ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Nicholas T. Otis

LaPorte, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________

In the

Indiana Supreme Court

No. 75S03-1401-CR-13

ROBERT CORBIN,

Appellant (Defendant below),

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellee (Plaintiff below).

_________________________________

Appeal from the Starke Circuit Court

No. 75C01-1204-FD-72

The Honorable Kim Hall, Judge

_________________________________

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 75A03-1209-CR-402 

_________________________________

September 30, 2014

Per Curiam.

This interlocutory appeal challenges the trial court’s refusal to dismiss charges of 

attempted child seduction. We affirm the trial court. 
2

The allegations are that Robert Corbin, a teacher and coach, communicated via an 

internet site (Facebook.com) with a sixteen-year-old student; on one day, he asked the student to 

“take care of” his sexual arousal and sneak out of the house after the adults were asleep so 

Corbin could drive over and pick up the student, and the next day, Corbin inquired about the size 

of the student’s breasts and again asked the student to sneak out so he could see them. Corbin 

was charged with two counts of attempted child seduction. A teacher who engages in touching 

or fondling a student age sixteen to eighteen years of age with the intent to arouse or satisfy the 

sexual desires of the teacher or the student commits “child seduction,” a class D felony, though 

“solicitation” of a student of that age, without more, is not a crime under the child solicitation 

statute. See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-4-6 (child solicitation) & 7 (child seduction). As relevant here, a 

person “attempts” to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission 

of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a “substantial step” toward commission of 

the crime. See I.C. § 35-41-5-1 (2008). 

Relying primarily on Ward v. State, 528 N.E.2d 52 (Ind. 1988), Corbin moved to dismiss 

the charges on grounds the online solicitation was not aimed at the “immediate commission of a 

crime.” (Appendix, p. 18.) See I.C. § 35-34-1-4(a)(5) (specifying that a trial court may dismiss 

charges when “the facts stated do not constitute an offense”).

The trial court denied Corbin’s motion to dismiss but certified the issue for an Appellate 

Rule 14(B) interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals accepted.

Reviewing for an abuse of discretion and taking the facts alleged in the charging 

document as true, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. See Corbin v. State, 999 N.E.2d 

70, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), vacated. The Court of Appeals concluded that as a matter of law, the 

internet solicitations did not constitute a substantial step toward the crime of child seduction 

because Corbin’s requests were simply an invitation to the student, not the required “urging” or 

“persuasion” discussed in Ward, and in any event because the requests were not made in the 

student’s presence, the student was never in a position to submit to the solicitation so the 

requests related to future conduct, not the immediate commission of a crime. We granted transfer 

of jurisdiction, Corbin v. State, 1 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2014) (table), and heard oral argument.
3

In Ward, this Court addressed the question whether solicitation of a child may suffice for 

conviction of attempted child molesting. 528 N.E.2d at 52. We noted, as stated in the Court of 

Appeals opinion, that what constitutes an attempt offense in the area of sex offenses against 

children can, on occasion, be determined as a matter of law, but often, the question involves

subtle distinctions in behavior and the nuance of the context in which the behavior occurs. One 

difference between Corbin’s case and most of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals, including 

Ward, is those cases involved review of a conviction after all of the evidence had been presented.

Corbin’s case, by contrast, is in the charging stage, when other evidence, if there is any, is not 

yet known. And for the most part, the charges against him reflect the language of the seduction

statute. At this point, we simply cannot say that dismissal is required and we conclude there are 

enough unanswered questions to affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. In short, 

the charges match the statutory elements and are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss at this 

time. 

Having previously granted transfer, we affirm the trial court and remand the case for 

further proceedings.

All Justices concur.