UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4554

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NICHOLAS R. CHAPMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, 

District Judge. (3:08-cr-00164-1)

Submitted: October 4, 2010 Decided: October 21, 2010

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Appellate Counsel, Edward H. Weis, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth 

Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Nicholas R. Chapman appeals his thirty-six month 

sentence imposed on revocation of his probation. We affirm. 

Chapman, who requested a variance in this case, makes 

a single contention on appeal: the district court imposed a 

plainly unreasonable sentence because the court allegedly failed 

to offer an individualized explanation for the sentence. We do 

not agree.

We “review probation revocation sentences, like 

supervised release revocation sentences, to determine if they 

are plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 

652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). The first step in this analysis is a 

determination of whether the sentence was unreasonable. United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). In 

determining reasonableness, we generally follow the procedural 

and substantive considerations employed in reviewing original 

sentences. Id. However, “[t]his initial inquiry takes a more 

‘deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the 

exercise of discretion’ than reasonableness review for 

guidelines sentences.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656 (quoting 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438). 

Although the district court must consider the U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual Chapter 7 policy statements and the 

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006), 
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“the sentencing court retains broad discretion to revoke a 

defendant’s probation and impose a term of imprisonment up to 

the statutory maximum.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657 (citing 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439). In Chapman’s case, the statutory 

maximum revocation sentence was ten years. 

“The court must provide a statement of reasons for the 

sentence imposed, as with the typical sentencing procedure, but 

this statement ‘need not be as specific as has been required’ 

for departing from a traditional guidelines range.” See United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657). If a sentence imposed after a 

revocation is not unreasonable, we will not proceed to the 

second prong of the analysis--whether the sentence was plainly 

unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.

A sentence is procedurally unreasonable only when the 

district court commits a “significant procedural error” in 

imposing the sentence. United States v. Curry, 523 F.3d 436, 

439 (4th Cir. 2008). A district court commits a significant 

procedural error by: “failing to calculate (or improperly 

calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 

mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting 

a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 

adequately explain the chosen sentence--including an explanation 

for any deviation from the Guidelines.” Gall v. United States, 
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552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Carter, 564 

F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that, while an

“individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, 

. . . it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular 

case . . . and [be] adequate to permit meaningful appellate 

review”). In this case, Chapman contends that the district 

court committed procedural error by failing to include an 

adequate statement of reasons justifying the sentence it 

imposed. 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the 

district court did not impose an unreasonable sentence, let 

alone one that is plainly so. The court discussed Chapman’s 

initial sentencing (where he was placed on probation), his 

attempts to receive substance abuse treatment, and the faith 

shown in him by the court and by the Probation Office. 

Nevertheless, the court concluded that Chapman’s probation 

violations (which included possession with intent to deliver 

marijuana) were significantly serious as to justify the term of 

imprisonment imposed. This explanation was not inadequate.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED