U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

49–866 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–31] 

READINESS AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE 

NAVY’S SURFACE FLEET 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 25, 2009 
(II) 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, COLORADO

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN PUTNAM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 25, 2009, Readiness and Sustainment of the Navy’s Surface Fleet ............................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 25, 2009 ................................................................................... 19 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 2009 

READINESS AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE NAVY’S SURFACE FLEET 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, 

Readiness Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 2 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Campbell, Rear Adm. (Upper Half) (Select) Joseph F., USN, Director of Staff, 

Fleet Maintenance Office (USFF N43) ............................................................... 6 

Cullom, Rear Adm. (Upper Half) (Select) Philip H., USN, Director, Fleet 

Readiness Division (OPNAV N43) ...................................................................... 4 

Eccles, Rear Adm. (Lower Half) Thomas J., USN, Deputy Commander Naval 

Systems Engineering, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 05) ...................... 10 

McManamon, Rear Adm. (Lower Half) James P., USN, Deputy Commander 

for Surface Warfare, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 21) ......................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cullom, Rear Adm. Philip H., joint with Rear Adm. Joseph F. Campbell, 

Rear Adm. James P. McManamon and Rear Adm. Thomas J. Eccles ..... 26 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 25 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Report to Congress, Ship Maintenance and Material Conditions ................ 49 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Nye ............................................................................................................. 69 

Ms. Shea-Porter ................................................................................................ 69 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 69 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 84 

Mr. Nye ............................................................................................................. 86 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 89 

(1) 

READINESS AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE NAVY’S 

SURFACE FLEET 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 25, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:17 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Today, the Readiness Subcommittee meets to hear testimony on 

the readiness of the ships comprising the Navy’s surface fleet and 

the Navy’s plan to sustain those ships to achieve and expand their 

anticipated service life. The hearing is intended to inform Readiness Subcommittee members on Navy operations and maintenance 

issues prior to release of the fiscal year 2010 budget submission. 

I thank our distinguished Navy witnesses for appearing before 

this subcommittee today to discuss ship readiness and 

sustainment. Our witnesses represent the Office of the Chief of 

Naval Operations, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, and Naval Sea Systems Command. 

The Navy intends to extend the operational life of its ships 5 

years or more beyond the designated lifespan in order to achieve 

a 313-ship fleet. However, the Navy is presently experiencing a series of incidents that raise concerns regarding possible systemic 

problems with the Navy’s manning, training, and maintenance. 

In addition to recent collisions, groundings, and even a fatal accident, in the past 3 years 10 ship commanders have been relieved 

of duty for failure to maintain training or materiel readiness standards. These concerns bring into question the Navy’s ability to 

achieve even the expected service life of its fleet and sustained fleet 

readiness, let alone extend the service life of entire ship classes. 

These incidents follow changes in the way the Navy conducts 

maintenance, changes in manpower and crew size, and changes in 

how the Navy trains its maintenance personnel. In view of these 

changes, the Readiness Subcommittee on March 16 asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the training, size, 

composition, and capabilities of Navy ship crews. 

Specifically, we requested the GAO to: evaluate current requirements, authorization, and on-hand personnel levels for selected 

ship types compared to historical data for the same or similar ship 
2 

types, including underlying reasons for any differences; compare 

shipboard rank and rate distributions over time and analyze underlying reasons for any changes and their impact on ship capabilities; 

evaluate qualification training for personnel in selected shipboard 

designators and ratings to determine any changes to formal off-ship 

training programs, including whether such changes have affected 

personnel availability and the amounts and types of on-the-job 

training for personnel to achieve required qualifications; and, also, 

evaluate to what extent requirements to provide personnel for Individual Augmentee and ‘‘In Lieu Of’’ positions in support of ongoing 

operations are impacting the levels or composition of shipboard 

manning. 

Our witnesses today are four distinguished Naval officers: Rear 

Admiral Philip Cullom, Director of Fleet Readiness Division, Deputy Chief of Navy Operations for Fleet Readiness Logistics; Rear 

Admiral Joseph Campbell, Director of Staff, Fleet Maintenance Officer, U.S. Fleet Forces Command; Rear Admiral James 

McManamon, Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare, Naval Sea 

Systems Command; and Rear Admiral Thomas Eccles, Deputy 

Commander, Naval Systems Engineering, Naval Sea Systems Command. 

Now I would like to yield to my good friend, the Ranking Member of the committee, Mr. Forbes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to first begin 

by thanking you for holding this hearing and for the hearings that 

you hold consistently, getting the kind of information we need to 

do our oversight; and also Mr. Taylor, who, while not chairing this 

committee, does such a good job on the Seapower Subcommittee. 

And I thank all of you for taking the time to be with us today. 

And we understand you have a lot on your plate, and we just appreciate your insight with us. 

As the committee is well aware, the Navy has been operating at 

extremely high operation tempos for several years. And during this 

period, not only have they worked to improve operational availability by implementing the Fleet Response Plan, but they have 

also made many changes in their training programs and are restructuring their approach to surface fleet maintenance and 

sustainment. 

I am very concerned that the confluence of all these changes in 

a relatively short time period have placed stressors on the fleet 

that have a degenerating effect on readiness, potentially jeopardizing safety and driving up long-term sustainment costs. 

This committee has been briefed on the numerous accidents, incidents, and unfit or seriously degraded inspection assessments that 

have plagued the Navy recently, and I think we must be careful 

not to view these events in isolation. While they may appear to be 

unrelated at first glance, I am concerned that they may be indicators of a broader set of problems. From unfit Board of Inspection 
3 

and Survey (INSURV) inspections to the recent collision of the USS 

Hartford and the USS New Orleans, we must work to understand 

if these events are simply the cost of doing business in these challenging times or if they are indicators that the Navy needs to make 

course corrections. 

Mr. Chairman, this is a very important hearing, and I want to 

thank you again for holding it. And I also understand that the witnesses we have with us today are here to discuss the condition of 

the surface fleet and the Navy’s sustainment challenges. I would 

like to welcome all of them. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for taking time to talk with us, as we 

mentioned earlier. 

But I hope that our discussion today will help us understand the 

challenges the surface fleet is facing and provide us some context 

on which to gauge the events I mentioned earlier. I am also interested to hear about the steps the Navy is taking to correct these 

deficiencies and to implement a sustainment strategy necessary to 

obtain the required service life out of our fleet. 

There is no doubt we are facing a tremendous challenge, and I 

don’t believe we are going to find a silver-bullet solution. I believe 

everything must be on the table for consideration, from manpower 

and resourcing to training to leadership. And we need to take time 

to evaluate our risk assessments and make sure we are comfortable 

with the risk levels. 

I think we must also look at the increased reliance on contractors 

to provide maintenance that was traditionally performed by our 

sailors. While this approach to sustainment may initially provide 

a cost benefit, there is a downside in that our young sailors aren’t 

required to perform many of the standard repair activities that 

hone their skills and sharpen their ability to assess the ship’s condition. This could have a long-term impact on the skill and ability 

of our sailors, and it is one specific area we must examine. 

And then just two other points. I recognize that everybody in 

here has good intentions in where we are going, but earlier today, 

in the Judiciary Committee, we passed out a bill, which was the 

Free Flow of Information Act, because we realized how important 

it was to get facts and concepts and ideas out as soon as possible 

to discuss them. 

I have to tell you that I am extremely bothered by the nondisclosure agreement that I know several members of our military were 

forced to sign. And this administration apparently has allowed that 

to take place, because, if you look at this form—and I know that 

none of you four had to sign that—but if you look at this, there is 

a huge question as to whether or not anybody involved in that 

budgetary process can ever disclose this information or talk about 

it. And I think that gives us grave concern when we are talking 

about maintenance of ships, when we are talking about weapons 

systems, whatever we are. And I hope at some point in time this 

committee will look at that. 

And the final thing I want to address is something that, while 

all of us sitting here talk about the maintenance dollars that we 

are going to need and what we are going to need to have a strong 

and viable Navy, with the bailouts that we have had and the stimulus packages that we have had—and I have raised this before— 
4 

but the reality is the interest alone on those bailouts and stimulus 

packages would fund the entire budget for all of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), all of the National 

Science Foundation, all of the Department of Transportation, all of 

Homeland Security, all of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), all of the Department of Justice, every operation of the 

White House, every operation of Congress, and every Army Corps 

of Engineers project in the country. 

And, at some point in time, I worry, Mr. Chairman, that we are 

going to come back here saying we need dollars, and we are going 

to have to struggle to see where we are going to get those dollars 

and how we are going to get them. And I think that is going to be 

a huge challenge. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and look forward to 

our witnesses and their testimony today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. The gentleman has brought up some very 

good points. 

And now, at this point, I would like Admiral Cullom to please 

proceed with your testimony, followed by Admirals Campbell, 

McManamon, and Eccles. 

Thank you. You may proceed, sir. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. (UPPER HALF) (SELECT) PHILIP H. 

CULLOM, USN, DIRECTOR, FLEET READINESS DIVISION 

(OPNAV N43) 

Admiral CULLOM. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Ortiz, Congressman Forbes, and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today to testify on surface ship readiness and 

sustainment. 

My name is Rear Admiral Phil Cullom, and I am the director of 

fleet readiness on the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

(OPNAV) staff. The Navy appreciates your support for the readiness of the surface fleet and the critical part materiel readiness 

and sustainment play in reaching expected service life. We have assembled witnesses from the OPNAV staff, Fleet Forces Command 

maintenance staff, and Naval Sea Systems Command to testify on 

these topics today. 

I am responsible to the chief of naval operations for validating 

the fleet-generated maintenance and operational requirements and 

then programming the resources necessary to operate and sustain 

our ships. I am here today to provide you with the OPNAV assessment of surface ship readiness and provide an overview of the 

major actions we are taking to better define surface ship maintenance requirements, properly resource that requirement, and then 

attain full service life for our ships. 

The Navy requires a minimum fleet of 313 ships by 2020; 215 of 

those 313 ships are already in service today. A key underpinning 

of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding planned and sustainment of a 

forward-deployed, surge-ready Naval force is our ability to reach 

the expected service life for each of our ship classes. Reaching expected service life demands an integrated engineering approach to 
5 

ensure the right maintenance is planned and executed over a ship’s 

lifetime, as well as the resources necessary to execute those plans. 

A well-established process exists to identify and program the resources required for ship maintenance. A cornerstone of this process is the Navy’s ship maintenance model, which receives a formal 

and independent validation by the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics 

Labs. 

The initial input to the model are class-specific, notional mandays that are validated by the fleet. The ship maintenance model 

uses these inputs to price the actual cost of that maintenance. 

Since the maintenance generation process begins almost two years 

prior to the actual budget year and whole unique maintenance developments routinely occur in the year prior to execution when 

most of the ships are deployed, execution-year realities have put 

pressure on the need for significant supplemental funding, work 

deferral, or occasionally even cancellation of availabilities. 

In order to increase the fidelity of the maintenance budget and 

reduce the churn associated with work deferral or availability cancellation, in August of 2007 the Navy instituted a process improvement to provide better visibility to hull-specific maintenance requirements. This Flag-level process, known as the ‘‘nine-step process,’’ conducts a hull-by-hull review of individual ship maintenance 

requirements that refines notional ship maintenance requirements 

and then tailors them to the physical condition of a specific ship 

as it gets closer to its scheduled availability period. 

This produces a more refined fleet maintenance requirement that 

updates our input into our ship maintenance model for pricing purposes. Beginning in 2011, we will use these adjustments to update 

our notional requirements, strengthening our ability to forecast future-year maintenance requirements and reducing our dependence 

on supplemental funding. 

The Navy has three distinct classes of ships: surface ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers. Simply put, submarines and aircraft 

carriers have very robust and technically validated class maintenance plans that precisely define the 100 percent maintenance requirement that is needed to reach expected service life. 

In conjunction with the class maintenance plan, submarines and 

aircraft carriers also have dedicated lifecycle organizations whose 

sole functions are to maintain and continuously update class maintenance plans and build availability work packages that ensure we 

execute the 100 percent maintenance requirement. This process 

has a proven track record of ensuring submarines and aircraft carriers reach that expected service life. 

Surface ships have not been maintained with the same rigor or 

discipline. To provide a highly surge-capable and present surface 

force, current maintenance plans limit the time ships spend in 

depot availability periods and instead spread maintenance into several pier-side continuous maintenance availabilities each year. 

This focus on short-term, get-the-ship-underway type of work, instead of the lifecycle-focused work associated with tanks, structures, and distributed systems executed on submarines and aircraft 

carriers, is adding risk to our ability to reach expected service life 

for our surface ships. 
6 

Additionally, surface ship class maintenance plans have not been 

as detailed or maintained with the same technical rigor as those 

for aircraft carriers and submarines. This has been one of the 

greatest obstacles to the surface fleet’s ability to articulate that 100 

percent maintenance requirement necessary to reach their expected 

service life. 

Fleet priorities, the unambiguous maintenance requirements of 

aircraft carriers and submarines, and the lack of an updated technically validated surface ship class maintenance plan has resulted 

in surface ship maintenance being the area where we have historically taken funding risk in a resource-constrained environment. 

Despite these challenges, current ship readiness for the Navy’s 

surface force remains strong, and the committee can be assured 

that we do not have a hollow force. We are meeting all our commitments around the globe today. If allowed to persist, however, these 

materiel discrepancies will ultimately impact our future readiness 

and shorten the service life of our surface ships. 

The good news is that the Navy and Surface Warfare Enterprise 

have taken specific steps to address these issues. Partners from the 

Navy’s technical community and fleet maintenance community are 

with me here today to provide the committee with a more detailed 

account of the actions they are taking in their respective areas of 

responsibility to ensure we continue to maintain and sustain our 

Naval forces. 

We appreciate your ongoing support and this opportunity to testify before the committee. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Cullom, Admiral 

Campbell, Admiral McManamon, and Admiral Eccles, can be found 

in the Appendix on page 26.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Admiral Campbell. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. (UPPER HALF) (SELECT) JOSEPH 

F. CAMPBELL, USN, DIRECTOR OF STAFF, FLEET MAINTENANCE OFFICE (USFF N43) 

Admiral CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. Chairman Ortiz, Congressman 

Forbes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today and address strategies 

for readiness and sustainment of the Navy’s fleet. 

My name is Rear Admiral Joseph Campbell, and I am the fleet 

maintenance officer for U.S. Fleet Forces Command. I am here to 

provide you with a fleet assessment of the Navy’s most recent ship 

maintenance findings and recommendations for corrective actions. 

Additionally, I will address the fiscal year 2009 ship maintenance 

budget. 

The Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey, referred to as 

INSURV, conducts material inspections on U.S. Navy ships every 

five years. The five primary areas that comprise material inspections include: deck; propulsion; combat systems; command, control, 

communications, and computers, known as C4I; and supply. 

Upon completion of INSURV’s inspections, the results are submitted to the chief of naval operations. In addition to individual 

ship reports, the chief of naval operations and fleet commanders receive an annual report summarizing fleet trends and the overall 
7 

health of the force. Currently, overall trends are positive, though 

some specific functional areas require further attention. 

I would now like to address in some detail recent INSURV results between the years 2003 and 2008. The surface naval force executed 191 material inspections with a pass rate of over 91 percent. 

Some high-visibility failures in 2008 led the Commander, Naval 

Surface Force to execute a range of assessments, reviews, and corrective actions to ensure that any degrading trend in material condition of ships was quickly identified and immediate corrective actions were devised and successfully implemented. 

The ships with these degraded results are indicative of the ship’s 

leadership team not following procedures and policies and not practicing the basics of equipment maintenance and operation. Commander, Naval Surface Force is correcting these trends via improvement in deck-plate knowledge of sailors and the Preventative 

Maintenance System accomplishment rates, development of applicable training courses and schools, improved troubleshooting procedures and techniques, and focused shipboard assessment teams for 

these deficient areas. 

Conversely, the positive trends on other ships are the result of 

increased training, assessments, and the directed actions by the 

Commander Naval Surface Forces, by Commander Naval Sea Systems Command, and Fleet Maintenance and Training resource providers. 

After the findings of the 2008 material inspections were released 

for the USS CHOSIN and the USS STOUT, Commander Naval 

Surface Forces embarked on a back-to-basics focus for ships. Shipboard leadership reemphasized preventative maintenance system 

program execution, zone inspection techniques, material condition 

documentation, and maintenance of high operation standards. 

Class squadrons, referred to as CLASSRONs, were also directed to 

apply focus to Inspection & Survey (INSURV) preparation and execution practices and to assist ships with the same. 

To determine if systemic support problems existed, Commander 

Naval Surface Forces conducted a comprehensive review of overall 

readiness of surface ships. This was known as the ‘‘take a fix’’ 

round of readiness briefs, where Commander Naval Surface Forces 

assessed and reported on all readiness factors, those being maintenance, supply, training, and personnel across the force. The review 

concluded that stressors were present in all readiness factors and 

course corrections were needed. 

From those efforts, the Navy’s Surface Ship Maintenance Strategic Offsite convened to identify gaps in the surface ship maintenance program and to clarify roles and responsibilities for Navy organizations in the maintenance program. The overarching focus of 

this offsite group was the commitment to charter, resource, activate, and support the surface ship lifecycle management activity, 

whose sole focus will be to establish rigorous engineered lifecycle 

maintenance plans and requirements for all surface ships. 

I will now briefly discuss the status of the fiscal year 2009 ship 

maintenance budget. Ship maintenance began fiscal year 2009 with 

a shortfall of $417 million. Of the $417 million shortfall, $186 million is with U.S. Fleet Forces Command and $231 million is at U.S. 

Pacific Fleet. 
8 

Since 2003, we have relied on supplemental appropriations to 

fund additional ship maintenance that has arisen from higher wartime operation tempos. There has been strong congressional support over the last seven years that has enabled us to plan and execute our ship maintenance workload. 

In fiscal year 2009, due to the uncertainty of answers to two 

questions—one, will we receive additional funds in fiscal year 2009; 

and, two, if we receive additional funds what will be the amount— 

the fleet is taking a measured approach and prudent steps to determine mitigations that will be required if no additional fiscal year 

2009 funding is received. 

In light of current fiscal realities, we are reviewing financial expenditures to ensure we are able to meet requirements for the remainder of the year. While challenging, it is necessary for us to 

execute these actions at this point in the year in order to remain 

within fiscal controls. We will continue to monitor our execution 

through the fiscal year and relax these measures if funding becomes available. 

It is important to consider that we are now just halfway through 

the fiscal year and are currently performing our mid-year review. 

Due to the often emergent nature of repairs to ships, there is always a possibility that additional maintenance will need to be accomplished later in the year. 

In summary, the Navy is committed to continually improving 

ships’ maintenance and lifecycle protocol and best practices. The 

Navy continues to address deficiencies and issues identified during 

INSURV inspections. We appreciate your ongoing support and the 

opportunity to testify before the committee today. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Campbell, Admiral 

Cullom, Admiral McManamon, and Admiral Eccles, can be found in 

the Appendix on page 26.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. (LOWER HALF) JAMES P. 

MCMANAMON, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR SURFACE 

WARFARE, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND (SEA 21) 

Admiral MCMANAMON. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Forbes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for 

this opportunity to testify on surface ship material readiness, particularly as it pertains to sustainment of surface ships, the lifecycle 

management of surface ships, and the Navy’s use of the multi-ship, 

multi-option—MSMO—acquisition strategy to execute both the 

fleet response plan and the material readiness of our ships. 

My name is Rear Admiral Jim McManamon, and I am here as 

the deputy commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Surface 

Warfare, SEA 21. I am responsible for the maintenance and modernization of nonnuclear surface ships currently operating in the 

fleet. I am also the Surface Warfare Enterprise’s designated focal 

point into the Naval Sea Systems Command and acquisition community, synchronizing lifetime support efforts for all in-service and 

decommissioned surface combatants, nonnuclear aircraft carriers, 

amphibious warships, Command Mine Warfare and special mission 

craft. SEA 21 is the strategic bridge to the fleet that connects Navy 
9 

headquarters, NAVSEA, and program executive officers to the waterfront and operating forces. 

A key component of ship readiness is a robust and proficiently 

executed process for ship maintenance and sustainment. Ship 

maintenance is more than the conduct of industrial efforts at a 

shipyard or another repair activity. All ship maintenance requires 

a solid foundation of engineering and analytics such that the right 

maintenance actions occur at the right time and for the right reasons. 

In spring of 2008, in response to a growing concern that material 

condition of surface ships would not provide sufficient margins to 

ensure each ship would meet its designated service life, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command recommended establishment of a dedicated activity to provide centralized lifecycle management and support for U.S. Navy surface ships. The Surface Warfare Enterprise approved that recommendation, and the Navy will 

formally stand up the Surface Ship Lifecycle Management Activity 

in May 2009. Partnering with fleet forces, this activity will assess 

and manage the maintenance requirements through the lifecycle of 

ships in the surface fleet in order to better plan and budget for 

long-term maintenance needs. 

The Lifecycle Management Activity is modeled after and would 

function very similarly to the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement Activity, SUBMEPP; and the Carrier Planning Activity, CPA. This activity will maintain, monitor, 

and refine class maintenance plans for all surface ships to maintain material readiness for the projected service life, develop 

lifecycle strategies to address system upgrades, and fully integrate 

the integrated class maintenance plan into each surface ship’s 

maintenance schedule and availability planning process. 

While improving maintenance planning on existing platforms, 

the Navy is also challenged with fleet introduction of new platforms. The Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS) is a class of ship that 

does not conform to the legacy process used on earlier-generation 

ships since the manning is reduced and coupled at the high level 

of automation, with much of that support, including maintenance 

functions, pushed ashore. 

An interim support period, ISP, has been contracted for a trial 

period of three years during which the government will conduct a 

business case analysis in order to determine an optimal long-term 

sustainment approach. The three-year period will give the Navy 

adequate time to evaluate contractor performance, responsiveness, 

and appropriate use and repair data in order to determine the optimal balance of ship’s force, contractor, and organic Navy workforce 

needed to support LCS for the long term. 

In a deliberate view to the future, ship life assessment pilots will 

be conducted to determine the ability of a ship to meet its expected 

service life. The surface ship life assessment pilots are particularly 

important as they will provide a solid analytical basis for making 

critical repair decisions in selected areas and provide the potential 

to build confidence that our surface ships can fulfill force level requirements well into the future by assuring they will remain effective warships for the full duration of their expected service life. 
10 

This effort takes a best practice from industry and utilizes advanced finite element modeling techniques to provide a fully engineered view of the criticality of needed maintenance actions. 

With your assistance, we will continue to provide maximum material readiness for our surface ships and improve our ability to ensure they reach their expected service life. 

Thank you again for letting me testify today. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral McManamon, Admiral 

Cullom, Admiral Campbell, and Admiral Eccles, can be found in 

the Appendix on page 26.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Admiral Eccles, go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. (LOWER HALF) THOMAS J. ECCLES, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER NAVAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND (SEA 05) 

Admiral ECCLES. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, thank you very much for this opportunity to testify 

on surface ship material readiness. 

My name is Rear Admiral Tom Eccles. I am here as the deputy 

commander for naval systems engineering, Naval Sea Systems 

Command. I am responsible for cradle-to-grave engineering support 

for naval ships and shipboard weapons systems. This includes research and development, establishment of design standards for 

new-construction ships, certification of new ships and ship systems, 

and lifecycle engineering for ships in service in the fleet. 

As Naval Sea Systems Command chief engineer, I am also the 

technical warranting authority responsible for applying statutory 

authorities delegated from the Secretary of the Navy to ensure the 

safe and effective operation of ships and ship systems. In that regard, I am responsible for the engineering aspects associated with 

the development of ship maintenance requirements. As chief technical authority, my staff monitors the effectiveness of ship maintenance processes and adjudicates critical variances and standards 

compliance issues. 

As naval technical authority, my organization is deeply dedicated 

to the success of the Surface Ship Lifecycle Management Activity 

mentioned by several of the other panelists. Other organizations 

also have roles in ship maintenance, including the regional maintenance centers, in-service engineering agents, and planning yards. 

My staff has the necessary visibility and influence to ensure the 

proper exercise of technical authority within those organizations. 

We are keenly focused on outcomes that will ensure our current 

fleet ships will meet their expected service lives. 

We have teamed with the fleet to execute ship life assessment pilots that have the potential to give us an accurate picture of the 

health of each ship in the fleet. Those pilot programs will survey 

representative combatant surface ships of four types and develop 

pictures of the structural and distributed electrical and fluid systems conditions compared with our expectations for ships that will 

meet their intended service lives. 

We will assess the utility of this method for possible future application on all surface ships. The result I am looking for is an affordable and objective assessment tool that may be useful in providing 
11 

the analytical basis for required maintenance investment to 

achieve expected service life. We believe that solid engineering and 

objective measurement are key elements of the plan to resolve our 

current challenges. 

Thank you, and we all look forward to your questions. 

[The joint statement of Admiral Eccles, Admiral Cullom, Admiral 

Campbell, and Admiral McManamon can be found in the Appendix 

on page 26.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much for your testimony. And I know 

the committee has several questions for you. 

You know, for all the changes in maintenance and manning and 

training over the past decade or more, it may appear to some to 

be a series of discrete actions detached from recent incidents. To 

the Readiness Subcommittee, to our committee, the cumulative impact that they have had on ship material readiness appears anything but discrete. 

My question is, what impact has the reduction on intermediate 

maintenance shore infrastructure and the consolidation of technical 

competitiveness on the regional maintenance centers had on 

lifecycle sustainment of the surface fleet? And what impact has the 

reduction in ships’ crew, including the removal of active-duty military from intermediate maintenance shore billets, had on ship 

sustainment in conjunction with reduction in shore infrastructure? 

And, to us, this is very, very important. And I know that we 

want to sing from the same page and we want to be of help to you. 

And, hopefully, maybe you can try to respond to at least those two 

questions that I have. 

Anybody who would like to lead off? 

Admiral CAMPBELL. Yes, sir, I will take that question. 

In fact, the Navy has combined our intermediate maintenance activities into, as you mentioned, regional maintenance centers. 

Those regional maintenance centers are sized to accomplish the 

maintenance that we develop during our programming and budgeting process. And I believe that for the current amount of maintenance that exists in our class maintenance plans, those activities 

are adequately sized. 

We have taken sailor billets out of the shore maintenance infrastructure to some extent, not entirely. But we have also taken some 

of those sailors and moved them over to be part of the naval shipyard team, where they get the benefit from working closely with civilian journeymen and still will have that opportunity to learn 

while they are on shore duty in maintenance billets. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Anybody else who would like to add anything? 

If not, I have another question. How does the Navy recover these 

lost assets, especially the wealth of experience gained by having 

sailors at the shore intermediate maintenance facilities who previously returned to their ships with the technical expertise they 

will share with junior sailors? 

Admiral CAMPBELL. Well, again, I would say that, while not all 

sailors will have the opportunity to serve in an intermediate maintenance activity, a number still do. 

And then there is also the training aspects that I am not really 

able to address in much detail. But we still are sending sailors to 
12 

ashore maintenance billets, where they have that opportunity to 

learn alongside the civilian journeymen. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And I know, you know, at least those of us who have 

depots, maintenance depots, I would like to know about the impact 

of having some contractors do some of these jobs. Maybe you can 

elaborate a little bit on that. Is it working out? 

Admiral CAMPBELL. Yes, sir, I would like to elaborate on that. 

I think the Navy takes fundamentally a three-level approach to 

maintenance. It is either a depot level, an intermediate level, or an 

organizational level; organizational level being the maintenance 

that is performed by the sailors on board the ships. Intermediate, 

as you have already mentioned in your earlier question, is done at 

the regional maintenance centers. And then depot, of course, is 

done, as you know, in the shipyards and other depots. 

The Navy has been combining intermediate- and depot-level 

maintenance. And that goes back to my earlier comment that that 

combination has brought sailors who used to be in the shore intermediate maintenance activities or on board tenders, many of those 

sailors now are at the depots, where they are working with those 

experienced civilian journeymen. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I want to allow as many members to ask questions 

because we are going to be having a vote pretty soon. 

Randy. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, thank you for what you are doing. You know, one of 

the great things about this committee is it is probably one of the 

most bipartisan committees in Congress, and I trust every individual sitting in here to ask the same kinds of questions and do 

what we need to do for the national defense of this country. 

It is so important that we get answers to the questions that we 

need so we can move together as a team. While we are sitting here 

right now, North Korea is loading a rocket on its launch pad that 

many of us think could perhaps hit Alaska if they actually go 

through with that launch. 

I am concerned because, again, as I mentioned earlier, I see so 

many of the discussions from the people who have the information 

that we need to have to do the kind of oversight that we need to 

do who are being barred from even talking to us, as I read this 

nondisclosure agreement. And it says ‘‘predecision or otherwise.’’ 

But when we talk about the state of our surface fleet, it is my understanding the Navy is now moving to a position where all the 

INSURV assessments are going to be classified. And if that is the 

case, I worry about how we are going to get the information that 

we need just to make sure we are making intelligent decisions to 

help you. 

And I am not asking you guys to address that, but I am just saying that is a concern that most of us have, if you will take that 

back. 

This committee, everybody that you see up here that was here 

during the last year, supported adding $120 million. The chairman 

got that into his mark for depot maintenance, and we lost that in 

the Senate and in conference, as you know. 

But as I understand, what we are talking about today—and if I 

am asking the question unfairly or I am not phrasing it the right 
13 

way, correct me, because there is no intent to catch anybody here. 

I just want to get the information. 

As I understand it to get to the 313-ship Navy that many of us 

think is a floor—it is not the ceiling of where we want to go—we 

are dependent upon getting an extra five years out of the lifecycle 

of most of our platforms. At least that is the basis, I think, that 

we are working on. 

Is that a fair assessment, or am I wrong on that? Maybe I misunderstood the testimony. 

Admiral MCMANAMON. Sir, I think in our most recent report to 

Congress OPNAV has asked the engineering community to look at 

the extension of up to five years on expected service life for a variety of the ship classes. So we are looking at that. 

Mr. FORBES. But don’t we need to get five years? I mean, somebody had testimony that we are trying to get an extra five years 

out of the lifecycle of those platforms. 

Admiral MCMANAMON. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And right now we are only at about 23 or 24 years 

on most of our vessels. Is that a fair statement? 

Admiral MCMANAMON. I think that is a fair statement. Obviously, each ship class has different maturity levels. And, obviously, 

the numbers of ships are—— 

Mr. FORBES. And one of the things that of course concerns us— 

and I think we addressed it—is whether or not we even have an 

assessment that gives us a lifecycle assessment as to what we need 

for maintenance to get there. And I know we are doing some prototypes to hopefully get there, but we don’t have that in play right 

now for the whole fleet, do we? 

Admiral ECCLES. No, sir, we do not have that in play yet for the 

entire fleet. But we are moving out, and, in fact, today in the 

Cruiser Mobile Bay, there is a survey team of a number of surveyors who are under way with the ship. The CLASSRON and the 

commanding officer of the ship felt it was important that those surveyors in this pilot program have an opportunity to not only measure the ship and have the kind of full disclosure into structures 

and so forth that they are looking for, but to see the ship in action 

under way. So they have been doing that this week. 

Mr. FORBES. And one of the things that I understand, a lot of 

times before we actually do the INSURV, because we know when 

the INSURV is going to take place, we actually spend quite a sizable sum on that vessel before the INSURV takes place sometimes, 

to get it up to go through the inspection. Is that a fair statement? 

Admiral CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. We recognized after STOUT and 

CHOSIN last year, with the results of those INSURVs, that the 

ships had not done adequate preparation for the in-depth inspection that the INSURV board performs. And so we did recognize the 

need to consider when the INSURV is actually scheduled in the 

ship’s cycle and ensuring that the ship is ready for such a detailed 

inspection. 

The INSURV inspection occurs only every five years on these 

ships, and so not all ships’ force sailors have had the opportunity 

on their current ship to have gone through an INSURV. And, 

therefore, it is necessary for them to do that kind of preparation 

before the board arrives. 
14 

Mr. FORBES. I am going to wrap up my question so we can get 

to some other people before we go vote. But I am going to submit 

some written questions to you, and let me just tell you the scope 

of those. 

I don’t even know—one, we may not get the INSURVs because 

they may be classified now. Second, if we get them, sometimes they 

are a little bit deceptive because we had spent a lot of money before the INSURV actually took place, you know, to get a full picture. But, as I understand it, we have a $417 million shortfall right 

now in our maintenance needs. 

And some of the questions I am just going to submit to you is, 

how much funding has the Navy requested in the 2009 supplemental request to meet the year-end shortfalls and ship depot 

maintenance funding levels and whether or not that requirement 

will be funded, the total fiscal year 2009 requirements for ship 

depot maintenance will be funded if Congress fully funds those 

amounts. 

But I have a series of other questions that I am going to just submit to you, if you don’t mind responding to them, just so we can 

get a handle on how much money we actually need so that perhaps 

we can get these budgets where we want them to be to get the 

maintenance up to where we think it needs to be. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time now. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Now for questions I yield to my good friend from Mississippi, the 

chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, with what I guess is going to be a shift in the Navy 

to building more 51s and fewer 1,000s, what plans, if any, have you 

taken so that the first couple blocks of 51s—what are you going to 

do to modify them to keep them in the fleet as long as possible? 

The second thing is, given the delays in the LCS program, I 

spend too much time shaking my head at the early retirement of 

the Coastal Mine Hunters. I am told that the primary reason that 

you can retire in this fiberglass hull with less than 18 years on 

them is because of the engine. I mean, why isn’t someone just looking at putting a different engine in them and keeping them around 

at least until we have sufficient LCSs with their packages? 

And the third question would be, I noticed the—what was your 

budget for fuel in 2008? And what did you actually spend for fuel 

in 2008 on these surface combatants? 

Admiral MCMANAMON. Yes, sir, I can easily talk a little bit about 

our DDG modernization program, which is under PMS–400 and 

surface combatants. 

And we have been working for approximately four years to plan 

the modernization plan for DDGs. And, in fact, we will be looking 

to start our first hull and mechanical engineering modernization 

for DDGs in 2010 and our combat systems in 2012. So Admiral 

Clark, before he left, actually started us to look down that. And, 

in fact, that was one of our big driving forces, knowing how long 

that ship class is going to be around for, to actually start looking 

now, right now today, at a modernization program for those DDGs. 

Our first ones are scheduled. We listened very carefully to the 

Congress. Our oldest DDGs are going in first. The Arleigh Burke 
15 

and the John Paul Jones will be starting. And our entire plan 

there is to do Maritime Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) 

and then combat system upgrades as we move forward, starting in 

2010 and 2012. 

In terms of the engines—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, those vessels were brought into the fleet 

in the late 1980’s? 

Admiral MCMANAMON. 1991 for Arleigh Burke, so she is—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. So what—— 

Admiral MCMANAMON [continuing]. Right about the 17-year 

mark. 

When we looked at—Arleigh Burke, herself, will be right about 

17, 18 as we move forward. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So what is the anticipated service life of the 51? 

Admiral MCMANAMON. Right now, the 51 was designed for a 35- 

year service life, and we were asked to look, could we extend that 

5 years to 40. And there is no—as long as we do the right maintenance and we do the right modernization, there is no technical reason why we cannot make 40 years for that ship hull. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Because, again, it really does gripe me that when 

the Block 1 cruisers were retired at less than 20 years, that was 

a terrible waste of the taxpayers’ resource. And we just can’t keep 

making those kinds of mistakes. 

Admiral MCMANAMON. Yes, sir. 

In terms of your question in regards to the Mine Hunters and 

the engines, we are, also under our upgrade program, looking to 

see how we can best support the MCMs. We do have a look at the 

engine, and that was one of the big engine issues on whether we 

were going to reengineer, were we going to try to do a planned improvement program to that. And I will take that for the record to 

give—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Also, we have a hold on two MHEs that were going 

to be transferred. 

Admiral MCMANAMON. Transferred, yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And, again, we are only given so much of the taxpayers’ treasure to try to put together a fleet, and it just doesn’t 

make sense to retire something at 18 years, particularly with the 

LCS being as late as it is, and not look at putting a better engine 

in instead. So I wish you would get back to us on that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. And on the fuel because, again, as is absolutely no 

secret, I am hard over that the next generation of cruisers should 

be nuclear-powered for a lot of reasons. I am just curious how 

much of that $417 million shortfall that you spoke of is because of 

fuel prices. 

Admiral CULLOM. Sir, I will take that one. 

On the fuel prices, overall writ large for Navy, our fuel bill has 

varied between $1.7 billion, $1.8 billion up to $5 billion, depending 

on the price that we are paying for fuel. 

For surface combatants exactly, I will go back and we will get 

you an exact figure for that and—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 
16 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I had a question about some of the problems that you are seeing 

in training now. And it used to be that the training was one-onone, and now you are using more of self-directed computer and also 

person. And they said that is more cost-effective but actually the 

result might not be as good. 

So could you address that, please? Do you have some concerns 

about the way we are training people? Are we relying too much on 

the automated and self-directed computer training versus the traditional way of apprenticeship, working under somebody actually 

showing how to do things? 

Admiral CULLOM. For the automated training, we are probably 

not the right grouping of folks to ask on that question. We can certainly get back to you with a better answer for you specifically 

on—— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, but you don’t have a sense at all that 

this might be factoring in some of the problems that you are seeing, you know, some of the collisions that we have seen recently 

and—— 

Admiral CULLOM. I think Admiral McManamon might be able to 

answer—— 

Admiral MCMANAMON. Yes, ma’am. As part of—the Surface Warfare Enterprise also is very interested in that. And, in fact, at a 

couple of meetings over the last two years we actually set up one 

of our enterprise cross-functional teams to actually look very specifically at what was the impact of the computer-based training, because there was some deck-plate concern that perhaps we had 

moved too quickly in that. 

We will get back to you for the record the results of that study, 

but there was acknowledgment by the ships. And I think what we 

generally found was that there are some years that are very wellsuited for the computer-based training and other areas that perhaps we needed some more hands-on on some of our junior sailors. 

And so we did look very carefully at that and the Commander 

Navy Surface Forces, in his enterprise hat, has asked us to look at 

it more carefully. 

But we will get back to you, ma’am, on the results and what we 

seem to be moving on there. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I would appreciate that. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Nye. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I would like to thank all of our members here for 

their service. And we are all working toward the same goal here, 

in keeping our Navy and our fleet as ready as possible and as effective as possible and doing the missions that our country requires 

overseas. 
17 

I am going to keep my questions short given the fact that we 

have a vote coming up, and I will submit additional questions in 

writing. 

But, first, a question for Admiral Cullom. Thank you for being 

here today. I want to note that in January of this year, the Navy 

announced its intention to home-port a nuclear carrier in Mayport, 

Florida. 

Given the fact that Mayport has, to date, never home ported a 

nuclear carrier, the fact that we have seen numbers, a $4.6 billion 

shortfall in 2009 budget priorities, including $417 million in ship 

maintenance and also $800 million in unfunded modernization and 

restoration for existing nuclear-capable shipyards, my question for 

you is: Is the infrastructure that would require what we estimate 

to be approaching a billion dollars of military construction 

(MILCON) investment at Mayport to put in place the same as that 

which is already available in Norfolk? 

Admiral CULLOM. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of Defense have been talking about this issue, and it is 

under discussion and deliberation right now as to what is the best 

decision. And no decision has really been made at this point yet as 

to whether it should be done or not. 

Mr. NYE. Okay. So if I understand your answer correctly, this 

issue is still under review and no final decision has been put forth? 

Admiral CULLOM. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. NYE. Okay. Well, let me just comment, it seems to me that 

if the facilities in Mayport would be equivalent to the ones in Norfolk, we are talking about some duplicative spending at a time 

when we are facing some serious budgetary shortfalls currently in 

terms of keeping our ships ready so they can do their missions 

overseas. 

One other question, I just wanted to follow up on something that 

my colleague Mr. Forbes said, a question for Admiral Campbell. I 

would also be very interested in seeing the results of your mid-year 

review. And I know you have said today you are still in the process 

of doing that review, and so you don’t have the numbers available 

today. 

I would appreciate it, if it is possible, to follow up in writing to 

us and let us know what those numbers are if they are available. 

Also, how much you plan to request in terms of supplemental funding for the ship maintenance deficit. 

To be quite frank with you, I, along with I know a number of my 

colleagues, would be very happy to see a specific plan on how we 

are going to get to meet that shortfall. And, again, recognizing you 

are still under review right now, I would appreciate it if you could 

give us as much, in a written response, in terms of details of meeting that plan for immediate shortfall as possible. I would appreciate that. 

Thank you. 

Admiral CAMPBELL. We will provide that to you, yes, sir. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 69.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 
18 

There are members that have other commitments, other meetings, and we have about 3 minutes for the next vote. I know a lot 

of members would like to submit questions for the record, and they 

will submit them to you. We don’t want to keep you here any 

longer because we have votes and I know you have other things to 

do. But thank you very much for your testimony. 

And this hearing stands adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 25, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 25, 2009 

(23) 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 25, 2009 

(49) 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 25, 2009 

(69) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Admiral MCMANAMON. A previous one-year test aboard two MCM 1 class ships 

demonstrated that the operational availability of the existing engines could be satisfactorily improved through a series of engine improvements. Test results showed engine operations in excess of 13,000 hours with a 56% reduction in corrective maintenance when compared to the class average. There were minimal critical component 

failures and no catastrophic casualties. Most failures experienced were repairable on 

board with stocked parts. 

The Navy developed and executed a planned product improvement program as 

part of its maintenance and modernization program for the MCM 1 class IsottaFraschini engines. This program has demonstrated a 15% increase in the operational availability of the existing engines. The following improvements were installed on all MCM 1 Class ships’ Isotta-Fraschini main propulsion and ship’s service diesel engines: improved cylinder heads, redesigned main bearings, improved cylinder liners, gallery cooled pistons, improved rings, as well as improved filter systems for combustion air, fuel oil and lube oil. 

Additionally, the Navy is conducting an AVENGER class MCM service life sustainability study. The study will determine the equipment/systems requiring modernization to continue all 14 AVENGER-class MCMs in commission through 2030. 

The AVENGER-class MCM was designed for a 30 year life span. They are 

planned to decommission between 2017 and 2024. [See page 15.] 

Admiral CULLOM. None of the $417 million ship depot maintenance shortfall is 

a result of fuel price changes. Maintenance and fuel are funded in separate budget 

line items. [See page 15.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER 

Admiral MCMANAMON. The Navy’s training methodologies, organizational manning, and maintenance philosophy have all evolved over time. Within the training 

area, selection of specific training methodologies to optimize the learning transfer 

of the knowledge, skill, and/or ability (KSA) of the individual is a foundational part 

of the curriculum development process to create a Navy course. The resultant 

Blended Training Solution (combination of instructor lead training, lab training, 

computer-based training, simulation training, etc.) requires assessment if a Sailor’s 

KSA’s are not adequate to support the work assigned. Currently CBT accounts for 

33% of training in Navy accession training schoolhouses; regular Training Requirement Reviews facilitate maintaining Navy courses to current Fleet requirements. 

There is great value in the effectiveness and efficiency of CBT. However, there 

is some concern that the pendulum has swung too far away from traditional schoolhouse based training and there needs to be a better balance between the two forms. 

The Navy is assessing if CBT is delivering the right prerequisite skills training 

and qualifications to our Sailors. The Center for Naval Analyses is reviewing the 

impact of CBT with a report due later this year. The Navy will take appropriate 

actions based on this report. [See page 16.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE 

Admiral CAMPBELL. The mid-year review of the FY09 unfunded requirement is 

still in progress and currently at the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces/Commander, 

Pacific Fleet level. In mid-March 2009, the Office of the Assistant Secretary (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER), provided guidance regarding 

the annual mid-year review of unfunded requirements for the Navy’s Operation and 

Maintenance (O&M,N) accounts. All O&M,N appropriation holders were directed to 

follow the guidance to generate, evaluate, prioritize, mitigate and forward all additional requirements identified since the beginning of the current fiscal year. The 

chain of command will evaluate, prioritize and mitigate issues and forward all unresolved mid-year issues to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) in 

the few weeks. OPNAV will decide how to address each unresolved unfunded issue 
70 

and whether additional funds will be requested. Any modifications to the FY09 initial ship maintenance shortfall will be made at that time. The several unplanned 

and unfunded requirements that DoN is currently addressing have rough order of 

magnitude (ROM) estimates and more thorough evaluations of the total cost of repair, required funding and plans of action are being conducted. As with the midyear issues, these repair costs will be evaluated, prioritized and mitigated within 

the entire Navy program prior to any additional funds being requested outside of 

DoN. Fleet readiness remains one of the Navy’s highest priorities and as such is 

receiving the highest level of attention from the Navy leadership. [See page 17.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 25, 2009 

(73) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. Extending ships’ operational life beyond their expected service life addresses a shortfall in acquisition, while uncertainty about the ability to achieve the 

expected service life raises issues regarding shortfalls in maintenance and 

sustainment. The Navy has not technically articulated the maintenance requirement if it wants to keep its ships operating 30–45 years. How is the Navy assessing 

whether its ships will achieve their expected service life, and what is it doing to extend ship service life? What efforts are being undertaken to improve the capability 

of the ship’s crew to do self-assessment of the ship’s material condition? What benefits would derive from extending the ship life assessment pilot program beyond fiscal year 2009? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. Reaching ESL for our surface platforms is a key underpinning of the 

Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan and our ability to reach a minimum 313-ship 

Navy. The Navy initiated four Surface Ship Life Assessment Pilots in FY09 to help 

determine the ability of a ship to meet its Expected Service Life (ESL). 

The Surface Ship Life Assessment pilots provide a solid analytical basis for making critical repair decisions in selected areas, and provide potential to build confidence that our surface ships can fulfill force-level requirements well into the future 

by assuring that they will remain effective warships for the full duration of their 

expected service life. This effort takes a best practice from industry and utilizes advanced finite element modeling techniques to provide a fully engineered view of the 

criticality of needed maintenance actions. NAVSEASYSCOM has currently undertaken four pilots: one on a DDG 51 Class ship (USS COLE, DDG 67); one on a CG 

47 Class ship (USS MOBILE BAY, CG 53); one on a LSD 41 class ship (USS GERMANTOWN, LSD 42); and, one on a FFG 7 Class ship (USS UNDERWOOD, FFG 

36). To accomplish the pilots, NAVSEASYSCOM has teamed with the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) which is the Classification Society that provides similar 

services for the commercial shipping industry. At the conclusion of the four pilots, 

the information gathered will be used for further study, analysis and possible incorporation into future life cycle management initiatives including ICMP tasks, new 

maintenance procedures and possible changes in our maintenance processes. The 

Navy will also use this information to decide how best to incorporate periodic engineering assessments into the maintenance planning sequence for each ship class. 

The benefit of extending the ship life assessment pilot program beyond FY09 is that 

more ships would be included in the process and receive an in-depth assessment of 

remaining ship life. 

Additional activities currently used to assess a ship’s material condition are: 

• Inspections and organizational level maintenance conducted by the ship’s 

crew 

• Integrated Class Maintenance Plan (ICMP) condition assessment tasks performed by Regional Maintenance Center personnel 

• Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) chartered to survey ships to assess 

current material condition and warfighting readiness, including ability to support continued service (individual ships surveyed about every five years) 

• Pre-Overhaul Tests & Inspections (POT&Is) performed on selected ship classes to better inform the work package development process 

Mr. ORTIZ. Ship commanding officers often face the quandary of deciding whether 

to stay in a maintenance availability longer or opt not to do maintenance work and 

risk more work later, potentially at a premium price. Please explain the criticality 

of the class maintenance plan to service life sustainment and service life extension 

of non-nuclear surface combatants such as cruisers and destroyers. How does engineered operating cycle versus a progressive maintenance plan affect service life? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. Prior to the 1980s, the Navy operated on a time-driven maintenance 

philosophy where equipment was overhauled to like-new status on fixed time intervals regardless of actual equipment material condition. Time-directed equipment 
74 

overhauls were bundled into large, preplanned, and fully integrated complex ship 

overhauls. The approach was less than optimal in that equipment often did not need 

complete overhauls and equipment overhauls often induced subsequent equipment 

failures. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the Navy followed industry best practices 

and transitioned to condition based maintenance. Condition based maintenance was 

introduced through the phased maintenance program implemented on fast combat 

stores ships in order to improve operational availability and was later expanded to 

include amphibious and some surface combatant ship classes. Success of these and 

other programs led to Navy wide adoption of condition based maintenance for all 

ships and aircraft in 1998. 

Under a condition based maintenance philosophy, maintenance is performed 

based on objective evidence of need. Today, class maintenance plans consist predominantly of material condition assessment tasks and qualified repair tasks. Material condition assessment tasks objectively measure material condition and establish 

objective evidence of the need to accomplish specific corrective maintenance. Qualified repair tasks are screened, brokered to a maintenance availability, and executed 

based on the results of material condition assessments. Failure to properly execute 

class maintenance plans will lead to late detection of material condition discrepancies. Because most material condition discrepancies get worse over time, late detection of discrepancies leads to more costly subsequent repair and ultimately, higher cost to achieve intended service life. 

Accurate class maintenance plans and effective execution of class maintenance 

plan requirements are therefore absolutely essential to economical achievement of 

intended ship service life. 

Engineered operating cycle is a maintenance availability scheduling strategy 

where maintenance requirements are scheduled and grouped into large depot maintenance availabilities. The Engineered operating cycle strategy also allowed time for 

and tight integration with the extensive modernization efforts being implemented 

prior to the 1990s. 

Progressive maintenance planning refers to a number of maintenance scheduling 

and contracting strategies (e.g., Multi-Ship Multi-Option contracting and continuous 

maintenance). These strategies move most depot maintenance required over a ship’s 

service life out of large availabilities. The maintenance is instead executed in shorter, more frequent depot maintenance availabilities (e.g., phased maintenance availabilities or selected restricted availabilities) or during operationally available times 

when the ship can be in a continuous maintenance availability without interfering 

with operational commitments through an equipment or component change-out program. 

For surface ships, progressive maintenance has a number of advantages over the 

engineered operating cycle strategy. Because progressive maintenance can be scheduled and executed during the shorter, more frequent maintenance availability periods, the length of time that material condition discrepancies are left uncorrected is 

minimized, allowing for less growth of material condition degradation and subsequent costs to repair. Because less maintenance is conducted during any one particular depot maintenance period, availabilities are less complicated, take up a 

smaller percentage of the operating cycle, incur less depot overhead costs and are 

less likely to go over budget or off schedule. 

However, there are two disadvantages to the progressive maintenance strategy. 

Maintenance planning can be more difficult under progressive maintenance because 

availabilities are shorter, and short maintenance period overruns can impact operational commitments. Additionally, because equipment is not routinely brought back 

to the more expensive ‘‘like new’’ post-overhauled condition, progressive maintenance may entail slightly greater per ship operational risk associated with successfully achieving intended service life. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How confident are you, in a constrained funding environment and in 

light of anticipated decreases in defense funding in FY10 and beyond, that sufficient 

funding, manpower, and technical support can be provided for SEA 21 to provide 

full-spectrum lifecycle management and to the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management 

(SSLCM) Activity to assess and manage maintenance requirements? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Navy will formally stand up the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management (SSLCM) Activity in May 2009 under the Deputy Commander for Surface 

Warfare (SEA 21). 

Partnering with U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the SSLCM Activity will assess and 

manage the maintenance requirements throughout the life cycle of ships in the surface fleet, in order to better plan and budget for long-term maintenance needs. The 

SSLCM Activity is planned as a long-term improvement to surface ship maintenance and is being addressed in the President’s Budget submission so it can be ap-
75 

propriately resourced, balancing the competing requirements of ship operations, 

maintenance and modernization. 

Mr. ORTIZ. In Commander Naval Surface Forces’ comprehensive review of surface 

ships’ overall readiness, what readiness factors were reviewed, what stressors did 

the review find, and what course corrections were found to be needed? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. In an effort to determine if systemic support problems existed, CNSF 

conducted a comprehensive review of overall surface ships readiness. Known as the 

‘‘Take a Fix’’ round of readiness briefs (Autumn 2008), CNSF assessed and reported 

on all readiness factors (maintenance, supply, training and personnel) across the 

Force. 

In the area of maintenance, three gaps or stressors were identified: (1) Strategy 

and organization. The long-range, lifecycle maintenance planning function for surface ships was missing. Submarines and aircraft carrier lifecycle maintenance is 

guided by two dedicated organizations (Submarine Maintenance Engineering, Planning and Procurement Activity (SUBMEPP), and Carrier Planning Activity (CPA)) 

who build long-range lifecycle maintenance plans based on engineered, task-level 

maintenance requirements. An equivalent organization does not exist for surface 

ships. This lack of centralized surface ship lifecycle management, coupled with a 

condition-based repair philosophy, limits the ability to accurately forecast maintenance requirements and translate them into credible budget requests. The Surface 

Ship Lifecycle Management (SSLCM) Activity of NAVSEA 21 will be established (8 

May 2009) as the activity responsible for this long-range, lifecycle maintenance 

management. NAVSEA 05 (Systems Engineering) is responsible to validate and approve the underlying engineering requirements and associated maintenance tasks 

that deliver the planned service life of shipboard systems. 

(2) Measurements. An accurate measurement of the current ship maintenance 

backlog (both planned and deferred work), and its associated cost, is needed as an 

input to the maintenance requirements development process. A measurement technique does exist to measure and capture this information (‘‘unfunded technical requirement’’, UTR), but requires strengthening of the underlying current ships maintenance package (CSMP) input. OPNAV N43 and NAVSEA 04 have developed the 

UTR technique; CNSF, through their ‘‘Back to Basics’’ campaign, is seeking to improve the inputs to the CSMP, which will then improve the UTR measurement. 

(3) Tools and processes. Each surface ship class maintenance strategy should be 

guided by a technical foundation paper (high-level maintenance strategy), which 

provides assumptions and boundaries for the Integrated Class Maintenance Plan 

(ICMP). The ICMP is a task-by-task listing of engineered maintenance requirements 

needed over the planned service life to maintain prescribed engineering standards 

and system technical attributes. ICMPs are then ‘‘filtered’’ into class-standard Baseline Availability Work Packages (BAWP), which guide notional availability planning. Each ship then combines ICMP tasks in the BAWP with ship-specific corrective maintenance actions to form the ship- and availability-specific Availability 

Work Packages (AWPs). The SSLCM Activity of NAVSEA 21 is responsible for the 

development of these tools and processes. They will work with the Ship Class 

Squadrons (CLASSRONS), who will be the ship-specific executive agents for BAWPs 

and AWPs. 

Residual supply storeroom shortfalls have been experienced as a result of funding 

constraints experienced during FY08 and FY09. The relaxation of 100% on hand/ 

on order TYCOM policy for parts was necessary to support the substantial decrease 

in funding levels. Although the aggregate range/depth percentages still remain 

above TYCOM goals, potential exists for a ‘‘bow wave’’ of parts should the requisitioning of material requirements be restored to normal parameters. CNSF continues 

to monitor range/depth percentages across the Force on a daily basis to ensure no 

severe degradation in logistics readiness occurs. 

In the area of training, Afloat Training Group (ATG) has had a difficult time 

keeping up with the training requirements for the fleet. They are fully capable of 

providing effective training however, manning reductions have limited their capacity 

to match every ship’s schedule. The fleet has relied on more computer based training (CBT) and the ATRC waterfront detachment was disestablished. Numbered 

Fleet Commander (NFC) tasking during Basic Phase, Component Commander’s 

(COCOM) Request For Forces (RFF) make it difficult for ATG and the ship to provide and receive effective training. 

Corrective actions included establishing a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) introduction course on the waterfront. Engineman career progression was reviewed and 

the formal training curriculum is being revised. A Anti Submarine Warfare Officer 

(ASWO) Course and an Engineering Readiness Assist Team (ERAT) was established. Initiatives are in progress with Naval Education and Training Command 
76 

(NETC) and Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) to bring back the Senior Officer 

Ship Material readiness Course (SOSMRC). ATG Limited Team Training (LTT) procedures were changed to stress less on assessment and more on training by ATG. 

Main battery Non-Combatant Expenditure Allocation (NCEA) was increased to improve gun systems readiness (INSURV finding). A two-phase Shipboard Training 

Team course to better prepare ships for the Basic Phase of the Fleet Response 

Training Plan to include Combat Systems and Engineering LTT visits was instituted. In addition, revised USW continuous certification requirements were implemented with emphasis on external assessment and resources. A16-week Basic Phase 

and increased Maintenance Phase entitlement was codifed in the revised Fleet 

Training Continuum (FTC) (USFF instruction approval pending) as part of an increased emphasis on basic level surface platform training and performance. 

In the area of personnel, a myriad of manpower decisions were made independently across a number of years resulting in a synergistic negative impact on shipboard manpower and manning. Optimal Manning (OM) concept, which applied to 

most ship classes, compounded by several extremely difficult POM cycles (POM 08/ 

10) reduced manpower even further. The reduction in manpower on the FFG 7 class 

was the result of POM 08 required fiscal balancing. In addition, OPNAV’s directed 

‘‘Top 6 Alignment,’’ though it did not reduce overall manpower on ships, it did reduce the pay grade of the billets and the associated personnel with the unintended 

consequence of reducing experience level, a significant impact to units with already 

reduced or Optimal Manning. Finally, the Navy Individual Augmentation program 

to support the Overseas Contingency Operations continues to reduce the available 

manning for ships. 

Corrective actions taken include a PR09 issue to fund additional enlisted billets 

on DDGs, and a PR11 issue submitted to refund billets on FFG 7s to support a revised Required Operations Capabilities (ROC)/Projected Operational Environment 

(POE) which will require the ships to be capable of full multi-mission operations. 

Additionally, action has been taken to support imminently deploying ships through 

the reassignment of personnel from future deploying units to those deploying within 

the next several months to ensure ships are fully manned to meet deployment requirements. This action resulted in the degradation of the manning level for some 

ships. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Aegis Program Executive Office PEO was involved in the full life 

of that ship, from design to development of training for sailors and life-cycle maintenance. What has the Navy learned from the Aegis experience about life-cycle 

sustainment and how can those lessons be applied to improve the life expectancy 

of other ship classes? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. Initial design of Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers included life-cycle 

sustainment as an overall design factor. The entire Aegis concept included a detailed systems engineered approach to meeting the mission of the ship. Organizations charged with sustaining these platforms over their lifecycle were integral participants in the design of the Aegis Combat System (ACS) and the platforms on 

which it is employed. This involvement during initial design and follow on improvements has resulted in a team of engineers, technicians and trainers who are better 

prepared to support these ships. The Aegis program was a complete ‘‘Cradle to 

Grave’’ organization that integrated HME, Combat Systems, Training, Logistics, InService support and modernization and upgrades. This expertise was transitioned 

to the homeports in support of in-service cruisers and destroyers with the Combatant Homeport Engineering Teams (CHET) and the Aegis Modernization Test Teams 

(AMTT) including a strong building yard planning yard component. These organizations, and headquarters commands, were constructed to allow continuous feedback 

which has proven instrumental in applying lessons learned from Fleet operations 

through both the iterative improvement to cruisers and destroyers during the construction process and in developing their mid-life upgrades. The mid-life upgrades 

of the modernization programs allow for further sustainment of these ships and enable the achievement of a 35 year expected service life in support of the Navy’s 313 

ship requirement. 

It is the intent of the Navy to apply many of the lessons learned in sustaining 

the Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers to other surface ships. In order to facilitate application of these lessons, and those obtained from other platforms, the Naval Sea Systems Command established the Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA–21). 

SEA–21 provides the Fleet with an organization focused toward sustainment of the 

surface force. This organization is further partnered with PEO SHIPS, forming 

Team Ships, to continue the tradition of including lifecycle sustainment as a primary factor in the ship design and construction process as the Navy introduces new 

platforms and capabilities to the Fleet. The Navy’s Surface Ship Lifecycle Manage-
77 

ment (SSLCM) Activity will take full advantage of the existing stakeholders (Program Manager’s Representatives, Engineering Field Representatives, Planning Yard 

representatives, etc. to apply best practices to ensure that every surface ship meets 

its expected design life. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Your testimony states that ‘‘a key tenet of our ability to maintain forward-deployed and surge-ready naval forces is the proper resourcing, planning and 

execution of maintenance needed to prepare and sustain our ships. The same testimony states that Fleet Response Plan, ‘‘when fully funded,’’ enables the Navy to 

continuously deploy three Carrier Strike Groups to points around the globe, surge 

three more in 30 days and deploy a seventh in 90s days.’’ What happens when sufficient resources are not found and accounts are not fully funded? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. If sufficient resources are not found, the Navy will be required to balance the risk between the operating, maintenance, and procurement accounts in a 

manner that takes into account the short term risks of not meeting current operational demands with the longer term risks of either not meeting expected service 

life or recapitalizing our ships and aircraft. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Your testimony states ‘‘A well established process exists to identify and 

program the resources required for ship maintenance,’’ yet it also states that ‘‘one 

of the greatest obstacles to the surface fleet’s ability to articulate the 100% maintenance requirement necessary to reach expected service life’’ is the lack of a detailed 

surface ship class maintenance plan. What steps is the Navy taking to bring greater 

rigor to the surface fleet maintenance requirements process and to ensure that these 

requirements are fully resourced? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Navy is taking several steps to bring greater rigor to the surface 

fleet maintenance requirements. These include: 

• Establishment of SEA 21 as the full spectrum life cycle manager for surface 

ship readiness 

• The creation of the Surface Ship Life Cycle Maintenance Activity (SSCLMA) 

to manage and improve class maintenance plans and create more accurate 

baseline availability work packages 

• Establishment of technical redlines for surface ships for NAVSEA 05 similar 

to those that exist on submarines and aircraft carriers 

• Conducting a bottom up review of surface ship class maintenance plan to ensure the 100% technical requirement required to meet expected service life is 

embedded in the our ship class maintenance plans 

• In conjuction with the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), conducting a pilot 

program to survey a ship from each of four major ship classes to establish 

baseline material conditions for use in building future class maintenance 

plans 

The Navy will continue to take a balanced approach that manages the risk to our 

operational, maintenance and procurement accounts to meet both current and future readiness demands in light of current fiscal constraints. 

Mr. ORTIZ. If only five weeks of a nine-week depot availability involves ‘‘real 

wrench turning,’’ what will need to be done to get more time in depot for surface 

combatant ships? Does the Navy have sufficient infrastructure, manpower and funding to increase that time to 15–16 weeks? How can the Navy meet its FRP requirements with extended depot time? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The current notional Fleet Response Plan (FRP) cycle for surface 

ships is 27 months in duration: 9 week (2 months) maintenance availability, 4 

months Basic Phase training, and 3 months Integrated Phase training, which generates 18 months (67%) where a unit is employable (available for tasking). 

Extending maintenance period to a 15–16 week maintenance availability (approximately 4 months), while maintaining the notional training cycle and timelines, 

leaves 16 months (59%) where a unit is employable. Aggregating this change across 

the surface force structure and making minor schedule changes, the Navy would 

still be able to meet the most stressful operational plan (OPLAN) requirements, and 

the SECDEF approved Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) presence requirements. 

With respect to maintenance infrastructure, most surface ship maintenance is 

sourced from the private sector which has demonstrated significant expansion capabilities. As for manpower and funding impacts, current maintenance execution practice involves assignment of a funded 2–4 week continuous maintenance availability 

(CMAVs) prior to and/or following the scheduled CNO availability. These CMAVs 
78 

enable the start of funded depot repair work (tank cleaning and gas freeing, interference lay-out and removal, open-and-inspection), as well as preliminary alteration 

production work. Thus, a nine-week CNO availability was, from a funding allocation 

perspective, essentially a 12–16 week availability. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Your testimony states operational tempo for Navy surface combatants 

has increased 19% since 2000. While maintenance and ship operating budgets also 

have increased, the focus of those additional maintenance dollars were aimed at 

near-term ship readiness, making the surface fleet much more susceptible to 

changes in optempo. Is the Navy funding the maintenance it needs or doing the 

maintenance it has funding for? When you look at the sharp rise in operational 

availability and the slight rise in maintenance funding, are we funding short-term 

readiness gains in operational availability at the expense of maintenance required 

to fund long-term readiness? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Navy is funding the maintenance it needs. In the case of Aircraft 

Carriers and Submarines, we have a proven process that has allowed us to fully articulate and fund the 100% technical requirement needed to fund both short-term 

and long-term readiness to ensure these ships reach their expected service life. 

While surface ship maintenance has also been funded near 100% of the stated surface ship maintenance requirement, our process for accurately identifying that specific 100% technical requirement was lacking. Our planning requires specific improvements. To that end, the Navy is taking several steps to bring greater rigor to 

the surface fleet maintenance requirements. These include: 

• Establishment of SEA 21 as the full spectrum life cycle manager for surface 

ship readiness 

• Stand up, under SEA 21, of the Surface Ship Life Cycle Maintenance Activity 

(SSCLMA) to manage and improve class maintenance plans and build baseline availability work packages 

• Establishment of technical redlines for surface ships for NAVSEA 05 similar 

to those that exist on submarines and aircraft carriers 

• Conducting a bottom up review of surface ship class maintenance plan to ensure the 100% technical requirement required to meet expected service life is 

embedded in the our ship class maintenance plans 

• With the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), conducting a pilot program to 

survey a ship from each of four major ship classes to establish baseline material conditions for use in building future class maintenance plans 

Once properly established, the 100% technical requirement will allow surface ship 

maintenance to compete on a level playing field with other Navy requirements for 

funding. The Navy will take a balanced approach that manages the risk to our operational, maintenance and procurement accounts to meet both current and future 

readiness demands. 

Mr. ORTIZ. In Commander Naval Surface Forces’ Surface Ship Maintenance Strategic Offsite, what gaps were identified in the surface ship maintenance program? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. Gaps identified were primarily process gaps in work package development and strengthening the technical foundation for work to be accomplished or deferred during surface ship maintenance availabilities. 

Comparable organizations such as the Submarine Maintenance Engineering, 

Planning and Procurement Activity (SUBMEPP) or Carrier Planning Activity (CPA) 

equivalent do not exist for surface ships. This lack of centralized surface ship life 

cycle management coupled with the current condition based repair model stresses 

the ability to accurately forecast maintenance requirements and translate them to 

budget requests. An accurate assessment of the current ship maintenance backlog, 

and its cost, has to be developed. Each surface ship class needed to have a specific 

Baseline Availability Work Package (BAWP) and a coordinated Integrated Class 

Maintenance Plan (ICMP). Ship Class Squadrons (CLASSRONS) did not have the 

tool necessary to help manage the Availability Work Package (AWP) to establish an 

accurate cost and schedule baseline for each availability. Notional availabilities 

were inaccurate and did not reflect actual cost and schedule return data. 

As part of a holistic effort, three key organizations were tasked to improve overall 

surface ship maintenance execution. 

1. CLASSRON’s are responsible for development of baseline and final Availability 

Work Packages (AWPs) and inclusion of Integrated Class Maintenance Program (ICMP) work items in appropriate availabilities. 
79 

2. NAVSEA 21 is responsible for development and management of the ICMP. Additionally, NAVSEA 21 will establish the Surface Ship life Cycle Maintenance 

(SSLCM) Activity in May 2009. 

3. NAVSEA 05 (Systems Engineering) is responsible for validating technical content of the ICMP, for adjudicating all deferral requests and for providing engineering support to SEA 21. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What are the timelines for completing the integrated class maintenance plans for each class of surface ships? When will the Navy complete the review 

of its process for recroding and report the surface ship maintenance unfunded technical requirement (UTR). Please provide for the record the UTR for surface ship 

maintenance each year since fiscal year 2000. 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. Integrated class maintenance plans currently exist for every surface 

ship class. However the Navy is conducting a bottom up review to ensure they are 

complete and technically accurate. The Navy expects to complete this review in late 

fiscal year 2010. Conducting a bottom up review of surface ship class maintenance 

plans will ensure the technical requirement required to meet expected service life 

is embedded in ship class maintenance plans. Once established, the technical requirement will allow surface ship maintenance to compete with other Navy requirements for funding. The Navy will take a balanced approach that manages the risk 

to our operational, maintenance and procurement accounts to meet both current and 

future readiness demands. 

The Navy calculates the surface ship maintenance unfunded technical requirement (UTR) for the previous fiscal year at the beginning of the next fiscal year. The 

UTR identifies future budget requirements for maintenance work that was not performed. UTRs are planning tools used to identify needed maintenance work and associated costs in order to avoid future operational impacts or mission effectiveness 

of performing maintenance at a later date. For example, FY08 UTR was calculated 

on October 1, 2008, the beginning of FY09. This year’s UTR will be calculated on 

October 1, 2009, at the beginning of FY10. The UTR process is reviewed annually 

at the time of calculation to ensure it is aligned with current Navy practices and 

desires. Slight adjustments are typically made to the process; however, a complete 

change has not occurred since 2001. 

Table 1 contains the surface ship unfunded technical requirement (UTR) for fiscal 

years 2001–2008 (POM04–PR11). UTR is expressed as the average for a single ship 

in the class in man-days to remove effects of inflation and location. UTR values are 

affected by ships’ operational availability and individual funding levels. Table 1 reflects supplemental funding received in FY03–FY05 to reduce maintenance backlog. 

UTR as a concept was introduced to the surface community in FY00. The UTR 

calculation method was significantly revised in 2001. These changes made UTR 

comparisons prior to 2001 invalid. The following steps were added in 2001: 

- Work must be identified prior to the start of an availability to ensure the opportunity exists to provide funding. 

- Service jobs inherent to availabilities are not considered. 

- All jobs are reviewed for validity using reliability-centered maintenance practices. Therefore, jobs not integral to the mission, safety, or structural integrity 

of the ship are removed. This typically accounts for 1% of the jobs considered 

for UTR. 

Beginning in FY06, a UTR business rule was added for classes that had no depot 

availability period during a single fiscal year. For classes with no availabilities during a fiscal year, the last valid UTR is carried forward. This business rule has been 

applied twice: LHD–1 Class in FY07 and LHA–1 Class in FY08. 

The following classes do not have UTR calculated for all years FY01–FY08: DD– 

963 Class and PC–1 Class. Responsibility for calculating UTR and representative 

availabilities for the PC–1 Class was assumed by the Maintenance Resource System 

in FY05. Prior to that year, UTR data was not collected for PC–1. UTR was no 

longer calculated for the DD–963 Class following the final depot availability in 

FY04. DD–963 Class decommissioned (decom) in FY05. 
80 

Table 1 

Average Surface Ship UTR in Man-Days 

FY01—FY08 

FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 

CG–47 1,808 890 204 82 760 380 410 849 

DD–963 1,458 879 855 Decom N/A N/A N/A N/A 

DDG–51 1,733 691 350 173 480 147 364 599 

FFG–7 731 589 36 45 223 302 490 687 

LHA–1 11,233 400 0 114 26 1,164 1,734 1,734 

LHD–1 4,993 2459 666 0 980 755 755 3,379 

LPD–4 3,038 347 0 1657 81 715 650 423 

LPD–17 2,430 1007 323 101 1006 612 972 913 

MCM–1 70 3 17 5 43 94 30 112 

PC–1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 338 2 0 0 

Mr. ORTIZ. Your testimony states that ‘‘Port engineers’’ who work for the [Regional Maintenance Centers] are the professional advisors of each ship’s maintenance team. What issues is the Navy experiencing in regard to recruitment and retention of qualified port engineers? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Navy is not experiencing any problems with recruitments or retention of Port Engineers. The current contract structure allows for greater flexibility in attracting qualified contracted Port Engineers. The strategy for attracting 

qualified candidates utilizes maritime trade magazines, direct interface with Maritime Academy Job Boards and Industry word of mouth to find qualified Port Engineers. Currently the 5 Maritime Academies being utilized are Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Kings Point and California. Based on contract requirements we are 

able to promptly find the right blend of experience and education in recruiting potential candidates. Surface Forces currently employs 114 port engineers in a mix of 

government civil service and contracted personnel. The current average retention for 

this aggregate community of Port Engineers is 10.64 years. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How do multi-ship, multi-option (MSMO) maintenance contracts contribute to achieving or extending ship expected service life? What steps is the Navy 

taking to resolve the difficulties it has experienced in successfully awarding MSMO 

contracts on the East Coast? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. Multi-Ship Multi-Option (MSMO) contract vehicles for ship maintenance, modernization, and repair within homeport areas maximize the ship’s operational availability and surge readiness, minimize the disruption in the quality of 

life of the ship’s crew, and provide potential for learning curve cost reductions. They 

form the cornerstone of Navy Fleet Maintenance and Modernization strategy for 

surface ships. Proper maintenance and modernization programs, such as the Cruiser 

and Destroyer Modernization programs, ensure our ships achieve their expected 

service life. 

There has been an extensive assessment of the Navy’s MSMO contracting process 

and Navy continues to work with Industry to improve the MSMO contracting process. The Navy has made the following commitments and improvements: 

(1) MSMO processes have been revised to capitalize on previous availabilities and 

repair work to improve Notional Work Package (NWP) relevance and Independent Government Estimate (IGE) accuracy. Specifically, historical data 

from previous CNO Availabilities, Continuing Maintenance (CM), and Emergency Maintenance (EM) periods for each ship class will be used to identify 

common work items for each ship class. Those common items will be used to 

develop the NWP included in the solicitation. In addition, historical cost data 

for those common work items will be utilized to formulate the IGE. These 

changes will provide credible, accurate data that will be the building blocks 

of future MSMO solicitations. 

(2) The MSMO post-award debriefing process has also been revised to provide to 

each bidder greater detail of the Government’s analysis of its proposal. This 

expanded debriefing format will provide each bidder with an in-depth review 

of the Government’s evaluation of its cost and technical proposals, with the 

goal of an improved bidder understanding of shortcomings in its proposal that 

can, in turn, help the bidder improve its competitiveness for future MSMO 

contract awards. This expanded format has been successfully piloted; a debriefing ‘‘template’’ is under development to standardize this approach. 
81 

(3) The Navy will publish the upcoming MSMO solicitation and contract award 

schedule in an earlier and more predictable manner. This will provide our Industry Partners with timely information to plan their resource allocation and 

to establish teaming arrangements, all of which will enhance the competitive 

marketplace for the benefit of all parties. 

(4) In accordance with FAR 15.201, the Navy conducted a ‘‘MSMO Industry Day’’ 

in Norfolk, VA. In an effort to increase transparency, NAVSEA discussed the 

MSMO process and engaged with industry on feedback for process refinements. To further communicate the Navy’s improvements to the MSMO strategy, a follow-on Industry Day is scheduled for April 22, 2009, at the Washington Navy Yard. 

Mr. ORTIZ. One of the three things your testimony cites as early signs that surface 

ship material readiness is being impacted is the current process for executing maintenance. What examination have you made regarding how reductions in ship manning and ashore maintenance billets, and changes in crew training in apprentice 

and journeyman technician schools, onboard ship, and through reduced shore intermediate maintenance facilities is having on ship material readiness? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. We are continuing to examine the impact of manpower and training 

changes to ship material readiness. Surface ship manpower reductions have occurred since 2003 for various reasons, including cost savings, policy changes (e.g. 

elimination of visual signaling requirement and consolidation of Boatswain’s Mate 

of the Watch with Quartermaster of the Watch) and technological advances 

(SmartShip installs and moving most Pay and Personnel functions ashore). Ship 

class manpower cuts since 2003 until 2008 are as follows: 

CG 13% 

DDG 13–15% (dependent on flight) 

FFG 11% 

LHA 06% 

LHD 10% 

LSD 04% 

LPD–4 05% 

Optimal Manning determines the minimum quantity and quality of personnel required to operate ships in both Condition I (general quarters) and Condition III 

(wartime steaming, maintained for 60 days). Ship classes with manpower requirements determined using optimal manning initiatives are funded at 100 percent of 

the number of required billets. One-hundred percent manning has not been consistently met due, in part, to the number of personnel assigned as individual 

augmentees, including those in post IA deployment dwell time. While on board manning is less than optimal, the overwhelming majority of ships are succeeding at 

these manning levels. Ships with good leadership who adhere to Navy’s material 

maintenance program have fared well during INSURV inspections. The Center for 

Naval Analysis (CNA) is conducting a study to better quantify the effect optimal 

maiming has on the combat readiness of ships, with an expected completion in June 

2009. We continue to assess our manning levels and will adjust as necessary. 

Computer Based Training (CBT) is a significant component of apprenticeship 

training. Consequently new recruits receive less classroom and hands-on training. 

As with the legacy training construct, the Revolution in Training relies heavily on 

utilizing experience levels on board ship to provide oversight to the new recruit. 

However, total training has not been significantly reduced between 2003 and 2009. 

The average recruit reaching the fleet in 2003 received 282 days of training, versus 

275 in 2009 (a 2.5 percent decrease). Some schools were significantly shortened. For 

example, the training pipeline for a Gas Systems Turbine Technician was reduced 

from 355 days to 290 days; however, we increased the number of Sailors reporting 

to their commands having completed Class ‘‘A’’ School. The percentage of unrated 

firemen reaching the fleet declined from 4.8 percent in 2004 to 0.3 percent in 2009. 

Likewise, the percentage of unrated Seamen declined from 16 percent to 8 percent 

during the same period. 

The journeyman level technician is critical to equipment readiness. The technical 

training associated with Navy’s Journeyman, or Class ‘‘C’’, schools, regardless of 

method of delivery, has not resulted in less prepared Sailors. The curriculum comprising Class ‘‘C’’ school training delivered via CBT has remained largely unchanged, unless modification is required by acquisition of new capabilities or equip-
82 

ment. Regular training requirement reviews facilitate maintaining course content 

designed to meet Fleet requirements. 

Historically, Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs) and Fleet Technical Support Centers (FTSCs) permitted active duty technicians to continue honing 

their technical skills in repairing ships while assigned to shore duty. This better 

prepared them to perform ship repairs upon returning to sea duty. As an efficiency 

measure, Fleet Forces Command requested that 2200 SIMA billets, in excess of seashore rotation requirements, as well as FTSC billets, be converted to civilian performance. Completed in fiscal year 2008, this initiative established a more proficient 

and lower cost workforce to provide intermediate level ship maintenance, but reduced opportunities for Sailors to learn journeyman level skills. Approximately $250 

million in realized savings was transferred from the Military Personnel, Navy 

(MP,N) account to Type Commander continuous maintenance to support the reduced 

capacity. Material degradations and rising costs due to increases in contracted 

maintenance have quickly outpaced the realized savings. Reductions in manning, 

along with reduced experience levels of technicians, have resulted in a situation in 

which the ships are challenged to train newly arriving personnel to an acceptable 

proficiency level. The Navy Inspector General (IG) is currently conducting an investigation into determining if CBT delivers appropriate levels of prerequisite skills 

training and qualifications for our Sailors. When the Navy IG completes the investigation and releases the findings, CNSF, with all surface ship providers, will take 

appropriate actions to rectify any indentified short-comings. 

In addition to the factors above, increased Operational Tempo presents the greatest challenge with respect to readiness. Since 9/11, the Navy OPTEMPO has increased by approximately 8%, and OPTEMPO for our surface combatants is up by 

18%. We are examining the initiatives and policy changes discussed above and see 

that each change had a valid reason, at the time, in terms of improved efficiency 

and cost savings. As we continue our pursuit of identifying the root causes of the 

material readiness decline, we will make any necessary resource adjustments. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead has stated that a 

crew of 40 people will not be enough to maintain the Littoral Combat Ship through 

its lifecycle. Manning and maintenance requirements are not defined adequately in 

the LCS interim support plan. What is the life-cycle support strategy for LCS? What 

work will be done in the private and public sectors? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a class of ship that does not conform to the legacy process used on earlier generation ships since the manning is reduced, coupled with a high level of automation, with much of the support, including 

maintenance functions, accomplished ashore. 

Although the USS FREEDOM (LCS 1), built by a team led by Lockheed Martin, 

and INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2), built by a team led by General Dynamics, have two 

different seaframe designs, the maintenance concept is the same. Specifically, maintenance actions beyond the capability or capacity of ships force, including more extensive facilities maintenance, will be assigned to shore support via the Maintenance Support Detachment (MSD) and appropriate contracting vehicles. Legacy systems, such as fire pumps and air conditioners, will be supported by existing infrastructure. An Interim Support Period (ISP) has been contracted for a trial period 

of three years during which the Government will conduct a Business Case Analysis 

(BCA) to determine an optimal long-term sustainment approach. The three-year period will give the Navy time to evaluate contractor performance/responsiveness and 

appropriate usage and repair data in order to determine the optimal balance of 

ship’s force, contractor, and organic Navy workforce needed to support LCS for the 

long term. 

Preventative and corrective maintenance will be accomplished during regularly 

planned Continuous Maintenance Availabilities (CMAVs). Initial estimates for LCS 

1 and 2 include the cost to execute preventative, facility and corrective maintenance 

that would traditionally be accomplished by the crew. Every 117 days there will be 

a CMAV coinciding with crew turnover where a contractor team will conduct necessary preventive and corrective maintenance. Every two years the ship will complete a Selected Restricted Availability (SRA). Docking SRAs (DSRA) will take place 

approximately every six years. 

All shipboard maintenance requirements will be managed by the LCS Class 

Squadron (LCSRON) and the Maintenance Support Detachment (MSD) in San 

Diego. The MSD consists of two teams, the Maintenance Support and the Logistics 

Support Teams that will handle any and all maintenance and logistics issues for the 

LCS hulls. Those teams consist of personnel from the Regional Maintenance Center, 

Fleet Industrial Support Center (FISC), Navy Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), 

LCSRON, and the prime contractors. 
83 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the plan to return sailors to waterfront schools a year after 

their first cruise? When will this plan be implemented and when will funding be 

requested? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The normal process is for schools to be scheduled to occur before and 

after a Sailor’s first shipboard tour which could be up to five years in duration. Formal schools are conducted by Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) with 

quotas controlled by the detailers at Naval Personnel Command (NAVPERS). 

NAVPERS also funds the Sailors to attend these schools. On an as-needed basis, 

officers and enlisted personnel are sent by their commands to schools to obtain critical skills. These schools could occur at any time during a Sailor’s tour, but typically 

not within one year of transferring or leaving the Navy, and are paid for out of the 

ship’s training funds account. These schools may be formal schools, with a Navy Enlisted Code earned upon successful completion, or waterfront schools depending on 

the skill taught and whether the school is for individuals or teams. Officers additionally attend Surface Warfare Officer training during their initial tour as part of 

their indoctrination and qualification process. 

Amplifying information: 

Combat Systems and Deck training is based on an Apprentice-Journeyman-Master construct and begins with ‘‘A’’ schools based on a Sailor’s rate prior to their arrival at their first ship. Sailors gain experience and qualifications during their initial tour and then attend ‘‘C’’ schools prior to their second tour. 

Engineering training follows an Apprentice-Journeyman-Master construct similar 

to topside training. All engineers attend Basic Engineering Common Core (BECC) 

before reporting to a ‘‘strand’’ training course based on their rate. BECC combined 

with the strand course constitutes the Apprentice level training. After an engineer’s 

first tour, they attend ‘‘C’’ school based on their rate and earn NECs prior to their 

second ship tour. 

In the Surface Officer world when an officer executes their first set of orders, they 

are sent to one of five pipeline schools en route to their first ship. These schools 

provide fundamental skills that the ship will require based on first tour division officer billets and include: Ammunition Administration, Anti-submarine Warfare Officer, Legal Officer, TTWCS/ATWCS, and EKMS Administration. Once the officer has 

been permanently assigned to a ship, he or she is required to attend the first available four-week SWO Introduction Course, which is provided at each Fleet Concentration Area. The first three weeks of the course covers subjects ranging from 

Division Officer Fundamentals, Engineering, Maritime Warfare, Navy Familiarization, Ship Simulators, Watchstanding, and School Ship visits. The 4th week focuses 

on Leadership and it is managed by the Center for Personal and Professional Development. When the officer completes the course, he/she returns to their ship to complete all applicable fundamental, system, and watchstation Professional Qualification Standards (PQS). Dependent on ship’s schedule and the officer’s drive, the PQS 

is normally completed in 8 to 12 months. Once the PQS is complete the officer will 

attend a three-week Surface Warfare Officers School Advanced Shiphandling and 

Tactics (SWOS ASAT) course in Newport, RI. The course focuses on advanced Surface Warfare fundamentals, Seamanship and Navigation, and Maritime Warfare. 

Funding is provided by PERS–41 to attend SWOS ASAT. It is calculated based on 

travel to and from homeport. For ships deployed away from homeport, a quota request will be submitted to and approved by PERS–41. Additional training is provided after an officer’s first tour based on their second tour assignment. For instance, if a junior officer is going to be the Damage Control Assistant then they will 

attend DCA School en route to their next command. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Navy surface fleet is heavily reliant upon private-sector contractors for ship maintenance. The reliance has translated into, and is reflected in, the 

changes in maintenance training at the Navy’s ‘‘A’’ (apprentice-level) and ‘‘C’’ (journeyman level) schools and onboard ship. For example, the engineman course at ‘‘C’’ 

school that previously took two months is now 13 days. Onboard ship, sailors no 

break down engines; they call in a contractor technical representative (CTR) instead. It would seem logical that the smaller the crew size, the more critical the 

individual sailor is to ship operation. If you no longer have intermediate maintenance shore infrastructure and if do not have engineered maintenance plan to support service-life extension, then it would seem apparent that you need to have very 

qualified sailors who can provide onboard care of the ship’s systems. Is the product 

that the ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘C’’ schools are producing adequate to meet the needs of the fleet 

at a time of high operational tempo, reduced manning of crews, and pressure to fill 

individual augmentee billets? How do you incorporate maintenance back into the C 

school side after you have contracted out so much intermediate maintenance and 
84 

reduced maintenance infrastructure ashore? How do we put a renewed value on onboard training? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The surface engineering ‘A’ (Apprentice level) schools and ‘C’ (journeyman level) schools production rates are closely aligned to FY09 production goals. 

Of the eight ratings that comprise surface engineers, six (EN, EM, GSE, GSM, HT 

and MR) are on or ahead of production goals. The other two (MM and IC) are slightly behind goal with sufficient capacity to meet goal by the completion of the fiscal 

year. Of the 17 total Surface ratings, the only Surface rating that will not meet the 

planned production goal for FY09 is the Combat System rating of ET. The content 

of the engineering schools was thoroughly reviewed and validated by a working 

group chartered by the Commander, Naval Surface Forces, US Atlantic Fleet in 

2002, and then revalidated by SURFOR and AIRFOR in 2008. The goal of the working group was to conduct an Engineering Functional Analysis and define requirements for surface engineers in the 21st Century. The working groups had representatives from the US Navy, US Coast Guard, Merchant Marine, British Navy, academia and industry. Significant efficiencies were gained by providing the right 

training at the right time in a sailor’s career. As a result, many courses attained 

a degree of efficiency that enabled the content to be delivered in significantly shorter training periods. While it may appear that an individual course was significantly 

reduced in length implying that the course is not meeting the training goal, training 

content was re-engineered to ensure that Sailors are being properly trained. 

The training requirements review process managed by Naval Education and 

Training Command ensures that course reviews are conducted on a periodic basis. 

The reviews enable the stake holders to update content training in response to shipboard system changes and to determine if Fleet objectives are being met. If the 

Fleet identifies training deficiencies, the courses are modified appropriately. 

The Navy is currently developing man-machine interface operating constructs and 

more robust automation for new construction ships as well as backfit capabilities 

for ships in service which reduce manpower requirements to operate and maintain 

ships. These also reduce the unique skill sets required of Sailors on legacy platforms. This is in response to OSD and DoN objectives to reduce Total Ownership 

Cost (TOC) for weapon systems and capabilities. Achieving this manpower TOC reduction requires systematic approaches to how ships are designed, maintained, operated, supplied and equipped. This includes embedded technologies to reduce corrective maintenance actions, automated performance monitoring and data collection capabilities to reduce operator loading, distance-support concepts to move non-operational tasks off ships to centrally managed support fimctions, and contract strategies to deliver business efficient logistic support to ships at the right location, time 

and cost. On board training is still being pursued in terms of skill retention for operators and maintainers who can practice scenario-based individual and teamwork 

skills and decision making/troubleshooting. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. ‘‘What are the results of the mid-year review of surface ship maintenance requirements?’’ ‘‘Have there been additional requirements identified in the 

mid-year review that have affected the surface ship maintenance shortfall?’’ ‘‘What 

is the resulting total surface ship maintenance shortfall for the remainder of FY09?’’ 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Office of the Assistant Secretary (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 

AND COMPTROLLER) letter dated 13 March 2009 provided guidance regarding the 

annual mid-year review of unfunded requirements for the Navy’s Operation and 

Maintenance (O&M,N) accounts. All O&M,N appropriation holders were directed to 

follow the process to generate, evaluate, prioritize, mitigate and forward all additional requirements identified since the beginning of the current fiscal year. During 

every phase of the process, each echelon command conducts a thorough review of 

the requirement prior to advancing that mid-year issue to higher authority; ultimately, to be reviewed and addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). As 

of now, the beginning of the year ship maintenance shortfall of $417M has been 

mitigated by USFF, CPF and CNO by $262M leaving $155M as the current recognized ship maintenance supplemental request. The several unplanned and unfunded 

requirements that DoN is currently addressing have rough order of magnitude 

(ROM) estimates of $161M and more thorough evaluations of the total cost of repair, 

required funding and plans of action are being conducted. Fleet readiness remains 

one of the Navy’s highest priorities and as such is receiving significant attention 

from the Navy leadership. 
85 

Mr. FORBES. The Recent Non-disclosure agreement prohibits the exchange of information pre-decisional or otherwise. What does this mean? Does this mean that 

senior DOD officials will be unable to share unscripted data with Congress? Congress is mandated to raise and support armies and navies—without the support of 

DOD, this task is very hard to achieve. The NDA also prohibits sharing information 

other than with required government agencies and then list OMB. Does this mean 

that DOD is prohibited from exchanges with Congress in relation to developing 

budget priorities? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Department of Defense was directed by OMB (Memorandum M– 

09–11 dated 19 February 2009) to refrain from making commitments about programs not specifically mentioned in the Department Budget Overview or address account level details until the release of the full Budget in April. We now expect that 

the full FY 2010 President’s Budget will be released in early May. The Secretary 

of the Defense recently reiterated this direction in a memorandum dated 8 April 

2009 to the Military Departments, Agencies and Staffs that the normal budget process rules apply and that DOD is ‘‘obliged to protect from disclosure the details of 

the proposed budget until released by the President.’’ The Department of the Navy 

is obligated to comply with the direction provided. The specific non-disclosure agreement which is referenced within this question was not provided to any of the witnesses at this hearing. As such, it is impossible to address these concerns. Specific 

questions regarding the application of the DOD non-disclosure agreement would 

need to be addressed by OSD. 

Mr. FORBES. In January 2009, the Navy announced its decision to homeport a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport Naval Station in Florida. Mayport has never 

homeported a nuclear-powered carrier. We are told that the military construction 

price tag will be $456 million dollars, plus a one-time maintenance cost of $85 million and $24 million in personnel change of station costs. That’s $565 million. Additionally, the Navy estimates that it will cost an additional $25.5 million in annual 

recurring costs compared to keeping a carrier in Norfolk. This is due to the recurring cost of base operating support and sustainment restoration and modernization 

costs, and travel and per diem for transitory maintenance labor. Can you help me 

understand how ship maintenance and readiness will be conducted on a nuclear aircraft should we move one to Florida? Were you consulted on the maintenance impacts of this arrangement during the Navy’s decision-making process? Will the Navy 

be able to do perform all of the required maintenance work in Mayport, or will a 

Mayport-homeported carrier still need to travel to Norfolk for certain maintenance 

work? Specifically, how often, and at what cost, will the Navy be required to fly specialized workers down to Florida? Do you feel this is an effective utilization of manpower? What other impacts—such as on quality of life and worker efficiency—do you 

believe will result from such an arrangement? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. Ship maintenance and readiness for an aircraft carrier stationed in 

Florida will be performed in a manner similar to the way it is currently conducted 

in San Diego. As in San Diego, with the exception of drydocking, the Navy can conduct the full spectrum of repair work required to support a ready carrier. The Navy 

has been successfully executing CVN maintenance availabilities in San Diego since 

1998. The relationship between Mayport and Norfolk Naval Shipyard will be the 

same as the proven relationship between San Diego and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. 

The Navy’s policy is that, when possible, we conduct maintenance in the 

homeports of our ships for crew Quality of Life reasons. During scheduled 6-month 

maintenance availabilities, conducted about once every 32 months, the Navy will be 

required to fly Naval Shipyard personnel to Mayport. The travel and per diem costs 

associated with that travel are estimated to be $23M. A CVN homeported in 

Mayport will be required to travel to Norfolk about five times in a 50-year life; four 

times for scheduled 10.5-month docking periods at Norfolk Naval Shipyard and once 

for a 39-month mid-life refueling overhaul conducted at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding—Newport News (NGSB–NN). This is similar to CVNs homeported in San 

Diego that are required to travel to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard four times for 

docking and to NGSB–NN for a mid-life refueling overhaul. 

This arrangement works well on the west coast. The best indication of the effect 

on shipyard worker quality of life is there has been no difficulty in assembling qualified crews of voluntary workers to conduct the remote site maintenance. There is 

no indication of a loss of worker productivity compared to availabilities conducted 

in the home shipyard. 

Mr. FORBES. How much funding has the Navy requested in the 09 supplemental 

request to meet year-end shortfalls in Ship Depot Maintenance funding levels? How 
86 

much of the Navy’s total FY09 requirement for ship depot maintenance will be funded if Congress fully funds your requests for FY09? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Navy has requested a total of $440 million in FY09 supplemental funding for ship maintenance, of which $155M has not yet been appropriated. The 

Navy plans to fund all remaining FY09 ship maintenance availabilities. We are taking targeted risk in our other operational accounts, while continuing to meet 

COCOM demands, to fund these availabilities. This plan is contingent upon receipt 

of the balance of supplement funding not yet appropriated. 

Mr. FORBES. How does the Navy anticipate budgeting for these costs in FY10? 

Given the recent incidents involving the USS Port Royal, the USS New Orleans and 

the USS Hartford and the likely emergent costs associated with getting these ships 

back into service at a time of war, does the Navy feel that these and other unanticipated costs can be properly accounted for in the regular FY10 budget and beyond, 

or do you anticipate targeted supplemental funding requests to handle such issues? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Navy has a process for adding unfunded prior year ship depot 

maintenance requirements (deferred maintenance) to future years and including 

that amount in future budget requests. The Navy baseline budget does not include 

allowances for extraordinary events like those that have affected USS Port Royal, 

USS New Orleans and USS Hartford. When they occur resources must be realigned 

and previously scheduled work must be deferred. Supplemental funding for Port 

Royal, Hartford and New Orleans would reduce the amount of deferred maintenance 

added to future budget years. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand that the Navy’s stated policy on contracting for the 

DDG modernization program is to conduct these modernization projects in the 

homeport region of each destroyer. Is this still the plan? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. Yes, execution of DDG modernization is planned to be conducted in 

the ships homeport region. DDG modernization utilizes a Multi-Ship Multi-Option 

(MSMO) contract vehicle within homeport areas. This strategy provides potential for 

learning curve cost reductions, maximizing the ships operational availability and 

minimizing the disruption to the quality of life to ships force. MSMO contracts operate under an ASN(RD&A) approved acquisition strategy and form the cornerstone 

of the Navy Fleet Maintenance and Modernization strategy for surface ships. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE 

Mr. NYE. In January 2009, the Navy announced its decision to homeport a nuclear 

aircraft carrier at Mayport Naval Station in Florida. Mayport has never homeported 

a nuclear-powered carrier and requires a minimum of $456 million Mil-Con dollars, 

a one-time maintenance cost of $85 million, $24 million in personnel costs, and 

$25.5 million in annual recurring costs compared to keeping a carrier in Norfolk. 

That’s more than $565 million in infrastructure costs, which is double the original 

estimated cost. It is my, and many of my colleagues’ estimate, that the total project 

cost for Homeporting a Carrier at Mayport will approach $1 billion. All this with 

$4.6 billion in unfunded 2009 budget priorities, $800 million in unfunded modernization and restoration projects at its four existing nuclear-capable shipyards, 

and a surface ship maintenance shortfall of at least $417 million. Is the infrastructure that would be required to be built at Mayport, FL to homeport a CVN identical 

to that at Norfolk, VA? If the answer is the infrastructure not identical: a. Does this 

mean the Navy will not be able to perform all of the required maintenance work 

in Mayport, and a Mayport-homeported carrier will still need to travel to Norfolk 

for certain maintenance work? b. Specifically, how often, and at what cost, will the 

Navy be required to fly specialized workers down to Florida? If the answer is the 

infrastructure is identical: c. Which parts—exactly—of the nuclear maintenance capacity that will be requested for Mayport are duplicative to the maintenance capacity in Norfolk? Given these funding realities, it would appear to me that spending 

more money to duplicate maintenance capacity in Mayport will only exacerbate your 

unfunded priorities. d. Maintaining the necessary fleet vessel numbers is the most 

important mission for Navy fleet readiness. Will you pledge today to review the requests you make to your superiors to find where possible duplicative or unnecessary 

funding can be cut in order to obtain this preeminent goal? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. No, the infrastructure required to be built in Mayport is not identical 

to that in Norfolk, VA. Specifically, the infrastructure will not include a CVN capable dry dock. However, the Navy’s policy is, when possible, to conduct maintenance 
87 

in the ship’s homeport to enhance crew Quality of Life. In this respect, the infrastructure required to homeport a CVN in Mayport is similar to the infrastructure 

that exists in San Diego today. The Navy has been successfully executing CVN 

maintenance availabilities in San Diego since 1998. The relationship between 

Mayport and Norfolk will be the same as the proven relationship between San Diego 

and Puget Sound with the same flexibility and dispersal objectives. 

During scheduled 6-month maintenance availabilities, conducted about once every 

32 months, the Navy will be required to fly Naval Shipyard personnel to Mayport. 

The travel and per diem costs associated with that travel are estimated to be about 

$23M. A CVN homeported in Mayport will shift homeports to Norfolk about five 

times over a 50-year life; four times for scheduled 10.5-month docking periods at 

Norfolk Naval Shipyard and once for one 39-month mid-life refueling overhaul conducted at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News (NGSB–NN). This is 

similar to CVNs homeported in San Diego that are required to shift homeports to 

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard four times for docking and to NGNN for one mid-life 

refueling overhaul. 

Mr. NYE. If the answer is the infrastructure is identical: 

c. Which parts—exactly—of the nuclear maintenance capacity that will be requested for Mayport are duplicative to the maintenance capacity in Norfolk? Given 

these funding realities, it would appear to me that spending more money to duplicate maintenance capacity in Mayport will only exacerbate your unfunded priorities. 

d. Maintaining the necessary fleet vessel numbers is the most important mission 

for Navy fleet readiness. 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The infrastructure is not identical so the above questions do not 

apply. 

Mr. NYE. Will you pledge today to review the requests you make to your superiors 

to find where possible duplicative or unnecessary funding can be cut in order to obtain this preeminent goal? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Navy agrees that an important mission for Navy fleet readiness 

is our ability to reach our goal of a floor of 313 ships. A key tenet of this plan is 

our ability to reach the expected service life for our ships and provide the maximum 

response out of all the fleet assets consistent with fiscal resources. To this end, the 

Navy reviews all funding requests to ensure they represent the most effective and 

efficient use of the resources required to meet all DON strategic and operational 

guidance. The Department of Defense (DOD) has determined that the final decision 

on whether to permanently homeport an aircraft carrier in Mayport, Fla., will be 

made during the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR will assess the 

need for carrier strategic dispersal in the broad context of future threats, future 

Navy force structure, and likely cost effectiveness. 

Mr. NYE. It is my understanding the Navy reported shortfall in Navy surface ship 

maintenance was $417M as of October 1st, 2008. There have been several unplanned and unfunded surface ship maintenance requirements since that time, including the USS Port Royal grounding and the most recent collision between a U.S. 

sub and the USS New Orleans. What are the results of the mid-year review of surface ship maintenance requirements and have there been additional requirements 

identified in the mid-year review that have affected the surface ship maintenance 

shortfall and if so, what is the resulting total surface ship maintenance shortfall for 

the remainder of fiscal year 09? a. In order to cover the current shortfall, you will 

certainly request substantial funding in the upcoming supplemental, how much 

funding exactly will you be requesting? b. If it isn’t enough, that just kicks the problem into the next year and doesn’t allow us to properly maintain the fleet. Maintaining the necessary fleet vessel numbers is the most important mission for Navy fleet 

readiness. I would like you to provide me a plan of how the Navy will rectify their 

surface ship maintenance funding deficit. 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Office of the Assistant Secretary (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 

AND COMPTROLLER) letter dated 13 March 2009 provided guidance regarding the 

annual mid-year review of unfunded requirements for the Navy’s Operation and 

Maintenance (O&M,N) accounts. All O&M,N appropriation holders were directed to 

follow the process to generate, evaluate, prioritize, mitigate and forward all additional requirements identified since the beginning of the current fiscal year. During 

every phase of the process, each echelon command conducts a thorough review of 

the requirement prior to advancing that mid-year issue to higher authority; ultimately, to be reviewed and addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). As 

of now, the beginning of the year ship maintenance shortfall of $417M has been 
88 

mitigated by USFF, CPF and CNO by $262M leaving $155M as the current recognized ship maintenance supplemental request. The several unplanned and unfunded 

requirements that DoN is currently addressing have rough order of magnitude 

(ROM) estimates of $161M and more thorough evaluations of the total cost of repair, 

required funding and plans of action are being conducted. Fleet readiness remains 

one of the Navy’s highest priorities and as such is receiving significant attention 

from the Navy leadership. 

Mr. NYE. The Navy recently suspended ship maintenance due to a funding shortfall. Its unfunded budget requirements for 2009 was $4.6 billion; the sea service also 

has a backlog of nearly $800 million in unfunded modernization and restoration 

projects at its four nuclear-capable shipyards. Given these funding realities, it would 

appear to me that spending more money to duplicate maintenance capacity in 

Mayport will only exacerbate your woes. How will you ensure that these added costs 

are accurately captured in future fleet readiness and maintenance budget requests 

to Congress? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Navy has experience establishing the maintenance facilities necessary to support homeporting CVNs in San Diego and has been successfully executing CVN maintenance availabilities in San Diego since 1998. The Navy will leverage that experience to ensure we accurately capture the cost to establish and 

maintain the infrastructure, as well as execute CVN maintenance in future fleet 

readiness and maintenance budget requests to Congress. 

Mr. NYE. The Navy’s Environmental Impact Statement includes a ‘‘purpose and 

need statement’’ that is to guide the Navy’s decisionmaking regarding homeporting 

additional ships at Mayport. The Navy’s purpose and need statement indicates that 

the Navy’s action should utilize the available facilities at Naval Station Mayport in 

an effective and efficient manner in order to minimum new construction. The Navy 

chose the option that maximizes new construction for a type of ship that the former 

Secretary of the Navy has indicated that SOUTHCOM and Fourth Fleet does not 

need. Former Secretary of the Navy, Donald Winter, said this at the Current Strategy Forum in June 2008. ‘‘The 4th Fleet demonstrates the Navy’s commitment to 

the region by creating presence in support of combined training operations, humanitarian operations, and disaster response. And this can be done without using a carrier battle group. We should also remember that it is sometimes more effective to 

have a smaller combatant that can access many of the littoral areas where we need 

to go. Smaller platforms are also more suitable for training, as they are more compatible with the navies with which we will be operating. We must balance our presence requirements with the missions and threats we are likely to face in a given 

region.’’ a. Given the fact that we know many of the existing frigates at Mayport 

will be retired soon and given the unique types of missions we encounter in Fourth 

Fleet’s operating areas, such as counter-drug operations, theater support cooperation, military-to-military exercises and training, do you agree with Secretary Winter’s assessment that the Fourth Fleet does not need a carrier group to accomplish 

its objectives ‘‘without a carrier battle group,’’ or do you believe that homeporting 

a nuclear carrier at Mayport is necessary to provide the right mix of assets to support the US Fourth Fleet and justifies spending $565 million to implement? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Fourth Fleet is routinely capable of accomplishing its engagement missions in the SOUTHCOM AOR without an aggregated carrier strike group 

(CSG). The Navy’s objectives for homeporting a CVN in Mayport are independent 

of Fourth Fleet operations in the SOUTHCOM AOR. The Navy’s objectives for 

homeporting a CVN in Mayport are to create a strategic dispersal alternative for 

Atlantic Fleet based CVNs and provide an alternative CVN nuclear maintenance capability on the East Coast. The Navy’s decision was based on the following: 

• Currently the Hampton Roads area is the sole East Coast location capable of 

supporting the operational, maintenance, and training needs of CVNs 

• A catastrophic event of any type in the Hampton Roads Area, whether to the 

ships themselves, the shipping channel, the supporting maintenance and 

training infrastructure, or the surrounding community (Northrop Grumman 

Newport News Shipyard and/or the public/private skilled nuclear labor force) 

has the potential to severely limit East Coast Carrier operations 

• The flexibility of a 2nd CVN capable homeport reduces risk, provides the 

Navy operational readiness and flexibility, and is consistent with homeporting 

strategies in place on the West Coast (i.e., Bremerton and San Diego) 
89 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WHITTMAN. Given the fact that we know many of the existing frigates at 

Mayport will be retired soon and given the unique types of missions we encounter 

in Fourth Fleet’s operating areas, such as counter-drug operations, theater support 

cooperation, military-to-military exercises and training, do you agree with Secretary 

Winter’s assessment that the Fourth Fleet can accomplish its objectives ‘‘without a 

carrier battle group,’’ or do you believe that homeporting a nuclear carrier at 

Mayport is necessary to provide the right mix of assets to support the US Fourth 

Fleet and justifies spending $565 million to implement? 

Admiral CULLOM, Admiral CAMPBELL, Admiral ECCLES, and Admiral 

MCMANAMON. The Fourth Fleet is routinely capable of accomplishing its engagement missions in the SOUTHCOM AOR without an aggregated carrier strike group 

(CSG). The Navy’s objectives for homeporting a CVN in Mayport are independent 

of Fourth Fleet operations in the SOUTHCOM AOR. The Navy’s objectives for 

homeporting a CVN in Mayport are to create a strategic dispersal alternative for 

Atlantic Fleet based CVNs and provide an alternative CVN nuclear maintenance capability on the East Coast. The Navy’s decision was based on the following: 

• Currently the Hampton Roads area is the sole East Coast location capable of 

supporting the operational, maintenance, and training needs of CVNs 

• A catastrophic event of any type in the Hampton Roads Area, whether to the 

ships themselves, the shipping channel, the supporting maintenance and 

training infrastructure, or the surrounding community (Northrop Grumman 

Newport News Shipyard and/or the public/private skilled nuclear labor force) 

has the potential to severely limit East Coast Carrier operations 

• The flexibility of a 2nd CVN capable homeport reduces risk, provides the 

Navy operational readiness and flexibility, and is consistent with homeporting 

strategies in place on the West Coast (i.e., Bremerton and San Diego) 

The Navy’s Environmental Impact Statement includes a ‘‘purpose and need statement’’ that is to guide the Navy’s decision-making regarding homeporting additional 

ships at Mayport. The Navy’s purpose and need statement indicates that the Navy’s 

action should utilize the available facilities at Naval Station Mayport in an effective 

and efficient manner in order to minimum new construction. The Navy chose the 

option that maximizes new construction for a type of ship that the former Secretary 

of the Navy has indicated that SOUTHCOM and Fourth Fleet does not need. 

Former Secretary of the Navy, Donald Winter, said this at the Current Strategy 

Forum in June 2008. 

‘‘The 4th Fleet demonstrates the Navy’s commitment to the region by creating 

presence in support of combined training operations, humanitarian operations, and 

disaster response. And this can be done without using a carrier battle group. We 

should also remember that it is sometimes more effective to have a smaller combatant that can access many of the littoral areas where we need to go. Smaller platforms are also more suitable for training, as they are more compatible with the navies with which we will be operating. We must balance our presence requirements 

with the missions and threats we are likely to face in a given region.’’ 

Æ