J-S46003-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ADAM J. BATH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1090 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered March 6, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-45-CR-0000485-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 23, 2020

Appellant, Adam J. Bath, appeals from the March 6, 2020 order 

dismissing his petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The facts of Appellant’s underlying convictions are not pertinent to our 

disposition of this appeal. We need only note that on May 20, 2016, he pled 

guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced, on July 26, 

2016, to a term of 18 to 36 months’ incarceration. Appellant did not file a 

timely appeal. However, he subsequently filed a PCRA petition seeking 

restoration of his direct appeal rights, which the court granted. Appellant then

filed a nunc pro tunc appeal with our Court, but he discontinued that appeal

on May 4, 2018. 

On September 19, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel 

was appointed and she filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf. 
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Following a hearing, the court issued an order denying Appellant’s petition on 

March 6, 2020. He then filed his present appeal.1

Herein, Appellant states five issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion in failing to find that counsel was ineffective in failing to

advise [Appellant] that his sentence was illegal?

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion in failing to find that counsel was ineffective in failing to

advise [Appellant] that his sentence violated the constitution?

3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion in failing to find that there is newly[-]discovered 

evidence?

4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion in failing to find that counsel was ineffective in failing to

appeal the illegal sentence?

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1 Appellant did not file his notice of appeal until April 29, 2020. However, on 

March 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared a general, 

statewide judicial emergency because of the coronavirus that causes COVID19. In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1281 (Pa.

filed Mar. 16, 2020) (per curiam). In its subsequent orders, the Supreme 

Court expanded the scope and extended the length of the judicial emergency. 

Further, as is relevant to the case at bar, the Supreme Court generally

suspended “all time calculations for purposes of time computation relevant to

court cases or other judicial business, as well as time deadlines.” See In re:

General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1283 (Pa. filed Mar. 18, 

2020) (per curiam). As to the general suspension of time calculations and

deadlines, on April 28, 2020, the Supreme Court ordered that “legal papers or

pleadings (other than commencement of actions where statutes of limitations

may be in issue) which are required to be filed between March 19, 2020, and

May 8, 2020, generally shall be deemed to have been filed timely if they are

filed by close of business on May 11, 2020.” In re: General Statewide

Judicial Emergency, 230 A.3d 1015 (Pa. filed Apr. 28, 2020) (per curiam)

(emphasis omitted). Therefore, we consider Appellant’s appeal, which was 

due on April 6, 2020 and filed on April 29, 2020, as being timely filed.
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5. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion in holding that it was without jurisdiction to afford 

relief?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition 

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported 

by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 

Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We must begin by addressing the 

timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the PCRA time limitations implicate 

our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the 

merits of a petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 

(Pa. 2007). Under the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including 

a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the following exceptions 

set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:

(b) Time for filing petition.--

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second 

or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the 

date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges 

and the petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States 

or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 

period provided in this section and has been held by 

that court to apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, any petition attempting to 

invoke one of these exceptions must “be filed within one year of the date the 

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 4, 2018, 

when he discontinued his direct appeal. Thus, Appellant had until May 4, 

2019, to file a timely petition, making his petition filed on September 19, 

2019, facially untimely. Consequently, for this Court to have jurisdiction to 

review the merits thereof, Appellant must prove that he meets one of the 

exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). 

Appellant wholly fails to meet this burden, as he makes no attempt to 

plead or prove the applicability of any timeliness exception. Instead, he 

simply claims that “[l]egality of a sentence is always subject to review within 

the PCRA[,]” and that such claims “may never be waived....” Appellant’s Brief 

at 14 (citations omitted). However, our Supreme Court has held that, while 

claims challenging the legality of sentence are subject to review within the

PCRA, they must first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits. See Commonwealth v. 

Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999). Because Appellant has not averred that 
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any timeliness exception applies to his legality-of-sentencing claim, we lack 

jurisdiction to review it.2

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/23/2020

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2

In any event, the record also indicates that Appellant is not eligible for PCRA 

relief because he is not currently serving the ostensibly illegal sentence that 

he challenges in this case. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (requiring a 

petitioner to prove that he is “currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, 

probation or parole for the crime” at the time PCRA relief is granted). As the 

PCRA court observes, Appellant “was sentenced ... on July 26, 2016, to a term 

of not less than 18 months, nor more than 36 months. Since the length of his 

sentence could not exceed 36 months, the sentence [this court] imposed on 

[Appellant] was completed on July 26, 2019.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/6/20, 

at 3-4. Therefore, even if Appellant’s petition were timely, he would not be 

entitled to relief.