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48–837 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 109–1060 

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AT THE WORKPLACE: LEARNING FROM THE MISTAKES OF 

1986 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER 

SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 19, 2006 

Serial No. J–109–87 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP

JOHN CORNYN, Texas, Chairman 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JAMES HO, Majority Chief Counsel 

JIM FLUG, Democratic Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas ............................... 1 

Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 104 

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 3 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S., Senater from the State of Vermont, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 111 

WITNESSES 

Baker, Stewart, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Development, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. ................................................. 5 

Dodd-Major, Linda, former Director of Office of Business Liaison, Immigration 

and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C. .................................................. 32 

Gerry, Martin H., Deputy Commissioner for Disability and Income Security 

Programs, Social Security, Administration, Baltimore, Maryland .................. 10 

Mun ̃ oz, Cecilia, Vice President, Office of Research, Advocacy, and Legislation, 

National Council of La Raza, Washington, D.C. ............................................... 29 

Myers, Julie L., Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

U.S. Department of Homeland, Security, Washington, D.C. ............................ 8 

Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C. .................................................. 25 

Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security, 

and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. ........................................................................................................... 27 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Stewart Baker and Julie Myers to questions submitted by Senators Gassley, Kennedy and Sessions ................................................................ 38 

Responses of Martin H. Gerry to questions submitted by Senators Sessions 

and Kennedy ......................................................................................................... 51 

Responses of Cecilia Mun ̃ oz to questions submitted by Senator Kennedy ......... 58 

Responses of Richard Stana to questions submitted by Senator Cornyn ........... 62 

Responses of Linda Dodd-Major to written questions were not available at 

the time of printing .............................................................................................. 66 

Responses of Stewart Verdery to written questions were not available at 

the time of printing .............................................................................................. 66 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Amador, Angelo I., Director of Immigration Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., statement .................................................................. 67 

Baker, Stewart, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Development, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., statement .............................. 79 

Dodd-Major, Linda, former Director of Office of Business Liaison, Immigration 

and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C., statement ............................... 88 

Gerry, Martin H., Deputy Commissioner for Disability and Income Security 

Programs, Social Security, Administration, Baltimore, Maryland, statement ...................................................................................................................... 94 

Mun ̃ oz, Cecilia, Vice President, Office of Research, Advocacy, and Legislation, 

National Council of La Raza, Washington, D.C., statement ............................ 113 

Page

IV 

Myers, Julie L., Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

U.S. Department of Homeland, Security, Washington, D.C., statement ......... 123 

Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., statement ............................... 134 

Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security, 

and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., statement ........................................................................................ 161 

(1) 

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AT THE WORKPLACE: LEARNING FROM THE MISTAKES OF 

1986 

MONDAY, JUNE 19, 2006 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, 

BORDER SECURITY, AND CITIZENSHIP, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Cornyn, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Cornyn, Kyl, and Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Chairman CORNYN. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Senate 

Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Citizenship 

will come to order. 

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to Senator 

Specter, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, for scheduling 

today’s hearing, as well as my appreciation to Senator Kennedy, 

the Ranking Member, and his staff for working with us on the 

hearing. 

I also want to acknowledge, given the subject matter of worksite 

verification, being within the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee 

we were fortunate to have both the Chairman and other members 

of the Finance Committee also on the Judiciary Committee to work 

very closely on Title III, or this worksite provision that is actually 

contained in the Senate version of the bill, and those would be 

Chairman Grassley and Senator Jon Kyl, and I want to express my 

appreciation for their leadership on that critical issue. 

More than 3 weeks ago, the Senate passed the Comprehensive 

Immigration Reform Act of 2006. In my judgment, that bill contains fundamental flaws, and I voted against its passage. But I also 

recognize that the Senate bill reflects a comprehensive approach to 

immigration reform, and I have consistently advocated for a comprehensive reform, and I believe if we can get the bill to conference, 

we can significantly improve the bill and come out with a bill that 

both reflects our National interests and our National values. 

And while the differences between the House and the Senate immigration bills are many, we need to roll up our sleeves and get 

to work to find common ground. There is really no other option. I 

2 

invite anyone who thinks this issue can wait to come down to 

Texas and just take a look firsthand at how this problem manifests 

itself along our borders, in our hospitals, in our schools, and in our 

criminal justice system. It simply cannot wait. 

The legislative history of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act—the floor debates and Committee reports—reveal how 

similar the current immigration reform debate is to one held 20 

years ago. 

Americans were assured then that there would be a one-time amnesty and better enforcement, and that that better enforcement, including a system to prevent undocumented workers from obtaining 

employment in the United States, would reduce the flow of illegal 

aliens into our country. 

The American people are now once again being asked to accept 

the same bargain today, and the cornerstone of this deal is a new 

electronic employment verification system. 

Unfortunately, the Senate has conducted virtually no open debate on this subject. Not a single amendment was debated or 

marked up during the Judiciary Committee hearing, and less than 

1 hour of floor time was devoted to this subject during the debates 

on the Senate floor. 

Now, this concerns me because not only do I see worksite enforcement as the critical means or linchpin, really, of successful immigration reform, but also because the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has told me that several provisions in 

the Senate bill would make the system unworkable. And the Government is not the only one to express concerns regarding the current proposal. Some groups have expressed concerns that an electronic verification system will increase opportunities for employers 

to discriminate against employees. 

Business groups, meanwhile, have also expressed concern with 

the Senate proposal. Under the Senate bill, an employer might not 

receive confirmation of a worker’s status for up to 50 days. That 

lengthy waiting period yields two results: a loophole for unscrupulous employers and a prolonged period of uncertainty for law-abiding employers. 

We have a diverse group of witnesses today, including current 

and former Government officials, and I am optimistic that their 

testimony will allow us to explore those issues in an open setting 

and build momentum for conference with the House. But a perfect 

verification system accomplishes nothing if we are not committed 

to enforcing the law against those who do not comply. And the Government’s track record on employer sanctions does not inspire confidence. In 1999, there were 2,849 worksite arrests for immigration 

violations. By 2004, that number had dropped to 159. 

And in 2003, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, devoted only 90 full-time equivalent employees to worksite enforcement. Let me just repeat that because the numbers are significant. 

Ninety employees to enforce laws that apply to every employer in 

the United States. Ninety. 

It is no wonder that many employers view enforcement as a remote possibility and any civil penalties that might potentially be 

assessed as merely a cost of doing business. And it is also no wonVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:53 May 06, 2009 Jkt 048837 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48837.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
3 

der that many Americans are skeptical about how serious the Federal Government is about enforcing its own laws. 

As we discuss these technical issues, we must not lose sight of 

the bigger question. Will this new electronic system eliminate the 

magnet of illegal employment? It is my belief we cannot control illegal immigration unless we stop illegal employment, as 45 percent 

of those who are currently in this country illegally have not come 

across the border illegally, but have come legally and overstayed 

and melted into the American landscape. 

This hearing will explore these issues, and it is my hope that we 

will be in a better position to improve the legislation during a conference with the House. 

Senator Kennedy has asked that his full statement be made part 

of the record, and it will be, without objection. And I know that we 

will probably have other Senators come in and out during the 

course of the day, as they have conflicting obligations. But since 

Senator Kyl is here with us, I would like to offer him an opportunity to make any opening remarks he would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF ARIZONA 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We certainly want to 

get to the witnesses, but I do want to commend you for the work 

you have done on this, not only as Chairman of this Subcommittee, 

but working alongside me and others to try to approach this whole 

question of comprehensive immigration reform in a sensible way. 

You have certainly done that, and I appreciate the hearing that 

you are holding here today. 

If you would pardon an anatomical analogy, it seems to me that 

not only is the workplace verification the backbone of any system, 

but it is also potentially the Achilles heel. As we saw in 1986, if 

you do not have a system that works well, then the rest of your 

program, however well intentioned it might be, is bound to fail. 

And what some people fail to appreciate is that you are not just 

talking about proper documents for guest workers, though, of 

course, that is included; but you are also talking about documentation for every American who is seeking a job, because the people 

who are here as guest workers will gladly show you valid documentation of their guest worker status. It is those who are not willing to participate in that kind of program, but, rather, will try to 

continue to get away with the use of false and fraudulent documents that you are concerned about. And those people contend that 

they have the right to work here because they have a Social Security card, a driver’s license, a passport, or other document that has 

been fraudulently prepared. 

So that is the challenge that exists, and I note that Mr. Baker 

in his testimony talks about the key components of the current 

failed employment verification and enforcement system: fake documents and no requirement for employers to verify with the electronic system; broad safe harbors for employers and high standards 

to prove malfeasance; insignificant penalties which do not provide 

deterrence; lack of information sharing to target those who significantly abuse the system; and a failure, and I might even say, to 

4 

some extent an inability to follow the fraud when new fraud 

schemes have developed. 

The plan that the administration lays out in general terms here 

I think is a good plan. One reason I think that, Mr. Chairman, is 

because it is very similar to the plan you and I laid out in our bill, 

and I think that the elements of a workable system are embodied 

in our legislation. But, there are some things that I hope that this 

panel and the subsequent panels can flesh out for us, which would 

include precisely how a plan will be implemented, for example, as 

to people who are currently employed, not just prospective employees; for all Americans, not just people that we think of as illegal 

employees today; how we will ensure that audits will occur so that 

it is known by employers that they will be audited within a relatively short period of time; therefore, appreciating the fact that 

they need to get into compliance quickly; how much it is going to 

cost; and in that regard, has the administration’s budget submission this year reflected a serious attempt to get ahead of this problem. In other words, much of what the administration proposes is 

not dependent on congressional legislation. And so as the first step 

toward implementing a program is, a little over $100 million adequate to begin this program? What will the costs be? And does that 

depend to some extent on whether a card is involved in the system, 

as both the administration and Senator Cornyn and I propose? If 

so, what does that cost? 

Importantly, the timeline. Is 18 months as good as we can do? 

If so, there are a lot of people that would like to ensure that the 

system is up and running before benefits of the legislation apply 

to people? And I think that is a reasonable issue to raise. 

There are other issues as well, but all of the things that have 

been raised in your testimony I think are appropriate for discussion. And as the Chairman pointed out, probably the most important part of the legislation, after border security, was given the 

least amount of time for debate on the floor. 

Now, in fairness, one of the reasons was because the small group 

that helped to put together Title III I think did a very good job of 

starting the process. It is a very good first step, but it is by no 

means complete and it is only the beginning. And because it is the 

most important part of the legislation, in my view, we need to 

spend a lot of time making sure that we get it right. 

So thank you for holding the hearing, Mr. Chairman. I thank our 

witnesses for being here. We have got the right people to tell us 

what needs to be done, and we need to get about it. 

Chairman CORNYN. Well, we are pleased to have a distinguished 

panel with us today, and I will introduce each member of the 

panel, and we will swear you in together and then ask each of you 

to give your opening statement. 

First, Stewart Baker was appointed by President Bush to be Assistant Secretary for Policy for the Department of Homeland Security and confirmed by the U.S. Senate on October 7, 2005. Before 

his appointment and confirmation as Assistant Secretary, Mr. 

Baker served as General Counsel of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, where he headed the drafting team for the Commission’s report. He also served as General Counsel of the National 

5 

Security Agency and Deputy General Counsel of the Department of 

Education. Earlier, Mr. Baker served as a law clerk to John Paul 

Stevens on the U.S. Supreme Court and to Frank M. Coffin on the 

First Circuit. 

Joining Mr. Baker on the first panel is Julie Myers. Ms. Myers 

is the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the United 

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In that role, she 

leads the largest investigative component of the Department of 

Homeland Security and the second largest investigative agency in 

the Federal Government. 

Before her appointment by President Bush on January 4, 2006, 

Ms. Myers served as Special Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel. Before that, she was nominated by President 

Bush and unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate to serve as 

Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement at the Department of 

Commerce. Before her service with the Commerce Department, Ms. 

Myers served as the Chief of Staff for the Criminal Division of the 

Department of Justice. 

Martin Gerry is our third witness. He was appointed Deputy 

Commissioner of Social Security for Disability and Income Security 

Programs in November of 2001. Before assuming his current position, Mr. Gerry served as research professor and director of the 

Center for the Study of Family, Neighborhood, and Community Policy at the University of Kansas, where he was also a faculty member within the university’s School of Law and Education. Before 

that, Mr. Gerry served as the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 

Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 

where his responsibilities included overseeing the formulation and 

implementation of all Department policy were, as I say, his responsibilities. 

If I can ask each of you to rise and let me swear the witnesses 

in. If you will raise your right hand and repeat after me, do each 

of you swear that in the matter before the Committee you will tell 

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 

God? 

Mr. BAKER. I do. 

Ms. MYERS. I do. 

Mr. GERRY. I do. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you. 

Mr. Baker, let’s go ahead and start with you, if we may. Of 

course, each of your written statements will be made part of the 

record, without objection, and if you would care to summarize that 

for us in 5 minutes or so, and we will ask each of the other witnesses to do the same. And then I know all of us are eager to get 

to the Q&A. 

STATEMENT OF STEWART BAKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. BAKER. I am glad to summarize it, although I actually feel 

as though you and Senator Kyl have already pretty well summarized what I was planning to say. 

Thank you very much for having us here. This is, as you said, 

perhaps the most important topic that the bill addresses in the imVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:53 May 06, 2009 Jkt 048837 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48837.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
6 

migration reform area, and it deserves the attention that you are 

giving to it. 

We share your support for a comprehensive solution—we think 

that is the only way to address this issue—and also your concerns 

about the Senate bill and the practicality of some of the worksite 

enforcement provisions in it. 

As you said, 1986 was a long time ago, and yet it is a very familiar debate. Just to show how long ago it was, I looked up some 

things that happened in 1986. There were only three networks before 1986, and there had always been three networks. Fox just got 

started in 1986, and there was a little daytime TV show called ‘‘AM 

Chicago’’ that was changing its name to ‘‘The Oprah Winfrey Show’’ 

for the first time in 1986. So a lot of things have changed since 

then, and yet when you read those debates, it feels like today. The 

debate was over an immigration crisis. There were 3 million illegal 

immigrants in the country. Everyone knew they were drawn here 

by jobs, and the question was: How could the immigration be controlled? 

The answer was an effort to say we will grant amnesty, as you 

said, one time to the illegal immigrants who are here and we will 

have a tough worksite enforcement program. Up until 1986, it was 

not illegal to employ people who had entered the country unlawfully, and there was no particular requirement that you show an 

ID to get a job. So Congress enacted what I think it was sure 

would be sufficient measures by making it unlawful to hire an illegal immigrant and by requiring that all workers show ID and go 

through a process of having that ID recorded by the employer. 

Obviously, that has not worked. We have got close to 12 million 

illegal immigrants in the country today. They are still being drawn 

here by the prospect of getting work. So the question is: What went 

wrong? 

It turned out that we probably put to many eggs in one basket. 

We thought that just making it illegal to hire illegal immigrants 

and requiring ID would solve the problem. Instead, employees who 

wanted jobs who were here illegally just got fake IDs. They made 

up Social Security numbers, and that was the end of the enforcement mechanisms. 

The reason that it was not possible to go beyond that solution I 

think lies also in some of the compromises that were made in 1986. 

It is worth remembering that the business groups that were a part 

of that debate wanted to make sure that they did not have an excessive burden in hiring people. The immigrants’ rights groups 

wanted to make sure that employers did not have too much discretion so that they could not use the rules for discriminatory purposes, and the result was employers were given a very narrow window. They were to look at the ID. If it was not obviously fake, it 

was not clear that they could do anything other than accept it. And 

so when fake IDs that did not misspell ‘‘California’’ came onto the 

market, it was very difficult for employers to do anything other 

than accept them. 

It was obvious that there was a problem. There are 9 million people who are the subject of no-match letters each year. Those are 

mostly people who have made up Social Security numbers, based 

on our experience, and the employers who get those rarely do anyVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:53 May 06, 2009 Jkt 048837 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48837.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
7 

thing about the fact that they have received a letter that indicates 

that their employee’s Social Security number and name do not 

match. They do not have an obligation to do that under the statute, 

and they have not had much clarity about how they should address 

that problem. 

We have come out with a proposed rule that will give more clarity and provide a clear safe harbor for employers so they know 

what they can do to clear up those problems and hopefully discourage workers who are working on false Social Security numbers. 

But, in general, it has been very difficult to squeeze solution to 

these new forms of fraud into a statute that was written on the assumption that everything could be solved with an ID requirement. 

We want to avoid making that same mistake with the new legislation, and our proposal is to address this in a number of ways. 

First, we ought to end the most obvious fraud, the made-up Social Security numbers, by requiring electronic verification of the 

name and the Social Security number, by sharing data from the Social Security Administration’s records, and by improving identification cards. 

Second, we need to have a much more pervasive partnership 

with employers. We have to make sure that employers do not mechanically carry out a limited number of tasks without asking the 

question: Do I really think this person is here in the country legally? We have got to get beyond a series of obligations that depend 

on not knowingly hiring an illegal alien and ask people not to recklessly or negligently hire illegal aliens. We cannot expect employers 

to be detectives, but we can expect them to be our partners in enforcing the laws of the land. And that is something that the statute 

needs to reflect. 

Third, we need to increase the penalties on employers who do not 

obey the law. As the President said, some of the penalties that are 

in the law now are less than a speeding ticket in many jurisdictions. We have got to substantially increase those, and we have got 

to particularly increase them very aggressively for repeat offenders 

so that we have the ability to take this well beyond the cost of 

doing business and making people put their business at risk if they 

are going to violate the law. 

And, finally, while we expect that these changes are going to 

make it much harder for people to work with a made-up or false 

Social Security number, we need to be very careful to not put all 

our eggs in one basket again. We need to have the regulatory flexibility to address new forms of fraud as they arise and to give employers a new sense of the steps that they ought to take to address 

these new frauds. I think you may have seen the story in the paper 

over the weekend about Audra Schmierer, who is a housewife in 

California who discovered that her Social Security number and 

name had been used by 81 people in 17 States. 

Now, that is a form of fraud that electronic verification by itself 

is not going to address, and we need to be alert to the fact that 

there will be new forms of fraud even if we stamp out the existing 

made-up Social Security fake ID business, and that is why we need 

broad authority to address new problems. 

8 

So I will close there, Mr. Chairman. I think this has been an 

enormously helpful exercise, and I hope to be able to address any 

further questions you may have at the end. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Baker. I have a copy of the 

Associated Press story that you just alluded to, 81 people in 17 

States using this woman’s Social Security number, and obviously 

creating havoc in her life, not to mention the fraud that it perpetrated upon others. We will get to that in a minute. 

Ms. Myers, would you please give us your opening statement? 

STATEMENT OF JULIE L. MYERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. MYERS. Thank you, Chairman Cornyn and members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you for having me here today with my colleague, Stewart Baker, to talk about immigration enforcement in 

the workplace. 

ICE is reinvigorating our worksite enforcement efforts as a core 

part of our interior enforcement strategy. We are seeking to change 

the culture of illegal employment across the country by pursuing 

the most egregious employers engaged in the employment of illegal 

workers and educating the private sector to institute best hiring 

practices. 

I appreciate the opportunity to elaborate a little bit about what 

Assistant Secretary Baker talked about, our historical experience 

implementing the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. 

The INS focused primarily on the enforcement of administrative 

employer sanction provisions. This approach resulted primarily in 

the issuance of Notices of Intent to Fine. After extensive litigation, 

the typical result was a small fine that was routinely litigated or 

ignored and had little to no deterrent effect. In short, the system 

did not serve as a true incentive to change their business model. 

Moreover, under the 1986 law, employers were not required to 

verify the validity of a document and were not required to even 

maintain a copy of the documents that they reviewed. This resulted, as Secretary Baker testified, in an explosive growth in an 

increasingly profitable false document industry that catered to undocumented workers who purchased the documents necessary to 

gain employment. 

Cognizant of these lessons, ICE’s current worksite enforcement 

strategy is targeting felony charges to bring in appropriate worksite enforcement investigation. And how does this approach work 

differently than the old approach used by the INS? Well, you could 

take the Kawasaki restaurant chain case as an example. Back in 

March, ICE executed warrants at three Kawasaki restaurants and 

at four related residences, where we encountered 15 undocumented 

aliens living in completely deplorable conditions in an apartment 

with non-working bathrooms and these aliens were being paid $2 

an hour to work at these restaurants. 

At the same time that the aliens were suffering, the owners of 

these restaurants had created a lavish lifestyle for themselves, purchased themselves several houses, fancy cars. Fortunately, the ICE 

9 

agents were able to criminally arrest them on money-laundering 

charges and harboring illegal aliens for commercial advantage. We 

seized their assets. We seized eight luxury vehicles and ten bank 

accounts. The owners have since pleaded guilty to these felony 

charges and agreed to forfeit approximately $1.1 million in assets. 

Now, how would this have been handled differently prior to ICE’s 

new approach? Well, historically, the INS agents would have simply conducted an I–9 inspection, which would likely have led to the 

issuance of a fine based on paperwork violations. The owners would 

have likely escaped even a misdemeanor charge available under 

274A, and the maximum fine would have been $20,000 or $30,000. 

And in any case, that would have been negotiated to something 

even further. 

With such a paltry end result, it is not surprising that the old 

employer sanction regime had simply become a cost of doing business. 

There are several other recent cases that demonstrate ICE’s new 

tougher approach that is designed to really attack egregious employers where it hurts—their bank accounts and by bringing criminal charges. For example, in April we had the IFCO Systems worksite case, where mid-level managers and employees at IFCO were 

charged with conspiracy to transport and harbor illegal aliens for 

financial gain, as well as with document fraud. 

Another example is the Fischer Homes case in May where several Fischer Homes employees were also charged with harboring illegal aliens for commercial advantage. Some of the penalties in 

these cases carry up to 10 years in prison. 

I firmly believe that charging egregious employers with criminal 

felonies will create the kind of deterrence that was previously absent in enforcement efforts. In fact, we are already starting to see 

that businesses are responding. We have seen a substantial increase in requests for training and for other information. And to be 

clear, while the magnet of employment is fueling illegal immigration, we do find that the vast majority of employers do their best 

to comply with the law. Accordingly, we are also providing good 

tools on our website and providing presentations to employers to 

tell them how to avoid getting into trouble with the law. 

Moreover, as part of our comprehensive strategy and since 9/11, 

we have continued to prioritize critical infrastructure for worksite 

enforcement. Just 5 days ago, an ICE investigation apprehended 55 

illegal aliens working at Dulles Airport. In our view, effective 

homeland security requires verifying the identity of not just the 

passengers who board the planes, but also the employees who work 

at the airports and the employees who staff our critical infrastructure sites. 

Additionally, to more effectively combat the significant role that 

fraudulent documents play in the illegal employment of aliens, we 

have created with the Department of Justice Document and Benefit 

Fraud Task Forces throughout the United States. These task forces 

focus on the illegal benefit and fraudulent document trade that caters to aliens looking to obtain illegal employment. By reshaping 

our enforcement efforts, I believe ICE will be able to more effectively reduce the magnet of illegal employment using existing authorities. And as the Congress seeks to learn from the lessons of 

10 

the 1986 Act, there are also several tools that would be of substantial aid to us in our efforts: 

As Assistant Secretary Baker noted, we need fuller access to information, access to the no-match data. Second, we believe we need 

a new and improved process for issuing fines, and larger fines so 

that they serve as more than just a cost of doing business. And, 

third, we need additional resources, as requested by the President 

in the 2007 budget. 

We are dedicated and committed to the worksite enforcement 

mission, and we look forward to working with the Subcommittee in 

our efforts. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Myers appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you very much, Ms. Myers. 

Mr. Gerry. 

STATEMENT OF MARTIN H. GERRY, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 

FOR DISABILITY AND INCOME SECURITY PROGRAMS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 

Mr. GERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, first I want to 

thank you for the opportunity to discuss how the Social Security 

Administration issues Social Security numbers and processes wage 

reports, which I think are the key parts of the testimony that relate to the theme of this hearing. These important activities are 

part of our core mission of determining eligibility and the benefit 

amounts for the Social Security retirement and disability programs 

that we administer. 

At the heart of these determinations are records of the amounts 

earned by each individual over his or her working years. Maintaining accurate records is of utmost importance, and the Social Security Administration developed the Social Security number to keep 

an accurate record of workers’ earnings. The Social Security card 

was provided to individuals as a record of their number. The Social 

Security card was never intended—and does not serve as a personal identification document. Possession of the card does not establish that the person presenting it is actually the person whose 

name and Social Security number appear on the card. 

Over the years, the use of the Social Security number has proliferated as Government agencies and private industry have used 

the Social Security number as a convenient recordkeeping method. 

Consequently, the Social Security Administration continually improves its processes for issuing numbers and cards to ensure the 

integrity of both. We have developed processes for issuing Social 

Security numbers to newborns and to immigrants with permanent 

work authorization. In addition, the Social Security Administration 

has developed more stringent verification processes and requirements, which I have discussed at some length in my written statement. 

As the uses of the Social Security number have increased, the 

need for counterfeit-resistant Social Security cards has also grown. 

Congress and the Executive Branch have worked together to increase the security features of the card. 

11 

You asked me to discuss the costs related to replacing cards currently in use with a different kind of card. The major cost of replacing cards is not the cost of the card itself, regardless of how elaborate that card might be. It is the cost of interviewing every individual and carefully verifying the documents that are submitted as 

evidence. 

Last year, we estimated that a card with enhanced security features would cost approximately $25 per card, not including the 

startup investments. According to those estimates, reissuance of all 

new cards for the 240 million cardholders over age 14 would cost 

approximately $9.5 billion. Since that estimate, we know that the 

cost of issuing Social Security cards has increased by approximately $3 per card due to new requirements for additional 

verification of evidence developed as a result of legislation passed 

by Congress. 

Last year, we estimated that we would need about 67,000 workyears to process 240 million new cards. This would require hiring 

approximately 34,000 new employees if we were required to complete the work within 2 years. If the new card was issued to only 

a limited number of individuals each year, such as 34 million, 

which would represent the individuals changing jobs and individuals reaching working age—new entrants to the labor force—the 

costs would be approximately $1.5 billion per year. 

The Social Security Administration offers many alternatives to 

assist employers in verifying that the name, number, and date of 

birth submitted by a new employee matches Social Security Administration records. Employers can call a toll-free number. They can 

submit a paper list to our local office of names and numbers, they 

can submit magnetic media, or they can use an Internet-based 

service which we call SSNVS. 

Last year, we processed over 25.7 million verifications for over 

12,000 employers through SSNVS. This is the new Internet-based 

service. We estimate that we provide an additional 41 million employer verifications through other methods. Employers may also 

use the Basic Pilot Program administered by the Department of 

Homeland Security to verify work eligibility of new hires. In 2005, 

the Social Security Administration processed approximately 1 million queries to the Basic Pilot. 

We also send letters, often called ‘‘no-match letters,’’ to employers 

who submit wage reports that meet a certain threshold for errors. 

In 2004, we sent approximately 120,000 no-match letters to employers, which covered 7.3 million mismatched records. For privacy 

reasons, the letter includes only the Social Security number, not 

the name of the individuals. These letters are generated as part of 

the wage-reporting process, and the source of information is the tax 

return information on Form W–2. SSA receives and processes Form 

W–2s for the Internal Revenue Service. 

The use and disclosure of tax return information is governed by 

Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code. SSA currently has the 

authority to use this information only for the purpose of determining eligibility for and the amount of Social Security benefits. 

Although under current law the Social Security Administration 

cannot release no-match data to the Department of Homeland SeVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:53 May 06, 2009 Jkt 048837 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48837.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
12 

curity, the Administration supports allowing this disclosure for national security and law enforcement purposes. 

In closing, the Social Security Administration remains committed 

to maintaining the security of the Social Security number and the 

card to ensure that the American public’s hard-earned wages are 

properly credited so that they will be able to receive all of the benefits to which they may be entitled. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you 

today, and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerry appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gerry. 

We will now proceed to 5-minute rounds of questions, and I can 

think of a lot of them based on what you have told us so far. 

Secretary Baker, you mentioned that we have all tried to learn 

from what happened in 1986, and I think the way you put it is, 

‘‘What went wrong? ’’ And as I recall, former Attorney General Ed 

Meese wrote an op-ed in the New York Times. He said that Ronald 

Reagan was persuaded that the only way that we could get beyond 

where we were in 1986 would be to grant amnesty, but then the 

trade-off, the quid pro quo, would be effective worksite verification 

and sanctions against employers who cheat. 

Here we are today, as several of you pointed out, with the number not 3 million but closer to probably 12 million, and no one 

knows for sure. We have had lengthy and I think very helpful debates both in the House and the Senate on this issue, and a lot of 

the focus has been on the border, some suggesting that we need to 

do more along the border. I certainly agree. We need to secure our 

border. We need to know who is coming into the country and what 

their intentions are when they get here in the interest of our national security. 

But as I pointed out, and as Senator Kyl reiterated, we spent 

about 1 hour on the Senate floor talking about this issue, which is 

essential to getting some handle on the 45 percent of illegal immigration that takes place from people who come in legally but who 

overstay and who are attracted to this huge magnet known as 

America, prosperity and jobs. 

How much of this problem—assuming we did not do anything 

else, how much of this problem could we address effectively if we 

just allowed information sharing between the Social Security Administration and the Department of Homeland Security when it 

came to no-match letters? The figure I had that Mr. Gerry mentioned, in 2004 we sent approximately 120,000 employer no-match 

letters, which covered 7.3 million mismatched records. 

Mr. BAKER. We could certainly make a big dent in the problem. 

In the long run, I think we believe that the electronic verification 

system is more effective. The Social Security system is not designed 

for addressing illegal immigration. It simply has revealed a lot of 

illegal immigration and has given us a clue as to where that is, or 

at least it has given the Social Security Administration a clue as 

to where that is. Since we cannot see it, we cannot use that as a 

tool to guide our investigations. 

We obviously need that. There are employers who are using the 

same Social Security number over and over again for dozens of emVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:53 May 06, 2009 Jkt 048837 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48837.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
13 

ployees. We need to know who those employers are because they 

obviously ought to be at the top of our list for investigation. 

So it would be a useful tool, if not perfect. It is delayed. It arrives 

up to a year or more after the employee has begun working so that 

for seasonal workers, they may well have moved on by the time we 

would get notice of a no-match, which is why we think the electronic verification also is necessary. 

Chairman CORNYN. Well, I certainly agree with you that both are 

necessary. 

Ms. Myers, recently ICE conducted a large raid on a pallet manufacturer who had refused to respond to—I believe it was up to 13 

different inquiries from the Social Security Administration about a 

number—as it turned out, more than 50 percent of their employees 

who were on the no-match list. Could you explain how you were 

able to conduct that enforcement action in spite of this law that 

prohibits information sharing as a rule? 

Ms. MYERS. Absolutely, Senator. In the IFCO case, we first started the investigation when an employee kind of came to us, came 

to local police and said they had seen some things inside IFCO that 

were wrong. People were ripping up W–2s and, you know, that certainly sent—this employee realized there was something wrong. 

As we worked through this investigation, we were able to bring 

Social Security in on this investigation, but if we had had this information at the beginning, we could have targeted IFCO. As you 

mentioned, approximately 13 letters, each letter saying more than 

1,000 employees had no-match. This would have been an employer 

that we would have targeted from the beginning and not had to 

work this case through other means. So it would have kind of tremendous value having access to this information up front to really 

drive our investigations to the most egregious employers. 

Chairman CORNYN. Mr. Gerry—and thank you for doing it—you 

gave us some proposals for how much money it would cost to 

change the Social Security card, and if we looked at doing it for everyone, some $9.5 billion, but if we targeted it, more; at least perhaps on a phased-in basis, it could be done for less than that. But, 

really, my question goes to all three of you about what the American people are being asked to accept when it comes to comprehensive immigration reform. Knowing that it is going to cost a lot of 

money and take some time and take development of considerable 

infrastructure when it comes to border security and the systems 

that it would be necessary to expand the Basic Pilot Program so 

that employers could actually verify employment eligibility, and 

perhaps even change the nature of the Social Security card to 

verify that, in fact, this person is actually the person who claims 

that is their card to prevent things like identity theft. 

Isn’t it realistic to say that this comprehensive reform, which I 

support, should be phased in once we have had an opportunity to 

get some of these systems up and running so that we can actually 

have some confidence that they will work? I am going to throw that 

hot potato to you, Mr. Baker, to start with. 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you. Well, certainly, on the question of what 

the American people will be asked to accept, you and Senator Kyl 

have both identified not just the costs. We all now when we get 

jobs have to fill out I–9 forms, and there will be more requirements 

14 

beyond paying taxes on Americans who want jobs because, as Senator Kyl pointed out, it is very easy for someone to pretend to be 

a U.S. citizen. And so if we do not ask everyone who takes a job 

to go the electronic verification system, then the system will not 

work. So this is not cost-free for anyone. 

On the question—you asked me a hot-potato question. Sorry. 

Chairman CORNYN. Well, the question is: Should the American 

people just accept comprehensive immigration reform based on the 

Government’s promise to follow through with the means to actually 

make it work? Or should there be a phased-in system where once 

the border is secure and once the worksite was—we were able to 

verify eligibility of prospective employees, then we could work on 

phasing in other aspects of the program? 

Mr. BAKER. The phasing of this is tricky, but there is no doubt 

that it is going to take us a little while to get many of these systems ramped up. This is not something that can be done overnight, 

or at least it cannot be done well overnight. And at the same time, 

I think that there would be considerable difficulty if you began aggressive worksite enforcement and had nowhere for the people who 

were going to lose their jobs as a result of that to go, if you did 

not have a temporary worker program for them to enter into. So 

that there are difficulties with beginning all of enforcement without 

also providing a place for people to go when they are driven out of 

the shadows and hopefully into the light. 

Ms. MYERS. If I could just add to Secretary Baker’s comments, 

as the enforcement agency we are committed to stepping up our 

worksite enforcement efforts and, in fact, are doing so, regardless 

of whether Congress will pass a law. This year alone, on criminal 

investigations of egregious employers, we are already up over 121 

percent over last fiscal year, and that is only based on the end of 

May totals. So we are aggressively ramping up worksite enforcement, as directed by Secretary Chertoff, and we will continue to do 

so, regardless of whether there is a change in the law. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you. 

Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let’s break this down a little bit. In your testimony, Mr. Baker, 

on page 7, you quoted the President talking about a key part of the 

system being a new identification card for every legal foreign worker. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the people least likely 

to be engaged in fraud would be those people who seek a new identification as a temporary worker. They would have every incentive 

to use that. It would probably be something like a laser visa that 

people from Mexico obtain today to come into the country for short 

periods of time. 

Would all of you agree or, in effect, stipulate that for the guest 

worker program, some kind of legal document that can be easily 

verified and has biometric data in it would be a logical step to take. 

Any disagreement there? 

So the key question is then what you do with everybody else, 

namely, American citizens and everybody who has claimed to or 

will claim to be an American citizen. And my question is: What are 

we going to do to verify the eligibility? Let me just state a couple 

predicates and then ask all three of you to relate to this. 

15 

Madam Secretary, you talk about the ICE worksite investigations, and you say the law should reasonably require to review and 

retain relevant documents and information obtained during the 

verification process, as well as during the subsequent employment 

of a worker. I am just going to posit that if we are relying upon 

employers to look at documents, we are starting off on the wrong 

foot here. So just put that away for a moment. 

And, Mr. Gerry, you say on page 2 of your testimony that, ‘‘Our 

ability to determine the identity of the person to whom a number 

has been assigned, whether that individual was entitled to an SSN, 

and whether the individual was authorized to work in the U.S. at 

the time the SSN was issued, has been improved with the development of SSA’s more stringent verification processes and requirements.’’ 

You go on to point out that the bulk of the expense and the 

issuance of a card for everyone who seeks employment—it would 

not have to be everybody in the United States, but at least if you 

seek employment, you would have to have this case—that the bulk 

of that expense is in the background checks to determine eligibility 

for it. It is not in the issuance of the piece of paper itself, as I recall. 

So with those background notes here, would all three of you 

speak to what the administration proposes with respect to verifying 

the employment eligibility, not of foreign workers but of everybody 

else, starting with Policy Secretary, Mr. Baker? 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you. The administration has been supportive 

of the idea of having a tamper-proof Social Security card, not one 

that is an identity card but a card that is not easily forged. As a 

way of preventing what happened to Audra Schmierer and the 

identity theft problem, that has considerable value. You do not 

have to go to an identity card or require— 

Senator KYL. May I just interrupt you? Would it have biometric 

data or at least a photograph? Otherwise, how would you identify 

the number with the person who is seeking employment? 

Mr. BAKER. Well, the important thing—we have not suggested 

that it necessarily include biometrics because even without biometrics, as long as a limited number are issued, as long as you do 

not issue more than one, then there is only one. And you cannot 

have 81 people walking around with the same card. 

Senator KYL. But if the card is stolen, I can contend it is my 

card, even though it is not, unless there is a way for the employer 

to see obviously that I am not the picture on that card. So don’t 

you have to have some identifier connected to the card? 

Mr. BAKER. We have not gone as far as that. That changes substantially the Social Security— 

Senator KYL. Wait, let me just interrupt and go on to the rest 

of the panel here. You are going to have to persuade me that somehow not only can Social Security verify the legitimacy of the number, but that you can connect it up to the individual who is presenting the card to you when you offer the job. So would all three 

of you address that? 

Mr. BAKER. And I would just point out that many—most Social 

Security cards now are issued at birth, and most people, unlike me, 

don’t look as much like they did when they were born. And so it 

16 

is unlikely that the picture will do much good, or you are going to 

have to have them renewed regularly. 

Ms. MYERS. I don’t know that I have too much to add on the particular point that Secretary Baker raised, but to the point about 

whether or not the card is enough, we think the card is not enough. 

You need to have kind of a comprehensive approach and a comprehensive view of how you do effective worksite enforcement. So 

from an enforcement agency’s point of view, we would be looking 

at, you know, beefed-up document and identify fraud cases. That 

is where for us I think it would be helpful if the employers were 

required to retain the documents. It is also helpful for us—we have 

had a number of employers come to us recently and say, ‘‘We are 

not sure we are doing this right. How do we do this? ’’ It is helpful, 

if they were required to keep the back-up documents, to see, you 

know, who was trained, how were they trained, what sort of things 

they were doing. So in terms of enforcing the law, it is helpful for 

us to be able to use all the criminal statutes to go after it and not 

depend on just one tool. 

Senator KYL. Let me get to Mr. Gerry, but let me just say that 

if we are going to rely upon documents, you are going to have to 

persuade me that they are not counterfeitable or that the employers can easily determine that they are not counterfeitable, or every 

employer is going to have to continue to play cop and try to figure 

out whether this birth certificate is real or not or the driver’s license is real, or whatever. I do not see how the administration can 

support a temporary worker program and an employment 

verification system that does not clearly connect a valid Social Security number to the applicant for the job in some very specific governmentally determined way. If you are going to rely upon the employer to figure it out, the system is bound to fail. It has a fundamental flaw, the same as the 1986 law did. 

Chairman CORNYN. Senator Sessions. 

Senator KYL. I am sorry. I interrupted Secretary Myers. 

Mr. GERRY. I was going to add on the point of the biometric identifier. The cost numbers that I gave you, the estimate we have 

right now is $28–$25 for the card; and we estimate an additional 

$3 per card due to new verification requirements. Adding pictures 

or other biometric information is not a large part of the cost. 

On the other hand, as Secretary Baker mentioned, if you use a 

picture, you are going to have downstream updating costs, and, of 

course, those costs will be the $25 part of the $28. That is, every 

time you have to have someone come back in and add a picture, 

of course, you want to be sure that the picture is the picture of the 

person, so you would have to go through that process. 

We have been looking at some of these cost issues, as well as 

how often we would have to update the card. Obviously, we would 

have to up date the card even for people who started with adult 

pictures, because over time the value of the biometric identifier 

would decrease. 

Chairman CORNYN. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Kyl. 

Both of you have worked very hard to identify the weaknesses in 

the workplace enforcement and have been active in attempting to 

develop a system that will actually work. 

17 

Secretary Baker, you are exactly correct, but I would be a little 

more critical of the Congress than you have been. You said they 

passed in 1986 a bill they thought would work. I submit they probably thought it would not work and maybe never intended for it to 

work, at least the interest groups who blocked the stronger legislation. The bill was not workable. 

So early on we realized, did we not, that the 1986 law was unenforceable as a practical matter? Wouldn’t you agree? 

Mr. BAKER. I think that by the middle 1990’s, at least, it was 

pretty clear that it was going to have major problems. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, it strikes me, Mr. Baker, that the President takes the oath to enforce the laws of the United States and 

ensures that the laws are enforced. The executive branch—I used 

to serve in the Department of Justice—is the branch with the responsibility to enforce the laws. My question to you is: Are you 

coming forward with a comprehensive plan to tell this Congress 

that we are now setting about to deal with the problem of immigration? Are you coming forward with a plan that would actually 

work? And do you have one? 

Mr. BAKER. We are doing two things. As Assistant Secretary 

Myers said, we are enforcing the law and we are enforcing it in creative, new ways, and we will continue to do that. And I think that 

that will demonstrate our resolve and our willingness to work within the current system to try to make it work. But as you said, we 

do not have today a civil enforcement scheme that works well. The 

fines are too low, and we cannot meet all of the administrative procedures and the knowing standard and still have an effective, fastmoving regulatory process. We have asked for that. 

Senator SESSIONS. T.J. Bonner with the Border Patrol Officers 

Association said, ‘‘Absolutely we can create a lawful system. You 

have border enforcement and you have workplace enforcement to 

eliminate the magnet, the jobs magnet.’’ 

Mr. BAKER. Absolutely. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think he is exactly correct. Would you agree 

with that? 

Mr. BAKER. I would. Those are the two critical things. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. Then, is the President committed to 

a program that will work? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes. We have asked for a lot of new worksite enforcement capabilities as well as, as you know, a lot of resources for the 

border, and those are a critical part of this comprehensive program. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Myers, you mentioned Secretary 

Chertoff, and I have been pleased in recent weeks that he has 

begun to speak out in ways that indicate he is serious. I thought 

one of the most helpful things was his statement—I believe in a 

conference call maybe some of the other Senators were involved 

in—in which he said that S. 2611, the immigration bill that passed 

the Senate, with regard to the Social Security number question and 

the ability to identify those who have fraudulent numbers and are 

submitting fraudulent numbers, he concluded that is a poison pill 

and that it would not work. Yet when Senator Cornyn objected to 

it, it was ratified anyway by a vote. I voted against it. 

18 

At any rate, the Senate has passed a bill. Would you agree that, 

with regard to enforcement at the workplace through utilization of 

the Social Security number, that will not be effective? 

Ms. MYERS. Well, certainly at this point, Senator Sessions, we 

have such limited access to the data. It is on a very limited caseby-case—we have to petition on each particular case only after we 

have articulable facts. Certainly we want free and complete access 

to this data. We think that would allow us to target the employers 

more effectively and do a better job. 

I also think, following up on what Assistant Secretary Baker 

said, that one of the mistakes in 1986 is thinking about worksite 

enforcement as simply enforcing 274A, that criminal misdemeanor 

and low fines statute. I think as Senator Kyl pointed out, unless 

we go after document fraud, the document fraud rings, unless we 

go after the other—the alien-smuggling rings that bring people into 

this country to find jobs, unless we go after the other parts of the 

problem, border security and interior enforcement, we will not be 

able to really stem the magnet of illegal employment. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, the matter is very serious. Mr. Chairman, I would just note that we created a wall between CIA and 

FBI that we recognize helped keep us from enforcing the law 

against terrorists, and we removed that wall. We now have one between the Department of Homeland Security and Social Security. 

Both of you work for the Government of the United States of America and the people, and we need to have that information readily 

shared. Under the bill that we passed, this Senate passed, Homeland Security has to ask for the specific information in writing, and 

Social Security is only required to respond if the employer that you 

are inquiring about has over 100 employees whose names do not 

match their individual taxpayer identifying number and more than 

10 employees are using the same taxpayer identifying number. 

That indicates to me that Congress, at least, is not very alert to 

what needs to be done. I thank the Secretary for at least objecting 

to that. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman CORNYN. To summarize what I understand you are 

telling us, Mr. Baker, first of all, I know the President has made 

a speech about the need for effective worksite verification, but until 

today, has the Department of Homeland Security actually come forward and asked the Congress to embrace the elements of this proposal for an electronic employment verification system, to share nomatch data, to ensure that all legal foreign workers have secure 

employment authorization, and to stiffen the penalties for employers who violate those laws? 

Mr. BAKER. Well, as you know, we have had a long and extensive 

engagement with the Senate, the Senate Committees, but I think 

we have not made a formal statement to that effect before today. 

Chairman CORNYN. Well, suffice it to say these elements which 

you consider essential to effective worksite verification, to your 

knowledge are they present in the current Senate bill? Or are these 

things that need to be added to improve it to actually make it 

workable? 

Mr. BAKER. We think the Senate bill needs substantial work 

along those lines. 

19 

Chairman CORNYN. The Senate bill would require all employers 

in the United States to participate in a mandatory electronic 

verification system within 18 months. Right now, only 8,600 employers participate in the voluntary Basic Pilot verification system. 

Is 18 months a realistic timeframe? 

Mr. BAKER. It is an aggressive timeframe. We were pressed pretty hard in the discussions to say what can you do. We have the advantage that the current budget proposal that is pending before 

Congress for next year actually includes about $100 million that is 

designed to ramp up electronic verification so that we could get 

started and we could have the money beginning in September or 

October. 

So as I say, it is aggressive, but the CIS experts who have followed this have looked at it and believe that they can meet it. 

Chairman CORNYN. Secretary Baker and Secretary Myers and 

Mr. Gerry, you all are dedicated public servants, and we appreciate 

your service. But the American people feel like they were scammed 

the last time we were on this subject 20 years ago. And if we are 

going to effectively solve this problem, we are going to have to regain their confidence. And I know that you have a gift for understatement, Mr. Baker, when you said that this is very aggressive 

to get this online in 18 months. But I feel very strongly that, unless 

we are serious about making the system work and we actually appropriate the money, hire the people, train the people, actually put 

them in place, create the databases, create the secure identification 

card to make this work, we will find ourselves here once again with 

not 12 million people illegally in the United States but maybe 24 

million or more. And the list goes on and on. And I for one do not 

want to look back with regret that I did not do everything within 

my power, as someone representing 23 million people, to make sure 

that we do not scam the American people, that we are serious with 

them, we mean what we say, and we are going to do what we say. 

Ms. Myers, we talked a little bit about the several hundred workers who were arrested in the IFCO case. That is the pallet company. And the GAO, the Government Accounting Office, reports 

that officials in 8 of the 12 field offices they interviewed told them 

that the lack of sufficient detention space has limited the effectiveness of worksite enforcement. This is an issue Senator Kyl and I 

have focused a lot on during the course of our hearings and our 

joint Subcommittee hearings. But we only currently have somewhere around 20,000 detention beds, and I know we have tried to 

add to those, but it seems like we are sticking our finger in a hole 

in a dike trying to hold the ocean back, when we had 1.1 million 

people come across the border illegally last year, yet we only have 

20,000 detention beds. And we say, the Secretary has said he 

wants to eliminate the catch-and-release program, particularly insofar as it relates to people coming from countries other than Mexico. But that was some 250,000 or so last year, and 20,000 detention beds are not enough to hold enough people to make that a 

credible deterrent. 

Can your agency expand worksite enforcement along the lines of 

what you are suggesting here if you do not have sufficient detention space? 

20 

Ms. MYERS. Well, certainly we will continue to prioritize the beds 

we have. As you noted, we have 20,800 beds. In the supplemental, 

we were just given an additional 4,000 beds through the end of this 

fiscal year. The President’s 2007 budget seeks an additional 6,700 

beds. 

What we are trying to do is to use the beds we have more efficiently by turning them over quickly, by utilizing things such as expedited removal, which we are using along the borders, and other 

tools, such as stipulated removal and administrative removal, to 

send aliens home more quickly. 

One of the things that I have implemented in worksite enforcement cases kind of after the IFCO case and looking at kind of the 

large number of worksite cases we have coming up is I am requiring my agents, the SACs, to meet with the head of their detention 

and removal local office before they start any worksite investigation and see is there a way that we can detain these people or do 

we have a JPATS that can come in, that can take these people if 

they want to stipulate to removal right away. That has been very 

effective in some recent cases in using the beds that we have and 

making sure everyone is detained. 

Another thing that we are doing and we did in the Fischer 

Homes case is we worked very successfully with the U.S. Attorney 

there and got them to agree to prosecute each and every one of the 

aliens that were arrested in the case on the misdemeanor 1325 

charge, and that allowed us to borrow the Bureau of Prison beds 

and not use the ICE detention beds, but also ensure that we were 

detaining these aliens before we were able to remove them. 

So it certainly is a challenge, but I think we are making some 

good progress. 

Chairman CORNYN. Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Let me go back to the question of what kind of 

verification system will be used for other than temporary workers. 

First of all, let me ask all of you this question: Does it make any 

sense necessarily to have a standard for temporary workers that 

requires the use of a fraud-proof document that in some way identifies the individual but not require the same kind of system for people who are seeking employment, 12 million of whom we know not 

to be United States citizens? Is there a reason for that double 

standard? 

Mr. BAKER. Let me try to address that. It is not our expectation 

that there will be no identification requirement for employees, prospective employees who say, ‘‘Well, I am not a temporary worker.’’ 

Senator KYL. That is obvious. My question is: Why would you 

have a double standard? When you know there are 12 million people who are here illegally and more coming every day, why would 

you have an easier standard for them to be employed than for people who voluntarily step forward and say, ‘‘I would like to be a temporary worker’’ ? 

Mr. BAKER. Well, we are working to raise the standards for documents. In the longer run, the REAL ID— 

Senator KYL. Look, Secretary Baker, let’s get to the point here. 

You are in charge of policy. Secretary Myers has to then figure out 

a way to enforce that policy. And Mr. Gerry has pointed out that 

for a nice sum of money but, nevertheless, his agency can verify the 

21 

eligibility of people to hold a Social Security card and run a system 

that uses a card for verification. 

Now, what you have outlined in your statement is a double 

standard. For temporary workers, they have got to have a fraudproof document that identifies them. But for everybody else, we are 

going to have a requirement to share no-match data—which could 

be at least a year old, as we have heard—and a mandatory electronic verification of the validity of the Social Security number system. But I have not heard any other fleshing out of what you propose to do to ensure that when I apply for a job, you verify that 

not only is my number valid but that I am who I say I am. 

Mr. BAKER. We would expect employees to show ID and to allow 

the Secretary to set standards for that ID that would be designed 

to make sure that it is high-quality ID. 

Senator KYL. Okay. Now, let me just ask you: Since you have 

had that authority in the last several years, is there a suggestion 

that the ID that is required today is adequate or that nobody has 

gotten around to requiring that it be improved? 

Mr. BAKER. We think that probably too many documents currently are permissible, and we propose in the legislation to trim 

those back. And if the legislation does not pass, we will have to 

take action in— 

Senator KYL. Well, have you suggested to us what documents 

you are talking about? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, and I do not have that list, but it would be a 

relatively limited list. 

Senator KYL. Give me the two or three most usable ones. 

Mr. BAKER. REAL ID-compliant driver’s license, which contains 

a lot of double-checks on IDs, on identity, and also on tamper-proof 

standards; a passport. Now, not everybody has those things. Birth 

certificates are going to have to be accepted. Those are the documents. 

Senator KYL. Okay. So let me just interrupt. We have got the 

same basic thing we have got today except that in 21⁄2 years REAL 

ID kicked in, and when it does, there may or may not be better 

driver’s licenses because there is still no foolproof way of the motor 

vehicle department personnel verifying the legitimacy of the person 

who is asking for a driver’s license. Not everybody has a passport, 

as you note. I do not know very may employers who are good at 

detecting counterfeit birth certificates. 

Are we going to improve this situation with what you are suggesting here? 

Mr. BAKER. I think it will improve it. I recognize that there are 

still gaps in the process that could be exploited. At the same time, 

there are great costs to saying to Americans, you are going to have 

to show up and get in line for a new form of ID that is going to 

be issued by an agency that has not been in the ID-issuing business before. Those are heavy costs, and not just in Government 

funds but in the time and energy and hassle that it would impose 

on every American. And so we want to be cautious before concluding that that is the only solution. 

Senator KYL. Okay. Let me just say that we require that for 

many, many other things in life, including a driver’s license or to 

get credit to go down to the store. I mean, people do not consider 

22 

it a huge burden to show some identification purposes at a store. 

It just seems to me that Americans want us to ensure that the rule 

of law is respected and enforced, and if they see us coming in with 

something that is second-best, that does not guarantee that people 

can be found out if they seek employment illegally, they are going 

to consider our efforts no better than 1986, as we talked about before. 

Now, you talked about what life was like in 1986. That was a 

big year for me. That is the year I was elected to the Congress. So 

since I did not come here until January 1987, I can say I had nothing to do with the 1986 law. But I do have something to do with 

this law, and I will just tell you this: We cannot repeat the mistake 

of 1986. You cannot rely on the same kind of documents and expect 

to get a different result. There must be a governmental-issued document that verifies employment eligibility, or this system will not 

work. 

Mr. Gerry has said that they have the ability to do that, and I 

do not think that Americans will consider it too much of an imposition when they are seeking a job—that is the only time they have 

to do it. Now, some people seek jobs relatively frequently, but most 

people do not. So on that one occasion where you are going to have 

to get a job or show your prospective employer you are eligible, is 

it too much to ask that you get something that looks like a driver’s 

license or an old Social Security card, but, in any event, that is 

fraud-proof, has your picture on it, and that the employer can 

verify is a properly issued card? It seems to me the American people are perfectly willing to bear that kind of expense to get back 

with the rule of law and end this problem of illegal immigration. 

Senator SESSIONS. I could not agree more with Senator Kyl in 

the fundamental premise that we have got to get it right this time. 

I will not support a bill and I will oppose as vigorously as I can 

any legislation that from a reasonable analysis of it, will not work. 

I am convinced S. 2611 will not work, and to the extent to which 

it has been sold to the American people, that is not legitimate. 

Mr. Baker, you mentioned objections from the business community. You know, it is kind of like the farmers. I think the farmers 

do not want open borders. There may be some lobbyist groups that 

do. I think some of the lobbying entities for businesses seem to 

favor almost—they do not want any restrictions on immigration. 

But looking at a recent poll from the National Federation of Independent Business in April, 76 percent said they would work with 

an electronic eligibility verification system and would not consider 

it a burden. That is over three-fourths. And over 90 percent of 

small businesses believe immigration is a problem. So I think we 

would have support if we would come up with a system that can 

work. 

Mr. Gerry, with regard to the Social Security match problem, 

that is, when an employer sends in a Social Security number and 

that number does not match some other number, or someone is already using that number I guess would be some of the things that 

show, did I understand you earlier to say that the Social Security 

Administration supports removing this wall between you and ICE 

and that the administration supports removing that wall for law 

enforcement purposes? 

23 

Mr. GERRY. Yes, I did say that, Senator. I think the Administration’s position is that, it would be appropriate for Congress to 

amend Section 6103 in order to remove the restriction that currently prevents us from sharing information on no-match letters, 

except in the extraordinary circumstances that Assistant Secretary 

Myers indicated. But the— 

Senator SESSIONS. What if it was—would that include all immigration offenses, civil and criminal? 

Mr. GERRY. Well, that would be the point, Senator. It would include all information that we have. We would provide the Department of Homeland Security with whatever information we have 

about the no-match—the no-match letters themselves, and the Social Security numbers that did not match. Then it would be up to 

the Department of Homeland Security to decide what, if anything, 

to do with that information. Right now we are actually precluded 

from doing that, unless Homeland Security is in the stage that Secretary Myers described earlier where they are in an active investigation. In which case, we are now allowed in that very limited circumstance to share information. 

The proposal that you are talking about would be to remove the 

barrier so that we could freely share information about no-match 

letters. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Myers, do you think that would 

meet the needs of the Department of Homeland Security and ICE? 

Ms. MYERS. Absolutely. That would be a terrific tool. Every time 

we have been able to work with Social Security in the middle of 

an investigation, it has been terrific, and we would love to have 

that information on the front end so we could talk to— 

Senator SESSIONS. It would give you an easy red alert that something is wrong in this business if they have a lot of no-match or 

improper Social Security numbers. 

Ms. MYERS. That is exactly right. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me ask you, how many ICE investigators 

are there? And how many do we have working on workplace enforcement today? 

Ms. MYERS. There are approximately 5,600 ICE agents, and then 

working on—40 percent of them work on various immigration-related topics full-time. I would say that it is—I cannot give you a 

precise work-year number. I think it is higher than the number 

that GAO had from a few years ago, but I would have to get back 

to you on that. I would say it is in the range—I would have to get 

back to you with the precise number. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, our numbers from the GAO report in 

August of 2005, just less than a year ago, said there were 90 

agents, which is down from 1995, when there were 240. But when 

you figure based on that full-time equivalent evaluation of how 

many hours were actually spent on it, it totaled 65 agents. Isn’t 

that an awfully small number if you want the American people to 

think you are serious about workplace enforcement, 65 for the 

whole United States of America? 

Ms. MYERS. Yes, it is, and the President is proposing some additional 171 agents to be dedicated solely to workplace enforcement. 

Since I have been in the job, I have made workplace enforcement 

a priority. As I mentioned earlier, we are up in terms of investigaVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:53 May 06, 2009 Jkt 048837 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48837.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
24 

tions, criminal investigations of egregious employers, over 121 percent already over all of fiscal year 2005. We are also up 48 percent 

in terms of investigations on critical infrastructure protection sites, 

and this year we have already apprehended and arrested on administrative charges almost twice as many individuals, illegal 

aliens, as we did all of last year on worksite enforcement. So we 

are increasing this as a priority, and we are also looking at what 

can we do that is not pure worksite, but how can we do document 

fraud cases more effectively, because if the aliens do not have those 

phony documents, they will not be able to bring them in and trick 

employers who want to do the right thing. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, the numbers show that the actual enforcement actions went to virtually insignificant numbers. They 

were so low in early 2000, and I am glad to see they are coming 

up. In my view there is a tipping point, and we are way away from 

it. But it is not impossible to reach it. And that tipping point is the 

point at which every business in America knows that they are likely to be audited and likely to be disciplined if they hire people illegally. 

We are not there yet. Doubling from 100 or 50 is not significant 

when you consider the nationwide challenge, so I think we need to 

get serious about it. I think some of that can be done through a 

reallocation of existing resources, and some may have to be done 

with new resources. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

We are winding down here with this panel. We have another 

panel. Senator Kyl wanted to send you off with some concluding 

thoughts and maybe requests for additional information. By the 

way, we will leave the record open until 5 p.m. next Monday, June 

26th, for members to submit additional documents or written questions to you, which we would ask for you to promptly respond to. 

But, Senator Kyl, I will recognize you. 

Senator KYL. Just this to close. The bill that the Senate passed 

in Title III does require a way of verifying the eligibility of all people who apply for a job that does not rely on documents that are 

currently relied upon. And my understanding from the administration’s position was that there was support for implementing that 

kind of a system, though the suggestion was it would take longer 

than the 18 months that we are seeking here. 

We need clarification of that from the administration, because I 

believe if we simply rely upon the kind of documents that we have 

been talking about and employers are required to verify it, we will 

not have a system that will work. 

And, second, Mr. Gerry, I think it is very important for us—and 

I would like to submit some additional questions to you—to find 

out what is necessary for, including the cost of, determining eligibility when you issue a Social Security number to an adult to ensure that the individual that receives the number is, in fact, legally 

entitled to be employed, whether U.S. citizen, green card holder, 

other kind of visa, or whatever the status might be, because it 

seems to me that those are the critical elements of not only making 

a system work but also providing that it can be enforced. And I 

think people have to know it can be enforced. 

25 

Finally, for Secretary Myers, I am going to do some followup 

questions regarding how many people would be required to perform 

the audits that employers must know are coming, because if they 

do not know that they are going to be audited—if they know they 

are going to be audited within a 3- or 4-year period for sure, then 

we are much more likely to have good compliance with this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CORNYN. Secretary Baker and Secretary Myers and 

Commissioner Gerry, thank you very much for being here with us 

today. We appreciate your service. 

If we could have the second panel assume their position at the 

table as soon as they are given an opportunity, we would appreciate it. 

[Pause.] 

Chairman CORNYN. We are pleased to have as a distinguished 

second panel today a number of individuals, and I will introduce 

you individually and turn the floor over for opening statements. On 

this panel we will hear from Mr. Richard Stana, Director of Homeland Security and Justice for the Government Accountability Office. 

Stewart Verdery is joining Mr. Stana to his left. Following his 

confirmation by the U.S. Senate in 2003, Mr. Verdery served as the 

Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security, and he is also an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Cecilia Mun ̃ oz is Vice President of the National Council of La 

Raza, the Office of Research, Advocacy, and Legislation. She has 

been actively involved in comprehensive immigration reform, and 

I know we will benefit from her testimony here today. 

Linda Dodd-Major is creator and director of the INS Office of 

Business Liaison. She worked with the attorneys, employers, and 

associations throughout the United States to explain regulations, 

policies, and procedures relating to the employment verification 

process. I know we will benefit from your experience. 

Let me at this time turn the floor over to Mr. Stana for a 5- 

minute opening statement. We will go down the line, and then we 

will open it up for questions. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. Stana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing today on worksite enforcement and employer sanctions efforts. 

My prepared statement is drawn from our recent work on the employment verification process and ICE’s worksite enforcement program. I would like to summarize it now and also briefly discuss our 

ongoing study of foreign countries’ programs for guest workers and 

worksite enforcement. 

As we and others have reported in the past, the opportunity for 

employment is a key magnet attracting illegal aliens to the United 

States. In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which made it illegal to knowingly hire unauthorized 

workers. IRCA established an employment verification process for 

employers to verify all newly hired employees’ work eligibility and 

26 

a sanctions program for fining employers who do not comply with 

the Act, and these programs have remained largely unchanged in 

the 20 years since passage of IRCA. 

The current employment verification process is primarily based 

on employers’ review of work authorization documents presented by 

new employees. However, the availability and use of counterfeit 

documents and the fraudulent use of valid documents belonging to 

others have made it difficult for employers who want to comply 

with the employment verification process to ensure that they hire 

only authorized workers. This is further complicated by the fact 

that employees can present 27 different documents to establish 

their identity and/or work eligibility. Counterfeit documents have 

also made it easier for employers who do not want to comply with 

the law to knowingly hire unauthorized workers without fear of 

sanction. 

DHS and the Social Security Administration currently operate 

the Basic Pilot Program, which is a voluntary, automated system 

authorized by the 1996 immigration act for employers to electronically check employees’ work eligibility information against information in DHS and SSA data bases. Of the 5.6 million employers in 

the U.S., about 8,600 employers have registered to use the program, and about half of them are active users. This program shows 

promise to help identify the use of counterfeit documents and assist 

ICE in better targeting its worksite enforcement efforts, particularly if the program is made mandatory as envisioned under various legislative proposals. Yet, a number of weaknesses exist in the 

pilot program that DHS will have to address before expanding it 

to all employers. They include the inability to detect the fraudulent 

use of valid documents and DHS delays in entering information 

into its data bases. Furthermore, according to DHS, additional resources may be needed to complete timely verifications under an 

expanded or mandatory program. 

Turning to worksite enforcement, the low priority given to it by 

both INS and ICE has been a major factor in the ineffectiveness 

of IRCA. In fiscal year 1999, INS devoted about 240 FTEs to worksite enforcement. It now devotes around 100 FTEs to address the 

employment of millions of unauthorized workers. After 9/11, ICE 

focused its worksite enforcement resources mainly on identifying 

and removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure 

sites, such as airports and nuclear power plants. As a result, the 

number of non-critical infrastructure worksite investigations declined. Furthermore, the number of Notices of Intent to Fine issued 

to employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers or improperly completing the employment verification forms dropped from 

417 in fiscal year 1999 to only 3 in fiscal year 2004. 

In addition to limited resources, a number of issues have hampered worksite enforcement efforts. In particular, the availability 

and use of counterfeit documents have made it difficult for ICE 

agents to prove that employers knowingly hired unauthorized 

workers. Further, although guilty employers could be fined from 

$275 to $11,000 for each unauthorized employee, fine amounts are 

often negotiated down in value during discussions between ICE attorneys and employers, to a point so low that employers might view 

it as a cost of doing business rather than an effective deterrent. 

27 

ICE recently announced a new interior enforcement strategy 

under which the agency will seek to bring criminal charges against 

employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers, and ICE has 

reported an increased number of criminal arrests, indictments, and 

convictions. However, it is too early to tell whether this revised 

strategy will materially affect ICE’s impact on the millions of unauthorized workers in the U.S. and those employers who hired them. 

As I mentioned earlier, we are currently studying foreign countries’ guest work programs and worksite enforcement efforts. 

Among the issues we are studying are the types of guest workers 

involved and the incentives used to help ensure their return to 

their home countries, the nature and effect of regularization policies, foreign countries’ experiences with integration and assimilation programs, and worksite enforcement activities and resources. 

We plan to report on the result of this work later this summer. 

In closing, both a strong employment verification process and a 

credible worksite enforcement program are needed to help reduce 

the employment of unauthorized workers. It is important to consider what resources would be needed to make these programs successful and how to balance these resources with those devoted to 

border enforcement and to other immigration management priorities. 

This concludes my oral statement, and I would be happy to address any questions that the Subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stana appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman CORNYN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Stana. 

Mr. Verdery. 

STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, AND ADJUNCT 

FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. VERDERY. Chairman Cornyn, Senator Kyl, Senator Sessions, 

thanks for having me back to the Committee again as you consider 

the most critical issue of how to get this employment system correct. I hope you will make sure that 2006 is not the immigration 

version of the movie ‘‘Groundhog Day.’’ We do need to get it right, 

and I think we have made a lot of progress over this year in trying 

to figure out the best employment system that we can come up 

with. 

I appeared here about a year ago as you were beginning your 

hearings. Now is the time to act. Senator Cornyn, as you said in 

your opening statement, each day that goes by the problem gets 

worse. The issues get more inflamed. The number of workers becomes greater. The politics become worse. This cannot be solved 

solely by enforcement or by what you might put on an appropriations bill. Now is the time to act. The issues are hard, but this is 

the time to act now that both bodies have acted and you have a 

chance to go to conference, I urge you to try to push this over the 

finish line this year, if you can. 

In that vein, I wanted to ask for your indulgence to put in the 

record an open letter from a number of former Immigration and 

28 

Homeland Security officials asking for a comprehensive approach 

to immigration strategy, which I believe your staff has. 

Chairman CORNYN. That will be made part of the record, without 

objection. 

[The letter appears as a submission for the record.] 

Mr. VERDERY. In particular, I would mention in terms of this 

comprehensive approach, is the issue of whether we should wait to 

turn on a guest worker program before the employment verification 

system were to come online 18 months or so after a bill were to 

pass. We have systems to vet foreign workers right now. They work 

for things like H1–Bs and other programs. Those systems should 

be used while we build out a better system down the line. But if 

you essentially wait to turn on that foreign guest worker program 

for another 18 months or more, you are only adding to the hole. 

You are having another 18 months of workers being attracted to 

employment and hired and employed illegally rather than channeling that flow through legal means. 

Turning to the employment issues, it is hard to imagine a situation worse than the current one, and it is not solely the fault of 

the 1986 law. It is a mix of law, of enforcement policy, of employer 

practices, and of legal decisions from the courts. But it has been 

mentioned by prior witnesses and by the Senators on the dais that 

essentially prospective employees are allowed to prove their identity by producing a number of identification documents which are 

illegally obtained, easily forged, and could be used multiple times. 

In essence, we have tried building an enforcement regime on quicksand. 

Prospective employers who would like to do the right thing have 

been provided no tools to ascertain anything but the very worst 

frauds, and there has been no system to confirm employment eligibility. Prospective employers who would like to break the law or 

are willing to look the other way have essentially been given a 

green light due to lack of enforcement resources and the fact that 

INS and DHS announced that enforcement activity would be focused on employers in a handful of critical infrastructure industries 

with national security implications. And despite the fact that Social 

Security has an elaborate system to vet down to the last penny the 

amount of retirement benefits and tax charges that people owe, 

that system has essentially been of little use to enforcement authorities. 

The American people rightfully are concerned about this situation, but they are also willing to accept the reality that a new employment verification scheme cannot be expected to be foolproof 

and universally applied from day one. This is not missile defense. 

Some measure of error is to be expected and tolerated, so long as 

it does not result in U.S. citizens being denied the right to work. 

Thus, as you begin and continue the process of building the electronic employment verification system, the EEVS, I make the following recommendations that are more thoroughly discussed in the 

written testimony. 

It should be a phased-in approach. You should go after the most 

critical industries first—aviation, chemical plants, other critical infrastructure—as your Senate bill does. 

29 

In terms of employee rights, during the initial phases of the 

EEVS, enforcement activities should err on the side of employees 

claiming to be U.S. citizens before they would be terminated. Eventually, over 50 million people are likely to be enrolled on an annual 

basis in the system, and nothing will cause support for it to collapse more quickly than horror stories of legitimate U.S. citizens 

being denied the right to work because of faulty Government data 

bases. 

Third, on REAL ID enforcement, the regulation process is ongoing at DHS, but the question is: Where is the funding? Are we 

going to stay on track with the regulations and tell States what 

they have to do? And are we going to help States pay for this? It 

is expensive. But we are building an immigration system, a voter 

ID system, and even perhaps a cross-border traffic system on 

REAL ID, and we have to keep it on track and have it be adequately funded. 

In terms of biometrics, basing this system on non-biometric identifiers, such as Social Security numbers and immigration control 

numbers, may be a good short-term fix, but over the long haul you 

have to nail down the person with a biometric identifier. This will 

be especially helpful for people who are likely to be discriminated 

against because you can tell one person from another with surety. 

In conclusion, I would also like to make two other points. We 

have to involve the private sector in building this system. The Herculean task of building this system on the back of a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services agency that is already busy is going 

to require private sector involvement. 

And, last, on fees, asking U.S. employers to pay for this beyond 

what they have to do in their own internal workplaces to make 

themselves into compliance is not right. Employers should be ready 

to comply with laws, whether it be environmental laws, tax laws, 

accounting compliance, immigration laws, but they should not have 

to pay for the Government to build this system. This is a core governmental function, and the taxpayers ought to pay for it. 

Again, I congratulate you on having the oversight of the legislation. There is nothing more critical than getting this right. It is the 

linchpin to this bill, and I hope that you will continue your oversight. And good luck during the summer on this most important 

project. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Verdery appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Verdery. 

Ms. Mun ̃ oz. 

STATEMENT OF CECILIA MUN ̃ OZ, VICE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF 

RESEARCH, ADVOCACY, AND LEGISLATION, NATIONAL 

COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. MUN ̃ OZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks 

for the opportunity to come and talk about this very critical issue 

in the immigration reform debate. 

This is perhaps the least discussed element of the bill, as you 

mentioned, and it is arguably the one which is going to have the 

biggest impact in the sense that it is going to affect everybody in 

30 

the United States work force. And I could not agree more with all 

of your assertion that it is essential that this provision of employment verification work. It needs to work in order to make immigration control more effective so that employers can efficiently and accurately verify their employees, and it needs to work to ensure that 

American workers and immigrant workers who are fully authorized 

to work in the United States do not experience delays and denial 

of employment as a result of what we do on immigration reform, 

and that they do not experience discriminatory practices. 

The potential for impact on the United States work force is enormous, and we have experience on what this is likely to do and the 

problems that may well be caused if we do not address them as 

Congress proceeds with immigration reform. 

We know that U.S. workers are likely to be—could be negatively 

affected if we do not fix problem in the data base, if we do not 

change the incentives that are in the law which affect discriminatory practices. And we must not move forward unless we are prepared to address the potential for mistakes to make sure that, as 

we are creating avenues for employers to effectively verify their 

employees, we are making sure that American workers and immigrant workers who are authorized to work do not experience delays 

or denials of employment. 

We have almost 20 years of experience with employer sanctions 

and nearly a decade of experience with the Basic Pilot Program 

that you mentioned, and in 2002, the Department of Justice conducted a study of the Basic Pilot and found that a sizable number 

of workers who were found by the program not to be work authorized actually were work authorized, about 4 percent of the 

verifications. If you multiply that times 54 million or so new hires 

every year, a 4-percent error rate means about 2 million American 

workers every year could face denials or delay in employment as 

a result of Government errors. That is an unacceptable level, and 

it needs to be addressed, and building in mechanisms to address 

it is essential to moving forward on this issue. 

For those people who the system said were not authorized to 

work when, in fact, they were, and they or employers attempted to 

address that with the immigration authorities or SSA, 39 percent 

of employers reported that SSA never or only sometimes returned 

their calls promptly, and 43 percent reported a similar experience 

with the INS, the precursor to DHS. 

The evaluators also discovered that employers engaged in prohibited practices. Forty-five percent of employees surveyed who contested the information coming out of the system were subject to 

pay cuts, delays in job training, and other restrictions on working, 

and a full 73 percent of employees who should have been informed 

of work authorization problems in the system were not. Those 

numbers should really give us pause. That is something that we 

need to fix as we move forward because the impact on the American work force would be substantial. 

The evaluators also found enormous problems with employers 

not complying with the terms of memoranda of understanding that 

they themselves had signed when they began to participate in the 

Basic Pilot. That includes pre-employment screening, which employers are not supposed to do, which essentially could deny workVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:53 May 06, 2009 Jkt 048837 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48837.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
31 

ers the ability to even find out that there is a data problem with 

their own data in the system and, therefore, address the system. 

It means they lose access to the job, but that they are likely to run 

into a problem the next time they apply for a job without an opportunity to address the mistake in the data base. These are things 

employers agreed not to do and ended up doing anyway as they 

participated in the Basic Pilot. 

We were pleased to see the amendment by Senators Grassley, 

Kennedy, Obama, and Baucus on S. 2611. We think it improves 

substantially the original Senate language. And the most critical 

protections that are now in the bill which passed the Senate include language protecting against discrimination, due process protections, and key language protecting privacy. We believe all of 

that needs to be maintained and strengthened as we move forward 

because of these problems that I just outlined. 

I want to highlight two particular concerns: Default confirmation. 

My colleague, Mr. Verdery, also mentioned this as well. It is incredibly important in the case that the Government data bases are 

unable to reach a final decision within the 30-day timeframe. 

And administrative and judicial review. When there are problems in the data for people where the names and the Social Security data base do not match up, for example, a lot of people in my 

community have multiple first names, multiple last names. I am 

one of those. The name on my Social Security record is different 

from the name that is on my W–2, and that is a very common 

issue. That could lead to employment problems. If that, in fact, 

leads to denial and delay of employment, I would hope that somebody like me would have the ability to address that expeditiously, 

certainly before I lost wages, the ability to support my family. 

We would also ask, just briefly, as we move forward with this 

legislative process, that we talk about a phase-in, again described 

by my colleague, Mr. Verdery, measures to ensure the accuracy of 

the data and to improve expeditiously the accuracy of the data before we subject the entire work force to verification under this system. 

Changes and greater efficiency in the issuance of immigration 

documentation. Immigrants workers, in particular, who are authorized to work should have an employment authorization document, 

but we know that thousands of them experience delays in renewing 

those documents. We have examples from all around the country 

of people experiencing delays in getting driver’s licenses, delays in 

employment, because even though they are, in fact, authorized to 

work but because the authorities have not gotten their documents 

or their renewals on time. That affects people’s ability to feed their 

families. It is something that we should address. 

Enforcement of labor laws ultimately is critical to the success of 

the overall effort and sufficient resources for the agencies to clean 

up their data and implement this swiftly and efficiently are essential. 

So, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we recognize that worksite 

verification is an essential element of the immigration debate, and 

we are prepared to play a constructive role in making sure that the 

policy is effective. But it would be morally and substantively disastrous to put a system in place without addressing serious flaws 

32 

which have been identified by 10 years of experience with the Basic 

Pilot and 20 years of experience with employer sanctions. We believe there is ample evidence of what we need to do. We believe 

that we have the capacity to do it, and we would urge you to look 

at those issues as we move this forward. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Mun ̃ oz appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman Cornyn. Thank you, Ms. Mun ̃ oz. 

Ms. Dodd-Major. 

STATEMENT OF LINDA DODD-MAJOR, FORMER DIRECTOR OF 

OFFICE OF BUSINESS LIAISON, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. DODD-MAJOR. Good afternoon, Senators. Thank you for the 

opportunity to address these issues today. I also look forward to 

doing that. I also consider it extremely important. I do not disagree 

with— 

Chairman CORNYN. Would you double-check to make sure your 

microphone is on? 

Ms. DODD-MAJOR. Okay. Now the light is on. 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. DODD-MAJOR. I do not disagree with what my colleagues on 

both panels have said. However, I probably of all of the panelists 

have more hands-on experience with the I–9 process. Not only did 

I direct and run the Office of Business Liaison, but I spent many 

years almost embedded, as we know it today, into many worksite 

operations, into audits, into raids, just as the media representatives do in the Middle East now. I did that so that I could better 

explain to employers who wanted to comply what the law expected 

of them, what the consequences could be so that they could be more 

likely to—so they could be persuaded toward voluntary compliance. 

I also was in charge of the I–9 regulation at INS for years. I also 

was the chairperson of the interagency task force on birth certificate standardization. 

So in terms of all these documents, in terms of the process, I 

have a lot of experience. I also have a different perspective. 

First of all, with respect to the new enforcement priorities, most 

employers are not engaged in criminal activity. Furthermore, most 

undocumented workers are not working for criminal employers. In 

fact, not only are most employers not engaged in criminal activity, 

they are furious that the difficulties they have had with the I–9 

process have not resulted in any enforcement that is meaningful to 

them. Those who try to get assistance do not get it. Those who call 

up to try to get removals of undocumented aliens do not get responses. And they feel that all of their efforts—and I am talking 

now of the huge percentage of compliance-minded employers. They 

feel that their efforts have been useless. They feel—and I think it 

is a justified position for them to take—that they have been victims 

in this process. Yes, they are often portrayed in the media and elsewhere as being addicted to low-cost labor. They will do anything for 

cheap labor. That is not true for most employers. In the private 

sector, I represent three Fortune 100 level companies that are in 

industries that have historically attracted undocumented workers. 

33 

They have tried their absolute best to keep undocumented workers 

out of the workplace. Two of them participate in the Basic Pilot at 

all of their worksites. Even that, for reasons that I will discuss, has 

not worked for them. 

Furthermore, to say that the penalties included in IRCA were 

not deterrents to undocumented employment is an understatement. 

The worst consequences of worksite enforcement were not penalties. They were not money damages. They were the business consequences of—now, they do not do this anymore, but what they 

were doing in the late 1990’s were raids on the work force. They 

were doing it at an Indian restaurant in Houston. They were doing 

it at a Denny’s-type restaurant in Scottsdale. All of these I participated in. I did not participate as a law enforcement officer, but I 

saw what happened firsthand. They were doing it in food-processing plants, in meat-packing plants. And if you think when they 

did those raids that all of those undocumented workers and certain 

legal workers who had fear of the immigration system exited calmly from those workplaces, you are wrong. Every exit and entry was 

jammed with people trying to leave. There were raw materials ruined. And those employers faced sometimes months and expenses 

of maybe $1,500 to $2,500 apiece trying to replace those workers, 

all under circumstances where their Forms I–9 were absolutely 

flawless. In other words, the system did not work for them. And yet 

when they called for assistance—now, in the early 1990’s, employers used to be able to call on local INS offices who would help them 

verify name and number matches for a number. After Salinas v. 

Pena—that was a lawsuit in the early 1990’s—there was a consent 

agreement after which Deputy Commissioner of INS Chris Sale 

prohibited all—and there were reasons for this. I am not saying 

there were not—any investigations offices from providing that type 

of assistance to employers. After that, they basically had nothing. 

Not only that, but contemporaneously came out certain GAO reports regarding discrimination that had resulted admittedly from 

overzealous following of the I–9 requirement and what has come to 

be known as ‘‘document abuse.’’ I think that there is far less evidence that that kind of thing is going on today than there was 

then. Nevertheless, the resources that had been dedicated to employer outreach were transferred more or less to antidiscrimination, with the result that the message that employers got was thou 

shalt not discriminate outside of the context of the regular I–9 compliance. They were told accept any document that might be genuine 

and might belong to that person, or you may face a lawsuit for discrimination. 

Some other issues that I want to highlight—they are fleshed out 

in more detail in my written statement—are some other parts of 

the process that are largely overlooked. 

First, there is an employee attestation section in the Form I–9. 

It is Section 1. It is there where the employee states under penalty 

of law, signed under penalty of perjury, ‘‘I am an authorized worker.’’ This is unfortunately—or maybe fortunately, I do not know. It 

depends on your perspective. The I–9 is seen as a document-driven 

and a number-driven process. There is a process during which and 

at which point employees themselves, with their personal signatures, have to attest to their current work authorization. That part 

34 

of the process has been almost completely overlooked. When you do 

audits of I–9s, you often see that part not completed, and there has 

been very little followup and enforcement against individuals who 

have provided, intentionally provided false data, for whatever personal reasons they have, that have gotten them into the work force 

and have not seen the consequences. 

Employers who have experienced consequences themselves try to 

get enforcement to come in and pick up people and have seen those 

people just move on to their competitors have a very, very difficult 

time with this process. 

There is another thing that is not addressed in the I–9 rule, and 

that is self-employment. A person who is an independent contractor 

does not have to complete an I–9, which has led to a widespread 

misimpression that if there is not an employer-employee relationship between the individual performing services and the payor for 

services, that that person can work whatever way he pleases. 

Now, while those people may not be working for some of these 

criminal employers where there are worksite enforcement actions 

under the current enforcement model, they are competing with 

U.S. workers, and that, after all, was the purpose why IRCA was 

passed in the first place. 

Discrimination. There is a lot that we could say here, but I will 

say that I have never once in any discussion with any employer or 

any organization ever heard—and we are talking about tens and 

tens of thousands—ever once heard anyone do anything but want 

to get more workers. Think about it. If an employer is in a labor 

shortage area, they do not want to discriminate against workers. 

As a matter of fact, in some cases they feel the I–9 process hampers them from getting workers that they could otherwise get and 

who have proven to be very good workers. 

I do not think discrimination—there may have been disproportionate impact on certain ethnic groups, but that may be more because of the huge volume of those ethnic groups in the workplace 

than it is a reflection of discrimination. 

Electronic verification. 

Chairman CORNYN. Ms. Dodd-Major, could I get you to conclude? 

Ms. DODD-MAJOR. Yes, yes. 

Chairman CORNYN. Unfortunately, we are under a little bit of a 

time constraint. 

Ms. DODD-MAJOR. Okay. This is the end. Electronic verification. 

The problem with this, as has been pointed out by other panel 

members is that it has driven fraud or exacerbated the movement 

of fraud from use of fake documents to use of false documents— 

fake being counterfeit, false being falsely used. 

This is a very slippery slope that is not going to be improved unless, as has been pointed out also by several of the Senators, there 

is a biometric link or there is a tamper-proof document, not just for 

the alien workers but for U.S. workers as well. Now, whether this 

is a passport or some other secure document for U.S. workers, such 

as the dreaded national ID card, I do not know. But without that, 

the Basic Pilot is going to continue to give false results even if it 

can be administered on a nationwide basis. 

Thank you. 

35 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dodd-Major appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman CORNYN. Thank you, Ms. Dodd-Major. Your testimony 

has been enormously helpful so far, and my only regret is that Senator Sessions and I both have to go to an Armed Services meeting 

and a classified briefing at 4 o’clock, and so we are going to have 

to cut this a little bit short—shorter than we would otherwise. But 

we hope you will understand and will also allow us to send you 

questions in writing that will allow us to followup on some of the 

excellent testimony you have given us. 

Let me ask Mr. Verdery—and this also touches on some of the 

other testimony we have heard here in terms of worksite 

verification. It seems like there is a proliferation of documents that 

the Federal Government is mandating, whether it is a REAL ID or 

the Western Hemisphere Initiative travel documents, where people 

in South Texas, in order to go across the border and come back, 

they are going to have to have a passport or some equivalent of 

that, to, I know, because it is so popular in South Texas, the laser 

visa that Mexican visitors use under the US–VISIT program, and 

I know you have helped initiate a biometric identifier. 

You mentioned a phased-in program. Is it possible for the Federal Government to come up with some means to take current documents that are in place or going to be coming in place soon to use 

that as some means of verifying eligibility until such time as we 

can come up with a $9.5 billion appropriation to give everybody a 

new Social Security card? 

Mr. VERDERY. Well, it is a very difficult question. The problem 

is, as you mentioned, I am not sure anybody is really looking for 

the solution. There are four things going on at the same time: the 

Western Hemisphere requirement for travel back into the country 

for U.S. citizens and Canadians; the US–VISIT program itself, 

where they are going to enroll people leaving and going; REAL ID; 

and then a guest worker program. They all have to work together 

in some way. 

I do think that you can have an interim step. The REAL ID 

would essentially have to suffice for people claiming to be U.S. citizens, and then you would have a foreign worker card, as the President has said, which is essentially already a tamper-resistant, biometrically based visa for foreign workers. 

The real question is people who are not U.S. citizens but claiming to be, as Senator Kyl was getting at quite a bit, and that is 

where REAL ID I think can help a bit. Even if the EEVS does not 

work perfectly, essentially you have to trust in the card, and you 

have to make sure that works. 

I do think that the next generation has to be a biometrically 

based system so you are actually tying the person to the card to 

a data base. If that is a national ID card system, so be it. But I 

think that is the only way you essentially can tie the person to the 

card and the person to a watchlist check and a data base check. 

Chairman CORNYN. Mr. Stana, until such time as we are able to 

figure out and to actually solve the identification card issue, do you 

agree that we could make great strides forward in bringing down 

the wall between the Social Security Administration and the DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:53 May 06, 2009 Jkt 048837 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\48837.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
36 

partment of Homeland Security and other law enforcement officials 

by allowing some sharing of the no-match list? 

Mr. Stana. Yes, there is no question that there are opportunities 

to get valuable data from the Earnings Suspense File, and the IRC 

Section 6103 limitations could be addressed to enable proper use. 

Of course, you also have privacy concerns. You do not want another 

laptop somewhere in suburban Washington with 13 million names 

on it from the ESF. There have to be appropriate safeguards. 

But I would also say this: Let’s not kid ourselves. Technology is 

not a panacea here. Without the proper procedures and a sufficient 

number of resources to followup with employers and employees 

alike, this whole system that we are proposing could face some real 

challenges. So you have to have all three. You have to have the 

technology, you have to have the people, and you have to have the 

processes that everyone understands and everyone knows how to 

use. 

Chairman CORNYN. And, Ms. Mun ̃ oz, I take it you would agree 

that one of the best protections we would have to some means to 

avoid either unintentional or intentional discrimination against 

lawful workers would be some type of verifiable card that would 

eliminate discretion on the part of the employer. 

Ms. MUN ̃ OZ. Well, it is a mixed bag. I think experience tells us 

it is a mixed bag. On the one hand, you are right that it is possible 

that having a single document that everybody in the country would 

have and having some confidence that that document is reliable 

would have some good impact on some of the discriminatory practices out there. I will tell you that experience in our community 

also leads to a real fear that it could become a document that a 

lot of us have to show in a lot of other contexts as well and that 

only some of us are going to be asked to show in the same way that 

my former boss, the former president of my organization, who grew 

up in a border town in Texas, carried a card issued by the Border 

Patrol as he was growing up so that he could prove that he belonged in his own community. 

There are some concerns that may be eased by such a document 

and other concerns that would be raised by such a document, and 

we need to be mindful of that, if we move in that direction, to make 

sure that we do not create new forms of discrimination. 

Chairman CORNYN. Ms. Dodd-Major, perhaps more than anyone 

else, you have had some real-life experience here, and I just have 

to ask you: Given the difficulties in both getting Congress to respond in a comprehensive way and in a way that actually works, 

given the political resistance of some in the employer community 

about sanctions or other ways to actually enforce the worksite 

verification requirement, and just given the difficulties of making 

all these moving pieces come together in some smoothly running, 

efficient machine, are you optimistic or are you pessimistic about 

Congress’ ability to actually learn from its mistakes in the past and 

actually make the system work? 

Ms. DODD-MAJOR. Oh, boy, that is a hard question. 

Chairman CORNYN. I knew you were up to it. 

Ms. DODD-MAJOR. I think that the pressures from the competing 

sides are so difficult and in a political year the advantages are so 

likely to cancel one another out politically that the incentive to 

37 

move this forward as a matter of public policy is—and there are 

different stakeholders here. There are employers. There is the general public. There are all those aliens who have never had opportunities here before. And I am not confident that all of those things 

can be brought together to pass legislation now. 

Chairman CORNYN. Well, you may be right. I hope you are not. 

I remain optimistic. And one thing, depending on your point of 

view, whether you are optimistic or less than optimistic about our 

chances, from my perspective doing nothing is not an option. And 

this is the responsibility that our constituents have sent us up here 

to undertake to try to solve difficult problems. And I recognize as 

much as anyone the upcoming elections, but there are always going 

to be elections in the future for those who hold office or those who 

aspire to public office. And I just believe that this is absolutely critical for us to deal with. 

We can go back to our voters and explain to them why we voted 

the way we did and why we did what we did. And if we do not have 

a good explanation, then they know what to do with that. If we do, 

then I think those who try to do their best and come up with a realistic solution will be rewarded accordingly. 

Unfortunately, due to the time constraint of this conflicting hearing, Armed Services hearing, we are going to have to conclude 

there, but please rest assured that your written testimony and your 

oral summary has been enormously helpful, and we are not going 

to let you off the hook. We are going to stay in touch with you and 

ask you more questions and ask you to contribute further in this 

effort. Thank you so much. 

We will leave the record open until 5 p.m. on Monday, June 26th, 

for members to submit additional documents to the record or ask 

additional questions in writing of the panelists. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follows.] 

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