In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 98-1501, 98-1578, 98-1683, 98-1684,

98-2005, 98-2179, 98-2570

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Frank Smith, Keith McCain, Russell Ellis,

Eric Wilson, Sherman Moore, Steven Pink

and Charles Poteete,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 95 CR 509--Paul E. Plunkett, Judge.

Argued September 10, 1999--Decided August 17, 2000

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Manion and Diane P.

Wood, Circuit Judges.

 Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge. For many years, the

Gangster Disciples (GD) street gang operated a

massive drug distribution business in the Chicago

area. Eventually, the government caught up with

it, and in 1995 the grand jury returned

indictments against different members of the GD

gang. We considered the appeals of other GDs in

United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d 910 (7th Cir.

2000), and in United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d

565 (7th Cir. 1998). In the present case, we have

before us the appeals of seven more members from

their convictions and sentences for a variety of

drug, weapons, and money laundering offenses. We

affirm on all counts.

I

 The phrase "street gang" hardly begins to

describe the breadth and complexity of the GD

organization, which began its operations in

Chicago in the early 1970s. Its chairman was

Larry Hoover, for years an inmate of the Vienna

Correctional Center in Vienna, Illinois, and now

an inmate of the maximum security federal prison

known as ADX Florence, in Florence, Colorado.
Next in command was Gregory Shell, who served as

Hoover’s go-between to GD leaders who were not in

prison. As of 1993, the GDs had approximately

6,000 members.

 As we have explained elsewhere, see Jackson,

207 F.3d at 913, the GDs were organized along

both territorial and hierarchical lines. Below

Hoover and Shell and the board of directors were

the Governors, each of whom was responsible for

a specific geographic territory. The Governors

had Assistant Governors, and in addition each

Governor had several Regents working under him.

Each Regent in turn had several coordinators and

soldiers working for him and for whom he was

responsible. The number of coordinators and

soldiers was referred to as the "count."

Defendants Keith McCain ("Khadafi"), Sherman

Moore, Eric Wilson ("Fat Eric"), and Russell

Ellis ("Poncho") were all Governors; defendants

Steven Pink ("Chi Chi") and Charles Poteete were

Regents; and defendant Frank Smith ("L’il Frank")

collected drug money for Shell and sold cocaine

for the group. The GDs as a whole protected their

territory from incursions by rival gangs, using

violence where necessary. They sometimes used

minors, armed with guns provided by the GDs, to

provide security and protection for GD leaders

and drug dealers.

 The GDs had an elaborate code of conduct and

set of rules for the internal management of the

organization. They enforced these codes through

punishments, known as "violations"; they

typically spoke of "violating person X." The

violations could be as lenient as fines or as

stringent as severe physical beatings, depending

on the infraction. Gang leaders decided which

punishment was appropriate for which misdeed.

 The GDs sold drugs throughout Chicago and the

surrounding areas. They organized their sales

both by territory and through the coordinating

efforts of the Governors and the higher gang

leadership. The Governors supervised their own

territories, ensured that members did not

interfere with one another’s sales, and kept tabs

on rival drug sellers. In addition, the Governors

and Regents often served as drug suppliers for

their territories. The principal illegal

substance involved in the present case was

cocaine, and so we often refer simply to cocaine

for the sake of simplicity.

 Hoover devised a number of ways by which the

street profits from cocaine sales worked their

way up to the higher levels of the GD

organization. First, he developed the system of

"nation work." This referred to the obligation of

members to devote one day a week to sales for the
GD organization. GD leaders provided members with

cocaine to sell on those days and required them

to return all receipts to the leaders. As

recorded on tapes from prison, see generally

Jackson, Hoover estimated that "nation work"

would be extremely lucrative, guessing that it

would bring in $300,000 per week. Next was the

"street tax," under which GDs were required to

pay $35 to $75 per week to their leaders on pain

of being "violated." The leaders, in turn, had to

pay "count" on a weekly basis, which was an

amount determined by the number of GDs in the

leader’s territory. In addition, Regents had to

pay $50 to $200 weekly to fund one of the GDs’

political organizations, the 21st Century Vote

project. Last, GD members were required to buy

tickets to concerts sponsored by another

ancillary organization, Save the Children.

 The government’s investigation relied heavily on

tape recordings of conversations among highranking GD members. We discussed in some detail

the recordings made of Hoover and his visitors at

Vienna in Jackson. In addition, the government

wiretapped June’s Shrimp on the Nine, a southside

restaurant purchased for Shell by a former gang

crimes police officer. GD members occasionally

used June’s Shrimp as a meeting place. Finally,

GD Governor Cedric Parks and GD Board Member

Darryl Johnson were wiretapped.

 The government also used a document it

discovered in the files of Save the Children

(which was owned by Hoover’s female partner). The

document was a list describing the territorial

and hierarchical organization of the entire GD

operation, and it was known simply as "The List"

at the trial. Hoover had mentioned his desire to

develop such a document in some of the taped

conversations, which he wanted to use to keep

track of gang members and their payments to the

GDs. "The List" includes all of the defendants

here except Wilson.

 Before turning to the many arguments raised in

this appeal, we review briefly (1) who the

players are, (2) what they were accused of doing,

and (3) what they were convicted for. We also set

forth the charges in the superseding indictment,

for ease of reference. (The charges in the

original indictment were dismissed on the

government’s motion.)

 A. Indictment

Count 1: Operation of drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C.

sec. 846.

Count 2: Operation of a continuing criminal
enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. sec. 848(a).

Counts 3, 4: Using minors to further drug

conspiracy and to avoid detection, 21 U.S.C. sec.

861(a), 18 U.S.C. sec. 2.

Counts 5-8, 10, 11, 13-17, 28, 38, 39: 

Possession and distribution of drugs by various

individuals, 21 U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C.

sec. 2.

Count 12: Attempted possession with intent to

distribute drugs by conspirators, 21 U.S.C. sec.

846, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2.

Counts 9, 18-27, 29-37: Using or causing use of

telephones to facilitate drug crimes, 21 U.S.C.

sec. 843(b), 18 U.S.C. sec. 2.

Count 40: Using a firearm during a drug

trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(c), 18

U.S.C. sec. 2.

Count 41: Money laundering, 18 U.S.C. sec.

1956(a)(1) (B)(i).

 B. Defendants, Accusations, and Convictions/1

Name Position Charges Convictions

McCain Governor, Counts 1-40 Counts 1-8,

 South East 11-27, 29,

 Chicago 31-36,39, 40

Moore Governor,

 Near West

 Chicago Counts 1-40 Counts 1-7

Ellis Regent Counts 1-40 Counts 1-8,

 under Moore, 11-27, 29,

 later 31-36, 

 Governor 39, 40

Wilson Governor Counts 1-41 Counts 1-8,

 after Ellis 11-27, 29, 

 31-36, 39-41

Pink Co-Regent, Counts 1, 7, Counts 1, 7,

 McCain 10, 14 14

 territory

Poteete Regent, Counts 1, 5, 6 Counts 1, 5, 6

 Moore

 territory

Smith Collection Counts 1, 17 Counts 1, 17

 agent
 We have organized our discussion of this

complex set of appeals as follows. We consider

first the issues raised in the consolidated brief

filed on behalf of all defendants; next we

consider the individual issues that related to

convictions; and finally, we consider the

individual sentencing issues. 

II

 A. Common Issues

 1. Section 848(b): Offense Element or

Sentencing Factor?

 Defendants McCain, Moore, Ellis, and Wilson (the

Governor defendants) begin with an argument to

which the Supreme Court has given significant

attention in recent years. Count 2 of the

indictment charged all four with engaging in a

continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21

U.S.C. sec. 848(a), which provides in pertinent

part as follows:

 Any person who engages in a continuing criminal

enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years

and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a

[specified] fine . . . , and to the forfeiture

prescribed in section 853 of this title; except

that if any person engaged in such activity after

one or more prior convictions of him under this

section have become final, he shall be sentenced

to a term of imprisonment which may not be less

than 30 years and which may be up to life

imprisonment, . . . .

The term "continuing criminal enterprise" is

defined in sec. 848(c) to apply to a person who

commits a drug felony, and that felony is part of

a continuing series of such violations that "are

undertaken by such person in concert with five or

more other persons with respect to whom such

person occupies a position of organizer, a

supervisory position, or any other position of

management," and from which the person obtains

substantial income or resources. 

 The statute goes on to prescribe a mandatory

term of life imprisonment for a subset of those

caught by it. The harsher sentence applies if:

 (1) such person is the principal administrator,

organizer, or leader of the enterprise or is one

of several such principal administrators,

organizers, or leaders; and

 (2)(A) the violation referred to in subsection
(c)(1) of this section involved at least 300

times the quantity of a substance described in

subsection 841(b)(1)(B) of this title, or (B) the

enterprise, or any other enterprise in which the

defendant was the principal or one of several

principal administrators, organizers, or leaders,

received $10 million dollars in gross receipts

during any twelve-month period of its existence

for the manufacture, importation, or distribution

of a substance described in section 841(b)(1)(B)

of this title.

21 U.S.C. sec. 848(b).

 The question the Governor defendants raise is

whether sec. 848(b) defines a separate offense,

or if it simply sets out factors that should be

used to enhance the sentence imposed for a

violation of sec. 848(a). At the time of the

trial, this court had never ruled definitively on

that question, although we had indicated that

sec. 848(b) "appear[ed] to be a sentencing

enhancement provision" in United States v.

Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 484 n.4 (7th Cir. 1992).

After the trial, we decided in United States v.

Hardin, 209 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2000), that it was

a sentencing factor. Id. at 656-59. The Hardin

decision took into account the two pertinent

Supreme Court decisions that were available at

the time, Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523

U.S. 224 (1998), and Jones v. United States, 526

U.S. 227 (1999). Since Hardin, however, the Court

has issued two more decisions that bear on the

subject: Castillo v. United States, 120 S. Ct.

2090 (2000); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.

Ct. 2348 (2000). We therefore consider it

appropriate to revisit the question that was

resolved in Hardin, to make sure that nothing in

these more recent decisions requires a different

result. 

 As the Supreme Court noted in Apprendi, 120 S.

Ct. at 2360, the first time the distinction

between "sentencing factors" and elements of an

offense appeared in those terms in the Court’s

decisions was in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477

U.S. 79 (1986). McMillan involved the

constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Mandatory

Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. sec.

9712 (1982). That statute provided that anyone

convicted of certain felonies was subject to a

mandatory minimum sentence of five years’

imprisonment if the sentencing judge found, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant

"visibly possessed a firearm" during the

commission of the offense. As the Court put it,

"[t]he Act operates to divest the judge of

discretion to impose any sentence of less than

five years for the underlying felony; it does not

authorize a sentence in excess of that otherwise
allowed for that offense." 477 U.S. at 81-82. The

Court found that Pennsylvania had merely taken

one factor traditionally considered by sentencing

judges--the instrumentality used to commit the

crime--and dictated the precise weight it was to

receive. Id. at 89-90. That act alone did not

transform what the state legislature plainly

regarded as a factor for sentencing into an

element of the offense that the Constitution

requires to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt

before a jury.

 The next case in this line, Almendarez-Torres,

involved the question whether a provision of the

Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. sec.

1326(b)(2), which authorized a prison term of up

to 20 years for an alien who has once been

deported, and who then re-enters the United

States without special permission, only in those

cases where the initial deportation was

subsequent to a conviction for commission of an

aggravated felony. Otherwise, the authorized

prison term was only two years. The Court held

that the factor of recidivism that underlay sec.

1326(b)(2) was a traditional sentencing factor

and thus (once again) did not have to be proved

beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of the

offense. It reached this result despite the fact

that, unlike McMillan, the additional factor had

the effect of increasing the total possible

sentence the defendant could receive. 523 U.S. at

243. Three considerations lay behind the Court’s

thinking: first, recidivism is traditionally

taken into account at the sentencing phase;

second, the sentencing factor in AlmendarezTorres merely increased the maximum permissive

sentence instead of triggering a mandatory

minimum term, as in McMillan; and third, the

statute’s broad permissive range did not create

significantly greater unfairness than the due

process clause tolerates. Id. at 243-46.

 In its very next Term, the Court had occasion

to begin defining the limits on the other side of

the sentencing factor/element of the offense

distinction. The case was Jones v. United States,

supra, which presented the question whether the

federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119,

defined three distinct offenses or a single crime

with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of

which were dependent on proof of facts that did

not need to be present in the indictment or

decided by the jury. 526 U.S. at 229. The basic

statute provided a fine or imprisonment of not

more than 15 years for the offense of carjacking,

sec. 2119(1), but if serious bodily injury

resulted, the maximum time in prison was 25

years, sec. 2119(2), and if death resulted, the

maximum was life imprisonment, sec. 2119(3). 
 The indictment in Jones’s case made no

reference to the subsections of the statute, nor

did it charge either that the defendant had

inflicted serious bodily injury on the victim or

death. Only when the presentence report showed up

did the factor of serious bodily injury enter the

case. The lower courts held that the additional

facts that triggered sec. 2119(2) and (3) were

nonetheless sentencing factors, but the Supreme

Court reversed. It first rejected the idea that

"the ’look’ of the statute" was a reliable guide

to whether the additional facts were elements of

the offense or factors for sentencing. 526 U.S.

at 233. Next, the Court compared this statute to

others and observed that Congress had very

frequently (though not always) made serious

bodily injury an element of the offense. Id. at

235-36. Finally, invoking the doctrine under

which the Court avoids interpretations of

statutes that raise constitutional doubts, id. at

239, the Court concluded that serious questions

under both the Sixth Amendment and the due

process clause would be present if it adopted the

"sentencing factor" approach. Id. at 248. It

distinguished Almendarez-Torres because of the

"distinctive significance of recidivism" as a

sentencing factor, noting that "unlike virtually

any other consideration used to enlarge the

possible penalty for an offense, and certainly

unlike the factor before us in this case, a prior

conviction must itself have been established

through procedures satisfying fair notice,

reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees." Id.

at 249 (emphasis added). 

 Taking Jones and Almendarez-Torres together, it

was unclear how far the Court was prepared to go

in characterizing factors other than recidivism

as "sentencing factors" rather than elements. Two

cases decided during O.T. 1999 cast further light

on the subject. First was Castillo v. United

States, supra, which involved the question

whether 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(c), which prohibits

the use or carrying of a "firearm" in relation to

a crime of violence, and then imposes a

significantly more severe penalty if the weapon

is a "machinegun," defines one or two offenses.

The Court held that the statute used the term

"machinegun" (and like terms) to state an element

of a separate offense. 120 S. Ct. at 2091. As

such, the indictment had to identify the firearm

type and the jury had to find that element proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2092. The Court

reached its conclusion by looking at the

statute’s "language, structure, context,

history," and other factors throwing light on its

objectives. Id. It was important that the maximum

penalty for an ordinary weapon was five years,

but for a machinegun it was 30 years. On the

other hand, the Court specifically rejected the
notion that the fact that sec. 924 as a whole was

entitled "Penalties" was significant. Id. at

2093. The kind of traditional sentencing factor

to which Almendarez-Torres had referred, the

Court stated, "often involve[d] either

characteristics of the offender, such as

recidivism, or special features of the manner in

which a basic crime is carried out (e.g., that

the defendant abused a position of trust or

brandished a gun)." Id. at 2094.

 The latest in this line is the Supreme Court’s

June 26, 2000, decision in Apprendi. There the

Court labeled Almendarez-Torres as "at best an

exceptional departure from the historic practice"

of entrusting to the jury "the determination of

a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal

defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he

would receive if punished according to the facts

reflected in the jury verdict alone." 120 S. Ct.

at 2361, 2359. It went on to hold as follows:

Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Id. at 2362-63. The New Jersey hate crime statute

at issue in Apprendi increased the normal 5-10

year range of imprisonment for possession of a

firearm for an unlawful purpose to a 10-20 year

term, if the defendant acted with a purpose to

intimidate an individual or a group because of

that person’s race, color, gender, handicap,

religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. Id.

at 2351. The doubling of the penalty was enough

to make the "purpose to intimidate" an offense

element, not a sentencing factor.

 With these cases in mind, we must decide

whether sec. 848(b) has the kind of "increased

punishment" effect that triggers the Apprendi

rule. This is a difficult inquiry. On the one

hand, sec. 848(a) authorizes a range of

imprisonment of 30 years to life, and sec. 848(b)

simply eliminates anything in that range below a

life sentence for the principal administrator,

organizer or leader when the required quantities

or value of drugs are involved. Thus, at the time

the Governor defendants went to trial, they knew

that they faced the risk of a life sentence. On

the other hand, as Justice Thomas wrote in his

concurring opinion in Apprendi, at a certain

level of generality one can surely say that a

fact that increases the prosecution’s entitlement

is an element, not a sentencing factor. Id. at

2379. Ex ante, the expected punishment the

defendant will receive is necessarily greater if

the range has been shrunk from 30 years to life,
to mandatory life: "The mandatory minimum

entitles the government to more than it would

otherwise be entitled (5 to 10 years, rather than

0 to 10 and the risk of a sentence below 5).

Thus, the fact triggering the mandatory minimum

is part of the punishment sought to be

inflicted." Id. (internal quotations and

citations omitted). 

 We must decide, therefore, whether the literal

fact that these defendants faced at least a risk

of a life term is enough to make sec. 848(b) a

sentencing statute under Apprendi. Such a

decision would, of course, amount to a rejection

of the theory of increased expected punishment

articulated by Justices Thomas and Scalia in

Apprendi--a theory that the other three justices

in the majority had no occasion to discuss, given

the nature of the New Jersey law actually before

them. In the end, however, it is our best guess

that the rest of the majority would not have gone

this far (and it seems clear that the four

dissenters would have no trouble finding a

sentencing factor under the circumstances now

before us). The language of the principal opinion

refers not to the defendant’s expected

punishment, but to the "prescribed statutory

maximum." Id. at 2363. That sounds to us like a

reference to the text of the statute, and there

is no doubt here that a life sentence was

possible under sec. 848(a), even if it was not a

certainty.

 We agree entirely with Justice Thomas’s

observation that the predicted sentence would

often be lower, if the judge knew she could

select a sentence below life. Indeed, we have

often remanded cases for resentencing if a

district court makes an error in calculating

either offense level or criminal history under

the Sentencing Guidelines, and (for example) that

error has the effect of moving the defendant from

level 43 (mandatory life) to level 42 at any

criminal history category (360 months to life).

See United States v. Patterson, 215 F.3d 776, 786

(7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Guyton, 36 F.3d

655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991). The defendant is

entitled in those cases to a chance to persuade

the judge to select something less than life,

even though the risk of a new life sentence

remains. Nevertheless, the Court has reiterated

several times that it has not overruled McMillan,

and it seems to us that the rationale of McMillan

applies with equal force to sec. 848: "[The

statute] operates to divest the judge of

discretion to impose any sentence of less than

[life] for the underlying felony; it does not

authorize a sentence in excess of that otherwise

allowed for that offense." See 477 U.S. at 81-82.

We therefore reject the Governor defendants’
argument that the indictment should have charged

that they satisfied the criteria of sec. 848(b)

and that the jury should have found those facts

beyond a reasonable doubt, and we move on to the

other common issues. 

 2. Jury Instructions: Use of Minor Pinkerton

Liability

 We review the instructions the district court

gave to the jury as a whole. "We reverse only if

the jury instructions, viewed as a whole,

misguide the jury to the litigant’s prejudice."

United States v. Rodriguez-Andrade, 62 F.3d 948,

953 (7th Cir. 1995). For example, reversal is

proper where the instructions inaccurately state

the law, see United States v. Madoch, 149 F.3d

596, 599 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.

1006 (1999), or fail to present a theory of

defense supported by the evidence, see United

States v. Minneman, 143 F.3d 274, 280 (7th Cir.

1998). With respect to the instruction regarding

the sec. 861 offenses, the defendants’ complaint

is that the instruction did not require the

government to prove that they knew that the

individual used was a minor. In fact, the court

told the jury that "the Government does not have

to prove that the defendant whom you are

considering knew that the person was under the

age of 18 when he was employed or used to further

the narcotics conspiracy." 

 This was a correct statement of the law, as we

have since held in United States v. Frazier, 213

F.3d 409, 419 (7th Cir. 2000). Other circuits had

so held before we addressed the issue, in cases

such as United States v. Chin, 981 F.2d 1275,

1280 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Williams,

922 F.2d 737, 738-39 (11th Cir. 1991); United

States v. Valencia-Roldan, 893 F.2d 1080, 1083

(9th Cir. 1990); and United States v. Carter, 854

F.2d 1102, 1108-09 (8th Cir. 1988). In Frazier,

we joined them, relying on the legislative

purpose to protect juveniles, the undesirability

of adopting a rule that would encourage drug

dealers to blind themselves to the ages of the

young people with whom they dealt, and the need

to place the burden of ascertaining age on the

drug dealer at the time of the transaction.

Frazier disposes of this argument entirely.

 With respect to the Pinkerton instruction, which

relates to the convictions on Counts 3-9, 11-23,

25-27, 29-37, and 39-40, the defendants make a

somewhat odd argument. They assert that Pinkerton

v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), is no

longer good law in narcotics cases after the

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.

Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994), which held that
proof of agreement is enough to support a

conviction under 21 U.S.C. sec. 846, and that the

government does not need to go further and prove

that the defendant committed an overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy. But the Court said

not a word about Pinkerton in Shabani, and for

understandable reasons. The two cases simply

dealt with different issues. Except for Count 12,

the counts to which the defendants refer charged

offenses under 21 U.S.C. sec. 841, not

conspiracies under sec. 846. Shabani is about how

much the government must prove to show a sec. 846

violation (and we note it does not prohibit the

government from proving overt acts--it just says

that the government does not bear that burden).

Pinkerton is about the ways in which acts of one

person may be attributed to another, when there

is a conspiracy. 

 This court has regularly applied Pinkerton to

drug conspiracies in post-Shabani cases. See,

e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 116 F.3d 1204,

1206 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Vega, 72

F.3d 507, 517 (7th Cir. 1995). There is nothing

wrong with the Pinkerton instruction given here,

which stated that:

A conspirator is responsible for the acts of any

other member of the conspiracy if he was a member

of the conspiracy when the act was committed, and

if the act was committed in furtherance of or as

a natural consequence of the conspiracy.

We add that there is no tension between Pinkerton

liability and the type of vertical territorial

organization that the GDs used for their drug

business. The question whether the actions of

others were reasonably foreseeable to the

particular defendants (or, as this instruction

put it, a natural consequence of the conspiracy

they joined) is a factual one. Those facts will

exist in some hub-and-spokes style conspiracies,

especially when the culpability of individuals

near the hub is at stake. They are the people who

can predict what their counterparts are doing,

even if they have no direct knowledge. We are not

prepared to hold that Pinkerton liability is

unavailable as a matter of law in this kind of

case. We therefore reject this line of argument

as well.

 3. Richardson Error

 After the trial in this case but before oral

argument, the Supreme Court decided in Richardson

v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999), that a

jury in a CCE case must unanimously agree on at

least three specific acts that constitute the

series of violations called for by sec. 848. As
in Richardson itself, the district court here had

not given such an instruction to the jury. The

Governor defendants argue that this omission

requires reversal of their CCE convictions.

 Before addressing that argument directly, we

must consider the proper standard of review. The

government argues that this kind of problem is

subject to harmless error analysis, under Neder

v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), while the

defendants predictably both resist that idea and

argue that the error here could not be considered

harmless. The language of Neder, however, leaves

little room for the defendants’ position. Neder

itself was a case in which the parties agreed

that the jury had been given erroneous

instructions, in that the issue of materiality

had not been submitted to the jury as it should

have been under United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.

506 (1995). Even so, the Supreme Court held that

the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18 (1967), applied. 

 The Chapman test, which the Court reconfirmed

in Neder, requires us to ask "whether it appears

’beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained.’" 527 U.S. at 15, quoting from Chapman,

386 U.S. at 24. In this case, as in its companion

Jackson, supra, that test is satisfied. In

Jackson, other members of the GDs made the same

argument under Richardson, based on the same

failure of the district court to require the jury

to decide on the three predicate offenses. In

Jackson, we found harmless error because the jury

in fact found the defendants guilty of "many more

than three predicate offenses relating to the

drug conspiracy." 207 F.3d at 919. The same is

true here. McCain, Moore, Ellis, and Wilson were

the four defendants that Count 2 charged with

violating sec. 848, and the jury convicted all

four. It also convicted all four on Counts 3 and

4 (violations of sec. 861, use of minor in

connection with drug offenses) and on Counts 5-7

(violations of sec. 841). That assures us that

the jury unanimously found that each defendant

had committed at least three specific predicate

offenses, and that any error here in the

instructions was harmless. See also Hardin, 209

F.3d at 659 (finding harmless error in exactly

the same circumstances).

 4. Sufficiency of Evidence for Life Sentences

 This aspect of the Governors’ argument attacks

the district court’s findings at the sentencing

phase that established the necessary drug

quantities and dollar volumes required to trigger

sec. 848(b). As the text we set out earlier
indicates, sec. 848 applies when (1) the person

is the principal administrator or one of several

principals, and (2) the violation involved at

least 300 times the quantity of a substance

described in sec. 841(b)(1)(B), or (3) the

enterprise received $10 million in gross receipts

during any 12-month period of its existence for

the manufacture, importation, or distribution of

the forbidden substance. Elements (2) and (3) are

the ones at issue here.

 Once again, the standard of review proves to be

critical. The district court’s calculations of

drug quantity and dollar volume were findings of

fact, and thus reviewable only for clear error.

United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 950 (7th

Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1103 (1999).

Even the defendants can do no more than say that

the evidence here was "thin," which is a weak

start on a difficult argument for them. In

specific terms, the government had to show that

the principal leaders of the CCE distributed 150

kilograms of cocaine powder or 1.5 kilograms of

crack cocaine, and that it received the required

revenues.

 To do so, it relied on the surveillance tapes

in which Hoover was heard discussing the GD drug

sales and stating that the GDs as a whole were

selling $200,000 to $300,000 a day worth of

cocaine. It also relied on the testimony of

cooperating witness Akira Stigler that he sold

$7,000 to $10,000 of drugs per day in "Pink’s

Alley," and that each $10 bag contained about 0.1

gram of crack cocaine. The court, adopting the

government’s estimates, then extrapolated from

these figures and concluded that Hoover’s

estimate led to annual GD sales of up to $109.5

million. Of that, the GD organization itself

received its "nation work" cut of one day per

week, or a total of $10.4 to $15.6 million

annually. Assuming that powder cocaine sells for

$20,000 per kilogram (the number suggested in

trial testimony), the GDs had to sell 10 to 15

kilos a day to reach Hoover’s estimates. Trial

witnesses also estimated that a $10 bag of crack

contains anywhere from 0.1 to 0.2 gram; taking

the average of 0.15 gram, the organization would

have had to sell between 3 and 4.5 kilos of crack

each day to reach Hoover’s estimates. Looking at

only the one day per week of "nation sales,"

there would still be annual sales of 156 to 234

kilos of crack. Using "The List," the court took

all these figures and allocated them among the

defendants in the same proportion as each

defendant’s "count" under "The List." For

example, McCain had a "count" of 761; he

therefore was responsible for 12% of the GD

members, and thus 12% of the GD sales. 
 The defendants attack this methodology on

several grounds. First, they urge us to find that

Hoover’s statements were unreliable because they

were nothing but idle boasts. But this was a call

for the district court to make, and in light of

the rest of the evidence showing the tremendous

scope of the GD operations, we cannot say it was

clear error to take Hoover seriously. The same is

true about the court’s assessment of Stigler’s

credibility. The figures here are so huge that

the court would have had to been off by an order

of magnitude before any mistake would have made

a difference. We see no such error.

 5.Other Issues

 a. Batson Claims 

 The consolidated brief argues that the

defendants’ right to an impartial jury drawn from

a cross-section of the community was violated for

three reasons: (1) African-Americans are

underrepresented on the Illinois voter

registration rolls from which the Northern

District of Illinois draws its jurors; (2) the

government moved to empanel an anonymous jury,

and the court’s grant of that motion prejudiced

the defendants; and (3) the government used its

peremptory challenges in a racially

discriminatory way, in violation of Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 

 We find no merit to any of these arguments. We

have found before that there is nothing wrong

with the use of voter rolls to select a venire.

United States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 1302 (7th

Cir. 1997). Furthermore, the 109-person venire in

this case included 15 African-Americans, or 13.8%

of the members. Counsel for Moore pointed out

that the voter rolls show that 18% of the

relevant population is African-American, but the

4.2% difference is hardly worth noting when one

considers the effect of random selection of

venires. The thrust of the defendants’ argument

on the anonymity of the jury was to support their

Batson argument. In any event, this is a decision

that lies within the district court’s discretion,

United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 301-02

(7th Cir. 1996), and there is nothing here that

persuades us the district court abused its

discretion or impermissibly communicated to the

jury that the defendants were likely to be

personally dangerous to it. Cf. United States v.

Smith, 31 F.3d 469, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1994).

 In all, the government exercised five peremptory

challenges during the jury selection process.

Three were against African-Americans, and the

other two were not. The final jury included two
African-Americans. Following the guidance from

Batson, the district court required the

government to articulate its reasons for striking

each of the African-American venire persons. See

United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1160-61

(7th Cir. 1994). The government explained that

Juror No. 49 lived in the "territory" of some of

the defendants, her brother had been prosecuted

for drugs, and the government attorneys found her

manner "stand-offish." Juror No. 116, it said,

was a "social worker type," who it believed would

be too sympathetic toward the defendants. It was

troubled by Juror No. 129 because on the one hand

she disavowed all knowledge of Larry Hoover, but

on the other hand she acknowledged reading

magazines that had published several articles

about Hoover; in addition, her brother and

Poteete were both hair dressers. The district

court accepted these reasons and found that they

were nondiscriminatory. A finding on the question

of discriminatory intent is entitled to

deferential review. See, e.g., United States v.

Brisk, 171 F.3d 514, 523 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 120 S. Ct. 150 (1999); Mahaffey v. Page,

162 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1127 (1999). We find no such error here;

to the contrary, the government provided multiple

nondiscriminatory reasons for its strikes, and

the record contains no support for the

defendants’ various efforts to suggest that the

government was somehow systematically

disadvantaging the African-American panel

members. 

 b. Admission of "The List" into Evidence

 The defendants all complain that the district

court should not have admitted "The List" into

evidence. We review that decision only for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Curry, 79 F.3d

1489, 1494-95 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.

De Gudino, 722 F.2d 1351, 1355 (7th Cir. 1984).

"The List" was the document that IRS agents

seized from a file cabinet at Save the Children

Promotions. The folder containing "The List" was

marked "L./Sr," presumably to distinguish it

somehow from Hoover’s son, Larry Hoover, Jr. The

information on "The List" described the

hierarchical and territorial organization of the

GDs.

 The defendants complain that it was not

properly admitted as a co-conspirator statement

under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), because the

identity of the person who created it was

unknown. They also assert that it was not

properly authenticated under Fed. R. Evid. 901.

Neither argument holds water.
 The details contained in "The List" were such

that it could only have been written by a member

of the GDs or by someone sufficiently involved

with the business to be intimately familiar with

it--in other words, by a co-conspirator. The

defendants are wrong to suggest that it is

necessary to know the precise identity of a coconspirator before statements can be admitted

under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See, e.g., De Gudino,

722 F.2d at 1355-56. As for authentication, the

magistrate judge concluded that there was ample

proof of its authenticity: there were recordings

of Hoover and Shell discussing its creation, it

was discovered in the files of Hoover’s female

companion, the label on the file matched Hoover’s

name, and the contents clearly indicated that it

was a GD document. These are the kinds of factors

to which Illustration (b)(4) of Rule 901 refers.

The district court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting "The List."

 c. Singleton Claim

 We have by now on numerous occasions rejected

the argument that criminal convictions must be

reversed whenever the government has promised its

witnesses leniency in exchange for their

testimony. See United States v. Turner, 203 F.3d

1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Curry, 187 F.3d 762, 765-66 (7th Cir. 1999),

cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 834 (2000); United

States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 688 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1126 (1999). It has no

merit here either, and we have nothing to add to

our earlier decisions on the point.

 B. Individual Issues: Convictions

 Before beginning our consideration of the

individual issues the different defendants have

raised, we note that defendants Poteete and Smith

did not file supplemental individual briefs,

choosing instead to rely on the points raised in

the joint brief. We therefore have the individual

claims of only five of the defendants to

consider.

 1. Moore

 a. Sufficiency of Indictment, sec. 861

 We begin with Moore’s pro se challenge to the

language of the indictment charging him with

using minors to commit or avoid detection of a

drug felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. sec. 861.

(Ellis moved pro se to join this argument; the

panel took that motion with the case, and we
hereby grant it.) The relevant parts of that

statute read as follows:

(a) Unlawful acts

 It shall be unlawful for any person at least

eighteen years of age to knowingly and

intentionally--

(1) employ, hire, use, persuade, induce, entice,

or coerce, a person under eighteen years of age

to violate any provision of this subchapter or

subchapter II of this chapter;

(2) employ, hire, use, persuade, induce, entice,

or coerce, a person under eighteen years of age

to assist in avoiding detection or apprehension

for any offense of this subchapter or subchapter

II of this chapter by any Federal, State, or

local law enforcement official; . . .

(Emphasis added.) As Moore correctly points out,

Count 3 of the superseding indictment alleged

only that from 1987 through August 30, 1995, in

Chicago and elsewhere within the Northern

District of Illinois, defendants McCain, Moore,

Vincent Martin, Ellis, Tirenzy Wilson, and Eric

Wilson "employed, hired, used, induced and

enticed a person under eighteen years of age to

violate Title 21, United States Code, Section

846, as charged in Count One of this Indictment,"

in violation of 21 U.S.C. sec. 861(a)(1) and 18

U.S.C. sec. 2. It never mentions doing these acts

"knowingly and intentionally," as the statute

appears to require. The same flaw exists in Count

4, which charges a violation of sec. 861(a)(2)

(use of minor to avoid detection of drug crime). 

 Moore makes his attack on the sufficiency of

the indictment for the first time on appeal. On

the one hand, it is clear that he is entitled to

do so, for Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) states that

a defendant may raise at any time an objection

that the indictment "fails to show jurisdiction

or to charge an offense," and such an objection

"shall be noticed by the court at any time during

the pendency of the proceedings." Here, Moore is

arguing that the indictment’s failure to allege

that he took these acts "knowingly and

intentionally" means that it fails to charge an

offense. On the other hand, the untimely nature

of Moore’s objection affects the standard of

review that we use. If an indictment has not been

challenged in the trial court, it is immune from

attack "unless it is so obviously defective as

not to charge the offense by any reasonable

construction." United States v. Wabaunsee, 528

F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1975), quoting United States

v. Vanderberg, 358 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir. 1966);

see also United States v. Johnson, 805 F.2d 753,
758 (7th Cir. 1986) (same). 

 While this indictment was far from perfect, and

it might have been vulnerable to a timely

objection, we conclude that it is not so

thoroughly defective that it must be set aside at

this late date. In so holding, we recognize that

"in order for an indictment to be valid it must

allege all of the elements which are necessary to

constitute a violation of the statute." Davis v.

United States, 253 F.2d 24, 25 (6th Cir. 1958),

quoted in Wabaunsee, 528 F.2d at 3. It is not

necessary to spell out each element, but each

element must be present in context. See United

States v. Olson, 846 F.2d 1103, 1115-16 (7th Cir.

1988). 

 Moore (and Ellis) rely on Wabaunsee in their

effort to urge the opposite result. Wabaunsee,

however, held only that a defect in an indictment

could not be cured by a mere citation to the

governing statute or by proper jury instructions.

We do not disagree with those propositions, but

we do not find them particularly useful here

either. The government responds by pointing to

United States v. Dixon, 596 F.2d 178 (7th Cir.

1979), in which the defendants were charged with

violating the statute that prohibits conveying a

weapon within a penal institution (in Dixon’s

case, a "shank," or sharpened table knife). In

that case, the statute did not contain an express

scienter requirement, but courts had inferred

that such a requirement existed. The indictment

tracked the language of the statute. This court

found the indictment sufficient for two reasons:

first, because it would be unlikely that a person

would unknowingly carry a weapon around in a

penal institution, and thus the acts charged

implicitly included a knowledge requirement (and

would have permitted the defendant to raise as a

defense the possibility that he was an unwitting

carrier); and second, because it was sufficient

for the indictment to trace the language of the

statute. Id. at 180-81.

 Our case differs from Dixon at least on the

latter point, because Counts 3 and 4 most

definitely did not include the statutory words

"knowingly and intentionally." The first point,

however, is more useful. As we held in United

States v. Garcia-Geronimo, 663 F.2d 738 (7th Cir.

1981), "[i]n determining whether an essential

element of the crime has been omitted from the

indictment, courts will not insist that any

particular word or phrase be used." Id. at 742.

In Garcia-Geronimo, we held that the use of the

phrase "dispose of" under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1426(b)

meant "to direct or assign for an illegal use,"

and thus made criminal intent an element of the

offense. Id. at 743. The use of the term "dispose
of" in the indictment was thus sufficient for

charging intent, bearing in mind the fact that

the criminal intent element may be alleged in any

form that substantially states it. Id. at 742-43.

 We agree with Moore that some of the actions

charged in Counts 3 and 4 might not necessarily

imply a knowing and intentional act. Perhaps one

might "employ," "hire," or "use" a person to

violate the controlled substance laws or to

assist in avoiding detection without criminal

intent (though we find it unnecessary to resolve

this question). But it seems to us impossible to

take the next step, which is to "induce" or

"entice" a person to take those actions, without

the necessary scienter. The ideas of purpose,

knowledge, and intent are inherent in those

words. We are therefore satisfied that this is

not one of those cases in which the indictment is

"so obviously defective as not to charge the

offense by any reasonable construction," and we

therefore reject Moore’s and Ellis’s argument

that Counts 3 and 4 (and others they say are

dependent on them) must be dismissed.

 b. Sufficiency of Evidence: sec.sec. 848,

861

 (1) CCE conviction, sec. 848. Moore next

argues that the evidence was insufficient to

support his convictions under the CCE statute,

sec. 848, and under the statute prohibiting the

use of a minor, sec. 861. We disagree with the

government that Moore (and Wilson) waived or

forfeited this argument; their motions under Fed.

R. Crim. P. 29(c) for judgment or acquittal or

new trial, while a bit on the general side, were

enough to preserve the argument. United States v.

South, 28 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 1994).

 Specifically, Moore argues that (1) there was

no direct evidence that he was engaged personally

or indirectly as a supervisor in three or more

illicit transactions, and that his convictions

for the predicate offenses were based solely on

the liability theory recognized by Pinkerton,

supra; (2) the government proved only that three

of the Regents working under him were involved in

drug sales and transactions, and thus his

conviction may rest impermissibly on the

inclusion of innocent supervisees; and (3) the

court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on

Moore’s defense that he had withdrawn from the

conspiracy.

 We see no merit in the latter two points. Moore

is wrong to assume that his CCE conviction could

rest only on his supervision of five of the eight

people the government named as his subordinates.
On this record, the jury easily could have found

that he acted in concert with numerous

individuals. Evidence in the record showed that

the GDs were a huge organization, that he was a

GD Governor, that GD Governors had several

hundred subordinates, and that many of those

subordinates were involved in drug trafficking.

That offers ample support for the jury’s verdict.

As for withdrawal, Moore underestimates the

instructions the court did give. Under those

instructions, the jury was told that it could

consider "evidence [of Moore’s demotion from

Governor] as it bears on [Moore’s] liability for

the acts of the conspiracy committed after that

time." The substantive counts on which the jury

convicted Moore (5, 6, and 7) all refer to

conduct from 1993, which was before Moore’s early

1994 demotion.

 As we recently had occasion to reiterate, under

Pinkerton "a coconspirator may be held criminally

liable for the foreseeable overt acts of others

in furtherance of a conspiracy." United States v.

Frazier, 213 F.3d 409, 416 (7th Cir. 2000). The

theory rests essentially on agency concepts.

Before Pinkerton can be applied, it is of course

necessary to show that a conspiracy existed, that

the defendant joined the conspiracy, that the

other actor was also part of the conspiracy, and

that the overt act was both foreseeable and in

furtherance of the conspiracy. At that point,

however, like the Three Musketeers, it’s all for

one and one for all. It is possible that a lowlevel street dealer might not be able to foresee

all of the actions of the ringleaders of the

conspiracy, and that people out on different

"spokes" of the conspiratorial wheel might

similarly be unaware of the role others are

playing. As applied to Moore, however, these

concerns do not arise. Pinkerton liability

applies in general to conspiracies and CCEs,

United States v. Graewe, 774 F.2d 106, 108 (6th

Cir. 1985), and the record showed countless overt

acts of other members of the GDs that were

foreseeable to Moore and that were in furtherance

of the enterprise. 

 (2) Use of minor convictions, sec. 861. As an

evidentiary matter, Moore argues that there was

no evidence that any of the defendants had

personally employed or used a minor to carry out

drug activities, that there was no evidence that

a minor worked in his territory, and that his

conviction was based solely on an impermissible

theory of global responsibility (i.e. that he was

guilty because he was a GD and because the GDs

often used minors to sell drugs). Even the

government points to no evidence indicating that

Moore personally used minors in the forbidden

ways. It argues instead that the GD drug
conspiracy did so regularly. Robert Crawford, for

example, joined the GDs when he was 12 years old

and was selling drugs by the time he was 16.

Vincent Martin, Moore’s assistant governor, used

minors to cover his drug spots. The GDs liked to

use minors for a variety of purposes (including

also providing security for the leaders) because

they knew or believed that minors would be

treated more leniently by law enforcement

authorities if they were caught. We agree with

the government that this is enough to show at

least vicarious liability for the use of the

minors. See United States v. Davis, 154 F.3d 772,

786 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1169

(1999). The jury reasonably could infer that

Moore, as a high official in the organization,

knew about this use in general, that it was

reasonably foreseeable to him, and that it

assisted the enterprise.

 c. Motion for Severance

 Before the trial, Moore moved unsuccessfully to

have his trial severed from that of Poteete. We

review the denial of such a motion for abuse of

discretion. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S.

534, 541 (1993). Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b),

multiple defendants may be tried together if they

participated in the same transactions

constituting the offense. On the other hand, Fed.

R. Crim. P. 14 provides that if a defendant will

be prejudiced by joinder of offenses or

defendants, the court may grant a severance.

Moore tried to show prejudice from the joinder of

his case with Poteete’s in two ways: first, he

claimed that Poteete’s defense was inconsistent

with Moore’s innocence, and second, the joint

trial meant that Moore would be unable to

confront Poteete, in violation of his Sixth

Amendment rights. 

 One of Moore’s defenses at trial was that he

withdrew from the conspiracy after he was

stripped of his rank of Governor for brutally

violating (i.e. punishing) Poteete, who was then

one of his Regents. As part of his defense, Moore

wanted to call Poteete to the stand to testify

that the violation never occurred. Poteete,

however, was defending himself on the ground that

Moore coerced him into joining the GD

organization, in part through the physical

beating. These circumstances do not show that the

district court abused its discretion. Indeed,

Moore’s defense is not really antagonistic to

Poteete’s. It was possible for the jury to

believe both that Moore coerced Poteete into

joining the GDs and that Moore later withdrew.

And in any event, even if there was some residual

inconsistency in the defenses, Zafiro holds that
"[m]utually antagonistic defenses are not

prejudicial per se." 506 U.S. at 538. Finally,

Moore has not shown that the denial of the

severance motion caused him to suffer actual

prejudice. He never showed that Poteete would

have testified at a separate trial (as he might

have done with an affidavit from Poteete), or

that he would have testified that Moore did not

beat him. 

 d. Use of Perjured Testimony

 Moore argues that Stigler perjured himself about

the time when he was selling drugs for Pink. He

moved for a new trial on that basis, but the

district court denied his motion. We review this

decision for abuse of discretion. United States

v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 523 (7th Cir. 1995). The

alleged perjury was as follows. At the trial,

Stigler (a former GD member) testified about the

drug selling activities in a location known as

"Pink’s Alley," on 82nd Street in Chicago.

Stigler said that he began selling drugs there

two months after he and his family moved to 81st

Street and Ellis Avenue. At the trial, Stigler

said that the move took place at the beginning of

1993. Records from the Cook County Department of

Corrections, however, show that Stigler was

incarcerated there from November 30, 1992, to

February 19, 1993. A rap sheet from the Chicago

Police Department (CPD) further showed that

Stigler was arrested again on March 1, 1993, and

re-entered Cook County custody on March 3, 1993,

where he stayed until May 28th. Even then, he was

not released; instead he was turned over to the

Illinois Department of Corrections, in whose care

he remained until November 23, 1993. 

 These dates, Moore argues, show that Stigler

must have perjured himself when he testified that

he started selling drugs for Pink two months

after the beginning of 1993. His testimony

detailed exactly the way these sales occurred.

Moore argues in addition that the government must

have known about this perjury, because it had

access to the various rap sheets and

incarceration records that would have proven it. 

 We do not dispute the fact that Stigler’s

testimony may have been inaccurate, but that does

not necessarily make it perjured, and even if he

was lying, it does not necessarily show that the

government knew this. He could have mixed up his

dates, for example. The government notes that

when he was arrested in November 1992, he gave as

his address 82nd and Ellis, indicating that the

move may have been sooner than he estimated. In

addition, it is clear that he was twice arrested

selling drugs in or near "Pink’s Alley." (The
government has conceded that one of those arrests

was approximately two blocks away, not right at

the mouth of the alley, but we agree that this

discrepancy is inconsequential.) Finally, there

was enough independent evidence corroborating

Stigler’s testimony that the district court was

entitled to conclude either that it was not

perjured or, at the very least, the government

would have had no reason to think it was

perjured. That is enough, under Saadeh, to reject

this claim. See 61 F.3d at 523.

 2. McCain

 a. Motion to Suppress

 Although the government argues that McCain

failed to object to the magistrate judge’s ruling

on his motion to suppress, our examination of the

record indicates that he did file an objection

(although the document itself is not here).

Rather than tarry on that point, we will consider

the merits of his challenge to the court’s denial

of the motion.

 McCain was arrested on June 4, 1991, by

officers from the CPD. He claims that they lacked

probable cause to arrest him then, and thus that

his statements following that arrest should have

been suppressed. Testimony from a CPD officer

indicated that on June 4, he and other CPD

officers traveling in an unmarked squad car saw

a group of four men standing in a driveway near

a building. They knew the building was a gang

members’ gathering place, and they recognized one

of the men to be a gang member. They pulled into

the driveway, at which point McCain and three

other men dropped some ammunition to the ground

and tried to leave. All four were then arrested

for illegal possession of ammunition. The officer

testified that McCain was twice given his Miranda

warnings, once at the time of arrest and later at

the stationhouse. McCain contradicted this

statement, but the district court chose to credit

the officer’s statement. We see no reversible

error in this decision; it was up to the court to

decide whom to believe, and if the officer’s

account was true, there was plenty of probable

cause for the arrest.

 Second, McCain complains that certain telephone

calls he made were improperly intercepted. The

court signed and issued a 30-day interception

order on July 6, 1994; that order was extended on

August 16, 1994, for another 30 days. The

extension was to end on September 14, 1994, at

12:25 p.m. The government agents shut down the

wiretap on September 15 at 12:00 p.m., and then

they applied for and received another 30-day
extension. The court signed that extension at

4:49 p.m., and the first call under it was

intercepted that day at 4:57 p.m. The calls about

which McCain is now complaining were intercepted

between 11:29 a.m. and 12:06 p.m. on October 15,

1994, the last day of this extension period.

 His argument is meritless in light of the

language of the federal wiretap statute, which

provides that the "thirty-day period begins on

the earlier of the day on which the investigative

or law enforcement officer first begins to

conduct an interception under the order or ten

days after the order is entered. . . ." 18 U.S.C.

sec. 2518(5). According to the statute, the 30-

day period for the extension began to run on

September 15, 1994--the day of the first

interception. We think it most sensible to look

to Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a) for guidance on the way

the statutory time period should be computed.

See, e.g., United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F.Supp.

296, 317 (S.D. Fla. 1971). Under that approach,

the first day of the 30-day period is not

included but the last is, and the order in this

case expired on October 15. Although one district

court has chosen not to apply Fed. R. Crim. P.

45(a) to the calculation of the 30-day period,

see United States v. Gangi, 33 F.Supp.2d 303, 309

(S.D. N.Y. 1999) (not applying Fed. R. Crim. P.

45(a) and including both first and last day in

calculation of 30-day period), the Third Circuit

interpreted the system in the same way we have

done. See United States v. Carson, 969 F.2d 1480,

1485 (3d Cir. 1992). We see no reason to create

a circuit conflict over this kind of mechanical

determination, especially when the general

methodology of the Rule is familiar (though we

note that we are not applying Rule 45 directly,

and thus that we are not necessarily

incorporating all of its details such as the way

to count weekends and holidays). The telephone

calls about which McCain is complaining were

intercepted within that time period, and so they

could be used in accordance with the statute. 

 Last, McCain argues that because the wiretap

was illegal, his arrest on October 15, 1994, was

also unsupported by probable cause (because the

arrest was based on information collected during

the wiretap). Because we have found no problem

with the wiretap, this argument falls with that

one.

 b. Sufficiency of Evidence, sec. 848

 McCain’s argument on this point, to the extent

that it differs from Moore’s, asserts only that

the jury should not have believed the trial

testimony of certain witnesses (Robert Crawford,
Christopher Robinson, and McKinley Hayden, in

particular). He also implies that it is

significant that he never personally visited

Larry Hoover at the Vienna Correctional Center.

The latter fact is irrelevant, and the former

argument asks us to re-do the jury’s job. That is

not our function. United States v. Johnson-Dix,

54 F.3d 1295, 1306 (7th Cir. 1995). There was

ample evidence to support McCain’s guilt under

sec. 848.

 3.Ellis

 a. Admission of Ellis’s Statements

 Ellis’s motion to suppress concerned statements

he made while he was under arrest on December 7,

1994. A magistrate judge held a hearing on the

motion and recommended that the statements should

be admitted; the district court agreed after

reviewing the transcript of the hearing and the

report and recommendation. The dispute centers

around the question whether Ellis received proper

Miranda warnings when he was arrested on that

date at the time of his arrest and when he

arrived at the police station. Ellis concedes

that he received written warnings later, when he

was taken to the office of the United States

Attorney; there he signed a waiver and agreed to

become a cooperating witness (though he later

retracted that agreement).

 This was a simple conflict in testimony that

the court resolved in favor of the police. The

officers testified that they administered oral

warnings, and Ellis denied that he did and

claimed that he asked to speak to an attorney and

was refused. Ellis also made a general allegation

of coercion. We agree with Ellis that some of the

reasons the magistrate judge offered for

believing the officers were not particularly

persuasive: the judge thought that the officers

would never have jeopardized such an important

investigation by being careless with Miranda, and

the judge also found it odd that Ellis waited a

year before executing his affidavit containing

the allegations of misconduct. The time lag is

easily explained, because Ellis was not arraigned

until November 21, 1995, and his affidavit

followed very shortly thereafter; the presumption

about police behavior we find troubling, but in

the end not enough to amount to reversible error.

The most important point was that the magistrate

chose to believe the testimony of the officers.

The district court had the full transcript of

that testimony before it, and it was able to

assess both accounts on its own. The magistrate

judge’s remark about the attention the officers

were probably paying to the investigation is not

enough to require reversal on this factual issue.
 b. Sufficiency of Evidence: sec.sec. 848,

861

 Ellis’s arguments on these points track those

of Moore, and we reject them for the same

reasons.

 4.Wilson

 a. Sufficiency of Evidence: sec.sec. 848,

861, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1956

 Wilson’s arguments challenging the sufficiency

of the evidence to support his convictions under

the CCE statute, sec. 848, and under the minors

statute, sec. 861, also founder on the same

grounds as the same points did with Moore. Wilson

also claims that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction on Count 41 for money

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec.

1956(a)(1)(B)(i). This subsection required the

government to prove that (1) the defendant knew

that the transaction involved the proceeds of

unlawful activities, and (2) that the transaction

was designed to conceal the unlawful nature of

the proceeds. See United States v. Jackson, 983

F.2d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 1993); see also United

States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 926-27 (7th Cir.

1996). The funds laundered need not be traceable

to a specific illegal transaction; it is enough

if the government shows that the transaction

involved some funds which were derived from some

illegal activity. See United States v. Jackson,

935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991). 

 The government presented the following evidence

at trial: (1) a 1994 Chevrolet Astro Van was

purchased under the name of Wilson’s brother-inlaw; the brother-in-law paid $2,500 cash down and

financed the rest with a loan for $31,000 from

the First National Bank, using a loan application

with fraudulent information on it; (2) Wilson’s

brother-in-law lived in the same household with

the defendant; (3) Wilson often used the van; (4)

Wilson had over $12,000 in stereo equipment

installed in the van; and (5) payments on the car

loan and stereo equipment were all made with cash

or money orders.

 The standard of review that applies to

sufficiency challenges to jury verdicts dooms

Wilson’s argument. We would have to find that no

rational jury could have seen the evidence as

this one did, taking all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the government and

drawing all permissible inferences in its favor.

United States v. Shorter, 54 F.3d 1248, 1254 (7th
Cir. 1995); United States v. FJ Vollmer & Co.,

Inc., 1 F.3d 1511, 1519 (7th Cir. 1993). At the

time Wilson was promoted to Governor in 1994, he

commented that he just wanted to make a quick

$100,000. This was right around the time when he

bought the van. Witnesses testified that Wilson

personally bought and sold drugs, so the jury

knew that he had illegal cash sloshing around

that could have been used. In addition, the false

information on the loan application permitted the

jury to infer that Wilson had something to hide

about the source of the funds he was going to use

for his payments.

 No one would call this evidence overwhelming,

but that is not the standard the government must

meet once the jury has come to its decision. The

circumstantial evidence here could legitimately

have been interpreted by the jury to show money

laundering, and we therefore reject Wilson’s

challenge to his conviction on Count 41.

 5.Pink

 a. Use of Perjured Testimony

 We have already considered this point in

connection with Moore’s challenge to the Stigler

testimony. Moore and Pink essentially briefed the

issue together, with most of the detail appearing

in Pink’s brief. For the reasons stated in our

discussion of Moore’s point, we find that Pink

cannot prevail on this issue either.

 b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Pink’s brief includes the argument that he

received constitutionally ineffective assistance

of trial counsel, because his lawyer did not

identify the inconsistency in the dates between

Stigler’s rap sheet and his trial testimony. Pink

alleges that this oversight fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and was

prejudicial to him, as required by Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He develops this

point, however, in a cursory two-page discussion

in his brief, most of which is devoted to a

description of what happened. We find this

insufficient to raise the point for direct review

and thus we decline to reach the issue. We note

as well that it is almost always undesirable to

try to raise effectiveness of counsel on direct

appeal, because the record normally needs the

kind of supplementation that can only occur in a

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255. See

McCleese v. United States, 75 F.3d 1174, 1178

(7th Cir. 1996).
III

 Last, we address the remaining sentencing

issues raised by the individual defendants. (We

say "remaining" because the question whether sec.

848 sets forth sentencing factors or elements of

two offenses logically might belong here too.) 

 A. Moore

 Moore reprises the perjured testimony argument

we have already discussed with respect to his

conviction in Part II.B.1.d., this time to

challenge his sentence. For the same reasons we

declined to find that Stigler’s testimony

infected the jury’s verdict, we find that it did

not infect the findings that formed the basis of

Moore’s sentence.

 B. McCain

 McCain raises two sentencing points specific to

his case. The first we can dispose of in a

sentence: he claims that U.S.S.G. sec. 2D1.1

violates his guarantee to equal protection

because of the 100:1 ratio it uses for crack

cocaine. This claim is meritless under our

decisions in United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d

996, 1010 n.16 (7th Cir. 1997), and United States

v. Booker, 73 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1996) (per

curiam), to name just a few. The second concerns

the evidence that supported the drug quantities

that were attributed to him individually. He

complains that the court should not have given

him an offense level of 38 for Guidelines

purposes, because (1) Crawford’s testimony was

unreliable and contradicted some things he said

at Hoover’s trial, and (2) Hoover and Shell

controlled "Pink’s Alley," and thus the court

should not have attributed those sales to him.

The former was a credibility call, however, and

the latter overlooks the fact that "Pink’s Alley"

was within McCain’s territory. There was no

reversible error in McCain’s sentencing.

 C. Ellis

 We have already considered part of Ellis’s (and

the others’) arguments that the evidence was not

sufficient to support the mandatory life sentence

required by sec. 848(b). He also asserts that the

evidence showed neither that he was a principal

administrator, organizer or leader, nor that his

drug sales resulted in an offense level of 36-38.

There was ample evidence, however, to show that

he was a Governor, and we ruled in Jackson that

Governors count as principal actors even though
Hoover and the Board of Directors were above

them. See 207 F.3d at 919-20. The logic of

Jackson, even if not all of its details, applies

here as well to this part of sec. 848(b), and

Jackson directly governs his argument under

U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1. 

 As for the amount of drug sales, while we would

have preferred more detailed findings from the

district court explaining how it reached the

calculations it did (which gave Ellis a total

offense level of 43 on the substantive counts),

we are satisfied that the record as a whole

supports these findings. The relevant conduct

guideline, U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1), requires

the court to take into account not only the

defendant’s personal conduct, but all other

quantities of contraband that were reasonably

foreseeable to him that were within the scope of

the joint criminal activity. Id., Application

Note 2. The district court knew this, it knew

what was reasonably foreseeable to the Governors,

and it knew how large the operations were. This

finding too can stand.

 Last, Ellis says that the court should have

given him a criminal history category of I

instead of a II. At offense level 43, the

criminal history category makes no difference

anyway, because all history levels carry the same

Guideline sentence of life in prison. In

addition, Ellis’s argument is based on the fact

that one of his criminal history points was based

on an aggravated assault charge for which he

received six months’ supervision. He claims that

the record does not show that he pleaded guilty

to the charge, and thus that his supervision was

based on something less than an admission or

adjudication of guilt. We think he is probably

splitting hairs, because Illinois permits

supervision either on a formal plea of guilty or

a "stipulation by the defendant of the facts

supporting the charge," as well as upon a finding

of guilt. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c). The stipulation

option appears to be at least as conclusive as a

plea of nolo contendere, however, and those pleas

are enough to show conviction of an offense for

purposes of U.S.S.G. sec. 4A1.2(a). In any event,

because the point made no difference to his

sentence, any error the court may have committed

was harmless.

 D. Pink

 Pink makes three arguments about his sentence,

in which he challenges (1) the enhancement he

received for use of a gun under U.S.S.G. sec.

2D1.1(b)(1); (2) the leadership enhancement he

received under U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1(b); and (3)
his criminal history calculation. Accepting his

first argument would require us to find that it

was not reasonably foreseeable to him that guns

were being used in the GD conspiracy. With all

respect, such a finding would be impossible to

make, even without taking into account the fact

that this is another issue we review only for

clear error. See United States v. Taylor, 111

F.3d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1997). With respect to the

second argument, Pink asserts that the judge

should have made specific findings about which

participants were under his supervision. What the

court said instead, referring to "Pink’s Alley,"

was "That alley was running full blast with

people all over it and they were working for him,

and, however we get there, there’s ample evidence

to say five." The evidence supports the court’s

observation. Furthermore, sec. 3B1.1 also permits

the three-level increase if the defendant

"exercised management responsibility over the

property, assets, or activities of a criminal

organization." Id., Application Note 2. Pink

managed "Pink’s Alley" and thus qualified in this

way for the enhancement as well.

 Last, Pink was assigned two criminal history

points for two separate 1984 state charges for

felony possession with intent to distribute

marijuana. Pink says that these convictions were

part of the same GD drug distribution conspiracy

at issue here. He notes that the GD conspiracy

allegedly began in the early 1970s, that the GDs

controlled the neighborhood where Pink committed

the earlier crimes, and that Pink was even then

in their "grasp." The government responds that

there is no evidence that Pink joined the GDs

before 1990 or so, that there is no evidence that

the earlier crimes took place in the same

geographical area as his crimes here, and that

the marijuana convictions were part of the same

plan as the GD conspiracy. The district court was

entitled to take the government’s view of the

evidence here. Indeed, Pink does not squarely

admit that he was a GD at the earlier time,

undoubtedly for good reason. 

IV

 In the end, therefore, we find no merit in any

of the arguments any of the defendants have

raised. This was a complex proceeding for all

concerned: the prosecutors, defense counsel, the

district court, and now us. We commend the

lawyers who were appointed to represent these

defendants for their vigorous efforts to do so.

For the reasons stated, however, we Affirm the

convictions and sentences of all seven

appellants.
/1 Counts 10, 28, and 38 were dismissed on the

government’s motion before trial. Convictions on

Count 1 were dismissed after the jury rendered

its verdict, as conspiracy is a lesser included

offense of the continuing criminal enterprise.