UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4435

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TOBARUS O’NEAL ALSTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00149-NCT-1)

Submitted: January 26, 2012 Decided: February 10, 2012

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, 

Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Tobarus O’Neal Alston pled guilty, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006). The 

conditional plea preserved Alston’s right to appeal the district 

court’s denial of his pro se motion to suppress. Alston was 

sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. Alston’s attorney has 

filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for 

appeal, but alleging that the district court erred in denying 

Alston’s motion to suppress. Alston has filed a pro se 

supplemental brief, also challenging the denial of his motion to 

suppress, as well as his sentence pursuant to the Armed Career 

Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The Government declined to file a

response. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion 

to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for 

clear error, and its legal determinations de novo. United 

States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009). The facts 

are viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 

below. United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 628 (4th Cir. 

2007).

Alston argued below, as he does on appeal, that the 

police officer had no legal justification to initiate a traffic 
3

stop of his vehicle. An automobile stop is a “seizure” falling 

under the Fourth Amendment’s protection. Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). “Observing a traffic 

violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer 

to detain the offending vehicle for as long as it takes to 

perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.” 

United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008).

The district court denied the motion to suppress by 

text order on two grounds: (1) Alston was represented by counsel 

who did not adopt the motion; and (2) the motion was without 

merit. As noted by the district court, Alston conceded that the 

officer notified him that he stopped the vehicle because Alston 

was driving without a valid license. Accordingly, we conclude 

the district court did not err in denying Alston’s motion to 

suppress.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and considered the claims Alston raises in his pro 

se supplemental brief, and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Alston, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Alston requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 
4

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Alston. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED