This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 34,113 4 LESTER MIKE, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Alisa Hadfield, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 12 Josephine H. Ford, Assistant Public Defender 13 Albuquerque, NM 14 for Appellant 15
MEMORANDUM OPINION 162 WECHSLER, Judge. 1 {1} Defendant, Lester Mike, appeals his conviction for driving while under the 2 influence of an intoxicating liquor. We issued a notice of proposed summary 3 disposition proposing to affirm on Novemb er 19, 2014. Defendant filed a timely 4 memorandum in opposition, whic h we have duly considered . We remain unpersuaded 5 that our initial proposed disposition was incorrect, and we therefore affirm. 6 DISCUSSION 7 {2} In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant continues to argue that the State 8 failed to show that reasonable suspicion exis ted to stop him for a turn signal violation. 9 [MIO 6-8] NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-325(A) (1978) provides, in relevant part, that 10 “[n]o person shall . . . turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal . . . in the 11 event any other traffic may be affected by such movement.” The two elements in the 12 statute that must be satisfied in order for its mandate to be triggered are “(1) there 13 must be other traffic (2) that may beaffected by the motorist’s turn.” State v. Hubble , 14 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (internal quotation marks and 15 citation omitted). Defendant argues that ther e was no reasonable suspicion to stop him 16 for a turn signal violation because the State failed to present any evidence that the 17 officer’s car might have been affected by hi s failure to use a turn signal. [MIO 6-7] 18 193 {3} The district court entered a memorandum opinion in Defendant’s on-record 1 appeal addressing this same issue. In our notice of proposed summary disposition, we 2 proposed to agree with the district court’s analysis and its determination that 3 reasonable suspicion to stop based on a turnsignal violation was established by the 4 officer’s testimony that he was following De fendant in his vehicle when he observed 5 Defendant turn without using a turn signal. [RP 87-90] In his memorandum in 6 opposition, Defendant again asserts that this evidence was not sufficient to show that 7 the officer’s car may have beenaffected by his failure to use a turn signal. [MIO 6-7] 8 However, we continue to agr ee with the district court th at the officer’s testimony that 9 he was following directly behind Defendant when he turned without signaling is 10 sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of a turn signal violation. See Hubble , 11 2009-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 14-20 (determining that the defendant violated Section 66-7- 12 325(A) where he failed to signal when turning onto a highway after a police officer 13 drove past the intersection); cf. State v. Anaya , 2008-NMCA-020, ¶ 19, 143 N.M. 431, 14 176 P.3d 1163 (affirming that the officer lackedreasonable suspicion of a turn signal 15 violation where the officer’s vehicle was nottraffic that could be affected by the 16 failure to signal and there was no other traffic in the area). 17 {4} Defendant also continues to argue that the district c ourt abused its discretion in 18 admitting the results of the BAC test becausethe State failed to show compliance with 194 the applicable SLD regulations. [MIO 8-9] Defendant argues that the portable breath 1 test mouthpiece that was introduced into his mouth during the deprivation period 2 could have caused the results of the test to be inaccurate. [MIO 9] Again, the district 3 court entered a memorandum opinion addressi ng this same issue. In our notice of 4 proposed summary disposition we proposed to agree with its analysis and its 5 determination that the applicable SLD re gulation does not require the State to show 6 that no foreign substances were introduced in to a subject’s mouth prior to testing. [RP 7 93-94] See 7.33.2.15(B)(2) NMAC (“Breath shall be coll ected only after the certified 8 operator or certified key operator has ascertain ed that the subject has not had anything 9 to eat, drink or smoke for at least 20 minutes prior to collection of the first breath 10 sample.”). We also proposed to agree withits determination that Officer Brown’s 11 testimony that he checked Defendant’s m outh at the beginning of the deprivation 12 period, and his observation that Defendant did not eat , drink, or smoke during the 13 deprivation period, was sufficient to show compliance with the regulation. [RP 94] 14 Nothing in Defendant’s memorandum in opposition persuades us that the district 15 court’s analysis was incorrect. We therefore adopt that portion of its opinion 16 addressing this issue. 17 {5} For these reasons, we affirm the metropolitan court’s sentencing order. 18 {6} IT IS SO ORDERED. 195 _______ _________________________ 1 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 2

WE CONCUR: 3

________________________________ 4 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 5

________________________________ 6 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 7