SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLAT E DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1040-22 

CARMEN SALGADO, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

JAMES MEIERS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________ 

Submitted January 24, 2024 – Decided May 15, 2024 

Before Judges Accurso and Walcott-Henderson. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FM-09-2595-08.

Heymann & Fletcher, attorneys for appellant (Alix 

Claps, on the brief). 

Respondent has not filed a brief. 

PER CURIAM 

 Defendant-father appeals from a November 4, 2022 Family Part order 

granting plaintiff-mother's motion in-part enforcing litigants rights and 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1040-22 

compelling defendant to contribute to their child's college tuition and expenses. 

At issue is whether defendant violated the parties' Property Settlement 

Agreement ("PSA") by failing to contribute to college tuition and expenses and

by claiming their child as a dependent in 2021. We affirm. 

At the time of their divorce in 2009, the parties executed a PSA which 

explicitly included support for their child, the sole child of the marriage. Under 

the terms of their PSA, the parties recognized their responsibility to provide a 

college education for their child "dependent upon their ability to pay[.]" 

The PSA included a separate provision for "college education/college 

accounts," which states in pertinent part: 

Both parties recognize that, under current New Jersey 

law, as divorced parents they are both responsible for 

providing a college or other post-secondary education 

for their child dependent upon their ability to pay at that 

time and the child's aptitude, opportunities and 

inclinations. The contributions of the parties shall be 

calculated after all applicable and/or available student 

loans, grants and scholarships have been applied for 

and the child's accounts have been fully accessed to the 

extent allowable. The child shall have an obligation to 

contribute by working summers and during the school

recesses, if possible. The parties anticipate sharing 

these expenses based on the guidelines percentages that 

are in effect at the time the child enters college. The 

child's loans shall be his responsibility unless the 

parties voluntarily decide to contribute. In other words, 

the parties shall have no obligation to pay for the child's 

loans. 
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There is no dispute plaintiff and defendant participated in the child's 

selection of a college and equally shared the cost of tuition for the first year and 

that defendant failed to contribute to the costs of college tuition during their 

child's sophomore year. 

Additionally, per Article III paragraph 8 of their PSA, the parties had 

agreed to alternately claim their child as a dependent every other year with 

defendant claiming the tax credit in even years and plaintiff in odd years. There 

is no dispute in the record that defendant claimed their child in 2021 when it 

was plaintiff's designated year. 

Plaintiff moved to enforce litigant's rights and for an order compelling 

defendant to pay fifty percent of the child's sophomore college tuition and 

expenses; for an order requiring defendant to amend his 2021 income tax return 

to remove the child as a dependent—allowing plaintiff to claim the child on her 

2021 income tax return and every odd year thereafter; counsel fees; and to 

enforce the $98.00 a week child support obligation. 

Defendant, then-self-represented, replied in an opposition styled as an 

"answer to plaintiff's motion and request for relief." He maintained the PSA 

"grants [him] the discretion to contribute to [their child's] college education as 

[defendant] deem[s] [he is] able," and that for the first year he "took a loan for 
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$15,000 and [he] still owe[d] $12,500 on this loan." Thus, he argued, "[his] 

determination that [he] cannot contribute further to college costs at this time is 

based on experience and is not capricious." 

As to the head of household tax credit, defendant maintained that: 

Article III, paragraph 8 of the PSA is no longer binding 

on the Parties. Further, paragraph 9 of the Certification 

Affidavit shows the years that each Party was permitted 

to claim [the child] as a dependent and ends at 2020. 

This paragraph thus demonstrates that the Parties had 

not yet come to an agreement over who would claim 

[their child] as a dependent in 2021. 

[Id. at 84.] 

At the hearing, defendant testified that at the time of the PSA "I was not making 

a commitment to pay [] half of [their child's] tuition, 15 years in the 

future. . . . And, freshman year, I gave it a shot and I just could not continue to 

do it." 

In an oral decision, the Family Part judge found defendant violated the

terms of the PSA by failing to contribute to their child's college tuition and 

expenses. The court noted the parties jointly participated in their child's college 

selection—having specifically considered Syracuse's accelerated engineering 

program and work-study. Although it found, "no obligation in their agreement 

or subsequent written document confirming . . . that they would each pay 50/50 
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of the cost," the court concluded the parties "anticipated sharing these expenses 

based on the guidelines percentages that are in effect at the time that the child 

attends college," based on the explicit language of the PSA. The court granted 

plaintiff's motion in-part—declining to equally divide college tuition—finding 

that defendant violated litigant's rights by prematurely claiming their child on 

his 2021 tax returns, clarified that plaintiff was entitled to claim the child in odd 

years, and continued defendant's child support obligation, stating "there's no 

motion before me to modify." 

In its subsequent written decision on plaintiff's fee application, the court 

noted that "[d]efendant did not file a cross-motion, and thus, [d]efendant does 

not have any requests pending before the [c]ourt at this time." The court further 

found that it was "unable to make findings on [d]efendant’s current financial 

circumstances as the record properly before the [c]ourt today is silent regarding 

same." 

Defendant appeals and presents the following arguments: 

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY MISSTATING 

THE PARTIES' PSA AND INACCURATELY 

LIMITING STUDENT LOANS TO "SUBSIDIZED" 

LOANS. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE 

SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF THE PSA THAT MAKES 
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THE STUDENT SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR 

REPAYMENT OF HIS STUDENT LOANS. 

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 

ASSESSING THE PARTIES' CURRENT ABILITY 

TO PAY AND PROPORTIONAL INCOME, BUT 

RATHER RELYING ON A CALCULATION FROM 

2012. 

IV. (NOT RAISED BELOW) THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD A PLENARY 

HEARING REGARDING COLLEGE 

CONTRIBUTION. 

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 

MODIFYING DEFENDANT’S CHILD SUPPORT 

OBLIGATION BASED ON THE CHILD NO 

LONGER RESIDING WITH PLAINTIFF. 

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT 

ADDRESSING THE AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF 

SOUGHT BY DEFENDANT AND IGNORING 

WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSTRUED AS A 

CROSS-MOTION. 

We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because 

of that court's special expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 

394, 411-12 (1998). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal 

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special 

deference." Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 

(1995). 
7 A-1040-22 

Matrimonial and property settlement agreements are governed by basic 

contract principles and, as such, courts should discern and implement the parties' 

intentions. J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013). "It is not the function of the 

court to rewrite or revise an agreement when the intent of the parties is clear." 

Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016) (citing J.B., 215 N.J. at 326). Thus, the 

court must "discern and implement 'the common intention of the parties[,]' and 

'enforce [the mutual agreement] as written.'" Id. at 46 (first quoting Tessmar v. 

Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201 (1957); then quoting Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 

33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960)). "Accordingly, [PSAs] should be enforced so long as 

they are consensual, voluntary, conscionable, and not the result of fraud or 

overreaching," or if they are wholly unconscionable when made. Satz v. Satz, 

476 N.J. Super. 536, 551 (App. Div. 2023) (first citing Weishaus v. Weishaus, 

180 N.J. 131, 143–44 (2004); then citing Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. 

Super. 531, 541 (App. Div. 1992)).

Defendant argues that under the PSA, "[the child's] loans shall be [the 

child's] responsibility unless the parties voluntarily decide to contribute," and 

thus he argues "the parties shall have no obligation to pay for [the child's] loans." 

Defendant further argues that no review of child support upon the child's entry 

into college was conducted, as provided for under the PSA. Plaintiff filed no 
8 A-1040-22 

responsive brief in this appeal and has since abandoned her cross-appeal for 

counsel fees. 

We are persuaded the Family court based its decision on the parties' PSA, 

those language was clear and required no interpretation. Although we can 

appreciate the financial impact on defendant in having to contribute towards the 

substantial costs of college tuition and related expenses, the Family court did 

not err in enforcing his obligation under the plain language of the PSA. As the 

court stated, the parties jointly participated in their child's college selection—

having specifically considered Syracuse University's accelerated engineering 

program and work-study—and the PSA evidences an agreement to share those 

costs. Moreover, PSAs "should be enforced so long as they are consensual, 

voluntary, conscionable, and not the result of fraud or overreaching." Satz, 476 

N.J. Super. at 551. Defendant makes no such challenge to the PSA. 

The parties' PSA explicitly provides that "[t]he parties anticipate sharing 

these expenses based on the guidelines percentages that are in effect at the time 

the child attends college." The court according denied that aspect of plaintiff's 

motion seeking the parties shared tuition expenses equally as it was contrary to 

the terms of their agreement. We discern no error in the court's findings which 

were based on the express terms of the PSA. 
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Similarly, the court did not err by confining its ruling to the issues 

properly before it in the motion and by declining to construe defendant's 

"answer" and arguments as a cross-motion. Defendant did not file a formal 

motion requesting any relief, nor did he file a case information statement (CIS) 

as required under our court rules: 

when a motion or cross-motion is brought for the entry 

or modification of an order or judgment for alimony or 

child support based on changed circumstances, the 

pleading filed in support of the motion shall have 

appended to it a copy of the prior [CIS] or statements 

filed before entry of the order or judgment sought to be 

modified and a copy of a current [CIS]. 

[R. 5:5-4.]

Thus, we discern no basis for the court to have gone beyond the motion 

that was before it to sua sponte consider any other issues. Contrary to 

defendant's arguments, the court had no basis to convert his answer to an 

application for modification of his child support obligation. As the court 

indicated, it was "unable to make findings on [d]efendant’s current financial 

circumstances as the record properly before the [c]ourt today is silent regarding 

same." At the hearing, defendant testified his income in 2012 was only $29,000 

and fell significantly short of the $80,000 imputed to him at that time. However, 
10 A-1040-22 

he does not make any representations about his current income other than to 

assert it hasn't changed much. 

Based on this record, defendant voluntarily paid one half of the child's 

tuition during the first year. Although defendant's financial circumstances may 

have changed, he presented the court with no reliable evidence, such as a CIS, 

which would have set forth his income and expenses, of that purported fact. Our 

Court Rules provide a mechanism for review of support obligations due to a 

change in circumstances, which defendant did not avail himself of. See R. 5:5-

4. Instead, defendant engaged in self-help by claiming the child as a dependent 

on plaintiff's year. 

Having reviewed this record, we are satisfied the court fairly resolved the 

issues before it and did not abuse its discretion. Defendant was not entitled to 

the relief he now seeks on appeal in the absence of a motion and the filing of a 

complete CIS and other pertinent financial information. Defendant cannot avail 

himself of the benefits of financial relief from his obligations while shielding 

his finances. 

We conclude defendant's remaining arguments are without merit and do 

not warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11–3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.