SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc

JOHN COOMER, ) ) Appellant, ) ) vs. ) No. SC93214 ) KANSAS CITY ROYALS ) BASEBALL CORPORATION, ) ) Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY The Honorable W. Brent Powell, Judge Opinion issued June 24, 2014 John Coomer claims he was injured wh en he was hit in th e eye with a hotdog thrown by Sluggerrr, the Kansas City Royals mascot. Coom er sued the Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation, claiming the te am is responsible for Sluggerrr’s negligence and the damages it caused. A jury found in favor of the Royals, and Coomer appeals. Among the jury instructions wa s one asking the jury to deci de whether the risk of being injured by Sluggerrr’s hotdo g toss is one of the inherent risks of watching a Royals home game that Coomer assumed merely by attending. Whether a particular risk is inherent in watching a sporting event is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. This Court holds that the risk of being injured by Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss is not one of the inherent risks of watching a Royals home game.In the past, this Court has held that spectators cannot sue a baseball team for injuries caused when a ball or bat enters the st ands. Such risks are an unavoidable – even desirable – part of the joy that comes with being close enough to the Great American Pastime to smell the new-mown gr ass, to hear the crack of 42 inches of solid ash meeting a 95-mph fastball, or to watch a diving thir d baseman turn a heart-rending triple into a soul-soaring double-play. Th e risk of being injured by Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss, on the other hand, is not an unavoidable part of watchi ng the Royals play baseball. That risk is no more inherent in watching a game of base ball than it is inherent in watching a rock concert, a monster truck rally, or any other assemblage where free fo od or T-shirts are tossed into the crowd to increase excitement and boost attendance. Accordingly, Coomer’s claim is not fo reclosed by the assu mption of the risk doctrine. Instead, it is up to the jury to decide: (1) whether Sluggerrr inju red Coomer by hitting him with a hotdog, and (2) whether Sluggerrr was neglig ent in doing so . If so, the jury is entitled to hold the Royals liable for Coomer’s da mages, and the jury is entitled to reduce those damages by whatever percentage of fault the evid ence shows should be assessed to Coomer. Because the jury instructions given below introduced an improper consideration into this otherwise ordinary analysis, the Court vacates the judgment in favor of the Royals and remands this case. Background Coomer is a longtime baseball fan and frequent spectator at Royals games in Kauffman Stadium. On Sept ember 8, 2009, he brought his father along to watch the Royals host the Detroit Tigers. Only abou t 12,000 people were on hand to watch thegame because it had rained most of the day. With such a small crowd, Coomer and his father left their assigned seats early in th e game and moved to empty seats six rows behind the visitor’s dugout. Shortly after Coomer changed seats, Sl uggerrr mounted the visitor’s dugout to begin the “Hotdog Launch,” a feature of ev ery Royals home game since 2000. The launch occurs between innings, when Sluggerrr uses an air gun to shoot hotdogs from the roof of the visitor’s dugout to fans s eated beyond hand-to ssing range. When his assistants are reloading the air gun, Slugge rrr tosses hotdogs by hand to the fans seated nearby. Sluggerrr generally tossed the hot dogs underhand while facing the fans but sometimes throws overhand, be hind his back, and side-armed. Coomer estimates that he attended 17 5 Royals games before this game in September 2009. He admits that he freque ntly watched Sluggerrr toss hotdogs from the roof of the visitor’s dugout and, on September 8, he saw Sluggerrr mount the dugout to begin the Hotdog Launch. Coomer and his fa ther were seated approximately 15 to 20 feet from Sluggerrr, directly in his view. Af ter employing his hotdog-shaped airgun to send hotdogs to distant fans, Sluggerrr began to toss hotdogs by hand to fans seated near Coomer. Coomer testified that he saw Sl uggerrr turn away from the crowd as if to prepare for a behind-the-back th row, but, because Coomer chos e that moment to turn and look at the scoreboard, he ad mits he never saw Sluggerrr thro w the hotdog that he claims injured him. Coomer testified only that a “split second later ... something hit me in the face,” and he described the bl ow as “pretty forceful.”

3Coomer did not report this incident to the Royals when it happened because he did not realize he had been injured. Instead, he stayed for most of the rest of Tuesday’s game (a thrilling 7-5 effort that snapped the firs t-place Tigers’ six-game winning streak) and even returned to Kauffmann Stadium the following night to witness the Royals’ further 5-1 drubbing of the Tigers. Thursday morn ing, however, Coomer felt he was “seeing differently” and something “wasn’t right” with his left eye. The problem progressed until, approximately eight days after th e incident, Coomer saw a doctor and was diagnosed with a detached retina. Coomer unde rwent surgeries to repair the retina and to remove a “traumatic cata ract” in the same eye. Coomer reported his injury to the Royals in September 2009, eight days after it occurred. In February 2010, Coomer filed th is lawsuit alleging one count of negligence and one count of battery. 1 Regarding the negligence coun t, Coomer asserted that the Royals (through its employee, Sluggerrr) failed to exercise ordinary care in throwing hotdogs into the stands, that the team failed to adequately train Sluggerrr on how to throw hotdogs into the stand safely, and that the team failed to adequately supervise Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss. In its answer, the Royals adm itted responsibility fo r Sluggerrr’s acts but denied he had been negligen t. The Royals also assert ed affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and comparative fault. The Royals employee who portrays Sluggerrr testified at trial he did not remember the throw that allegedly injure d Coomer. He admitted that the Royals had given him no

1 The trial court dismissed the battery claim in a partial summary judgment, and Coomer does not appeal that dismissal.

4specific training on how to toss hotdogs, but testified that he was aware that fans could be hurt and that he was careful in making his to sses. For example, when a fan is seated nearby, Sluggerrr said he tries to make eye c ontact before tossing a hotdog so that the fan will know it is coming and – if the fan is seat ed near enough – tries to throw the hotdog in an arc to make it easier to catch. In addition to hearing Sl uggerrr’s testimony and Coomer’s description of the incident, the jury heard testimony from another fan who claimed to have been in jured by a hotdog toss fro m Sluggerrr under similar circumstances. At the close of the evidence, Coomer moved for a directed verdict on the issues of comparative fault and assumptio n of the risk. He argued th at implied primary assumption of the risk “only applies to risks that are inhere nt in the nature of the activity” and, in this case, “the harm of getting hit with a hotdog ha s absolutely no relati onship to going to a baseball game.” Regarding comparative fault, Coomer argued that, as a matter of law, he cannot have been negligent me rely for not fleeing his seat during the Hotdog Launch. The trial court overruled Coomer’s motion, hol ding that both (a) whether the risk of being injured by Sluggerrr’s hotd og toss is one of the risks inherent in watching a Royals game and (b) the reasonableness of Coomer’s ac tions were proper questions for the jury. In preparing the jury instructions, the Royals pro posed adding a “tail” to Instruction No. 9 (i.e., the ve rdict director for Coomer’s negligence claim). This tail directs the jury to Instructi on No. 11, which asks the jury to decide whet her injury from Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss is an inherent risk of watching the Royals play baseball. The Royals’ proposed instructions, as given, read:

5Instruction No. 9 In your verdict you must assess a percen tage of fault to the defendant if you believe: First, defendant’s employee threw a hotdog that hit plaintiff; and Second, defendant’s employee was thereby negligence [sic], and Third, as a direct result of su ch negligence plaintiff sustained damage, unless you believe plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction No. 11. Instruction No. 11: In your verdict you must not assess a pe rcentage of fault to defendant if you believe: First, the risk of suffering an in jury by being struck by a hotdog thrown in a manner in which Sluggerrr threw the hotdog that plaintiff alleges struck him was a risk inherent in attending a game at Royals’ Stadium, and Second, plaintiff comprehend ed the actual risk, and Third, plaintiff intelligently accepted the risk. Coomer objected to Instruction No. 11 (and to the tail on Instruction No. 9 directing the jury to that inst ruction) on the same grounds ra ised in his directed verdict motion. In addition, Coomer objected to the Royals’ proposed comparative fault instruction, 2 arguing that there was insufficient evid ence to submit this i ssue to the jury. The trial court overruled Coomer’s objections.

2 Instruction No. 12 submitted comparat ive fault to the jury as follows: In your verdict you must assess a percenta ge of fault to plaintiff if you believe: First, either: plaintiff observed the manner in wh ich the “Hotdog Launch” was being conducted on September 8, 2009, and with su ch knowledge, he stayed in the area where the “Hotdog Launch” was being conducted, or

6The jury returned a ve rdict in favor of the Royals. Th e verdict form states that the jury assessed zero percent of fa ult to the Royals and 100 perc ent of fault to Coomer, but it does not disclose the basis for this decision. Coomer moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new tria l based on the arguments asserted in his directed verdict motion and in his objections to the jury instructi ons. The trial court overruled Coomer’s motions an d entered judgment for the Roya ls. Coomer appeals and, after granting transfer, this Court has jurisdiction. See Mo. Const. art. V, § 10. Standard of Review This Court reviews claims of instructional error de novo

. Hervey v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections , 379 S.W.3d 156, 159 (Mo. banc 20 12). The Court will not vacate a judgment on the basis of such an error, however, unless that error materially affected the merits of the action. Id . Accordingly, “the party challe nging the instruction must show that the offending instruction misdirected, mi sled, or confused the jury, resulting in prejudice to the party cha llenging the instruction.” Id . (citation omitted). Analysis This case presents the question of whet her the century-old affirmative defense commonly referred to as “assumption of the risk” survived this Court’s adoption of comparative fault in Gustafson v. Benda , 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. banc 1983). To the extent

plaintiff unreasonably failed to appreciate the risks associated with the manner in which the “Hotdog Launch” was being conducted on September 8, 2009, and Second, plaintiff, in any one or more of th e respects submitted in paragraph First, was thereby negligent, and Third, such negligence of plaintiff directly caused or directly cont ributed to cause any damage plaintiff may have sustained.

7it survives, Coomer claims that the applicatio n of this doctrine is to be decided by the court and not the jury. The Co urt agrees. Because the trial court erred in submitting the question of assumption of the risk to the jury, the ju dgment in this case must be vacated and the matter remanded. I. Assumption of the Risk in a post- Gustafson World It is safe to say that judicial analysis and application of assumption of the risk doctrine has not always achieved high marks for clarity and precision. Historically, courts often failed to draw or maintain important distincti ons between this doctrine and defenses such as contributory negligence, which, though they may have seemed similar to assumption of the risk, were quite different. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk , 50 UCLA L. Rev. 481, 486 (2002) (“ Reflections ”). Admittedly, those distinctions seldom made any difference as a practical matter because any of these often-overlapping defenses was sufficient to bar completely all re covery by the plaintiff. At least this was so before the advent of co mparative fault. Because Gustafson rejects the complete defense of contributory negligence in favor of the partial defense of comparative fault, greater precision is required when analyzing claims of assumptions of the risk. The assumption of the risk doctrine wa s a relative late-comer in the law of negligence. See William Prosser, H ANDBOOK OF THE L AW OF T ORTS , at 376 (1941) (hereinafter, “ P ROSSER ON T ORTS ”) (identifying 1809 as the earliest use of the defense in a negligence action). The basic principle of th is defense is easily stated: if a person voluntarily consents to accept th e danger of a known and appreciated risk, that person may not sue another for failing to protect him from it. See Ross v. Clouser , 637 S.W.2d

811, 14 (Mo. banc 1982) (recove ry is barred when the plaintiff “comprehended the actual danger and intelligently acquies ced in it”). In practice, however, this principle proved easier to state than to apply. The simplest application of this doctrine recognizes that, when a plaintiff makes an express statement that he is voluntarily accepting a specified risk, the plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for an injury resulting from that risk. This application (i.e., “express assumption of the risk”) most often involves a written waiver or release by the would-be plaintiff, but it can be based on any form of any explicit acquiescence.
P

ROSSER ON T ORTS , at 376; Reflections , 50 UCLA L. Rev. at 486-87. In most cases, however, the plaintiff’s cons ent cannot be proved so easily. There, the defendant contends that the plain tiff’s voluntary accept ance of a known and appreciated risk should be inferred from th e plaintiff’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances. P ROSSER ON T ORTS , at 376. Though the distinction seldom was noted before the adoption of comparative fault, this category of implied – rather than expressed – assumption of the risk incl udes two very different appl ications of this doctrine: “implied primary assumption of the risk” and “implied secondary assumption of the risk.” The difference between these applications is the type – or, more precisely, the source – of the risk at issue. Reflections , 50 UCLA L. Rev. at 487-89. When the risk arises from the circ umstances (e.g., fro m a condition on the defendant’s property or the inherent nature of the defendant’s activ ity), “implied primary assumption of the risk” comp letely bars recovery by a plaintiff who knowingly and voluntarily encounters that risk. Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., Inc. , 787 S.W.2d 708, 711-12

9(Mo. banc 1990); Reflections , 50 UCLA L. Rev. at 487-88. When the risk is created by defendant’s negligence, on the other hand, this has been identified as “implied secondary assumption of the risk.” Lewis v. Snow Creek, Inc. , 6 S.W.3d 388, 395 (Mo. App. 1999); Reflections , 50 UCLA L. Rev. at 489. Understandably, courts were less willing to bar all recovery in the latter circumstance unless th e plaintiff not only kn owingly and voluntarily acquiesced in the risk created by the defendant ’s negligence but also acted unreasonably in doing so. Id. Accordingly, prior to the advent of co mparative fault, a plaintiff’s claim was barred completely by assumption of the risk if the plaintiff (a) expressly consented to assume a known and understood risk (i.e ., “express assumption of the risk”); (b) implicitly consented (based on his conduct and surrounding ci rcumstances) to assume a known and understood risk that was not created by the defe ndant’s own negligence (i.e., “implied primary assumption of the risk”); or (c) implicitly consented (based on his conduct and surrounding circumstances) to assume a known and understood risk that resulted from the defendant’s own negligen ce, provided that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in doing so (i.e ., “implied secondary assumption of the risk”). Though all three were lumped together un der the heading of assumption of the risk and treated as affirmative defenses, only the latter app lication was properly viewed as such. The version of comparative fa ult adopted by this Court in Gustafson fundamentally altered this landscape. Sectio n 1(a) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (the “UCFA”) provides that “any contributory fault chargeable to th e claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compen satory damages for an injury attributable

10to the claimant's contributory fau lt, but does not bar recovery.” Gustafson , 661 S.W.2d at 18 (quoting from the UCFA, which is set forth in fu ll in an appendix to that opinion). Section 1(b) of the UCFA defines “fault” for purposes of section 1(a) to include “unreasonable assumption of risk not cons tituting an enforceable express consent.” Id

. As a result, Gustafson , rejects any further applic ation of “implied secondary assumption of the risk.” When a plaintiff acts unreasonably in deciding to assume a risk created by a defendant’s neg ligence, such “fault” may reduce – but not bar – the plaintiff’s recovery under Gustafson . By the same token, when the plaintiff’s decision was reasonable, it cannot be used to reduce his recovery because reasonable behavior does not constitute “fault” under the UCFA. Reflections , 50 UCLA L. Rev. at 489 (noting that the “predominan t modern position” of most courts and the Restatement (Third) of Torts is that secondary implied as sumption of the risk ha s be assimilated into comparative fault).
But Gustafson does not reject or abandon “expr ess assumption of the risk.” Though this application of th e assumption of the risk doctrin e always has been subject to certain limitations as a matter of public policy, 3 Gustafson and the adoption of comparative fault have no effect on this applic ation or its limitations. This is because, in

3 When considering a claim of express assumpti on of the risk, language in a document offered by a defendant as evidence of the plainti ff’s “consent” must be “clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous language in order to release a party from his or her own future negligence.” Alack v. Vic Tanny Int’l of Missouri, Inc. , 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo. banc 1996). The presence or absence of ambiguity in such a writing is a question for th e court to decide as a matter of law. Id. Moreover, even when the plaintiff consents unambiguously in writing, this Court will refuse to enforce such consent in so me situations because “one may never exonerate oneself from future liability fo r intentional torts or for gro ss negligence, or for activities involving the public interest.” Id.

11an “express assumption of the risk” case, the plaintiff’s consent relie ves the defendant of any duty to protect the plaintiff from injury . As a result, the defendant cannot be negligent and there is no “fault” to which the jury can comp are the plaintiff’s fault. Gustafson , 661 S.W.2d at 18 (“fault” does not include “enforceable express consent”). By the same token, Gustafson has no effect on the con tinued viability of “implied primary assumption of the risk.” Gustafson , 661 S.W.2d at 20 (“the term [“fault”] does not include ... a lack of violation of duty by the defendant (as in the failure of a landowner to warn a licensee of a patent da nger on the premises)”). This is because, under the law of Missouri and most other ju risdictions, implied primary assumption of the risk “is not really an affirmative defense ; rather, it indicates that the defendant did not even owe the plaintiff any duty of care .” Krause , 787 S.W.2d at 711-12 (emphasis added). 4 With no duty to protec t the plaintiff, the defendant cannot be negligent and there is no “fault” for the jury to compare und er comparative fault principles. Missouri’s characterization of the implied primary assumption of the risk doctrine in terms of “duty” is decidedly mainstream: Like express assumption of the risk, “‘primary’ implied assumption of the risk .... is really a principle of no dut y, or no negligence, and so denies the existence of any cause of action.”

4 See also Harris v. Niehaus , 857 S.W.2d 222, 227 (Mo. banc 1993) (even after comparative fault, the open and obvious nature of the risks is an issue for the court to use “ in determining a possessor of land’s standard of care ”) (emphasis added); Sheppard v. Midway R-1 Sch. Dist. , 904 S.W.2d 257, 261-62 (Mo. App. 1995) (“Implied primary assumption of risk, like express assumption of risk, relates to the initial issue of whether the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff”) (emphasis added); Lewis , 6 S.W.3d at 395-96 (“if the plain tiff’s injury is the result of a risk inherent in the sport in which he was part icipating, the defendant is relieved from liability on the grounds that by participating in the sport, the plaintiff assumed the risk and the defendant never owed the plaintiff a duty to protect him from that risk”) (emphasis added).

12W. Page Keeton, P ROSSER AND K EETON ON T ORTS , at 496-97 (5th ed. 1984). 5 Accordingly, when the pl aintiff is injured by the de fendant’s negligence, this Court holds that the adopti on of comparative fault in Gustafson precludes any consideration of the plainti ff’s conduct in assuming that risk (i.e., implied secondary assumption of the risk) except as a partial defense under a proper comparative fault instruction. Conversely, because the “expre ss” and “implied primary” applications of assumption of the risk result in determinations that the de fendant has no duty to protect the plaintiff, the form of co mparative fault adopted in Gustafson does not preclude these applications as a complete – not merely a partial – bar to the plaintiff’s recovery. II. Implied Primary Assumption of the Risk and the “Baseball Rule” One of the most interesting – and certainly the most re levant – applications of implied primary assumption of the risk invol ves certain risks assumed by spectators at sporting events. Long before the Kansas City Athletics moved to Oakland and the fledging Royals joined the Junior Circuit, an overwhelming majority of courts recognized that spectators at sporting events are exposed to certain risks that are inherent merely in watching the contest. Accordingly, under what is described above as implied primary assumption of the risk, these c ourts held that the home team was not liable to a spectator injured as a result of such risks. See Augustine, Who Is Responsible When Spectators Are

5 See also Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. , 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 184, (1986) (deciding as a matter of law that “Dodgers were under no duty to do anything further to protect her from that [foul ball] hazard”) (emphasis added); Friedman v. Houston Sports Ass’n , 731 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. App. 1987) (deciding as a matter of law that “stadium owner has no duty to warn spectators of the danger of f oul balls”) (emphasis added); When Spectators Are Injured , 2008 Den. U. Sports & Ent. L.J. at 42-46 (collecting cases).

13Injured While Attending Pr ofessional Sporting Events? , 2008 Den. U. Sports & Ent. L.J. 39, 42-46 (2008) (“ When Spectators Are Injured ”). The archetypal example of this applicati on of implied primary assumption of the risk is when a baseball park owner fails to protect each and every spectator from the risk of being injured by a ball or bat flying into the stands. Just as Missouri teams have led (and continue to lead) professional baseball on the field, Missouri courts helped lead the nation in defining this area of the law off the field. More than 50 years ago, this Court was one of the first to articulat e the so-called “Baseball Rule:” [W]here a baseball game is being con ducted under the customary and usual conditions prevailing in baseball parks, it is not negligen ce to fail to protect all seats in the park by wire netting ; and that the special circumstances and specific negligence pleaded did not aid plaintiff or impose upon the defendant a duty to warn him ag ainst hazards which are necessarily incident to baseball and are perfectly obvious to a person in possession of his faculties. Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club , 231 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo. 1950) (emphasis added). 6
Anderson was based on this Court’s earlier decision in Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club , 164 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Mo. 1942), whic h used the “no dut y” language of implied primary assumption of the risk to explain its holding: The basis of the proprietor’s liability is his superior knowledge and if his invitee knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because

6 This “no duty” or “limited duty” rule for claims by baseball spectators has been dubbed the Baseball Rule and has been adopted by ever y court to consider it, save one. Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc. , 635 N.W.2d 219, 221 (2001(Mic h. App.) (“review of precedents from other jurisdictions finds overwhelming, if not universal, support for th e limited duty rule,” and noting that the contrary decisions in Illinois were overruled by statute).

14the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting, in view of his know ledge, assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition.

Hudson , 164 S.W.2d at 323 (emphasis added) (a pplying Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343). Hudson involved a spectator with personal kno wledge of the inherent risk of being injured by a foul ball while watching a baseball game. But, when the Court returned to this same is sue eight years later in Anderson , it continued to rely on section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (i .e., the “open and obvious dangers” doctrine under the rules of premises liability) to exte nd Missouri’s no-duty rule to cases involving baseball spectators with no prior knowledge of baseball or the risks inherent in watching it. All of the cases cited here and many others which are cited in Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, supra , emphasize that when due care has been exercised to provide a reasonable number of screened seats, there remains a hazard that spectators in unscreened seats may be struck and injured by balls which are fouled or otherw ise driven into the stands. This risk is a necessary and inherent part of the game and remains after ordinary care has been exercised to provide the spectators with seats which are reasonably safe. It is a risk which is assumed by the spectators because it remains after due care has been exerci sed and is not the result of negligence on the part of the baseball club. It is clearly not an unreasonable risk to spectators which imposes a duty to warn [or protect].

Anderson , 231 S.W.2d at 173 (emphasis added). 7

7 This use of an objective standard based on what a defendant reasonably can expect, rather than a subjective standard based on what a plainti ff actually knew and understood, is one of the key distinctions between the primary and secondary va rieties of implied assump tion of the risk that went unnoticed until comparative fault. It also explains why, before comparative fault, the former was decided by the court as a question of the defendant’s “duty,” while the latter was usually decided by the jury as an affirmative defense. As noted above, Gustafson merges the latter into the jury’s consideration of comparativ e fault but leaves the former to be decided by the court just as before. See Harris , 857 S.W.2d at 227 (notwithst anding Court’s adoption of

15Anderson and Hudson are just two of the many dozens of cases 8 around the country holding that, as long as some seats di rectly behind home plate are protected, the team owes “no duty” to spectators outside th at area who are injured by a ball or bat while watching a baseball game. 9 Despite being decided by such different courts across so many decades, all of these cases reflect certain shared principles. First, it is not possible for baseball players to play the game without occasionally sending balls or bats (or parts of bats) into the stands, sometimes at unsaf e speeds. Second, it is not possible for the home team to protect each a nd every spectator from such risks without fundamentally altering the game or the spectators’ experien ce of watching it through such means as: (a) substituting foam rubber balls and bats that will not injure anyone (or be very fun to watch); (b) erecting a screen or other ba rrier around the entire field protecting all

comparative fault, “open and obviousness of a condition [continues] as a consideration for the court in determining a possessor of land’s standard of care”) (emphasis added).

8 See Zitter, Liability to Spectator at Ba seball Game Who Is Hit by Ball or Injured as Result of Other Hazards of Game—Failure to Prov ide or Maintain Sufficient Screening , 82 A.L.R.6th 417 (2013) ( superseding Rigelhaupt, Liability to spectator at base ball game who is hit by ball or injured as result of other hazards of game , 91 A.L.R.3d 24 (1979), and Liability to spectator at baseball game who is hit by a ball or injured as result of other hazards of the game , 142 A.L.R. 868 (1943)) (“ Liability to Spectator ”). 9 This “limited duty” to screen only certain se ats is an anachronism, far less meaningful today than in the days before box seats, season ticke ts, and sellout crowds. As one court noted: Were we deciding this issue without the precedent ... we would not be persuaded that there is a need to impose a duty to provide any screened seats. A person who fears injury always has the option of refr aining from attending a baseball game or of sitting in a part of the park which is out of reach of balls traveling with sufficient velocity to cause harm. In any event, the duty seem s to be one of little practical value. The injured person is alwa ys going to be one who is seated in an unscreened area and, who ... would be preclude d from recovering regardless of the reason why he or she elected to sit there. Los Angeles Dodgers , 185 Cal. App. 3d at 182 (emphasis added).

16spectators while obstructing their view an d making them feel more removed from the action; or (c) moving all spectators at le ast 600 feet away from home plate in all directions. 10 Third, ordinary negligence principl es do not produce reliably acceptable results in these circumstances because the risk of injury (and the extent of the harm) to spectators is substantial, 11 yet the justification for not prot ecting spectators from that risk can be expressed only in terms of the amusem ent or entertainment value of watching the sport that brought the spectators to the stadium in the first place. 12 Against this background, Anderson and Hudson (and dozens of Baseball Rule cases around the country) represent a conscious decision to favor th e collective interests of all spectators by rejecting as a matter of law the individual claims of injured spectators. Using the rules of premises liability and th e rationale now identified as implied primary assumption of the risk, these decisions protect the home team from liability fo r risks that are inherent in watching a baseball game base d on the team’s failure to take steps that

10 Los Angeles Dodgers , 185 Cal. App. 3d at 181 (“As we see it, to permit plaintiff to recover under the circumstances here would force baseball stadium owners to do one of two things: place all spectator areas behind a pr otective screen, thereby reducing the quality of everyone’s view, and since players are often able to reach into the spectator area to catch foul balls, changing the very nature of the game itself; or continue the status quo and incr ease the price of tickets to cover the cost of compensating injured persons with th e attendant result that persons of meager means might be ‘priced out’ of enjoyi ng the great American pastime.”)

11 One study found injuries from foul balls in major league ballparks occur at a rate of 35.1 injuries per million spectator visits. See When Spectators Are Injured , 2008 Den. U. Sports & Ent. L.J. at 39 n.3. For teams like the Royals, with more than 1.7 million in home attendance each season, this equates to approximately 60 injured fans per year.

12 As one court noted, the “logical result of ha ving these [baseball] cas es governed by usual invitor-invitee prin ciples of liability [wit hout adjusting for “open and obvious” risks] would be that warned against in Akins : ‘[E]very spectator injured by a foul ball, no matter where he is seated or standing in th e ball park, would have an absolute ri ght to go to the jury on every claim of negligence.’” Detroit Tigers, Inc. , 635 N.W.2d 219, 224-25 (Mich. App. 2001) ( quoting Akins v. Glen Falls City Sch. Dist. , 424 N.E.2d at 534).

17could defeat the reason spectators are there at all, i.e., to get as close as they can to the action without interfering with th e game they came to watch. 13 But the rationale for this rule – and, th erefore, the rule itself – extends only to those risks that the home team is powerle ss to alleviate without fundamentally altering the game or spectator’s enjoymen t of it. As a result, the solid wall of authority in support of the Baseball Rule is badly cracked in ca ses where a spectator is injured by a ball when the game is not underway or where fans ordinarily do expect to have to keep a careful lookout for balls or bats leaving the field. 14 This Court has not had to address such a question and does not do so now.

13 See Detroit Tigers , 635 N.W.2d at 222 (“there is inhere nt value in having most seats unprotected by a screen because base ball patrons generally want to be involved with the game in an intimate way and are even hoping that they wi ll come in contact with some projectile from the field (in the form of a souvenir baseball).”); Rudnick v. Golden W. Broadcasters , 156 Cal. App. 3d 793, 802 (1984) (“Reasonable screening is defined in the expectations of the fans and the traditions of the national pastime itself” because “the chance to apprehend a misdirected baseball is as much a part of the game as the sevent h inning stretch or pea nuts and Cracker Jack”); Akins , 424 N.E.2d at 533 (“many spectators prefer to sit where their view of the game is unobstructed by fences or protective netting and the proprieto r of a ball park has a legitimate interest in catering to these desires”); Liability to Spectator , 82 A.L.R.6th at 417 (“Part of the experience of attending a baseball game is that many of the do zens of baseballs used in each game are hit out of play into foul terr itory, into the backstop and screens, an d into the stands. Most fans would love to return from a game with a souvenir of the actual play, a nd some even bring gloves with them in the hope of making a catch.”). See also Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. , 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, C.J.) (“One w ho takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the ball. ... The timorous may stay at home.”). 14 See, e.g. , Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof’l Baseball Club, Inc. , 881 A.2d 700, 709 (N. J. 2005) (deciding as a matter of law that, “in areas outside of the stands, including concourses and mezzanines such as the one in this appeal, a comme rcial sports facility is no different than any other commercial establishment, and we do not hesi tate to apply general negligence principles”); Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp. , 394 A.2d 546, 551 (Pa. 1978) (deciding as a matter of law that “one who attends a baseball game as a spectator [cannot] prope rly be charged with anticipating as inherent to baseba ll the risk of being struck by a baseball while properly using an interior walkway”). But see Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC , 180 P.3d 1172, 1177 (Nev.

18Moreover, even though the “no duty” rationale of the Baseball Rule applies to risks inherent in watching a baseball game, the home team s till owes a duty of reasonable

care not to alter or increase such inherent risks. 15 One example, useful both for its facts and its analysis, is Lowe v. California Lea gue of Prof. Baseball , 56 Cal. App. 4th 112 (1997). There, the court began by explaining this “no duty” rationale: In the first instance, foul balls hit into the spectators’ area clearly create a risk of injury. If such foul balls were to be eliminated, it would be impossible to play the game. Thus, foul balls represent an inherent risk to spectators attending baseball games. Under Knight, such risk is assumed. Id . at 123 ( citing Knight v. Jewett , 834 P.2d 696, 698 (Cal. 1992)).
In Lowe , however, even though the plaintiff was struck by a foul ball, he claimed that his injuries were not caused by that inherent risk. Instead, the plaintiff claimed he was prevented from watching for foul balls because he was repeatedly jostled and

2008) (barring claim as a matter of law because sp ectator was injured while eating in concession area because “primary implied assumption of risk doctrine merely goes to the initial determination of whether the defendant’s legal duty encompasses the risk encountered by the plaintiff,” which is a question for the court); Loughran v. The Phillies , 888 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding as a matter of la w that, even though risk of bei ng injured by a ball tossed into the stands during a break in the game was not pa rt of the sport of baseball, such risks were inherent in watching professional baseball game s because such “activities [by players] have become inextricably intertwined with a fan’s baseball experience”); Sparks v. Sterling Doubleday Enterprises, LP. , 752 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80 (2002) (holding as a matter of law that team owed no duty beyond screening seats behind home plate and was not liable to member of high school band hit during batting practice while waiti ng to participate in pre-game ceremonies on opening day). 15 Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque , 241 P.3d 1086, 1097-98 (N.M. 2010) (“vast majority of jurisdictions that have addresse d the issue” hold that spectators “must exercise ordinary care to protect themselves from the inherent risk of being hit by a project ile that leaves the field of play and the owner/occupant must ex ercise ordinary care not to increase that inherent risk”); Knight v. Jewett , 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992) (“Alt hough [stadium owners] generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a [spectator] against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well established that [owners] generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks ... over and above those inhe rent in the sport.”).

19distracted by the team’s dinosaur mascot. The court agreed that the Baseball Rule did not bar such a claim: [ T]he key inquiry here is whether the risk which led to plaintiff’s injury involved some feature or aspect of the game which is inevitable or unavoidable in the actual playing of the game . ... Can [this] be said about the antics of the mascot? We think not . Actually, the ... person who dressed up as Tremor, recounted that there were occasional games played when he was not there. In view of th is testimony, as a matter of law, we hold that the antics of the mascot are not an essential or integral part of the playing of a baseball game. In short, the game can be played in the absence of such antics. Id . (emphasis added). Accordingly, even though implied pr imary assumption of the risk precludes recovery for injuries caused by the inherent risk of being h it by a foul ball while watching a baseball game, Lowe holds that the jury can hold the te am liable for such injuries if the negligence of its mascot altered or increase d that otherwise inherent risk and this negligence causes the pl aintiff’s injuries. See also Sheppard , 904 S.W.2d at 263-64 (even though the student cannot sue under im plied primary assumption of the risk for injuries resulting from inherent risk of a bad landing in hi gh school long-jump contest, the jury can hold the school district liable wh en the inherent risk of a bad landing was altered or increased by defendant’s neglig ence in preparing th e landing pit and this negligence caused the student’s injuries). 16

16 The Royals seek to distinguish Sheppard on the ground that it concerns participants rather than spectators. This distinction is more a pparent than real, howev er, because the implied primary assumption of the risk always is evaluated in term of participants. Baseball Rule cases, therefore, evaluate the inherent risks assumed by all who particip ate in the activity of watching a baseball game. True, those risks are different from the ones assumed by those who participate in the activity of playing baseball, but that is not a sufficient basi s to ignore well-researched and

20Accordingly, the proper application of implied primary assumption of the risk in this case – unaffected by Gustafson – is this: if Coomer was in jured by a risk that is an inherent part of watching the Royals play baseball, the team had no duty to protect him and cannot be liable for his injuries. But, if Coomer’s injury resulte d from a risk that is not an inherent part of watching baseball in person – or if the neg ligence of the Royals altered or increased one of these inherent risk s and caused Coomer’s injury – the jury is entitled to hold the Royals liable for such neg ligence and, to the extent the reasonableness of Coomer’s actions are in dispute, the ju ry must apportion fau lt between the parties using comparative fault principles. This appr oach has been used in Missouri and around the country. Therefore, in the sports context, under comparative fault, if the plaintiff’s injury is the result of a risk inhe rent in the sport in which he was participating, the defendant is relieved from liability on the grounds that by participating in the sport, the plaintiff assumed the risk and the defendant never owed the plaintiff a duty to protect him from that risk. If, on the other hand, the plai ntiff’s injury is the resu lt of negligence on the part of the defendant , the issue regarding the plai ntiff’s assumption of that risk and whether it was a reasonable assumption of risk, is an element of fault to be compared to the defendant’s negligence by the jury. Sheppard , 904 S.W.2d at 263-64 (emphasis added).

clearly written appellate decisions . Somewhat inconsistently, the Royals also argue that this Court should follow Sheppard and allow the jury to decide th e application of implied primary assumption of the risk. The Court already has held that this issue is to be decided as a matter of law, however, and the issue in Sheppard was causation, not inherent risk. A properly drafted verdict director is all that is needed to present the issue of cau sation, not a separate and likely confusing instruction regarding imp lied primary assumption of the risk.

21III. Implied Primary Assumption of the Risk is a Question of Law To this point, it appears that the Royals are in at least tac it agreement with the Court’s analysis. The Royals invoke the do ctrine of implied primary assumption of the risk by name and contend that, under this doctrine, it owed no duty to protect Coomer from the risk of inju ry from Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss becaus e that is an inherent risk Coomer assumed by attending a Royals game at Kauffman Stadium. The Royals contend, however, that the question of which risks qualif y as “inherent risks” for purposes of implied primary assumption of the ri sk is a question of fa ct for the jury to decide, not the court. The Court disagrees. As explained above, the doctrine of implied primary assumption of the risk negates any duty the de fendant otherwise may have owed the plaintiff. The question of whether and to what extent the defendant owes a duty to the plainti ff is always a question for the court, not the jury. Hoffman v. Union Elec. Co. , 176 S.W.3d 706, 708 (Mo. banc 2005). This principle is no less applicable wh en the question of duty arises in the context of implied primary assumption of the risk. See Krause , 787 S.W.2d at 711-12 (under Missouri law, implied primary assumption of the risk “is not really an affirmative defense; rather, it indicates that the defendant did not even owe the plaintiff any duty of care”); Harris , 857 S.W.2d at 227 (holding that, even after Gustafson , the open and obvious nature of the risks is an issue for the court to us e “in determining a possessor of land’s standard of care”). This answer is even clear er when the doctrine of im plied primary assumption of the risk arises in the context of claims by spec tators at a sporting even t. In such cases,

22this and others consistently have held that the question of whethe r a particular risk is or is not an inherent part of watching the event is to be decided by the court as a matter of law. See Anderson , 231 S.W.2d at 173 (holdi ng as a matter of law that the risk of injury from a foul ball is “clearly not an unreasonable risk to spectators which imposes a duty to warn [or protect]”); Hudson , 164 S.W.2d at 323 (holding as a matter of law that, “if his invitee knows of the condition or hazard there is no du ty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury”). See also Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch.
Dist. , 424 N.E.2d 531, 534 (N.Y. 1981) (rejecting vi ew that the extent of the team’s duty should be left to th e jury because it “would mean that every spectator injured by a foul ball, no matter where he is seated or standi ng in the ball park, would have an absolute right to go to the jury on every claim of negligence”); When Spectators Are Injured , 2008 Den. U. Sports & Ent. L.J. at 42-46 (collec ting cases holding, as a matter of law, that the team owed no duty to injured spectators). 17
Anderson , Hudson , and similar implied primary assumption of the risk cases around the country answer this “inherent risk” question as a matter of law because, if that question is left to each separate jury in each separate case, a team would never know for sure what duty it owes to its spectators. For example, under the Royals’ approach,

17 When the court determines that the risk is not an inherent one and, therefore, that implied primary assumption of the risk does not apply, the quest ion of whether the plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s negligence remains a jury question. See Sheppard , 904 S.W.2d at 263-64 (school cannot be liable as a matter of law for in juries from inherent risk of a long-jumper’s bad landing, but it was a question for th e jury whether jumper’s injuries were caused by school’s negligence in preparing the landing pit); Lowe , 56 Cal. App. 4th at 123 (team cannot be held liable for spectator’s injuries from inherent risk of being hit by f oul ball, but it was a question for the jury whether spectator’s injuries were cau sed by team’s negligence in allowing mascot to bump and distract fans during the game).

23Sluggerrr could throw two cons ecutive hotdogs in precisely the same manner, hit two spectators causing precisely the same injuries, and the Royals could be held liable for all or some part of one spectator’s damages a nd escape all liability for the other spectator’s damages solely because the la tter jury found the risk of injury from Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss to be an “inherent risk” and the former jury did not. Such conflicting results are unacceptable. The reason courts – not juries – decide what duty a defendant owes is to ensure that all similarly situated de fendants are treated equally a nd, more importantly, to give notice of these duties so that potential defenda nts will have an opportunity to adjust their conduct accordingly. These principles of fa ir notice and equal treatment are fundamental values in our legal system. Courts are well positioned to serve and protect such values; juries are not. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts , at 236 (noting that “it is no part of the province of the jury” to weig h the considerations of prece dent and sound public policy that inform decisions regarding the existence and extent of a defendant’s duty of care). The Royals’ argument that ju ries should determine whet her a particular risk is inherent simply in watching the game fails at an even more fu ndamental level. A question of fact is submitted to a jury in a civil case if, but only if, the evidence regarding that fact is such that reas onable jurors may reach contradictory conclusions. Here, the dispute between the Royals and Coomer con cerning whether the ri sk of injury from Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss is one of the risks that is inherent in watching the Royals play baseball is a policy debate, not an evidentiary one. To the extent there was any evidence at trial relevant to this debate, that evidence was not specific to Coomer, or to his decision

24whether to attend this specific game and where to sit, or to similar decisions made by the 12,000 other spectators in the park that da y. Instead, the evid ence – and, more importantly, the policy debate itself – will be th e same in every case. The only thing that will change is the jury (and potentially, under the Royals’ a pproach, the jury’s answer). Juries decide disputed questions of materi al fact, e.g., questions such as what the plaintiff or defendant (or others around them ) did or did not do, wh at the circumstances surrounding this conduct were, and what the consequences of this conduct have been. Such questions may be difficult to answer, but there is a right and wrong answer for the jury to pursue. The question of whether bein g injured by Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss is a risk inherent in watching a Royals home game, on the other hand, has no right or wrong answer. It is a conclusion about a fact, not a fact itself. Juries do not decide such questions; courts do. Finally, even the word “inhe rent” defies the Royals’ ca se-by-case approach. For a risk to be “inherent,” it must be “ structural or involved in the constitution or essential character of something: belonging by nature or settled habit .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966), at 1163 (emphasis added). A particular risk cannot be “structural” or “involved in the constitution or essential character of something” one day but not the next. Under this definition, once a risk is determined to be “inherent” in something, it will rema in so until there is a fundament al change in that thing’s constitution or essential character.
In Hudson and Anderson , the Court decided that the risk of a spectator being injured by a foul ball at a baseba ll game was an inherent risk, i.e., that it was “structural”

25or “involved in the constitution or essential char acter” of watching baseball. This is why the Court’s determinations in those cases were made as a matter of law, not fact, and this is why those determinations have properly be en binding on all similar claims since they were made. As a result, the Court must appr oach the risk of being injured by Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss the same way. Either that risk is “structural” and “involved in the constitution or essential character” of watching a Royals game or it is not. It cannot be both, any more than this Court can allow one jury to say it is and the next jury to say it is

not. Accordingly, this Court holds that the que stion of whether a ri sk is “inherent” for purposes of the doctrine of implied primary a ssumption of the risk is not a question for the jury. As a result, the qu estion of whether being injure d by Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss is an “inherent risk” of watching a Royals home ga me must be answered as a matter of law. IV. Being Injured by Slugge rrr’s Hotdog Toss is Not a Risk Inherent in Watching Royals Baseball The Royals admit that, “[ s]trictly speaking, this is not a baseball rule case” because Coomer does not claim he was injured by a foul ball or loose bat. But, because it claims the Hotdog Launch is a “common sens e” activity, the Royals contend that the same implied primary assumption of the risk rationale should apply and bar all recovery by Coomer. According to th e Royals, the risk to a sp ectator of being injured by Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss shares th e same essential characteristics as the other risks that this Court (and many others) determined long ago we re inherent in watching a baseball game

26in person, i.e., risks that a spectator will be injured by a flying ba ll or bat. The Court disagrees. The rationale for barring recovery for in juries from risks that are inherent in watching a particular sport under implied pr imary assumption of the risk is that the defendant team owner cannot re move such risks w ithout materially altering either the sport that the spectators come to see or th e spectator’s enjoymen t of it. No such argument applies to Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss. Millions of fans have watched the Royals (and its forebears in professional baseball) play the National Pastime for the better part of a century before Sluggerrr began tossing hotdogs, and m illions more people watch professional baseball every year in stadiums a ll across this country w ithout the benefit of such antics. Some fans may find Sluggerrr’s hotdog to ss fun to watch between innings, and some fans may even have come to expect it, but this does not make the risk of injury from Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss an “inherent risk ” of watching a Royals game. As noted above, “inherent” means “ structural or involved in the constitution or essential character of something: belonging by nature or settled habit ,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966), at 1163 (emphasis added). There is nothing about the risk of injury from Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss that is “structural” or involves the “constitution or essential character” of watchi ng a Royals game at Kauffman Stadium. The Royals concede that Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss has nothing to do with watching the game of baseball but contend that the Hotdog Launch is a well-established (even customary) part of the overall stadium “experi ence.” In support, the Royals cite cases

27that have applied the Baseball Rule to risks th at were not created directly from the game. These cases do not support the Royals’ argument.
In Loughran v. The Phillies, 888 A.2d 872 876-77 (Pa. 2005), because a plaintiff was injured when a fielder tosse d the ball into the stands afte r catching the last out of the inning, the court held that im plied primary assumption of th e risk barred the plaintiff’s claims. In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the Baseball Rule should not apply because the throw was not part of the game itself, Loughran holds that – even though the “‘no duty’ rule applies only to ‘c ommon, expected, and frequent’ risks of the game” – the link between the game and the risk of being hit with a ball tossed into the stands by a player is undeniable. Id . at 876. 18 Baseball is the reason centerfiel der Marlon Byrd was there, just as it was the reason the fans were in the st ands (including the ma ny who were yelling for Byrd to toss the ball to them ). Here, on the other hand, there is no link between the game and the risk of being hit by Sluggerrr’s hotdog to ss. The Hotdog Launch is not an inherent part of the game; it is what the Roya ls do to entertain baseball fans when there is no game for them to watch. Sluggerrr may make breaks in the game more fun, but Coomer and his 12,000 rain-soaked fellow sp ectators were not th ere to watch Sluggerrr toss hotdogs; they were there to watch the Royals play baseball.

18 In Dalton v. Jones, 581 S.E.2d 360, 362 (Ga. App. 2003), the c ourt rejected claims against a fielder who tossed a ball into the stands betw een innings based on similar reasoning: “Whether the ball was thrown or tossed during an inni ng of play or between innings lacks legal significance because, as the trial court noted, ‘this throw occurred during a time which was necessary to the playi ng of the game, during which time the Plaintiff has assumed the risk of injury from bats, balls, and other missiles.’” See also Pira v. Sterling Equities, Inc., 16 A.D.3d 396, 790 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2005) (dismissing claims by fa n injured when pitcher tossed ball into stands between innings).

28Somewhat closer to the mark – but s till inapposite – is the Royals’ reliance on Cohen v. Sterling Mets, L.P, 17 Misc. 3d 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007), aff’d 870 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). A vendor sued th e team for injuries ca used by a fan who hit the vendor while diving for a so uvenir T-shirt that had been tossed into the crowd. The court dismissed these claims, stating: “When a ball is tossed into the stands by a player many spectators rush toward the ball in hopes of getting a souvenir, just as what allegedly occurred here during the t-shirt launch.” Id . at 220. The Royals’ reliance on Cohen highlights one of the basic flaws in its effort to use implied primary assumption to bar Coomer’s claims, and it shows the importance of correctly identifying the risks and activity in each case. As explained above, what makes a risk “inherent” for purposes of this doctr ine – and what distingu ishes such risks from those at issue in an implied s econdary assumption of the risk cas e – is that the risks are so intertwined (i.e., so “structura l” or involved in the “constitution or essential character”) with the underlying activity th at the team cannot contro l or limit the risk without abandoning the activity. In Cohen , because the Mets could not control how fans reacted to the T-shirt launch, that reaction was an inhe rent risk – not of watching a baseball game but – of taking part in the T-shirt launch (which the plai ntiff’s work required him to do). 19 Here, on the other hand, not only is being injured by Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss n ot

19 Lowe also is instructive on this point. Because th e team had no ability to eliminate the r being hit by a foul ball without fundamentally alteri ng the game or the fans’ access to it, the team could not be liable for injuries caused by that risk. The team was in control of its mascot, however, which is why the court held the team c ould be liable when the mascot’s actions made the risk of injury from a foul ball greater than it was inherently. Lowe, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 1 Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to fi isk of

23. nd both that Sluggerrr was negligent and that

29an inherent risk of watching a Royals game , it is not an inherent risk of the Hotdog Launch. As discussed below, the Ro yals concede that there are negligent and non-negligent ways of tossing a hotdog and that Sluggerr (for whom the Royals are responsible) can control which he uses. Accordingly, the Court holds as a matte r of law that the ri sk of injury from Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss is not one of the risks inherent in watching the Royals play baseball that Coomer assumed merely by atte nding a game at Kauffman Stadium. This risk can be increased, decreased or eliminated altogether w ith no impact on the game or the spectators’ enjoyment of it. As a resu lt, Sluggerrr (and, therefore, the Royals) owe the fans a duty to use reasonable care in co nducting the Hotdog Launch and can be held liable for damages caused by a breach of that duty. 20 Sluggerrr’s tosses may – or may not – be negligent; that is a que stion of fact for the jury to decide. But the Royals owe the same duty of reasonable care when di stributing hotdogs or other promotional

his negligence directly caused Coomer’s injuries, elim inating any need to invoke the Lowe analysis of increasing an otherwise inherent risk. 20 This observation highlights another – perh aps even more basic – flaw in the Royals’ argument. From the very beginning, Baseball Ru le cases holding that the home team has “no duty” to protect spectators recognized that balls and bats can go flying into the seats even though the batter, pitcher, or fielder is using reasonable care. The risk that is “inherent” in watching this game is that even careful players cannot always c ontrol the flight of the ball or keep control of the bat. To eliminate all risk of that occurri ng, the team’s only choice is to change the game or the fans’ access to it. Here, on the other hand, nothing (except the Royals) compels Sluggerrr to throw hotdogs at the spectators. Perhaps the Ro yals are correct and ther e is a non-negligent way to throw a hotdog at a patron, but safety always can be ensured simply by handing the food to the customer ... as waiters, waitresses, and concessionaires prove millions of times every day. So, if Sluggerrr and the Royals decide to engage in the riskier conduct of throwing the food, they cannot complain that they have to persuade a jury that such conduct was reasonable anytime a fan is injured.

30materials that it owes to their 1.7 million fans in all other circumstances, excepting only

.

end that the jury’s verdict and

luggerrr

t to

., t.

is

isk that survived those risks of injury that are an inherent pa rt of watching a baseball game in person V. The Jury Instructions Were Prejudicial As held above, the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether the risk of injury from Sluggerrr’s hotdog toss was an inherent risk of watching a baseball game at Kauffman Stadium. The R oyals cont resulting judgment need not be vacated, howeve r, because this instructional error did not affect the outcome of this case. The Court disagrees. The crux of the Royals’ argument is that the jury must have decided that S was not negligent in tossing the hotdog that injured Coomer. This is incorrect. The essence of an affirmative defense is that it precludes liability to the plaintiff that otherwise would be justif ied by the facts. In this case, therefore, the Royals’ attemp invoke the assumption of th e risk doctrine can be para phrased as “Sluggerrr was negligent in injuring Coom er, but Coomer is barred from recovering any damages because he knowingly and inte lligently assumed the risk of such an injury.” As explained above, however, the a ffirmative defense aspect of assumption of the risk, i.e implied secondary assumption of the risk, did no t survive the advent of comparative faul Once the jury finds that th e defendant was negligent, Gustafson prohibits any further inquiry into the reasonableness or unreasonabl eness of the plaintiff’s conduct as a bas for barring the plaintiff’s claim entirely. Instead, that inquir y now occurs (if at all) only in the context of comparative fault. The pa rt of assumption of th e r

31Gustafson , i.e., implied primary assumption of the risk, was never an affirmative defense or a jury question, and, as expl ained above, it does not apply here. The language of the instructions in this case also contradicts the Royals’ argument. The Royals contend that Instru ction No. 11 only permits the jury to resolve the question of assumption of the risk in its favor if the jury determines that Sluggerrr’s throw was not negligent. That is not what this instruction says. It refe rs only to the “manner in which Sluggerrr threw the hotdog,” bu t it does not characterize that manner or ask the jury to so. More importantly, the jury would never have had any occasion to apply Instruction No. 11 unless and until it had found the Royals (and Sluggerrr) were negligent under Instruction No. 9. If the jury determined Sluggerrr was not negligent, Instruction No. 9 would have been th e end of its analysis. But, if th e jury determined that Sluggerrr w do

as
to

e jury uld have base d its verdict on

ome o negligent under Instruction No. 9, then – a nd only then – would the jury have reason consult the “tail” at the bo ttom of Instruction No. 9 sendi ng it to Instruction No. 11. The Royals also argue that the judgme nt should be affirmed because the jury might have entered its verdict for the Roya ls on another basis entirely removed from assumption of the risk. For in stance, because there was no di rect evidence that Coomer was injured by the hotdog Slu ggerrr threw, the jury may ha ve concluded that Coomer was not hit by the hotdog but by another fan who was reaching for th e hotdog. Th could have reached such a conclu sion, of course, just as it co s ther factor that was not influenced by the trial court’s error. But the mere possibility that an error was not prejudicial is not sufficient.

32Here, the Court holds that Coomer has shown a sufficient likelihood of prejudic to justify vacating the judgment and remandi ng the case. Instruction No. 11 not only put an issue (implied primary assumption of the risk ) to the jury that must be deci court as a matter of law, it created an unaccept able risk that the ju e

ded by the ry found the Royals centage of the fault to the team because

se the judgment mu st be vacated and the case remanded as a result of the trial

at

he

ing the negligent but then did not assess at least some per that is what the introducto ry phrase to Instruction No . 11 told the ju ry to do. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. VI. Issues that Likely Will Arise in a Retrial Coomer claims that the trial court e rred in submitting the Royals’ affirmative defense of comparative fault to the jury and in refusing to submit Coomer’s alternative claims that the Royals were negligent in training and/or superv ising Slugge rrr’s hotdog
toss. Becau court’s errors, the Court does not need to ad dress Coomer’s other claims. Given th these issues likely will recur at retrial (if there is one), however, the Court will address them here. First, the Court holds that the evid ence was sufficient to justify submitting Coomer’s comparative fault to the jury. Coomer contends that, because he was “just sitting there,” this cannot constitute negligen ce. The jury might reach that conclusion and, as a result, not attribute any percentage of the fault to Coomer. But that is not t only conclusion supported by this evidence. The ev idence also was suffi cient for the jury to find that Coomer acted un reasonably by: (a) watching Sluggerrr go into his leonine wind-up in preparation for a behind-the-b ack hotdog toss and then (b) choos

33precise –

vision as

ourt simply ruled that Coomer wa s entitled to submit one, but only one, theory on whi

ior

e theories for attaching liability to one person for the

ent moment that Sluggerrr was releasing the hotdog to let his gaze – and attention wander elsewhere. The jury may find that this failure to keep a careful lookout, among other reasons, was sufficient to assess some percentage of fault to Coomer. Second, Coomer contends that the trial c ourt erred in refusing to allow him to submit multiple theories on which the jury coul d hold the Royals liable for his damages. The trial court did not dismiss Coomer’s claims for negligent training and super unsubstantiated. Instead, citing McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. banc 1995), the trial c ch the jury could hold the Royals liable for Slu ggerrr’s negligence (e.g., respondeat superior , negligent training, or negligent supervision). The trial court was

correct. As explained in McHaffie , “once an employer has admitted respondeat super liability ... it is improper to allow a plaintiff to proceed against th e employer on any other theory of imputed liability.” Id . at 826 (citations omitted). The Court’s rationale for this decision was that, if “all of th negligence of another were recognized and all pleaded in one case where the imputation of negligence is admitt ed, the evidence laboriously submitted to establish other theories serves no real purpose.” Id

. The reasoning of McHaffie prohibits a plaintiff from goi ng to the jury on multiple alternative theories of imputed liability. Once the ju ry is told that a particular defendant is liable for the negligent actions of someone else, no purpose is served by explaining to the jury alternative ways to r each the same result. Here, even though claims of neglig

34training or supervision may not strictly be th eories of imputed liability in the same way that the doctrine of respondeat superior is, Coomer still must show that Sluggerrr was negligent before the jury can award him any of his damages under these theories. In other words, the team may have been neglig ent in training or supervising Sluggerrr but, unless Sluggerrr acted wrongfully in injuring Coomer, there is no basis for the Royals liability. Here, there was no need to explore those alternate paths. Because the Royals conceded the application of respon ’

deat superior , Coomer’s recovery was certain as long

d

ve,
ry

the wing a plain tiff to demand both belt and suspenders in submit gh as he could prove Sluggerrr’s negligence an d causation. As there was no purpose in allowing Coomer to pursue a lternative grounds for the same result, the trial court did not err in its application of McHaffie

. Even though the Court holds that the trial court’s application of McHaffie was not error, it is worth noting how prej udicial this ruling was in the context of the trial court’s errors regarding assumption of the risk. McHaffie assumes that a plaintiff does not nee both a belt and suspenders when one basis of liability is estab lished. As discussed abo however, Instruction No. 11 allowe d the jury to find for the Royals even though the ju determined under Instruction No. 9 that Co omer was injured as a result of Sluggerrr’s negligent conduct. Instruction No. 11, therefore, deprived Coomer of the benefit that McHaffie assumes is present. McHaffie was designed to save the time and avoid confusion that comes with allo ting his claim to the jury . But when Instruction No. 11 improperly sliced throu Coomer’s belt, he was sorely prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to allow him suspenders under McHaffie

.

3536 nd, the jury

ay conclude that Coomer failed to use reasonable care to protect Sluggerrr’s negligence (failing to

Coomer under a proper comparative fault instruction. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, this C ourt vacates the judgment and remands the

_________________________________ Paul C. Wilson, Judge

All concur. If this case is tried again on remand, th e instructional error will not recur a therefore, there will be no prejudi ce from the proper application of McHaffie . If finds that Sluggerrr failed to use reasonable care when he threw the hotdog at Coomer and injured him, it will assess a percentage of fault to the Royals as required by Instruction No. 9, and it will do so without the distra ction and mixed-signals of Instruction No. 11. No other th eory of liability will be needed by, or useful to, Coomer. Finally, if the evidence on retria l is the same as here, the ju ry m himself from keep an adequate lookout or otherwise) and, on that basis, it could assess a percentage of fault to

case.