, Djibouti NEC, Libreville NEC, Surabaya NEC, Abuja NOX, Tbilisi 

NOX, Johannesburg NEC, Suva NEC, Koror NOB (Strategic), Kolonia NOB (Strategic), Guangzhou NEC (design), Brazzaville NEC, Karachi NEC, Addis Ababa NEC, 

Antananarivo NEC, Jeddah NEC, Manila NOX, Ouagadougou NEC, Riga NEC, Sarajevo NEC, Tijuana NEC, Valletta NEC. 

NEC–New Embassy/Consulate Compound 

NOX–New Office Annex 

USAID–USAID Annex Bldg. 

NOB–New Office Bldg. 

NAB–Newly Acquired Bldg. 

IOB–Interim Office Bldg. 

We believe this program will probably run out to as late as 2018, 

because we were starting from a very, very low base. When I was 

the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, we had funds 

to construct one new embassy a year. And it requires a major effort 

when you have 160 embassies and approximately 100 consulates, 

many of them not in the best condition, unsafe, and not prepared 

to deal with the volumes and the concerns that we have in the 

modern world, as you referenced earlier. 

867 

This construction program has very much benefited from the 

support of our oversight committees, which have been tremendous 

in giving us direct appropriations, and also in getting for us, in effect, fees from other Government agencies which occupy our facilities, so it’s the support you have given us have enabled us to construct 53 and be working on 37 more. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator. 

Let me return to Mr. Kennedy for a second round, here. I heard 

your answers to Senator Lugar about the passport issue, and am 

I to understand from your answers that you believe that systemic 

changes have been now put in place that makes the possibility of 

reliving the fiasco that we have, unlikely? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, I’m glad you added the word ‘‘unlikely’’ 

at the end of it. If confirmed, this would be my responsibility, but 

I jokingly and seriously say I can only ever offer a 99 percent guarantee. But, following the surge, I was charged by the Secretary and 

the Deputy Secretary, and the Under Secretary for Management 

with assembling a State Department task force, and I have looked 

into this very, very deeply, and was part of the working group that 

mobilized the personnel to do it. 

I believe with the production capacity that we now have, which 

is probably 25 million, with the additional personnel that we’re hiring, with additional checks we have put into place at various points 

along the line, and with the ability to potentially bring on more 

personnel, including remobilized personnel from within the Department, I believe that I can offer you a very solid guarantee, that 

barring some incredibly unforeseen circumstance, there will not be 

a repeat of this. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And, in that context, then, you would say to 

me the Department is ready for the next phase of the Western 

Hemisphere Initiative? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We are building to that, yes sir, we are building 

to that phase right now. We have the production capacity, and we 

plan to expand the production capacity. Because as the Assistant 

Secretary for Consular Affairs looks out into the future, they see 

the demand for passports over the next 5 years rising to as possibly 

as many as 30 million a year. So, we have brought back out of retirement a senior retired Foreign Service officer whose specialty is 

management and administration in regard to buildings, and he has 

now been detailed to the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and is looking 

to see what additional facility capacity we need to put into place 

to keep us ahead, well ahead of that growth curve, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. One last question to you, as you approach 

this position. For 15 years, 13 in the House, on the House International Relations Committee, and now having had the privilege of 

sitting on this committee, I have a real issue—I appreciated very 

much in your opening statement, the comments you made about 

having a workforce that is as diverse as America is, but I still believe that—this is going back over several administration’s now— 

one of the worst Departments in the Federal Government—particularly as it relates to Latinos in the Foreign Service and senior executive management ranks—is the State Department. 

868 

And every time we broach this issue, you know, we talk a lot 

about recruitment, and recruitment is great, I actually got into law 

several provisions to give the Department the money for recruitment. The problem is that recruitment, in and of itself, doesn’t 

solve the problem. When you want to get weeded out from the Department, you’re told by panels that you either cannot communicate effectively, or cannot write effectively. And I understand 

both skills, but I think they’re subjective at the end of the day. 

And so, I hope that in your new position that you’ll work toward—and I understand there is a timeframe here that, up until 

a new administration, but you may very well be there after that 

new administration—I hope that you will work with us to try to 

truly diversify the Foreign Service and the senior executive management, because in a country that increasingly has a large number of Americans of Hispanic descent, it does not represent that at 

the Department. Something I’d like to see you work with us on. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, I fully agree. If I look at the numbers, 

the numbers are wrong. We have to improve them. You’re right, we 

have to do the right kind of recruitment, you have to spread your 

net widely, you have to also offer training once you do have people 

in the service. 

If confirmed, one of the things that I have in the back of my 

mind, which I might bring to the front, very quickly, is I don’t 

think that we cast a wide enough net, we have 17 diplomats and 

residents arrayed around the country, numbers of them at Hispanic 

and Historically Black Universities, but I don’t think that we have 

fully tapped our potential for recruiting—major colleges and universities employ their alumni, who are spread all over the country, 

to be their best recruiters. 

I think that the State Department should seriously consider, and 

this was something that I’m very interested in doing, tapping the 

network of retired Foreign Service officers who live in every State 

in the union, and using them as, in effect, deputized recruiters to 

go to every college and every university, and not just certain ones 

to make sure that we are taking every option and every opportunity to get the diversity and get the people we need. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you. I appreciate your answer, 

it’s very forthright. I look forward to working with you. 

Mr. Mulvaney, let me ask you, with reference—you and I have 

had some discussions about the position that you’ll have, and it’s 

a very important one at a critical time, in my view, for USAID— 

I heard your opening statement and I appreciated some of the 

things that you included in there. How do you think that reduced 

resources have affected USAID’s ability to carry out its mission? 

And, while you’re dealing with that reality, I would hope that if 

you are confirmed in this position that you will be engaged with 

members of the committee and members of the Congress, who are 

concerned about the future of USAID, about its mission, about 

being the premier entity that has been at the forefront of development assistance in the world on behalf of the United States and 

putting that side of America’s face out there throughout the world. 

And, including the AID mission in the budget process that’s so 

critical—could I hear your views on that? It’s a lot, but I’ve talked 

869 

to you about it before, I’d like to hear your view on the record, if 

I may. 

Mr. MULVANEY. Let me start out by addressing the three issues 

you mentioned, and I’ll try to go through each one of them that I 

internalized. 

First, how has declined resources impacted the ability of the 

agency to implement its development programs and its mission? I 

would say that the agency has been running on scarce OE for a 

number of years. And this situation has created a number of challenges on the ground. 

One can look at the growth in programmatic funds that the agency has had to implement, and it’s been dramatic since 2001. When 

I first started in 2001, I think the figures were around $7 or $8 

billion, and we’re almost at a doubling of that, $13 billion in terms 

of what the agency actually implements, all spigots, all programs 

around the world, in over 150 countries. Its regular OE budget has 

more or less remained the same, its staffing levels have, more or 

less, remained the same. It has desperately tried to backfill attrition as people retire, so it’s been a struggle to maintain the quality 

of our development programs. 

But, I think the agency is committed to doing more with less, to 

trying to be more efficient. That’s not to say that, perhaps in the 

future, more resources couldn’t be used to help revitalize the agency, and I think the senior leadership is committed to that goal. 

In second point, you talked about morale at the agency, and how 

it has suffered in recent years. And the importance of maintaining 

it as the premier development agency—I’m aware of this issue, and 

it is serious. What I can add to improve it is an approach. While 

serving the President, and being a part of an administration team 

I would essentially play a strong role in listening to the career Foreign Service officer, and the career civil service, becoming an advocate for the equities of the agency, within an overall administration 

framework. 

I would make it clear to the staff that I’m present to facilitate 

their work, and my sense of public service is not only to the American taxpayer, but my sense of public service is also to the rank 

and file of the agency. 

Your last point was on the budget process—and I assume that 

the motivation of your question relates to making sure that the 

long-term development objective is front and center in the DFA 

framework as things go forward. 

My sense of the agency is that, in the senior leadership of the 

agency, and the Director of Foreign Assistance, his office—her office, now—is that they understand that, the rollout of the DFA 

framework did not go well. Congress was upset about a number of 

actions that were taken. A number of external stakeholders, NGOs, 

and think-tanks were also not happy, and I think the senior leadership is committed to making changes to that process after hearing 

Congressional concerns. 

To the extent I play a role in that process, I will carry your concerns to them, and try to help the agency think about it. My portfolio is different, though, from the actual programmatic decisions. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Lugar. 

870 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, let me just follow along your 

question. You’ve just responded, Mr. Mulvaney, that there has been 

considerable consternation about, as you say, the roll-out of the Director of Foreign Assistance and that creation. And the morale 

problems, at least that some have reported to us, seem to come 

from personnel at USAID who have been affected in this roll-out 

situation. 

When we have hearings on the Millennium Challenge Program, 

many members refer to the old days. The old days were USAID, 

we had appropriations annually for a list of countries. Things happened, money went out, and sometimes there were oversight situations in which all that was accomplished was now precisely what 

had been hoped for, or there were malfeasance in countries—all 

sorts of difficulties. 

Now comes along Millennium Challenge and 15 criteria for receiving funds, including what some have said is a rather laborious 

process of democracy-building within the potential recipient, people 

making decisions as to how the money ought to be spent, whether 

for infrastructure of roads, or water supply for the people or whatever, which sometimes takes time. So, as a result, criticism has 

come that not much money is being spent. That a lot of time is 

going by, some feel the terms of members the House and the Senate may go by before something occurs there, oversight is rather 

difficult. 

Now, if that is difficult for us to contemplate, it must be very difficult for the career employees who are involved in this process, as 

different criteria, different expectations occur—how would you estimate the success of this process, of working through the Millennium Challenge criteria and programs which, at the end of the day 

many people do contend is probably a good idea for countries to 

take responsibility for decisionmaking, take responsibility to fight 

corruption, so that even after we’ve deemed that a road should be 

built, in fact, if it isn’t built and the money is out in a Swiss bank 

that, for some reason nothing occurs—I just ask you, as a professional in this, trying as you say, to listen to, not to salve the 

wounds of the process, but in this coming year, really, try to meld 

together all of this—what do you have in mind? Do you have any 

action points that you can share with us? 

Mr. MULVANEY. Senator, thank you very much for the question, 

I understand your concern. 

The portfolio, I would assume, is actually more in the back room 

of the foreign assistance process, it’s not the front-line policy process. So, a lot of the decisions, ideas, and points that you make 

wouldn’t actually relate to the position I would fulfill, but I will 

share a couple of thoughts with you, in the spirit of trying to answer your question. 

My own view of the MCC, and I think it’s shared by other folks, 

is that it was not a replacement of traditional core accounts of U.S. 

foreign assistance, particularly those accounts administered by 

USAID. The intention of the MCC was to be an incremental spigot 

of ODA that would have a number of characteristics that would incorporate lessons learned in development, which is an imperfect 

process, as we all know. 

871 

Some of those characteristics were that the MCC would be nonearmarked money. It wouldn’t be tied aid, and it would be flexible, 

in the sense of being able to work with developing countries, allowing for the principle of local ownership to be incorporated into compacts. 

The existence of the MCC has, I think, impacted agency morale. 

The agency views the MCC a bit enviously, to be frank. They would 

like to have some of those same flexibilities. But, one thing I would 

point out is that, AID is the backbone of the U.S. foreign assistance 

architecture. There’s no substitute for it. We need it and it can’t 

go away. The MCC, to my knowledge, as a staffer in the process, 

helping the institutions in the House and Senate contemplate how 

that would fit in a niche of U.S. foreign assistance policy—the intent of that institution was that it would only operate in a limited 

number of countries—20, 25, some of the better performers—but 

AID operates in over 150 countries. It has a direct, higher presence 

in 75 or 80. 

Let me stop there, and see if I answered your question, sir. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, that’s very helpful, and obviously, this is, 

sort of, an essay-type exam in which you could go on through several chapters. But, I think that’s thoughtful. The backroom, essentially, the difference between the numbers—25 as opposed to 160— 

sort of the backbone stability give, I think, a good outline of sort 

of where you’re headed, and some counts you might give. 

Let me just ask one more question, and that is, we talked to Mr. 

Kennedy about the building of embassies, and the question often 

arises—should the new U.S. embassies include the USAID missions 

in the embassies? Obviously, historically, several of the missions 

have not been in embassies. Some have argued that’s good, some 

have argued that’s not so good. What is your general judgment, 

and for that matter, if you can’t make a general judgment, what 

are the facts, in terms of embassy planning that you will have to 

deal with as you counsel USAID officials? 

Mr. MULVANEY. Senator, thank you for the question, it’s an important one. I will be assuming this position in a continuum of decisions that have gone on before me. It was Secretary Powell and 

Deputy Secretary Armitage that made the initial decisions about 

having new embassy compounds constructed, and having co-location between the State Department and USAID. There is no doubt 

that these co-locations into new embassy compounds that are going 

to be affecting the delivery model of USAID, because in many countries around the world, they have had separate missions, and now 

they are going to be co-located. 

I think the agency and the State Department are committed to 

a good faith effort, though. To the extent that there is co-location, 

and perhaps a consolidation of administrative services that serve 

both State and AID, there must there must be an importance 

placed on the objectives of efficiency, cost savings, and respect for 

each organization’s different but complimentary mission. And, if 

those aren’t achieved, that there’s an objective of security for all 

U.S. Government personnel serving in these compounds. 

I will be assuming this post and working as a team member with 

my colleague here who is at the table, if I’m confirmed. So, I hope 

I answered your question, sir. 

872 

Senator LUGAR. Yes, thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator. I have one final round 

of questions, and I don’t want you to think that Senator Lugar and 

I actually choreographed this tag-team, but when he raises something that is of interest that I had, I want to raise it, follow-on. 

In his questions to you, Mr. Mulvaney, about the Millennium 

Challenge Account, if I understand correctly, you actually led the 

final negotiations of a staff agreement with the executive branch, 

establishing the President’s new development assistance initiative, 

known to us now as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, when 

you served as an advisor to then-Congressman Colby. 

Now, one of the—ironically, one of the programs that’s cut into 

the sovereignty—not just about money—but the sovereignty of AID, 

is the Millennium Challenge Account and, in fact, an overwhelming 

majority of countries that have received MCC monies have seen 

their own USAID funds slashed. 

Now, I really, my ears perked up when you said—in response to 

Senator Lugar—this is not meant to be a replacement, and certainly those of us who supported the MCC believed it to be additive, not as a replacement. So, I’m glad to hear that that’s your 

framework of mind, as well. 

But, can we have a better coordination between AID and MCC? 

It just seems to me that we’re missing out on some opportunities 

here, I’d like to hear your insights on that. 

Mr. MULVANEY. A couple of thoughts—and again, this is beyond 

my portfolio that I would be confirmed for, so these are all my own 

personal views. Interagency coordination in foreign assistance has 

been a very difficult process and challenge from the Congressional 

viewpoint—and I haven’t been in the executive branch—but in the 

design of the MCC, one of the things that Congress created was an 

Interagency Board that would provide oversight over those foreign 

assistance programs, and that includes Department of Treasury, 

State, USAID, and USTR. 

And that board structure was intended to enhance interagency 

coordination, AID being on the board, particularly, would give it 

the opportunity to interact with the MCC at a very high level, so 

that there would be coordination. 

Can there be better coordination? I think we always can see better coordination as a possibility. 

You raised a point about bilateral funding levels of, say, the 

agency, where MCC countries have compacts. I would say this 

point was one that was left open as to what would be the interface 

of USAID in that particular country, if it would change, if it would 

be modified to the extent that the agency would pivot and focus on 

potentially non-MCC-type programs. It was an open question, 

largely because the administration did not have a clear blueprint 

on how it was going to implement the MCC. So, it was an area that 

was destined for further Congressional oversight and interaction. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, that’s a good cause for me and the subcommittee to do some of that. I appreciate that insight, because we 

have, I believe that those of us that supported MCC believe that, 

in fact, what has happened is that it has become a replacement 

versus additive, in its totality of its nature. 

873 

And the coordination, have a USAID sit on the board, that’s one 

thing. But, when we have missions in-country, that are then also 

having an MCC compact, that’s the type of coordination I’d like to 

see us more succeed. 

Mr. Heath, I didn’t want you to think you were out there all by 

yourself. At the—I know you were saying, ‘‘Wow, I’m going to get 

away with it.’’ [Laughter.] 

But, I was impressed with your answers privately, I just want 

to go one or two things with you publicly. 

The United States is the single-largest country contributor the 

IMF, with cumulative contributions of over $55 billion to the quota 

of the organization, so this is a very significant position. 

I’d like to hear from you, what do you believe are the top three 

priorities of the Office of the U.S. Executive Director in the year 

ahead, since that, as the alternate you will may—you will be called 

upon to cast your vote or advocate policies there, I’d like to hear 

what you believe are the three top priorities we should be pursuing? 

Mr. HEATH. Thank you, Senator. The priorities for the Executive 

Director’s office certainly touch on all of the disparate issues now 

that are coming at the IMF. 

For my own view, I would believe the first priority is on exchange rate surveillance. I strongly support the Executive Board’s 

decision to incorporate exchange rate surveillance activities in its 

Article 4 consultations, the decision of June 2007, and it is vital to 

implement this decision in a firm manner. 

This issue of exchange rate surveillance is an old one, in fact, for 

the IMF, something they’ve grappled with for about a generation, 

and I think the time is certainly overdue for firm action in this 

area. 

Second one, I would say, was the reform of the IMF governance. 

We are witnessing in the current turbulence in credit markets, the 

emergence of emerging market countries as a stabilizing force, and 

as a group accounting for more than half of global growth, it’s only 

appropriate, in fact, vital, that these emerging market countries assume leadership and responsible positions in the global community 

of finance, and certainly having representative positions in the IMF 

would reinforce that. 

Finally, a third priority would be the integration of capital markets and financial markets analysis into the surveillance, Article 4 

surveillance, and indeed, the full range of work done by the IMF. 

Again, we have seen, the latest turbulence in the market, a need 

for more profound or deeper examination of capital markets, of 

their functionings and how they affect players around the world. 

Ironically, this latest crisis emanated from the most sophisticated 

economy in the world, that is, the United States economy, when 

others are looking for low-income countries to generate crises, it 

comes from an unexpected quarter. And so, it underscores the importance of integrating much more serious and profound analysis 

and examination of capital and financial markets into the work of 

the IMF. 

And, if confirmed, those would be the areas I would be keenest 

on. 

874 

Senator MENENDEZ. When you speak about reform of governance, 

can you give me a sense of what you mean by that? 

Mr. HEATH. The emerging market countries certainly should 

have a larger voice and a larger vote. One of the analyses that impressed me was a simple one of comparing the voting power of 

China, Brazil, and India with Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. 

I found that the former countries had 19 percent less voting power 

than the latter countries, even though the former countries have 

GDP four times that of the latter group of countries. 

We are expecting emerging market countries to be responsible 

players in the International Monetary System, it’s important that 

they have the vote and responsibility to support the institutions 

that now are residing with other high-income countries. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Two other questions—do you believe the 

IMF has a role in promoting and facilitating economic development? 

Mr. HEATH. Yes, I do. And, as we enjoyed in a conversation last 

week, the importance of fundamental policies, macro-economic policies as preconditions for growth is important to that kind of 

growth, within the United States and in low-income neighborhoods 

in the United States, as well as around the globe. 

The primary responsibility of the IMF, of course, is macro-stability, and encouraging growth through that kind of stability, as 

well as through sound debt management and strengthened macroeconomic institutions. 

So, I believe its role is distinct from that of the World Bank and 

the recent commission by Pedro Moran, underscores the need for 

collaboration, but a distinct role where the World Bank has, really, 

the tools for a long-term development finance, whereas the IMF, 

while it has loan facilities for short-term needs and balance of payments needs, really has the expertise and mandate to encourage 

macro-stability in those countries as a fundamental for growth. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, debt relief has been at the forefront 

of the development debate for many years. The IMF has participated, starting in 1996 in the heavily indebted poor country initiative. 

Now, there are some who believe that this has not had the success that they think it should have. What do you believe are the 

success and failures of that program, and how do we make sure 

that debt relief promotes economic growth and poverty reduction? 

Mr. HEATH. The most recent round of debt relief involving the 

multilateral debt relief initiative, which, I think was from 2005, 

joined the earlier initiative of the heavily indebted poor countries, 

the HIPC initiative, and are strongly supported by the administration. The debt workouts that—and policy changes, I think—that accompany the forgiveness of debt strikes me as someone who’s not 

intimate with the details not being in the position nonetheless, as 

the weak part of the program, and would require much more attention, I think, than they’ve been receiving. 

It’s important, not only that countries work, be free of debt, but 

operate in such a way that they don’t return to an indebted situation. So, it requires building institutions, the technical assistance 

necessary to create stability and the economic power, the depth of 

financial markets to avoid returning to that situation. 

875 

Senator MENENDEZ. In other words it’s not just the relief, it’s the 

structure of the relief? 

Mr. HEATH. Yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Senator Lugar? 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Heath, you’ve raised, I think, some very sophisticated points 

that, undoubtedly you’ve already made in consultation with your 

colleagues at the IMF, or will shortly. 

But, I just want to reiterate some, and gain further comment 

from you, because I don’t think it’s well understood in this country, 

quite apart from, on the board of the IMF, the extraordinary 

change is that you exemplified in the contrast of three countries, 

and their contribution to world economy, as opposed to three that 

are underrepresented, and the disproportion is staggering and 

growing. 

Now, without offering investment advice, either one of us, the 

fact is that so-called emerging funds, mutual funds, as opposed 

even to international mutual funds, as opposed to, say, something 

based on the Dow Jones of our basic countries, have extraordinarily 

different returns, not only in this year, but, say for the past 5 

years. 

And so many investors who note this arithmetically are aware of 

it, but on the other hand they don’t ponder, why is this so? How 

can this be sustained, this separation that is growing very large 

with the Dow Jones being our companies, as opposed to some that 

are represented clearly by emerging markets. But, it used to be 

part of the clientele of the IMF. 

Now, this leads many questions, why haven’t IMF—is that part 

of world history ???passe??? And, obviously you would respond, as 

you have, if not so, then you have experts there, an extraordinary 

talent pool of people delving into current problems in the world 

that still include debts of many countries—a situation in which, 

even as we describe, the rich becoming much richer, the poor really 

may be at the bottom of the heap. 

And some of these countries are afflicted by problems of HIV/ 

AIDS and malaria and tuberculosis, problems of agricultural failure that come up in this committee, or some of our other committees, in other words, huge, huge problems that don’t necessarily affect the IMF, but they do in the sense of debt or interrelationships, 

those budgets, those countries with others. 

I’m just curious, as you take a look at your responsibilities, the 

advice you will get from our country—how receptive is the current 

leadership of the IMF? Or others who have responsibilities, or are 

sitting around the table? May not be officers, but nevertheless, certainly large shareholders, to these kind of changes? Do you feel 

that there is a fairly universal recognition of what we’re talking 

about today, in terms of the changes that sovereign funds bring, for 

example, as opposed to the kind of capital the IMF or the World 

Bank or others used to dispense? 

Mr. HEATH. Well, thank you Senator Lugar for that question. It 

gets to the heart of everything, I suppose. And I would like to actually return and—after, if confirmed, in such a job, I could give a 

better assessment of the receptivity of leadership there, or in other 

876 

countries to change, but certainly for some of the reasons you mentioned, it strikes me as, there is a high level of receptivity. I do 

think that the surprise of the current credit market turmoil that— 

as I mentioned before—coming from a most sophisticated of markets, and not the least sophisticated, is something that catches the 

attention of people around the world. 

In the emerging markets stock performance that you mentioned, 

now I see talk of bubbles in Chinese housing and other asset markets. So, it’s prudent for people to pay attention, not only on the 

extraordinary up side, but what dangers are inherent in that kind 

of rapid growth. 

Generally, these support the notion of caution about imbalances 

around the world, financial imbalances, and an orderly unwinding 

of these imbalances. The new leadership at the IMF, Monsieur 

Strauss Caan begins in a couple of days, has indicated a receptivity 

to a number of reform proposals, not only in the governance of the 

IMF, but looking beyond that to the role. 

And that’s going to be the real test for the IMF is, does it really 

step up to a new type of leadership that the world, in some sense, 

wants in dealing with vulnerabilities and crises and avoiding them, 

or is it going to be passive and more or less a think tank with a 

lot of expertise that offers advice, but no urgency about implementation? I think that’s the key of the emerging market issue—are 

the players invested enough in the organization, so not only can 

they discuss policy, but make deals that stick. 

Senator LUGAR. This intrigues me, just to ask this question. For 

example, some have pointed out that one of the reasons why the 

emerging market banking systems are doing so well comparatively 

during this system, is that perhaps they were not so ‘‘sophisticated.’’ We can drive these subprime loans, package them in all 

sorts of attractive packages, flog them off around the world to other 

sophisticated bankers, who now have them in their portfolio, as the 

triggers are going off, and explosions occurring unexpected, here 

and there and, in other words, many of the so-called emerging markets were not receptive of this, maybe were not considered so sophisticated, thus do not have all of these time bombs sitting around 

in their safes every day, wondering what will happen to the rest 

of their economies. 

Could the IMF, in an ideal situation, be a counselor to banking 

systems throughout the world? Maybe they wouldn’t have spotted 

our sophisticated subprime loans, and the packages, and all of the 

fallout, but maybe some might have been bright enough to do so. 

That is, to understand, as you say, these imbalances in the world. 

Imbalances that are further exacerbated when this type of thing 

with the subprime business in the United States causes explosions 

all over the world, not just with regard to our own economy. 

And, I’m wondering if this is a potential role for the sophisticated 

people who were sitting around the table, maybe dealing with other 

problems in the world at a different point, but now realizing that 

these imbalances themselves could throw things awry and create 

great suffering, as huge recessions occurred in various parts of the 

world, simultaneously, trade dried up, credit situations, ditto—that 

is the kind of thing, I think, that worries many of us, I’m sure you 

877 

as a professional in this situation. What do you see as the possibilities here of a role for the IMF? 

Mr. HEATH. Yes, Senator, I think you’ve explained very well the 

possibility here for a high-level coordinating function for work already being done, perhaps by the Bank of International Settlements or other bodies, but there certainly has, is no parallel to the 

IMF’s credibility in this area. And, I would be interested in pursuing that, or helping to define that emerging role for the IMF. 

It’s bound to be significant in, not only highlighting concerns as 

they’ve done, but as I say, actually making efforts to reach agreements on activity, actions that should be taken by member states. 

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Chairman, as a point of personal privilege, I would compliment you on pointing out the responsiveness of the daughters of 

Mr. Mulvaney when he was testifying, which was exemplary. 

I would like to also add, that the sons of Mr. Heath, when they 

were introduced, stood proud and straight and they looked like candidates for public service if I ever saw them. [Laughter.] 

Mr. HEATH. Senator Lugar, their grandfather is a graduate of 

Purdue University and takes an active interest in the next generation of Purdue University students. 

Senator LUGAR. Great Hoosier roots, I knew it. That’s great. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If you had said that at the beginning, you 

would have saved yourself all of the questions that were—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Well, we appreciate, this is refreshing to hear some rather 

straightforward answers to questions. The administration would be 

well-served to send more people like you up here to give us 

straightforward answers to some questions. 

With that, I understand that it is Chairman Biden’s desire to 

move these nominations quickly. However, the record will remain 

open until 6 p.m. this evening, so that committee members may 

submit additional questions to the nominees, I myself have a few, 

but in the fairness of time, here, we’ll submit it for the record. We 

ask the nominees to respond expeditiously to these questions. 

If no one has any additional comments, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

Mr. Chairman, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider 

the President’s nominees for three important positions—Mr. Sean R. Mulvaney to 

be the Assistant Administrator for Management of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), Mr. Daniel D. Heath to be the Alternate Executive Director 

of the International Monetary Fund, and Patrick Kennedy to be Under Secretary 

of State for Management. 

Sean Mulvaney has been nominated to be the Assistant Administrator for Management at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 

Endemic global poverty remains one of the biggest challenges we face in the world 

today. It is in America’s national interest to help developing countries to achieve 

stable and effective economic, political, and social institutions in order to reduce 

poverty and ease the strain of human despair. Foreign assistance is central to our 

878 

efforts to address the fundamental challenge posed by poverty in our world, and 

USAID will continue to play the lead role in this effort for the United States. 

USAID faces a number of internal challenges over the course of the next several 

years, including long-needed foreign assistance reform and the continuing need to 

make the agency’s financial management and administration as transparent and efficient as possible. Recruiting and sustaining USAID professional staff will be a key 

priority and one that requires closer attention. Contracting oversight will also require close examination, particularly in light of recent developments in Iraq and 

elsewhere. The role of the Assistant Administrator for Management of USAID is integral in addressing these issues. 

Mr. Mulvaney has a strong management and administrative background, with degrees from Washington University in St. Louis and the Thunderbird School of Global Management. Notably, from 2005 to 2007, Mr. Mulvaney handled budget, appropriations, and U.S. trade policy as an Assistant to the Speaker for Policy in the U.S. 

House of Representatives. As adviser to House Foreign Operations Appropriations 

Subcommittee Chair, Congressman Jim Kolbe, Mr. Mulvaney helped in the development and negotiation of a number of important appropriations bills and programs 

including the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 

Mr. Mulvaney will need to ensure the integrity of the agency’s administrative and 

management operations in a rapidly changing and highly complex international environment. 

We are also here to consider the nomination of Mr. Daniel Heath to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 

Today, we live in a globally interconnected society underpinned by a global economy. The IMF plays an important role in the stability and prosperity of that economy. 

The mission of the IMF is to promote economic growth, international financial cooperation, and economic order. The organization will face a number of challenging 

issues over the next several years, including internal institutional and structural reform, the possibility of deteriorating finances, a new IMF Managing Director, and 

a rapidly growing developing world. The organization will need a strong, steady U.S. 

presence in order to navigate these difficult challenges. 

The United States. is the IMF’s largest contributor, with substantial influence on 

the body’s decisionmaking. As the primary U.S. representative at the IMF, the office 

of the U.S. Executive Director has a very influential and important role to play in 

the stability and growth of the global economy. The Alternate Director must have 

a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of international economic and financial issues, represent U.S. interests abroad, and be able to collaborate and cooperate 

with each of the other 184 IMF member countries—as well as America’s own Treasury Department and other U.S. Government officers and agencies. 

Mr. Heath will bring a strong record of government, academic, and business experience to this important position. Heath has served on the National Economic Council at the White House as Associate Director for nearly 6 years. He also served at 

the Office of Management and Budget for over a decade as a Senior Economist. 

Heath has also served as the Director of Economics at Oxford Analytica, an influential international consulting firm. 

Finally, the committee will consider the nomination of Patrick Kennedy to be the 

Under Secretary of State for Management. 

This is a vital position to effective and efficient operations at the State Department. With State Department officials posting in embassies and consulates spanning the globe and several thousand employees in Washington, DC, the Under Secretary for Management must be highly experienced in administration and committed to these challenging tasks. 

Contracting oversight will be an immediate task that Ambassador Kennedy will 

have to address. Our reliance on contractors has led to deep problems, with foreign 

policy implications, particularly in Iraq. 

Ambassador Kennedy is not new to this job, having served as acting Under Secretary for Management from 1996 to 1997. Since that time, he has served in several 

top management positions, including as Director of Management Policy at the State 

Department, as Acting Chief of Staff at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and as Chief of Staff of the Transition Office in Baghdad. 

The committee looks forward to hearing the testimony of Mr. Mulvaney, Mr. 

Heath, and Mr. Kennedy. I believe that each of the nominees is qualified and deserves speedy consideration by the committee. I wish all three of these professionals 

continued success and look forward to working with them at this critical time in 

our country’s history. 

Thank you. 

879 

RESPONSES OF PATRICK F. KENNEDY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. Secretary Gates has recently stated that, at the moment, State Department security contractor methods and the United States military’s effort to protect 

the Iraqi population are at odds. Do you agree with this assessment and, if so, what 

will you do to address this serious problem? 

Answer. The utilization of security contractors is essential to the Department of 

State’s ongoing diplomatic and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Without security contractors, the Department would simply not be able to interact with our counterparts 

in the Iraqi Government and population in furtherance of our critical mission and 

obligations to our Iraqi partners. That being said, the Deputy Secretaries of State 

and Defense have agreed to implement all of the recommendations in the Report 

of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Protective Security Services in Iraq which involve both Departments. This follows on Secretary Rice’s previous decision to implement all of the panel’s recommendations which were solely State Department responsibilities. A number of these steps were intended specifically to better coordinate our security measures with MNF–I operations. 

Additionally, the Deputy Secretaries established a working group with three 

teams to implement those recommendations and recommend any further necessary 

steps. Meetings have already begun on ways to increase coordination and oversight. 

The deputy secretaries and secretaries will continue to be actively involved on this 

issue. 

Question. Has the Department of State conducted a legal analysis of whether the 

excessive use of force, if committed by private security contractors, could be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act? If so, please provide that analysis. If a private 

security contractor in Iraq acted with reckless disregard of civilian life and that conduct resulted in the death of a civilian who was not participating in hostilities, 

would this be a violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions covered 

by the War Crimes Act? 

Answer. Private security contractors hired by the Department of State in Iraq are 

civilians. They are not civilians accompanying the U.S. armed forces, nor are they 

participating in armed conflict. Their primary mission is to protect diplomats from 

harm, not to engage in combat operations. Indeed, the individuals they are protecting are generally civilians, not military officials. The ordinary duties of these security contractors therefore are generally governed by any relevant agreements between the United States and the host country related to their activities and by applicable U.S. and host country rules governing law enforcement-type activities (as 

the Secret Service presumably would be when protecting the President overseas), 

rather than by the laws of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions and 

their Common Article 3. If one of the Department’s private security contractors committed a serious crime, the Department of State would refer the matter to the Department of Justice which would evaluate, among other provisions, whether the contractor had violated the War Crimes Act. 

The Department of State has not conducted a formal legal analysis of whether the 

excessive use of force, if committed by private security contractors hired by the Department, could be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act. 

Question. U.S. military commanders have complained that contractors have fired 

unaimed shots to clear their way in Baghdad. One of the changes you suggested to 

the rules for the use of force is that all shots must be aimed shots. Do unaimed 

shots in urban areas violate the Geneva Conventions? 

Answer. A basic principle of the law of international armed conflict is that combatants are to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants and between 

military objectives and civilian objects when carrying out an attack. Whether 

unaimed shots by a combatant in urban areas violate this principle depends on the 

specific facts and circumstances prevailing at the time. 

In making the specific recommendation, the review panel had been comparing Department of State policies and procedures with those of the Department of Defense. 

The panel found that the State Department’s written guidelines for when to use 

force were robust and more detailed than those of the Department of Defense. However, the panel found that DOD’s rules on how to use force were more clearly written, and thus recommended that DOD’s language be added. 

Question. To date, both the State Department and the Defense Department have 

relied on a self-reporting system to ensure oversight of contractors’ actions. U.S. officials have stated that they do not think that all incidents are reported. Self-reports 

from two of the three State Department security contractors, DynCorp and 

880 

Blackwater, both average around one shooting a week. Has the Department conducted an analysis of whether these shootings were justified? If so, please provide 

any reports that the Department prepared. What percentage of those incidents involved unaimed shots or aimed shots conducted without sufficient prior warning? 

Answer. Personal Security Specialist (PSS) contractors working under the WPPS 

contract are required to immediately report operational incidents of weapons discharges, attacks, serious injury, or death. Contractors are also required to report incidents of a negative nature, including incidents that would reflect negatively on the 

United States, the State Department, RSO, or the contractor. Each post has a Chief 

of Mission approved post specific Mission Firearms Policy that includes reporting requirements for weapons discharges. The RSO, Contracting Officer, and the program 

office receive such notifications simultaneously. 

Significant incidents involving security contractor personnel are reviewed by the 

RSO and by relevant management and oversight offices within the Department to 

ensure that specific use-of-force incidents are consistent with Department policies. 

Incidents of security personnel misconduct are addressed through procedures in accordance with our contractual arrangements. 

The addition of a State Department special agent to every movement will improve 

leadership and oversight, and not require us to rely on self-reporting by the contractor. 

The WPPS base contract and guard contracts require all security personnel to follow the Mission Firearms Policy of the post to which they are assigned. Any use 

of force by security personnel in the course of operations must comply with this policy. 

Embassy Mission Firearms Policies are defensive in nature, while at the same 

time taking into account specific circumstances surrounding our security operations 

in an active war or high-threat zone. The Mission Firearms Policy is founded upon 

the Department of State’s respect for the paramount value of all human life, and 

our commitment to take all reasonable steps to prevent the need to use deadly force. 

Accordingly, the touchstone of the policy is necessity; deadly force can only be used 

in situations where there is no safe alternative to using such force, and without 

which the security personnel and the individuals they are charged with protecting 

would face imminent and grave danger. 

In Iraq, nine personnel have been removed from the Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) program for shootings not in accordance with the rules of engagement in the Mission Firearms Policy. Based on a program office review, two individuals that had been removed from the WPPS program after a 2005 incident 

were declared eligible to return to WPPS, although they have not returned to date. 

One incident, which occurred on December 24, 2006, in Iraq, is under review by the 

Justice Department. The September 16, 2007, incident in Iraq is currently under investigation. 

One individual, employed in Iraq by Triple Canopy Inc. under the Baghdad Embassy Security Force contract, was removed due to the discharge of a weapon. The 

incident occurred on November 7, 2005, and involved a third country national guard 

who, during an indirect fire attack, discharged his weapon at a vehicle from which 

the guard believed an RPG had been fired. There were no injuries as a result of 

this incident. 

DOS is currently conducting a comprehensive review of all use-of-force incidents 

in Iraq. As this process is ongoing, the Department will provide you with an update 

once that review is complete. 

Question. I understand that the reports provided by the contractors are reviewed 

by State Department management. In the past, what has kept contractors from reporting that all of the shootings were justified if in fact some were not justified? 

Answer. Personal Security Specialist (PSS) contractors working under the WPPS 

contract are required to immediately report operational incidents of weapons discharges, attacks, serious injury, or death. Contractors are also required to report incidents of a negative nature, including incidents that would reflect negatively on the 

United States, the State Department, RSO, or the contractor. Each post has a Chief 

of Mission approved post-specific Mission Firearms Policy that includes reporting requirements for weapons discharges. The RSO, contracting officer, and the program 

office receive such notifications simultaneously. 

Significant incidents involving security contractor personnel are reviewed by the 

RSO and by relevant management and oversight offices within the Department to 

ensure that specific use-of-force incidents are consistent with Department policies. 

Incidents of security personnel misconduct are addressed through procedures in accordance with our contractual arrangements. 

881 

The addition of a State Department special agent to every movement will ensure 

that any shooting is reported. 

Question. In your view, if there is no independent oversight of the activities of private security contractors in the field, will their behavior change? 

Answer. The Secretary’s decision to implement the coordination and oversight recommendations, such as the addition of DS agents to motorcades, vehicle cameras, 

and the establishment of the Embassy Joint Incident Review Board, will ensure the 

highest level of accountability for the Department’s protective security contractors. 

The Department of State and Department of Defense have already initiated a series of meetings to increase coordination and to enhance current contractor methods 

as appropriate. Moreover, the Embassy in Baghdad and the Iraqi Prime Minister’s 

office have established a joint Government of Iraq and United States Government 

Commission of Inquiry to examine issues of security and safety related to United 

States Government-affiliated protective security operations and to make joint policy 

recommendations. 

Question. Pursuant to your recommendations to the Secretary, will the RSO staff 

accompanying the security details have command control over the security details? 

Answer. Pursuant to the Secretary’s mandate following the September 16 incident, a diplomatic security special agent is currently serving as the agent in charge 

(AIC) of all protective security details (PSD) for Chief of Mission personnel and has 

command control over the security detail. 

Question. If so, will this include command over the contractor helicopters that 

overfly some of these convoys? 

Answer. RSO air assets are currently under command control of the Regional Security Office’s (RSO) Tactical Operations Center (TOC). If assistance from air assets 

is required, the AIC will request support from the TOC. 

The diplomatic security special agent in charge of the TOC will then authorize 

air support. 

Question. What are the rules for the use of force for contractors operating those 

helicopters? 

Answer. The rules for the use of force outlined in the RSO Baghdad Mission Firearms policy apply to all personnel under Chief of Mission authority, to include RSO 

air assets. 

Question. You did not recommend that State Department security personnel accompany the advance teams that clear the route ahead of the motorcade, correct? 

If so, that means at least half of the movements of private security details will not 

be accompanied, correct? 

Answer. Pursuant to the Secretary’s mandate following the September 16 incident, a diplomatic security special agent is currently serving as the agent in charge 

of all protective security details for Chief of Mission personnel and has command 

control over the security detail. This includes the advance teams, principal’s motorcade, and the tactical support teams (TST). As a result, all movement phases of protective security details are being accompanied by DS agents. 

Question. Of the over 300 incident reports since January 2005, how many were 

filed by advance teams? 

Answer. DOS is currently conducting a comprehensive review of all use-of-force 

incidents in Iraq. As this process is ongoing, the Department will provide you with 

an update once that review is complete. 

Question. Is it correct that, during the September 16 incident, the Blackwater advance team members were among those that fired their weapons? 

Answer. At this time, the Department of State cannot comment on any aspect of 

the ongoing Department of Justice investigation and review of the facts surrounding 

the events of the September 16 incident. 

In addition, my mandate to study the operations of security contractors in Iraq 

did not include investigating the September 16 incident. 

Question. Will the Department continue to rely on the self-reports of advance 

teams since those teams will not be accompanied by DSS personnel? 

Answer. Pursuant to the Secretary’s mandate, a diplomatic security special agent 

is currently serving as the agent in charge of all protective security details for Chief 

of Mission personnel and has command control over the security detail. This includes the advance teams, principal’s motorcade, and the tactical support teams. As 

882 

a result, all movement phases of protective security details are being accompanied 

by DOS agents. 

Question. What about subcontractors at any level who provide security for State 

Department contractors? 

Answer. At this time, the application of oversight policies to State Department 

and Defense Department subcontractors is under review by the joint Department of 

State and Department of Defense working groups. 

Question. Will the recommendation to have DSS employees accompany all motorcades apply to USAID security details and details for other civilian personnel under 

Chief of Mission authority? 

Answer. All personnel, including USAID and civilian personnel, under Chief of 

Mission authority are required by Mission policy to travel with a regional security 

office protective security detail. 

Question. Does it apply to State Department subcontractors at all levels? If not, 

how many subcontractors will not be covered by this requirement? 

Answer. At this time, the application of this policy to State Department subcontractors is not being considered. DS does not have the manpower or resource requirements to establish and sustain such a requirement. 

Question. How many employees are there in Iraq under Chief of Mission authority? 

Answer. As of October 26, 2007, there are 1,183 authorized U.S. positions and 196 

locally employed staff in Iraq. 

Question. how many security details do they require on a daily basis? 

Answer. There are 49 total protective security details (PSDs) currently operating 

in Iraq: Baghdad—34 PSDs; Basrah/Tallil—5 PSDs; Al-Hillah—5 PSDs; and Kirkuk/ 

Erbil—5 PSDs. PSD missions are configured based upon such factors as the venue, 

threat environment, and may include the deployment of an advance team, principal’s motorcade, tactical support team, and explosive detection dog (EDD K–9) 

teams. 

Question. I commend you for recommending that the Embassy Joint Incident Review team include employees of Federal agencies other than the Department of 

State. This makes sense given the fact that as protectees of contractors, State Department employees have a conflict of interest when they investigate their wrongdoing. Indeed, the Associated Press reported that one of the witnesses at the Nisoor 

shooting said that State Department personnel ‘‘tried to intimidate him into changing his story’’ and that his account was consistent with other accounts that the initial State Department investigation appeared to be an attempt to ‘‘vindicate the 

Blackwater guards.’’ Has the State Department investigated these allegations? If so, 

what conclusions did the Department reach? 

Answer. At this time, the Department of State cannot comment on any aspect of 

the ongoing Department of Justice investigation and review of the facts surrounding 

the events of the September 16 incident. In addition, my mandate to study the operations of security contractors in Iraq did not include investigating the September 

16 incident. 

Question. Has the State Department permitted private security contractors to remove employees who have allegedly used excessive force from Iraq? 

Answer. In Iraq, nine personnel have been terminated from the WPPS program 

and one individual from the BESF contract, for shootings not in accordance with the 

rules of engagement in the Mission Firearms Policy. In each case, the personnel left 

post, as the contractual basis and purpose for their remaining in Iraq had ended. 

Incidents of security personnel misconduct, to include their termination and removal 

from post, are addressed through procedures in accordance with our contractual arrangements. 

Question. There has been press indicating that State Department employees investigating the September 16 incident may have conducted their investigation in a 

manner that may make it harder to prosecute contractors involved in that incident 

and/or offered those contractors immunity. Did any State Department employees 

offer any Blackwater employees immunity? Did they coordinate with the Department of Justice before doing so? Do State Department employees have authority to 

offer immunity to individuals alleged to have engaged in wrongdoing? 

Answer. The Department of State is not in a position to immunize individuals 

from Federal criminal prosecution. The kinds of statements about which the press 

883 

has written would provide limited protection that does not preclude prosecution. The 

Department of State would not have asked FBI to investigate this case unless we 

and they thought that they could investigate the case and potentially prosecute individuals if warranted. The Department of Justice has issued a public statement confirming that Blackwater employees have not been given immunity from prosecution 

and that the FBI’s criminal investigation of this matter continues. 

Question. Your panel recommended the use of ‘‘go teams’’ to investigate any shooting incident and to promptly offer ‘‘appropriate condolences and compensation.’’ This 

could create a conflict of interest. Why shouldn’t these functions be delegated to separate entities? 

Answer. The report’s recommendation is for the ‘‘go team’’ to work with counterparts designated by the Government of Iraq to identify potential individuals affected 

by an incident and to initiate the ‘‘appropriate condolences and compensation’’ process. This process would not be in conflict with the other investigative responsibilities 

of the ‘‘Go Teams.’’ The payment of such compensation is not indicative of fault and 

is in accordance with traditional Iraqi norms and cultural expectations. The Department’s program is modeled on the Department of Defense’s claims and condolence 

payment program currently administered in Iraq. 

Question. Please describe the training in evidence collection and crime scene protocols that State Department personnel charged with overseeing private security 

contractors receive. 

Answer. Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) special agents receive crime scene 

preservation/management and evidence collection training. This training is provided 

at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), during DSS Basic Special Agent Course (BSAC) training and again in the DSS Basic Regional Security 

Officer (BRSO) training prior to deployment abroad. The training is broken down 

into the following subject areas: 

FLETC 

• Fingerprint Lecture 

• Rolled Fingerprint Lab 

• Video Techniques Lecture 

• Video Techniques Lab 

• Basic Physical Evidence Collection Lecture 

• Basic Physical Evidence Collection Lab 

• Digital Photography Lecture 

• Photography Lab 

BSAC 

• Evidence Database Lecture 

BRSO 

• Crime Scene Management 

The evidence collection and crime scene management training is part of the 

FLETC, DSS basic agent, and basic RSO training courses. Although this training 

provides an excellent overview of the crime scene and evidence collection fields of 

study, it is not a substitute for the expertise that forensic scientists and/or crime 

scene technicians utilize in processing crime scenes. Additionally, it should be noted 

that the current security situation in Iraq can make it problematic to properly secure a crime scene in accordance with established practice in the United States. 

Question. Would you agree that any Iraqi families who lost loved ones as a result 

of the wrongful use of force are entitled to know that the perpetrator was tried for 

any wrongdoing, not just monetary compensation? 

Answer. The Department of State strongly supports efforts to provide greater 

legal accountability for unlawful acts its security contractors may commit abroad. 

The applicability of U.S. criminal law to the activities of private security contractors 

overseas is not always clear and may depend on the facts at issue in any particular 

case. The administration is currently working with the Congress on legislation to 

clarify any ambiguities and expand the coverage of U.S. criminal laws so that we 

have the laws we need to hold private contractors overseas accountable where appropriate. 

Question. Does the Department support elimination of the immunity created by 

CPA Order 17? 

Answer. CPA Order 17 (Revised) currently gives private security contractors for 

diplomatic missions, including for U.S. missions, immunity from Iraqi legal process 

with respect to acts performed pursuant to the terms and conditions of their conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00891 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
884 

tracts. The U.S. military operating in Iraq, and U.S. Government contractors working on reconstruction, humanitarian, and development projects also receive immunity under this order. 

One of the principal recommendations of the Secretary of State’s panel on personal protective services in Iraq was that the U.S. Government (State and Defense) 

determine how to commence discussions with the Government of Iraq on a new regulatory framework for private security contractors. The panel found that CPA Order 

17 and Memorandum 17, which provide this framework, need to be updated or replaced. 

We are already engaging with the Government of Iraq on this issue. The U.S.- 

Iraqi Joint Commission, co-chaired by the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission and the 

Iraqi Minister of Defense, is examining issues of safety and security related to U.S. 

Government-affiliated personal security detail operations in Iraq. Its work includes 

examination of the impact of CPA Order 17 on such operations. More broadly, as 

the United States and Iraq engage in discussions on their long-term strategic relationship, we expect to address how to update or replace many of CPA Order 17’s 

provisions, including its provisions on jurisdictional immunities. We have seen reports that the Maliki government has a legislative proposal to reformulate the Iraqi 

regulatory framework for private security contractors, but have not yet reviewed a 

draft. 

Question. Are any steps under consideration to bring greater control and coordination over the operations of private security contractors in Iraq other than those on 

the WPPS contract and those on DOD contracts—including many who are providing 

security to contractors and NGOs on DOS (including USAID) contracts? Is there any 

reason to believe there is any lesser need to control and coordinate their operations 

than those of the WPPS contractors? 

Answer. As advised in the response to your first question, the Department of 

State and Department of Defense have already initiated a series of meetings to increase coordination and to enhance current contractor methods as appropriate. This 

process will also include a review of those policies and a determination on their appropriate applicability to State Department subcontractors. 

Question. Are any similar steps being taken in Afghanistan for WPPS contractor 

operations there? If so, what is the status of implementation? If not, why are these 

good ideas for Iraq but not Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Secretary’s decision to implement coordination and oversight recommendations, such as the addition of DOS agents to motorcades, vehicle cameras, 

and the establishment of the Embassy Joint Incident Review Board, is currently focused on ongoing WPPS contractor operations in Iraq. Enhancements in Iraq will 

be evaluated and considered for deployment to WPPS contractors operating in Afghanistan and other countries as appropriate. 

RESPONSES OF SEAN R. MULVANEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. Is the USAID operating expense budget roughly the same now as it was 

in 2001? If no, please clarify. 

Answer. Yes. The fiscal year 2001 (inflation adjusted to 2005 dollars) OE level as 

compared to the fiscal year 2007 enacted level for the OE fund is: 

• Fiscal year 2001 OE = $589,000,000. 

• Fiscal year 2007 OE Appropriation = $626,832,000. 

The difference between 2001 and 2007 OE dollars = $37,832,000. This is approximately a 6 percent increase over 2001 dollars and is attributed to annual payroll 

adjustments. 

Amounts do not include Office of Inspector General or the Capital Investment 

Fund. 

Question. Is it correct that USAID program funds were about $7–8 billion in 2001 

and are about $13 billion now? What does the $13 billion figure include? Specifically, does it include some PEPFAR programs and MCC Threshold programs? 

Answer. Yes, it is correct. In fiscal year 2001, USAID managed approximately 

$7.362 billion of program funds. In fiscal year 2007, USAID estimates that it managed approximately $12.772 billion of program funds. 

The $12.772 billion figure includes PEPFAR funds of approximately $1.3 billion 

and MCC programs. These figures are based on total dollars obligated. 

885 

RESPONSES OF SEAN R. MULVANEY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. It is critical that USAID is able to recruit and retain the highest-caliber 

personnel if it is to carry out its mission and fulfill its development objectives. As 

you know, attrition rates at the agency are extremely high. Please describe what 

steps you would take to ensure that the agency is able to recruit top-level staff. 

Please also discuss what steps are needed to provide opportunities for rising junior 

officers, improve morale, and increase junior officer and overall staff retention rates. 

Answer. Over the past few years, attrition for the Foreign Service and Civil Service has been around 7 percent per year, with over 82 percent of Foreign Service attrition and 33 percent of Civil Service attrition due to retirement. These levels are 

commensurate with other similar U.S. Government agencies. 

USAID has traditionally attracted very high quality candidates. Over the past 

many years, however, agency budgets have seriously constrained hiring Foreign 

Service officers above attrition, as well as Civil Service hiring in critical areas such 

as procurement, even as the size and scope of our programs have increased dramatically. If confirmed, I am committed to helping USAID reverse this trend by targeting resources to meet the Foreign Service and Civil Service recruitment needs 

of the agency. 

USAID values all of its employees and has strived to provide professional growth 

opportunities for its entire staff to avoid any increase in attrition. We greatly appreciate the flexibility Congress granted USAID to more rapidly assign our junior officers overseas and we intend to continue to use it to the fullest extent possible. 

Training is understood to be of utmost importance. In fiscal year 2007, USAID doubled the training budget for staff development focusing efforts on technical and leadership skill enhancement. I am committed to sustaining our focus on increased 

training for staff, including additional foreign language training. 

Question. At USAID field missions, administrative staff complains that the State 

Department and USAID have very different needs and that consolidation programs 

fail to address these differences. 

• What administrative requirements of USAID are not shared by State? 

• How do these differences make consolidation difficult for USAID? 

• Will consolidation efforts impede USAID activities in any way? 

Answer. USAID and State negotiated 15 administrative support functions (warehouse management, expendable supplies, leasing, motor pool, property maintenance, 

customs and shipping, reproduction services, administrative procurement, mail, 

messenger and pouch services, Foreign Service National (FSN) payroll and FSN initiatives, cashiering, recruitment, the Eligible Family Member program, and language training) that would be subject to consolidation, and further agreed that functions that are unique to supporting USAID operations would not be subject to consolidation. USAID does not share hiring and classification authority for all staffing 

actions, and will continue to perform its non-ICASS equivalent HR functions. 

USAID technical and program management, legal advisory support, procurement, 

grant-making and financial management activities that support programmatic 

USAID functions and staff are not subject to consolidation with State. 

Integration of Information Technology (IT) systems and services to support the 

consolidation initiative is a significant challenge. State and USAID have made considerable progress in developing and deploying an IT solution to enable the use of 

shared IT applications to support the consolidated administrative support services. 

The IT solution has provided the enabling environment to eliminate redundancies 

through the use of standardized applications. Uniform use of these applications in 

the coming year will be a significant accomplishment of the consolidation initiative. 

Consolidation of overlapping services is a sound objective. Nonetheless, the consolidation of these 15 administrative services will require ICASS in many instances 

to change its service standards to meet USAID’s business requirements as the implementing United States Government agency for foreign assistance. Providing the 

necessary administrative support to USAID’s activities while ensuring cost effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of services will be a continuing challenge for ICASS. 

(887) 

NOMINATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

Glendon, Mary Ann, to be Ambassador to the Holy See 

Larson, Charles W., Jr., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Latvia 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr. 

presiding. 

Present: Senator Casey. 

Also present: Senators Harkin and Grassley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. The 

Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order to consider 

nominations for two important diplomatic posts. The President of 

the United States has asked that Mary Ann Glendon serve as 

United States Ambassador to the Holy See, and that Charles Larson represent the United States as Ambassador to Latvia. And I 

want to welcome Professor Glendon and Mr. Larson here, and if 

you have family here, and others, we welcome them, as well. 

And I know that Senator Tom Harkin—I refer to him as Chairman Harkin, we’re on—we serve together, but he’s done a wonderful job in a number of posts that affect people’s lives, but he and 

I just came through the process of having the Farm bill voted on 

by the United States Senate, and as the Chairman of the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, he’s done a wonderful 

job on a very difficult piece of legislation. Not to mention, some of 

the people, like me, he has to deal with in that process. He has 

served so honorably over many years in the United States Senate, 

we’re honored to have him here. 

And I guess I just wanted to provide some background, but I 

wanted to make sure that we’re—I was cognizant of Senator Harkin’s time and his schedule. 

Senator, I’m just asking you if you’re—do you have—how much 

time do you have to—— 

A couple of minutes, okay. 

Maybe we’ll do, instead of providing some background, maybe I’ll 

just go right to you. 

888 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM HARKIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA 

Senator HARKIN. I’d appreciate that, very much. 

Senator CASEY. And you can provide your statement or testimony, and then we’ll move forward. 

Senator HARKIN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

I appreciate, first of all, your expediting this hearing for these two 

candidates—one of whom I know, the other one I don’t, but I congratulate her for her position, and for expediting this, and hopefully we can get the full committee to further expedite it. 

Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for your kind words on the 

Farm bill. That was a long exercise, and I want to personally thank 

you for all of the good work that you did on the committee and 

helping us pull it together and finally get it through, and hopefully 

we’ll get it done here sometime in January, as we get through the 

conference committee. 

But I just wanted to be here this morning to introduce to you, 

Mr. Chairman, and to the committee—through you to the committee—Chuck Larson, the President’s nominee to be our next Ambassador to Latvia. 

I’ve known Chuck Larson and his father for quite some time, His 

father served as the U.S. District Attorney in the 1980s, first under 

President Reagan, then under President Bush, and then there was 

a hey, this there, for the 1990s, and then his dad came back again 

as District Attorney under President Bush. 

And I can just tell you—so Chuck comes from a family of really 

dedicated public service—people that are interested in public service, and Chuck himself has taken up that himself. 

He served—graduated from the University of Northern Iowa 

when he was a member of the legislature, member of the House, 

Iowa House for a long time, I think, from 1993 to 2003, a member 

of the Iowa House. He chaired the Judiciary Committee and, in 

fact, had pushed through one of the toughest 

antimethamphetamine laws anywhere in the Nation, and we’ve 

had a real problem with that in Iowa, and Chuck did a great job 

in leading the charge on that. 

He also chaired the Iowa House Economic Development Committee, making Iowa a more competitive environment to attract 

and retain some high-paying jobs. 

Now then, from 2003 to 2007 he served in the Iowa Senate, and 

served as chairman of the Iowa Republican Party from 2001 to 

2005. Again, to show you his dedication to public service, while he 

was a State Senator he was also in the Army Reserves, and served 

for a year in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Was awarded 

the Bronze Star for meritorious service in combat, and the combat 

action badge. He was stationed in LSA, Anaconda in the heart of 

the Sunni Triangle, in charge of the command’s legal affairs and 

spearheaded its humanitarian missions. 

As I’ve stated earlier, I’ve known Chuck Larson for over, well 

over a decade—more than that. He is a qualified public servant, 

and I urge this committee to report his nomination with a positive 

recommendation. 

And if I just might add, parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, you see 

I have some, I have perhaps some personal interest in this also. 

889 

You see, Chuck Larson is a very active, dedicated Republican, 

served as chair of the Republican Party. I happen to be up next 

year, I figure if he’s in Latvia, I might have a better time of it next 

year. [Laughter.] 

But he’s served with distinction as chair of the Republican Party, 

and I can say this—he’s landed a few blows on me in the past, but 

they were always, as I always say, in-bounds and between the goal 

posts—which is the way political contests ought to be conducted. 

And he’s done so in his own political career in Iowa, the same way. 

So, I just have no hesitation at all in endorsing him—great family, great person, great father, good family, two kids, and I can’t 

think of a better representative of what we stand for in America, 

to represent us abroad than Chuck Larson, so I just give him my 

wholehearted support for this. And we’ll get him to Latvia so he’s 

not around Iowa next year. [Laughter.] 

Thanks, Chuck. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, we want to thank you for being 

here, especially today when it’s rather quiet in the Capital after a 

late night, and we were passing legislation late into the evening 

last night, actually almost into the early morning, and it’s another 

sign of Chairman Harkin’s dedication that he’s here at all this 

morning, not heading back like some others are. And we’re just 

grateful that you’re taking the time to be here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it very much. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator HARKIN. See you later. 

Mr. LARSON. Thank you, sir. Have a great Christmas and New 

Year. 

Senator HARKIN. Hopefully we can get this thing done in a hurry. 

Senator CASEY. I, first of all, wanted to formally welcome both 

Professor Glendon and Mr. Larson to the hearing today. I think, 

speaking about both of you—and I’ll try to speak about each of you 

individually, but together you both provide a whole broad range of 

experience that you bring to this hearing and to this confirmation 

process that spans all kinds of life experience, subject matter expertise and experience in public affairs and public policy. So, we’re 

grateful that you’ve demonstrated the willingness to put yourself 

forward to be confirmed and to serve the United States Government and the people of our country. 

And I know you look forward to, even, the challenges that you’ll 

be confronting, not just the challenge of the confirmation process, 

but the challenge of serving. And I know you see that as both and 

opportunity for meeting challenges, but also as an opportunity for 

meeting challenges, but also an opportunity to render capable and 

effective and competent public service. 

I wanted to start with the Ambassador of the Holy See, that position, Professor Glendon. I think as the seat of the Catholic Church 

we know that the Holy See is unique among diplomatic postings 

around the world. Its influence reaches into the lives of over a billion individuals worldwide, who look to the Vatican for spiritual 

guidance, including one out of every four Americans. As a Roman 

Catholic, I am one of those of every four Americans. 

890 

Worldwide, the Catholic Church has been at the forefront of efforts to promote human rights, to protect human dignity, and to 

provide humanitarian assistance across the world. 

The Church, I think, has challenged people of all faiths to care 

about and to fight for the least, the last, and the lost in our society, 

and of course that goes for the world over. We know that under the 

leadership—just by way of important examples—under the leadership of Pope John Paul II, the Holy See played a particularly significant role in ending decades of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. And although our Government over the years, and I think 

even at present, doesn’t always agree with the Church on every 

issue, I think when you talk about the priorities I just mentioned— 

whether it’s the role played by the church in ending communism, 

the role in Eastern Europe, the role it plays in human rights and 

human dignity or the work that it does on humanitarian causes 

around the globe—I think on those priorities, the Vatican has been 

an invaluable partner for the United States of America, and we expect that to continue. 

Professor Glendon, I think based upon your own experience, just 

your resume alone, you’re well-prepared to continue that long and 

cooperative relationship between the United States and the Holy 

See. 

Due to your extensive past work on behalf of the Catholic 

Church, and your experience and expertise in domestic and international law, you are already well-acquainted with many of the 

issues that you’ll confront as ambassador. 

You’ve gained wide respect as a legal scholar of the first order. 

I’m a lawyer—I’ve never been accused of being a legal scholar—but 

I have great respect and regard for those in our legal circles who 

have that capacity. 

But, I think, in addition to the academic underpinning of your 

experience, you’ve been honored as an advocate, and I think you’ve 

been honored as a servant. And, of course, by taking on the responsibility of putting yourself forward as a candidate, a nominee to be 

an ambassador, you’re, of course, amplifying and enlarging and 

public service that is so important in the United States today. 

I want to recognize in a personal way the work that you did with 

my father, when he was the governor of Pennsylvania and thereafter, he remained active as an advocate in the nonprofit world 

after he left his 8 years as governor, but I personally want to thank 

you for the way that you worked with him, and the respect that 

you accorded him. 

And I know that he had high regard for you, as I mentioned a 

couple of moments ago, as a lawyer. He was a really, really good 

lawyer, and had great respect for good lawyers. But he also, I 

think, respected your integrity and your honesty and your commitment to principle. 

Like him, you’ve never shied away from taking tough stands. 

You’ve been honest about where you stand, and I think he was a 

great example of that, on a whole range of public policy matters 

going back, in his case, going back a couple of decades in public office. 

He was a someone—if I can just add a personal note here—probably the only person in, I think, certainly the history of PennsylVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00898 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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vania, but maybe the history of any other State, who ran for governor of Pennsylvania in four different decades. Not all of those 

successful, but he had a great determination and a great identification with the underdog. And I think if—the church, when it’s at its 

best—in this country, and worldwide, does that when it’s focused 

on the underdog, the person who doesn’t have a voice, or at least 

doesn’t have power. 

So, we’re grateful for that personal connect that you made to 

him, and I’m especially grateful. 

I think your work as ambassador would probably require that 

you draw upon those skills and that experience and that passion 

that you bring, and that you have brought to your work. So, we’re 

grateful for your presence here today and looking forward to your 

testimony. 

Mr. Larson, I want to thank you for your willingness to serve. 

It doesn’t happen very often that a United States Senator from the 

other party gives the kind of testimony that Senator Harkin just 

gave on your behalf, and I think that speaks volumes about both 

of you. It doesn’t happen enough in Washington, and usually when 

it happens there is no coverage of it—or limited coverage. 

But I’ve been a witness, and those of us here today are bearing 

witness to that kind of—not just bipartisanship, but I think an affirmative statement about your qualifications. 

The country of Latvia is one of the many countries in the world— 

as we were speaking about the Vatican—benefit from the Vatican’s 

efforts to roll back the Iron Curtain. This country has amassed— 

Latvia has amassed—an impressive list of accomplishments even 

more recently, since reestablishing its independence from the Soviet Union, joining NATO and the European Union. It’s been at the 

forefront of regional efforts to promote democracy—so important 

across the world—and its economic growth rate is the envy of 

Western Europe. 

Latvia has also been an important security partner for the 

United States of America, and has currently almost 100 troops 

serving in Afghanistan. 

Despite these achievements, Latvians face considerable challenges, as you know. Like other countries in the region, it struggles 

with corruption, the problem of energy dependence on Russia, and 

the successful integration of a large Russian minority. 

Resolving these issues won’t be easy, and the people of Latvia deserve our support as they work to meet these challenges. 

Mr. Larson, your past experience as a prosecutor—and dare I say 

it, a politician, which I think actually is a good qualification, despite what we read in newspapers sometimes—and also as a soldier 

will be valuable preparation for representing our country, the 

United States of America, as an Ambassador to Latvia. The legal, 

political, and security challenges facing Latvia’s young democracy 

will draw upon all of your varied professional stills, and we thank 

you for your willingness to serve. 

And I would say to both of our nominees today, both of your 

nominations come at a critical time in the history of American diplomacy. Now, more than ever, the United States needs ambassadors who exemplify the principles that made our Nation great, 

and still make it great. Providing that type of representation in the 

892 

Holy See, and in Latvia, will require all of your energy, creativity, 

and determination, but I’m confident that both of you are up to 

that task. 

We’ll turn to our nominees at this moment, and I ask you both 

to deliver your statements in the order you were introduced, Professor Glendon, you can start. And if you can be somewhat brief 

and succinct, that would be helpful, and if you feel the need to 

summarize your testimony, please know that the text of your full 

statement will be included in the hearing record. 

And I know that this—and we probably don’t do this enough— 

this is not just a day for the particular United States Senate committee, or just a day for the discussion about a confirmation—this 

is a personal moment, and an important personal moment in your 

life, so if you have family or friends that you’d want to introduce— 

I’m glad the room isn’t full of hundreds that we have to introduce, 

but if you have someone or a group of individuals you’d like to introduce, certainly we’d welcome your using that, your time to 

present them at this time. 

So, at this time, Professor Glendon, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF MARY ANN GLENDON, NOMINEE TO BE 

AMBASSADOR TO THE HOLY SEE 

Ms. GLENDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this 

hearing. It’s a real honor and a privilege to be before you today as 

you consider my nomination to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to 

the Holy See and I will try to be brief. 

My hope is, if I am confirmed by the Senate, that my 30 years 

of experience in a variety of international settings could aid me in 

promoting American interests and the American image, the best of 

American values with the Holy See. 

Most of my legal work, my research, and my pro bono activity 

have, as it happens, been concentrated in areas that are common 

interest to the Holy See and the United States, and so if I were 

confirmed, I would expect to be vigorously involved in the collaboration that already exists between the United States and the Holy 

See on such issues as human rights, religious freedom, trafficking 

in human persons, development and alleviation of hunger, disease, 

and poverty. 

From the beginning of my legal career—which was quite a long 

time ago—I’ve been engaged in cross-national dialogs. I studied European law at the University of Brussels and interned at what was 

then the European Common Market, now the European Union, and 

since then I’ve had leadership roles in many organizations that are 

dedicated to improving international relations. 

I’d just mention three experiences, in particular, that seem to be 

relevant to the Holy See post. I was elected the President of the 

UNESCO-sponsored International Association for Legal Science by 

a multinational membership, a worldwide membership. I was a 

member of the Board of Directors of the Southern Africa Legal Assistance Program, which during the apartheid era, provided scholarships and other kinds of aid to aspiring African lawyers, and I’m 

a member of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, a group 

whose members are drawn from five continents and a variety of religious backgrounds—I’ve been their President since 2004. And curVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00900 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
893 

rently, I’m involved with Harvard Law School’s efforts to internationalize its curriculum. 

In all of those capacities, I have organized many international 

conferences here and abroad, and I would hope that that sort of activity would be part of the work of the Ambassador to the Holy See. 

Among my writings relevant to the post, I will mention just one, 

my history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 

is a diplomatic history and a biography of Eleanor Roosevelt, covering the years when she chaired the Human Rights Commission 

and represented the United States in the United Nations. 

I would also like to mention that my participation in the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, my pro bono work for the Catholic 

Church has, I believe, given me a certain insight and understanding of the Holy See that should be helpful to me in advocating 

for our Government, and help to fortify the cooperation that has already been achieved. 

Mr. Chairman, the Holy See is a vital partner for the United 

States. It’s a vital partner because of its global reach and impact, 

its presence in areas that are of concern to the United States that 

affect U.S. interests and the U.S. image abroad. The Holy See is 

actively engaged on five continents in humanitarian work, as you 

said, Mr. Chairman, for the least, the lost and the last, for the defense of human dignity and for the promotion of dialog among diverse faiths and cultures. 

Its concerns in those areas form a natural alliance with many of 

our policies, and if confirmed, I would work vigorously to develop 

those areas for our mutual benefit. 

I believe that Pope Benedict’s forthcoming visit to the United 

States in April will provide an excellent opportunity for us to develop our mutual interests, and explore new areas of cooperation. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, if I were confirmed, I would devote my 

best efforts to building on the relationship that already exists, reinforcing those ties. It would be a privilege to be entrusted with that 

responsibility, to carry on the work of Ambassador Rooney, and the 

other fine representatives that have served the United States at 

the Holy See since we began diplomatic relations in 1984. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would look forward to working with 

you and with your colleagues in Congress to serve the American 

people and to advance our national interests abroad. And I would 

be very pleased to answer any questions that you have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Glendon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY ANN GLENDON, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE HOLY SEE

Mr. Chairman, and members of this distinguished committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as you consider my nomination to serve as United States Ambassador to the Holy See. I am grateful for President Bush’s nomination, and for 

the support of Secretary Rice. 

If confirmed by the Senate, my hope is that my experience in a variety of international settings will aid me in promoting American interests with the Holy See. 

Most of my legal work, academic writing, and pro bono activity has concentrated in 

areas where the United States and the Holy See have common concerns. If confirmed, I would expect to be vigorously involved in the collaboration that has already been established on a range of issues, such as human rights, religious freedom, trafficking in human persons, development, and the fight against hunger, disease and poverty. 

894 

For many years, my work in international legal studies has engaged me in crossnational dialogs in those areas. After studying European civil law at the University 

of Brussels, I worked as a press liaison in the headquarters of the European Common Market, now the European Union. Over the course of my academic career, I 

have had leadership roles in many organizations dedicated to improving international relations. 

Three experiences in particular that I would mention are the UNESCO-sponsored 

International Association for Legal Studies (to which I was elected president by a 

multinational membership), the board of directors of the Southern Africa Legal Assistance Program (which aided aspiring African lawyers in the apartheid years), and 

the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (a group whose members are drawn from 

five continents and from a variety of religious backgrounds). Currently, I have been 

closely involved with Harvard Law School’s efforts to adapt its curriculum to the 

needs of students who will be practicing law in increasingly globalized environments. 

An important part of representing our country as ambassador is bringing people 

together on matters of common interest to the United States and the Holy See. I 

have been the principal organizer of numerous international conferences over the 

past 20 years for Harvard Law School, for the International Association of Legal 

Science, and for the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. 

Among my writings on subjects relevant to the post for which I have been nominated, I would mention especially my history of the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights, a book that combines diplomatic history with a biography of Eleanor Roosevelt covering the years when she represented the United States in the United Nations. 

I would also like to mention that since 1994, when I was appointed to the Pontifical Academy of Social Science, I have acquired a knowledge and understanding of 

the Holy See that will aid me in advocating for our Government, while helping to 

fortify and expand the cooperation that has already been achieved. 

Mr. Chairman, the Holy See is actively engaged on every continent in the defense 

of peace, justice, and human rights. Because of this global perspective, the Holy See 

is a vital partner for the United States. 

The Vatican is committed to defending fundamental human rights, promoting 

human dignity, and working to advance dialog among people of differing faiths, 

races, and ethnicities. These priorities create a natural alignment with our policies 

that, if confirmed, I intend to exploit to its fullest potential in our mutual benefit. 

The Pontiff’s visit to the United States next April will provide an excellent opportunity to expand areas of cooperation and explore new ones. President Bush and 

Pope Benedict met in Rome in the summer of 2006 and this visit will deepen the 

tie between the two leaders. 

If confirmed, I would devote my best efforts to build relations at all levels and 

deepen the ties that have existed between the United States and the Holy See ever 

since formal diplomatic relations were established in 1984. It would be a privilege 

and an honor to be entrusted with the responsibility of carrying forward the fine 

work of Ambassador Rooney and all the other U.S. representatives who have served 

so ably in that post. 

Mr. Chairman, Embassy Vatican is at the front lines of this important shared 

agenda. Though few in numbers, its outstanding staff does excellent work on a modest budget. If confirmed, I will work with them to move forward our current priority 

issues and seek new areas in which to engage the Vatican. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your colleagues in Congress to serve the American people and advance our national interests. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator CASEY. Professor, thank you very much, I appreciate 

your testimony. 

Mr. Larson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES W. LARSON, JR., NOMINEE 

TO BE AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA 

Mr. LARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, first, want to 

thank you for the time you’ve taken on the eve of the holiday and 

the New Year after a very long session, which I can appreciate 

from my service in the legislature, so I’m very, very thankful. I also 

want to thank the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff for 

895 

their hard work in organizing today’s hearing, and Senator Harkin, 

for his kind words. This has been a tremendous experience and I 

only have the highest regard and compliments for Senator Harkin 

and his staff—they have literally bent over backward to assist me, 

and without their support, I recognize that this hearing would not 

be occurring on such short notice. 

I’m deeply honored to appear before you today as President 

Bush’s nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the 

Republic of Latvia. I’m grateful to President Bush and Secretary 

Rice for the confidence and trust they have placed in me, and if 

confirmed, I pledge to maintain that trust by working to advance 

and defend American interests in Latvia, while deepening the ties 

between our two nations. 

For 14 years, I served the citizens of Iowa as a representative, 

as well as a Senator in the Iowa legislature. Through that experience, I learned the importance of being responsive to the legitimate 

needs of the people. 

As State representative, I had the opportunity to chair several 

committees. My work as chair of the House Judiciary Committee 

increased my appreciation for the essential role of the rule of law, 

and the importance that it plays in a democratic nation. 

As chairman of the House Economic Development Committee, I 

participated in a mission to Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, 

and witnessed the importance of trade in strengthening relationships between nations. My respect and appreciation for cultures 

outside of the United States began in my youth, when I lived in 

Saudi Arabia for 2 years, and further developed when I spent a 

year in France. 

In 2004, I deployed to Iraq as a citizen-soldier with the United 

States Army, serving as the Command Judge Advocate for an engineer and aviation command for 1 year. 

In addition to my military justice duties, I spearheaded our command’s humanitarian mission, working with Iraqis to build 12 new 

schools, 3 city halls, and to distribute more than $100,000 in school 

and medical supplies to approximately 17,000 Iraqi children. 

Through this work, a bond of trust developed between the Iraqis 

and American forces, and a foundation was laid to develop some of 

the key elements of democracy at the lowest level. 

My experience in Iraq ingrained in me the critical importance of 

security and counterterrorism, as well. The welfare and protection 

of American citizens will continue to be one of my key priorities, 

if confirmed. 

Overall, my legislative and cross-cultural experiences have 

taught me the importance of diplomacy, strengthening political and 

economic ties with other nations, and of achieving results by moderation, tact and compromise. It is in that knowledge that I will 

apply to my position, if confirmed as United States Ambassador to 

Latvia. 

Since regaining its independence is 1991, Latvia has rapidly 

moved away from the political economic structures and 

sociocultural patterns of the former Soviet Union. Today, Latvia 

fully embraces democratic and open market principles. It’s a member of the IMF, the World Bank, the Organization on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, and in 2004 Latvia officially joined the EuVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00903 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
896 

ropean Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in 

2006 it hosted NATO’s summit in its capital of Riga. 

As a NATO ally, Latvia has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us 

in the war on terrorism. This country of 2.3 million has deployed 

more than 10 percent of its national armed forces to coalition and 

NATO peacekeeping missions abroad. Having supported the liberation of Iraq for several years, Latvia has now shifted its deployment focus to Afghanistan, where it plans to increase its deployments from the current 98 soldiers to 200 by October 2008, with 

no caveat. 

In addition to using its troops to promote democracy in the 

world, Latvia provides developmental assistance and expertise to 

other countries of the former Soviet Union, as they work to build 

their own democratic states. Latvia’s microfinance projects provide 

economic assistance to Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine. 

Latvia also funds projects to transfer to these countries the knowledge it gained from the political reforms it undertook in order to 

accede to NATO and the European Union. 

If confirmed, I will work to support and encourage continued robust Latvian engagement in the fight against terror, and the promotion of freedom worldwide. 

Latvia still has to work to overcome the legacy of World War II 

and the Soviet rule, particularly in promoting social integration, 

historical reconciliation and the rule of law. 

Almost 29 percent of Latvian’s residents are ethnic Russians, 

and a large portion of them are noncitizens. The Latvian Government has been making an effort to achieve a more complete social 

integration of this minority population. Latvia’s policies on minority language, education, naturalization and citizenship requirements for voting are consistent with international norms. 

I hope to use my position as ambassador to support the government in outreach efforts, not only with the Russian community, but 

all minority interests. 

Latvia is also making progress in coming to terms with the horrors of the Holocaust. The Latvian Historical Commission, under 

sponsorship of the Government of Latvia has promoted Holocaust 

awareness throughout all elements of society. Although the restitution of Jewish property has been substantially completed, approximately 200 communal and heirless private properties have yet to 

be compensated for. If confirmed, I will work with the government 

and the local Jewish community to further address Holocaust legacy and property restitution issues. 

Latvia continues to take steps toward strengthening the rule of 

law, and increasing transparency. Latvia similarly has taken important steps to ensure a productive relationship with neighboring 

Russia, including forming an intergovernmental commission with 

Russia to address bilateral issues. Today, the two countries exchanged the instruments of ratification on a historic treaty, delineating their common border, in fact that occurred yesterday with 

very, very positive comment. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, I know the high importance each of you place on service to the United States of American. I, too, place a high value on service to our country, whether 

as a citizen-soldier, or as an ambassador. 

897 

If you confirm my nomination, I pledge to dedicate myself to promoting the ideals of the United States, while protecting and developing our relationship with Latvia. Thank you for granting me the 

honor of appearing before you today, I’m pleased to answer any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Larson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES W. LARSON, NOMINEE TO BE

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am deeply honored to appear before 

you today as President Bush’s nominee to be the next United States Ambassador 

to the Republic of Latvia. I am grateful to President Bush and Secretary Rice for 

the confidence and trust they have placed in me. If confirmed, I pledge to maintain 

that trust by working to advance and defend American interests in Latvia while 

deepening the ties between our two nations. 

For 14 years, I served the citizens of Iowa as a representative as well as a Senator 

in the State legislature. Through this experience I learned the importance of being 

responsive to the legitimate needs of the people. As a State representative, I had 

the opportunity to chair several committees. My work on the House Judiciary Committee increased my appreciation for the essential role the rule of law plays in a 

democratic nation. As chairman of the House Economic Development Committee, I 

participated in a mission to Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, and witnessed the 

importance of trade in strengthening the relationships between nations. 

My respect and appreciation for cultures outside the United States began in my 

youth, when I lived with my family in Saudi Arabia for 2 years and further developed when I studied in France for a year. 

In 2004, I deployed to Iraq as a citizen soldier with the United States Army, serving as the command judge advocate for an engineer and aviation command for 1 

year. In addition to my military justice duties, I spearheaded our command’s humanitarian mission, working with Iraqis to build 12 schools, 3 city halls, and to distribute more than $100,000 worth of donated school supplies to approximately 

17,000 Iraqi school children. Through this work, a bond of trust developed between 

the Iraqis and American forces and a foundation was laid to develop some of the 

key elements of democracy at the local level. 

My experience in Iraq ingrained in me the critical importance of security and 

countering terrorism, as well. The welfare and protection of American citizens will 

continue to be one of my key priorities. 

Overall, my legislative and cross-cultural experiences have taught me the importance of diplomacy, of strengthening political and economic ties with other nations, 

and of achieving results by moderation, tact, and compromise. 

It is that knowledge that I will apply to my position as United States Ambassador 

to Latvia. Since regaining its independence in 1991, Latvia has rapidly moved away 

from the political-economic structures and sociocultural patterns of the former Soviet Union. Today, Latvia fully embraces democratic and open market principles. It 

is a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In 2004, Latvia officially joined the 

European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and in 

2006 it hosted the NATO Summit in its capital, Riga. 

As a NATO Ally Latvia has stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us in the war on terrorism. This country of 2.3 million people has deployed more than 10 percent of its 

national armed forces to coalition and NATO peacekeeping missions abroad. Having 

supported the liberation of Iraq for several years, Latvia has now shifted its deployment focus to Afghanistan, where it plans to increase its deployment from the current 98 troops to 200 by October 2008, with no caveats. 

In addition to using its troops to promote democracy in the world, Latvia provides 

development assistance and expertise to other countries of the former Soviet Union 

as they work to build their own democratic states. Latvia’s microfinance projects 

provide economic assistance to Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine. Latvia also 

funds projects to transfer to these countries the knowledge it gained from the political reforms it undertook in order to accede to NATO and the European Union. If 

confirmed, I will work to support and encourage continued robust Latvian engagement in the fight against terror and the promotion of freedom worldwide. 

Latvia still has work to do to overcome the legacy of World War II and Soviet 

rule, particularly in promoting social integration, historical reconciliation, and the 

rule of law. Almost 29 percent of Latvia’s residents are ethnic Russians, and a large 

portion of them are noncitizens. The Latvian Government has been making an effort 

898 

to achieve a more complete social integration of this minority population. Latvia’s 

policies on minority language education, naturalization, and citizenship requirements for voting are consistent with international norms. I hope to use my position 

as ambassador to support the Government in its outreach efforts with not only the 

Russian community but all minorities. 

Latvia is also making progress in coming to terms with the horrors of the Holocaust. The Latvian Historical Commission, under sponsorship of the Government of 

Latvia, has promoted Holocaust awareness throughout all elements of society. Although the restitution of Jewish property has been substantially completed, approximately 200 communal and heirless private properties have yet to be compensated 

for. If confirmed, I will work with the Government and the local Jewish community 

to further address Holocaust legacy and property restitution issues. 

Latvia continues to take steps toward strengthening the rule of law and increasing transparency. Latvia similarly has taken important steps to ensure a productive 

relationship with neighboring Russia, including forming an intergovernmental commission with Russia to address bilateral issues. Today, the two countries exchange 

the instruments of ratification of a historic treaty delineating their common border. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, I know the high importance that each 

of you places on service to the United States of America. I too place a high value 

on service to our country, whether as a citizen soldier or as an ambassador. If you 

confirm my nomination, I pledge to dedicate myself to promoting the ideals of the 

United States while protecting and developing our relationship with Latvia. 

Thank you for granting me the honor of appearing before you today. I am pleased 

to answer any questions. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Larson. We’ll start the round of 

questions now. The rounds normally at a hearing like this go per 

Senator, 7 minutes or even 10 minutes, but usually about 7 minutes. I don’t want to alarm you, though, I’m not going to multiply 

7 by every chair here, so—I have some discretion today as chairman, but also as the lone Senator sitting here, so I might have 

some—a couple of questions beyond the 10 minutes, but I’m grateful for your testimony. 

I guess I’ll start, Professor Glendon, with you. A couple of questions. One would be—we live in a world now where, because of 

what we’re seeing playing out not only in the Middle East, but especially there and across the world, conflicts that have some of 

their origin in religious differences, in fact, sometimes even disputes—violent disputes—about the meaning of one, tenets of one 

particular religion, we’re seeing that all of the time. 

And I guess, in light of the conflict, but also just in terms of the 

integrity of our debates about these issues, I wanted to ask you 

about—I guess, one or two questions about how you’d assess the 

Holy See’s kind of broader relationship with the Muslim world. I 

know it’s an expansive question but it becomes very important, because I think the Holy See becomes—not an arbiter, but becomes 

an important player in those kinds of situations where you have 

not just countries competing for power or resources, but also when 

it comes to relationships, or the kind of ecumenical efforts that we 

try to make, not only in this country but as a world leader. 

But, I guess, I want to get your just, general sense of the relationship between the Holy See and the Muslim world. 

Ms. GLENDON. I’d start by recalling that the Holy See has had 

a long, long experience with dialog with the Muslim world. It’s a 

dialog that’s had its phases and its ups and downs. But, at the 

present time, that dialog has been marked by a very intensive 

search by the Holy See for discussion partners who are open to the 

idea of meeting on the plane of reason—this has been a particular 

mark of the Pontificate of Benedict that he looking for persons who 

899 

can advance their religiously grounded viewpoints in a manner 

that is intelligible to all men and women of goodwill. 

The present state of affairs with the Muslim dialog, I believe, is 

that in December, Benedict extended an invitation, or proposed a 

conference between Holy See and Muslim representatives in response, I believe, to a letter that 138 Muslim leaders sent to him, 

and that process certainly affords some hope of achieving agreement on some very basic things, such as religion is never, ever an 

excuse for violence. 

Senator CASEY. And I know there were some questions raised recently about the—Pope Benedict had made several statements that 

cast doubt on whether he would welcome Turkey’s entry into the 

European Union, what’s your understanding of the Vatican’s current position on that, and anything else you’d want to add about 

how you see that issue? 

Ms. GLENDON. My understanding is that the Holy See is very 

concerned about religious freedom, and of course, the European 

Union is committed to certain basic standards of religious freedom, 

and I believe the Holy See’s position is that countries should meet 

those standards, or show significant progress toward meeting those 

standards. 

Senator CASEY. And I guess I also wanted to get your sense of— 

when you make a list of some of the challenges the world faces, virtually, you can’t point to one that the Holy See is not involved in 

or making efforts to try to improve the condition of human dignity 

or the condition of people that are suffering. And, this is a very difficult question to answer succinctly, but I would ask you if you 

could kind of highlight or even rank—when you look at the globe 

and you look at the challenges that so many people face, whether 

it’s poverty or AIDS or violence, go down the list—what do you 

think is the most challenging for the Holy See and how do you see 

your role in helping this country relate to what the Holy See needs 

to focus on in terms of those—the biggest challenges, when we 

think of poverty or the others I mentioned? 

Ms. GLENDON. Well, that’s a really challenging question, Mr. 

Chairman-- 

Senator CASEY. It could take a couple of hours. 

Ms. GLENDON. In view of your indication you’d like a brief response, I will refer to the Pope’s World Day of Peace message, the 

text of which was just issued. 

And he highlighted three concerns, and I would expect that these 

would be the same concerns that he will bring to the United States 

when he visits here in April, and they were, of course, peace—as 

you would expect in a World Day of Peace message. Concern for the 

environment, climate change, and the third—something that has 

always and everywhere been at the heart of the Church—the concern for poverty, disease, lack of development. 

The Holy See, I think, in its interventions on occasions like the 

World Day of Peace or the speech that the Pope is likely to give 

at the United Nations—it is constantly calling the developed world 

to be attentive to be attentive to what you referred to as the least, 

the last and the lost, and that’s a major theme in the World Day 

of Peace message. 

900 

As for what the United States Embassy could do, I think those 

areas are all areas where—they are three of the many areas where 

the Holy See and the United States share common concerns and 

have already established cooperative relationships. 

My own view is that in 2008, an excellent way of our highlighting those concerns and achieving something fairly important 

in—not only in the relationship between the two entities, but to advance the issues, in general, is 2008 happens to be the 60th anniversary, both of the Genocide Convention, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it would seem to me that that provides the occasion for the United States and the Holy See to join 

forces in advances their own commitment, and promulgating the 

principles that underlie those two documents. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much, and I may come back to 

you. 

I’m going to move to Mr. Larson about some questions about Latvia—one of the issues that I mentioned in some of my opening comments was the issue of corruption. If you could speak to your 

knowledge of that and efforts underway, if any, to address that— 

because we, any democracy faces that in the early, in the infancy 

of a democracy, but even, as we know here in the United States, 

even very well developed, in our case a republic that has had centuries of development now, more than two at least, we still have 

that problem here—local governments, State government, and even 

the Federal Government—what’s your sense of that, and what’s 

your sense of kind of a mission that you’ll have to try to impact 

it positively? 

Mr. LARSON. That’s an excellent question, Senator, and as you 

know, the foundation of a democracy is the rule of law, and having 

confidence in the government, and I can tell you that many of the 

emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, or even in Iraq—one of 

the greatest problems we were confronted with was the rule of law 

and stopping corruption. 

Latvia has worked very aggressively, the have an Office of AntiCorruption that is investigating and trying to root it out. There 

have been many reforms put in place in the 1990s to help combat 

that, and if confirmed as ambassador, I will work to leverage resources, technical assistance that we have here in the United 

States from the Department of Treasury, FBI, and the Department 

of Justice to assist them in their investigations to provide that the 

technical assistance that could be key in building the cases and key 

to success in developing the rule of law is to prosecute and to root 

it out, and to help set an example that will give confidence to the 

people of a nation and their government. 

Senator CASEY. You mentioned Treasury, FBI—who’s the third? 

Mr. LARSON. The Department of Justice, Treasury. 

Senator CASEY. Okay, and I want to get back to that, but I know 

we have, who just came in the room, Senator Grassley, who I think 

may want to provide some testimony. 

Thank you, Senator, appreciate you being here. 

Sure, we’re honored to have Senator Grassley here who, as a— 

in my case as a first-year Senator you have to do your best not just 

to learn where the hearing rooms are and what to do every day, 

but you have to try to learn from those who have been here ahead 

901 

of you, and he’s been a great inspiration to a lot of people here, 

even those who have been here longer than I have. And we’ve 

worked together on a number of issues, and whether it’s in the Agriculture Committee, I’ve watched his work for many years in the 

Finance Committee, so we’re grateful for his presence here, and his 

testimony. 

Thank you, Senator. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY. You know, many times since I’ve been in Congress, I’ve had and opportunity to introduce many Iowans to the 

Senate and to various committees of the Senate, and even this committee, but very seldom can I say I’ve introduced people who are 

friends of mine. I hope they’ve all been friends, but I mean a real 

friend, and Chuck Larson’s an example of a real friend—both personally as well as politically, and so I’m glad to be here to introduce him and have that special relationship with him. 

I want to commend you and the committee for considering Chuck 

Larson for this ambassadorship, and of course, holding a hearing 

at this late stage to fill this position in Latvia is very important, 

because Latvia—even though a new country, well, relatively new in 

the sense of not being out of the Soviet Bloc very long, and you 

held this hearing so early because this just came before the Senate 

on November 30, so thank you. 

You’ll find out as ambassador or anything else he’s done that 

Chuck Larson is an intelligent, accomplished leader, first being 

elected to the Iowa General Assembly in 1992, and I told him at 

that time—his mother was campaigning for him—if he wins this 

because his mother is working so hard for him, because I know how 

that is, my mother worked hard for me when I was first running 

for the Iowa House of Representatives half a century ago. 

While in the Iowa House, he served as chairman of the Judiciary 

Committee, and chairman of the Economic Development Committee, and then he was elected to the United States Senate. And 

then while he was in the Senate, he was called into full-time military service, because he had been in the military, going way back 

to 1987. He’s currently a Major, as you know, from his BTA, and 

he had to miss sessions of the Senate because he served in Iraq. 

He was deployed for a year with the 332nd Engineering Group, he 

also happens to be a graduate of law school, and he has practiced 

law, and he has practiced law, and he’s been a business man. 

Chuck Larson has served Iowa, then, not only as a State Senator 

and not only as a member of the military, but in a lot of specific 

ways, as well. 

So, I’m pleased that he’s now been called by the President to 

serve his country once again, in this particular case, as an ambassador. I’m confident that my friend, Chuck Larson, will represent 

the United States well, and excel in this position just as he has 

throughout his career. 

So, Mr. Chairman and members of your committee, I want you 

to know that I strongly support this nomination, and I hopefully 

have the ability, since, you know, we’re getting toward the end of 

one President’s constitutionally limited term of office that we can 

902 

get him approved so he can serve a full time over there for the rest 

of this President’s term, and who knows, if our side of the aisle is 

lucky enough, he might be able to serve longer than one year. 

So, thank you very much for considering this, and thank you 

very much for wanting to serve. 

Mr. LARSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator GRASSLEY. And let me say congratulations to you, too, 

for your important nomination. 

Ms. GLENDON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator GRASSLEY. You bet. 

Senator CASEY. Senator, thank you very much, and we appreciate your presence here on a day when many are not, and we’re 

grateful for your leadership and it’s a great testament to this nominee and to the State of Iowa, that both of the United States Senators were here today to provide that testimony, so we’re grateful. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Larson, I wanted to also explore the relationship, obviously, 

that I think many people have had concerns about and they’re wellfounded, the relation between Russia and Latvia, and in particular 

in the area of energy—gas and electricity and what that means in 

terms of political leverage. 

How concerned are you by Latvia’s significant and really heavy 

dependence on Russia for its energy supplies, and how do you see 

that playing out in the time that you would serve, upon confirmation as ambassador? 

Mr. LARSON. That’s an excellent question and key to it is the development and improvement of the relations between Latvia and 

Russia. Yesterday, the Russian-Latvian border treaty was signed 

with very, very, positive comments by Foreign Minister Zavrov 

from Russia—he invited the President of Latvia to Russia next 

year. So, we’re seeing, overall, not only positive comments, but improvements in relations. 

The two nations have developed an intergovernmental commission that’s addressing approximately 10 issues right now that affect 

both of their communities. 

Latvia is working aggressively to diversify their sources of energy. They’ve received assistance and expanded their hydroelectric 

to provide approximately 25 percent of their needs, but you’re correct, Mr. Chairman, the vast majority of their electrical needs is 

coming from Russia, natural gas, as well. 

They’re exploring opportunities with Finland to expand electrical 

transmission from Finland, through Estonia to Latvia and Lithuania, and Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia are also investing in a 

new nuclear plant that will be based in Lithuania and provide expanded electrical transmission for them. 

So, I believe the key is for expanded diversification, and if confirmed, I will work with U.S. companies to help provide technical 

assistance, potential investment opportunities for U.S. companies, 

and additionally, I’ll draw from my own State, where we have a 

very diversified renewable fuels agenda, and some of the leading 

experts in the Nation are in Iowa for biodiesel, ethanol, and whatnot, and I know that they have a tremendous interest in Latvia, 

as well. 

903 

I guess, I want to ask you a follow-up on the use of the—in place 

now, an intergovernmental committee? 

Mr. LARSON. There’s a commission—— 

Senator CASEY. Oh, commission, sorry. 

Mr. LARSON [continuing]. Made up of representatives from both 

countries, yes, sir. 

Senator CASEY. Can you tell me more about that? 

Mr. LARSON. It’s a bilateral commission that has about 10 issues 

underway that they’re actively working on—— 

Senator CASEY. Representation from Russia? 

Mr. LARSON. Both Latvia and Russia, yes sir. 

Senator CASEY. And, but you fell confident that they are on a 

path where they have a—at least a plan or a strategy to diversify, 

sufficient to diminish or reduce that dependence? 

Mr. LARSON. I believe that they are actively pursuing that plan 

right now, from an electrical transmission perspective with Finland, and also from a more expanded source of energy, with a plan 

to, in Lithuania, to provide nuclear energy. 

Senator CASEY. You mentioned in your testimony the, obviously, 

the horrific history—the world history, really—with regard to the 

Holocaust, but in particular, in Latvia, the attempt to raise both 

awareness, but also the property restitution issues it’s surrounding. 

Can you tell us more about that just in terms of where it is now, 

and how you see it developing? 

Mr. LARSON. There’s great education that needs to be done. 

When I served in the Iowa Senate, I spearheaded an effort to bring 

part of the traveling Holocaust Museum to Iowa, because I recognized that not every Iowan would have the opportunity to visit the 

museum and learn. And at the crux of the issue is that the best 

way to ensure that we do not experience, as a society, another Holocaust, is education. And that’s where the Latvian Government is 

proactively working to educate the people about what occurred, and 

to help ensure that it does not happen again. 

There remains some tension, tension I think would be appropriate, that we see in many European countries regarding antiSemitism. And so, more work needs to be done. 

Additionally, although the vast majority of the private property 

issues have been resolved, as far as restitution, there is still approximately 200 communal properties, or heirless properties that I 

mentioned, where restitution has not been made. And as ambassador I will—if confirmed—will do two things in this area, and I’ll 

work very closely with the local Jewish community to help encourage expanded education, and then second, that the issue of communal property must be resolved. 

Senator CASEY. And there’s still a good bit of work to be done 

there? 

Mr. LARSON. There is, there is. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. I’m going to go back to Professor 

Glendon, and maybe go back to Mr. Larson, as well. 

Professor, one issue that obviously has consumed a lot of our 

time in the Senate, and the same is true of the House, which is 

as it should be, is the war, the war in Iraq. And I know that there’s 

a—upon confirmation, you’d be in a—maybe not a unique position, 

but an easy position in terms of what the Holy See has said about 

904 

the war and what the administration’s position is on the war. How 

do you see that playing out and how do you—not just with regard 

to that issue, but how do you approach those issues, where you 

see—at a minimum, a tension, and in some cases there may be 

issues where there’s a direct conflict. How do you—how do you resolve those kinds of disputes or tensions? 

Ms. GLENDON. Well, let me start by saying that it seems to me 

that leaving aside the Holy See’s well-known opposition to our invasion of Iraq that in the period of time since then it certainly has 

supported our goals of achieving a peaceful, religion-respecting, 

free society in Iraq. And the Holy See has a presence in Iraq that 

could, in fact, it has access, I think, in the capillaries of the society 

to keep a sense of what’s going on that could be very beneficial for 

us to get in touch with. 

So, I think that despite the initial conflict over the entry into the 

situation, the Holy See can be a reliable and valuable partner in 

working our way through toward some kind of peaceful outcome. 

Senator CASEY. Your broad experience as a lawyer, I think, 

should come in handy when you deal with issues like that. 

And, I guess I’d ask you what—in terms of your own experience 

as a lawyer, as an advocate, as someone who’s weighed in on public 

policy, what do you think your most—this is probably not a question anybody wants to answer—but what do you think is going to 

be your most difficult challenge upon confirmation? 

Ms. GLENDON. I think the most difficult challenge, frankly, arises 

from the short period of time that these ambassadorial appointments are likely to last, and I have given a good deal of thought 

to what could be accomplished in a short period of time. It seems 

to me that it’s fortuitous that we have these two anniversaries that 

I mentioned—the Genocide Convention, and of the Human Rights 

Declaration—it seems to me that in itself would provide a couple 

of project that would enable us to explain and defend American positions, and to lift up American values, in a way that if it could impress the Holy See it could, through the Holy See, influence the 

image of the United States everywhere that there are Catholics— 

all over the world—but also especially in Europe, where I think 

that the image of the United States needs some improvement. 

Senator CASEY. And I know that you’re anticipating the visit by 

Pope Benedict here, in the United States, and I’m not asking you 

to provide an itinerary—but how does that work in terms of your 

involvement? How much of your time has to be devoted to helping 

that journey be well-planned or executed, or is that of—I’m just curious as to your involvement in that, because it’s a—I can’t even 

begin to imagine how difficult it is to—for those who were charged 

with that responsibility to set up that itinerary and make it go 

smoothly, but I just didn’t know the role you have to play in that, 

or—if any. 

Ms. GLENDON. Well, frankly, I’m not sure what exactly the role 

I would have to play would be, but I would expect it to be the first 

thing that the new ambassador would have to attend to. And I 

would hope that—you were kind enough to mention my background 

as an advocate—I would hope that I would be able to be helpful 

in translating from one frame of reference to another, I think I 

would be able to ease communication between the two entities. 

905 

Senator CASEY. Well, thank you, I appreciate that, and I don’t 

envy those who are planning that kind of a trip, with the detail 

and the work that goes into that kind of a trip must be overwhelming, so we wish them all the luck in the world. 

I guess, one more Professor, I was going down a list, and I don’t 

want to—we can’t cover everything today, but there was one other 

that I had—oh, with regard to the Peoples Republic of China, I 

guess there’s some speculation that the Vatican might reestablish 

diplomatic relations with China—do you have any sense of that, 

yet? Or do you think, is it too early in your consideration of that, 

or your information about that to comment, but what do you know 

about that? The likelihood of that happening, if any? Or, what’s 

your sense of that? 

Ms. GLENDON. I think the most significant thing is that these 

conversations are taking place, and that there does seem some disposition on the part of China to discuss the question of the status 

of the most neuralgic question concerning the internal government 

as a church, the appointment of bishops—I would expect the negotiation process to be protracted, the questions are difficult, and I 

do believe that the Holy See is much more interested in religious 

freedom in China, than it is in establishing diplomatic relations, 

and that some progress—a good deal of progress—would have to be 

made on the religious freedom front before a change was made on 

the diplomatic front. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. I know we’re a little tight on time, 

but Mr. Larson, I guess my last question pertains principally to the 

issue in Latvia, not just in terms of how it’s dealing with Russia 

as it relates to energy policy and diversification, but just generally, 

how would you characterize that relationship now, even beyond the 

issue of energy? Where, you can’t pick up an American newspaper 

without reading yet another story about what’s happening in Russia, specifically as it pertains to Mr. Putin and what his intentions 

are, especially in light of a close ally of his now, being on a path 

to assume power. 

And there’s real concern, frankly, in this country, for a lot of reasons. Not just because of things he has said and intentions he 

seems to have in mind, but what it does for that region, and stability and the relationship between our two countries. 

And, I guess as Ambassador to Latvia, you’d be dealing with 

some of those same concerns, and some of those—weighing those 

considerations when you’re ambassador to that country on behalf 

of the United States and you have to deal with the Kremlin, and 

you’ve got to deal with the leadership in Russia, and how do you 

see that relationship now, both between Latvia and Russia, but 

also how the United States handles that? 

Mr. LARSON. That’s an excellent question. I would describe it, 

Mr. Chairman, that it’s improving, and as Foreign Minister Zavrov 

said, we cannot turn a blind eye to the historical challenges we’ve 

had in the past, and he just made that comment yesterday. 

And I think it fairly sums up the growing warmth between the 

relationships or the growing improvement in their relations. As I 

mentioned, yesterday we saw a very positive sign that they signed 

the Latvian-Russian Border treaty; Russia also more recently, last 

week, suspended their participation in the Conventional Forces EuVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:58 May 11, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00913 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\48267.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
906 

rope treaty and yesterday they said that they would be willing to 

return to the table to continue those discussions. 

On the Intergovernmental Commission, we’re seeing continued 

dialog as these two nations work to iron out a number of issues 

that nations would face that border each other. So, I would describe it, clearly, as improving and if confirmed, as United States 

Ambassador, I would work with the Latvian Government to encourage that continued dialog and improvement of relations, and building relations across borders. 

Senator CASEY. We especially appreciate your service to the 

country in Iraq, and there are few people, I think that have the 

combination of government service, and service in a current or recent conflict, so I think both sets of experience in addition to other 

life experience should serve you well. 

But, we’re grateful, and we’re thinking at this holiday season 

about those who are still serving in Iraq and Afghanistan and 

around the world, but we’re wanting to note as other shave here, 

your service. 

Mr. LARSON. Thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Unless there are other comments that either of 

you would like to make, you could certainly amplify the record by 

way of written followup or statement if you wanted to. I may have 

questions that I submit for the record, other members of the committee might, to amplify what we talked about, but we’re particularly grateful for your presence here today and your willingness to 

serve the people of the United States and also the diplomatic posts, 

the areas of the world you’d be serving in upon confirmation, so 

we’re grateful. 

Unless either of you have anything else, I’d ask that we—I make 

my own motion to adjourn this hearing, but thank you very much. 

Mr. LARSON. Thank you. 

Ms. GLENDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 10:33 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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