UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2406

GERTRUDE CORETTA FENNELL HAMILTON,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

SUSANNA H. MURRAY; ERIC C. SCHWEITZER; CATHERINE B. 

TEMPLETON; OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART PC; 

DEPUTY CLERK MELISSA NEWMAN,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior

District Judge. (2:15-cv-02085-PMD)

Submitted: April 29, 2016 Decided: May 13, 2016

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gertrude Coretta Fennell Hamilton, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Gertrude Coretta Fennell Hamilton filed suit against the 

opposing counsel and a federal district court deputy clerk 

involved in her prior Americans with Disabilities Act suit. Her 

instant complaint alleged fraud and other misconduct related to 

the prior employment litigation. The district court dismissed 

the suit as frivolous. Our review of the record and Hamilton’s 

contentions on appeal reveal no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Hamilton v. Murray, No. 2:15-cv-02085-PMD (D.S.C. Oct. 

14, 2015).

In addition, Hamilton sought to bring suit against a deputy 

clerk of the court for errors and actions taken as part of her 

employment. Judges possess absolute immunity for their judicial 

acts and are subject to liability only in the “clear absence of 

all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 

(1978). Similarly, court clerks enjoy derivative absolute 

judicial immunity when they act in obedience to a judicial order 

or under the court’s direction. McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 

5 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 78 (4th 

Cir. 1995) (holding that causes of action against clerks of 

court for negligent conduct impeding access to the courts cannot 

survive). Moreover, to the extent Hamilton alleged that the 

clerk acted intentionally, this fact alone, even if true, would 
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not deprive her of absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit. 

See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (holding that a judge may “not be 

deprived of immunity because the action [taken] was in error, 

was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority”).

Here, Hamilton’s claim is based on her confusion regarding 

the docket sheet from her prior case. She alleges that the 

clerk intentionally delayed entering the final order in her 

prior case until the Defendants’ bankruptcy stay was in place in 

order to prevent Hamilton’s appeal. However, although summary 

judgment was granted on Hamilton’s claim in February 2009, the 

clerk could not enter a final order until the counterclaim was 

resolved. This is the delay of which Hamilton complains. It 

was entirely proper and did not prevent her appeal. Moreover, 

to the extent Hamilton claims that the bankruptcy stay prevented

her from timely appealing the underlying order, this claim was 

raised and rejected in the prior proceeding.

Hamilton also avers that the court clerk improperly altered 

the final court order. However, the alteration removed language 

stating that Hamilton had agreed to the dismissal of the 

counterclaim. Given that Hamilton herself complained of this 

language, the alteration did not prejudice her. There is also a

notation that the final order was later modified to replace a 

damaged document. Although Hamilton asserts that this was 
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wrongful and compensable conduct, she does not aver how this 

modification was improper or how she was injured. 

Thus, Hamilton’s claims against the court clerk consist of 

assertions that she delayed entry of an order and improperly 

altered another order. Our review of the prior case makes clear 

that no procedural inconsistencies or damage to Hamilton

existed. Accordingly, the claims against the clerk were 

properly dismissed as frivolous.

As such, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny 

Hamilton’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED