Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Arkebauer v. Springfield Clinic, 2021 IL App (4th) 190697

Appellate Court 

Caption

REBECCA LEE ARKEBAUER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 

SPRINGFIELD CLINIC and PETER J. KARRAS, M.D., DefendantsAppellees.

District & No. Fourth District 

No. 4-19-0697

Filed March 29, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 12-L-152; 

the Hon. John W. Belz, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Amelia S. Buragas, of Bolen Robinson & Ellis, LLP, of Bloomington, 

and Monroe D. McWard, of Taylorville, for appellant.

Christian D. Biswell, of Drake, Narup & Mead, P.C., of Springfield, 

and Karen Kies DeGrand and Laura Coffey Ieremia, of Donohue 

Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC, of Chicago, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices DeArmond and Steigmann concurred in the judgment and 

opinion. 
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OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Rebecca Lee Arkebauer, brought a medical malpractice action against defendants, 

Dr. Peter J. Karras and Springfield Clinic, alleging she was injured as the result of a medical 

procedure negligently performed by Dr. Karras. In December 2018, a jury returned a verdict 

in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) denying her 

motions in limine to exclude certain evidence, (2) denying her motion for a mistrial based upon 

the erroneous admission of evidence, and (3) allowing defendants to present closing argument 

that was contrary to one of their judicial admissions. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On June 28, 2010, plaintiff underwent a colonoscopy performed by Dr. Karras at 

Springfield Clinic. In the days following that procedure, she began to experience various 

symptoms including abdominal, back, and shoulder pain. On July 3, 2010, plaintiff sought 

emergency medical care and was found to have a ruptured spleen with internal bleeding. The 

following day, she underwent emergency surgery to have her spleen removed. 

¶ 4 In June 2012, plaintiff initiated the underlying medical negligence action against 

defendants, and in July 2015, she filed a three-count amended complaint. In count I of her 

amended complaint, plaintiff alleged Dr. Karras was negligent in advising her about, and in 

performing, the colonoscopy procedure. Specifically, she asserted he owed her a duty to 

provide medical and surgical services in conformance with applicable standards of care, as 

well as sufficient information about the risks attendant to a colonoscopy. Plaintiff maintained 

Dr. Karras breached those duties by (1) exerting undue or excessive “force, torque, and/or 

traumatic contact with her [s]plenic [f]lexure and/or her [s]pleen” during her colonoscopy; 

(2) failing to advise or warn her “about the known possibility that the [c]olonoscopy procedure 

might or could cause injury to her [s]pleen”; (3) failing to warn or advise her that she should 

not take aspirin or other blood-thinning medications after her colonoscopy; and (4) “otherwise 

*** employing surgical technique and/or instruments in a manner not within the prevailing 

standards of care.” Plaintiff asserted Dr. Karras’s negligent acts or omissions caused her 

injuries, including the ultimate removal of her spleen, “permanent loss of her normal life,” and 

pain and suffering. Additionally, she maintained she would not have consented to the 

colonoscopy procedure had she known “of the undisclosed risks” she faced, including the loss 

of her spleen. 

¶ 5 In count II of her amended complaint, plaintiff alleged negligence by Dr. Karras based on 

the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. Finally, in count III of her amended complaint, she alleged 

negligence by Springfield Clinic based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 

¶ 6 In August 2015, defendants filed an answer to plaintiff’s amended complaint. They 

admitted that, prior to performing plaintiff’s June 2010 colonoscopy, “neither Dr. Karras nor 

any other medical provider at the Springfield Clinic” advised or warned plaintiff “about the 

possibility or probabilities of injury to her [s]pleen attendant to the [c]olonoscopy.” However, 

defendants denied having a duty to disclose or warn of the risk of a splenic injury and disputed 

the claim that they were negligent in their care and treatment of plaintiff. Defendants did not 

plead any affirmative defenses. 
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¶ 7 Prior to trial, the parties filed various motions. Relevant to this appeal, plaintiff filed 

motions in limine seeking to bar any evidence or argument that she was contributorily 

negligent or comparatively at fault for causing her injuries (plaintiff’s motion in limine No. 3), 

as well as any evidence or argument that she failed to mitigate her damages or injuries 

(plaintiff’s motion in limine No. 4). She asserted that any claim that her own conduct 

contributed in whole or in part to the injuries she complained of had to be raised by defendants 

in their pleadings as an affirmative defense and noted defendants’ pleadings did not assert any 

such defenses. Plaintiff requested an order barring defendants “from making any mention 

whatsoever of any act and/or omission on [her] part *** that might or could be construed *** 

to mean that [she] contributed to [the] cause [of] her injuries” or “failed to follow any doctors’ 

or nurses[’] instructions or otherwise failed to mitigate her damages.” 

¶ 8 In February 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on pending motions in the case, 

including plaintiff’s motions in limine Nos. 3 and 4. Although the record contains no transcript 

of the hearing, it does contain the court’s docket entry, showing plaintiff’s motion in limine

No. 3 was “granted as to surgery itself” and plaintiff’s motion in limine No. 4 was “taken under 

advisement.” 

¶ 9 In October 2018, plaintiff filed a motion to clarify the trial court’s ruling on her motion 

in limine No. 3 and to obtain a ruling on her motion in limine No. 4 (motion to clarify). In 

connection with that motion, she, again, argued that facts constituting any affirmative defense, 

including that the negligence of the plaintiff contributed in whole or in part to his or her injury, 

had to be plainly set forth in a defendant’s pleadings. She asserted defendants “never pled the 

defense of contributory or comparative negligence, the defense of the failure to follow doctor’s 

orders, the defense of the failure to mitigate injuries or damages, or any other defense.” 

Accordingly, she maintained defendants could not assert them at trial. 

¶ 10 Plaintiff further acknowledged that defendants had previously responded to her motions by 

arguing they could raise a sole proximate cause defense at trial without having to explicitly 

plead it as a defense. However, she maintained defendants had no factual basis to support that 

defense and argued as follows: 

“At oral argument [on the motions in February 2018], the Defendants’ only 

response to this failure to plead any defense was that the ‘sole proximate cause defense’ 

need not be explicitly plead[ed] as a defense. Yes, but there must be competent 

evidence showing that either some third party’s acts/omissions or the Plaintiff’s 

acts/omissions were the sole proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Hence, although it 

is true that a defendant need not formally plead that plaintiff’s acts or omissions were 

the sole proximate cause of the injuries of which he/she complains in order to assert 

this defense, here, in light of the facts and the Defendants’ own experts’ opinion 

testimony, under Illinois law there is no basis for the assertion of the sole proximate 

cause defense. *** [T]he defense here cannot make a good faith assertion that any act 

or omission on the part of Plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of her [s]pleen injury 

or the necessary [s]plenectomy procedure ***.” (Emphases in original.)

¶ 11 Defendants filed a written response to plaintiff’s motion to clarify, arguing they were not 

required to plead an affirmative defense to introduce relevant proximate cause evidence and 

that there was evidence supporting a sole proximate defense and jury instruction. They also 

asserted plaintiff’s pleadings made “relevant” post-colonoscopy discharge events, including 

the discharge instructions plaintiff received. In particular, defendants noted plaintiff’s amended 
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complaint contained allegations that she was not advised to refrain from taking aspirin or other 

blood-thinning medication after her colonoscopy and that her health progressively worsened 

after her procedure. Defendants argued that granting plaintiff’s motions would preclude them 

from rebutting her allegations. 

¶ 12 Plaintiff filed a reply to defendants’ response, arguing defendants were attempting to assert 

that she was contributorily negligent or failed to mitigate her damages by not following 

doctors’ orders under the “guise” of a sole proximate cause defense. She argued no factual 

basis existed for a sole proximate cause defense, noting, in part, that defendants’ medical 

experts opined Dr. Karras “alone on his own caused the initial injury to Plaintiff’s [s]pleen 

during the *** [c]olonoscopy.” Plaintiff maintained defendants essentially asserted that she 

was “blameworthy for contributing to cause an exacerbation of her [s]pleen injury after Dr. 

Karras injured her [s]pleen during the [c]olonoscopy,” not that “any act or omission on [her] 

part *** was the sole proximate cause of her [s]pleen injury.” (Emphases in original.) 

Additionally, plaintiff argued that the allegations of her complaint could not “open[ ] the door” 

to defendants presenting affirmative defenses they did not plead. 

¶ 13 On December 3, 2018, the trial court conducted a final pretrial hearing in the matter and 

addressed plaintiff’s motion to clarify. Following a lengthy discussion of the matter, the court 

found a “sole proximate cause defense [was] allowable in *** Illinois.” It then took the matter 

under advisement, stating it would review depositions submitted by the parties to determine if 

there was “enough evidence for [that defense] to be presented to the jury.” On December 6, 

2018, the court entered the following docket entry: “After careful consideration, the Court 

Clarifies the Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #3 and #4. The Court finds sufficient 

evidence in the record[,] namely depositions provided to the Court[,] to allow the defendant[s] 

to proceed with a Sole Proximate Cause Defense in this case.”

¶ 14 From December 10 to 19, 2018, a jury trial was conducted in the matter. Plaintiff’s 

evidence included her own testimony, as well as testimony from her husband; her brother; a 

family acquaintance; Dr. Karras as an adverse witness; Dr. Robert McClintock, her primary 

care physician; Dr. Kristopher Mitchell, the doctor who performed her emergency 

splenectomy; and medical experts, including Dr. Olu Sangodeyi and Dr. Harold Fenster. 

¶ 15 Plaintiff’s evidence showed that prior to June 2010, she had been treated for hypertension 

and was taking aspirin on a daily basis. In April 2010, she sought treatment with Dr. 

McClintock and reported an incident of rectal bleeding. On June 28, 2010, she underwent a 

colonoscopy performed by Dr. Karras at Springfield Clinic. Plaintiff testified she met with an 

anesthesiologist prior to the procedure and reported that her current medications included 

aspirin. 

¶ 16 After the colonoscopy, Dr. Karras informed plaintiff that the procedure went well, and she 

was discharged home. Plaintiff and her husband testified that neither Dr. Karras nor any nurse 

at Springfield Clinic told her not to take aspirin after her procedure. In the days following her 

colonoscopy, plaintiff began to experience pain in her stomach, back, and shoulder, which 

progressively worsened. On July 3, 2010, she became very ill while visiting her mother and 

was taken to the hospital by ambulance for emergency medical care. Plaintiff was found to 

have internal bleeding at the location of her spleen and, on July 4, 2010, underwent emergency 

surgery with Dr. Mitchell to remove her spleen. The parties stipulated that “the injury to 

[plaintiff’s] spleen that occurred during the course of the colonoscopy did not involve 

negligence on the part of [plaintiff].”
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¶ 17 While testifying during plaintiff’s case, Dr. Karras stated he was a gastroenterologist and, 

in June 2010, was performing approximately 15 colonoscopies a week. He asserted that prior 

to plaintiff’s colonoscopy, he informed plaintiff of the most frequent complications associated 

with the procedure, including a perforated colon and bleeding. Although Dr. Karras was aware 

before 2010 that a colonoscopy procedure could cause injury to the spleen, he agreed he did 

not inform plaintiff of the possibility of a splenic injury. He asserted “[p]hysicians don’t have 

to inform patients of every single risk associated with a procedure” and that providing such 

information “could scare more patients away from having a very valuable test.” 

¶ 18 Dr. Karras further testified that when performing plaintiff’s colonoscopy, the applicable 

standard of care required that he not use excessive force with the scope during the procedure 

and not “miss polyps or colon cancer.” He agreed that he did not know how much force he 

exerted during the procedure, stating an instrument to measure such a thing did not exist. 

However, he denied that he used excessive force, stating “the scope was in [his] hand, and [he] 

met no resistance.” Dr. Karras agreed that the injury to plaintiff’s spleen “most likely” occurred 

during her colonoscopy. 

¶ 19 Dr. Mitchell testified that during plaintiff’s splenectomy, he observed a large amount of 

blood in her abdomen. He opined “that there was a bleed in [plaintiff’s] spleen that over time 

built up pressure and caused the capsule [of her spleen] to rip off.” Dr. Mitchell agreed that the 

“most likely” cause of plaintiff’s initial splenic injury was “torque during the colonoscopy Dr. 

Karras performed” in the area of the “splenic flexure” of the colon, which attaches to the 

spleen. He stated that “during a colonoscopy, *** a scope that goes past the splenic flexure can 

pull on the spleen capsule and tear it.” Regarding plaintiff’s case, he further stated as follows 

on direct examination by plaintiff’s counsel:

“So my best recollection, in reviewing the chart and looking at everything, is that likely 

what happened was, there was a little torquing that caused a little tear in the splenic 

capsule and she got a small bleed and then she took a bunch of ibuprofen and aspirin 

and continued to bleed over the five days which then eventually ruptured [the spleen].” 

¶ 20 Dr. Mitchell further offered testimony that taking aspirin was “not a contraindication to do 

a colonoscopy.” However, he asserted “adding more aspirin and more ibuprofen would 

increase [plaintiff’s] risk.” Dr. Mitchell asserted his belief that the anesthesiology record from 

prior to plaintiff’s colonoscopy, indicating that aspirin was one of her current medications, 

“probably was pre-populated.” He also testified that plaintiff reported to him that “she was 

taking ibuprofen and aspirin for pain control” after her colonoscopy. 

¶ 21 On cross-examination, Dr. Mitchell testified that plaintiff reported to him that she 

experienced pain symptoms approximately 24 hours after her colonoscopy. She also stated 

“she took ibuprofen or aspirin to manage the pain, and her symptoms continued to increase.” 

Dr. Mitchell opined plaintiff had a tear “somewhere on the spleen as a result of the 

colonoscopy,” the injury “caused some bleeding[,] and the bleeding was made worse by 

[plaintiff’s] continued use of ibuprofen or aspirin.” Finally, Dr. Mitchell explained that “prepopulated” meant that a patient’s past medical history automatically “shows up in [a] note” 

without being “filled *** out” at the time of a current visit. 

¶ 22 Dr. Sangodeyi testified he was a board-certified general surgeon. He estimated that during 

his medical career he had performed approximately 6000 colonoscopies and at least 1000 

surgeries on patients with traumatic spleen injuries. He opined plaintiff’s spleen was injured 

during her June 2010 colonoscopy and that the most likely cause of that injury was “the torque 
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and force” Dr. Karras exerted on plaintiff’s splenic flexure during the procedure. He testified 

that Dr. Mitchell’s operative note described “a large injury to the spleen” and a “large amount 

of blood in the abdomen.” 

¶ 23 Dr. Sangodeyi further opined that Dr. Karras’s failure to discover plaintiff’s splenic injury 

lessened the likelihood of saving her spleen from being totally removed. He believed Dr. 

Karras should have discovered plaintiff’s splenic injury the day of the colonoscopy, June 28, 

2010, or by the day after that procedure, June 29, 2010, when plaintiff began experiencing 

shoulder and abdominal pain. He opined that by June 29, it was “more likely than not” that 

plaintiff’s injury would require a total splenectomy. On direct examination, Dr. Sangodeyi 

further testified he did not see any documentation in plaintiff’s medical records indicating that 

she was advised not to take aspirin either before or after her colonoscopy. 

¶ 24 On cross-examination, Dr. Sangodeyi testified he did not know whether plaintiff’s splenic 

injury started out as a relatively small bleed that evolved into a more severe bleed. He 

acknowledged that a splenic bleed is a known colonoscopy complication and that such a 

complication could be “self-limiting,” meaning “it stops on its own.” 

¶ 25 Dr. Fenster, a board-certified general surgeon, estimated he had performed approximately 

6000 colonoscopies over the course of his career. He also opined plaintiff’s splenic injury 

occurred during her colonoscopy. He testified such injuries were “usually caused by traction 

of the splenic flexure by the colonoscopist” and opined that “more likely than not, [Dr. Karras] 

caused[,] by excessive force[,] a shearing effect that tore [plaintiff’s] splenic capsule.” In Dr. 

Fenster’s opinion, Dr. Karras violated the standard of care of a reasonably qualified 

colonoscopist during plaintiff’s colonoscopy.

¶ 26 Dr. Fenster further opined that the fact that plaintiff had been taking aspirin prior to the 

colonoscopy was “a risk factor,” in that aspirin prevents coagulation. He testified the applicable 

standard of care required Dr. Karras to tell plaintiff to stop taking aspirin before her 

colonoscopy or to cancel the colonoscopy if plaintiff reported aspirin as one of the medications 

she had been taking on the day the procedure was set to take place. 

¶ 27 Dr. Fenster opined defendants had a duty to inform plaintiff about the risks and 

complications of a splenic injury before her colonoscopy. He testified such a duty stemmed 

from the severity of the risk and that rarity of the risk did not “trump” severity in terms of 

disclosures to a patient. Dr. Fenster stated defendants deviated from the applicable standard of 

care by failing to inform plaintiff of such a risk. Finally, Dr. Fenster testified it was his opinion 

that nothing plaintiff “did after [her] colonoscopy caused or contributed to cause her ultimate 

outcome with respect to her spleen.” 

¶ 28 On cross-examination, Dr. Fenster agreed the amount of force necessary to cause a splenic 

bleeding complication during a colonoscopy was unknown. He agreed that human beings have 

“anatomical uniqueness” and there was “no way to know how the splenocolic ligament is 

attached to the spleen.” He agreed that it was true to say that plaintiff’s “spleen could have 

been injured without excessive force during the performance of th[e] colonoscopy.” Dr. 

Fenster further agreed that there was no specific literature, text, or protocol that required 

informing a colonoscopy patient about the risk of injury to the spleen, specifically. 

¶ 29 In their case-in-chief, defendants presented testimony from Dr. Karras and two nurses who 

cared for plaintiff on the day of her colonoscopy—Lori Lascelles and Lori Jean Butler. 

Defendants’ witnesses also included retained medical experts Dr. Douglas Rex and Dr. Craig 

Smith. Dr. Rex testified he was a board-certified gastroenterologist and estimated that he had 
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performed 45,000 colonoscopies throughout his 30-year career. He opined it was “more likely 

than not, [Dr. Karras] complied with the standard of care” in his care and treatment of plaintiff. 

¶ 30 Dr. Rex testified that injuries to the spleen during a colonoscopy were “believed to be able 

to occur with [doctors] using forces of pushing, torquing, and withdrawing that are not outside 

the range of forces that [they] normally use.” He asserted such injuries were rare and “occur 

without doing something that is inappropriate or careless or negligent on the part of how the 

endoscopist was using the scope.” He opined a bleeding injury to the spleen could occur 

without the use of excessive force.

¶ 31 Dr. Rex further testified that the applicable standard of care did not require advising the 

patient to discontinue aspirin prior to a colonoscopy. He stated that in his practice, declining 

to proceed with the colonoscopy when the patient “came in for the procedure prepped ready to 

go and they were on aspirin” would “[v]irtually never *** happen.” He testified he would have 

proceeded with plaintiff’s colonoscopy whether or not she was taking aspirin. 

¶ 32 Dr. Rex also opined that disclosing the possibility of a splenic injury as a potential risk 

prior to a colonoscopy “was not required in 2010.” He asserted it was common at the time of 

plaintiff’s procedure to warn of the risks of bleeding, perforation, and drug reactions. However, 

he believed it was “quite unusual for people to get consent for splenic injury primarily because 

of the rarity of the *** type of the injury.” 

¶ 33 On cross-examination, Dr. Rex acknowledged that he did not know how much pressure or 

force was exerted by Dr. Karras during the colonoscopy. He also agreed that plaintiff’s splenic 

injury “occurred from things that happened during the colonoscopy.” Further, Dr. Rex denied 

that there was a significant increase in risk from the removal of polyps when the patient was 

taking aspirin either before, during, or after the procedure.

¶ 34 Dr. Smith testified he was a general surgeon. According to him, plaintiff’s medical records 

indicated she was stable following her colonoscopy, and he opined it was reasonable for her to 

be discharged. On cross-examination, Dr. Smith agreed plaintiff’s spleen was injured during 

the colonoscopy performed by Dr. Karras. 

¶ 35 Lascelles testified that she was a registered nurse and involved in caring for plaintiff at the 

time of her colonoscopy. She assisted in admitting plaintiff and prepping her for the procedure. 

Lascelles testified that, according to the medical records, plaintiff spoke with a “phone nurse” 

prior to her colonoscopy. Plaintiff’s medical records indicated the nurse asked plaintiff about 

aspirin or other blood thinners and then the nurse documented that those medications were 

“nonapplicable,” indicating plaintiff was not taking them at that time. Lascelles also testified 

that she asked plaintiff if she was taking aspirin or nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 

(NSAIDs) on the day of her colonoscopy, and plaintiff answered that she was not. Lascelles 

stated she also reviewed “discharge instructions” with plaintiff. Those included informing 

patients to call if they experienced symptoms including rectal bleeding, fever, lightheadedness, 

persistent tenderness, sharp or severe abdominal pain, nausea, or vomiting. Lascelles testified 

she informed patients to avoid NSAID products for two weeks if they had several polyps or a 

large polyp removed.

¶ 36 On cross-examination, Lascelles testified aspirin was an NSAID and that she would have 

informed plaintiff of that fact. She acknowledged stating the opposite at her deposition—that 

she told plaintiff aspirin was not an NSAID. However, Lascelles maintained she was mistaken 

at the time of her deposition testimony. 
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¶ 37 Butler testified she too was a registered nurse. On June 28, 2010, she saw plaintiff after her 

colonoscopy in “the recovery, postanesthesia area.” Once patients were in that area, Butler 

would monitor them and assess their vitals. Once a patient was awake, she would review 

discharge instructions with the patient. Butler testified plaintiff’s medical records showed her 

vital signs were stable and within normal limits. She stated she explained plaintiff’s discharge 

or “home care” instructions to her, including symptoms “to look out for” and avoidance of 

NSAID products for two weeks with the removal of several polyps or a large polyp. According 

to Butler, she usually explained that NSAID meant “nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory” and that 

it included products “that contain aspirin.” 

¶ 38 When testifying on his own behalf, Dr. Karras opined his care and treatment of plaintiff 

complied with applicable standards of care. He asserted that on May 18, 2010, he met with 

plaintiff for the first time and explained the risks of colonoscopy, including bleeding, 

perforation, and the adverse effects of sedation. Dr. Karras stated he also went over risks with 

plaintiff on the day of her colonoscopy. During plaintiff’s colonoscopy, Dr. Karras found and 

removed polyps, which were sent to the pathology department for analysis. One polyp was 

determined precancerous.

¶ 39 During Dr. Karras’s testimony, defense counsel questioned him regarding a “request and 

authorization for operation and/or procedure” form signed by plaintiff. Defendants’ counsel 

asked Dr. Karras the following question: “[U]nder paragraph three, it discusses unforeseen 

conditions which may arise, and my question is this: Is a splenic bleeding complication the 

kind of unforeseen condition which may arise?” Plaintiff’s counsel objected and, during a 

sidebar in the proceedings, argued defendants were impermissibly attempting to contradict a 

judicially admitted answer to plaintiff’s complaint that they “never made any mention 

whatsoever or gave [plaintiff] any information about spleen injury.” The following colloquy 

then occurred between the parties and the court: 

“MR. BISWELL [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: Number one with this, I’m going to 

ask him if a splenic injury is unforeseen, and he’s going to explain the incidence of it 

and how frequently it occurs and how it is an unforeseen [sic]. It’s broad. It’s a broad—

MR. STANDA [(PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL)]: He could have asked that, but he’s 

tying it to this document and—

THE COURT: Let’s move on from the document and ask your questions. You can 

ask the questions, but you can’t ask about the document. I don’t want to hear any 

questions about the document, but you can ask about splenic injury and the level of 

occurrence.

MR. STANDA: So you’re going to sustain my objection and strike that question?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STANDA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But I’m going to allow him to get into the unforeseen splenic injury. 

MR. BISWELL: So I can ask him if splenic injury is unforeseen?

THE COURT: You can ask him—I don’t want you using that language, but you 

can ask—you can ask how often it is, the types of splenic injury, and how often it 

occurs, and then let’s move on.”

Dr. Karras went on to testify that a splenic bleeding complication was an extremely rare 

occurrence. 
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¶ 40 Later, defense counsel asked Dr. Karras whether “the consent [form] at issue *** 

discuss[ed] different or additional procedures” and whether a splenectomy would “be a 

different or additional procedure.” Dr. Karras responded “yes” to both questions, and plaintiff’s 

counsel objected, arguing the trial court “just ruled on this.” During a sidebar, plaintiff’s 

counsel also moved for a mistrial, arguing defendants were “trying to go around [their] judicial 

admission.” Defense counsel responded that the extent of defendants’ agreement was that they 

“did not discuss specifically the word ‘spleen’ or ‘splenic injury’ ” with plaintiff but asserted 

defendants did not say they “wouldn’t go into other things.” Following further argument by 

the parties, the court determined it would sustain plaintiff’s counsel’s objection but would 

allow defendants’ counsel to present argument on the topic during his closing argument. 

Plaintiff’s counsel asserted he “object[ed] to that” but understood the court’s ruling.

¶ 41 Dr. Karras then testified that the standard of care did not require him to use the words 

“spleen” or “splenic injury” when informing plaintiff of the risks of a colonoscopy procedure. 

He asserted that in 2010, physicians did not inform patients of the risk of splenic injury with a 

colonoscopy. Dr. Karras testified the standard of care did not require a physician to specifically 

state all risks. 

¶ 42 Dr. Karras further testified plaintiff’s colonoscopy was not technically difficult. He 

asserted he would have documented any difficulties “in [his] note.” In plaintiff’s case, he noted 

“the procedure was well tolerated,” indicating it was not a technically difficult examination 

and he “had no problems advancing the scope.” Dr. Karras testified splenic injuries could occur 

during a colonoscopy “when the doctor does everything right.” 

¶ 43 Dr. Karras also testified he recommended that his patients avoid blood thinners after the 

removal of polyps because the area could bleed. According to Dr. Karras, plaintiff was 

specifically told to avoid aspirin for 10 to 14 days. He asserted he met with plaintiff and her 

husband after the procedure and discussed the procedure and “postpolypectomy” instructions. 

¶ 44 Finally, defendant’s evidence established a Springfield Clinic nurse telephoned plaintiff 

the day after her colonoscopy. Additionally, on July 1, 2010, plaintiff was notified of her 

biopsy results. Dr. Karras maintained the symptoms plaintiff experienced after the colonoscopy 

were never reported to him and he did not learn of any complications she had until July 7, 

2010, when he learned of her emergency surgery.

¶ 45 The record reflects that following the presentation of evidence, a jury instruction 

conference occurred without a court reporter present. The following day, the court made a 

record of what occurred during the unreported conference, stating it had refused defendants’ 

sole proximate cause instructions. It further stated as follows: 

“Based on the evidence that’s been presented, I do think what came out in front of the 

jury, which happens, deviated from the—from the depositions and things that the Court 

was provided with. At this point in time, I cannot find sufficient evidence for the sole 

proximate cause instructions to go back to the jury. You know, if anything, the evidence 

may be the other way, sole proximate cause was the surgery, not other events, so in 

light of the way the evidence has come out, I am refusing the sole proximate cause 

instruction based on the evidence that was provided in the course of this trial.” 

¶ 46 The trial court then asked whether plaintiff had a limiting instruction she wanted it to 

consider. Plaintiff’s counsel responded that plaintiff did, arguing testimony that was highly 

prejudicial to plaintiff’s case was presented “blaming her for contributing to cause her ultimate 

outcome of splenectomy.” Plaintiff’s counsel then presented the following instruction:
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“I am striking all testimony and evidence in this case and ordering you to disregard 

all testimony and opinions and other evidence regarding Plaintiff having taken aspirin 

and/or NSAIDs after the colonoscopy procedure and all testimony opinions and other 

evidence regarding Plaintiff’s supposed failure to follow doctor’s or nurses’ orders or 

instructions after the colonoscopy procedure and all testimony, opinions, and other 

evidence to the effect that something Plaintiff did or failed to do caused or contributed 

to cause her spleen injury and/or the need for her splenectomy surgery.” 

¶ 47 Defendants objected, asserting (1) some of the evidence targeted by the instruction was 

presented to rebut plaintiff’s claims of “a delay in diagnosis [of her injury]” by Dr. Karras, 

(2) they would present no argument that blamed plaintiff for causing her injury, (3) the 

instruction was confusing and misleading, and (4) the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction on 

proximate cause would sufficiently inform the jury that the evidence targeted by the instruction 

“doesn’t matter.” The trial court gave the instruction over defendants’ objection. 

¶ 48 Ultimately, the jury found in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. The record reflects 

that during their deliberations, the jury sent the following two notes: (1) “The jury would like 

to request that the parties work towards a settlement while we continue to deliberate” and 

(2) “What if we agree on one count but not the other?” In response to both notes, the trial court 

instructed the jury to “[p]lease continue your deliberations.” 

¶ 49 In May 2019, plaintiff filed a posttrial motion. She argued she was denied a fair trial by 

defendants’ presentation of prejudicial evidence related to her alleged fault in contributing to 

her injuries under the guise of a sole proximate cause defense. Plaintiff also argued reversible 

error occurred through defendants’ attempts to contradict their judicial admission that they 

“did not inform Plaintiff before the [c]olonoscopy procedure about the known risk” of injury 

to the spleen.

¶ 50 The same day plaintiff’s posttrial motion was filed, her attorney filed a “Bystander’s 

Affidavit,” citing Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), “concerning events 

that occurred *** during the course of trial ***, but without benefit of a court reporter.” He 

averred that during the jury instruction conference, the trial court rejected defendants’ sole 

proximate cause instructions. Thereafter, “a short discussion ensued regarding the 

ramifications of [the court’s] decision, but a full discussion on the topic was tabled until the 

next morning.” Plaintiff’s counsel asserted “a substantive discussion” of the matter occurred 

the next morning before the arrival of the court reporter, with the court asking for plaintiff’s 

counsel’s thoughts on the matter. Plaintiff’s counsel maintained the following then occurred:

“[Plaintiff’s counsel responded] by stating that he was loath to request a mistrial after 

so much time and money had been spent on this trial, but that he had to ask for a mistrial 

because during trial there had been so much highly prejudicial evidence adduced for 

the jury to hear under the guise of the sole proximate cause defense ***. *** In 

addition, [plaintiff’s counsel] stated that if the Court were not inclined to grant a 

mis[ ]trial, which [the court] indicated [it] was not, then, at minimum, the Plaintiff 

wanted the Court to give an instruction to the jury before closing arguments, which 

would tell the jury that the Court was striking and they should disregard, all of the 

irrelevant evidence adduced blaming Plaintiff ***. In response to this, [the court] stated 

that [it] was inclined to give such an instruction to the jury, and specifically directed 

[plaintiff’s counsel] to draft a proposed jury instruction addressing this; to which 

[defendants’ counsel] objected.” 
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¶ 51 In September 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on plaintiff’s posttrial motion. In 

presenting argument on the motion, plaintiff’s counsel argued defendants improperly “put on 

days’ worth of testimony blaming” plaintiff for contributing to her injury and, again, referred 

to matters that occurred without the court reporter present. In particular, counsel noted 

plaintiff’s desire for a mistrial or curative instruction following the court’s sole-proximatecause ruling and the court’s statement “that [it was not] going to give a mistrial, but [it] would 

give a curative instruction.” 

¶ 52 Ultimately, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion. It noted that it had considered the 

record, the evidence presented at trial, and the briefs submitted by the parties. The court found 

sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury’s verdict. It further stated as follows:

“I also don’t find that any ruling was overtly erroneous and not overtly prejudicial. I 

find that if there was [sic] problems with the ruling, there was a curative instruction 

that was given to the jury. I do not feel, based on the total record and everything that 

was presented, that the defendant overly blamed the plaintiff for what occurred[.]”

¶ 53 This appeal followed.

¶ 54 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 55 A. Evidence of Plaintiff’s Conduct 

¶ 56 On appeal, plaintiff first argues the trial court erred by denying her motions in limine to 

exclude “any evidence that [her] conduct caused or contributed to her harm or that she failed 

to mitigate her damages.” She maintains such evidence was relevant only to determining issues 

of contributory negligence and failure to mitigate harm, which are affirmative defenses that 

defendants were required, but failed, to plead in their answer. She also argues the challenged 

evidence could not be properly admitted in connection with a sole proximate cause defense 

because that defense “is concerned with the conduct of non-party individuals or other 

conditions that are the sole cause of harm, and not the conduct of the plaintiff.” 

¶ 57 Plaintiff further maintains that the trial court’s denial of her motions resulted in an unfair 

trial because “highly prejudicial” evidence was presented to the jury. As a result, she asserts 

the court should have granted her request for a mistrial at the close of the evidence.

¶ 58 1. Trial Court’s Denial of Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine

¶ 59 Initially, we note defendants argue plaintiff has forfeited her challenge to the trial court’s 

denial of her motions in limine. They contend that to preserve the issue of a court’s pretrial 

evidentiary rulings for appellate review, a party is required to raise contemporaneous 

objections at trial to the evidence he or she sought to have excluded. Defendants maintain 

plaintiff raised no such objections at trial in this case. 

¶ 60 “When the [trial] court makes its rulings before trial in response to the parties’ motions 

in limine, the rulings are interlocutory and remain subject to reconsideration throughout trial.” 

Baumrucker v. Express Cab Dispatch, Inc., 2017 IL App (1st) 161278, ¶ 54, 84 N.E.3d 482; 

see also McHale v. Kiswani Trucking, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132625, ¶ 36, 39 N.E.3d 595 

(“[A] trial court rules on a motion in limine before hearing the full evidence at trial that may 

justify admission or require exclusion of the evidence. [Citation.] Therefore, the court’s ruling 

on a motion in limine is an interlocutory order and always subject to reconsideration during 

trial.”). Thus, “[t]he denial of a motion in limine does not in itself preserve an objection to 
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disputed evidence that is introduced later at trial.” Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 569, 

763 N.E.2d 720, 738 (2002). 

¶ 61 Instead, “[w]hen a motion in limine is denied, a contemporaneous objection to the evidence 

at the time it is offered is required to preserve the issue for review.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id.; see also Ill. R. Evid. 103(b)(3) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015) (“In civil trials, even if the 

court rules before or at trial on the record concerning the admission of evidence, a 

contemporaneous trial objection or offer of proof must be made to preserve a claim of error for 

appeal.”); People v. Denson, 2014 IL 116231, ¶ 19, 21 N.E.3d 398 (explaining that, following 

the denial of a motion in limine, a contemporaneous objection is required in civil cases). 

“While there is not always a need to repeat the objection each time similar evidence is 

presented ***, one must nonetheless object the first time the evidence is introduced.” Illinois 

State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 163 Ill. 2d 498, 502, 

645 N.E.2d 896, 898 (1994). 

¶ 62 Here, plaintiff does not point to contemporaneous objections she raised at trial to the 

evidence she sought to exclude in her motions in limine. Instead, quoting this court’s decision 

in Cunningham v. Millers General Insurance Co., 227 Ill. App. 3d 201, 207, 591 N.E.2d 80, 

84 (1992), she asserts an exception to the forfeiture rule applies where “a trial court’s ruling 

on a motion in limine is so definite and unconditional that the parties may treat it as 

controlling.” Plaintiff contends that the court’s denial of her motions in this case was so definite 

and controlling that she was not required to raise contemporaneous trial objections to preserve 

her evidentiary challenges. We disagree with plaintiff’s assertion and find no such “exception” 

to the forfeiture rule exists. To the extent Cunningham holds otherwise, we find it was wrongly 

decided and decline to follow it. 

¶ 63 Like in this case, the defendant in Cunningham argued the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 

admission of evidence was not preserved for review because, after the trial court denied the 

plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude the evidence, the plaintiffs “failed to make any objection 

at the time the evidence was introduced.” Id. at 204-05. In considering the issue on review, this 

court noted the rule that “[w]hen a motion in limine is denied, the unsuccessful movant is left 

with the procedure of specifically objecting to the evidence when it is offered at trial.” Id. at 

206. However, as noted by plaintiff, we also stated as follows: 

“Sometimes a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine is so definite and 

unconditional that the parties may treat it as controlling. [Citation.] The Second District 

Appellate Court has declined to find a waiver where it appeared [the] defendant failed 

to object based on [the] defendant’s misinterpretation that the court’s ruling on the 

motion in limine conclusively admitted the evidence. [Citation.]” Id. at 207. 

Ultimately, we held the plaintiffs’ challenge to the admission of evidence was not properly 

preserved, finding the “exception” did not apply because “the trial court specifically reserved 

the right to modify its ruling” and the moving party “did not object at a time when the objection 

could have been acted upon by the trial court.” Id. at 207-08.

¶ 64 In referencing the above exception for “definite and unconditional” in limine rulings, 

Cunningham relied on two cases: Woodward v. Mettille, 81 Ill. App. 3d 168, 400 N.E.2d 934 

(1980), and Lundberg v. Church Farm, Inc., 151 Ill. App. 3d 452, 502 N.E.2d 806 (1986). In 

the first case, Woodward, 81 Ill. App. 3d at 178, the plaintiffs challenged a jury’s finding that 

they were contributorily negligent. The defendant, in turn, argued the plaintiffs had “waived” 
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the issue “by failing to offer an instruction without mention of their due care.” Id. On review, 

the Third District found the issue had been preserved, stating as follows: 

“We find that [the] plaintiffs sufficiently preserved the issue through two motions 

in limine, one during trial and one before, both of which sought to preclude evidence 

or argument on the question of [the] plaintiffs’ due care. These motions were denied, 

and it would not be in the interests of fairness to conclude that [the] plaintiffs, faced 

with the court’s decision that their due care was in issue, were required to continue to 

object or to submit instructions in order to preserve the issue for appeal.” Id.

¶ 65 We note Woodward neither referenced the rule that requires a contemporaneous objection 

following the denial of a motion in limine nor did it rely on the specific “exception” expressed 

in Cunningham. Instead, the Woodward court simply held that it was unfair to apply the 

“waiver” rule where there had been two motions in limine addressing the issue raised on 

appeal, one of which was presented at trial. We find Woodward provides no basis for 

concluding—as Cunningham suggests is permissible—that the trial court’s initial denial of a 

motion in limine may somehow be determined definite, conclusive, or unconditional enough—

on its own—such that the contemporaneous objection requirement does not apply.

¶ 66 Second, in Lundberg, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 460, the defendant filed a motion in limine on the 

day of trial, seeking to exclude certain testimony. “The [trial] court had no opportunity to 

carefully review the motion, and tentatively ruled that the evidence was admissible ***, stating 

that specific objections could be made at trial.” Id. However, the defendant failed to object to 

the challenged evidence when it was introduced. Id. The Second District noted the rule that 

“[w]here no objection is made to improper evidence at the time of its admission, the objection 

is waived.” Id. Nevertheless, it determined that “because the defendant may genuinely have 

interpreted the court’s ruling as conclusively admitting the evidence,” it was appropriate to 

ignore the “waiver doctrine.” Id. In so holding, it cited case authority for the proposition that a 

reviewing court may ignore the waiver rule. Id. (citing Eddings v. Dundee Township Highway 

Commissioner, 135 Ill. App. 3d 190, 200, 478 N.E.2d 888, 895 (1985)). 

¶ 67 Although Lundberg appears to support the existence of the “exception” referenced in 

Cunningham, we note the Second District did not set forth any rationale for its determination 

that the trial court’s motion in limine ruling could be viewed as “conclusively admitting *** 

evidence.” Id. Significantly, the facts set forth in the decision indicate precisely the opposite—

that the trial court lacked time to fully consider the motion in limine, its ruling was tentative, 

and it said it would consider further objections at trial. We find applying the “exception” in 

these circumstances would result in it swallowing the contemporaneous objection rule, 

rendering the rule meaningless. Further, the legal authority relied upon by the Second District 

in Lundberg did not address procedures following the denial of a motion in limine; instead, it 

simply set forth the general proposition that a reviewing court is not bound by the “waiver,” 

i.e., forfeiture, rule. 

¶ 68 To reiterate, we find no sound basis for the “exception” identified in Cunningham, either 

in the facts of that case or in the case authority it relies upon. Accordingly, we decline to follow 

Cunningham to the extent it holds a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine may be found to 

be “so definite and unconditional” that it obviates the need for a subsequent, contemporaneous 

trial objection. 

¶ 69 Moreover, exacerbating the problem for plaintiff in this case is that not only did she fail to 

object at trial to the evidence she sought to exclude, she also introduced much of that evidence 
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into the trial during her case-in-chief. A party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court 

erred in admitting evidence that the party both failed to object to and introduced. Simmons, 

198 Ill. 2d at 569. Accordingly, assuming plaintiff is correct and the trial court erred in finding 

defendants could go forward with a sole proximate cause defense based on her conduct, 

plaintiff’s own action in affirmatively introducing the complained-of evidence during her casein-chief has forfeited the issue. 

¶ 70 Specifically, on appeal, plaintiff suggests defendants were improperly allowed to present 

evidence at trial that she (1) failed to inform defendants that she was taking aspirin before her 

colonoscopy, (2) continued to take aspirin after her colonoscopy, despite instructions to 

discontinue such medications after her procedure, and (3) failed to report post-colonoscopy 

symptoms of pain to defendants. Notably, however, plaintiff was the first party at trial to 

introduce evidence relevant to each of these subjects. Plaintiff presented her own testimony 

and the testimony of her primary care physician to demonstrate her use of aspirin prior to the 

colonoscopy. She also testified that she reported her aspirin use to an anesthesiologist on the 

day of the procedure, and both plaintiff and her husband denied that defendants told plaintiff 

to avoid taking aspirin after the colonoscopy. Additionally, Dr. Mitchell first testified on direct 

examination that plaintiff reported taking aspirin after her colonoscopy and that such use 

increased her risk of bleeding. Further, plaintiff’s medical experts—Dr. Sangodeyi and Dr. 

Fenster—offered opinions that Dr. Karras improperly failed to discover plaintiff’s splenic 

injury after the colonoscopy (Dr. Sangodeyi) and breached the standard of care either by failing 

to advise plaintiff not to take aspirin prior to her procedure or to cancel the procedure (Dr. 

Fenster). Dr. Sangodeyi also testified on direct examination that he did not see any 

documentation in plaintiff’s medical records that she was advised to avoid aspirin either before 

or after her colonoscopy. 

¶ 71 Further, we note that, on review, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s denial of her motions 

in limine on a basis not presented to the trial court and which, in fact, contradicts an argument 

she made to the court below. Specifically, on appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by 

denying her motions in limine “because the sole proximate cause defense is concerned with 

the conduct of non-party individuals or other conditions that are the sole cause of harm, and 

not the conduct of the plaintiff.” (Emphasis added.) However, before the trial court, she argued 

that (1) defendants were improperly attempting to allege that she contributed to or exacerbated 

her injuries under the “guise” of a sole proximate cause defense and (2) there was no evidence 

in the case to support defendants’ claim that her conduct was the sole proximate cause of her 

injuries. Moreover, contrary to her argument on appeal, she acknowledged in her arguments to 

the trial court that a sole proximate cause defense could be based on a plaintiff’s acts or 

omissions, stating as follows: 

“[Defendants argue] that the ‘sole proximate cause defense’ need not be explicitly 

plead[ed] as a defense. Yes, but there must be competent evidence showing that either 

some third party’s acts/omissions or the Plaintiff’s acts/omissions were the sole

proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Hence, although it is true that a defendant need 

not formally plead that plaintiff’s acts or omissions were the sole proximate cause of 

the injuries of which he/she complains in order to assert this defense, here, in light of 

the facts *** there is no basis for the assertion of the sole proximate cause defense.” 

(Emphasis in original and added.)
- 15 -

¶ 72 Given plaintiff’s failure to raise contemporaneous objections to the evidence she 

challenges, her introduction of that evidence in her case-in-chief, and her failure to present to 

the trial court one of the specific arguments she now raises on appeal, we agree with defendants 

that she has forfeited her challenge to the court’s pretrial evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, we 

decline to address the merits of her challenge to the court’s rulings on her pretrial motions 

in limine.

¶ 73 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Mistrial

¶ 74 On appeal, plaintiff next asserts that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a 

mistrial based on defendants’ presentation of “inadmissible evidence” regarding her conduct 

in causing or worsening her splenic injury. She notes the court ultimately ruled defendants did 

not present sufficient evidence to support a sole proximate cause defense and asserts she was 

prejudiced by the evidence they submitted in attempting to establish that defense. Further, 

plaintiff argues defendants’ presentation of such evidence “was not an isolated or singular 

incident” but “integral” to their case. She contends that although the jury was instructed to 

ignore the challenged evidence, the instruction did not cure the prejudicial impact of the 

evidence. 

¶ 75 “ ‘Generally, a mistrial should be granted where an error of such gravity has occurred that 

it has infected the fundamental fairness of the trial, such that continuation of the proceeding 

would defeat the ends of justice.’ ” Lovell v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 397 Ill. App. 

3d 890, 899, 931 N.E.2d 246, 253 (2010) (quoting People v. Bishop, 218 Ill. 2d 232, 251, 843 

N.E.2d 365, 376 (2006)). “A trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine the 

propriety of declaring a mistrial.” McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 534, 736 N.E.2d 

1074, 1091 (2000). The denial of such a motion will not be disturbed on review absent a clear 

abuse of discretion. Lovell, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 899. 

¶ 76 Defendants respond to plaintiff’s argument on appeal by asserting she failed to present a 

sufficiently complete record for review because no record was made during the trial of her 

alleged motion for a mistrial or the trial court’s purported denial of that motion. See Foutch v. 

O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984) (“[A]n appellant has the burden 

to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, 

and in the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the 

trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.”). Further, although 

they acknowledge plaintiff’s counsel prepared a “bystander’s” affidavit addressing the issue 

of a mistrial request, they assert that affidavit was insufficient to “fill the gap in the transcript” 

because it was not in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 77 Rule 323(c) permits “the appellant” to “prepare a proposed report of proceedings” when 

“no verbatim transcript of the evidence of proceedings is obtainable.” Id. It further provides as 

follows:

“The proposed report shall be served on all parties within 28 days after the notice of 

appeal is filed. Within 14 days after service of the proposed report of proceedings, any 

other party may serve proposed amendments or an alternative proposed report of 

proceedings. Within 7 days thereafter, the appellant shall, upon notice, present the 

proposed report or reports and any proposed amendments to the trial court for

settlement and approval. The court, holding hearings if necessary, shall promptly settle, 
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certify, and order filed an accurate report of proceedings. Absent stipulation, only the 

report of proceedings so certified shall be included in the record on appeal.” Id.

¶ 78 Defendants contend the “bystander’s” affidavit submitted by plaintiff’s counsel is deficient 

because plaintiff did not seek the input of defendants or the approval of the trial court. 

However, we note Rule 323(c) speaks in terms of what an “appellant” must do when no 

verbatim transcript of a proceeding is available. In this case, plaintiff’s counsel submitted his 

affidavit at the same time plaintiff filed her posttrial motion, i.e., when the proceedings before 

the trial court were ongoing. Moreover, at the hearing on plaintiff’s posttrial motion, her 

counsel presented argument to the court on the issue of plaintiff’s desire for a mistrial based 

on its denial of a sole proximate cause instruction. Counsel reiterated that the court stated it 

would not grant a mistrial but would allow a curative instruction. At no time during that hearing 

did defendants object to plaintiff’s counsel’s description of the non-transcribed proceedings, 

nor did the trial court offer any correction or comment. Under these circumstances, we find it 

is not fatal to plaintiff’s claim that her counsel’s “bystander’s” affidavit did not strictly comply 

with the requirements of Rule 323(c). Further, we find the record is sufficient for purposes of 

this appeal to show the court’s rejection of a mistrial request. 

¶ 79 Nevertheless, although we do not reject plaintiff’s claim based on an incomplete record, 

we do find that her argument on this issue is deficient and that her ultimate claim is without 

merit. First, plaintiff essentially argues defendants were impermissibly allowed to present 

copious amounts of prejudicial testimony. However, nowhere in her brief does she identify the 

specific testimony and evidence she challenges with citation to the record. Additionally, as 

discussed, our review of the record indicates much of the subject matter of which she now 

complains was initially introduced during her case-in-chief. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate 

reversible error under such circumstances. See Simmons, 198 Ill. 2d at 569. 

¶ 80 Second, we note that in denying plaintiff’s posttrial motion, the trial court stated it did not 

believe “based on the total record and everything that was presented, that the defendant[s] 

overly blamed the plaintiff for what occurred.” Our review of the record leads us to agree that 

defendants did not present a significant amount of evidence on the subject of plaintiff’s actions 

in causing or worsening her injury. Not only that, but the record shows the court allowed a 

curative instruction, advocated for by plaintiff, which directed the jury to disregard the 

complained-of evidence. Therefore, we find no prejudice to plaintiff and that the underlying 

circumstances did not warrant a mistrial.

¶ 81 B. Defendants’ Closing Argument

¶ 82 Finally, on appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by allowing defendants to assert 

during their closing argument that they “obtained informed consent from [plaintiff] regarding 

the risks of injury to her spleen because of language pertaining to ‘unforeseen conditions’ in 

[defendants’] patient consent form.” Plaintiff maintains such an argument was (1) inconsistent 

with judicial admissions contained in defendants’ answer to her complaint and (2) not 

supported by the evidence at trial where “the trial court sustained [her] objection to Dr. Karras’ 

testimony regarding the consent form.” She seeks reversal of the trial court’s judgment and 

remand for a new trial based on the alleged improper remarks.

¶ 83 Initially, defendants respond that plaintiff has also forfeited this claim of error by failing to 

raise a contemporaneous objection during closing arguments. See Babikian v. Mruz, 2011 IL 

App (1st) 102579, ¶ 13, 956 N.E.2d 959 (“[T]he failure to object to allegedly improper 
- 17 -

comments during closing argument operates as a forfeiture of the objection.”). However, the 

record here reflects a lengthy discussion of issues related to the challenged argument during 

Dr. Karras’s testimony and reveals that plaintiff’s counsel did voice an objection to the trial 

court’s statement that it would allow defendants to present argument on the “consent” form at 

issue. Plaintiff also raised the issue in her posttrial motion. Under these circumstances, we 

decline to find forfeiture and consider the merits of plaintiff’s claim.

¶ 84 During closing arguments, attorneys are permitted wide latitude. Wilson v. Moon, 2019 IL 

App (1st) 173065, ¶ 46, 138 N.E.3d 150. “Comments on evidence during closing argument are 

proper if they are either proved by direct evidence or are a fair and reasonable inference from 

the facts and circumstances proven.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 47. “Questions 

as to the prejudicial effect of remarks made during *** closing argument are within the 

discretion of the trial court, and determinations as to such questions will not be overturned 

absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Simmons, 198 Ill. 2d at 568. 

¶ 85 Further, “[i]mproper comments do not constitute reversible error unless they were so 

prejudicial that defendants were deprived of a fair trial.” Denton v. Universal Am-Can, Ltd., 

2019 IL App (1st) 181525, ¶ 48, 146 N.E.3d 103.

“A new trial is not warranted based on an improper opening statement or closing 

argument unless, when the trial is viewed in its entirety, the argument resulted in 

substantial prejudice to the losing party or rose to the level of preventing a fair trial. 

[Citations.] [E]rrors in opening statements or closing argument must result in 

substantial prejudice such that the result would have been different absent the 

complained-of remark before reversal is required.” (Emphases and internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Davis v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 122427, ¶ 84, 8 N.E.3d 

120. 

¶ 86 “[J]udicial admissions are formal concessions or stipulations that withdraw a fact from 

issue and dispense of the need of proof of the fact.” Knauerhaze v. Nelson, 361 Ill. App. 3d 

538, 559, 836 N.E.2d 640, 659 (2005). They must be clear and unequivocal. Id. “As a general 

rule, a statement of fact that has been admitted in a pleading is a judicial admission and is 

binding on the party making it.” Id. at 557. However, a party waives any right to rely on 

admission “by introducing evidence on the issues which would have been determined by the 

admissions.” People ex rel. Reynolds v. Aldridge, 107 Ill. App. 3d 679, 685, 437 N.E.2d 1268, 

1272 (1982); see also Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 247 Ill. App. 3d 686, 696, 617 N.E.2d 

520, 528 (1993) (“[A] party waives his right to rely on an admission if he introduces evidence 

on the issues which would be controlled by the admissions.”). 

¶ 87 In this case, the record reflects plaintiff’s amended complaint contained the following 

allegation:

“29. Before performing the [c]olonoscopy procedure on [plaintiff] ***, neither Dr. 

Karras nor any other medical provider at the Springfield Clinic ever advised [plaintiff] 

about or warned her about the possibility or probabilities of injury to her [s]pleen 

attendant to the [c]olonoscopy procedure, even though Dr. Karras knew at the time that 

there was a medically recognized risk of [s]plenic injury as well as [s]pleenectomy [sic] 

attendant to this [c]olonoscopy procedure.” 

In their answer to plaintiff’s amended complaint, defendants admitted the allegations contained 

in paragraph 29 as set forth above but otherwise denied that they were required to warn plaintiff 

of the risk of splenic injury. 
- 18 -

¶ 88 At trial, defendants attempted to question Dr. Karras regarding a “request and authorization 

for operation and/or procedure” form, also referred to by the parties as a “consent” form, that 

was signed by plaintiff and admitted into evidence. Portions of the form contained warnings 

about “unforeseen conditions” and “different” or “addition[al]” procedures from a 

colonoscopy. Plaintiff’s counsel objected to the questioning, arguing in part that such 

testimony would improperly contradict defendants’ judicial admission to paragraph 29 of her 

amended complaint. The trial court sustained the objections to Dr. Karras’s testimony but 

stated it would allow defendants to present closing argument on the topic.

¶ 89 During closing arguments, defendants’ counsel argued that the applicable standard of care 

did not require Dr. Karras to specifically inform plaintiff about the risk of splenic injury prior 

to her colonoscopy. In arguing the issue of informed consent, counsel also referenced the 

“authorization” or “consent” form signed by plaintiff and asserted as follows:

“That document talked about unforeseen conditions. Do you remember seeing that? 

It talked about, you know, unforeseen conditions that may arise and may necessitate 

different or additional procedures. And unforeseen conditions, nobody foresaw that 

there would be an injury to her splenocolic ligament. Nobody foresaw that. Nobody 

could foresee that, you know, there was some connection, and again, this isn’t critical 

of her, it was just sort of function of anatomy, *** some people’s ligaments are frail, 

some of them are broad, some of them are short, and nobody foresaw that, and that is 

an unforeseeable condition.

In the next phrase[,] *** that consent form talked about unforeseen conditions *** 

which may necessitate procedures different from or in addition to those contemplated, 

and you heard testimony, and it’s not disputed, additional or different procedures *** 

was necessitated five days later.”

¶ 90 Here, through their answer to plaintiff’s amended complaint, defendants conceded that they 

did not advise or warn plaintiff about the medically recognized risk of splenic injury attendant 

to a colonoscopy. However, as defendants argue on appeal, plaintiff introduced evidence 

during her case-in-chief on issues controlled by the admission. Specifically, she presented Dr. 

Karras as an adverse witness and elicited testimony that she “wasn’t informed [before her 

colonoscopy] that splenic injury could occur.” Plaintiff also elicited testimony from Dr. Fenster 

that defendants did not give plaintiff “any information about the known serious risk of injury 

to her spleen or the potential for splenectomy at any time before her colonoscopy procedure.” 

Accordingly, we agree with defendants that plaintiff waived her right to rely on defendants’ 

admission at trial. 

¶ 91 Moreover, we find that even assuming the challenged portion of defendants’ closing 

argument was improper, plaintiff was not denied a fair trial, and there was no reversible error. 

The challenged remarks constituted only a small part of defendants’ informed consent 

argument. The greater weight of their defense of the issue focused on other assertions, 

including that the standard of care did not require a splenic injury warning or advisement prior 

to plaintiff’s colonoscopy. Ample evidence was presented to support that assertion. Under the 

circumstances presented, plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial based on the alleged improper 

arguments.
- 19 -

¶ 92 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 93 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 94 Affirmed.