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Filed 4/1/22 Medical Benefits Admin. v. Nivano Physicians CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Nevada)

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MEDICAL BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, INC. et 

al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

NIVANO PHYSICIANS, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

C093214

(Super. Ct. No. CU17-082413)

Defendant Nivano Physicians and plaintiffs Medical Benefits Administration, Inc. 

(MBA) and Keely L. Smith are before this court a second time. In a previous opinion, we 

concluded that a software licensing agreement and settlement agreement purporting to 

enforce that agreement were illegal and unenforceable. (Medical Benefits 

Administration, Inc. v. Nivano Physicians, Inc. (Dec. 23, 2021, C091841) [nonpub. opn.] 
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(Slip Opn.).)1 In this appeal, defendant Nivano Physicians contends the trial court’s 

order awarding plaintiffs attorney fees and costs must be vacated. We agree. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The underlying facts and procedural history of the litigation at issue here was set 

forth in our prior opinion on this matter. As relevant here, at the close of the evidence at 

trial, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 

664.6 for an award of $140,183, and subsequently the jury returned a verdict awarding 

$250,000 in damages to MBA, and $1 in damages to Smith. (Slip Opn., supra.) 

On May 1, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees, arguing that both MBA 

and Smith were prevailing parties for purposes of an attorney fee award and that the 

proposed fees were reasonable. Defendant’s opposition to the motion argued that 

plaintiffs’ proposed fees were unnecessary and unreasonable, and Smith was not a 

prevailing party entitled to an attorney fee award. 

Following a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees in 

full, awarding $365,065. The court concluded MBA and Smith “were and are the 

prevailing parties in connection with the contract claims at issue” in the case. The court 

further explained that, even if Smith were not a prevailing party, it “would find that 

plaintiff MBA and Smith’s ‘various claims were inextricably intertwined, making it 

impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the multitude of conjoined activities into 

compensable or noncompensable time units.’ ” 

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 We grant defendant’s motion for judicial notice as to our previous opinion. (Evid. 

Code, §§ 452, subd. (d) [court may take judicial notice of records of any court of this 

state], 459 [reviewing court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Evid. 

Code, § 452].) 
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On December 23, 2021, we reversed the judgment. We concluded that the 

agreements underlying the parties’ dispute, on which the court’s and jury’s awards were

based, were illegal and unenforceable. (Slip Opn., supra.) 

Defendant timely appealed. The case was fully briefed on January 12, 2022, and 

assigned to this panel on January 31, 2022. We sent an oral argument waiver notice to 

the parties on February 23, 2022; the parties waived oral argument. 

DISCUSSION

I

Prevailing Party

The parties filed their opening briefs before we issued our previous opinion 

reversing the trial court’s judgment. However, defendant argued in its opening brief that, 

in the event we reversed the judgment on appeal, such a reversal would “necessarily 

compel[ ] the reversal of the award of fees” and costs to plaintiffs. (Gillan v. City of San 

Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1053 [reversal of the judgment necessarily 

compels the reversal of the award of fees as costs to the prevailing party based on the 

judgment]; Ducoing Management, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 306, 314 

[“A disposition that reverses a judgment automatically vacates the costs award in the 

underlying judgment even without an express statement to this effect”].

Respondents answered that they were entitled to reasonable fees as the prevailing 

party; they did not address the effect of a prospective reversal (that indeed occurred one 

day after respondents’ brief was filed) and did not later request supplemental briefing. 

Defendant’s reply brief argued that our reversal, which by that brief’s filing had occurred, 

necessarily vacated the fee award. 

We agree with defendant. An order awarding attorney fees falls within the 

reversal of the judgment on which it is based (California Grocers Assn. v. Bank of 

America (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 205, 220), and an appellate court’s reversal of a trial 

court’s judgment on the merits automatically extinguishes a postjudgment attorney fees 
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award even in the absence of an appeal. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of 

San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 613, fn. 4 [“even when there is no appeal of 

a postjudgment order awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party, and the award has 

become final, the appellate court’s reversal of the judgment on the merits extinguishes 

the order on fees”]; Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 5, 16 

[reversal of judgment with directions to vacate writ of mandate means respondents were 

unsuccessful, and reversal of attorney fee award is “automatic”].)

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order awarding costs and attorney fees to plaintiffs is reversed. 

Each party is to bear its own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).) 

 /s/

Duarte, J.

We concur:

 /s/

Hull, Acting P. J.

 /s/

Earl, J.