United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 23, 2021 

Decided November 23, 2021 

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

No. 21-1948 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DARIUS J. LOVE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 20-CR-30081-NJR-01 

Nancy J. Rosenstengel, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R

Darius Love pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment and three 

years’ supervised release. Love appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the 

appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 

Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and discusses the potential issues that an 

appeal like this would be expected to involve. Because his analysis appears thorough, 

and Love has not responded to the motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the 

potential issues he identifies. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 21-1948 Page 2 

Counsel informs us that he consulted with his client and confirmed that Love 

wishes to challenge only his sentence, not the validity of his guilty plea. Counsel thus 

properly refrains from exploring the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the voluntariness 

of the plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Counsel considers whether Love could raise a nonfrivolous challenge to his 

sentence but rightly concludes that he could not. The district court correctly calculated a 

sentencing range of 130 to 162 months (based on an offense level of 27 and criminalhistory category of VI) but that range was capped by the statutory maximum of 120 

months. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). The offense level reflects a base of 24, 

based on Love’s prior convictions for delivery of controlled substances and delivery of

heroin, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2); plus two levels because the offense involved three

firearms, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A); plus four levels because Love possessed the 

firearms in connection with another felony offense, drug possession with intent to 

deliver, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); minus three levels for Love’s acceptance of 

responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)–(b).

We also agree with counsel that any challenge to Love’s sentence as 

substantively unreasonable would be futile. The sentence falls within the guideline 

range, so we may presume it to be reasonable, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 

(2007); United States v. McDonald, 981 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 2020), and like counsel, we 

see no basis in the record that might rebut that presumption. The court appropriately 

weighed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), highlighting the nature of the 

offense (“a very serious case ... that someone who’s on state parole would be in 

possession of three firearms and be selling drugs”); Love’s criminal history

(“remarkable” both in the number of points and his failure to comply with conditions of 

release); and the need for deterrence (“a big factor,” given Love’s recidivism). The 

district court also considered mitigating factors, including the trauma Love confronted 

early in life. 

Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.