UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DOMINIQUE JEFFERSON, : 

 : 

Plaintiff, : 

 : 

 v. : Civil Action No.: 22-1436 (RC)

 : 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al, : Re Document No.: 12 

 : 

Defendants. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S PARTIAL MOTION TO 

DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Dominique Jefferson brings claims against the District of Columbia and 

Jeannette Myrick based on his time spent in D.C. Jail, including a total of five counts, and 

requests money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. The District moves under Rule 

(12)(b)(1) to dismiss Mr. Jefferson’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. The District

also moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss one count in its entirety and one theory of liability 

under another count. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in 

part the District’s motion to dismiss. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Reentry and Sanctions Center (“RSC”) is a short-term residential patient facility 

operated by the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (“CSOSA”) that houses 

“defendants with mental health and substance abuse disorders” and has capacity for 102 

individuals at a time. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10, ECF No. 1. Criminal defendants held in custody may be 
2 

directly released into the custody of CSOSA for a “bed-to-bed” transfer from D.C. Jail to the 

RSC.1 Compl. ¶ 17. Mr. Jefferson alleges that judges “routinely and frequently” include 

inpatient treatment at the RSC as a condition of probation or pre-trial release. See Compl. ¶¶ 14–

16. But capacity constraints at the RSC mean that defendants ordered to be released from jail 

into RSC placement nonetheless end up spending excess time in D.C. Jail waiting for RSC space 

to open. See id. ¶ 18. 

On August 16, 2021, Mr. Jefferson was sentenced to serve “180 days all jail time 

suspended.”2 Compl. ¶¶ 14, 20–21. He was also sentenced to a term of probation, which 

included a condition that he undergo “[i]npatient [substance abuse] treatment through a 

residential treatment facility.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 23–24. The sentencing court ordered that Mr. Jefferson 

was to be immediately released from the custody of the District of Columbia Department of 

Corrections (“DOC”), id. ¶¶ 21–22, 25–26, “and into the custody of Representatives of CSOSA 

for a bed to bed treatment program.” Id. ¶ 25. That did not happen; the DOC instead continued 

to hold Mr. Jefferson. Id. ¶ 29. The DOC did not provide any notice “to the committing judge, 

to Mr. Jefferson, and to his attorney” when they decided to hold Mr. Jefferson past his release 

date instead of immediately transferring him into CSOSA custody. Id. ¶ 28. Mr. Jefferson was 

finally released to CSOSA “approximately 30 days” after his sentencing date. Id. ¶ 29. 

Mr. Jefferson alleges two other recent examples of defendants who were held in DOC 

custody beyond the date when they should have been released to CSOSA, and asserts that DOC 

has a policy or custom “of holding persons ordered released to a third party until the third party 

1 The complaint uses “D.C. Jail” to refer to the District of Columbia’s Central Detention 

Facility and the Correctional Treatment Facility.

2

 As required at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court recounts the allegations in the 

Complaint as if true. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 

2000). 
3 

comes to fetch them.” Id. ¶¶ 33, 54. He adds that DOC knows that CSOSA has a “longstanding 

practice” of not picking up inmates from DOC until “two or more weeks” have elapsed after the 

conclusion of their sentences. Id. ¶ 64. Mr. Jefferson asserts that the DOC decides to “shift[] 

blame” to CSOSA and other parties rather than taking active measures to avoid detaining 

defendants beyond their release date. Id. ¶¶ 84, 89. 

Finally, Mr. Jefferson argues that Ms. Jeannette Myrick, who serves as “Lead 

Supervisory Legal Instruments Examiner” at DOC’s Records Office, is individually at fault for 

his overdetention. Id. ¶¶ 99–101. He alleges that Ms. Myrick was responsible for ensuring DOC 

had authority to detain inmates, and that she failed to guarantee his release on his release date. 

Id. ¶¶ 108–09. Ms. Myrick was allegedly acting within the scope of her employment with the 

District during these wrongful acts. Id. ¶ 6. 

Mr. Jefferson now brings suit based on his alleged wrongful overdetention. The District 

seeks partial dismissal of the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), focusing on (1) Mr. 

Jefferson’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief; (2) Mr. Jefferson’s respondeat superior 

liability claim against the District; and (3) Mr. Jefferson’s theory of liability that the DOC has an 

explicit policy of overdetention. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff’s likelihood of success 

on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 

(1982); Brewer v. District of Columbia, 891 F. Supp. 2d 126, 130 (D.D.C. 2012). When 

reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court should presume that the complaint’s factual allegations 

are true and construe them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
4 

116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). The complaint must still “contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements,” are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. A court need not 

accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, id., nor must a court presume the veracity of legal 

conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

For a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving that 

the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). A court has an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting 

within the scope of its jurisdictional authority.” Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. 

Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001). For this reason, “the [p]laintiff’s factual 

allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in 

resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 13–14 (quotation omitted). 

Additionally, under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court “may consider materials outside the pleadings in 

deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens Pharms. 

v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Request for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

In addition to money damages, Mr. Jefferson’s requested relief includes “declaratory 

judgment and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 law against the Government of the 
5 

District of Columbia[.]” Compl. ¶ 1.3 The District contends that the Court does not have 

standing to hear this claim for relief and that the Court should dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). See 

Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss (“Def. Mem.”) at 5, ECF No. 12. 

A plaintiff must show that he has standing to sue, which is “an ‘essential and unchanging’ 

predicate to any exercise of [the Court’s] jurisdiction.” Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 

658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). To establish “[t]he ‘irreducible 

constitutional minimum’” of standing, “(i) the party must have suffered a concrete and 

particularized injury in fact, (ii) that was caused by or is fairly traceable to the actions of the 

defendant, and (iii) is capable of resolution and likely to be redressed by judicial decision.” 

Sierra Club v. EPA, 755 F.3d 968, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 

Further, a “plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought[.]” 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). 

Relief that “aims to prevent future illegal acts often will implicate standing concerns.” 

Proctor v. District of Columbia, 531 F. Supp. 3d 49, 59 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting City of Houston 

v. HUD, 24 F.3d 1421, 1429 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1994). If the asserted injury has not occurred, “that 

threatened injury must be certainly impending” in order to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. 

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013) (quotations omitted); see also Swanson 

Grp. Mfg. LLC v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (to obtain injunctive relief, a 

plaintiff “must show an imminent future injury”). A “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” 

3 Mr. Jefferson brings his claim on behalf of himself and as a prospective class action. 

See Compl. ¶ 2. The parties have agreed to stay class certification until after the motion to 

dismiss. This delay does not affect the analysis here. “That a suit may be a class action . . . adds 

nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege 

and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, 

unidentified members of the class[.]’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 n.6 (2016) 

(quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)). 
6 

that might lead to injury is not sufficient to satisfy Article III standing. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410. 

Even after past injuries, “[u]nless a plaintiff can show he is ‘realistically threatened by a 

repetition of his experience [giving rise to the injury] . . . he has not met the requirements for 

seeking an injunction in federal court[.]’” Chang v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 

(D.D.C. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 

(1983)); Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“past injuries alone are 

insufficient to establish standing.”). The same requirement applies to declaratory judgments. 

See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, No. 6-cv-1453, 2009 WL 6810187, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2009) 

(holding that Lyons applies to both injunctive and declaratory relief); see also Haase v. Sessions, 

835 F.2d 902, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Although Lyons and its predecessors involved injunctive 

relief, whereas [Plaintiff] seeks declaratory relief, we do not distinguish Lyons on this basis.”). 

Here, the District argues that Mr. Jefferson has no standing to seek declaratory and 

injunctive relief because he has not shown any certainly impending future injury. See Def. Mem. 

at 5. Despite his burden to demonstrate standing, Mr. Jefferson does not respond at all to this 

argument and therefore concedes a lack of standing. Uranga v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 

490 F. Supp. 3d 86, 109 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[I]t is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff 

files an opposition to a motion to dismiss addressing only certain arguments raised by the defendant, 

a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

On top of Mr. Jefferson’s concession, the Court agrees with the District’s argument that Mr. 

Jefferson lacks standing for declaratory and injunctive relief. As the District says, for Mr. Jefferson 

to once again be injured by the practices he identifies here, he would need to “engage in criminal 

conduct, then be arrested, then be convicted, then be sentenced to release from DOC into the 

custody of CSOSA for inpatient substance abuse treatment, and then CSOSA would need to fail 
7 

to make arrangements to timely transport him by or before his expected release date.” Def. 

Mem. at 5–6. Such a speculative series of events is insufficient to confer standing. Black Lives 

Matter D.C. v. Trump, 544 F. Supp. 3d 15, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding plaintiffs’ 

“hypothetical chain of events . . . too speculative to confer standing for injunctive relief” when 

injury depended on four different uncertain things happening in succession). Although Mr. 

Jefferson’s complaint has allegations suggesting that future overdetentions will happen for other 

people, there is nothing to indicate “[he] himself will again be involved in one of those 

unfortunate instances.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108. Thus, Mr. Jefferson has not satisfied the 

constitutional injury-in-fact requirement necessary for standing, and the Court will grant the 

motion to dismiss Mr. Jefferson’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. See Rowe v. 

PChange Protective Servs., LLC, No. 22-cv-3098, 2023 WL 2598683, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 

2023) (“The future harm [Plaintiff] alleges as the basis for injunctive relief, however, is too 

speculative to support standing. The Court will thus excise that element of his sought relief and 

allow his suit to otherwise proceed.”).

B. Claim 3 – Respondeat Superior Liability

Respondeat superior “is not an independent tort claim, but rather a legal theory of 

vicarious liability that transfers liability from an agent to its principals.” Simmons v. Skelonc, 

No. 20-cv-2845, 2021 WL 3207042, at *7 (D.D.C. July 29, 2021) (quoting Convit v. Wilson, 980 

A.2d 1104, 1114 (D.C. 2009)). It is firmly established that “a municipality cannot be held liable 

under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New 

York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also Singletary v. District of 

Columbia, 766 F.3d 66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2014). That includes the District of Columbia. See Act 

Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. & Muslim Am. Soc'y Freedom Found. v. District of 
8 

Columbia, 846 F.3d 391, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (treating D.C. as a municipality for the purposes 

of § 1983). However, the District may still be vicariously liable under the respondeat superior 

doctrine when a plaintiff brings common law tort claims against a District employee acting in the 

scope of employment. See Holder v. District of Columbia, 700 A.2d 738, 741 (D.C. 1997); see 

also Dingle v. District of Columbia, 571 F. Supp. 2d 87, 99 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The Court agrees 

that the District cannot be held liable for constitutional torts committed by employees, but it 

finds liability for common-law torts may be imposed on the District under the theory of 

respondeat superior.”). 

Claim 3 asserts a respondeat liability theory, but the challenge is determining whether it 

does so under § 1983 or as part of Mr. Jefferson’s common law claims. The District makes a 

compelling argument that Claim 3 should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) as a forbidden 

§ 1983 respondeat superior claim. Def. Mem. at 7; Reply Sup. Def. Mot. Dismiss (“Reply”) at 

2–3, ECF No. 14. Indeed, Claim 3 is titled as “§ 1983 Liability of District of Columbia for 

Overdetentions – respondeat superior.” Compl. at 20. And earlier in the complaint, Mr.

Jefferson asserts that he has claims for “relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 law against the 

Government of the District of Columbia . . . and for money damages under the common law 

against Jeanette Myrick” with no mention of a common law claim against the District. Id. ¶ 1. 

Mr. Jefferson responds that “[t]he heading contains an extraneous term ‘§ 1983’ but it 

also contains the legal term ‘respondeat superior.’” Pl. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pl. Opp’n”) at 3, 

ECF No. 13. Looking beyond the heading of Claim 3, the following Paragraph 118 alleges that 

“Defendant District of Columbia is liable in respondeat superior for the torts of Ms. Myrick and 

the other agents of the District.” Compl. ¶ 118. Elsewhere in the complaint, Mr. Jefferson only 

pleads common law torts—false imprisonment and negligence—against Ms. Myrick. See id. 
9 

¶¶ 94–103, 104–116. He does not assert any § 1983 claim against Ms. Myrick, or any other 

agent of the District, meaning that his common law claims are the only logical underlying tort for 

respondeat superior liability.

4

 See Simmons, 2021 WL 3207042, at *7 (“Respondeat superior is 

not a stand-alone tort claim, and there are no remaining claims to which the theory of respondeat 

superior could be applied to create liability for the District.”); Black v. District of Columbia, 480 

F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding no basis for respondeat superior vicarious liability 

where predicate claims against employees were dismissed). 

The unfortunate takeaway from this back-and-forth is that the complaint is at odds with 

itself. Still, with that contradiction in mind, the Court construes Claim 3 as advancing under the 

common law and declines to dismiss “for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the 

claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (allowing § 1983 claim to go 

forward when plaintiff did not explicitly invoke statute); see also Bean v. Perdue, No. 17-cv0140, 2017 WL 4005603, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2017) (citing Johnson, 574 U.S at 11). While 

this situation is the reverse of Johnson—instead of omitting § 1983, the complaint includes an 

inapposite reference to the statute—the logic of looking past a poorly stated legal theory also 

applies here. Despite the reference to § 1983, Mr. Jefferson has pleaded an array of underlying 

common law misconduct by Ms. Myrick, alleged that she was acting in the scope of her 

employment during that misconduct, and used Claim 3 to explicitly invoke the doctrine of 

respondeat superior with regard to Ms. Myrick’s misconduct. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 94–103, 104–116. 

That is enough to fairly put the District on notice of the claim. See Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 

4 Certainly, plaintiffs do sometimes plead claims that are plainly foreclosed by the law. 

While the Court would have no qualms about dismissing a § 1983 respondeat superior claim, it is 

questionable that Mr. Jefferson intended to invoke the statute. 
10 

1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Johnson, 574 U.S at 11) (using fair notice as the touchstone 

for sustaining a claim pleaded under an unclear legal theory); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

The District also argues in Reply that if the Court does not dismiss Claim 3 entirely, it 

should alternatively dismiss Claim 3 as to “the other agents of the District” because the identity 

of these agents and the nature of their conduct are unspecified and because the “only common 

law causes of action expressly pled in the Complaint are brought against Myrick.” Reply at 3 

(emphasis in original) (citing Compl. ¶ 118). The District has waived this argument by failing to 

raise it until the reply brief. Lindsey v. District of Columbia, 879 F. Supp. 2d 87, 95–96 (D.D.C. 

2012) (holding that “because the District raised [an] argument for the first time in its reply brief, 

it is waived” (citations omitted)); accord Latson v. Holder, 82 F. Supp. 3d 377, 388 n.4 (D.D.C. 

2015). Accordingly, at this stage, the Court will not dismiss this part of Claim 3.

5

 Of course, 

because any respondeat superior claim against the District must be based on an underlying 

common law cause of action, it follows that Mr. Jefferson can only invoke respondeat superior 

liability with regards to Ms. Myrick’s alleged tortious conduct. See Simmons, 2021 WL 

3207042, at *7. 

C. Claim 4 – Explicit Policy Theory of Liability

To hold a municipality liable under ¶ 1983, a plaintiff must plead a constitutional 

violation that is “affirmative[ly] link[ed]” to a municipal policy. Baker v. District of Columbia, 

326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 

823 (1985)). A plaintiff has four ways to demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy: (1) 

“the explicit setting of a policy by the government that violates the Constitution,” (2) “the action 

5

 Additionally, as discussed below, there is unsettled law regarding piecemeal dismissals 

of parts of claims under Rule 12(b)(6). 
11 

of a policy maker within the government,” (3) “the adoption through a knowing failure to act by 

a policy maker of actions by his subordinates that are so consistent that they have become 

‘custom,’” or (4) “the failure of the government to respond to a need . . . in such a manner as to 

show ‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional 

violations.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

Mr. Jefferson attempts three of those ways, alleging that his overdetention was caused by 

either an explicit policy, a custom, or deliberate indifference. Compl. ¶¶ 123, 130–31. The 

District notes that Mr. Jefferson’s “allegations concerning the existence of an explicit District 

policy are materially identical to those presented in a related case before this Court.” Reply at 4. 

In fact, these allegations are for the most part directly copied from that prior case. See Tyson v. 

District of Columbia, No. 20-cv-1450, 2021 WL 4860685, at *9 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2021); 

compare Tyson, Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 103–09, ECF No. 29, with Compl. ¶¶ 123–29. The Court 

found that this previous complaint did not sufficiently allege the existence of an explicit policy. 

Tyson, 2021 WL 4860685, at *9 (“Tyson has therefore failed to allege the existence of an 

explicit policy under the first Baker method.”). And so the District asks the Court to dismiss the 

explicit policy theory of liability in this case for failure to state a claim.

6

 

Mr. Jefferson’s response is sparse, citing the District of Columbia’s Rules of Professional 

Conduct to say that his counsel believes there is a “good-faith argument for extension, 

modification, or reversal of existing law at the motion to dismiss stage and to preserve the 

claim.” Pl. Opp’n at 4. If such an argument exists, Mr. Jefferson’s counsel has not made it. 

6 The plaintiff in Tyson also made allegations nearly identical to those in the present case 

that the overdetention was alternatively caused by either custom or deliberate indifference. 

Compare Tyson, Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 110–13, with Compl. ¶¶ 130–33. Tyson found those 

theories were sufficiently alleged, and the District is not seeking to dismiss Mr. Jefferson’s 

custom or deliberate indifference theories of liability. Id. at 10–14. 
12 

Instead, the opposition offers nothing at all to support “modification” or “reversal” of the 

conclusions in Tyson. Id.; Reply at 4. 

However, the Court does not stop there. While Mr. Jefferson did not raise this argument 

in opposing the motion to partially dismiss Claim 4, “[t]here appears to be some disagreement 

among the federal courts as to whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12[(b)(6)] permits a 

district court to dismiss a portion of a claim (i.e., a theory of liability) or rather whether Rule 12 

permits only dismissal of a claim in toto.”7

 S. Poverty L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

605 F. Supp. 3d 157, 160 n.1 (D.D.C. 2022). The D.C. Circuit has not addressed this question 

directly, although it has previously implied that a court may partially dismiss a claim. See 

generally Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding 

that certain theories of liability should be dismissed for failure to state a claim). More recently, 

one judge in this district tackled this issue and found that “at the motion-to-dismiss stage, once a 

court determines that a claim states a viable basis for relief, it cannot further parse out whether 

other portions of the claim would suffice on their own.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., 

581 F. Supp. 3d 34, 60 (D.D.C. 2022) (declining to dismiss a Count when only some of the 

allegations therein stated a plausible claim for relief). After that decision, another judge in this 

district recounted the unsettled legal landscape and declined to order a partial dismissal “[i]n an 

abundance of caution.” S. Poverty L. Ctr., 605 F. Supp. 3d at 160 n.1. 

The Court follows that cautious approach here. That approach is also consistent with 

Tyson. See Tyson, 2021 WL 4860685. Contrary to the District’s assertion that the Court “has 

7

 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is different than a 

motion to dismiss Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing; as explained above, the Court not only can 

but must dismiss a portion of requested relief for which it does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Rowe, 2023 WL 2598683, at *4. 
13 

already dismissed materially identical allegations,” Def. Mem. at 2, Tyson found the explicit 

policy allegations insufficient but nevertheless did not take the step of dismissing that theory of 

liability. See Tyson, 2021 WL 4860685, at *14 (denying motion to dismiss in total). The Court 

therefore declines to partially dismiss Claim 4. 

This decision does not mean the Court ignores the similarity of the current allegations to

those in Tyson. Notwithstanding the current ruling, “summary judgment is different” than a 

motion to dismiss, and the District could challenge Mr. Jefferson’s explicit policy theory at the 

summary judgment stage. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 581 F. Supp. 3d at 60 (“In stark contrast to Rule 

12(b)(6), Rule 56 ‘explicitly allows for partial summary judgment and requires parties to identify 

each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is 

sought.’”) (quoting BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up)). 

Plus, even when declining to partially dismiss a claim, “[a] trial court enjoys considerable 

discretion over discovery matters.” Id. at 61 (quoting TIG Ins. Co. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of 

Washington, D.C., 718 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95 (D.D.C. 2010)). During discovery, the Court will be 

mindful of Tyson, and will take its holding into consideration when resolving any discovery 

disputes resulting from the explicit policy theory of liability included within Claim 4. See Fed. 

Trade Comm’n, 581 F. Supp. 3d at 61. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District of Columbia’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 

12, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in Part. An order consistent with this Memorandum 

Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued. 

Dated: June 29, 2023 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge