Filed 7/9/14 In re K.C. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts a nd parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re K.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

___________________ __________________ LOS ANGELES COUN TY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
W.C.,
Defendant and Appellant. B250897
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK78135)

APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Akemi Arakaki, Judge. Affirmed. Janette Freeman Cochran, under appo intment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Principal Deputy County Co unsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________ ____________2 W.C. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment of June 26, 2013, declaring his sons, K.C. and R.C., depe ndents of the court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 360. 1 He contends substantial evidence does not support the sustained allegations unde r section 300, subdivisions (a ), (b), and (j) that there is
a substantial risk the children will suffe r serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally or serious physical harm or illne ss as a result of his failure to adequately supervise. We affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE
K. was born in 2001 and R. was born in 2002 to father 2 and R.M. (mother),
who were married. Parents were divorced in 2008. The family had an extensive history w ith Department of Children and Family Services (Department). There were 20 ch ild abuse or neglec t referrals spanning 12 years. The family had a voluntary fa mily maintenance case under Department supervision in 2004-2005 due to father’s emotional abuse of the children. In 2008,
father cracked mother’s head against a window. K. was injured when he stepped on a piece of the broken glass. In 2009, the children were ma de dependents of the court and placed in home of pare nt-mother under a plan of family maintenance due to, among other things, father’s striking them with a sandal, derogatory name-calling, and domestic violence, which caused the children to suffer post traumatic stress
disorder 3 and placed them at risk of physical harm inflicted non-accidentally and emotional harm. As father did not comple te required services and the children were afraid of unmonitored visits, mother was granted full custody of the children when

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated. 2 The court found father to be the children’s presumed father. 3 In addition, K. received a diagnosi s of mild autism and R. demonstrated behaviors associated with the inattention subtype of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The children began attending weekly psychotherapy in 2006.3 the court terminated jurisdiction in 2010 w ith a family law order. Father’s visits were required to be monitored. In 2011, as a result of his concerns a bout father, K. made a plan to commit suicide by hanging himself by a book bag strap from the monkey bars at school. In 2012, after father filed an order to show cause in family court to modify visitation and child support, parents agr eed to gradually lift father’s visitation
restrictions. Beginning in January 2013, parents shared custody equally, each parent having the children on alternating weeks. The children’s therapist reported, “ ‘conflicts between the boys and their father appeared to escalate dramatically. . . . [T]he boys were experiencing a great deal of stress, anxi ety, and anger.’ ” Father regularly pushed K., was mean to the children for no reas on, constantly called them derogatory names such as “asshole” and “son s of bitches,” told th em that what they say is “bullshit,” yelled at the children co nstantly, and did not feed them enough. On two occasions, father left the child ren in his car unattended for hours while he attended a cockfight. On one of the occasions, he left them alone in the car in a garage for four hours. The children were frightened and hungry, but they were afraid to get out of the car because father had to ld them the car alarm was set to go off if they left the car. On one occasion, K. saw the cocks fighting. On e of the men at the cockfight warned K. to keep his mouth shut.
Father did not believe the children shoul d be in therapy, told the children therapy does not work and they did not need it, and did not take them to their weekly therapy appointments. Father did notbelieve the children suffered from posttraumatic stress syndrome or that K. was autis tic. He attributed the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress syndrome to th e fact that the children move d often when in mother’s
care. Father did not take K. to K. ’s program for children with autism.4 The children were afraid of father, felt unsafe in his home, and wanted nothing to do with him. K. reporte d in early March 2013 he woul d run away if father called him names any more. Each child ran away fr om father’s home. On one occasion, R. took the subway to mother’s home. On March 9, a rainy day, when R. did not return to fathe r’s apartment after school, K. became very worried and felt he should go out and se arch for R. K. believed the responsibility for safeguarding R. rested on hi s shoulders because father
refused to answer when he asked where R. was, and, on a previous occasion, father stated he did not care if R. ran away. Bl ocked by father from getting in the elevator, K. attempted to take the stairs. Father gr abbed K. with such force that K.’s sweater and shirt were ripped from his body. Fath er shoved K. to th e ground and dragged him across the floor, scratching K.’s rib cage, arm, and neck. K. yelled for help. Following this incident, K. told his school counselor he was afraid of father and he would run away if he had to go back to father’s care. The children were intelligent and were g ood advocates for th emselves. Their therapist believed their reports about visits with father. “[T]he children have ‘high
conflict’ with father . . . and the last time [the therapist] saw th e children, they were having a difficult time, crying and stating that they wanted to ru n away from father’s home if they had to go back for the next visit.” On March 11, 2013, father played vide otapes to the therapist and children which showed father having power struggles with the children. The children were very upset, because they ha d not known father was tapi ng them. Concerned about the physical and emotional abuse, the ther apist concluded it was not in the children’s best interest to continue overnight visits.5 Another videotape, recorded late at ni ght, depicted the children very upset and angry with father because he would not let them call mother on the telephone. Father stated he made the tape to show the child ren were not telling th e truth about him. “The children appear agitated and are cr ying as father videotapes them and the children are saying, ‘can’t you listen to us fo r once? We want to go to mom’s house. What kind of person are you[,] dad? Why are you filming us? I can get the locked gun. Why are you smiling while taping us? If mom were here[,] she would beat the fuck out of you. You beat mom before. What do you fuck in’ want to achieve? What do you want from us?’ Father again says that he needs to protect himself and R. then states, ‘I’ll kill you when you fall asleep, you sick bastard.’ Father asks R. what he said and R. states, ‘Nothing.’ Father then says, ‘You’re going to kill me[,] huh?’ ” Father denied he did anything wrong. He stated he did not beat mother, yell at the children, or call the childre n derogatory names. He stated he never hit or pushed the children or exposed them to cockfights. K. stated th at in 2007 and 2008, father threw slippers at the children and hit them with slippers as punishment. Father said the incidents with the slippers were just a game. He said the children were not afraid
of him. Father stated that the children’ s anger did not come from anything he did.
He blamed mother and the children fo r his problems with the children. In late March 2013, father agreed that the children would remain in mother’s home pending an investigation by the Department. Once th e children were back with mother fulltime and not having visits with father, they were “calmer [and] less anxious.” Father participated in a team d ecision-making meeting in late April, but he refused to sign the safety plan established at the meeting. Father was referred to therapy that would focus on assisting pare nts to identify their parental role and developing stronger parent-ch ild relationships, but he re sisted participating. The Department detained the children fro m father on May 8, 2013, and filed a section 300 petition. On June 26, 2013, the children were de clared dependents of the court based on sustained allegations under section 300, subdi visions (a), (b), and (j). In counts a, b-6 1, and j, the court found the children are at serious risk of physical harm in that, in 2013, father physically abused K. by drag ging him on the floor, ripping his clothes off and throwing slippers at him, K. fear ed father and did not want to live in his home, and K. is a prior dependent of the co urt due to father’s physical abuse. In count b-2, the court found the children are at serious risk of physical harm in that the children were diagnosed with po st-traumatic stress disorder and father failed to keep the children’s scheduled appointme nts with their therapist. Custody was taken from father, and the children were ordered to remain in mother’s custody. The Department was ordered to provide family maintenance services. Father was to be provided enhanced services. He was ordered to participate in a program of parenting special needs children, individual counseling to address case issues and anger management issues, and conjoint counseling if recommended by the children’s therapist and fa ther’s therapist. He was granted one hour monitored visits in a therap eutic setting two times per month.
DISCUSSION
Substantial evidence.
1. Count b-1
, Father contends the evidence is not sufficient to support the sustained allegations in count b-1, unde r section 300, subdivision (b). 4 We disagree with the
contention.

4 To the extent father contends the su stained allegations are not sufficient to support jurisdiction, the contention was fo rfeited by his failure to file a demurrer. The legal sufficiency of a petition cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal. ( E.g. In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 82-83.) To test the legal sufficiency of a petition, a demurrer must be filed in the depende ncy court pursuant to the procedure set forth in Los Angeles Co unty Superior Court Rules, rule 7.16(d). If a demurrer is not filed, any challenge on appeal to the legal sufficiency of the petition is forfeited. (E.g., In re Christopher C., at p. 83.) In any event, any deficiency of the petition was rendered ha rmless by the fact that a jurisdictional hearing was held and substantial eviden ce supports the finding of jurisdiction.7 In determining whether a finding or order is supported by substantial evidence, “we look to see if substantial evidence, c ontradicted or uncontradicted, supports [it]. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the ev idence to support the findings and orders of the [juvenile] court; we review the record in the light mo st favorable to the court’s determinations;
and we note that issues of fact and cred ibility are the province of the trial court. [Citation.]” ( In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.Ap p.4th 183, 193.) “When considering a claim of insuffici ent evidence on appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence, but rather determin e whether, after resolving all conflicts favorably to the prevailing party, and accor ding the prevailing party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there is substantia l evidence to support the judgment.” ( Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 45 4, 465.) (Accord, In re Matthew
S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321 [we “d o not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial cour t”].) Thus, the pertinent in quiry is whether substantial evidence supports the finding, not whether a contrary finding might have been made. ( In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.A pp.4th 212, 228.) Section 300, subdivision (b), in pertin ent part, describes a child who “has suffered, or there is a substa ntial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or in ability of his or her pa rent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.” “While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the que stion under secti on 300 is whether
circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.” ( In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824. ) Section 300, subdivision (b) “does not require that a child actually be abused or neglected before the court can assume jurisdiction. [Secti on 300, subdivision (b)] requi re[s] only a ‘substantial risk’ that the child will be abused or neglected. The legislatively declared purpose of [section 300] ‘is to provide maximum sa fety and protection for children who are currently being physically, se xually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being8 exploited, and to ensure the safety, prot ection, and physical and emotional well-being
of children who are at risk of that harm .’ (§ 300.2, italics a dded.) ‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protec t the child.’ [Citation.]” ( In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “[T]he court may . . . consider past ev ents when determining whether a child presently needs the juvenile court’s protection. . . . A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior. [Citation.] ‘Facts supporting allegations that a child is one described by section 3 00 are cumulative.’ [Citation.] Thus, the court ‘must consider all the circumstances affecting the child, wherever they occur.’ [Citation.]” ( In re T.V . (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) Substantial evidence supports the sust ained allegation in count b-1. The
record contains evidence fath er grabbed K. and dragged him across the floor near the stairs in the apartment bui lding, tearing his clothes off and causing injuries. Grabbing and dragging a resis ting child near a staircase cr eates a grave risk the child will be flung down or tumble down the stairs, causing se rious physical harm. It is
reasonable to infer from the ev idence father threw slippers and sandals at the children to punish them that he threw the objects with force, aiming to strike them. Forcefully throwing objects at children w ith the intent of striking them creates a substantial risk of causing serious physical harm. There was evidence father minimized the abuse, calling it “playing,” and refused to participat e in rehabilitative treatment. His denial he physically abused the children, resist ance to treatment, and recent physical abusiveness, is evidence the abuse is likely to continue and cause the children serious physical harm.
There is evidence father had a conten tious relationship wi th the children, involving frequent anger, derogatory name-ca lling, and refusals to listen to them. The children suffered from post-traumatic st ress syndrome as a result of father’s conduct. There is evidence K. was so nega tively affected by father’s treatment he planned to commit suicide. Angered and frustrated by father’s insensitivity and9 aggression, the children ran away and threat ened to continue ru nning away. Running away from parental protection and supervis ion jeopardizes a child’s safety, health, and welfare, causing a substantial risk of se rious physical harm or illness. Moreover,
father’s conduct made K. so fearful and an gry he threatened to get father’s gun. A gun in the hands of an upset child create s a substantial risk the child and others
will be shot. There is evidence father left the children unattended in the car for hours in an unfamiliar location, in cluding, on one occasion, warnin g them they must not get out of the car, which created a risk the children would not r eceive protection and assistance should something go wrong. From the evidence father denied his role and took no responsibility for the children’s psychiatric di agnosis, negative emotions, and risky behaviors, it may be reasonably inferred that father will continue his inappropriate parenting and failure to protect, which will create an ongoing
substantial risk the children w ill suffer serious physical harm. The foregoing is substantial evidence supporting juvenile court jurisdiction under section 300, subdivis ion (b) based on the alle gations of count b-1. Father reargues the evidence and asks us to reweigh it. This we will not do.
Our role is to determine whether substantia l evidence supports the finding. In this case, ample substantial ev idence supports the finding.
2. The remaining sustained allegations.
Father contends substantial eviden ce does not support the findings under section 300, subdivisions (a) 5 and (j) 6 or in count b-2 under section 300, subdivision (b). As we have concluded juvenile court jurisdiction is supported under section 300,

5 Section 300, subdivision (a) describe s a child who “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by th e child’s parent or guardian.” 6 Section 300, subdivision (j) describe s a child whose “sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be ab used or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.”10 subdivision (b) as alleged in count b-1, we need not address the contentions that jurisdiction is not supported by additional grounds. When one jurisdictional finding has been found to be supported by substantial evidence, an appellate court may decline to address the evidentia ry support for any remaining jurisdictional findings. (See In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [affirming jurisdiction under s ection 300, subdivision (j) [sibling abuse], the Supreme
Court held it did not need to consider wh ether the evidence supported jurisdiction under subdivisions (b) or (d)] .) “As long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate.” ( In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979.)
Father contends we should exerci se discretion and reach the other jurisdictional findings, even though any infirmity in them would not result in a reversal of the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction. (Cf. In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1493-1494 [where jurisdiction was sustained based on one sustained allegation, appellate court declin ed to exercise discretion to review the other sustained allegation, as no potentia l adverse consequence was identified].) Father does not identify any specific adverse impact that the challenged findings could have on him. As substantial evidence su pports the physical abuse allegation and father does not challenge th e findings the children have post-traumatic stress syndrome and he failed to take them to their therapy appointments, individual counseling will address these is sues even if the evidence for the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j) and co unt b-2 were to be found lacking. As we find substantial evidence suppor ts jurisdiction under count b-1 and father does not identify any consequence to him from the challenged findings, we will not review whether those findings cons titute additional grounds for jurisdiction.11 DISPOSITION The judgment and orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KLEIN, P. J.

We concur:

KITCHING, J.

ALDRICH, J.