Opinion issued January 20 , 202 2

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 20
- 00083
- CV

——————————— SHERESE OAKLAND AND/OR ALL OCC UPANTS , Appella nt V. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS CERTIFICATE

TRUSTEE ON BEHAL F O F BOSCO , Appell e e

O n Appeal from the Co unty Civil C our t at Law No . 4

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 1146674

MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an ap peal fro m a forcible entry and detainer suit. Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Comp any , as Ce r t ificate Trustee on Behalf of Bosco Credit II Trust Series 2010

- 1 , ( “Deutsche Bank ”) purchased the resi dential property previously owned by appellant Sherese Oakland at a non

- judicial forecl osure sale.2

After Oakland failed to vacate the pre mises, Deut sche B ank brou ght a forcible entry and detainer action in justice court. The justice court entered ju dgment of possession in favor of Deut s ch e Bank . Oaklan d appea led to t he county court. The county court entered a judgment of possession in favor of Deut sc he Ba n k

. O akla n d appeal ed. On appeal, Oakland contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the qu estion of title was so integrally linked to the issue of possessi on that possession could not be determined without first determining title . We affi rm. Ba c kground I n March 2005, O aklan d executed a d e ed of t rust to secure payment of a note on the real property located at 7602 Timberway Lane, Houston , Texas. The d ee d of
t rust was assigned to Deutsche Bank

. The d eed of t rust provided that in the event

o f a d ef a u lt, the lender could accelerate the note an d require immediate payment of all sums. I t also provided that the property could be sold at a foreclosur e sale, and that if the loan were foreclose , the person in poss ession of the property, would become a te nan t at sufferance and could be removed by a writ of possession. After default by Oakland, Deut sch e B ank foreclo sed the loan and purcha sed the property on Octo ber 1, 2019. A trustee ’ s deed was recor ded, an d Deut sche Bank mailed Oaklan d a notice to vacate. After Oa kland failed to vacate the property, Deutsche Bank instituted a forcible entry and detainer act ion agai nst Oakland in justice court. Oakland fil ed suit in the Harris County district court3

asking the court to set aside t he foreclosure because the s tatute of limitations had

r un. 1 Oakland then filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the justice cou rt, argu ing that the court did not have jurisdict ion to determine immed iate possession of the property until the title was resolved in the district cour t. S h e s tated that the title issue involved her challenge to the validity of the foreclosure sale. F ollo wing a h earing on the motion, t he justice court ruled in Deutsche Bank ’s favor. Oakland filed an appeal de n ovo to County Court at L aw No . 4. In January 2020, t he county
court entered a judgment of possession in favor of Deut sche Bank. Prior to
execut ion of t he w rit of possession , Oakland appeal ed. Oakland appeals the judgment gr a nting immed iate possession of the
prop e rty to Deutsche Bank, arguing tha t the court did not have jurisdiction over the evi ction suit because the statute of lim itations claim in the district court title suit had to be resolved as a prerequisite to the reso l ution of im medi ate possession. This is the only issue on appeal. We hold that the c ounty court at law had jurisdictio n and affirm the court ’ s judgment. Standard of R eview Su bject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a

ca se. B l an d Indep. Sc h. D ist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 553

– 5 4 ( Tex. 20 0 0). Whether a co urt has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review

1 I n its brief, Deut sch e Bank states that it removed the suit to the United Sta t es District Court for the Southern Di strict of Texas in December 2019

.4

de novo. Te x. Dep ’ t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Applicable Law Jurisd iction over a f

orcible detainer action is expressly given to the justice

cou rt of the precinct where the property is located, and on appeal, to the county

cour t for a trial de novo. See T EX
. P ROP
. C ODE § 24.004(a); T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 27.031(a)(2); T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 510. 10(c ). A trial de novo is a new trial in which the entire case is presented as if there had been no previous trial. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 510 .10(c). A county court must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not title. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 5 1 0.3( e); see Black v. Washin gton Mut. Bank , 31 8 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism ’ d w.o.j.) ( “ [T]he justice court, and a county court on appeal, lack jurisdiction to resolve any questions of title beyond the immediate right to p osse ssion. ” ). A forcible detainer “ action ‘ i s intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property. ’ ” Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp. , 417 S.W.3d 909 , 919 (Tex. 2013) (quoting
M arshall v. Hous. Aut h. , 198 S.W.3d 782, 78 5 ( Te x. 2006)). The judg m ent in a forcible detainer action is a final determination only of the right to i mmediate possession

. I

d. Thus, to prevail in a forcible d etainer action, the plaintiff is not
req uired to pr ove title, but is on ly required to present sufficient evidence of5

o wnership to demonstrate a s uperior ri ght to immediate possession. Isaac v.
Citi Mortgage, Inc. , 563 S.W .3d 305, 310 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied ). I f, however, an issue of title is so intert wined with the issue of possession that a cour t must resolve the title dispute befor e determining whic h party has a superior right to immedia te possession, then the justice court and the county court lack juris dict ion to resolve the matter and must dismiss the case. Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. I I I , 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

“ A forcible detainer action is cumulative, not exclusive, of other remedies tha t a party m ay h ave, thus the parties may pursue both a fo rcible detainer action in justi c e court an d a s uit to quiet title in district cou rt. ” Dormady v. Diner o L and & Cattle Co ., L.C. , 61 S.W.3d 555, 55 8 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2001, pet. dism ’ d w.o.j.) (op. on re h ’ g) ( citing S cot t v. Hewitt , 90 S.W.2d 816, 818

– 19 ( Tex. 1936)).

“ [N]ot only can the right to i mmediate possession be determined sep arately from the right to title in most cases, but th e Texas L egislature purposel y established just such a system. ” Dormady , 61 S .W.3d at 55 8 (q uoting Rice v. Pinney , 51 S. W.3d 705, 710 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2001, no pet.) )

. Analy sis O akl a nd contends that the question of title is intertwine d with t he question of possession such that the county co urt did no t have jurisdiction to determ i ne6

possessi on . Oakland argues that Deutsche Bank is not entitled to possession because it does not have proper tit le to the pro perty

. Deu tsche Bank argues that the tri al court had jurisdiction to decide possession because Oakland ’ s challenge to the validity of the fo reclosure sale need not be resol ved in order to decide possession. We agree wi t h Deutsche B ank.

“ A landlord

- tenant r elationship provides ‘ an indepen dent bas is on which the trial court could determine the issue of imme diate possess i on without resolving the issue of title to the property. ’ ” Salazar v. HPA Tex. Sub 2016

- 1 LLC , No. 01

- 1 9

- 003 3 0

- CV, 2020 W L 7702176, at *3 (Te x. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29,
2020 , pet. denied) (mem. op.) ( quoting Rice , 51 S.W.3d at 712 )

. W hen “ a landlor d

tenant relationship is established in the orig inal dee d of trust [ ,] [ t]he landlord

tenant relationsh i p provides a basis for determining th e right to immediate possession w ithout r esolving the ultimate issue of title to the property. ” Dormad y , 61 S.W.3d a t 559. Even when the vali dity of a de ed is challenged, c ourts have held that the issue of possession m a y be determined without addressing ti tle when a landlord

- tenant relati onship i s established through a deed of trust. See Casalicchio v. Fed

. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. , No. 01

- 19

- 00392 , 2021 W L 921779, at *4 ( Tex. App.

— Houston [1st D ist.] Mar. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; Chevalier v. Roberson , No. 01

- 15

- 0022 5

- CV, 2016 WL 1 590993, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.

—7

Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 19, 2016, no pe t.) (mem . op.) ( “ [Appe llant] has the ri ght
to sue in district court t o determine whose deed is valid. ” )

. H ere the de e d of trust provided : If the property is sold pursuant to this paragrap h 16, Bo rrower [Oakland] or any person holding possession of the Prop erty through Borrower shall imme diately surrender possession of the P roperty to the purchaser [ Deutsche Bank] at the sale. If possession is not surrendered, Borrower or such person shall be a ten ant at sufferance and may be removed by writ of possession

. Oakland argues that because th e statute of limitations had run, both the d eed of t rust and the power of sale pursuan t to it are void. S he argues that if the deed of trust is void , the te nancy - at

- sufferance clause is also void, depriving the j ustice court of its independent basis for ju risd iction

. “ A title dispute ‘ based ent irel y on [t he] contention that the foreclosure w as improper ” is not intertwined with the right of immediate p ossessio n. ” Guillen v. U.S. Bank , N.A. , 494 S.W.3d 861, 86 7 (Tex

. App.

— Hou ston [14th Dist.] 2016, no p et.) ( quoting Pinnacle P r emi er Props

. , Inc.

v . Breton , 44 7 S.W.3d 558 , 564 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ). Oaklan d ’ s attack on the validity of the foreclosure sale is independent of the
qu estion of posse ssion in the forcible detainer action. V illa lon v. Bank O ne , 176 S.W.3d 66, 7 1 (T ex. App.

— Ho uston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. de n ied) ( holding appellant could sue in district court to determ ine whet her appellee ’ s deed should be cancelled because of wrong ful foreclosure, but county court could determine immediate possession in forcible detai ner suit ); Dormady , 61 S.W.3d at 558 (citing8

Hew i tt , 90 S.W.2d at 818

– 19) ( “ [I] f the fo r cible detainer defendants desired to attack the validit y of the sale made under the deed of trust, they could proceed with a suit in the district c ourt. ” ). We need not decide whether the statute of limitations actua l ly expired and whether, as a re sult, th e d eed of t rust , with its tenancy

- at

- sufferance clause , w as invalid. The question of the forec losure’s validity may be resolved independently of the county court ’ s dete rmination that Deutsche Bank is entitled to immed i a te
posse ssion of the property. See Gu illen , 494 S.W.3d at 868. D e utsch e Bank established the existence of a landlord

- tenant relationship through the de ed of trust.
Because there was a basi s for determ ining possession without resolving the ultimate issue o f title, we hold the trial court had s ubject

- matter jurisdiction to decide the forcible detainer action. See Dormady , 61 S.W.3d at 557

– 59. We overrule Oaklan d ’ s issue on appeal.

Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Peter Kel l y Ju stice Panel consists of Ch ief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly and Landau.