## I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-41353

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v. GUSTAVO LOEZA CASTANEDA, also known as Gustavo Loeza-Castaneda, Defendant–Appellant.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 5:12-CR-163-1

Before OWEN, SOUTHWICK, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: 1 

### Defendant–Appellant Gustavo Loeza Castaneda (Castaneda) a ppeals his 58-month s entence for i llegal reentry in violation o f 8 U .S.C. § 1326. Castaneda claims the district court committed plain error by imposing a 16-level crime of violence enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines based o n Castaneda’s Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. We vacate Castaneda’s sentence and remand for resentencing. U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

## F I L E D Decem ber 19, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

1 Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R

. 47. 5, the court has d eterm ined that this op inion should not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. 

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### No. 12-41353
I Castaneda pleaded guilty wit h o u t a plea agreement t o illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. T he presentence investigation report (PSR) began with a base offense level of 8. 1 

### T h e P S R t hen added a 16-level enhancement pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) o f the S entenci n g Guidelines b ecause he was previously deported following a conviction for a crime of violence: his 2001 Texas felony conviction for b u r g l a ry of a habitation. 2 

### The PSR thus calculated his adjusted offense level as 24, and a f ter a 2-level reduction fo r acceptance of responsibility, determined his t otal of f e n s e l evel to be 22. 3 

### This total offense level coupled with h i s criminal history category o f III yielded a Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months of i mprisonment. 4 

### After Castaneda failed to object to the 16- level sentencing enhan cement for a prior crime of violence, the district court sentenced him within the Gu i d e lines range to 58 months o f imprisonment,

e x p l a i n i n g t h a t h i s b u r glary conviction constituted one of the enumerated crimes of violence listed in the Sentencing Guidelines. 5 

### This timely appeal followed. II We review de novo a district c ourt’s c haracterization of a p rior offense as

a crime of v iolence. 6 

### However, because Castaneda did not o bject on this basis in the district court, our review is for plain e rror. 7 

### T o establish plain error, Castaneda m ust s how t here was (1) an error, (2) the error was clear or obvious,

1 U

. S. S E N T E N C I N G G U I DE L I N E S M A N U A L § 2L1. 2( a) ( 2011) [hereinaf ter U

. S. S. G

. ]

.

2 Id. § 2L1. 2( b) ( 1) ( A) ( ii)

.
3 Id. § 3E1. 1( a)

.

4 Id. ch. 5, p t. A ( Sentencing Table)

.
5 Id. § 2L1. 2 cm t. n. 1( B ) ( iii)

.
6 U ni ted Sta tes v
. Esp a rz a - Perez , 681 F. 3d 228, 229 ( 5th Cir. 2012)

.
7 U ni ted Sta tes v
. A ndi no- O rtega , 608 F. 3d 305, 309 ( 5th Cir. 2010)

. 

### 2 Case: 12-41353 Document: 00512477400 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/19/2013

### No. 12-41353

and ( 3) the error affected his substantial r i g h t s. 8 

### If t hese three s howings are made, we have the discretion to c orrect the error but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 9 

### III Castaneda argues that the district co u rt erred by imposing the 16-level crime of v i o l e n c e e nhancement. He c laims his Texas burglary of a habitation conviction was under subsection (a)(3) of Texas Pen a l C o d e § 30.02, which he contends does not constitute a crime of violence. The G overnment concedes that the district court plainly erred and that the sentence should be vacated and the

c a s e r e manded for resentencing. This court, however, is not b ound by t h e Government’s concession, and we “give the issue independent review.” 1 0 

### Under § 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, defendants who a re convicted of unlawful reentry face a 1 6

- l e v e l sentencing enhancement if, prior to their deportation, they were convicted for a felony t h at is a “crime of violence.” 1 1 

### The commentary to § 2 L1.2 defines a “ c r i m e o f v iolence” as (1) any offense in a list of twelve e n u m e r a t e d offenses, which includes “burglary of a dwelling,” or (2) “any other offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 1 2 

### When classifying a prior con v iction for s entence enhancement purposes,

we e mploy a c a t e gorical approach when determining if the offense was an

8 Puckett v
. U

ni t ed S ta tes , 556 U

. S. 129, 135 ( 2009)

.
9 Id.

1 0 U ni ted Sta tes v
. H

op e , 545 F. 3d 293, 295 ( 5th Cir. 2008)

.

1 1 U

. S. S. G. § 2L1. 2( b) ( 1) ( A) ( ii)

.

1 2 Id. § 2L1. 2 cm t. n. 1( B) ( iii)

. 

### 3 Case: 12-41353 Document: 00512477400 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/19/2013

### No. 12-41353

enumerated o ffense, 1 3 

### unless the Guidelines d i r e c t otherwise. U nder the categorical approach, “the statute of conviction, not the d efendant’s underlying conduct, is the proper focus.” 1 4 

### If a statute has d isjunctive subsections, as here, “we may look beyond the statute t o certain records made or used in adjudicating guilt to determine which subpart of t h e statute formed the basis of the conviction.” 1 5 

### I n doing so, our review is “generally li m ited to the charging document, written plea agreement, transcr i p t o f the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual findings by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” 1 6 

### Castaneda was convicted of b urglary of a h abitation under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a), but the central issue is whether Castaneda was convicted under subsection (a)(1) or (a)(3). Section 30.02 provides, in relevant part, (a) A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, the person: (1) enters a habitation

. . . with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault; or . . . (3) enters a . . . habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or an assault. 1 7 

### The district court applied th e c r i m e of v iolence e nhancement because it believed that Castaneda’s conviction constituted the enumerated offense of “burglary of a d welling.” 1 8 

### Before considering whether h i s conviction under

1 3 See Ta yl or v
. U ni ted Sta tes , 495 U

. S. 575, 602 ( 1990) ; Uni ted Sta tes v. Rodri guez , 711 F. 3d 541, 549- 50 (5th Cir. 2013) ( en banc)

.

1 4 U ni ted Sta tes v
. Ca l deron- Pena , 383 F

. 3d 254, 257 ( 5th Cir. 2004) ( citations om itted )

.

1 5 U ni ted Sta tes v
. Esp a rz a- Perez , 681 F. 3d 228, 230 ( 5t h Cir. 2012) (citing U ni ted Sta tes v
. M

ungi a - Porti l l o , 484 F. 3d 813, 815 ( 5th C ir. 2007) ; U ni ted Sta tes v
. M

uri l l o–Lop ez , 444 F. 3d 337, 339- 40 ( 5th Cir. 2006) )

.

1 6 Id.

1 7 T E X

. P E N

A L C O DE A N N

. § 30. 02( a) ( Wes t Sup p
. 2000)

.

1 8 At s entencing, the d is trict jud ge s tated , “if you look at

. . . the illegal reentry, and then you look at the s coring, and then it s ays the s coring is f or certain k ind s of

of fens es , it’s
a 16 level bum p
. And s o, you k now it’s

— and one of them is burglary of a [ d welling]

. ” See


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### No. 12-41353

§ 30.02(a) constitutes a crime of violence as a “burglary of a dwelling,” we note tha t C a s t a neda was not convicted of a n offense within the meaning of the residua l c l a u s e in the definition of “crime of v iolence” i n § 2L1.2 of the Guidelines, which includes any offense that “has as an element the use, attempte d u s e , or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 1 9 

### No subsection of § 30.02(a) requires as an e l e m e n t t h e use,

a t t e mpted use, or threatened use of force. 2 0 

### C onsequently, Castaneda ’ s conviction does not constitute a crime of violence under the residual clause, and the o nly issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred in deciding that C a staneda’s burglary of a habitation c o nviction constituted an enumera t e d offense. The Fifth Circuit h a s held that § 30.02(a)(1) coincides with the generic, contemporary definition of burglary, so it constitutes a “burglary of a dwelling” and therefore a crime o f violence. 2 1 

### How e v e r , t h i s court has h eld that a

U

. S. S. G

. § 2L1. 2 cm t. n. 1( B) (iii)

.

1 9 U

. S. S. G. § 2L1. 2 cm t. n. 1( B) ( iii)

.

2 0 See U ni ted Sta t es v
. Va rga s- D u r a n , 356 F. 3d 598, 605 (5th C ir. 2004) ( en banc) ( p rovid ing that “in ord er f or § 2L1. 2 to ap p ly, the intentional us e of f orce m us t be ‘a cons tituent p art of a claim that m us t be p roved f or the claim to succeed ’” and that “[ i] f any s et of f acts
w o u ld sup p ort a conviction w ithout p roof of that com p onent, then the com p onent m os t d ecid ed ly is not an elem ent— im p licit or exp lic i t

— o f the crim e”) ( citation om itted ) ; U ni ted Sta tes v
. Turner , 305 F. 3d 349, 350- 51 ( 5th C ir. 2002) ( cons id ering w hether T exas Penal Cod e § 30. 02( a) “has as an elem ent the us e, attem p ted us e, or th r e a t e n ed us e of p hys ical f orce agains t the p ers on of another” and conclud ing that the s tatutory elem ents of § 30. 02( a) “d o not
m ak e it a per s e crim e of violence, becaus e they d o not neces sarily involve us e of p hys ical f orce agains t the p ers on of another”)

.

2 1 See Uni ted S ta tes v
. M ora l es- M

ota , 704 F. 3d 410, 412 ( 5th Cir. 2013) (p er cu r iam )

. In U ni ted Sta tes v
. Rodri guez , 711 F. 3d 541 ( 5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) , cert. deni ed, 134 S. Ct. 512 ( 20 1 3 ) , t his court revis ed its m ethod ology w ith res p ect to certain crim e of violence d eterm inations , but the court lim ited the ap plication of its revis ed crim e of violence analys is to “of fens e categories that are not d ef ine d a t c o m m o n l a w. ” I d. at 552 & n. 17. Becaus e the Rodri guez court noted th a t b u r g l a r y is d ef ined at com m on law , the new Rodri guez m ethod ology d oes not ap ply in the ins tant cas e. See i d. at 552 n. 16. 

### 5 Case: 12-41353 Document: 00512477400 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/19/2013

### No. 12-41353

conviction un d e r § 3 0

. 02(a)(3) is not a generic burglary because it lacks the requisite element of specific int e n t t o c ommit a crime at the time of entry. 2 2 

### Whether Castaneda was convicted under § 30.02(a)(1) or § 30.02(a)(3) therefore matters because t he former is a crime of violence under the enumerated offense of “burglary of a dwelling” but the latter is not. In the instant c ase, to determine whether § 3 0.02(a)(1) o r § 3 0

. 0 2 (a)(3) formed the basis of Castaneda’s conviction, we consider three r e cords from the Texas procee d i n g s against Castaneda: t he judgment, t he indictment, and the judicial confession and stipulation. 2 3 

### T he Texas judgment states that Castaneda

was c harged with and pl e a d e d guilty to b urglary of a habitation and t hat the court accepted h is plea, but it does n ot i dentify the subsection of § 30.02 that he violated. The T exas indictment charged that C a s t a n e da “did then and there with the intent to c o m m i t theft, enter a habitation owned by F ermin Garcia without Fermin Garcia’s e ffective consent.” A lthough the indict m e n t does not specify a subsection of § 30.02, the language of the indictment tracks subsection (a)(1) since it includes the phrase “with the intent to commit theft.” The final record is Castaneda’s judicial confession and stipulation, in which Castaneda confessed that he “did t hen and there intentionally or knowingly enter a habitation, without the effective consent of [F.G.], the owner

2 2 See U ni ted S ta tes v
. Consta nte , 544 F. 3d 584, 585- 8 7 ( 5th Cir. 2008) (p er curiam ) ( hold ing that, f

or p urp os es of 18 U

. S. C. § 924( e) , while § 30. 02( a) ( 1) qualif ies a s a g e n e ric burglary, § 30. 02( a) (3) does not “becaus e it d oes not contain an elem ent of intent to com m it a f elony, thef

t, or as s ault at the mom ent of entry”) ; see a l so U ni ted Sta tes v. Trev i no- Rodri g uez , 463 F. Ap p ’x 305, 307- 08 (5th Cir. 2012) ( unp ublis hed ) ( ap p lying Consta nte in the § 2L1. 2( b) ( 1) ( A) ( ii) context) ; U ni ted Sta tes v
. M

oore , 635 F. 3d 774, 776 ( 5th Cir. 2011) ( s tating that, becaus e of the s im ilarities betw een § 2L1. 2( b) ( 1) ( A) and 18 U

. S. C. § 924( e ) , this court “treat[ s ] cas es d ealing w ith thes e p rovis ions interchangeably”)

.

2 3 S ee U ni ted Sta tes v
. E

sp a rz a - Perez , 681 F. 3d 228, 230 ( 5th Cir. 2012) (exp laining that the charging d ocum ent m ay be cons id ered in d eterm ining w hich s ubp art of a s tatute f orm ed the bas is of conviction) ; U ni ted Sta tes v
. G a rci a- A rel l a no , 522 F. 3d 477, 480- 81 ( 5th Cir. 2008) ( conclud ing that a s tate cour t j u d g m e nt and a Texas jud icial conf es s ion m ay als o be
cons id ered )

. 

### 6 Case: 12-41353 Document: 00512477400 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/19/2013

### No. 12-41353

t h ereof, and attempted to commit or committed theft of p roperty

. . . .” T h i s confession tracks § 30.02(a)(3)’s language providing t hat an offense is committed when someone “enters a
. . . h abitati o n and commits o r attempts t o commit” a theft. 2 4 

### The confession does c o n tain the p h rase “intentionally or knowingly.” However, the c onfession only states that Castaneda “ intentionally or knowingly enter[ed] a habitation,” not that he entered “with intent to commit a theft,” which is the specific intent required under § 30.02(a)(1). 2 5 

### Castaneda thus did not confess to having the specific intent to c omm i t a c r ime required of § 30.02(a)(1). The Government had the burden of proving, b y a p r e p o nderance of the evidence, that Castaneda’s prior conv i c t ion q ualified for a sentencing enhancement. 2 6 

### To prove Castaneda committed a “burglary of a dwelling” for
purposes of the crime o f violence sentencing enhancement, the Government had to e stablish that Castaneda’s plea of g uilty “ necessarily admitte d elements of the generic offense” of burglary of a dwelling. 2 7 

### While Castaneda was charged with burglary of a dwelling under § 30.02(a)(1), he did not admit to all of elements of that subsection because he d id not admit t hat he entered “with intent to commit

2 4 T E X

. P E N

A L C O DE A N N

. § 30. 02( a) (3) ( Wes t Sup p
. 2000)

.

2 5 Id. § 30

. 0 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; s ee Consta nte , 544 F. 3d at 586 & n. 3 ( exam ining language of an ind ictm ent charging that the d ef end ant “ intentionally or k now ingly enter[ ed ] a habitation,
w ithout the ef

f ective cons ent of

. . . the ow ner
. . . and attem p ted to com m it or com m itted thef t of p rop erty” and obs erving that “[ t] he ‘intentionally or k now ingly’ language in the ind ictm ent ref ers to a general crim inal intent requirem ent, but not the s p ecif ic intent elem ent contained in § 30. 02( a) ( 1) and the Ta yl or d ef inition of generic burglary”)

.

2 6 Uni ted Sta t es v. H

errera -Sol orz a no , 114 F. 3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1997) ( noting that “[ t] he burd en is on the p arty s eek ing to ad jus t the s entence level to p rove by a p rep ond erance of the relevant and s uf

f iciently reliable evid ence the f acts neces s ary to s u p p o r t t h e ad jus tm ent. ”) ( internal quotation m ark s om itted )

.

2 7 See Shep a rd v
. U

ni ted Sta tes , 544 U

. S. 13, 26 ( 2005) ; see a lso U ni ted Sta tes v
. H

ena oM el o , 591 F. 3d 798, 805 ( 5th Cir. 2009) ( “ A s t h e C ourt noted in Shep a rd , Ta yl or d em and s certainty when determ ining w hether a p as t guilty plea ‘neces s arily ad m itted elem ents of the generic of

f ens e. ’”) ( citation om itted )

. 

### 7 Case: 12-41353 Document: 00512477400 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/19/2013

### No. 12-41353

a felony, theft, or a n assault

. ” C a s t a neda o nly admitted to the e lements of § 30.02(a)(3), which does not i nclu d e a n e l e ment o f the generic offense of burglary—intent t o commit a cr i m e a t the time of entry. 2 8 

### The G overnment therefore f

ailed to show that Castaneda necessarily a d m i tted to a ll of the elements of a generic “burglary of a dwelling” offense. As a r esult, the district court erred in holding t hat t he Government had satisfied its b urden of proving Castaneda was convicted of a crime of violence. The district court’s error was clear and o bvious. At the time of sentencing, it was clear that for an offense to constitute a generic b urglary, it must contain the element of e ntry “with intent to commit a crime,” 2 9 

### a nd that the G overnment had to show Castaneda’s p lea of guilty “ necessarily admitted elem e n t s o f the generic offense” of burglary. 3 0 

### Because Castaneda did not admit to the element of specific intent in his judicial confession and stipulation, it was clear error to find h e confessed to “burglary of a dwelling” under t he Sentencing Guidelines. We n ote that Fifth Circuit cases have specifically considered Texas Penal Code §30.02(a) and held that while § 30.02(a)(1) i s a generic burglary, § 30.02(a)(3) is not. 3 1

2 8 See Ta

yl or v
. U

ni ted Sta t es , 495 U

. S. 575, 598 ( 1990) ( exp laining that “the generic, contem p orary m eaning of burglary contains at leas t the f ol l o w ing elem ents : an unlaw f ul or unp rivileged entry into, or rem aining in, a build ing or other s tructure, w ith intent to com m it
a crim e”) ; Con s t a n t e , 5 44 F. 3d at 585 ( recognizing that, und er Ta yl or , a g eneric burglary requires intent to com m it a crim e at the tim e of entry)

.

2 9 Ta yl or , 495 U

. S. at 598

.
3 0 Shep a rd , 544 U

. S. at 26.

3 1 Consta nte , 544 F. 3d at 585, 587 ( noting that “[ t] his court has p revious ly held that the of f ens e of burglary of a habitation und er § 30. 02( a) ( 1) of the Texas Penal C od e qualif ies as a generic burglary f

or p urp os es of [ 18 U

. S. C. § 924( 3) ] ” but conclud ing that “a burglary conviction und er § 30. 02( a) ( 3) of the Texas Pen a l C o d e is not a generic burglary und er the Ta yl or d ef inition becaus e it d oes not contain an elem ent of intent to com m it a f elony, thef

t, or as s ault at the m om ent of entry”) ; see a l so U ni ted Sta tes v. Trev i no- Rodri g uez , 463 F. Ap p ’x 305, 3 0 7

- 0 8 ( 5th Cir. 2012) (unp ublis hed ) ( ap p lying Consta nte in the § 2L1. 2( b) ( 1) ( A) ( ii) context and hold ing it w as obvious error to ap p ly the crim e of violence enhancem ent w hen the 

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### No. 12-41353

T h e p a r t i e s agree that without the 16-level crime of violence en h a n c e m e n t , Castaneda would h ave been s ubject to, at most, an 8- level “aggravated felony” enhancement authorized b y § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) for the purposes of the advisory Guidelines sentencing range
. 32 

### Together with the appropriate reduction for acceptance of res p o n s i bility, Castaneda’s total offense level would have been 1 4

. 33 

### T h i s total offense level coupled with a criminal history category of I I I would produce a G uidelines range of 21 to 27 months of imprisonment, 3 4 

### which would be anywhere from 31 to 37 months (or roughly 3 years) less than the 58 months imposed by the district court. Given that the applicable Guidelines range would be s ubstantially lower
t h a n t h e s e n t e n c e C a s t aneda received, the e rror affected C a s t a n e d a ’ s s u b s t a n t i a l rights a nd seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the proceedings. 3 5 

### A ccordingly, we vacate Castaneda’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

ind ictm ent tra c k e d t h e l anguage of § 30. 02( a) ( 3) ) ; U ni t ed Sta tes v
. Rodri guez
- Serna , 428 F. Ap p ’x 488, 488- 89 ( 5th C i r
. 2 0 1 1 ) ( unp ublis hed ) (citing C onsta nte in the § 2L1. 2( b) ( 1) ( A) ( ii) context and recogni z i n g that § 30. 02( a) ( 3) d oes not cons titute a g eneric burglary) ; U ni ted Sta tes v
. A

g u i l a r - Rocha , 307 F. Ap p ’x 794, 796 ( 5th Cir. 2009) ( unp ublis hed ) ( als o citing Consta nte in the § 2L1. 2( b) (1) ( A) ( ii) context and recognizing that § 30. 02( a) ( 1) cons titutes the “burglary of a d w elling” und er the Sentencing G uid elines but § 30. 02( a) ( 3) d oes not)

.

3 2 U

. S. S. G. § 2L1. 2( b) ( 1) ( C)

.
3 3 M ore s p ecif

ically, the bas e of

f ens e level of 8 w ould be enhanced by 8 levels but then red uced by 2 levels f

or accep tance of res p ons ibility.

3 4 U

. S. S. G. ch. 5, p t. A ( Sentencing Table)

.
3 5 See U ni ted Sta tes v
. A ndi no- O rtega , 6 0 8 F

. 3 d 305, 311- 12 (5th Cir. 2010) ( hold ing that an error in ap p lying the 16- level crim e- of

- violence enhancem ent af f ected the d ef

end ant’s
s u b s tantial rights and s erious ly af f ected the f

airnes s , integrity, or p ublic rep utation of the jud icial p roceed ings , w hen, abs ent the error, the d ef end ant w ould have been s ubject to either
a 4- level or 8- level enhancem ent)

. 

### 9 Case: 12-41353 Document: 00512477400 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/19/2013

### No. 12-41353 * * * Cas t aneda’s sentence is VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

10 Case: 12-41353 Document: 00512477400 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/19/2013