GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

January 2001 ELECTRONIC 

WARFARE

Comprehensive 

Strategy Needed for 

Suppressing Enemy 

Air Defenses

GAO-01-28

Page 1 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

January 3, 2001

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military 

Research and Development 

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Smith

United States Senate

The U.S. armed services must suppress enemy air defenses to be able to 

accomplish their war fighting objectives and survive.1

 To achieve this 

suppression, the services use specialized aircraft designed to neutralize, 

destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy air defense systems through either 

physical attack or electronic warfare. Specialized aircraft use electronic 

warfare devices, called jammers, to temporarily suppress enemy air 

defenses by transmitting electronic signals that disrupt enemy radar and 

communications. Other specialized aircraft use anti-radiation missiles that 

home in on radar used by surface-to-air missile or anti-aircraft artillery 

systems to physically degrade or destroy them. Because suppression 

aircraft are charged with protecting all of the services’ aviation assets in 

hostile airspace, the suppression mission necessarily crosses individual 

service lines.

You have expressed concern that a 1996 decision to retire the Air Force’s 

EF-111 and F-4G suppression aircraft, combined with a growing threat 

from increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses, has created a gap 

between the services’ suppression capabilities and their needs.2

 This report 

responds to your request that we (1) describe the actions the services have 

taken since 1996 to improve their capabilities for suppressing enemy air 

defenses and (2) evaluate the services’ plans for eliminating any gap 

between their suppression capabilities and needs.

1

 The suppression of enemy air defenses mission increases U.S. air forces’ ability to 

accomplish other missions by reducing their vulnerability to air defense missiles or guns. 

2

 By May 1998, all of the Air Force’s EF-111 and F-4G suppression aircraft had been retired.
Page 2 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

Results in Brief Since 1996, the services have taken some actions to restore suppression 

capabilities lost through the retirement of the EF-111 and F-4G aircraft, 

mainly by increasing the number of Air Force F-16CJ and Navy/Marine 

Corps EA-6B suppression aircraft. These aircraft, together with their 

electronic warfare equipment and high-speed anti-radiation missiles, 

provide limited capability against sophisticated enemy air defenses. To 

enhance this capability, the Air Force is improving the performance of the 

F-16CJ’s targeting system. In addition, the Navy is upgrading the electronic 

warfare equipment on the EA-6B to improve its radar jammer performance 

and is working on improvements to increase the effectiveness of the 

high-speed anti-radiation missile. Also, the Navy is conducting a study—

scheduled for completion in late 2001—to determine the most

cost-effective alternatives for the future. Alternatives being considered 

include modifications to manned and unmanned aircraft for replacement of 

the EA-6B by 2015.

According to a 1998 study conducted for the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,3

 the services have not adapted to the 

evolution of enemy air defenses from fixed, stand-alone radar systems that 

could be easily suppressed to integrated air defenses incorporating modern 

telecommunications links, passive sensors, and other sophisticated means 

of avoiding suppression.4

 In a follow-on 1999 study, also conducted for the 

Joint Chiefs, the services were found not to have the quality or quantity of 

systems necessary to protect their aircraft across the full range of military 

operations.5

 Successfully addressing the evolving threat, according to these 

studies, will require innovative suppression solutions utilizing multiple 

technologies and cutting across individual service lines. We found that the 

Air Force’s and the Navy’s efforts, while beneficial, do not reflect a 

comprehensive, cross-service approach. Despite their interdependence in 

carrying out the suppression mission, the services act on an individual 

3

 Coleman Research Corporation, Arlington, Virginia, conducted this study for the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

between June 1996 and March 1998.

4

 Integrated air defense systems use modern telecommunications equipment and computers 

to create networks of early warning radar, targeting radar and passive detection equipment 

that pick up aircraft communications or engine heat or other means to track and target 

aircraft.

5

 The Department convened a special Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Integrated 

Product Team, sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct this assessment.
Page 3 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

basis to define and prioritize suppression requirements and to develop, 

manage, and fund solutions to those requirements. Within the Department 

of Defense, no comprehensive, cross-service strategy for closing the gap 

between the services’ suppression capabilities and needs exists—and no 

coordinating entity has been tasked with preparing such a strategy—to 

identify, among other things, suppression mission objectives, needed 

solutions, funding, timelines, and mechanisms to track progress. 

Consequently, service-level decisions are, in our view, much less likely to 

reflect the needed priority for closing the gap and to be the most 

cost-effective solutions for the Department overall.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense designate a 

coordinating entity, including officials from each of the services, to develop 

a comprehensive cross-service strategy to close the gap between the U.S. 

armed services’ suppression capabilities and their needs and to evaluate 

progress toward achieving the suppression objectives. In comments on a 

draft of this report, the Department agreed with our findings but disagreed 

with our recommendation. It maintained that it is already addressing some 

shortfalls, citing as evidence, for example, the ongoing upgrade efforts 

described in this report. Furthermore, the Department stated that it is 

performing a study—the ongoing analysis of alternatives—to underlie a 

Department-wide strategy for the suppression mission and that it will 

ensure the outcome of the study leads to a balanced set of acquisition 

programs between the services. We remain convinced that the Department 

is not likely to close the gap between suppression capabilities and needs 

without developing a comprehensive, cross-service strategy for doing so 

and assigning responsibility for this task to a coordinating entity. The 

ongoing analysis of alternatives is a necessary step, but a study is not a 

strategy. In disagreeing with our recommendation to designate a 

coordinating entity, the Department also expressed concern that such an 

entity may lead to the neglect of unique service requirements but added 

that any such authority should be staffed in a manner that allowed 

coordination of planning and explanation of those unique requirements. To 

address the Department’s concern about the need for representation from 

the services, we revised our recommendation to include such 

representation.

Background The United States experienced heavy aircraft and aircrew losses to enemy 

air defenses during the Vietnam War. Since then, the services have 

recognized air defense suppression as a critical component of air 

operations. Consequently, when a crisis arises, suppression aircraft are 
Page 4 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

among the first to be called in and the last to leave. Suppression aircraft 

such as the now retired EF-111 and F-4G played a vital role in protecting 

other U.S. aircraft from radar-guided missile systems during Operation 

Desert Storm in Iraq. In fact, Air Force strike aircraft were normally not 

permitted to conduct air operations unless protected by these suppression 

aircraft. The EF-111 was equipped with transmitters to disrupt or “jam” 

radar equipment used by enemy surface-to-air missile or anti-aircraft 

artillery systems. The F-4G used anti-radiation missiles that homed in on 

enemy radar systems to destroy them (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

Source: U.S. Air Force.

Since the end of Desert Storm in 1991, U.S. suppression aircraft have been 

continuously deployed in support of Operations Northern and Southern 

Watch protecting fighter aircraft maintaining the no-fly zones over Iraq. In 

1999, during Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, EA-6B 

suppression aircraft (see fig. 2) carrying electronic jamming equipment and 

anti-radiation missiles were extremely important for protecting strike 

aircraft from enemy radar-guided missiles.
Page 5 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

Figure 2: EA-6B Prowler

Source: U.S. Navy.

Radar is the primary means used by enemy forces to detect, track, and 

target U.S. aircraft. Hence, U.S. suppression aircraft focus on trying to 

neutralize, degrade, or destroy the radar equipment of an enemy’s air 

defense system. Enemy radars in the past were often fixed in position, 

operated in a stand-alone mode, and turned on for lengthy periods of 

time—all of which made them relatively easy to find and suppress through 

electronic warfare or physical attack. 

U.S. suppression aircraft, using missiles and jammers, begin suppressing 

enemy air defenses after they begin emitting radio-frequency signals. At 

some risk to the aircraft and aircrew, the suppression aircraft must also be 

in the vicinity of the enemy air defenses to complete their mission. In 

response to this suppression capability, according to the Department, 

countries have been seeking to make their air defenses more resistant to 

suppression. These efforts include increasing the mobility of their 

surface-to-air missiles and radar equipment (see fig. 3), connecting radars 

together into networks, and adding sophisticated capabilities so that the 

radar can detect aircraft while turned on for shorter periods of time.
Page 6 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

Figure 3: Mobile SA-6 Surface-to-Air Missile System 

Source: Federation of American Scientists.

Additionally, many nations, including some hostile to U.S. interests such as 

Iraq and North Korea, operate what is referred to as integrated air defense 

systems. These systems use various means to track and target aircraft, 

including modern telecommunications equipment and computers to create 

networks of early warning radar, missile system radar, and passive 

detection systems that pick up aircraft communications or heat from 

aircraft engines.6

 Integrated networks provide air defense operators with 

the ability to track and target aircraft even if individual radar elements of 

the network are jammed or destroyed.

During Operation Allied Force in 1999, according to the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, U.S. suppression aircraft faced Yugoslavia’s integrated 

air defense system and experienced significant difficulty trying to destroy 

it, as Yugoslav forces often engaged in elaborate efforts to protect their air 

defense assets. These protective efforts allowed Yugoslav forces to thwart 

many attacks, but they also reduced Yugoslav opportunities to track and 

6

 Alternatives to radar for tracking aircraft include electro-optical, infrared, laser, and 

passive means. 
Page 7 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

engage U.S. and coalition aircraft because their air defense assets could not 

be utilized and protected simultaneously. Nevertheless, Yugoslav forces 

managed to shoot down an F-117 stealth fighter (referred to as stealth 

because it is harder to detect with radar) (see fig. 4) and an F-16CJ on a 

suppression mission. (Specific details about the two aircraft losses and 

tactics used by Yugoslav forces to avoid destruction are considered 

classified by the Department.) In addition to the two losses, the inability of 

the U.S. to destroy the Yugoslav air defense network forced the U.S. to 

(1) fly its strike missions at higher altitudes to reduce risk; (2) fly 

thousands of dedicated suppression missions, pushing its EA-6B force in 

Europe to its limits; and (3) keep many low-flying aircraft, such as the 

Army’s Apache attack helicopters, out of combat.

Figure 4: F-117 Stealth Fighter

Source: U.S. Air Force.

At one point in time, advocates of acquiring more stealth aircraft believed 

that the Air Force’s successful fielding of F-117 fighters and B-2 bombers 

would allow the services to reduce their suppression aircraft requirements. 

However, the loss of the F-117 over Yugoslavia in 1999 demonstrated that 

stealth aircraft could also benefit from improved suppression capabilities. 

Moreover, even if stealth aircraft required no suppression support, and 

even if the services do introduce more of them in the future, the majority of 
Page 8 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

the aircraft in the U.S. fleet will not have stealth capabilities for many years 

and will still require suppression support.

The Services Have 

Taken Some Actions to 

Improve Their 

Suppression 

Capabilities

In 1996, we expressed concern about the decision to retire the Air Force’s 

F-4G and EF-111 without comparable replacements.7

 Subsequently, the 

services realized that the decrease in their suppression capabilities had 

increased U.S. aircraft vulnerability and could potentially frustrate 

achievement of U.S. military objectives and prolong future conflicts. 

Therefore, since 1996, the services have taken a number of actions to 

improve their suppression capabilities. First, the Air Force is increasing the 

size of its fleet of F-16CJ suppression aircraft (see fig. 5), and the Navy and 

the Marine Corps are adding EA-6B suppression aircraft to help reverse the 

quantitative impact of the retirement of the EF-111s and F-4Gs.

Figure 5: F-16CJ Aircraft

Source: U.S. Air Force.

7

 See Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses May Be 

Too Low (GAO/NSIAD-96-128, Apr. 10, 1996).
Page 9 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

Although not comparable in capability to the F-4G it replaced, the Air Force 

F-16CJ has an electronic targeting system and is equipped with high-speed 

anti-radiation missiles to attack enemy radar. The Air Force is acquiring 30 

additional F-16CJ aircraft to bring its total to 210. The Navy and the Marine 

Corps EA-6B is a modified A-6 strike aircraft outfitted with special 

electronic transmitters for disrupting radar and communications. The

EA-6B can also fire anti-radiation missiles. The Navy has brought back 

from retirement 20 EA-6Bs to increase the total to 123 aircraft, of which 104 

are available for combat operations. Recent operations in Yugoslavia, 

Kosovo, and no-fly zones in Iraq have required extensive use of Air Force 

F-16CJs and Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B suppression aircraft.

Second, the services are improving the electronic warfare and missile 

systems on these aircraft to enhance their limited capability against 

sophisticated enemy air defenses. The Air Force is upgrading the targeting 

system on the F-16CJ. The Navy is upgrading the radar jamming equipment 

on the EA-6B to improve its performance. The upgraded EA-6B equipment 

is scheduled to be fielded beginning in 2004 and to reach Initial Operational 

Capability8

 in 2005. The Navy and the Air Force are also working together 

on improvements to increase the effectiveness of the high-speed 

anti-radiation missile. (Further details about these upgrades are classified.)

Third, the Navy is conducting a study to determine the most cost-effective 

alternatives for suppression in the future. According to the Department, it 

is the most important electronic warfare study presently ongoing and has 

considerable resources being applied to it. Numerous options for 

augmenting the EA-6B starting in 2010 and replacing it by 2015 are being 

considered, including using a modified version of the Navy’s new 

F/A-18 E/F aircraft equipped with electronic warfare systems, or making 

modifications to other manned or unmanned aircraft. According to the 

Department, the study will also identify deficiencies and/or limitations and 

seek corrective actions. It is scheduled for completion in late 2001.

Fourth, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics is conducting a Department-wide review of electronic warfare 

programs, which include suppression programs. The purpose of this 

internal review is to determine whether these programs are adequately 

managed, prioritized, and funded.

8

 Initial Operational Capability will be reached when the first EA-6B squadron equipped with 

the upgraded systems is ready to be deployed. 
Page 10 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

No Comprehensive 

Strategy Exists to 

Address Evolving 

Threats

Despite actions taken by the services since 1996, a gap remains between 

the services’ current suppression capabilities and their aircraft’s need for 

protection from sophisticated enemy air defenses. Without a 

comprehensive, cross-service strategy for addressing that gap and a 

coordinating entity charged with developing such a strategy and evaluating 

progress, it is unlikely that the actions needed to close the gap will be 

taken.

Current Suppression 

Capabilities Are Not 

Adequate

In the mid-1990s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found in its Joint Tactical Aircraft 

Electronic Warfare Study that the services’ suppression capabilities were 

diminishing while the proliferation and modernization of enemy air 

defenses were increasing. Recognizing this, in 1996 the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense directed that a Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses mission 

area architecture study be conducted. The purpose of the study was to 

develop well-grounded bases for decisions regarding platform, weapon, 

and support system modernization and to explore new ways and means for 

conducting suppression operations.

The study, completed in 1998, found that the services had not adequately 

adapted to the evolution of enemy air defenses from fixed, stand-alone 

radar systems that could be easily suppressed to integrated air defenses 

incorporating modern telecommunications links, passive sensors, and 

other sophisticated means of avoiding suppression. It also found that 

maintaining an effective suppression capability will require the 

development of innovative and nontraditional solutions cutting across 

individual service and functional (e.g., suppression, reconnaissance, and 

command and control) lines.

The willingness to adopt innovative approaches has provided the armed 

services with large suppression dividends in the past. For instance, during 

Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, the U.S. launched unmanned 

aircraft as decoys from beyond the reach of enemy air defenses to cause 

the Iraqis to turn on their radar and/or fire, thereby revealing their positions 

to suppression aircraft so they could be attacked. These attacks were 

highly successful when the Iraqi air defense forces remained fixed in 

position with their radar sites emitting signals that could be tracked by 

anti-radiation missiles fired from U.S. suppression aircraft such as the F-4G 

and EA-6B. As demonstrated in Yugoslavia in 1999, however, these tactics 

cannot succeed if enemy air defense forces choose not to reveal 

themselves or move quickly after firing.
Page 11 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

To address these shortcomings, the 1998 study envisioned the leveraging of 

advances in sensor and data link technologies to build a multifunctional 

U.S. suppression mission “network” in which loitering decoys and other 

unmanned aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, suppression 

aircraft, command and control aircraft, and strike aircraft are all 

interconnected by high-speed data links. Military commanders could then 

use this network to locate targets and launch coordinated Army, Navy, and 

Air Force attacks on the enemy air defense forces’ positions.

According to the study, suppression weapon development is also ripe for 

innovation. Future weapons could include, for instance, unmanned 

loitering drones with high-explosive warheads waiting silently high above 

to dive on enemy air defense forces before they can fire, or precisionguided munitions or anti-radiation missiles fired from unmanned aircraft 

that track enemy air defense forces as they move. By using unmanned 

aircraft, the suppression mission controller could take risks that would be 

unacceptable using manned aircraft. The potential loss of the unmanned 

aircraft or decoys in these scenarios is far preferable to the risk the 

services face today of losing manned EA-6B and F-16CJ aircraft conducting 

suppression missions (such as the F-16CJ lost over Yugoslavia in 1999).

The results of the mission area architecture study also led to a follow-on 

mission needs assessment to identify suppression mission deficiencies and 

technological opportunities to address them. According to the mission 

needs assessment completed in 1999, the services’ overriding suppression 

mission deficiency is that they do not have the quality or quantity of 

systems necessary to protect U.S., allied, and coalition air forces across the 

full range of military operations. In terms of technological opportunities to 

address these shortcomings, the assessment concluded that a mix of 

manned and unmanned aircraft and lethal and nonlethal weapons (e.g., 

anti-radiation missiles and jammers) will be required to meet current and 

future operational objectives.9

 To provide near-term relief until these new 

systems can be acquired, the mission needs assessment proposed the 

appointment of a single entity to conduct joint suppression mission 

experiments involving assets from air, land, sea, information, and 

space-based forces. The objective of these experiments would be to try to 

develop joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to aid in the 

suppression mission.

9

 The Department today has no lethal or nonlethal weapons-equipped unmanned aircraft 

with which to conduct suppression missions.
Page 12 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

No Comprehensive, CrossService Strategy Exists for 

Achieving Suppression 

Mission

Although Air Force and Navy suppression aircraft are charged with 

protecting all of the services’ aviation assets in hostile airspace, 

suppression mission requirements are defined and prioritized by the 

individual services. Also, the material and nonmaterial solutions that 

address these requirements are developed, managed, and funded by the 

individual services. The services’ ongoing decisions to add F-16CJ and 

EA-6B aircraft and to improve the EA-6B aircraft and the high-speed

anti-radiation missile, while beneficial, do not reflect a comprehensive, 

cross-service approach to improving their suppression capabilities. 

Within the Department, no comprehensive, cross-service suppression 

mission strategy exists that identifies, specifically,

• the suppression objectives, preferably measurable, to be achieved;

• the actions, including material and nonmaterial solutions, needed to 

achieve those objectives;

• special technologies to be developed;

• funding, timelines, and responsibilities; and

• evaluation mechanisms to track progress or signal the need for 

adjustments.

Also, while it tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff with conducting the mission 

area architecture study and mission needs assessment, the Department did 

not give responsibility to the Joint Chiefs or any other entity for

(1) developing a comprehensive strategy and (2) evaluating to what extent 

suppression mission objectives are being achieved. 

Without such a strategy or coordinating entity, service-level decisions are, 

in our view, much less likely to reflect the needed priority or the most

cost-effective solutions for the services overall. For instance, in July 1999, 

the Commanding General of the Army’s 101st Airborne Division wrote to 

Army headquarters that, due to the retirement of the Air Force’s EF-111 and 

the shortage of Navy EA-6B suppression aircraft, there were insufficient 

suppression assets to meet the Army’s needs. He expressed concern that 

the lack of required suppression support and failure to degrade enemy air 

defenses could result in catastrophic losses of his soldiers and equipment. 

The Commanding General’s proposed solution to this shortfall was for the 

Army to develop its own suppression mission aircraft.
Page 13 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

Conclusions Since retiring the EF-111 and F-4G, the Air Force and the Navy have been 

acquiring additional suppression aircraft to restore some lost suppression 

capabilities and have begun improving their existing suppression systems. 

However, recent studies have pointed to a number of suppression mission 

area deficiencies. In our view, the development of a comprehensive, 

cross-service strategy for suppressing enemy air defenses is the best—and, 

perhaps, the only—way to really know whether the services are 

successfully closing the gap between suppression capabilities and needs. 

And the designation of a coordinating entity would provide the necessary 

institutionalized leadership to develop a strategy and evaluate its 

implementation. Until the gap is closed, U.S. aircraft will remain vulnerable 

in future conflicts, possibly resulting in the loss of lives and expensive 

assets and forcing U.S. aircraft to continue modifying their tactics (as they 

had to do in Yugoslavia in 1999) to reduce their exposure to increasingly 

sophisticated enemy air defenses.

Recommendation to 

the Executive Agency 

To significantly increase the likelihood that needed actions are taken to 

improve the ability of U.S. aircraft to suppress enemy air defenses, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense designate a coordinating entity, 

including officials from each of the services, to develop a comprehensive, 

cross-service strategy for closing the gap between the services’ suppression 

capabilities and their needs and to evaluate progress toward achieving 

suppression objectives.

Agency Comments and 

Our Review

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

agreed with our findings regarding shortcomings in suppression 

capabilities but did not concur with our recommendation. The Department 

maintained that the services are already addressing some shortfalls, citing 

as evidence, for example, the ongoing upgrades of F-16CJ and EA-6B 

aircraft and the high-speed anti-radiation missile as described in this 

report. Furthermore, the Department stated that the ongoing analysis of 

alternatives will underlie a Department-wide strategy and that it will ensure 

the outcome of this study will lead to balanced, joint suppression of enemy 

air defense acquisition programs between the services. In disagreeing with 

our recommendation to appoint a coordinating entity, the Department 

expressed concern that such an entity may neglect unique service 

requirements, but it also added that any such entity should be staffed in a 

manner that allows coordination of planning and explanation of those 

unique requirements.
Page 14 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

Although the Department asserted that it would ensure that the outcome of 

the ongoing alternatives analysis would lead to a balanced program for 

addressing the shortfalls, it did not explain how it would do so. We remain 

convinced that the Department is not likely to eliminate the gap between 

suppression capabilities and needs without assigning responsibility to a 

coordinating entity to develop a comprehensive strategy and evaluate 

progress toward achieving suppression objectives. The ongoing analysis of 

alternatives is a necessary step, but a study is not a strategy. As emphasized 

in this report, a comprehensive, cross-service strategy would increase the 

likelihood that actions would be taken. Among other things, it would 

identify objectives, material and nonmaterial solutions, funding, timelines, 

and mechanisms to track progress in closing the gap. Regarding the 

Department’s concern that the coordinating entity would neglect unique 

service requirements, we revised our recommendation to include 

representation from the services. 

The Department’s written comments are reprinted in appendix II.

Scope and 

Methodology

To describe the actions taken to improve the U.S. armed services’ 

capabilities for suppressing enemy air defenses, we interviewed Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force, and Navy officials 

responsible for electronic warfare requirements, EA-6B aircraft 

requirements, and F-16CJ aircraft requirements. We interviewed officials 

from the EA-6B, F-16CJ, and high-speed anti-radiation missile programs. 

We interviewed Defense Intelligence Agency officials and reviewed 

performance data related to the Department’s current suppression 

capabilities and the capabilities of enemy air defense systems. To evaluate 

the services’ plans for eliminating the gap between U.S. suppression 

capabilities and needs, we reviewed the results of the Department’s Joint 

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Mission Area Architecture Study and 

follow-on Mission Needs Assessment and compared them to the actions 

taken by the Department to improve its suppression capabilities since 1996. 

To determine whether successful fielding of stealth aircraft has affected 

overall suppression requirements, we interviewed Air Force officials 

knowledgeable about stealth aircraft and stealth operations.

We conducted our work at Office of the Secretary of Defense, Air Force, 

Army, Marine Corps, and Navy locations. We visited requirements, 

acquisition, logistics, and testing offices of the military services; field 

commands and operating units; various program offices; government 
Page 15 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

organizations involved in developmental efforts or military studies; and 

contractor facilities. Specific locations we visited are listed in appendix I.

We performed our review from December 1998 through November 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator John Warner, Chairman, and 

Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on 

Armed Services, and Representative Floyd Spence, Chairman, and 

Representative Ike Skelton, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee 

on Armed Services. We are also sending copies to the Honorable Louis 

Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of 

the Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and 

the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. 

Copies will also be made available to others upon request. We are also 

sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees. 

The report will also be available on our home page at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have questions, please contact me on (202) 512-4841. Major 

contributors to this report were Michael Aiken, Terry Parker, Charles Ward, 

and Neil Wickliffe.

R. E. Levin

Director, Acquisition and 

 Sourcing Management
Page 16 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

Appendix I

Locations Visited During This Review ApApenednxidexiIs

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

Headquarters Elements, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, 

Washington, D.C. 

Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia 

Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia

Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia

Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia

Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

U.S. 9th Air Force and 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, 

South Carolina

Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland

Marine Corps Warfighting and Development Division, Quantico, Virginia

U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air Force 

Base, Ohio

U.S. Air Force Air Armament Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

U.S. Air Force Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada

Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fallon, Nevada

Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, Florida

Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center, Robbins Air Force Base, Georgia
Appendix I

Locations Visited During This Review

Page 17 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station Whidbey 

Island, Washington

38th Marine Air Control Group, Miramar, California

355th Operations Group, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona

33rd Tactical Fighter Wing, 53rd Test Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

169th Air National Guard, McEntire Air Force Base, South Carolina

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Coleman Research Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia
Page 18 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 19 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

(707389) Letr Page 20 GAO-01-28 Electronic Warfare
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