SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 

en banc 

DAVIS R. CONWAY AND ) 

SHERI D. CONWAY, ) 

 ) 

 Appellants, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. SC93951 

 ) 

CITIMORTGAGE, INC. AND ) 

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ) 

ASSOCIATION, INC., ) 

 ) 

 Respondents. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. CHARLES COUNTY

The Honorable Jon A. Cunningham, Judge 

Opinion issued August 19, 2014 

 Homeowners appeal from the trial court’s judgment dismissing their claim against 

Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and CitiMortgage under the 

Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), section 407.020,1

 for an alleged 

wrongful foreclosure of a deed of trust. The trial court held the MMPA did not apply 

because Fannie Mae and CitiMortgage were not parties to the original loan transaction. It 

further held that the MMPA did not apply to post-sale activities that were unrelated to 

                                                           

1

 All references are to RSMo Supp. 2013 unless otherwise noted. 
claims or representations made before or at the time of the transaction. Homeowners 

contend the trial court erred in construing the phrase “in connection with” too narrowly to 

exclude post-transaction activities from MMPA coverage. 

 At issue in this case is whether the homeowners sufficiently pleaded that the 

defendants’ alleged wrongful foreclosure was “in connection with” the sale of 

merchandise so as to state a claim under the MMPA. For the purposes of the MMPA, a 

loan is an agreed upon bundle of services being “sold” by the lender to the borrower, and 

the “sale” of a loan lasts until the last service is performed or the loan is repaid. 

Accordingly, allegations of fraud and deception in the course of those services are “in 

connection with” the “sale,” as required by section 407.020.1. This is true even where, as 

here, the party committing the alleged fraud or deception is not the seller. As long as the 

plaintiff alleges that the misconduct occurred in connection with the services that 

comprise the “sale” of a loan, the actor can be liable under the MMPA. 

 Here, the homeowners allege that the defendants committed fraud and deception in 

the course of performing some of the services that were agreed to at the outset of the 

loan. Because the sale of a loan lasts as long as the agreed upon services are being (or 

could be) performed, the homeowners’ allegations of fraud and deception must have 

occurred “in connection with” the “sale” of their loan. Other questions relating to 

whether loan modification negotiations are done “in connection with” the initial 

extension of credit in a loan are considered in a second case decided today, Watson v. 

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., --- S.W.3d --- (Mo. banc 2014) (No. SC93769). The 

trial court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 
Factual Background 

In 2007, Davis and Sheri Conway purchased a home in Wentzville (“the 

Wentzville property”) with the intention of remodeling and making it their permanent 

home. They continued to reside at their home in St. Peters (“the St. Peters property”) 

during the renovations. In conjunction with this purchase, they obtained a mortgage loan 

from Pulaski Bank (“the 2007 loan”). Pulaski assigned the loan to Fannie Mae, and 

CitiMortgage serviced the loan. 

During renovations, the Wentzville property was damaged in a fire and had to be 

torn down. The Conways subsequently settled a claim with their insurance company for 

$150,000 and notified the loss mitigation department at CitiMortgage. As work 

progressed on rebuilding, the insurance company cut checks payable to both the Conways 

and CitiMortgage. The Conways endorsed the checks, and CitiMortgage held the funds 

in an escrow account. As the Conways submitted bills, CitiMortgage sent payments to 

the St. Peters address. Although the insurance company paid the full amount of the 

claim, the Wentzville property required additional construction in the amount of 

$150,000. The Conways notified CitiMortgage that they would not have the funds to 

complete the construction, and CitiMortgage stated it intended to hold the last $15,000 of 

the insurance money in the escrow account until the construction was complete. 

The Conways then fell behind on their mortgage payments by approximately 

$9,000, but CitiMortgage would not apply the $15,000 balance from the escrow account 

to the balance owed on the 2007 loan. Instead, CitiMortgage sent a foreclosure notice to 

the Wentzville address, even though it had sent payments relating to the insurance 

3 
settlement to the St. Peters address. After CitiMortgage foreclosed on the Wentzville 

property, Fannie Mae acquired title to the property. 

The Conways filed a claim against Fannie Mae and CitiMortgage (collectively 

“Defendants”) under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), section 

407.020, alleging that CitiMortgage engaged in unfair practices “in connection with the 

sale of the mortgage loan” by sending the notice to the Wentzville address despite having 

actual or constructive notice that the Conways lived at the St. Peters property, failing to 

apply the funds in the escrow account to the mortgage balance, failing to remit the escrow 

funds after the foreclosure, and failing to provide proper notice of the foreclosure sale. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the alleged wrongful 

foreclosure of the deed of trust was not “in connection with” the 2007 loan. The trial 

court granted the motion, finding that the MMPA “does not apply to post-sale . . . activity 

wholly unrelated to claims or representations made before or at the time of the 

transaction.” It further found that the Conways had not alleged that the Defendants were 

original parties to the loan. The Conways appeal. This Court granted transfer pursuant to 

Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. 

Standard of Review 

 Appellate courts review a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Ward 

v. W. Cnty. Motor Co., Inc., 403 S.W.3d 82, 84 (Mo. banc 2013). A motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim tests the adequacy of a plaintiff’s petition. Nazeri v. Mo. 

Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. banc 1993). The petition is reviewed in an 

almost academic manner to determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that meet the 

4 
elements of a recognized cause of action or of a cause that might be adopted in that case. 

Id. The facts alleged in the petition are assumed to be true and are construed liberally in 

favor of the plaintiff. Ward, 206 S.W.3d at 84. 

Analysis 

At issue in this case is whether the Conways sufficiently pleaded that the 

Defendants’ alleged wrongful foreclosure of the deed of trust was “in connection with” 

the 2007 loan so as to have stated a claim under the MMPA. In their petition, the 

Conways alleged an MMPA violation as a result of the “sale of the mortgage loan” they 

obtained when purchasing the Wentzville property. They further alleged that Pulaski 

Bank, the original lender, assigned the loan to Fannie Mae and that CitiMortgage was an 

agent of Fannie Mae. The Conways stated in their petition that CitiMortgage engaged in 

four alleged unlawful actions in foreclosing on the Wentzville property: (1) sending 

notice of the foreclosure sale to the Wentzville property even though it knew the 

Conways resided at the St. Peters property; (2) failing to act in good faith by refusing to 

apply the $15,000 in the escrow account to the outstanding balance on their mortgage; (3) 

failing to remit the balance of the escrow account after the foreclosure; and (4) failing to 

provide proper notice of the foreclosure sale pursuant to section 443.325. 

The MMPA, as first adopted by the legislature in 1967, protects consumers by 

expanding the common law definition of fraud “to preserve fundamental honesty, fair 

play and right dealings in public transactions.” State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence 

Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362, 368 (Mo. App. 1973); see Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, 

Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 725-26 (Mo. banc 2009). For this purpose, section 407.020.1 

5 
makes the “act, use or employment by any person” of any unfair or deceptive practice 

done “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise” unlawful 

(emphasis added). The use of an unlawful practice is a violation of the MMPA “whether 

committed before, during or after the sale,” so long as it was made “in connection with” 

the sale. See section 407.020.1. Section 407.025.1, RSMo 2000, permits private 

individuals to bring an action under the MMPA,2

 and courts may award a prevailing 

party punitive damages and attorney fees. 

                                                           

While the MMPA states that a violation can happen at any time before, during or 

after a sale, it does not set out when an unlawful act is committed “in connection with” 

the sale. When a statute does not include a definition for a term, courts consider its plain 

and ordinary meaning. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Nixon, 37 S.W.3d 237, 240 

(Mo. banc 2001). While the full phrase “in connection with” is not in the dictionary, “to 

connect” is defined as “to have a relationship.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 

DICTIONARY 480 (1993). In this light, section 407.020.1 prohibits the use of the 

enumerated deceptive practices if there is a relationship between the sale of merchandise 

and the alleged unlawful action. According to the statute, the unlawful action may occur 

at any time before, during or after the sale and by any person. 

In this case, the Conways’ premised their MMPA claim on the 2007 loan 

transaction. To have stated a claim, the Conways must have alleged a relationship 

2

 Section 407.100 allows the attorney general to pursue a cause of action under the MMPA as 

well. 

6 
between the foreclosure actions and the 2007 loan.3

 

A loan is composed of both the initial extension of credit and the bundle of related 

services. It creates a long-term relationship in which the borrower and the lender 

continue to perform various duties, such as making and collecting payments over an 

extended period of time. Because each party must continue to perform these duties for 

the life of the loan, the sale continues throughout the time the parties perform their duties. 

A party’s right to collect a loan is part of that sale and is, therefore, “in connection with” 

the loan. 

In this case, as in many cases, the loan servicer was a different entity than the loan 

originator. Defendants argue that the Conways’ claim is foreclosed by two court of 

appeals decisions: State ex rel. Koster v. Professional Debt Management, LLC, 351 

S.W.3d 668 (Mo. App. 2011), and State ex rel. Koster v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, 

LLC, 351 S.W.3d 661 (Mo. App. 2011). These cases were handed down at the same time 

and are virtually identical. In both cases, the plaintiffs brought a suit against third-party 

debt collectors alleging MMPA violations for deceptive and unfair debt collection 

practices. The defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing 

that because they were not parties to the original transactions, their actions could not have 

been “in connection with” the original sales transactions. The court of appeals held that 

“actions occurring after the initial sales transaction, which do not relate to any claims or 

                                                           

3

 They also must have alleged that: (1) made a purchase; (2) for personal, family, or household 

purposes; and (3) suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of an act 

declared unlawful by section 407.020. See Ward v. W. Cnty. Motor Co., Inc., 403 S.W.3d 82, 84 

(Mo. banc 2013). The Conways made these allegations in their petition, and they are not at 

issue. 

7 
representations made before or at the time of the initial sales transaction, and which are 

taken by a person who is not a party to the initial sales transactions, are not made ‘in 

connection with’ the sale.” Professional Debt, 351 S.W.3d at 674; Portfolio Recovery 

Associates, 351 S.W.3d at 667. 

A similar argument was rejected in Schuchmann v. Air Services Heating & Air 

Conditioning. 199 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Mo. App. 2006). There, the defendant argued that 

the plaintiff had not shown the failure to honor a lifetime warranty several years after the 

initial purchase was “in connection with the sale” because the plaintiff could not prove 

the defendant had made any misrepresentations at the time of the sale. The court noted 

that the MMPA was meant to supplement the common law definition of fraud, and the 

fact that the wrongful conduct came after the sale was “of no consequence.” Id. Whether 

it is a lifetime warranty or a loan, how a party enforces the terms of a “sale” is “in 

connection with” the original sale of merchandise because the MMPA covers alleged 

wrongdoing “before, during or after” the sale. 

Given that the MMPA was enacted to supplement the common law definition of 

fraud, there is no compelling reason to interpret “in connection with” to apply only when 

the entity engaged in the misconduct was a party to the transaction at the time the 

transaction was initiated as Professional Debt and Portfolio Recovery Associates require. 

Even if the loan servicer was not an original party when the lender and borrower agreed 

to the services and responsibilities each would perform, enforcing the terms of the loan is 

8 
in connection with the ongoing sale of the loan, as discussed above. Because a loan is an 

ongoing transaction, loan collection procedures, whether initiated by a loan originator or 

a loan servicer, are done “in connection with” the original procurement of the loan. To 

the extent Professional Debt and Portfolio Recovery Assets conflict with this holding, 

they should no longer be followed. 

Construing “in connection with” to include loan collection practices is consistent 

with case law that has interpreted the MMPA to provide protection to consumers in a 

gradually increasing variety of circumstances. For example, in Gibbons v. J. Nuckolls, 

Inc., this Court determined that a plaintiff could prevail on an MMPA claim against a 

wholesaler who was not directly involved in the relevant transaction. 216 S.W.3d 667 

(Mo. banc 2007). In that case, a plaintiff brought an MMPA suit against an automobile 

wholesaler after purchasing the car from a dealership that had purchased the car from the 

wholesaler. The wholesaler filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was not a “person” 

under section 447.020.1 because it was not the direct seller.4

 This Court rejected this 

argument, noting that “precedent consistently reinforces the plain language and spirit of 

the statute to further the ultimate objective of consumer protection.” Id. at 670. It then 

determined that the phrase “any person” “does not contemplate a direct contractual 

relationship between plaintiff and defendant.” Id. at 669. 

                                                           

4

 Section 407.010(5), RSMo 2000, defines “person” as “any natural person or his legal 

representative, partnership, firm, for-profit or not-for-profit corporation . . . and any agent . . . 

thereof.” The Conways alleged that Pulaski assigned the loan to Fannie Mae and that 

CitiMortgage was an agent of Fannie Mae, as section 407.010(5) requires. See Peel v. Credit 

Acceptance Corp., 408 S.W.3d 191, 205-06 (Mo. App. 2013) (noting that the defendant’s status 

as an assignee of an installment contract created the requisite connection to the sale). 

9 
Similarly, here, it is not necessary for the Defendants to have had “a direct 

contractual relationship” with the Conways when they first obtained the loan. The 

Gibbons court found a plaintiff can maintain a suit under the MMPA against a party with 

a connection to the merchandise before a buyer enters the transaction. Similarly, the 

MMPA may cover parties who enter the relationship after a buyer enters the transaction, 

including a loan servicer. 

Interpreting “in connection with” to include enforcing the terms of a loan is also 

consistent with the interpretation this Court has given to other phrases in the MMPA. 

Illustrative of this point is Ports Petroleum. In Ports Petroleum, this Court had to 

determine whether a violation of the Motor Fuel Marketing Act, sections 416.600 to 

416.640, was an “unfair practice” actionable under the MMPA. Looking at the plain 

meaning of “unfair practice,” this Court noted the words themselves were “unrestricted, 

all-encompassing and exceedingly broad.” 37 S.W.3d at 240. It further found that “the 

literal words cover every practice imaginable and every unfairness to whatever degree.” 

Id. Given the potentially broad scope of what is prohibited under the MMPA, it would 

seem incongruous to limit “in connection with” to only apply to the original parties in a 

transaction. 

10 
11 

                                                           

Conclusion 

The Conways have stated a claim under the MMPA as the Defendants’ alleged 

actions were “in connection with” the 2007 loan. The trial court’s judgment is reversed, 

and the case is remanded.5

_________________________ 

Mary R. Russell, Chief Justice 

All concur. 

5

 Prior to the submission of this case on appeal, the Conways filed a motion for attorney fees on 

appeal pursuant to section 407.025.1. On remand, the trial court should determine the 

appropriate amount of attorney fees for counsel’s appellate work. Berry v. Volkswagen Grp. of 

Am., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Mo. banc 2013).