### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION

U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: MA GGIE LIU, Deb to r. VIN C EN T JU E, A p pellant,

v. MA GGIE LIU; R IC HA RD A
. MA R SHA C K

, C hapter 7 Trustee, A p pellees. BA P N o . C C -19-1101-STaL Bk. N o . 8:17-b k-12832-C B

M E M ORA ND U M *

A rgued and Sub m itted o n O c tob er 24, 2019

at Pasadena, C alifo rnia Filed – Feb ruary 11, 2020 

# FIL ED
FEB 11 2020 SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI T

* Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appr opr i ate for publi cati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er per suasiv e v alue i t may hav e, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no pr ecedenti al v alue. See 9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt fo r the C entral Distric t o f C alifo rnia Ho no rab le C atherine E. Bauer, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

A ppearanc es: K athleen P. March o f The Bankruptc y Law Firm, P.C
.

argued fo r appellant; David Edward Hays o f Marshac k Hays LLP argued fo r appellee R ic hard A . Marshac k, chapter 7 trustee.

Befo r e: SPRA K ER

, TAY L O R

, and LA FFER TY, Bankruptcy Judges. Mem o randum b y Judge Spraker C o nc u rrenc e b y Judge Taylo r INT ROD U CT I ON Vinc ent Jue appeals fro man o r der granting c hapter 7 1 deb to r Maggie Liu’s m o tio n under § 522(f)(1)(A ) to avo id an attachm ent lien as im pairing her ho m estead exem ptio n in her residenc e. Jue also appeals fro mthe denial
o f his m o tio n under Rule 9024 seeking relief fro mthe c o urt’s o rder
avo iding the lien. Jue lac ked standing to o ppo se a § 522(f) lien avo idanc e m o t io n. Based
o n o u r dec isio n in Jue’s related appeals, Jue v. Liu , BA P N o s. C C -19-1039-

1 Unless speci fi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532, and all “Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e. 2STaF, and C C -19-1040-STaF (9th C ir. BA P Feb . 11, 2020), Jue has nointerest

in the attac hm ent lien. W e have affirm ed the judgm ent avo iding that lien under § 547(b ) and preserving it fo r the b enefit o f Liu’s b ankruptc y estate under § 551. Therefo r e, the attachm ent lien b elo ngs to Liu’s b ankruptc y estate, and the chapter 7 trustee represents the interests o f the b ankruptc y estate – no t Jue. N o party has challenged the ho m estead exem ptio n, and the trustee has stated that he do es no t o ppo se the relief so ught. A s o ne o f Liu’s unsecured c redito rs, Jue never so ught, no r ob tained, the trustee’s agreem ent o r the c o urt’s perm issio n to o ppo se Liu’s lien avo idanc e m o tio n
o n b ehalf o f the estate. Bec ause Jue lac ked standing, we A FFIRM the b ankruptc y c o urt’s lien
avo idanc e o rder and its o rder denying relief under Rule 9024. FA CT S The fac ts essential to o ur dispo sitio n are few. Jue is a judgm ent
c redito r o f Liu. 2 He ob tained an attachm ent lien against Liu o n June 5, 2017. Sho rtly thereafter, o n June 28, 2017, Liu stipulated toentry o f a $480,000.00 judgm ent in favo r o f Jue. Liu c o m m enc ed her c hapter 7 c ase o n July 17, 2017. In August 2018, the chapter 7 trustee c o m m enc ed a preferenc e ac tio n against Jue to avo id and preserve the attachm ent lien fo r the b enefit o f the

2 For a fulleraccount of the hi stor y between Jue and Liu, please r eferto thi s Panel’s deci si on i n Jue v. Liu , BAP Nos. CC-19-1039-S T a F & CC-19-1040-S TaF (9th Ci r . BAP Feb. 11, 2020). 3b ankruptc y estate. The b ankruptc y c o urt entered judgm ent o n A pril 3,

2019, avo iding and preserving Jue’s attachm ent lien. Jue appealed, b ut we affirm ed the preferenc e judgm ent. Liu o wned her residenc e in N ewpo r t C o ast, C alifo rnia, which she valued at $1,379,833.00 in her Sc hedule A /B when she filed her b ankruptc y. A fter o b taining b ankruptc y c o urt appro val, the c hapter 7 trustee so ld the residenc e in May 2018 fo r $1,075,000.00. At c lo sing, the trustee paid the
o utstanding tax liens, the first deed o f trust, and the statuto ry ho m eo wner’s
asso c iatio n lien. A fter paym ent o f the c o s ts o f sale and the senio r liens (as indic ated ab o ve), there rem ained $555,852.52. The rem aining
enc umb ranc es against the pro perty inc luded Jue’s attachm ent lien, ano ther judgm ent lien, and two junio r deeds o f trust in the fo llo wing am o unts and prio rity: C redito r Enc umb ranc e D ate R ec o rded A m o unt o f Lien Vinc ent Jue A t tachm ent Lien 6/8/17 $ 140,371.16 Y u Huo Judgm ent Lien 6/21/17 $ 704,043.90 Mei-Ling Su 2nd Deed o f Trust 6/27/17 $ 118,382.00 Q iang Li 3rd Deed o f Trust 7/12/17 $ 400,000.00
The trustee has challenged eac h o f these fo u r junio r enc umb ranc es, inc luding Jue’s attachm ent lien. Bec ause o f the trustee’s challenges, the
rem aining sale pro c eeds were held pending further c o urt o rder. The trustee has sinc e avo ided and preserved the third deed o f trust, fo r m erly held b y Liu’s b ro ther, Q iang Li, and the two no n-c o nsensual liens. The preferenc e 4ac tio n seeking to avo id and preserve the sec o nd deed o f trust is still

pending. O n O c tob er 12, 2018, Liu filed a m o tio n to avo id Jue’s attachm ent lien under § 522(f)(1)(A ) as im pairing her $75,000 ho m estead exem ptio n under C alifo rnia law. Liu used the $1,075,000.00 sale pric e to estab lish the fair
m arket value o f her residenc e. She also used the ac tual lien am o unts paid at c lo sing as evidenc e o f the senio r liens, and to o k the am o u nts o f the junio r deeds o f trust and liens fro m her schedules. Based o n these am o unts, Liu c alc ulated that Jue’s judgm ent lien im p aired her ho m estead exem ptio n b y $80,088.75, as fo llo w s:
Value o f R eal Pro p erty $ 1,075,000.00 O r ange C o unty Treasurer Tax Lien $ 26,743.64 A m west Funding C o rp. 1st Deed o f Trust $ 390,055.40 Z iani Ho m eo wners A ss'n Statuto ry Lien $ 4,536.55 Mei-Ling Su 2nd Deed o f Trust $ 118,382.00 Q iang Li 3rd Deed o f Trust $ 400,000.00 To tal Statuto ry Liens & Deeds o f Trust $ 939,717.59

Ho m estead Exem ptio n $ 75,000.00 To tal Liens and ( 1,014,717.59) 5Exem ptio n

Equity N et o f Liens and Exem ptio n $ 60,282.41 Senio r Judgm ent Lien (Jue) ( 140,371.16) Im pairm ent o f Exem ptio n ( 80,088.75)
Jue o ppo sed Liu’s m o tio n to avo id his lien. He prim arily attac ked the b o na fides o f the $400,000.00 third deed o f trust fo rm erly held b y Q iang Li. In respo nse, Liu pro vided a dec laratio n detailing m o r e than $400,000.00 in transac tio ns which she c laim s c o m prised the m o nies lo aned to her b y Q iang Li. Jue po inted o u t , ho wever, that the do c u m ents attached to Liu’s dec laratio n sho wed that o nly $55,977.00 in funds were fro mso m eo ne o ther than Liu herself. Jue argued that the third deed o f trust mu st therefo re b e lim ited to the $55,977.00 in funds that c am e fro m third perso ns. A lternately, he argued that a junio r deed o f trust sho uld no t b e c o unted fo r purpo ses o f determ ining whether the attac hm ent lien im paired Liu’s
exem ptio n within the m eaning o f § 522(f)(2)(A ). 3

3 Jue also ar gued that the bankr uptcy cour t used the wr ong amount as the fai r mar ket v alue of the pr oper ty. Jue clai ms the fai r mar ket v alue was $1,379,833.00 as stated i nLi u’s or i gi nal schedules filed on July 17, 2018. But Liu fi l ed amended schedules on October 29, 2018 stati ng that the fai r mar ket v a lue was $1,075,000.00. Fur ther mor e, the lesser amount was suppor ted by the actual sale pr i ce the tr ustee obtai ned for the pr oper ty when i t was sold inMay 2018 – r oughly ten months after L iu commenced her bankr uptcy case. The lesseramount also was suppor ted by the declar a ti on of the r eal estate agent the tr ustee r etai ned to sell the r esi d ence, who opined that the v alue of the (continued...) 6A t the hearing o n the m o tio n to avo id the lien, the b ankruptc y c o urt

expressed c o nsiderab le skeptic ismc o nc erning the b o na fides o f the third deed o f trust. U ltim ately, ho wever, the b ankruptc y c o urt rejec ted Jue’s argum ents. The c o urt effec tively held that Jue c o u ld no t questio n the validity o r the am o unt o f the third deed o f trust o n the m o tio n to avo id the judgm ent lien. A m o ng o ther things, the c o urt also no ted that, o n O c tob er 31, 2017, the b ankruptc y c o urt entered an o r der appro ving a stipulatio n b etween the trustee and Q iang Li fo r the avo idanc e, rec o very, and preservatio n o f the third deed o f trust fo r the b enefit o f Liu’s b a nkruptc y estate. A dditio nally, the c o urt c o nc luded: “N o objec tio n to the deb t underlying the Li Deed o f Trust was filed. Therefo re, the deb t sec ured b y the Li Deed o f Trust is $400,000.” The b ankruptc y c o urt entered its o r der granting the m o tio n to avo id lien o n A pril 10, 2019. Jue filed a m o tio n under Rule 9024 fo r relief fro mthe lien avo idanc e o rder. Jue asserted that the o rder erro neo usly avo ided the attachm ent lien in its entiret y. A d ditio nally, Jue o nc e again asserted that the c o urt sho uld no t have c o unted the third deed o f trust in c alc ulating the extent the attac hm ent lien im paired Liu’s ho m estead exem ptio n. Jue

3 (...continued) r esi dence as of the date Li u’s bankr uptcy was fi led was “nearor at $1,075,000.00.” S he based thi s opini on on the actual sale pr i ce for the pr oper ty. Jue offer ed no competi ng ev i dence r egar ding the fai r mar ket v alue of the pr oper ty. Nor i s ther e anythi n g in the r ecor d that would enable us to conclude that the bankr uptcy cour t clear ly er r ed when i t found that the pr oper ty was wor th $1,075,000.00. 7m aintained that, per § 522(f)(2)(B), avo ided liens sho uld no t b e c o unted in

c alc ulating the extent o f im pairm ent under § 522(f)(2)(A ). O n A p ril 22, 2019, the b ankruptc y c o urt entered an am ended o rder
avo iding the attac hm ent lien o nly to the extent o f $80,088.75. The amended
o rder spec ified that the rem a ining b alanc e o f the lien, $60,282.41, rem ained valid and enfo r c eab le as an unsecured deb t. The b ankruptc y c o urt also entered an o rder denying Jue’s m o tio n fo rRule 9024 relief. Jue tim ely appealed b o th o rders. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptc y c o urt had jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(2)(A ) and (O ). Subjec t to the jurisdic tio nal discu ssio n set fo rth b elo w, we have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158. ISSU E Did Jue have standing to o ppo se Liu’s § 522(f)(1)(A ) lien avo idanc e
m o tio n and to seek relief under Rule 9024 fro mthe o r der granting that
m o tio n? ST A ND A RD S OF RE V IE W Standing issues generally are questio ns o f law that we review de
no vo . H a rkey v. Gro b stein (In re Po int C tr. F i n., Inc.) , 890 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th C ir. 2018). But underlying fac tual issues are questions o f fac t reviewed under the c learly erro neo us standard. Pa lm da le Hills Prop., LLC v. Lehm a n Co m m ercia l Paper, Inc. (In re Pa lm da le Hi lls Prop ., LLC ) , 654 F.3d 868, 873 (9th

8C ir. 2011) (c iting D ucko r S pra dling &

Metzger v. Ba um Trust (In re P.R .T.C ., Inc.) , 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1999)). When we c o nduc t a de no vo review, we c o nsider the m atter anew, as if the b ankruptc y c o urt had no t previo usly reso lved it. K a shika r v. Turnstile Ca pita l M

gm t., LLC (In re K

a s hika r) , 567 B.R . 160, 164 (9th C ir. BA P 2017). Afac tual finding is no t c learly erro neo us unless it is illo gic a l, im plausib le o r witho ut suppo rt in the rec o rd. R etz v. S a m so n (In re R etz ) , 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th C ir. 2010). W e m a y affirmo n any gro und suppo rted b y the rec o rd. S ha nks v. D ressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). D ISCU SSION Standing is a thresho ld requirem ent that m ust b e satisfied in every federal c ase. W

a r th v. S eldin , 422 U .S. 490, 498 (1975). The party seeking relief has the b u rden to estab lish its standing. N a t’l F ire Ins. Co . o

f H a rtfo rd v. Tho rpe Insula tio n C o . (In re Tho rpe Insula tio n C o .) , 393 F. A pp’x 467, 469 (9th C ir. 2010) (c iting Luja n v. D efenders o f W ildlife , 504 U .S. 555, 561 (1992)). A . Statutory Standing – Generally. There are a numb er o f different aspec t s o f standing do c trine sub sum ed within the general standing inquiry. S ee V ea l v. Am . H

o m e Mo rtg. S ervicing, Inc. (In re V

ea l) , 450 B.R . 897, 906–07 (9th C ir. BA P 2011). But there is o nly o ne aspec t o f standing do c trine relevant to this appeal. It frequently is referred to as statuto ry standing and asks: towho mdo es the

9applic ab le statute give the right to b e heard o n the m atter? S ee genera lly In

re Go do n, Inc ., 275 B.R . 555, 564-65 (Bankr. E.D. C al. 2002) (explaining at length statuto ry standing). B. T he T rus tee’s A v oidanc e Of T he A ttac hm ent L ien D iv es ted Jue Of Statutory Standing

T o Challeng e L iu’s M otion T o A v oid. When the trustee prevailed in his preferenc e ac tio n against Jue and
avo ided his attachm ent lien, § 551 auto m atic ally preserved the lien fo r the b enefit o f Liu’s b ankruptc y estate. S ee genera lly R eta il C lerk s W elfa re Trust v. M cCa rty (In re V

a n de K a m p's D utch Ba ke ries) , 908 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1990) (no ting that “the legislative histo r y stresses the auto m aticnature o f preservatio n under sec tio n 551”). 4 C o nsequently, upo n avo idanc e, the trustee stepped into Jue’s sho es as the suc c esso r lienho lder and enjo ys the
sam e rights in the attac hm ent lien as Jue enjo yed. Gio va na z z i v. S chuette (In re Lebbo s) , BA P N o . EC –11–1735–KiDJu, 2012 WL 6737841, at *14 (9th Cir. BA P Dec . 31, 2012), a

ff'd, 600 F. A pp’x 521 (9th C ir. 2015) (c iting Mo r ris v. S t. Jo h n N

a t'l Ba nk (In re H a berm a n) , 516 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2008)); see

4 The tr ustee r eli es on In re Van de Kamp's Dutch Bakeries for a much br oader pr oposi ti on. Accor ding to the tr ustee, once a li en i s av oi ded and pr eser v ed for the benefi t of the estate under § 551, i t i s wholly insulated fr om any challenge to i ts v ali di ty or a m ount. We do not necessar i ly r ead Van de Kamp's so br oadly. The Van de Kamp's deci si on mor e nar r owly deci ded whether a li en av oi d ed as a fr a udulent tr ansferand pr eser v ed for the benefi t of the estate was subj ect to attack by j uni or secur ed cr edi tor s on state law fr audulent tr a nsfergr ounds. Van de Kamp's held that Congr ess enacted § 551, i n par t, to pr otect the estate fr om such attacks. I d. at 519-20. In any ev ent, we need not deci de the br eadth of Van de Kamp's holdi ng i n or der to r esolv e thi s appeal on statutor y standi ng gr ounds. That i ssue i s for a n other day. 10a lso D e Gia co m o v. Tra verse (In re Tra verse) , 753 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2014)

(no t ing that § 551 auto m atic ally puts the trustee “in the sho es o f the
c redito r who se lien is avo ided.”). Thus, under § 541(a)(4), the attac hm ent lien b ec a m e pro perty o f Liu’s b ankruptc y estate. A s spec ified in § 323(a), the trustee is the so le representative o f the b ankruptc y estate. Bec ause the attachm ent lien was pro perty o f the estate, o nly the trustee had standing to assert legal c laim s and defenses pertaining to the attachm ent lien. S e e Esta te o f S p irto s v. O ne S a n Berna rdino C nty. S uperio r Co urt Ca se, 443 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (ho lding that trustee has exc lusive standing to assert legal c laim s with respec t to estate pro perty); D iS a lvo v. D i S a lvo (In re D iS a lvo ) , 219 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th C ir. 2000) (c iting Ca ble v. Ivy Tech S ta te Co llege , 200 F.3d 467, 472 (7th C ir. 1999), and no ting that in c hapter 7 c ases, o nly the trustee has standing to assert estate c laim s). The N inth C irc uit has rec o gnized an exc eptio n to this rule, which perm its a c redito r, with the trustee’s agreem ent and the c o urt’s appro val, to pursue ac tio ns o n b ehalf o f the estate. S e e Ava la nche Ma r., Ltd. v. Pa rek h (In re Pa rm etex, Inc.) , 199 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999) (c iting H a nsen v. F inn (In re C urry a nd S o rensen) , 57 B.R . 824, 828 (9th C ir. BA P1986)). But Jue neither so ught no rob tained the trustee’s agreem ent o r the b ankruptc y c o u rt’s appro val. N o r did Jue take any o ther affirm ative ac tio n in the b ankruptc y c o urt to the extent he b elieved that the trustee was failing to

11perfo rmhis duties b y no t o ppo sing the § 522(f)(1)(A ) lien avo idanc e

m o tio n. S e e Esta te o

f S pirto s , 443 F.3d at 1176 (“if the trustee is guilty o f
m alfeasanc e, the pro per rem edy is rem o val under sec tio n 324(a).”). In sho rt, § 323(a) perm its o nly the trustee to represent the estate’s interests in chapter 7 c ases with respec t to estate pro perty. C o nsequently, Jue had no standing to take any ac tio n in the b ankruptc y c o urt pertaining to the attachm ent lien o nc e it was avo ided and preserved fo r the estate’s b enefit under § 551. 5 C. Jue’sA p peal Of T he Preferenc e Judg m ent D oes Not Giv e Him Standing

T o Oppos e L iu’s M otion T o A v oid T he A ttac hm ent L ien. Jue disputes his lack o f statuto ry standing. He c o nc edes that the b ankruptc y c o urt avo ided his interest in the attachm ent lien and preserved it fo r the b enefit o f the estate. But he argues that the effec t o f that o rder is
no t b inding o n himso lo ng as he has no t exhausted his appeal rights. Jue is sim ply wro ng. Even when subjec t to a pending appeal, federal judgm ents

5 Our analysi s i s consi stent wi th Rule 4003(d), whi ch sets for th the pr ocedur es gov er ning moti ons for r eli ef under§ 522(f). Rule 4003(d) and the accompanyi ng Adv i sor y Commi ttee Notes i ndi cate that the li enholder i s the par ty who has the r i ght to oppose a moti on br ought under § 522(f). Rule 4003(d) r efer s to “affected cr edi tor s,” and the Adv i sor y Commi ttee Notes accompanyi n g the Rule’s 2008 amendments mor e speci fi cally r efer to “a cr edi tor wi th a li en on pr oper ty.” In contr ast, the Rules mor e br oadly gi v e standing to tr u stees and all par ti es in inter est to obj ect to exempti on clai ms. See Rule 4003(b). The br oader standin g under Rule 4003(b) makes sense. Exempti on clai m s ar e much mor e li kely to affect the economi c inter ests of in d i vi dual cr edi tor s than would a § 522(f) moti on, whi ch only di r ectly affects the r i ghts of li enholder s. 12and o rders are im m ediately effec tive and enfo rc eab le ab sent a stay pending

appeal. Bennett v. Gem m ill (In re Co m bined Meta l s R eductio n C o .) , 557 F.2d 179, 190 (9th C ir. 1977). Jue has no t ob tained a stay o f the preferenc e judgm ent in any o f his appeals. Jue fo c uses o n the issue prec lusive effec t o f a judgm ent o r o rder subjec t to appeal. A c c o rding to him, under C alifo r nia law, a C a lifo rnia judgm ent is no t final fo r issue prec lusio n purpo ses until all appeals are exhausted. This is a true statement o f C alifo rnia law. S ee Lum berm a ns Accepta nce Co . v. S ecured Inv. o f Ma rysville, Ltd. (In re Lum berm a ns Mo rtg. Co .) , 712 F.2d 1334, 1335 (9th Cir. 1983) (c iting Peo ple ex. rel. Gow v. M itchell Bro s.' S a nta Ana Thea ter , 101 C al. A pp. 3d 296, 306 (1980)). Here, however, we are dealing with a federal judgm ent im po sed under federal law –
avo iding and preserving a lien pursuant to § 547 o f the Bankruptc y C o de. U nder federal law, a federal judgm ent is c o nsidered final fo r issue prec lusio n purpo s es even b efo re the appeals pro c ess has b een c o m pleted. 6

6 In li ght of our affi r mance of the pr efer ence j udgment, we ar e bound by i ts effect under the law of the case doctr i n e. As we pr ev i ously hav e explai n ed: Under the law of the case doctr i ne, a cour t i s bar r ed fr om r econsi d er i n g an i ssue that alr eady has been deci d ed in the same cour t or i n a hi gher cour t i n the same case. For the law of the case doctr i ne to apply, the i s sue must hav e been deci ded, ei ther expr essly or by necessar y i mpli cati on. Howev er , ev en i f the law of the case doctr i ne appli es, a cour t may deci de, i n i ts di scr eti on, to r ev i si t the i ssue i f: “(1) the fi r s t deci si on was clear l y er r oneous and would r esult in mani fest inj u sti ce; (2) an inter v ening (continued...) 13S ee F rye v. Excelsio r Co llege (In re Frye) , BA P N o . C C –08–1055–PaMkK , 2008 W L 8444822, at *5 n.12 (9th Cir. BA P A ug. 19, 2008); see a lso R o bi v. F ive Pla tters, Inc. , 838 F.2d 318, 327 (9th Cir. 1988) (ho lding that a pending appeal do es no t vitiate the prec lusive effec t o f a federal distric t c o urt judgm ent). In sum, b ec ause Jue no lo nger held the attac hm ent lien avo ided and preserved b y the trustee, it was no t his lien that was sub jec t to Liu’s m o tio n to avo id. The attachm ent lien, therefo re, did no t pro vide Jue with standing to o ppo se the relief so ught b y Liu. D . Jue’sStatus A s A n U ns ec ured Creditor IsIrrelev ant T o T he M otion T o A v oid T he L ien U n der § 522(f). Jue alternately argues that, even if he no lo nger was entitled to assert the rights o f a lienho lder, he no netheless had a suffic ient interest in the attachm ent lien as an unsecured c redito rto o ppo se the § 522(f) lien
avo idanc e m o tio n. Jue po ints to Rule 4003(b ), which b ro adly gives standing

6 (...continued) change in the law has occur r ed; or (3) the ev i dence on r emand [i s] substanti ally di ffer ent.” FDIC v. Kipperman (In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc.) , 392 B.R. 814, 832–33 (9th Ci r . BAP 2008) (ci ti ng Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am. , 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Ci r . 1990)). Thi s doctr i ne i s di scr eti onar y, but we typi cally follow i t unless one of the abov e-r efer enced excepti ons appli es. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Fraschilla (In re Fraschilla) , 235 B.R. 449, 454 (9th Ci r . BAP 1999), aff'd, 242 F.3d 381 (9th Ci r. 2000) (ci ti ng United States v. Garcia , 77 F.3d 274, 276 (9th Ci r . 1996)). None of the excepti ons apply her e. 14to trustees and any “party in interest” toobjec t to exem ptio n c laim s.

Sec tio n 522(l) sim ilarly ac kno wledges the right o f parties in interest to
objec t to a deb to r’s c laimo f exem ptio ns. This has b een c o nstrued to m ean that unsecured c redito rs have a right to obj ec t to the deb to r’s exem ptio n
c laim s. S ee In re Anderso n , 386 B.R . 315, 326 (Bankr. D. K an. 2008), a ff’d , 406 B.R . 79 (D. K an. 2009). Here, ho w ever, there is no objec tio n to Liu’s ho m estead exem ptio n
c laim, and the tim e to objec t to that c laimhas passed. S ee genera lly Taylo r v. F reela nd &Kro nz, 503 U .S. 638, 643-44 (1992). Jue never filed an o bjec t io n to Liu’s exem p tio ns. N o r did Jue attem pt to challenge the validity o f the
exem ptio n as part o f his defense against the lien avo idanc e m o tio n. 7In sho rt, standing to objec t to exem ptio n c laim s is no tat issue herein. It is no t Rule 4003(b ) that applies in this instanc e. Rule 4003(d) details who m ay o ppo se a § 522(f) lien avo idanc e m o tio n. A s set fo rth ab o ve, the language used in Rule 4003(d) is signific antly m o r e restric tive than the “parties in interest” language c o ntained in Rule 4003(b ). Instead o f referring to “parties in interest,” R ule 4003(d) refers to “affec ted c redito rs.” The A dviso ry C o m m ittee N o tes ac c o m p anying the 2008 am endm ents to Rule 4003 further c larify that o nly “a c redito r with a lien o n pro perty” m ay

7Thi s Panel has held that li enholder s who do not ti mely obj ect to a debtor ’s exempti on clai m sti ll may challenge the v a l i di ty of the exempti on clai mas par t of defending agai nst a § 522(f) li en av oi dance moti on. Morgan v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Morgan) , 149 B.R. 147, 152 (9th Ci r . BAP 1993). 15objec t to a lien avo idanc e m o tio n.

W e c o nstrue this narro wer language to m ean that o nly the affec ted lienho lder has standing to o ppo se a § 522(f) lien avo idanc e m o tio n. In this instanc e, that is the chapter 7 trustee whoavo ided and has preserved the attachm ent lien. Jue’s argum ent that he had standing to objec t to the § 522(f) lien
avo idanc e m o tio n as an unsecured c redito rrings ho llo w. There b eing no
objec tio n to Liu’s ho m estead exem ptio n, there is no sc enario where Liu is
no t paid her ho m estead exem ptio n. R ather, Jue advo c ates fo r lim iting, o r elim inating, the third deed o f trust. But this sho uld no t im pac t the distrib utio n to the unsec ured c redito rs in this c ase as the trustee has
avo ided, and preserved, b o th judic ial liens and Li’s third deed o f trust fo r the b enefit o f the estate. If the third deed o f trust were elim inated, then there wo uld b e a greater distrib utio n to the judic ial liens. Jue’s attachm ent lien wo uld no t im pair the exem ptio n and c o uld b e paid in full. Huo ’s judgm ent lien wo uld then o nly partially im pair the ho m estead exem ptio n, and it wo u ld b e paid a sub s tantial am o unt o f the b alanc e due. But ultim ately, the sam e am o unt
o f m o nies wo uld go to the estate, b ec ause it ho lds no to nly the third deed
o f trust, b ut also b o th judic ial liens. In sho rt, Jue’s argum ents sho uld have
no effec to n the unsec ured c redito rs’ rec o very. They will rec eive the sam e
am o u nt ho w ever the im pairm ent is c alc ulated. Jue’s argum ents o nly affec t

16whether the trustee rec o vers under Jue’s attachm ent lien o r thro ugh the

avo ided judgm ent lien. It is c lear fro mhis argum ents, b o th o n appeal and in the b ankruptc y c o u rt, that Jue is no t interested in pro tec ting his interests as an unsecured
c redito r. He seeks m erely to preserve full paym ent o n the attachm ent lien in the event that he prevails in his appeals o f the preferenc e judgm ent. Thus, the legal po sitio ns Jue has taken well illustrate why a narro w
c o nstruc tio n o f standing in this c o ntext is prac t ic a l, lo gic al, and pro m o tes the m o re effic ient adm inistratio n o f the c hapter 7 estate. A c c o rdingly, Jue lac ked standing to o ppo s e Liu’s § 522(f) lien
avo idanc e m o tio n o r to seek relief under Rule 9024 fro mthe o rder granting that m o tio n. O n that b a sis, we A FFIRM b o th o rders appealed. 8 CONCL U SION Fo r the reaso ns set fo rth ab o ve, we A FFIRM the b ankruptc y c o urt’s
o rders granting the lien avo idanc e m o tio n and denying the m o tio n fo r

8 We ar e awar e of Cali f or ni a Code of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e (“C.C.P.”) § 493.030(b). Thi s statute automati cally ter minates attachment li ens when they ar e cr eated wi thi n ninety days of a bankr uptcy fi ling. See Wind Power Sys., Inc. v. Cannon Financial Group, Inc. (In re Wind Power Sys., Inc.) , 841 F.2d 288, 293 (9th Ci r . 1988) (“The pur pose of [C.C.P. § 493.030(b)] i s to hav e a li en of attachment declar ed v oi d wi thout cour t acti on”). Ev en so, thi s Cali for ni a statute di d not r ender thi s appeal moot. S i mi lar to § 551 of the Bankr uptcy Code, Cali for ni a automati cally pr eser v es for the bankr uptcy estate attachment li ens ter minated by oper ati on of C.C.P. § 493.030(b). See C.C.P. § 493.060 (“Upon the fi l i ng of a peti ti on commencing a case underTi tle 11 of the Uni ted S tates Code (Bankr uptcy), a li en ter m i nated pur s uant to thi s chapter i s pr eser v ed for the benefi t of the estate.”). 17relief under Rule 9024.

C o nc u r renc e b egins o n next page.

18TAY LO R

, Bankruptcy Judge, c o nc urring: I write separately no tb ec ause I disagree with the well-reaso ned analysis o f m y c o lleagues b ut b ec ause I b elieve that the lien at issue was set aside under C alifo rnia law and that Ms. Liu’s m o tio n to set aside the lien under § 522(f), thus, was unnec essary. Previo usly, we dism issed an appeal
o f the b ankruptc y c o urt’s o rder denying a § 109(g)(2) dism issal o f Ms. Liu’s b ankruptc y c ase. S ee Jue v. Liu (In re Liu) , BA P N o s. C C -19-1039-STaF and C C -19-1040-STaF (9th C ir. BA P Feb ruary 11 2020). A s a result, as explained in m o re detail in m y c o nc urrenc e in a c o m p anio n appeal o f the b ankruptc y c o u rt’s sum m ary judgm ent in favo r o f the trustee in a preferenc e ac tio n, Mr. Jue’s attachm ent lien term inated as a m atter o f state law. S ee id . A s a result, there was no lien to set aside under § 522(f). I, thus, agree with my c o lleagues that this m atter is m o o t and that we
c anno t grant effec tive relief. I write separately o nly to em phasize that I do
so fo r a different reaso n.

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