Filed 2/25/14 P. v. Robles CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAVID ROBLES et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B232828

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SA059334)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Sam 

Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.

Sara H. Ruddy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant David Robles.

John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Jesse Garcia.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson and Blythe J. 

Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendants and appellants David Robles and Jesse Garcia appeal their convictions 

for murder and attempted murder. Robles was sentenced to life in prison without the 

possibility of parole, plus 39 years to life. Garcia was sentenced to life in prison without 

the possibility of parole, plus 178 years to life. Appellants contend the trial court made 

various evidentiary errors. Discerning no prejudicial error, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts.1

a. People’s evidence. 

(i) Background information.

Appellants Robles and Garcia are cousins. In 1998, Robles was a member of the 

Lennox 13 criminal street gang, who went by the moniker “Puppet.” Garcia was an 

active member of the Culver City Boys street gang, who went by the moniker “Psycho.” 

Robles and Garcia lived together.

Frank Ernest Juarez (Frank)2 and Arturo Arce were co-owners of the Westside 

Clothing Store, located at 2204 Lincoln Boulevard in Santa Monica. Arce was a member 

of the Santa Monica 17 gang, who used the moniker “Termite.”

(ii) The October 27, 1998 shootings.

On October 27, 1998, Frank was at the store preparing for its upcoming grand

opening. With him were his cousins, Michael Juarez (Michael) and Anthony Juarez

(Anthony), and an acquaintance, Matt Vaughn. Just before noon, three masked men 

entered the store and fired multiple rounds. Frank was alerted to the shooting when 

Vaughn ran to the back of the store, terrified. Frank saw one of the men wearing a black 

mask and carrying a long gun enter the store through the front door. The men began 

1 We discuss additional evidence post, where relevant to the issues presented on 

appeal. 

2 For ease of reference, and with no disrespect, we hereinafter sometimes refer to 

members of the Juarez family by their first names. 
3

shooting multiple rounds randomly. Frank ran to shelter in the back office, where he 

heard rapid gunfire. The gunmen then fled to a waiting car.

When the shots stopped, Frank grabbed his pistol and went to the front of the store 

to find Michael lying on the ground. He had been shot 13 times, and died of multiple 

gunshot wounds. Anthony, who had suffered five gunshot wounds, was still breathing 

but died minutes later. Vaughn and Frank were both wounded, but survived. 

Aimee Phelps, her then-husband Jason Morse, Glenn Commans, Eric Huffine, 

Robert Mook, and Rick Heltzer were all waiting in their vehicles in the drive-through line 

of a Taco Bell restaurant located across the street from the clothing store. They all heard 

multiple gunshots fired in rapid succession at the store. They saw three men, wearing 

long coats and carrying long guns, exit the store and run to a waiting green or blue-green 

car, which sped away after they entered. Robles was later identified as the driver. One of 

the men, later identified as Garcia, removed a ski mask or cap, which fell to the ground

just outside the store. Heltzer followed the getaway car for some distance, and recorded a 

partial license plate number. Commans also wrote down a portion of the getaway car’s 

license plate number. 

Phelps and Morse ran into the store to assist the victims. Phelps and Frank prayed 

with Anthony as he died.

(iii) Discovery of the getaway car.

At approximately noon on October 27, 1998, high school student Janine Gertsch 

left school early to wash her car, which had been egged during homecoming festivities. 

She saw two Hispanic men drive up in a green Dodge Neon automobile, and park in front 

of her home in El Segundo. The men exited the car and walked down the street. One had 

a tattoo on his neck. The next day, the car was still parked in front of the house. Gertsch 

looked inside and observed that the ignition had been “punched.” She alerted police, who 
4

determined that the registered owner of the Neon was a rental car company. At trial, 

Gertsch identified Robles as the Neon’s driver.3

(iv) Arrest of Robles and Garcia on October 28, 1998 on unrelated charges.

On the day after the shooting, October 28, 1998, police executed a search warrant 

at Robles’s and Garcia’s residence in connection with an October 9, 1998 home invasion 

robbery in which Garcia was a suspect (see post.) Robles, Garcia, and Rudy Renteria

were present. Both Robles and Garcia were arrested on charges unrelated to the shooting, 

convicted, and sentenced to prison. 

(v) Forensic investigation.

Police recovered the knit cap that had been dropped at the crime scene. Three 

holes had been cut in the cap, apparently for the wearer’s eyes and mouth. In 2002 and 

2004, respectively, testing revealed the presence of Robles’s and Garcia’s DNA on the 

cap. DNA on the cap had been contributed by at least three, and possibly as many as 

five, persons. The identity of the other contributor(s) was undetermined.

(vi) Eyewitness identifications.

Based on Phelps’s description of the driver, a police artist prepared a composite 

sketch, which resembled Robles. Following the DNA testing, in 2006 and 2007 police 

contacted the witnesses who had been in the Taco Bell line to attempt to identify the 

assailants. Commans identified Garcia in a live lineup, at the preliminary hearing, and at 

trial. He also identified Garcia and another man in a pretrial six-pack photographic 

lineup. He was positive about his identification of Garcia at trial. Phelps selected Robles 

as one of the assailants in a photographic lineup, and identified him at trial as the driver. 

3 When Gertsch testified at appellants’ first trial, she did not state that she had seen 

the car and its occupants arrive. Instead, she testified she had come home from school 

between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. and the car was already parked in front of her house. She 

never told anyone she could recognize the driver until shortly before she testified at the 

second trial. When asked why she failed to reveal this information during the prior 13 

years, she testified that she was worried about getting in trouble because she was not 

supposed to be out of school, and no one asked her if she had seen anyone get out of the 

car.
5

Morse was unable to identify either appellant in court, but identified Robles in a pretrial 

photographic lineup based on his resemblance to the sketch. Heltzer identified Robles 

and Garcia in photographic lineups in 2007, but equivocated regarding which was the 

driver. At a live lineup, he identified Robles and another subject as resembling the 

driver. He positively identified Robles as the driver at trial. 

(vii) Evidence regarding criminal street gangs and the Mexican Mafia.

The People introduced the testimony of three experts on gangs and drug 

trafficking at trial. In addition to the gang evidence briefly discussed ante, they testified 

as follows. 

A. Albert Casillas.

Albert Casillas, a Culver City police officer, testified regarding the Culver City 

Boys criminal street gang.4 In 1998, the gang had over 300 members, and its primary 

activities were narcotics sales, murder, and robberies. The gang used storefronts to sell 

narcotics. In 1998, Garcia was a Culver City Boys gang member. At the time of trial, 

Garcia had a tattoo that read, “ ‘I’ll ride for you CECE. We murderers[.]’ ” In October 

1998, the Culver City Boys and the Santa Monica 17 gangs were embroiled in a gang 

feud. There were shootings between the two gangs, and in October 1998 a Culver City

Boy was killed in Santa Monica. It is common for one gang to retaliate against another if 

one of its members is killed. The Culver City Boys and the Lennox 13 gangs were not 

gang rivals in October 1998, nor were they allied.

B. Richard Valdemar.

Retired Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Sergeant Richard Valdemar testified as an 

expert on the Mexican Mafia. The Mexican Mafia is a covert criminal organization that 

operates in prison and controls the day-to-day activities of Hispanic street gangs. It is 

allied with drug cartels from Mexico and Colombia and requires the payment of “taxes”

from drug dealers in its territory. Mexican Mafia leaders in prison designate street gang 

members to conduct their drug sale business. The gangs are responsible for contacting 

4 The gang was known as both the “Culver City Boys” and the “Culver City 13.”
6

local drug sources, who are often cartel members, and procuring drugs from them. The 

designated gangs are then responsible for distributing the drugs throughout the 

community, ensuring safe delivery and payment. “Taxer[s]” or “enforcer[s]” appointed 

by the organization are responsible for collecting approximately one-third of the profits 

from gangs’ drug sales. Mexican Mafia members in prison have means of 

communicating with persons outside prison.

The Mexican Mafia promulgates a code of conduct that must be followed by 

inmates and gang members. Gang members are prohibited from informing on other gang 

members, divulging the secrets of their organization, or displaying weakness or 

cowardice. They are to attack rivals and represent their neighborhood even when 

outnumbered. The organization disciplines persons who do not follow their rules by 

attacking and seriously injuring or killing them. Street gang members volunteer to “put 

in work” for the Mexican Mafia in hopes of being invited to join the organization. Such 

work may include committing murders on behalf of the Mexican Mafia.

The Mexican Mafia issued a variety of edicts which street gang members were 

required to follow. One was a prohibition on drive-by shootings. Group leaders 

determined that drive-by shootings result in innocent people being killed or wounded, 

which results in bad publicity and a higher police presence. At meetings in 1998, this 

principle was reiterated. The Mexican Mafia required that gang members exit their car 

and approach the intended victim on foot, shooting them directly, possibly in the head, to 

“be sure of killing without injuring innocent people.” The Mexican Mafia’s “signature 

method” of execution of an individual, however, was “[o]verkill. That is where one or 

two shots might be terminal. The Mexican Mafia, to show, again, an example, actually 

establish a terrorist-type feeling in the street, will over-shoot the person, almost a 

ritualistic shooting, and often including head shots.” The Mexican Mafia sometimes uses 

three-man, or four-man teams to commit such a killing.

If an individual or gang in the Mexican Mafia’s jurisdiction failed to pay taxes, a 

“hit list would be generated, referred to as a green light list, and the surrounding gangs 

would be given permission, or a green light, to attack members of that gang and kill 
7

them, if possible.” Written green light lists were generated by Mexican Mafia members 

in prison, who would then circulate the lists in the prison system and notify 

representatives on the street, who would get the word out. Either a whole gang or 

individual gang members could be placed on a green light list. Individuals placed on 

such lists were known as “hard candies,” and were “marked for special attention and 

murder.” Such lists were typically written down and duplicated for distribution to 

multiple gangs.

In 1998, the Mexican Mafia used Westside criminal street gangs under its control 

to control a portion of the Los Angeles narcotics trade. The Culver City Boys, the 

Lennox 13, and the Santa Monica gangs were aligned with and controlled by the Mexican 

Mafia. Hector Marroquin, or “Weasel,” was the Mexican Mafia’s representative on the 

street in West Los Angeles. Marroquin was responsible for collecting taxes, enforcing 

the Mexican Mafia’s rules, and dealing with “green light” lists. The Lennox 13, Santa 

Monica, and Culver City gangs were under Marroquin’s control and answered to him. In 

Valdemar’s opinion, a Santa Monica 17 gang member who was a significant distributor 

of narcotics would be taxed. If he did not pay, he would be placed on a green light list 

and “made an example of.”

“Termite from Santa Monica” was on a green light list confiscated in 1999 from a 

Mexican Mafia member who was incarcerated. Two more green light lists containing 

Termite’s name were confiscated from inmates. One was dated February 2000; the other 

was confiscated in September 1999.5 Valdemar opined that “Termite from Santa 

Monica” was Arce, a gang member. Arce was the only “Termite” Valdemar was aware 

of in the Santa Monica area gangs. In Valdemar’s opinion, the green light lists 

authorized the Westside Clothing shooting.

Gangs do not ordinarily cooperate in joint operations with other gangs, but they 

will act together when ordered to do so by the Mexican Mafia.

5 The People presented the testimony of the officers who confiscated these lists. 
8

When given a hypothetical based upon the facts of the case, Valdemar opined that 

such a shooting would be consistent with a killing ordered by the Mexican Mafia.

In August 1998, Valdemar met with Vito Medina of the Lennox 13 gang. This 

was their only meeting. The Lennox 13 gang was on a 1998 green light list because of its

failure to cooperate with Marroquin.

C. Stephen Diederich.

Stephen Diederich was a supervisory special agent with the Unites States Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA).6 Much of his testimony overlapped with Sergeant 

Valdemar’s. In 1998, he was assigned to the DEA’s Los Angeles field office, which was 

at that time targeting Mexican drug cartels. In late 1997 Vito Medina, a member of the 

Lennox 13 gang with the moniker “Capone,” contacted the Los Angeles DEA office and 

offered his services as an informant. Medina was an “original gangster” and a “shotcaller,” that is, a higher-echelon, older member of the gang. From December 1997 to 

April 1999, Medina supplied information to Diederich regarding the narcotics trafficking 

activities of the Martinez family, the distribution of narcotics to gangs, and the activities 

of the Mexican Mafia and the Lennox 13 gang. Medina’s information resulted in the 

seizure of evidence and convictions. The DEA paid Medina approximately $4,000 for 

his services.

Using an organizational chart supplied by Medina, Diederich testified regarding 

the Mexican Mafia’s control of drug dealing activities in West Los Angeles. Diederich

explained that top Mexican Mafia leaders in prison would issue orders “down through the 

prison system” and out to spokespersons on the outside. Mexican Mafia representative 

Hector Marroquin, known as “Weasel,” was in charge of “collecting taxes, issuing green 

lights, discipline” in the Westside Los Angeles area. A “ ‘green light’ ” is an order to kill 

someone. A “tax” is protection money, that is, monies paid to the Mexican Mafia for the 

privilege of continuing to sell narcotics. The Mexican Mafia had given permission for 

the Martinez family, based in Hawthorne, to distribute substantial quantities of narcotics 

6 We discuss Diederich’s testimony, and the basis for it, in more detail post. 
9

to various Westside Los Angeles gangs, including, inter alia, the Lennox 13, Culver City, 

and Santa Monica gangs. In exchange, the gangs were required to pay “taxes” to a 

Mexican Mafia representative for the privilege of trafficking the drugs. The Lennox 13 

gang paid its taxes to Marroquin. Medina was one of the Lennox 13 gang’s liaisons with 

Marroquin, and was responsible for paying the gang’s taxes and attending meetings 

called by Marroquin.

“Green light” is a term commonly used by the Mexican Mafia and other gangs. A 

green light is “an order it’s okay to place a hit, to murder somebody, generally a rival.” 

The Mexican Mafia, operating through its spokespersons, would authorize the placement 

of a person on a green light list. A person who failed to follow the Mexican Mafia’s rules 

would be placed on a “green light” list, authorizing his or her murder, and would likely 

be killed. Assassins carrying out the hit would not commit a drive-by shooting, but 

instead would exit their vehicle and shoot the victim in the head. A Lennox 13 gang 

member would be expected to know this procedure. In 1998, Medina was on a green 

light list. He was shot in September 1998, and died of his injuries in April 1999.7

During his investigation, Diederich learned of a Santa Monica gang member with 

the moniker “Termite,” who was a significant distributor of cocaine.

(viii) Arturo Arce’s testimony.

Arce denied being a Santa Monica 17 gang member or using the moniker 

“Termite.”8 After the murders, no one had tried to kill him. 

(ix) Garcia’s tattoo.

When Garcia was arrested on October 28, 1998, he had a tattoo on his neck with 

the letters “CECE.” Sometime thereafter, Garcia had an additional tattoo added, reading 

7 Appellant Robles was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing Medina. 

The jury was not informed of this fact.

8 The trial court found Arce was unavailable as a witness due to his invocation of 

his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Accordingly, his former 

testimony was read into the record. 
10

“ ‘I’ll ride for you CECE. We murderers.’ ”

9 While anyone could obtain such a tattoo, a 

gang member who did so would likely be disciplined by his own gang if he had not, in 

fact, participated in a murder.

(x) Jailhouse informer.

In 2006, Robert Kube was in custody in a Los Angeles County jail facility, 

awaiting trial on robbery charges. Robles arrived at the jail from Corcoran. According to 

Kube, Robles told Kube that he was the driver in homicides committed in 1998. 

Subsequently, Garcia arrived at the jail from Ironwood State Prison. According to Kube, 

Garcia stated that he was in custody for two murders and two attempted murders. He 

said he had been sent to commit the shootings by the “big homies,” and that the shootings 

had involved a dispute over money. Garcia stated that four men were involved and the 

shootings occurred at a store on Lincoln Boulevard in Santa Monica. Garcia stated that 

he was worried a witness who had been at the Taco Bell could identify him. He was also 

concerned that he had inadvertently dropped a cap with holes cut from it at the crime 

scene. 

(xi) October 9, 1998 home invasion robbery. 

Approximately two weeks prior to the Westside Clothing Store shootings, on the 

afternoon of October 9, 1998, Kammellia Tadayon and her friend Laurie returned to 

Tadayon’s Los Angeles apartment after going out to lunch. Using a ruse, Garcia and 

another man, “Marco,” obtained entry to her apartment. Garcia had a large, black gun 

that resembled a machine gun, and was between 18 to 20 inches long. He pointed it at 

Tadayon and Laurie. Both men said, “ ‘I know you’ve been selling narcotics in our 

territory. This is Mexican Mafia, Culver City Boys.’ ” During the next several hours, the 

intruders searched the apartment, hog-tied Tadayon, put a knife to her throat, and 

demanded $10,000. Laurie and Tadayon unsuccessfully attempted to obtain money from 

relatives and friends. When the women were unable to pay, Garcia and the other man 

forced Tadayon to write a letter stating she was giving Garcia her car. Garcia and the 

9 “CECE” stands for the Culver City Boys gang. 
11

other man then left in Tadayon’s car, taking Laurie as a hostage. Tadayon called police, 

who recovered Laurie and the car shortly thereafter.

b. Garcia’s defense. 

Garcia’s defense was mistaken identity. He was 5 feet 41⁄2 inches tall. 

Eyewitnesses Huffine, Mook, and Heltzer had told police the assailant they saw was 

between 5 feet 9 inches and six feet tall.

Garcia also presented the testimony of an identification expert, Mitchell Eisen. 

Among other things, Eisen testified that distraction resulting from multiple visual targets, 

a delay between the event and the identification, and “carryover” effects after seeing a 

suspect’s face repeatedly during identification procedures or in court, could all decrease 

the accuracy of an identification. 

James Esten, an expert on the conditions of confinement in state prison, testified 

that Kube could have received benefits from early work assignments and being housed in 

protective housing, even if he did not receive a reduction in sentence.

Rudy Renteria, who was Garcia’s brother and lived with Garcia and Robles prior 

to their arrests, testified that the three men routinely worked out in the late morning in 

their garage and wore beanies in cold weather. The caps they wore resembled the one 

dropped at the crime scene, minus the holes. 

c. Robles’s defense. 

Robles’s defense was primarily aimed at showing the shooting was not an

execution ordered by the Mexican Mafia, but was instead the result of an ongoing gang 

war between the Culver City Boys and the Santa Monica 13 gangs. As discussed in more 

detail ante, Robles presented evidence regarding the gang feud going on between the two 

gangs in October 1998. 

Frank testified that he did not know Arce to use the moniker “Termite.” Another 

man, Felix Munoz, used that name, however. 

Detective Bambrick testified that, in 2009, there were two other persons in Santa 

Monica who went by the name “Termite.” However, he knew of no other Santa Monica 

gang members with that moniker.
12

d. People’s rebuttal. 

Kube’s prison records revealed that he did not receive any special treatment or 

benefits while in prison, and his custody credits were unaffected by his work assignment, 

or lack thereof.

II. Procedure.

Robles and Garcia were tried twice. Their first trial, in 2009, ended in a mistrial 

after the jury deadlocked. In the second jury trial in 2011, appellants were convicted of 

the first degree murders of Michael and Anthony, and the attempted willful, deliberate, 

and premeditated attempted murders of Frank and Vaughn. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, 

subd. (a).)10 As to appellant Garcia, the jury found that a principal personally and 

intentionally used and discharged a firearm during commission of all the offenses, 

causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d).) As to both 

appellants, the jury found a multiple murder special circumstance true. In a bifurcated 

proceeding, the trial court found Garcia had suffered a prior “strike” conviction.

The trial court sentenced Robles to life in prison without the possibility of parole, 

plus 39 years to life. It sentenced Garcia to life in prison without the possibility of 

parole, plus 178 years to life. The court imposed restitution fines of $10,000 and $5,000 

on Garcia and Robles, respectively, as well as court security assessments and criminal 

conviction assessments. Robles and Garcia appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of Agent Diederich’s expert testimony. 

a. Additional facts.

Prior to trial, appellant Robles objected to admission of Agent Diederich’s

testimony on the grounds it was inadmissible hearsay, violated the Sixth Amendment’s 

Confrontation Clause, and was irrelevant. Robles argued that most of Diederich’s

10 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
13

information came from Medina, who was not available as a witness,

11 and Diederich 

could not simply restate what Medina had told him in the guise of expert opinion. 

The trial court conducted an Evidence Code section 402 hearing at which 

Diederich testified regarding the substance of his proposed testimony. Diederich detailed 

his substantial training and experience, which he reiterated in his trial testimony.

12 He 

explained that most of his information had come from Medina, and he had corroborated 

some, but not all, of it by other means, such as discussions with other law enforcement 

agents, evidence seized in searches, or further DEA investigation. 

The trial court ruled, pursuant to People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605 

(Gardeley), that Diederich could testify as an expert regarding only the following topics: 

(1) whether “Termite” was involved in the distribution of narcotics; (2) the manner and 

extent of the Mexican Mafia’s control over the distribution of narcotics; (3) the illegal 

narcotics distribution hierarchy on the Westside of Los Angeles in 1998; and (4) the 

consequences of distributing narcotics in violation of the Mexican Mafia’s rules. The 

court excluded substantial portions of Diederich’s Evidence Code section 402 hearing 

testimony in order to prevent the jury from learning of incompetent hearsay. It explained 

that Diederich could not act as a pass-through for Medina’s statements, or parrot what 

11 Although Medina was unavailable as a witness only because Robles killed him, 

under current United States Supreme Court authority this fact does not prevent Robles 

from asserting a confrontation claim. Although Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 

36 (Crawford) accepted that the “rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . extinguishes 

confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds” (id. at p. 62), the high court has 

since ruled that the doctrine only applies where the defendant killed the witness in order 

to prevent him or her from testifying. (Giles v. California (2008) 554 U.S. 353, 359-361, 

368; see also People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1039-1040, fn. 21; People v. Streeter 

(2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 240.) Since there is no showing Robles committed the killing to 

prevent Medina from testifying, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine does not apply. 

The People do not argue otherwise. 

12 Among other things, Diederich had been an agent with the Department of Justice 

for 20 years; had completed a 14-week live-in academy course which included instruction 

on narcotics investigations of drug-trafficking organizations; and had investigated 

numerous drug trafficking cases in a variety of contexts.
14

Medina had told him; however, he could form opinions based on his conversations with 

Medina.

b. Discussion. 

Robles, joined by Garcia, contends the trial court’s ruling was error. Appellants 

urge Diederich’s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because it was based on 

testimonial hearsay provided by Medina, an unavailable witness who had not been crossexamined.

(i) Applicable legal principles

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives a criminal 

defendant the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. (People v. Lopez 

(2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 573, 576 (Lopez).) In the seminal case of Crawford, supra,

541 U.S. 36, the court overruled its prior precedent and held that the Sixth Amendment 

generally bars admission at trial of a testimonial out-of-court statement offered for its 

truth against a criminal defendant, unless the maker of the statement is unavailable to 

testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. (Id. at p. 69; 

Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 821; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 

1145, 1158; Lopez, at pp. 573, 580-581.) Although Crawford set forth a new standard for 

admissibility, the court declined to provide a comprehensive definition of “testimonial.”

(Crawford, at p. 68; People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 969; People v. Hill (2011) 

191 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1134.) Crawford did make clear that the Confrontation Clause 

does not apply to out-of-court statements not offered for their truth. (Crawford, at p. 60, 

fn. 9; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 775-776; People v. Valadez (2013) 220 

Cal.App.4th 16, 30 (Valadez); People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1210.) 

We review the trial court’s admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. 

(Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 29; People v. Hill, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1122.) Whether evidence was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause is 

subject to independent review. (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304; People v. 

Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210, 221.) 
15

(ii) Was Diederich’s expert testimony about Medina’s statements admissible 

because it was not offered for its truth?

It has long been the law in California that gang experts may rely on reliable 

hearsay in forming their opinions, even if the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible.

(Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b);

13 Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 617-618 [gang 

expert’s testimony may be premised on inadmissible material, including reliable 

hearsay]; Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 29; People v. Hill, supra, 191 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1122; People v. Ramirez (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1426-1427; 

People v. Sisneros (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 142, 153.) A gang expert’s sources can 

include, inter alia, written material, conversations with gang members, information 

learned from colleagues or other law enforcement agencies, and the expert’s personal 

investigation of gang-related crimes. (Valadez, at p. 29; Hill, supra, at pp. 1121-1122; 

People v. Vy (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1223, & fn. 10; see, e.g., People v. 

Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 324; Gardeley, at p. 620.)

Because Evidence Code section 802 allows an expert witness to “ ‘state on direct 

examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter . . . upon which it is based,’ an 

expert witness whose opinion is based on such inadmissible matter can, when testifying, 

describe the material that forms the basis of the opinion.” (Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 

p. 618; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 918; People v. Thomas, supra, 130 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1209-1210.) An expert’s recitation of sources relied upon for his or 

her opinion “does not transform inadmissible matter into ‘independent proof’ of any 

fact.” (Gardeley, supra, at p. 619.) “[P]rejudice may arise if, ‘ “under the guise of 

reasons,” ’ the expert’s detailed explanation ‘ “[brings] before the jury incompetent 

13 Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b) provides that an expert’s opinion may 

be based on “matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and 

education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or 

before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be 

relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony 

relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his 

opinion.”
16

hearsay evidence.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Montiel, supra, at pp. 918-919; People v. 

Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731, 747.) Thus, both before and after Crawford, an 

expert was and is not allowed to simply parrot the testimony of an out-of-court witness 

under the guise of expert testimony.

California appellate courts after Crawford repeatedly have held that the admission 

of testimonial out-of-court statements or other hearsay evidence offered as the basis for 

an expert’s opinion (“basis evidence”) does not violate Crawford. (See Valadez, supra, 

220 Cal.App.4th at p. 30 [listing cases]; People v. Thomas, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1209-1210; People v. Cooper, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 746-747; People v. 

Ramirez, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1426-1427; People v. Sisneros, supra, 174 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 153-154.) For example, Thomas reasoned: “Crawford does not 

undermine the established rule that experts can testify to their opinions on relevant 

matters, and relate the information and sources upon which they rely in forming those 

opinions. This is so because an expert is subject to cross-examination about his or her 

opinions and additionally, the materials on which the expert bases his or her opinion are 

not elicited for the truth of their contents; they are examined to assess the weight of the 

expert’s opinion. Crawford itself states that the [C]onfrontation [C]lause ‘does not bar 

the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 

matter asserted.’ [Citations.]” (Thomas, at p. 1210; see also People v. Cooper, supra, 

148 Cal.App.4th at p. 747 [“Hearsay relied upon by experts in formulating their opinions 

is not testimonial because it is not offered for the truth of the facts stated but merely as 

the basis for the expert’s opinion”]; People v. Sisneros, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 153.)

People v. Hill, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 1104, questioned this reasoning. It 

explained: “Central to the reasoning in Gardeley and Thomas is the implied assumption 

that the out-of-court statements may help the jury evaluate the expert’s opinion without 

regard to the truth of the statements. Otherwise, the conclusion that the statements should 

remain free of Crawford review because they are not admitted for their truth is 

nonsensical. But this assumption appears to be incorrect.” (Hill, at pp. 1129-1130.) 
17

Citing a New York case, Hill pointed out that a jury will often be required to determine 

the truth of the basis evidence in order to use it to evaluate the expert’s opinion. (Id. at 

pp. 1130-1131; see Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 31.) While Hill disagreed with 

the reasoning in Thomas, the court concluded Thomas’s holding was based on binding 

California Supreme Court precedent, which it was required to follow. (Hill, at pp. 1127, 

1131.) Moreover, in Hill the bulk of the challenged out-of-court statements were not 

testimonial, because they were comprised of consensual conversations with gang 

members and did not involve the investigation of particular crimes. (Id. at pp. 1135-

1136; see Valadez, at p. 31.)

Subsequent to the decision in Thomas, the United States Supreme Court has issued 

a trio of opinions addressing the application of Crawford to expert scientific or forensic 

testimony. (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S 305; Bullcoming v. New 

Mexico (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2705; Williams v. Illinois (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2221 (Williams).

These decisions have left the law in a “muddled state.” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 

p. 590 (dis. opn. of Lui, J.).) Our California Supreme Court has subsequently issued its 

own trio of cases interpreting these authorities, and addressing the constitutionality of a 

prosecution expert’s testimony about forensic evidence contained in a report prepared by 

someone who did not testify at trial. (Id. at p. 573; People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 

608; People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650.) Based on Williams and Dungo, it 

appears that, at least when scientific or forensic expert testimony is at issue, “a majority 

of justices on both the United States Supreme Court and our high court have indicated 

expert basis evidence is offered for its truth and subject to the confrontation clause.” 

(Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 31; see People v. Mercado (2013) 216 

Cal.App.4th 67, 89 & fn. 6.)

In Williams, supra, 132 S.Ct. 2221, the defendant was identified as the suspect in a 

rape after an Illinois police crime laboratory (ISP) matched his DNA profile, derived 

from a blood sample taken from him in an unrelated case, with a DNA sample derived by 

Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory from semen found on vaginal swabs taken from the 

rape victim. At Williams’s bench trial for rape, a state forensic analyst testified that she 
18

had developed a DNA profile from the defendant’s blood sample. Sandra Lambatos, a 

forensic expert, testified that she had compared the DNA profile derived from the blood 

sample with that produced by Cellmark from the swabs, and determined that the DNA 

profiles matched. (Id. at pp. 2230.) Lambatos testified that shipping manifests showed 

the swabs had been sent to Cellmark, and that Cellmark had sent them back with the male 

DNA profile. (Ibid.) The Cellmark report containing the DNA profile was not 

introduced into evidence, and no analyst from Cellmark testified. (Id. at p. 2230.) 

Lambatos testified that she did not conduct or observe any of the testing on the vaginal 

swabs, and that her testimony relied on the DNA profile produced by Cellmark. (Id. at 

p. 2230.) The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Williams’s conviction, concluding that 

Lambatos’ testimony did not violate his confrontation rights, because the Cellmark report 

was not referenced to prove the truth of the matter it asserted, only to explain the basis for 

Lambatos’ expert opinion. (Williams, supra, 132 S.Ct. at pp. 2231-2232; see People v. 

Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 578-579.) 

In a fractured four-one-four opinion, the Supreme Court held there was no 

Confrontation Clause violation, but a majority of the court could not agree on a rationale. 

(See Williams, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2228; Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 578-580; 

People v. Barba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 712, 727-728.) Justice Alito, in a plurality 

opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, held that because 

the expert’s testimony about the Cellmark report was not offered for its truth, its 

admission did not offend the Confrontation Clause. The plurality opinion explained: 

“[T]his form of expert testimony does not violate the Confrontation Clause because that 

provision has no application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted. When an expert testifies for the prosecution in a criminal 

case, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the expert about any statements 

that are offered for their truth. Out-of-court statements that are related by the expert 

solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which that opinion rests are not 
19

offered for their truth and thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.” 

(Williams, supra, 132. S.Ct. at p. 2228.)14

However, the other five justices rejected the plurality’s analysis on this point. 

Justice Thomas concurred with the result reached by the plurality solely because, in his 

view, Cellmark’s statements lacked the requisite formality and solemnity to be 

considered testimonial. (Williams, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2255 (conc. opn. of 

Thomas, J.).) Justice Thomas found the plurality’s reasoning “flawed.” (Ibid.) He 

perceived “no plausible reason for the introduction of Cellmark’s statements other than to 

establish their truth.” (Id. at p. 2256.) “[T]he validity of Lambatos’ opinion ultimately 

turned on the truth of Cellmark’s statements. The plurality’s assertion that Cellmark’s 

statements were merely relayed to explain ‘the assumptions on which [Lambatos’] 

opinion rest[ed],’ . . . overlooks that the value of Lambatos’ testimony depended on the 

truth of those very assumptions.” (Id. at p. 2258; see Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at

pp. 578-580.) 

Justice Kagan’s dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, 

likewise rejected the plurality’s reasoning, concluding that “Lambatos’s statements about 

Cellmark’s report went to its truth.” (Williams, supra, 132 S.Ct at p. 2268 (dis. opn. of 

Kagan, J.).) In the dissent’s view, the case was indistinguishable from Melendez-Diaz 

14 The plurality offered a second, independent basis for its decision: the 

Cellmark report was “not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted 

individual.” (Williams, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2243.) “The Cellmark report is very 

different from the sort of extrajudicial statements, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 

testimony, and confessions, that the Confrontation Clause was originally understood to 

reach. The report was produced before any suspect was identified. The report was 

sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against petitioner, who was 

not even under suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on 

the loose.” (Id. at p. 2228.) This rationale was rejected by Justice Thomas, who found it 

lacked any “grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in logic,” (id. at p. 2262), and 

by the dissent. (Id. at pp. 2273-2274 (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.).)
20

and Bullcoming. (Id. at pp. 2265-2267.)15 Justice Kagan reasoned that when an expert 

witness “repeats an out-of-court statement as the basis for a conclusion . . . the 

statement’s utility is then dependent on its truth. If the statement is true, then the 

conclusion based on it is probably true; if not, not. So to determine the validity of the 

witness’s conclusion, the factfinder must assess the truth of the out-of-court statement on 

which it relies. That is why the principal modern treatise on evidence variously calls the 

idea that such ‘basis evidence’ comes in not for its truth, but only to help the factfinder 

evaluate an expert’s opinion ‘very weak,’ ‘factually implausible,’ ‘nonsense,’ and ‘sheer 

fiction.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 2268-2269.)

In People v. Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th 608, a forensic pathologist testified that the 

victim had been strangled. The pathologist’s opinion was based on objective facts 

contained in an autopsy report completed by another pathologist, and accompanying 

photographs, which were not introduced into evidence. (Id. at p. 612.) As Valadez 

explained: “The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennard and joined by the Chief 

Justice and three other justices, concluded the statements in the autopsy report were not 

testimonial, and therefore not subject to the confrontation clause. [Citation.] That 

opinion did not address the hearsay issue, although it noted the Williams plurality’s 

nonhearsay rationale. [Citation.] Justice Werdegar wrote a concurring opinion, however, 

which garnered majority support (joined by the Chief Justice and two other justices), 

explaining the statements in the report were offered for their truth, so they were subject to 

the confrontation clause. [Citation.] In dissent, Justice Corrigan, joined by Justice Liu, 

noted, ‘When an expert witness treats as factual the contents of an out-of-court statement, 

and relates as true the contents of that statement to the jury, a majority of the high court 

15 In Melendez-Diaz, the court held that sworn “certificates of analysis,” stating that 

a substance seized by police and connected to the defendant contained cocaine, were 

testimonial and their admission violated the Confrontation Clause. (Melendez-Diaz, 

supra, 557 U.S. at pp. 308-311.) In Bullcoming, the court held the Confrontation Clause 

prohibited admission of a forensic laboratory report, certifying that the defendant’s blood 

alcohol level was above the legal limit, through the in-court testimony of a scientist who 

neither observed nor performed the testing. (Bullcoming v. New Mexico, supra, 131 S.Ct. 

at p. 2717.)
21

in Williams . . . rejects the premise that the out-of-court statement is not admitted for its 

truth.’ [Citation.]” (Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 32.)

Valadez concluded: “If the currently constituted courts were called upon to 

resolve this issue, it seems likely the holdings in Thomas, Hill, and other cases extending 

Gardeley to find out-of-court statements offered as expert basis evidence are not offered 

for their truth for confrontation purposes will be significantly undermined.” (Valadez, 

supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 32.)16 We similarly noted in Mercado: “Although the 

Williams plurality concluded expert basis testimony does not constitute hearsay because 

it is not admitted for its truth, both Justice Thomas and the Williams dissenters rejected 

that analysis, concluding the evidence at issue had been admitted for its truth.” (People v. 

Mercado, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 89.) We also observed that at least six of the 

seven California Supreme Court justices appear to agree that for purposes of the 

Confrontation Clause, out-of-court statements admitted as basis evidence during expert 

testimony are admitted for their truth if treated as factual by the expert. (Id. at fn. 6.)17

The People argue that because Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams 

addressed scientific evidence, not expert opinion of the sort presented by a gang expert, 

they have no application here. Instead, they urge that the earlier California cases 

discussed ante—Gardeley, Thomas, Sisneros, Cooper, and Ramirez—govern the 

outcome of the instant matter. To be sure, Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams, as 

well as the recent California trilogy of cases, are an imperfect factual template given the 

16 Valadez did not decide the question, instead holding that the statements at issue 

were not testimonial. 

17 In Dungo, Justice Chin’s concurring opinion set forth an amplified explanation of 

how to harmonize the views expressed in Williams. (People v. Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th 

at p. 628 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) Justice Chin reasoned that where no Confrontation 

Clause violation exists under both the plurality’s and Justice Thomas’s concurring 

opinions, a reviewing court can conclude there is no Crawford error. (Id. at pp. 628-629; 

see People v. Mercado, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 87.) This approach does not come 

into play here because, as we have explained, Justice Thomas’s concurrence rejected the 

plurality’s analysis regarding the admission of expert basis evidence. 
22

different contexts in which the expert testimony-confrontation issues arose. 

Nevertheless, it appears that the underlying principles articulated in these cases may be 

equally applicable to all expert testimony. We need not reach this question, however, 

because as we discuss post, assuming arguendo that Diederich’s testimony about 

Medina’s statements was offered for its truth, any violation of the Confrontation Clause 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(iii) Were Medina’s statements to Diederich testimonial?

We next consider whether Medina’s statements were testimonial. “Although the 

high court has not agreed on a definition of ‘testimonial,’ a review of the [CrawfordMelendez-Diaz-Bullcoming-Williams quartet] indicates that a statement is testimonial 

when two critical components are present. [¶] First, to be testimonial the out-of-court 

statement must have been made with some degree of formality or solemnity. [Citations.] 

The degree of formality required, however, remains a subject of dispute in the United 

States Supreme Court. [Citation.] [¶] Second, all nine high court justices agree that an 

out-of-court statement is testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in some fashion 

to a criminal prosecution, but they do not agree on what the statement’s primary purpose 

must be.” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 581-582; People v. Mercado, supra, 216 

Cal.App.4th 87; People v. Barba, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 720-721.)

Here it seems likely that a majority of the Supreme Court justices would conclude 

Medina’s statements were testimonial. Crawford stated that statements taken by police 

officers during interrogations, including statements by a witness in response to structured 

police questioning, are testimonial. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 52; Valadez, supra, 

220 Cal.App.4th at p. 33; People v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 978.) In Davis v. 

Washington, the court clarified: “Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course 

of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 

purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 

They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 

ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 

prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” (Davis v. 
23

Washington, supra, 547 U.S. 813, 822, italics added; see also People v. Cage, supra, at 

pp. 984-985 [statement made to an officer over one hour after an assault was testimonial 

because the primary purpose was to investigate the crime].)

Cage “derive[d] several basic principles from Davis. First, . . . the confrontation 

clause is concerned solely with hearsay statements that are testimonial, in that they are 

out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the testimony given by witnesses at trial. 

Second, though a statement need not be sworn under oath to be testimonial, it must have 

occurred under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the formality and solemnity 

characteristic of testimony. Third, the statement must have been given and taken 

primarily for the purpose ascribed to testimony—to establish or prove some past fact for 

possible use in a criminal trial. Fourth, the primary purpose for which a statement was 

given and taken is to be determined ‘objectively,’ considering all the circumstances that 

might reasonably bear on the intent of the participants in the conversation. Fifth, 

sufficient formality and solemnity are present when, in a nonemergency situation, one 

responds to questioning by law enforcement officials, where deliberate falsehoods might 

be criminal offenses. Sixth, statements elicited by law enforcement officials are not 

testimonial if the primary purpose in giving and receiving them is to deal with a 

contemporaneous emergency, rather than to produce evidence about past events for 

possible use at a criminal trial.” (People v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 984, 

fns. omitted; Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 33-34.)

In Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 1143], police found the 

mortally wounded victim in a parking lot. His statements identifying his shooter and 

describing the shooting were not testimonial, because their primary purpose was to 

enable police to respond to an ongoing emergency. (Id. at p. 1150.) The statements were 

also not sufficiently formal: they were made in an exposed, public area, in a disorganized 

fashion, before emergency medical services arrived. (Id. at p. 1160; see also People v. 

Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 811-816.) 

Here, Medina’s statements were made under circumstances that imparted the 

requisite degree of formality. Agent Diederich testified that when the DEA “signs up” a 
24

confidential informant, “there are forms that are signed, agreements, personal histories 

are taken, fingerprints are taken, photographs are taken, and they are assigned a 

number. . . . Before you can make a payment to somebody, you would have to have them 

in a sense sign up in the books.” Medina signed such forms, and was paid a substantial 

sum of money for his information. These circumstances contrast with the type of 

informal, unstructured police interactions with gang members that have typically been 

held to produce nontestimonial statements. (See, e.g., People v. Hill, supra, 191 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1135-1136; Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 35-36.) Nor were 

Medina’s statements made during a contemporaneous emergency. (See Michigan v. 

Bryant, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 1160.)

Further, it appears the primary purpose of Medina’s statements to Agent Diederich 

was to produce evidence about past events for possible use at a criminal trial. Diederich 

testified that Medina’s statements led to “evidence being seized and convictions being 

obtained.” Diederich’s conversations with Medina were part of his investigation into 

ongoing drug trafficking involving the Martinez family. Of course, Diederich was not 

investigating the Westside Clothing store crimes or specifically targeting Robles or 

Garcia; at the time of the conversations at issue, the Westside Clothing store murders had 

not yet occurred. However, it appears that a majority of the Supreme Court justices 

would not consider this distinction significant. For the Williams dissenters, the pertinent 

inquiry is whether the evidence was generated “for the primary purpose of establishing 

‘past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution’—in other words, for the 

purpose of providing evidence.” (Williams, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2273 (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.); 

see Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 582.) For Justice Thomas, the pertinent inquiry is 

whether the statement was “primarily intend[ed] to establish some fact with the 

understanding that [the] statement may be used in a criminal prosecution.” (Williams, at 

p. 2261 (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.); Lopez, supra, at p. 582.) These standards appear to 

be satisfied here.
25

(iv) Were Medina’s testimonial statements admitted, and, if so, was the error 

harmless?

As noted ante, the trial court excluded significant portions of Diederich’s proposed 

testimony after the Evidence Code section 402 hearing; it also sustained numerous 

hearsay objections during his trial testimony. Almost without exception, Diederich’s trial 

testimony was based not only on Medina’s statements, but also on his training and 

experience and/or information he gleaned from other law enforcement officers. Robles 

nonetheless avers that Medina was Diederich’s sole source of information showing the 

Westside Clothing homicides were a Mexican Mafia hit, and that the relationship 

between Lennox 13 and the Mexican Mafia made it “likely that a Lennox 13 gang 

member would have participated in it.” In support of these contentions, Robles points to 

three aspects of Diederich’s testimony.18

a. Testimony that Termite was a significant narcotics dealer.

Robles first avers that “Medina was Diederich’s sole source of information that 

Termite of Santa Monica was a significant dealer of narcotics who had failed to pay his 

taxes to the Mexican Mafia.” He urges, “The only factual basis in the record for

connecting the Westside Clothing homicides to the Mexican Mafia was Diederich’s 

testimony that Arturo Arce,” the co-owner of Westside Clothing, “was the same 

18 In his opening brief, Robles averred that Medina was the only source of 

Diederich’s information about (1) the relationship between the Westside gangs and the 

Mexican Mafia; (2) Termite from Santa Monica, his narcotics activities, and his alleged 

place of residence; (3) the Mexican Mafia’s policies of issuing green lights on gang 

members who did not adhere to their rules; (4) the Mexican Mafia’s instructions to gang 

members to carry out homicides by getting out of a car and shooting victims in the head; 

and (5) the fact that members of the Lennox 13 and Culver City gangs would be aware of 

the Mexican Mafia’s policies on the latter point. In a detailed response, the People point 

out that as to three of the aforementioned topics, Diederich explicitly relied for his 

information on sources other than, or in addition to, Medina, and four of the five topics 

were covered and corroborated by the testimony of Sergeant Valdemar. In his reply 

brief, Robles concedes that the assertion in his opening brief about the five topics 

“appears to have been an overstatement.” We address only those aspects of the evidence 

that Robles continues to challenge in his reply brief. 
26

‘Termite’ who had failed to pay his ‘taxes’ and who was on a green light list issued by 

the Mexican Mafia.”

Robles’s contentions fail in large part as a factual matter. Diederich did not

directly testify at trial that the Termite about whom he testified was Arce, or co-owned 

Westside Clothing.19 Diederich did not testify at trial that Termite (or Arce) had failed to 

pay taxes to the Mexican Mafia. Diederich did not testify at trial that Termite was on a 

green light list.

Diederich did testify that “Termite” from Santa Monica was a significant 

distributor of cocaine, who dealt in quantities of one kilogram or more. It appears that his

testimony on this point came directly and solely from Medina. Assuming arguendo it 

was offered for its truth, it was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause. 

However, admission of the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(See People v. Rutterschmidt, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 661 [“Violation of the Sixth 

Amendment’s confrontation right requires reversal of the judgment against a criminal 

defendant unless the prosecution can show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the error was 

harmless”]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Livingston, supra, 

53 Cal.4th at p. 1159.) Far from being the “glue that held the prosecution’s theory of the 

case together,” as Robles avers, Diederich’s testimony on this point was far from crucial. 

Among other evidence on the point, the jury learned from Valdemar’s testimony that 

“Termite from Santa Monica” was on several green light lists, which were introduced 

into evidence. The jury learned from Valdemar and Detective Bambrick that Arce was 

“Termite” from Santa Monica. The jury also knew through Detective Bambrick that 

Arce was arrested in October 1997 for participating in the sale of a small amount of 

cocaine. Given that the jury already knew Arce was on a “green light” list, 

demonstrating he had committed some infraction earning the ire of the Mexican Mafia

and a death sentence, the quantity of cocaine he trafficked was largely immaterial. 

(People v. Livingston, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1159-1160.)

19 Diederich did testify that he had received information that Termite lived near 

Ninth and Lincoln in Santa Monica, but was unable to corroborate this information. 
27

b. Testimony that the Lennox 13 gang distributed drugs under the auspices of 

the Mexican Mafia.

Robles next complains that Medina was Diederich’s sole source of information to 

show the Lennox 13 gang was involved in Mexican Mafia sponsored drug trafficking, a 

fact that was crucial to explain why a Lennox 13 gang member such as Robles would 

carry out a green light hit for the Mexican Mafia.

However, it is not clear that Diederich’s only source for this information was 

Medina. At the Evidence Code section 402 hearing Diederich stated that his information

about the Martinez family was only based in part on what Medina told him. Diederich 

corroborated Medina’s information about the Martinez family’s supplying cocaine to the 

Lennox 13 gang when the DEA seized narcotics at a stash location controlled by a 

Martinez family member. Diederich believed, but was not sure, the location was being 

guarded by a Lennox 13 gang member with the moniker “Mouse.” Diederich also 

corroborated information about the Martinez family’s drug distribution: “Through 

surveillance, the execution of search warrants, arrests and wire taps, we were able to 

confirm and seize narcotics from the Martinez family members or organizational 

members.”

Moreover, the organizational chart provided evidence the Lennox gang was part of 

the Mexican Mafia run drug distribution network. That chart included the names of the 

gangs to which the drugs were distributed, including Lennox 13. Although the chart was 

first explained to Diederich by Medina, he subsequently confirmed its accuracy with 

Sergeant Valdemar. Diederich also talked to Deputy Karen Shanka, a Lennox 13 expert, 

regarding “what was happening with Lennox 13 and Hector Marroquin.”

We do not believe Crawford and its progeny prohibit an expert from basing his or 

her opinions on information gleaned from a testimonial source that was subsequently 

corroborated and reiterated by other, nontestimonial sources such as other law 

enforcement officials. (See Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 29; U.S. v. Johnson 

(4th Cir. 2009) 587 F.3d 625, 635.) Nothing suggests Diederich’s conversations with 

Sergeant Valdemar or Deputy Shanka were testimonial, and appellants do not contend 
28

admission of their information violated the Confrontation Clause. It appears Diederich 

could have testified to the same fact—that Lennox 13 was a link in the drug distribution 

chain approved by the Mexican Mafia—based on his conversations with other law 

enforcement personnel. Moreover, Valdemar confirmed the accuracy of the 

organizational chart Diederich testified about at trial, and testified that Lennox 13 was 

one of the gangs within the Mexican Mafia’s control. Because this evidence came in 

through Valdemar as well as Diederich, to the extent Diederich’s testimony about the 

Lennox 13 gang was based on Medina’s testimonial hearsay, its admission was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Lewis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 874, 887.)

c. Testimony about the Mexican Mafia’s directives on the method of 

execution. 

Third, appellants complain that Diederich’s testimony about the Mexican Mafia’s 

“no drive-by policy” violated the Confrontation Clause because Medina was Diederich’s 

only source of information for this information. Appellants acknowledge that Sergeant 

Valdemar also testified regarding the no-drive-by policy, but hypothesize that 

Valdemar’s information might have come from Medina as well.

Diederich’s actual trial testimony regarding the no-drive-by policy was minimal. 

When asked for his opinion on how a person who had been “greenlighted” by the 

Mexican Mafia would be killed, Diederich answered: “To shoot the person, not from a 

car, but to shoot—get out, shoot the person in the head.” Valdemar, in contrast, provided 

significantly fuller testimony on the point, as discussed in our recitation of the facts, ante. 

Valdemar’s unchallenged testimony on the point was more complete and compelling than 

Diederich’s. Robles’s contention that Valdemar perhaps learned this information through 

the same meeting with Medina is purely speculative. 

In any event, the no drive-by edict had limited probative value for the People here. 

The victims were not killed with a clean shot to the head that avoided injuring innocents; 

to the contrary, the assailants sprayed the store with a hail of bullets, hitting the victims—

who were all innocent bystanders, not the intended target—multiple times. This was 

consistent with Valdemar’s testimony that the Mexican Mafia’s “signature method” for 
29

killing was this type of “[o]verkill.” For these reasons, to the extent Agent Diederich’s 

brief testimony on the point was based on testimonial hearsay and offered for its truth, 

admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Finally, Robles suggests a comparison of Agent Diederich’s testimony at the first 

and second trials demonstrates his testimony at the second trial was prejudicial. He 

suggests that at the second trial, Diederich was prohibited from identifying Medina as the 

source of his information about the Mexican Mafia, and this “conceal[ment]” of 

Medina’s involvement exacerbated the error in admitting Diederich’s testimony. But as 

we discuss post, the jury at the second trial was clearly informed that Medina had 

provided Diederich with information regarding the Mexican Mafia’s control of the 

Westside drug distribution, which Diederich relied upon in formulating his opinion. 

Moreover, we have compared Diederich’s testimony in the two trials and see no 

possibility that his testimony was more damaging to the defense at the second trial.

II. Admission of Agent Diederich’s testimony did not deprive appellants of a 

fair trial. 

Appellants contend, in a related argument, that the “admission of hidden 

testimonial hearsay in Diederich’s testimony deprived them of their rights to a jury trial. 

Robles echoes the arguments made in his confrontation argument, urging that the 

purported error in admitting Diederich’s testimony was exacerbated by allowing 

Diederich to characterize the information he received from Medina as opinion, without 

disclosing the source of the information to the jury. By relying on testimonial hearsay, 

appellants urge, “the expert witness has ipso facto determined that the hearsay is 

reliable.”

This argument fails as a factual matter. That Medina provided Diederich with 

information which assisted Diederich in formulating his testimony was by no means 

“hidden” from the jury. At the outset of his testimony, Diederich explained that he met 

with and relied on Medina as a paid informant between December 1997 and April 1999. 

He testified that Medina gave him “information on narcotics trafficking, on [a] narcotic 

trafficking family based in the Hawthorne area and the distribution of narcotics to gangs.” 
30

He also testified that Medina provided him with the organizational chart, and 

acknowledged that Medina’s information helped him form his opinion about the Mexican 

Mafia and drug trafficking on the Westside. As the People correctly point out, “the jury 

was well aware that Medina was a primary source, but not the only source,” for much of 

Diederich’s knowledge and opinion. Furthermore, as we have already explained, 

admission of the challenged portions of Diederich’s testimony was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. For the same reasons, he was not deprived of his right to trial.

III. Evidence of hostilities between the Santa Monica 17 and Culver City 

Boys gangs.

a. Additional facts.

At several points during trial, Robles’s counsel sought to introduce evidence of the 

gang feud extant between the Culver City Boys and the Santa Monica 17 gangs in 

October 1998. Robles’s counsel averred that such evidence would show the Westside 

Clothing shooting was committed as part of the gang war, rather than as a Mexican Mafia 

execution, and would establish Robles, who belonged to a gang not embroiled in the 

feud, lacked a motive to commit the shooting. The prosecutor and appellant Garcia 

objected on grounds the proffered evidence was irrelevant and speculative; was based on 

hearsay; and was improper third party culpability evidence, in that Robles did not have 

evidence sufficiently linking the Westside Clothing store crimes to the gang feud.

The trial court reasoned that the gang war evidence was relevant to establish a 

possible motive for the charged crimes, which Robles—a Lennox 13 gang member—

would not have shared. It explained: “I don’t really see this as third party culpability 

[evidence] . . . . Third party culpability is where you’re pointing to a specific person and 

saying that person looks like the suspect in this case. [Robles’s counsel is] not really 

doing that. She’s trying to establish a motive for the crime, to exclude her client from 

having that motive.” The court reasoned that the People had put on considerable 

evidence of motive, and fairness required that the defense be able to counter that 

evidence by showing Robles lacked a motive. In accordance with Evidence Code 

section 352, the court ruled Robles could introduce the dates of the prior shootings, the 
31

names of the suspect(s), and the suspects’ gang affiliations. The court excluded 

(1) evidence of the details of the other shootings; (2) the opinion of two Santa Monica 

detectives that the charged crimes were committed as part of the gang feud; and 

(3) evidence that a shooting at the Mar Vista Gardens in Culver City occurred on the 

same day as the charged crimes. 

Appellants now advance competing arguments regarding the trial court’s ruling. 

Robles asserts that the limitation on his presentation of gang war evidence deprived him 

of his right to present a defense. Garcia, on the other hand, argues admission of the gang 

war evidence was erroneous, and violated his due process rights. We conclude the trial 

court properly admitted and limited the gang war evidence. 

b. Admission of the gang war evidence was not error.

A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether evidence is relevant and 

whether Evidence Code section 352 precludes its admission. (People v. Mills (2010) 

48 Cal.4th 158, 195; People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 634.) We apply the abuse 

of discretion standard to a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence, including 

those turning on the relevance or probative value of the evidence in question. (People v. 

Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 643; People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 930.) 

Here, we cannot fault the trial court’s reasoning that a limited amount of evidence 

regarding the hostilities between the Santa Monica 17 and Culver City Boys gangs was 

relevant. Evidence of gang affiliation and activity is generally admissible where such 

evidence shows motive or intent. (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 

1550; People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1519 [evidence of gang attacks were 

“relevant to the issue of motive (retaliation as part of an ongoing rivalry between the two 

gangs)”]; cf. People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 686 [defendant “had a motive for 

the killings, given the active gang war between defendant’s gang and Atlantic Drive 

Crips”].) “ ‘[B]ecause a motive is ordinarily the incentive for criminal behavior, its 

probative value generally exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is permitted in 

admitting evidence of its existence.’ ” (Gonzalez, at p. 1550.) As the trial court 

reasoned, the prosecution presented considerable evidence to show the charged crimes 
32

were committed at the behest of the Mexican Mafia, to discipline a gang member who 

failed to pay his “taxes.” Robles was entitled to attempt to disprove this theory by 

showing the crimes were committed for an entirely different motive—retaliation in a

gang feud—that he did not share. 

Garcia complains, as the prosecutor did below, that the evidence was nothing more 

than thinly disguised third party culpability evidence. “ ‘The principles of law are 

clear. . . . [T]he standard for admitting evidence of third party culpability [is] the same as 

for other exculpatory evidence: the evidence [has] to be relevant under Evidence Code 

section 350, and its probative value [can]not be “substantially outweighed by the risk of 

undue delay, prejudice, or confusion” under Evidence Code section 352.’ ” (People v. 

Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 581.) To be admissible, the third-party evidence “need not 

show ‘substantial proof of a probability’ that the third person committed the act; it need 

only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.” (People v. Hall 

(1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833.) However, the evidence must “ ‘ “link the third person either 

directly or circumstantially to the actual perpetration of the crime.” ’ ” (People v. 

Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 729.) “ ‘The rule does “not require that any evidence, 

however remote, must be admitted to show a third party’s possible culpability . . . . 

[E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without 

more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt: there must be 

direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the 

crime.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 481.) 

Here, if the jury believed the Westside Clothing shootings were carried out in 

retaliation for an earlier Santa Monica 17 gang shooting, that evidence could have raised 

a reasonable doubt that Robles, who was not allied with the Culver City Boys, was not a

participant. The evidence supporting this theory amounted to more than a showing of

mere motive or opportunity. Instead there was evidence that two criminal street gangs 

were actually engaged in hostilities. This stands in contrast to cases holding third party 

culpability evidence was insufficiently supported. For example, Hall explained: “ ‘if 

evidence of motive alone upon the part of other persons were admissible, . . . in a case 
33

involving the killing of a man who had led an active and aggressive life it might easily be 

possible for the defendant to produce evidence tending to show that hundreds of other 

persons had some motive or animus against the deceased . . . .’ ” (People v. Hall, supra, 

41 Cal.3d at p. 835; see also, e.g., People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 581-582 

[evidence third party was with the victim the night of the murder, failed to return home, 

and later stated he had dropped the victim at her apartment, was properly excluded]; 

People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 481-482; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 

155, 176 [evidence victim “was the center of a violent criminal operation involving drugs 

and stolen cars and guns, and that any number of criminal accomplices or rivals could 

have killed him” was inadmissible; there was no evidence of another person’s actual 

motive to commit the crimes]; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1137 

[insufficient foundation for evidence of third party culpability where evidence was mere 

speculation].) If Robles had simply offered evidence that the Culver City gang was 

hostile to the Santa Monica gang, and therefore might have committed the shooting, the 

evidence would be analogous to that in the Hall illustration. But because the gangs were 

actually engaged in back-and-forth shootings at the very time the charged murders 

occurred, we believe there was sufficient foundation for admission of the evidence, even 

if characterized as third party culpability evidence. 

But even if the gang war evidence was admitted in error, it was harmless. The 

erroneous admission of evidence requires reversal only if it is reasonably probable that 

appellant would have obtained a more favorable result had the evidence been excluded. 

(Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b); People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 878; People v. 

Avitia (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 185, 194.) The admission of relevant evidence will not 

offend due process unless the evidence is so prejudicial as to render the defendant’s trial 

fundamentally unfair. (People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 930; People v. Partida 

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.)

These standards are not met here. Garcia avers that the evidence was prejudicial 

because it amounted to improper propensity evidence, and the jury was likely to convict 

him simply because his gang was involved in a series of shootings. We disagree that the 
34

challenged evidence had this effect. Apart from the evidence elicited by Robles, the jury 

already knew Garcia was a Culver City Boys gang member with the moniker “Psycho.”

The jury had already heard evidence that the Culver City gang participated in murders, 

narcotics sales, and robberies. The jury already knew Garcia had adorned himself with a 

tattoo reading “ ‘I’ll ride for you CECE. We murderers[.]’ ” There was no evidence or 

innuendo suggesting that Garcia had participated in the other shootings. Thus, the facts 

here are distinguishable from those in the authorities cited by Garcia (U.S. v. Bradley (9th 

Cir. 1993) 5 F.3d 1317; People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 228). The 

evidence adduced by Robles could not have prejudiced Garcia, given the nature of the 

evidence that was already before the jury. For the same reasons, Garcia’s due process 

challenge fails. 

c. The trial court’s evidentiary rulings did not deprive Robles of his right to 

present a defense. 

Robles raises the flip side of Garcia’s argument, contending that the court erred by 

excluding certain additional evidence purportedly related to the gang war and limiting 

him to what he characterizes as a “bare bones” presentation. We disagree. Just because 

some evidence to show the existence of the gang war was admissible does not mean 

Robles had carte blanche to introduce cumulative and insignificant evidence on the topic. 

Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 

the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) 

create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading 

the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 643.) 

The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful 

opportunity to present a defense. (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 727; Crane v. 

Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690.) Evidence that falls short of exonerating a defendant 

may still be critical to a defense. (Cash, at p. 727.) “A defendant has the general right to 

offer a defense through the testimony of his or her witnesses [citation], but a state court’s 

application of ordinary rules of evidence—including the rule stated in Evidence Code 

section 352—generally does not infringe upon this right [citations].” (People v. Cornwell
35

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 82, disapproved on another ground by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 

Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 443-444; People v. 

Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1291-1292.) Although the complete exclusion of an 

accused’s defense may constitute federal constitutional error, “ ‘ “excluding defense 

evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an accused’s due process right to 

present a defense.” ’ [Citation.]” (Thornton, at p. 443; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 

Cal.4th 381, 427-428.) “A defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not 

unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions.” (United States v. Scheffer 

(1998) 523 U.S. 303, 308.) The erroneous exclusion of evidence requires reversal only if 

it is reasonably probable that appellant would have obtained a more favorable result had 

the evidence been allowed. (Evid. Code, § 354; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 

959, 1001; People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 880.)

Here, a wealth of evidence about the gang war was adduced at trial. At least three 

witnesses—Culver City Police Officer Albert Casillas, Santa Monica gang officer Eric 

Uyeno, and former Santa Monica Detective William Brown, testified that the Culver City 

Boys and the Santa Monica 17 gangs were embroiled in a gang war in October 1998. 

Casillas and Brown both testified regarding the murder of Culver City Boys gang 

member Omar Sevilla on October 12, 1998. Officers believed Sevilla had been killed by 

Santa Monica gang members. Defense witness Gary Steiner, a retired detective, testified 

that prior to the Sevilla murder, there were some gang-related incidents in Santa Monica 

but “it was generally quiet.” After the Sevilla shooting, there was an “upsurge” of 

activity. Steiner explained: “[W]e had a series of assaults, shootings, stabbings that 

resulted in either significant injuries or fatalities. Some of them at the time appeared to 

be involved with gang activity and others were totally unrelated to gang activity, but for 

some reason after October 12th we had just a flurry of murders and lesser crimes that 

lasted for several weeks.” Brown testified that the “word on the street [w]as from gang 

officers and other individuals basically said that we were going to have a gang war from 

Culver City to Santa Monica.” Prosecution witness Valdemar testified on crossexamination that there had been approximately 20 shootings in Santa Monica in 
36

September and October 1998. Uyeno similarly testified that there were “a lot” of 

shootings in Santa Monica during October 1998, although not all of them were attributed 

to gang members. Brown likewise testified that there were a series of shootings in Santa 

Monica between the date Sevilla was murdered and the charged crimes.

The defense elicited evidence regarding additional shootings occurring on 

October 10, 16, 17, and 18, 1998. Both Brown and Steiner testified that a shooting 

occurred in Santa Monica on October 10. Officer Uyeno investigated a shooting of four 

persons in a car on October 16. The victims were not gang members, but were in an area 

frequented by Santa Monica 17 members. In Uyeno’s view, the shooting was gangrelated. However, no suspect was identified in the case, and no one was arrested. Steiner 

investigated an October 17 shooting that occurred at 20th Street and Lincoln Boulevard 

in Santa Monica. The victim was Juan Martin Campos. Retired Santa Monica police 

officers Shane Talbot and Harry Young testified that they investigated a shooting that 

occurred in Santa Monica on October 18, 1998. The victim was Jaime Cruz, a former 

Santa Monica 17 gang member. Alex Acuna and Marcos Camarillo were arrested for the 

shooting. Casillas testified that Acuna was a Culver City Boys gang member.

Detective Brown, who was one of the investigating officers on the charged crimes, 

testified that when investigating the Westside Clothing store murders he took a blood 

sample from Sevilla’s brother, who was a Culver City Boys gang member, because 

Brown believed the brother might be involved in the Westside Clothing shootings. When 

preparing six-pack photographic lineups for use in investigating the case, he used 

photographs of Culver City gang members. Brown testified that when he had been 

investigating the murders years before, he felt the October 27 Westside Clothing 

shootings were in retaliation for the murder of Sevilla.

Additionally, Casillas testified that it is common for one gang to retaliate against 

another if one of its members is killed. Steiner testified that the Santa Monica 17 gang

claimed all of Santa Monica as its territory. The Westside Clothing store was located in a 

gang area, and Santa Monica 17 gang members were often in close proximity to it.
37

We do not agree with Robles’s characterization of this evidence as “skeletal.” To 

the contrary, from this ample evidence Robles was fully able to—and did—effectively

argue to the jury his theory that the Westside Clothing crimes were not a Mexican Mafia 

hit, but were an outgrowth of the gang hostilities between the Culver City and Santa 

Monica gangs.

Despite this, Robles avers that: “To properly evaluate the merits of the defense 

theory . . . the jury needed to know all the facts about the gang war, starting with the 

murder of Omar Sevilla and continuing through the Mar Vista Gardens murder of a 

Culver City gang member that occurred after the Westside Clothing crimes.” (Italics in 

original.) We disagree. It is not clear from the record before us that the type of 

comprehensive evidence Robles suggests should have been admitted was even available. 

In any event, admission of all details on all the shootings would have consumed an 

inordinate amount of time, lacked probative value, and had the potential to confuse the 

jury. Exclusion of the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 was therefore proper. 

“The principle that undergirds the defendant’s right to present exculpatory evidence is 

also the source of essential limitations on the right. . . . The trial process would be a 

shambles if either party had an absolute right to control the time and content of his 

witnesses’ testimony. . . . The State’s interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial is 

sufficient to justify the imposition and enforcement of firm, though not always inflexible, 

rules relating to the identification and presentation of evidence.” (Taylor v. Illinois 

(1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410-411.) 

People v. Funes, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, cited by Robles, does not compel a 

different conclusion. Funes held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of nine prior incidents occurring in a 

gang war, some of which involved the defendant. (Id. at pp. 1511-1513, 1519.) Funes 

did not hold that admission of such evidence was required, only that, on the facts of that 

case, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit it. (Id. at pp. 1518-1519.) As the People 

point out, Funes did not purport to set a boundary for what must be allowed.
38

We discern no error in regard to the specific evidentiary exclusions challenged by 

Robles. First, the trial court did not err by excluding details of the gang-war shootings. 

Among other things, defense counsel never made a sufficient offer of proof 

demonstrating any similarities between the charged crimes and the other October 

incidents to make such evidence relevant. She averred only that in the October 17 

shooting, the three men who followed a pedestrian into a liquor store were driving a 

stolen Dodge Neon, the same sort of car used here; in the October 18 incident, the vehicle 

was also a stolen Dodge; and in one shooting, the assailants purportedly used “the same 

type of weapon.” None of these purported similarities were significant enough to allow 

the jury to draw the inference that the same people, or same gang, committed those 

incidents and the Westside Clothing Store crimes. (Cf. People v. Harris (2013) 57 

Cal.4th 804, 841 [for prior crimes to be admissible to prove identity, the pattern and 

characteristics of the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense must be so unusual 

and distinctive as to be like a signature].) The trial court correctly reasoned that 

admission of such evidence here had the potential to confuse the jury. Although Robles 

contends the details of the other crimes were essential to his defense, his counsel never 

made a further offer of proof showing that evidence of other details existed, and he 

mentions no others on appeal.

Robles also complains that he was not allowed to introduce evidence that 

shootings occurred on October 13 and 14 because the identity of the assailants was 

unknown. Assuming arguendo Robles actually had such evidence to present, we see no 

error. As Officer Uyeno testified, not all the shootings in Santa Monica during October 

1998 were attributable to gang members. Defense counsel admitted she did not know if 

the October 14 shooting involved the Culver City Boys. Attacks that were not related to 

the gang war were irrelevant. Thus, absent evidence showing the assailants were gang 

members, such evidence was properly excluded. In any event, evidence of these two 

shootings was cumulative and therefore lacked probative value, and exclusion was 

necessarily harmless.
39

Likewise, the trial court did not err by excluding opinion testimony from retired 

police officers. After an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, the trial court ruled 

Detective Talbot did not qualify as a gang expert, a ruling Robles does not challenge. 

Therefore Talbot was not competent to offer an opinion on why the charged crimes 

occurred. The trial court also correctly precluded Robles from asking Detective Steiner 

whether, in his opinion, the charged crimes were committed in retaliation for the Sevilla 

murder. Detective Steiner handled the case in 2001. At that time, police were unaware 

of the significant evidence presented at trial, including the DNA evidence, the eyewitness 

identifications, and Kube’s testimony regarding appellants’ statements. The detective’s 

opinion regarding the motive for the crime, based on the state of the evidence in 2001, 

was not probative. Moreover, any error in this regard was harmless: contrary to Robles’s 

argument, Detective Brown was allowed to offer such testimony and opined that when he 

had been investigating years before, he surmised that the Westside Clothing shootings 

were in retaliation for Sevilla’s murder.

Finally, exclusion of the October 27 Mar Vista Gardens shooting was not 

prejudicial error. Robles sought to introduce evidence that on the evening of the 

Westside Clothing shooting, a Santa Monica gang member carried out a shooting of a 

Culver City Boy gang member in the Mar Vista Gardens. According to defense counsel, 

a conviction had been obtained in the case. The trial court excluded the evidence on the 

ground it went to third party culpability, not motive, which was Robles’s original basis 

for seeking to admit the gang war evidence; it was cumulative; it lacked probative value; 

and it could potentially confuse the issues. This was not an abuse of discretion, for the 

reasons we have set forth. Even assuming arguendo the court’s first ground for exclusion 

was error, as Robles asserts, the second ground clearly was not. As the trial court 

reasoned, the evidence already showed a gang war, with “back and forth” shootings, was 

transpiring. Cumulative evidence of this fact would have been of minimal assistance to 

the defense.
40

IV. Evidence of Garcia’s prior robbery was properly admitted.

a. Additional facts. 

Prior to trial, Garcia moved to exclude evidence of his prior home invasion 

robbery of Tadayon. He argued, inter alia, that the crimes were insufficiently similar, and 

evidence of the prior crime was highly prejudicial. The prosecutor countered that the 

evidence was relevant to show intent and motive. The trial court concluded the evidence 

was not probative on the issue of intent, but was probative to show motive. The court 

recognized that any prior bad act is prejudicial, but the prior crime was not as egregious 

as the charged offenses.

b. Discussion.

Garcia argues that the trial court’s ruling was error because there was insufficient 

similarity between the Tadayon robbery and the charged murders; there was insufficient 

foundation for the People’s theory that the Westside Clothing store murders were a 

Mexican Mafia hit; and the evidence was unduly prejudicial. He argues that evidence of 

the prior incident served only to convince the jury he was the type of person who would 

have committed the charged crimes. We disagree. 

Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.) Evidence is relevant if 

it has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence 

to the determination of the action. (Evid. Code, § 210; People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th 

at p. 193; People v. Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 642.) A trial court has broad discretion in 

determining whether evidence is relevant and whether Evidence Code section 352 

precludes its admission, but lacks discretion to admit irrelevant evidence. (People v. 

Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 482; Mills, at p. 195; People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 

584, 634.) 

Evidence that a defendant committed misconduct other than that currently charged 

is generally inadmissible to prove he or she had a propensity to commit the charged 

crime. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a); People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 782; 

People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1165.) However, such evidence is admissible 

if it is relevant to prove, among other things, intent, knowledge, identity, motive, or the 
41

existence of a common design or plan. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People v. Carter

(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1147; People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 400; People v. 

Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1374.) “The categories listed in section 1101, 

subdivision (b), are examples of facts that legitimately may be proved by other-crimes 

evidence, but . . . the list is not exclusive. [Citations.]” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 81, 146; Spector, at p. 1373.) Although evidence of prior offenses may not be 

introduced solely to prove criminal disposition, it may be admitted whenever it tends

“ ‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material for the 

People or to overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the defense.’ ”

(Spector, at p. 1373.)

When reviewing the admission of evidence of other offenses, a court must 

consider: (1) the materiality of the fact to be proved or disproved, (2) the probative value 

of the other crimes evidence to prove or disprove the fact, and (3) the existence of any 

rule or policy requiring exclusion even if the evidence is relevant. (People v. Fuiava 

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 667; People v. Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1372-1373.) 

Even if other crimes evidence is admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, 

subdivision (b), it should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 

Cal.4th 336, 354.) Because evidence relating to uncharged misconduct may be highly 

prejudicial, its admission requires careful analysis. (Fuiava, at p. 667; People v. Ewoldt,

supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.) “ ‘ “ ‘Prejudice’ as contemplated by [Evidence Code] section 

352 is not so sweeping as to include any evidence the opponent finds inconvenient. 

Evidence is not prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely because 

it undermines the opponent’s position or shores up that of the proponent.” ’ ” (People v. 

Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 490.) Evidence is prejudicial under Evidence Code section 

352 if it uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant and has little 

effect on the issues. (Id. at p. 491.) 

We review the trial court’s rulings under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 for 

abuse of discretion, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. 
42

(People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 667-668; People v. Edwards, supra, 57 

Cal.4th at p. 711; People v. Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 491; People v. Thomas, supra, 

52 Cal.4th at pp. 354-355.) 

Evidence of the prior Tadayon robbery was highly probative of the People’s 

theory that Garcia committed the Westside Clothing store shootings because he was 

acting as an enforcer for the Mexican Mafia. Tadayon testified that both robbers said, 

“ ‘I know you’ve been selling narcotics in our territory. This is Mexican Mafia, Culver 

City Boys.’ ” Garcia’s statement was therefore an admission that he was indeed working 

for the Mexican Mafia, enforcing the gang’s requirement that drug sellers in the gang’s 

territory pay taxes. As the trial court found, the evidence was probative to show Garcia 

was a “disciplinarian[] who [was] conducting business for the Mexican Mafia and that is 

their motive.” Evidence that approximately two weeks before the charged crimes Garcia 

was acting in the capacity of a Mexican Mafia enforcer logically, naturally, and by 

reasonable inference suggested he had a motive for committing the Westside Clothing 

store homicides, and was one of the perpetrators of those crimes. 

Garcia argues that the evidence was improperly admitted for several reasons. 

First, he urges that the prior and charged crimes lacked sufficient similarity. Evidence of 

uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common plan, and intent only if the 

charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational inference on 

these issues. (People v. Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 711; People v. Ewoldt, supra, 

7 Cal.4th at p. 402.) The least degree of similarity is required to prove intent; the 

uncharged misconduct must only be sufficiently similar to support the inference the 

defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance. (Ewoldt, at p. 402; People 

v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 841.) A greater degree of similarity is required to prove 

the existence of a common design or plan; there must be not merely a similarity in the 

results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally 

explained as caused by a general plan. (Ewoldt, at pp. 402-403; Edwards, at p. 712.) The 

greatest degree of similarity is required to prove identity; the uncharged misconduct and 

the charged offense must share common features that are sufficiently distinctive to 
43

support the inference the same person committed both acts; the pattern and characteristics 

of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature. (Ewoldt, at 

pp. 402-403; Harris, at p. 841.)

However, here the evidence of the Tadayon robbery was not admitted to prove 

intent, common plan, or identity; it was admitted to prove motive. (See People v. Letner 

and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 191 [argument that other-crimes evidence was too 

dissimilar to allow admission rejected where it was not admitted to prove intent, identity, 

or a common design or plan].) Other crimes evidence is admissible to establish motive 

where both crimes are explainable as the result of the same motive. (People v. Spector, 

supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381.) The “probativeness of other-crimes evidence on the 

issue of motive does not necessarily depend on similarities between the charged and 

uncharged crimes, so long as the offenses have a direct logical nexus.” (People v. 

Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15.) There was such a direct logical nexus here: the 

evidence showed Garcia was working as a Mexican Mafia tax enforcer in both the 

charged and uncharged crimes, which occurred in close proximity.

Garcia next avers that the evidence was inadmissible because there was no 

“foundation for the prosecution’s theory that the charged crimes were executions ordered 

by the Mexican Mafia,” because Diederich conceded he was unable to verify that Termite 

was a cocaine dealer. This argument ignores the plethora of other evidence supporting 

the People’s Mexican Mafia hit theory as detailed in our recitation of the facts, ante,

including evidence that the Mexican Mafia controlled drug distribution by the Westside 

gangs; Garcia’s admission to Kube that the shooting was “a hit for the big homies”; 

Arce’s membership in the Santa Monica gang; and the fact Arce’s name had been placed 

on a Mexican Mafia green light list. 

Finally, Garcia contends evidence of the Tadayon robbery was unduly prejudicial. 

Certainly, the facts of the Tadayon home invasion robbery were troubling. However, that 

incident was not nearly as egregious as the charged crimes. While Tadayon and her 

friend Laurie were held for several hours and threatened, they were not physically hurt. 

In contrast, in the charged crimes two people were killed and two injured when masked 
44

gunmen burst in and sprayed the store with gunfire. (See People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 

Cal.4th 110, 144 [the potential for prejudice is decreased when testimony describing the 

defendant’s uncharged acts is no stronger and no more inflammatory than the testimony 

concerning the charged offenses].) The evidence related to the prior crime was relatively

brief and uncomplicated, and was unlikely to confuse or distract the jury. (See generally 

People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 42.) The trial court gave a limiting 

instruction both during Tadayon’s testimony, and again at the close of evidence, 

informing the jury that the evidence could be considered only on the issue of motive and 

could not be used to infer Garcia had a criminal disposition. The limiting instructions 

mitigated the possibility of prejudice. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637.) In 

sum, there was no error and no violation of Garcia’s due process rights. (People v. 

Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 26.)

V. Testimony of the jailhouse informer.

Prior to trial, Garcia, joined by Robles, argued Kube’s testimony should be 

excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because Kube was an unreliable witness. 

Counsel urged Kube was “a convict with a long record who is essentially a professional 

snitch.” According to counsel, Kube had acted as an informant in other cases and was 

attempting to obtain reconsideration of his own sentence in exchange for his testimony. 

The trial court denied appellants’ request, finding that Kube’s testimony was more 

probative than prejudicial. 

Relying on federal law, Garcia argues that jailhouse informant testimony is 

inherently unreliable and must be excluded, and admission of Kube’s testimony was 

reversible error. Garcia acknowledges that the California Supreme Court has upheld the 

admission of jailhouse informer testimony against identical due process challenges. (See, 

e.g., People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 997; People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 

872, 898; People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 347; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 

Cal.4th 900, 1007-1008 [“we consistently have rejected the contention . . . that informant 

testimony is inherently unreliable”]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1165

[“[w]ith respect to [the witness’s] status as an inmate at the time he overheard 
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defendant’s statements, no authority holds this circumstance requires exclusion of a 

witness’s testimony. We have consistently rejected claims such evidence is inherently 

unreliable” (fn. omitted)].) As Garcia recognizes, we are bound by the Supreme Court’s 

pronouncements on the issue.

20 (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 

Cal.2d 450.) Moreover, appellants had ample opportunity to cross-examine Kube and 

expose any unreliability in his testimony, and the jury was instructed to consider his 

testimony with “caution and close scrutiny.” (See Hovarter, at pp. 997-998.) 

Accordingly, we reject Garcia’s claim. 

VI. Cumulative error.

Appellants contend that the cumulative effect of the purported errors deprived 

them of a fair trial. As we have “ ‘either rejected on the merits defendant’s claims of 

error or have found any assumed errors to be nonprejudicial,’ ” we reach the same 

conclusion with respect to the cumulative effect of any purported errors. (People v. Cole

(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1235-1236; People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 885.)

20 Garcia explains that he raises the issue to preserve it for federal review.
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DISPOSITION

The judgments are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

KLEIN, P. J.

CROSKEY, J.