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43–849 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–68] 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE 

BATTLE OF IDEAS: WINNING THE HEARTS 

AND MINDS IN THE GLOBAL WAR 

AGAINST TERRORISTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 11, 2007 
(II) 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

BILL NATTER, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2007 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 11, 2007, Strategic Communications and the Battle of Ideas: 

Winning the Hearts and Minds in the Global War Against Terrorists ........... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 11, 2007 ....................................................................................... 25 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2007 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE BATTLE OF IDEAS: WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST 

TERRORISTS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 1 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee .................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Kramer, Franklin D., Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Policy ...................................................................................................... 5 

Wells, Dr. Linton, II, National Defense University .............................................. 9 

Zalman, Dr. Amy, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) ........ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Kramer, Franklin D. ........................................................................................ 40 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 29 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac ...................................................................................... 30 

Wells, Dr. Linton, II ......................................................................................... 49 

Zalman, Dr. Amy .............................................................................................. 32 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Questions submitted.] 

(1) 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE BATTLE OF 

IDEAS: WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS IN THE 

GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 11, 2007. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:46 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. I think we are going to go ahead and get started, if 

we could have everybody take their seats, actually. Sorry, we 

should more formally greet the witnesses. I apologize for that. It 

is just that we have votes coming up here imminently. So I wanted 

to try to hopefully get our opening statements in and your opening 

statements in, get as much as we can in in the short period of time 

that we have. 

Thank you all for joining us. I particularly want to thank Representative Thornberry for his interest in the subject matter and 

our strategic communications efforts on the war on terror. 

And it is something that has been of particular interest to this 

subcommittee, which basically is the ideological battle that is attached to the military battle. And I think that we really need to 

focus more on that in our government. 

And we cannot possibly win the battle that we are fighting by 

simply killing every terrorist that we see. This is a battle of ideas 

as much as it is a military battle. 

We have to get to the point where people don’t want to follow al 

Qaida, don’t want to sign up for their ideology and commit those 

violent acts. If it is a game where we are simply trying to always 

stop them before they get to us, it kind of puts us on a treadmill 

that is picking up speed constantly. That is not something we can 

succeed at. 

We need to get our broader message out there. And, without 

question, we have the better message. Al Qaida represents a violent, totalitarian ideology that is simply trying to subjugate people 

under the guise of religion, which really has very little to do with 

what they are talking about. It has more to do with control. You 

know, we have seen what the Taliban did in Afghanistan—not 

something that people are signing up for. 
2 

We, on the other hand, offer a message of freedom and opportunity. I think we have the better message in any culture, be it the 

West or the Muslim culture or wherever. We have the ability to deliver a message that offers a better way. 

As strongly as I feel that, I also feel that, at this point, we are 

by and large losing a public relations (PR) war to Osama bin Laden 

in far too many parts of the world, even in some cases with our 

allies, who have shown reluctance to jump on full-bore with our effort. For one thing, they don’t even like the fact that we call it the 

global war on terror, and I tend to agree with them. I think there 

would be a better way to phrase this, in terms of how we pull people together. And certainly within the Muslim world, America is 

not popular. We are not winning the battle there. 

So what we want to find out today and look forward to your testimony is, you know, what are we doing to improve that message? 

What is the message that we are trying to send out? 

And of particular interest to me is who is in charge of it. Because 

there are a lot of different pieces here: The Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA) has a role, the Department of Defense (DOD) has a 

role, the State Department has a role, various different White 

House agencies, the Counterterrorism Center. Who is in charge? 

How are we delineating that message? 

Because, to some degree, this is something that all politicians understand: Develop a message and deliver that message. That is 

what we did to get here—on a much smaller, less dangerous scale, 

I might add. But it is a basic communications message, saying that 

we all understand and we want it to work better than it does right 

now. 

It is a major, major commitment of this committee. And I know 

it is also a major commitment of my ranking member, Mr. Thornberry, who has worked on this extensively. 

And with that, I will yield to Mr. Thornberry for his opening 

statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate 

your comments. But I agree with everything you said. 

One of the reasons I am so interested in this is because I think 

it is so critical to our country’s security. We obviously face a determined, ruthless, adaptable enemy who uses terrorism as a tactic. 

But we will not defeat that enemy with military power alone. We 

have to engage in the battle of ideas, and we have to engage successfully. 

But the reason I am so motivated about this is because I know 

of no one who thinks we are doing so successfully, or maybe even 

competently, at the current time. And there have been study after 

study, report after report, that talk about how important it is, and 

yet we seem to be a lumbering bureaucracy, moving to be slightly 

better. But as you point out, in too many parts of the world, I am 

afraid, we are losing. 
3 

My view is that you have to begin with an understanding of the 

enemy, a deep understanding of the enemy, and then develop specific approaches to then address that understanding, to 

delegitimize his view of the world, offer an alternative, and then 

have effective methods and perseverance enough to actually implement what you are trying to do. 

And I think that is what brings us to this hearing. 

Mr. Chairman, strategic communications—one of those words 

that gets slapped around—some people think it means we ought to 

hire better PR people. Some people say that it is better slogans, 

more effective commercials on television or radio. I think it is much 

more and much deeper than that. 

I have an article in my written statement from a colonel who 

used to be with Central Command (CENTCOM), who describes it 

as synchronizing public diplomacy, public affairs, public relations, 

outreach, information operations, psychological operations, so that 

you get the right message to the right audience in order to help 

shape perceptions. 

As you mentioned, that does not mean that it is the job of one 

department of government—or, in my view, it is even government 

alone. I think we have to bring in the considerable expertise of the 

private sector to help do it. 

But the point is, we have to do it. We can’t fight this battle with 

bullets alone. And I think we have to do a lot better. 

Defense Science Board study in 2004 said that ‘‘strategic communications is a vital component of our security. It is in crisis and 

must be transformed with a strength of purpose that matches our 

commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement 

and homeland security.’’ That is what motivates me, Mr. Chairman, to try to put more light on it. 

I appreciate very much the witnesses and the work they have 

done in this area. And I am especially looking forward to their suggestions on what we can do in Congress to help give it the same 

strength of purpose that matches our commitment in those other 

areas. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 30.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

With that, I will turn to our witnesses. We have three this morning: Dr. Amy Zalman, the Honorable Franklin D. Kramer and Dr. 

Linton Wells. 

We will start with Dr. Zalman, who is with SAIC but has written, taught and done considerable research in the area of strategic 

communications, particularly focused on the Muslim world. 

And I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Dr. ZALMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. You can go ahead and get started. I think we can get 

through. There are a few a minutes before we have to go. 

STATEMENT OF DR. AMY ZALMAN, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS 

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (SAIC) 

Dr. ZALMAN. Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry, thank 

you for the opportunity to present my observations on strategic 

communications today. 
4 

As Bill Natter pointed out in his introduction to the session, my 

written testimony speaks primarily to the question of strategic 

communications content. 

It has been an American objective to tell our story to the world. 

There has been less focus to date on what that story really is and 

how to construct it so that others want to listen and participate in 

shaping its ending. 

The 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications lays out a number of ways in which American voices are about to be amplified throughout the world. But 

what are these voices going to say that makes people want to keep 

listening? Is it enough to recite lists of American good works, no 

matter how true? Is more necessarily better? 

Potentially, but not inevitably. Indeed, new efforts are as reasonably doomed to failure as some of those of the past five years if, 

in my view, the U.S. does not take seriously the need to reaffirm 

its understanding of the simple: what it means to tell a story. 

What is a story? A story is a structured way of telling events and 

of making sense of what happens to us. It has a beginning, a middle and an end. Individuals tell stories; so do collectivities. 

When I think of stories, I think, of something that we tell. But 

at the collective level, stories also tell us. They tell us who we are, 

what we believe and idealize, who is one of us, who is an outsider, 

how to behave and how not to behave. This is their strategic function. 

We are not only shaped by the stories we inherit, we also contribute to them: what we tell our children, how we celebrate, what 

we valorize, what we think of as right and wrong, and how we behave. Through these activities, we participate in story-telling. 

Community stories do not so much have endings as they do proposed futures. This, I think, is where strategic communications 

takes place: at that point between present and future. 

Communications that are designed to influence can be inserted 

into that moment, so that we shift one future and propose an alternative. But we insert into a story that is ongoing, not into a vacuum and not into an entirely new place. 

From this, a few thoughts: One, strategic communications does 

not take place in a vacuum. Everyone already has a story. When 

people turn away from American messaging efforts, it may not always be a sign of hostility, but rather, it is a sign that they don’t 

need someone else’s story, they already have their own. 

I think we may better understand past failures and future possibilities if we simply grasp that there are already other stories in 

existence. 

Two, a story must be credible. This has, of course, been said ad 

infinitum in the past five years. But I would like to explain what 

I think ‘‘credibility’’ means when we think of communications in 

terms of stories. 

In this case, ‘‘credibility’’ does not mean either scientific veracity 

nor necessarily verifiable authority. What it means is the ability to 

identify with a story and, in fact, with characters in a story, to look 

up and go, ‘‘Wow, I see something that resembles someone like me 

doing things that I think would be good and right to do.’’ 
5 

What this means for strategic communications is it has to be 

built out of ingredients and values that people already have. They 

cannot come from outside. They must come from inside an existing 

community, for people to be spoken to. 

And three, listening remains the most important task before the 

United States. The opportunity to gain from listening to others has 

not yet been as well-exploited as it could be. 

Here is one way we may use listening. Take our best ideals, find 

out, listen for, go and actively unearth what those terms already 

mean to others. What is your idea of progress? Where in your history are there events or processes that you would cast as democratic? What is your vision of your future? What is the meaning of 

the best universal ideals in your idiom? 

I am hopeful that knowing these and having some facility with 

using them in the idioms of others is the beginning of being able 

to communicate truly well. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zalman can be found in the Appendix on page 32.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Kramer, I think we will go ahead and give you a chance to 

get your testimony in, as well, before we have to go vote. So I will 

keep my introduction of you short, so that you can speak. Go 

ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking 

Member. Thanks for the opportunity to be here. 

I won’t belabor the point that each of you have made, that, although we are an information superpower, we are not winning the 

war of ideas. I think that is the basis for this hearing. 

And I won’t belabor the point, though I believe it deeply, that we 

have a very good, really an excellent, story to tell. So the question 

is, why aren’t we winning? 

And we are not winning despite the fact—and I think the committee has some hearings planned—that the United States government does communicate. So what is the problem? 

Well, one thing is it is a complex world out there. There are 

many other messages. There are multiple cultures; there are multiple audiences. Actions, especially violent actions, speak louder 

than words. And it is a difficult problem to find the right messengers and the right mechanisms to get our story across. 

More specifically, a lot of what we do in the U.S. is what I would 

call mass messaging. And mass messages are good, if the audience 

is ready to listen, if they are already tuned into the channel. But 

it is not for the people who haven’t tuned in yet, not for the 

unconverted. 

So, for example, if you have a Presidential address on the Middle 

East, naturally it goes to the American people. But in Jakarta or 

Islamabad, it is heard differently. It is in the wrong language. It 

is covered differently. The people come with different preconceptions. 
6 

The U.S. also, because we have multiple interests, has multiple 

messages, so it is hard for us to focus. We are the superpower. We 

are always going to have multiple messages. So we have to deal 

with that problem, because with multiple messages comes lack of 

clarity, overlapping. So we have to think about differentiation, audience segmentation, ways to get our point to the right people. 

And those right people, if you will, the target audience—although 

I am not sure that is precisely right, because the audience participates; it is a two-way street—they do live in their own context. 

They already have multiple messages coming in to them. And so, 

some of those people really don’t want more information. Some will 

only take information that is congenial to their attitudes already. 

And there are a lot of, if you will, anti-U.S. channels out there 

already. There is a very recent Radio Free Europe study which 

points out that both the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and al Qaida 

make a great deal of use of communications. They do so through 

Web sites. And those are amplified by Arab media. 

And the real point that they made—and this is a quote—is that 

there is a real demand for this in the Arab world. So people are 

listening for those anti-U.S. messages, and we have to recognize 

that and overcome that. 

Even for those who want to listen when we put out a message, 

they may hear it differently than we intend it to be heard. It is because, again, they come with their own culture, their own attitude, 

their own preconceptions. And so, exposure, if you will, is not 

enough all by itself. 

If you put that in the U.S. context, a Rush Limbaugh listener is 

not going to be much persuaded by Michael Moore and vice versa. 

So it is not enough just to increase the flow of information. You 

have to think about how to make the information effective. 

Well, you also have to recognize that our actions have consequences. Many people have said—it is a truism—actions speak 

louder than words. So our policies, their impact, make a big difference. And you have to cast the words in light of the actual policies. 

And we have to recognize that opposition entities like al Qaida 

will take those policies and use them for their own purposes. The 

al Qaida narrative, which, briefly, is that the West is attacking the 

Muslim world, they draw heavily on what is going on in Iraq to 

support their narrative. It is not true, but it is how they use the 

activity. 

So what do we do? Well, I have eight suggestions for the committee. 

The first is I think we need a substantially greater focus on other 

cultures and other societies. We need to be able to more clearly differentiate our audiences. We need to figure out who are, if you will, 

the influencers in those societies. 

In the book, ‘‘The Tipping Point,’’ Malcolm Gladwell talked about 

what he called mavens who validate messages, connectors who link 

messages, the link persons, and salesmen who sell messages. And 

whether or not that is the exact right set of categories, there are 

influential people in society, and we need to look to them and talk 

to them and get them to talk in their own society. 
7 

We also need to think about how to make a message effective. 

For example, do you focus on individual values, or do you focus on 

group values? It is different in different societies. 

What is the role of religion in messaging? If you look at a Sunni 

insurgency message, it is wrapped in religious metaphors. What 

should we do? We need to at least think about that. 

As implied by that, my second point is we need more experts— 

more experts focused on culture, more experts focused on geography—who are working in the communications world. We need to 

be able to build what I would call a societal map for communications. 

And to those experts, we need other disciplines: marketing, psychology and expertise in the use of T.V. and Internet and radio. 

Those are multiple disciplines. They are not taught in basic training. They aren’t taught in advanced training. And they are not 

taught in foreign service school. So we need to think about how to 

bring those kind of people in. 

I would not suggest we don’t have any; that would be a mistake. 

But we don’t have enough. And we need to expand that. 

We also need to think about the fact that multiple theaters require multiple message campaigns. Indonesia, which is part of the 

Muslim world, is not the same as Pakistan, which is part of the 

Muslim world; is not the same as Egypt, which is part of the Muslim world. We need to think differently about how to get our messages across in different places. We need a regional and focused 

kind of approach. 

As is implied by all that, we need more resources. I would 

strongly suggest that we look hard at the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors (BBG) and their various T.V. and radio stations, increase there; the State Department’s public diplomacy budget. We 

need to do a lot more with respect to the Internet, Web. The Government Accountability Office has said that our embassies are very 

poor at sending out messages. We need to increase their capacity. 

We need more regional efforts—— 

Mr. SMITH. I apologize, sir. Unfortunately, we have to go vote. 

We are down to a couple of minutes here. So I will stop you on your 

fourth point, and we will have four more when we come back. 

It is going to be about 45 minutes before we come back, for which 

I apologize. But—— 

Mr. KRAMER. We know where the cafeteria is. [Laughter.] 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. Thornberry and I, certainly I think we will—other members 

of the committee who are probably over there voting now will be 

back. And we look forward to hearing the rest of your testimony, 

and yours as well, and asking questions. 

So we will be back as soon as we can. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. Well, thank you for your patience. We will go ahead 

and get started again. I am pretty sure that Mr. Thornberry is 

coming back in just a second. And, you know, I mentioned it to a 

few other members. See if we get a few other folks here. 

But, Mr. Kramer, I believe you were in the middle of—— 
8 

Mr. KRAMER. I was working my way through my points, as it 

were. I think I had made four, so let me just make four more and 

get off the podium here. 

The fifth point I would make is that we need to take a long-term 

as well as a short-term view. Especially in the DOD, there is a 

tendency to be short-term. And it is understandable, because you 

have to deal with the consequences of violent actions. But what we 

are really talking about is changing attitudes, and attitudes change 

over time. 

And just, again, to use an example, think of the difference in attitudes toward cigarette smoking in the U.S. It took 30 years. It 

takes time. And we need to have information activities that are 

long-term. 

The department, the DOD, for example, runs something called 

the Southeast European Times. It is in nine languages. It is an information site. Or it runs another one called Magharebia. It is in 

three languages. All those are are news sites and information and 

analysis. They are not going to solve the problem today. But they 

are that background kind of information that gives you a possibility. 

The sixth point I will make is that, although it is true and I certainly subscribe to the fact that facts speak louder than words, it 

is possible to explain facts. And I think we really need to increase 

both the training and the resources for our combat forces to help 

them in this arena. 

It is good, and the committee’s work with Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM), which runs psychological operations. It is 

good what strategic communications (STRATCOM) does. But when 

you are in counterinsurgency, you are in stability operations, it is 

really the folks on the ground who are doing it. So that is your brigade, your battalion, your company, your platoons. 

And they need, of course, to get to the center of gravity. The center of gravity is the people. That means they need to be able to 

communicate. And they really don’t have sufficient—I wouldn’t say 

none at all, but they don’t have sufficient training. They don’t have 

sufficient resources. They don’t have sufficient capacities when 

they go in. So I think that is awfully important. 

The seventh point I would make is that we really need to use 

much more greater use of a partnership approach with allies and 

partners. If you are a business, you simply would not go into another country without a local advisor or a local partner or a joint 

venture or something like that. You would know you would be lost. 

And we need to have that, what I would call, fingertip feel for 

the country. And you get that when you have deep, local knowledge. Now, Americans can get that of countries, but you have to 

live there, work with them and the like. 

It is not a Washington approach; it is a in-country approach. And 

we actually do it on the military side. And we even do it on the 

diplomatic side. We need to do it on the communications side. 

And the last point I would make is that, although I think this 

hearing and others I know the committee is holding is enormously 

valuable, it would be terrific if the Congress as a whole could take, 

what I would call, a comprehensive look at strategic communications. 
9 

I mean, you have the jurisdictional set of issues. But, you know, 

by and large, you get along well with one another. And so you have 

got what the department is doing. You mentioned in your opening 

statement what State is doing and the BBGs. Putting that all together and figuring out whether we have enough real resources in 

the program. 

You know, as a benchmark, if you are a beer company in the 

U.S., you would probably spend no less than $100 million a year 

selling your beer. You know, a car company, the same way. So if 

you put that together, you know, with the number of beer companies, the number of car companies, you are talking real money. 

If you look at the recruiting budget we have for the DOD—I 

think this is right—it is about $4 billion a year. Shouldn’t we be 

thinking about putting real money and resources into strategic 

communications? 

And with that, let me close. And I appreciate the opportunity to 

testify, and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kramer can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Wells, who is the Force Transformation Chair and Distinguished Research Professor at the National Defense University. 

Dr. Wells. 

STATEMENT OF DR. LINTON WELLS II, NATIONAL DEFENSE 

UNIVERSITY 

Dr. WELLS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Thornberry. I appreciate the chance to be here at this really 

important topic. And I want to emphasize I am here in an individual capacity. 

Certainly, effective communications, strategic communications 

would be essential to winning the ‘‘Long War’’ just as they were in 

the Cold War. And it has been pointed out, in this area, facts, 

which include actions, speak much louder than words. 

I think there are four areas where we ought to focus on doing 

a better job. And one is communicating the nation’s commitment to 

its core values. Second is reaching out to those who share our 

ideals. Third is supporting those who struggle for freedom, and 

then countering those who espouse hate and oppression. 

An objective of strategic communication, in fact, the ultimate 

measure of success, is the way it forced the advancement of U.S. 

policies. And this is achieved by influencing foreign audiences to 

take action that either support U.S. interests or to cease action 

that damage them. And the point here is that the success of strategic communication alone does rest with the government actions 

by themselves. 

There is no doubt this is very hard to achieve. You have to synchronize a whole series of messages. And Mr. Kramer just talked 

about messages and delivery mechanisms have to be aligned within 

the government. You have to link actions across organization, nations and cultural lines. You have to understand the impact on foreign audiences. 
10 

And this is compounded by the rapidly changing information environment that relatively few people actually have experience in 

working with. 

On the other hand, the Nation does have a number of enduring 

advantages which ought to stand us in good stead in the long-term 

competition, which is what we have to focus on. 

First of all, it is the nation’s openness; the opportunity it is perceived, I think, mostly in the world as providing; and importantly, 

the ability to learn from our mistakes. And so, a core issue, as Dr. 

Zalman has mentioned, is how to describe these qualities in ways 

that are important to people around the world and in ways that 

matter in their lives. 

The U.S. Government has done a number of things working to 

improve its strategic communication performance. And one I would 

commend to you is, as soon as the minutes come out, there is actually, as we speak, a two-day strategic communication symposium 

going on at National Defense University. 

It was kicked off this morning by Newt Gingrich. Admiral 

Giambastiani spoke, Karen Hughes spoke, Deputy Secretary England is speaking tomorrow. And it is a serious effort of looking at 

the way we address it and reflects, I think, the increasing importance that people are putting on this. 

As was cited at the end of May, the National Security Council 

issued the National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 

Communications within DOD last September. Deputy Secretary 

signed out a roadmap for the execution of the Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR). And in the last two months, actually, there has 

been a lot of progress on implementing and executing that roadmap. 

That said, we still have a long way to go, and one of the key 

areas is definitional. The Defense Department has a definition of 

strategic comms, but it is not fully accepted across the interagency. 

So I would submit, until we agree on the definition of what we are 

doing, we are not necessarily going to align with the efforts. 

On the other hand, there does seem to be agreement that this 

is—Congressman Thornberry said that strategic communication actually is a process. And it is a process that links together a whole 

batch of other things, from public affairs to public diplomacy. Some 

parts of information operations, very importantly in the third 

world, visual information, and finds that target, and makes it 

available to foreign audiences. 

The issues are broader than just definitional. We need to integrate and synchronize our actions, while promoting cultural and organizational change across at least DOD. And the point is these 

are transformational changes; this is not a modest bureaucratic 

change. And it needs to be treated with that level of seriousness. 

In addition, though, as you look at these U.S. Government 

things, this is a messy business. The information environment is 

very complicated. And a lot of this is going to happen from the bottom up, not from top-down, coordinated actions. 

And so, again, as we pointed out, the glut of information in this 

new environment means that an information source has to be perceived by the audience as credible and trustworthy in order to cap-
11 

ture their attention. We need to understand how to make our information competitive in that environment. 

And I think it is critical that decision-makers understand the impact of these sorts of changes. 

One related area where the Defense Department is starting to 

make progress is in the sharing of unclassified information outside 

the boundaries of the defense enterprise with several military partners who may or may not have security clearances. We have typically focused at sharing classified information within the department. We need to reach out, communicate, collaborate, translate, 

engage with these partners. 

This is not just a governmental effort. Strategic communications 

is much broader than that. There are many, many, many more 

messages delivered around the world about our nation every year 

through advertising, entertainment, through government channels. 

Unfortunately, those messages are not always positive. We need 

to understand how to deal with them. On the other hand, there 

have been effective advertising campaigns. There are people who 

know how to do this. We need to be able to tap into them. 

Ultimately, it is important that people perceive that U.S. actions 

are advancing their interest, not just our own. And the facts have 

to be coherent with words and also need to provide hope to the population in their terms for things like jobs. 

So finally, there are no simple ways ahead. We have to match 

means to ends with just a few thoughts. 

First of all, we have to define the values, the visions, the metrics, 

the strategy and the programs clearly and assess the probability of 

success honestly. 

Second, these processes need to be made more agile, decentralized and local. Again, a single integrated, top-down process will not 

work. 

We have to do a better job at understanding the intended audience, their culture, their language, their history. 

We have to be realistic about the cause of anti-Americanism and 

realistic about our ability to change this in the near term. 

We have to leverage new technologies in ways that allow much 

greater interaction, not just transmission but interaction, with audiences. 

We have to recognize that total control is not possible. I heard 

a very good description this morning that we need to train our people and trust them, rather than trying to manage and supervise 

them continuously. 

But in this context, then, people need to be allowed to make mistakes. And if I were to ask for one area from the Congress, is to 

allow our people the ability to make those mistakes without being 

necessarily hung out to dry when they make them. 

We have to work to align the U.S. with the public in the areas 

we seek to reach. Dr. Zalman, I think, made this point very well. 

How do we fit into their story and their idiom? 

And finally is the question, as Mr. Kramer said, of resources, especially, I think, in priority for exchange programs. As Under Secretary Hughes will point out, exchange programs are life-long commitments. We have actually begun summer camps for 8- to 14- 
12 

year-olds recently in order to begin that bonding as soon as possible. 

Language training, cultural awareness, for DOD the unclassified 

engagement, and something else to remove the obstacles to allow 

our processes to be more nimble. 

Just a simple example: The DOD benefited enormously last year 

from the conference language in the authorization bill that allowed 

information and communications technologies to be included as 

part of rudimentary construction and repair when the department 

is doing humanitarian civic assistance. 

I mean, amazingly, it had been interpreted by a number of judge 

advocates general that you could rebuild a hospital destroyed by an 

earthquake but could not put any wiring in that could connect that 

hospital to the Internet to become a teaching hospital or something. 

The committee’s language clarified that. And the removal of that 

impediment has been a big help to us. 

In terms of resources, what I am told, last year the funding for public diplomacy was about $800,000 a year, with another 

$700,000 for exchange programs. 

Two-point-nine million dollars was available for public opinion 

research, which, in the standards of the U.S. political campaign, 

even is small. So I echo Mr. Kramer’s point. If you look at our advertising budgets, certainly we need to be able to be serious about 

this. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Wells can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Several questions. There is the first question in terms of the 

structure and how we are getting this message out. 

Imagine, for the moment, that in this meeting we came up with 

some great idea for how we wanted to, you know, do strategic communications, either the message or how we were delivering it. Who 

would you go see in the Federal Government? Who would be the 

person or the agency or the area that is overseeing this, in your 

view, as you have observed our efforts? 

Dr. WELLS. Well, clearly, I think the responsibility in the government is assigned to Under Secretary Karen Hughes in several hats. 

One is as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and 

Public Affairs. But she also shares this policy coordinating committee (PCC) on the National Security Council (NSC) of Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. 

DOD has stood up something called the Strategic Communication 

Integration Group, or SCIG. And this came out of the roadmap 

from the Quadrennial Defense Review. There is an executive committee of that made up of people from public affairs, from the joint 

staff, from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. And several of 

those are members of this interagency PCC. 

Mr. SMITH. And does Karen Hughes’s shop sort of oversee that, 

as well? Or is that separate? 

Dr. WELLS. The DOD SCIG reports to the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, but clearly through the PCC, which is the interagency 

mechanism that is coordinated with Karen Hughes. 
13 

Mr. SMITH. Great. And how would you evaluate, at this point, the 

performance? How are they doing? What could they be doing better? 

Dr. WELLS. So I think—let me see. I think there is progress 

being made, and there is particularly progress in the last of couple 

of months, and it is a little bit too early to say. 

If you look at our performance since 9/11 candidly, sir, I would 

say it has been very poor. If you look at the current vector, there 

are at least some hopeful signs. 

Again, this morning at this symposium, Under Secretary Hughes 

was talking about three main thrusts, and one was the exchange 

programs. Another was on communicating better, finding the mechanisms, how you get our people out to talk on Al Jazeera in Arabic 

to Arabic languages, how you get the embassies more engaged from 

the, you know, region. And then what they call the diplomacy of 

deeds, which is a focus on the things we are doing with public 

health and the comfort deployment, Central America—— 

Mr. SMITH. Disaster relief—— 

Dr. WELLS. Disaster relief. The Pakistan earthquake was a success, and the tsunami was a success. Again, Defense is looking at 

making influence operations sort of a major operational line of warfare, along with maneuver and intelligence and logistics. And if you 

get to that, then you are assigning it a priority that, you know, it 

has not previously had. 

So I think the attention and the vectors are right. It remains to 

be seen whether we can execute along these vectors. 

Mr. KRAMER. Could I jump in on that? 

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. 

Mr. KRAMER. You know, they just put out the National Strategy 

for Public Diplomacy. You have it because Bill was the one who actually sent it to us. If you look at it, it is hard to quarrel with the 

document, but it is a nascent document. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Mr. KRAMER. And the whole point here—and Dr. Wells made this 

point—is we haven’t done well up to now. We are still in the organizational stage. And actually getting the messages out is very, 

very difficult. 

I go back to the point that the Government Accountability Office 

made about the posts. I mean, they are the people out on the front 

line. And if you look at what comes out of the embassies themselves, it is pretty poor, not because they are unintelligent people, 

not because they don’t care, but they don’t have the training, they 

don’t have the resources, and they have other day jobs. 

So we really have a long way to go. So I would say, you know, 

heart is in the right place, but the execution is pretty limited. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I have more questions, but I will yield to Mr. Thornberry for his 

questions. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Zalman, would you answer the question 

that we have been discussing: How well are we doing now? 

Dr. ZALMAN. Yes. Well, I am encouraged by this event. It seems 

to me that from the 2004 strategic communications document that 

came out to now, there is a leap in sophistication and in recogni-
14 

tion of the thing that I call ‘‘story’’ but other people talk about in 

other ways. 

So that two or three years ago, the entire Middle East did look 

like a big, kind of, one geographic and one, kind of, conceptual unit 

to people looking out. And now, on a regular basis, it is recognized 

that people speak different languages, that they need to be addressed differently, and that, as a matter of fact, they need to be 

addressed in different ways. 

And I suppose that part of that reflects the experience that people have now had on the ground and speaks to the need that you 

just spoke to, to have processes that come from the bottom up. 

But clearly, American opinion, the opinion of the world of the 

United States, remains generally in decline. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Part of my frustration is we are six years after 

9/11 and we are still grappling with beginning steps to wage the 

kind of struggle that we are in—on other than the military, which 

I don’t mean to diminish. 

And part of the difficulty is, as you all have described, it is a 

cumbersome process that goes across government agencies. And so, 

you may have an NSC coordinating committee, but that is not exactly the best way to implement communications at a time when 

so much of it is over the Internet and happens in a matter of seconds. 

And I think it was you, Dr. Wells, that talked about the importance of training our people and trusting them to be more nimble. 

Because if you have to get a press release approved through the 

bureaucratic process, you are way behind already in a time when 

things happen so quickly. 

Some people have suggested that, in order to kickstart this issue, 

that a new organization needs to be created. Now, that is a typical, 

you know, suggestion that comes: When in doubt, rearrange the 

boxes. But let us see if any of you all have any opinions about that. 

And I guess the argument would be United States Information 

Agency (USIA) has been, you know, bandied about. Obviously, 

there is not the resources, not the emphasis on training there 

needs to be for people in our embassies or others. 

So a new organization that can focus better on strategic communication might not be as threatening as having the Department of 

Defense be in charge of strategic communications—some other 

agency out there. 

Anybody have an opinion about that? 

Mr. KRAMER. I will take a shot at it, yes. 

First of all, I think it is fair to say that the Office of Public Diplomacy itself is, you know, something of a new organization, Karen 

Hughes’s office. And it got started with great difficulty. As you recall, there was a prior Under Secretary who had a lot of problems. 

I think there are a lot of different ways to play it. But I would 

say that, wherever you put it, you have to have a lot more people 

and a lot more resources. 

And one easy way to do it sometimes is to create a, you know, 

kind of a joint task force. The NCTC, National Counterterrorism 

Center, is an example of a new organization that was created by 

melding some capacities from old ones, but they put them in a sep-
15 

arate place, so they can really focus and so that they would have 

the responsibility. 

And I would think that there is some argument, which is one of 

the reasons why I encourage the committee to really look at this 

comprehensively, to create, if you will, an NCTC-like organization 

to focus on influence. 

I don’t think the Department of Defense can, in any way, shape 

or form, be in charge of strategic communications, but it will necessarily be involved in that. And so will the State Department, and 

so will the posts. 

So when you create a new organization, you have to recognize 

that you are still going to have people out in the field who have 

great involvement. And I guess, you know, that is the argument, 

about how do you put this all together. 

As Dr. Wells said, you have a lot of players here. If you try to 

do it from a top-down point of view only, then it is going to just 

kluge up the system. You will get clogged arteries. So you really 

do have to trust people below you. 

But you could have some greater nimbleness, I think, and some 

greater focus, including by this body, you know, by the Congress, 

for resources if you had a central point. 

Dr. WELLS. One of the points that Under Secretary Hughes made 

this morning—because this was asked of her. And she said, ‘‘Look, 

nothing is going to happen in the remainder of this Administration. 

So the question is, what to do next?’’ 

But an advantage that her structure has is that it is part of the 

policy planning process at State, whereas at least there was a perception that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was a distinct entity that was communicating a 

message, but none the—and something that has been discussed a 

lot is that strategic communication needs to be part of the overall 

campaign plan from the beginning of the policy planning, not just 

reacting to events as something goes on. 

And so there is an argument, at least, that whatever entity you 

would want to set up, whether it is independent, ought to have this 

kind of link back into the planning process. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me touch on another area. The Defense 

Science Board study that looked at this recommended creation of 

an Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) 

or some entity that would facilitate private-sector expertise being 

used. I mean, you think about the resources in this country that 

are available for people who want to figure out a message, tell a 

story and communicate that story. It is unbelievable. 

Part of what got me into this is a person who fits that description ended up volunteering his efforts in other countries. And he 

would like to make a greater contribution. He doesn’t want to be 

a GS–11, but he is looking for a way to contribute. 

Talk to me a little about your view as to how we can tap into 

this expertise that exists in the United States in the national interest, but in a coordinated way—not everybody doing their own. 

Dr. ZALMAN. I have a small comment to make about this, because 

I actually worked in a very direct way a couple of years ago on a 

private-sector effort that was intended to produce materials for dissemination in the Middle East. And one of the problems was that, 
16 

despite very good intentions by all involved, it ended up being very 

difficult to have them informed by necessary cultural expertise. 

So, very sophisticated and good materials produced by people 

who knew what they were doing were created. But there was a 

really complicated disconnect between people who understood the 

place and the region into which they were supposed to be put and 

the creators. 

And clearly, there are solutions to this, but I think that they 

can’t be spontaneous ones, or they should be considered in advance 

of these sorts of projects. 

Mr. KRAMER. You know, whether it is an FFRDC or not, I mean, 

I couldn’t agree more with that point. It really is an interdisciplinary requirement. 

I mean, you have got the message-makers, if you will, the 

marketeers. And I am not sure who you were speaking about, but 

we certainly have fabulous marketers in the U.S. And they are 

very sophisticated, take advantage of psychological studies and the 

like. But they know the culture, so they don’t even have to think 

about that. Then you have people who know the culture, and we 

have people who, well, do know the culture, but they are not the 

marketers. 

And then there actually is an expertise on the use of the medium: T.V. or Internet or radio. And they are all different. So if you 

are a radio person and not a T.V. person and you are not an Internet—I mean, you can be, but they are different. So I think you 

really need to have all three put together. 

Now, whether you use an FFRDC or not, open question. But I 

would make the point that Dr. Wells made before, that you really 

also do need to connect into the policy people, because if it is not 

connected to the policy, you are just lost out there. 

I mean, one of the difficulties that contractors always have if 

they have a, I am going to call, the statement of work. And, you 

know, they are in good faith. And they work to the statement of 

work. But in the meantime, the policy is changing, things are happening and the like. And it is hard for them to be as flexible. 

So having the capacity to be inside the government while you are 

trying to have this agility is, I think, enormously important. 

FFRDCs have that, to some extent. 

Dr. WELLS. I would think that one would perhaps be better focusing on the commercial world rather than the entertainment 

world. And I say this only because—and I am speaking with absolutely no personal expertise in the area. But there have been a 

number of very successful campaigns for U.S. products that have 

been sold in the third world or in foreign markets. But there have 

also been a lot of very successful television shows and cable whatever which are wildly popular but convey the U.S. in not necessarily the view we would like to see the U.S. conveyed in. 

And so, at least when you have the economic incentive to wind 

up with the product being sold and the intent that you are trying 

to deliver, there is that feedback mechanism that may not be the 

case in a purely entertainment environment. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Zalman, I think you make a very good 

point about narrative, and particularly in the Muslim world, the 
17 

narrative that stretches back centuries, which we are not used to 

thinking in those terms. 

I am interested to know, in your interactions, have you found 

places in the U.S. Government you think that have a good understanding that there is a narrative stretching back hundreds of 

years, and that we have to take that into account in what we try 

to do? 

Dr. ZALMAN. I want to understand your question. Do you mean, 

are there examples in our own—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. What I am really trying to understand is to 

what extent—my view is that there are pockets of deep understanding in the government but that it is not very widespread and 

that often this understanding of a long historical narrative, which 

plays a much greater role in other cultures than it does in our own, 

that understanding does not translate always into policy decisions 

or into communications. 

And I am just curious as to your experience, what you have 

found in dealing with government entities, positive and negative. 

Dr. ZALMAN. Instead of addressing length of historical experience, I might use the concept of stakeholder. Who understands the 

concept of what it means to actually be engaged as a stakeholder? 

And I would say, to that end, I would have to think a little bit 

more about where there are institutional pockets, because I think 

that they exist. And I would like to get back to you on that. But 

in terms of individual, I see them everywhere. 

And I will use myself as an example. I am a stakeholder in an 

old American story that goes back to the 17th century. I think of 

my past as starting at Plymouth Rock. That is not a reflection of 

the truth of my family, which arrived much more recently. But I 

engage and am a stakeholder in perpetuating this history. 

And I think it is very possible to easily make people working in 

the government and these institutions simply self-conscious holders 

of their own experience, and that that is transferable, that that is 

a kind of portable framing. 

And it can be said in a more sophisticated way than I just did, 

if necessary. 

Does that answer the question? 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes. I think it is just a challenge for us, because there are some differences in culture. And, as you said earlier, you can’t look at everybody who speaks Arabic as one monolithic thing, or all the Muslim world as one monolithic thing, and 

all we need is a glitzy commercial to go out there and say how 

great we are, and it is going to translate into any degree of effectiveness. 

Dr. ZALMAN. Right. 

Mr. SMITH. Could—— 

Dr. ZALMAN. But you—— 

Mr. SMITH. Go ahead. 

Dr. ZALMAN. But you can go out and go, why is this contemporary community—whether it is a national community or a segment of a national community—why are they, say, stakeholders or 

engaged in a certain historical narrative of themselves? And then 

you can speak to that. 
18 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I want to follow up and ask a little bit about 

exactly what the attitudes are about America out there. 

And we all have our answers for it. I mean, there is widespread 

agreement that, particularly in the Islamic world but even more 

broadly, opinions about America are worse now than they were 

pre–9/11 and certainly fading in the last, you know, 20 or 30 years. 

And it has been a rather precipitous drop. 

An example I think I have used before this committee before is 

I remember reading Thomas Friedman, ‘‘From Beirut to Jerusalem,’’ talking about when the Marines showed up in Beirut. And 

I read this book post–9/11 and was just staggered by the fact that 

when the Marines showed up in Beirut, the reaction was very positive in Lebanon amongst the Muslims as well as the Christians. 

There was the feeling that if America is there, things must be getting better. And this is 1983. Hard for me to imagine too many 

places, you know, certainly in the Islamic world, where some Marines could show up at this point and have that same reaction. 

And certainly, you know, day after 9/11, there was a certain 

amount of sympathy for us out there that we seem to have lost in 

the last five or six years. And I think, you know, certainly I have 

my answers for how that came about. But it is three people who 

track this stuff. 

And, I mean, this is a starting point. If we are going to change 

these attitudes, what are the attitudes? How did they come about? 

And I understand that, oh, it is probably different. There is a full 

history in Pakistan. I just got back from a trip there. And I have 

a much better understanding about their attitude toward us that 

go back to stuff that happened in the 1960’s and elsewhere. It varies from country to country. I get that. 

But in the broad category, or if you want to take it down to a 

specific, you know, why are we having such trouble winning this 

PR war? What are we doing? What are the reactions? What are the 

feelings that people have toward us? How can you sum up the reasons for the anti-Americanism that we are talking about? 

Dr. WELLS. You know, there are two broad arguments. And I 

know you know this. They come in the category of ‘‘they hate us 

for what we are’’ and ‘‘they hate us for what we do.’’ 

In the ‘‘hate us for what we are,’’ I think that is limited to a very, 

very small group of what I would call militant radical, you know, 

al Qaida types. They hate us—and I don’t even know they ‘‘hate’’ 

us is the right word—but not with us for what we do goes a lot 

more to policies and a view that our policies are not advancing 

their interests. 

And there are certain hot-button issues in that world which, 

whether we choose to believe it or not, do seem to make an issue. 

One, obviously, is the Middle East peace process, which has stalled 

for a long time now. Another was not so much necessarily the invasion of Iraq, but the fact that it has gone very poorly. So the consequences are difficult. 

But, you see, when we go into different parts of that world—you 

have been to Pakistan. You know the relief effort got widespread 

approbation. The relief effort with respect to the tsunami got widespread approbation. There are certainly places where we are able 

to work very capably. 
19 

So I think that, and in my opinion—and I defer to my colleagues 

here at the table if they disagree—I do think that our broad message, which we all talked about—you know, democracy, freedom, 

human rights, social openness, economic opportunity—really still 

resonates broadly in their world, but they are not sure that we 

mean it. 

And I think the last thing I would say is I think we have to do 

a lot more listening. I think that was mentioned by each of the 

other speakers. If you want to understand the Middle East, it is 

good to drink a lot of tea. You know, it is a metaphor, of course. 

But it is good to sit and talk and listen. And they have a lot to say. 

Mr. SMITH. And one specific aspect of that, you mentioned that, 

I think the perception is that America impacts the rest of the 

world. You know, we just do because of our size and scope in a variety of different ways. And the perception is largely that we are 

impacting it in a way that is negative to the rest of the world. 

And one of the concerns that I have had—you know, obviously 

within our foreign policy, within our military policy, we are supposed to pursue our own interests. This is a point that Mr. Bolton, 

amongst others, have made about the process of the United Nations (UN) and other international institutions. But in so doing, if 

that is our message, and we are more invested in winning over the 

rest of the world and most other countries—if that is our message 

that basically we are out there trying to pursue our own interests, 

we fundamentally undermine ourselves. 

There has to be some piece of that message that says we want 

to do good for you as well. And I think we have really lost that; 

because I think post–9/11 there was that attitude of we have been 

wronged. Therefore whatever we do is justified. And I think that 

has sort of accelerated some of the trends out there of people feeling like that U.S. is not particularly interested in what is in the 

best interests of Pakistan or Iraq or any other country out there. 

And, you know, if we are serious about winning the hearts and 

minds, we have to sometimes put our, you know, short-term interests—one of you mentioned short-term versus long-term—put our 

short-term interests on the back burner and desire to pursue that 

long-term interest of how we get the rest of the world to view us 

in a more positive way. 

Dr. Wells. 

Dr. WELLS. I think a couple things. First of all, the words are important. And I was looking about a year ago to co-author an article 

with a Jordanian businessman on the use of information communications technologies for promoting opportunities in the Arab 

world for employment. And in the course of this, democracy came 

up. 

And he basically came back very quickly and said, ‘‘Please let us 

not use that term in this article, because it has a connotation in 

the Arab world that is not necessarily advantageous to the image 

that America wants to promote. If you want to say participatory 

government to enhance people’s opportunities or things like that, 

that would be terrific. But the phrase democracy in and of itself 

has a cache associated with it.’’ 

And the second piece is historically, anytime we have a dramatic 

imbalance of power, whether it is Britain’s role as a balancer of 
20 

continental powers, over there is an inherent tendency of the others to form coalitions to restore that balance. And so, whatever our 

message, all that does is make our environment more complicated 

and more difficult to restore the image. I think that is just a natural consequence of international relations we need to take into account. 

And the third, as somebody pointed out at the symposium this 

morning, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union in many respects 

was almost an ideal enemy. One could point to the KGB. One could 

point to this and say well, them versus us. You know, clearly this 

is the way most people would want to go. We don’t have that clearcut opponent now. Again, it is a much more difficult environment 

for us to make the case. 

So I think irrespective of what we do versus what we are, there 

is an environment there that complicates our ability to get our 

positive message across. 

Mr. SMITH. And, Dr. Zalman, I want to ask you one additional 

question. In your prepared remarks, you talked about not trying to, 

sort of, create our own narrative to counter existing narratives in 

the places we are trying to persuade, but sort of feed into the narrative, which I think makes a great deal of sense; because you are 

then, you know, feeding into cultural understandings that are already there, instead of—I mean, there is a limit to what marketing 

can do. You can’t come in and, you know—you really can’t sell iceboxes to Eskimos, cliche notwithstanding. So I think that is a good 

idea. 

Can you expand upon that particular idea, an example of how we 

could do that to better promote ourselves? 

Dr. ZALMAN. Sure. I am going to borrow one from the paper that 

I provided you before. 

A couple of years ago, there was a very big flap over an article 

that showed up in Newsweek and found its way to Pakistan about 

a Koran having been thrown into a toilet at Guantanamo Bay. This 

led subsequently, or was structured as we narrated it, to have led 

to very big demonstrations across the Islamic world. 

Mr. SMITH. Turns out I don’t think it actually happened, by the 

way. But it was just a side note. 

Dr. ZALMAN. It actually was explained to me by one of the—anyway—— 

Mr. SMITH. Correct. Yes. 

Dr. ZALMAN. That is not exactly what happened. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Dr. ZALMAN. But it actually—it doesn’t matter. 

Mr. SMITH. It doesn’t matter, no. I agree with you on that point. 

But—— 

Dr. ZALMAN. So the official response to this was two-fold. One 

was the United States respects Islam. We wouldn’t do—we respect 

other religions. And the other one, hopefully was so negligent, but 

that is the reason why I can’t remember it right now. But there 

was not a very big response. 

But if you looked and examined, as I had the opportunity to do 

then, to where this started in Afghanistan, there were actually a 

number of local responses. For example, a local sheikh who said, 

wow, this is in Afghan. We don’t behave this way. We don’t protest 
21 

in this way. There is foreign provocation here. They were responding to a local set of circumstances between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was an official response from Hamid Karzai, who said 

wow, look at this incipient democracy. This is so great. We have 

protests now. 

There was a response among the population to other events, Abu 

Ghraib, et cetera. And they weren’t really responding to something 

that was Islamic per se but to a story about human rights on a universal human rights and a series of events that had led up to that. 

I think that there were ways probably, if those stories had been 

available and had been followed at that time, that more acute and 

precise responses coming from the State Department and perhaps 

elsewhere could have been made that would get at what was actually being said and would hook into some of the ways in which 

local populations were themselves already addressing the situation. 

Mr. SMITH. Instead of trying to go—— 

Dr. ZALMAN. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. No, this is wrong—— 

Dr. ZALMAN. Right. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. ‘‘America would never do such a thing.’’ 

You could sort of feed into it and find narratives that fit with the 

need to narrative. That is a great example. 

And then one final question in terms of policy. And I am trying 

to get an idea for, you know, getting outside the messaging for the 

moment. And, again, policy-wise if there were two or three things 

that we could change, from a policy perspective, that would then 

help us deliver the message, because I am mindful of the fact 

that—I have a great example from my brief career in the legal 

field. Looking at a case one time with an attorney who warned me 

before we started that we had some bad facts—which, I love that. 

‘‘It is not that we are going to lose. It is not that we are wrong. 

We just got some bad facts. We got to work on those.’’ 

Well, we have some bad facts at the moment, you know, in terms 

of the U.S. effort, particularly in the Islamic world. You know, certainly that is what is going on in Iraq. 

But there is a whole, you know, phrasing of the ‘‘global war on 

terror.’’ There is the whole tendency of American policymakers to 

use the words ‘‘Islamic terrorist.’’ I mean, to my mind, in this whole 

battle, you know, we ought to keep the word ‘‘Islam’’ out of how we 

describe al Qaida. It gives them credibility in the Islamic world 

that we shouldn’t be doing. 

But I also stopped at Great Britain on my trip. And we talked 

about the global war on terror, old phraseology. Is that the right 

way to do it? 

You know, if you had just two or three policy things, if you are 

the messenger, we say to you, ‘‘Okay, go out there, sell America to 

the Islamic world,’’ you come back to us and say, ‘‘Okay, I can do 

that, but you have to help me with a couple of things. Here is a 

couple policies that I think you ought to change to help us with 

that messaging.’’ 

What are the things that you would point toward? 

Dr. WELLS. I think one of the points Under Secretary Hughes 

made this morning was that she is actively working to eliminate 
22 

the religious terminology in the U.S. Government pronouncements—to make them religion-neutral. 

And so I think that is very close to what—in fact, she said she 

has taken to calling a lot of the suicide bombers and whoever 

‘‘death cult’’—the point is their only message is death—and leaving 

out the Islamic whatever. 

Mr. SMITH. I think that is a great idea. 

Mr. Kramer, Dr. Zalman. 

Mr. KRAMER. I think you have to jump into some of the really 

difficult issues in a more effective way. 

One is, I think that if you want to have good messages, you have 

to be thought of as a partner. If you want to be a partner, you have 

to have a partnership. And I think we need to think hard about 

how to create partnerships with specific countries and the perception then of the partnership with the Arab world as a whole. 

There is a lot of economic difficulties—not in every state, because 

some of them are fairly rich, but in quite a number. And we might 

look hard at expanding our capabilities there in the economic 

arena. It is not an easy sell, I am sure, to the American public. Foreign aid has never been an easy sell. But I think—— 

Mr. SMITH. Well, it should be. I mean, following up with something Mac said earlier, we talked about how we haven’t put the resources in, except for the Defense Department. We talked about 

how, you know, by and large, from a military standpoint, our military has been successful in Afghanistan and certainly they were 

successful in Iraq in toppling Saddam Hussein. We have targeted 

a large number of al Qaida members successfully. You know, but 

the public diplomacy piece hasn’t been so good. And you can look 

at, you know, Defense Department budget, State Department budget over the same period. And it is not hard to see. So I think that 

resources point is very well made. 

And whether it is an easy argument for the American public or 

not, we have to make it. You know, it is just as important, arguably more important, in keeping this country safe that we upgrade 

our public diplomacy and our commitment to the rest of the world, 

in terms of the support you are talking about, as it is that we, you 

know, better fund our troops to fight the war. 

Dr. WELLS. Second point I would make is I am fully in support 

of what is being done for the expected exchange programs and various other interactions with other publics. The difference is I would 

probably increase it by about 10 times. 

And I would certainly look hard at reducing some of the visa requirements. You know, we have put them on for good reasons. 

There are people who are out to harm the United States, no question about that. But at the same time, we have reduced some of 

the flow into this country. And I think we need both increased flow 

out and more flow in. 

Now, that is a long-term kind of activity. In my government service, I had the International Military Education and Training Program, IMET, underneath me both times. And that is also a longterm activity. And it was dollar-for-dollar, universally thought of 

as, essentially, the most valuable thing we did. I think these exchange programs have the same potential. And I think they ought 

to be substantially, substantially increased. 
23 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Zalman. 

Dr. ZALMAN. I want to draw on one of the very good ideas I heard 

at a conference recently that I referenced in the written testimony 

at the East-West Institute on violent extremism and stopping it or 

forestalling it. And that was that U.S. officials and policymakers 

are not seen as condemning all forms of extremism equally. And 

there is a perception globally or elsewhere that there is a real selective condemnation of that violent extremism committed by Muslims and by Islamic actors. 

And so, there should be attention to making sure that they both 

do and are seen condemning extremism wherever it takes place 

and by whichever parties, perhaps especially in the realm of religious actors or actors saying that they act in the name of religion. 

Mr. SMITH. You answered all the questions I had. 

Mac, do you have anything further? 

Well, thank you. 

Dr. WELLS. May I respond just to Congressman Thornberry’s 

question earlier about the source of expertise in the government? 

I think one of the truly spectacularly successful uses of, really, 

anthropology in support of government policy was the World War 

II set of studies that went on in Germany and Japan that sort of 

led to Ruth Benedict’s Chrysanthemum and the Sword and the decisions to retain the emperor and really an understanding of Japanese culture that wouldn’t have been in place without that. 

And that was not something you would find within the government, even within the foreign service officers who had served out 

there, but actually went out to anthropologists and academics and 

brought that expertise together. 

So this would, sort of, argue either for the, sort of, ad hoc task 

force or focused task force that Mr. Kramer talked about you might 

bring together for particular purposes. But that would be my 

thought on that. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there anything else? No one else? 

Again, thank you very much. It turned into a longer afternoon 

than you expected, and I appreciate your patience in sticking with 

us. 

And last, I would like to stay in touch. We are going to be working on this for quite a while, and your expertise will be helpful to 

us in the future, I am sure. 

So thank you for testifying today and for your time. 

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 11, 2007 

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JULY 11, 2007 

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