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42–582 PDF 2008

COAST GUARD AND NATIONAL 

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

CASUALTY INVESTIGATION 

PROGRAM 

(110–130) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 20, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York, Vice Chair 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TED POE, Texas 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Higgins, Kathryn O’Leary, Board Member, National Transportation Safety 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 4 

Richards, Anne L., Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Department of 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 4 

Watson, IV, Rear Admiral James, Director of Prevention Policy for Maritime 

Safety, Security, and Stewardship ...................................................................... 4 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., of Maryland ............................................................... 37 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Higgins, Kathryn O’Leary ....................................................................................... 50 

Richards, Anne L. .................................................................................................... 60 

Watson, IV, Rear Admiral James ........................................................................... 69 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Higgins, Kathryn O’Leary, Board Member, National Transportation Safety 

Board, responses to questions from the Subcommittee .................................... 57 

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(1) 

HEARING ON COAST GUARD AND NTSB 

CASUALTY INVESTIGATION PROGRAM 

Tuesday, May 20, 2008, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Elijah E. 

Cummings [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. This hearing is called to order. Good morning, 

everyone. 

Today we convene this hearing to receive a report issued by the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General regarding the Coast Guard’s marine casualty investigation program 

and the legislative proposal made by the National Transportation 

Safety Board to be the lead investigative agency for those accidents 

which the Board elects to investigate. 

The Subcommittee has been examining the multiple facets of the 

Coast Guard’s marine safety program throughout much of the 

110th Congress. We began the examination in August of last year 

when witnesses from the maritime industry testified regarding a 

number of troubling concerns they had about a loss of professional 

expertise among Coast Guard marine inspection personnel, unprofessional treatment, and extreme delays in pending rulemakings. 

Many of these problems were subsequently documented in a report developed by retired Coast Guard Vice Admiral James C. Card 

at the request of the Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Thad 

Allen, following the Subcommittee’s hearing. Admiral Card’s report 

detailed not only the loss of professional competence among marine 

inspectors and investigators, it indicated that frequent transfers 

prevent marine safety personnel from developing technical or geographic expertise and it documented a deterioration in the relationship between the Coast Guard and the maritime industry regarding the achievement of safety goals. 

The allision of the COSCO Busan with the San Francisco Bay 

Bridge in November 2007 and the report developed by the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General on the Coast 

Guard’s response to that incident have demonstrated in a single 

event many of the challenges the Coast Guard’s marine safety program faces, particularly in the casualty investigation mission, 

which is the cornerstone of all marine safety missions. 

2 

With the issuance of today’s report, however, we finally have 

quantifiable assessments of the Coast Guard’s challenges in the 

casualty investigation program, and we have clear and disturbing 

conclusions: the Coast Guard’s marine casualty investigations program is both ‘‘hindered by unqualified personnel,’’ by ‘‘investigations concluded at inappropriate levels,’’ and by ‘‘ineffective management of a substantial backlog of investigations needing review 

and closure.’’ Ladies and gentlemen, this is simply unacceptable 

and we can do much better, and we must. 

Just to look at one of these findings, the lack of qualified personnel, I note that this was foreshadowed in the IG’s study of the 

COSCO Busan accident, which found that five of the six individuals assigned as casualty investigators to Sector San Francisco 

were not qualified. For the life of me, I cannot figure out how we 

can avoid accidents from happening in the future if the very people 

who are investigating them are not qualified to do the investigation. Something is simply wrong with that picture. 

The report that we received from the IG today indicates that, 

among a sample of individuals assigned as casualty investigators 

throughout the Coast Guard, more than half were not qualified as 

casualty investigators. Perhaps more staggering to me, however, is 

that during last month’s hearing on the COSCO Busan, Admiral 

Brian Salerno, who is in charge of the Coast Guard’s marine safety 

program, testified that he did not know how widespread the lack 

of qualifications among casualty investigators was. 

We look forward to the testimony of Ms. Anne Richards, DHS’s 

Assistant Inspector General, who will expand on the IG’s findings. 

However, let me note that one of the most troubling findings of the 

IG report is that some of the challenges we will discuss today were 

identified more than 10 years ago by the Coast Guard itself, and 

even as far back as the seminal oversight report, Semi-Paratus: 

The United States Coast Guard, 1981, issued during the 97th Congressional session. 

In other words, the Coast Guard’s challenges with the marine 

safety program far predate the service’s assumption of a expanded 

responsibilities following 9/11. While these new responsibilities 

make finding balance among all missions much more challenging, 

they also make it much more important. 

Frankly, as anyone who follows this Subcommittee knows, I find 

it to be a disservice to the American people when Government 

kicks around the same issues year after year or, in this case, decade after decade. The marine safety mission is a critical mission 

performed by our thin blue line at sea, the United States Coast 

Guard, and it needs to adequately serve the safety needs of the 

maritime industry. 

While I appreciate the efforts that the Commandant has taken 

to strengthen the program, including the requests of 276 new billets in marine safety, I believe that the only way to ensure that the 

Coast Guard’s marine safety program is staffed by qualified and experienced personnel will be the enactment of legislation that codifies new processes and procedures to ensure that robust standards 

are in place and met by the marine safety program. For that reason, I believe that the enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization 

Act, H.R. 2830, which passed the House of Representatives, even 

3 

with a presidential veto, by a resounding 395 votes to 7 is absolutely critical. 

Against this backdrop, we will also hear today from the National 

Transportation Safety Board regarding their proposals to align 

their relationship with the Coast Guard regarding the investigation 

of major marine casualties so that it parallels their relationship 

with the modal administrations of the United States Department 

of Transportation. The Board’s proposal would provide NTSB with 

the legislative authority to take the lead in important marine casualties, an authority that they already have for all the other 

modes. 

Given that the Coast Guard infrequently empanels Marine 

Boards to investigate major casualties, they have done so only 

twice in the past eight years, it would seem that the NTSB, which 

has conducted 23 marine casualty investigations in the same period, is in many ways already fulfilling this role. 

Since this is the first time that our Subcommittee has met since 

our reauthorization legislation passed the House, I take this moment to thank on the record all the Members of our Subcommittee 

for doing outstanding work, because without the outstanding work 

of this Subcommittee, there is absolutely no way that we would 

have been able to get the vote that we got on the floor of the 

House. 

With that, I yield to my colleague and the former Chairman of 

this Committee, Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, for holding today’s very important hearing. I believe you are aware that 

Ranking Member LaTourette, while he is not here now, is supposed 

to be here very shortly. As a result, I would ask unanimous consent 

to insert his prepared statement into the record. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So granted. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The Subcommittee will be hearing from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General 

regarding their review of the Coast Guard’s marine investigation 

program. I am concerned by the report’s findings that many of the 

Coast Guard’s investigating officers do not meet the qualification 

standards prescribed for those positions and that the service has 

relaxed its review and management of the program. 

I am encouraged by the Coast Guard’s positive response to the 

report’s recommendations. However, I would like to hear more regarding the plans of the Coast Guard and how they will put into 

place the different measures to improve the investigation process. 

I am also concerned about the scope of the new authorities being 

proposed by the National Transportation Safety Board, which 

would authorize the Board to establish itself as the lead investigating agency at its own choosing and without regard or consultation with the Coast Guard. This policy could have the effect of 

muddying the waters farther, allowing the two agencies to move 

forward with competing investigations with different aims and 

needs. I look forward to discussing the proposed language further 

with the witnesses to determine if such an expansion is necessary. 

Finally, I know there has been some valid concerns about the 

ability of the Coast Guard to conduct marine casualty investigations. I would like the record to reflect that the investigation conVerDate Aug 31 2005 20:22 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42582 JASON
4 

cluded by the Coast Guard in response to the Athos I oil spill on 

the Delaware River a few years ago was handled very professionally and was completed in a timely manner. I want to commend them for it. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to again thank you for the recognition and 

thank you for holding this very important hearing. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I have no detailed opening statement. 

I will just reiterate what I have said previously at these various 

hearings. I think the American people probably get more bang from 

its buck with the U.S. Coast Guard than any other Federal entity 

known to man, and I look forward to hearing the testimony today, 

and thank you for scheduling this hearing. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Let me be clear that, as I have said many times and I reiterate, 

I am the biggest fan of the Coast Guard. But I am also the biggest 

critic, because I want it to be the very, very best that it can be because there is so much that depends on it. All of our efforts are 

aimed at trying to strengthen the Coast Guard so that it can be 

the very, very best that it can be not just for the present, but for 

generations yet unborn. 

With that, we will now hear from our witnesses. We welcome all 

of you. We will hear from Ms. Anne Richards. She is the Inspector 

General for Audits with the Department of Homeland Security. 

Then we will hear from Rear Admiral James Watson, who is the 

Director of Prevention Policy for Marine Safety, Security, and 

Stewardship, United States Coast Guard. Then we will hear from 

Kathryn Higgins, who is a Board Member with the National Transportation Safety Board. 

With that, we will now hear from you, Ms. Richards. 

TESTIMONY OF ANNE L. RICHARDS, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR 

GENERAL FOR AUDITS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; REAR ADMIRAL JAMES WATSON, IV, DIRECTOR OF 

PREVENTION POLICY FOR MARITIME SAFETY, SECURITY, 

AND STEWARDSHIP; AND KATHRYN O’LEARY HIGGINS, 

BOARD MEMBER, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY 

BOARD 

Ms. RICHARDS. Good morning, Chairman Cummings and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Anne Richards, Assistant Inspector 

General for Audits for the Department of Homeland Security. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our report on the Coast 

Guard’s management of the marine casualty investigations program. 

I would first like to express our appreciation to the Coast 

Guard’s Office of Budget and Programs, as well as the staff assigned to the marine casualty investigation program, for their timely and thorough responses to my staff’s requests for information 

and documentation. 

Our audit was conducted at the request of the Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation Committee. My testimony will address 

three areas of concern identified in our audit. They are, first, the 

5 

training, experience, and qualification of marine casualty investigations; second, the levels at which marine casualty investigations 

are conducted; and, third, the Coast Guard’s process for reviewing 

and closing its backlog of marine casualty investigations. 

Concerning the training, experience, and qualifications of investigators, we found that 15 of the 22 marine casualty investigators 

in our sample were not qualified to conduct marine casualty investigations based on the standards applicable during our audit period. This problem can be attributed to inadequate management 

oversight and internal controls to ensure effective assignment, 

training, and development of qualified marine casualty investigators across the Coast Guard. 

The Coast Guard’s 1988 standard for determining who was qualified to conduct marine casualty investigations, which was in effect 

at the time we analyzed our sample, required a combination of experience, investigative tasks, and training. To be considered prequalified for the marine casualty investigations program, personnel 

had to be qualified as a Hull or Machinery and Small Vessel Inspector, or be trained in port operations as a Boarding Officer, Facility Inspector, and Harbor Safety Officer. 

The 1988 standard also required that personnel satisfactorily 

complete specific investigative tasks and satisfactorily complete the 

basic marine investigator training course. 

Seven of the 22 investigators reviewed at the five locations visited during our audit met the pre-qualification standards by either 

fulfilling all port operations requirements or through a combination 

of inspector qualifications. The remaining 15 marine casualty investigators, or 68 percent of the investigators we reviewed, were 

not qualified under the 1988 standard. Of particular concern were 

four investigators who did not meet any of the requisite training, 

experience, or qualification requirements, and did not attend the 

basic marine investigator training course. 

In August 2007, the Coast Guard revised the qualifications for 

marine casualty investigators by updating the tasks that an investigator must perform to qualify for the position. The revised qualifications also removed the pre-qualification requirement of being a 

Hull or Machinery and Small Vessel Inspector. According to the 

Coast Guard, knowledge in these specialty areas is essential to the 

ability of the investigators to correctly identify the causes of marine 

casualties and issue appropriate safety alerts and recommendations. Consequently, removing the standard may negatively affect 

the qualifications and capabilities of Coast Guard marine casualty 

investigators. 

The Coast Guard claims the pre-qualification standard as a Hull 

or Machinery and Small Vessel Inspector are still required, although not specifically outlined in the August 2007 standard, since 

this pre-qualification is a prerequisite for attending the basic marine investigator training course. However, we found that five of 

the 15 investigators that we reviewed that had attended the basic 

course did so without meeting any of the prerequisites for attendance. Further, the current prerequisites for the course call for certification as a Hull or Machinery or a Small Vessel Inspector, 

which we believe degrades the prerequisites. 

6 

The problem of unqualified marine casualty investigators can 

also be attributed to the lack of a clear and desirable career path 

for investigators and the Coast Guard’s decision to reduce from 

four years to three years the tour of duty as a marine casualty investigator, which hinders investigators in acquiring the experience 

needed for career development. 

In contrast, civilian marine casualty investigators are not subject 

to the three year tour of duty rotation standard. Over time, civilian 

investigators can gain a greater knowledge of specialties, such as 

local waterways and industries or experience in enforcing maritime 

regulations. Of the 22 marine casualty investigators we reviewed, 

one was a civilian. In fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard reported 

there were six civilians serving as full-time marine casualty investigators. To its credit, as part of its efforts to enhance the marine 

safety program, the Coast Guard is planning to add civilian investigator positions. 

Unqualified marine casualty investigators are not a new issue to 

the Coast Guard. Coast Guard studies in the mid-1990s of various 

aspects of the marine casualty program also identified many of 

these same problems with marine casualty investigator qualifications. Although the Coast Guard studies included recommendations 

to address these problems, there were little progress made in this 

area. 

The second area I want to discuss concerns the level at which 

marine casualty investigations are conducted. 

The Coast Guard has guidance identifying the appropriate level 

to conduct an investigation based on the severity of the incident. 

The levels of marine casualty investigations are: preliminary investigations, which are initial investigative efforts; data collection activity investigations, which usually consist only of collecting basic 

factual information; informal investigations, which are less exhaustive than formal investigations, but determine and report on the 

causes of the casualty; and formal investigations, which are reserved for the more serious or significant incidents in which the 

most investigative value can be gained. 

Data provided by the Coast Guard showed that between January 

1st, 2003 and October 31st, 2006, 93 percent of all marine casualty 

investigations were conducted at either the preliminary or data collection activity level, the two lowest levels of effort that consists 

only of collecting information and do not require an analysis of 

cause. Only 13 of 15,000 investigations were conducted at the formal level. 

Our detailed review of a sample of 145 marine casualty investigations from the five Coast Guard locations visited showed that 

53 percent of the investigations were conducted at a lower level 

than that recommended by Coast Guard guidance. The Sector commands have the leeway to conduct investigations at other than the 

recommended level; however, to maintain control over the program, 

the Sector commands should document departures from Coast 

Guard guidance. 

We also compared an extract of 15,327 marine casualty investigations contained in the Coast Guard’s database against the 

Coast Guard’s guidance on the recommended levels of investigation. From this comparison, we identified 1,255 cases which were 

7 

investigated at a lower level than prescribed by Coast Guard guidance. As a result of formal and informal investigations conducted 

at the lower data collection activity level, causal factors were not 

always determined. Without such determinations, the Coast Guard 

may have lost the opportunity to issue safety recommendations or 

alerts to prevent or minimize the effect of similar casualties. 

Finally, we found the Coast Guard Headquarters was not timely 

in its review and closure of marine casualty investigations. On November 9th, 2006, Coast Guard Headquarters had a backlog of 

4,240 investigations, of which 2,466, or 58 percent, have been 

awaiting review and closure for more than six months. One Headquarter staff member was responsible for reviewing and closing all 

of the investigations. This function is only one of several functions 

performed by this staff member. 

To reduce the backlog, the Coast Guard resorted to a mass closure of investigations without thorough review. On September 

29th, 2006, Coast Guard closed 3,848 investigations that it deemed 

low risk. However, based on the data provided by the Coast Guard, 

there were 194 informal investigations and one formal investigation included in this mass closure project. Although the Coast 

Guard deemed them low risk, we considered the investigations as 

high risk because they involved serious incidents requiring complete causal analysis. 

Coast Guard studies dating to 1994 have identified these same 

basic problems affecting the marine casualty investigation program. In September 2007, the Coast Guard issued a plan for 

strengthening the program. This plan included recommendations 

similar to those made in 1994 and in our audit report. Coast Guard 

senior leadership must take seriously implementing these recommendations to have a lasting impact on the marine casualty investigations program. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, this concludes my 

statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may 

have. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Rear Admiral James Watson. 

Admiral WATSON. Good morning, Chairman Cummings, Representative LoBiondo, Members of the Subcommittee. 

Thirty years ago, when I entered the Coast Guard, it was not uncommon to lose whole ships to the sea, inspected ships with professional crews like Edmund Fitzgerald, The Poet, Ocean Ranger, and 

Marine Electric. Poor designs, loading, training, and maintenance 

led to structural failures. The Coast Guard investigated and analyzed each casualty and made the necessary changes to design, construction, manning, and inspection standards. Today, the risk of a 

serious marine casualty on an inspected vessel is less than one in 

a million, but we can do better. 

Just one year into George Washington’s first term, Alexander 

Hamilton created the U.S. Revenue Marine Service, which is today’s Coast Guard. He charged our first officers never to forget that 

their seafaring countrymen are free men impatient of domineering 

government officials. He charged them to carry out the law and 

warned that sloppy work would create clamor, disgust, and alarm. 

8 

The combination of maritime service, leadership, professional law 

enforcement has characterized the Coast Guard for 218 years. 

Your alarm regarding our casual investigation program has reverberated throughout the Coast Guard. Nothing gives us more resolve than suggesting we have neglected Alexander Hamilton’s 

warning. 

In response to the questions you raised, I can tell you we currently have 136 persons assigned to marine casualty investigating 

officer billets. 110 of those persons are certified as marine casualty 

investigators; the other 26 are apprenticed investigators. Coast 

Guard-wide, we have a total 448 civilians, officers, and warrant officers who are certified marine casualty investigators. Every Coast 

Guard sector and marine safety unit has at least one certified casualty investigator; most have more. But we are completing a review 

of all personnel conducting marine casualty investigations and will 

assign veteran marine casualty investigators back to investigation 

billets to fill critical gaps. Our military workforce is perfectly suited 

to adjust when necessary. 

Ultimately, the Coast Guard’s marine safety program, including 

marine casualty investigations, will have to grow to match the 

growth of the marine industry. By this time next year, we plan on 

having a marine investigation center of expertise and over 40 new 

investigator billets. 

The Coast Guard and the NTSB are each authorized to investigate major marine casualties. NTSB has a staff of 16 and investigates about seven marine casualties a year; Coast Guard provides 

the immediate response to all reported marine casualties and completes about 5,000 investigations a year. Unlike the NTSB, Coast 

Guard investigations must go beyond determination of the cause 

and determine if a violation of law or regulation warrants administrative, civil, or criminal action. Our overall marine safety mission, 

which includes search and rescue, pollution response, waterways 

management, and marine inspection, also requires characteristics 

unique to Coast Guard investigations, such as speedy dissemination of safety alerts, notice to mariners, and policy updates. 

We strongly believe that the existing statutory and investigatory 

regimes work well and should not be changed. Neither agency’s 

role in casualty investigations should be diminished. Any change 

would seriously disrupt the existing well-considered statutory balance and interagency cooperation between the Coast Guard and the 

NTSB. 

NTSB primacy in marine casualty investigations would not only 

disrupt the good order and discipline of the U.S. maritime community, it would also proclaim to governments around the world that 

the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard has been summarily demoted, a message we do not want to send. 

The Coast Guard is keenly aware of what is at stake for America’s waterways, our economy, and for the thousands of people who 

go to sea. We stand ready to work with the NTSB and Congress 

to address all the marine casualty investigation issues in the context of the existing statutory and investigatory framework. 

I look forward to this hearing and responding to your questions. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

9 

Ms. Higgins, I don’t usually do this, but the Rear Admiral just 

said something I want you to answer, to save us some time. He 

feels that NTSB taking over the responsibilities that you all are 

proposing would, in the eyes of the world, I think he said, be a demotion of the Commandant. Would you address that in your opening statement, please? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Mr. LaTourette and 

other Members of the Committee. Let me just say that Admiral 

Allen is a personal friend of mine and I have the highest regard 

for him and all of the members of the Coast Guard, many of whom 

I consider good friends. Our objective is in no way to diminish the 

role of the Coast Guard or to send any signal that would in any 

way indicate any kind of demotion in terms of the important role 

that they play. 

As you know, the National Transportation Safety Board is an 

independent Federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of transportation—railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials—and issuing safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. 

I want to talk today about our request to modify the authority 

we currently have to investigate marine accidents. 

The Board proposes to have the right to elect to lead or have primary status in major marine investigations. This proposal is not 

intended to serve as an expansion of the Board’s authority, but to 

provide the clear authority if at any time in the immediate aftermath of a marine casualty there is a disagreement between the 

Safety Board and the Coast Guard over interpretation of the regulations we have jointly issued. Such authority is consistent with 

what we now have in other modes of transportation. 

The Safety Board and the Coast Guard currently enjoy a good 

working relationship; however, there is no assurance that a disagreement concerning primacy in a high-profile marine accident 

can be resolved in the short time frame necessary to respond quickly and efficiently. We believe that in the aftermath of an accident 

there should be no confusion or uncertainty about which Federal 

agency has the lead and which investigative protocol will be followed. 

The Safety Board and the Coast Guard take different approaches 

to accident investigation. We use a party system to leverage the resources of technical experts from operators, manufacturers, and 

professional organizations. They provide us specialized knowledge 

to help develop the factual record, and the Coast Guard is almost 

always a party to our marine investigations and, under our legislation, would have a statutory right to party status. 

We may also convene a public hearing to gather additional data. 

That factual information gathered from various sources is routinely 

released to the public to inform them of the progress we are making. After the record is developed and analyzed, the Board then discusses the report and deliberates on findings of probable cause and 

recommendations in a public meeting. 

Coast Guard investigations, as Admiral Watson has indicated, 

address law enforcement as well as safety considerations, but the 

cause is not determined in a public meeting. The Coast Guard may 

10 

also convene a Marine Board of investigation, but it has not done 

so regularly in recent years. 

The Safety Board enjoys a worldwide reputation for technical excellence. Many of our marine investigators, although they are small 

in number, hold the highest U.S. Coast Guard licenses, are vessel 

masters or chief engineers. We also have investigators with extensive experience as Coast Guard marine inspectors and marine investigators. Our investigators also include specialists in other engineering, operations, and human performance disciplines. And we 

have staff dedicated to the analysis of ship voyage data recorders 

and they can draw on years of Safety Board experience in reading 

out cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders. 

Just last week, the International Maritime Organization adopted 

a code for safety investigations into marine casualties. Reflecting 

the current practice in many countries and the growing trend in 

many others, the code states: ‘‘a marine safety investigation should 

be unbiased to ensure the free flow of information to it. In order 

to achieve the outcome, the investigator carrying out a marine safety investigation should have functional independence from: the parties involved in the marine casualty or marine incident; and anyone who may make a decision to take administrative or disciplinary 

action against an individual or organization involved in that incident.’’ The Safety Board has that independence. 

The Coast Guard will always be in charge of rescue, response, security, and port safety. Their investigations and investigators are 

geared to frequent and routine accidents and the Safety Board has 

no intention or capability to take over that role. We excel at the 

unusual accidents, which are often the most serious and also, fortunately, the most rare. It is only on those that the Safety Board 

seeks clear and unambiguous authority to lead. This approach 

works very well in our aviation, rail, and pipeline investigations, 

and will work equally well in the future for marine investigations. 

I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I want to thank all of our witnesses for your testimony. 

Ms. Richards, there were several items that the Committee suggested that the Inspector General’s Office might examine, but to 

which you did not devote much attention in your report. For example, the Committee suggested that the IG examine whether any 

changes to current statutes would clarify the Coast Guard’s responsibilities for marine casualty investigations and reports. To this, 

the report responded that there are some conflicting interpretations 

in applications of the Coast Guard’s September 2002 policy letter, 

such as regarding the question of what constitutes a loss of propulsion. You also suggested that dollar estimates for damages in the 

various categories of investigations should be updated. 

Are there any other suggestions that you would have to make to 

us with regard to potential statutory changes? 

Ms. RICHARDS. No, sir. When we started the audit, we were looking at the broad spectrum, but when we found the problems in the 

qualifications of the marine casualty investigators and the issues 

on what level they were actually completed the investigations, we 

concentrated our efforts on those issues, believing that the Coast 

Guard needed to address those first, and that there would be time 

11 

to look at the broader issues after those critical issues had been addressed. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. On that note, you noted in the report that the 

Coast Guard marine casualty investigation program needs additional qualified personnel, and you have recommended increasing 

the number of civilians in the casualty program or extending the 

tour of duty for Coast Guard personnel. Can you comment on how 

many personnel the Coast Guard needs overall in the casualty investigation program to conduct all the casualty investigations at 

the recommended level? 

Ms. RICHARDS. We did not complete a workload analysis, in part 

because, with the investigations that have been done being at levels other than what was recommended by the Coast Guard guidance, the amount of time it took to complete those investigations 

wouldn’t shed accurate light on the full staffing that would be 

needed by the Coast Guard. We would ask that the Coast Guard 

complete a workload analysis to project how many investigators 

they need total. 

We did suggest that increasing the number of civilian investigators would be beneficial to the Coast Guard in part because as the 

civilians do not rotate, similar to the military members, they would 

have time to develop the local expertise in that particular waterway or the industry at a particular port. The Coast Guard has a 

number of civilian investigators currently, but we believe that they 

should look into increasing that number. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Rear Admiral, I heard what you said about 

the image of the Commandant, and certainly we do not want the 

image of the Commandant diminished in the least bit. But I guess 

one of the things that I am concerned about is effectiveness and efficiency. I often talk about how we can get caught up in a culture 

of mediocrity. 

I talk about that with regard to Katrina, where not, thank God, 

the Coast Guard was great, but other agencies were caught up in 

a culture that did not allow us to respond the way we should have 

responded. And in this instance I think when we are talking about 

the NTSB doing investigations, there have been times in the past 

when the Coast Guard was of the belief that there may have been 

a conflict of interest and asked the NTSB to intervene. Is that correct? 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did you see that as might possibly diminishing 

the image of the Commandant? 

Admiral WATSON. No, sir.. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So, in this instance—and I realize that the 

NTSB—and I want you to be ready for this, Ms. Higgins—has a 

limited budget. We saw that when we were working on the ALJ situation. The NTSB was very sensitive about the little bit of money 

that they have and how tight things are. We are familiar. 

But here we are, the NTSB asking to take on—although you 

were very careful in your testimony to say we are really not trying 

to get more authority here, but there are some things we need to 

be in a position to do, but no matter how you look at it, it is the 

probability of taking on some more work, and I am just trying to 

figure out how does this all come together. In other words, I take 

12 

it that there are cases, based upon your testimony, that the NTSB 

would look at and say, wait a minute, this is something that we 

really need to be involved in. 

Tell me the kinds of facts or factors that would cause you to be 

able to get in a case under the proposed changes, that you are not 

able to get into now. Do you understand the question? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Yes, sir. Let me just say that I think we look at 

this request—and we think of it really as a modest change—as not 

changing the underlying guidelines or criteria that we use to select 

accidents. We are looking at this essentially to be a tiebreaker in 

the case of high profile accidents where there is a dispute. And I 

am not suggesting that happens very often. Right now, because of 

the people involved, we have a very close working relationship. 

But essentially the criteria we use is the definition that is in the 

statute of major marine casualty. We also look at some other factors in terms of the cost involved—there is a dollar value assigned 

to it. We use the term catastrophic, which, for example, was applicable in the Ethan Allen accident, where it was not on navigable 

waters, so the Coast Guard wasn’t involved. We use that criteria, 

which is in our statute, to be able to look at that accident, even 

though it was under State jurisdiction. 

So, fundamentally, we think the criteria are not going to change. 

But we want to make sure we have that authority in our statute, 

just as we have the authority in aviation to take the lead, and all 

of what that means. And it really means following our protocol, so 

that it is clear that we are the spokesperson, and our investigator 

is in charge. 

There was a question or comment made earlier about parallel investigations. We fully expect, as with the FAA, that the Coast 

Guard would continue to carry out its investigation if they think 

that there are enforcement issues that have to be addressed. That 

is not in conflict. In fact, that happens now. What we want is to 

be sure that, in a major casualty like the COSCO Busan, there is 

one voice speaking to the public about the accident, that the facts 

are developed under the guidelines that we have put forth, and 

that we work cooperatively. And, again, it mostly works, but there 

have been some examples where it hasn’t. 

I hope that answers your question. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, you did. Now, you used the word tiebreaker, 

isn’t that right? Didn’t you use that word? 

Ms. HIGGINS. That is my word, yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Who would break that tie right now? Right now. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Right now it would be a standoff. If we couldn’t 

agree, presumably, we would both move forward. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So both of you would be doing investigations. 

And what you are saying is that it would be better if there was this 

tiebreaker and with the NTSB, I guess, being more of an independent sort of agency. Am I right? 

Ms. HIGGINS. That is the way our statute was written. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. I understand. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Congress wanted us to have the independent responsibility to look at all the modes of transportation, including 

marine. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

13 

Ms. HIGGINS. Because if you are the regulator, you do the certification, a lot of these issues come into play, and it is important, I 

think, when Congress created the statute 40 years ago, that they 

wanted somebody who didn’t have that responsibility, who wasn’t 

the enforcement agency, wasn’t the regulator, who wasn’t the certifier, who didn’t issue the licenses to be able to look impartially 

at all those issues. And it has worked very well, but we want to 

make sure that in the event that there is that kind of disagreement 

with the Coast Guard, that we could, by statute, assert the lead in 

an important marine investigation. 

You made the point about resources. We are not asking. We 

would like more resources, but they are not reflected in the President’s budget. So we are not going to have more investigators. We 

don’t anticipate we are going to have the resources to do many 

more investigations than we do. We are pretty selective about the 

ones where we want to assert our lead. We just want to be sure 

that in the event of a dispute that can’t be resolved through the 

informal process of our office working with the Coast Guard, that 

we can say we want to take this and we have got the authority to 

do it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. In other words, these are cases that you would 

be investigating, probably, no matter what. But with this 

tiebreaker situation, it would allow you to, I guess, to work closely 

with the Coast Guard to move forward. Is that basically what you 

are saying? Hopefully so you would be more effective and efficient. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Exactly. This issue of efficiency, I asked the staff 

to put together—we now have seven open investigations. None of 

them are older than a little over a year old, a year and a couple 

months old. In the last 10 years, with our limited staff, we have 

issued 22 reports and 17 briefs, and a total of 244 recommendations, half of those to the Coast Guard, and we closed half of those, 

120, acceptable. 

So when we pick accidents, we are pretty selective, but we get 

the job done. We have had some problems in the past with backlog, 

we admit that, but in the last couple of years I think we had a 

GAO report that we paid attention to. We have really improved our 

operations. So we want to make sure that we can continue to focus 

on the most difficult high profile accidents, because we think those 

have the biggest payoff in the long-run in terms of safety. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one last question, then I will come back 

later. Rear Admiral Watson, respond to what she just said. It 

sounds like it makes sense to me. Maybe I am missing something. 

She is talking about effectiveness and efficiency; talking about a 

tiebreaker situation; talking about NTSB, which is supposed to be 

the more independent agency; not really trying to take away any 

authority, I don’t think. I am just trying figure out—I just need 

your response on that. 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. What my point was is that when Congress changes the legislative authority of the Coast Guard to be 

able to manage when it is going to do an investigation and when 

it isn’t, shift primacy to another agency, that appears to everyone 

around the world as a type of a demotion. It is an appearance 

thing. We shift the lead to NTSB on a regular basis right now. 

14 

The system that we have, working under the Memorandum of 

Understanding between the two agencies, works very well and, in 

fact, I think it sends a much more powerful statement when the 

Commandant, who has the authority to do an investigation, voluntarily says I think this is one that ought to be given to the NTSB 

to lead because there is involvement of a Coast Guard operation 

with respect to that particular incident. 

It could be the VTS, it could be a marine inspection, it could be 

a buoy out of place. And we have been doing that. The system that 

we have with the authorities that both agencies have right now 

works very, very well. I think the improvements that have been 

made in the marine industry bear this out. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I think that—and then I will turn it over to Mr. 

LaTourette, but in my opening statement I talked about how some 

of these issues have been passed on year after year, decade after 

decade, and I do believe that it was the actions of this Committee, 

and perhaps the Senate, that caused action to take place with regard to marine safety. And I give credit to both sides; it is not a 

Democrat thing, it is not a Republican thing. I think we all had 

something to do with that. I think we saw significant movement— 

significant—with regard to marine safety. 

I guess what my concern is that I would hope that everybody 

who takes on the position of Commandant would be as good as Admiral Allen, and his decision-making. He has caused this Committee to have a tremendous amount of trust and faith in him. But 

I am just wondering when a new Commandant comes in, or in future generations, when we all are having hearings up in Heaven,— 

hopefully, we won’t be having hearings—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just want to relax. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Anyway, I just want to make sure that we put 

in what is necessary to make sure that it works. You follow what 

I am saying? I don’t think we can depend just upon people. So 

sometimes you need to put in mechanisms so that it makes people’s 

jobs easier. But I understand what you are saying. 

Admiral WATSON. Well, I had one more point, sir. The tiebreaker 

concept, that could be driven by the amount of interest that there 

is in a particular marine casualty; it may not be driven by anything other than that. We don’t know. You are suggesting that the 

authority should be given to the National Transportation Safety 

Board to make that decision. 

The unintended consequence of that could be—the focus of any 

national Marine Board investigation is just to find the cause of the 

casualty. What if there is a situation where there needs to be some 

discipline there, that it needs to be done fast and information needs 

to be moved out to the Coast Guard’s inspectors or our boarding 

officers in order to correct the maritime? This really is a good order 

and discipline kind of an issue that is not unlike what the Coast 

Guard does for ourselves, and it is very important for the commanding officer to be able to have that authority. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But with regard to punishment authority, that 

would remain with you all, right? Isn’t that right? 

15 

Ms. HIGGINS. Absolutely. The enforcement responsibility would 

continue with the Coast Guard. Let me just say that this is how 

we work currently with the FAA and with the Coast Guard. We 

fully respect the missions of both the FAA and the Coast Guard in 

terms of their enforcement responsibilities. In fact, our process allows for that kind of action to be taken immediately if that is what 

is called for. That does not in any way get in the way of the safety 

investigation, which may take a little longer to identify the probable cause. 

We feel strongly that the way to improve safety over the long 

term is to take action as quickly as possible, so we in no way want 

to use our process or currently use our process to delay any kind 

of enforcement actions, whether it be against pilots or mariners, 

that need to be taken. 

I was, for example, the Member on scene for a cruise ship accident in Juneau just about a year ago, and we worked with the 

Coast Guard. We were the lead agency, but at the same time they 

took the actions necessary to engage the crew and ask the crew 

member who was on the deck at the time of the accident. He voluntarily surrendered his license and they are still having conversations with the captain. That is the kind of process that is currently 

working. It would not change under this authority. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. Thank you. 

Mr. LaTourette. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing, and I apologize for not being here at the very beginning. 

I have to say the Chairman and I have worked really well together for the last year, but I have a little different take on today’s 

hearing and NTSB’s proposal, and I will try to make that evident 

during the course of my questions. 

Admiral, to you, before I came here I was a prosecuting attorney 

and we had this really, really big murder, and I was a little naive 

country lawyer, so on. It was apparently budget time, appropriations time and we were lucky enough to be assisted by some Federal law enforcement agencies. The next time I came back to the 

crime scene, FBI and ATF and DEA agents, who had appeared in 

jeans and work clothes, they all had slickers on that said FBI, 

ATF, DEA, and I thought, it is not raining; why do they have these 

slickers on? And it became apparent to me, when I watch television, it was so we could all see back at home that their tax dollars were at work and the FBI needed more money than the ATF 

because they had more jackets working on the murder. 

This, to me, as I read the Inspector General’s report, I think the 

Coast Guard is responsible for creating a vacuum in this area, and 

I think the Inspector General’s report, by pointing out deficiencies, 

has sort of left the playing field open, and I do fault the Coast 

Guard for that. 

I will say, though, Ms. Higgins, that I think NTSB’s proposal is 

not benign, it is not minor, and it is a pretty big, aggressive attempt to fill that vacuum. I thought it was interesting that you 

used the word tiebreaker, and the Admiral picked up on the word 

tiebreaker. 

16 

A tiebreaker, to me, means that if, at the end of the game, the 

score is tied, you flip a coin, you go into overtime. In your version 

of tiebreaker, you always win. So if there is a tie and there is a 

disagreement, the tie is broken because you say you are going to 

take the lead, right? You can never lose a tie. You can have a tie, 

we can have a disagreement, but if NTSB says, hey, tiebreaker 

time, you win, right? I am not wrong about that, am I? 

Ms. HIGGINS. You are right. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. That is what I thought. And to the Admiral’s 

point about it appearing to the world to be a demotion, I look at 

the proposed legislation that NTSB has set up here, particularly 

Section 1132(a) subparagraph (c) and the participation of the Commandant in marine investigations, the last sentence is: ‘‘However, 

the Commandant may not participate in establishing probable 

cause.’’ I mean, you are cutting the Commandant out of the equation. 

So if I am the Commandant, and to this moment in time we have 

had a system that has worked pretty well and everybody has gotten along, you like the Commandant, you like the Coast Guard; 

they have got some deficiencies that the IG has indicated, but you 

are taking him out of a process that he is now involved in. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Sir, if I could explain. When we talk about probable 

cause—and I mentioned in my statement that probable cause is determined in a public meeting that is convened by the Chairman of 

our Board, five-member Safety Board, and we publicly vote on a 

probable cause. We do that for all our accident investigations. 

The Coast Guard, under this provision, and as currently exists, 

would serve as a party to the investigation, our investigation, and 

they would sit at the table, we would share information with them, 

they would share information with us. They may conduct an independent enforcement investigation if that is so required. But under 

our process, which is, again, what we use now for marine investigations, we, as the Safety Board, charged by Congress, determine the 

probable cause of the accidents. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Then why do you need to put that sentence in 

there? 

Ms. HIGGINS. We tried to, in that language, just parallel the authority that we currently have in investigating aviation accidents. 

If you were to look at them side-by-side, we substituted marine for 

aviation. All we are trying to say is that this is the same system 

that we currently have in aviation, where we have the clear lead 

and this is the process we follow. I would make a distinction, 

though, that in aviation we are charged by statute to investigate 

every aviation accident. Under the statute, which we are really not 

changing, we would only investigate major marine accidents as defined by regulation 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. Thank you very much for that. 

To you, Ms. Richards, under the current Coast Guard personnel 

requirements that apparently came up short in terms of meeting 

them, in your report, a marine casualty investigator must be either 

a Hull Inspector, a Machinery Inspector, or a Small Vessel Inspector, and have served as a Boarding Officer, Facility Inspector, or 

Harbor Safety Officer. Did the IG, as a part of its investigation, 

look at the qualifications of the NTSB investigators? 

17 

Ms. RICHARDS. No, sir 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. 

And then to you, Ms. Higgins, can you tell me how many NTSB 

investigators meet the requirement of Hull Inspector, Machinery 

Inspector, Small Vessel Inspector, and have also served as a Boarding Officer, Facility Inspector, or Harbor Safety Officer? 

Ms. HIGGINS. I have with me the resumes of our safety investigators, which I would be happy to provide to the Committee. I don’t 

have the information characterized or classified in the way you 

asked for, but we can certainly get that for you. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. I would ask unanimous consent that those documents be made part of the record. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So granted. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. And then if the Chairman would permit me 

one more question. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Please. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you so much. 

Ms. Higgins, you indicated in your testimony that the proposed 

language would give the Board clear authority to move forward in 

the case that there is a paralysis between the Board and the Coast 

Guard created by this agreement over interpretation of the regulations that they have jointly issued. I would ask you has such a paralysis ever occurred? 

Ms. HIGGINS. It is my understanding—and I have been with the 

Board about two and a half years—that in recent history there has 

not been such paralysis. Admiral Watson and Dr. Spencer from our 

office were colleagues when they were both with the Coast Guard, 

before Dr. Spencer came to the Safety Board. So as has been explained to me, this is done as much on personal relationships now 

as it is in terms of the process that is outlined in the regulations. 

But there have been instances in the past where it has been a 

problem, and we can get you specific examples of that, if that is 

helpful to the Committee. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, I would want you to supplement the 

record because what I think you are telling me is that everything 

works well because the Commandant is a great guy, the folks at 

NTSB are great people, but you think that somehow the new Commandant might be a jerk and we may get some jerks over at NTSB, 

so we have to make some rules. We are not having any problems 

at the moment, but we have to make some rules taking away some 

authority from the Coast Guard because we might get people who 

don’t get along in the future. 

Ms. HIGGINS. I think that we are looking for clear authority, the 

same authority we have in investigating every other mode of transportation when there is an accident. We have had problems in the 

past. Currently, things are working well. They could work better. 

We have had some specific issues, for example, in the COSCO 

Busan, that we worked out, but it is not without its problems. We 

are looking for the same authority to elect to lead marine investigations that we have in aviation, rail, pipeline, and hazardous materials. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Okay. Then if the Chairman would just indulge me, because you brought up the COSCO Busan. 

18 

Was the confusion regarding the COSCO Busan illustrative of a 

faulty process or was it the failure of certain individuals to follow 

the appropriate steps outlined in the current process? 

Ms. HIGGINS. My understanding of what happened in the 

COSCO Busan is that the information that was provided to us initially, in terms of the amount of the spill, was inaccurate. I think 

everybody knows that that was part of the problem. We learned 

through press accounts the next day that the spill was much greater than what had been originally told to us. We then decided perhaps we should take a closer look at this, and the Coast Guard 

then also contacted us. 

But we didn’t get the information about the actual dimensions of 

the casualty directly from the Coast Guard, we got them from press 

accounts. So we didn’t get on scene until three days after this accident happened. As a result of that, some of the important information, like the voyage data recorder, was not secured, and mistakes 

happen and we have made it better, but we think if there had been 

a better process in the beginning, in terms of more accurate information, we could have made a decision earlier that this was a 

major investigation and we would have launched sooner. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I really don’t need an answer on this first comment, it is just a 

possible answer to Ms Higgins’ questions about you don’t understand why NTSB doesn’t have this lead authority when you have 

it in other areas. I don’t have an answer to that, but I personally 

would like to look into that. It could be because the Coast Guard 

has had this investigative function since 1832 or so, and it is possible that it has been relatively effective over that time as it has 

changed to meet the needs of maritime transportation; whereas, in 

other areas, we didn’t have an effective way to investigate accidents. So that is certainly possible. 

I also want to throw it out to NTSB. In my district we had the 

pipeline explosion in 1999 of the Bellingham pipeline. NTSB was 

johnny-on-the-spot, did a great job with investigation, took the 

lead. So it is not to say that NTSB can’t take the lead on these 

things; they were great. But that itself, though, was not without its 

conflicts between NTSB and other agencies in terms of who gets to 

penalize who and for how much. So it is not a totally perfect process either when you all get the lead. 

On page 4 of your testimony, in the last paragraph you say 

‘‘There may be some incidents where the Coast Guard disagrees 

with the Safety Board’s position that the Board’s investigation 

should take precedence over the Coast Guard’s investigation, and 

a change to the law would enable this dispute to be resolved unambiguously and quickly.’’ This gets into the tiebreaker issue. I am 

just curious why you decided that you ought to be the tiebreaker 

and you didn’t come to recommend to us that the Coast Guard 

ought to be the tiebreaker. It would seem to us that it would be 

just as unambiguous and resolved as quickly if we gave the Coast 

Guard the tiebreaker. 

19 

Ms. HIGGINS. Well, I am representing the NTSB. I think it is important to step back and remember why Congress created the 

NTSB 40 years ago. The FAA has investigative authority, the Federal Railroad Administration has investigative authority. Congress 

wanted an independent agency—who was not the regulator, was 

not the law enforcement agency, didn’t do the certification, didn’t 

do the inspections—to have the responsibility to investigate accidents. We don’t have a history, necessarily, with any of the players 

in a particular accident. We don’t inspect the ships, we don’t license the ships. I think that is why it would make sense in—— 

Mr. LARSEN. If I may, I think it would be very important for us 

to go back and look at the same question, which is then why did 

not Congress include the Coast Guard in that. And that is all I am 

saying, is perhaps I need to go back and look at that history to understand that better. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Sure. 

Mr. LARSEN. Because if it happened on purpose that NTSB got 

the lead for these other investigative efforts, then it must have 

happened on purpose that the NTSB didn’t get the lead for maritime. It is an interesting question for me to try to get an answer 

to, and I may have to do that independently myself. 

With regards to the criteria that NTSB would use to make a decision, you used the term high profile. I hope there are other criteria other than high profile cases that you would use to decide 

that NTSB was going to be the lead or have primacy. You discussed those somewhat. Can you be specific about the criteria 

NTSB uses and would use to determine lead? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Sure. I can submit for the record all the criteria 

that we use. Significant loss of life is one criteria. Another criteria 

would be the dollar amount in terms of the damage done to the 

vessel itself. The other criteria we look at is whether the accident 

raises important safety implications that would have significance 

for the marine industry overall, or whether this is an accident that 

we have seen before. 

Mr. LARSEN. What is your process and time line, say, in an airplane investigation to make that determination? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Well, we have to investigate every aviation accident, by statute. So even for civil aviation accidents, we have to determine the probable cause. We may work with the FAA and they 

provide us the information. So it is a little bit different. In marine 

we have to be more selective, so that is why the criteria is developed and put in regulation. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. 

Ms. HIGGINS. The statute talks about major marine casualties, 

and then all of that is defined in regulation. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay, that is fine. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is good to have you all with us. 

Ms. Richards, I am referring to my notes. I want to revisit the 

22 investigative officers who were interviewed. How many of that 

group did you say were found to be unqualified? 

20 

Ms. RICHARDS. Fifteen of the 22 of the marine casualty investigators in our sample were not fully qualified. 

Mr. COBLE. So that would be seven were qualified, I guess, then. 

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes. 

Mr. COBLE. Admiral, do you want to refute or embrace those 

findings? 

Admiral WATSON. Sir, I think one of the main factors that led to 

the conclusions—first of all, I am not disputing the IG’s findings. 

Mr. COBLE. And I am not initiating a fight between you either. 

Admiral WATSON. That is right, sir. In fact, I think it is important to reiterate that we agreed with almost all of the recommendations from the IG and we are actively working on implementing 

changes as a result of those recommendations. But back to the 

data, I just want to clarify that the issue there was the prerequisites of an officer or warrant officer, perhaps even a civilian, 

that we have in our policy to begin the process of becoming a marine casualty investigator. 

And as Ms. Richards said, we had a standard that had a requirement that you have qualifications in other areas of marine inspection, the Hull Inspector, Machinery Inspector, Small Passenger 

Vessel Inspector; or over in the port operation side, Harbor Officer, 

Facility Officer, and so on. That was the main cause for the IG’s 

determination on these unqualified people. Some of them had actually achieved their qualifications through going to school in Yorktown, at our marine casualty investigation school, and then performing investigations as an apprentice, and then sitting before the 

Board, but they bypassed the prerequisites. So it was determined 

that they were unqualified. 

Now, those people, some of them may have been lawyers, they 

may have been naval architects, like myself, that hadn’t been in 

those particular assignments prior to being an investigating officer, 

but they were given exceptions to becoming marine casualty investigators by virtue of other qualifications. So our policy, our guidance doesn’t cover every different situation, and we have that allowance for the assignment officers and the commanding officers to 

make these changes. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that. Admiral, let me put a two part 

question to you. We have heard that the Coast Guard needs additional personnel—I have heard potentially up to maybe 10,000 

more—to carry out its responsibilities. Two part question: What 

areas would the Coast Guard focus upon with the additional personnel, A? And, B, what is the Coast Guard doing to strengthen the 

casualty investigation program? 

Admiral WATSON. Sir, the areas that we would focus on are the 

areas where the maritime community—whether it is boating, 

cruise lines activities—all of the different growth areas of the maritime communities are growing. We need to right-size the Coast 

Guard, since we have missions that affect all of these waterways 

users. We need to match that with the size of the activities that 

we are responsible for. So that will be one area. 

The other thing is that we have been charged, through the Safe 

Port Act and some other recent legislation, to do things that we 

haven’t done before. We have joint command centers that Congress 

has asked us to manage in all of the port areas. We need staffing 

21 

in those command centers. We also are anticipating to do inspections of towing vessels, approximately 7,000 new vessels that are 

currently uninspected. Things like that. We are looking at ballast 

water inspections, air emissions. We have got a lot of activities associated with environmental protection. Those are the types of 

things that we are going to need to grow to fill. 

Now, with regard to marine casualty investigators, we have a 

program to enhance the whole marine safety program, of which the 

investigations program is a critical part of that. Our fiscal year 

2009 budget requests 276 total new billets for the entire program, 

of which 44 would be for the investigations program, 20 of those 

would be for civilian marine casualty investigators; and then there 

are some other billets in that batch that are to support the training 

system. 

Mr. COBLE. One final question, Mr. Chairman. 

Is the 10,000 number an accurate one, additional forces, Admiral? 

Admiral WATSON. Sir, that was a number that Admiral Allen 

suggested. I don’t have the details of all of the accumulation to 

reach that figure. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you. My time has expired. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I noticed our Chairman had entered. Did you want me to defer to him? No? Okay. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

You know, as I listen to this discussion, this is the reason why 

we live in America and we have a democracy. I am going to be really frank with you. I represent an area with ports. There is no need 

for egos in this room. It really doesn’t matter to me who does it. 

It is important that it is done and it is done right. 

I respect, Mr. Admiral, the need for not wanting to appear to be 

demoted or whatever, but the bottom line is this isn’t about who 

is demoted or who is promoted. This is about ensuring we don’t 

have accidents, so people are not killed and our environment is not 

caused such harm that it costs all of us for generations. 

When I look at what happened in San Francisco, it doesn’t matter to me. I have relatives who served, and I understand the need 

to want to be respected and to be honored, and we give you that. 

But I don’t believe we should jeopardize our personal safety upon 

that. 

Now, the gentleman from the other side asked you about some 

additional responsibilities and I didn’t hear you reference—I think 

the Coast Guard is now going to be working with also inspecting 

and being involved with LNG facilities, as well, vessels, and it is 

like when I look at all the additional responsibilities, I don’t view 

it as a negative. I think what we would be saying to you—and I 

remember other hearings that we have had of all the additional responsibilities now that is being laid on the Coast Guard. I would 

see it as a welcoming assistance. 

Now, I would challenge Ms. Richards and Ms. Higgins to figure 

out how we can, as adults, coach this or present it that it is not 

viewed as a negative, but I would be extremely opposed to us mainVerDate Aug 31 2005 20:22 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42582 JASON
22 

taining jurisdiction just for the sake of because we always had it, 

because the American people deserve better than that. And you 

have done a commendable job and all the folks that work with you 

have done an excellent job, but we should not jeopardize our personal safety for the sake that you have handled it for the last 100 

years. 

With that, let me say, Ms. Richards, in your testimony you stated 

that the Coast Guard has not established a clear and desirable career path for its instigators. I think this means investigators, actually. That was typed here. You also state that the Coast Guard has 

not focused on addressing recommendations related to the investigators qualifications. Can you please go further in detail about 

these recommendations? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes. During our audit, we spoke to a number of 

investigators, both currently in investigator billets and previous investigator billets, as well as personnel in positions of authority. It 

was suggested to us very strongly that the reason that it is difficult 

to fill the billets as a marine casualty investigator is that it is not 

seen as a desirable career move, that it doesn’t lead to additional 

promotions. Coast Guard personnel expressed some reluctance to 

go into the marine safety line and specifically the marine casualty 

investigators because, of course, as normal individuals, they are 

looking for advancement and promotion, and they don’t feel that 

this is the quickest or easiest path to get there, or even a sure path 

to get there. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Now, the gentleman on the other side 

there mentioned that this really may not be that big of a problem, 

but according to your testimony, Rear Admiral Watson, the IG 

found that five out of the six individuals assigned to the marine 

casualty investigators in the Sector San Francisco were unqualified. The IG report also found in its sample that the casualty investigators, 68 percent of those assigned to these positions are not 

qualified. 

And then to further add burden to this, in a report that was done 

in August of 2007, the standards were removed from requiring prequalifications that the requirement that an individual have experience as a Hull or Machinery Inspector and a Small Vessel Inspector, those were removed, and the IG found that this change in fact 

lowered the standard, which we see an impact today in accidents 

that have happened. 

So that would bring me to the question, Rear Admiral. It says 

that you guys have developed a plan. When is it going to be implemented and why did you wait so long? 

Admiral WATSON. We had developed a plan prior to the IG’s report. I touched on a few of the parts just a few minutes ago with 

the additional capacity that is needed for our program. Last year, 

2007, we implemented a completely new training regime, as well 

as a qualifications process. 

Once a graduate of our training program in Yorktown reaches 

the field and becomes an apprentice and works under a mentor, 

they are using something called a personal qualification system, 

which has been revamped so that they have experienced every element of the program before they go before a board of fully qualified 

senior investigators to be tested in their knowledge. That whole 

23 

system has been in place for years, but the specifics of it was revamped in 2007. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. But again, Admiral, I stated to you that the IG 

said that those revised standards, the IG found that these changes, 

in their words, was, in essence, it lowered the standard. 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, that was in reference to the prerequisites 

for assignment to a marine casualty investigator billet in the Coast 

Guard. The old standards there were based on a 1980s version of 

the marine industry. Today we have a whole new set of qualifications for inspectors and for other officers in the Coast Guard sectors that we have today such that the prerequisites can go well beyond Hull Inspector and Machinery Inspector and Small Passenger 

Vessel Inspector. 

We have a large number of our people that are busy every day 

doing what we call port state control, which are exams of foreign 

vessels that by far the larger number of vessels where there is 

Coast Guard activities is foreign vessels today, compared to U.S. 

flag domestic vessel. So we shifted to those being the qualifications. 

By the way, we removed or are in the process of removing a prerequisite that existed back then that would have allowed a person 

who only experienced limited activity as a Coast Guard boarding 

officer for certain navigational checks on a vessel or harbor patrol 

officers, they are not going to be allowed to begin the process because they really don’t have the adequate background. So all we 

have really done is some shifting; we have not gone backwards. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, if I could just get 30 seconds to 

wrap up. 

Ms. Richards, would you agree, then, that the standard has in 

fact been met? 

Ms. RICHARDS. No, I would not. It is our opinion that, in particular, the standard to be a Hull or Machinery Inspector, as well 

as a Small Vessel Inspector, is very important to the prerequisites 

of becoming a marine casualty investigator. The way it was explained to me was that those qualifications allowed the investigators, when they were doing an investigation and talking to the operators of the vessel in question, to basically tell if they were hearing truth or they were hearing a fabricated story, or at least have 

some basic knowledge of how a vessel would be operated and the 

components of a vessel would be operated in order to make that 

initial determination which drives their investigation. 

One of the individuals that we spoke to during the course of our 

audit was the Captain of the Port of New York. He suggested to 

us that six to nine years experience as an inspector in those areas 

would be a sufficient criteria to become an investigator. So we believe those are very important still. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So, Mr. Chairman, I would just say that, to me, 

what I just heard here the last minute is of great concern to me, 

that we have our Admiral, who feels that the standards are appropriate, and yet we have the Inspector General who says clearly 

they are not. So I look forward to us exploring this further. 

Again, Admiral, we have nothing but respect for you. In fact, our 

Chairman has talked continually about the additional responsibilities that has been put on you, and we support you. So if there is 

a way that we can help you to do the job more effectively, we want 

24 

to do that; and it shouldn’t be viewed as a demotion, it should be 

viewed as thanking you for what you have done, and we know the 

tremendous challenges you have before you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

As we now go to the Chairman of the Full Committee, let me just 

ask you this. Rear Admiral Watson, if you just heard what Ms. 

Richards said, that is a pretty tough statement she just made 

about what they found. We have a lot of confidence in Ms. Richards. And Rich Johnson, who is sitting behind her, I want to thank 

you too, Mr. Johnson, for all your hard work. We really do thank 

you and the whole team there. 

But I guess there are just two things I want to get to before the 

Chairman asks his questions. Of the 110 people you cite as being 

fully qualified to meet all the prerequisites, as well as having completed all required training, is that accurate? You said 110 were 

fully qualified. Is that true? And while you are doing that, you 

mentioned certain people like yourself, I think you said, where exceptions are granted. Is that written somewhere, that if I am a 

plumber, I can get an exception; if I am a lawyer I can get an exception? Do you remember mentioning that? 

I guess what I am trying to get to is that if I want somebody to 

operate on my heart, I don’t want people that got exceptions and 

they have never had to go through the heart classes—you follow 

what I am saying?—in medical school. I am just trying to make 

sure that when we have people who are doing—because these casualty investigations have the potential for so much impact, I want 

to make sure that there is some kind of a standard. So where is 

that standard of who gets an exception? 

And then we will hear from Mr. Oberstar. 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. The policy, the guidance is designed 

for the majority of the people that you would—the pool of people 

that you would draw from if you were the Coast Guard assignment 

officers and you were needing to put apprenticed marine casualty 

investigators out to the sectors and begin the process. We are talking about who do you use for the pool. 

So we wrote the guidance for the majority. And we have got to 

remember that we are not saying there are any exceptions to the 

sequence of going to the school, doing the PQS, going through the 

Board to get examined, and then having the commanding officer 

actually sign your designation as a marine casualty. No exceptions 

there. 

What we are talking about is, is it acceptable to look beyond that 

assumed pool and choose somebody whose background has been in 

the technical side of the program. This gets into some of the same 

issues I think that you probably had to think about in the recent 

bill; what should those qualifications be for different positions. We 

could have hired somebody from the American Bureau of Shipping, 

for example, as a civilian in the Coast Guard. That person may 

have years and years of experience, but he has never gotten the 

Coast Guard qualification as a marine inspector of hulls or machinery. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, of that 110, how many of them were given 

exceptions, the 110 that you cited that were fully qualified? 

25 

Admiral WATSON. I don’t know, sir. But those exceptions were, 

in effect, not exceptions because our system, our policy accommodates those reasonable alternatives. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral, I have to stop here, but I have got to 

tell you what you just said concerns me more than anything else 

you have said here, because what that means is that anybody can 

come up with a pie-in-the-sky this is an exception and say, okay, 

this person has now met the requirements. That is the impression 

I get from what you said. Maybe I am wrong, but Mr. Oberstar can 

pick that up. I see he is anxious to get started. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Oh, no, you are doing well. I am in agreement 

with you. I am very concerned about the direction this is going. 

I think some of the problems that we are covering here, and have 

in the past work of the Committee leading to this hearing, are 

going to be addressed if we ever get the Coast Guard authorization 

bill enacted, making substantial improvements in the marine safety function of the Coast Guard and establishing full course in marine safety work and qualifications of Coast Guard personnel. 

What disturbed me so much was a comment that, well, our people aren’t up to ABS standards. Oh, my goodness. The ABS should 

be up to Coast Guard standards, it shouldn’t be the other way 

around. I was at the Coast Guard Academy recently, a month or 

so ago, and talked to the Commandant of the Academy and Commandant of the Cadets, talked with several of the cadets. 

They are pretty excited about the idea of having a full-time safety course, and the other provisions that we have crafted into that 

legislation will ameliorate the existing situation, but two-thirds of 

Coast Guard marine casualty investigators don’t meet Coast Guard 

qualifications, let alone the NTSB qualifications; and five of the six 

Coast Guard personnel who investigated the allision in San Francisco were unqualified. 

Now, if you look at the NTSB—and I won’t name them, need to 

do that, but their qualifications—Master of U.S. Steam or Motor 

Vessels of 100 gross tons, Master of Steam or Motor Vessels of not 

more than 1600 registered gross tons, graduates of Massachusetts 

Maritime Academy; Chief Engineer Unlimited Horsepower for 

Steam, Motor and Gas Turbine, Bachelor of Science Marine Engineering, Marine Maritime Academy; Master of U.S. Steam or Motor 

Vessels of any gross ton, Master of Science, World Maritime University, Bachelor of Science, California Maritime Academy. 

I am not going to go through the others, but they are of that 

qualification. That is the standard the Coast Guard should have internally. That is what we are expecting of the Coast Guard, to be 

the gold standard. Those are NTSB investigators. 

Thirty percent of casualty reports surveyed had factual errors. 

And until we pressed this issue in Committee, Coast Guard had 

not established a career path for casualty investigators. 

Now, when I first immersed myself in this issue of the division 

of responsibilities between the NTSB and the Coast Guard was in 

the aftermath of a vessel inspected by the Coast Guard that just 

a few days later sank in Arkansas. A duck gone through the Coast 

Guard. And there were fatalities. The Coast Guard insisted on investigating itself. Now, Admiral, don’t you think that was a conflict 

of interest? 

26 

Admiral WATSON. Sir, I think a organization like the Coast 

Guard needs to investigate itself. We need to have a process to do 

a critical examination of ourselves. We do that—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. You should, but should you be the lead investigator in a situation where just a few days before the Coast Guard 

said this vessel is fine to operate and a few days later it sinks? 

Should you be the lead investigator of yourself? 

Admiral WATSON. Sir, we have a long tradition of doing that. We 

investigate when an accident occurs involving a Coast Guard cutter, involving an aviator, and we certainly need to investigate ourselves when the incident involves a Coast Guard marine inspection. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, I submit that the Coast Guard is a human 

institution, and you are fallible when you are investigating yourself; and, at the very least, the MOU that resulted from that incident that was preceded several years earlier by a previous MOU 

between the Coast Guard and the NTSB, I think that should be refined. There are two differing responsibilities. Can you tell me 

what the differences are between the role of the NTSB in an investigation and the role of the Coast Guard in conducting an investigation? 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. The role of the NTSB is to determine 

the cause, and the role of the Coast Guard is to determine the 

cause for the purpose of the management of the marine safety program, which runs all the way from the inspections, standards for 

search and rescue, waterways management, all the missions that 

we have, as well as to ensure good order and discipline in the U.S. 

maritime. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Okay, but you shortcut the NTSB. Not only determine the cause, but make safety recommendations. In the investigation of aviation accidents, the NTSB engages the FAA, the aircraft manufacturer, the airline, a range of outside interests. They 

bring metallurgists in to the investigation, whatever specialty they 

need, but the NTSB is in charge of the overall investigation and, 

in the end, they make the recommendations independent. 

If Boeing were the only one to have investigated the crash of a 

737 at Aliquippa, Pennsylvania following an uncommanded rudder 

movement, Boeing would have cleared itself of any responsibility, 

said this just doesn’t happen; we have 93 million hours of operation 

of 737s and we have never had an uncommanded rudder movement. Oh, really? There were at least a dozen. There were two unexplained crashes. 

Now, the manufacturer should not be in charge of investigating 

its own aircraft or failure of its own. Yes, they should be engaged, 

they should be part, but they should not be the one to make the 

final determination. There are certain incidents in which the NTSB 

ought to have the lead. And where there is clearly a conflict of interest where the Coast Guard has, in the incident I cited a moment 

ago, I think that surely the Coast Guard should be engaged, as provided for in the MOU, but I think the NTSB in those situations 

ought to be the lead, because they have the independence and the 

objectivity. 

Admiral WATSON. Sir, I agree with you. We have an MOU which 

lays out those conditions in which it is expected that the Commandant will shift the lead to the NTSB. It has been working very 

27 

well and it has been working through a number of Commandants 

now. The responsibility of the Coast Guard to have the overall 

charge for the marine industry needs to stay with the Coast Guard. 

I think that is the larger question: Does Congress, which exempted 

maritime from the NTSB’s authorities when NTSB was created, 

and then subsequently reinforced that original decision, is it a good 

idea now to change the primacy for the maritime? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think that time has arrived and we have to 

raise that question and review the issue. That separation of authority was done in the 1970s by the Merchant Marine & Fisheries 

Committee which had jurisdiction over Coast Guard at the time, 

and it was done without a great deal of thought. 

But let me ask Ms. Higgins and Ms. Richards whether you think 

the MOU is in fact working satisfactorily. Do you work out the 

question of primacy in a satisfactory manner? 

Ms. HIGGINS. Mr. Chairman, based on my experience and in 

what I have been told by our investigators, it has worked pretty 

well. I think our concern is—and we talked about this a little earlier—if we can’t reach agreement—and I don’t want to say that we 

haven’t been able to reach agreement, but in that instance we 

think we ought to be able to look to the statute to be able to assert 

our jurisdiction to take the lead for all the reasons that you just 

suggested, because we are an independent agency and we have a 

responsibility to look at the regulatory agencies as we do in aviation and the other modes to reach probable cause and safety recommendations regardless of who that might affect. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Ms. Richards? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Sir, we did not look at the interaction between 

the Coast Guard and the NTSB on determining who would take the 

lead on investigations, so I don’t have any information to offer at 

this time. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, Homeland Security is rather new to this as 

a department and new to this subject matter. 

Ms. Higgins, let me come back. The NTSB has a very different 

relationship with other modes of transportation. It has a primacy 

role. 

Ms. HIGGINS. We do, with every other mode. It is very clear. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. What is different about maritime? Why should 

that be different? 

Ms. HIGGINS. We believe it shouldn’t be different. We believe historically it has been different. It has been refined over time 

through previous reauthorizations where the MOU was first called 

for and then later modified. Again, I don’t want to suggest here 

that we haven’t all tried to make it work, but we do think that, 

from the standpoint of the Safety Board, we ought to have the authority to exert primacy and take the lead without any question 

about that in investigations where we can’t reach agreement. 

As we talked about earlier, the regulations and the process that 

we currently follow would be what we would look to for guidance, 

but if for some reason we can’t reach agreement, then we think we 

ought to be able to assert jurisdiction, because we think we have 

a track record that shows that our investigations were very selective. We only look at those we think will have national significance 

in terms of the recommendations we make and we have demVerDate Aug 31 2005 20:22 Jun 25, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42582 JASON
28 

onstrated the benefit of having an independent investigative body 

take the lead in certain kinds of investigations. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, the most recent serious accident, that of the 

COSCO allision, is a good example where the Coast Guard rather 

early on dismissed the issue as of not very great significance and 

did not dispatch personnel to the scene for a substantial investigation and only later rose to the incident when 58,000 gallons of pollutant were discharged. 

It reminds me somewhat, in a different vein, of TWA 800. The 

FBI arrived on the scene immediately, they were right there—they 

had offices all over the Country—and took charge of the scene as 

a crime scene. That substantially inhibited the ability of the NTSB 

to conduct its complete investigation as an accident, as a failure of 

a system—gaining control of material, gaining control of the engines, for example, to inspect those engines and determine whether 

engine failure occurred; to rule out or rule in a missile strike, as 

was hypothesized at the outset. It is a very, very important distinction to be made between the role of the FBI and the NTSB, between the role of the Coast Guard and the NTSB. 

I am not suggesting that the Coast Guard step aside, nor is the 

NTSB that the Coast Guard step aside and stay out of the investigation; it should be a partner in it. But there are some situations 

where the NTSB should take the lead and where its current role 

under the MOU should be strengthened. 

Ms. HIGGINS. Mr. Chairman, we would agree with that. As you 

probably know, I was very involved in a different capacity in the 

standoff, if you will, between the NTSB and the FBI on the TWA 

800 investigation, and in the end the two agencies worked together 

until it could be determined that, in fact, it was an accident rather 

than a criminal act, but it was very hard to make that work. As 

a result of that, we have changed our procedures and now it works 

much better. 

Again, I think we said at the outset we have enormous respect 

for the Coast Guard and the challenges that they face in terms of 

all their responsibilities. They would be, as they are now, a party 

to any investigation where we would take primacy. We need their 

resources; we need their capability to help manage the site on 

scene and to do all the good things that they do in terms of search 

and rescue and everything else. 

But in the COSCO Busan, for example, the voyage data recorder 

was not protected immediately, until our people got there. There 

wasn’t recognition that there even was one. 

So these are just some of the things that are important in major 

investigations that we think we have the expertise and the experience to handle, taking nothing away from the Coast Guard and all 

the good work they do, but there are some special circumstances 

and special accidents where we think it would be important for us 

to be able to clearly take the lead and then have our protocol and 

our process followed in terms of leading the investigation. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. The Coast Guard would argue that they should 

have, among other reasons, because they lead the U.S. delegation 

to the IMO. The FAA leads the U.S. delegation to IKO, the international civil aviation organization. But the NTSB is the lead entity in an aviation accident. 

29 

Admiral, do you see any further adjustments that could be made 

to the existing MOU without undermining the Coast Guard’s proud 

and historic role? 

Admiral WATSON. Absolutely, sir. I think we are very anxious to 

engage with NTSB and make improvements to the MOU. We have 

learned a lot since the MOU was written originally, and we would 

like to incorporate those changes for the betterment of NTSB’s investigations and Coast Guard investigations. We are very supportive of the MOU process; it is the way to go. I think there are 

things that we can look back on to where it could have been improved. 

My personal experience was with a boiler explosion on a vessel 

called the S.S. Norway down in Miami, Florida. That investigation, 

quite frankly, was, per the MOU, given to NTSB to lead. My concern with it is that it took years before we had any results from 

that. In the meantime, there was a DOJ investigation, and just this 

year, about five years later, both agencies, DOJ and the NTSB, had 

outcomes. 

But the Coast Guard can do both of those roles. As you say, the 

difference between the Coast Guard and the NTSB is that we do 

have an obligation to do the law enforcement side, the disciplinary 

side. So when a Coast Guard investigation is ongoing and the 

Coast Guard has the lead, we can do both of these things at the 

same time; we can accommodate both the NTSB and the DOJ, and 

we don’t have a Flight 800 type of situation. That is what we have 

been doing for over 100 years, so I think that is part of the reason 

why Congress has left our system the way it is. 

In addition, I think it is important to note that, for aviation, 

NTSB does all aviation casualty investigations. Were they to do 

that for maritime, they would add the 5,000 investigations that we 

are currently doing to their area of responsibility, and if you think 

that there needs to be separation, how is that justified just for a 

very small handful out of the total number? I just think that there 

is a lot of unintended consequences that could come from this. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. For a very long period of time, the Marine Board 

was headed by Justice Department official. That was changed in 

1948. And I think the Coast Guard’s personnel qualifications are 

going to improve with enactment of our authorization bill and establishment of these programs. 

Meanwhile, I think there are at least refinements to the MOU 

that should be made, and I would like to recommend and request 

specifically that the Coast Guard submit their thoughts to the 

Chairman and Ranking Member, and that the NTSB submit their 

language comparably for changes, and then let us evaluate those 

and see if we can play the role of honest broker and achieve what 

I see as a need to upgrade the quality of safety investigations. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am going to pass. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. 

Let me just go back. Rear Admiral Watson, you said that you all 

had looked at the recommendations from the Inspector General’s 

Office and that you were in agreement, I think. Don’t let me put 

30 

words in your mouth. Tell me what you said, because I am going 

to hold you to it. 

Admiral WATSON. Sir, I think there were about seven recommendations. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. There were eight. 

Admiral WATSON. Eight recommendations, yes, sir. We concurred 

with all except for one that we agreed with some of it but disagreed 

with—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And which one was that? 

Admiral WATSON. That was the one that was about the hull and 

machinery inspectors and small passenger vessel inspection as a 

prerequisite, versus hull, machinery or small passenger vessel inspectors as an entering prerequisite condition for assigning a person to a marine casualty investigation billet. And if I could just 

touch on that, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is recommendation number 4. It says revise 

the August 2007 marine casualty investigation qualification standard to include the pre-qualification of all or machinery and small 

vessel inspectors. Is that the one? 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. And it is the word ‘‘and’’ that is the 

issue. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And small vessel inspectors. 

Admiral WATSON. Our standard is or. If you are a small passenger vessel inspector—actually, that goes beyond that. A variety 

of other inspection qualifications. You don’t have to have them all 

before you can begin the process of becoming a marine casualty investigator. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Sam tells me that you all made that 

change. It used to be ‘‘and.’’ 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So now it is still ‘‘and.’’ So what happened? 

Admiral WATSON. We made it into an ‘‘or.’’ 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now you want to go back? 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. It was almost impossible for us to 

have enough of a pool of people with prerequisites to feed our marine casualty inspection program, which requires 136 Coast Guard 

officers to fill the billets, if we had that ‘‘and’’ in there, and the reason is because we really don’t need that large of a number of hull 

and machinery inspectors for U.S. flag vessels like we did in the 

1980s. 

There aren’t as many of those type of vessels. Our fleet of 10,200 

inspected vessels is largely small passenger vessels. The industry 

has changed significantly, and the way you get experience on the 

large vessels these days is doing port state control, which is a 

whole other set of qualifications different from hull and machinery. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you have an opinion on that, Ms. Richards, 

since they are your recommendations? 

Ms. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. In the August 2007 publication, the 

Coast Guard actually did not include the prerequisite to a hull or 

machinery or small vessel inspector. They believe that it is covered 

because it is a prerequisite for attending the basic investigator 

training course. And that is one of our problems with the Coast 

Guard’s position, because we know from our work that it is possible 

to attend the basic training without meeting the prerequisites for 

31 

the basic training. So we believe that the qualifications need to be 

specifically set in the Coast Guard’s guidance. 

We also believe that the Coast Guard is taking a step backwards 

by eliminating the ‘‘and’’ and lowering the standards, and we don’t 

understand why the Coast Guard would choose to do so other than 

perhaps it is difficult to fill its billets because they don’t have a 

number of personnel trained to meet all those inspector qualifications. Our work showed, and the people that we talked to said that 

it was very important to have both the hull or machinery and the 

small vessel inspector qualifications. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right, I get the picture. Let me go on to something else very quickly. Going back to these qualifications of the 

110 investigators you cited as being fully qualified, Rear Admiral, 

I am just wondering, do you think the IG team would find all of 

them to be qualified? I guess what I am trying to understand is in 

a sample of the IG, they found 68 percent of the investigators were 

unqualified. You say that 110 of 136 assigned individuals are qualified. So either the IG had a non-representative sample or we are 

not talking about the same thing, and I am trying to figure out 

where the problem is here. 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. Well, both of these sets of numbers 

are a snapshot in time. That is one thing. The 68 percent is from 

a sample of five units some time last summer, I believe. Now, you 

have got to remember that in the spring there is typically going to 

be more people that have reached their qualifications than in the 

summer, when people just get assigned to a unit. So there is a 

cycle to this that is a natural cycle. 

The 110, I would have to give all of the data to the IG for them 

to be able to tell me whether they agree with us, but we look at 

the data. It is like Chairman Oberstar looking at the resumes. 

They are what they are. We make our own rules for this and we 

determine that they are fully qualified. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand. I guess, based on what you just 

said about seasonal and cycles, would it be safe to say that there 

are times when a small percentage are qualified? In other words, 

you are talking about the snapshots and the fact that certain 

things happen at certain times of the year, what have you. Would 

that be an accurate assessment, do you think? 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. There is always going to be some apprentices in the system, people that are assigned to a billet that 

have yet to be qualified, they are working on their qualifications. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what we need is consistency, because we 

never know when these things are going to happen and when we 

are going to need these personnel to use certain skills. I am just 

trying to figure out how do you plan to—I am sure you would agree 

with me that we want more consistency. You understand what I 

am saying, right? 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. We have 448 fully qualified marine 

casualty investigators throughout the Coast Guard. Most of them 

are not in marine casualty inspection investigator billets, but we 

are a military organization. If we need somebody that has the experience and knowledge to deal with a marine casualty on an LNG 

ship, some special ship, we will get the right person to the right 

place at the right time. 

32 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, did that happen with the San Francisco incident? 

Admiral WATSON. No, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, see, that is the problem. 

Admiral WATSON. Well, I think there was—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Listen to what you just said to me. 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You just said if we have a problem, we will find 

the people and we will get them here. In this instance it didn’t happen, and that is the problem. I understand the Coast Guard is 

stretching, and I am telling you, we fight on both sides to try to 

get you the personnel and the expertise you need. But one thing 

I do know is that if I haven’t learned anything in my 57 years on 

earth, I have learned this: in order to deal with a problem, you 

have got to first acknowledge you have got it. 

I remember when my daughter—I have to tell you this little 

story, and then I will turn it over to Mr. Taylor. When my 26-yearold was 3, she used to come up to me, Admiral, and I can remember this as if it was happening right now. She would come up to 

me and she would put her hand over my eyes and she would say, 

daddy, let’s play hide and go seek. And she is standing right in 

front of me and then she would say you can’t find me. Well, that 

is all right for a three-year-old, but we have to face up to whatever 

the problems are that we have so we can try to address them, because I think that we all want to work together to make this work. 

I think Mr. Taylor wanted to ask a question. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, thank you very much for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for recognizing me. 

I have to admit that I have mixed feelings about this whole hearing because I realize that the Coast Guard is increasingly asked to 

do more things, and then we scratch our heads in amazement when 

you are not experts at everything we ask you to do, and that is just 

not realistic. But there are a couple of things that come to mind 

that make me wonder whether or not something does need to improve. 

Number one, the case of the Seabold Trader, which is a vessel 

in the American flag that had major modifications done to it over 

in China. Folks brought me photographs of those. I don’t know how 

they smuggled them out of China, but they brought me photographs of it. We handed it to the Coast Guard and I think the answer was, well, we don’t have enough people to inspect this. That 

wasn’t a good thing. 

Second thing, obviously, that still continues to stick in my craw 

is the mess up on the 110s to 123s. To this day, I haven’t heard 

anyone in the Coast Guard—and you do have some very knowledgeable people working for you at Baltimore; they walked me 

through the vessels. But to this day I haven’t heard anybody say 

this is where they screwed up. We should have taken a coupon; we 

should have known the hull wasn’t ready; we should have done the 

hogging and sagging. To this day. So the Nation is out $100 million. We have got eight tied-up vessels. That tells me you lack expertise. 

And I would give you the opportunity to tell me that I am wrong, 

but those two things really jump out at me. 

33 

I appreciate your willingness to make some changes. What I 

haven’t seen, and I am curious if you have considered, is I can’t believe that you need the best team every day. You are not going to 

face a major collision every day. You may not even face a major collision once a month. But when you do need a good team, you need 

a good team. Using the example of the Air Guard and the Reserves, 

who are on a daily basis we have people out there flying 747s, 

757s, 767s in the commercial world within transit over to fly a C130, C-17s as a Guardsman, and we get that world of experience, 

and when we need them they are there. 

Has the Coast Guard considered some sort of a reserve outfit 

where people could have a career either in the Merchant Marine 

or working for ABS or Lloyds, but also have a reserve commission 

that when you need that pool of experts for a major collision like 

you saw in San Francisco or any other similar, that you could call 

those people up and that is how they perform their active duty? I 

have got to believe that in this Nation there would be people who 

would be chomping at the bit for that opportunity. I am just curious if the Coast Guard has considered it. 

Admiral WATSON. Sir, we have a Coast Guard Reserve and there 

are large numbers of those people that have their primary job in 

other elements of the maritime. Do we recruit specifically for Master Mariners, Chief Engineers? I think maybe that is the question 

you are asking. And the answer is no, we allow everybody to apply 

and compete on a more or less even playing field for the Coast 

Guard Reserve, and then we train them after they answer the service. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, Admiral, reclaiming my time. Keeping in 

mind that this is a specialty, keeping in mind that you may have 

some 50-year-old ship captain out there who would be a phenomenal investigator, but who may not be up to the day-to-day activities on one of your big cutters, or who may be, beyond that, financially just couldn’t take that sort of hit to come back in the active force. But he would have all those years of experience in determining the cause of an accident. 

I would think it would make abundant sense for the Coast 

Guard, rather than, again, spending more money to train a handful 

of people that you are not going to need every day pursuing some 

sort of a reserve officer corps of trained engineers, of trained marine architects that you could call on when you have a major accident that you need a pool of experts wearing the Coast Guard uniform to make a determination. 

I would ask that you consider that as well, because, again, I can 

hear this Committee asking you to do a lot of things with a limited 

budget, and what troubles me is there are times when you do phenomenally well, such as Hurricane Katrina There are times, such 

as stretching the 110s to 123s, where to this day I don’t think you 

have done the Nation any favors. And I think that this might be 

somewhere in between where we can accomplish that goal by 

thinking outside the normal course of action. 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I would ask that you or the Commandant get back 

to me on this, because I do think it is a way of getting a heck of 

34 

a lot of expertise when we need them, and only when we need 

them, without paying for them all year long. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LaTourette. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think Mr. Taylor, as he often does, has really hit on an outstanding idea. I know that in the Coast Guard reauthorization that 

was just shepherded through by Chairman Cummings and Chairman Oberstar, the Commandant—and I know he didn’t like some 

portions of it because he and I have had conversations, but on the 

marine safety side was a little resistant to adding some civilian 

posts within that marine safety. 

I supported that and continue to support that, and I know that 

my support is based upon the fact that all of the testimony before 

this Subcommittee relative to rotation and career paths and things 

of that nature, and longevity in the service, point to the fact that 

on the marine safety side, and now on the marine casualty side, 

the Country would be better served with a civilian component that 

augments the uniform corps, and I think that is what Mr. Taylor 

was talking about. I had never thought of reservists, but that 

makes perfect sense, and I would ask you to take that back to the 

Commandant, because it does in fact make sense. 

Just a couple of cleanup things. I was talking to the Chairman 

and I do think, Admiral, that this business of exemptions or exceptions has sort of a negative connotation in this hearing today, and 

I don’t think it needs to be left that way. I don’t want anybody to 

be left with the impression that the Coast Guard, using the Chairman’s analogy, would send a plumber to do heart surgery. 

What I indicated to the Chairman was, I am a lawyer, he is a 

lawyer, and we have continuing legal education requirements. 

Some States have equivalencies. And by virtue of being a Member 

of Congress or a member of State legislature, you get credit, so you 

don’t have to sit in the classroom for two hours listening to some 

pointy-headed guy talking about rules of evidence, because you are 

actually creating laws at the national level. So you get credit for 

that. 

I assume that that forms the basis of your exemptions or your 

exceptions, but if you could perhaps supplement the record as to 

how that process works. In other words, somebody coming from 

ABS and opting out of the hull inspector course is different from 

the Chairman’s example of a lawyer. Because you happen to be a 

lawyer, you don’t have to take the hull course. So if you could do 

that. 

My other difficulty is—well, it is not a difficulty. Chairman Oberstar, the reason he is such a great Chairman is he often, almost 

always comes up with sort of the middle course that is good. I do 

think that the legislative language set up by the NTSB, even 

though I have great respect for the work they do, is a power grab 

in this instance, and we will respectfully disagree on that. 

So the Chairman’s suggestion that both NTSB and Coast Guard 

come up with suggested modifications to your Memorandum of Understanding I think would be a great idea, and I would urge you 

both to accept the Chairman’s invitation. Admiral, to you, I would 

35 

say I really urge you to do it because I do get the sense that, absent that, the NTSB will be successful and tie-breaks will now always be determined in favor of the NTSB unless you provide the 

majority of the Members of this Committee with a reasonable alternative. 

And my objection to the power grab is that the Inspector General’s report found eight deficiencies, and you have acknowledged 

seven of those. I would just say on number four, which is the 

eighth of the eight, the Coast Guard created the original standards, 

and my understanding is you went from Hull Inspector or Machinery Inspector and Small Vessel Inspector plus Board Officer plus 

Facility Inspector plus Harbor Safety Officer to now it is either 

Hull Inspector or Machinery Inspector or Small Vessel Inspector 

plus the other three; and that is the change that caused the Inspector General to say that you sort of dumbed down the standards. 

I have had a chance to sort of review the resumes of the folks 

that work for the NTSB, and I have to say that all of them have 

outstanding credentials. But I would note that 95 percent of them 

are former Coast Guardsmen. So you can’t make the argument that 

people trained by the Coast Guard can’t do the job when the NTSB 

has now hired the same people—maybe they pay them more 

money, I don’t know—to do what it is the Coast Guard does. 

And again I would say that just making a change for change 

sake, because of the deficiencies found by the IG b the Coast 

Guard, if the IG has not looked at the qualifications of the folks 

that work for the NTSB, I think it is silly to say, well, let’s give 

NTSB primacy even though their inspectors may not meet the 

qualifications that you are being criticized for. So change for 

change sake is not very attractive to me either. 

So, at the end of the day, please accept Chairman Oberstar’s invitation; come up with modifications to the MOU and let’s see if we 

can work this out in a peaceful way that will continue to demonstrate great cooperation between the Coast Guard and the 

NTSB. 

Ms. Higgins, last thing. I had a train derailment in my district 

and I am still waiting for your report. So if you could get that to 

me, I would very much appreciate it. 

Ms. HIGGINS. We will do that, sir. 

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you so much. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Richardson. 

Thank you very much. 

Finally, let me just ask two other questions. Admiral, when it 

comes to revocation and suspension hearings, I would imagine that 

if you have these investigators and a charge is appropriate, it 

would be likely that they would testify or definitely provide some 

type of evidence in these hearings. Is that a reasonable expectation? 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir. They shouldn’t even be charging a 

mariner with any kind of charge unless they have evidence. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. I guess what I am getting at is, as you know 

from previous testimony in other hearings, a lot of times the mariners felt that they were not necessarily treated fairly. We had testimony from some judge or two—I think it was two judges—who had 

concerns about the ALJs. I guess what I am getting at here is if 

36 

we have people who are not qualified doing these investigations, 

trying to present evidence of their findings in a hearing, it seems 

to me that there might be a problem with that. Would you agree? 

Admiral WATSON. Yes, sir, but I don’t have any evidence that we 

have used unqualified people to present a case to an ALJ. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did you have a comment on that, Ms. Richards? 

Ms. RICHARDS. No, sir. We didn’t trace the investigations done by 

the individuals we have determined to be unqualified through the 

whole process to see if they had been adjudicated before an ALJ. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right, I want to thank you all very much for 

your testimony. As usual, as you can see, we act in a very much 

bipartisan manner, and I think a lot has come out of this hearing, 

and I am hoping that the issues that Chairman Oberstar and 

Ranking Member LaTourette have raised and the suggestions that 

have been made here, that you will take heed and would hope that 

you would also—there are all kinds of ways to resolve issues; some 

of them you do through statute, some you do by way of people sitting down and working out their differences, or agencies sitting 

down. So where you can try your hand at that, we would love to 

do that, consistent with what Chairman Oberstar had to say. 

Again, thank you all very much and have a good day. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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