### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 07 -00 696 -CR

And r e w All e n M c Do nal d , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 3 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. C1CR-0 7-1 0000 9 , HO NORAB LE DAVID CRAIN , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt A nd re w M c Do na ld, a ft e r b e ingc on vic te d o f sp e e din g in j us tic e c ourt , appea led his conviction to Travi s C o u n t y Court at L aw No. 3. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn.
art. 4 4
. 1 7 ( We s t 2 0 0 6 ) ( p r o v id in g f o r d e n o v o a

p p e a ls f r o m j u s ti c e c o u rt t o c o u n ty c o u rt)
. McDona ld filed a motion to dismi ss in county court, a lleg ing a depr ivation of his constituti onal rig ht t o a s p ee dy

t ri al
. T h e c o u n t y co u rt d en i edh i s m o t i o nan d a j u ry fo u n d h i m gu i l t y

o f s p ee d i n g, assessing punishment at a $200 fine. See Tex. Tr ansp. Code Ann. §§ 542.301, 545.351 (West 1999). Mc Do na ld a

pp e a ls, a sse rt ingthat th e c ounty c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis mot ion

to dis mis s. B e c a

us e we have dete rmined that McDona ld’s constitutional right to a spe edy trial was not violated, we
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ounty c ourt
.2 BACK GR OUND On Janu ary 28 , 2 00 3, Roy

B ri sto w, a

Te xas hig hw ay

patr olm an, iss ue d M c Do na ld a citation for

speedingin Travis County . Br istow testified that his radar showed McD onald trave ling
a ta s p e e d o f 6 7 m i l e s p e r

h o u r , e x c e e d i n g t h e 6 0 m i l e - p e r - h o u r s p e e d l i m i t
. T h e n e x td a y, McDona ld appea

red in justice c ourt in Travis County and re quested a

trial by jury
. McDona ld’s trial did not take plac e u n t i l approximately four y ear s later whe n, on F e br ua ry 27 , 2 00 7, a

jur y fo un d M c Do na ld guil ty , a sse ssi ngpunis hme nt at a $1 00 fi ne . M c Do na ld fi le d a n a pp e a l bo nd

the same da

y , a sse rt inghis ri g ht to a

pp e a l a jus tic e -c ourt c on vic tio n to c ounty court. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 44.17.

O n O c to b e r 30, 2007, the c ounty court he ard Mc Donald’s a ppeal by conductinga trial de novo. See id. (appe als from justice c ourts to county courts ar e tried de novo, “the same as if the prosec ution ha d been orig inally commence d in that c ourt”). The day of trial, McDona ld f iled a motion to di smiss, alleginga depr ivation of hi s rig ht to a spee dy trial. The c ounty

court ove rruled the mot ion , a

nd the jur y fo un d McD on a ld g uil ty , ass e ssi ng punis hme nt at a $2 00 fi ne . M c Do na ld
a pp e a ls t o th is c ourt , a sse rt ingthat th e c ounty c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis mot ion

to d ism iss
. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Ap pe llate c ourt s a

pp ly a bif ur c a te d st and ard

of re vie w t o s pe e dy -t

ri a l c la ims
. Zam oran o v . S

tat e , 84 S.W .3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Specifica lly , we r eview the trial court’s de cision under “ an abuse of discre tion standard for the fa ctual compone nts, and a de novo standard f or the leg al components.” Id . Where, a s in this case, the fa cts are larg ely undisputed, the pr ima ry is su e for re vie w i s th e le g a l si g nif ic anc e of the se fa c ts t o th e a

pp e lla nt’ s c la im.3

Sto c k v . S tat e , 214 S
. W
. 3 d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.). We will uphold the trial court’s r uling if it is supported by the re cord a

nd corr ect unde r t h e appli cable law. Sh aw v . S tat e , 117 S.W .3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
DI SCU SSIO N As a pre liminary

matter, we must address the State’s arg ument that county courts ar e prec luded from c onsidering speedy -trial cla ims based on events that occur red in justice court. The State c on te nd s th a t be c a

us e an a pp e a l fr om jus tic e c ourt

to c ounty c ourt is h e ard de no vo , “ the same as if the pr osecutio n had bee n orig inally commence d in that court,” Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art . 4 4. 17 , a ll p ro c e dura l de fe c ts o ri g inatin g in jus tic e c ourt are c ur e d by the tr ia l de nov o in c ounty court, a nd there fore any

violation of McDonald’ s rig ht to a speedy trial in justice court could not be proper ly considere d by

the county

court. We disag ree . I n Grimm v. G arner , 589 S.W
. 2d 955 (Tex. 1979), the Texas Supreme Court held that
mand a mus re lie f w a s im

pr op e r t o a dd

re ss a jus tic e c o u

r t ’ s d e n i a l of

a sp e e dy -t ri a l c omp la int , b e c a

us e the def endant’ s “rig ht to appeal to the county court or county court at law is a n adequate re medy .” 58 9 S. W.2 d at 95 7. Whil e the de fe nd ant a rgue d, a s th e State do e s h e re , th a t a sp e e dy -t ri a l c la im arising from justice c ourt was not re viewable by the county

court be cause an appe al to county court is b y tr ia l de no vo , th e c ourt

re je c te d th is a

rgume nt, statin g that “ [s]inc e the a pp e a l to th e co un ty
c ourt wo uld be by tr ia l de no vo , G arn e r wo uld have the ri g ht t o urg e his same mot ion ” in t he c ounty court, a nd the “or igina l court pape rs of the justice c ourt ca se filed in the county court . . . c an for

m the basis of such a

motion.” Id. I n light of the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Grimm , w e ho ld that the county

court wa s not preclude d from conside ring a motion to dism iss based on potential4

viola t i o n s o f M cD onald’s rig ht to a speedy trial in justice court. Se e als o Le ini ng e r v . S tat e , 67 4 S.W.2 d 868 , 873 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 84 , p e t. r e f’ d) (a dd re ssi ngsp e e dy -t

ri a l c la im based on a lleg ed dela

y in justi ce c ourt). We also observe that a cr iminal defenda nt’s rig ht to a speedy trial is protecte d by the United States and Te x as constitutions, see U.S. Const. amend. V I ; T ex. Const. art. I , § 10, and that the failure to de mand a speedy trial in justice court does not a ct as a waivero f a co nstitut ional sp e e dy -t ri a l c la im, see Leininger , 674 S.W .2d at 873. Ther efor e, we wi l l ad d re s s McDonald’ s
a lle g a tio ns that hi s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o a sp e e dy tr ia l w a s v iol a te d in

the jus tic e c ourt
. I n deter mining whe ther a

defe ndant’s rig ht to a speedy trial has bee n violated, we
a p p l y a b a l an c i n g t e s t i nw h i c h t h e f o l l o w i n g f

o u r f a c t o r s ar e c o n s i d e r e d : ( 1 ) t h e l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y; (2) the r eason f

or the de lay ; ( 3 ) t h e d efendant’s a ssertion of his rig ht; and (4) the pr ejudice to the d e f e n d an t. S ee B a r ker v. W

ingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (c rea ting ba lancingtest for re viewing sp e e dy -t ri a l c la ims un de r f

e de ra l c on sti tut ion ); Zamorano , 8 4 S. W.3 d at 64 8 ( a d o p t i n g b a l a n c i n g t e st set forth in Ba rk

e r to addre ss speedy -trial cla ims under Texas Constit ution). Length of the Delay

The leng th of

the delay from the time the de fenda nt is arre sted or for

mally acc used to the time of t rial i s a trigg ering mecha nism, so that a speedy

trial claim will not be hea rd until the delay is prima fac ie unrea sonable unde r the c ircumstance s. Shaw , 1 1 7 S
. W
. 3 d a t8 8 9
. G e n e r a l l y, courts have found a de lay

approa ching one y ear

to be sufficie nt to trig g er a speedy trial inquiry
. Id. ; see also Dogge tt v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (noting that delay approa ching one y ear is ge nera lly

considere d “pre sumptively prejudicia l”). McD onald’s trial in the justice court took5

place over f

our y ear s after

he wa s char g ed with spee ding. B eca use the de lay

in McDonald’s trial far exceeds the “bar e minimum neede d to tr igg er judicial examination of the claim,” this fac tor weig hs in favor of

finding a spee dy -trial violation. Zamorano , 84 S.W .3d at 649. Reason for the Delay

The State ha s the burden of justify ing a

n unrea sonable de lay
. Tur ne r v . S tat e , 545 S.W .2d 133, 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Wi th o u t an y justification by

the State, this factor weig hs in favor

of finding a violation of the rig ht to a speedy trial. Shaw , 117 S.W .3d at 889. I n the prese nt case , there is no indication in the reco rd t hat the State provide d any explanation or j ustification for the four- y ear delay
. Be cause the State has not me t its burden of j u s t i fy i n g a presumptively

prejudicia l delay , this factor a lso w eig hs in f avor of a spe edy -trial violation. See id.
Ass e rtion o

f R igh t Whil e a de fenda

nt has no dut y

to bring himself to trial, persistent asser tion of the rig ht to a spee dy

trial ca rries a g reat deal of w eig ht in determining whether that rig ht has been violated. See Zamorano , 84 S.W .3d at 651. “Repe ated r equests for a speedy trial weig h heavily in favor of the def endant, while the failure to make such requests supports an infe renc e that the de fenda nt does not rea lly want a trial, he wants only a dismissal.” Can tu v . S

tat e , 2 53 S.W. 3d

27 3, 28 3 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2008). F urthermor e, “[f]ili ng for a dismiss al instead of a

speedy trial will g ener ally

weaken a spee dy -trial cla im because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a spee dy one.” Id. The re cord r efle cts that McDona ld did not raise the issue of hi s rig ht to a speedy trial
un til he fi led his mot ion to d ism iss in c ounty

c ourt , a ft e r a

de lay of ov e r f our y e ars . B e c a

us e Mc Do nal d’s lon g pe ri od of ina c tio n b e fo re fi na lly a sse rt ingthe ri g ht i n a mot ion to6

dismiss “indicate s strong ly that he did not rea lly want a speedy trial,” Ha rri

s v . S tat e , 827 S.W .2d 949, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), this fa ct o r we ighs a g ainst finding a speedy -trial violation. See Dragoo v . S

tat e , 96 S.W .3d 308, 315-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“I n view of the leng thy

delay here , in which appellant quietly acquie sced, this factor we ighs ve ry heavily ag ainst finding a

violation of the spee dy

trial rig ht.”). Prejudice to the Accused

The most important fac tor in determining whether an appe llant was denie d his right t o a s p e e dy t r i a l i s t h e a m o u n to f p r e j u d i c e t h a tt h e a

p p e l l an th a s s u f

f e r e d a s a r e s u l t o f

t h e d e l a y. Gu aj ar do v . S

tat e , 999 S.W .2d 566, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Any pr e jud ic e su ff

e re d is a sse sse d in

vie w of the int e re sts that th e ri g ht t o a sp e e dy tr ia l w a s in te nd e d to protec t. Zamorano , 84 S.W. 3d a t 65 2. Th e U. S. Su

pr e me Court

ha s id e nti fi e d thre e su c h in te re sts : “(i) to pr event oppr essive pretria l inc arc eration; (ii) to minimize a nx iety and conce rn of the a ccuse d; and (iii) to limit the possibili ty that the defe nse will be impaired.” Barker , 407 U.S. at 532. Of the se int e re sts , “ the mos t se ri ou s is the la st, be c a us e the ina

bil ity of a de fe nd ant a de qu a te ly

to p re pa re his
case skews the f

airne ss of the entire sy stem.” Id
. The intere st in preventing oppressive pr etr i al i ncar cer ation is inapplicable to the prese nt case , as McDona ld was not imprisoned. Fur thermore , it is unlikely that McDona ld suffer ed a sig nificant amount of anxi ety or concern over his i mpending misdemeanor tr ial for spe eding , an of fe ns e fo r w hic h th e ma ximumse nte nc e wa s a $2 00 fi ne . M c Do na ld d oe s c la im, ho we ve r, that hi s de fe ns e wa s im

pa ir e d b y the de lay be c a

us e the so le wi tne ss, Of

fi c e r B ri sto w, wa s una

ble to r e c a ll the exact spee d at which he was traveling at the time his ra d ar gun reg istered Mc Donald’s spe ed.Br istow testified, “I wouldn’t have stopped y ou if Iwas g etting a n inacc urate rea ding on 1 my sp e e d, ” and

la te r t e sti fi e d, “ Ic an’ t g ive y ou a sp e c if ic sp e e d be c a

us e Ic a n’ t r e me mbe r e xac tly how fa st Iwas g oing f

our y ear s ag o. Ido know t hat my patrol spee d was a ccur ate f or the re ading that was g iven.” 7 At trial, McDona ld p re s ented a defe nsive theory

that Br istow’s rada

r g un may

have g iven an ina c c ur a te re a din g , and

that B ri sto w w ou ld h a ve ne e de d to ve ri fy that hi s o wn

sp e e d w a s a c c ur a te ly
re fl e c te d b y

the equ ipm e nt i n o rd e r t o c on fi rm that it s r e a din g of

Mc Do na ld’ s sp e e d w a s c or re c t. Mc Do na ld a

rgue s th a t B ri sto w’ s in a

bil ity to r e c a ll the sp e e d h e wa s tr a ve lin g pr e ve nte d M c Do na ld fr om p ur su inghis de fe ns ive the or y a t tr ia l. A def endant does not suffer

prejudice wher e “minor la pses in memory ” do not af fec t the outcome of

a trial. Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 534 . In th is c a se , e ve n th ou g h B ri sto w w a s una ble to
rec all how fa st he wa s travelingat the time he r ecor ded McD onald’s spee d, Br istow testified that befor e makingthe traf

fic stop, he verified that the r adar g un acc urate ly

ref lected his own spe ed. 1 Br istow f u rth e r te s ti f

ie d th a t h e is tr a in e d to c o n f ir m th e a c c u r a c y o f a r e a d in g in th is w ay befor e stopping a

ny vehicle for speeding , stating, “ I f I g et a f alse re ading on there , I ’m not g oing to stop the
car beca use I , y ou know, that’s not what we do.” The jury was e ntitled to believe B ristow’s testimony
. J

on es v . S tat e , 9 84 S.W. 2d

25 4, 25 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) ( the jur y , a s f ind e r o f f a c t, is entitled to believe all or part of testimony proff ere d and introduce d by

either side) . Fur

thermore , we must view the e vidence in the light most favor able to the trial court’s r uling, whic h, in this case,
was a denial of Mc Donald’s motion. See Zamorano , 8 4 S. W.3 d at 64 8 ( “ B e c a us e a pp e lla nt los t in the trial cour

t on his speedy

trial claim, we must presume t he trial c ourt resolve d any disputed fac t issues in the State’s favor , and we m u st also defe r to the implied findings of fac t that the rec ord supports.”). Vie wing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favor able to the trial court’s ruling , we hold that8

McDona ld’s defe nse wa s not impaired by the delay . As a result, McDona ld has not established that he suff ere d prejudice and, ther efor e, this fac tor does not support a fi nding of a constitutional viol ation.

Whil e the f

irst two fac t o rs we i gh i n favor of finding a violation of McDona ld’s constitutional right to a spee dy trial, the re maining f

actor s, particular ly

the lack of

prejudice , car

ry
more we ight. Se e Ru sse ll v . S tat e , 90 S.W .3d 865, 874-75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, p et
. d en i ed ) ( h o l d i n g t h at l ac k o f p re j u d i ce o u t we i gh s t h e r em ai n i n g Barker fac tors); se e als o Guajardo , 999 S.W .2d at 571 (holding that, wher e first thre e Barker fac tors clea

rly weig h in favor of the a ppellant, l ack of prejudice outweig hs rema ining factors) . There fore , in light of the Barker balanc in g te s t a s a

p p li e d to th e f

a c ts o f th is c a s e , w e h o ld th a t M c D o n a ld ’ s r ig h t to a s p e e dy trial was not violated.
CO NC LU SION

Be cause we ha

ve dete rmined that the trial court did not err in denying Mc Donald’s mot ion to d ism iss fo r l a c k o f a

sp e e dy tr ia l, w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

____________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: August 20, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh