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HEARING TO REVIEW CURRENT FOOD SAFETY 

SYSTEMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 2, 2009

Serial No. 111–8

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture 

agriculture.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE 

COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota, Chairman 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania, 

Vice Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

JOE BACA, California 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

STEPHANIE HERSETH SANDLIN, South 

Dakota 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

JIM COSTA, California 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

KURT SCHRADER, Oregon 

DEBORAH L. HALVORSON, Illinois 

KATHLEEN A. DAHLKEMPER, 

Pennsylvania 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

FRANK KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota 

TRAVIS W. CHILDERS, Mississippi 

WALT MINNICK, Idaho 

———

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma, Ranking 

Minority Member 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

DAVID P. ROE, Tennessee 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

GLENN THOMPSON, Pennsylvania 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

ROBERT L. LAREW, Chief of Staff 

ANDREW W. BAKER, Chief Counsel 

APRIL SLAYTON, Communications Director 

NICOLE SCOTT, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Lucas, Hon. Frank D., a Representative in Congress from Oklahoma, opening 

statement .............................................................................................................. 2

Peterson, Hon. Collin C., a Representative in Congress from Minnesota, opening statement ........................................................................................................ 1

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2

WITNESSES

Keys III, Chandler, Head of Government Affairs and Industry Relations, 

JBS USA LLC, Washington, D.C. ....................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Dever, David D., CEO and President, Pandol Brothers, Incorporated, Delano, 

CA .......................................................................................................................... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12

DiMare, Anthony J., Vice President, DiMare Homestead Inc., DiMare Ruskin 

Inc., and DiMare Johns Island Inc.; Member, Board of Directors, Florida 

Fruit & Vegetable Association; President, Florida Tomato Exchange; Member, Board of Directors, United Fresh Produce Association, Ruskin, FL ........ 15

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18

Submitted report .............................................................................................. 87

Murano, Ph.D., Elsa A., President, Texas A&M University, College Station, 

TX .......................................................................................................................... 38

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40

Taylor, J.D., Michael R., Research Professor, Department of Health Policy, 

George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services, 

Washington, D.C. ................................................................................................. 42

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44

Tucker-Foreman, Hon. Carol L., Distinguished Fellow, The Food Policy Institute, Consumer Federation of America, Washington, D.C. .............................. 49

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50

Hanlin, Ph.D., John H., Vice President Food Safety, SUPERVALU INC., 

Eden Prairie, MN; accompanied by Michael S. Erlandson, Vice President 

Government Affairs, SUPERVALU INC. ........................................................... 73

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75

(1)

HEARING TO REVIEW CURRENT FOOD 

SAFETY SYSTEMS 

THURSDAY, APRIL 2, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:07 p.m., in Room 

1300 of the Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Collin C. Peterson [Chairman of the Committee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Peterson, Boswell, Baca, 

Scott, Costa, Kagen, Schrader, Dahlkemper, Massa, Bright, Markey, Kissell, Boccieri, Pomeroy, Childers, Minnick, Lucas, Goodlatte, Moran, Smith, and Lummis. 

Staff present: Nathan Fretz, Alejandra Gonzalez-Arias, Chandler 

Goule, Keith Jones, John Konya, Robert L. Larew, April Slayton, 

Rebekah Solem, Kristin Sosanie, Patricia Barr, John Goldberg, 

Pam Miller, Nicole Scott, Pete Thomson, and Jamie Mitchell. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM MINNESOTA 

The CHAIRMAN. We will call the Committee to order. We apologize for the late delay or the late start here. We have had some 

other difficulties and rearranged things, so we appreciate everybody being patient with us. But we welcome everyone to today’s 

hearing of the House Agriculture Committee. 

Food safety has been on the minds of many Americans with 

these recent recalls and foodborne illness outbreaks. At the beginning of this Congress our Committee adopted an aggressive oversight plan that makes food safety a priority. It is our responsibility 

to ensure that we have the most modern and effective food safety 

system possible, so you can expect rigorous oversight and action 

from us. 

While it is true that our current food safety system, and those 

entrusted to produce wholesome and safe food products, do a good 

job most of the time, it is clear that there are gaping holes in some 

points of the process. Modernization and reform are needed. During 

the farm bill I worked hard to ensure an open and transparent 

process that allowed for many different points of view, and I will 

use a similar process with food safety. 

Today’s hearing, the first in a series of hearings that we will hold 

on this topic in this Congress, is just the opening round. The next 

hearing will be a joint event in April with the Subcommittee on 

Livestock, Dairy and Poultry and the Subcommittee on Horticulture and Organic Agriculture. Now, future hearings are being 

2

planned, and throughout this process, I expect this Committee to 

do its homework, to listen to all stakeholders, to understand the 

issues and consider possible improvements. We will use the knowledge and insight gained through these hearings to consider all of 

the alternatives that could be included in a food safety modernization bill developed by the House Committee on Agriculture. 

This is an important task, and we will work with everyone who 

shares the responsibility for safe food from the farmers and ranchers to the processors and handlers; the handlers to the retailers, 

and also to the consumers. As we start on this work, I look forward 

to learning from the experience of today’s witnesses. I believe this 

will be a good, educational hearing for all of our Members, and we 

have a lot of work to do so let us get started. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peterson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM MINNESOTA

Good morning and welcome to today’s hearing of the House Agriculture Committee. Food safety has been on the minds of many Americans with the recent recalls and foodborne illness outbreaks. At the beginning of this Congress, our Committee adopted an aggressive oversight plan that makes food safety a priority. It’s 

our responsibility to ensure that we have the most modern and effective food safety 

system possible, so you can expect rigorous oversight and action from us. 

While it’s true that our current food safety system and those entrusted to produce 

wholesome and safe products do a good job most of the time, it’s clear that there 

are gaping holes at some points of the process. Modernization and reform are needed. 

During the farm bill, I worked hard to ensure an open and transparent process 

that allowed for many different points of view. I will use a similar process with food 

safety. Today’s hearing is the first in a series of hearings that we will hold on this 

topic this Congress. The next hearing will be a joint event in April with the Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry and the Subcommittee on Horticulture 

and Organic Agriculture. Future hearings are being planned. Throughout this process, I expect this Committee to do its homework—to listen to all stakeholders, understand the issues, and consider possible improvements. 

We will use the knowledge and insight gained through these hearings to consider 

all of the alternatives that could be included in a food safety modernization bill developed by the House Committee on Agriculture. This is an important task, and we 

will work with everyone who shares the responsibility for safe food—from the farmers and ranchers to the processors and handlers to the retailers and consumers. 

As we get started on this work, I look forward to learning from the experience 

of today’s witnesses. I believe this will be a good educational hearing for all of our 

Members. We have a lot of work to do. Let’s get started.

The CHAIRMAN. And with that, I will recognize the gentleman 

from Oklahoma, the Ranking Member, Mr. Lucas. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK D. LUCAS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM OKLAHOMA 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing 

which is intended to be the first in a series of Agriculture Committee food safety hearings this session. The theme of this first 

hearing was presented to us as educational, intended to lay a foundation to refresh the minds of our colleagues regarding the current 

state of the Federal food safety system. 

While we have many fine witnesses today, I believe it would 

have been helpful to have begun with the current representatives 

from our regulatory agencies and the many producers and processors who actually are subject to Federal food safety regulation. 

3

I am hopeful that we will hear from these interests fully in later 

hearings. 

Consumers, producers, processors and retailers I talked to have 

questions about where our food safety system is going. A series of 

foodborne illness incidents, most recently Salmonella illnesses and 

deaths associated with peanut better and peanut paste from a commercial supplier, have focused criticism on the Food and Drug Administration. It is therefore not surprising that most of the legislative proposals under current discussion have implications for FDA 

and the producers and processors of foods under their jurisdiction. 

It would be easy to simply adopt those legislative proposals, declare 

victory, issue our press releases and get on with our business. 

Agency reorganization, farm-to-table traceback, mandatory recall, 

hazard analysis plans and performance in standards, inspection 

frequency, import inspection, civil and criminal penalties, thirdparty certification and regulation of on-farm production practices, 

to name just a few of the proposals, all have implications for the 

future of our Federal food safety system. 

However, as we consider these ideas both in hearings and 

through the legislative activities, we must consider the merits of 

each proposal according to a very simple standard. We must judge 

each of these as to whether they contribute to or reduce the ability 

of our farmers and ranchers to provide our consumers with the 

safest, most affordable, the most abundant food supply in the history of the world. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to the testimony 

of our witnesses and the response to our questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his statement, and I 

thank the other Members for their attendance. I would ask the 

other Members if they have opening statements that they will be 

made part of the record so that we can move forward. We are already a little over an hour behind. 

We welcome our first panel to the Committee. Mr. Chandler 

Keys, the Head of the Government Relations for JBS, LLC; Mr. 

David Dever, the CEO and President of Pandol Brothers Incorporated of Delano, California; and Mr. Tony DiMare, Vice President 

of DiMare Homestead, Inc., and DiMare Ruskin, Inc., of Ruskin, 

Florida. 

This was rearranged as I said from an earlier deal, but one of 

the things I wanted to do was something that has not been focused 

on enough, and that is look at the situation of agriculture products 

that are coming in from other countries. I want to get a better understanding of how that system works and find out if there are 

equivalent systems there as it affects our domestic producers. 

So we welcome the panel to the Committee. You have 5 minutes 

to summarize your testimony. Your testimony will be made part of 

the record in full, and we will probably have some questions for 

you when we get done with your testimony. So welcome to the 

Committee. 

Mr. Keys, you can begin. 

4

STATEMENT OF CHANDLER KEYS III, HEAD OF GOVERNMENT 

AFFAIRS AND INDUSTRY RELATIONS, JBS USA LLC,

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. KEYS. Thank you. Chairman Peterson, Ranking Member 

Lucas, and Members of the House Agriculture Committee, my 

name is Chandler Keys, and I am Head of Government Affairs for 

JBS in Washington, D.C. 

JBS is currently the world’s largest beef processor with operations in Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Italy and the United States. 

Currently, our U.S. operations are one of the top three U.S. processors in both beef and pork. We also process lamb in Australia 

and the United States. Our U.S. operations are headquartered in 

Greeley, Colorado, in the Congressional District of the Committee’s 

Representative Betsy Markey. 

Food safety is the number one priority for JBS. From the moment livestock enters our facilities to the time the meat is boxed 

for shipment to further processors and retailers, we are focused on 

mitigating risk and ensuring that we provide a safe product. We 

stand ready to assist Congress and the Administration as you look 

for ways to enhance meat inspection systems and food safety 

through strong science-based and risk-based principles. 

At the request of the Chairman, I will focus my testimony on our 

Australian operations and how this division of the company works 

with Australian and U.S. regulatory officials to ship frozen beef 

trimmings into the United States. 

JBS is very familiar with the USDA regulatory regime and its 

hallmarks of continuous inspection at slaughter facilities, domestic 

plant certification, and hazard requirements. We are also wellversed in the system of equivalency and the requirement that our 

foreign plants must meet the same food safety and regulatory requirements as their U.S. counterparts in order to ship product into 

the United States. We have a strong professional working relationship with both Australian and American inspectors and regulatory 

bodies, and the import/export process. It is handled by consummate 

professionals who work every day to ensure that the process runs 

smoothly, efficiently and effectively without sacrificing the tenets of 

food safety for the swift movement of product. 

As an importer, JBS’ Australia division is required to submit all 

imported meat products from Australia for inspection by Federal 

agencies, including U.S. Customs, which looks for things requiring 

a duty and contraband, and the other divisions of the USDA that 

acts to stop dangerous insects and diseases from entering the country. USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service further inspects 

imported meat products upon arrival into the U.S., determining 

their fitness for consumption and verifying that no unacceptable or 

illegal residues are present. This inspection at the port of entry is 

often called re-inspection since all JBS Australian meat processing 

plants are already under an in-plant USDA inspection guidelines 

under the auspices of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection 

Service, AQIS. 

The majority of imported meat from Australia is shipped in containers on sea freight to points of entry in the United States. JBS 

operations are consolidated into the major ports across the country, 

5

Philadelphia, Long Beach, Houston, and these three ports are the 

busiest for bringing in product. 

To explain the process of importing beef into the United States, 

we must first understand the regulatory requirements of both the 

Australian and United States that an establishment must follow in 

order to ship to the United States. 

One, the Australian regulatory regime, AQIS, a regulatory body 

equivalent to the USDA, requires an establishment be engaged in 

the preparation of meat and meat products for export has an approved arrangement. The approved arrangement describes companies like JBS Australia will meet legislative requirements, including compliance with good hygienic practices and HACCP systems; 

product integrity including product identification, segregation, 

traceability; importing country requirements and animal welfare 

requirements. 

AQIS further requires the establishment to be listed to export to 

the United States and that all meat, meat products and edible offal 

must be slaughtered, processed and stored in U.S. listed establishments at all times. 

USDA regulatory requirements: in order for Australian product 

to be eligible for export, U.S. listed establishments must also comply with U.S. requirements. These requirements constitute the 

hallmark of USDA’s regulation of foreign plants, equivalency. 

First, the Federal Meat Inspection Act requires foreign countries 

that export meat and poultry into the United States to establish 

and maintain an inspection system that is equivalent to that of the 

United States and to conform with HACCP systems. Exporting 

countries like Australia must undergo a rigorous review process before they can become eligible to export meat and poultry to the 

United States. Even after a country is granted eligibility, FSIS constantly reviews its inspection program to ensure it remains equivalent to the U.S. system. 

The equivalency standard is a dynamic one. Foreign establishments are subject to additional regulatory measures applied to the 

U.S. plants by FSIS. For example, BSE now is part of the process 

that Australian meat has to go through to make sure that it is 

equivalent to the United States. 

On an annual basis, a representative from FSIS will visit Australia and perform reviews, and often JBS operations are part of 

these reviews. In addition, AQIS performs verification activities to 

ensure JBS Australian establishments are compliant with U.S. 

country requirements at all times. These activities are performed 

through daily, weekly and monthly on-plant inspections by the 

AQIS veterinary officers and the AQIS technical team managers. 

In order to comply with the U.S. requirements, U.S. listed establishments must have the following in place: an effective HACCP 

plan to prevent fecal, ingesta and milk contamination; standard operation procedures to cover all pre-operational and operational 

sanitation procedures; standard operating procedures for individual 

employee work instructions that describe hygiene operations establishment for each task performed; product monitoring records that 

are reviewed on at least a daily basis to confirm that the product 

has met the critical limits at each critical control point; and an efVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:36 Sep 30, 2009 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 I:\DOCS\111-08\52483.TXT AGR1 PsN: BRIAN
6

fective means to segregate non-ambulatory and disabled animals 

not eligible for the U.S. market. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask that the rest of my testimony be put in the 

record to move along on time, but we look forward to working with 

this Committee in explaining the rigor of the USDA system as it 

works with the Australian system to make sure that the product 

that comes into the United States is safe and is equivalent. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keys follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHANDLER KEYS III, HEAD OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND

INDUSTRY RELATIONS, JBS USA LLC, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Chairman Peterson, Ranking Member Lucas, and Members of the House Agriculture Committee, I am Chandler Keys, Head of Government Affairs and Industry 

Relations for JBS USA in Washington D.C. As past Vice President of the National 

Cattlemen’s Beef Association and in my more recent role as a government relations 

executive for Swift & Company and its successor, JBS, I have had the pleasure of 

working alongside many of you over the years. I look forward to working with this 

Committee again in the future as we strive to collaboratively address issues impacting the livestock sector and enhancing the safety of the U.S. food supply. 

JBS is currently the world’s largest beef processor—with beef operations in Brazil, 

Argentina, Australia, Italy and the United States. Currently, our U.S. operations 

are one of the top three U.S. processors in both beef and pork. We also process lamb 

in both Australia and the United States. Our U.S. operations are headquartered in 

Greeley, Colorado, in the Congressional District of the Committee’s own, Representative Betsy Markey. 

Food safety is the number one priority at JBS. From the moment livestock enter 

our facilities to the time meat is boxed for shipment to further processors and retailers, we are focused on mitigating risk and ensuring that we provide a safe product. 

We stand ready to assist Congress and the Administration as you look to enhance 

meat inspection and food safety through strong science-based and risk-based principles. 

Importing Frozen Beef Trimmings From Australia Into the U.S. 

At the request of the Chairman, I will focus my testimony on our Australian operations and how this division of the company works with Australian and U.S. regulatory officials to ship ‘‘fresh and frozen’’ beef trimmings into the United States. I 

hope the Committee will find this information instructive to its deliberations on how 

we can enhance the safety of products regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 

JBS is very familiar with the USDA regulatory regime and its hallmarks of continuous inspection at slaughtering facilities, domestic plant certification, and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) requirements. We are also wellversed in the system of equivalency and the requirement that our foreign plants 

must meet the same food safety and regulatory standards as their U.S. counterparts 

in order to ship product into the U.S. We have a strong professional relationship 

with both Australian and American inspectors and regulatory bodies, and the import/export process is handled by consummate professionals who work every day to 

ensure that the process runs smoothly, efficiently, and effectively without sacrificing 

the tenets of food safety for the swift movement of product. 

Overview 

As an importer, JBS’ Australia division is required to submit all imported meat 

products from Australia for inspection by Federal agencies, including U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, which looks for items requiring a duty and contraband, and 

the USDA, which acts to stop dangerous insects and diseases from entering the 

country. USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) further inspects imported meat products upon arrival into the U.S., determining their fitness for consumption and verifying that no unacceptable or illegal residues are present. This 

inspection at the port of entry is often considered a ‘‘re-inspection’’ since all JBS 

Australian meat processing plants are already under in-plant USDA inspection 

guidelines under the auspices of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 

(AQIS). 

The majority of imported meat from Australia is shipped in containerized sea 

freight to ports of entry across the United States. JBS operations are consolidated 

into the major ports across the country; however the majority of our business goes 

7

through the ports of Philadelphia, PA, Long Beach, CA and Houston, TX. These 

three ports are the busiest and most adequately equipped for the importing of fresh 

and frozen meat products. 

Regulatory Requirements 

To explain the process of importing beef into the U.S., we must first understand 

the regulatory requirements—both Australian and U.S.—that an establishment 

must follow in order to ship to the U.S. 

Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) 

The Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, a regulatory body equivalent 

to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, requires, through Australian Export Control 

(meat and meat products) Orders, that the occupier of an establishment engaged in 

the preparation of meat and meat products for export has an ‘‘Approved Arrangement.’’

The purpose of the approved arrangement is to clearly describe those processes 

and practices which underpin AQIS certification of meat and meat products for export. 

The approved arrangement describes how companies like JBS Australia will meet 

legislative requirements, including compliance with:

• Good hygienic practices (GHP) to ensure that food is wholesome;

• The application of HACCP systems for food safety;

• Product integrity through the application of product identification, segregation 

and traceability practices ensuring the product is accurately described and 

maintains relevant importing country identification;

• Importing country requirements necessary to maintain market eligibility; and

• Animal welfare requirements.

In addition, Australian producing establishments must be registered by AQIS and 

‘‘listed’’ as eligible to export to the U.S. and its territories. All meat, meat products 

and edible offal must be slaughtered, processed and stored in U.S. listed establishments at all times. 

United States Department of Agriculture 

In order for Australian product to be eligible for export, U.S. listed establishments 

must also comply with U.S. requirements. These requirements constitute the hallmark of USDA’s regulation of foreign plants: equivalency. 

The Federal Meat Inspection Act requires foreign countries that export meat and 

poultry into the United States to establish and maintain inspection systems that are 

equivalent to those of the United States and conform with HACCP systems. Exporting countries like Australia must undergo a rigorous review process before they can 

become eligible to export meat and poultry to the United States. Even after a country is granted eligibility, FSIS continually reviews its inspection program to ensure 

it remains equivalent to the U.S. system. 

The equivalency standard is a dynamic one. Foreign establishments are subject 

to the same additional regulatory measures applied to U.S. plants by FSIS. For example, when additional requirements were imposed on U.S. plants to mitigate the 

risks of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE); our JBS Australia plants had to 

meet those same standards in order to maintain eligibility to ship to the U.S. 

On an annual basis, a representative from FSIS will visit Australia to perform 

a country review to ensure the Australian systems in place are achieving the requirements or deliver an equivalent outcome as agreed upon by the two countries. 

JBS Australia regularly has plants involved in these FSIS reviews. 

In addition, AQIS performs verification activities to ensure JBS Australia establishments are compliant with U.S. country requirements at all times. These activities are performed through daily, weekly and monthly on-plant inspections by the 

On-Plant AQIS Veterinary Officer and the AQIS Area Technical Manager. 

Understanding Equivalency 

JBS Australia establishments have systems in place that comply with the AQIS 

approved arrangement guidelines, which include importing country requirements 

such as those for the U.S. 

In order to comply with U.S. requirements, U.S. listed establishments must have 

the following in place:

• Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP)—An effective 

HACCP plan that considers issues related to food safety hazards (E. coli 

O157:H7) and includes critical control points (CCPs) for all processes conducted 

8

at the establishment with set critical limits that have been validated and monitored. The HACCP plan is required to be reviewed annually or whenever an 

alteration to the process has been made.

» FSIS requires zero tolerances for feces, ingesta, and milk on the slaughter 

floor on all U.S. listed establishments. U.S. listed establishments must also 

adopt effective controls for preventing contamination of carcasses with fecal, 

ingesta, and milk. These zero tolerances must be included in the company’s 

HACCP plans.

» Raw ground beef products destined for export to the U.S. must be tested for 

E. coli O157:H7, utilizing a N=60 sampling plan for each 700 carton lot. In 

addition, an Association of Official Analytical Chemists (AOAC) accredited 

screening test method is required.

» U.S. listed establishments are also required to review product-monitoring 

records on at least a daily basis to confirm that the product has met the critical limits at each critical control point prior to being loaded for export to the 

U.S.

• Sanitation Standard Operating Procedures (SSOP) that relate to the process controls for producing the meat product, which covers procedures conducted 

both before (pre-operational) and during (operational) operations. All corrective 

and preventive actions undertaken to prevent product contamination need to be 

documented.

• Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and individual employee Work 

Instructions (WI) that describe the hygiene operations of the establishment 

for each process task performed including corrective and preventive actions undertaken where there is failure in a SOP or WI procedure.

• Non-ambulatory disabled animals ‘‘that cannot rise from a recumbent position or that cannot walk, including, but not limited to, those with broken appendages, severed tendons or ligaments, nerve paralysis, fractured vertebral column or metabolic conditions’’ are required to be segregated as they are not eligible for the U.S. market. 

The Export/Import Process 

• Product Transfer and Loadout Requirements 

Meat and meat products from JBS Australia establishments eligible to export to 

the U.S. must adhere to strict documentation requirements while being transferred 

and loaded for shipment.

» Meat Transfer Certificates must be used to cover the transfer of product 

from one establishment to another for further processing or storage. These certificates must be endorsed to prove the meat is eligible for export to the U.S.

» Shipping marks—Unique shipping marks are used for all shipments of edible 

meat to the U.S. These shipping marks must be clear and legible, and cannot 

be hand-written. Shipping marks must be unique over a thirteen-month period 

and not exceed 12 characters/digits. The first three characters are the alpha 

prefix registered in the Export Documentation (EXDOC) system for the purpose 

of monitoring shipping marks. Shipping marks may be either applied as a stencil or as an adhesive label. If adhesive labels are used they must be tamper evident with an adhesive that ensures they remain securely attached in adverse 

conditions such as excess moisture.

» Upon container loading, a traceable and accountable AQIS high security seal 

is applied to the container and recorded on the relevant documentation.

» Through the JBS Australia electronic export documentation system and the 

AQIS EXDOC system, the JBS Head Office and the shipping line are notified 

of the intention to export product.

» AQIS receives a Request for Permit (RFP) from JBS Australia from which a 

health certificate is generated for each shipping mark represented within the 

container.

• Health Certification for meat and edible offal is accomplished through an E7

health certificate. The E7 health certificate is granted when the following

endorsements are made:

» All production lots of manufacturing beef exported to the U.S. have been tested 

and cleared in accordance with the AQIS E. coli O157:H7 protocol.

» The product:

9

• was derived from animals that have never been in;

• did not originate in and was never stored, rendered or otherwise processed

in;

• was not otherwise physically associated with a facility located in; and

• has not been otherwise physically associated with or exposed to, or commingled with ruminant material from:

» Any region listed in Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations part 94.18(a), which 

governs the prohibition and or restriction of the importation of products from 

countries with rinderpest, foot and mouth disease, bovine spongiform 

encephalopathy and other foreign animal diseases of livestock and poultry.

» All health certificates for all shipments of edible meat, meat products and offal 

must include a product description as defined on the label of the product.

» The shipping line receives a pre-receivable advice (PRA) from which the container is added to the vessel manifest. The shipping line provides customs with 

the manifest, and Customs contacts AQIS EXDOC to ascertain if there is health 

certification for the container load of product.

» AQIS provides the original health certificate to JBS Australia.

» JBS Australia supplies the original health certificate, the bill of lading and the 

commercial invoice to the customer prior to the arrival of the container in the 

U.S. port.

» A copy of all documentation for each consignment is kept on file at the JBS 

Australia Head Office documentation department.

• U.S. Customs Clearance

When a shipment of imported meat arrives in the United States from Australia, 

JBS, via our customs broker (licensed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection), files 

entry documents with U.S. Customs. 

U.S. Customs examine the goods to determine:

1. The value of the goods for any applicable duties, and if commercial invoices 

are accurate;

2. Any special markings from the country of origin that are required by Federal 

law; and

3. Whether the shipment contains prohibited items.

The container may not legally enter the U.S. until the shipment has arrived at 

the port and U.S. Customs has authorized the clearance of the container from the 

pier to a USDA inspection warehouse. Upon delivery of the container to the warehouse, the USDA inspection process begins. 

• USDA Inspection—the ‘‘Re-Inspection Process’’

Once at the warehouse, each container is presented to FSIS. FSIS enters information about the shipment into a centralized computer system called the Automated 

Import Information System (AIIS). The AIIS scans its memory bank to determine 

if the country, plant, and product are eligible for export to the United States. When 

the shipment is ready to be re-inspected by FSIS, the AIIS will generate an inspection assignment, based on the plant and country’s compliance history for that specific product. Inspection results are later entered into the AIIS, helping to establish 

the level of re-inspection for future shipments from JBS Australia and for shipments 

from Australia in general. 

FSIS import inspectors first check the documents to assure the shipment is properly certified by the foreign country. Inspection may be delayed or refused if the documents contain irregularities or errors. If there are issues with documents, the importer is required to rectify the problem. Inspectors commence by examining each 

shipment for general condition and labeling. 

A recurring problem that many importers face involves inaccurate shipping marks 

(unique ID numbers stamped on each box by the exporting establishment that link 

the shipment to the government health certificate). The shipping marks must correspond with the Australian health certificate, and if they don’t, a guarantee must 

be issued by the Australian Embassy. Any boxes missing shipping marks must be 

stamped by a representative of the Australian government or destroyed. USDA will 

also hold any shipment when the physical inventory count does not match the Australian health certificate. Overages or shortages also require a guarantee issued by 

the Australian Embassy. 

10

Once documentation and labeling are approved, the inspection continues with assignments directed by the AIIS. AIIS may designate the shipment as a ‘‘skip’’, and 

no further inspections are required. A plant with a good compliance history will not 

have as many inspections assigned. 

There are three levels of inspection:

(a) ‘‘normal’’ level of inspection—all lots are re-inspected;

(b) ‘‘skip 1’’ (S1) level—one of every four lots is re-inspected; and

(c) ‘‘skip 2’’ (S2) level—one of every 12 lots is re-inspected.

JBS Australian plants have the highest performance record and we currently are 

on ‘‘skip 2’’ level for all beef plants. 

If the container is marked for an intensive inspection, several types of inspection 

may be assigned by the AIIS, including net weight checks of retail packages; examination of the container’s condition; physical examination for product defects; and 

laboratory analysis for product composition, microbiological contamination, residues, 

and species verification. In conducting these inspections, a certain amount of product is randomly selected and examined by FSIS import inspectors. Microbiological 

analysis includes tests for Listeria monocytogenes, E. coli O157:H7, and Salmonella

among others. Residue analysis testing targets include sulfonamides, chlorinated hydrocarbons, arsenic, antibiotics, carbadox and ivermectin. 

However, even with a good record, if a lot fails an intensive inspection, future 

shipments of product from the plant may be allocated a different inspection level. 

This allocation by AIIS is based on formulas that rate the type of defect; however, 

for a failed residue and microbiological analyses, the plant stays on ‘‘tightened and 

hold’’ until 15 consecutive lots pass within 180 days. 

When product samples are sent to FSIS laboratories for analysis, the shipment 

is usually released before test results are received. However, if the plant had previous violations or a problem is suspected, the shipment is held until the laboratory 

results are known. Even though JBS plants in Australia have the lowest possible 

incidence of problems during inspection, our internal protocols require all product 

that undergoes an intensive inspection to be withheld from commerce until results 

have been returned. 

When a shipment passes inspection, each shipping container is stamped with the 

official mark of inspection and released into U.S. commerce. 

If a shipment does not meet U.S. requirements, the cartons are stamped ‘‘U.S. Refused Entry,’’ and within 45 days must be exported, destroyed or converted to animal feed (with the approval of the Food and Drug Administration). 

JBS typically will have some boxes rejected by USDA. This is generally due to 

carton damage. Due to container moment during the overseas voyage, cartons may 

tear. Any cartons with exposed meat (through poly plastic liner and cardboard) are 

rejected. USDA will also reject cartons that may contain leaking chilled vacuum 

packages. 

Conclusion 

In summary, the importation of meat and meat products from Australia into the 

U.S. is a very intensive and robust process with failsafe mechanisms at each step. 

Our products are not only subject to intense scrutiny and inspection in Australia; 

but to re-inspection at the U.S. port of entry. In addition, our plants must adhere 

to the same regulatory requirements and procedures as American-produced products—ensuring that American consumers enjoy a safe, quality product irrespective 

of its origin.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Keys, and we appreciate your being with us. 

Mr. Dever, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID D. DEVER, CEO AND PRESIDENT, 

PANDOL BROTHERS, INCORPORATED, DELANO, CA 

Mr. DEVER. Thank you very much. Good morning, Chairman Peterson, Ranking Member Lucas and the Members of the Committee. My name is David Dever and I am CEO and President of 

Pandol Brothers, Inc. Our headquarters are located in Delano, California, which is in the San Joaquin Valley. Today we farm approximately 5,000 acres, primarily of California table grapes in addition 

to importing product from Latin America. 

11

Pandol has led the industry with transparent forms of self-regulation for many years. These produce-based standards work to 

identify: risks, control points, control measures, and to provide for 

independent verification. This starts with land use through to the 

transportation of our products to market. Good agricultural products, good manufacturing practices, food security, hazard analysis, 

and critical control point programs have been developed and updated annually. 

Pandol utilizes internal and external verification processes to 

provide verification of the effectiveness of these systems and to provide guidance for improvement. In addition, Pandol has introduced 

a Trace Recall Program and a Management Plan to ensure our 

ability to trace the product through the supply chain. We have 

complied with the U.S. Bioterrorism Act of 2002 which requires the 

ability to establish and maintain records, to document movement 

of our products both one step forward and one step back through 

the supply chain. 

Pandol is a member of the Steering Committee of the Produce 

Traceability Initiative, created and led by three leading industry 

organizations, the United Fresh Produce Association, Produce Marketing Association and the Canadian Produce Marketing Association. Adoption of these standards is now in motion, and complete 

details on this initiative can be found on the industry website 

www.producetraceability.org.

However, with all of that that has been accomplished to ensure 

our products are safe, we acknowledge there are many challenges 

that continue to face us today in strengthening the safety of our 

food source. These include, first, the industry must work together 

at developing and improving systems and processes on a commodity-specific basis. Simultaneously, government regulation must 

be created to support the process, to provide the necessary enforcement policies to equalize the playing field, and to strengthen the 

consumer confidence in the overall process. We also believe these 

food safety standards must be consistent and applicable to the 

identified commodity, irrespective of its origin. 

Imported products need to meet equivalent standards as that required of domestic produce. Although some countries have sophisticated food safety operations, we encourage U.S. food safety officials 

to work together with our foreign counterparts to ensure and verify 

that equivalent policies and standards are in place. 

Third, the additional cost to develop and implement the systems 

along with the verification and audit process is costly. We must encourage, as part of this commodity-specific approach, that FDA develop a rule-making procedure that establishes risk and sciencebased regulations for the production, handling and distribution of 

those types of fruits and vegetables for which the Secretary determines such standards are necessary to minimize the risk of microbial illness. 

Fourth, time is critical when an incident occurs. A standardized 

electronic web-based record-keeping throughout the supply chain 

will provide crisis managers with the ability to instantaneously 

trace the source product, thereby allowing them to identify the contaminating source, limiting the threat and strengthening the consumers’ confidence. 

12

Last, even with all of the proactive development of food safety 

systems, including verification processes, we continue to be dependent on those we do business with to apply the same standards to 

ensure the integrity of the supply chain. Therefore, we believe 

achieving consistent produce safety standards across the industry 

requires strong Federal Government oversight and responsibility in 

order to optimize our credibility to the consumer and to be equitable to all producers. 

Let me conclude with these closing thoughts. Produce safety 

must be a process of continuous improvement, not a static achievement. As long as there is the potential of even one individual getting sick, as an industry we will do all we can to prevent that from 

happening. It can be discouraging when events such as the 

jalapen ̃ o pepper, peanut, and now the pistachio incidents occur, 

and as bad as those have been, as producers, regulators, policymakers and consumers, we need to understand that the produce industry has achieved an overwhelming success record in regards to 

food safety with the actual incidents of illness at an extremely low 

level. Please look at the numbers. Over one billion servings of fresh 

produce are eaten every day. More than five million bags of fresh 

salads are sold every day. Of the hundreds of fruits and vegetables 

offered in the produce section of the supermarket, only a handful 

have been implicated in illness outbreaks, and when they are, the 

incident is small in volume in comparison to their volume of consumption. 

But, we also know that consumers today are very concerned 

about the safety of their food. They don’t care about the statistics 

or industry’s effort put forth to date. They want improved results, 

and it is both the industry and government’s obligation to restore 

the consumers’ confidence by working together to develop, implement, verify and ensure the most thorough, state-of-the art food 

safety systems possible. We must all be able to trust the overall 

system of government insight and industry responsibility working 

together to produce the safest possible supply of fresh, healthy and 

nutritious fruits and vegetables. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dever follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID D. DEVER, CEO AND PRESIDENT, PANDOL

BROTHERS, INCORPORATED, DELANO, CA 

Good morning Chairman Peterson, Ranking Member Lucas and the Members of 

the Committee. My name is David Dever and I am CEO and President of Pandol 

Bros., Inc. (Pandol). Our headquarters are located in Delano, California which is in 

the San Joaquin Valley between Fresno and Bakersfield. The Pandol Family has 

been farming and bringing to market fresh produce for more than half a century. 

In 1908 Steve Pandol immigrated from modern day Croatia to the United States. 

In the early 1940’s he and his wife Margaret, also from the old country, purchased 

160 acres in the San Joaquin Valley and began farming and raising a family. Their 

three sons joined the business and together, with each contributing their special set 

of skills, they expanded the business into a major grower, marketer and shipper of 

fresh quality produce, primarily table grapes. Today, with the third generation in 

the lead and as the fourth generation of the Pandol Family enters the organization, 

the company continues to focus on its core competency of growing, shipping, importing, exporting and marketing premium quality table grapes and other fresh produce 

items. The Pandol Family farms approximately 5,000 acres in California. Together 

with sources in Latin America, Pandol has a supply of table grapes to bring to the 

marketplace year round. From California in the summer and fall, Mexico in the 

13

spring, and Chile, Peru and Brazil in late fall and winter, Pandol Bros, Inc. almost 

always has fresh table grapes available to the market. In addition to domestic markets Pandol has a long history of exporting products to the world marketplace including Canada, Europe, Latin American, the Middle East and especially the Pacific 

Rim. 

As this business has evolved over the years, so have the challenges over the safety 

of our food supply. Meeting or exceeding these challenges and delivering safe, quality produce to the marketplace has always been a primary goal of the Pandol Company. From the start of our company to the present day the Pandol family has been 

advocates of developing and implementing procedures that give our customers and 

consumers’ confidence in the products that we grow and deliver. 

Pandol Bros. has led the industry with transparent forms of self-regulation for 

many years. These produce based standards work to identify risks, identify control 

points and control measures, and to provide for independent verification of compliance. In fulfilling these produce standards Pandol evaluates and reviews:

• Land history and use.

• Adjacent land use.

• Soil amendments.

• Pesticide usage.

• Irrigation water source and quality.

• Employee hygiene and sanitation practices, including training procedures.

• Employee habits and conditions, including training procedures.

• Harvest procedures.

• Transportation procedures.

• Packaging materials.

• Field packing sanitation procedures.

In each of these categories Pandol identifies any potential areas of hazard or exposure and develops a plan to monitor for, prevent and mitigate any undesirable conditions. 

Pandol utilizes verification processes which include internal standard operating 

procedures, independent experts and governmental agencies. We periodically perform reviews and evaluations of the systems and develop corrective actions as needed. Additionally, we utilize third party audit companies to provide verification of the 

effectiveness of the systems and to provide guidance for improvement. 

These tests or procedures are extensive but as a sample include:

• Conducting a pre-harvest pesticide residue testing program which establishes 

that the product tested meets or exceeds U.S. EPA established standards. This 

program is conducted and monitored by an independent, third-party laboratory 

which posts, to its website, United States tolerance levels whenever residues are 

detected.

• We monitor microbial or physical adulteration of product by participating in 

Good Agricultural Practices (GAP), field and harvest crew audits by independent third party auditors, and HACCP/GMP programs for our cold storage 

operation, also audited by an independent third party.

• In our fields Pandol conducts independent lab testing of soil and water sources, 

conducts fertilizer and chemical monitoring and reporting programs, and assessment of adjacent land uses, and other risks from surrounding activities.

• Harvest practices and employee hygiene/sanitation issues are also monitored 

and subject to periodic third party review and periodic unannounced inspection 

by state and Federal authorities.

• Mock product recalls are periodically implemented to test the traceability system.

Pandol requires its suppliers to certify they have food safety programs in place 

that include compliance with the following guidelines:

• Compliance with the FDA Guide to Minimizing Microbial Food Safety Hazards 

for Fresh Food and Vegetables.

• Good Agricultural Practices (GAP).

• Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), if applicable.

• Third Party Audits (Field/Facility).

• Food Security Program (Field/Facility).

• Trace Recall Program.

14

• Multi-Residue screening of all supplied product.

• Meet all COOL regulatory requirements.

In addition, Pandol has long been committed to the ability to trace its product 

through the supply chain, and has complied with the U.S. Bioterrorism Act of 2002 

which requires the ability to establish and maintain records to document movement 

of its products both one step forward and one step back through the supply chain. 

Pandol has developed a Trace Recall Program in the event a product may be 

deemed to be potentially hazardous or defective. In addition we have developed a 

Crisis Management Plan in the unlikely event that a situation reaches the point of 

a ‘‘disaster’’ or ‘‘crisis’’ beyond the scope of what usual policies address. The availability of such a plan insures that management and employees have a clear, well 

thought out guide and plan of action if a disaster should ever arise. 

Pandol is also a member of the Steering Committee of the Produce Traceability 

Initiative, an industry wide initiative created by the three leading industry organizations United Fresh Produce Association, Produce Marketing Association and the 

Canadian Produce Marketing Association. This initiative that began in late 2007 

was designed to assist the industry maximize the effectiveness of current traceback 

procedures, while developing a standardized industry approach to enhance the speed 

and efficiency of traceability systems for the future. The Steering Committee representing every segment of the produce supply chain; from farm to store and restaurant, and actively involved nine U.S. and Canadian trade associations met numerous times and spent countless hours in collaborative discussions and sub-groups 

to develop unparalleled standardization policies for the industry as a whole. Pandol, 

who agrees with and supports this Initiative, is working diligently at developing systems and procedures to be able to adhere to the Milestones as established by this 

Committee. Adoption of these standards is now in motion, and complete details on 

this initiative can be found on the industry website www.producetraceability.org.

However, it is important to acknowledge and address the challenges that we face 

today in strengthening the safety of our food source:

1. Food safety is our industry’s top priority. The men and women who grow, 

pack, prepare and deliver fresh produce are committed to providing consumers 

with safe and wholesome foods. The industry, as a whole, must work together 

at developing systems and processes on a commodity-specific basis to enhance 

our food safety policies. Industry needs to take the lead in assessing the risks 

and exposure depending on the commodity, location and processes involved in 

the production of our food. Government regulation must be created to support 

the process, to provide the necessary enforcement policies to equalize the playing field and to strengthen the consumer confidence in the overall process. 

Therefore we believe food safety standards must be consistent and applicable 

to the identified commodity or commodity sector, no matter where grown or 

packaged in the United States, or imported into the country. Consumers must 

have the confidence that safety standards are met no matter where the commodity is grown or processed.

2. We believe that product imported into the United States needs to meet equivalent standards as that required of domestic produce. U.S. food safety officials 

can work together with foreign food safety officials to ensure and verify that 

equivalent policies and standards are in place. Many foreign governments work 

closely with their industries to establish and enforce food safety guidance and 

traceability systems. We have found that some of the more sophisticated food 

safety operations are found outside of the United States. When foreign countries 

are working congruently with U.S. standards we should acknowledge their food 

safety programs accordingly. This approach of working with and recognizing foreign regulatory systems is necessary to save government and industry resources. If the U.S. industry is required to police the supply chain outside of 

the U.S., this will put U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace.

3. Within the food supply chain there are many people involved in the process 

and many procedures that need to be complied with in order to minimize risk 

of contaminated food. The additional cost to develop and implement the systems 

along with the verification and audit process is costly. We must encourage participation of governmental agencies in providing input into the ongoing development of commodity-specific science based standards. In particular, as part of 

this commodity specific approach, FDA must develop a rule-making procedure 

that establishes risk and science-based regulations for the production, handling 

and distribution of those types of fruits and vegetables for which the Secretary 

15

determines such standards are necessary to minimize the risk of microbial illness.

4. Electronic record-keeping with web based search features is the next level. 

When an incident is reported electronic record-keeping will give the investigating process the ability to instantaneously trace the source product in order 

to expediently identify potential sources of the problem or to eliminate possible 

exposures.

5. Last, with all of the proactive development of systems in addition to the independent verification processes we employ to ensure that we are holding ourselves accountable for compliance, we continue to be dependent on those we do 

business with and the overall integrity of the people involved in the supply 

chain. We do not have the systems in place or the necessary personnel to monitor the compliance of non-Pandol affiliated suppliers and must rely upon the 

honesty and integrity of those we do business with. Therefore, we believe 

achieving consistent produce safety standards across the industry requires 

strong Federal Government oversight and responsibility in order to be most 

credible to consumers and equitable to producers.

Let me conclude with these closing thoughts. Produce food safety must be a process of continuous improvement, not a static achievement. We are on a continuum, 

constantly striving toward perfection, while understanding scientifically that perfection—or zero risk—is not possible. Because our products are enjoyed by consumers 

in their fresh and natural state without cooking, we have to be right every single 

time—not one in a million, or even one in a billion. But as long as there is the potential of even one individual getting sick, we will do all we can to prevent that from 

happening. 

The good news is that this is happening now. For the produce industry we have 

an overwhelming success record in regards to food safety with actual incidence of 

illness extremely low. Just look at the numbers.

• Over a billion servings of fresh produce are eaten every day.

• More than five million bags of fresh salads are sold every day.

• And, out of the hundreds of fruits and vegetables offered in a typical supermarket, only a very few have been implicated in illness outbreaks, and then 

rarely as compared with their volume of consumption.

But, we also know that consumers today are walking into grocery stores and restaurants with new concerns, new doubts, and sometimes fears about produce. They 

don’t understand those statistics; they don’t know what farmers and processors are 

doing to protect the safety of their produce; and equally important, they do not have 

complete confidence that government is doing all it should to protect their health. 

Fears of food safety have no place in the fresh produce department. We, as an 

industry, must do all we can to prevent illnesses from ever occurring, and we will. 

But because science tells us there is no such thing as zero risk, government must 

also be able to assure the public that even if something does go horribly wrong in 

an isolated case, consumers can continue to have confidence in fresh produce. We 

must all be able to trust the overall system of government oversight and industry 

responsibility, working together to produce the safest possible supply of fresh, 

healthy and nutritious fruits and vegetables.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. 

DiMare? 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY J. DIMARE, VICE PRESIDENT, 

DIMARE HOMESTEAD INC., DIMARE RUSKIN INC., AND 

DIMARE JOHNS ISLAND INC.; MEMBER, BOARD OF

DIRECTORS, FLORIDA FRUIT & VEGETABLE ASSOCIATION; 

PRESIDENT, FLORIDA TOMATO EXCHANGE; MEMBER, 

BOARD OF DIRECTORS, UNITED FRESH PRODUCE

ASSOCIATION, RUSKIN, FL 

Mr. DIMARE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Lucas, Committee Members, my name is Tony DiMare, and I am 

Vice President of DiMare Homestead and DiMare Ruskin, Inc. 

The DiMare Company is an 80 year old company and the largest 

vertically integrated tomato company in the United States. We are 

16

growers, packers, re-packers, and distributors of all types of fresh 

tomatoes. Our company has been one of the industry leaders and 

instrumental in helping form food safety guidelines that are in 

place in our industry today. The DiMare Company started a Food 

Safety and HACCP Program as early as 1990 at our Tampa, Florida repack facility. Food safety is not new to the DiMare Company. 

We then expanded the Food Safety Program to the remainder of 

our growing and packing facilities in the mid-1990s. 

I would like to give the Committee an overview and sense of 

what we do as a company to ensure that the products we produce, 

pack, and distribute are handled in the safest possible manner by 

our stringent Food Safety and Food Security Programs and our 

ability to positively identify and traceback our products. 

Starting with our farms, we routinely test our irrigation water 

and the water we use for spraying our crops to ensure it is free 

from harmful pathogens. We have invested heavily in some areas, 

installing fences where animal intrusion had been a problem. Our 

field workers are trained prior to the start of each crop season on 

awareness of food safety procedures. They are also trained on proper personal hygiene. Proper hand-washing after restroom use is one 

example of this. Our key personnel have been trained to identify 

worker illnesses and health issues and report them immediately to 

management. Our key personnel have also been trained for food security with special attention to any unusual activities and awareness of any unauthorized people coming onto our farms and facilities. Everything we do relative to food safety is documented and reviewed annually by one or more third-party auditors. We also conduct self-audits during each crop season and document those results. Any deficiencies are noted, and corrective actions are immediately addressed. 

At our packinghouses, we also have worker training sessions 

prior to the start of every season, educating workers on proper personal hygiene, including proper hand-washing, proper use of protective gloves, smocks, and hairnets. The workers are educated to not 

wear jewelry, have personal items, or food or drinks in the work 

area. There are designated eating and drinking areas for all employees. All of these procedures are in place to help minimize any 

possibility of contamination to our food products. Any machinery 

sprays and lubricants are of Food Grade quality, and MSDS 

records are kept for these and all other chemicals. 

The water we use to wash and rinse our product in our packinghouses is required to be of potable quality and is tested seasonally 

to ensure it is of safe quality. Our product at the packinghouse 

level typically goes through a chlorine bath wash procedure followed by a fresh water rinse, and then one final sanitizing rinse 

before it is quality sorted and sized for packaging. We very closely 

monitor our bath wash water on an hourly basis, recording chlorine 

levels, pH, and the water temperature, which are critical for ensuring proper kills of any bacteria or pathogens and prevention of infiltration of these contaminants into the tomatoes. 

The containers we harvest in are cleansed with a chlorine wash 

to rid them of any dirt and debris after they have been emptied of 

product and prior to returning to the farm for harvesting use 

again. The equipment used for all packing in all our operations is 

17

sanitized before the start of each packing day. Swab tests are conducted on the equipment twice per season and sent off to an independent lab for presence of total coliforms, E. coli O157:H7, and 

Salmonella. Pest control is another important area of our overall Food Safety 

Program. We contract with independent and licensed pest control 

companies to manage pest control in all of our packing operations. 

Traps and bait stations are placed around the perimeter of our 

properties, around the perimeter of our buildings, and around the 

inside of our packing facilities. In essence, we have three layers of 

pest control protections in place. 

After our product has been packed and readied for shipment, 

independent trucks used for transportation are inspected for cleanliness and absence of any foul odors and documented. Temperatures are set according to customer requests and temperature recorders are placed on every truck to monitor temperature settings 

during transportation. Again, everything we do is documented, and 

third-party audits are conducted annually to ensure we are delivering the most wholesome and safest products possible. 

The final process in our Food Safety Program is a Recall and 

Traceback Program. There is a Crisis Management Team in place 

at every level of our operation to act on a recall and quickly and 

timely trace our product back. I will share with the Committee a 

recent mock recall that was conducted on July 8, 2008, by one of 

our repacking operations in California during the Salmonella 

saintpaul outbreak in which tomatoes were incorrectly named as 

the source. Our facility in Sacramento, California, was chosen to 

conduct the mock recall to test the ability of industry to effectively 

conduct traceback, and more importantly, the timeliness of a recall 

from an individual quick-serve restaurant all the way back to the 

individual farm and specific field. 

Present at the traceback were the Quality Assurance Director of 

the quick-serve restaurant, a DiMare Company official, industry 

representatives from the California Tomato Farmers and Western 

Growers Association, and four Congressional investigators. The recall was initiated by the QA Director of the quick-serve restaurant 

by randomly and literally selecting one of their individual restaurant stores from a Yellow Pages phone book in the Sacramento 

area. He proceeded to call the store and asked the employee to give 

him the identification numbers on the side of the DiMare Fresh tomato box. The information was then given to the general manager 

at our Sacramento location, who then began the traceback of the 

delivery. The individual box was tracked to an order number and 

accompanying PO number, which was tied to our internal repack 

number. From this information, we identified the packer/shipper, 

who in turn identified the individual farm and the field from which 

this individual box was harvested. This entire process took less 

than 1 hour to complete. 

We strive and have achieved for tracebacks to be done in less 

than 4 hours each and every time we conduct a mock recall. We 

conduct these mock recalls twice a year in each of our repacking 

locations. 

In conclusion, I want to share the ‘‘proactiveness’’ of the Florida 

and California tomato industries with the establishment of mandaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:36 Sep 30, 2009 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 I:\DOCS\111-08\52483.TXT AGR1 PsN: BRIAN
18

tory food safety programs encompassing farms and packing operations of all tomato types. The two states represent approximately 

80 percent of the total fresh tomatoes produced in the United 

States. The programs are audited by USDA and enforced by their 

respective state agricultural agencies. In the case of Florida, the 

growers unanimously voted in support of the mandatory Food Safety Program back in 2006. This program became law this past July 

1, 2008, and is in place today. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to share with the 

Committee the rigorous steps and procedures we have implemented 

and practice every day at the DiMare Company. Thank you for 

your time today and the opportunity to discuss these issues. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. DiMare follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTHONY J. DIMARE, VICE PRESIDENT, DIMARE

HOMESTEAD INC., DIMARE RUSKIN INC., AND DIMARE JOHNS ISLAND INC.;

MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, FLORIDA FRUIT & VEGETABLE ASSOCIATION; 

PRESIDENT, FLORIDA TOMATO EXCHANGE; MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, UNITED

FRESH PRODUCE ASSOCIATION, RUSKIN, FL 

Good Morning Chairman Peterson and Committee Members.

My name is Tony DiMare, and I am Vice President of DiMare Homestead and 

DiMare Ruskin, Inc. The DiMare Company is an 80 year old company and the largest vertically integrated tomato company in the United States. We are growers, 

packers, repackers, and distributors of all types of fresh tomatoes. Our company has 

been one of the industry leaders and instrumental in helping form Food Safety 

Guidelines that are in place in our industry today. The DiMare Company started 

a Food Safety and HACCP Program as early as 1990 at our Tampa, Florida repack 

facility. Food safety is not new to our company. We then expanded the Food Safety 

Program to the remainder of our growing and packing facilities in the mid-1990’s. 

I would like to give the Committee an overview and sense of what we do as a 

company to ensure that the products we produce, pack, and distribute are handled 

in the safest possible manner by our stringent Food Safety and Food Security Programs we have in place, and our ability to positively identify and traceback our 

products. 

Starting with our farms, we routinely test our irrigation water and the water we 

use for spraying our crops to ensure it is free from harmful pathogens. We have invested heavily in some areas, installing fences where animal intrusion had been a 

problem. Our field workers are trained prior to the start of each crop season on 

awareness of food safety procedures. They are also educated on proper personal hygiene . . . proper hand-washing after restroom use is one example. Our key personnel have been educated to identify worker illnesses and health issues, such as 

tuberculosis, and report them immediately to management. Our key personnel have 

also been trained for Food Security with special attention to any unusual activities 

and awareness of any unauthorized people coming onto our farms. Everything we 

do relative to food safety is documented and reviewed annually by one or more 

third-party auditors. We also conduct self-audits during each crop season and document those results; any deficiencies are noted, and corrective actions are immediately addressed. 

At our packinghouses, we have worker training sessions prior to the start of every 

season, educating workers on proper personal hygiene, including: proper hand-washing, proper use of gloves, smocks, and hairnets. The workers are educated to not 

wear jewelry, have personal items, or food or drinks in the work area. There are 

designated eating and drinking areas for all employees. All of these procedures are 

in place to help minimize any possibility of contamination to our food products. Any 

machinery sprays and lubricants are of Food Grade quality and MSDS records are 

kept for these and all other chemicals. 

The water we use to wash and rinse our product in our packinghouses is required 

to be of potable quality and is tested seasonally to ensure it is of safe quality. Our 

product at the packinghouse level typically goes through a chlorine bath wash procedure followed by a water rinse, and then one final sanitizing rinse before it is quality sorted and sized for packaging. We very closely monitor our bath wash water 

on an hourly basis, recording chlorine levels, pH, and the water temperature, which 

19

are critical for ensuring proper kills of any bacteria or pathogens, and prevention 

of infiltration of these contaminants into the tomatoes. 

The containers we harvest in are cleansed with a chlorine wash to rid them of 

any dirt and debris after they have been emptied of product, and prior to returning 

to the farm for harvesting use again. The equipment used for packing in all our operations is sanitized before the start of each packing day. Swab tests are conducted 

on the equipment twice per season and sent off to an independent lab for presence 

of total coliforms, E. coli, E. coli O157H7, and Salmonella. 

Pest control is another important part of our overall Food Safety Program. We 

have contracted an independent and licensed pest control company to manage pest 

control in all of our packing operations. Traps and bait stations are placed around 

the perimeter of our properties, around the perimeter of our buildings, and around 

the inside of our packing facilities. In essence, we have three layers of pest protections in place. 

After our product has been packed and readied for shipment, independent trucks 

used for transportation are inspected for cleanliness and absence of any foul odors 

and documented. Temperatures are set according to customer requests and temperature recorders are placed on every truck to monitor temperature settings during 

transportation. Again, everything we do is documented, and third-party audits are 

conducted annually to ensure we are delivering the most wholesome and safest 

products possible. 

The final process in our Food Safety Program is a Recall and Traceback Program. 

There is a Crisis Management Team in place at every level of our operation to act 

on a recall and quickly and timely traceback our product. I will share with the Committee a recent mock recall that was conducted July 8, 2008, by one of our repacking operations in California during the Salmonella saintpaul outbreak in which tomatoes were incorrectly named as the source. Our facility in Sacramento, California, 

was chosen to conduct the mock recall to test the ability of industry to effectively 

conduct traceback and more importantly, the timeliness of a recall from an individual quick-serve restaurant (QSR) all the way back to the individual farm and 

specific field. Present at the traceback were the Quality Assurance (QA) Director of 

the quick-serve restaurant, a DiMare Company official, industry representatives 

from the California Tomato Farmers and Western Growers Association, and several 

congressional investigators. The recall was initiated by the QA Director of the QSR 

by randomly and literally selecting one of their individual restaurant stores from 

a Yellow Pages phone book in the Sacramento area. He proceeded to call the store 

and asked the employee to give him the identification numbers on the side of the 

DiMare Fresh tomato box. The information was then given to the general manager 

at our Sacramento location, who then began the traceback of the delivery. The individual box was tracked to an order number and accompanying PO number, which 

was tied to our internal repack number. From this information, we identified the 

packer/shipper, who in turn identified the individual farm and field from which this 

individual box was harvested. This entire process took less than 1 hour to complete. 

We strive and have achieved for tracebacks to be done in less than 4 hours each 

and every time we conduct a mock recall. We conduct these mock recalls twice a 

year in each of our repacking locations. 

I appreciate the opportunity to share with the Committee the rigorous steps and 

procedures we have implemented and practice every day at the DiMare Company. 

Thank you for your time today and the opportunity to discuss these issues, Mr. 

Chairman and Committee Members.

• A Risk Management Program and Self-Audit System are in place to help reduce 

and eliminate potential exposures.

• Our facilities are registered with the FDA in accordance with the Public Health 

Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.

• We have positive lot identification and can traceback our product from retail 

store or restaurant all the way back to our farms through our internal accounting programs.

• We begin by sourcing from only approved growers and packers, requiring they 

follow Good Agricultural Practices and that they are audited by third parties.

• All products are obtained by a Purchase Order, which begins the traceability—

one step forward and one step back.

• Internal self-audits are conducted monthly at our repack operations and seasonally at our farming and packing operations to help maintain compliance.

• Customers routinely conduct unannounced audits at our repacking facilities to 

review our Food Safety Programs and verify compliance.

20

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. DiMare. I want to thank again 

the panel for being with us. 

Mr. Keys, how often are your facilities reevaluated for equivalency and when the FSIS visits your plants abroad, are they scheduled or can they come in any time? Can they just——

Mr. KEYS. Mr. Chairman, FSIS informs AQIS, which is their 

equivalent in Australia, that they are going to come for a review 

of the plants, and then AQIS will pick out of all the plants that 

are certified to export to the United States within Australia, they 

will pick a series of plants to go see. And we won’t know at any 

given time when we will be inspected. It will be a short period of 

time. We will know, but we have AQIS officials that are in our 

plants every day. So they see that if we are doing something different to get prepared for the Americans, of course, they would be 

wise to that very quickly. 

The CHAIRMAN. But before any of these plants can ship, they actually get a visit from FSIS before they are certified, right? 

Mr. KEYS. Well, they have to be certified by the Australians to 

be equivalent——

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Mr. KEYS.—so then we can ship. It is up to the Australians——

The CHAIRMAN. But FSIS doesn’t actually come to every plant. 

In some cases they will just take the word of the Australians? 

Mr. KEYS. Yes, it is the same way when we are exporting a 

United States product to Japan or Korea. They don’t certify each 

individual plant. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Mr. KEYS. FSIS does that, and then you can ship. 

The CHAIRMAN. They have an agreement. Mr. Dever, is it Dever? 

Mr. DEVER. Dever. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. In the case of the plants that are 

fruits and vegetable plants, does FDA have an equivalent system 

to FSIS in terms of going to each of these plants and inspecting 

them? 

Mr. DEVER. No, they do not. We deal typically with the FDA who 

has grade inspections performed by FDA for a product being imported from outside the country. 

The CHAIRMAN. So FDA goes to these plants? 

Mr. DEVER. No, we have FDA actually at the ports of entry here 

in the United States. 

The CHAIRMAN. And so in your case, as I understand it, you have 

some kind of agreement with your people that you are importing 

from that they meet some standards that you guys set? 

Mr. DEVER. That is correct, yes. We expect equivalency from the 

standards within our organization. We require that of all of the——

The CHAIRMAN. And how do you check that? 

Mr. DEVER. I am sorry? 

The CHAIRMAN. How do you check that? Do you have third-party 

audits, do you send your own people down there? 

Mr. DEVER. No, we do not require third-party audits. We do have 

people that do go on-site from time to time and check, but it is not 

on a normal basis. It is not something that we do typically unless 

we have a concern that is brought to our attention. 

21

The CHAIRMAN. So nobody actually, necessarily, goes and visits 

that plant before they can important into the country? 

Mr. DEVER. That is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are comfortable with that? 

Mr. DEVER. We are comfortable with the Chilean operations that 

occur today, but what we are looking for is more equivalency as to 

the Chilean operations which is where our product, primarily, 

comes from, from South America. What we are looking for is from 

some equivalency of regulations down there to ensure the product 

comes in here that equals ours. 

The CHAIRMAN. And they are not equivalent at this point in your 

opinion? 

Mr. DEVER. In some cases they are even better than equivalent, 

but it is not as consistent. We are looking for consistency throughout——

The CHAIRMAN. So you are talking country by country? 

Mr. DEVER. Yes, correct. As an example, in Mexico, we have substantially much more FDA inspections done on products coming 

into the United States out of Mexico than we do from South America. 

The CHAIRMAN. Does FDA currently do anything to ensure that 

there are systems in place in these other countries? 

Mr. DEVER. Not to my knowledge. 

The CHAIRMAN. No? Are they talking about it? 

Mr. DEVER. Not to my knowledge. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keys, we understand that FSIS has a multilayered system for ensuring the safety of imported products that 

determines the equivalence. What are the benefits of approaching 

inspection with a system-based approach like the FSIS focusing on 

the potential importing country and evaluating each system as a 

whole? 

Mr. KEYS. We think it is important for consistency, and it is two 

governments working with one another to figure out what those 

points of equivalency are. So we as a company, we of course give 

input and try to work with each one of our respective governments 

to figure out what that equivalency is or if we can sustain it in 

plants. But at the end of the day, it is a negotiation and a deal between two sovereign countries to decide what is equivalency and 

then working together. 

They manage that over a continuum, and if you look how long 

Australian product has been coming into the United States, that 

history going back, two governments working together to figure out 

what equivalency means. You have that consistency and quality of 

government-to-government work that really helps trade flow and 

industry to work. And we struggle with that in the United States 

as we work with the Koreans and the Japanese on equivalency 

with their meat inspection systems, or the Chinese, back and forth. 

But it is a process that we believe that works well between two 

governments, not two industries or two companies. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know I am a little bit over my time, but Mr. 

DiMare and Mr. Dever, why do you think FDA has never done this, 

or why can’t they do the same kind of a system that USDA does 

with these other countries? I mean, they don’t have the resources, 

or they don’t care? 

22

Mr. DEVER. I don’t know enough to speculate on why they don’t. 

Typically we deal a lot with FDA on grade standards, but not a lot 

with USDA, and why they may be focused on other things other 

than fresh fruit and vegetables. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. DiMare? 

Mr. DIMARE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment on 

that. You know, having gone through the Salmonella saintpaul outbreak last year and having FDA officials in both our packing operations and repacking operations around the country, in talking 

with some of those folks, they do wish they had more presence, particularly in Mexico, but a lack of resources is part of the issue. And 

I know they were a little bit frustrated because they don’t have 

personnel down in Mexico to better monitor what was going on 

down there. And I know from speaking with some of these folks 

that when they did go down during this whole investigation and 

conducted inspections for tomatoes at the time, before peppers were 

named, comments were made back to me in the area they were investigating that this particular area was rich in Salmonella, although it wasn’t the Salmonella saintpaul strain that they were 

trying to find. 

I think they would love to have the ability to have more oversight and presence, particularly in Latin American countries and 

particularly in Mexico, but, again, the lack of resources, from what 

they have conveyed to me, is part of the problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. Within the government, and I know I am—if it 

is all right, Mr. Lucas—is there any pressure from the people that 

want to have more trade to try to not get in the way of that? In 

other words, if we put too rigorous a test on things that they are 

going to see that as restraining trade and whatever. Is there pressure within the government itself not to do this because we are 

going to somehow or another restrict ability of Mexicans to send 

fruit and vegetables up here? 

Mr. DIMARE. In my opinion, I am sure there is some sentiment 

to that. Yes, I am sure there are some people that are sensitive to 

over-regulating and making regulations too stringent to obstruct 

trade. And there is no doubt having again gone through this investigation that as soon as Mexico was discussed as a possibility that 

this Salmonella saintpaul might have originated from there, the 

political pressure in Mexico to our government in Washington, particularly the State Department, was tremendous. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. DIMARE. They are extremely influential and very powerful in 

their lobby, and they put tremendous amount of pressure on our 

government to, in my opinion, to delay part of the process because 

you can’t tell me an investigation could take 3 months like it did 

and all of a sudden the State of Minnesota Health Department, it 

was actually your state——

The CHAIRMAN. We are proud of them. They are——

Mr. DIMARE.—was the actual state agency that uncovered the 

Salmonella and indeed traced it back to a distributor in Texas who 

traced it back to two farms in Mexico, for 3 months to investigate 

and looking solely at tomatoes to come to find out it was Serrano 

and jalapen ̃ o peppers from Mexico. Something is wrong with the 

system. 

23

The CHAIRMAN. No question about that. Thank you. The gentleman from Oklahoma. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pursuing some 

of your thoughts there. Mr. Keys, your company has operations in 

many countries, sells products around the world. So your folks 

have experience in a wide range of food safety food regulatory systems. 

Based on your company’s experiences, how would you rate the 

United States in comparison to many of these other countries? 

Mr. KEYS. On food as it relates to meat, meat inspection, which 

is I guess what we are talking about here. It is the standard. People have a lot of trust in FSIS. They look to it for answers on how 

to bring equivalency, and the gold standard is to be able to ship 

fresh meat and poultry into the United States, and to do that you 

have to satisfy the USDA and you have to work with the USDA. 

I think it is important to note that just in the last few years, three 

countries, I am not going to name them right here, but three countries voluntarily pulled their certification to export to the United 

States to work with FSIS to manage some equivalency problems. 

And that was done without fanfare. It was done very professionally 

between two governments, and I think that is important. It is really important to have the governments working, and the governments to have equivalency for food safety, so companies know 

where the bright lines are, not only companies that are in other 

countries but ourselves. 

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Dever, in your testimony you state that you 

found that some of the more sophisticated food safety operations 

are found outside of the United States. Would you take a moment 

to expand on that statement and perhaps give us a few examples? 

Mr. DEVER. There are certain companies and/or countries that do 

have sanitation requirements that I do believe exceed what we 

have here in the United States, from a regulatory perspective. 

There are certain countries that we have done business with in the 

past and continue to do business with today that have very detailed, not only requirements related to sanitation, but also inspections that are done more so than what we do have here. 

Mr. LUCAS. Could you give me an example or two of just how 

those systems are more sophisticated? 

Mr. DEVER. The requirements are such that in certain areas, 

hair nets will be required in the production of grape packing. All 

of the product will come to one facility rather than packed out in 

the field. They will have lab coats so that everything is covered. 

People will ensure that everyone’s hands are washed and sanitized 

at all times, and it will continue through the entire packing process 

in order to ensure that the product quality is not contaminated as 

it is going through the process. 

Mr. LUCAS. Now, you have my curiosity. I have to ask without 

naming of all of these potential places, perhaps a couple examples 

of these countries? 

Mr. DEVER. I would prefer not to mention them today. 

Mr. LUCAS. Okay. You advocate that FDA commencing a rulemaking program to regulate on-farm production practices. Do you 

believe that FDA has the greater expertise and resources to regulate farming practices than USDA? 

24

Mr. DEVER. No, sir. 

Mr. LUCAS. I am not even going to ask then how you think farmers and ranchers would react to such a view. Enough said. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Let me look at the list 

here. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I am going to forego questions on this 

panel in the interest of time, and I will reserve them for the next 

panel. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Kagen. 

Mr. KAGEN. Thank you for being here. I appreciate your testimony. I had the opportunity to read your prepared comments last 

evening. I don’t have too many questions. I want to thank Mr. Keys 

for not renaming the Green Bay Packers after you brought the 

packing facility there in Green Bay. It has a lot to do with how we 

feel about ourselves. 

Is there any way that consumers, when they go to the grocery 

store, can tell where that meat is coming from? Are you going to 

comply with the country of origin labeling? 

Mr. KEYS. We are complying with the country of origin labeling. 

I could say right now that the vast majority of the beef that we are 

producing and labeling, we are talking close to 90 percent or more, 

is going to be labeled with an USA label. And that is what consumers will see in the stores, will be that. That is what we use primarily, what we would call label number one or label A. 

Mr. KAGEN. And are you inspected in your rendering facilities 

every day? 

Mr. KEYS. Do we inspect our rendering——

Mr. KAGEN. You have a rendering facility, and it is being inspected every day. Is that true? 

Mr. KEYS. Well, the rendering is separate than red meat, the 

meat part of it, but it is run professionally every day by our professionals, and it is regulated of course as a feed or however the rendered product goes out. 

Mr. KAGEN. Would you have any objection, either all three of 

you, of having reports that are made by any inspector at all made 

public on the Internet? Would you have any objection to that at all 

for full transparency? 

Mr. KEYS. I think you can get most of the reports that come out 

of USDA now on when we have NR’s in our plants and noncompliance. 

Mr. KAGEN. Have you ever brought to the attention of any of the 

inspectors a problem that they may not have seen that you have 

corrected yourselves? 

Mr. KEYS. I don’t know that answer, but I could find out and get 

back to you. 

Mr. KAGEN. I appreciate it. That is all I have for this group. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from 

Kansas, Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Keys, 

thank you all for your testimony today. My general inquiry is just 

about your recommendations as to what kind of the bottom line of 

what we need to do to improve food safety, and as you know, there 

25

is a concerted effort on this topic. I am very interested in knowing 

what the industry’s kind of best suggestion is. It seems to me that 

you have described a pretty robust system, Mr. Keys, but based 

upon your area, is there anything that you would do to recommend 

improvements? 

Mr. KEYS. I am just a lobbyist, not a scientist. But I will say I 

think the elephant in the room here is that there is a difference. 

There is a difference, USDA inspects meat and poultry, and FDA 

inspects everything else. I don’t think the American public really 

understands that. And the robustness of the inspection service at 

USDA, it is every carcass, every day. It is very robust, not only domestically but as we—you go around the world, people look at it 

as a gold standard if they can ship fresh meat or poultry into the 

United States, fresh, frozen or whatever you want to call it, noncooked. I think USDA has a long history here. I don’t know enough 

about FDA. We are not regulated by FDA in our company, at any 

given site. But those are the big differences. I don’t think we separate these things out and look at them in a way that it is meaningful to the public so they really understand. They just see it is inspected by the government. They don’t know the difference between 

USDA and FDA and it never comes out, but that is something that 

maybe this hearing is trying to accomplish and good for you all. 

We have a robust system. A lot of people say the law on meat 

inspection developed at the turn of the last century, but it is a very 

robust law with a lot of the power given to the Department of Agriculture to do a lot of different things in working with the industry 

on a daily basis, if not constant basis, to continue to work to make 

the products safer and safer for the public. And the industry has 

stepped up to that challenge. We certainly could always do more, 

and we should always think about doing more. But we are constantly looking for ways to improve our systems in working with 

USDA to make sure that we are doing a better and better job. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Keys. Mr. Dever, you advocate that 

FDA commence a rule-making process to regulate on-farm production practices. Why do you believe that FDA has greater expertise 

and resources to regulate farming practices than USDA? 

Mr. DEVER. Well, from my perspective quite honestly, I am looking for a regulatory body. It is more up to Congress to decide which 

is the best regulatory body to do it. So I can correct my testimony 

accordingly, but I am looking for that particular fact and we are 

looking for that kind of regulation. 

Second, is going back to your questions to Mr. Keys. From my 

perspective, the electronic record-keeping is one of the key things 

that we seriously need in this industry that is standardized 

throughout the entire supply chain. What Tony does in his company and what Mr. Keys is doing in their company is phenomenal, 

and I can tell you that for the most part, they can probably do anything within a matter of minutes and possibly an hour. 

But the problem is that if we don’t have it through the entire 

supply chain electronically, that is where the need is. And a lot of 

things are still done manually in this industry, so I would suggest 

that. 

And last, the only thing I can say is I now, after listening to Mr. 

Keys, I am planning on having a filet mignon tonight for dinner. 

26

Mr. MORAN. As a Kansan, we are delighted at your choice. Mr. 

DiMare, anything you would like to add for those specific suggestions? 

Mr. DIMARE. I just want to clarify one thing. In the tomato industry, USDA’s role in our industry, in our operation, is to inspect 

for quality, size, and grade. Now, as I mentioned in my testimony, 

Florida just adopted a mandatory food safety program this past 

July, and part of that program, USDA, under the auspices of the 

State Department of Agriculture in Florida, does the actual thirdparty audits which again is separate from quality or grade in the 

packing house. Same agency, two different roles at different times. 

And this is done now on an annual basis. It could be announced 

or unannounced, and that is for both farms and packing operations 

which is new, which is unprecedented in the produce industry. The 

tomato industry has been the leader to implement these programs 

which again, as I stated in my testimony, was unanimously supported by the growers. We, the growers, asked that to be mandated 

for food safety. As I said back in 2006, we actually took the vote 

in Florida, the Board of Directors, and it was unanimously passed 

to adopt this. 

So I just wanted to clarify the USDA’s role from our perspective 

in the packing houses versus third-party audits as far as quality of 

grade. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Schrader. 

Mr. SCHRADER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I would ask 

for the panel’s comment, would enhanced regulation, as we are 

talking about here, really stop the absolute bad characters like we 

have seen in this most recent peanut butter fiasco? One person deliberately obstructs and has no intention of applying to any of the 

regulation. Any of the panelists? Just a real quick no, yes down the 

line. 

Mr. KEYS. I would just tell you, the number one priority in our 

company, before anything, is food safety followed by worker safety. 

And our reputation is what we have to stand on. Regulations by 

and of themselves are not going to make us good players, so we 

constantly work on that. You know, we have built a culture in our 

company to work on these issues, and maybe some people don’t 

have that culture, but I am not going to talk about them. I can only 

talk about us. 

Mr. SCHRADER. Fair enough. Mr. Dever? 

Mr. DEVER. Yes, if you look from Pandol’s perspective, you look 

in our written testimony, it refers to how we still have to count on 

the integrity of the people we are doing business with. No matter 

how much regulation that we instill on the industry, at the end of 

the day, if somebody intentionally goes to harm another human 

being, I don’t think regulation is going to avoid that. 

Mr. SCHRADER. Thank you. 

Mr. DIMARE. And I agree. You know, the liability factor, if you 

look at some of the companies that have been implicated in the 

meat industry, Cornett Foods about 6 or 7 years ago in West Virginia, had stores in Pennsylvania that had contaminated Roma tomatoes. It broke Cornett Foods. Do we as an individual company 

27

or industry want to take that risk because in today’s world, all that 

it takes is one incident with gross negligence. From what I can see 

on the surface knowing the food industry and watching the news 

media over the peanut butter situation, there is no doubt there was 

gross negligence going on. Just look at the physical facility. 

Mr. SCHRADER. My time is running out, if I may. I appreciate 

that, and that is an important point. 

Mr. DIMARE. Mr. Chairman, if I may, this is a commodity-specific Food Safety Guidelines that we developed in the tomato industry, and if the Chairman wishes, I would like to submit it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be made part of the 

record. 

[The information is located on p. 87.] 

Mr. DIMARE. Thank you. And we can get one to all Committee 

Members if so——

The CHAIRMAN. That would be good if you could make those 

available. 

Mr. SCHRADER. Mr. Keys has talked several times about USDA’s 

process being the gold standard by which much of the world tries 

to emulate the United States’ inspection process. Mr. Dever and 

Mr. DiMare, would you say that FDA standards are the gold standard also with produce and inspection? 

Mr. DEVER. Once again, from our perspective, we deal with FDA 

inspectors most of the time, so those are the people that we do a 

lot of business with. We don’t with the other party. I can’t answer 

the question from that perspective. 

Mr. SCHRADER. All right. 

Mr. DIMARE. And from our perspective, USDA does not have 

oversight of what we do on a daily basis, FDA does. 

Mr. SCHRADER. That is fair enough. There has been a lot of talk 

from the panel as far as equivalency being the gold standard, also, 

that really helps any company deal with at least a consistent set 

of regulations. Does the panel have any opinion about FDA’s 

equivalency versus the FDA’s equivalency procedures? 

Mr. KEYS. I would just say equivalency, if you really study it and 

you look at it, how you get governments to buy in with other governments and work things out, that is the beauty of equivalency, 

government-to-government equivalency because it makes them part 

of the process in getting it to an end goal. If you don’t have that, 

then government is in, government is out, and you never know 

where the steady line is so you can produce for that marketplace, 

and that is the important thing about equivalency. 

Mr. DEVER. I would agree with that. We export to 24 different 

countries, and we import from a number of different countries, and 

for us, if it was a global specification if you will, it would make it 

much better for the global industry from a food safety perspective. 

So we are looking for countries to work together within the government regulatory bodies because we cannot as producers, we 

can’t be expected nor can we afford to go and inspect every facility 

in every country that we do business with. It is impossible. So we 

have to count on countries developing the right equivalent standards so that we can count on that and have certifications if necessary. But that is the extent of it from my perspective. 

28

Mr. SCHRADER. Last question. My time is actually running out. 

It has just come to my attention as a consumer and as a farmer, 

a person that spent some time in our state legislative situation 

that a lot of the problems that we are dealing with come from foreign countries where there is this inconsistency that the panel has 

talked about. That it is sometimes lost upon a great many Americans, that the fact that we catch a lot of the issues that we do catch 

in this country before they get out of hand is sometimes a testament to some of the inspection processes we already have in place 

that have stood the test of time, and in some cases are the gold 

standard. And while we can always improve them, and some of the 

improvements that have been suggested here today I am sure we 

will incorporate, I think Americans have to remember we have the 

safest food on the planet, we should feel lucky that way. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from Wyoming, Mrs. Lummis? 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is for 

Mr. Dever. What regulations are required to equalize the playing 

field? You mentioned that term in your testimony. 

Mr. DEVER. We are looking for regulations for the entire supply 

chain. So that starts at the farm, goes through the packing houses 

and the transportation for the product, and how it is both harvested, grown, and also transported. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you. Mr. Keys, a question for you. Do you 

think the FSIS needs any additional funding or manpower, legislative authority, to make the process of importing, particularly Australian beef, any safer? 

Mr. KEYS. Well, we think Australian beef is very safe because of 

the equivalency process that we have been going over. Look, I am 

not an FSIS employee. I am sure if I asked them in the back here 

they would certainly love more money. I am sure that probably 

wouldn’t be a problem. But, more importantly, with the FSIS, is 

that the structure of their regulatory regime is very important, and 

to understand that and for them to work with industry to continue 

to modify it. I mean, E. coli took us from looking at every carcass 

every day to looking at the carcass basically through a microscope. 

And that whole transformation was done without new legislation. 

It was done within the guidelines of the current laws on the books. 

So there is a lot of flexibility there in the law to get to the main 

point which is to provide a safe and wholesome product for the consumer, no matter if it comes from in the United States or it is imported from a foreign country. It has to meet that standard, the 

same way when we ship product, our beef, to Japan, Korea, and 

our main export markets, Mexico, Canada, is that we have to work 

with those countries to get their equivalencies down right. 

So it is all a give and take, and if we try to do something a little 

sly or silly, we can bet that people in other countries that we are 

exporting beef to would do the same sly and silly thing. So what 

goes around comes around as my grandmother said. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Thank you for your answer. I have another 

question for you. Now I am going to ask you to put on a hat that 

you are not currently wearing. Obviously JBS is about as far as 

you could get from the very small cow/calf operator or rancher/

29

farmer in the United States, but could you talk about the perspective of a small rancher or processor? Do you think that they could 

continue to operate under the on-farm regulatory regime that has 

been contemplated by some of the proposed legislation? 

Mr. KEYS. I grew up on one of those small operations, so I understand this. And what I think is always—to understand the beef industry, the cow/calf industry, is that it is 70 percent of our producers control 30 percent of our production in cow/calf. So you have 

a lot of small, part-time guys who do this. And if they feel at any 

given point in time that it is more trouble to raise that animal than 

it is worth, based on their time, effort, place in the food chain, they 

will just quit it. And I think you are seeing that right now. The 

cow herding in the United States is going down at the same time 

that globally, the demand for beef is going up. And a lot of it is 

land cost, it is demographics, but it could also become heavily regulatory burdens on small cow/calf producers that just say enough of 

that. I am not going to do that. I am going to grow wheat or whatever they want to do. 

So I think that is an important balance to always watch. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. The last number that I was aware of is that we 

have 1.2 million ranchers. There are now less than 900,000, and 

they are declining. And if you have a specific number that is more 

current than mine, I would love to see it. 

Mr. KEYS. Well, I don’t have it right now, but I will get that to 

you. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you. Mr. DiMare, could you tell me, is there 

anything a Federal agency could do to help bolster your safety protocols that are already in place, or do you feel that they are adequate as is? 

Mr. DIMARE. I don’t believe there is because again, this document here was a creation from all stakeholders, from producers to 

users, to government regulators within FDA, scientists. The work 

has already been done in the tomato industry and put into this document from all these people, and we are currently revising and creating a new matrix for the tomato industry. It will be the first, 

again, commodity in produce that—I don’t know when it is going 

to be done because we are right in the midst of it right now—that 

addresses every operation in the tomato chain from the farm all 

the way to the quick-serve restaurant, and the responsibilities at 

each one of those facets relative to food safety. We are doing it, we 

have been doing it. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you, Mr. DiMare. My time is up, but I want 

to thank you all for being here today, and I am hopeful that the 

best practices that you are instituting in the tomato industry will 

be shared among other commodities. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Massa. 

Mr. MASSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the 

work you do in the private sector to secure the end product of what 

so many farmers try to get to the table. I have a lot of experience 

in supermarkets and not much on ranches. So I end up like most 

consumers seeing the end-product of their efforts. However, as we 

compare the oversight responsibilities of these two major government institutions, my concerns and focus are not necessarily about 

30

what is happening here in the United States but rather the food 

safety and jurisdiction requirements of our overseas imports. We 

have members here on the panel who have significant overseas interests in grapes and beef, and I know that countries, specifically 

in Latin America, still use pesticides that are banned by regimes 

in this nation and we still import that food. And I know there are 

practices overseas in the beef industry that frankly are not conducted here. 

And so my question to both of you today, if I might, could you 

please give us some insight as to how the United States, with its 

heavy, new importation of food, can move through these agencies 

to further secure our food safety? That really is one of the most 

critical issues we are going to be facing in the future. Mr. Keys? 

Mr. KEYS. Thank you. The equivalency to ship fresh meat, fresh 

frozen meat, into the United States from foreign countries, there 

are only a few foreign countries that actually can ship here, that 

are certified to do so. The rigor that they have to go through to get 

that product in a container and get it to the United States is very 

robust, all the way to the point where USDA has a residue program to test for residues, chemical residues, drug residues, in all 

this product. And they do it not only for foreign product coming in 

but also domestic programs. FSIS runs a residue program. So the 

rigor that USDA has put into this system over the years on meat 

and poultry—and that is by the way the only thing they do regulate on the food side—we believe is very robust. And they are always looking for ways to make it better, and we just went through 

a big reclassification on how imported countries have to test for E. 

coli. And the Australians, New Zealanders, Uruguay, Nicaragua, 

all the countries, Mexico, Canada, they all came to Washington, 

worked with the USDA, came up with a regime for testing for E. 

coli in a better, more robust way. 

And so you see those type of activities happening all the time at 

USDA because they are actively involved with their counterparts. 

That is the important link with equivalency with foreign countries 

when foreign meat and poultry comes into the United States. 

Mr. MASSA. Thank you, sir. And with respect to grapes and agricultural products, this is something that we have a significant 

focus on in my district, and I would like your insight, specifically, 

for instance, Chile. 

Mr. DEVER. We are looking at that all of the time because one 

of the problems that we do have in this industry is the equivalency 

portion, as we have talked about quite a bit throughout this hearing. Down in South America in numerous countries, including 

Chile, you have a lot of people that are implementing a lot of good 

safety regulations themselves, but that is by the industry, and the 

Chilean Fresh Fruit Association is doing a wonderful job, in particular, at spreading the word as to what is to go on down there 

in helping the people improve that aren’t doing a good job. We have 

the same situation here in the United States, but from Chile’s perspective, what we are looking for is we are trying to get as much 

assurance as possible and we want to deal with the Chilean Government to ensure that they understand what the requirements are 

here for safe product through the entire supply chain, and we are 

looking for that going down to the smallest grower. And whether 

31

it be in the United States or Chile or Argentina, I can’t say—if anybody asked me today, can we be sure 100 percent that everybody 

is complying with that, I can’t say that today. 

Mr. MASSA. But you would concur that the entire regime is built 

largely on one of trusting the foreign governments’ certification of 

their systems? 

Mr. DEVER. That is correct. 

Mr. MASSA. With respect to beef, would you agree that we are 

relying heavily on the foreign governments’ certification of their inspection regime? 

Mr. KEYS. No, I would say it is sort of an equivalency. We sign 

off, FSIS signs off, so they can say yes, this is what we are going 

to do——

Mr. MASSA. But they are not——

Mr. KEYS.—and FSIS can say, well, no that is not good enough. 

You have to——

Mr. MASSA. But they are not American inspectors. 

Mr. KEYS. But we go and audit every year. We send teams over 

there. It is a very rigorous program. There are only a few countries 

that qualify to ship beef and ship red meat to the United States 

and poultry. 

Mr. MASSA. Thank you both very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Nebraska is recognized. Pass? The gentleman from California, Mr. 

Costa? 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this very 

timely hearing and for your efforts in working with myself and others on food safety efforts. As many of you know, I represent the 

highly diversified area in the San Joaquin Valley in which agriculture is the number one industry, and food safety is always job 

number one. I am also pleased that Mr. Dever from the Pandol 

family, an immigrant family from Croatia that has farmed in the 

San Joaquin Valley for generations now and is part of this panel, 

and Mr. DiMare whose family I have known for years as well. Good 

witnesses, Mr. Keys as well. 

I want to go through a quick list of questions because I have introduced legislation that I would invite all the Members to look at. 

Congressman Putnam and I, a bipartisan effort to truly try to develop, one, a gold standard and uniformity across the country as it 

relates to food safety, but first, when we talk about the overlapping 

myriad of regulations and issues it is important to know that—

raise your hands when I ask you the following questions if you are 

doing it. Do you currently operate under food safety standards imposed by the USDA or the FDA? USDA? 

Mr. KEYS. USDA. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay. 

Mr. DIMARE. Well, again, the Florida Tomato Industry developed 

their own food safety——

Mr. COSTA. No, I know that. I want to quickly—my time is limited. Yes or no. 

Mr. DIMARE. No. 

Mr. COSTA. No? Okay. Or is it a combination in any cases? Mr. 

Dever? 

32

Mr. DEVER. It can be a combination, but primarily FDA. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay. How many of you currently follow a hazardous 

analysis critical control plan, otherwise known as a HACCP? Okay. 

How many of you are currently following good agricultural practices, otherwise known as GAPs? You all follow which we like to 

refer to as a gold standard, right? How can you discuss differences 

between the HACCP and the GAPs and do you believe that safety 

on the field requires a different approach to those that are in the—

where we do the value-added and the processing facilities? Yes, Mr. 

DiMare? 

Mr. DIMARE. There are some variances between the two, between the farms and packaging. 

Mr. COSTA. And we have to take those into account, correct? 

Mr. DEVER. In most cases, we follow GAP in fields. We have internal GAP as well as regular, but over and above that you also 

follow good manufacturing practices when it comes to some of the 

processing of product. 

Mr. COSTA. Which brings me to my next question. How many of 

you follow additional food safety requirements not required by law 

but are part of your marketing orders, part of agreements that you 

have with co-ops or farmer-collective operations? All of you do, 

which never gets taken into account when people are looking at the 

food safety issues, right? 

Mr. DEVER. Correct. 

Mr. COSTA. It is my understanding, and this is probably with Mr. 

Dever and Mr. DiMare—I don’t know, Mr. Keys if it would apply 

to you—as we talk about our efforts to improve the GAPs—standards in food safety, do you support a mandatory commodity-specific, risk-based regulation effort and guidelines to fill in the holes 

and to create the greater confidence that we need among American 

consumers? 

Mr. DEVER. Yes. 

Mr. COSTA. Do you support the Safe FEAST Act? Yes? 

Mr. DEVER. Yes. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. Mr. DiMare, and I think this is really at 

the heart of the traceability program and we knew what happened 

with the tomato market last summer because of the scare that 

ended up being jalapen ̃ o peppers imported from Mexico. But, you 

mentioned your initiative in Florida and the guidelines of the programs that were developed in conjunction with the FDA, is that 

correct? 

Mr. DIMARE. That is correct. 

Mr. COSTA. And the enforcement or the audits were in conjunction with the FDA as well? Or the USDA? They were done by the 

USDA? 

Mr. DIMARE. FDA. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay. Do you think that system is effective? 

Mr. DIMARE. Pardon? 

Mr. COSTA. Do you think that system is effective? 

Mr. DIMARE. I think it is very effective. 

Mr. COSTA. Because I was wondering whether or not you can promulgate a system in which the FDA promulgates the regulations 

and then the USDA does the administration because a lot of the 

different food safety proposals that are out there want to know 

33

whether or not or how you are going to be able to do this as we 

look at developing a new food safety program. 

Mr. DIMARE. Well, I just want to comment in going back to the 

investigation. I will give you a little example what happened with 

us. In our Houston facility, we had folks come in from FDA that 

came in from the drug side that had no experience in the produce 

industry in conducting these actual investigation, with no knowledge of produce. I think that is just absolutely ludicrous that in today’s society with a regulating agency that they send in people that 

have no experience investigating something that was so serious. I 

think that is a serious problem. That needs to be looked at. 

Mr. COSTA. Well, my time has expired here, but Mr. Chairman, 

can I finish this? Thank you. So you think it is possible then for 

the FDA to work on the science and then the USDA to work with 

other efforts especially when we talk about imported foods to in effect be the foot boots on the ground to provide the enforcement? 

Mr. DIMARE. I think it is possible as long as both agencies are 

willing to work together. 

Mr. COSTA. Under the category of not wanting to reinvent the 

wheel, I would like, at least, Mr. DiMare and Mr. Dever to talk 

about the traceability program because we have witnessed it just 

in the random sampling right now with the pistachio issue here in 

the last few days. But in the tomato industry, we have taken people of the Energy and Commerce Committee out to California, and 

we had a random sample that I am aware of in which they tried 

to pick five different farms. And the earliest they could traceback 

the sampling was within a 1⁄2 an hour to the farm. The longest took 

51⁄5 hours, and that was because the farmer was a single operator. 

He was gone from the farm, and there was a message on his phone. 

When he got to his phone, he checked it and he called back. But 

the traceability factor is a critical part in terms of best management practices. 

Mr. DEVER. I fully agree from Pandol’s perspective. We are also 

on the Produce Traceability Initiative put together by the three industry associations that was mentioned in my testimony. 

We are very much involved in traceability, and that is one reason 

why we do believe electronic record-keeping is important because 

we do mock recalls continuously. We fortunately have not had the 

experience to date of having to use it in real life like Tony has. You 

know, grapes so far have been off of the hit list, and we are very 

fortunate for that, and I suggest everybody go and buy a couple 

pounds this afternoon. But to your point, traceability is extremely 

key to minimizing the damage that is caused when an incident occurs. And if you have the right traceability in place, it solves many 

of the problems, rather than a shotgun approach that has been 

used in other commodities that I have seen recently. Once again, 

we have not experienced that ourselves. It is just what we see in 

the industry. But from our perspective, traceability is it. And for 

the most part, the people that are in this business, if they don’t 

have a good traceability program, they won’t be in the business for 

very long. I mean, it is crucial to our industry and it is crucial to 

the consumer to be able to trace the product. 

Last, we are the ones that suffer the most if we can’t do it because it puts us out of business. I don’t know how much money 

34

Tony lost in the last tomato recall, but a lot of companies wouldn’t 

have survived that. 

Mr. COSTA. To that point, and I know all the Members of this 

Committee understand that because of their own representation in 

their own districts, but I try to explain to people when we are talking about food safety, the farmers first of all consume the products 

they grow. So they don’t want to have products that potentially 

may be contaminated and neither do their neighbors and their 

friends. Number two, they have an economic interest because if you 

have a contamination scare, I mean, the bottom drops out of the 

market. So it is in this industry’s interest, and a lot has changed 

in 20 years in our ability in best sciences. But, frankly, the industry really, I think, wants to come together. That is why we have 

broad support for our legislation and others as we try to use best 

management practices based on risk assessment and risk management, and how we can assure the American consuming public that 

we grow the absolute best food in the world. That those same 

standards are required for food that is imported to the United 

States, that it is not two standards but it is the same standard, the 

gold standard, which is what we are trying to achieve. 

Mr. DEVER. And we applaud you for that. 

Mr. COSTA. I have gone way past my time, and the Chairman 

has been very generous. Thank you. But just for the——

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Pardon? 

Mr. COSTA. I don’t know if they want to comment. Both the other 

two gentlemen deal in other parts of the world, and if we are talking about how you establish a gold standard, at some point in time, 

I think it would be interesting for the Committee to know, based 

upon their experiences in South America and other places where 

they grow food, what lessons we can learn or what should be the 

very best standards. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think we covered that a little bit when you 

were out, but you are right on. We appreciate your leadership and 

the work that you have done on this issue, Mr. Costa. I look forward to working with you. The gentleman from——

Mr. COSTA. I thank the Chairman for coauthoring my bill. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Baca. 

Mr. BACA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow 

up on what Mr. Costa has just said, and the question I guess would 

go for Tony DiMare. If you can elaborate a little bit more on how 

to ensure proper traceability when a crisis hits so that another industry does not have to go through what the tomato industry did, 

to receive false blame for the outbreak? Would you elaborate a little bit more on that? 

Mr. DIMARE. I guess we are fortunate in the tomato industry we 

do have the ability to identify products that we ship out into the 

marketplace, which is really a tool to help, not only identify what 

your product is or where the origin is, but God forbid you have an 

issue you need to investigate and quickly traceback the product, 

you do have the ability, either through labeling or otherwise on the 

package or even the specific commodity to trace it back and identify 

where that product came from. 

Mr. BACA. Because now we are getting a lot of tomatoes from 

Mexico, and a lot of people don’t even know that we are getting a 

35

lot of tomatoes. And the pesticides, the requirements, and the safeties are not there in comparison to those of you here in the United 

States, is that correct? 

Mr. DIMARE. That is correct, and that is part of the challenge 

with country of origin labeling that has just been passed. You 

know, that is again a tool to help identify, for consumers, where 

products are coming from because there are a lot of products that 

come in from outside the United States. 

Mr. BACA. Mr. Dever, could you please give us a little bit more 

details of the Trace Recall Program? 

Mr. DEVER. Specifically to Pandol’s Trace Recall Program? 

Mr. BACA. Yes. 

Mr. DEVER. What we do is we have a mock recall that is done 

every couple of weeks that comes through. We hire an independent 

third party facilitator to assist with that, and that comes into our 

corporate office with a phone call that says there is a problem. And 

then it goes through to the supply chain down to the grower that 

grew the product, as well as which ranch that product came from 

as well as the block that that product came from We typically can 

do that anywhere—the best we have been to date has been about 

45 minutes, and the worst we have been has been about 6 hours. 

Mr. BACA. How effective is it when needed and do you think this 

is something that we can apply to the Federal level? 

Mr. DEVER. Well, it is effective and I think it is beneficial for us 

to do it, so in case we do have that one incident where there is a 

problem, we are able to trace it. I can tell you, to give you an example, there was recently this season a call in to our office that was 

real life, that there was a black widow spider found in a bag of 

grapes. We identified within approximately 45 minutes that that 

bag did not come from our company. If we didn’t have the ability 

to know that, that could have been a huge problem for us. 

So I think it is extremely beneficial for all corporations to have 

the ability to traceback that product, and also it helped the consumer know very quickly where that product came from and be 

able to deal with it. 

Mr. BACA. Thank you. In your opinion, how critical is that electronic record-keeping and food safety procedures? 

Mr. DEVER. I think it is very critical because if it is done on a 

manual basis, it takes too much time. Time is money in this industry, and time is health to the consumer. Every day that goes by 

that we haven’t identified the contaminated product and the source 

of that contaminated product, another person can have a health 

issue and/or more of the industry gets hurt from the instance. So 

to me it is key. 

Mr. BACA. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SCOTT [presiding.] The gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Mrs. 

Dahlkemper. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since I just came 

in and I haven’t really heard all the questions, I am going to yield 

back. 

Mr. SCOTT. All right. The gentlelady from Colorado. 

Ms. MARKEY. Yes, thank you very much. I also knew I had a 

markup in another Committee, but Mr. Keys, as you mentioned in 

your testimony you are headquartered in Greeley, Colorado, which 

36

is in my district. I can tell you I have had an extensive tour of JBS’ 

facility in Greeley and met with several USDA inspectors there and 

can attest to the vigorous control standards that are in place at 

that facility. So I look forward to going on another tour, that was 

a couple of years ago, and working with you. 

But I wanted to also ask the panel, how do you verify that your 

suppliers are also falling under compliance and have you ever 

dropped a supplier that you used because of noncompliance? And 

you may want to answer that Mr. Dever. 

Mr. DEVER. It depends greatly on the source of the product, but 

in most cases all of our contracts with our growers—we don’t have 

a lot of growers, first of all. So it is easier for us, but for the most 

part in our industry, we have contracts with growers that require 

this and also there is a lot of testing that is done at pre-harvest 

to understand the pesticide levels that are on the products prior to 

them being harvested. 

We also have independent audits that will be done from time to 

time to give us the assurance, make sure that people are complying. To date we have not had a grower that had to be eliminated 

from our source because of noncompliance. 

Ms. MARKEY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. KEYS. USDA regulates right to the consumer, so if anybody 

takes our product and does something else with it, they have to answer to the government. We try to work with the people we sell our 

beef, pork, and lamb to, to make sure if they need expertise or they 

need help figuring out HACCP programs, we will work with them 

and we like to do that. But the USDA has that responsibility all 

the way to the consumer as it relates to red meat and poultry. 

Ms. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Keys. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel, for 

being here. I am going to pull back a little bit from some of the 

more specific questions, and I am looking for a general overview. 

And this is to each of the people on the panel if you could answer. 

In your opinions, what are the top two weakest points, the weakest 

links, in food safety? Is it the farmers, is it the processing, is it 

being able to follow the goods, is it imports, pesticides, regulations, 

lack of regulations? What are the top two biggest threats to food 

safety as you see them? 

Mr. KEYS. That is 50,000 feet. I will give you what it is. I think 

it is the lack of willingness of governments around the world, using 

the WTO, the Codex, to come up with some kind of a standardization of sanitary, globally. I know it is tough, but a lot of countries, 

including our own, Europe, Japan, use non-tariff trade barriers for 

phyto-sanitary reasons. And they do it for protectionist reasons, 

and that is a big problem because it confuses the public in a general term on what is science and what is not science and how do 

you cut through it when you know the government is using a 

science issue to stop trade. I think that really slows us down in getting to true equivalency around the world on trade. 

And then the number two issue would be making sure that we 

have the research dollars, infrastructure dollars going into critical 

research facilities at USDA or in the land-grant university to conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:36 Sep 30, 2009 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 I:\DOCS\111-08\52483.TXT AGR1 PsN: BRIAN
37

tinue to look for ways to improve our food safety system, and then 

getting that technology out on the field and implementing it. 

Mr. DEVER. Going back to the original testimony, I do think consistency throughout the globe is the critical thing for us. Food now 

is global. All of our sources come from around the world in order 

to be a year-round supplier of produce. As such, we would like to 

see the other countries that grow our products be held to the same 

equivalency and be consistent within the grower base, first of all. 

Second of all, I would like to see an electronic, as mentioned previously, traceability initiative that allows us to be able to trace that 

product to a grower, any country where they happen to be where 

that product was grown at any point in time. But that all costs 

money, and we are looking for support to have that happen. 

Mr. DIMARE. If you again take the tomato industry as a model 

of what we have developed over years of collaboration between all 

stakeholders and the success that we have had, maybe it is something to consider across other commodity groups is to have a document such as this that addresses the whole food chain from farm 

to the end-user to make sure the best management practices, good 

agricultural practices, are adhered to and that there are thirdparty audits that are conducted to make sure. 

None of this is a guarantee. There is always going to be risk in 

our food chain because there are many different factors that play 

into it. But what we can do as an industry is to continue to address 

any of the gaps, try to close those gaps within the operation or individual company and look to prevent them in the future by good 

management practices. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Boccieri. 

Mr. BOCCIERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One quick question I 

just have. How often or frequent are the containers that come into 

the country from overseas inspected? Is there any data out there 

that shows the frequency? 

Mr. KEYS. I can get that for you, Congressman. A lot depends on 

your track record. I mean, if you have a plant that is not going well 

and FSIS gets onto it, every container. And they are pretty rough 

on it, rough on you when you have a residue or you have some paperwork, literally paperwork, that doesn’t line up, they will inspect 

you very hard. So there is a huge incentive to be a good actor and 

have all your ducks in a row. 

Mr. BOCCIERI. Those are the containers that are coming in from 

the ports, ships, and the like? 

Mr. KEYS. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. BOCCIERI. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. I believe we have relinquished 

all of our questions for this panel. I want to thank this panel. 

Thank you for your expert testimonies, it is very appreciated. We 

will now have the second panel. 

Kind of ease your conversations out into the hallway so we can 

begin our second panel. Thank you very much. We will introduce 

our second panel, which was our third panel, but we will make it 

our second panel now. First we have Dr. Elsa A. Murano, President 

of Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas. Thank you very 

much for coming, Dr. Murano. Next we have Mr. Michael Taylor, 

38

Research Professor, Department of Health Policy, George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services, 

Washington, D.C. Thank you for being here with us. Then we have 

Ms. Carol Tucker-Foreman. Ms. Tucker-Foreman is Distinguished 

Fellow, The Food Policy Institute, Consumer Federation of America, Chevy Chase, Maryland. 

Thank you all for coming. We are delighted to have you, and Dr. 

Murano, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF ELSA A. MURANO, PH.D., PRESIDENT, TEXAS 

A&M UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE STATION, TX 

Dr. MURANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Elsa 

Murano, and I am currently the President of Texas A&M University, the best university in the country. From October of 2001 to 

December of 2004, I had the tremendous privilege, Mr. Chairman, 

of serving the American people as Under Secretary for Food Safety 

at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. I have had a long career as 

a food microbiologist, a teacher, and as a research scientist working 

on many of the issues in the laboratory that I then became familiar 

with as a regulator later on while I served as Under Secretary. 

I served as the first food microbiologist to take the position of 

Under Secretary, so I felt had a special responsibility and certainly 

an opportunity to inject science into the policy of food safety. 

But as I began my tenure as Under Secretary, I soon learned 

that what happens in the laboratory is very different than what 

happens in the real world. You have crises that happen that frankly don’t like to wait for laboratory results to come in. 

We had in 2002 what we later referred to as the perfect storm, 

Mr. Chairman. We had two very large outbreaks of foodborne illness, one involving E. coli O157:H7 in ground beef which resulted 

in a very large recall of ground beef product, about 19 million 

pounds at the time, and then very soon after that, there was another incident of foodborne illness due to listeriosis, and that was 

involving deli meats and that totaled about 28 million pounds. It 

was a perfect storm because it showed that when things go bad, a 

lot of things can go bad at the same time, and it really indicated 

to me that we needed to roll up our sleeves in a very deliberate 

manner and get to work on addressing the underlying reasons why 

these outbreaks and recalls happened. And by the way, 2002 was 

not the only year. It had been happening for about a decade, almost on an annual basis. 

So that situation really became an opportunity, to be honest with 

you, even though it was a trying time it was an opportunity to assess the case of these outbreaks and recalls. And what we came 

down to, really, is two issues, a human factor issue and a science 

issue, and let me explain. People can make a tremendous difference. At USDA, Food Safety and Inspection Service has about 

8,000 inspectors at our at 6,500 meat and poultry processing plants 

every day, and as you can imagine, there is a lot of product that 

is under their jurisdiction, about 110 billion pounds, plus another 

10 billion pounds of imported product every year. 

So, it became evident to me that we needed to make sure these 

people, these 8,000 strong needed to be trained in a different way, 

needed to receive the kind of training that would help them know 

39

the science behind food safety, behind the regulations that they 

were enforcing, behind their inspection practices, if you will. So, 

that they would know and be able to discern better what was going 

on in the plants, so that they could actually pick up on problems 

before they happened. 

So what we did is we launched a Food Safety Regulatory Essentials program that trained our inspectors on how to verify that food 

safety systems were working based on science. 

We also established an Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement and Review, that would help supervise those inspectors because when you have people, you have to have supervision and accountability, and also we created a new class of inspector, the Enforcement Investigations and Analysis Officer. These would be 

super-experts, if you will, that would go into plants that had problems or that had a history, a track record of failures that we would 

be able to then identify the problems before they got to develop into 

an outbreak or a large recall. 

But the human factor, of course, also involves the plant operators 

themselves. It is not just left to the inspectors. And the plants had 

been left, frankly, in my opinion, largely to their own devices to implement HACCP, which is really the food safety prevention program FSIS had been operating under for several years. They were 

left to implement that system basically up to their own judgment. 

And what we found is that when we ordered reassessment of 

their HACCP plans, there was a lot of mistakes, frankly, in my 

opinion, that had been made, lack of assessing the risks properly. 

And if you think there is not a risk due to a certain pathogen, perhaps deeming it not likely to be present, then you are not going to 

do anything about it. 

So the first step in assessing the risk, the likelihood of that 

pathogen being in the food, is the first step that has to be done 

right. That analysis has to be done correctly. 

So to make a long story short, in ordering these reassessments 

of these plants in 2002, 62 percent of these operations changed 

their plans as a result, and 60 percent of them started to include 

E. coli O157:H7 as a hazard reasonably likely to occur. So that was 

a dramatic change in the human factor that was operating those 

plants. And of course, the training that we undertook, the education I should say of consumers, because they certainly have a 

role to play as well in terms of good, safe food handling practices, 

cooking practices and so forth which culminated in the launching 

of——

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Dr. Murano. We are going to ask you to 

kind of wrap it up just a bit, please. 

Dr. MURANO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Dr. MURANO. I will tell you very quickly that the second element, 

that of science, became very important as well, and the science of 

risk assessment is what really made a big difference for us to develop policies and regulations that would work. So as a result, Mr. 

Chairman, just to tell you in a nutshell, we saw a tremendous decrease in the incidents of foodborne pathogens in foods, we saw a 

tremendous decrease in the illnesses and we achieved the Healthy 

40

People 2010 goals for reduction of E. coli illnesses in 2004, 6 years 

early. 

So it can be done, but it requires vigilance and paying attention 

to the human factor as well as to the science that goes into the regulations, and results can be had. USDA has a tremendous cadre of 

very dedicated——

Mr. SCOTT. Dr. Murano, I am going to have to close you down. 

Dr. MURANO. Yes, sir. I am done. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Murano follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELSA A. MURANO, PH.D., PRESIDENT, TEXAS A&M 

UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE STATION, TX 

My name is Elsa Murano, and I am currently the President of Texas A&M University. From October of 2001 to December of 2004, I had the tremendous privilege 

of serving the American people as Under Secretary for Food Safety at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Prior to my appointment, I had been a successful researcher and educator in the field of food microbiology, working on the very pathogens that have been the thorn on the side of regulators, the food industry, and consumers for many years. When I first arrived in Washington, exactly 1 week before 

9/11, I remember thinking that as the first food microbiologist to serve as Under 

Secretary for food safety, I had a special responsibility, as well as an opportunity, 

to inject science into the process of making our food supply as safe as possible. By 

this I meant I would use the scientific method to examine the causes and to arrive 

at solutions that would minimize food contamination and increase our ability to prevent foodborne illness. 

I soon learned that the most significant difference between working on food safety 

at the laboratory versus the real world is that the real world doesn’t like waiting 

for results, that crises can happen while you are in the middle of finding solutions 

to problems, and so one must learn to balance the need to act quickly with the need 

to provide solutions that will stand the test of time. Such was the case in the Summer and Fall of 2002. We had been working to identify where, in the production 

of ground beef, would contamination with the pathogen E. coli O157:H7 be most 

likely to occur, as well as to determine what we could do to minimize it. As we were 

pondering this, we started to receive reports of several people becoming ill with this 

pathogen, resulting in one of the largest recalls of ground beef in our nation’s history, totaling 19 million pounds. As we worked to control the outbreak, and to determine what went wrong so we could address the problem, we soon received news of 

several people becoming ill with listeriosis, resulting in one of the largest recalls of 

processed deli meats in our nation’s history, totaling 28 million pounds. We referred 

to this period as ‘‘the perfect storm’’ because it showed how weaknesses in our system could line up in such a way as to produce the worst results, with multiple outbreaks by multiple pathogens in rapid succession. 

I’ve always been a believer that the worst of times can also become the best of 

times, because they can be the best teacher. So, I was determined that we would 

learn from these situations and that those lessons would be the basis for our strategy in order to prevent this from happening again. In assessing the causes, I confirmed what I had known before I even took the position, which is that people can 

make a tremendous difference. FSIS has almost 8,000 inspectors at over 6,500 meat 

and poultry processing plants in the U.S., and these folks are responsible for inspecting 110 billion pounds of meat, poultry, and egg products, plus another 10 billion pounds of imported product each year. That translates to nine million inspection procedures being carried out every year, or a thousand procedures per inspector 

per year! So, it became evident to me that we needed to make sure that these hardworking men and women needed to be trained in a different way, in a way that ensured they knew the science behind what they were doing with regard to food safety, so they could do a better job of anticipating problems, and also, that they would 

be supervised adequately. The underlying idea was to address the human factor so 

that errors in inspection would be minimized. So, we went to work to design a training program that would help address this, and in April of 2003, we launched our 

Food Safety Regulatory Essentials program, or FSRE, to help inspectors know how 

to verify that food safety systems implemented by the companies were done correctly. We also created an Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement and Review, 

to improve our inspector supervision activities, and created a new class of inspector, 

the Enforcement Investigations and Analysis Officer, charged with conducting comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:36 Sep 30, 2009 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 I:\DOCS\111-08\52483.TXT AGR1 PsN: BRIAN
41

prehensive food safety assessments, which could be targeted to specific plants based 

on their track-record. 

Speaking of the human factor, we also realized that over the previous years, meat 

and poultry processing plants had been left to their own devices to figure out how 

to implement food safety preventive programs with little oversight by FSIS. In the 

mid 1990s, the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points system, known as HACCP, 

became a requirement of all meat and poultry processing plants, but how it would 

be implemented was left largely to each plant to determine. Let me explain what 

I mean. The very first step in implementing HACCP is to determine the types of 

hazards that are most likely to occur in a specific food. For ground beef, for example, 

plants are expected to determine whether in their operations, E. coli O157:H7

should be considered a hazard likely to be found in their product. If a plant answers 

this question with a ‘‘no’’ then they don’t need to worry about it anymore. We found 

that many ground beef processing plants had in fact answered ‘‘no’’ and therefore, 

they were not taking direct steps to deal with this hazard. So, in October of 2002, 

we ordered each plant to reassess their HACCP plans. As a result, 62% changed 

their operations, and 60% changed their plans to include E. coli O157:H7 as a hazard reasonably likely to occur. 

The human factor also included consumers, for they are the ones at the end of 

the food supply chain, and what they do, or fail to do, can also have an impact. So, 

we launched a comprehensive food safety education campaign, designed to address 

three elements: a mass media campaign, a cluster targeting to segmented audiences, 

and one-on-one activities utilizing our brand-new ‘‘food safety mobile’’ which would 

impart the message of safe food handling practices to various locations throughout 

the country. Turns out that our mobile was also very useful during the aftermath 

of Hurricane Katrina, helping New Orleans residents know what to do during the 

storm and afterwards, and helping distribute safe food and water to those affected. 

Besides addressing the human factor, we also knew that we needed to use science

to determine what else we could do to prevent contamination wherever possible, and 

how to control it, as our only other option. At the time of the listeriosis outbreak 

in the Fall of 2002, we came under a lot of pressure to implement regulations before 

our risk assessment on this pathogen was completed. Standing firm, we resisted the 

temptation to come up with a quick-fix solution before data was available, so we 

continued our risk assessment work. In October of 2003, our new Listeria rule was 

published, based on the results of our risk assessment. It offered a new approach 

in which we created incentives for the industry to do more microbial testing, and 

to implement post-processing intervention technologies that would reduce, if not 

eliminate this hazard. As a result, 87% of food plants changed their operations, 57% 

started testing more for the presence of Listeria, 27% introduced antimicrobial treatments in their operations, and 17% began using technologies that would eliminate 

the pathogen after cooking. We also launched a New Technologies Office so that we 

could streamline the approval process to introduce new pathogen-reduction methodologies as part of the arsenal available to food processors to control microbial contamination. 

With these two approaches, concentrating on the human factor and on science, at 

the end of my time at USDA, we achieved results beyond our wildest dreams. By 

the end of 2004, we realized a 78% reduction in the prevalence of E. coli O157:H7

in ground beef, and a 47% reduction in the prevalence of Listeria monocytogenes in 

deli meats compared with 2002, which you will remember was the year of the ‘‘perfect storm’’. Most rewarding is the fact that by 2004 we were able to achieve the 

Healthy People 2020 goals for reduction of illnesses due to E. coli O157:H7 6 years 

ahead of schedule! Of course, all this also translated into decreases in other 

foodborne illnesses, and in breaking the yearly cycle of large single-event recalls of 

meat and poultry products down to zero in 2003 and 2004. 

There were two fundamental factors that contributed to our success. One is the 

culture that exists at FSIS, which has developed over many decades. It is a culture 

of commitment to prevention through continuous inspection and enforcement. History will attest to the fact that inspection is ‘‘in the DNA’’ of these incredible professionals. They know what to do, they know it is their responsibility to do it well, and 

they know that they are there to ensure public health. That is a culture of dedicated 

professionals which is not easy to duplicate. I would put FSIS inspectors against 

any other food inspectors in the world. I guarantee they are by far the best regarded 

among their colleagues, and this is due to a track record that is the envy of the 

world. 

The second factor is that FSIS is guided by legislation that requires daily inspection of meat and poultry products, making it essential for the agency to have enough 

personnel to accomplish this task, and enough funding to operate it. The laws I’m 

referring to are the Federal Meat Inspection, Poultry Inspection, and Egg Products 

42

Inspection Acts of 1906, 1957, and 1970. By comparison, the Food and Drug Administration, which is responsible for all other foods over which FSIS has no jurisdiction, is directed by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938, which has no such 

requirements. As a result, most foods under FDA regulation are not inspected daily 

and are not subjected to the degree of scrutiny they should. Some don’t see an inspector for years. This has certainly played a role in outbreaks of foodborne illness 

in foods inspected by FDA, such as tomatoes, spinach, and most recently, peanut 

butter. 

The bottom line is that in order to ensure that we are doing all we can to improve 

food safety, we need to pay attention to the human factor and to utilizing science, 

but we need to do so within a culture that understands how inspection works, and 

which is armed with the regulations to carry out this mission. If I could offer advice 

to the Committee, it would be to allow FSIS and FDA to play to their strengths. 

The specialty at FSIS is food policy and food inspection, while FDA is primarily a 

drug and medical device regulatory agency. Perhaps now is the time to consider 

moving all food-related activities from FDA to FSIS, and allow FDA to concentrate 

on what it does best, and provide FSIS the regulatory authority and funding to inspect all foods, not just meat and poultry. An alternative that has often been discussed is the creation of a single food safety agency, as a stand-alone entity that 

would take over the functions of FSIS, FDA, and others like the National Marine 

Fisheries Service. Before this alternative is considered, I would ask the Committee 

to determine whether the formation of the Department of Homeland Security as a 

single agency right after 9/11 contributed to the problems encountered at FEMA in 

the handling of Hurricane Katrina, or whether transferring the import inspection 

from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Agency at USDA to the Department 

of Homeland Security has reduced the number of illegal items introduced into commerce. My point is that forming a single food safety agency would disturb the operations at FSIS and would require the creation of a culture of inspection and enforcement that has taken decades to develop at a time when we need to enhance, not 

disrupt our food safety system. 

I’ve now been gone from Washington longer than the time I served there. Unfortunately, in that time we have seen some setbacks in the gains we made at FSIS. We 

have also seen more outbreaks due to consumption of foods regulated by FDA. It 

is a reminder that we need to be ever vigilant about making sure that the human 

factor, and the science behind food safety, are paid attention to. This requires leadership and I urge the President to select people to the important positions overseeing FSIS and FDA very carefully. We need professionals with the scientific expertise to understand how to improve public health through risk reduction, and with 

the decision-making skills and character to do what is right. Thank you so much 

for this opportunity to give you my perspective. It has been a pleasure, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. SCOTT. We have been long. 

Dr. MURANO. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. We certainly will follow up that with some questions. 

Dr. MURANO. All right. 

Mr. SCOTT. Five minutes is not nearly long enough——

Dr. MURANO. It is not. 

Mr. SCOTT.—nearly to get everything, and we appreciate everyone kind of keeping remarks to 5 minutes. This is indeed a very, 

very growing and urgent issue facing our country, and we appreciate all of your information. 

Mr. Michael Taylor. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL R. TAYLOR, J.D., RESEARCH

PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH POLICY, GEORGE 

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 

AND HEALTH SERVICES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lucas, 

Members of the Committee, I appreciate the chance to testify 

today. 

The Committee’s review of the government’s food safety system 

is without question timely. The public is paying close attention, 

43

and food safety reform is quite properly a front-runner issue for 

this Congress. Government, of course, doesn’t make food and government cannot make it safe. But government has an absolutely 

central role on behalf of consumers in ensuring that food companies 

do their food safety job in keeping with what science and public expectations tell us is necessary, and what modern techniques show 

is possible. 

Unfortunately, recent illness outbreaks and problems with imported food demonstrate that the government’s food safety system 

has fallen far behind dramatic changes in the global food system, 

and is simply not equipped to deal with today’s food safety challenges. 

Mr. Chairman, we need a food safety system that takes a farmto-table approach to preventing food safety problems, that uses the 

best available science to understand potential hazards and how to 

prevent them, and that establishes and enforces science-based food 

safety standards that hold companies accountable for meeting their 

prevention duty. 

What we have on the other hand is a food safety system that focuses more on reaction than prevention, under-invests in the 

science and data analysis needed for prevention, and lacks both 

modern standards and strong enforcement. It is a system that the 

National Academy of Sciences and the Government Accountability 

Office have found in numerous studies to be plagued by obsolete 

laws, inadequate and often poor use of resources, and fragmented 

organizational structures. 

I know from personal experience a lot of talented and committed 

people at USDA and FDA are working hard on food safety within 

the existing system, but today’s food safety system is fundamentally flawed. Let me give you just a few examples of what I mean, 

first with respect to the FDA program. 

Core elements of FDA’s food safety law date back to 1906. It is 

thus not surprising that the law lacks a mandate for companies to 

implement modern preventive controls, and it establishes little or 

no accountability for prevention on the part of the companies or on 

the part of FDA. FDA’s current law takes the same weak, reactive 

approach to imports that it takes to domestic food. To have any 

chance of success, the reaction paradigm in current law depends 

heavily on vigorous FDA inspection and enforcement, yet due to 

chronic under-funding of its food safety program, FDA is unable to 

inspect even high-risk domestic plants as much as once a year, or 

to examine more than about one percent of import shipments. FDA 

also lacks other basic elements of a modern enforcement toolkit 

such as traceback and mandatory recall authority. 

Finally, FDA’s management structure for food safety is fragmented internally, and FDA lacks the management connections 

and working relationships with the CDC, Centers for Disease Control, which are essential both to better manage major outbreaks 

and to assemble the data and analysis needed for prevention. 

Mr. Chairman, FSIS and USDA have a quite different set of 

problems stemming primarily from the obsolete mandates in the 

meat and poultry inspection laws. The NAS and GAO have found, 

repeatedly, that the mandated carcass-by-carcass visual approach 

to slaughter inspection and the requirement for daily inspection of 

44

1Mr. Taylor is Research Professor of Health Policy at The George Washington University 

School of Public Health and Health Services and chair of the Food Safety Research Consortium. 

He served formerly as Administrator of USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service and Acting 

Under Secretary for Food Safety (1994–1996) and as Deputy Commissioner for Policy of the 

Food and Drug Administration (1991–1994). 

all processing plants without regard to relative risk make poor use 

of scarce food safety resources. Moreover, FSIS has no authority to 

address food safety at the point of animal production where many 

pathogen problems originate. Even within slaughter and processing 

plants, the authority of FSIS to establish and enforce pathogen reduction standards is under a legal cloud because the inspection 

laws do not expressly authorize them. FSIS is even precluded from 

conducting food safety research. 

Beyond FDA and FSIS, of course, there are other Federal agencies and literally thousands of state and local agencies working on 

food safety. They all need to be considered in crafting a comprehensive systems approach to food safety and food safety reform. 

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that unless Congress addresses 

the problems and gaps all across the nation’s food safety system, 

we will continue to fall short in fulfilling the modern vision of a 

science and risk-based system that is effective in preventing 

foodborne illness. 

So again, I commend the Committee for taking the time to consider these issues and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL R. TAYLOR, J.D., RESEARCH PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH POLICY, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF

PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1

Chairman Peterson, Ranking Member Lucas, Members of the Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify at today’s hearing to review the current food safety 

systems at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 

Introduction 

The Committee is right to be reviewing food safety systems at both HHS and 

USDA, which, primarily through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the 

Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), carry out most of the Federal Government’s food safety regulatory activity. 

I would note, of course, that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also 

plays an important role in food safety as the agency charged by Congress with setting tolerances for pesticide residues in food, and many other agencies within HHS 

and USDA and across the Federal Government perform food safety data collection, 

research and inspection activities. Moreover, literally thousands of state and local 

health and agriculture departments and laboratories play critical frontline roles in 

the nation’s food safety system, with primary responsibility lodged at the state and 

local level for responding to illness outbreaks and regulating the food safety practices of the one million retail food outlets in this country. 

My testimony today will focus primarily on FDA and FSIS, but one of my key 

messages is that we need to understand food safety as a system problem that needs 

an integrated system solution, and we need a comprehensive food safety reform 

strategy that takes account of the severe challenges faced by both FDA and FSIS, 

as well as the many other agencies in the system, in carrying out their food safety 

responsibilities. 

FDA and FSIS both have a lot of good people working hard within the existing 

system, but today’s food safety system is fundamentally flawed. As the National 

Academy of Sciences (NAS) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) have 

found in numerous studies, the Federal food safety system is plagued by obsolete 

laws and food safety strategies, inadequate and often poor use of resources, and 

fragmented organizational structures. Based on these problems, the GAO has placed 

the Federal Government’s food safety program on the list of Federal programs at 

45

high risk of failure, and GAO included food safety among the 13 problems most in 

need of urgent attention by the new Administration and Congress. 

It is thus important that President Obama has already made food safety a high 

priority for the Administration, as has Secretary Vilsack, and I’m sure food safety 

reform will be high on the agenda of Governor Sebelius and Dr. Hamburg upon 

their confirmations by the Senate as Secretary of HHS and Commissioner of FDA. 

But, while there is much the food safety agencies can do on their own to improve 

their programs, transformative and sustainable food safety reform requires strong 

action by Congress, based on a 21st century vision of what a modern food safety 

system can and should do. 

In my testimony today, I will briefly outline the elements of a modern vision for 

the nation’s food safety system and then analyze the challenges FDA and FSIS face 

in fulfilling the vision. 

Vision 

The vision I outline here is rooted in the seminal 1998 NAS report Ensuring Safe 

Food From Production to Consumption. That report and a series of subsequent GAO 

reports have called for a science- and risk-based food safety system that focuses on 

preventing food safety problems and that makes efficient use of all available public 

resources for that purpose. The key functional elements of such a preventive system 

include:

1. Taking a farm-to-table approach to preventing food safety problems;

2. Using risk analysis to better understand potential hazards, design interventions, and prioritize prevention efforts;

3. Collecting necessary data to support risk analysis, through monitoring of the 

food supply, foodborne illness surveillance, and food safety research;

4. Harnessing the primary role of food producers, processors, retailers and consumers in preventing food safety problems;

5. Implementing preventive process control, such as HACCP, throughout the 

food industry;

6. Establishing science-based food safety performance standards;

7. Carrying out a modern inspection program to support the vigorous enforcement of food safety standards;

8. Integrating food safety efforts among Federal, state, and local food safety 

agencies;

9. Allocating government food safety efforts and resources in relation to risk 

and opportunities to reduce risk; and

10. Observing sound food safety practices at the final preparation and consumption stage through well-informed commercial food handlers and consumers.

This system-oriented vision for the food safety system is widely embraced. The 

question for Congress is: what reforms will it take to implement the modern vision 

of an effective food safety system? My view is that it will take a modern legislative 

mandate, adequate resources that are better used, and effective leadership and 

management structures. These are the key ingredients for any successful government program, and all are lacking in the case of food safety. FDA and FSIS simply 

do not have the tools to be successful. 

Gaps in the Food Safety Tool Kit 

Modern Legislative Mandate 

FDA’s basic food safety legislative tools date back to 1938, while the principles 

governing FSIS slaughter inspection under the meat and poultry inspection laws 

were adopted in 1906. Today’s food safety laws were passed before foodborne pathogens emerged as a central public health concern and as a threat to the well-being 

of the food industry, and before globalization made the United States as dependent 

on food imports as it is today. As a result, neither FDA nor FSIS has the modern 

mandate and legal tools to deal with today’s food safety challenges. 

Food and Drug Administration 

FDA’s basic, 1938-vintage statutory tools for dealing with Salmonella and other 

foodborne pathogens and chemical contaminants consist of authority to enter and 

inspect food factories, warehouses and other establishments; a broad definition of 

when a contaminant renders food legally ‘‘adulterated;’’ and the ability to seek judicial intervention to remove adulterated food from commerce. With respect to imports, FDA’s legal authority is limited to examining shipments at the port of entry 

and blocking them if FDA inspectors can detect a problem. 

46

These limited tools give FDA some ability to react to problems after they occur, 

but very limited ability to ensure that food safety problems are prevented in the 

first place. 

In particular, under current law, FDA lacks:

• A legislative mandate and accountability for reducing foodborne illness;

• Authority to hold the operators of all food facilities accountable for implementing modern preventive controls that reduce the risk of foodborne illness;

• An inspection mandate that ensures an adequate frequency of inspection;

• Authority to routinely examine company records to verify that proper food safety procedures have been followed;

• Authority to administratively detain products that have not been produced 

under proper conditions;

• Authority to require that companies be able to provide immediate traceback information so that major outbreaks can be more promptly contained;

• Authority to order a recall of unsafe products and enforce rigorous implementation of needed recalls;

• Authority to penalize violations of food safety standards other than through 

cumbersome and time-consuming court proceedings; and

• Authority to hold importers accountable for ensuring that imported food is produced using modern preventive controls and in a manner that meets U.S. standards. 

Food Safety and Inspection Service 

The core FSIS legislative mandate is to conduct inspection in slaughter houses 

and in plants that process meat and poultry products. The original 1906 mandate 

for carcass-by-carcass slaughter inspection was a response to The Jungle and Upton 

Sinclair’s documentation of diseased animals, gross insanitary conditions and often 

intentional commingling of bad meat with good. The visual inspection Congress 

mandated was effective in addressing those problems, but, as found by the NAS and 

other expert bodies, this mode of inspection is ineffective in dealing with today’s 

food safety concerns. Pathogenic bacteria are, of course, invisible. 

Congress also mandates daily FSIS inspection of all plants that process meat and 

poultry products, without regard to the nature of the operation, which today may 

range from the relatively high-risk processing of raw ground meat products all the 

way to the pizza plant that applies pepperoni slices to a pizza that will be cooked 

to a very high temperature. In the case of the pepperoni pizza plant, FSIS will already have inspected the slaughter of the animals that provided the meat and the 

manufacture of the pepperoni at the processing plant. 

Slaughter plants and many meat processing plants are among the most sensitive 

and risk-prone links in the farm-to-table food safety system and deserve substantial 

government inspection. It is very clear, however, that the current inspection mandate and the resulting mode of inspection at FSIS is obsolete and wastes government resources that could be used more effectively in those plants and elsewhere 

to prevent foodborne illness. 

Despite its obsolete statutory mandate, important changes have occurred in the 

FSIS program in recent years. Prior to 1994, the official position of the Department 

of Agriculture was that slaughter houses and plants processing raw meat were not 

responsible or accountable for pathogen contamination, on the ground that consumers were expected to properly cook the product. We changed that when I was 

Administrator of FSIS by (1) declaring that E. coli O157:H7 is an adulterant in raw 

ground beef, (2) mandating that all slaughter and processing plants implement a 

modern preventive control system called HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points), and (3) establishing for the first time microbial test requirements and 

pathogen reduction performance standards. 

Since the reforms of the mid-1990s, FSIS and the industries it regulates have 

made progress in reducing pathogens, but progress has been constrained by the 

agency’s obsolete statutes. On the positive side, minimizing pathogen contamination 

is now seen as a central part of the FSIS mission, and the professional staff at FSIS 

has been creative in using the tools they have to pursue pathogen reduction. Reductions in the incidence of contamination have been achieved for some pathogens, such 

as Listeria in deli meats and Salmonella in poultry, and many companies in the 

meat and poultry industry have substantially increased their own pathogen testing 

and pathogen reduction efforts in response to both FSIS initiatives and market incentives. 

On the negative side, an industry legal challenge has put a cloud over the enforceability of the pathogen reduction standards FSIS established in the 1990s, and those 

47

standards have not been updated in the way we originally intended. Thus, FSIS is 

forced to rely on obsolete benchmarks and indirect means in an attempt to drive 

pathogen contamination down to levels we know are achievable, when it should be 

setting and enforcing science-based performance standards to protect consumers. 

Moreover, because meeting the obsolete statutory inspection mandate consumes 

nearly all FSIS resources, it has limited capacity to invest in more modern approaches to enforcing every plant’s duty to prevent food safety problems through 

HACCP and other means. 

There is room for more food safety progress at FSIS within the current statutory 

framework, but FSIS is unable to fulfill the vision of a modern, science- and riskbased food safety system because it lacks a modern food safety law. Most importantly, FSIS lacks:

• A legislative mandate and accountability for reducing foodborne illness;

• A mandate and authority to deploy resources efficiently to prevent foodborne illness;

• Authority to address food safety problems at the point of animal production, 

where many pathogen problems originate;

• A mandate and clear authority to set and enforce science-based pathogen reduction performance standards;

• Authority to order a recall of unsafe products and enforce rigorous implementation of needed recalls; and

• Authority to conduct food safety research. 

Adequate Resources That Are Used Efficiently 

FDA regulates 80% of the food supply and the vast majority of food imports with 

a budget of about $650 million. FSIS regulates about 20% of the food supply with 

a budget of about $1 billion. The primary explanation for this dichotomy is that 

FDA has no food safety legislative mandate that requires a certain level of funding 

to fulfill, while FSIS has an inspection mandate that provides a strong anchor for 

FSIS resources. Slaughter plants cannot operate unless FSIS mans the slaughter 

lines, and issuance of the FSIS mark of inspection, which processing plants must 

have to ship food, depends on the daily inspection. 

Fulfilling the vision of a modern, science- and risk-based food safety system requires not only an adequate level of resources but the targeting of government food 

safety efforts and allocation of resources based on risk and the best opportunities 

to reduce risk. The differences in the current resource situations at FDA and FSIS 

mean they have distinct resource challenges. 

Food and Drug Administration 

FDA currently has ample flexibility legally to allocate its resources based on risk. 

FDA’s primary problem is that it has too few resources to allocate. FDA can inspect 

food facilities on average once every 10 years, and is unable to inspect all high-risk 

facilities even once per year. Moreover, as documented by the FDA Science Board, 

a group of independent experts from outside FDA, FDA’s science base for food safety 

has eroded over the years; it has miniscule resources for applied food safety research; and it lacks the modern information systems that are essential to implementation of a science-based and preventive food safety program. 

Fortunately, Congress has recognized this funding shortfall at FDA and begun to 

correct it with increases in the last two budgets, and the Obama Administration has 

signaled plans for further significant increases. This is good news. 

It is essential to remember, however, that FDA will never have enough resources 

to be successful on food safety as long as it remains in a primarily reactive mode. 

That is why it is so important that Congress give FDA the mandate and authority 

to change the food safety paradigm to one that holds all food facilities accountable 

for implementing modern preventive controls and meeting science-based standards 

and gives FDA the tools to enforce that duty efficiently and effectively. 

Food Safety and Inspection Service 

The resource problem at FSIS is less the level of resources and more the inefficient use of those resources, which is driven by the obsolete nature of the inspection 

mandate. I believe that FSIS needs a strong inspection mandate and that FSIS 

needs every one of the billion dollars Congress gives it to do its food safety job. But, 

FSIS needs a modern inspection mandate that is aimed at addressing today’s food 

safety challenges and preventing foodborne illness and that directs and empowers 

FSIS to better allocate its resources within slaughter and processing plants and outside those plants, in ways most likely to improve food safety. 

48

Effective Leadership and Management Structures 

One of the key findings of the 1998 NAS report Ensuring Safe Food From Production to Consumption was that the organizationally fragmented nature of the nation’s 

food safety system is an obstacle to fulfilling the vision of a science- and risk-based 

program that is effective in preventing foodborne illness. With responsibilities 

spread across numerous Federal agencies and thousands of state and local agencies, 

it is often unclear which agency is responsible for what, and there is a fundamental 

lack of clearly lodged responsibility and accountability for mounting an integrated, 

systems approach to preventing foodborne illness. That is why the NAS recommended unifying all Federal food safety programs under a single, accountable 

leadership structure. 

I believe the creation of a single food safety agency is a worthy long-term goal, 

but consideration of that possibility should take a back seat to the immediate need 

and opportunity we have to improve the food safety programs of FDA and FSIS, 

where they sit today within HHS and USDA. This includes improving the leadership and management structures through which they implement their food safety 

programs. 

Food and Drug Administration 

Last week, Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) issued a report Keeping America’s 

Food Safe: A Blueprint for Fixing the Food Safety System at the Department of 

Health and Human Services. This report noted the fragmentation of management 

responsibility for food safety within FDA. Two headquarters units and the FDA field 

force having major food safety responsibilities but are separately managed, with no 

official whose full-time job is food safety having management responsibility and accountability for the program’s success. In order to implement a new paradigm of 

risk-based prevention of foodborne illness, FDA, HHS and Congress need to address 

this management problem. 

In addition, as noted in the TFAH report, the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC) is also a separately managed unit within HHS but plays a central 

role in investigating and thus helping to contain foodborne illness outbreaks. CDC 

also must play an even larger role in implementing the new prevention-oriented, 

risk-based food safety paradigm, as the agency on which the nation relies to compile 

and analyze information on foodborne illness—information that FDA and the food 

industry need to design and implement preventive measures. New mechanisms are 

required to improve management of multi-state outbreaks involving both FDA- and 

FSIS-regulated products and to ensure that CDC has the resources and accountability to provide the data and analysis on human illness that FDA and FSIS need 

for prevention. 

Food Safety and Inspection Service 

FSIS, through the Administrator and Under Secretary for Food Safety has ample 

full-time leadership for food safety. 

The primary structural issue at USDA is that FSIS and the Under Secretary for 

Food Safety are precluded from conducting food safety research and must rely solely 

on the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) for the applied intramural research that 

FSIS needs to do its job. ARS has many fine researchers, and its mission includes 

meeting the research needs of operating agencies within USDA, such as FSIS, but 

ARS also has competing priorities, and its food safety research priorities are influenced by factors other than the FSIS program needs. A science-based food safety 

regulatory program should have the authority to conduct its own applied food safety 

research, in addition to collaborating with researchers in other agencies and in academia. 

Conclusion 

In considering food safety reform at FDA and FSIS, it is critical that Congress 

keep its eye on the big picture and address the needs of these agencies comprehensively. We owe the people working on food safety at FDA and FSIS the legal tools, 

resource levels and flexibility, and management structures they need to meet today’s challenges. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to the Committee’s questions.

Mr. BOSWELL [presiding.] Thank you very much. Ms. TuckerForeman, please? 

49

STATEMENT OF HON. CAROL L. TUCKER-FOREMAN,

DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE FOOD POLICY INSTITUTE, 

CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Lucas, and Members of the Committee, thank you for having me here today. 

I am Carol Tucker-Foreman. I was Assistant Secretary for Food 

and Consumer Services at USDA from 1977 to 1981, and in those 

days had responsibility for meat and poultry inspection, all the food 

and nutrition service programs, and the grading programs that are 

now in the agricultural marketing system. I was busy. 

No hearing you hold this year will be more important to American consumers and to food processors and to farmers. The continuing series of foodborne illness outbreaks, both imported and domestic food products, doesn’t just threaten our health, it threatens 

the confidence that Americans have in our government food safety 

system and in the industry. 

The Government Accountability Office has warned that food safety programs are at a high risk of failure and urged President 

Obama to take steps to act quickly on them. In 2007, data from the 

Centers for Disease Control showed just how big the problem is. 

We are far from meeting the objectives of Healthy People 2010. 

There has been no reduction in E. coli poisoning since the agency 

began tracking food. Salmonella illnesses are double the national 

objective. Listeria was as high in 2007 as it was in 2004. The Food 

and Drug Administration, sapped of funds and leadership and saddled with a law that gives no mandate to prevent illness, has been 

unable to contain these illnesses that have hit people in your states 

and districts. 

Just Salmonella saintpaul from imported peppers hit people in 

43 states including 559 Texans, 120 people in Illinois, 42 in Georgia, and 59 in Arizona. The fresh sprout outbreak that occurred 

earlier this year, earlier last month, 27 Iowans, five Kansans, 84 

Nebraskans, and five South Dakotans were among those people 

who got ill. So these are illnesses that hit all the way across the 

country. 

The medical costs of foodborne illness are staggering. One study 

set the annual total cost of foodborne illness in 2006, including 

medical care and lost productivity and wages, at over $1 trillion, 

$1.4 trillion in 1 year. 

Obviously, you could tell from the last panel these outbreaks hit 

businesses and they hit farmers as well. The ERS reported that 

spinach shipments dropped 17 percent and green onion shipments 

dropped ten percent after those products were implicated in E. coli

outbreaks in 2006. 

I urge you, and my organization urges you, to act quickly to direct the FDA to concentrate on preventing foodborne illness and 

give it the power and the funding to do so. We also believe that 

it would be useful to give food safety a separate organization within HHS. 

I think that the Congress can take a look at FSIS to see how important that separate organizational structure can be. Since 1994, 

FSIS has come out of the dark ages. Unlike FDA, the FSIS system 

has focused on preventing illness. For imported products, there is 

50

a strict equivalence system. Inspectors are in the plant every day 

examining product to ensure it is safe. Congress has acted to give 

FSIS an adequate leadership structure, including the position of 

the Under Secretary for Food Safety, the highest ranking food safety official in the government . 

The agency, as Mike Taylor pointed out, is burdened by a seriously outmoded statute and by inadequate money to fulfill its obligation to have inspectors in the plant every day, and it doesn’t 

have the staff of statisticians and scientists as it should have. 

However, I have come to think of FSIS as the Rodney 

Dangerfield of food safety. It gets no respect despite the fact that 

it has made major strides in the last 15 years to improve its food 

safety efforts. Taking food safety and putting it in a separate public 

health agency in USDA so that it is separated from marketing, and 

separated from the conflict of interest that arises when it has to 

compete with production agriculture issues has been very, very important. 

Now, if you would just modernize the Meat and Poultry Inspection Acts to let them follow through on the scientific basis that Mr. 

Taylor and Dr. Murano established, I think you would do the 

American people a great service. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tucker-Foreman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CAROL L. TUCKER-FOREMAN, DISTINGUISHED

FELLOW, THE FOOD POLICY INSTITUTE, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Good morning Chairman Peterson, Ranking Member Lucas and Members of the 

Committee. My name is Carol Tucker-Foreman. I am Distinguished Fellow in the 

Food Policy Institute at Consumer Federation of America. CFA is a nonprofit association of over 300 local, state and national organizations, representing a combined 

membership of over 50 million American consumers. Since 1968 we have conducted 

research, provided educational materials and engaged in advocacy on behalf of consumers on a range of issues including banking and financial services, food and agriculture, and product safety. Our positions and priorities are set by vote of representatives of our member groups. 

From 1977–1981 I served as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. My responsibilities included oversight of the nation’s meat, poultry and egg inspection and food 

assistance programs. In 1986 I founded the Safe Food Coalition which includes 

foodborne illness victims, consumer and public health organizations and a trade 

union to seek improvements in U.S. Government food safety programs, especially 

meat and poultry inspection. I am a member of the Food and Drug Administration 

Food Advisory Committee, the National Advisory Committee on Meat and Poultry 

Inspection and USDA’s Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology. 

No hearing you hold this year will be more important to American consumers, to 

the food industry, or to the people who produce our food. Americans are acutely 

aware of the crisis in our food safety system. We have experienced recurring outbreaks over the past few years, including a new one involving pistachio nuts this 

week. 

Consumers are not the only ones who fear our food safety system is failing. In 

January 2007, the Government Accountability Office declared the Federal food safety programs at ‘‘high risk’’ of failure. In November 2008, the GAO named food safety 

as one of 13 topics most in need of urgent action by the new Administration and 

the new Congress. 

Each spring the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports on levels of foodborne illness. The April 2007 report was sobering. The agency announced 

that there has been almost no reduction in foodborne illness in recent years. In 

2007, the Salmonella illness rate was more than double the national goal. There has 

been no real decline in the rate of E. coli illness since the FoodNet tracking began. 

There has been no decline in Campylobacter illnesses since 2002 and the Listeria

51

1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘‘Preliminary FoodNet Data on the Incidence of 

Infection with Pathogens Transmitted Commonly Through Food—10 States, 2007.’’ MMWR 

57(14): 366–370, April 11, 2008. 2 Roberts T, ‘‘Estimates of the Societal Costs of U.S. Food-Borne Illness.’’ American Journal 

of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 89, Issue 5, pp. 1183–1188, December 2007. 3 Consumer Confidence in Food Safety Plunges in Wake of Peanut Butter Contamination, University of MN Study Finds, UMN NEWS, Feb. 23, 2009).

rate was as high in 2007 as it was in 2004.1 Unless something changes quickly and 

radically, the nation will not meet the Healthy People 2010 national objectives for 

reducing foodborne illness. 

At a time when everyone is feeling the pinch of severe recession, the economic 

costs of foodborne illness continue to rise. Dr. Tanya Roberts, formerly of USDA’s 

Economic Research Service, estimates that illnesses caused by all foodborne pathogens cost the nation $1.4 trillion each year in medical expenses, lost productivity 

and wages.2

Numbers as large as these have a certain unreality about them. They may seem 

unconnected to what goes on in our daily lives. It is important to remember the personal suffering and loss that are involved but not factored into the trillion dollar 

loss. There is no calculation for physical suffering or the pain when a family loses 

a young child or beloved grandparent to a foodborne disease. 

I urge you to remember that we are talking about individual lives. Over the past 

5 years, thousands of people have, literally, been poisoned by common, everyday 

foods that we serve at the family dinner table—spinach, lettuce, tomatoes, peppers 

and peanut products. 

In addition, we have been threatened by high levels of drug residues and toxic 

chemicals in fish and dairy products imported from China. 

The largest foodborne disease outbreak was the most recent. Almost 700 people 

got sick and nine deaths have been tied to consumption of a variety of foods that 

contained peanut products contaminated with Salmonella typhimurium. Starting 

early this year, 2,100 products from more than 200 companies were recalled. 

This was the second major Salmonella contamination, outbreak and recall of peanut butter products in 2 years. Previously, FDA had viewed peanut butter and related products as ‘‘low-risk’’ foods, not particularly susceptible to contamination. 

That illusion should have ended with the outbreak of Salmonella illnesses traced 

to peanut products produced by Con-Agra at a plant a short distance away from the 

one involved in the most recent outbreak. However, FDA made no substantive 

changes in order to effectively prevent another peanut related outbreak. 

That next outbreak wasn’t long in coming. Between April and June 2008, more 

than 1,300 people in 43 states, the District of Columbia and Canada were infected 

by Salmonella saintpaul, an unusual strain of the bacterium. The outbreak, originally thought to have been caused by tomatoes, was ultimately traced to Serrano 

and jalapen ̃ o peppers imported from Mexico. 

Foodborne illness is not something that happens just to other people. Citizens of 

46 states were hit by the Peanut Corporation of America outbreak. The victims included 100 Ohioans; 76 Californians; 43 Minnesotans. The 2008 Salmonella 

saintpaul outbreak traced to contaminated Serrano and jalapen ̃ o peppers hit 559 

Texans, 120 people in Illinois, 42 in Georgia, 59 in Arizona. This month 84 Nebraskans, 27 Iowans, and five Kansans and South Dakotans were among the victims of 

a Salmonella saintpaul outbreak traced to eating contaminated fresh sprouts. 

These people are your friends, neighbors and constituents. They and all the rest 

of us need your help and your leadership to rewrite the archaic laws and organizational structure that govern our food safety system. 

The outbreaks I’ve discussed were the result of poor sanitation or mishandling at 

some point in the food chain. None resulted from consumer mishandling, although 

a great deal of foodborne illness can be traced to consumers’ failure to handle foods 

carefully. 

Thankfully, Americans have not been subjected to illnesses caused by intentional 

efforts to poison our food. We cannot assume, however, that that will never happen. 

Former Secretary of HHS Tommy Thompson, as he left office, noted that we are unprepared to address attacks on our food supply and urged that the nation begin to 

address this. 

The continuing series of foodborne illness outbreaks have seriously shaken consumer confidence in the safety of our food supply.

• After the Peanut Corporation of America outbreak, the University of Minnesota’s Food Industry Center reported that only 22.5% of consumers were confident the food supply is safer today than it was a year ago.3

52

4Food-Labeling Poll 2008, Consumer Reports National Research Center, NRC #2008. 18, Nov. 

11, 2008. 5Statement of David Mackay, President & CEO, Kellogg Company, before the House Committee on Oversight and Investigations, ‘‘The Salmonella Outbreak: The Role of Industry in Protecting the Nation’s Food Supply.’’ U.S. House of Representatives, March 19, 2009. 6 Rampton R., ‘‘U.S. peanut plantings to drop 27 percent after peanut scare.’’ Reuters, March 

31, 2009. 7The primary legal authorities for the FDA are the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, as 

amended (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.); the Public Health Service Act, as amended (42 U.S.C., et seq.) 

and the Egg Products Inspection Act, as amended (21 U.S.C., 1031 et seq.) Governing authorities 

for FSIS are the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906, as amended (21 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) the 

Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957, as amended (21 U.S.C. 451 et seq. and the Egg Products Inspection Act, as amended (21 U.S.C. 1031 et seq.). 8 Numerous reports available at U.S. Government Accountability Office website, http://

gao.gov/. 9 Institute of Medicine, National Research Council Ensuring Safe Food from Production to 

Consumption, 1998. 

• A Consumers Union study conducted last November, found that 48 percent of 

those polled said their confidence in the food supply had declined.4

• Last spring, the United Fresh Produce Association conducted a survey of consumer attitudes toward produce safety. In April 46% of consumers were concerned about produce safety. Four months later, the tomato/pepper Salmonella 

saintpaul outbreak had occurred and the number of people concerned about 

produce safety had risen substantially. 54% were concerned about produce safety and 56% were concerned about salad mix.

That lack of confidence is bad for the food business and for food producers. The 

CEO of Kellogg’s told the House Energy & Commerce Committee that the PCA recall cost the company $65–$70 million.5 Although no major brands of peanut butter 

sold at retail were involved in the PCA outbreak, sales of those products plunged 

after the outbreak became known. 

Foodborne illness outbreaks are also bad for farmers who grow the crops implicated. Florida tomato farmers were devastated by the connection of their product 

to the Salmonella saintpaul outbreak that came at the height of their growing season. Spinach and lettuce farmers experienced a drop in demand after their products 

were implicated in outbreaks. USDA recently announced that farmers will likely cut 

their production of peanuts by about 27 percent this year as a result of smaller contracts from buyers.6 It is true that these markets often come back but the lost sales 

and lost income are not recoverable. 

We can expect that outbreaks like these will continue, threatening the health of 

consumers and the businesses of food processors and farmers until Congress acts 

to address the archaic laws, confused organizational structure and under-funded 

food safety system. 

The Source of the Problem 

The U.S. food safety system is broken. The Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) has identified 15 agencies involved in administering 30 different Federal 

laws that touch on food safety. 

The two agencies with primary responsibility for protecting our food are the Food 

Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), located in the Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) located in the Department 

of Health and Human Services (HHS). The primary laws governing food safety were 

written over 100 years ago.7 The most recent major food amendments to the Food 

Drug and Cosmetic Act were passed 70 years ago. The last rewrite of the Meat Inspection Act was over 50 years ago. The world we live in and the way we produce, 

process and consume food have all changed radically but the laws remain the same. 

We Need A 21st Century Food Safety System 

Consumer Federation of America and other consumer and public health organizations have called on Congress and the President for over 20 years to undertake a 

comprehensive revision and modernization of food safety laws and to combine all 

food safety activities in an independent food safety agency. 

Both the GAO and a number of expert committees have examined the problems 

with the food safety system. The GAO has produced a number of studies, beginning 

in the mid-1990s, documenting the pressing need to modernize food safety laws and 

organization.8

In 1998, the National Academy of Sciences recommended that Congress modernize food safety laws and overhaul the Federal Government’s food safety structure 

to meet current needs.9 My colleague Mike Taylor served on that committee and has 

53

10 Institute of Medicine, National Research Council Scientific Criteria to Ensure Safe Food,

2003. 

taken a lead role in updating some of its recommendations. In 2003 another NAS 

committee recommended that Congress give the agencies the authority to set and 

enforce microbiological criteria.10

Starting in the 1990s, Senator Richard Durbin and Representatives Rosa 

DeLauro, Frank Pallone and John Dingell introduced bills that gave FDA enhanced 

authority to prevent foodborne illness. Senator Durbin and Representative DeLauro 

also introduced legislation to create an independent single food safety agency. 

In the 111th Congress, nearly a dozen bills have been introduced so far, including 

H.R. 1332, The Safe FEAST Act sponsored by Rep. Costa and several Members of 

this Committee. All the bills embrace at least some of the elements identified by 

the NAS and GAO as necessary for securing the safety of both domestic and imported foods. 

Some key elements of what is required for an effective modern food safety system 

appear in the recommendations of almost all of the outside panels and most are reflected to some degree in all the bills introduced in Congress this year. 

Frequently Noted Elements of An Adequate Food Safety System

1. Create a system that addresses risks of foodborne illness that may arise anywhere along the food chain, from farm to fork and into the consumer’s mouth. 

Microbiological pathogens can enter food at any point.

2. Make prevention the focal point of the new system.

3. Require food companies to develop and implement controls to assure that the 

food they sell is safe.

4. Require food safety agencies to establish and enforce microbial performance 

standards that will reduce pathogens to a minimum and assure an acceptable 

level of public health protection.

5. Protect the integrity of the system and the food supply by providing for comprehensive enforcement. This should include: regular oversight (inspection) conducted by public officials and based on the risk presented by the product; require sampling and testing for pathogens and reporting; assure food safety officials have access to company food safety records; and authorize agencies to require recalls of contaminated food.

6. Ensure that the food we import is as safe as that produced and processed 

here.

7. Provide for research capacity to develop the best means to address current 

and emerging pathogens.

8. Assure adequate financial and staff resources in an institutional setting that 

provides the leadership, visibility, and status needed to support the program. 

Comparison of How Existing Food Safety Authorities and Organizations 

Address the Elements of a Modern Food Safety Program 

As a starting point for thinking about what kind of statutory changes may be necessary to build the kind of system envisioned in these elements, it is useful to examine the basic legal mandates of the two agencies and compare how they address the 

elements under current law. 

The Food and Drug Administration has responsibility for ensuring that all domestic and imported foods except meat, poultry, processed eggs and, since passage of 

the 2008 Farm Bill, farm-raised catfish, are safe, nutritious, wholesome and accurately labeled. Domestically, FDA has responsibility for some 44,000 food processors, 

114,000 food retailers and 935,000 restaurants. 

The Food Safety and Inspection Service is responsible for the safety, wholesomeness and proper labeling of most domestic and imported meat and poultry and their 

products sold for human consumption. It regulates over 6,000 domestic meat, poultry plants and egg plants. 

1. System Authority Should Extend From Farm to Fork 

FDA—has some ability to regulate on-farm activities. However, this ability is limited and according to the Congressional Research Service, FDA’s general approach 

has been not to impose mandatory on-farm safety standards or inspections of agricultural facilities but to rely on farmers’ adoption of good agricultural practices to 

54

11 Congressional Research Service, RS22600, The Federal Food Safety System: A Primer, Geoffrey S. Becker, March 3, 2009. 12 Ibid.

reduce hazards prior to harvest. FDA issues good agricultural practices as guidance, 

not regulations; they are advisory and not legally enforceable.11

FSIS—authority begins at the door of the slaughterhouse. Has no on-farm authority. 

2. System Designed to Prevent Contamination and Foodborne Illness 

Prevention is a core public health value. It is always better to prevent a problem 

than try to resolve it. The language in the FFDCA and the FMIA and PPIA is quite 

similar but the results are quite different. 

FDA—system is reactive. The FFDCA contains no specific direction to the agency 

to prevent food contamination or foodborne illness. FDA’s primary food safety authority is the power to seize adulterated or misbranded food. The burden is on FDA 

to prove a product is adulterated or mislabeled before it can act. To justify a product 

seizure FDA must have laboratory tests to show that the product is adulterated or 

misbranded before it acts. As a result, FDA often doesn’t act at all until there are 

confirmed reports of illness or death. 

FSIS—system is preventive. Meat and poultry processors must, in effect, prove to 

a USDA inspector that the plant’s product is safe and accurately labeled. Products 

can’t be entered into commerce until a USDA inspector applies the ‘‘mark of inspection.’’ This means that trained Federal inspectors paid by public funds must take 

an affirmative action before food products can leave the plant. 

3. System Requires Companies to Take Responsibility for Safety of Their Products 

FDA—The FFDCA does not give FDA specific authority to require companies to 

establish or follow preventive controls. FDA’s primary method of operation is to rely 

on each company’s self-interest in producing safe products, and to work with the industry to encourage improved production practices.12 FDA has required HACCP systems in seafood and fresh juices. A HACCP plan for shell eggs has been in process 

for several years. 

Virtually all large processors have some form of process control, many with higher 

standards than the government would require. Majority of other facilities do not 

have formal process controls. Very few farms have adopted formal systems for avoiding food safety problems. 

FDA’s failure to require food companies to institute preventive process controls 

was partially responsible for the Peanut Corporation of America’s ability to hide 

their activity. Since PCA wasn’t required to show the FDA or Georgia State inspectors their plans, inspection was just a quick visual review of what the plant looked 

like at a given moment. 

FSIS—Since 2000, FSIS has required all meat and poultry companies to adopt 

HACCP systems and sanitary operating plans. A dozen years into HACCP, many 

companies still have not identified any critical control points or adopted meaningful 

HACCP programs. Lack of specific statutory authorization for HACCP and sanitation procedures prevents full benefits of HACCP. The agency cannot permanently 

withdraw inspection from a plant that fails to follow its HACCP and sanitation 

plans. 

One of the most glaring weaknesses of the FSIS system is that, unable to withdraw inspection from plants that fail to adopt effective HACCP plans, FSIS then 

tries to ‘‘help’’ them comply, contrary to the notion that this is the ‘‘company’s’’ plan. 

This requires additional agency resources to assist a company that is unable or unwilling to develop an effective HACCP plan. It also means that FSIS is caught between the old inspection system in which it often was the only quality control in 

the plant, and the new system where companies are supposed to take ownership of 

their food safety plans. 

4. System Requires Agencies to Establish and Enforce Pathogen Reduction Performance Standards 

FDA—has no specific mandate or authority to establish pathogen reduction performance standards that companies must meet. FDA has adopted some performance 

criteria and standards. Government needs to establish a minimum acceptable level 

of public health protection. If food companies know what the standard is most will 

immediately set their own systems to meet or exceed the standard. 

FSIS—has no specific authority to establish or apply performance standards, nor 

to withdraw inspection from companies that fail to meet them. But agency has instituted standards for generic E. coli and Salmonella on animal and poultry carcasses. 

55

13Much of the information on the basic information about FDA and FSIS authorities, jurisdiction and funding is from Congressional Research Service paper, 7–5700. The Federal Food Safety System: A Primer, by Geoffrey S. Becker, March 3, 2009. 14Food Safety Primer. 

Lack of specific authority to set and enforce these standards limits effectiveness. Enforcement of performance standards is a key public health element but courts have 

limited FSIS’s enforcement. The agency does have authority to set a zero tolerance 

standard for E. coli O157:H7 in ground beef and trim, and zero tolerance for Listeria

and Salmonella in ready-to-eat products. 

5. System Provides for Adequate Enforcement, applied according to the risk presented 

by the product. Must include regular oversight (inspection) by public officials to 

assure companies are complying with standards; microbial testing and reporting; 

access to records; mandatory recall. Food safety system integrity depends upon 

adequate enforcement authority. 

FDA—

Inspection—Consistent with its reactive approach to food safety, FDA makes little 

investment in preventive inspections to assure a company is complying with the 

law. FDA contracts with state governments to conduct inspection of some facilities 

and works with states to set safety standards for food establishments.13 Common 

practice is to rely on non-FDA sources for information that a particular facility may 

be in need of additional inspection or to act after having cause to believe a facility 

is connected to an outbreak of foodborne illness.14

Risk-Based Inspection—Current effort to devise mechanism to assign inspector 

based on risk. Work plan and budget say FDA inspects ‘‘high-risk’’ facilities more 

often. Many plants are inspected only once in a decade. FDA has no organized system for determining level of risk and applying resources accordingly but has begun 

analysis of relative risk, working with outside groups, including the Institute of 

Food Technologists. 

Government Access to Company Records—FDA does not have authority to require 

access to plant records; does not require companies to keep records and provide FDA 

information on source of material or destination of products. 

Traceback—no authority or capacity to track products back to source. 

Recall—no authority to require recall. Recalls are voluntary but FDA, with a court 

order, can seize a product that is adulterated. 

FSIS—

Inspection—law requires continuous inspection in slaughter and processing of animals and birds. For animals, FSIS must inspect before slaughter; individual postmortem carcass inspection for red meat animals and poultry. At least daily visit to 

every processing plant. 

Risk-Based Inspection—Inspection resources not applied according to risk. Agency 

has been trying to devise a risk-ranking system but has been unable to produce one 

that meets scientific criteria. Statutory requirement to inspect every poultry carcass 

is not risk-based, but FSIS has no alternative given law and lack of data to support 

another system. 

Consumer groups oppose attempts to alter system without rewriting underlying 

law to include better enforcement tools and more science. Requirement to visit every 

processing plant daily is also not risk-based but agency has failed to offer a valid 

alternative or to persuade Congress to change the law. FSIS has trouble meeting 

responsibility to visit every processing plant at least daily. In addition, many high 

risk meat grinding operations are visited only once daily when a more intensive regime would offer more protection for consumers. Plants that are not high risk often 

have same level of inspection. 

Government Access to Company Records—most records must be made available on 

request of inspector. 

Traceback—each inspected plant is identified by a plant number which follows 

product making it easier to identify products and recall them. Products packaged 

for final sale in a USDA inspected plant will have the plant number on the final 

package so that consumers can identify a recalled product. FSIS has no authority 

to track product back to the farm of origin. No way to determine if some ranches 

and feed lots have cattle that consistently turns up with high levels of E. coli contamination. 

Recall—no authority to require plant to recall products. Recalls are voluntary on 

part of plant. 

56

15http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼furls/ffregsum.html, Accessed March 30, 2009. 16FDA Office of Regulatory Affairs. ‘‘FY 2007 ORA Field Workplan,’’ October 1, 2006, p. 03–

20. 17Taylor, Michael R. & David, Stephanie, 2009 Unifying and Elevating Food Safety Leadership at HHS, George Washington University Medical Center, School of Public and Health Services. 

6. System Ensures Safety of Imported Foods 

FDA—countries wishing to export to the U.S. may do so after filing registration 

forms with the agency as required by the Bioterrorism Act. 

As of Jan. 2009, 367,600 facilities in 180 foreign countries were registered to export to the U.S.15 The exporting country is not required to demonstrate its food safety system is equivalent to the U.S. system. 

FDA inspects less than one percent of all the food that enters the country. Imported foods are responsible for a large proportion of foodborne illnesses that arise 

from FDA-regulated products. In 2006 the FDA stated, ‘‘to the best of our knowledge, approximately half of the foods that have been associated with foodborne illness have been imported.’’ 16

In June 2007, FDA detained imports of farm-raised seafood from China because 

of the possibility they were contaminated with unapproved drug residues. In late 

2008, FDA held up further imports of dairy products from China until importers 

could prove they were not contaminated with melamine, a toxic chemical intentionally added to milk to increased measured protein levels. The same chemical was 

implicated in the recall of large amounts of pet food and in infant formula in China. 

FSIS—no country can export meat or poultry to the U.S. until FSIS has certified 

that the exporting country has an inspection system that is equivalent to the U.S. 

In addition, each foreign plant that wants to export to the U.S. must be found to 

be operating in a manner that is equivalent to that required of U.S. plants. 

FSIS inspectors are present at all points of import into the country to carry out 

statistical sampling and testing to assure the safety of imported products. The agency inspects approximately 10% of all meat and poultry imports at port. 

7. System Provides for Research Capacity 

FDA—little research capacity. 

FSIS—USDA does most of the government’s food safety research but it is done 

at ARS and FSIS has virtually no influence over focus of efforts. 

8. System Has Appropriate Organizational Structure and Accountability 

FDA—new paper from George Washington University’s School of Public Health 

reports that no single official at FDA has a full time job directing food safety as 

well as budget and line authority over all the food elements of the FDA.17 Within 

FDA, food safety is dispersed among three organizational units, the Center for Food 

Safety and Applied Nutrition, the Center for Veterinary Medicine and the Office of 

Regulatory Affairs. Directors of each unit report to the Commissioner but coordination responsibility rests with Associate Commissioner for Foods who is housed in the 

Office of FDA’s Deputy Commissioner for Operations. The Associate Commissioner 

for Foods, sometimes called the FDA’s food ‘‘czar’’ has no line authority and no control over the food safety budget. The FDA Commissioner reports directly to the Secretary of HHS but historically the Commissioner has given little time to oversight 

of food safety functions. 

FSIS—The USDA Reorganization Act of 1994 removed food safety activities from 

USDA marketing and animal health activities and created a separate entity to protect public health program from undue influence. 

The Act also created the Under Secretary for Food Safety, the highest ranking 

food safety official in government and gave this Level III official direct and specific 

responsibility for oversight and administration of the USDA’s meat, poultry and egg 

inspection programs. Act requires that Under Secretary be someone qualified by 

training or experience to address food safety issues. Under Secretary is under direction of the USDA Secretary and therefore not entirely free from influence driven by 

agricultural interests. However, both Democratic and Republican Administrations 

have, since 1994, sought to appoint individuals with food safety or public health credentials. Industry continues to apply pressure to appoint someone with ties to the 

industry. 

System Has Adequate Budget and Staff Resources 

FDA—the FDA’s food budget for FY 2009 is $648.7 million ($210 million for the 

Center for Food Safety and $438.2 million for food related activities of the Office 

of Regulatory Affairs). In FY 2008, there were 2,800 food related staff, 1,900 in the 

57

field and 900 headquarters staff. FDA inspection (compliance) staff have science 

education and training. 

For most of the last 25 years, until recently, the FDA budget has been either reduced or flat. The food portion of the FDA budget suffered during part of that period 

because money was directed to the drug program in order to assure that appropriated funds were sufficient to keep drug user fees in place. FSIS—2008 budget of $930 million in appropriated funds in FY 2008, and $140 

million in fees paid by companies that want to operate additional shifts beyond 

those covered by Federal inspection. FSIS has 9,400 staff. Approximately 8,000 of 

the staff are present in meat and poultry plants on a daily basis. The FSIS staff 

includes 1,000 doctors of veterinary medicine. Since HACCP, FSIS has created a 

compliance staff with 300 Enforcement, Investigations and Analysis Officers (EIAO) 

and program investigators in addition to the inspection staff. A risk-based system 

will require FSIS to upgrade GS level and training of inspectors to handle new 

tasks. 

Conclusion 

There has been extensive discussion of reorganizing inspection functions. CFA 

supports creation of a single independent food safety agency that would combine all 

Federal food safety functions. 

As an interim step we support the approach Representative DeLauro has taken 

in H.R. 875 to divide FDA into a Federal Drug Administration and a Food Safety 

Administration within HHS, providing separate budget authority and leadership for 

food. 

CFA does not support moving meat and poultry inspection to the Department of 

HHS. Addressing the very serious problems that now plague FDA’s food safety programs and possibly creating a new Food Safety Administration within HHS will be 

a major undertaking, not leaving resources for integrating a much larger program. 

In addition, as the FDA has slipped into dysfunction, the food safety functions of 

the USDA have made some progress toward a more modern and science-based program. Little more can be done without rewriting the authorizing statutes. We urge 

this Committee, in cooperation with the Obama Administration, to take the lead in 

developing new authority embracing the elements discussed here. 

Occasionally, it is proposed that FDA’s food safety functions be moved to a new 

Department of Food and Agriculture. I’m not sure how Consumer Federation of 

America would feel about that. However, with or without food safety functions, creating a Department of Food and Agriculture that acknowledges and embraces all 

the people of the U.S. as its constituency is an idea whose time I hope will come.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding.] Thank you very much. I want to 

thank all of the witnesses for being here and putting up with us 

with all this stuff going on. We didn’t know the budget was going 

to be up today when we set this up. 

Dr. Murano and Mr. Taylor, the industry values the USDA mark 

of inspection. Can you tell me what the USDA mark of inspection 

means and does FDA provide an equivalent to the USDA mark, 

and if so, what level of inspection backs up the inspection mark? 

Dr. MURANO. Let me address that a little bit, and Mr. Taylor can 

follow up as well, obviously. Mr. Chairman, the mark of inspection 

at its most basic level means that there has been an inspector who 

has actually been at the plant who has looked at that carcass. But 

it is not only that, it is also backed up by an entire system that 

was developed and implemented in the early 1990s as a result of 

some foodborne illness outbreaks. It is called HACCP, Hazard 

Analysis Critical Control Points, which the USDA requires every 

meat and poultry plant to have. And that program, that system, involves microbial testing, involves monitoring every step that is critical to control the hazards that may be present in that product. So 

it is a whole array of different things that are involved in ensuring 

to the greatest extent that one can that that product has been inspected, by not only an actual inspector being there, but an inspector that is looking at the entire process; not only at the carcasses 

what you can see with the naked eye, which is insufficient clearly 

58

because microorganisms are not seen with the naked eye. And this 

comes out of these laws that are pretty old, hearkening back to 

1906, and so forth, that require that there be carcass-by-carcass inspection. And that is why there has to be an inspector in every 

plant every day from the USDA perspective. 

FDA is under no such laws, and therefore plants sometimes don’t 

see an FDA inspector for a year or longer. And so it is a huge difference. You do not see a mark of inspection by FDA that is in the 

same vein, and I don’t know that the public realizes that, the 

robustness and the rigor with which meat and poultry is inspected 

in this country. It is not perfect because, obviously, we continue to 

have outbreaks of meat and poultry products, but I would agree 

with Ms. Tucker-Foreman that there has been tremendous improvements at USDA. It is the Rodney Dangerfield. I will tell you 

that when I was at USDA as Under Secretary, one of the things 

that bothered me a lot is that there was not the same expectation 

of product that was inspected by FDA in terms of if there was an 

outbreak, FDA would put out the Food Safety Alerts and things 

like that. And I always said, boy, if something happened at USDA 

with a USDA product, if all we did was put out a Food Safety Alert 

it would be chaotic. We were expected to stop the outbreak. We 

were expected, rightfully so, to find out the source of the outbreak, 

to get at who and what caused the outbreak. And that fundamental 

difference between the two agencies is really rooted in regulations, 

the lack of robustness in the regulations that FDA operates under, 

but also, frankly, a culture, a culture of inspection that exists at 

USDA borne out of decades, and that culture is really not at FDA 

from my point of view. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Since your having served at both USDA and FDA, 

I may turn out to be the designated FDA defender at the hearing 

here today, but I do want to answer your question about the mark 

of inspection and Dr. Murano’s reference to the history of it is germane. The concept of carcass-by-carcass inspection and the 

issuance of a mark came about in the aftermath, as you know, of 

The Jungle, 1906, when gross sanitation conditions, diseased animals were common in the food supply. And the judgment, correctly, 

at the time was that a carcass-by-carcass visual inspection could 

solve that problem, could eliminate those animals from the food 

supply. And the mark of inspection and the inspection program 

that is in place stems from the fact that you have done a good job 

of dealing with those visible problems. 

The reason why the National Academy of Sciences and GAO 

have criticized that approach to inspection and said that it is not 

really contributing significantly to today’s food safety problems is 

because today we are concerned about invisible, microbial pathogens, and the visual inspection program simply doesn’t address 

those. I referred to the lack of standards in my testimony. One of 

the limitations in terms of what that mark stands for is that because there are not enforceable standards for microbial pathogens 

that make people sick, there is very wide variability across slaughter plants with respect to control of pathogens. Many have made 

enormous progress, and they are doing a terrific job, others less so. 

59

But the mark of inspection doesn’t reflect in any way directly the 

degree of control over the pathogens that make people sick. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Carol, you want to comment on this, 

too? And my time is out, but we appreciate you being with us and 

the work that we did together during the farm bill, we very much 

appreciated that. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. Thank you. I thought it came out very 

well. Now, if we can just get the regulations out. 

I am going to agree just a little bit with both of the other panelists. The mark of inspection doesn’t represent today what it did in 

the beginning, but it is still important. It does say to the American 

people a government official who has pledged to protect public 

health has been present and looked at this product. And it is not 

just looking anymore. Under HACCP, we have developed and Mr. 

Taylor started it, an intensive system of microbial testing to determine that meat and poultry are not adulterated. There were performance standards that were established when he was at USDA, 

and it is an important point to make that USDA continues to have 

a number of recalls every year. I just took a quick look at the recalls for 2008 which was a pretty good year for USDA; over half 

of the recalls that occurred at USDA occurred because USDA inspectors tested the product, found that it had E. coli or in the case 

of ready-to-eat products, Salmonella or Campylobacter or Listeria

and recalled the products before they got into retail commerce. This 

is prevention, and FDA because it is not oriented to prevention, the 

product is out there and it has been eaten and people get sick and 

then someone says, uh-oh, I guess we better call the FDA. That is 

too late in the system. 

Now, Consumer Federation and other consumer groups and the 

National Academy of Sciences have urged that Congress give 

USDA and FDA specific authority to enforce those microbial standards. Right now if a plant does not comply, the only thing USDA 

can do is go in and say, Hey guys, you didn’t comply. And if they 

still don’t comply, ultimately they send in an assessment team, and 

the assessment team sits there until the company finally does it 

right. That is not a very good use of public resources. There ought 

to be the ability to say you failed the test, there is the penalty, fix 

the problem and we will go on. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and all of the panel. I just want to 

make the point which has kind of been made but to make it clear 

that you know, one of the problems here is that USDA actually has 

a law, and FDA doesn’t, basically. I mean, that is what it boils 

down to. I mean, they don’t have to do this stuff. And, like in the 

case of the previous panel, they don’t have to go in and have an 

equivalency on the plants and so forth. 

You know, I still don’t quite understand why they don’t, you 

know. If it is pressure from the industry, that they don’t want this 

stuff inspected overseas or exactly what is going on there, but, we 

are again part of the problem, the Congress. We haven’t given 

these agencies the tools to do what they should be doing. And hopefully out of this process that we are starting here, we can be helpful along with the other committees to get these people the tools 

and the resources to do what has to be done. That is what we intend to do. 

60

So I recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, the Ranking Member, for his questions. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Murano, some advocates have proposed the creation of a single food safety agency. Let 

us discuss for a moment the nature of risk profiles for different 

food products. Do they lend themselves to a one-size-fits-all model 

of food inspection? 

Dr. MURANO. Well, the simple answer is no, and it is because it 

is tied to risk. Some products are very highly processed, meaning 

that they have steps in the preparation of those products that kills 

microbial contaminants, for example. So those products are relatively safe. You know, nothing is absolutely safe unless it is sterilized completely which a canned food product is. 

So there is a degree of risk. The fresher products, the products 

that are not processed are more likely to be contaminated, the 

highly processed products, less likely to be contaminated after processing. And so there is a whole family of products that fall into 

many of these categories. One of the things that needs to happen 

is for there to be a recognition that the products that are more 

risky need to be subjected to more inspection, more monitoring, 

more testing. The products that are less risky, there can be less of 

that oversight. 

I will say that from my perspective on the issue of single food 

safety agency or what should we do, if we just kind of take all 

those words out of the discussion and just look at what makes 

sense, what does common sense dictate. When I worked at USDA 

and now of course I have been away for even longer than I served 

as Under Secretary, I certainly got an opportunity to see what 

USDA does, got an opportunity to see what my colleagues at FDA 

were doing and the differences in the laws and so forth, as the 

Chairman just mentioned. And it is clear to me that at FSIS, because of the laws, there has been as I said earlier a culture of inspection, an expectation that things would be done a certain way 

which I don’t believe is as prevalent at FDA. Plus FDA, frankly, 

has jurisdiction over medical devices and drugs and other kinds of 

products. So they are spread pretty thin at FDA. 

So I would offer the suggestion that maybe what we need to do 

is play to these agencies’ strengths. In other words, if FSIS as I believe is where the strength is in terms of food inspection, as one 

of the gentlemen from the last panel talked about, he even uses 

USDA personnel as third-party auditors of his fruit and vegetable 

operation. Perhaps all food inspection, not just meat and poultry, 

needs to reside at FSIS because these people have that culture over 

decades of being able to do that, and then FDA has some other activities related to food. 

One thing the Chairman mentioned or maybe somebody else did, 

I guess it was Mike Taylor, that FSIS does not have the ability to 

conduct research, and that is something that frankly, as a scientist, 

troubled me when I was at USDA. There are research agencies 

within USDA, and we tried to work as well as we could with them 

and we did. But a more direct line for FSIS to participate in research funding would have been helpful, when I was there. 

So I will just finish by telling you, sir, that to me, putting everything under one umbrella, even though it may sound good, we need 

61

to study that very carefully. What makes most sense to me is look 

at the agencies we have now, play to their strengths, and frankly 

the laws need to be changed. But FSIS is more adept to conduct 

inspections, I believe, at this point than any other agency in the 

government . 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Doctor. Ms. Tucker-Foreman, do you 

think FDA authority should be extended to regulate on-farm production practices? 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. Yes, sir, in some cases I do. We have supported that legislation. 

Mr. LUCAS. I guess one of the concerns I have always had, from 

my understanding they have something like 1,900 field personnel, 

and they are already charged with the responsibility with 44,000 

food processors to look at and 114,000 retail establishments, 

900,000+ restaurants. I just have always been concerned about how 

we then expand that out to cover probably two million-plus farms 

across the country. Tell me with the time remaining that I have 

how you envision how we would be able to do that. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. Let me answer you very quickly since 

your time is up, and I can talk to you about it in more detail later. 

Mr. LUCAS. Of course. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. First of all, under Congresswoman 

DeLauro’s bill, H.R. 875, there are categories of risk established so 

that some plants, those with the highest risk, would be inspected 

most frequently, and those with lower risk would be inspected less 

frequently. In addition, there is a provision that you have the assistance of state governments and even some third-party certifiers 

for on-farm work. There is no way you are ever going to give FDA 

enough inspectors to do that job, so you are absolutely right. 

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me with one more 

question? If FDA issues regulations regarding on-farm production 

practices in the United States, do you believe that these identical 

regulations should be enforced on foreign farms producing products 

that are then imported into the United States? 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. Oh, I can certainly agree with you on 

that because again, to my mind, the greatest strength of the Meat 

and Poultry Inspection Program is the equivalence. Now, the trade 

folks just don’t like that equivalence. They say, we are only getting 

meat and poultry from 34 countries. All you have to do to export 

FDA-regulated products to the United States of America is register 

under the Bioterrorism Act. 

Mr. LUCAS. To flesh up in the way that would be necessary for 

FDA to be able to do this, you know how challenging appropriations are in this place. So from your perspective, would you envision a user-fee system that would generate the revenue to provide 

the enforcement? 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. No, registration fee yes, and we have 

urged the adoption of registration fee on food processing companies. 

I really think that the on-farm program, the place that it is needed 

most, is with regard to produce, fresh produce, that is being 

shipped as fresh produce. And we think that Senator Durbin and 

Congresswoman DeLauro have developed mechanisms that would 

ease the demands on FDA for inspection resources to do that. 

62

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the Committee’s indulgence on extra time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from 

Georgia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you may 

know, I am Chairman of our Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, 

Poultry, Seafood, and Food Safety and Inspection for those areas 

come under us. I am very concerned about the fact we are not moving even fast enough. But let me first start with you, Mr. Taylor. 

In your testimony, you mentioned that FDA lacks the resources to 

adequately inspect food facilities. Would you please clarify for us 

exactly what constitutes an inspection by the FDA? My understanding is that such inspections are actually just audits of food establishments, and the agency never actually inspects the food itself. 

Does the FDA notify food establishments in advance that they will 

be coming to inspect? 

Mr. TAYLOR. First of all, there is no one type of FDA inspection. 

There are different kinds of inspections based on the facility and 

based on the reason for the inspection. And those inspections are 

unannounced, and they do include more than just auditing. In fact, 

FDA, one of the problems it has got with its statute, it does not 

have routine access to the records that relate to a company’s food 

safety system. They need that access. In fact, the typical inspection 

includes visually observing and taking samples from the production 

line of the food itself, samples from the equipment to see if it is 

contaminated. So it is a direct inspection, hands-on inspection, of 

the facilities and the food there. 

Mr. SCOTT. But I mean, are you adamant on your point that the 

FDA lacks the resources to adequately inspect food facilities? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The inspection frequency that they are able to 

achieve, if you average out the number of inspections they are able 

to do annually, and the number of plants, averages out to about 

one every 10 years. I consider that inadequate resources. There is 

a critical point here though which comes up, and it is a comparison 

between USDA and FDA. The gap in inspection intensity is obviously enormous, and that reflects a lot of the history of why we do 

what we do on meat and poultry, why we do carcass-by-carcass. 

And you can debate whether that makes sense. You don’t want to 

aspire, I would argue, to a system at FDA for all the rest of the 

food supply and all of its diversity that emulates the USDA approach, which is all about inspection in a very constant way. 

FDA inspection will be sufficient and effective when it is with respect to enforcing a company’s duty to have modern, preventive 

controls. If the company is not obligated to have modern, preventive controls, then FDA is in the position of looking around for the 

problem as opposed to being able to yes, audit the company’s system but also take the verification samples, do the microbial testing 

and so forth to really, in an efficient way, determine whether that 

company is operating an effective system. 

Mr. SCOTT. Dr. Murano, let me ask you as a follow-up on that, 

how does what Mr. Taylor is saying compare to how FSIS conducts 

its inspections? 

Dr. MURANO. Well, sir, as I alluded to, because FSIS is in the 

plants every day, they have access to the records that are the food 

63

safety records that the plant has. If they have an operation where 

they are processing, say, hot dogs, they look at the records that the 

plant is keeping of the temperature controls, for example, for the 

oven, their sanitation operating procedures and records of the percent chlorine in a solution that sanitizes equipment, things of that 

nature, all the time. They are able to look at that as well as take 

samples, and that is the essence of the difference. I agree with Mr. 

Taylor that not every product requires that kind of oversight, but 

certainly on a regular basis, on a frequent basis being able to look 

at the complete process is extremely important. And it is the basis 

for why USDA has done so well. Again, not perfect because we are 

dealing with human beings, and human beings make mistakes, but 

it is a fundamental difference that has enabled USDA to be much 

more proactive, much more preventive. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me ask you one other thing as my time is running out, I listened intently to your testimony, and it seems to me 

that I picked up that you were saying that the weak link is in 

plant operators. Is that an accurate assessment? 

Dr. MURANO. Well, let me put it to you this way. There are several links in this food safety chain, and just like inspectors are an 

important link, another important link, if not the most important 

link, are the plant operators themselves. They are the ones that 

are making the food, that are producing the products. So just as 

we went about training our inspection personnel, we knew that if 

they had been making mistakes based on lack of adequate scientific 

training and so forth, that the plant personnel maybe needed some 

looking into. And so we, as a regulatory agency, what we could do 

is mandate reassessments to make sure that those operators looked 

at their process, explained and justified why they did what they did 

based on science, and that had not happened very well before. That 

made a difference. 

Mr. SCOTT. By plant operator, you are distinguishing a plant operator from regular plant worker, food processor, somewhere down 

the line. Is that plant operator a supervisory designation? 

Dr. MURANO. Yes, sir, that is what I mean. A supervisor that 

would be accountable for monitoring the various steps in the process and for supervising their own line people. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I think we are going to 

recess. We have one vote. If the panel would stay if you have time 

to do that, I know the Members have some more questions. Mr. 

Boswell will be recognized as soon as we get back, and we appreciate your patience and being with us. It is very helpful, and it is 

just how things go around here. You guys know about that. 

Dr. MURANO. I understand. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will be in recess until the call of 

the chair. 

[Recess] 

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will come back to order. Is Mr. 

Taylor in the vicinity? All right. We appreciate the panel sticking 

around. I now recognize the gentleman from Iowa, a Subcommittee 

Chairman for such time as he may consume. 

Mr. BOSWELL. You got by Mr. Taylor. Is he, Chandler——

The CHAIRMAN. You want to ask Mr. Taylor? 

64

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, I kind of want to go with him in a minute 

anyway. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will find him. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. They sent out a party. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Okay. Before we get started, I will just say this. 

First off, it is a great panel, Mr. Chairman, and they bring the expertise that we have been looking for. So we are certainly glad to 

have you here, and what you have done in the past that certainly 

makes you eminently qualified to be with us and help us out. I 

want to talk about some of the things we are importing here. We 

will give Chandler just a second here and we will go on without 

Mr. Taylor. 

The CHAIRMAN. Here he comes. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Taylor has arrived. What I want to do, to include you in, Mr. Taylor, and of course the whole panel, is with a 

recent CODEL we went to Japan and Vietnam and Korea and so 

on, and some concerns were brought back from that visit, particularly Vietnam. I want to ask some questions to you, but can you 

tell me, Mr. Taylor and the rest of you jump in, can you tell me 

how our fish and seafood are categorized with respect to risk? And 

we are all hearing very troubling things about the fish and seafood 

that is currently being imported into the United States. In the recent past FDA has issued import alerts of imported farm-raised 

fish and seafood, particularly from China. However, I was surprised to learn that domestic fish are only inspected by the Department of Commerce on a voluntary basis, and I wonder if that 

should be mandatory. And I would like for you to comment on this. 

There are about two or three items in there and I got more to follow. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. If I may, let me just correct the facts 

on the domestic inspection. There is as voluntary Department of 

Commerce National Marine Fisheries Seafood Inspection Program, 

but it is a voluntary fee-for-service thing that is done by Commerce 

to support the trade, essentially. That is not the regulatory inspection program. FDA has a regulatory seafood HACCP inspection 

program, and they do inspect domestic seafood facilities. And in 

fact, they are typically considered, particularly ones processing raw 

seafood, high-risk facilities in terms of the frequency of inspection 

they get by FDA. So, FDA strives, I would have to check to be sure, 

but currently strives for at least annual inspection of high-risk domestic seafood establishments. 

Mr. BOSWELL. So to put it in the right categorization, to categorize this, how is that done? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, it has been a while since I have been at the 

agency. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Okay. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I haven’t looked at this. I can certainly provide that 

for the record. Seafood is inherently a higher, particularly when it 

is being processed for sale in raw form, an inherently high-risk 

food. It promotes microbial growth. There are a lot of hazards that 

can come in. That is the one area in which FDA uses current authority to mandate modern preventative controls as HACCP systems mandated by FDA for seafood. The issue of the Chinese imports and those import alerts had to do with animal drug residues 

65

and chemical residues from just the practices that go on in fish 

farming in some situations in China and even elsewhere in Asia. 

And so this is based on testing of the product, detecting illegal residues that don’t meet our U.S. standards for such residues in food. 

Mr. BOSWELL. That is a concern. To continue, where does Commerce’s authority end and FDA begin and how do they work together? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, FDA is the food safety regulatory agency 

with respect to seafood, other than catfish if I may note. 

Mr. BOSWELL. I was going to get to that in just a minute. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. Department of Commerce has no food safety regulatory authority. Again, they are conducting a voluntary 

service, basically, for the industry. They look to FDA standards as 

the template for their inspection, so they are borrowing FDA standards. They are providing a level of inspection that, frankly, FDA 

is unable to provide and that some companies want to have for 

their business purposes. 

Mr. BOSWELL. So if we are not mandating domestic inspection at 

face, how can we guarantee the imports are safe? And you have 

just answered that, even if the importers meet the equivalent 

standards. 

Now that we are giving FSIS the authority to inspect catfish, 

what exactly will change when the authority is transferred from 

FDA to FSIS? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I think, Congressman, that remains to be seen 

based on how USDA chooses to implement that, and the nature of 

the program that they design. I hope that it will be a HACCPbased approach, and I hope they will find a way to make efficient 

use of inspection resources. There are a lot of catfish out there. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, I hope you are right as well. What specifically will change, with regard to inspection presence at catfish 

farms and slaughter and processing facilities, and how will importers be affected? You may want to note that I would like for Dr. 

Murano to jump in, too, but would you like to finish up on anything 

you want to say, Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. No, I hope I have answered your question. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, you might want to pursue it a little more. 

Dr. MURANO. Sir, I would agree, and certainly based on my experience at USDA, I would expect that USDA would apply the same 

principles as they do to meat and poultry to the catfish. It is muscle food, after all. So the same kinds of things happen, in the harvesting would be akin to the slaughter part of things, the processing in terms of cleaning and packaging and all of that, all of 

those things would apply, and therefore, the same system, the 

HACCP preventive system I would expect is what would be implemented with inspection that is, I believe, not required for it to be 

carcass-by-carcass with catfish. I don’t think that is the case. So I 

am sure it will be a modification. But I would expect that they 

would do it with more rigor than has been done in the past. 

Mr. BOSWELL. This is my last question, Mr. Chairman, but would 

you feel, any comment from anybody, that as you check this out 

and food safety being the concern, we have certainly got to look at 

the processing and the packaging all that. I would like to know 

your thoughts about going out for catfish, for example, the spawnVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:36 Sep 30, 2009 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 I:\DOCS\111-08\52483.TXT AGR1 PsN: BRIAN
66

ing, the environment they are raised in, how concerned would you 

be about that? 

Dr. MURANO. Certainly. I think that is very important. In fact, 

when it comes to cattle, there is a lot of contamination that happens when the animal is still alive. So some oversight over the production side of things of the live animal is required and is something that, frankly, needs to be applied to cattle as well. It is more 

difficult because you have an open environment that is a lot more 

difficult to control what goes on, but there are certain practices, 

best practices, sir, that can be identified that producers can adhere 

to that would minimize, never eliminate, but minimize contamination. 

Mr. BOSWELL. I appreciate that. It seems to me like I have always heard that, for example, fish or catfish in particular pick up 

about everything in the environment. And if they are spawned and 

raised in unsanitary conditions, I won’t quite go to farm language 

here, and there would be some concern. Would that be correct? 

Dr. MURANO. That is correct. I am no fish expert, but I understand that certainly when you decontaminate fish by a process 

called purification where you put the fish in a tank with water that 

is clean and you process that for a while. So you can remove the 

contamination. But you are right, the place where it is raised certainly can have an impact on the colonization of microorganisms in 

that product. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. If I could add one thing about a the law 

that was passed last year, it applies only to farm-raised catfish, 

and the inspection is of processing plants. It applies only to domestic, farm-raised catfish and the inspection is of processing plants. 

And it is required to be continuous, which means that somebody 

will have to be in the plant once a day. It remains to be seen 

whether the Department will require that HACCP principles be attached, since it is required, as Dr. Murano said, for all the other 

products regulated by FSIS. I assume that that will be the case, 

but we haven’t seen the regulations yet. 

As for wild catfish, I grew up on them. They ate everything. That 

is what made them taste good. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Okay. But would you share the concern that Dr. 

Murano said about the environment where they are spawned and 

raised in, though, in the fish farm operations? 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. I think it is an interesting question, who 

will have that jurisdiction now because I am sorry, I can’t remember exactly the legislation addressed, the ponds. These are all farm 

raised, so they have a very controlled environment. 

In terms of on-farm food safety, we have advocated at Consumer 

Federation for years that on-farm food safety regulations of some 

sort be applied in order to use process controls, have people set 

standards, have the government set the standards. And then have 

companies have process controls that will assure that animals are 

not unduly contaminated all the way from birth to the point where 

they are slaughtered, because meat inspection now starts at the 

slaughterhouse, just a little late. 

Mr. BOSWELL. I appreciate that very much, particularly since the 

trip. And I guess equivalency is the word I may have left out. We 

are talking about catfish. We understand that, but they are fish 

67

that are very similar as you well know. There is some debate 

whether they are or they aren’t. I guess I am also concerned about 

that as I am about a fish farm you just described. I think about 

a plot if you will, a tank if you will, earthen tank or whatever, but 

also some of them are put in rivers and considered fish farms, and 

there is not too much care about what goes into the river. That is 

a concern. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

panel. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kissell? 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel. I had 

asked the first panel this question, and I want to ask you all the 

same thing. Of all the concerns about food safety, whether it be in 

the fields, processing, imports, pesticides, regulation, lack of regulation, whatever, what are your top two concerns about food safety 

and why? 

Dr. MURANO. I can start. I will mention one, for example, that 

bothered me when I was at USDA as Under Secretary. What happens when you consider meat and poultry, once it is in the retail 

store and a butcher can grind product, co-mingle it, there are certain jurisdictions that end right there at the retail level, and you 

have the local health department that takes over. And I will tell 

you just from the experience that we had that there would be times 

that there would be outbreaks for example, foodborne illness, that 

it would have been a lot better to have prevented than if we had 

had some control, some way to control things at the retail level. 

Things can kind of get out of control at that point in terms of comingling of products. When we tried to identify, for example, from 

where was the outbreak originating, what product, we would find 

many times that a product was ground at the retail store from 

many different suppliers. That is what made the recalls as large 

as they were because we could never pinpoint it necessarily to one 

plant, in some cases. So that is one area that I think it would be 

nice to have more oversight, whether it is FDA or somebody else, 

have a little bit more oversight. 

And I will just end by saying the fruit and vegetable arena is one 

that is always a challenge because you have products that are 

grown outside, out of doors, with birds flying overhead and contaminating product that is so closely tied to the soil. Anything that 

we can do to try to put interventions that will decontaminate those 

products before they get to the consumer, we can go a long way because so many people want to have fresh produce, salads, and 

healthy foods like that. Without the processing that can eliminate 

those microorganisms, the risk is always going to be there, be it tomatoes, peppers, whatever it may be. 

Mr. TAYLOR. From my standpoint by far the highest priority food 

safety reform issue is FDA, and it is shifting FDA’s paradigm from 

a reaction paradigm to prevention paradigm. That means very specifically a statutory mandate for FDA to require that all companies 

producing food for the commercial marketplace use modern preventive controls suitable to their operations, and that FDA have the 

mandated authority to set and enforce standards to ensure the adequacy of those controls. It sort of boils down to that. 

If you look at the various bills pending, most of them embody 

those and have a lot of the provisions that are necessary to make 

68

that happen, whether it is enforcement tools or inspection mandates or whatever. But that is the core as it shifts from a reactive 

paradigm to a preventive one and the ability to set standards and 

hold companies accountable for prevention. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. I agree with Mike Taylor on that, and 

second to that would be to modernize the Meat and Poultry Inspection Acts to have the same kind of authority to have enforceable 

standards as recommended by the National Academy of Sciences in 

2003. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, panel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from 

California. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. TuckerForeman, you have, I believe, made the statement and others that 

additional information is needed under the FSIS effort to fully implement what I refer to as a risk-based, risk assessment effort that 

uses FSIS. In your view, what data do we need to continue to pull 

through, especially as we are looking at the area of fresh fruits and 

vegetables? 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. Congressman, you have asked me about 

FSIS. I think you meant to ask me about FDA. FSIS doesn’t regulate——

Mr. COSTA. Yes, but under the FDA, what data would they require? I am sorry, I misspoke. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. I am not sure I have said it about FDA. 

At FSIS, we are very concerned that there is not adequate data to 

move ahead with a public health-based poultry slaughter system 

which they have proposed. With regard to fresh fruits and vegetables, what we think is appropriate is to require operations to set 

up process controls similar to HACCP. They can be HACCP. Those 

process controls can be as simple as the product and the operation 

underway at a particular location, or as complicated as those are 

to show that there is a mechanism for assuring food safety. Then, 

those need to be based on Federal health standards, public health 

standards. Does that answer your question? I am not sure that 

I——

Mr. COSTA. The pay-for would be the same methodology that you 

spoke in a response to my colleague who asked whether it would 

be a fee, I think. I am trying to remember the response you gave 

to him in terms of how you pay for this additional inspection program. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. And I am glad Mr. Lucas is here because 

in responding to his question, I did not factor in the most important element I believe which is that if each company is required to 

establish a process control system, then you can allocate your resources according to the adequacy of process control. I am assuming that nobody would be inspected on a daily basis under such a 

system. 

Mr. COSTA. What are best science practices? And we had the 

analogy earlier going back to the book, The Jungle, and the inspection under USDA of each carcass on beef. But don’t you think the 

scientific progress that has been made over almost now a century, 

in terms of best management practices, best science, that a random 

69

methodology can really reduce the—so you can ensure the detection 

effort? 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. I believe we are talking here about what 

I am calling process controls, but companies establish HACCP 

plans to identify all the places in their operation where something 

might go wrong, and then identify the steps that they need to take 

to prevent that from happening. But——

Mr. COSTA. Go ahead. I just want to get my time. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN.—that has to be in our view calibrated to 

what Federal public health standards are. Otherwise, every company would set up their——

Mr. COSTA. Yes, I understand a national standard, a uniform 

standard. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTA. My bill has that. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. Yes, it does. 

Mr. COSTA. That is not the discussion. That is not my question 

anyway. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. Okay. 

Mr. COSTA. The point I am trying to raise is at some point, I 

mean, the standards for clean water, for example, what is detectable. And it was every part per million, and that is what was detectable. Now every parts per billion and that is what is detectable. 

Now, we are able to determine every parts per trillion, and when 

you have the limited dollars for health safety and health protection 

to get your best bang for your buck, I don’t think because the 

threshold because of the amazing ability of science to continue to 

improve our ability, in this case for detection. That when you are 

doing risk assessment versus risk management that we ought to be 

going out trying to trace very trillionth level of element that might 

be a carcinogen, for example. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. I think there is a difference between 

pathogens and chemical contamination. 

Mr. COSTA. No, I know there is. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. They don’t grow those chemicals. 

Mr. COSTA. Correct, but the concept is the same in terms of trying to get the best bang for your dollar in terms of risk assessment 

versus risk management. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. We call that a risk-based system where 

you allocate your resources where there is the greatest risk, yes, 

sir. 

Mr. COSTA. And you support that? 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. I do. 

Mr. COSTA. Mr. Taylor, you are anxious to—my time is out. I 

don’t know how you want to——

Mr. TAYLOR. Just real briefly. In thinking about produce safety 

standards and what science is needed, we do need to get very specifically to the level of, for example, what is the appropriate microbial quality of the water that you use for irrigation in a tomatogrowing operation. 

Mr. COSTA. Right. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And you are right. I mean, you have to look at that 

from the standpoint of its contribution to a system, all the controls 

that are in place, and what the finished result is. It is not a matter 

70

of chasing zero in terms of microbial content of the water, it is looking at it in a system way. 

The point I want to make though is that one of the weaknesses 

in our system is that FDA, which is the agency responsible for developing those standards, has never been given among the mandates they have, they are not precluded from research but they 

have no mandate to do research and provide leadership to get that 

practical applied research. So again, this whole shift to a risk-based 

system does require equipping our regulatory agencies with the scientific tools to get this right from a public health standpoint. 

Mr. COSTA. Dr. Murano, did you want to comment? 

Dr. MURANO. Just very briefly, sir. As a microbiologist, I will tell 

you that the best way to control contaminates, hopefully even 

eliminate them, is to first know what the risk is. What are the contaminants likely to be found, where are they introduced along the 

line, and then you can start to intervene and put steps in the process to intervene. So risk assessment, you are absolutely right. That 

is exactly at the crux of the matter but not to have a zero risk because I think we all——

Mr. COSTA. That is impossible. 

Dr. MURANO. That is impossible. 

Mr. COSTA. You will never achieve it. 

Dr. MURANO. And risk assessment ties, not only the likelihood of 

the presence but the likelihood of someone getting ill and with all 

of the——

Mr. COSTA. It is the difference of preventive health maintenance 

versus the FDA which I would liken to the emergency room physician. 

Dr. MURANO. Exactly. 

Mr. COSTA. I mean, the way the FDA works today——

Dr. MURANO. It is a little late. 

Mr. COSTA.—I mean, the car wreck has happened already——

Dr. MURANO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTA.—or the person is already very sick and they may be 

in ICU and they are there. They are in the emergency room. 

Dr. MURANO. Correct. I agree. 

Mr. COSTA. There is a whole lot of stuff you could have done before they ever got there. 

Dr. MURANO. This is correct, and they do have good agricultural 

practices, GAPs, as guidelines for farmers to use, but they are really not enforced to be honest with you. It is up to each producer as 

we saw with the panelists who testified before us. 

Mr. COSTA. Well, if there is a second round there are a couple 

other questions I would like in this line, but thank you very much, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentleman from Iowa. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Just a comment, Mr. Chairman. I want to compliment you for assembling this panel of expertise today. The trip 

we went on, Pete was there, Mr. Lucas, from your staff and made 

a great contribution, Chandler. I see Mr. Goule in the back of the 

room. I won’t call him out because he was on FSIS, and we know 

some things that we probably ought to talk about. And with the expertise of these folks to work for this, we may want to huddle and 

71

talk some. And if everything is okay, we will leave it alone. If it 

is not, maybe we ought to do something about it. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you and we need to get some of 

these trade people in here and straighten them out. That is part 

of the problem with all this stuff in my opinion. I just wanted to, 

if I could, ask a question. 

You know, it seems to me that these companies that are in this 

business that have developed brand names, they have put a lot of 

money into developing brands and so forth—and I may be getting 

off field here—they seem to me to be more focused or concerned on 

this than people that don’t have that situation because if they have 

a problem, it really hurts them. So they have a very good motivating influence to make sure that whatever they are doing is not 

a problem. And it seems like with a lot of these things that crop 

up, it is some little company that doesn’t have a brand name that 

is in the middle of all of this that nobody ever heard of. Is that 

something that is taken into consideration when you are looking at 

risk in terms of—not scientific, but it does have a big influence or 

at least in my mind—and I would like to know what you think 

about that. 

Dr. MURANO. If I may, Mr. Chairman, very quickly I will give 

you a very good example of that being so true. The companies, the 

small companies, that don’t have a recognizable brand that supply 

to bigger meat and poultry companies, sometimes, were the cause 

of the problems in meat contamination. And so when we order the 

reassessments of HACCP plans, one of the things that we required 

is that these plants would have to verify from their suppliers that 

things were done right. So, when you start to put the burden on 

the companies that want to protect their brand, it is in their best 

interest for many reasons, public health reasons, their bottom line 

as well, to do the right thing. It kind of goes downstream and they 

start requiring it of their suppliers that may not be as accountable 

as those big companies are. 

The CHAIRMAN. But we as a government, do you think we should 

inspect those people more? 

Dr. MURANO. And we do, and that is exactly right. At FSIS, that 

is what we started to discover is that we needed to go to those companies that maybe were falling through the cracks, if you will, that 

were not being monitored as robustly as they should have been, 

that they themselves maybe didn’t have the expertise. We found 

that out with Listeria. That was a big problem because a lot of 

mom and pop operations producing deli meats were the cause of 

outbreaks. And so we started to target those companies more 

through our new cadre of inspectors that were doing the more thorough analysis. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, it looks like you wanted to——

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, I guess I hesitate to make it a big company/

small company issue. I think the fact is that there are different 

business incentives for companies to put extra effort into food safety, and brands are very much one of those factors. A lot of small 

businesses do fantastic job on food safety as well. I think there is 

a much bigger point here, though, suggested by your question is 

that innovation on food safety has typically come from the private 

sector, from leaders in the industry who have incentives to do 

72

more. Certainly when we were trying to put the HACCP system in 

place following the Jack in the Box outbreak in the early 1990s, 

McDonald’s was driving progress, Jack in the Box was driving 

progress through their systems way faster than we were able to do 

it. And there are big retailers today who have specifications, supply 

chain management techniques, traceability systems that really represent best practices, and government needs to learn from those. 

To figure out how you set—create a level playing field that is workable across an industry that elevates all of the players to a level 

that meets public expectations with those industry best practices 

leadership really providing a lot of input into where standards 

should go. 

Ms. TUCKER-FOREMAN. If I could add just one thing to that, I absolutely agree that the brand name is desperately important and 

people protect it, but they have to have some help. The Chief Executive Officer at Kellogg testified that it cost his company $65 to 

$70 million to recall the peanut products that were contaminated 

by peanuts from Peanut Corporation of America. And they had supply chain management. They paid a certifier to go in and certify 

that plant, but the certifier kind of went in and looked around, 

didn’t check it very well, and the company was able to hide records 

because there was no food/drug law that said you can’t do that and 

you have to provide them to inspectors from Georgia and FDA. 

So there is always going to be somebody who tries to get around 

the best system, but systems get set up assuming, just like the cop 

on the beat, that somebody will not play by the rules and you want 

to reduce their window for not playing by the rules to the smallest 

one that is possible. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I don’t know, we have one more 

panel. Everybody is not completed. I guess we will dismiss this 

panel. Dr. Murano, Mr. Ralph Hall is waiting back there for you. 

He has been patient. Welcome to the Committee, Ralph. 

So thank you very much to this panel, and thank you for being 

with us and being so patient. It was very helpful. 

We will call the next panel, which we apologize to for making you 

sit through this whole ordeal here today, but I would encourage the 

Members that are here to stay and listen to this. They have done 

some good thinking, and they have some ideas that should be considered by the Committee. And from my home State of Minnesota, 

which has been one of the leaders in ferreting out a lot of these 

issues, we are very proud of our people there that have done some 

outstanding work in some of these food safety issues. So we welcome to the Committee from the SUPERVALU Corporation in Minnesota, Dr. Hanlin who is their food safety person. I don’t know exactly what your title is, he has been at a number of other companies and he is accompanied by Mike Erlandson who a lot of you 

may know used to be Mr. Sabo’s Chief of Staff. So welcome to the 

Committee, and thank you for your patience and sitting through all 

of this until we got here. You are recognized, Dr. Hanlin. 

73

STATEMENT OF JOHN H. HANLIN, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT 

FOOD SAFETY, SUPERVALU INC., EDEN PRAIRIE, MN;

ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL S. ERLANDSON, VICE

PRESIDENT GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, SUPERVALU INC. 

Dr. HANLIN. Good afternoon, Chairman Peterson, Ranking Member Lucas, Committee Members, ladies and gentlemen. My name is 

John Hanlin, I am the Vice President of Food Safety at 

SUPERVALU. We are one of the largest grocery chains in the 

United States, and I refer you to figure 1 of the packet that I hope 

you have in front of you that will tell you a little bit more about 

who we are. 

We are based in Minnesota. We operate over 2,500 retail stores, 

35 distribution centers and employ over 190,000 people. Many of 

you may know us better by the banners under which we operate, 

and these include ACME and Shaw’s in the Northeast, Jewel/Osco, 

Cub Foods, Albertson’s on the West Coast, and others. 

I am joined this afternoon by Mike Erlandson. Mike is 

SUPERVALU’s Vice President for Government Affairs, and we 

bring a unique perspective to the national discussion on improving 

the safety of our nation’s food supply. I have almost 25 years’ experience working in the food safety area on both the manufacturing 

and the retail aspects of the business. And prior to joining 

SUPERVALU, I worked for companies that included Campbell 

Soup, The Pillsbury Company and General Mills. Mr. Erlandson 

spent 20 years working here in the nation’s Capitol as Chief of 

Staff to former U.S. Congressman Martin Sabo from Minnesota. 

As one of the largest grocery store chains, we find ourselves removing products from our shelves and our DCs almost daily due to 

food safety issues reported to us by the USDA, FDA and food manufacturers. Consumers are losing confidence in the food supply. 

Equally important is the fact we have entered a new age of food 

safety. The same bacteria that were traditionally associated with 

beef, poultry, eggs and pork are contaminating raw agricultural 

commodities, and people are getting sick. 

Several of the largest outbreaks of E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella in recent memory have been associated with fruits and 

vegetables. For example, the spinach out break of 2006, last summer’s Salmonella outbreak due to jalapen ̃ o peppers and possibly tomatoes and most recently peanut butter. 

If you refer to figure 2 in your handouts, as you well know, both 

USDA, on the right hand of the slide, and FDA lead our food safety 

inspections systems. USDA has primary responsibility for meat, 

poultry and eggs products, while FDA has jurisdictional responsibility over everything else. 

In the past, this made sense given the historical association of 

foodborne illness with animals and poultry, a diet different than today’s and a simpler supply chain. But currently inspection of meat 

and poultry and its products is not always clear-cut. On figure 2

about halfway down you will notice several arrows going from right 

to left. Under some circumstances, meat, poultry and egg products 

move from USDA inspection to FDA jurisdiction depending upon 

how the item is manipulated further down the manufacturing or 

the supply chain. 

74

For example, in figure 3 we show a frozen breakfast entre ́e comprising a sandwich with two side items. This product is under inspection of the USDA, and you will see that mark of inspection on 

left-hand side. However, a breakfast sandwich-only product, as 

shown in figure 4, is not under the inspection of the USDA. Similarly, in figure 5 you see a steak Panini-style product. This product 

is fully enrobed by bread and is under USDA inspection; however 

in figure 6 a similar steak Panini-style sandwich that looks more 

like a sandwich is not under USDA inspection. And finally, in figure 7, these cheeseburger sandwiches are not required to be inspected by the USDA nor do they bear the USDA mark of inspection. 

We show these slides to highlight the fact that all of these products generally carry the same relatively low food safety risk, yet 

the inspection requirements vary differently. I will come back to 

this notion of risk-based inspections in a moment as we offer some 

ideas on new approaches to risk-based inspections and a re-deployment of resources that we have today. 

We need to modernize our food safety inspection and enforcement 

system. Consumers are changing their dietary habits. They are listening to the messages about the importance of increased consumption of fruit and produce. And as I said, organisms traditionally associated with animals and birds can contaminate fruit and produce 

and make people sick. 

Our supply chain grows in complexity. A few lots of a raw agricultural commodities when used as an ingredient in other products 

can contaminate hundreds of products representing millions of 

pounds of food. Given all of these converging factors, we propose a 

refocus and re-alignment of the current Federal food safety inspection systems. Specifically we propose taking the successful riskbased USDA surveillance, inspection and enforcement model that 

has helped reduce the incidence of Salmonella in poultry, and has 

highlighted the challenges with reducing E. coli in ground beef, 

and expanding that risk-based inspection model to other agricultural commodities like spinach and other leafy greens, tomatoes, 

fresh fruits, peanuts, grains and other raw agricultural commodities. This is shown in figure 8. In other words expand USDA’s 

risk-based inspection system to include commodities that today receive minimal inspection due to budget challenges at FDA. 

What we propose in figure 8 is to focus USDA risk-based efforts 

against improving the safety of all commodities, particularly those 

commodities that are consumed in the raw state, or those that are 

cooked or pasteurized and eaten without a further microbial step. 

We believe an approach like this—pushing food safety upstream in 

the supply chain, that will help all of us. It will do three things. 

It will reduce overall public exposure to pathogens, thereby improving food safety; it will provide greatest synergies in the implementation of good agricultural practices; and we believe it will 

strengthen international competitiveness of U.S. agriculture. 

As I close here, I would like to go back for a minute and talk 

about redeployment of resources. This type of model would enable 

the agency to deploy resources against the greatest food safety 

risks. Imagine for a moment being able to redeploy the FTE resource currently inspecting a facility making frozen sandwiches as 

75

an entre ́e and re-training that inspector to inspect and be in a peanut facility every day, or perhaps inspecting and surveilling and 

sampling a spinach farm just prior to harvest. We believe the proposed model would work if we, as a nation, create a single food 

agency or whether we maintain dual jurisdictional responsibilities 

within USDA and FDA. 

In a dual role we would envision FDA providing the food safety 

leadership further down the supply chain, for example, in the manufacture of frozen pizza, entre ́es, canned soup, broths, sauces, 

snacks, and other packaged products. 

In closing we understand where our food safety risks are. We 

must look beyond the current meat and poultry divide and focus on 

food safety systems across all categories of commodities using a 

risk-based approach. There is nothing more important than safe 

food to those of us in the food business and all of us as consumers. 

Mr. Erlandson and I look forward to further discussions, and all 

of us at SUPERVALU look forward to working with you to ensure 

that we prevent foodborne illness. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hanlin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN H. HANLIN, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOOD SAFETY, 

SUPERVALU INC., EDEN PRAIRIE, MN 

JOHN H. HANLIN, PH.D.—Vice President Food Safety, SUPERVALU INC.

MICHAEL S. ERLANDSON—Vice President Government Affairs, SUPERVALU INC.

Good morning Chairman Peterson, Committee Members, ladies and gentlemen,

My name is John Hanlin, I am the Vice President of Food Safety at SUPERVALU. 

We are one of the largest grocery chains in the United States. I refer you to figure 

1 of your packet. We are headquartered in Minnesota and operate over 2,500 retail 

stores, 35 distributions centers and employ over 190,000 people. Many of you may 

know us better by the banners under which we operate. These include ACME and 

Shaw’s in the Northeast, Jewel/Osco in the Chicago area, Cub Foods in Minnesota, 

Albertson on the West Coast, Save-A-Lot nationally and several others. 

I am joined this morning by Mike Erlandson, SUPERVALU’s Vice President for 

Government Affairs. We bring a unique perspective to the national discussion on improving the safety of our nation’s food supply. I have almost 25 years experience 

working in the food safety area on both the manufacturing and retail aspects of the 

business. Prior to joining SUPERVALU, I worked for companies that included, 

Campbell Soup Company, The Pillsbury Company and General Mills. Mr. Erlandson 

spent 20 years working here in the nation’s Capitol as Chief of Staff to former U.S. 

Congressman Martin Sabo from Minnesota. 

As one of the largest grocery store chains, we must remove products from our 

shelves and our DC’s almost daily due to food safety issues reported to us by USDA, 

FDA and food manufacturers. Consumers are losing confidence in our food supply 

and this has been highlighted in several public opinion surveys of recent. 

We have entered a new age of food safety. Scientific advances in the fields of epidemiology, DNA fingerprinting of pathogens and good laboratory practices, are 

showing that the same bacteria that were traditionally associated with beef, poultry, 

eggs and pork are contaminating raw agricultural commodities. Several of the largest outbreaks of E. coli O157:H7 and salmonellosis in recent memory have been associated with fruits and vegetables, e.g., spinach, last summer’s outbreak due to 

jalapen ̃ o peppers and possibly tomatoes and most recently peanut butter. 

If you refer to figure 2, as you well know, both USDA (right hand side) and FDA 

(left hand side) lead our food safety inspections systems. USDA has primary responsibility for meat, poultry and eggs products, while FDA has jurisdictional responsibility over everything else we eat. 

In the past, this made sense given the historical association of foodborne illness 

with animals and poultry, a diet different than today’s and a simpler supply chain. 

Currently inspection of meat and poultry is not always clear cut and sometimes a 

meat and poultry containing product is under FDA jurisdiction, not USDA inspection. 

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On figure 2, you’ll notice several arrows going from right to left. Under some circumstances, meat, poultry and egg products move from USDA inspection to FDA jurisdiction depending on how the item is manipulated further down the manufacturing chain. 

Figure 3 shows a frozen breakfast entre ́e comprising a sandwich with two side 

items. This product is under inspection of the USDA (mark of inspection on left 

hand side). However, a breakfast sandwich-only product (figure 4) is not under the 

inspection of the USDA. In figure 5 you see a steak Panini-style product. This product is fully enrobed by bread and is under USDA inspection; however in Figure 6

a similar steak Panini-style product more in line with a sandwich is not under 

USDA inspection. 

Similarly in Figure 7, these cheeseburger sandwiches are not required to be inspected by the USDA nor bear the USDA mark of inspection. We show these slides 

to highlight the fact that all of these products generally carry the same (relatively 

low) food safety risk yet the inspection requirements vary differently. I’ll come back 

to this notion of risk-based inspections in a moment as we offer some ideas on new 

approaches to risk-based inspection and a re-deployment of resources. 

We need to modernize our food safety inspection and enforcement system. Consumers are changing their dietary habits—they’re listening to the messages about 

the importance of increased consumption of fresh fruit and produce. Our scientists 

in government, at Universities, in industry and those working for consumer groups 

understand how organisms traditionally associated with animals and birds can contaminate fruit and produce and make people sick. 

Our supply chain grows in complexity—a few lots of a raw agricultural commodity 

when used as an ingredient in other products can contaminate hundreds of products 

representing millions of pounds of food. 

Given all of these converging factors, we propose a refocus and re-alignment of 

our current food safety inspection systems. Specifically we propose taking the successful risk-based USDA surveillance, inspection and enforcement model that has 

helped reduce the incidence salmonella in poultry and has highlighted the challenges associated with reducing E. coli O157:H7 in ground beef and expanding to 

other agricultural commodities like spinach, and other leafy greens, tomatoes, fresh 

fruits, peanuts, pistachios, grains and other raw agricultural commodities. This is 

shown in figure 8. In other words expand USDA’s risk-based inspection system to 

include commodities that today receive minimal inspection due to budget challenges 

at FDA. 

What we propose in Figure 8 is to focus USDA risk-based efforts against improving the safety of all food commodities, particularly those commodities that are consumed in the raw state or those that are cooked or pasteurized and eaten without 

a further microbial inactivation step, e.g., peanuts, almonds, cooked chicken. We believe an approach like this—pushing food safety upstream in the supply chain will:

1. reduce overall public exposure to pathogens and thereby improve food safety.

2. provide greatest synergies in the implementation of good agricultural practices.

3. strengthen international competitiveness of U.S. agriculture.

I’d like to go back for a minute and talk about redeployment of resources. This 

type of model would enable the agency to deploy resource against the greatest food 

safety risks. Imagine for a moment being able to redeploy the FTE resource currently inspecting a facility making a frozen, fully cooked, cheeseburger sandwich 

(figure 8) and re-training the Inspector to inspect a peanut facility or a spinach farm 

just prior to the harvest. 

We believe this proposed model would work if we, as a nation, create a single food 

agency or maintain dual jurisdictional responsibilities within USDA and FDA. In a 

dual role we would envision FDA providing the food safety leadership further down 

the supply chain, e.g., the manufacture of frozen pizza, entre ́es, canned soup, broths, 

sauces, snacks, seasonings, etc.

In closing we understand where our food safety risks are. We must look beyond 

the meat and poultry divide and focus on food safety systems across all categories 

of commodities using a risk-based approach. There is nothing more important than 

safe food to those of us in the food business and all of us as consumers. 

Mr. Erlandson and I look forward to further discussions and all of us at 

SUPERVALU look forward to working with you to ensure that we prevent foodborne 

illness. 

Thank you.

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony. I have 

tried to explain this to a couple other Members, and I found out 

that I didn’t know as much about this as I needed to. So what you 

are proposing is that we would extend what FSIS does across all 

the commodities at the farm level, and then through the processing 

plant. So that would be like a slaughter plant or in the case of 

produce where they wash the lettuce and put them into bags and 

so forth, is that where the cutoff would be with USDA? I guess I 

am not as familiar with fruits and vegetables. 

Dr. HANLIN. Yes, Chairman Peterson, that is fundamentally the 

concept that we are bringing to the Committee today as to where 

the bright light or the dividing line is. We believe that experts in 

government and academia and industry could really help flesh that 

out for different commodity groups. For example, perhaps USDA 

might have inspectional jurisdiction to the point where milk is pasteurized but then as milk goes to manufacturers who are making 

sour cream, cottage cheese, yogurt and other, more complex diary 

products, one could imagine perhaps that being a convenient split. 

With respect to bagged salad, we would suggest that if the product is being field cored and immediately packaged that that would 

stay with USDA. However, if the spinach or the lettuce or the leafy 

greens are being brought into a facility, they are being sliced, 

diced, chopped, shredded, and put into bags where the raw commodities are being significantly transformed, we feel that would be 

again another breakpoint. 

So it is really, where does that commodity substantially change 

its form? 

The CHAIRMAN. Then in the case of that, why would FDA be better at regulating that plant that cuts this lettuce up or whatever 

as opposed to USDA? What is the logic behind that? 

Dr. HANLIN. Well, sir, what we are trying to do is really try to 

provide a food safety framework that would work regardless of 

whether we, as a nation, go to a single agency or whether we feel 

that there is a role for both FSIS which really is the single agency 

within USDA or SFAN, if you will, the single food agency within 

FDA. So we wanted to try to provide a model that would work regardless of whether it is going to be a single agency or perhaps 

dual jurisdictions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have been in a couple of these, I guess 

you would call, processing plants for lettuce, and I would compare 

that kind of to a slaughter plant. I mean, they come in and they 

wash them and they run them through these lines, and it is kind 

of like what we do in a slaughter facility. So I don’t know why you 

wouldn’t have USDA. You know, there probably should be inspectors on the line there like they are on a meat inspection. I don’t 

know. 

But anyway, what you are saying to us is that you are not locked 

into this, you are just making some suggestions about how to——

Dr. HANLIN. Correct. We are not locking in to say this must be 

the bright light for fruit, this must be the bright light or the line 

if you will for produce. What we are offering up today, sir, is just 

the concept of taking the very successful programs that have occurred within USDA, FSIS, and rather than cutting the pie this 

way with the dividing line being meat and poultry, can we cut it 

84

another way and use the risk-based inspection, enforcement and 

surveillance programs that have worked for meat and poultry, and 

try to bring them over to other commodities that today are not inspected by the USDA for food safety. 

Mr. ERLANDSON. In the case of your example, Chairman Peterson, I think that processing plant for fruits and vegetables or lettuce would probably fall under FSIS or the single food agency that 

would be housed under the USDA. Again, you are expanding both 

the USDA and the FDA in food safety, and you have a logical dividing line where products are clearly closer to the farm and closer 

to that process versus packaged goods, so to speak, which falls into 

a different area. And, that you also get USDA focused on what it 

does best, and you add I would think a new level of educating the 

farmers in this country as our world becomes more complicated 

with foodborne illnesses, things growing up from the ground, et 

cetera. Do this with more of a focus on addressing all of the commodities at that level instead of having only some of the commodities as it is today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman from Oklahoma. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, would you, 

for a little background reinforcement educational process because 

of the magnitude of your operation, remind me of when FDA or 

USDA requests a recall? Take me quickly through the steps that 

are involved for you at the retail level. 

Dr. HANLIN. We would be happy to. We are only as good in terms 

of our recall function as the quality of the information that we receive through USDA, through FDA, and from the food manufacturers. We monitor all of the websites, we monitor all of the blogs, we 

have a good idea of what is happening out there, but once we get 

a formal communication from USDA, FDA or the manufacturer directly, they are calling us to say there is an issue, we then active 

our recall team. 

Our recall team then works directly with the supplier to understand what DCs or distribution centers did that product go into. So 

we need to know which DCs was the product shipped to and what 

is or are the UPC codes, the barcode numbers, for that product. 

And then once we have that information, which typically we can 

gather in a matter of minutes, 30, 40 minutes, we are then able 

to electronically execute a recall. And for a health hazard recall, we 

require that the product be removed from the shelves within a 3 

hour window. For a non-health hazard recall, we let it go longer 

But our focus is to get the product off of our shelves, out of our 

back rooms, out of our DCs quickly. What we also do is we also 

make sure that we are auditing our own shelves to determine that 

we have indeed removed the product from the shelves. 

Mr. LUCAS. In your experiences in dealing with recalls, I know 

there is no such thing as typical, but could you tell me, based on 

your experiences, how much product usually comes back from the 

customers? Because more often than not a certain amount of whatever it is has made its way out the door. 

Dr. HANLIN. Yes, sir. I can provide good information on what we 

are destroying at store level and at DC level. We would be very 

happy to follow up with you to try to understand how much prodVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:36 Sep 30, 2009 Jkt 041481 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 I:\DOCS\111-08\52483.TXT AGR1 PsN: BRIAN
85

uct is actually being returned by our shoppers. I don’t have that 

information in front of me, but we can follow up with you on that. 

Mr. ERLANDSON. And Congressman, I would add, on the recalls, 

in the case of just the pistachio situation, the retailers are pulling 

the product that is being targeted off the shelves as fast as they 

can because as many people have said today, there is nothing more 

important than food safety to those of us in the food business. And 

what becomes so important there is that as the investigation goes 

forward, that the people investigating the product, whether that be 

the manufacturers or the government do so efficiently and quickly 

so that you don’t have products like in the case of tomatoes rotting 

on the shelves in the back or being destroyed when they certainly 

didn’t need to be destroyed. 

Mr. LUCAS. Exactly. Thank you for those insights. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman, from North Carolina, Mr. 

Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I was enjoying some of these peanuts. 

In the model that you are proposing, and the cutoff between 

FSIS and FDA, you talked about the bright light of where the divide should be, is any consideration given in your experiences to 

which side of those two agencies does a better job in terms of food 

safety? 

Dr. HANLIN. Well, the previous panel articulated the fundamental differences between the jurisdictional powers that USDA 

and FDA have. Our concept here is that with respect to the USDA 

regulations, that we have a model that is working. We have a 

model whereby the USDA, their programs, have really helped drive 

down the Salmonella rate in poultry. We respect that there are 

huge challenges, and they haven’t achieved the same quality of results with respect to E. coli O157:H7 in ground beef, but the methodology, the inspection, the surveillance, the enforcement, the 

training that USDA provides, the risk-based approach, which really 

has helped improve the safety of the meat and poultry products. 

And so our concept here is how do we take the ideas, the concepts, 

the risk-based method and try to apply it to categories that currently don’t see the same level of inspection. 

It is not a one-size-fits-all, and clearly the type of inspection for 

spinach and leafy greens, the way that they are processed and handled may be different for tomatoes, it may be different for apples. 

But again, that concept of reducing, eliminating, and preventing 

hazards using a risk-based approach we think is very powerful. 

Mr. KISSELL. You were also talking about when there is an alert 

that goes out, and the inspections that have to take place with 

what you have in the stores or in the supply chain or what is 

brought back to you. Is it consistent that the product is checked 

quickly or you might have insinuated, or maybe I just understood 

that perhaps there is a length of time there that we just don’t get 

the inspections done as quickly as we should. 

Dr. HANLIN. Could you describe what you mean by——

Mr. KISSELL. Well, once something has been defined as——

Mr. ERLANDSON. A recall? 

86

Mr. KISSELL. A recall, yes. And you halt the product, whatever 

it is in the supply chain stores, warehouses, and it comes back in 

maybe from customers, is that inspected quickly? I just got the insinuation perhaps that you thought that perhaps it didn’t get inspected as quickly as it should, and perhaps we didn’t get on top 

of it as quickly as we could. I mean, it may have just been something I picked up. 

Dr. HANLIN. At SUPERVALU, we execute recalls as quickly as 

we can with the best available information. It is all about protecting the consumer. And so we will execute recalls and pull product perhaps before we have all the information that we need. Sometimes we know if it is just going to be a couple more minutes while 

the supplier gives us the UPC, we will wait a couple more minutes. 

But again, we are ready to hit that recall button, but we want to 

make sure that we have accurate information. But it is very timesensitive. As soon as we execute that recall for products that are 

frozen or refrigerated, we will dump and destroy. We want to get 

them out of our system as quickly as possible and make sure they 

are unavailable to anyone in our shops or DCs. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Well, we have been 

called to vote, and the Members, like everybody else, have had 

about enough. But, you have brought some very interesting perspective to this debate, and it is a new way of thinking about how 

to approach this that has some merit. And I want to not only the 

Committee Members but others to be exposed to this as we go. I 

don’t know how many Members you have had a chance to talk to 

yet of the other Members but——

Mr. ERLANDSON. We have been working our way around, and it 

is quite well-received. It just takes a little while for people to wrap 

their arms around. So we appreciate that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I had a meeting yesterday with Ms. 

DeLauro for some time. Apparently you haven’t got to her yet, I 

guess. 

Mr. ERLANDSON. We have talked to her staff, but apparently they 

haven’t gotten to her yet. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. She wants to, if you get a chance, she 

would like to talk to you guys directly, too. So the more we can get 

all the different players that are involved in this, get as much information as we can, I think the better chance we have in coming 

up with the right solution. Clearly there is improvement that can 

be made in food safety, and that is what our Committee is about 

here. We are trying to do our part to make sure we get a safer food 

system and protect people as much as possible. And we appreciate 

very much your involvement and your addition to this process. 

Thank you for being with us, being so patient, and we will probably 

as we get down the line here, we will probably have you involved 

again in whatever we end up doing. 

Mr. ERLANDSON. We appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

87

SUBMITTED REPORT BY ANTHONY J. DIMARE, VICE PRESIDENT, DIMARE HOMESTEAD

INC., DIMARE RUSKIN INC., AND DIMARE JOHNS ISLAND INC.; MEMBER, BOARD OF

DIRECTORS, FLORIDA FRUIT & VEGETABLE ASSOCIATION; PRESIDENT, FLORIDA

TOMATO EXCHANGE; MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, UNITED FRESH PRODUCE

ASSOCIATION


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