* Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should

not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-51483

Summary Calendar

LINDA BALDWIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BART BARRE, Attorney, and NORTHROP GRUMMAN INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGY,

Defendant-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

No. 1:07-cv-00151-LY

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

On February 10, 2003, Plaintiff-Appellant Linda Baldwin filed with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a charge of discrimination against

her employer, Appellee Northrop Grumman Information Technology (“NGIT”).

The EEOC issued Baldwin a right-to-sue letter on September 8, 2003, informing

her she had 90 days to file suit in federal court. Baldwin did not do so, but

waited until January 26, 2007 to file a pro se Title VII discrimination action

against NGIT in state court. She named Bart Barre—an attorney with NGIT’s

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 18, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-51483

2

affiliate Northrop Grumman Corp. who had responded to her EEOC charge—as

an additional defendant. NGIT and Barre removed the case to federal court,

where the district court dismissed it as time-barred and for failure to state a

claim against Barre. We affirm on both grounds.

As the EEOC informed Baldwin in 2003, Title VII allows claimants 90

days to file suit after receipt of a statutory notice of right to sue. See 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (West 2003). This 90 day limitation period is “strictly construed.”

Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002). A case filed

after the deadline is subject to dismissal unless “the pleadings . . . raise some

basis for tolling or the like.” Jones v. Alcoa Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir.

2003).

Baldwin missed her 90 day deadline by several years, but she argues the

deadline should be equitably tolled because events in early 2005 subjected her

to “unreasonable delay.” Construing her allegations liberally, it appears

Baldwin had sought out counsel to bring an employment discrimination action

around that time, but that counsel withdrew or declined the representation.

Counsel’s withdrawal letter informed Baldwin thatthe statute of limitations for

a state law employment discrimination action would run on February 10, 2005

(two years after her EEOC charge). The letter was dated January 7, 2005, but

Baldwin asserts she did not receive it until February 9, which she says was one

day before the deadline. Although Baldwin otherwise describes her current

lawsuit as sounding in federal employmentlaw, she argues thatthis last-minute

notice regarding state law prevented her from timely bringing suit.

We review a district court’s decision on equitable tolling for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226, 229-30 (5th Cir. 2002). Here

the district court was within its discretion to conclude that equitable tolling

should not apply. Equitable tolling applies in rare and exceptional

circumstances where strict application of a statute of limitations would be

inequitable. Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 2002). It is available
No. 07-51483

3

only to a party who “diligently pursue[s] [her] rights.” Caldwell v. Dretke, 429

F.3d 521, 530 n.23 (2005). Baldwin’s Title VII filing deadline passed almost two

years before the events in February 2005 that she now claims prejudiced her,

and she did not bring the present suit for another two years after that. She

offers no reason to conclude that these delays resulted from rare, exceptional,

inequitable circumstances, as opposed to her own lack of diligence. 

The district court also dismissed Baldwin’s claim against Barre for failure

to state a Title VII claim. Reviewing this dismissal de novo, see Taylor, 296 F.3d

at 378, we conclude that it was correct. Title VII imposes liability only on

“employers,” and Barre was not Baldwin’s employer. See generally Grant v. Lone

Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Finally, the district court neither erred nor abused its discretion in

denying Baldwin’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. See Templet v.

HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that denial of a

motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is reviewed de

novo as to materials the district court considers, and for abuse of discretion as

to materials the district court declines to consider). The district court correctly

concluded that this and Baldwin’s myriad other pre-and post-judgment filings

presented redundant and unavailing arguments.

For the reasons stated above, the district court’s order dismissing

Baldwin’s claims with prejudice is AFFIRMED.