Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed September 27, 2018.

 

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-17-00713-CV

SHANE HAWKINS D/B/A GENESIS II CHURCH OF HEALTH AND 

HEALING CHAPTER #119, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 157th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2016-29921 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

In this case under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“the DTPA”), appellant 

Shane Hawkins d/b/a Genesis II Church of Health and Healing Chapter #119 appeals 

the summary judgment and permanent injunction barring him from selling “MMS,” 

which also is variously called “Miracle Mineral Solution,” “Master Mineral 

Solution,” or “Miracle Mineral Supplement.” MMS is a sodium chlorite product 

that when used as directed produces chlorine dioxide, a chemical used in 
2

disinfectants and as an industrial bleaching agent. The Food and Drug 

Administration warns that MMS poses significant health risks to humans when taken 

at the doses recommended on the product’s label. 

 Hawkins promotes and sells MMS as a “health sacrament” of the Genesis II 

Church, a “non-religious church” that is open to people that take the sacrament “no 

matter what beliefs they may have.” Hawkins explains on his website that the church 

teaches only the taking of its health sacraments, which he touts as a cure for 95% of 

human diseases and conditions, including addiction, cancer, HIV, heart disease, 

autism, and ebola. No medical research supports these claims. Hawkins holds 

monthly “seminars,” styled as “Genesis II Church Sacraments: The Fundamentals 

of MMS,” in which participants are taught to mix and consume MMS. 

 The trial court granted the State’s motion for traditional summary judgment 

and permanently enjoined Hawkins and those in active concert or participation with 

him, and their successors and assigns, from (a) promoting, marketing, selling, 

offering for sale, advertising, or hosting events of any kind related in any way to 

MMS, sodium chlorite, or chlorine dioxide; (b) promoting, marketing, selling, 

offering for sale, advertising, or manufacturing any substance that is offered or 

intended for use in treating a disease or condition of the human body unless the 

substance has been legally approved by the Texas Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act;1 and 

(c) promoting, marketing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or manufacturing 

any substance intended for use in treating a disease or condition of the human body 

where the substance is adulterated or misbranded as defined in the Texas Food, Drug 

& Cosmetic Act. 

 

1 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 431.001–.460 (West 2017).
3

 On appeal, Hawkins raises a variety of jurisdictional, legal, factual, and 

procedural arguments. Finding no merit to these arguments, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

I. Issues Presented 

 Hawkins does not list the issues he presents for review, but so far as we can 

discern, he makes the following arguments: 

1. The trial court was required to rule upon Hawkins’s jurisdictional 

challenge before any other action was taken; 

2. the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the action; 

3. the State was represented at trial by Harris County Attorney Vince Ryan 

and Assistant County Attorney Rosemarie Donnelly, neither of whom are 

licensed to practice law in Texas; 

4. neither Ryan nor Donnelly has filed a valid oath of office or bond; 

5. neither Harris County nor Ryan is authorized to act on behalf of the State 

of Texas; 

6. Hawkins is not doing business as Genesis II Church of Health and Healing 

Chapter 119, and a church cannot be a “dba”; 

7. there is no contract between Hawkins, on one hand, and opposing parties 

and opposing counsel the State of Texas, Harris County, Harris County 

Attorney Vince Ryan, or Assistant County Attorney Rosemarie Donnelly, 

on the other hand; 

8. no one has the right to prevent a church or its believers from teaching its 

beliefs and offering its sacraments if the sacraments do not consist of 

controlled or illegal substances; 
4

9. there is no evidence that any one has been injured by Hawkins or by 

Genesis II Church’s teachings; and 

10. he is entitled to judgment because the State’s brief was due on March 2, 

2018, and the State waited until March 5, 2018, to request an extension of 

time to file its brief. 

II. Jurisdictional Arguments 

 We begin with Hawkins’s jurisdictional arguments. In the absence of subjectmatter jurisdiction, a trial court lacks authority to decide the case on the merits. See 

Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2018). The existence 

of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law which we review de novo. Harris 

County v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2018). 

 Hawkins first argues that the trial court was required to rule on his 

jurisdictional challenge before ruling on anything else. Although it is not clear when 

or how Hawkins challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction, the record before us 

demonstrates that the trial court expressly ruled on the matter in the only signed 

order in the appellate record. In that order, the trial court expressly stated that it has 

jurisdiction over the case, granted the State’s motion for final summary judgment, 

and issued a permanent injunction against Hawkins. We overrule Hawkins’s first 

issue. 

 In his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the action, Hawkins 

contends that no court can determine for itself whether it has jurisdiction. Hawkins 

is mistaken, for “[c]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own 

jurisdiction.” Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. 

2007).
5

 Hawkins also asserts that he is a bishop of Genesis II Church, and that both 

he and the church are sovereign so that no court has jurisdiction over them. It is 

well-established, however, that such “sovereignty” arguments are frivolous. Lewis 

v. State, 532 S.W.3d 423, 430–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) 

(recounting that “sovereign citizens” share a common courtroom strategy of, among 

other things, “arguing over the proper format and meaning of their names [and]

raising nonsensical challenges to subject matter jurisdiction”); Barcroft v. County of 

Fannin, 118 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (explaining 

that a person’s claim of “[sovereign] status is, at this point in our history, 

imaginary”); see also See Ex parte Blakely, No. 02-17-00393-CR, 2018 WL 

1191875, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 8, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (“Appellant argued that he is exempt from the 

jurisdiction of the trial court because he is a sovereign citizen of the state. The law 

is well-established that this argument is frivolous.”).

 Hawkins further contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because there 

is no evidence of damages in excess of $500. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 

§ 24.007(b) (West Supp. 2017) (“A district court has original jurisdiction of a civil 

matter in which the amount in controversy is more than $500, exclusive of 

interest.”). But, the district court’s jurisdiction in this case is not dependent on the 

amount in controversy because the case was brought under the DTPA. See TEX.

BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41–.63 (West 2011 & Supp. 2017). The DTPA 

states, 

Whenever the consumer protection division has reason to believe that 

any person is engaging in, has engaged in, or is about to engage in any 

act or practice declared to be unlawful by this subchapter, and that 

proceedings would be in the public interest, the division may bring an 

action in the name of the state against the person to restrain by 
6

temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, or permanent 

injunction the use of such method, act, or practice. 

Id. § 17.47(a). Acts that are unlawful under the DTPA and that have been alleged 

in this case include representing that goods or services have characteristics, uses, or 

benefits that they do not have, and “failing to disclose information concerning goods 

or services which was known at the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose 

such information was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which 

the consumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed.” See id. 

§ 17.46(b)(5), (b)(24). The DTPA expressly authorizes a district or county attorney 

to institute and prosecute a suit for injunctive relief to restrain such practices. Id. 

§ 17.48(b). The district court’s jurisdiction over such a suit for injunctive relief is 

not dependent on allegations or proof that a particular individual has sustained 

damages. See id. § 17.47(a). 

 Here, the suit was filed on behalf of the State of Texas by Vince Ryan in his 

capacity as the County Attorney of Harris County, acting through Rosemarie 

Donnelly, the Assistant County Attorney. As permitted by the statute, the action 

was brought in the district court of the county where the defendant has done business. 

Id. § 17.47(b). The suit was brought as authorized by the DTPA, and the trial court 

had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims presented.

 We overrule Hawkins’s second and ninth arguments. 

III. Opposing Counsel’s Authority 

 In issues three through five, Hawkins challenges opposing counsel’s 

qualifications or authorization to bring this suit. 

 Hawkins asserts in his third issue that neither Ryan nor Donnelly are licensed 

to practice law in this state. We may judicially notice whether a person is licensed 

to practice law in Texas. Hunnicutt v. State, 531 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 
7

1976), overruled on other grounds by Hurley v. State, 606 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1980); Landale v. Villamil, 813 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1991, no pet.). As their titles indicate and the State Bar of Texas confirms, 

Harris County Attorney Vince Ryan and Assistant County Attorney Rosemarie 

Donnelly are attorneys licensed to practice law in this state.

2 We overrule Hawkins’s 

third issue.

 In his fourth issue, Hawkins asserts that neither Ryan nor Donnelly has taken 

an oath of office or filed a bond. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (requiring oath of 

office); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 45.001 (West 2004) (county attorney must execute 

bond payable to the governor conditioned on attorney’s paying over all money 

received for a county or the state); id. § 41.104 (prosecuting attorney may require 

assistant prosecuting attorneys to execute a bond). This argument was not raised in 

the trial court, and thus, there is no evidence in the appellate record to support this 

contention. We accordingly overrule Hawkins’s sixth argument. Cf. Davis v. State, 

227 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005) (refusing to address argument raised 

for the first time on appeal that the county attorney had not taken oath of office at 

the time of appellant’s conviction), aff’d, 227 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

 Hawkins asserts in his fifth issue that neither Harris County nor Ryan is

authorized to act on behalf of the State of Texas. The contention that a suit is being 

prosecuted or defended without authority must be raised by a sworn motion, and the 

moving party must set it for a hearing. TEX. R. CIV. P. 12. Because the record does 

not show that these requirements were met, we overrule Hawkins’s fifth issue. 

 

2

See Find a Lawyer, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, https://www.texasbar.com/ (last visited Sept. 

25, 2018). 
8

IV. Hawkins’s Capacity 

 In his sixth issue, Hawkins asserts that he is not doing business as Genesis II 

Church of Health and Healing Chapter 119. This appears to be a challenge to the 

capacity in which Hawkins was sued, and such a challenge must be raised in a 

verified answer. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 93. Because Hawkins did not file a verified 

answer challenging capacity, this argument has not been preserved for our review. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). 

 In a related argument, Hawkins contends that a church cannot be a “dba.” 

Hawkins cites no authority for this assertion. Moreover, it is well-established that a 

person may do business under an assumed name. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 28 

(“Any . . . individual doing business under an assumed name may sue or be sued in 

its . . . assumed or common name . . . .”). This is true even if the assumed name 

includes the word “church.” See, e.g., Bonner v. Austin, No. 01-09-01059-CV, 2012 

WL 3038511, at *1, *4 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 14, 2012, no pet.) 

(per curiam) (mem. op.). (judgment partly for and partly against “Feldon Bonner, II, 

individually and d/b/a Powerhouse Ministry/Church”); Johnson v. Direct Lending 

Grp., Inc., No. 05-07-01503-CV, 2010 WL 3749481, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 

28, 2010, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal by “J. Wayne Johnson 

d/b/a New Community Baptist Church of Dallas County Texas” due to Johnson’s 

bankruptcy); First Assembly of God, Inc. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 52 S.W.3d 482, 

482 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (appeal filed by “First Assembly of God, Inc. 

d/b/a Assembly of God Church”). We overrule Hawkins’s sixth issue.

V. Absence of a Contract 

 In his seventh issue, Hawkins contends that he has no contract with the State 

of Texas, Harris County, Ryan, or Donnelly. Elsewhere in his brief, he additionally 

asserts that there is no contract between himself and Genesis II Church. But, this is 
9

not a contract action, and no one has alleged the existence of a contract between 

Hawkins and any other person or entity. Because we cannot divine the significance 

of these assertions and Hawkins has not explained them, his seventh issue presents 

nothing for our review. 

VI. Availability of Injunctive Relief 

 Hawkins maintains in his eighth issue that no one has the right to prevent a 

church or its believers from teaching its beliefs and offering its sacraments so long 

as the sacraments are not controlled or illegal substances. We construe this as a 

challenge to the trial court’s grant of its final summary judgment and permanent 

injunction, which prohibits Hawkins from (a) promoting, marketing, selling, 

offering for sale, advertising, or hosting events of any kind related in any way to 

MMS, sodium chlorite, or chlorine dioxide; (b) promoting, marketing, selling, 

offering for sale, advertising, or manufacturing any substance that is offered or 

intended for use in treating a disease or condition of the human body unless the 

substance has been legally approved by the Texas Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act; and 

(c) promoting, marketing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or manufacturing 

any substance intended for use in treating a disease or condition of the human body 

where the substance is adulterated or misbranded as defined in the Texas Food, Drug 

& Cosmetic Act. 

 To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must 

show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 

215–16 (Tex. 2003). We review a summary judgment de novo, construing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant by crediting evidence 

favorable to the non-movant if a reasonable juror could and disregarding contrary 
10

evidence unless a reasonable juror could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp 

Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). 

 As previously discussed, the State brought this action in the public interest 

pursuant to the DTPA. The State alleges that Hawkins has engaged in false, 

misleading, and deceptive acts and practices by, among other things, representing 

that MMS has benefits it does not have and by inducing consumers into transactions 

by failing to disclose the health risks of ingesting MMS as directed and the absence 

of medical research supporting his claims about MMS’s health benefits. The State’s 

summary-judgment motion was supported by evidence that the federal Food & Drug 

Administration (“the FDA”) issued the following “safety alert” concerning MMS on 

July 30, 2010: 

[The] FDA warned consumers not to consume or use Miracle 

Mineral Solution, an oral liquid solution also known as “Miracle 

Mineral Supplement” or “MMS.” The product, when used as directed, 

produces an industrial bleach that can cause serious harm to health. The 

product instructs consumers to mix the 28 percent sodium chlorite 

solution with an acid such as citrus juice. This mixture produces 

chlorine dioxide, a potent bleach used for stripping textiles and 

industrial water treatment. High oral doses of this bleach, such as those 

recommended in the labeling, can cause nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and 

symptoms of severe dehydration.

In a subsequent “consumer update,” the FDA added that one person had a lifethreatening reaction after drinking MMS, but that some MMS labels claimed that 

reactions such as vomiting and diarrhea instead were “evidence MMS is working.” 

The FDA further stated, 

FDA experts say MMS is dangerous, and they’re advising consumers 

to stop using the product immediately. 

. . . .

Some distributors claim MMS mixed with citric acid is an 

antimicrobial, antiviral, and antibacterial liquid that is a remedy for 
11

colds, acne, cancer, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, H1N1 flu, and other 

conditions. But FDA experts say they aren’t aware of any research that 

shows the product can effectively treat any illnesses. 

 The State produced evidence that Hawkins is promoting and selling MMS to 

be ingested as a miracle cure, and he states on his website that “[s]ome people, with 

little understanding, say MMS is bleach. MMS is not bleach . . . .” According to 

the evidence that the State obtained from Hawkins’s website, Hawkins teaches the 

administration of the “sacrament” of MMS in his “Minister of Health & Healing 

Training Course.” Hawkins states, “Those who finish this course know how to fix 

95% of the diseases of mankind.” He represents on his website that those who take 

the course can legally use the title “Reverend,” and after “treating and recording 

info. for 50 people, you can be awarded a ‘Doctor of MMS’” and use the title 

“Doctor.” Hawkins further represents that “Genesis II Church Care of Health” is 

superior to health insurance, and that MMS’s “side effects” of nausea, diarrhea, and 

flu-like symptoms “are due to ‘die off’ of pathogens and too many toxins entering 

the blood too quickly.” Hawkins does not disclose that there is no known medical 

research that MMS is effective in treating any of the diseases he claims. In sum, the 

State’s summary-judgment evidence supports the trial court’s rendition of judgment 

and its issuance of the permanent injunction at issue. 

 The State’s evidence is uncontroverted because Hawkins failed to timely 

respond to the summary-judgment motion. Except on leave of court, the respondent 

to a summary-judgment motion must file and serve a response and any evidence 

seven days before the hearing on the motion. TEX.R.CIV. P. 166a(c). Hawkins filed 

his summary-judgment response five days before the hearing. Because the record 

does not show that the response was filed with leave of court or otherwise indicate 

that the trial court considered it, we similarly do not consider Hawkins’s untimely 

response and evidence. See Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 
12

(Tex. 1996); Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass’n v. Dickinson Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-16-

00474-CV, __S.W.3d__, 2018 WL 2436924, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] May 31, 2018, no pet). 

 Because the State established its right to the relief awarded and Hawkins failed 

to timely respond with evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, we overrule 

Hawkins’s eighth issue. 

VII. Alleged Procedural Default on Appeal 

 In his final issue, Hawkins contends he is entitled to judgment because the 

State’s appellate brief was due on March 2, 2018, and the State waited until March 

5, 2018, to request an extension of time to file it. Hawkins cites no authority that the 

State’s failure to timely request an extension to file an appellate brief is grounds for 

reversing an otherwise-correct judgment. Moreover, the State’s request for an 

extension was not untimely; a party may move to extend the time for filing a brief 

before or after the brief is due. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(c). We granted the State’s 

timely motion for an extension of time to file its brief. Thus, we overrule Hawkins’s 

tenth issue. 

VIII. Conclusion 

 Having overruled all of the arguments we have gleaned from Hawkins’s brief 

and that have been preserved for review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 

 /s/ Tracy Christopher 

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and Brown.