Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1950–1955

The Intelligence

Community

1950–1955

Editors Douglas Keane

Michael Warner

General Editor Edward C. Keefer

United States Government Printing Off

Washington

2007
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 11441

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-
Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the 

documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisio

significant diplomatic activity of the United States Governme

Historian of the Department of State is charged with the resp

ity for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staf

Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the dire

the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, rese

compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of Stat

B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying speci

dards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on 

26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided 

ries through 1991. 

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorizati

which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 2

established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the 

Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Depart

State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.). 

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a th

accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign po

cisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The v

of the series should include all records needed to provide com

sive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and action

United States Government. The statute also confirms the editin

ciples established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations s

guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; 

should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in t

lished text that a deletion has been made; the published record 

omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decisi

nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a d

policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series 

lished not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The edi

convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and 

arly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series 

This volume is part of a retrospective subseries of volume

Foreign Relations series that fills in gaps in the volumes of the 

and Eisenhower subseries. At the time the Truman and Eisenhow

umes were prepared, the Office of the Historian did not have a

documents related to intelligence. This is the second volum

documents the institutional foundations of the relationship b
foreign policy and intelligence. The first, Foreign Relations, 194

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, was published 

This volume is a sequel, and it will be followed by a third volu

the same focus, covering the years 1956–1960. After 1960, the 

Relations volumes for the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon-Ford s

include a chapter on intelligence and foreign policy in their v

on the organization and management of foreign policy, thus n

the need for separate retrospective volumes. 

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relation

1950–1955, Development of the Intelligence Community

This volume is organized along chronological lines in o

chapter covering 1950–1955, and a second chapter that includes 

National Security Council Intelligence Directives of the period. 

ume documents the institutional growth of the intelligence com

during the first half of the 1950s. When Lt. General Walter Bede

took over as Director of Central Intelligence in October 1950

herited an agency that was widely believed to have been unab

tablish itself as the central institution of the U.S. intelligence 

nity. Utilizing his great prestige, and a national security directi

President Truman, Smith established the multiple directorate s

within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that has continue

day, brought the clandestine service into the CIA, and worke

fect greater inter-agency coordination through a strengthened 

to produce National Intelligence Estimates. The exponential gr

the national security establishment and of the intelligence com

was due to the impact of two factors: NSC 68 (a clarion call f

active containment of the Soviet Union) and the Korean War. T

tral Intelligence Agency was called upon to expand the clandes

vice, and the intelligence community was required to provid

and more definitive intelligence on the Soviet bloc and China

Allen Dulles took over as Director of Central Intelligence in F

1953, these pressures continued. By 1955, the general consensu

commissions appointed by President Eisenhower to review th

gence effort was that the clandestine service had grown too 

and was plagued by poor management. In general, the commis

plied that the clandestine service’s growth had come at the exp

the agency’s intelligence analysts. 

This volume presented the editors with documentary cha

The documents used to compile this volume were unique by 

Relations standards. Rather than documenting the formulation 

eign policy decisions or important diplomatic negotiations, t

ume is a record of high-level policy plans, discussions, admin

decisions, and managerial actions that transformed the inte

community from its somewhat shaky establishment into a com
that collected intelligence worldwide; provided extensive ana

that intelligence for policy makers; and carried out covert ope

as approved by the United States Government, on a global sca

intelligence community under President Eisenhower in 1955 

much more significant player and a more robust bureaucracy 

was under President Truman in the late 1940s. This volume doc

that growth and development. 

In preparing this volume, the editors sought to limit thei

tion of documents to those dealing with national intelligence 

nation, planning, and policies. The editors did not seek to do

the planning and implementation of specific intelligence operat

to document the impact of intelligence appraisals upon specific 

policy decisions or negotiations. Intelligence reports, estimat

analyses dealing with particular regions, countries, or issues h

been included. The important intelligence operations of the 

and Eisenhower years, missing in the coverage of Foreign R

for 1945–1960, are covered in other retrospective volumes. Th

Guatemala, 1952–1954, was published in 2003. Others will foll

The preparation of this volume raised special problems sinc

of the intelligence documents for 1950–1955 have been destro

were widely scattered in multiple archival holdings. Documen

hard to locate because of the shifting and rapid growth of var

telligence organizations. It became obvious that some importa

sions were probably reached without written records havin

made. Still, this volume presents an extensive collection of doc

that will go a long way to demonstrate the growth of the inte

community during the key period 1950–1955. That growth and 

opment was not without growing pains, as the documents rev

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to 

ington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according 

date and time of the conversation, rather than the date a memor

was drafted. Documents chosen for printing are authoritative or 

copies, unless otherwise noted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the For

lations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented b

ance from the General Editor. The documents are reproduced 

actly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, wh

described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed ac

to accepted conventions for the publication of historical doc

within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has be

plied by the editors for each document included in the v

Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as fo

the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are 
corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are c

by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an add

roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are 

in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as foun

original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the fron

of each volume. 

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text th

with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains class

ter declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, wh

sible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted 

cating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted

documents withheld for declassification purposes have been ac

for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of p

declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appea

original text are so identified in footnotes. With the exception 

dential recordings transcribed in the Office of the Historian by 

tor(s) of the volume, all ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the doc

source, original classification, distribution, and drafting infor

This note also provides the background of important docume

policies and indicates whether the President or his major po

visers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize p

material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of ad

documentary sources, provide references to important relate

ments printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provi

maries of and citations to public statements that supplement a

cidate the printed documents. Information derived from mem

other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to 

ment or explicate the official record. 

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rath

to page numbers. 

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation 

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Docu

tion, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews 

advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign R

series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilat

editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of th

ration and declassification of the series. The Advisory Commit

not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in th

but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attent

reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory an

tory obligations. 
Declassification Review 

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau 

ministration, conducted the declassification review for the Dep

of State of the documents published in this volume. The revi

conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Execu

der 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Infor

and other applicable laws. 

The principle guiding declassification review is to release 

formation, subject only to the current requirements of nation

rity, as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification d

entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functio

reaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of 

Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regardi

cific documents of those governments. The declassification re

this volume, which began in 2002 and was completed in 2006, r

in the decision to withhold 18 documents in full, excise a parag

more in 28 documents, and make minor excisions of less than 

graph in 35 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the r

conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the de

cation review process described above, that notwithstanding th

ber of denied and excised documents, the record presented in t

ume presented here provides an accurate and comprehensive 

the development of the intelligence community, 1950–1955. 

Acknowledgments 

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials 

tional Archives and Records Administration for their assistance 

viding access to documents at the Truman and Eisenhower Pr

tial Libraries. David Haight at the Eisenhower Library was part

helpful. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Inte

was extremely cooperative in assisting the editors in collecting r

documents from Central Intelligence Agency files. Michael 

then Deputy Historian of the History Staff, was so instrumenta

production of this volume that he is listed as a co-editor. Special 

to David Hatcher, Historian at the National Security Agency, 

historian at the Defense Intelligence Agency, who provided adv

key documents from their agencies. 

The retrospective volumes on the organization and devel

of the intelligence community during the Truman and Eise

years was the brainchild of Neal Petersen, a long time editor of 

Relations and an expert on intelligence history. Petersen retire

the Office of the Historian before the first volume on the Estab

of the Intelligence Community was published in 1996, but the id
basic concept was his. Douglas Keene and Michael Warner selec

annotated this volume under the supervision of David S. Pa

then General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. The current 

Editor, Edward C. Keefer, oversaw the final revisions and pro

of the volume. Susan Weetman and Dean Weatherhead coordin

declassification of the volume and, with Edward Keefer and Re

ings, prepared extensive declassification appeals which resulte

nificantly more documentation being released. Florence Seg

Carl Ashley did the copy and technical editing. Caroline Sapp 

and updated the name list. Juniee Oneida prepared the index

Bureau of Public Affairs Marc J

December 2007 The H
Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Abbreviations and Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

Organization of U.S. Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NSCIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Sources

In keeping with the statutory requirement of the Foreign R

series, the editors have complete access to all the retired reco

papers of the Department of State: the decimal central files; the 

decentralized files (“lot files”) at the bureau, office, and divis

els; and the files of the Executive Secretariat. Virtually all the 

ment’s files have been permanently transferred to the N

Archives and Records Administration at College Park, M

(Archives II). All of these files, which the exception of the INR

torical files, and the administrative lot file that was later destroy

open for research at the National Archives.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full a

the papers of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, and other 

House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained a

served at the Truman and Eisenhower libraries include signifi

telligence documentation from the Department of State and oth

eral agencies including the National Security Council, the 

Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint 

of Staff. 

The editors also have full access to the files of the Central 

gence Agency still in the possession of the Agency as well as to 

transferred from the Agency to the National Archives. The Cen

telligence Agency files were crucial to the preparation of this 

and they will be discussed below.

Since this volume focuses on the development of intelligen

not foreign policy and foreign relations, its sources are consi

different from most other Foreign Relations volumes. The decim

tral files used for this volume are mainly intelligence-related

flected in the annotated source list below. The volume relies 

on the retired files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (

the Department of State. The most useful lot file was Lot 58 

covering INR’s work from 1945–1960. INR lot files subsequent

been consolidated at the National Archives, but Lot 58 D 776 p

core documentation for that consolidated file. The files of the 

Planning Staff (S/P) of the Department of State also proved ver

able, especially S/P Files, Lot 64 D 563 and S/P–NSC Files, L

1, both of which had key material on psychological warfare 

Psychological Strategy Board. The lot files of the Executive Sec

(S/S) of the Department of State were also very useful, part

S/S–NSC, Lot 62 D 333, which contains the minutes and rela

pers of the Psychological Strategy Board, 1951–1953. Also of va
S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, the basic master files of the Depar

NSC records for 1947–1961 and S/S–NSC Files, Lot 66 D and S

Files, Lot 66 D 95, which both contain miscellaneous NSC 

with the latter containing NSC records of actions and some N

Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs). Finally, the 

Historical Files have documentation on the preparation and 

ing of NSC 10 series, the papers establishing and refining re

bilities for covert operations. All lots mentioned above, with 

ception of the INR/IL Historical Files, are available at the N

Archives.

The best Central Intelligence Agency files listed are thos

Executive Registry, the Directorate of Operations, and the Histo

They are of equal importance to the Department of State lot fi

History Staff files require special explanation. The History Staf

tion, maintained by the History Staff in the Center for the Stud

telligence, contains documents selected over time by personn

various components of the Agency as having significant historic

and transferred to the physical custody of the History Staff to 

their continued availability as part of the historical record. Doc

in the historical collection tend to vary widely in nature and 

and usually provide only a partial record, but they are nonet

major resource and have been widely used in the preparation 

volume.

The Central Intelligence Agency files from the Executive R

the various directorates, and the Intelligence Community Mana

Staff, have a more direct provenance. The Executive Registry 

the official records of the Director of Central Intelligence and a

fore crucial. The files of the Directorate of Operation were equa

able, while the files of the Directorate of Intelligence and Dir

of Science and Technology, and the Community Management St

important, but not to the standard of the Executive Registry, 

Staff files, or the Operations files. 

The editors did not do research in the massive files of 

tional Security Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency, but 

relied upon the historians at those agencies to make available k

uments upon request or recommendation. At the National A

research in Record Group 218, the Records of the Joint Chiefs 

provided a few key documents. Record Group 263, the Centr

ligence Agency Files at the National Archives also fell into th

category. At the time the research for this volume was done, 

contained basically sources made available to Thomas Troy fo

preparation of his book on the founding of the Agency, dec

National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intellige

timates, and declassified article from the Agency in-house 
Studies in Intelligence. Since the research for this volume was 

taken, the Central Intelligence Agency has transferred more rec

the National Archives and made others available on its web

nally, Record Group 273, the records of the National Security C

contains some key NSC policy papers, official minutes of NSC 

ings, and NSCIDs. 

Research at the Truman and Eisenhower presidential librar

vided important documents, but certainly not to the magnitud

portance as the records of the Department of State or Central 

gence Agency. At the Truman Library in the Papers of the Pr

the President’s Secretary’s File was the most important, fo

closely by the Subject File with documents on organizing cove

ation and copies of NSCIDs. At the Eisenhower Library the b

were the Whitman File (records kept by Eisenhower’s persona

ant Ann Whitman), the Staff Secretary Records, and the Record

President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Two published works are worthy of consideration as 

points or research. The first is Michael Warner, editor, The CIA C

Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, which reproduces in facsim

mat 81 documents covering 1945–1953, some of which are al

duced in this volume. The other book is Ludwell Monatgue, 

Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, Octobe

February 1953, originally a classified five volume CIA study of th

name, but published in declassified form as a monograph by P

vania State University Press. Montague was both a participant 

observer of the events of which he writes and supplemented h

recollections by research in CIA records and by extensive interv

and correspondence with other key participants. 

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and 

Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Arc

Records Administration below.

A/MS Files: Lot 54 D 291 

Consolidated administrative files of the Department of State for 1949

maintained by the Management Staff of the Bureau of Administration (sub

destroyed and not transferred to the National Archives). 

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and 
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Mar

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Decimal Central Files, 1950-1955

100.4/PSB: Psychological Strategy Board

101.2: National Security Council

101.21: Central Intelligence Agency

103.11: U.S. federal agencies of non-Cabinet rank

103.1102: personnel of U.S. federal agencies of non-Cabinet rank

114.3: unauthorized or improper publication

120.201: workloads of diplomatic and consular representation 

511.00: U.S. psychological warfare

611.00: U.S. international relations 

611.61: U.S. relations with the Soviet Union

700.5411: U.S. overflights

711.5: U.S. national defense

711.52: U.S. intelligence activities

711.5200: U.S. intelligence activities

711.5261: U.S. intelligence activities in the Soviet Union

794.0221: Japanese occupied territory

Lot Files

Administration Files: Lot 62 D 220

Top Secret records of the Bureau of Administration dealing with int

relations from 1948–1961

INR Files: Lot 58 D 528

Miscellaneous Top Secret files for the years 1949–1954 as retired by the 

Intelligence and Research, including master files of Intelligence Estimates 

by the Department of States Estimates Group

INR Files: Lot 58 D 776 (INR Lots 61 D 67 and 62 D 42 subsequently combined 

lot file) 

Subject files for 1945–1960, as maintained by the Office of the Special A

the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, which includes infor

the birth of the intelligence organization in the Department of State and 

of the national intelligence structure

INR Files: Lot 59 D 27

Miscellaneous files for the years 1948–1954, including master file of minu

Intelligence Advisory Committee

INR Files, Lot 78 D 394

Files relating to National Intelligence Estimates and Special Intelligence E

Policy Planning Staff Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts an

correspondence for 1957–1961

S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, an

correspondence for 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff
S/S–NSC OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coo

Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council docum

correspondence for the years 1948–1961 maintained by the Policy Plannin

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333

Master file of minutes and papers of the Psychological Strategy Board for 

1951–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master file of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953

maintained by the Executive Secretariat

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspond

related Department of State memoranda for 1947–1961, as maintaine

Executive Secretariat

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148

Miscellaneous files concerning subjects considered by the National Securit

during 1949–1962, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council docum

including NSC Records of Action for 1947–1963, as maintained by the 

Secretariat

P Files: Lot 52 D 432

Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Edward W. Barrett f

P Files: Lot 55 D 339

Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1951–1952

S/S–RD Files

Files of restricted data materials maintained by the Executive Secretariat

Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf

Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency

Background documents from various sources made available to Thomas Troy i

tion with the preparation of his book on the founding of the Central Intelligenc

Collection of NIE’s, SNIE’s and SE’s

Declassified articles from Studies in Intelligence, a CIA publication

Record Group 273, Records of the National Security Council

Official NSC meeting minutes file

Records of the NSC Representative for Internal Security

Record set of NSC policy papers
Record Group 306

USIA Files, Lot 63 A 190, Files of the U.S. Information Agency 

Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency

Special Research History Files

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Radford Papers

National Security Council

Operations Coordination Board Records of Project Approvals

Central Intelligence Agency

Directorate for Intelligence files

Job 80–R01440R

Directorate for Operations files

Job 78–04513R

Job 78–05091A

Job 79–01228A

Job 80–01795R

Job 84–B00389R

Directorate for Science and Technology files

Job 83–02415A

Community Management Staff files

Job 82–00400R

Executive Registry files

Files of the Directors of Central Intelligence

Job 80–R01731R

Job 83–01034R

Job 85–500362R

Job 86–T00268R

Job 86–B00269R

Job 95–G00278R

History Staff files

Documents from various components of the Agency transferred to the c

the History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence

Job 83–00036R

Job 83–00764R

Job 83–01034R

Job 84–00022R

Job 84–00161R

Job 84–T00286R

Job 84–T00389R
Defense Intelligence Agency

Records made available by the Defense Intelligence Agency Historian

National Security Agency

Records held by or obtained through the Center for Cryptologic History, Nati

Security Agency

Records of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Records of the meetings, reports and miscellaneous papers of the President’s 

Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities and, its successor, the Preside

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Truman Library, Independence, Missouri

President’s Secretary’s Files

Subject File

Official File

Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959

Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1

maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File 

the Name Series, the Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitma

Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabin

Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series

International File

Eisenhower Records

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, inclu

daily appointment book of the President

Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities

Project “Clean Up”

Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and A

Goodpaster, 1953–1961

Staff Secretary Records

Records of the office of the Staff Secretary, 1952–1961

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records

Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Records

Published Sources

Benson, Robert L., and Michael Warner, eds., Venona: Soviet Espionage and the 

Response, 1939–1957. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996
Montague, Ludwell Lee. General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intell

tober 1950–February 1953. University Park: The Pennsylvania State Univer

1992.

Pedlow, Gregory W., and Donald E. Welzenbach. The CIA and the U–2 Program, 1

Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency.

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presid

United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, 1951, 1952–1953. Washington, D.C.: Go

Printing Office, 1965–1966.

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presid

United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, 1954, 1955. Washington, D.C.: Go

Printing Office, 1959–1960.

Warner, Michael, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, Washington, D.C.: Cent

gence Agency, 1994.
Abbreviations and Terms

AD/ORE, Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

ADPC, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA

ADSO, Assistant Director for Special Operations (CIG and CIA)

AEC, Atomic Energy Commission

AFSA, Armed Forces Security Agency

AFSS, Air Force Security Service

ARC, Air Resupply and Communications

ARPA, Advanced Research Projects Agency

ASA, Army Security Agency

ATIC, Air Technical Intelligence Center

BOB, Bureau of the Budget

BW, biological warfare

CA, covert action; also circular airgram

CAS, Cleared American Source

CAT, Civil Air Transport

CE, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State; also Counter-E

CENTO, Central Treaty Organization

CERP, Combined Economic Reporting Program

CG, Commanding General

CI, Counter-intelligence

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CID, Criminal Investigative Division; also Counter-intelligence Division

CIG, Central Intelligence Group

CO, Commanding Officer

COAPS, Coordination, Operations and Policy/Planning Staff

COMINT, Communications Intelligence

CP, Communist party

CRITIC, Critical Intelligence Communications

CSP, Chief, Special Projects Division, Office of Policy Coordination

CW, chemical warfare

DCD, Domestic Contacts Division

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence (CIG and CIA)

DCID, Director of Central Intelligence Directive

DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (CIG and CIA)

DDA, Deputy Director for Administration

DDC, Deputy Director for Coordination

DDI, Deputy Director for Intelligence

DDO, Deputy Director for Operations

DDP, Deputy Director for Plans

DD/S&T, Deputy Director for Science and Technology

DIRNSA, Director, National Security Agency

DNI, Director of Naval Intelligence

DOD, Department of Defense

DPD, Development Projects Division

E & E, escape and evasion

ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECM, electronic counter-measures

ELINT, electronic intelligence

ES/NSC, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

EUCOM, European Command

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBID, Foreign Broadcast Information Division

FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FE, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

FEA, Foreign Economic Administration

FEC, Free Europe Committee

FI, Foreign Intelligence

FOA, Foreign Operations Administration

FSO, Foreign Service Officer

FSR, Foreign Service Reserve

FTX, field training exercise

FY, fiscal year

G–2, intelligence section of divisional or higher staff

G–5, civil affairs section of divisional or higher staff

GAO, General Accounting Office

GCHQ, General Communications Headquarters (UK)

GMAIC, Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

GMIC, Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

HICOG, High Commissioner for Germany

HUMINT, human intelligence

IAB, Intelligence Advisory Board

IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee

IAD, Acquisition and Distribution Division, Office of Research and In

Department of State

IBD, International Broadcasting Division

ICA, International Cooperation Administration

ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile

ICIS, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

ICS, Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff; also Intelligence Community Staff

IDP, Initial deployment plan

IFIO, International Foreign Information Organization

IFIS, International Foreign Information Staff

IG, Inspector General

IIC, Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee

IS, Intelligence Staff

ISA, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

J–2, JCS intelligence organization

JAEIC, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

JANIS, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JIC, Joint Intelligence Committee; also Joint Intelligence Center

JIS, Joint Intelligence Staff

JISPD, Joint Intelligence Studies Publication Board
JOT, junior officer trainee

JRC, Joint Reconnaissance Center

JRDB, Joint Research and Development Board

JSPD, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division

JTIS, Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee

L, Legal Adviser, Department of State

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MI, military intelligence

MID, Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army

MIS, Military Intelligence Staff, War Department General Staff; also military in

service

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCFE, National Committee for a Free Europe

NIA, National Intelligence Authority

NIC, National Indications Center of the IAC Watch Committee

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

NIS, National Intelligence Survey; also National Intelligence Summary

NPIC, National Photographic Interpretation Center

NSA, National Security Agency

NSC, National Security Council

NSCID, National Security Council Intelligence Directive

NSG, Navy Security Group

NSRB, National Security Resources Board

NTPC, National Technical Processing Center

OB, order of battle

OCB, Operations Coordination Board

OCD, Office of Collection and Dissemination

OCI, Office of Current Intelligence

ODA, Office of Departmental Administration, Bureau of Administration, Depa

State

ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization

OIR, Office of Intelligence Research

OLI, Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition

ONE, Office of National Estimates

ONI, Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

ONR, Office of Naval Research

OO, Office of Operations

OPC, Office of Policy Coordination

OPD, Operations Division, War Department

ORE, Office of Research and Evaluation; also Office of Reports and Estimates

OSO, Office of Special Operations

OSS, Office of Strategic Services

OWI, Office of War Information

PACAF, Pacific Air Forces

PACOM, Pacific Command

PBCFIA, President’s Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities

PCG, Planning Coordination Group

PFIAB, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PHOTINT, photographic intelligence
PIC, Photographic Interpretation Center

PM, Directorate of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; also parami

PNG, persona non grata

PNIO, priority national intelligence objectives

POCC, Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee

PP, political and psychological

PSB, Psychological Strategy Board

R, Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence

R&A, research and analysis

R&D, Research and development

RFA, Radio Free Asia

RFE, Radio Free Europe

RIAS, Radio in the American Sector

ROB, radar order of battle

ROKG, Republic of Korea Government

RTG, Reconnaissance Technical Group

S&T, Science and Technology

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SANACC, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee

SE, Special Estimate

SEC, Scientific Estimates Committee

SESP, Special Electronic Airborne Search Operations

SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SI, special intelligence

SIS, Special Intelligence Service

SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate

SO or SOPAG, Special Operations

SOVMAT, Soviet material

SWNCC, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

T/O, table of organization

TAC, Tactical Air Command

UNO, United Nations Organization

USAFE, U.S. Air Forces, Europe

USCIB, U.S. Communications Intelligence Board

USEB, U.S. Evaluation Board

USFA, U.S. Forces in Austria

USIA, U.S. Information Agency

USIB, U.S. Intelligence Board

USIE, U.S. Information and Education (Program)

USRO, U.S. Mission to NATO and European Regional Organizations

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VOA, Voice of America

ZI, zone of interior
Persons

Acheson, Dean, Secretary of State from January 21, 1949 to January 20, 1953

Adams, Sherman, White House Chief of Staff from January 20, 1953

Allen, George V., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 3

November 28, 1949; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South A

African Affairs from January 24, 1955 to November 1957; Director of th

States Information Agency from November 15, 1957 to 1960

Allen, Raymond B., Director of the Psychological Strategy Board from Janua

gust 1952

Amory, Robert, Jr., Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligenc

from March 23, 1953 to 1962

Armstrong, W. Park, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Rese

Intelligence from June 11, 1950; Chairman of the Communications In

Board 

Baker, William, Vice President, Bell Laboratories; Member of the President’s Sc

visory Committee; Head of Baker Panel on Communications Intelligence

Balmer, Brigadier General Jesmond D., USA, member of the Joint Chiefs of 

Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Interagency Coordina

Barbour, Walworth, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs from July 25

May 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 

1954 to November 20, 1955

Barrett, Edward W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from Februa

to February 20, 1952

Belmont, Alan H., Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Berding, Andrew H., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 

to 1961

Bishop, Max, Consulate General at Dhahran from September 20, 1951 to Januar

Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State from Nov

1954 to December 3, 1955

Bissell, Richard, Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence from 

1, 1954 to 1958; Deputy Director for Plans from 1958 to February 1962

Boggs, Marion, Director of the National Security Council Secretariat until J

Deputy Executive Secretary, from July 1959

Bohlen, Charles, Counselor, Department of State from March 13, 1951 to Ma

Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 27, 1953 to March 1957; Am

to the Philippines from March 13, 1957 to May 1959; Special Assistant to 

tary of State from May 9, 1959

Booster, Davis E., Staff Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles

Bowie, Robert, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from 

1953 to August 1955; Department of State Representative on the Nationa

Planning Board from 1953 to 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy 

from August 10, 1955 to August 28, 1957

Braden, Thomas, Assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligenc

Office of Policy Coordination, International Organizations Division from 

1952; Chief, International Organizations Division, Central Intelligence Age

1952 to 1954

Bradley, General Omar N., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from Augus

to August 15, 1953
Breitweiser, Major General Robert, USAF, Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff 

ruary 1957

Brownell, George, former military officer and lawyer; Head of Communicat

ligence Committee from December 28, 1951

Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to France from 1949 to 1952; Under Secretar

from February 7, 1952 to January 20, 1953; Observer to the Interim Com

the European Defense Community from February 19, 1953; Representat

European Coal and Steel Authority from 1954 to January 22, 1955; Amb

Germany from March 14, 1957 to 1959

Brundage, Percival E., Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget from 1954 to 19

tor, Bureau of the Budget from April 2, 1956 to March 17, 1958

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., USN, Chief of Naval Operations from August 1

1961

Cabell, General Charles P., USAF, Director of Intelligence, Office of the Dep

of Staff from 1951 to 1953; Intelligence Advisory Committee, Deputy D

Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1962

Caccia, Sir Harold, British Ambassador to the United States from 1956 to 196

Canine, Lieutenant General Ralph J., USA, Director, Armed Forces Securit

from 1951; Director, National Security Agency from November 4, 1952 to 

Cassidy, Brigadier General John, USA, Staff Director, President’s Board of C

on Foreign Intelligence Activities from January 1956

Clark, General (Ret.) Mark, USA, President of the Citadel from 1953 to 1955; 

of the Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch 

vestigation of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1954 to 1955

Conant, James, B., Ambassador to Germany from May 17, 1955 to February 

Connolly, Admiral Richard L., USN, President, Long Island University; mem

ident’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities from Ja

1956

Coyne, J. Patrick, National Security Council Representative for Internal Secu

1947 to 1960; President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Acti

Director from 1960

Cumming, Hugh, Foreign Service Officer, Moscow, Department of State from 

1950 to August 14, 1951; Personal Rank of Minister to Moscow, Departmen

from August 14, 1951 to June 1952; Deputy Secretary General for Politic

NATO, from June 30, 1952 to September 1953; Director of Intelligence and 

Department of State from October 10, 1957

Cutler, Robert, Administrative Assistant to the President until 1953; Special A

the President for National Security Affairs from March 23, 1953 to April 

from January 1957 to July 1958

Dulles, Allen W., Chairman, National Security Council Survey Committee u

Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, 1951; Deput

Plans, Central Intelligence Agency in 1951; Deputy Director of Central In

from 1951 to 1953; Director of Central Intelligence from 1953; member, C

on Information Activities Abroad from February 17, 1960 to January 12, 

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State from January 21, 1953 to April 1959

Dodge, Joseph M., Director, Bureau of the Budget from 1953 to 1954; Chairm

cil on Foreign Economic Policy from December 1954 to 1956

Doolittle, General James, USAF; member, President’s Board of Consultants o

Intelligence Activities; Head of Doolittle Panel on Covert Activities from Ja

1956

Eden, Anthony, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom from 1951 to 1955; P

ister of the United Kingdom from 1955 to 1957
Eisenhower, General Dwight D., USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Eur

December 1950 to May 31, 1952; President of the United States from Ja

1953

Eisenhower, Major John S.D., USA, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President f

Elbrick, C. Burke, General Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State, f

26, 1954 to February 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for European Aff

February 11, 1957 to April 22, 1958; Ambassador to Portugal from Octobe

Erskine, General (Ret.) Graves, USMC, Special Assistant to the Secretary of D

Special Operations from June 1953 to October 31, 1961

Evans, Allan, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of S

September 15, 1957; Director, Office of Intelligence, Research, and Analysis 

ruary 22, 1959

Fechteler, Admiral William M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations from Augu

August 1953

Foster, William C., Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration from 

1951; member, Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee or “Teapot Committ

June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954; Deputy Secretary of Defense from Sept

1951 to 1953

Frank, Joseph A., Office of Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency fr

28, 1955

Furnas, Howard, Office of Research and Intelligence, Department of State 

vember 2, 1950 to September 1952 and from August 20, 1954 to Septem

member Policy Planning Staff and Representative to the National Securit

Planning Board from January 13, 1958

Gaither, Rowan, Assistant Director of the Radiation Laboratory, MIT; memb

Board of Trustees, the RAND Corporation, from May 14, 1948; Chairman o

Foundations from March 1951; Head of the Strategic Missile Evaluation C

or “Teapot Committee,” from June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954; Head o

Resources Board of Office of Defense Mobilization which issued “De

Survival in the Nuclear Age” from April 1957

Gardner, Trevor, USAF, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and 

ment from 1954 to February 1956

Gates, Thomas S., Under Secretary of the Navy from October 2, 1953 to 1957; 

of the Navy from 1957 to 1959; Deputy Secretary of Defense from June t

ber 1959; Secretary of Defense from December 2, 1959 to January 20, 1961

Gleason, S. Everett, Historian, Council on Foreign Relations from 1946 to 1950

Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from March 1953 to 1

tural Attaché of the United States to the United Kingdom from 1959 to 19

Goodpaster, Major General Andrew, USA, Staff Secretary to the President fr

ber 10, 1954 to January 1961

Gray, Gordon, Secretary of the Army from June 20, 1949 to April 12, 1950; D

the Psychological Strategy Board from 1951 to 1952; member, the Presiden

mittee on International Information Activities from January 20, 1953 to June 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from Jul

February 1957; Director of Defense Mobilization from March 1957 to July 1

cial Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from July 195

ary 1961; member, Committee for Information Activities Abroad from Feb

1960 to January 12, 1961

Guthe, Otto, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Libraries and Intellig

quisition from January 23, 1948 to October 30, 1949; Assistant Director, Res

Reports, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Committee from 

1965; Chairman, Economic Intelligence Committee from 1953 to 1965
Hagerty, James, Press Secretary to the President from January 1953 to 1961

Harlow, Bryce N., Administrative Assistant to the President from January 195

Assistant to the President from 1953 to 1961

Harriman, W. Averell, Representative to Europe of the Economic Cooperatio

istration from 1948 to 1950; Special Assistant to the President from 1950; D

Mutual Security from 1951 to 1953

Helms, Richard, Office of Special Operations, Deputy Assistant Director for S

erations, Central Intelligence Agency from 1951 to 1952; Acting Chief of O

Office of the Deputy Director for Plans from 1952 to 1953; Chief of Opera

1953 to 1958; Deputy to the Deputy Director for Plans and Chief of Opera

1958 to 1962

Henderson, Loy, Ambassador to Iran from September 19, 1951 to January 19

ber of the First and Second Suez Canal Conference, Suez Canal Committ

don and Cairo from August to September 1956; Deputy Under Secretary o

Administration from January 26, 1955 to 1961

Herter, Christian, Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coo

Board from February 1957 to April 1959; Secretary of State from April 19

uary 1961

Hillenkoetter, Rear Admiral Roscoe, USN, Director of Central Intelligence, C

telligence Group and Central Intelligence Agency from May 1, 1947 to O

1950

Hooker, Robert G., Jr., Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from Januar

to December 1951; Foreign Affairs Officer, Department of State, from Nov

1953 to December 1954

Hoover, Herbert, former President; Chairman of the Commission on Organiza

Executive Branch of the Government from 1953

Hoover, Herbert, Jr. Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coo

Board from October 1954 to February 1957

Hoover, J. Edgar, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Houston, Lawrence, Assistant General Counsel of the Office of Strategic Serv

eral Counsel to the Central Intelligence Group and to the Central Intelligen

from 1946

Howe, Fisher, Deputy Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, Depa

State from March 1, 1950 to March 12, 1956; Director, Executive Secretaria

ment of State, from March 12, 1956 to October 1958

Hughes, John C., member, the President’s Committee on International Inform

tivities from January 20, 1953 to June 30, 1953

Hughes, Rowland R., Director, Bureau of the Budget from 1954 to 1956

Hulick, Charles E., Jr., Deputy Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Se

State from March 1, 1954 to August 12, 1956

Hull, General (Ret.) John E., USA, member, Strategic Missile Evaluation Com

“Teapot Committee” from June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954; Chairman o

ident’s Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities from Januar

Humelsine, Carlisle H., Executive Secretary, Department of State from June 19

uary 11, 1950; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration from 

1950; Assistant Secretary of State for Administration from July 29, 1950; D

der Secretary of State for Administration from August 11, 1950 to 1953

Irwin, John N. II, member, the President’s Committee on International Inform

tivities from January 20, 1953 to June 30, 1953; Deputy Assistant Secretary 

sistant Secretary for Internal Security Affairs, Department of Defense fro

1961; Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Affairs from 195

member, Committee on Information Activities Abroad from February 1

January 12, 1961
Jackson, C.D., Special Assistant to the President from January 26, 1953 to Ma

President, Free Europe Committee in 1954; member, Committee on Inform

tivities Abroad from February 17, 1960 to January 12, 1961

Jackson, William H., member, National Security Council Survey Committee 

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from October 7, 1950 to 1951; Chai

President’s Committee on International Information Activities from Januar

to June 30, 1953; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from Septembe

January 1956; Special Assistant to the President from January to Septem

Acting Special Assistant to the President from September 1956 to January 

Jessup, Phillip, Ambassador at Large from March 2, 1949 to 1953

Johnson, Louis, Secretary of Defense from March 28, 1949 to September 19, 1

Johnson, Roy W., Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department o

from February 1958 to 1959

Joyce, Robert P., Office of Special Operations, Central Intelligence Group, Liai

Department of State from 1946 to June 1947; Political Adviser on Trieste 

1, 1947 to October 27, 1948; Senior Consultant Representing the Secretary 

Office of Policy Coordination from September 1948; Policy Planning Staf

ment of State from December 23, 1948 to December 22, 1952; Special Assi

reau of Intelligence and Research from October 7, 1957 to April 19, 1959

Kennan, George F., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from 

1948 to January 1, 1950; Counselor of the Department of State from Augu

to July 1951; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 14, 1952 to S

1952

Kent, Sherman, Head of the Office of the National Estimates from Novembe

December 31, 1967; Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Central In

Agency, November 1953 to December 31, 1967

Khrushchev, Nikita, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union 

tember 7, 1953

Killian, James, member, Scientific Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mob

from 1951 to 1957; Head Technical Capabilities Panel, Office of Defense 

tion in June 1955; Chairman, President’s Board of Consultants on Foreig

gence Activities from January 13, 1956 to 1958; Special Assistant to the Pre

Science and Technology from November 1957 to July 1959

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Deputy Assistant Director for Office of Operations, Cen

ligence Agency until 1950; Executive Assistant to the Director of Central In

from 1950 to 1951; Assistant Director for Special Operations from 1951 to 1

of Operations, Deputy Directorate of Plans from 1952 to 1953; Special Assist

Deputy Director for Plans in 1953; Inspector General from April 1953 to 19

Kistiakowsky, George, member, Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee or 

Committee” from June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954; staff member, White H

fice of Science and Technology from 1957 to 1959; Director and Special As

the President for Science and Technology from July 1959 to January 1961

Kohler, Foy, Chief, International Broadcasting Division, Department of State 

vember 1, 1949; Director, Voice of America Broadcasting from 1949 to 195

ant Administrator, International Information Administration Februa

November 1952; Policy Planning Staff from November 9, 1952 to Februar

Kyes, Roger, member, President’s Committee on International Information 

from January 20, 1953 to June 30, 1953; Deputy Secretary of Defense from 

2, 1953 to May 1, 1954

Land, Edwin, Founder of Polaroid; Chairman, Technical Capabilities Panel, Off

fense Mobilization from 1954; member, President’s Board of Consultants o

Intelligence Activities from 1962
Larson, Arthur, Director, Under Secretary for Labor until 1956; United States 

tion Agency from 1956 to 1957; Special Assistant to the President for Sp

ing from 1957 to 1958

Lawrence, Harold, Deputy Staff Director, President’s Board of Consultants fo

Intelligence Activities from January 1956

Lay, James S., Jr., member, Central Intelligence Group from January 1946; Sec

telligence Advisory Board from January 1946 to September 1947; Office o

and Estimates, Central Intelligence Group in 1947; Assistant to the Execu

tary, National Security Council from September 1947 to January 1950; Exec

retary, National Security Council from January 1950 to 1961

LeMay, Curtis, USAF, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command from 194

Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force from 1957 to 1961

Lemnitzer, General Lyman, USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army from April 

September 1960; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from September 1960 to 

Lloyd, Selwyn, Minister of Defense of the United Kingdom from 1954 to 1955

of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom from December 1955 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Senator (R–MA); Permanent Representative to the Unite

from January 23, 1953 to 1960

Lovett, Robert A., Assistant Secretary of War for Air until December 1945; U

retary of State from July, 1, 1947 to January 20, 1949; Deputy Secretary o

from 1950 to 1951; Secretary of Defense from 1951 to 1953; member, Stra

sile Evaluation Committee or “Teapot Committee” from June 16, 1953 to 

8, 1954; member, President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence 

from January 13, 1956

MacArthur, Douglas II, Counselor of the Department of State from March 3

July 20, 1956

MacMillan, Harold, British Prime Minister from January 1957 to October 196

Macy, Robert M., Chief, International Division, Bureau of the Budget from 19

Magruder, Brigadier General (Ret.) John, USA, United States Army, Senior C

representing the Secretary of Defense, Office of Policy Coordination from 

ber 1948 to 1953

Makins, Sir Roger, British Ambassador to the United States from January 

November 9, 1956

Marshall, Charles Burton, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of S

June 1, 1950 to 1953

Marshall, General George C., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army until November 

retary of State from January 21, 1947 to January 20, 1949; Secretary of Def

September 21, 1950 to 1951

Matthews, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 

5, 1950 to 1953

McCone, John, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission from 1958 to 1960; D

Central Intelligence from November 29, 1961

McElroy, Neil H., Secretary of Defense from August 7, 1957 to December 195

Merchant, Livingstone, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from Nov

1951 to March 24, 1952; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs fr

11, 1953 to May 7, 1956 and October 29, 1958 to August 12, 1959; Deputy U

retary of State for Political Affairs from August to December 1959; mem

mittee on Information Activities Abroad from February 17, 1960 to Januar

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from June 24, 1960 to Februa

Meyer, Cord, International Organizations Division, Central Intelligence Age

1951 to 1954; Director, International Organizations Division from 1954

Morgan, George, Acting Director, Psychological Strategy Board from 1951 to 195

Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board from March 23, 1953 to 
Murphy, Robert, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from N

1953 to 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from August t

ber 1959

Nash, Frank C., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Securi

from 1951 to 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Securi

from March 23, 1953 to 1954

Nitze, Paul H., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 

1, 1950 to 1953; member, Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee or “Tea

mittee” from June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954

Parrott, Thomas A., Office of Policy Coordination

Persons, Major General “Jerry” Wilton B., Deputy Assistant to the President 

uary 20, 1953 to October 7, 1958; Assistant to the President from October 

1961 

Peurifoy, John E., Assistant Secretary of State for Administration from March 

to August 10, 1950

Quarles, Donald A., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Developm

October 1, 1953 to August 11, 1955; Secretary of the Air Force from Augus

to 1957; Deputy Secretary of Defense from April 30, 1957 to May 8, 1959

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 

1953 to August 1957

Reber, James Q., Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination, Central In

Agency from 1950 to 1954

Robertson, Reuben, Deputy Secretary of Defense from August 1, 1955 to Apr

Rockefeller, Nelson A., Special Assistant to the President and Chairman of the 

Coordination Group from 1954 to 1955

Rusk, Dean, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from March 2

1951

Samford, Lieutenant General John, USAF, Director of Intelligence for the Uni

Air Force from 1952 to 1956; Director, National Security Agency from N

1956 to November 1960

Sargeant, Howland H., Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Af

October 1, 1947 to 1950

Savage, Carlton, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from O

1949

Smith, Gerard C., Consultant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Aff

April 12, 1954 to January 1, 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy 

from October 18, 1957 to 1961

Smith, Walter Bedell, Director of Central Intelligence from October 7, 1950 to 

20, 1953; Under Secretary of State from February 9, 1953 to 1954

Sprague, Mansfield, General Counsel, Department of Defense from 1955 to 

sistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1957 

Head of the Committee on Information Activities Abroad from February 1

January 12, 1961

Staats, Elmer B., Executive Officer of Operations Coordinating Board, Nationa

Council from 1953 to 1954

Stassen, Harold, Director for Mutual Security from January to May 1953; Di

Foreign Operations from August 1, 1953 to 1955; Special Assistant to the 

for Disarmament from 1955 to 1958

Stevens, Vice Admiral (Ret.) Leslie C., Joint Plans Subsidiary Division, Joint 

Staff; Director, Psychological Strategy Board from September 1949
Stewart, Gordon, Chief, Foreign Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency from 

Strauss, Lewis L., Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission from July 1953 to 1

Streibert, Theodore C., Director of the United States Information Agency fro

1956

Stubbs, Gail L., Office of Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency

Symington, W. Stuart, Secretary of the Air Force from September 18, 1947 to 

1950; Senator (D–MO)

Talbott, Harold E, Secretary of the Air Force from February 4, 1953 to Augus

Trudeau, Major General Arthur G., USA, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 from N

16, 1953 to August 8, 1955

Truman, Harry S, President of the United States from April 12, 1945 to Januar

Truscott, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Lucian, the first Deputy Director for Coo

Central Intelligence Agency from July 1, 1957 to July 1, 1960

Twining, General Nathan, USAF, Vice Chief of Staff from June 30, 1953 to Au

Chief of Staff from June 1953 to 1957; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

gust 15, 1957

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., USAF, Director of Central Intelligence, Cent

gence Group from June 10, 1946 to May 1, 1947; Chief of Staff, United 

Force from April 30, 1948 to 1953

Webb, James E., Under Secretary of State from January 28, 1949 to 1952

Whearty, Raymond P., Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal S

Wilson, Charles, E., Secretary of Defense from 1953 to 1957

Wisner, Frank G., Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligen

from September 1, 1948 to August 1, 1951; Deputy Director for Plans fro

23, 1951 to December 1, 1958

Yost, Charles W., Foreign Service Officer, Director, Office of Eastern Europea

Department of State from December 30, 1949 to September 29, 1950; me

icy Planning Staff from April 20, 1958
The Intelligence Commun

1950–1955

Organization of U.S. Intelligence

1. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Johnson1

Washington, January 1

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT

Support of Covert Operations of CIA

REFS

(a) Memorandum to the Director, CIA, on the above subject dtd 6 Oct ‘4

(b) Reply of Director, CIA, to the Secretary of Defense, 18 Oct ‘493

1. Pursuant to the last paragraph of the first reference you 

thorized to support the covert operations of the Central Intelligence 

in accordance with the terms of my memorandum of 6 October 1

2. The Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Joint Staff, is the 

within the Department of Defense responsible, among other du

coordinating and facilitating operational support of approved 

operations of the CIA with the Services.

3. The responsibilities in this field of Brigadier General Jo

gruder, USA (Retired), Policy Consultant for this office with th

Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, remain as in

in my letter of 7 October 1949, to the Secretary of State, a copy o

was provided you.4

Louis Jo

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278

Folder 5. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, S

Plans Division; and the Director of Central Intelligence. 2 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 312. 3 Ibid., Document 315.

4 Ibid., Document 313.

5 Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.
2. National Security Council Report1

NSC 59/1 Washington, March 

THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PLANNING

1. Foreign information programs in periods of peace and 

logical warfare programs in periods of national emergency or 

established instruments of national policy and must be conti

directed toward the achievement of national aims. Foreign info

activities and related facilities of all departments and agencie

U. S. Government comprise the essential elements of a national 

information program in time of peace and the essential nucleus 

chological warfare in periods of national emergency and th

stages of war.

2. To achieve continuity between peacetime and wartim

and programs and to provide for the strengthening and coord

of all foreign information activities in time of peace and psych

warfare activities in time of national emergency and the initia

of war:

a. The Secretary of State shall be responsible for:

(1) The formulation of policies and plans for a national for

formation program in time of peace. This program shall includ

eign information activities conducted by departments and age

the U. S. Government.

(2) The formulation of national psychological warfare p

time of national emergency and the initial stages of war.

(3) The coordination of policies and plans for the national 

information program and for overt psychological warfare with 

partment of Defense, with other appropriate departments an

cies of the U. S. Government, and with related planning un

NSC–10 series.2

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Psy

Warfare. Secret. NSC Action No. 283 recorded that the Council approved N

amended by memorandum action of March 9. The report in its approved form 

here) was circulated as NSC 59/1 under cover of a March 9 note from Lay an

ted to the President for consideration. NSC Action No. 283 is ibid., S/S–NSC 

66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. A memorandum 

to the National Security Council, March 10, indicates that the President appr

59/1 on March 10. (Ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, 1935–62, Box 115) 2 For the NSC 10 series, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of t

gence Establishment, Documents 283 ff.
b. All departments and agencies of the U.S. Government sh

mulate detailed plans in support of the overall plans, and shal

the most effective coordination and utilization of their appropr

tivities and facilities for the implementation of approved plan

cies, and programs.

3. There shall be established within the Department of Stat

ganization to:

a. Initiate and develop interdepartmental plans, make 

mendations, and otherwise advise and assist the Secretary of 

discharging his responsibilities for the national foreign infor

program in time of peace.

b. Make plans for overt psychological warfare, including 

mendations for preparations for national emergency and the 

stages of war. Such plans shall be continuously coordinated w

war plans through the planning agencies of the Department of D

and where such plans have a direct impact on war plans they 

subject to the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Plans prepared by this organization for overt psych

warfare in time of national emergency or the initial stages of w

provide for:

a. Coordination of overt psychological warfare with:

(1) Covert psychological warfare.

(2) Censorship.

(3) Domestic information.

b. The employment and expansion, insofar as is feasible, o

tivities and facilities which compose the national foreign infor

program in time of peace, in order to assure rapid transition to 

tions in time of national emergency or war.

c. Control of the execution of approved plans and policie

(1) the Department of Defense in theaters of military ope

(2) the Department of State in areas other than theaters 

tary operations.

d. Transmittal of approved psychological warfare plans an

cies to theater commanders through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. The organization provided for in paragraph 3 above sh

sist of:

a. A Director appointed by the Secretary of State after co

tion with other departments and agencies represented on the N

Security Council.

b. Policy consultants representing the Secretary of State, t

retary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Re

Board.
c. A consultant representing the Director of Central Intellig

matters relating to coordination with planning under the NSC–1

d. A consultant representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 

and NSC 10/2 matters.

e. A staff composed of full-time personnel representing 

partment of State, the Department of Defense, and the Centra

gence Agency.

f. A liaison representative to the staff from the National 

Resources Board and such liaison representation or staff mem

from other departments and agencies of the government as ma

termined by the Director after consultation with the consultan

6. The Department of State shall provide necessary spac

tarial staff, and such other administrative services as may be r

for this organization.3

7. The NSC–4 and the NSC–43 series are hereby rescinde

3 See Document 17.

4 The NSC 43 series, “Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychlo

fare,” is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, Nationa

Council Files. For text of NSC 4–A, December 9, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 253. NSC 4, Decembe

is ibid., Document 252.

3. Letter From the Department of State Member of the S

Committee (Trueheart) to the Chief of the Coordinatio

Operations, and Policy Staff of the Central Intelligenc

Agency (Childs)1

Washington, March 2

Dear Mr. Childs:

Reference is made to your memorandum of March 6, 19

warding a draft interagency operating procedure for the p

Watch Committee.2

As you are aware, we are in full accord with the Watch C

tee idea. We believe, however, that the specific procedures out

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–R01731

Folder 7. Top Secret. A handwritten notation indicates a copy was sent to AD

March 30. 2 Not found.
the CIA proposal tend to obscure the method by which the C

tee should operate and, indeed, the basic purpose for which th

mittee needs to be established.

In considering procedures for the Watch Committee, it is 

tant to bear in mind that a committee is not needed merely to e

exchange of pertinent items of information. The unique featu

committee—and the reason a committee is needed in this field—

it provides a mechanism whereby all such items of informati

be juxtaposed, compared with each other, discussed, and joint

uated by the members. Similarly, the committee structure perm

consideration of the important question: What are the proper a

nificant categories of information (indicators) having a bearing 

viet intentions to make war in the near future?

With this is mind we are submitting for your consideratio

draft of the agreement.3 While there are a number of minor c

the most important adjustments we propose are designed to 

size this deliberative aspect of the Committee’s work. I should 

to discuss it with you in detail at your convenience.

I am sending copies of this letter to the other action addre

your memorandum.4

Sincerely yours,

William C. Tr

3 The enclosure, entitled ”Draft of Proposed Interagency Operating Pr

was not found. 4 Not further identified.

4. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department 

State (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, March 3

On June 18 [17], 1948, at its 13th meeting, the National S

Council approved a directive (NSC 10/2)2 establishing in the 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Chronolog

Secret.2 For text of NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of t

gence Establishment, Document 292.
Intelligence Agency an Office of Special Projects3 to plan and 

covert operations, and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of 

plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in war ti

directive charged the Director of Central Intelligence with a

through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of t

tary of Defense that covert operations be planned and conduc

manner consistent with United States foreign and military poli

with overt activities.

Pursuant to this Directive, I was designated by General M

as his representative for the above purpose, and this designat

officially made known to the Executive Secretary of the Nati

curity Council by a letter signed August 13, 1948 by Mr. Lovet

that date, I have continued to bear this responsibility.

My present preoccupation with other duties and my pend

parture from the Department oblige me to recommend that I 

relieved of this responsibility, and I do so recommend.

However, I do not think that any successor to me should 

pointed in present circumstances; and I would urge that the N

Security Council be informed that the Department will not be 

give further guidance on the exercise of this function by CIA u

tain prerequisites are met which could alone assure the sound

the operation of these arrangements. These are:

(a) There would have to be a marked improvement in th

ties for assuring the cooperation of security authorities of the 

ment in general, and the Department of Justice in particular, in 

forts of this Department and the Office of Special Projects to p

psychological warfare purposes.

It was never to be expected that covert operations could be 

ducted as to produce appreciable political results unless those 

with their conduct could command the cooperation and the con

of all agencies of the United States Government. In a memoran

conversation and understanding initialed on August 12, 1948 

Souers, Admiral Hillenkoetter, Mr. Blum, Colonel Yeaton, Mr

and myself,5 designed to serve as the basic premises underly

conduct of this work, it was agreed that the activity was to be 

3 The Office of Special Projects was the name originally proposed for th

Policy Coordination. 4 Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Politica

chological Warfare) 5 The actual date of the meeting was August 6, 1948; the memorandum 

sation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligen

lishment, Document 298.
ered 

a major political operation and that the greatest flexibi

freedom from the regulations and administrative standards go

ordinary operations” would be required for its successful prose

These requirements have not been adequately met. In pa

the Government has proven itself unable to take the necessary 

propriate action in matters concerning a number of the ex-comm

and others who are the heart and soul of the potential ideolog

sistance to communism both here and abroad and whose mov

in and out of this country are important to this purpose. Any p

warfare efforts which purport to dispense with a free and flexi

laboration with these elements must be largely unrealistic. In a

to this, present restrictions on the exercise of executive discretio

employment of persons by the United States Government plac

handicaps on the fulfillment of the purposes of political and p

logical warfare. I do not deny that positive results can still be ob

in a fragmentary way and in limited areas of political warfar

where the cooperation of other agencies of the Government is 

quired. But in general the framework for the accomplishment 

work is so discouraging that prospects for success cannot be re

as balancing out, in present circumstances, the other risks and 

vantages of the Department’s participation in it.

(b) Some suitable arrangements would have to be devised 

tect State Department personnel against personal damage to 

selves arising out of their participation in this work.

Experience has indicated that the issuance of political guid

the Director of Central Intelligence in these matters is, in pres

cumstances, liable to distortion and exploitation in ways dange

the reputations and positions of the persons concerned in this 

ment. We have already had one instance in which the issuance 

guidance in good faith, through the proper channels and with 

authority of superior officers in this Department, has—withou

cation to anyone in this Department—been reported by the CIA 

FBI as possible evidence of political unreliability on the part of t

Department official concerned. We have no protection against th

pening again and no assurance that any one in this Departm

even be aware of it when it does happen. In these circumst

would consider it unjust to permit any official of this Departm

have anything to do with this work without warning him that 

ticipation in it may very well be used, unbeknownst to him, 

purpose of throwing suspicion on his character and his loyal

since it is obviously not a tolerable state of affairs that men sh

asked to work in this atmosphere and in this jeopardy, I think 

essary that this matter be clarified before the Department of S

participate further in this work.
On point (a), above, I think it may still be possible to brin

some improvement by direct discussion with the agencies conc

particularly with the Attorney General. If this proves not to be t

it seems to me that our only resort is the National Security Co

On point (b), I think that this must in any event be taken 

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

You will appreciate that it is not without great concern a

appointment that I make this recommendation. The idea of th

lishment of an organization of this sort for covert operations in 

litical field was largely my own, as was the initiative which le

Department’s prominent part in launching this venture. It h

and is, my conviction that the effective conduct of political wa

the covert plane is indispensable to the prosecution of a succes

icy toward the Soviet Union, designed to prevent a third wo

and to reduce Soviet power and influence to tolerable dimensio

thing which interferes, even temporarily, with the prosecution 

work seems to me to diminish materially the chances for defeati

munist purposes on a world-wide scale.

I would also like to make it clear that the above recomme

is not meant to be in any sense critical of the conduct of the 

the Office of Special Projects by Mr. Wisner who, as far as I am 

observe, has struggled loyally and valiantly to make a succes

work under bitterly discouraging conditions and who has cons

accomplishments to his credit in those areas where conditio

permitted him to develop his official activity.

George F. K

6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

5. Editorial Note

NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for Nati

curity,” April 14, 1950, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vo

pages 234–292. The National Security Council adopted NSC 68 

25, but President Truman did not approve it until September 

paper envisioned, among other things, a dramatic increase in 

spending, particularly in the form of covert action operations 

against the Soviet Union and its satellites. For subsequent p

the NSC 68 series and related documentation, see the compila

national security policy, ibid., 1951, volume I.
6. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secreta

Defense Johnson1

Washington, May 

SUBJECT

Special Electronic Airborne Search Operations (SESP)

1. For several years since the end of the war, the Navy and 

Force have been codirecting special electronic airborne search 

in the furtherance of a program of obtaining the maximum am

intelligence concerning foreign electronic developments as a sa

to the national defense. These operations have been carried o

out a formal statement of policy but on the basis of an informa

ing agreement between the Navy and the Air Force. The infor

derived from these activities is of the utmost importance from 

operational and technical standpoint, and thus far has not b

tainable from any other source.

2. As you undoubtedly know, the recent incident in the 

in which a Navy patrol plane engaged in a flight connected w

program was lost, resulted in a high-level decision, on 17 Apr

to discontinue further projects of this program for a period o

days.

3. It is recognized that there is a risk of repetition of such in

upon resumption of these flights, but it is felt that there would b

serious disadvantages accruing to the United States if the cess

these operations were to be extended over an excessively long 

4. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that the spec

tronic airborne search projects be resumed with the least pra

delay and that action be initiated at the highest governmental 

secure approval therefor. In this connection they have agreed u

policies stated below as a definitive basis of operation whe

flights are resumed:

a. The division of effort, geographically, will be that whic

nearly follows normal peacetime deployment of air units, and 

ent is as follows:

1 Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Serie

Top Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Johnson saw i

2 A U.S. Navy B–24 Privateer aircraft with 10 crewmen abroad was shot 

Soviet planes on April 8. The United States protested the Soviet action; see For

tions, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 1140–1149.
(1) Europe:

(a) To the Navy—Mediterranean and Black Sea Area

(b) To the Air Force—Baltic, Gulf of Bothnia, Murman

Caucasus Areas.

(2) Far East—To the Air Force.

The above division of responsibility does not preclude perform

Special Electronics Search Projects missions by either Service 

area, as may be locally agreed, when operational, cover, and ot

siderations so indicate. However, missions conducted by one 

which penetrate the area of the other Service will be coordinat

oughly through the Commander concerned.

b. Aircraft engaged in these operations over routes n

flown by unarmed transport-type aircraft, i.e., the land masse

Allied Occupation Zones and the Berlin and Vienna corridors, w

tinue to operate with or without armament. Aircraft engaged 

operations3 over all other routes adjacent to the USSR or to U

satellite-controlled territory will be armed and instructed to 

self-defense.4

c. Pending the availability of armed ECM aircraft, and in 

continue reconnaissance operations at the same tempo as was 

prior to the Baltic incident, flights will be conducted on the sam

ules and routes as planned for ECM aircraft but with armed, 

necessarily ECM equipped, B–29 or B–50 aircraft.

d. Flights by single aircraft will, to the maximum extent p

be scheduled so that the portion(s) of the flight near particula

sitive or heavily defended areas will be under cover of dark

weather.

e. Flights will not be made closer than twenty miles to th

or USSR- or satellite-controlled territory.

f. Emergency single-group code transmissions meaning “

ing attacked by VF,” “I am being tracked by VF,” etc., are pr

for joint use.

g. Flights will not deviate from or alter planned flight cou

other than reasons of safety.

(Note: Although it is recognized that this paper is concer

marily with SESP missions, it is considered that certain of th

3 “Which?” is handwritten in the margin, presumably by Johnson. In re

tary of the Navy Captain W.G. Lalor sent a memorandum to the Executive Se

the Secretary of Defense on May 22 explaining that the phrase “with or with

ment” meant either armed or unarmed aircraft. (National Security Agency, C

Cryptologic History, Series V, L.1.2.) 4 President Truman wrote at the end of this sentence: “Good sense, it see

HST.”
sions contained herein are equally applicable to all aerial rec

sance which may be conducted in sensitive areas adjacent to th

or to USSR- or satellite-controlled areas.)5

For the Joint Chiefs 

Omar N. B

C

Joint Chiefs 

5 President Truman wrote “Approved 5/19/50 Harry S Truman” below t

ture block.

7. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 

SUBJECT

OPC–Department of State Liaison

PARTICIPANTS

OPC–Mr. Wisner, P—Mr. Barrett, P—Mr. Sargeant, A—Mr. Humelsine, 

S/S—Mr. Sheppard, S/P—Mr. Joyce, and P—Mr. [name not declassified]

The following points of agreement were reached at the me

Mr. Humelsine’s office on May 5.

1. The focal point of responsibility in the Department of S

providing coordinated propaganda policy guidance to OPC is 

sistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

2. There are two major segments to the problem of liaiso

as public affairs programs are concerned:

(a) Policy guidance and (b) coordination of operations.

3. To make certain that operations do in fact proceed in acco

with top-level decisions on propaganda policy, the following a

ments should be undertaken:

(a) Designation by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affa

deputy who would work with an OPC designee on (1) policy gu

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80

Box 2, Folder 7. Top Secret. Drafted by [name not declassified]. A handwritten no

the memorandum reads “Mr. Wisner (Your designee?)”
matters and, (2) coordination of operations. Once specific arrang

for coordination of operations are approved, agreed-on worki

relations can be started between OPC and P area units.

(b) Mr. Joyce will designate a person, to be associated w

to work with OPC on propaganda projects. Mr. Barrett will arr

this designee to work with his deputy for P–OPC liaison a

B/POL. The Joyce designee will have full access to P area poli

ance materials and meetings. (c) Mr. Joyce will look to P for the coordination of prop

policy guidance and coordination of operations under the 

arrangements. (d) Mr. Joyce, under these arrangements, will continue to h

access to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and to the re

of the Public Affairs area. Proposals for modification of these a

ments or modification of major operational decisions will be 

ject of prior discussion by P, Mr. Joyce and OPC.

8. Memorandum by the Assistant Director for Policy

Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisn

Washington, May 

SUBJECT

Data for Consideration in Connection with NSC Studies

1. The attached data have been prepared in response to a 

on 4 May from the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, fo

etary estimates by OPC for the period from 1 July 1950 to 30 Ju

in connection with certain studies being conducted with regard 

68.2 These estimates are based upon the assumptions understo

applicable to NSC 68 and particularly the decision of the Unite

Government to make a major effort in the field of covert ope

The OPC charter is not elaborated here since it is assumed th

reviewing this paper will be familiar with NSC 10/23 and 

documents.

2. The primary consideration is determination of the s

which it may be possible to carry out covert operations in su

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, NSC 68. T

The memorandum bears no indication of addressees. 2 An annex of budgetary estimates for FY 1951–1957 is attached but no

The Policy Planning Staff request of May 4 has not been found. 3 See footnote 2, Document 2.
United States foreign policy. In this connection it is apparent t

factors impose ceilings on covert operations:

a. The establishment of an organization such as OPC is u

dented in the peacetime history of the United States. Because o

significant body of knowledge, personnel reserves, techniqu

philosophy of operations are not readily available. The diffic

locating and inducing physically, intellectually and psychol

qualified American personnel to abandon their present activit

enlist in the cold war imposes a significant limitation on the cap

plan and conduct covert operations. So long as the nation is tech

at peace and manpower controls do not exist, recruitment of ad

numbers of personnel with ability to direct and execute these a

will be difficult and a fairly heavy attrition rate can be foreseen

b. The second major limiting factor is the requirement th

activities be conducted in such a covert manner that they ca

traced to the United States Government and in the event such 

ties are so traced, the Government shall be in a position plau

disavow responsibility. Covert operations are increasingly diff

execute as they increase in size. Even such a relatively simple 

as the clandestine disbursement of funds grows difficult as the a

involved increase to millions of dollars. These difficulties p

when complex activities are undertaken, such as the creation 

resistance organizations or the extensive employment of guerril

The problems attendant on security are not insurmountable in 

selves, but there are definite [limits?] above which it is not sa

without willingness to face exposure which might entail hosti

ical and psychological exploitation.

3. A further difficulty inherent in the conduct of clandest

erations on behalf of this Government lies in the vast water a

various national borders interposed between the United States 

target areas. In contrast to the USSR operating from the cente

Eurasian land mass with interior lines of communication and 

nating all areas between them and their primary targets in E

United States is confronted with major logistical and security pr

that are not comparable. Even though logistical problems can 

solved the maintenance of adequate security in peacetime is a r

iting factor in the conduct of covert operations in Eurasia.

4. Responsive to the decision of the United States Govern

make a major effort in the field of covert operations and to prov

basis on which the increased responsibilities of OPC may be 

plished, it is assumed that adequate administrative and logisti

port will be available; specifically, that:

a. Prompt and final decision is made on NSC 50,4 thus pr

a firm basis for organization.

4 For text of NSC 50, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the In

Establishment, Document 384.
b. Adequate space is available to accommodate the Was

headquarters.

c. OPC (or the combined covert offices if OPC and OSO 

solidated under NSC 50) will have a high degree of administra

tonomy and control.

d. The FBI will conduct such personnel and other invest

as may be requested by OPC on a priority basis.

e. The Departments of Defense, State and other gover

agencies will provide adequate logistical and administrative 

upon request of OPC.

f. In view of the dearth of personnel experienced in cove

ations, military and foreign service personnel having appropria

ifications will be made available to OPC on a high priority ba

g. Recognition will be given to the fact that those con

covert operations are in fact the front line troops in the cold w

should be given maximum support with administrative flexib

5. Since it is considered that 1954 is the crucial year, the e

up to and including that time must necessarily include expen

for establishing, stockpiling and operating overseas supply ba

establishment and strengthening of effective organizations to di

execute covert operations in and against each target area, th

lishment of an adequate, world-wide communications system, 

conduct of extensive training with adequate facilities of all ty

cluding paramilitary.

6. A series of independent projections coincide in establ

figure of [number not declassified] as the maximum American fie

that OPC can install and maintain overseas in 1954. This force 

disposed largely in Eurasia in considerable depth along the pe

of the Soviet Union. Prior to 1954 the primary limitation wil

size and inexperience of our overseas stations. However, by 1

bulk of the [number not declassified] personnel will have attain

gree of effectiveness which should have a significant effect 

cold war. The number of American personnel does not indicat

tal size of the forces involved in covert operations, which m

essarily be conducted largely through apparati utilizing ind

personnel.

7. The attached data which present estimates of OPC fina

quirements by target areas as well as operational areas are con

as realistic as is possible within the framework of considerati

limitations outlined herein. Modifications of these estimates w

required in response to more specific policy guidance with re

emphasis on certain programs or areas. For example, if covert ec

warfare operations on any considerable scale were subsidized 

it would require sums greatly in excess of these estimates. L

the share of financial responsibility to be borne by OPC in con

with certain types of joint operations undertaken with the Dep

of Defense may affect the estimates.
8. As is indicated above, the two major factors limiting the 

covert operations are qualified and trained personnel willing a

to undertake these activities in the areas involved and the requ

that the activities be conducted in such a covert manner that th

not be traced to the United States Government. Manpower cont

signed to channel qualified personnel into the Government ser

behalf of the cold war would ameliorate the first limitation. Like

the international situation deteriorates further, the United Stat

ernment may be willing to authorize greater security risks in co

erations in order to step up such activities. For example, covert 

of guerrilla or resistance forces on a large scale would be impos

accomplish with the degree of security required by current Unite

policy. Should the Government’s policy require such support on 

larged scale with recognition of security factors involved, funds 

in excess of those indicated on the attachment would be require

Frank G. W

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

9. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special As

for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Under Secretary of 

(Webb)

Washington, May 

[Source: Department of State, A/MS Files: Lot 54 D 29

1949–52. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

10. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to Di

of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, June 

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 10

6–650. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]
11. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoe

the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, June 1

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Regis

80–R01731R, Box 13, Folder 560. Secret. 2 pages not declassifie

12. Editorial Note

When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, 

intelligence organizations had few resources or personnel dedi

Korean matters. This situation changed quickly, with the Cen

telligence Agency and the armed forces’ intelligence services d

massive efforts to support the Korean war effort. The CIA Offic

icy Coordination began an immediate build-up. Its operation

cepts were based on the Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS) Wo

II experience and stressed stay-behind agents and guerrilla for

the CIA’s intelligence analysis of the early phase of the Korean 

Woodrow J. Kuhns, Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold W

(Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997).

After the second capture of Seoul by Communist forces 

guerrilla forces, along with commando and reconnaissance r

ceived the bulk of CIA attention. Eventually some 3,000 guerril

operating in the mountains of North Korea, and they briefly su

in tying up some North Korean and Chinese troops. The CIA a

vided order of battle and targeting intelligence, intelligence to 

the economic embargo against North Korea and China, and da

rent intelligence publications on the situation in Korea.

For a time, following the entry of Chinese troops in late 

ber 1950, there was widespread concern in the United States 

Korean invasion was the first phase of a Soviet-inspired World 

that would soon engulf Europe as well as Asia. Planning beg

multaneously provide massive support for anti-Communist g

in China and paramilitary activity in Europe. Emergency wa

were drawn up. In this crisis atmosphere, the Department of 

urged the CIA to begin to accelerate many other war-related pr

evasion and escape planning, the build-up of supplies, training 
military forces, increased propaganda, encouragement of Sovie

tions, economic defense programs, and the like. This led DCI 

Bedell Smith to raise the issue of the appropriate scope and 

CIA activities.

13. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Deputy Sp

Assistant for Intelligence and Research (Howe) to the 

Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Hume

Washington, June 2

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 

State–CIA Relations. Top Secret. 1 page not declassified.]

14. Administrative Agreement Between the Department o

and the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, u

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 54 D 2

1948–1952. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

15. Editorial Note

The Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Policy Coord

sought to make use of ostensibly private organizations and bus

in carrying out its cold war covert action mandate. The Nationa

mittee for Free Europe (NCFE) was one of the first such organi

incorporated in 1949. At the instigation of George Kennan of 

icy Planning Staff of the Department of State, NCFE was created 

lize anti-Communist refugees and émigrés to undermine Sov

trol of Eastern Europe. In February 1950, the CIA gave N
transmitter that was installed in Germany and went on the ai

dio Free Europe on July 4, 1950. A host of other organizatio

worked with OPC, with more or less independence, in the ea

war years. These included the American Committee for Free

the Peoples of the USSR, the Committee for a Free Asia, the C

for Cultural Freedom, and several youth and student organizat

cluding the National Student Association. One of the earliest 

proprietary companies was Air America, which long provided 

lift capability in the Far East. CIA purchased Air America from 

Chennault and his partner on August 23, 1950. Air America p

extensive support for CIA activities during the Korean war.

16. Letter From the Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (Hoover) to the President’s Special Cons

(Souers)1

Washington, July 

My Dear Admiral:

For some months representatives of the FBI and of the Dep

of Justice have been formulating a plan of action for an emerge

uation wherein it would be necessary to apprehend and det

sons who are potentially dangerous to the internal security of th

try. I thought you would be interested in a brief outline of the 

Action to Be Taken By the Department of Justice

The plan envisions four types of emergency situations: (1

upon the United States; (2) threatened invasion; (3) attack upon 

States troops in legally occupied territory; and (4) rebellion.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 273, Files of the National Security Coun

sentative for Internal Security 1947–69, Box 36, Problem 11. Personal and Co

by Special Messenger. A handwritten notation reads: “Mr. Coyne has suggeste

probably will choose to discuss this with Mr. Lay and Mr. Coyne.” This is fo

an initial that appears to be an “S”. The initials JPC probably indicate that 

Coyne, NSC Representative for Internal Security, read the letter. Souers se

committal reply on July 14. (Ibid.)
The plan contains a prepared document which should be r

to the President immediately upon the existence of one of th

gency situations for the President’s signature. Briefly, this pr

tion recites the existence of the emergency situation and that i

to immediately protect the country against treason, espionage a

otage the Attorney General is instructed to apprehend all indi

potentially dangerous to the internal security. In order to mak

tive these apprehensions, the proclamation suspends the 

Habeas Corpus for apprehensions made pursuant to it.

The plan also contains a prepared joint resolution to be pa

Congress and an Executive Order for the President which too w

idate the previous Presidential proclamation.

The next step in the plan is a prepared order from the A

General to the Director of the FBI to apprehend dangerous in

als, conduct necessary searches and seize contraband as define

plan. Together with the order to the Director of the FBI the A

General will forward a master warrant attached to a list of na

individuals which names have previously been furnished from 

time to the Attorney General by the FBI as being individuals w

potentially dangerous to the internal security.

It should be pointed out that the plan does not distinguish b

aliens and citizens and both are included in its purview. If for so

son the full plan is not put into operation it has so been drawn 

section applicable only to alien enemies may be put into effect

Action to Be Taken By the FBI

For a long period of time the FBI has been accumulating the 

identities and activities of individuals found to be potentially 

ous to the internal security through investigation. These nam

been compiled in an index which index has been kept up to da

names in this index are the ones that have been furnished to 

partment of Justice and will be attached to the master warrant r

to above. This master warrant will, therefore, serve as legal au

for the FBI to cause the apprehension and detention of the indi

maintained in this index. The index now contains approximately 

thousand individuals, of which approximately ninety-seven p

are citizens of the United States. Immediately upon receipt of 

tions and the master warrant from the Attorney General the 

FBI Field Divisions will be instructed by expeditious means t

the apprehension of the individuals within their various ter

Each FBI Field Division maintains an index of the individuals 

its territory, which index is so arranged that it may be used fo

apprehension purposes. Upon apprehension the individuals 

delivered to the nearest jail for temporary detention and action 

Attorney General.
Detention and Subsequent Procedures

The permanent detention of these individuals will take 

regularly established Federal detention facilities. These facilit

been confidentially surveyed and the facilities have been foun

adequate in all areas except in the territory covered by the FB

York, Los Angeles and San Francisco Offices. In these thre

arrangements have been perfected with the National Military 

lishment for the temporary and permanent detention in Milita

ities of the individuals apprehended.

The plan calls for a statement of charges to be served on e

tainee and a hearing be afforded the individual within a speci

riod. The Hearing Board will consist of three members to be ap

by the Attorney General composed of one Judge of the Unite

or State Court and two citizens. The hearing procedure will 

detainee an opportunity to know why he is being detained and 

him to introduce material in the nature of evidence in his own 

The hearing procedure will not be bound by the rules of eviden

Hearing Board may make one of three recommendations, tha

the individual be detained, paroled or released. This action 

Board is subject to review by the Attorney General and the A

General’s decision on the matter will be final except for appe

President.

The details of this plan as set forth in this communicati

also been furnished on this date to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Execut

retary, National Security Council.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar 

17. Editorial Note

On July 10, 1950, NSC 74, a report to the National Securit

cil by Under Secretary of State James Webb on “A Plan for N

Psychological Warfare,” totalling 51 pages, was circulated to m

of the Council and Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder. 

port dealt largely with wartime contingency planning. It also 

mended that a national psychological warfare organization b

lished. Pursuant to this recommendation and to NSC 59/1 (Do

2), the Department of State announced on August 17 the creat
National Psychological Strategy Board under the Secretary of St

text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, Au

1950, page 335. The board was in fact the Director and Consulta

posed in NSC 59/1, with representatives of the Joint Chiefs o

NSC 74 never received the formal approval of the Council, b

used for reference in subsequent studies of this subject. A copy 

74 is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 6

NSC 74.

18. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 14/11

Washington, July 1

ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY DEFECTOR COMM

1. Pursuant to the provisions of NSCIDs 13 and 14,2 a per

Interagency Defector Committee is hereby established, un

Chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, composed 

representative each from the Central Intelligence Agency, t

partment of State, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and 

Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bu

Investigation.

2. The various Intelligence Advisory Committee represen

acting for their chiefs, will exercise within the Committee all 

of decision defined by and allocated to the various Intelligenc

cies under the provisions of NSCIDs 13 and 14.

3. The Interagency Defector Committee will proceed imme

to implement the Defector Program in accordance with NSC

and 14.

R.H. Hillenk

Director of Cenral Int

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, HS

Box 4. Secret; Security Information. 2 Documents 252 and 253.

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
19. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Communicat

Intelligence Board (Armstrong) to the Executive Secre

the National Security Council (Lay)1

Washington, July 1

SUBJECT

Communications Intelligence Requirements and Mobilization

1. At its Fifty-third meeting, 14 July 1950, the United Stat

munications Intelligence Board (USCIB) reviewed the statu

United States communications intelligence effort in the face 

world situation.

2. The members of the Board agreed unanimously that:

(a) the total communications intelligence requirements 

United States at this time transcend the specific requirements 

ing solely out of the Korean problem;

(b) the present scale of communications intelligence effort 

short of meeting total requirements or even of enabling the 

States to exploit available communications information to 

potential;

(c) the intensification of the effort to meet even current 

ments can be accomplished only slowly because of the tim

involved in obtaining the indispensable security clearances o

personnel and in constructing the complex physical ap

required;

(d) for the foregoing reasons, the expansion of the com

tions intelligence effort must be started now;

(e) partial mobilization in the communications intelligen

should be undertaken on a selective basis immediately.

3. In view of the above, the United States Communicatio

ligence Board recommends to the National Security Council t

matter of urgency:

(a) the National Security Council recognize that expansio

United States communications intelligence effort is required an

earliest possible moment;

(b) the National Security Council recommend to the Presid

the member departments and agencies of the United States C

nications Intelligence Board be authorized to intensify withou

the communications intelligence effort by proceeding with th

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC In

Directives. Top Secret. Lay circulated the memorandum to the NSC the next d
tive mobilization of reserves in this specialized field and with 

eral expansion of other personnel and equipment.2

For the Unite

Communications Intelligence 

W. Park Armstro

2 The Intelligence Advisory Committee approved the recommendation, ad

“intensification” should apply to the entire intelligence structure, not just com

tions intelligence. Hillenkoetter informed NSC Executive Secretary Lay of this 

a memorandum of August 8, and Lay in turn informed the members of the 

memorandum the same day. Both memoranda are ibid. The President appr

USCIB recommendation on July 27 in NSC Action No. 322. (Truman Library, P

Secretary File) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.

20. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoe

the Under Secretary of State (Webb)1

Washington, July 2

Dear Mr. Webb:

The State-Defense Staff Study of 1 May 1950, on “Produ

National Intelligence”, transmitted with your letter of 7 July2 

comments, points up the conflicting theories which have pr

since the inception of CIA on the responsibility within our Gove

for intelligence relating to the national security, i.e., a responsi

gle Director versus a committee of co-equal directors of the sev

telligence agencies.

The proposals set forth in the Staff Study would be so ra

departure from the concept of the Central Intelligence Agency 

visaged by the Congress that there exists at present no legal au

to adopt them.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, Na

telligence Staff Study. Secret. All ellipses in the original letter. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) For the staff study, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, E

of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 420. Apparently, however, the s

sent to Hillenkoetter mistakenly included pages from a “preliminary” or “ea

sion; see Document 22.
As an indication of this Congressional intent, I quote f

statement of the Chairman of the Special Subcommittee of th

Expenditures Committee Investigating Intelligence Activitie

Government (at the time of the Bogota crisis) dated 16 April 1

“It may be necessary for Congress to enact additional leg

to give the CIA the independent status it was generally presu

enjoy . . . . Our Central Intelligence Agency must be protected 

censorship or intimidation by any arm of the Executive Branc

This position has been repeatedly made clear to me in v

every committee session I have attended since assuming the D

ship. It is also a fact that in times of crisis the appropriate C

sional Committees have always called on the Director of Cen

telligence for an accounting and for briefing on the inte

situation. The Congress has always made it amply clear in th

ations that it holds the Director and this Agency completely r

ble in the field of foreign intelligence, and it presumes that this 

has the requisite powers and authorities to make that responsib

fective in the interests of our national security.

The effect of your Staff Study is to abrogate the statutory 

sibility for the production of national intelligence of the Centr

ligence Agency and shift it as a collective responsibility to a c

tee. This is specified in your study as follows:

“Until the emergence of a national estimate or study from 

collective responsibility is inescapable under the Act of 1947 

full statutory responsibility of the D/CI for the production of 

intelligence becomes operative only when . . . final drafts of 

estimates or studies are recommended by the IAC to the D/C

Not only does the National Security Act contemplate no su

trine of collective responsibility, but, in NSC 50,3 the National 

Council specifically disavowed this doctrine in the following la

“. . . we do not believe that the Director and the IAC sh

bound by the concept of collective responsibility because thi

inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowe

mon denominator among the agencies concerned.”

Careful thought and study has been given to the existing N

in its relation to the statutory responsibilities of this Agency. T

ent directives and their implementation have not been sati

There has been prepared for submission to the National Securit

3 For text of NSC 50, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the In

Establishment, Document 384. 4 Ibid., Document 432.
cil a basic NSCID which is attached herewith for your inform

This draft clearly establishes the minimum authorities necessar

able this Agency to fulfill its statutory responsibilities and likew

tablishes the responsibilities of the departmental agencies in 

of national intelligence. Separate specific comments on your Sta

are also attached.6

It is noted that you propose to submit your Staff Study 

proposed NSC Directive direct to the NSC. It is therefore reques

our comments and the inclosure accompany your submission.

As a matter of parallel interest the CIA has been instructed 

NSC to consider through normal NSCID procedure the fo

quoted comments of the Secretary of Defense, and to submit 

mendations in connection therewith:

“I do not find the IAC comments on RECOMMENDATIO

be convincing. Existing directives fall far short of coming to gri

urgent and recognizable problems of coordination of intellig

Washington and overseas. Furthermore, I do not concede t

‘rather elaborate committee structure’ is either inevitable or de

On the contrary, it is my belief that the intricate committee stru

the consequence of compromises created by inter-bureau r

rather than the results of objective study of intelligence organi

Dependable conclusions from . . . intelligence, as from ever

subject matter of national intelligence, should result from eva

and synthesis within the framework of the Central Agency of a

able material from every Federal source. Final responsibility fo

dinating the collection of this material as well as its processing 

rest squarely in the same agency. With that responsibility sho

corresponding authority, which now is ambiguous and obscure

present interlocking committee structure.”

In view of our instructions from the NSC in connection w

statement, it would in any case be incumbent on this Agency 

mit our proposed revision of the NSCID through normal chan

it reflects our considered opinion of what is needed as a prope

dation for the national intelligence mission.

Sincerely,

R. H. Hillenk

Rear Admir

5 Not found.

6 A 7-page paper, July 25, signed by Hillenkoetter, is attached but not pr

7 Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.
21. Memorandum From the Chief of Staff of the Army (C

to Secretary of Defense Johnson1

Washington, July 2

SUBJECT

Expanded Requirements of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) 

of Current World Situation

1. By a memorandum dated 22 June 19502 the Joint Chiefs 

recommended to you that funds be made available to perm

mencing immediate recruiting of additional civilian personne

Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), in order to increa

Agency’s output of communications intelligence. The Director

was thereafter authorized by the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

troller) to commence recruiting, with ultimate ceiling to be dete

later.

2. In the light of the current world situation, as it has de

since 22 June, the necessity for a large increase in output of co

cations intelligence has taken an added degree of urgency. In a

the same developments have generated an additional need for 

expedited production of cryptographic material required by th

forces, and for stepped-up prosecution of already approved 

and development projects in both the communications intellige

communication security fields.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after careful study of the n

volved, recommend as a matter of urgency that the current d

sources of AFSA be increased as follows (these increases incl

additional personnel recommended in the above mentioned 

randum of 22 June 1950):

a. Personal Services (Civilian)

Additional Incr

positions FY 19

Communications

intelligence 1253 $5,2

Communication

security 389 $ 8

Totals.... 1642 $6,1

1 Source: National Archives, RG 218, CCS 334 NSA (7–24–48) Sec. 4 (Forme

Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Assistant to 

of Naval Operations, Director, P&O Air, and Director of the Joint Staff. 2 Not found.
Note—The increased funds include, in addition to salaries of n

sonnel, allowance for overtime to provide for a 6-day work-w

all civilian personnel.

b. Other Objects

Incr

FY 195

Communications intelligence $2,91

Communication security $2,17

Total . . . . $5,09

Note—The increased funds for objects other than personal serv

chiefly to provide supplies and equipment entailed in increased 

pedited effort represented by the recommended increase in per

4. The foregoing amounts include $2,998,000 for research 

velopment, which amount has already been requested of the 

man, Research and Development Board.

5. In addition to the increases in funds and in civilian pe

recommended above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved in

amounting to 244 officers and 464 enlisted men, in the milita

sonnel assigned to AFSA. A program for intercept facilities exp

to be provided for AFSA by the Services is now under consid

by the Armed Forces Security Agency Council. The expande

munications requirements related to this program will be dete

as soon as practicable.

For the Joint Chiefs 

J. Lawton C

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Collins signed the original.
22. Memorandum From the Secretary of State

s Special A

for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to the Unde

Secretary of State (Webb)1

Washington, August 1

SUBJECT

State–Defense Staff Study on “Production of National Intelligence”2

I regret to report the discovery that the staff study enclos

your letter of July 7 to Admiral Hillenkoetter on this subject3 

fact a preliminary version containing three pages which we

amended. While the final version of the paper is not fundam

different, the fact is that only the early version contained the r

to “collective responsibility”—to which Hillenkoetter took str

ception and on which he pinned much of his argument.4

This error, for which I am fully responsible, appears to ha

about through the circumstance that the paper was amended in 

terval between the time it was first presented to you (May 2) 

time when you considered it for the second time and forward

Hillenkoetter (July 7). The amended pages were not substitute

copies in your office, one of which apparently was transmitted 

lenkoetter.

While we feel sure that the CIA reaction to either versio

paper would have been substantially the same, we must of co

the record straight by transmitting the final version of the p

which there was State-Defense agreement. At the same time, 

the chance, however faint, that if Hillenkoetter has any inclin

modify his original and extreme position, forwarding of the la

sion will provide him with a convenient excuse for doing so.

In this connection, General Magruder and Admiral Souer

day discussed the CIA reaction to our proposals. According 

gruder, it is Souers’s view that Hillenkoetter’s position is wro

an effort should be made to make him see the constructive fea

our proposals, and that the later version of the paper may prov

with a convenient “out.” To this end, Souers has suggested 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, N

telligence Staff Study. Secret. Drafted by Trueheart. Sent through the Executive S

2 Dated May 1, 1950; printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence 

telligence Establishment, Document 420. 3 Regarding Webb’s July 7 letter, see footnote 2, Document 20. The enclo

liminary” or “early” version of the State–Defense staff study has not been fou

4 See Document 20.
himself call Hillenkoetter and urge him to set up a meeting 

Magruder could go over the paper with Hillenkoetter and his 

pal assistants.

Before that meeting, however, it will be important that w

Hillenkoetter the correct final version of the paper. The simpl

best way of accomplishing this would be for you to telephone 

ral Hillenkoetter, inform him of the mistake and tell him that 

sending over the correct version of the paper. At the same tim

should mention that you understand that General Magruder 

discussing the subject of national intelligence with him.

Recommendation:

That you telephone Admiral Hillenkoetter along the abov

That you sign the attached letter after making the teleph

which will transmit the corrected paper.5

W. Park Armstro

5 The attached letter and “corrected paper” have not been found, but the 

tachments at the end of the letter identifies the corrected paper as the May 1, 

(see footnote 2 above). 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

23. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, August 2

Set forth below is a brief statement of some of the more p

problems presently facing the Central Intelligence Agency. Th

the subject of extensive studies within the Agency and are v

nously documented in Agency files.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 263, History Staff/History Collection: H

search Project 82–2/00286, Box 4, HS/HC 500, National Intelligence Directive

Not signed but prepared by CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston. Accordin

well Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligenc

1950–February 1953, p. 60, Smith had asked Houston for a review of the prob

ing CIA and Houston responded on this date. A signed copy of Houston’s A

covering memorandum to Smith and another copy of the memorandum for t

are printed in Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, pp. 341–347.
Appended hereto are certain documents which most clear

trate the issues involved and which indicate measures which w

basic steps in the solution thereof. These documents are iden

a list of tabs at the end of this paper.2

1. Coordination of Activities.

Difficulties in coordinating the intelligence activities of t

ernment, and of performing other functions imposed upon CIA 

result from existing National Security Council directives which 

upon CIA the board of directors mechanism of the Intelligenc

sory Committee (IAC) in the following manner:

a. They require that recommendations and advice of the 

of Central Intelligence (DCI) to the National Security Counci

must contain the concurrence or non-concurrence of the IAC;

b. They enable the IAC to assert the position that they 

merely advisory to the DCI, but are actually a board of dire

which the DCI is but the executive secretary, i.e. one among e

c. Therefore the recommendations which go forward to t

are not CIA recommendations as contemplated by the law, b

ally are watered-down compromises, replete with loop-holes, 

tempt to secure complete IAC support.

2. Intelligence Support for Production of Estimates.

Difficulties are encountered by CIA in producing adequa

ligence estimates, due to the refusal of the IAC agencies to ho

requests for necessary intelligence information, departmenta

gence, or collection action:

a. Information has been withheld from CIA by IAC agen

the basis that it is “operational” rather than “intelligence infor

and therefore not available to CIA; that it is “eyes only” info

or on a highly limited dissemination basis; or that it is handle

special security provisions which by-pass CIA;

b. CIA is not empowered to enforce its collection requests 

agencies, or establish priorities;

c. There is a failure of spontaneous dissemination of cert

terial to CIA;

d. IAC agencies continue to cite the so-called “Third Agenc

as a basis for refusing to give intelligence to CIA.

3. Production and Dissemination of Estimates.

The furnishing of adequate national intelligence estimate

President, the NSC, and other appropriate recipients is hamp

2 None of the tabs are attached.
the lack of complete material, (as set forth in paragraph 3, abov

by present procedures which require concurrence or substan

sent to each estimate from the IAC agencies, but make no provi

setting time limits thereon:

a. Departmental agencies of the IAC cannot concur in inte

estimates which conflict with agency substantive policy; nor c

free themselves from departmental bias or budgetary interests

b. Coordination of CIA estimates often takes months, with 

sult a compromise position;

c. Departmental dissents to CIA estimates are frequently 

stantial, quibbling or reflective of departmental policy.

4. Special Problems.

a. The IAC agencies resist the grant of authority to CIA 

directives affecting the intelligence field in general and their a

or priorities in particular on the ground that it would violate t

cept of command channels;

b. The status of CIA in relation to the President and the NS

be redefined and clarified;

c. The relationships between CIA on the one hand, and 

partment of Justice—particularly the FBI, on the other, espec

connection with the defector problem, must be improved and c

d. Difficulties imposed by NSC directives in the field of 

ventional warfare must be eliminated, particularly the policy 

over CIA granted to the Departments of State and Defense. Th

ration of clandestine operations into two offices within CIA cre

rious problems of efficiency, efficacy and, above all, security;

e. There is a failure of coordination of overt intelligence co

in the field, due in part to competition among the department

field, but also to lack of positive planning and action by CIA. 

sults in unnecessary duplication and overlaps, and the initia

holding of choice material. It is becoming necessary for CIA to 

strong position in the field of overt collection abroad.

5. Nuclear Energy and Other Special Intelligence Subjects.

Each has its own but related problems.

6. Relationship Between JCS and CIA in the Event of War.

This is an unresolved problem which has been the subject 

siderable discussion, one aspect of which is covered by Tabs F 

attached. It may of course require urgent consideration at any 

7. Conclusion.

Solution of the above problems lies in a grant of adequate au

to the DCI and CIA, and use of that authority to achieve the ne
coordination by direction rather than placing reliance in a spir

operation and good will.

INDEX OF TABS

Tab A — CIA proposed revision of NSCID #1. This directiv

lieved by CIA to be necessary to give the Director 

thority needed for exercise of his responsibilitie

been forwarded to State for discussion, but no fur

tion has been taken on it.

Tab B — Proposed “Memorandum to the National Securit

cil,” which elaborates paragraphs 1–3 set forth 

memorandum above. This was prepared several 

ago as an introduction to CIA’s proposed rev

NSCID #1, included herewith under Tab A.

Tab C — National Security Council Intelligence Directive (

#1, under which CIA presently operates.3

Tab D — Memorandum entitled “Legal Responsibilities of t

tral Intelligence Agency”, which emphasizes part

Congressional intent in regard to the national inte

mission.

Tab E — Current State/Defense proposals for reorganizati

telligence production within CIA. A compromise 

of this paper is still under discussion.

Tab E/1 — Compromise now urged by State/Defense th

Magruder.

Tab F — Joint Intelligence Committee report on war tim

and responsibilities of CIA and its field agenc

455/1, 12 July 1950). This indicates an intention 

part of the JIC to have JCS take over control of a

activities in the event of war.

Tab G — Memorandum for Brig. Gen. John Magruder, date

gust 1950, setting forth CIA’s position on its war 

lations to the Joint Chiefs. This memorandum w

nally drafted for dispatch to the Secretary of Defe

was actually dispatched to General Magruder.

3 Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishme

ment 432.
24. Memorandum From the Secretary of State

s Special As

for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to the Unde

Secretary of State (Webb)1

Washington, September 1

SUBJECT

Review of Relations with CIA

The purpose of this review is twofold:

1. To give you a general roundup of the state of our relatio

the CIA at this juncture, as a new Director is coming in;

2. To ascertain which, if any, issues should be discussed w

miral Hillenkoetter as a result of your letter,2 written just prior 

departure for Europe, in which you suggested getting togeth

him to take up any problems which exist in relation to one pa

phase of the Department’s relations with CIA, namely, secret 

gence [1 line not declassified].

Any review such as this naturally focuses on areas of di

these, however, must be kept in the perspective of our total r

which in a great number of areas are on the whole satisfactory

connection it should be pointed out that the Department’s r

with CIA on the following important matters are of the best:

1. Defectors—each case invariably presents a knotty probl

in the course of the last six months they have been smooth

cooperatively dealt with by the Department, CIA, and the M

Services.

2. Foreign Broadcast Monitoring—an important “service of c

concern” in which CIA produces for the Department and othe

cies a vast quantity of voice monitoring reports.

3. Scientific Intelligence—A “service of common concern” a

a coordinating mechanism in which CIA’s performance has bee

This office also works very closely with U/A, Mr. Arneson.

1 Source: Department of State, A/MS Files: Lot 54 D 291, CIA 1948–1952. T

The memorandum was under cover of a September 19 memorandum from C.E

of the Management Staff of the Bureau of Administration to Humelsine, which 

that a September 20 meeting was scheduled among Webb, Humelsine, Armst

Howe to review relations with the CIA and Johnson’s recommendations for chan

proposed memorandum to Webb. Johnson recommended adding a statement 

adequacy of CIA’s intelligence collection and production. He further wanted to 

reference to showing the memorandum to Smith, preferring this be conveyed 

orally. He also believed Smith should be invited to the Department for the me

briefed on the Department of State role in and capabilities for intelligence. 2 Not found.
4. Contacts Branch—again a 

service of common concern i

CIA exploits the foreign intelligence available in the US throu

tacts with foreign nationality groups and individuals and US b

firms with representatives abroad.

I should point out also that whereas the problems which 

discuss below are focused primarily in OSO (secret intelligen

ORE (research intelligence) it should not be construed that tro

ists with these offices on all points. Rather, there is a wide are

operative effort and useful collaboration and liaison with onl

if significant, areas of disagreement on policy or method.

By way of general comment I would like to indicate that t

two factors in CIA attitude and method which we find difficul

with and which are often a source of misunderstanding:

a. CIA is reluctant to give us full information—especially 

tarily, but even after request. This applies to some intelligenc

mation and also to activities in which they participate. In this 

view that they carry security too far, or use security as an ex

withholding information.

b. Similarly, we find CIA reluctant to come to us directly w

problems, to identify issues and seek solutions directly. We g

plaints, but we find an unhealthy lack of direct approach to us 

ior officers seeking constructive solutions to problems large an

which inevitably arise.

The following outline summarizes the points of difficulty, 

and potential, in our relations with CIA.

I. Coordination of Intelligence Activities.

The Department has long felt that CIA has been deficien

filling its responsibilities for leadership and direction in the co

tion of intelligence throughout the Government. This respo

within CIA is fulfilled essentially by two mechanisms:

a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) compose

Chiefs of each of the intelligence services, advisory to the Dir

b. A staff office (COAPS) composed of officers contribute

various agencies and headed by a State Department officer, r

ble to the Director and charged with formulating any proced

the coordination of intelligence activities.

The Department is confident that change for the better ca

ticipated not only by virtue of the new Director who will ass

chairmanship of the IAC and should fulfill the leadership exp

the Director of CIA in coordination matters, but also through 

pointment of James Q. Reber as the State Department officer in 

of COAPS, who will also be Executive Secretary of the IAC.

I believe that no useful purpose would be served by discu

this matter with the outgoing Director.
II. Intelligence Collection Programs.

This problem, which has very wide implications and is 

up by the Korean incident, is discussed in a separate, accomp

memorandum.3

No useful purpose would be served by a discussion of the 

at this time with the Director.

III. Research Intelligence and “National Intelligence.”

The difficulties which have arisen between the Departm

CIA in this area stem from divergence of views as to the nature 

tional intelligence” and the method of producing it on the on

and, on the other, a conflict of ideas on the location of responsi

the Department and CIA for the production of research intellig

the political and economic fields. The latter of these two prob

perennial and may in some measure be clarified with a solutio

problem of national intelligence. In any event, the steps neces

bring this problem to a solution will only come in time and sh

improved with the arrival of the new Director.

Some advance has been made in the problem of “nationa

gence” which was sharpened by your exchange of letters with 

ral Hillenkoetter on the joint State-Defense proposal. General Ma

has made a preliminary exploration with Admiral Hillenkoet

believes that an area of agreement may be possible.

Pending the outcome of these negotiations and the install

the new Director on whose decision any final revision will de

believe no useful purpose would be served in raising this matt

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

IV. Organization for Secret Intelligence (OSO) and Secret 

Operations (OPC).

You will remember that some months ago general agreem

reached between the Department of Defense, CIA/OSO, CIA

and ourselves on a reorganization which would combine OSO an

and would take the form of an NSC directive (proposed NSC 

Further action on this document, however, was delayed pendin

lution to the problem of personnel involved in the reorganizat

now must await the new Director for action and implementati

No useful purpose, therefore, would be served by discuss

this matter with Admiral Hillenkoetter. However, you should 

3 Dated September 14; attached but not printed.

4 Further information on the proposed merger is in Foreign Relations, 1

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 419. The draft NSC 

printed as an attachment to that document.
that although there is no disagreement as between the Departm

State and Defense and CIA on this question, the Defense Depar

currently considering a revision of authorities for wartime with 

both to OSO and OPC activities, and this may present some dif

V. [Heading and 10 paragraphs (49 lines) not declassified]

VI. CIA Budget.

Each year the CIA submits an over-all budget figure to t

prior to submission to the Bureau of the Budget. It appears th

the course of the last few years no agency—neither the NSC 

Budget Bureau nor the Office of the President, nor, for that matt

gressional committees—examines the CIA budget with any th

ness to warrant assumption of the responsibility for approval

At best it is a very difficult matter to determine what degr

view should be made of the CIA budget to bring about a bala

tween the security factors which are obviously involved on 

hand, and the minimum requirements for assumption of resp

ity by the Secretaries of State and Defense in the NSC, on the 

Last year at your suggestion General Magruder and Halaby 

fense, and Sheppard and Howe for the State Department, we

an informal presentation of the budget programs for some of th

of CIA. This was an initial step on the part of the NSC to form 

for judgment for approval of the budget. Since that time an ef

been made by the Departments of State and Defense to arrive 

mula for an annual review of the budget. Consideration was g

instance, to the possibility of appointing each year a special ad h

level group under the NSC for this specific purpose. More ac

seems the possibility that the Director submit to the IAC on 

basis for its comment the budget programs of the several CIA o

that the NSC would at least have the benefit of the IAC advice

This problem has advanced no further and almost surely 

await the installation of the new Director and a new look at th

lem with him. (As yet no discussions on this subject have be

with CIA itself.) In the meantime, no purpose would seem to b

in a discussion of the problem with Admiral Hillenkoetter.

General Conclusion.

1. The Department’s relations with CIA are, with some exc

satisfactory.

2. The areas of difficultly are by no means impossible of 

and most, if not all, should be soluble with the new Director.

3. Although you asked to have a meeting with Admi

lenkoetter on your return, we know of no problems between th

cies which are of a kind that can be solved by such a discussi
Recommendations:

1. That you take the opportunity to ask Admiral Hillenkoet

has any matters he wants to discuss, but you do not press for a m

2. That you consider showing this memorandum to Genera

on a personal and informal basis soon after he takes office.5

W. Park Armstro

5 A handwritten comment in the margin just below this paragraph read

adequate?” 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

25. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/21

Washington, September 2

PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICAL NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

In accordance with DCI 4/1,2 paragraph 3, the following 

critical national intelligence objectives, with respect to the USS

tablished; so the highest priority shall be given to the collectio

formation and to the production of intelligence concerning So

pabilities and intentions for:

1. taking direct military action against the Continental United 

2. taking direct military action, employing USSR Armed 

against vital U.S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Uni

Western Europe;

3. interfering with U.S. strategic air attack;

4. interfering with U.S. movement of men and material b

transport;

5. production and stockpiling, including location of insta

and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical w

and equipment, and critical transportation equipment;

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 78

Folder 35, Box 2. Secret. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, Box 4)
6. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to 

tional security, short of commitment of Soviet Armed Forces, 

ing foreign directed sabotage and espionage objectives;

7. interfering with U.S. political, psychological, and e

courses of action for the achievement of critical U.S. aims and ob

R. H. Hillen

Rear Admir

Director of Central Int

26. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Off

of Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence 

Agency to Thomas A. Parrott of the Office of Policy

Coordination1

Washington, October 1

SUBJECT

Quarterly PW Guidance Report

1. Psychological warfare policy guidance for OPC activi

received from two principal sources during the past quarter. M

this guidance came from the OPC Consultants, while some 

ceived from the National Psychological Strategy Board (form

Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization, on whi

functioned in consultant status).

2. From the OPC Consultants, the following guidance wa

OPC in matters of Psychological Warfare:

a. At the meeting of 9 August 1950, Mr. Joyce (State) agre

the opinion that OPC should no longer engage in [less than 1 

declassified] motion pictures. He stated that this should be treat

overt matter and that such matters would be handled elsewhe

b. On the same date, it was agreed that any possible 

propaganda balloons [less than 1 line not declassified] should 

publicized.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 8

Box 3. Top Secret.
c. On 23 August 1950, the consultants agreed that there 

objection on policy grounds to OPC proposals for the use of b

from time to time [less than 1 line not declassified].

d. At the meeting of 13 September 1950, Admiral Stevens 

cautioned against any attempt to use Navy vessels as cover 

than 1 line not declassified] psychological warfare operations. H

that the Navy could furnish technical advice as to the feasib

water-borne operations but that no warships would be made a

for this purpose.

e. On 20 September 1950 the consultants stated that in p

and executing covert psychological warfare operations OPC 

consider decisions of the National Psychological Strategy Board 

stituting governing policy.

f. Again on 20 September, Mr. Hulick (OPC) referred to a 

decision of the National Psychological Strategy Board to the eff

balloons other than those of the toy variety would not be used f

or covert propaganda against Iron Curtain countries without pr

cific permission from the Board. Such a medium will be reserv

particularly important message. It was stated that this policy i

means irrevocable and that proposals for OPC action in this field 

be considered on their merits.

3. Guidance received from the National Psychological S

Board:

a. On 14 July 1950, Mr. Barrett (State) announced the form

an ad hoc coordinating group composed of State, Army, Navy, Ai

and JSPD members, chaired by Mr. Jos. Phillips, State. This gro

to coordinate information policy guidance in connection with 

rean situation. OPC made arrangements to have a member pr

the ad hoc meetings, and overt guidance discussed therein was 

later into general materials for OPC Area Divisions. Guidance r

at meetings for this inter-service group was indirect and irregu

only used when appropriate to OPC methods and channels.

b. At the same meeting of 14 July, Mr. Wisner (OPC) refer

decision, approved by the Department of State, to permit the N

Committee for Free Europe to use certain material attributing 

sibility of the Korean situation to the Soviets.

c. On Tuesday, 15 August 1950, the Board discussed atte

defeat the admission of Communist China to the Security Coun

Board felt that [less than 1 line not declassified] propaganda iden

Communist China participation in the Korean situation migh

tremely effective in certain limited areas. Mr. Phillips (State) r

to a suggestion that we might give circulation to reports or 

that the Soviets did not actually want to seat the Chinese C

nists in the UN. Mr. Barrett (State) saw no objection to this on 
grounds and undertook to review the policy question of limite

use.

d. On 21 August 1950, Mr. Barrett (State) reported the 

mendations of his department on identification of Chinese Com

participation in the Korean war. Such action was approved. (S

above.)

e. At a special meeting of 13 September 1950, it was dec

the Board that the use of balloons as a propaganda carrying m

against the Iron Curtain countries would not at that time achi

important advantage; the potential value of balloons was de

have been sufficiently established to justify the further devel

and stockpiling of balloons for use in an emergency or in time 

OPC was given the responsibility of doing so.

f. The [less than 1 line not declassified] was discussed on 

tember 1950, and Gen. Magruder (Defense) expressed the n

handout materials explaining [less than 1 line not declassified

public.

g. At the meeting of 25 September 1950, Mr. [name not dec

(OPC) was asked to comment on the progress of the balloon 

and in doing so Mr. [name not declassified] requested authoriz

coordinate with ONR on research, which was agreed to. A uni

ply to private inquiries re government use of balloons was ag

“The matter is under continuous study by agencies of the gove

but disclosure of results at this time would not be in the publ

est.” The Board decided that utilization of large balloons wou

be desirable on extraordinary basis to seek to reach large num

hind the Curtain with important messages. The right of decisio

them was held by the NPSB. The Board further indicated at t

that any use of balloons for propaganda purposes, whether 

small (toy variety) would be a matter falling under its jurisdict

that such uses should be for Board decision. In view of the pre

uation, OPC was admonished to procure balloons for these p

simultaneously with the fostering of training of personnel, ad

research and experimentation. [11

⁄2 lines not declassified]

[name not dec
27. Memorandum From Theodore Babbitt, Ludwell Monta

and Forrest Van Slyck of the Office of Research and

Evaluation of the Central Intelligence Agency to the D

Director of Central Intelligence (Jackson)1

Washington, October 1

SUBJECT

Plan for a CIA Office of Estimates

1. Pursuant to your oral instructions given on 7 October w

mit, in Enclosure A, an outline plan for a CIA Office of Estima

2. The end in view cannot be accomplished by reorgan

within CIA alone. Successful implementation of this plan will 

complementary action to ensure adequate research support by 

partmental agencies and a cooperative attitude in the process 

coordination of estimates. The plan should not be put into effe

these requirements have been reasonably met.

3. Details of the structure and strength of the Office of Es

will depend to a considerable extent on the composition and c

ities of the proposed Office of Research, as well as upon the de

research support which can be reasonably expected from the 

mental agencies, especially OIR. Consequently the elaboration 

closure A should be deferred until these matters are sufficient

fied to afford a sound basis for further planning.

4. Some concrete problems which will arise in the course 

ganization with CIA and related negotiations with the IAC a

are set forth in Enclosure B.2

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–T00286R, Box 

2. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned. 2 Not found.
Enclosure A

ROUGH PLAN FOR AN OFFICE OF ESTIMATES

This plan is based on the concepts held in 1945–46 and m

cently set forth in the Dulles Report,4 NSC 50,5 and the “We

posals”.6 One point must be made absolutely clear however, 

to avoid the patent defects of a joint committee system. It mus

derstood by all concerned that the Director at his level 

Assistant Director at his, having heard all the pertinent evide

argument, have a power of decision with respect to the form a

tent of the estimate, other interested parties retaining the right t

divergent views when these relate to substantial issues and ser

crease the reader’s comprehension of the problem, and then o

The plan also presupposes:

a. The establishment of a Research Office in CIA to provi

ligence research reports in fields of common concern (e.g., sc

economic, geographic).

b. Action to make sure of the availability of research supp

the departmental agencies adequate to meet the requirement

Estimates Office as to both timeliness and content. This condit

not be met at present.

c. The recruitment of requisite senior personnel as rapidly 

sible. The contemplated Office cannot be adequately manned w

sonnel now in CIA.

d. Thorough indoctrination of the IAC agencies in the new, 

ative concept, and a new start in relations with them. Initiatio

plan in the atmosphere which now exists would very probably b

by them as an opportunity to impose on the partly imaginary C

which they have long contended. This plan will not work except 

sis of mutual confidence and cooperation in the national interes

Organization and Functions

Office of the Assistant Director

Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director

Coordination and Liaison Staff

Administrative Staff

3 Confidential.

4 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 358. 5 Ibid., Document 384.

6 Ibid., Documents 378, 380, and 404.
Coordination and Liaison Staff (For supporting argumentation se

Annex to this Enclosure.)7

A. Composition.

1. One full-time representative each designated by the IA

resentatives of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force respectively.

2. A similar representative of the CIA research office (or pa

representation of each of its major components?).

3. CIA Staff Assistant, NSC Staff.

4. A similar CIA representative with OSD and JIG.

5. Executive Secretariat.

B. Functions.

1. In general, to represent the interest of their respective a

in the Estimates Office, and the interest of the Estimates Office 

respective agencies.

2. Specifically, to assist the Assistant Director in:

a. Developing the estimates production program.

b. Formulating the terms of reference for particular estim

c. Formulating requests for research support and ob

prompt and effective compliance therewith. d. Reviewing the estimates produced prior to their submi

the Director and the IAC.

e. Securing IAC concurrence, or at least the formulation of 

in the light of joint consideration.

Administrative Staff

Personnel, fiscal, and administrative services.

Receipt and dissemination services.

Reproduction services.

Current Intelligence Division

Production of the Daily Summary.

Editing and publishing of other periodical reviews.

Custody of sensitive material.

Maintenance of situation room.

Maintenance of off-hours watch.

7 Not printed.
Five Regional Divisions: American, North Atlantic, East European,

Southern, and Far Eastern.

A. Composition

1. Senior analysts well qualified by aptitude and experi

critical appraisal of current information and research data, for 

ception of emergent trends, and for interpretation of the sign

of current or anticipated developments. While every sort of exp

political, economic, military, and area—should be represented, 

phasis should be on appreciation of the effect of all factors in 

nation.

2. Integral research support for these senior analysts, t

them by keeping track of current developments, organizing 

data from various sources, doing leg work, and drafting und

direction.

B. Functions

1. Surveillance of the developing situation, consultative g

of the Current Intelligence Division, and the initiation of resear

ects and of estimates as required.

2. Production of estimates falling within Divisional comp

3. Provision of appropriate expert participation in task 

formed to produce estimates of broader scope.

Functional Division

Provision of expertise (e.g., scientific, economic, geograph

quired on a functional rather than regional basis.

General Division

A very few analysts of broad competence rather than pa

specialization, to concern themselves with the interrelation

developments falling within the cognizance of two or more d

and to provide leadership for task groups set up to deal w

problems.
28. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Web

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Counc

(Lay)1

Washington, October 1

SUBJECT

Second Progress Report on NSC 59/1 “The Foreign Information Program 

Psychological Warfare Planning”2

NSC 59/1 was approved as Government policy on March 1

It is requested that this Progress Report as of September 30, 1

circulated to the members of the Council for their information

With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the Secretary of St

immediate steps to meet the urgent requirements of the situation

steps included:

(1) the issuance of public policy guidance for all U. S. Gove

information media on Korea;

(2) the establishment within the Department of State of an 

interdepartmental group to facilitate rapid coordination, especi

tween the Department of State and the Department of Defense, 

chological warfare policy matters in connection with the Korea si

(3) the establishment of communications with Toyko, with 

partment of the Army as executive agent, and transmission to C

of numerous suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of o

chological warfare effort in Korea;

(4) the assignment to the psychological warfare section 

lished by General MacArthur in G–2 of Department of State in

tion specialists normally attached to the information staff of 

sador Muccio3 in Korea.

In order to meet the requirements of further situations in 

joint political and military action is required in the psychologic

fare field, the Secretary of State took action to strengthen the 

organization under NSC 59/1.

With the concurrence of the Interdepartmental Foreign In

tion Organization, the Department of State on August 16, ann

the establishment of a national psychological strategy board t

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Psyc

Warfare. Secret. This memorandum was circulated by Lay on October 17 as a 

Security Council Progress Report. (Ibid.) 2 For text of NSC 59/1, see Document 2; the text of the first progress repor

59/1, June 21, is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148

logical Warfare. 3 Ambassador to Korea John J. Muccio.
out the functions assigned to the present Organization as esta

under NSC 59/1.4 Instead of serving simply as policy consulta

representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of S

the Director of Central Intelligence are meeting regularly each 

members of the Board with the Assistant Secretary of State fo

Affairs as Chairman. Liaison representatives from the Nation

rity Resources Board and the Economic Cooperation Admin

are also meeting with the Board. A liaison representative from t

tral Intelligence Agency will be available to attend Board mee

required for intelligence matters. In addition to the responsibili

down in NSC 59/1, the Secretary of State is looking to the B

concrete advice on both policy and operating problems in cur

uations where joint political and military action is required in 

chological warfare field.

The Board has taken action on a report forwarded by the 

partmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS) on August 16, 

mending adequate research and development on balloons for 

use as an alternative means of reaching the Soviet Union in th

of war or in the absence of diplomatic relations. The Centra

gence Agency has been requested to arrange for the devel

and stocking of suitable types of balloons for possible use in em

or war.

Other IFIS reports considered by the Organization include 

training of personnel for psychological warfare and foreign infor

The report prepared by the Organization on a Plan for 

logical Warfare was transmitted to the Executive Secretary, N

Security Council on July 7, 1950.5 This report has been distrib

consideration by the NSC and is now under study by the in

Departments and Agencies.

James E

4 Reference is to the National Psychological Strategy Board; see Documen

the establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board on April 4, 1951 (see D

60), the National Psychological Strategy Board was redesignated the Psycholo

erations Coordinating Committee. 5 See Document 17.

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Webb signed the original.
29. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Com

IAC–M–1 Washington, October 2

PARTICIPANTS

Director of Central Intelligence Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, 

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department o

Major General R. J. Canine, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Dep

of the Army

Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence

Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, 

United States Air Force

Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission

Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, Deputy Director for Intelligence, 

The Joint Staff

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bure

of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. William H. Jackson, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Fisher Howe, Department of State

Colonel Hamilton Howze, Department of the Army

Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy

Brigadier General E. Moore, Department of the Air Force

Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, Atomic Energy Commission

Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff

1. The agenda of the meeting was “Policies and Procedure

Intelligence Advisory Committee.”

CIA Developments

2. In opening the meeting, General Smith gave a brief rés

some of the problems affecting the Central Intelligence Agency 

were deemed of interest to the members of the Intelligence A

Committee. He referred specifically to certain drafts of propos

directives, which were under discussion at the time General Sm

over the duties of Director of Central Intelligence between repr

tives of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of St

the Department of Defense. In general, the drafts under discussi

designed to implement NSC 50.2 By agreement of the Dire

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 59 D 27, IAC Minutes 11

12/20/1951, Box 71. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. T

ing was held in the Director’s Conference Room at the Central Intelligence Ag

2 For text of NSC 50, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the In

Establishment, Document 384.
Central Intelligence, the Department of State and Departmen

fense, further consideration of these drafts was terminated on 

sis of General Smith’s assurance that NSC 50 constituted a s

directive at the present time. General Smith stated that NSC 50

effect in substance to the recommendations of the so-called Dull

mittee Report, had not yet been carried out by the Central Inte

Agency but that it was his intention promptly to carry out th

tive except in one respect.

3. The exception related to the merger of the Office of Spe

erations, the Office of Policy Coordination, and the Contact Br

the Office of Operations. This merger was considered neither p

nor advisable at this time. General Smith said he believed the 

nation of these offices, as recommended by the Dulles Report 

corporated in the directive from the National Security Counc

be achieved by more effective cooperation without actual merg

eral Smith’s position in regard to this aspect of NSC 50 had bee

clear to the National Security Council at its meeting on 12 Octob

and had been approved by the Council.3

4. General Smith also stated that he had encountered 

problem in the Central Intelligence Agency which arose out o

sion as to the position of the Office of Policy Coordination in 

to the Central Intelligence Agency and to OPC’s guidance f

Department of State and the Department of Defense. Genera

said that he construed NSC 10/2,4 though somewhat ambigu

giving clear responsibility and authority to the Director of Ce

telligence for the activities of the Office of Policy Coordinat

said that guidance from the Department of State and the Dep

of Defense was essential for the success of these operations a

as a matter of procedure, he was willing that such guidance b

by representatives of the Department of State and the Depart

Defense directly to Mr. Wisner. However, Mr. Wisner would 

der the authority and subject to the control of the Director of 

Intelligence, who, under NSC 10/2, was responsible for Mr. W

operations.

Meetings of the IAC

5. In referring directly to the work of the Intelligence A

Committee in the future, General Smith expressed his opinion 

Committee should meet more often and for longer periods al

3 The NSC meeting of October 12 is mentioned in Montague, Walter Bede

Director of Central Intelligence, p. 66. Smith became DCI on October 7, 1950. 4 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 292.
as chairman, he would make every effort to keep the meetings 

as possible. He stated that the Intelligence Advisory Committe

be geared for rapid cooperative work.

National Intelligence Estimates

6. In opening the subject of national intelligence estimate

eral Smith read from a memorandum written by Mr. William H

son, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, as follows:5

The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for N

Intelligence Estimates.

One of the principal duties assigned to the Central Inte

Agency “for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activ

the several Government departments and agencies in the int

national security” is “to correlate and evaluate intelligence rel

the national security, and provide for its appropriate dissemin

The Central Intelligence Agency is thus given the responsibility 

ing to it that the United States has adequate central machinery 

examination and interpretation of intelligence so that the nati

curity will not be jeopardized by failure to coordinate the best 

gence opinion in the country, based on all available informatio

Although the Act6 provides that “the departments and othe

cies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, co

and disseminate departmental intelligence,” the statute does n

the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency to correlate and e

intelligence, except by the standard of “national security.”

The purport of the National Security Act can be understo

justified in the light of the history and general objectives of t

Behind the concept of a Central Intelligence Agency lay the n

not only for the coordination of diversified intelligence activit

for the performance by the central agency itself of certain ser

common usefulness, but also for the coordination of intelligenc

ion in the form of reports or estimates affecting generally the n

security as a whole.

The Act apparently gives the Central Intelligence Agency 

dependent right of producing national intelligence. As a practic

ter, such estimates can be written only with the collaboration of 

in many fields of intelligence and with the cooperation of sev

partments and agencies of the Government. A national intellig

port or estimate as assembled and produced by the Central Inte

5 The full text of Jackson’s memorandum has not been found.

6 Reference is to the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80–253), enacted 

1947; 61 Stat. 495–510.
Agency should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence 

based on all available information. It should deal with topics 

scope relevant to the determination of basic policy, such as the 

ment of a country’s war potential, its preparedness for war, it

gic capabilities and intentions, its vulnerability to various form

rect attack or indirect pressures. An intelligence estimate of suc

would go beyond the competence of any single Department or 

of the Government. A major objective, then, in establishing the 

Intelligence Agency was to provide the administrative machi

the coordination of intelligence opinion, for its assembly and 

objectively and impartially, and for its expression in the form 

mates of national scope and importance.

The concept of national intelligence estimates underly

statute is that of an authoritative interpretation and appraisal t

serve as a firm guide to policy-makers and planners. A nation

ligence estimate should reflect the coordination of the best inte

opinion, with notation of and reasons for dissent in the instanc

there is not unanimity. It should be based on all available info

and be prepared with full knowledge of our own plans and in 

of our own policy requirements. The estimate should be comp

assembled centrally by an agency whose objectivity and disint

ness are not open to question. Its ultimate approval should re

the collective judgment of the highest officials in the various 

gence agencies. Finally, it should command recognition and 

throughout the Government as the best available and presum

most authoritative intelligence estimate.

Although the task is made more difficult by a lack of gen

ceptance of the concept of national intelligence estimates in t

ernment, it is, nevertheless, the clear duty and responsibility of 

tral Intelligence Agency under the statute to assemble and 

such coordinated and authoritative estimates.

7. There followed a discussion of the above excerpt from th

orandum and there was general assent at the meeting to its st

of the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for nati

telligence estimates. General Smith stated that, in order to d

this responsibility, he proposed at the earliest possible time t

in the Central Intelligence Agency an Office of National Estima

division, in his opinion, would become the heart of the Centr

ligence Agency and of the national intelligence machinery. Ser

common concern, now performed in the present Office of Rep

Estimates but not including the production of political inte

would be placed in a separate office or division which might p

be called the Office of Research and Reports. The latter would 

its activities to the production of reports as a service of comm

cern in fields assigned specifically by directives of the Nation
rity Council. It was pointed out by Mr. Jackson that the fact 

Office of Reports and Estimates has in the past produced both n

estimates and miscellaneous reports in various fields, which co

possibly be construed as national estimates, had blurred and co

both the product and function of the Office of Reports and Es

There has been insufficient differentiation between the form 

coordination procedure in connection with the two products 

their methods of production.

8. General Smith said that, as to the matter of form, in the 

intelligence estimates produced by the Central Intelligence Ag

the basis of intelligence contributions from the various inte

agencies and concurred in or dissented from by the respectiv

cies would be published under a cover showing plainly that t

mate was a collective effort the result of which would be labe

national intelligence estimate.

Action

9. After discussion the following procedural steps were 

upon in the production of national estimates:

a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee will adopt an inte

plan, or more specifically, a list of required national estimates i

der of priority.

b. In the case of a particular estimate, a frame of reference 

assumptions on which the estimate is based will be discussed 

proved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

c. Work on the estimate will be referred in the first instanc

Office of Reports and Estimates, or to the Office of National Es

when it is established in the Central Intelligence Agency, and t

eral intelligence agencies will be consulted and a time-table fi

contributions to the national estimate within the fields of their 

tive interests.

d. On the basis of these contributions, the Central Inte

Agency will produce a first draft of the proposed national es

e. This draft will be sent back to the agencies for comm

modification and for further discussion if required. On the basis 

comments and discussion, the Central Intelligence Agency w

duce a second draft of the estimate.

f. This second, or later drafts if required, will be submitte

Intelligence Advisory Committee for final discussion, resolution 

ferences and approval. g. If differences cannot be resolved and approval obtained

timate will be published with notation of substantial dissent a

sons therefor.

It was made clear by General Smith that this procedure wo

and could not be followed in the case of so-called “crisis estima

the event of need arising for a quick or crisis estimate, a procedu

ilar to that used in the recent instance when the President call

series of estimates prior to his departure for the meeting with G
MacArthur would be followed.

That is, a special meeting of 

telligence Advisory Committee will be called and representativ

various intelligence agencies assigned at once to the product

draft of the required estimate for immediate submission to the 

gence Advisory Committee for discussion, revision and appro

Agenda for the Next IAC Meeting

Action:

10. It was determined that at the next meeting of the Inte

Advisory Committee there would be discussion of national e

priorities and the frame of references and assumptions to form 

sis of an intelligence estimate of the situation in Indo-China. It w

agreed that at a future date General Smith will produce a p

submission to the Intelligence Advisory Committee indicating 

Central Intelligence Agency will function in the theater of oper

time of war. The next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Co

was scheduled for Wednesday, 25 October, 3:00 P.M.

7 The resultant Korean “estimates” are reprinted in Michael Warner, ed

Under Harry Truman, pp. 349–372.

30. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special A

for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Secretary 

State Acheson1

Washington, October 2

SUBJECT

NSC Consideration of CIA Budget

Annually the CIA has submitted for NSC approval a bu

which it proposes to seek appropriation. This “budget” usu

been stated simply as a total figure and, until last year, approve

out extensive consideration by the NSC or its staff.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 

Top Secret. This memorandum received the concurrence of Humelsine, Je

Matthews. Document 24 provides background on this issue.
For the 1950–51 year representatives of State and Defense 

view in a cursory fashion the budget programs of several of t

offices prior to NSC approval of the figure “for submission to 

reau of the Budget.” Subsequently, State and Defense gav

thought to the difficult problem of how, without compromising 

curity of the Agency, to fulfill its responsibility by a more satis

review of the CIA budget.

With the recent change in leadership in CIA, however, it no 

seems appropriate to suggest that a detailed NSC examination 

budget should take place; rather, there should be an indication 

NSC and the Departments of State and Defense have confidenc

new Director. It is quite likely that General Smith will voluntee

cuss some of his plans and programs with the Council.

Recommendations:

1. That the NSC approve the budget figure as submitted.

2. That, if appropriate and without indicating any lack o

dence, you might suggest in the course of the discussions that i

be helpful if General Smith, during the course of the year, wou

sider the problem of how the NSC can best fulfill its respons

with respect to the CIA budget and recommend procedures 

would permit the fulfillment of those responsibilities withou

promising the security of his Agency.

31. Memorandum for the Record by the Assistant Director 

for Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence 

Agency (Wisner)1

Washington, November 

SUBJECT

Relationship with ECA; conversations between top-ranking ECA and CI

officials on 2 November 1950

1. This memorandum will record the highlights of a con

which took place on Thursday 2 November between General 

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80

Box 3. Top Secret. Drafted on November 7.
Mr. Jackson and the undersigned for CIA, and Messrs. Fos

Bissell for ECA. At the outset of the meeting, I was requested 

eral Smith to summarize the history of the relationship whic

ceeded to do by giving a brief but general chronological accoun

origin and development of our dealings with ECA, together wi

or four illustrations of the activities in which we have been joi

gaged. At the conclusion of this résumé I emphasized our con

the score of security breaches and operational and other impro

as regards the use of counterpart funds. After giving a numb

lustrations of these unhappy developments and after referring 

eral of the points made by Mr. Harriman in his most recent co

tions with me, I stated that it seemed to me that there had b

chief types of insecurity and that there were two methods which 

be employed in order to clear up as much of the difficulty as p

2. The two types of action which had given us concern an

promise to create much more serious problems for all who are i

unless they can be brought to an end are (a) loosetalk, i.e., the t

on the part of certain ECA labor and public relations people to ta

matters which were none of their concern and with unauthoriz

ple; and (b) clumsy and dangerously insecure attempts on the 

ECA labor and public relations officials [less than 1 line not decla

acknowledged that we might not have been entirely without fa

selves and I said that we had taken a number of steps to tig

within our own organization, but I said that it seemed that act

in order on the part of Messrs. Foster and Bissell to clear up t

culties within ECA. It was agreed by Messrs. Foster and Bissell th

actions should be taken and that as a first step fresh directives 

be prepared to all ECA personnel concerned, [1 line not declas

was further agreed that I should endeavor to work this out with 

sell at an early meeting (meeting set for two P.M., 10 Nov 50)2 

not declassified].

3. [1 paragraph (29 lines) not declassified]

4. Mr. Foster then referred to a number of other projects w

pending before him at the present time. He said that he had 

proved these projects because he had not received enough info

about them to enable him to exercise his judgment. [3 lines no

sified] He requested that further information be supplied to 

these and the other projects before him and I agreed to furnish 

formation either to himself or in his absence to Mr. Bissell. (It s

me that either Mr. Foster has forgotten what we have told him 

2 A handwritten note in the left margin reads, “Staff I to prepare draft.” S

part of OPC.
we have not done a proper job of providing details—with a th

sibility that Mr. Tappin may not have passed on to Mr. Foster 

formation which we have provided to him about the project

consideration.)3

5. I inquired as to whether Mr. Bissell would be authorize

on matters of common concern, including the approval of pro

the absence of Mr. Foster, who will be out of the country for 

weeks on a round-the-world tour. Mr. Foster acknowledged t

Bissell would have full authority in his absence. (Accordin

should endeavor to clear these matters with Mr. Bissell at a ve

meeting and I should like to be reminded of this and provid

the papers and a reasonable oral briefing. I consider this to be 

sponsibility of Colonel Taylor as to the pending projects.)4

6. There were some very favorable comments made ab

progress of our [less than 1 line not declassified] operations and all 

that there was not only success here but immeasurable success i

of evident results. The situation as regards [less than 1 line not 

fied] operations was acknowledged to be by no means as clear

called upon for an explanation of this, I said that the principal p

arose from the fact that the leadership of the [less than 1 line not 

fied] has been weak and vacillating and that it has not been pos

press them as far as the [less than 1 line not declassified] have gon

ther said that our approach had been more along the lines of b

up the younger and more vigorous elements [less than 1 line not 

fied] and providing them with encouragement, guidance and fu

specific projects. General Smith commented that we should c

along this line especially that of building up vigorous youn

ments—but that we should take our own independent sounding

[less than 1 line not declassified] situation at a very early date with 

to reappraising the possibilities and reevaluating our efforts to 

might be that we have been too soft about the old leadership a

we should undertake more stringent measures to move aside th

ership in order to make way for the other and better elements. 

sell raised a question about the [less than 1 line not declassified] an

eral Smith replied that he did not think that they offered too pro

a medium but that they should be looked at again.

3 A handwritten notation in the left margin reads “SAA.” This referred 

to Wisner’s Special Assistant for Action Colonel Robert Taylor. 4 A handwritten notation in the left margin reads, “SAA.” A handwritten 

in the right margin reads [text not declassified]. 5 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
32. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Marshall to

Director of Central Intelligence Smith1

Washington, November 2

SUBJECT

Present Status of United States Intelligence

In the overall planning for our national security, an adequ

timely intelligence capability is felt to be a first priority consid

In order to prevent strategic and tactical surprise we would 

have:

(a) A 7- to 10-day warning of the imminence of hostilities

which period our defense systems could be alerted and forces d

or positioned as required.

(b) Provide additional warnings at least 12 to 48 hours pri

initiation of hostilities which will indicate the location of b

which atomic attacks are mounted and which will report the a

mate time of launching of these attacks.

The foregoing provisions are obviously beyond our cap

and possibly for a long time to come. However, they do provide 

cut target toward which your agency and the Department of 

should point their intelligence efforts.

Satisfaction of these requirements necessitates detailed, 

hensive and continuing knowledge of the disposition, organiza

state of readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and the supportin

omy. The current basis of estimates concerning the Soviet arme

seems dangerously inadequate.

Because of the extraordinary security program of the Sovie

virtually no intelligence contribution to these requirements is a

through normal channels available to Service intelligence agen

In view of the basic requirement to prevent strategic and 

surprise, our limited capability to meet this requirement and 

tential for improvement of this capability through operation

Central Intelligence Agency within the USSR and the satellites

ularly in the covert and defector fields, the Department of De

prepared to place support of CIA operations in these fields in 

One.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 8

Box 3. Top Secret.
In view of the foregoing, a statement of your foreseeable 

tative and qualitative requirements in as much detail as possib

quested in order to enable the Department of Defense to arra

this support.

With special reference to the matter of military equipment 

ther requested that your requirements in this field be forwa

soon as possible and separately from the more general requirem

support of the broader intelligence programs.

G. C. M

2 Printed from a copy that indicates Marshall signed the original.

33. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy

Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisn

Staff and Division Chiefs1

Washington, November 2

SUBJECT

Policy Governing the Conduct of OPC Operations Within the United Sta

The following policy is announced to guide all concerned 

ing the appropriateness of engaging in a given activity wit

United States or its outlying possessions. This policy will not 

strued as an alteration of existing procedures for obtaining ap

to undertake a specific project or operation.

1. Basic Authority.

a. The following sources and limitations of authority are a

ble to the subject of this paper:

(1) Sec. 102(d), National Security Act of 1947:

“. . . Provided, that the agency [CIA]2 shall have no poli

poena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations Job 80

Box 3. Top Secret. Drafted in I/PR on November 21 and 24. All ellipses in the 

2 Brackets in the original.
(2) Excerpt from Memorandum of Agreement between AD

FBI:3

“. . . The Office of Policy Coordination recognizes the 

responsibility of the FBI in the field of United States d

security. . . .”

(3) NSC 10/2:

OPC was created by NSC 10/2 (under the authority 

102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947) to supplement t

foreign activities of the U.S. Government and to conduct cove

ations in support of or to accomplish U.S. foreign policy ob

The term covert operations is defined as embracing all activi

clusive of operations to secure intelligence and of cover and 

tion for military operations) against hostile foreign states or gr

in support of friendly foreign states or groups, which are con

so that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not 

and that if uncovered the responsibility therefor can be deni

eign policy objectives are interpreted to be those objectives w

established by the President (usually acting through the Secr

State) in pursuance of applicable laws, and enunciated and inte

through various regulations and pronouncements. OPC’s so

determination of what is U.S. foreign policy at a given time is 

partment of State.

2. Interpretation.

a. General.

It is clear that by both law and charter OPC is precluded f

gaging in operations concerned with the domestic affairs of the 

States. OPC is authorized to conduct operations only against or 

port of foreign states or elements thereof. Police, law-enforcem

internal security functions are responsibilities of other U.S. 

ment agencies; OPC is bound by the presumption that these a

are performing their functions faithfully and effectively.

What may not be clear is whether OPC is authorized to en

operations within the United States against or in support of a 

state or group and in so doing support U.S. foreign policy ob

In many instances it might appear more practicable to carry out 

operation in the United States than elsewhere. OPC is not e

authorized or forbidden by NSC 10/2 to conduct such ope

However, it appears to have been the intent of the NSC that co

3 Not found.
erations were only to be executed abroad (cf., purpose of estab

OPC: “to supplement the overt foreign activities of the U.S. G

ment” (underscoring supplied)). Moreover and more impor

would be very difficult if not impossible to undertake covert 

tions in the United States in such a manner that “any U.S. G

ment responsibility for them is not evident and that if unc

the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibi

them.” The U.S. Government has certain responsibilities unde

national law for acts committed within its jurisdiction which 

well make impossible disavowal of responsibility for a cov

committed by OPC in the United States. For these reasons it 

sidered that only in the most exceptional circumstances will i

sirable to propose operations which are to be executed wit

United States.

b. Auxiliary Activities.

It is also evident, however, that OPC does have occasion 

on certain activities within the United States. [31

⁄2 lines not decl

The fact that these activities take place within the United States 

ever, purely incidental to the main purpose of the OPC operati

essential element is that they are part of operations to be e

abroad against hostile foreign states. Such activities have no o

lation to the domestic affairs of the United States than that the

ically take place, for reasons of necessity, convenience, secur

within the United States. The determinant as to the propriety, f

standpoint of OPC’s charter, of an OPC undertaking within the 

States is therefore the objective of the operation. The ultimate o

of any proposed undertaking must clearly be to produce an effe

a foreign state or group. This effect may even be the ultimate 

tion abroad of an idea which has been produced and dissem

within the United States. It is not appropriate to undertake an

ity which has the objective or primary effect of influencing the 

or domestic policies of the United States, or of influencing the 

security of the United States; or which has as its target a domesti

in the United States.

c. Preliminary Activities.

There are certain other kinds of activity which OPC must c

within the United States which are incidental but necessary to 

ecution of its substantive tasks. Some of these are self-evident a

not be dealt with here (e.g., personnel recruitment, domestic 

matériel procurement). Others are not so clearly defined and del

and consequently provide opportunity for misunderstanding. 

these are:

[1 paragraph (20 lines) not declassified]
(2) External Research—Preliminary to launching some op

it may be necessary to perform certain research or to acquire i

tion which is necessary for realistic planning. Since OPC is n

search organization, it is often obliged to turn to external sour

employment of private individuals and organizations outside t

ernment is sometimes required. In this activity OPC will finan

that research which (a) deals with matériel the need for whic

sential to OPC operations, and (b) can not be obtained from esta

U.S. governmental research organizations. Here again, howev

contacts with U.S. groups, and their utilization, is solely 

support of OPC operations abroad.

(3) Training—Providing specialized training is an inher

requisite to the undertaking of many substantive activities. It i

sary to give indoctrination training to staff personnel. It is ne

to train staff agents and indigenous agents in doctrine and tec

of secret operations. It may be desirable to train individuals or 

of indigenous agents for execution of a particular clandestine 

tion. When it is more convenient and more practicable to do 

training will be administered in the United States.

There are other types of training which involve personnel 

der the permanent or complete control of OPC but which enab

indirectly to execute operations abroad. The training of a selecte

of members of a foreign internal security service in anti-sabota

niques might enable OPC effectively to discharge a requirem

protection of vital materials or installations in the country repr

[4 lines not declassified] It is appropriate for OPC to provide the

of training within the United States if (1) the objective of such 

is within the charter of OPC, and (2) the training can, for rea

convenience, security, control, or availability of facilities, mo

tively be provided within the United States. OPC can of cou

vide this training through its own or through other available 

where it is more desirable to do so.

(4) Technological Research and Development—In order tha

ciency in execution of operations and capabilities for new op

may be constantly expanded, it is desirable to conduct resea

and to sponsor the development of new devices, weapons, and 

ment, including psychological warfare aids. It is necessary and 

priate to carry on this activity within the United States. In so 

however, OPC will insofar as practicable conduct research an

opment through other Government agencies, OPC will not ini

search or development directly through private organization

United States, except where OPC has principal interest in the a

be developed, and where it is demonstrably impracticable 

through an established Government agency.
3. Chief, Staff III will promulgate this policy through appr

regulations.4

Frank G. W

4 A handwritten note in the margin next to paragraph 3 reads: “Done! see 

50-15 dated 30 Nov 50. [initials not declassified] 30 Nov.” [text not declassified] 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

34. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department 

State and the Central Intelligence Agency1

Washington, December 

I. Purpose

This agreement is entered into between the Department 

(hereinafter referred to as the Department) and the Central Inte

Agency (hereinafter referred to as CIA), to make administrati

visions for budget and finance procedures pertaining to the sup

overt assignments of personnel of the Department (including 

Service personnel) to CIA Washington and field activities in th

nental United States. This agreement also provides a basis f

other budget and finance arrangements as may be mutually 

upon. This agreement does not cover those personnel details o

porary nature [less than 1 line not declassified], or regular interser

signments as provided for in the Foreign Service Act, or other 

imbursable assignments mutually agreed upon. This agreeme

cover all assignments of Departmental personnel now or h

made to all CIA Washington and domestic field office activities 

for security reasons appropriate officials determine that reimbur

should be made under the terms of the “covert” arrangemen

pendices may be added or amendments made to this agreem

cover other budget and finance arrangements of an overt nature 

tually agreed upon in writing by appropriate officials of the 

ment and CIA.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, S

Relationship 1949–56, Box 2. Secret.
II. Salaries

Advances will be made to the Department at the begin

each quarter. Such payments will be based upon the salary c

sation paid by the Department since other direct costs will b

by CIA. Quarterly estimates will be based on known and ant

needs for each quarter by grades, positions, and types of offi

signed. Adjustments will be made for over or under-payment

preceding quarter. Fourth quarter adjustments should not norm

necessary.

III. Travel Arrangements

Any required temporary duty travel in the United States 

covered by appropriate CIA authorizations and all expenses 

paid to the officials concerned by CIA. Travel from overseas 

the continental United States prior to detail to CIA and, in the 

assignment for overseas duty, the travel, salary, and other expe

cident thereto will be handled under the terms of costs arrang

consummated for such purposes.

IV. Liaison2

Liaison between the Department of State and the Centra

gence Agency pertinent to this agreement shall be controlled a

designated by each agency for policy clearance, administrativ

dination and implementation, and budgetary planning an

bursement as follows:

a. The Policy Clearance Liaison Official shall be responsibl

curing or ensuring operation and policy clearance, and establis

curity standards for each activity requiring administrative supp

for advising the appropriate Administrative Liaison official th

b. The Administrative Liaison Official of each Agency sha

sponsible for intra-agency administrative coordination, impl

tion and maintenance of established security provisions.

c. The Budgetary and Finance Liaison Official shall be r

ble for the establishment of cost factors, the transfer of funds b

2 In a November 2 letter to DCI Smith, Humelsine reaffirmed the Depar

aison officers and agreed to establish an administrative control officer in the 

the Special Assistant, Intelligence and Research, “to coordinate Departmenta

trative support to CIA on all covert and overt matters except those pertaining 

(National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 103.11/11–150) Deputy Direct

tral Intelligence Jackson’s letter to Humelsine, November 28, acceded to the D

liaison arrangements, named the CIA liaison officials, and enclosed copies of 

and overt agreements for signature. (Ibid., 103.11/11–2850) The Department ac

CIA’s designated liaisons and signed each agreement. (Letter from Humelsin

son, December 5; ibid., 103.11/12–550) The text of the December agreements ha

found.
Agencies, and the accomplishment of the necessary budgetar

ning and allotment adjustments. d. Additional liaison points at appropriate working levels 

established at the discretion and under the control of the Adm

tive Liaison Official.

e. Each Agency will determine if one or more officers will 

ignated to represent it in the discharge of the liaison respons

listed in a, b, and c above.

W. H. J

Deputy Director of Central Int

C. H. Hum

Deputy Under Secretary for Admin

Department 

3 Printed from a copy that indicates the memorandum was signed by Ja

November 28, and Humelsine on December 4.

35. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory

Committee1

IAC–M–10 Washington, December 

Director of Central Intelligence

Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith

Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department o

Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department 

of the Army

Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence

Brigadier General Ernest B. Moore, acting for Director of Intelligence, 

Headquarters, United States Air Force

Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission

Captain R. G. McCool, USN, acting for Deputy Director for Intelligence, 

The Joint Staff

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, Of

braries and Intelligence Acquisition, 1950–51, Box 18. Top Secret. No drafting 

tion appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the DCI’s Conference R
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau o

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. William H. Jackson, Central Intelligence Agency

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. [name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Ludwell Montague, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State

Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, Department of the Army

Dr. Samuel McKee, Jr., Department of the Army

Mr. Roy S. Tod, Department of the Army

Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy

Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force

Lieut. Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force

Mr. C. D. DeLoach, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Acting Secretary Mr. James Q. Reber, Central Intelligence Agency

[Omitted here is discussion of minutes of previous mee

comparative study of U.S.–USSR military and industrial s

China, NSRB request for an estimate, and intelligence requirem

Spitzbergen.]

Watch Committee Terms of Reference (IAC–D–6)2

7. Action: Agreed that there should be a single Watch Co

in the Government properly operated with the full participatio

IAC members. This Committee should be the Watch Commit

rently located in the Pentagon and headed by General Weckerlin

eral Smith stated that the Watch Committee headed by the CIA 

be abolished and that the terms of reference before the members 

therefore, not need to be acted upon. He requested General Bo

have distributed to the member agencies the terms of referenc

which the present Watch Committee in the Pentagon is operat

arrange for such modification as may be necessary to provide 

Government the service required. General Smith stated that it 

responsibility to see that there is an arrangement in the Gove

for carrying out the functions of a Watch Committee, that he 

consider it necessary for the CIA to head it, that this Committee 

serve the entire Government and should accordingly be fu

ported. He said that he was prepared to provide such financial 

support as was necessary for this Committee to fulfill his need

the statute. It was understood that teletype facilities already exi

2 Not found.
would ensure communication necessary to meet the needs of t

and the IAC members.

[Omitted here is discussion of the German Defector Expl

Center and crisis estimates on Germany, Iran, and Indochina.]

36. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Sm

Secretary of Defense Marshall1

Washington, December 2

SUBJECT

Support Required by the Central Intelligence Agency from the Departm

of Defense

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum dated 27 November 1950, Subject: Present Status of 

United States Intelligence2

1. This Agency will make a maximum effort and will coo

the collective efforts of all intelligence agencies toward attainm

the objectives set forth in reference memorandum. Defense pla

not be based, however, on the assumption that timely warnin

viet attack can be assured.

2. The following is a general statement of the support nee

the Central Intelligence Agency from the Department of Defen

a. Assignment to CIA of one or two officers each from the 

Navy, and Air Force, well qualified to assist in preparing nati

telligence estimates.

b. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

c. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

d. [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

e. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

f. Clarification of the relationship between representatives 

and the theater commanders in theaters of operations to insu

details of operations, covert personnel, and other highly sensit

terial are known to a minimum number of individuals.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80

Box 3. Top Secret. 2 Document 32.
g. Arrangements by which CIA will be kept fully infor

those operational decisions and plans of the JCS which have 

or indirect bearing on the functions of CIA. For the present, we 

that this would require providing this Agency, for carefully re

use, copies of JCS, JIC and other papers bearing upon the du

responsibilities of CIA.

h. Establishment of a permanent liaison between the JCS 

propriate elements of CIA, including a method for furnishing 

and guidance on essential elements of information which are 

ered of paramount importance for intelligence collection effor

3. The above are general statements of the requirements 

Central Intelligence Agency and indicate the major principles o

it is necessary to establish agreement between CIA and the JC

methods of support of this Agency.

Walter B

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

37. Memorandum by J. L. Barnard of the Bureau of Europ

Affairs1

Washington, January 

PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMA

General Bedell Smith’s direction of CIA has resulted in a 

cant change in that organization’s production of finished inte

CIA is now in the business of producing what are called Nati

telligence Estimates along the lines laid down in NSC 50. These 

are interdepartmental in character, designed to focus all avai

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 528, NIE Corres

VI, 1950–54. Confidential. The memorandum was prepared to provide infor

EUR on the production of National Intelligence Estimates. It was attached to 

randum entitled “Background Paper for Mr. Armstrong’s Statement at UM on 

Intelligence Estimates.” After that meeting, held on January 5, Special Assist

telligence, W. Park Armstrong, Jr., circulated a list of completed and projected 

Intelligence Estimates to 20 senior officials in 20 different offices and bureaus 

partment of State. (Ibid., Central Files 1950–54, 103.11/1–851)
telligence on a problem of importance to the national security

preparation of these Estimates, CIA is now relying on the State 

ment, rather than its own staff, for political and economic intel

the Department of the Army for military, etc., etc. Areorganization 

CIA is in process with the emphasis on quality rather than qua

personnel. CIA’s Office of Reports and Evaluation (ORE) is bein

inated so far as political intelligence is concerned, and a small t

Office of National Estimates has been created to integrate the 

mental drafts for the approval of the Intelligence Advisory Com

(IAC). (The IAC advises the Director of Central Intelligence and 

up of the chiefs of intelligence of State, Army, Navy, Air, AEC, F

a representative from the Joint Staff in the Department of Defense

approval by the IAC, the paper becomes a National Intelligence E

and is sent by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Presid

propriate officers of Cabinet level, and the NSC.

What all this means to EUR is simply this: heretofore repor

ten by CIA’s former evaluation office (ORE) were sent to the R 

the Department for comment and concurrence or dissent. In th

cedure, the Bureau’s role was gauged to the relatively minor 

tance of these papers. The R area checked with the Bureau to 

that the Department was speaking with one voice, but the pap

dom dealt with major issues.

With the new CIA product, however, it is obvious that Bure

ticipation will be more important than it has been in the past

National Intelligence Estimates, as can be seen by the auspice

which they are prepared and their eventual destination, carry 

erable weight. What the new CIA Office of National Estimate

and should have from State is the pooled intelligence of the 

and R. This approach does not mean that the Bureau will hav

any original drafting—such drafts will be prepared by the R ar

it does mean that the Bureau will share the responsibility for 

State’s contribution.

In practice, the preparation of a National Intelligence E

breaks down into the following steps: (1) the R area (OIR) pre

first draft of the political and/or economic section of the pape

interdepartmental agreements as provided for in NSC 50; (2) th

tions are then taken by the Office of National Estimates (CI

worked into a draft of the whole paper; (3) this CIA draft is sen

contributing Departments for comment; (4) after consideration 

Departments, it is further discussed in CIA by an interdepar

working group; (5) a final draft is then issued by CIA for appr

the IAC.

Although the Bureau may, on occasion, be consulted at st

it will generally not enter the picture until stage (3) when the C
of the whole paper is sent to the Departments for comment a

gestion. Stage (3) should be the beginning and the end of Bure

ticipation, unless the draft is radically changed in the course o

ture development either in the working group discussion or 

(see below). The Bureau will receive its copy for comment thro

Intelligence Adviser. Bureau comment may be made either in 

to the Intelligence Adviser, or directly to the OIR personnel i

(in which case the Intelligence Adviser should be informed)

event that the Bureau or OIR feel that further discussion is ne

order to develop a unified Departmental position, they will no

Intelligence Adviser who will then arrange a meeting for a rec

tion of views. If there is a fundamental divergence of interpreta

tween the Bureau and R, this fact and the opposing arguments 

presented to the Special Assistant for Intelligence who will fo

accepted principles of action and review by referring the m

higher authority for a decision as to the Departmental positio

In this connection it should be noted that the Special A

speaks for the Department in the IAC. This role has its compl

The IAC, although formerly concerned almost exclusively wi

dictional matters, has now been transformed under General 

chairmanship into a substantive group, which means that ther

siderable give and take around the table before a final versio

Estimate is approved. Should the Special Assistant feel that in h

ment the final version is so changed by this give and take a

counter to the Departmental position, he can either ask time 

ther consideration (in which case the Bureau will be apprise

time does not permit, he can publish the Departmental posit

dissent in an appendix to the National Estimate.

Throughout this whole process, it must be recognized tha

National Estimate draft is underway, the timing on deadlines 

tributions or comments is out of the hands of R. The Special A

will attempt to have these deadlines made realistic, but the u

decision as to their urgency rests with the IAC itself. Therefor

der to incorporate the Bureau’s views in this new and influe

ries of intelligence appraisals, it is essential that every effort b

within EUR to meet the due dates specified.

It is hoped that the procedure cited above will not place t

an additional burden on Bureau personnel, while, at the same 

will ensure that the Bureau’s role as a contributor of intelligen

ing effectively played.
38. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence 

Smith to the Executive Secretary of the National 

Security Council (Lay)1

Washington, January 

SUBJECT

Draft of NSC Directive on Covert Operations and Clandestine Activities

1. On 14 December 1950, at my request, the National S

Council suspended paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2.2

2. I am submitting herewith the draft of a directive for i

by the National Security Council which clearly defines the re

bilities for covert operations and clandestine activities in pea

war.3 This draft was prepared by representatives of this agency 

sultation with Rear Admiral Leslie Stevens from the Joint C

Staff, Brigadier General John Magruder from the Office of th

tary of Defense, and Mr. Robert Joyce from the Department of 

3. It is my recommendation that this Directive be sent by 

tional Security Council to the Departments of State and Defen

the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

4. A related subject which needs clarification is the dis

between covert operations such as may be planned and execu

this agency, and guerrilla warfare conducted by regular forces

directed that a paper on this subject be prepared for submis

the NSC.

Walter B. 

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Job 83–00036R, Box 

The date is taken from an attached document summary. 2 NSC Action No. 400, approved December 14, 1950, suspended the pro

paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2, at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence

issuance of a further directive. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneo

Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) 3 The attachment printed below is a draft of NSC 10/3; see footnote 2, Doc

4 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.
Attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

COVERT OPERATIONS AND CLANDESTINE 

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Under the authority of Section 102(d) (5) of the Nation

rity Act of 1947 the National Security Council hereby directs t

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible 

planning, preparation and execution of covert operations an

destine intelligence activities in peace or in war and for insur

such operations are planned and conducted in a manner co

with and in support of U.S. foreign and military policies and wi

activities.

3. The following relationships shall prevail in wartime or i

time in areas where U.S. military forces are engaged in comba

a. The DCI shall coordinate covert operations and clande

telligence activities with the Secretary of Defense and the Join

of Staff and the appropriate non-military U.S. government depa

and agencies, and insure that plans for such activities are acce

JCS as being consistent with and complementary to approved p

wartime or emergency military operations.

b. Covert operations and clandestine intelligence activit

theater of military command shall come within the responsi

the theater commander and the DCI shall designate a senior re

ative to be on the General Staff of each theater commander co

with such operations and activities, responsible to the theat

mander through the Chief of Staff, to assist in the planning, d

and command of such operations and activities. Policy direct

control of the execution of such operations and activities in the 

shall be through the JCS via the theater commander.

c. Theater commanders shall be advised of such covert op

and clandestine intelligence activities as are based in their re

areas but with objectives that transcend or do not directly affec

sponsibilities of the respective theater commanders.

d. The DCI shall coordinate with the Secretary of State in 

insure that plans and activities are consistent with the politic

egy and political operations and objectives of the United State

e. In areas other than theaters of military operations, th

representative of the DCI shall keep the respective senior polit

5 Secret.
resentatives, in the countries concerned, generally advised of 

operations and clandestine intelligence activities affecting the 

their responsibility or based thereon, and shall obtain politica

ance from such representatives with respect thereto.

f. For reasons of security and adequate liaison, the DCI sha

tain independent communications with his representatives ov

including lateral communications between theaters. Arrangem

such communications shall be coordinated with those of the m

g. The Departments of State and Defense and the JCS sh

vide continuous guidance and support of the DCI in planning 

operations and clandestine intelligence activities and insure th

operations and activities receive the necessary and appr

support.

4. As used herein clandestine intelligence includes espion

counterespionage; covert operations include guerrilla warfare 

fined in NSC______), sabotage, covert demolitions, covert coun

otage, covert removal of personnel including escape and evasio

uation and exfiltration, covert propaganda, covert political warf

covert economic warfare. Such operations do not include arm

flict by organized military forces or cover and deception for m

purposes.

5. The foregoing rescinds paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2 and a

provisions of NSC 10/2 and NSCID–56 which may be inconsiste

the provisions of this directive.

6 For text of NSCID No. 5, December 12, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 423.

39. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Deputy 

Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research (Howe

to the Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research

(Armstrong)

Washington, January 

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 103.11/1–

cret; R Distribution Only. 1 page not declassified.]
40. Report by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Security

Agency Council (Stone) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

J.C.S. 2010/25 Washington, January 1

SUCCESSION OF DIRECTORS, ARMED 

FORCES SECURITY AGENCY

Reference: J.C.S. 2010

The Problem

1. In light of the directive in the Appendix to J.C.S. 2010,

ommend a procedure by which the successors to the office of D

Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), will be appointed.

Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion

2. Paragraph 2b of the Appendix to J.C.S. 2010 provides th

or General Officer of the Army, Navy, or Air Force be appointe

Joint Chiefs of Staff as Director, Armed Forces Security Agency

to the approval of the Secretary of Defense. It further provides 

Director’s normal tour of duty shall be two years, and that th

torship be rotated among the Services. No procedure has yet 

tablished whereby successors to the Director, AFSA, will be app

3. The first Director, AFSA, was nominated to the Joint C

Staff by an ad hoc committee (appointed by the Joint Chiefs 

composed of two members from each of the three Services; 

pointment was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the app

the Secretary of Defense.

4. The first Director (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, U.S. Nav

office on 15 July 1949; his tour of duty will be completed on 

1951.

5. A proposed procedure to determine the succession of D

Armed Forces Security Agency, has been concurred in by the 

Forces Security Agency Council (Enclosure).

1 Source: National Archives, RG 218, CCS 334 NSA (7–24–48) Sec. 4 (for

AFSA). Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A covering note from W.G. Lalor and L

of the Joint Secretariat indicates that on January 19 the Joint Chiefs of Staff app

recommendations and the conclusion in JCS 2010/25 and issued the direct

enclosure. 2 Not found.
Conclusion

6. It is concluded that a requirement exists for a definite 

dure to be established whereby the succession of Directors, 

Forces Security Agency, will be determined.

Recommedations

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Approve the above conclusion.

b. Issue the directive in the Enclosure to the Chairman, 

Forces Security Agency Council.

Enclosure3

DIRECTIVE FOR THE CHAIRMAN, ARMED FORCES 

SECURITY AGENCY COUNCIL

SUBJECT

Procedures for Nominating and Appointing the Director, Armed Forces 

Security Agency

1. An ad hoc committee of the Armed Forces Security 

Council (AFSAC), composed of two Flag or General Officer m

of each Service, shall convene on or about 1 February 1951 for t

pose of nominating the second Director, Armed Forces Security 

(AFSA). The Army and the Air Force will indicate not later than 

ruary their General Officer candidate or candidates for the O

Director, who are considered to be suitably qualified, and ava

appointed. (The first and present Director is a Navy Flag Offic

2. This committee shall nominate one officer from amon

indicated as candidates by the Army and Air Force, and will rep

nomination to AFSAC for forwarding to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

propriate action, not later than 1 March 1951.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, upon approving the nominati

subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense, will appo

General Officer to assume the duties of Director, AFSA, on or a

July 1951, for two years.

4. The third Director, AFSA, shall be a General Officer of th

ice not previously represented in this position.

5. Biennially thereafter, the succeeding Director of AFS

be from the appropriate Service, as determined by the rotati

established.

3 Top Secret.
41. Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Dip

Missions and Consulates1

Washington, January 15, 1951, 2

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS (NIS)

Reference is made to the Department’s unnumbered circ

struction dated November 5, 1948 entitled “National Intelligen

ies”.2 In the above instruction the general outline of the prog

production of NIS was announced, and a brief description giv

of the purpose of NIS, and the responsibilities of the Departme

production. Since the issuance of this instruction, a number o

ters and sections of NIS relating to various countries have be

pleted. Copies of these portions have regularly been forwarde

principal post in the area concerned under cover of Form DS–

The present international situation has emphasized and gr

creased our requirements of both current and basic intelligen

present greater emphasis on current information is obviously i

but it must not obscure and completely supplant the collection 

porting of needed basic information. Planning and the establ

of policy relative to national security require basic intelligen

Therefore, where at all possible, increased attention should be 

to providing the basic information needed for the preparatio

NIS and to filling in and bringing up-to-date chapters and 

which have already been completed.

In preparing portions of NIS, every effort is made by the 

ing agency to utilize all pertinent information available in Wash

It has been and will continue to be necessary, however, to req

ditional data and information from Foreign Service posts. In som

it will be expedient to forward to the post concerned preliminar

of sections for revision or correction and return to the Departm

It is, of course, very important that portions of NIS whi

been produced be revised and kept up-to-date. In the prepar

occasional and voluntary reports, Foreign Service personnel ar

to consult available NIS material, and wherever possible, end

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 103.11/1–1551

Distribution Only. Drafted on January 5 by OLI/IAD: Theodore M. Nordbec

by R/NIS: John B. Appleton, EUR: John L. Barnard, FE: Cyrus Peake, NEA: 

Wright, ARA: Hobart A. Spalding, GER: John R. Kennedy. The airgram was 

Embassies and Legations and 10 Consulates. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., 101.61/11–548)
augment the information contained therein. Each NIS section a

section concludes with a paragraph entitled “Comments on P

Sources”, which contains a brief survey of the information ga

weaknesses in the preceding section. These comments are a v

guide to the basic information which is currently not available in 

ington and which should, if possible, be acquired and reporte

The Department, and the other agencies cooperating in 

program, welcome and request comments and suggestions fr

field concerning NIS. It is requested that completed sections a

sections forwarded to posts be brought to the attention of all 

priate personnel at the post.

A

42. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Sec

Council (Lay) to the National Security Council1

NSC 10/4 Washington, January 1

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIA (OPC) WITH RESPECT TO

GUERRILLA WARFARE

References: NSC 10/2 and NSC 10/32

Upon the recommendation of the Acting Director of Cen

telligence, his enclosed memorandum and its attached draft D

on the subject are circulated herewith for consideration by the N

Security Council.

As recommended in paragraph 3 of the enclosed memor

the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of S

being requested to transmit to this office their respective comm

Council consideration in connection with the enclosed draft Di

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Subject File. Top Secret. 2 For text of NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of t

gence Establishment, Document 292. DCI Smith’s interpretation of NSC 10/

veyed by Wisner to the Departments of State and Defense and JCS is printed in 

Under Harry Truman, p. 347. A draft of NSC 10/3 is in Foreign Relations, 1945–19

gence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 419. Other versions are att

to Documents 38 and 43.
It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the 

of this matter.

James S. 

Enclosure

Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelli

Jackson to the Executive Secretary of the National Sec

Council (Lay)4

Washington, January 1

SUBJECT

Draft of NSC Directive on Responsibilities of CIA (OPC) with Respect t

Guerrilla Warfare

1. Under date of January 8, 1951, the Director of Central Inte

transmitted to the Executive Secretary, National Security Counci

NSC directive on covert operations and clandestine activities.5 

graph 4 of the memorandum of transmittal, which accompan

draft, he stated that a paper dealing with a related subject requir

clarification would shortly be submitted to the NSC.

2. Submitted herewith is the draft of a directive for issu

the NSC which defines and delimits the responsibilities of CIA 

with respect to guerrilla warfare. This draft was prepared in 

ration with representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defe

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. It is recommended that this draft be sent by the NSC to 

partments of State and Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

sideration and comment.

William H. J

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

4 Top Secret.

5 Document 38.

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Jackson signed the original.
Enclosure7

Washington, January 1

DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

on

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIA (OPC) WITH RESPECT TO

GUERRILLA WARFARE

The Problem

1. To determine the appropriate responsibilities of CIA (O

the field of guerrilla warfare.

Definitions

2. For the purpose of this study the several types of mil

paramilitary forces which may be involved in armed conflict 

fined as follows:

a. National Military Forces. Organized and uniformed m

elements which are organically components of a national m

establishment.

b. Guerrilla Forces. Organized bodies of politically motiva

predominantly indigenous irregulars, in or out of uniform, not 

ically a part of national military forces, trained and equipped fo

conflict of specialized character and for limited objectives.

c. Underground Resistance Forces. Politically motivated an

dominantly indigenous individuals and groups organized and 

clandestinely for covert subversive operations against the sta

when opportunity offers, for semi-covert physical operations, 

ing armed conflict. In the latter stages, underground resistance 

ments tend to become identical with guerrilla organizations.

Discussion

3. This study deals with the respective roles of the U.S. M

Forces and CIA (OPC) in the exploitation of friendly guerrilla f

order to determine the responsibilities of CIA (OPC) in this fie

General Responsibilities of CIA (OPC) in Guerrilla Warfare

a. This organization is the national agency responsible und

ified conditions for the “planning, preparation and execution

various types of covert operations enumerated in NSC 10/2. S

these operations do not involve armed conflict and will not 

cussed in this study. Some of the physical types of covert ope

might indirectly involve armed conflict but it is primarily in t

7 Top Secret.
of guerrilla warfare that responsibilities of CIA (OPC) and the 

military forces overlap.

b. The responsibility of CIA (OPC) with respect to guerril

ations differs in peace and war. In peacetime, OPC formulates 

and technique for utilization and employment of guerrilla 

plans guerrilla warfare operations to be implemented in case o

response to and consistent with the requirements of the mili

thorities, and within the limits of feasibility, makes the physica

rations necessary for such implementation. It foments, suppo

conducts only such peacetime guerrilla operations as may be 

ized by the State Department with the approval of the Depart

Defense. In wartime, OPC implements plans previously prepa

continues the planning and execution of guerrilla warfare op

within the framework of organization and command spec

NSC______.8

Characteristics and Capabilities of CIA (OPC) in Support of Guerri

Warfare

4. a. The covert operations of CIA (OPC) “do not includ

conflict by organized military forces.” Therefore CIA (OPC) ha

sponsibility for the organization, training or operations of su

as “Commandos,” “Rangers,” etc., which are in all respects 

components of national military forces. This does not, howev

vent mutual arrangements between the national military for

CIA (OPC) for employing the same facilities, when appropriate

training of individuals or groups in subjects of common intere

b. A distinguishing characteristic of guerrilla operations 

(OPC) is the employment of relatively limited numbers of A

CIA (OPC) personnel. This consists of individual operatives an

ers rather than large bodies of men. Such personnel, howev

have specialized qualifications, including linguistic and politic

ground, imagination, resourcefulness and initiative. They mu

access to clandestine intelligence sources. They will be concern

such intricate matters as establishing initial contacts with app

leaders of underground or guerrilla forces in enemy territory, 

their confidence and developing their capabilities by furnishin

munications, weapons, equipment and training, and by exercisi

controls over their organization and operations as will insure th

activities support U.S. political and military objectives.

c. These operations will generally be strategic rather than 

in nature. Initially and usually they will be deep in enemy t

and will require special intelligence, communications and cove

8 NSC 10/3, as approved. [Footnote in the original.]
portation facilities. In the initial phases, the fomentation, devel

and exploitation of indigenous underground and guerrilla 

should be exclusively a responsibility of CIA (OPC). Without w

duplication, the national military forces could not be expected 

the assembled talent and flexibility of organization for such ope

d. Most resistance activities and movements in their earlie

are covert in character, and have their origins in the successfu

lishment and operation of underground organizations. As the

to develop strength, these movements have a tendency to co

into the open and under proper circumstances, including sup

the local population, favorable terrain, and assistance from the o

develop into organized resistance movements on a major sc

suming the successful development of large-scale and relative

organized resistance movements behind enemy lines resultin

successful covert operations or originating spontaneously, the 

and exploitation as well as the support and provisioning of s

sistance movements should become the responsibility of the 

commanders whose interests are most directly affected or ben

e. However, such guerrilla movements never entirely lo

covert characteristics in that they maintain contacts with under

operatives located in cities and in or near centers of enemy cont

moreover, in that they depend for their survival upon extreme m

and secrecy as to their location and movements as of any given t

nally, they remain highly political in their nature and inspiration, 

this as well as other reasons already mentioned, cannot be used 

all types of objectives and targets. It follows that even though con

direction of large organized resistance movements should pass to 

ior military commanders, there remains the necessity for close c

tion by and assistance from those experienced in covert operatio

Responsibility of the National Military Forces in Unconventional C

Methods

5. a. As previously stated, guerrilla forces are not to be co

with organizations such as “Commandos” and “Rangers”. Th

ter are organized by and are organically a part of the national m

forces. The combat operations of these types of units will often 

methods similar to those employed by guerrillas. The training 

organizations will, in some respects, be analogous to that of gu

Their operations can best be described as employment of “unc

tional combat methods” by orthodox forces—unconventional 

the sense that they have been little exploited in the American M

Forces and are more flexible and adaptable to circumstances tha

of conventional combat units.

b. Independent Commando-type units can accomplish clo

distant raids for a variety of purposes. They may include airb
landing operations. Ranger-type units, organic to the division

of specially equipped personnel trained in hand-to-hand 

furtive movement and individual resourcefulness in all situation

are adept at infiltration and disruptive tactics behind enemy li

activity of these units is limited to the zone of combat of the pa

vision and is employed to assist the division in carrying out 

cific missions. These units may at times employ local indigen

habitants. While they employ tactics similar to guerrillas, 

Commando nor Ranger operations are deemed to be guerrill

tions, and CIA (OPC) has no responsibility respecting them.

Responsibility of the National Military Forces in Guerrilla Warfare

6. a. The national military forces rarely, if ever, will be 

tion to assume responsibility for the covert techniques require

menting guerrilla movements, establishing initial contacts wi

ing ones, and in the early development of the movemen

appreciable military assets. This is the mission of CIA (OPC) a

agency should be afforded all feasible logistical support by t

tary forces.

b. In wartime, a guerrilla movement having successful

built up to a certain magnitude, may require military direction 

gistical support from an appropriate military commander si

that furnished regularly constituted forces under his comman

direction and support will exceed the resources of CIA (OPC)

time, control, exploitation and supply of the movement shoul

sumed by or assigned to the appropriate military commander

theless, for reasons stated in paragraph 4–e, CIA (OPC) pe

should either serve as, or continue to be a part of, the operat

between that commander and the guerrilla forces.

In some cases a decision by the theater commander becom

essary as to whether or not command of the guerrillas should 

a few cases, attended by profound political implications, cons

in the matter of command will be advisable between the theat

mander and higher authority.

Conclusions

7. a. Guerrilla warfare is defined as the operations of or

bodies of politically motivated and predominantly indigenous 

lars, in or out of uniform, not organically a part of national 

forces, trained and equipped for armed conflict of specialized 

ter and for limited objectives.

b. CIA (OPC) is the agency of this Government which in 

time has the sole responsibility under specified conditions for t

ning, preparation and conduct of guerrilla operations. In warti

(OPC) is responsible for continued planning and conduct of g
warfare, subject to the provisions of NSC______,9 and in collab

with the national military forces as follows:

CIA (OPC) is responsible for the development of existing g

movements and the fomentation of new ones; and for the cont

support of guerrilla operations until their magnitude requires th

control and support be passed to an appropriate military comm

Such elements of CIA (OPC) as may be required should eithe

as, or continue to be a part of, the operating link between th

mander and the guerrilla forces.

Recommendations

8. That the National Security Council accept the Discus

guiding principles and approve the Conclusions.

9 NSC 10/4, as approved. [Footnote in the original. NSC 10/4 was with

the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence following approva

10/5 on October 23 (see Document 90).]

43. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Plann

Staff to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)1

Washington, January 1

SUBJECT

NSC 10/3

I think you will find the attached file2 to be self-explanato

I believe that you will desire to review it before the Under Se

considers signing the attached draft memorandum addressed 

James S. Lay, Jr. The following considerations with respect to NS

have been suggested to me within the Department:

1. The document as presently worded does not sufficie

sert Department of State responsibility, authority and control o

activities set forth in 10/3. Specifically paragraph 3a would s

1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files: NSC 10 Series, 1951. T

2 Joyce apparently clipped this memorandum to a file folder holding sev

uments on this topic. The folder has not been found.
place complete control of covert operations and clandestine inte

activities within the JCS. Similarly the last sentence in parag

reenforces JCS control. (In active military theatres)3

2. Paragraph 3d then produces [reduces?] the “coordinati

of the Secretary of State vis-à-vis the Director of Central Intelli

Washington. It has been suggested that this coordinating role 

ficiently explicit and does not extend down to the theatre com

ers through the JCS.

It has been suggested to me that the Department should a

great deal more in that the roles between the Department and 

itary Establishment have now reached a point where the Dep

of State is in a position to obtain a great deal more than this do

provides for. It was therefore suggested that the two alterations 

on page 2 and page 3 of the draft 10/3 might now be include

Department’s comment requested by Mr. Lay.

I have the following comments to make:

1. General Smith and Allen W. Dulles feel that it is nece

this time to obtain for CIA what is set forth in 10/3. They both 

they have gone as far as possible in asserting CIA’s role vis-à

JCS in Washington and as related to theatre commanders. As 

the present JCS position remains in its present state, nothing 

can be accomplished in increasing the responsibility and auth

the CIA particularly in military theatres. As you know, Genera

and Allen Dulles are presently in Tokyo in an endeavor to acc

something with General MacArthur and General Willoughby 

will make it possible for CIA to play some role in the intelligen

in General MacArthur’s theatre. (Has his theatre ever been 

geographically?)

2. The Director of Central Intelligence feels that if he trie

more than 10/3 calls for, he might end up by getting much 

other words, General Smith is prepared to settle for 10/3 as p

drafted on the theory that this gives him enough to work ou

problems in the command structure given present thinking wi

JCS and the personalities of theatre commanders in time of w

eral Smith does not feel that it would be wise at this time, in 

deavor to obtain the necessary degree of authority and cont

secret operations and clandestine activities, to engage in a jurisd

battle with the JCS which would raise basic issues, generate h

3 The parenthetical phrase was added by hand. References to paragrap

3d under points 1 and 2 of this memorandum apparently refer to the earlie

tached to Document 38.
conflict and probably result in jeopardizing what CIA now has 

get in the present circumstances.

3. My own feeling is that the Department of State can p

not go beyond the present language of draft NSC 10/3 in a

civilian responsibility and authority. General Magruder and A

Stevens agree that this is a fact. General Magruder is an outs

exponent of the theory that war is too serious a business for t

erals, is an extension of politics, etc., etc. He advises against 

partment’s trying to assert itself further than is now outlined 

present draft and believes that if it did so the JCS would react vi

and immediate conflict would develop and there would be litt

hope of getting even what is set forth in the present language o

I think it will be most useful if Messrs. Matthews and Web

have your comments on the foregoing.4

Robert 

Attachment5

DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

on

COVERT OPERATIONS AND CLANDESTINE 

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the Nationa

rity Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs t

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible 

planning, preparation and execution of covert operations an

destine intelligence activities in peace or in war and for insuri

such operations are planned and conducted in a manner co

with and in support of U.S. foreign and military policies and wi

activities.

3. The DCI shall coordinate with the Secretary of State in o

insure that plans and activities are consistent with the politic

egy and political operations and objectives of the United State

4. In areas other than theaters of military operations, the 

representative of the DCI shall keep the respective senior politi

resentatives, in the countries concerned, generally advised of 

4 A handwritten postscript by Joyce reads, “. . . Another consideration: If 

causes difficulties with the JCS which hold up indefinitely W.B. Smith’s new chart

C.I.A., I think, will not appreciate this Dept’s role therein. RPJ.” Ellipsis in the or

5 Top Secret.
operations and clandestine intelligence activities affecting the 

their responsibility or based thereon, and shall obtain politic

ance from such representatives with respect thereto.

5. The following relationships shall prevail in wartime or i

time in areas where U.S. military forces are engaged in comba

a. The DCI shall coordinate covert operations and clande

telligence activities with the Secretary of Defense and the Join

of Staff and the appropriate non-military U.S. Government 

ments and agencies, and insure that plans for such activities 

cepted by JCS as being consistent with and complementary to ap

plans for wartime or emergency military operations. b. Covert operations and clandestine intelligence activit

theater of military command shall come within the responsi

the theater commander and the DCI shall designate a senior re

ative to be on the General Staff of each theater commander co

with such operations and activities, responsible to the theat

mander through the Chief of Staff, to assist in the planning, d

and command of such operations and activities. Policy direct

control of the execution of such operations and activities in the 

shall be through the JCS via the theater commander. c. Theater commanders shall be advised of such covert op

and clandestine intelligence activities as are based in their re

areas but with objectives that transcend or do not directly affec

sponsibilities of the respective theater commanders.

d. For reasons of security and adequate liaison, the D

maintain independent communications with his representativ

seas, including lateral communications between theaters. A

ments for such communications shall be coordinated with thos

military.

6. The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of 

tional Security Resources Board, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff sh

vide continuous guidance and support of the DCI in plannin

operations and clandestine intelligence activities and insure th

operations and activities receive the necessary and appropriate 

7. As used herein clandestine intelligence includes espion

counterespionage; covert operations include guerilla warfare 

fined in NSC______), sabotage, covert demolitions, covert cou

otage, covert removal of personnel including escape and evasio

uation and exfiltration, covert propaganda, covert political war

covert economic warfare. Such operations do not include 

conflict by organized military forces or cover and deception f

tary purposes.

8. The foregoing rescinds paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2 and a

provisions of NSC 10/2 and NSCID No. 5 which may be inco

with the provisions of this directive.
44. Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intellig

Jackson to the Executive Secretary of the National Secu

Council (Lay)1

NSC 66/1 Washington, January 1

SUBJECT

Intelligence Support for the Voice of America with regard to Soviet Jamm

1. Reference is made to my memorandum of 7 September 

the above subject,2 forwarding the Report of the Ad Hoc Com

on Voice of America Jamming, and noting that Recommendat

the Report regarding establishment of an additional monitorin

ity would be referred to the United States Communications Inte

Board.

2. The Chairman of USCIB has now forwarded to me the a

report3 which recommends, in brief, that an additional monito

cility be established under the operational direction of AFSA 

lineates the requirements in terms of facilities, personnel and 

ment for the establishment of such a facility. This USCIB report 

recommendations have the unanimous approval of the IAC.

3. In the light of the USCIB report and further consideratio

problem, the IAC now submits, for the consideration of the Co

connection with NSC 66, the following final recommendation

incorporate the recommendations of the USCIB report and the 

mendations of the earlier IAC report, appropriately revised:

a. That a readjustment of priorities among existing inte

tasks or a reallocation of the use of existing intelligence facilities 

not be undertaken.

b. That there should be established an additional monito

tivity to obtain and provide information on current Soviet jamm

tivities which will assist the VOA in its program and assist oth

Government communications services in combatting present 

ture Soviet radio interference, and that this additional monito

tivity be established, coordinated and operated as follows:

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 21, 1935–62

Box 115. Secret. 2 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary subject: “Support for the Voice 

ica in the Fields of Intelligence and of Research and Development,” dated Sept

1950. [Footnote in the original. This memorandum has not been found.] 3 Not found.
(1) The initial program for this activity should be und

along the lines suggested in Enclosure 2 of the USCIB Report o

vember 1950.4

(2) This activity should monitor and locate Russian jamm

nals and other interfering transmitters and should convey p

and continuously to the VOA and other interested U. S. com

tions services such resulting information as will assist them to i

their reception. (3) This activity should not interfere with existing monitor

grams, particularly from the standpoint of equipment and per

(4) This activity will be coordinated by CIA with existi

AFSA monitoring activities. (5) In view of the COMINT aspects of this program, USCIB 

be assigned the function of general coordination of this activit

performance of this function USCIB should be governed by th

sions of NSCID No. 9.5

(6) This activity should be placed under the operational d

of AFSA, and appropriate provision should be made for Serv

curement of the necessary equipment and personnel.

c. That the CIA assume over-all responsibility to:

(1) Coordinate the collection of information concerning 

jamming from all sources.

(2) Serve as the collection point for this information and 

that such of this information as will assist the VOA and other 

ment communications services to improve their reception on 

basis is passed promptly and continuously to these services. T

with the assistance of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Dep

of State, should determine and establish such security arrang

and channels of dissemination as may be required to pass th

mation to the VOA; these arrangements and channels to be dete

in the light of materials made available.

(3) Undertake, in conjunction with the other intelligence a

a coordinated program for the collation, evaluation and dissem

of such information as will be useful in the long-range analysis 

ian radio interference and in the development of counter-mea

W. H. J

4 Attached hereto. [Footnote in the original. Enclosure 2, IAC–D–11, is not 

5 For text of NSCID No. 9, March 10, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1945–19

gence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 435. 6 The President approved the recommendations on February 28. (Mem

from Lay to the National Security Council, February 28; National Archive

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 21, 1935–62, no label, Box 115) 7 Printed from a copy that indicates Jackson signed the original.
45. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the

Department of State (McWilliams) to the Deputy Unde

Secretary of State for Administration (Humelsine)1

Washington, January 1

I am attaching herewith a copy of a draft directive on the n

psychological effort which was left with Mr. Webb by Mr. Souer

Mr. Webb informs me that Mr. Souers made a very strong p

we accept this arrangement, and it had been Souers’ desire to 

rect to the Secretary with this proposal.

Mr. Webb has asked me to put the paper into the proper ha

staff study and presentation of recommendations to the Secret

considers this a matter of urgency since Souers intends to go 

President about this in a short time.

Mr. Webb specifically asked that you and Mr. Barrett coll

on the staff paper for the Secretary. I am forwarding this to you 

tion with the request that you prepare a paper in coordination w

Barrett and such other offices as you might think necessary.

W.J. McWi

Attachment3

Washington, January 1

DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON THE NATIONAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT

There is hereby established under the National Security Co

Psychological Strategy Board responsible at the national level 

chological policy formulation within the framework of appro

tional policies, and for coordination and evaluation of the nation

chological effort, including authority to issue policy guidanc

departments and agencies of the Government executing major p

of the psychological effort abroad:

The Board shall be composed of:

a. a full-time chairman, who shall be designated by the Pr

on the recommendation of the National Security Council, and w

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 52 D 432. Secret.

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

3 Secret.
be the head thereof and shall, subject to review by the Nation

rity Council at the request of any Council member, have the p

decision upon matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Bo

b. one representative each of the Secretary of State, the Secr

Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Inte

c. one representative each of the heads of such other depa

and agencies of the Government as may from time to time b

mined by the Board.

In the event of an objection by any member of the Nation

rity Council to a decision of the Board or its Chairman, an eff

be made by the Council member and the Board, or its Chairma

solve the divergency prior to any consideration by the Nation

rity Council.

The Chairman of the Board, subject to the direction of the N

Security Council, shall be authorized to employ such consul

may be necessary and to organize a staff composed of individu

ployed for this purpose and of individuals detailed from the 

pating departments and agencies.

The Board and its staff shall perform no psychological ope

46. Letter From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligenc

(Jackson) to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant f

Intelligence and Research (Armstrong)1

Washington, February 

Dear Mr. Armstrong:

As you know, General Smith has written to the Secretary 

to indicate in broad terms how he envisions the allocation of 

intelligence responsibilities, in line with National Security 

Directives, as between the Department of State and the Centr

ligence Agency. This letter was based on the principles agre

our recent discussions on the responsibilities of the Departm

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, 

Relationship 1949–56. Confidential. 2 Dated February 1. (Ibid.)
Central Intelligence Agency with reference to certain functio

merly performed in Central Intelligence Agency by the O

Reports and Estimates. To assist you in planning to meet th

tional burden which will fall on the Department, I am outlin

understanding of the agreements upon which General Smith

is based.

The Department has responsibility for intelligence researc

political, cultural and sociological fields. The research work h

performed in these fields by our former Office of Reports an

mates is discontinued and the Department will be responsible fo

ing the requests from all departments and agencies previously h

by the Office of Reports and Estimates. This will include initi

requirements for intelligence collection and evaluation of raw 

mation reports in these fields. The Department will undoubted

further demands on its resources arising from its increasing pa

tion in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates.

As a guide towards estimating the increased burden on 

partment, I might point out that Central Intelligence Agency 

continuing, among other activities, the following:

1. Political research to meet the requests of the National S

Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other departments and ag

2. Intelligence research for psychological warfare;

3. Intelligence research on international organizations, part

United Nations;

4. Intelligence research on world Communism;

5. Intelligence research in the political, cultural and soci

fields for the internal needs of Central Intelligence Agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency wishes to assist the Depart

meeting these new responsibilities, as is indicated in General Sm

ter. To fulfill this obligation, Central Intelligence Agency is prep

1. Provide, for the remainder of fiscal 1951, funds for ad

personnel up to the amount of $200,000. We have both estima

the number of additional personnel which the Department ma

is approximately 150.

2. Cooperate in the detail or transfer to the Department 

available personnel formerly engaged in the Office of Research 

timates. The Department is free to discuss such detail or tran

rectly with the personnel involved.3

I understand that working negotiations are under way o

points. Copies of this letter have been distributed to the appr

3 This assistance was presumably to tide the Department over until the 

were properly authorized and budgeted.
officers in this organization for policy guidance. I hope you an

meet for further discussions if the need arises in the course 

negotiations.

Sincerely,

William H. J

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

47. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Web

the Executive Secretary of the Department of State

(McWilliams)1

Washington, February 

Admiral Souers has spoken to the Secretary regarding the 

sions Admiral Souers and I have been having about the propos

inet Committee on psychological warfare, to be headed by a f

chairman and report to the NSC.2

Admiral Souers made the point to the Secretary that there 

number of programs going in this field which we were not a

and which he did not think could be coordinated without so

cedure such as he has suggested. He said his main objective w

all these things out on the table so they could be looked at and 

gether as a program.

The Secretary desires Mr. Humelsine or Mr. Barrett, or the 

person, to prepare for him a short paper on the programs tha

ing discussed with Admiral Souers. He wants to know part

what programs are going which are not subject to our coord

now. What is the subject matter of these programs, both ov

covert?

After the Secretary has studied this matter, he is inclined 

to a meeting that would include himself, Admiral Souers, Fre

ton, Bedell Smith and Bob Lovett to thrash the matter out.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 52 D 432. Top Secret. Co

sent to Barrett for action and to Humelsine. 2 See Document 45.
48. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 

PARTICIPANTS

CIA—Messrs. Reber, Smith, Webb, [name not declassified]

State—Messrs. Barnes S/S, Manfull S/S–R, Trueheart R

SUBJECT

CIA Daily Summary

In opening the meeting, Mr. Reber stated in substance tha

ter consultations with the President, CIA had decided to cont

publish its Daily Summary but to recast the publication in the 

a true “Intelligence Summary” rather than a mere summ

telegrams; and 2) CIA desired to obtain from the Department 

ditional copy of all S/S telegrams for a new Office of Current 

gence, which will be established to publish the new Daily.

Mr. Barnes2 stated that while the Department had always 

to keep the CIA Director and the analysts in the Office of Natio

timates fully informed of current developments of a sensitive 

we had always had certain reservations regarding the Daily Su

particularly with respect to its distribution. He pointed out t

CIA Daily Summary had never been an “Intelligence Summ

such and that we have been concerned at times in the past re

the use of sensitive and operational S/S telegrams in that publ

particularly after the distribution of the Summary had been ex

to include persons not normally receiving S/S–R telegrams.

Mr. Reber expressed the view that the distribution of the Su

was an incidental question; that it was necessary in the first i

to determine the intelligence need to be met by the new Summa

that it was necessary in any event for the new Office of Curren

ligence to receive all pertinent information, including S/S tel

in order to do an adequate job.

At this point there was a long and inconclusive discus

whether it was necessary for the editors of the new Daily to h

cess to all sensitive and operational materials in order for them 

lect intelligently the significant items for reporting and whethe

feasible to publish a true “Intelligence Summary” on a daily b

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 114.3/2–55

Drafted by Melvin L. Manfull. 2 Robert G. Barnes, Chief of the Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretari
this connection, there was a divergence of opinion among the C

ple themselves as to whether they could publish on a period

the type of “Intelligence Summary” they apparently had in m

Mr. Barnes explained the various channels through which 

ceived Department telegrams and expressed doubt that the O

National Estimates and Office of Current Intelligence in CIA r

equal treatment with respect to S/S telegrams. He stressed in t

nection overall responsibilities of S/S concerning the distrib

sensitive material to other agencies and the relationship of 

Daily Summary to this problem.

It was finally agreed that: 1) CIA would develop and pr

the Department more concrete proposals with respect to the 

publication they had in mind, the distribution it should receiv

justification of their request; and 2) in the interim, Mr. Smith 

thorized to make available to the editor of the new Summary c

“information only” S/S telegrams on a trial basis in order for 

determine its possible future need for this type of material in 

tion with the new Summary.

49. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State fo

Public Affairs (Barrett) to Secretary of State Acheson1

Washington, February 1

SUBJECT

Meeting with Admiral Souers

Regarding your meeting with Admiral Souers:

When the parties concerned were unable to resolve thei

ences over who should supervise psychological strategy now 

event of war, the question was referred to the NSC.2 The Presid

directed Admiral Souers, with the assistance of the Bureau 

Budget, to study the subject and make recommendations.

The Admiral came up with what he considered a comprom

This was a plan for a board as proposed by the Defense Depa

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 511.00/2–13

Sent through the Executive Secretariat. 2 See Documents 45 and 47.
consisting of one representative each from State, Defense, Join

and CIA, plus an “independent” chairman. However, the Admi

posed that the chairman should report to the National Security 

cil—not to the President as recommended by Defense.

We have objected strenuously to this plan, and accordingly, 

derstand it hasn’t been presented to the President.

Subsequent discussion with Admiral Souers developed 

that he had in mind a board whose field would be far broad

that discussed in any of the NSC 74 papers.3 The original pa

specified that the board would give broad direction to overt in

tion and psychological warfare matters and just “coordinate 

covert psychological operations. The Admiral, it developed, wa

ing in terms of a board that would plan general strategy for v

all unconventional warfare measures. These would include ov

chological strategy, covert psychological strategy (whisperin

paigns, etc.), covert operations of the old OSS variety, and perh

tain economic warfare measures (like pre-emptive buying).

Admiral Souers has implied in private conversations tha

lieves the planning for perfectly overt psychological operations 

continue under the coordination of the Secretary of State, as is n

case with our Psychological Strategy Board, which presently o

under the authority given the Secretary in NSC 594 and which 

be strengthened under State’s version of NSC 74. He seems, h

inclined to advocate the creation under NSC of a superboard 

dinate overt psychological planning with planning in all the ot

conventional warfare fields mentioned above.

The following is a listing of U.S. foreign propaganda prog

being or planned and the state of coordination with each:

In addition to the Department’s USIE program, programs a

being carried on or are planned by CIA, ECA, Army, Air Forces

and SHAPE.

The Department, ECA, Army, NATO and SHAPE are now e

in overt information activity abroad.

Coordination of overt operations by the Department is und

through the National Psychological Strategy Board (members: S

Chairman, Defense, JCS, CIA, ECA and NSRB) which has been 

under NSC 59, and through direct liaison in the U.S. and abr

tween the Department and the agencies concerned. The indep

charters held by ECA and the Army occasion a lack of coord

3 See Document 17.

4 For the text of NSC 59/1, see Document 2.
and/or duplication in some operations such as the Armed Fo

dio Service and the activity of some ECA country units.

Covert propaganda operations are centered in CIA altho

ECA and Army, in some instances, appear to be involved in ac

this nature (to the apparent annoyance of CIA).

CIA covert propaganda operations are coordinated with 

partment through an agreement for direct liaison between P an

Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), through the role of Mr. Joy

as CIA consultant, and through CIA participation in the Natio

chological Strategy Board. I consider that coordination in this 

satisfactory, but do not know and do not need to know the su

of all of CIA’s programs. ECA and Army covert or semi-cover

tions are not coordinated with State or CIA in all cases. NA

SHAPE information operations are in the formative stage, and 

working out the problems of coordination. No major proble

have been uncovered so far.

Psychological warfare in areas of military operations is un

control of the theatre commander, as in Korea.

There is a substantial lack of coordination in relation to 

logical operations in Korea. This is a problem not only for the 

ment but for the JCS, the Department of the Army and CIA.

Research in psychological warfare is being undertaken b

Army, Air Forces, and CIA.

There is a definite lack of coordination in the field of psy

cal warfare research, particularly within the defense establishm

50. Memorandum for the Record by the Director of Centr

Intelligence’s Executive Assistant (Kirkpatrick)1

Washington, February 1

SUBJECT

Meeting on Integration of O/SO and O/PC

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 7

Box 1. Secret.
PRESENT

Mr. Dulles, [name not declassified], W.C. Wyman, Mr. Wisner

Col. Johnston, [name not declassified], Mr. Angleton, Mr. Helms, and 

Mr. Kirkpatrick

1. It was proposed by Mr. Dulles that a basic step towa

gration might be the adjustment of the geographical division

two offices so that they correspond to each other. Mr. Wisner s

this might prove difficult in certain instances and cited Italy a

ample. He said that O/PC in Italy falls naturally into the W

Hemisphere bloc, whereas in O/SO it is in the Mediterranean

area. It was pointed out that [less than 1 line not declassified]. It w

cluded that this matter would be studied and that there probably 

be adjustments necessary on both sides.

2. There was discussion of making the staffs in both offi

respond to each other. It was pointed out that Mr. O’Gara ha

for the administrative staffs of both offices which will make the

tical. It was decided that a committee composed of Col. Johnst

Helms, and Mr. O’Gara should study this problem and come u

recommendations.

3. There was discussion of the level on which O/SO and 

operations should be coordinated. O/PC feels that there should 

cialists at a certain level. It was suggested that this level migh

area region which would be the bottom of the merger. It was su

that each area division be combined with the deputy for each 

The pattern by area may vary. It was pointed out that the “co

tial” activities of O/PC as distinguished from the “secret” ope

might be separated. The general operations of the two office

down into political-economic, paramilitary, and intelligence. It w

suggested that perhaps area divisions might have a deputy for 

these activities rather than a deputy for O/SO and one for O/

4. O/PC raised the question of the responsibility for dea

rectly with resistance groups. It was pointed out that it was th

function to run resistance groups although it is recognized that 

O/SO function to get intelligence from these groups. A task for

posed of Mr. Angleton, Mr. [name not declassified], and Mr. Rositz

named to reach an agreement on this subject and to present any 

of controversy to the Assistant Directors for referral, if necessar

Deputy Director.

5. There was talk of the fact that three offices, OO [Office 

erations],2 O/SO and O/PC were all in contact with the [less tha

not declassified]. It was agreed that this was a very sensitive subj

2 Brackets in the original.
that there should be a unified approach. A task force compose

Thompson, Mr. Houck, Mr. Hunter, and Mr. Ashcraft was na

determine a policy on dealing with labor.

6. A similar problem of three offices all dealing with the [le

line not declassified] was raised. A task force composed of Mr. Hor

Ashcraft and Mr. Lloyd was named to determine an agency p

dealing with the [less than 1 line not declassified].

7. The question of training was brought up and Mr. Kir

was asked to prepare for Mr. Dulles a statement on training.

Lyman B. Kirk

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

51. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Central

Intelligence Agency and the Department of State1

Washington, February 1

RE SS CABLES

Because of certain changes in CIA organization the Depart

State and CIA have considered it useful to re-examine arrang

whereby the Department has been making available to CIA cert

cial cables through the Office of the Secretary of State. The fo

understandings have been reached as a result of the re-examin

a. The Department of State will make every effort to supply 

to CIA, through direct distribution or through the IAD liaison 

all intelligence reports of interest to CIA. In addition the Departm

continue to supply to the Central Intelligence Agency, through th

nel indicated in paragraph f. below, two copies of operational an

telegrams of interest and concern to CIA which may be consid

sensitive as to not be placed within the normal liaison channel.

b. The external distribution of the Daily Intelligence B

which will replace the CIA Daily Summary,2 is:

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, 

Relationships, 1949–56. Confidential. 2 See Document 48.
The President

Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

c. Inclusion of materials from the special State Departmen

bution in the Daily Intelligence Bulletin will be based on imp

in terms of intelligence rather than operations or policy develop

The agencies will rely upon close contact between the Office 

rent Intelligence and SS to develop understandings regarding in

of sensitive materials.

d. Because of State Department’s legitimate concern with 

to the extent of third agency use of State Department sensitive 

any extension of the proposed distribution (see paragraph b. 

will be done only after consultation with the State Departmen

e. The responsibility for receipt and internal CIA distribu

telegrams under consideration shall be the Office of Current Inte

with the understanding that distribution will be limited to: the O

the Director, the Office of National Estimates, and to Daily Inte

Bulletin editors as necessary for their background information.

f. As of the beginning of business Tuesday, February 20th, 

fice of Current Intelligence will assume the responsibility for rece

dissemination, a function discharged at present by the Office 

tional Estimates. Specifically the officer in charge and his addre

[3 lines not declassified]

g. In the Department of State this special liaison will be h

by the Policy Reports Staff of the Executive Secretariat.

For the Director of Central Intel

James Q. 

Acting Assistant D

Intelligence Coor

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Below the signature 

“Endorsed: Agreed: Robert G. Barnes, February 19, 1951” with an indication th

signed the original.
52. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

for Administration (Scott) to the Under Secretary of S

(Webb)1

Washington, u

SUBJECT

NSC–74 Background

This is in response to your request for a full statemen

inter-departmental arrangements and planning leading up to N

and the assignment of the psychological problem to Admiral 

1. NSC–10/2

NSC–10/2 (attached as Tab A),3 approved in June 1948 f

sponsibility for covert operations and directed the responsibl

to assure coordination of such activities with U.S. foreign and 

policies and overt activities. This decision has remained in ef

has not been at issue in the planning of organization for ov

chological operations until Admiral Souers’ assignment.

2. NSC–4 and NSC–43

NSC–44 (attached as Tab B), which was approved by the 

December, 1947, made provision for the coordination of foreig

mation measures. NSC–435 (attached as Tab C), which was ap

by the NSC in March, 1949, made certain provisions on plan

wartime conduct of overt psychological warfare. In December, 1

provisions of these two papers were consolidated with minor 

and approved as NSC–59.6

3. NSC–59

NSC–59 (attached as Tab D), approved in March, 1950, cha

Secretary of State with responsibilities for:

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 55 D 339. Top Secret. Alth

memorandum is attached to one from Barrett to Webb, March 14, the content 

memorandum indicates that it was probably drafted about February 20. 2 See Document 17.

3 An attached list of Tabs A–M is not printed. None of the tabs are attac

memorandum. For NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of 

ligence Establishment, Document 292. 4 Ibid., Document 252.

5 See ibid., Documents 392 and 401.

6 See Document 2.
(1) Formulation of policies and plans for peacetime infor

program, including all foreign information activity conducted 

partments and agencies of the U.S. Government. (2) Formulation of National Psychological Warfare policy 

of national emergency and the initial stages of war. (3) Coordination of policies and plans for the information p

and for overt psychological warfare with the Department of D

with other appropriate departments and with related planning 

the NSC–10 series.

There was directed to be established within the Departm

State an organization to consist of: “(a) A Director appointed 

retary of State after consultation with other departments and a

represented on the National Security Council. (b) Policy con

representing the Secretary of the State, the Secretary of Defen

the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. (c) A c

ant representing the Director of Central Intelligence for matte

ing to coordination with planning under the NSC–10 series. (d

sultant representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC–59 and NS

matters. (e) A staff composed of full-time personnel represent

Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Cen

telligence Agency. (f) A liaison representative to the staff from 

tional Security Resources Board and such liaison representation 

membership from other departments and agencies of the gove

as may be determined by the Director after consultation w

consultants.”

This organization was directed to:

“(a) Initiate and develop interdepartmental plans, make 

mendations, and otherwise advise and assist the Secretary of 

discharging his responsibilities for the national foreign infor

program in time of peace.

(b) Make plans for overt psychological warfare, including 

mendations for the preparations for national emergency and th

stages of war. Such plans shall be continuously coordinated w

war plans through the planning agencies of the Department of D

and where such plans have a direct impact on war plans they 

subject to the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

4. Psychological Strategy Board

On August 17, 1950, the Department of State issued a press 

(attached as Tab E) announcing the establishment of a nation

chological strategy board under the Secretary of State.7 This S

Board was in fact nothing more than the “Director” and the “

tants” under NSC–59, including the JCS representative. This s

7 Printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 28, 1950, p. 335.
taken in recognition of the necessity for conducting psych

measures in connection with the hostilities in Korea and the 

ingly critical world-wide situation. The activities of the “organ

were in fact intensified, as the Board has met more frequently s

announcement and has dealt with more problems of a psych

character requiring joint political and military action.

5. NSC–74

In July, 1950 the Under Secretary of State transmitted to t

a report prepared by the Organization established pursuant to N

This report was issued for clearance as NSC–74 (attached as T

This paper has been prepared principally during the peri

to Korea and was based on the tacit assumption that any wa

be general and would break out without warning. It prov

“initial stage” of psychological warfare organization to be 

on D–day, or earlier at the discretion of the President, and a 

the “subsequent stages” to be established as rapidly there

possible.

The plan for the initial stages of war recognized the respo

of the Secretary of State to “formulate national psychological 

policy and issue psychological warfare policy directives to ap

ate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government” and t

dinate policies and plans for overt psychological warfare with 

partment of Defense” and other agencies. The plan also dire

Secretary of State to make “detailed plans and preparations to 

psychological warfare to the maximum in consonance with thi

It was recognized that overt psychological warfare would be e

in theaters of military operations by theater commanders and 

areas by the Department of State.

For the “initial stages” the Interdepartmental Foreign Info

Organization was to be “augmented” and established as an 

Psychological Warfare Board to act as the “Executive Agent” of 

retary of State in the execution of his planning and coordina

sponsibility for psychological warfare. The Board was to be co

of a Chairman representing the Secretary of State, a Vice-Chairm

resenting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one representative ea

State, Defense, and ECA.

The plan for the “subsequent stages” provided a Nation

chological Warfare Board “composed of a Chairman, appointe

President and directly responsible to him; a member designated 

representing the Department of State; a member chosen from t

Chiefs of Staff organization, designated by and representing 

partment of Defense; and a member designated by and repre

the Central Intelligence Agency.”
On September 13, 1950, Secretary Johnson submitted to th

utive Secretary of NSC his comments on NSC–748 (attached as 

He proposed the immediate implementation of the plan for t

tial stages”, but he considered it inadequate even for the situ

that time and thought that “we should move to create immedia

independent psychological planning board in the Executive O

the President.” The chairman would have been directly respon

the President and the board members would have been full-t

pointees not representing the Departments.

Also on September 14, the Under Secretary of State advi

NSC that the Department of State approved NSC–74 except for t

sequent stages plan, which he believed required further stud

Tab H.) He also stated that he had “taken steps to strength

Inter-departmental Foreign Information Organization establish

der NSC–59/1, so that it may meet the requirements of situation

joint military and political action is necessary in the field of p

logical warfare”, referring to the establishment of the psych

strategy board.

After further study within the Department, a draft NSC–7

tached as Tab I) was developed.10 In an effort to meet the requir

of the present situation, this paper provided for the establishm

National Psychological Strategy Board (or National Psychologic

fare Board in time of war) “as the coordinating agent for the Se

of State” with respect to his responsibility to “recommend bro

cies and plans for the national psychological effort designed to 

a maximum support of U.S. national objectives” and to “rev

plans and programs of agencies executing psychological meas

conformity with national policy.” The chairman was to be des

by the Secretary of State, the vice-chairman by JCS and additiona

bers by State, Defense, and CIA. This paper spoke of the “Nation

chological Effort” in order to avoid the controversy about w

“psychological warfare” is conducted in time of peace, and t

adequate provision for the present situation. It was the positio

Department of State that organization in time of war should 

jected to further study.

Following discussion of the new State Department draft by t

senior staff, it was determined that agreement between the Depa

could not be secured. A memorandum of disagreement was p

8 Not found.

9 Not found.

10 Not found.
(attached as Tab J) and submitted for NSC consideration, togeth

an additional memorandum from the JCS11 (attached as Tab K). 

ior staff memorandum stated the essential issue as follows:

“Should responsibility at the national level for psycholog

icy formulation, within the framework of approved national 

and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psych

effort, including authority to issue policy guidance to all Depa

and agencies of the Government executing portions of the psy

ical effort (1) be assigned to the Secretary of State, or, (2) be a

to an official independent of any Department and responsibl

President.”

After NSC consideration on January 4, the President referr

memoranda “to Mr. Souers and the Bureau of the Budget for 

study and recommendation to the President.”12

On January 18, Mr. Souers presented to you the propos

Board “under the NSC” with a chairman to be appointed by t

ident13 (attached as Tab L).

Last week there was a meeting at the Bureau of the Budget 

cussion of this problem which was attended by Admiral 

Messrs. Lawton and Staats of the Bureau; Messrs. Barrett, Ma

Joyce, and Scott. A revised draft of the Souers directive was ci

and discussed, but no copies were given out. An analysis of 

vised draft is attached as Tab M.14

W. K

11 Neither found. 12 Not further identified. 13 See attachment to Document 45. 14 Memorandum from Scott to Webb, February 16. (National Archive

P Files: Lot 55 D 339) 15 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
53. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Sm

President Truman1

Washington, February 2

Your copy of the initial issue of the daily Current Intelligen

letin, which is based upon information from all sources, is en

The former summary, which was based solely upon cables from 

matic representatives, has been discontinued.3

It is hoped that the broad representative current inte

presented in the new Bulletin, with immediate comments of a

will be of more comprehensive value to you. It should be emp

that the comments do not necessarily represent the mature 

ciation of the Central Intelligence Agency and have not bee

dinated with the other agencies represented on the Inte

Advisory Committee. They are actually the first impressions 

on “spot” information, and are subject to later revision. The n

following copies will contain selected items received directly fr

sources.

Walter B

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Top Secret. 2 Not found. A description of the enclosure at the end of the memorand

tifies it as the Current Intelligence Bulletin of February 28, 1951. A copy is in C

telligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 97–T00975A, Box 1. 3 The former summary, called the Daily Summary, was based on collatera

primarily news media and Department of State telegrams from U.S. Embassie

It was designed for the use of the President and the National Security Council. 

rent Intelligence Bulletin drew on all-source material, including COMINT-de

formation. Distribution outside of CIA was to the President, the Secretary of S

the Secretary of Defense. See also Documents 48 and 51.
54. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to t

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley)1

Washington, March 

Dear General Bradley:

Herewith as discussed during our conference last Monday 

nex 1)2 are estimates of the support which is or which may be 

by CIA from the Department of Defense in order to carry out 

which have already been approved or which it is possible ma

proved within the near future in accordance with our estimate 

ent trends of policy. Our estimated requirements are listed und

categories as follow: those already requested under approved p

those required for the support of approved projects, requests fo

will be made within the next thirty days; those required for t

port of projects which are still tentative or which are still in 

cussion state.

These latter are largely guesswork but the guesswork is e

to the extent that it is based on past experience and on our est

future possibilities.

For cross reference, in Annex 2,3 we have indicated the 

ments for covert operations by project, listing those which fal

the above three categories.

As I mentioned during Monday’s conference, the respon

which are being placed upon us under our Charter and under 

rectives, particularly in the field of planning and execution of g

warfare activities, go beyond our current capabilities and ind

brace operations of such magnitude that they threaten to ab

resources of this Agency to a point which might be detriment

other responsibilities.

In order to bring these activities into proper focus a statem

be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the next 60 da

ing CIA estimate of support required from the Department of 

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731

Top Secret. 2 Attached but not printed.

3 Not found.

4 Smith sent a follow-up letter to Bradley on May 4 stating that NSC con

of his request for a determination of the appropriate scope and pace of CIA o

was pending. He was therefore withholding providing his overall requiremen

partment of Defense support until the NSC had made its decision. (Central In

Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1, Folder 9)
in order to meet our dual responsibilities in the field of operatio

accordingly to enable it to:

(1) complete the organization of a professional clandestin

ligence service, adequate to meet all peacetime requirements 

estimate of expansion to meet conditions of general war; (2) conduct effective covert operations on a global basis und

tinued conditions of cold war and including guerrilla activities 

mainland of Asia and in Eastern Europe.

The above would require, in my opinion, detailed plannin

ance, and control, participated in by the three Armed services, 

partment of State, and probably the Office of Defense Mobiliza

well as the Central Intelligence Agency. This Agency will be 

participate in discussions directed toward the formation of a 

syndicate competent to give such guidance and control.

Faithfully,

Walter B. 

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

55. Letter From President Truman to Director of Central

Intelligence Smith1

U.S. Naval Station, Key West, March 

Dear Bedell:

I have been reading the Intelligence Bulletin2 and I am hig

pressed with it.

I believe you have hit the jackpot with this one.

Sincerely,

Harry S. T

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

No classification marking. President Truman was on vacation at the Little Wh

in Key West, Florida. A handwritten notation on the letter reads, “air mailed 

West.”2 See Document 53.

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Truman signed the original.
56. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(Bradley) to Director of Central Intelligence Smith1

Washington, March 

Dear General Smith:

I have read your letter (TS #43690) of 2 March 19512 with 

and note that you are preparing a statement for submittal to t

Chiefs of Staff giving your estimate of the support required f

Department of Defense in order to meet your responsibilitie

field of operations.

The assets which may be generated by requirements for op

in the cold war can be expected to be of proportionate value 

overt global war should intervene, and for some time all of 

been acquiring a considerable body of experience in learning 

chanics of dealing with the complex elements that are involve

It seems to me that much of the support which is visualize

enclosures to your letter can be provided by arrangements whi

already been set in motion and are well advanced. This lead

hope that we will not have too much difficulty in handling th

tion within the current framework, but it is, of course, a prop

ject for further exploration and discussion with the Joint Chiefs 

Financing appears to be a matter between you and the C

but you may be assured that I shall support your efforts to obta

for any conception of your plans and operations which has b

cepted by Defense.

Sincerely,

Omar N. B

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G0027

Folder 9. Top Secret. 2 Document 54.

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Bradley signed the original.
57. Memorandum to the Executive Secretary of the Nation

Security Council (Lay)1

Washington, u

SUBJECT

Third Progress Report on NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program 

Psychological Warfare Planning”2

1. NSC 59/1 was approved as Government policy on Ma

1950. It is requested that this Progress Report as of March 6, 1

circulated to the members of the Council for their information

2. In addition to steps taken to strengthen the existing or

tion under NSC 59/1 as reported in the second progress repo

ther measures have been taken in this direction. Twenty-one we

semi-weekly meetings of the National Psychological Strategy 

have been held since the last progress report. The new proced

expediting the conduct of Board meetings were approved in 

ber 1950, and the appointment of a full-time Executive Secretar

Board is pending.

3. New arrangements were made for closer interdepartme

ordination of information policy guidances.

4. A survey team composed of Colonel W.J. Bohnaker, Joi

sidiary Plans Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lt. Col. Fred

Young, Psychological Warfare Division, Department of the Arm

Mr. W. Bradley Connors, Department of State, was sent to Tok

Korea in October. Findings of the survey group were reviewed 

Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization at its me

November 13, 1950, and on 18 January 1951 the Director, Mr. 

transmitted to executing agencies the following statement on p

logical warfare activities in Korea:

“The Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization, 

reviewed psychological warfare activities in Korea on the basis o

mation now available, which is admittedly incomplete, and not

psychological warfare activities in the Department of the Army ha

elevated to the status of a Special Staff Division, concludes that:

“1. The importance of psychological warfare as an instru

national policy should be emphasized to all executing agencie

field;

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 711.5200/3–75

Drafted by Oechsner. 2 For text of NSC 59/1, see Document 2.

3 Document 28.
2. Executing agencies should give psychological warfare 

ority commensurate with its importance. “3. The fullest use should be made of all known techniq

facilities now available for psychological warfare. “4. To assure the most effective coordination of psychologi

fare measures at the national level, it is desirable that agencies 

ing psychological warfare programs in the field provide full re

current plans and operations.”

Periodic reviews of psychological warfare activities in Kor

been made subsequently by the Board with the purpose o

menting the above conclusions. It is the view of the Depart

State, however, that proper status and importance have not y

given psychological warfare in Korea.

5. A Plan for National Psychological Warfare for General W

pared by the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff un

terms of NSC 59/1, has been forwarded to the Director and i

consideration by the Board.

6. The staff has also notified the Director of completion of 

on “Detailed Functions of a National Psychological Warfare O

tion,” pending a decision on the location of the organization und

74/3.4

7. Plans for the following areas have been developed 

partmentally or by the Department of State and have been acce

the Board for implementation or are under present considerat

Korea

China

Indo-China

Russia

Germany

8. “Project Troy”.5 A report developed by the Department 

after consultation with the National Psychological Strategy Bo

been submitted; its implementation is now under considerati

report covers only the first stages of the study described bel

4 Regarding NSC 74, see Document 17. NSC 74 and NSC 74/1 are in 

Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 74. NSC 74/3 was not fo

5 Project Troy, initiated in October 1950, was a research study undertaken b

of scientists and social scientists assembled by the Massachusetts Institute o

ogy. The “Project Troy Report to the Secretary of State” was submitted on F

1951. It proposed technical means to get around Soviet jamming of VOA and 

political and psychological warfare. A copy is in National Archives, RG 59, IN

ical Files: Lot 58 D 776, Project Troy, Perforating the Iron Curtain. Documentat

report and consideration of it within the Department of State is ibid., Cen

1950–54, 511.00, 611.00, 711.5, and ibid., S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563. See also Doc
will be available to other departments shortly. Under this proj

Massachusetts Institute of Technology assembled 30 of the natio

scientists and other experts to explore all means—conventional 

conventional—for penetrating the Iron Curtain. The report e

the large scale expansion of radio facilities, already initiated, a

for even further expansion along lines which should facilitate 

piercing the curtain by means which will not interfere wit

telecommunications channels (military).

9. “Project Vagabond”. Under this project, a study has bee

of the use of seaborne portable radio transmitters to be moun

stationary operations at negotiated bases in our overt informa

tivities, but also to be available for covert operations and for m

psychological warfare in the event of war.

10. “Project Brain Wave”. The Department of State is dev

and has reported to the Board a project designed to stimulate 

of indigenous anti-Communist sentiment in the countries of W

Europe.

11. “Project Nobel”. The Board has approved a project 

issuance of a pro-Western statement by all surviving holders 

Nobel peace prize.

12. The Board has continued to study the use of balloons a

aganda carriers. CIA has been assigned the project of a continuin

in this field and has also been instructed to stockpile one thousan

sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available.

13. The Board has at various meetings studied the questio

fectors and their possible use in the information and psychologic

fare programs.

14. The subject of the relationship between SHAPE, NATO

and Defense, with respect to both the current information p

and psychological warfare planning, is under active study by s

Board.

58. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Sm

President Truman

Washington, March 2

[Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Pre

Secretary’s Files. Top Secret. 1 page not declassified.]
59. Memorandum From Robert J. Hooker of the Policy Pl

Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitz

Washington, March 2

SUBJECT

Troy Report2

The Troy Report almost uniformly reflects a very high 

technical competence, political sophistication, and common s

deserves the most serious consideration. It lays down princip

techniques for the conduct of political warfare which, with few 

tions, seem worthy of adoption. On the non-technical side its 

not so much its originality—few of the ideas will seem origina

one who has sat around the S/P table—as its cogency. Develop

Staff views as to what recommendations should be adopted, a

we can secure their adoption, would seem to be in order.3

Following are its highlights. I am intruding my own co

only with respect to recommendations which seem to be quest

Volume I—Foreword

Explains that although the initial study was directed prim

ward the technical problems confronting VOA because of Sov

ming, it was agreed that other methods of piercing the Iron 

should be examined, “and that the nature of any technical faci

inevitably tied to the target and to the content of the material to 

veyed and finally to the effect which was ultimately desired.” 

Thus the study has emerged with the concept of “political w

“The newness of our idea, if any, lies in the understanding of th

gic power of the several elements when combined as a well r

and coordinated whole. . . . the idea that the United States m

velop a coordinated political warfare effort is the most import

in the report.” (p. ix)

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Political an

logical Warfare 1951–1953, Box 11A. Top Secret. Drafted by Hooker. All ellip

original. 2 See numbered paragraph 8 of Document 57 and footnote 5 thereto.

3 Another evaluation of the Troy report is in a memorandum from Arm

Barrett, March 26, which complimented the report for “its appreciation of the 

political warfare and in its proposals as to the techniques that could be employ

seminating our propaganda and otherwise carrying on political warfare acti

his memorandum Armstrong also offered a critique of the “over-all substa

proach” of the Troy report. (National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 77
Part I—Political Warfare

Chapter I—Political Warfare

Urges the “unification of political warfare”, which “should 

ganized like any form of warfare, with specialized weapons, s

tactics, logistics, and training”. (p. 3)

Part II—Communication Into Shielded Areas

Deals with means of communication for piercing the Iron C

mentioning, besides radio and balloons, and other existing w

use of direct mail to send professional journals and industrial an

mercial publications and questions “Impulsive emotional block

this kind of communication, such as the recent ban on shipm

The Iron Age”. It also mentions sending of objects, typical of Am

life, drugs, flash lights, fountain pens, small radio receivers, et

Chapter II—Radio

“Really important advances can be made along two comp

tary lines: a) by developing a broadcasting system which co

standard elements in a special way to achieve the effect of en

power and, b) by developing a tiny, cheap, self-contained, dur

ceiver that could eventually be distributed in large numbers o

world.” (p. 11) It notes that a hundred, perhaps a thousand

jamming transmitters are in use, which “appear to be centrally co

although the individual transmitters are widely distributed”. 

“The evidence suggests that the operation is growing in scale 

direct and major threat to high-frequency radio communication 

and to Europe generally”. (p. 14)

Recommends use of “the coherent transmitter” technique w

a ten unit cluster, radiating one megawatt each, costing about 

lion dollars apiece, would have the same power as a single on

dred megawatt unit, “and if well-located could reach most of 

Europe at night. . . . (a) it cannot easily be jammed over a larg

(b) it can be heard with a receiver as insensitive as a simple crys

(p. 21)

Recommends also “a concerted effort to develop crystal an

sistor receivers for mass production”. (p. 22)

Points out “The Russian jamming operation seems to us 

clear and serious implications extending beyond the immediat

lems of the Voice of America. . . . Already there have been insta

deliberate, effective jamming of intercontinental point-to-poin

missions, both United States and British. . . . If our high-fre

transmissions were jammed (they could be jammed tomorrow) 

Atlantic cables cut by submarine action, air mail would be o

means of communication with Europe. . . . the problem must b
as a matter of national security, now. . . . A wideband transatlan

munication facility, reliable and secure against jamming, can an

be provided. The appropriate agency should at once sponsor 

ough engineering study of the several possible methods. The 

telecommunications policy must be reexamined. . . . The chal

the electro-magnetic war is serious and we are not organized 

it.” (pp. 24–27)

Chapter III—Balloons

“An area of a million square miles could be saturated wi

lion propaganda sheets in a single balloon operation costing a 

lion dollars. . . . If the area of dispersal in such an operation w

stricted to 30,000 square miles, which may be practicable, ther

be a leaflet laid down, on the average, for each area of 30 by 

. . . The dispersion of balloons in flight and the dispersion of le

falling from altitude both lend themselves to saturation ope

. . . Production specifications should be established now and 

tive capacity should be located.... The operational testing a

duction program should be undertaken now. It may cost about 

lion dollars. . . . In order to coordinate balloon use with other 

warfare operations, organizational planning for the final op

should start now....A stockpile sufficient for an actual op

should be created now, and the questions of size and type 

should be reviewed periodically as the program develops”. (pp

Part III—Notes on Target Areas

Introduction

Observes that VOA “programs should deal insofar as possi

subjects that are matters of real emotional concern to the membe

audience. . . . There is a real danger . . . that heavy emphasis o

will lead to a neglect of longer range types of programs deali

the local concerns of people behind the curtain”. (p. 40)

Chapter IV—Russia

Notes that appeals to reason or efforts to modify ideologic

have small chance of success. Suggests efforts should be dire

ward undermining Soviet rulers’ confidence in themselves a

other: noting possibility of producing deterioration in admin

structure “by overloading the system with material introduc

outside”; disturbing confidence of the leaders by increasing de

stimulating mutual distrust by artificial means, bogus letters, e

moting distrust of dependability of military and political organ

among the satellites. Comments that although the “full and f

mula is officially abandoned, it remains in the habits of psych

warfare operators. Recommends “We should avoid the posit
press or implied, that communism is bad, or any implication 

tempt for communism . . . rather . . . that Stalinism has betray

tain ideals of Marxism which have actually had a peaceful ev

in the West. . . . Discord in the United States is not only tolera

actually necessary. Variation and divergence . . . are . . . an evid

strength, not weakness. . . . There should be no direct or indir

paraging of Soviet culture.” (pp. 44–45)

Our principal targets should be the intelligentsia, skilled w

bureaucrats, personnel of the mechanized armed forces, rura

Major themes should be “The Soviet peoples have proven them

capable, patriotic, hard-working . . . having with their sweat an

built up a large scale industry and modern agriculture, are now 

denied the fruits of their labor by a harsh and grasping regime

USSR and the United States . . . have . . . common interests an

mon attitudes. . . . Americans grant that the teachings of Marx, 

and Lenin have great historical importance. Yet the Stalinist sys

not evolved . . . as Marx and Engels would have wished”. (p. 

handling of the material “should be persistent, simple and co

. . . based on genuine sophistication in Stalinist thinking . . . tru

sonal . . . occasionally seek the opportunity for drama . . . sho

on the band-wagon at the earliest possible moment for program

are certain to be widely popular among the Russian people, 

they also have official Russian support.” (pp. 46–47)

Chapter V—Europe

Proposes “a program based on the concept of European u

one must look to European tradition itself. . . . Nor will mere ve

gument suffice if in our other acts we appear to encourage the 

uance of inequities or special privilege long associated with th

agerial elites of European society.” (pp. 51–55)

Recommends exploiting the opportunities offered by Yug

Recommends considering seriously the inclusion of satel

possibly Russian units in the all-European Army and, with suit

knowledgment of the difficulty of the problem, emphasizes 

portance and the genuine possibility of organizing a European 

with national units as small as companies. (Comment: The in

of satellite and Russian units under their own flags or so organ

to appear to the world as national units would seem questionab

to an outbreak of hostilities. But they should be so organized th

can readily be converted into national units. The Report’s un

ness to accept the assumption that national units in the Europea

must be of division size seems warranted, provided the problem 

proached with suitable realism and flexibility.) The economic p

should be designed to reduce the inequalities between social 
reduce the feeling of isolation from sources of raw materials a

kets for manufactures, eliminate barriers between the nation

rope and encourage increase in productivity.

Recommends emergency aid and all possible support to Yug

Chapter VI—China and Southeast Asia

“We cannot appeal to them to align themselves with us 

Russia, save in terms of the fact that we, rather than Russia, 

them in their struggles for development. . . . There is needed 

special Presidential Commission on Aid to Asia”. (p. 66) Politi

fare operations “should operate at the local level and specially 

technical personnel should participate at the local level. . . . 

must fit local needs, local customs, and local requirements”.

Chapter VII—The Defector

Makes the highly questionable recommendation that an 

mental Russian government-in-exile should be set up, “a smal

sponsible state with its own territory and a more or less free 

develop social and political institutions which could fit the n

present day Russians. . . . the creation of Russian troop units 

in the all European Army . . . almost immediately”. (p. 71)

The remaining recommendations are closely similar to th

decisions already taken and now pending with respect to defec

cept for a recommendation, the necessity for which seems q

able, “that the defector program be set up under a single ind

with authority to draw on necessary resources and personne

ever located within the government”. (p. 72)

Part IV—Some General Conclusions

Chapter VIII—General Conclusions

“In the absence of plans the conduct of political warfar

to become a series of defensive responses to enemy action. 

success of our political warfare depends finally, upon the 

support of national policies. . . . What is needed, what is ind

dispensable, is a planned research effort to insure first, tha

resources of personnel, wherever located, are assigned task

highest priority and second, that pieces of the research mo

lying clearly within the responsibility of existing agencies a

plied to complete the whole picture. . . . there must be som

authority concerned with political warfare exclusively, with 

pacity to design a comprehensive program and the power to 

execution of this program through the effective action of all th

cies and departments that are now engaged in waging politi

fare.” (pp. 79–81)
Volume II

Annex 1—Political Warfare

Points out that “the rise of technology has so changed the 

economic and social forces that the questions that now divide 

. . . go too deep to yield easily to negotiation . . . international r

must therefore increasingly be conducted through channels tha

the mass of people directly”. (pp. 1–2)

Observes that U.S. Civil War was the first since the religio

of the 17th Century to be fought consciously over an idea, a

fought not by professional armies but by masses of men represe

of the whole society, with spectacular losses on both sides, won 

superior tactical skill than by overwhelming weight, and ended 

conditional surrender. “Technological advance has now put 

hands logistical weapons of such power that we find ourselv

ally unable to use them for limited objectives. War has becom

not only all-out but all-or-none. . . . Even though such a weapon 

win a war, it probably would not do so in a way that will lead 

isfactory peace. Atomic war thus falls outside the Clausewitz 

tion. Its possession gives us time to develop a united world, bu

will not continue that policy.” (p. 3)

Thus, we must seek other ways of reaching our internatio

jectives. “Fear of all-out war has so far kept us from aggressiv

to halt the Russian advance. This is just the wrong attitude. A c

planned series of forward steps that erode the Russian power p

the best way of avoiding, not provoking, the last great battle 

West . . . we must remember clearly that all international actions

included—are directed at the minds and emotions of men. . . . 

terconnected simultaneous use of all instruments of internatio

tion to obtain a single objective is what we call, in this Report

cal warfare. . . . a political war consisting of well-planned attac

series of limited objectives will make an all-out shooting war im

ble for Russia and unnecessary for us.” (pp. 3–4)

Annex 2—Briefing Travelers

Points out desirability of briefing travelers and U.S. soldiers 

to make a good impression and answer intelligently the types o

tions they will be asked.

Annex 3—The Mails

Points out value of use of the mails for “some sort of acces

U.S.S.R. and easy access to some of the satellites. . . . this channel 

be used for what it is worth. . . . suited to a long-range back

program.... can provide an equal-status contact—a profe

talking to an already-sympathetic professional. . . . of non-gove
origin.... Lists of appropriate printed material, commercial 

commercial should . . . be selected from that now distributed in th

States. . . . (1) of a high standard (2) non-political.” (pp. 1–2)

Annex 4—Distribution of Objects

Seems far-fetched, with the all-important exception of cr

dios capable of receiving new and future VOA programs.

Annex 5—Overload and Delay

An “attack... should be directed at those weaknesses whic

not be corrected without seriously reducing the power held b

few at the top. We might, for instance, take actions which wou

in a serious overloading of the top levels by a crippling increas

number of problems referred upward for a decision. How far c

Soviet system go in increasing the decision-making powers at th

ranks before it fell below the critical level of centralized con

maintaining a dictatorship? We should explore all the ‘input

available to us, and we should deliberately embark on a prog

increasing them, particularly at the lower levels. . . . delibera

periment in this area . . . investigate the nature of departures fr

tine which make any local action improbable. . . . We might crea

difficulties for the system by making as many of the situations 

meet highly conditional.” (pp. 3–4)

Annex 6—Albania

Discusses possible defection of Albania in terms which ad

ing to our understanding of this problem and its potentialities

Annex 7—Two Doctors

Skip it.

Annex 8—Political Warfare—United States vs. Russia

“. . . propaganda against the U.S.S.R. will be a squandering o

and of personnel and may actually be harmful unless there is a 

minimum coordination of words and acts. . . . unless its policy 

know in advance of significant military, economic, and politica

which are to be undertaken by all Government agencies . . . o

grams of attack must be derived from the properties of the tar

from the properties of the weapons we happen to have.” (pp. 2

As objectives for VOA discusses friendship, creating do

sistance, and social groupings by classes, sex and age, the pe

nationality groups, party affiliation, and military-civil.

It recommends strongly against “the non-Party people b

off against the Party members. This has long been a shaky prop

because it neglected the structure of the Party and the diversi

actual roles in Soviet society. . . . A very high proportion of d
persons . . . maintain that a large number of the Party people are 

less, were forced into their membership, and do their best not t

people. . . . To stress the theme of Party as against non-Party 

might serve to push them deeper into the Party rather than aw

it.” The crucial differentiation is between “we” and “they”, “b

the ordinary, poor driven people both within and without th

and those in power or associated and/or identified with it”. (p

“The suggested approach does not slight, minimize, or deb

viet accomplishments. A series error is often made in assumi

because so many Soviet citizens seem to have so strong a reje

the Soviet regime, they equally reject all of its works and insti

Nothing could be further from the truth. Work with defectors in

that even among the most disaffected there tends to be strong p

even emotional, identification with many of the features of soc

veloped under Soviet rule....

“By the same token, we should be exceedingly cautious in 

ing the Soviet system not to permit the impression that this me

us the sweeping away of all the basic institutions of contempor

viet society and their replacement by institutions imported fr

West. Our central appeal is the promise of an end to the opp

compulsive totalitarian aspects of the Soviet regime....

“. . . There are two closely related themes which meet the r

ments indicated. The first stresses that the Soviet regime is imp

harsh, capricious, with little or no respect for the human dignit

the basic rights to justice and fair play of a hardworking, decen

suffering people. The second stresses that the Soviet people hav

great sacrifices and endured extraordinary hardship and suffe

build up in the Soviet Union a great and powerful industry and 

ising agricultural establishment, but they are being denied the f

their labor and the just reward for their suffering—which itse

never have been so great or so long-lasting—by a regime whic

ploiting the ordinary people, peasant, worker, and intelligen

alike, for purposes of its own having nothing to do with the we

the people.” (pp. 15–16)

Volume III

Annex 9—Personnel for Southeast Asia and Other Backward Areas

Proposes “the recruiting of a group of American youth will

able to spend two to four years of their lives in intimate person

tact with the village people of Asia. Their primary task would 

demonstration of suitably modified western techniques of publi

4 Brackets in the original.
and agriculture. . . . The training program would have, of cour

elaborated with care and modified on the basis of future exp

. . . whether the scheme proposed here can actually meet the 

practice can only be found out by trying. The importance of th

lem certainly justifies a pilot project to test the possibilities.” (

Annex 10—Population Problems

Notes futility of economic aid when “no ingenuity of Ma

alectic, and no Point IV can reason away or buy off the rules of b

In the not-very-long run the various proposed measures of as

“will increase in even greater proportion the number of mouths

Suggests efforts to build up in such areas of the Far East 

what different attitudes toward individual life than now exists

ically, this change can be described in terms of encouraging 

to recognize the value of having a limited number of healthy, e

and well-nourished children rather than a succession of sick, fee

starving ones. . . . Demonstration that medicine and public hea

vide a more certain means of survival may well reduce the e

ated drive towards numbers”. (pp. 1–2)

Annex 11—Research in Support of Political Warfare

“. . . it is particularly crucial that research be instituted wh

guide the central coordinating body charged with fashioning t

all national political welfare [warfare?] strategy. . . . [it]5 must be 

a kind that it provides partial predictions concerning the psy

cal repercussions at home and abroad of economic, military, dip

and informational policies.”

Recommends study of the political control systems utilize

fluencing the decisions of groups holding or seeking power, 

of the social structure of key target areas, and of basic attitude

get populations, investigation of major channels of commu

within a country and existing attitudes towards materials ca

these channels, continuing studies of domestic vulnerability t

cal warfare, and research on the changing of attitudes.

Also recommends research in support of the defector prog

the use of radio, the creation of the image of America, method

rupting Russian administrative systems, vulnerabilities of 

satellite armed forces, revolutionary role of Russian intellectu

concept of “United Europe”, the problem of inventing things fo

east Asian requirements, the effectiveness of the exchange of p

and political warfare administration.

5 Brackets in the original.
Annex 12—Defectors

“The lesson of history is clear that exiles or defectors have 

a key role in revolutionary or counterrevolutionary movements

extent that they have been supported and aided by foreign gover

. . . such support has usually paid good dividends in terms of n

interests to the foreign government . . . [11⁄2 lines not declassified

however, the consequences of such techniques for our general d

program must be carefully evaluated before any such decision i

. . . [6 lines not declassified] . . . The intelligentsia and the middle 

tional elite are more strongly represented in the defector group 

the total Russian population. A third (at least) of the defectors ha

and/or Komsomol membership—this is much higher than a 

sample. This fact militates strongly against the contention that d

overwhelmingly represent the rejects of Soviet society or peop

were never able to adjust to the Soviet regime.” (pp. 5–19)

Annex 13—Forward Planning

Deals with the possible impact on our society of the dev

situation and its “threat to some of the historic qualities that w

heretofore assumed to be an inherent part of our way of life”

sity, mobility, curiosity, and affection or sympathy. “We earnes

ommend a research program that will pool the energies and w

of historians, anthropologists, economists and psychologists to 

the possible effects of a prolonged preparedness upon this soci

provide us with a basis for dealing intelligently with the life t

immediately before us.” (pp. 2–4)

[Comment: This might well be a desirable project for th

Foundation to undertake.]6

Annex 14—Public Opinion

“A special problem of public support might arise if Russ

to appear to relax or stabilize her aggressive pressure. . . . Othe

lems of public support may well arise if the government adopt

icy of aggressive political warfare.” (p. 1)

Discusses, among the type of problems which can be antic

How does public opinion influence foreign policy? How can p

best presented to earn support? How can public understandi

support be increased? and America’s image of itself.

Annex 15—Stalin

“Since Stalin’s death offers the best opportunity for exploi

fear and self-interest of the Soviet elite with the aim of weaken

6 Brackets in the original.
regime to the point where it can no longer threaten our worl

tives, and since the death of the dictator can occur at any time

the utmost importance to initiate planning for this eventuality 

delay. . . . it is proposed that a special section be set up within 

litical Warfare Executive to concentrate exclusively on this tas

collect the views of the most competent students of Soviet Gov

and society and those of recent refugees from the U.S.S.R. as to 

likely to take place when Stalin dies. From these views, several hyp

should be developed. . . . For each one of these hypotheses the 

outline of a political warfare campaign would be developed. F

have a strategy worked out might permit consolidation of powe

a new dictator, and we might have to wait another quarter of a 

(if we survive that long) for another opportunity.”

Annex 16—Biography of Team

Annex 17—Consultants

Annex 18—Project Troy Briefing

Volume IV

The annexes contained in Volume IV, 19 through 26 inclu

deal with the various technical problems of breaking through 

viet jamming of VOA.

60. Editorial Note

In a directive of April 4, 1951, to the Secretary of State, th

tary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, Presid

man established the Psychological Strategy Board. His goal wa

mote “more effective planning, coordination and conduct, wi

framework of approved national policies, of psychological oper

The Board, consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Dep

retary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, w

port to the National Security Council. For text of the directive 

4, see Foreign Relations, 1951, volume I, pages 58–60. See also ibid

902–965. President Truman appointed Gordon Gray as the firs

tor of the Psychological Strategy Board.

The White House released an abbreviated version of the Pre

directive on June 20. See Public Papers: Truman, 1951, pages 341–

The Department of State initially opposed the creation of th

and later maintained that a Department member should c
Board, arguing that it was 

impossible . . . to entrust the form

and execution of policies and programs of political warfare to an 

not subject or subordinate to the Department of State.” (Memor

from Under Secretary of State Webb to the Director, Bureau of t

get, March 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–5

PSB/4–451) Ellipsis in the original.

Master files of minutes and papers of the PSB for the yea

existence are ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333. Additional m

on the establishment of the PSB and its operations is ibid., P Fi

55 D 339, Barrett Files and ibid., Central Files 1950–54, 100

511.00, and 711.5200.

61. Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy Coordination of 

Central Intelligence Agency1

Washington, April 

CIA/OPC STRATEGIC WAR PLAN

IN SUPPORT OF

THE JOINT OUTLINE EMERGENCY WAR PLAN

I. General

1. Purpose

This plan provides for conversion of peacetime covert ope

to wartime needs in support of military war plans based on force

able. This plan is limited to such operations and excludes con

tion of the manifold CIA/OPC responsibilities for covert opera

peace, in cold war and in overt war not in direct support of m

war plans.

2. Definitions

a. For the purposes of this paper, “D (The) Day” refers to 

on which actual, active combat operations of conventional warfa

in a general war.

b. “Peace” as used herein refers to all situations short of ov

eral war.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Op

Job 79–01228A, Box 6. Top Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates that the 

pages were revised on November 1.
3. Assumptions

At any time after 1 January 1951, war may be forced u

United States and her Allies by acts of aggression on the par

USSR and/or her satellites.

a. (1) Basic Assumption (JCS). This plan may be effective 

moment, but full implementation of the plan is predicated o

hostilities not starting before 30 June 1952.

b. Special Assumptions (JCS).

(1) M–Day and D–Day may be the same.

(2) The USSR will have the following Allies:

Poland Bulgaria

Eastern Germany Communist China

Czechoslovakia Outer Mongolia

Hungary Albania (probably)

Rumania

The political alignment of Korea will depend on the out

the UN actions there.

(3) The Western bloc will consist of the following:

(a) Allied with the United States at the outbreak of war:

United Kingdom Italy

France Portugal

Benelux Australia

Denmark New Zealand

Norway South Africa

Iceland Ceylon

Canada

(b) Bound to Allies by treaty commitments (subject to pr

of the UN Charter):

1 UK and Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq

2 US and Philippines

3 US and Latin American countries (in varying de

cooperation)

(c) The Arab States are favorably disposed toward the A

are unlikely to fight, especially outside of their own territory.

(d) The Allies will have base facilities at least in Japan.

(e) The status of the governments of Western Germany a

tria is dependent upon plans under NATO.

(f) Greece is entirely sympathetic and will help as far as p

(g) Sympathetic to the Western bloc but probably not bell

at the outset:

India

Pakistan
(4) Neutral Countries

(a) Probable neutral countries unless attacked:

Switzerland Afghanistan Iran

Sweden Burma Yugoslavia

Spain Thailand

Finland Indonesia

Ireland Israel

(5) Western European countries under NATO will have im

economically and militarily but, except for the UK, will be un

resist effectively, being overrun and occupied.

(6) Atomic weapons will be used by both sides.

(7) Biological warfare may be used by either side.

(8) War may start with little or no warning. At best, it will 

ceded by a period of political negotiations and tension which w

the Allies a few months warning. The Allies may decide to s

main attack.

(9) Part of the oil of the Middle East will become vital to 

lied effort at some stage of the war.

(10) It is expected that the Soviets will employ subversive 

ties and unconventional warfare on a global scale and to an ext

paralleled in history.

c. Added Assumptions (CIA). For the Armed Forces to capit

CIA effort, they should on a top priority basis:

(1) General

(a) Provide material, logistical, and administrative (comm

tion) support from the Army. (b) Ear-mark, effective for use on “D–Day” (or earlier if th

nence of Soviet invasion is unmistakable), the necessary Air S

from the Air Force to include coordinated and simultaneous at

both Air and Unconventional Forces and the execution of nigh

tions for the purpose of infiltrating personnel and sabotage sto

(c) Detail for duty with CIA the selected Department of D

officer and enlisted personnel who are trained in Clandestine W

under CIA auspices.

(2) For Covert Operations in Europe

(a) Authorize a limited relaxation of security measures an

ities in Europe under Army and/or Air Force cover and the all

to CIA of a safe Military training area in Germany for process

leting, and administering limited number of CIA recruited A

and German indigenes now available for training. (b) Authorize the utilization by CIA of selected personn

U.S. controlled indigenous labor battalions in Germany as a 

for recruiting personnel to be trained and employed in Clan

Operations.
(c) Expedite procurement of and authorize CIA particip

the screening and selection of indigenous personnel to be recru

the Army under the Lodge Bill, so that an adequate percentag

personnel screened and accepted can be made available to CI

(d) In conjunction with CIA, set up without delay in the E

Theater a planning team to effectuate the above. This team to 

of one each member from the Army, Air Forces, and CIA.

II. Mission

4. Strategic Concept Peace and War

a. Peace. To conduct covert operations in support of U. S

policy objectives and to plan and prepare for support of milit

plans.

b. War. In time of war to conduct covert operations in milit

aters in support of military war plans as well as covert opera

support of U.S. foreign policy directives. In areas outside of 

theaters, to conduct covert operations in support of over-all 

military war plans to reduce the Soviet war potential.

5. Basic Missions

a. Peace. In general CIA/OPC’s present basic activities ar

ically prescribed in NSC 10/2 as follows:

(1) Propaganda

(2) Economic warfare

(3) Preventive direct action, including:

(a) Sabotage

(b) Anti-sabotage

(c) Demolition

(d) Evacuation.

(4) Subversion against hostile states, including:

(a) Assistance to underground resistance movements

(b) Assistance to guerrillas

(c) Assistance to refugee liberation groups

(d) Support of anti-Communist elements in threatened co

(5) Planning and preparation, in conjunction with the JCS

conduct of covert operations in wartime. 

CIA/OPC has intensified and amplified certain of these c

activities in response to NSC 68, NSC 58/2, NSC 59, NSC 103

104 and other significant NSC documents.2

2 Regarding NSC 68 and NSC 59, see Documents 5 and 2, respectively

58/2, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. V, pp. 42–54. For NSC 103/1, see ibid., 19

pp. 463–466. For NSC 104, see ibid., 1951, vol. I, pp. 1023–1034.
b. War. In time of war, or when the President directs, all p

covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs 

with a view to the accomplishment of the following mission:

THE UTILIZATION OF COVERT OPERATIONS TO 

FULLEST PRACTICABLE EXTENT TO ASSIST IN ACCOMPLI

THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF THE U.S.S.R. AND HER SATEL

HIGHEST PRIORITY AMONG COVERT OPERATIONS IN SU

OF MILITARY WAR PLANS WILL BE GIVEN TO THE RET

TION OF THE SOVIET ADVANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE.

6. Specific Undertakings

a. Support by covert means the following military undert

(1) Essential defensive tasks

(a) Protection of the Western Hemisphere outside of th

nental U.S.

(b) Defense of the U.K.

(c) Holding of Northwest Africa and the Cairo–Suez area

(2) Strategic air offensive

(a) The strategic air offensive will be directed against:

1 Soviet atomic air offensive

2 Support elements of Soviet offensive

3 Soviet industrial potential with emphasis on POL an

portation facilities

(3) Operations in Western Eurasia

(a) Operations in Western Europe will include defensive ope

if the situation renders it imperative, withdrawal until assumptio

fensive operations and reoccupation of lost territory. The defens

erations by unconventional warfare forces in support of milita

plans will include, on highest priority, the retardation of the So

vance and attacks on Soviet forces and lines of communication

outset of hostilities. Maximum pressure will be maintained dur

time that the Allied forces are engaged in the Western European d

(4) Control of essential lines of communication as follows

(a) Western Hemisphere to U.K.

(b) Western Hemisphere to Gibraltar

(c) East coast of U.S. to South America and South Africa

(d) West coast of U.S. to Japan, Okinawa, Philippines Anza

and Alaska

(e) U.K. to Gibraltar and Central and South Atlantic

(f) Gibraltar to Suez

b. Unconventional warfare against Soviet submarine and 

potential.

c. Increase of psychological warfare upon the outbreak of 

overt war.
d. Increase of unconventional warfare upon the outbreak 

eral overt war.

7. Phasing of Tasks—General

a. Present to “D Day”

(1) Preparation of CIA war plan and coordination of th

with that of the military theaters. Procurement and training o

personnel, stockpiling of supplies, and matériel to be used in 

of war plans. Conduct of approved covert operations.

(2) The activation and effectuation of such covert opera

support of war plans (e.g., evacuation, sabotage, or counter-sa

as may be ordered by competent authority.

(3) Preparation for the transition from peacetime execu

covert operations to the wartime execution under the comman

American Theater Commander. This will include activation o

cial CIA staff at the American Theater Commander’s headqua

b. First Phase (D to D 3 Months)

The implementation of covert operations in support of the

plans to cover withdrawals and in support of an air offensive. 

this phase and beginning at the outset of hostilities, highest 

will be given to retardation of the Soviet advance, attacks on 

forces, and interruption of Soviet LOC’s.

c. Second Phase (D 3 Months to D 12 Months)

Continuation of basic strategy of first phase to include 

phasis on the retardation of the Soviet advance.

d. Third Phase (D 12 Months to D 24 Months)

The implementation of covert operations in support of the

plans aimed at stabilizing the Soviet offensive. Upon stabiliz

the Soviet offensive, such covert operations will be directed tow

hancing the Allied position and toward initiating an Allied o

either in this phase or phase IV.

e. Fourth Phase (D 24 Months to End of War)

Continuation of basic strategy of second and third phase 

creasing emphasis on covert operations in support of an Allie

sive and in support of the establishment of military governm

erations to nullify “scorched earth” tactics on the part of the re

enemy will be mounted at this time.

III. TASKS FOR CIA/OPC DIVISIONS IN SUPPORT O

MILITARY WAR OPERATIONS 

8. General

Each geographical division will plan, develop facilities for, 

ecute upon direction, covert operations in the countries within 
in coordination with and in support of the programs of other 

States Government agencies, as follows:

a. Eastern Europe:3 Assist U.S. armed forces to

(1) Retard from the outset of hostilities, the Soviet advance

the Soviet forces, destroy their lines of communication, and e

maximum pressure on them during the period that the Allied 

are engaged in the defense of Western Europe. This is of 

priority.

(2) Incite discontent amongst Soviet peoples with the K

controlled government and keep alive and strengthen their h

eventual liberation therefrom.

(3) Develop the resistance potential of opposition elements 

the USSR and countries under its domination.

(4) Induce, by every stratagem and means possible, the d

of satellite states and their separation from the USSR.

(5) After the Western Allies are prepared to capitalize ther

stigate revolts in selected countries in the area with a view to 

ing the communist regimes and replacing them with gover

which are friendly to the cause and subscribe to the principles s

in the U.N. Charter.

(6) Inhibit the growth of Soviet political and military cap

for further offensive action against the non-communist world.

(7) In countries in the area not under control of the 

strengthen the will and ability of the peoples and the governm

resist efforts at communist subversion.

(8) Assist the military theater commanders, in the event o

ities, in conducting such operations against the Soviet Union 

satellites as will destroy the effectiveness of their combined m

forces, and the effectiveness of supporting communist parties

ing in their replacement by governments sympathetic to the free 

(9) Provide support to other competently authorized ope

and activities directed from or toward the area.

(10) Priority in CIA preparations for wartime operations in

Western Europe is concerned will be in areas east of the Rhine–A

b. Western Europe4

(1) Assist U.S. Armed Forces to retard, where and when a

ble, the Soviet advance, attack the Soviet forces, destroy their 

communication, and exert the maximum pressure on them dur

3 Balkans, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Germ

tria, Switzerland, USSR. [Footnote in the original.] 4 Scandinavian Countries, Benelux, United Kingdom, France, Iberia, Ital

[Footnote in the original.]
period that the Allied forces are engaged in the defense of Wes

rope. This is of highest priority.

(2) Disaffect local Communist parties from the Cominfo

the CPSU(B).

(3) Dissipate the support and strength of the Communist 

each country.

(4) Strengthen the will and ability of the peoples in the ar

sist both the internal and external forces of Communism.

(5) Prepare the peoples of the area, in case of attack by 

Communist forces, to engage in resistance activities and the 

powers to communicate with, assist, and direct this resistance

(6) Provide support to other competently authorized op

and activities directed from or toward the area.

(7) Every possible precaution must be taken to insure that 

tern of recruiting, organizing, and coordinating activities in N

lantic Treaty Organization areas does not indicate that the Unite

lacks confidence that the line of the Rhine–Alps can be held. Su

cautions may require the use of cover plans to conceal the tr

pose of preparations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

c. Near East and Africa5

(1) Acquaint the peoples in critical parts of the area with 

perialist and subversive aims of the USSR and local communis

ments.

(2) Strengthen the will and ability of the peoples in the ar

sist the internal and external encroachments of communist for

(3) Enroll the peoples and governments in the area on the 

the West in the East-West conflict.

(4) Ensure the availability to the Western world, and the d

the USSR and satellites, of the strategically important resource

area.

(5) Alleviate the conflicts and differences between or amon

tries within the area with a view to establishing harmonious r

between the various states in the area.

(6) Prepare the peoples of those areas likely to be overrun 

tile forces in case of war to carry on resistance activities, and th

ern allies to communicate with, assist, and direct this resistan

(7) Provide support to other competently authorized op

and activities directed from or towards the area.

5 All of Africa, Israel, Arab States, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordania, Sau

Yemen, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, Tibet. [Footn

original.]
d. Far East

(1) Frustrate by all possible means the efforts of the USS

tablish a regime in China subservient to the interests of the US

to consolidate its control over the territories and peoples of Ch

(2) Foster the emergence of and develop a Chinese politic

ership which can command popular support of the Chinese peo

not be subject to domination by the USSR.

(3) Dissipate the support and strength of local Communist 

in those countries where such parties are actively functioning.

(4) In countries in the area not under the control of the U

the Communist Party of China, acquaint the peoples and gover

with Communist aims and strengthen their will and ability to r

forts at Communist subversion.

(5) In countries in the area likely to be overrun by Com

forces, prepare the peoples thereof to engage in resistance activi

the Western Allies to communicate with, assist, and direct this res

(6) Develop the resistance potential of opposition elements 

ern USSR.

(7) Provide support to other competently authorized ope

or activities directed from or toward the area.

e. Western Hemisphere7

(1) Dissipate the support and strength of the local Com

party in those countries where one is actively functioning.

(2) Strengthen the will and ability of the peoples in the are

sist both the internal and external forces of communism.

(3) Ensure the availability to the United States and its All

the denial to the USSR and satellites, of those strategically im

resources designated by compotent authority.

(4) Provide support to other competently authorized ope

and activities directed from or toward the area.

f. Psychological Staff Division

(1) To provide the over-all direction, technical guidan

means (as required) to Area Divisions for exploitation of econom

litical, propaganda, and scientific situations.

(2) To plan and develop facilities for covert economic, p

propaganda, and scientific operations, and execute those operat

quiring centralized control and which transcend military the

operations and are not within the operational capabilities of th

Divisions, to:

6 Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, Philippines, Burma, China, Japan, Okinawa, Ko

Zealand, Australia, Pacific Islands. [Footnote in the original.] 7 South and Central Americas. [Footnote in the original.]
(a) Weaken the position of the Soviet Bloc and strengthen 

sition of the U.S. and Allies.

(b) Combat the activities of Communist-controlled inter

organizations.

(c) Strengthen the will and ability of non-Communist inter

organizations to resist Communist effort at subversion, and en

these organizations in anti-Communist activities.

(d) Encourage the subjects of the USSR and its Satellites t

Communist jurisdiction, renounce allegiance to their rulers, a

haven in non-Communist jurisdiction; provide interim sanctu

support to such disaffected peoples and other refugees from U

Satellite jurisdiction; and prepare for their employment in the 

liberating their respective homelands.

(e) Accomplish such other missions as may be assigned fr

to time in the pursuit of opportunities or support of other pro

9. Operational Forces

a. Tab “A”8 outlines the CIA/OPC operational forces avai

a phased basis.

b. Tab “B” outlines the Air Force support requirements.

c. Tab “C” outlines the Naval support requirements.

IV. Administrative and Logistical Matters

Requirements for logistical support, bases, and personnel 

teriel in the ZI for period from 1 July 1952 to 1 July 1954 will 

V. Command, Communications, and Liaison Matters

11. The command and communications channel of CIA will 

the Headquarters in Washington to its principal headquarters in t

In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, co

erations will be conducted under the direct command of the A

Theater Commander and orders therefore will be transmitted 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the Preside

12. For reasons of security and adequate liaison, the D

maintain independent communications with designated rep

tives overseas, including lateral communications between t

Arrangements for such communications shall be coordinat

those of the military.

13. Command and Liaison Procedures for War Planning o

Operations in Theaters (see Annex 1).10

8 None of the tabs are printed.

9 Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Direct

erations, Job 79–01228A, Box 6) 10 Not printed.
62. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Plannin

(Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)1

Washington, April 

Mr. McWilliams asked me to set down briefly my ideas c

ing the functions of the new Psychological Strategy Board.2 In 

ular I want to state my exceptions to Mr. Barrett’s memorandum 

of March 29, 1951, on the subject: Plans for Psychological S

Board.3

That memorandum speaks of the board’s jurisdiction as in

“the development of proposals in the field of military, political a

nomic action geared for psychological effect and to the devel

of campaigns directed toward important psychological objecti

embracing action in these fields as well as the fields of pure

chological activity”. It envisages the board as operating as a cen

thority on political warfare—”as recommended by the Troy gr

The Troy group, you will recall, was originally given wa

study the problem of defeating Russian jamming of the Voice o

ica. The group widened its own jurisdiction to include the con

the programs to be protected against jamming. The group inte

this widened jurisdiction to include the substance of “politic

fare”. The group interpreted “political warfare” to include the M

Plan, Point IV, ECA operations in the Far East, and the like. Th

referred to political warfare as “inter-connected simultaneous u

instruments of international action”. The group envisaged p

warfare as the range of activities which, if successful, “will m

all-out shooting war impossible for Russia and unnecessary fo

The group then called for an “aggressive” political warfare p

instead of the current efforts, which the group labeled “defensiv

The group discovered a need that “the many elements of 

tional power, political, economic, military,” be “wielded as a

grated effort”. In the group’s phrasing, “We therefore urge th

cation of political warfare”.

The group thus called for “some single authority”. Th

to have “capacity to design a comprehensive program and p

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Chronologica

cret. Drafted by Marshall. 2 See Document 60.

3 The memorandum by Barrett has not been found. An unsigned March 

prepared by Leon Crutcher of the Management Staff is in National Archive

P Files: Lot 55 D 339. 4 See footnote 5, Document 57 and Document 58.
obtain execution of this program

. The authority was to be co

with political warfare exclusively”, but the phrase, as we ha

was interpreted to embrace all aspects of foreign policy.

The Troy group went vastly beyond its original terms of r

and explored a field for which it had no special competence an

which it had little information. In effect it proposed a new b

take over the jurisdiction of all the agencies operating in the 

field, of the NSC, and in part of the President himself.

I think I have stated sufficiently my misgivings about the 

port as a frame of reference for the new board. I have the sa

givings about the reference in Mr. Barrett’s memorandum to 

velopment of proposals in the field of military, political and ec

action geared for psychological effect and to the development 

paigns directed toward important psychological objectives a

bracing action in these fields as well as fields of purely psych

activity”.

In my view, if the board were to follow out the implication

Troy report and the language cited from Mr. Barrett’s memor

the result would be a harmful duplication and conflict of author

established agencies and a missing of the potentially very valu

jective set up for the board in the establishing directive.

The board obviously is not intended as a new agency to de

or formulate the ends of our foreign policy. Its primary jurisdic

to do with means of our policy—those means devoted direct

fecting the state of mind within the adversary’s camp. I emp

word “directly” advisedly. I am aware that all of our policy—e

means—relates in some way to the state of mind in the adv

camp. Certain of the means for carrying out that policy act in

on his state of mind as a collateral effect. I do not believe thes

fall within the board’s primary jurisdiction. Other means are d

for direct effect on that state of mind. These clearly do fall wi

board’s primary jurisdiction.

I believe the board should bring about a sharpening of effo

gard to our behind-the-iron-curtain information program, our 

program, our covert activities within the adversary’s fold, and 

It should seek to ensure that no opportunity for such activit

unexploited and that the activities are consistent among the 

agencies carrying them out. When this part of our effort m

helped by a clarification of policy or broadening the effort to i

that policy on some other front, the board should be alert to 

portunity to call the matter to the attention of the agency or a

concerned. If the board should undertake to formulate p

“geared for psychological effect” in the field of military, polit

economic action and “embracing action in these fields as well 
of purely psychological activity

, there would be no stoppin

short of assuming jurisdiction over the whole range of our fore

icy—ends and means.

Paul H

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

63. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Nat

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Counci

Washington, April 

SUBJECT

NSC 10/3 and NSC 10/42

REFERENCES

A. NSC 10/23

B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “NSC 10/3” and s

“NSC 10/3 and NSC 10/4”, dated February 6 and March 30, 1951,

respectively4

The enclosed memorandum by the Director of Central Inte

on the subject reports is submitted herewith for consideration 

National Security Council of the proposal contained in parag

thereof.

Accordingly, it is requested that each Council member indi

action with respect to the proposal contained in the first parag

1 Source: Truman Library, Harry S. Truman Papers, President’s Secreta

Subject File. Top Secret. 2 For a draft of NSC 10/3, see the attachment to Document 43. For NSC 

uary 16, see Document 42. NSC 10/4 was withdrawn on December 13, after the 

of NSC 10/5; see Document 90. 3 For text, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligen

lishment, Document 292. This text cites the 1951 revised language of paragra

includes the added final phase “unless otherwise directed by the President.” 

note 6 below. 4 Lay’s February 6 memorandum to the National Security Council transm

CIA’s draft directive on NSC 10/3 along with a memorandum from Under 

Webb outlining the views of the Department of State. Lay’s memorandum also 

that the National Security Resources Board concurred in the proposed direc

tional Archives, RG 273, Policy Papers, NSC 10/3, Box 3) Lay’s March 30 mem

has not been found (see footnote 6 below).
the enclosure by completing and returning the attached memo

form.5

Furthermore, if the proposal in paragraph 1 of the enclosu

proved,6 it is requested that all copies of NSC 10/3 and of th

ence memorandum of March 30 be returned to this office in acc

with the recommendation contained in paragraph 2 of the enc

With respect to NSC 10/4, it is suggested that further Coun

sideration of that report be deferred until additional recommen

regarding it are submitted by the Director of Central Intellige

later date, as indicated in the last paragraph of the enclosure.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the 

of this material and that access be limited to individuals requiring t

mation contained herein in order to carry out their official duties.

James S

Enclosure

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence S

the National Security Council7

Washington, April 

SUBJECT

NSC 10/3 and NSC 10/4

1. As a result of a conference held on 5 April 1951 by the 

Secretary of Defense Lovett, Under Secretary of State Webb, 

Bradley, and the undersigned,8 it was agreed that the difference

5 Not found.

6 Truman approved the proposal for a new paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2 in 

16 memorandum to Lay. In a handwritten note he added: “It is a proper sug

approve it.” (Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Subject File) Lay informed the Council by memorandum of April 16 that the 

members of the Council had approved the new paragraph 4. This settled the co

between CIA and the JCS (see Document 42) and draft NSC 10/3 was withd

President’s copy of Lay’s April 16 memorandum bears a handwritten notat

May 25, 1951, by Rose A. Conway, Administrative Assistant in the President’s 

dicating that copies of NSC 10/3 and Lay’s memorandum of March 30 had been 

to Lay for destruction. 7 Top Secret.

8 The conference is described in Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith 

of Central Intelligence, p. 207.
the interested agencies with regard to the proposed changes 

10/2 could best be composed by substituting for paragraph 4 

the following:

“4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all pl

covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of 

active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, cov

erations will be conducted under the direct command of the Am

Theater Commander and orders therefor will be transmitted t

the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the Presi

2. Accordingly, it is recommended that NSC 10/3, and th

menting paper thereon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 27 

1951,9 be withdrawn.

3. If this recommendation is accepted by the National S

Council, the basic directive for covert operations by the Office 

icy Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency (NSC 10

remain in effect with paragraph 4 thereof changed as indicated 

graph 1, above. This document leaves something to be desire

is workable. Discussions relative to the details of authority 

sponsibility, which appear inevitably to follow any significant 

can thus be minimized. Those which cannot be avoided wh

or more agencies of Government are cooperating in pursuit of 

mon objective can be continued indefinitely on the staff level w

militating against the effectiveness of important operations 

progress.

4. Further recommendations regarding final action on NS

(Responsibilities of CIA with Respect to Guerrilla Warfare) will 

mitted at a later date when it is determined to what extent, if an

responsibilities can be transferred or decentralized to other age

the Government.

Walter B. S

9 Not found.

10 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.
64. Letter From Secretary of Defense Marshall to Director 

Central Intelligence Smith1

Washington, April 1

Dear General Smith:

Reference is made to your memorandum of 26 Decemb

transmitting a general statement of the support needed by the 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the Department of Defense.2

The military agencies accept the commitment for furnish

or two officers each to CIA to aid in the preparation of nation

ligence estimates.

Your request for special consideration in obtaining milit

sonnel for use in clandestine intelligence and covert operation

budgetary, personnel and training implications which must be 

ered by the three Services in their manpower plans. If you will 

the Department of Defense with more detailed breakdown with 

to the numbers of enlisted and officer personnel desired from 

the Services, the qualifications desired in such personnel, and 

at which you desire they be supplied, I will be glad to cons

matter further.

With respect to the use of certain facilities at Army, Navy 

Force installations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will welcome discu

the details of such requirements and be receptive to any reason

mands which will further the national security.

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

The assignment of CIA representatives to the military staff

aters of operations will be dependent upon the relationship b

those representatives and the theater commanders. This is now 

consideration in NSC 10/3 proposed by CIA.3

With reference to your request that you be kept fully info

operational decisions and plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I 

formed that the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this ma

been transmitted to you in JICM–1205 of 25 September 1950.4

Permanent liaison between elements of the Central Inte

Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including a method of fur

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G0027

Folder 9. Top Secret. 2 Document 36.

3 For the draft text of NSC 10/3, see the attachment to Document 43.

4 Not found.
advice and guidance on essential elements of information, app

be established through frequent working-level contacts with th

ice intelligence agencies and the representative of the Joint C

Staff on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Should any defi

exist under this arrangement, I would appreciate having them b

to my attention.

As the remaining proposals made in your memorandum 

directly affected by the decisions reached with respect to rev

NSC 10/2 and NSCID 5,5 it is believed advisable to defer a def

ply until final action on the proposed revisions has been taken

Faithfully yours,

G. C. M

5 See Document 255 for the revision of NSCID No. 5.

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Marshall signed the original.

65. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Sm

the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence

Conference (Hoover)1

Washington, April 1

SUBJECT

Need for Specific Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Information

Your memorandum of 28 February 1951,2 outlining the n

specific intelligence and counter-intelligence information on t

of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, was handed t

22 March 1951 by Major General Bolling. This Agency realizes 

type of information which you describe is becoming more an

necessary and vital to the internal security of the United Sta

preciates your action in specifying the types of information des

your Committee and welcomes the opportunity to comment 

problem you have presented.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731R

Secret.2 Not found.
In our overseas operations our ability to achieve satisfac

sults in the fields of interest to the IIC depends in some areas u

taining the cooperation of local intelligence and security organi

These local organizations have, in varying degrees, useful info

on the specific targets listed in your memorandum. We could 

more information from these local agencies if we were able, wi

limits prescribed by the primary requirements of our own sec

work out an exchange of information and to furnish them on 

of reciprocity some information on these subjects developed wi

United States.

Furthermore, we could more effectively address the work 

Agency to the targets set out in your memorandum if there 

closer coordination of the intelligence on Soviet controlled es

activities abroad and the intelligence on such activities in this 

To this end, the CIA would be glad to consider with the II

cies the desirability of designating a CIA liaison representativ

tend meetings of the IIC or to serve as a member of a workin

of the IIC in order to facilitate the exchange of information wh

be mutually helpful.

Walter B

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

66. Letter From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental

Intelligence Conference (Hoover) to Director of Centra

Intelligence Smith1

Washington, May 

Dear General Smith:

Your memorandum of April 17, 1951,2 concerning the I

for specific intelligence and counterintelligence informati

been received and considered by the Interdepartmental Inte

Conference.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731

Confidential; Via Liaison. The letter is on FBI stationery. 2 Document 65.
It will not be possible for the IIC agencies to furnish to y

regular basis information of a confidential nature, or that dev

from confidential sources, for use in bartering with foreign inte

and security organizations. Where there is a specific problem 

cial circumstances existing, we will, of course, be glad to consi

specific requests or suggestions and, where possible, informa

such cases will be made available for your use in this manner.

When the IIC or its Subcommittee is considering a specif

lem concerning the coordination of domestic intelligence with 

intelligence matters, you will, of course, be invited to designat

resentative to attend, as contemplated in the IIC Charter. Ge

however, it is felt that the appropriate media for the coordin

the intelligence on Soviet-controlled espionage activities abro

the intelligence on such activities in this country exists in the 

gence Advisory Committee and in the close liaison facilities wh

maintained with CIA.

The IIC agencies desire to cooperate with you in any mann

sible in connection with the obtaining of this vital information

can for the most part only be obtained in the foreign field. A

ously indicated, it is most urgent that this type of information 

veloped as its receipt could, when considered in the light of d

problems, possibly be the means of averting serious Com

controlled Fifth Column or sabotage operations within our bor

will be appreciated if you will furnish at your earliest convenie

studies or information which you may presently have in con

with the type of information listed in the IIC memorandum of 

ary 28, 1951.3

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar 

3 Not found.
67. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State fo

Public Affairs (Barrett) to the Under Secretary of State

(Webb)1

Washington, May 1

SUBJECT

Plans for New PSB

On Tuesday, May 8, a meeting was called by General Smith 

to discuss plans for the new PSB. This meeting was attended 

Dulles, Admiral Stevens, General Magruder, Mr. Wisner and 

Minutes of the meeting are being prepared by CIA and a copy 

sent to your office in case you would like to look at them.2

No firm recommendations were made as to the substantiv

lems which the Board should attack. General Smith expressed t

ion, however, that the PSB should have as one of its function

high policy from NSC and other sources and translating this i

chological warfare objectives. Admiral Stevens felt that th

should concern itself largely with use of psychological warfar

cold war and General Smith believes it might constitute a “

staff” for the cold war.

At the end of the meeting General Smith requested th

agency concerned designate two men to draft recommendation

consideration of the Board members. This working group is to 

itself to the following questions:

1. What kind of a staff will the Board need?

2. How should this staff proceed?

3. What mechanisms are presently available which could 

for the conduct of the Board’s business.

4. What should be the initial program of the Board?

Allen Dulles and I registered mild objections to the above

that the Board should consume as little time as possible on form

sideration of mechanisms, organizational problems, etc.—and c

should not get involved in a lot of formal papers on this subje

of us expressed the belief that we would like to see the Board 

ing immediately on certain substantive problems—like our 

strategy with regard to Iran, or overloading the Soviet admin

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 100.4–PS

Secret. Sent through S/S, and initialed by Webb. 2 The minutes have not been found.
system. The General seemed to agree in part, but, I gather, f

some minimum organizational planning would be necessary.

I have asked Mr. Phillips Davison, Executive Secretary of t

chological Operations Coordinating Board, to represent the 

ment on this working group. He would be accompanied 

Crutcher from Mr. Humelsine’s office when organizational pr

are being considered, and by Mr. Phillips from this office when 

matters are under discussion.

The first meeting of this working group has been called f

Wednesday.

68. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Nat

Security Council (Lay) to the Director of the Policy Pla

Staff (Nitze), the Department of Defense Representativ

the National Security Council Senior Staff (Nash), the 

Chiefs of Staff Representative on the National Security

Council Senior Staff (Wooldridge), and the Deputy Di

of Central Intelligence (Jackson)1

Washington, May 1

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

At the direction of the President you have been designat

special group of the Senior NSC Staff to consider the attached 

randum on the subject from the Director of Central Intelligen

to prepare for the Council’s consideration appropriate recom

tions with respect thereto.

In performing this function it is anticipated that you will w

close collaboration with your respective principals in order to 

their views during the staff work, and with the designated rep

atives of your respective departments and agencies under NSC 

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Subject File. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 2 Regarding NSC 10/2, see footnote 2, Document 42.
in order to realize the advantages of their knowledge and exp

in this field.

After allowing time for your study of the attached memor

a meeting will be scheduled within the next week or so.

It is requested that extraordinary security precautions be take

handling of this project and that knowledge of and access to the attach

orandum and subsequent documents be restricted to the minimum 

for adequate staff work. Copies of or extracts from this and subseque

ments should not be made without permission of this office.

James S. 

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligen

(Smith) to the National Security Council4

Washington, May 

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

The Problem

1. To obtain more specific guidance from the National 

Council in order to define the projected scope and pace of co

erations in aid of current overt cold-war and of military prep

to meet overt global war, and to insure timely and effective 

for such operations.

Pertinent Facts

2. The following facts highlight the need for this guida

support:

a. To meet its responsibilities for covert operations, the Ce

telligence Agency has already had to increase its personnel 

penditures to an extent believed to exceed the scope contemp

the National Security Council when it authorized covert opera

the summer of 1948.

b. Even more considerable increases will be required in 

future if this agency is to discharge the missions already spe

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

4 Top Secret; Eyes Only.
proposed to it by the Departments of State and Defense and t

Chiefs of Staff or undertaken on the initiative of CIA with the ap

of such Departments. Still greater increases would be require

complish the missions which are apparently envisioned under t

68 series (and of which segments are found in various other N

pers; e.g., NSC 58/2, NSC 59, NSC 103/1, and NSC 104).5 Th

creases are beyond CIA’s present administrative support capab

c. High level policy decisions are required not only on the 

these increases in themselves, but on the direction and nature o

operations. For example, to what extent will the United States 

counter-revolution in the slave states? A Joint Chiefs of Staff me

dum to the Director of Central Intelligence, 28 March 1951,6 rais

lated issue: The view of the JCS that CIA give maximum emp

preparations for the retardation of Soviet advances in Europe be

on D Day. In view of CIA’s presently limited facilities this reque

the issue of the priorities as between covert-cold-war activities an

activities to support the military in the event of a general war.

Discussion

3. Pursuant to the provisions of NSC 10/2, CIA has been 

engaged for over two years in the planning and conduct of cov

erations in the general fields of activity specifically provid

therein, viz:

a. propaganda

b. economic warfare

c. preventive direct action, including—

(1) sabotage

(2) anti-sabotage

(3) demolition

(4) evacuation

d. subversion against hostile states, including—

(1) assistance to underground resistance movements

(2) assistance to guerrillas

(3) assistance to refugee liberation groups

(4) support of anti-Communist elements in threatened co

e. Planning and preparation, in conjunction with the JCS, 

conduct of covert operations in wartime.

5 Regarding the NSC 68 series, see Document 5. For NSC 58/2, “U.S. P

ward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe,” December 8, 1949, see For

tions, 1949, vol. V, pp. 42–54. Regarding NSC 59, NSC 103/1, and NSC 104, see 

2, Document 61. 6 Not found.
4. Subsequent to NSC 10/2, the NSC 68 series called fo

tensification of covert operations in the fields of economic, 

and psychological warfare with the purpose of rolling back the 

ter of Soviet power and the ultimate frustration of the Kremlin 

As a result, the covert activities of CIA have been stepped 

siderably, even though the policies established by NSC 6

never been spelled out in terms of a specific covert program d

to CIA.

5. Specifically, the currently stepped-up covert projects of C

more detailed listing at Tab “A”) are being prosecuted in five 

the world as follows [1 line not declassified]:

Western Europe [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: psychological and labor operations especia

than 1 line not declassified], organization of stay-behind and re

groups in all Western Europe [less than 1 line not declassified], 

action [less than 1 line not declassified] and a pilot economic war

eration [less than 1 line not declassified].

Eastern Europe [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: psychological warfare [less than 1 line not decl

extensive special political operations [less than 1 line not declassif

ganization of resistance groups in Eastern Europe and the Ba

expansion of the [less than 1 line not declassified] underground.

Near East [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: preliminary exploratory activities [less than 1 

declassified]; denial of [less than 1 line not declassified] oil fields; 

logical and labor operations throughout the Near East.

Far East [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: guerrilla warfare and escape and evasion in [

1 line not declassified]; stay-behind preparations [less than 1 line no

sified]; psychological and labor activities throughout the Far East

sive buying; [2 lines not declassified].

Latin America [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: preliminary exploratory activities, propagan

the establishment of a mechanism for these and other activitie

expanded scale.

Special Projects [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: National Committee for Free Europe and its 

Radio Free Europe; training foreign agents in the United Stat
port of international anti-Communist labor and youth organi

and the development of outlets for propaganda against foreign 

Research and Development [dollar amount not declassified

Overhead [dollar amount not declassified]

6. [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

7. [7 paragraphs (26 lines) not declassified]

8. The above missions, current and proposed, representing 

considerable number of covert cold-war projects, constitute in 

selves a rather extensive preparation to conduct covert opera

support of the military effort in the event of the outbreak of a 

war. Nevertheless, they do not comprise the comprehensive co

program clearly contemplated by NSC 68. In the absence of a 

detailed plan for conducting a comprehensive cold-war progra

not possible to make an accurate estimate of manpower, matér

money required. Nor, in the absence of detailed overt war pla

possible to make an accurate estimate of the requirements of fu

covert operational support of an all-out military effort. Never

it is possible, on the basis of the requirements of the programs 

under way or in the planning stage, to make an informed gues

general order of magnitude of a covert apparatus capable of s

ing either an effort to prevent overt war or an all-out military e

the event of such war. [11

⁄2 line not declassified] (These estimates 

additional requirements for military personnel and for funds t

pile and resupply certain standard military items for guerrillas 

sistance groups. For further detail see Tab “B”.)

9. Thus, the Central Intelligence Agency is faced with the f

its covert operations are outstripping its present administrativ

bilities. Even an apparatus of the magnitude required to discha

relatively limited cold war and military support programs, outl

paragraphs 5 and 7 above, calls for an administrative organiz

considerably greater strength than now present in CIA to solv

tively the complex planning and logistical problems involved. 

ically, there would be required a staff comparable to that of 

Command, procurement and production machinery for those it

properly assignable to the Department of Defense, and additi

cilities for: training, security clearances, communications, headq

office space, and other requisite administrative and logistical s

Without such augmentation the growing magnitude of covert 

tions will tend to divert an ever increasing share of the time 

tention of CIA key personnel from the basic intelligence missio

Agency, with the attendant risk that such mission will not 

quately accomplished.
10. Although the cumulation of missions already undert

CIA, to say nothing of those now proposed to CIA, may transc

original intentions of NSC 10/2, the NSC 68 series leaves littl

that it is our national policy to conduct covert operations on 

large scale. It is the view of CIA that all of these things can and 

be done. But before launching CIA into such large activities, a 

of high level policy decisions and certain vital assurances are r

from the National Security Council. The following paragrap

with the qualitative nature of the required guidance.

11. It appears that the Office of Policy Coordination was or

created to be primarily an agency to execute covert support to c

activities (with planning and preparation for covert suppor

event of hot war as an additional responsibility). However, 

creasing scope and pace of hot war preparation is tending 

shadow this original purpose. The cold war program (thoug

tially political in conception) is heavily weighted with 

considerations; equally, the hot war preparations (though ess

military in conception) are heavily weighted with political co

tions. Because CIA’s present responsibilities cover both curre

war covert operations and certain covert aspects of preparat

hot war, it has perhaps been more immediately aware than o

terested agencies of the need for delineation of policies and p

as between these programs and of the need for more definit

chinery to give both programs politico-military guidance on a 

uing basis. The machinery established under NSC 10/2, i.e., 

ignated representatives of the Departments of State and Defe

consisted of individuals of the most exceptional qualificatio

have been of the greatest assistance in developing projects. Th

of these representatives have been augmented by those of an 

well qualified and helpful representative of the Joint Chiefs 

However, this machinery was not designed to develop strateg

ance of the order required by the far-reaching policy determin

NSC 68 and other post-NSC 10/2 policy papers.

12. An illustration of the need for such strategic guidanc

problem raised by the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as expr

its memorandum of 28 March 1951, that the Central Intelligence 

should give top priority to preparations for the retardation of 

military advance across Europe. The responsibilities of the Dir

Central Intelligence under NSC 10/2 are such that he canno

this view as controlling without assurance that this military po

also be consistent with the foreign policy of the United States

National Security Council decision can give this assurance in 

of such moment. Such a decision will require a determination 

tive priorities and of the extent to which the United States is w

support and follow up on counter-revolution in the slave state
ical and matériel support on a national scale is required to back 

capitalize on any counter-revolution which may be engendere

the National Security Council can insure such support.

13. It is true that the covert apparatus needed for the cold 

similar to that needed to support the military effort in a hot wa

ever, there are numerous important differences in detail and in 

For example, it is clearly desirable from the standpoint of eith

war or hot war to develop the potential of resistance groups 

ern Europe. How much of this potential to develop, when to re

and how much to hold in reserve are problems which can be 

argued differently by the military and by the political experts

CIA must seek politico-military guidance at the NSC level to de

where and how to build and utilize its covert assets.

14. Another area requiring such guidance pertains to the q

of concealing U.S. participation in covert activities which can

main completely covert. The training of indigenous personne

sistance and guerrilla activity, the mounting of guerrilla operat

become more difficult to cover as the size of the effort increa

the time for field operations approaches. [3 lines not declassified

where in the process it becomes pointless to attempt to deceive 

emy on U.S. participation, just as it would have been naive 

U.S.S.R. to expect the U.S. to believe it had no part in support

directing the Greek Communist guerrilla operations. Only con

guidance from the National Security Council level can insure 

decisions in this field.

15. Finally, it is urged that these matters call for immedia

lution by the National Security Council. It requires approx

eighteen months to build the base from which all-out covert ope

can be launched. The building of the U.S. covert base and appa

not proceeding at the required pace and cannot until the spec

termination and guidance discussed above have been issued 

National Security Council.

Conclusions and Recommendations

16. The above discussion leads to the following conclusion

are stated in the form of recommendations to the National S

Council:

a. That in view of the magnitude issue as well as the gu

needed to give proper direction to stepped up covert operatio

National Security Council initiate a comprehensive review of th

operations situation.

b. That this review contain a restatement or redetermina

appropriate of the several responsibilities and authorities invo

U.S. covert operations.
c. That if the above review results in a reaffirmation of t

sion to place covert operational responsibility within the Cen

telligence Agency—the Central Intelligence Agency should 

vided necessary support from other agencies of the govern

insure the successful discharge of this responsibility including 

lowing specific assurances:

(1) Adequate provisions for joint planning with the Arme

for covert activities and operations in support of wartime 

operations, spelling out a clear delineation of authorities, du

responsibilities.

(2) Specific guidance for dealing with the military in field

the same covert apparatus is being developed to engage in h

ority cold war missions as well as to be available to the militar

event of overt war.

(3) More specific provision for insuring that the foreign po

political considerations which are involved in covert operat

brought to bear on determinations of politico-military signific

(4) Specific provisions to insure that the type and quantitie

sonnel, administrative and logistical support required of oth

ernmental departments and agencies for the prosecution of th

effort will be forthcoming as necessary.

d. That where guidance for covert operations is of concern 

than one Department, this guidance be coordinated and issue

Central Intelligence Agency (and to other participating agencie

new Psychological Strategy Board.

Walter B

Tab A8

[2 pages not declassified]

Tab B9

[1 page not declassified]

7 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

8 Top Secret; Eyes Only.

9 Eyes Only.
69. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

for Public Affairs (Sargeant) to the Under Secretary of 

(Webb)1

Washington, May 2

Program Planning for Psychological Warfare

The National Security Council has directed that in any act

ater of war the Department of Defense will be responsible for p

logical activities. However, as it is agreed that the State Depar

program of International Information and Educational Exchan

be called on to assist the military the following steps have been 

1. An emergency plan has been prepared which covers t

essary general directives for providing propaganda activities 

country attacked and in adjacent countries, not only for the 

States forces which might be involved but for the governmen

attack. While this plan is general, it was drawn with two specia

tries in view—Iran and Yugoslavia.

2. A stockpile of necessary basic supplies, including pap

mimeograph, and necessary sound equipment is being prepar

3. A basic stockpile of propaganda output in the form of r

materials on various subjects that will probably need to be cov

an emergency as well as some semi-prepared press releases, pam

leaflets and other similar forms of propaganda is being prepar

Further, an informal meeting has been held with the British 

vide for the beginning of active policy and operations liaison.

In a situation short of actual warfare the State Departmen

sponsible for overt propaganda activities. Through the Nation

chological Strategy Board we are in constant liaison with othe

cies in the field. As an acknowledged agency of the United 

Government we do not engage in activities which will seriou

barrass the government.

However, recognizing the seriousness of the internationa

tion we began to prepare almost two years ago for a vigoro

chological Offensive. The Offensive has the dual purpose 

strengthening the alliance of free nations, and (2) weaken

Soviet Union and its satellites. We distinguish between th

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 52 D 432, Office of Assi

retary Edward Barrett, 1950–51, Box 5. Restricted. The unsigned original appe

a draft. There is no indication whether it was sent to Webb. It bears the han

note, “Hand-carried to Wilber’s office this PM.”
term objective in psychological warfare of persuading the en

make a false move and the longer term objective in our psy

cal offensive of both encouraging our friends and discourag

enemies.

In preparation for our special program we prepared a plan 

as the Campaign of Truth, which contains the following device

centrate our efforts on our specialized objectives:

1. A system of country priorities in which we analyzed 

ganda strategy on a global basis.

2. Country papers which aimed our efforts more prec

stating:

a. Those propaganda themes or objectives which in each 

would best contribute to our overall objectives. b. Target group priorities in which we chose those socia

in each country which it was most expedient for us to reach; 

c. Media priorities by which we determined what devices a

effective in each country for reaching our target groups.

3. Special Propaganda Plans—Special plans spelling out 

detail the psychological vulnerability of the peoples and the 

useful in reaching them, have been prepared for Russia, Chin

China and the Eastern European satellites and South Asia. Ot

in process.

4. Guidances—There are four types of guidances used to 

that our operators use the most effective messages:

a. The country paper or basic guidance for each area.

b. The overnight guidance which covers day to day even

c. The weekly guidance which takes care of events of con

concern; and

d. Special guidances which cover either special propagand

lems or special events which lend themselves to propaganda e

tion.

Among the State Department activities which might be po

as vigorous implementation of the propaganda responsibilit

State Department, I include the following:

(1) Radio—We have two radio stations—RIAS in Berlin a

White-Red in Vienna beaming a strong signal and a hard-hitti

sage into the Eastern European areas constantly. The Radio Div

now constructing studios in Munich in addition to increas

strength of its transmitters and from there will beam still a th

gram into Russia and Eastern Europe soon. The next step ca

fourth program to be beamed out of Salonika to the Near E

Ring Plan which calls for encircling Russia and her satellites w

most powerful radio transmitters ever built, and Project Vagab

which radio transmitters are mounted on ships, are example
new planning of IBD.

A further effort to get our message into 

cial areas, has already resulted in contracting for radio receive

distributed in Korea, Indo-China, Greece, Iran and Turkey. T

budget provides for further increase of this program. Further, I

begun to broadcast in many minority languages of China and 

as for example, Ukrainian, Georgian, Lithuanian, Amoy, Ma

Cantonese and Swatow dialect, as well as Urdu and Hindi to 

Asia, and is actively working toward programs in Central A

alects in the very near future.

(2) Press—The major changes under the Campaign of Trut

press program are that regional and local production in not only 

ard languages but important dialects is being stressed and that 

deal of material which is either tied to the local interests of the 

or is anti-Soviet in character is being produced under the im

private groups. This is one way in which we have been able to 

ganizations interested in furthering the same objectives we ha

(3) Motion Pictures—The new developments in the moti

ture program are ever-increasing emphasis on production in th

particularly in priority countries and the speeding up of the p

tion of a newsreel so that it can become a fast medium for prop

messages.

(4) Exchange of Persons—Priority emphasis worldwide h

given to labor leaders and journalists, as labor is a most import

get group for us in almost every priority country and opinion 

are also a first priority group. The trend has been away from ac

exchanges toward political exchanges.

(5) Libraries and Institutes—In addition to more careful s

of types of books and languages in the translation program the 

concept of the library has been sharpened into that of an Infor

Center which specializes in books, magazines and exhibits whi

tribute directly to our basic purposes of strengthening ourselv

weakening the enemy.

In policy formulation USIE plays an active role in the Depa

Mr. Barrett participates in Mr. Webb’s meetings. Representative

Policy Staff are members of working groups on special problem

example, the CFM meetings in Paris, the Forced Labor issue, the 

information program for which we have the responsibility in the 

States Government. A special Policy Implementation Staff mak

for us to exploit. We help to determine the content of various 

gence reports sent out to the missions, and we receive prop

guidance reports from our missions at regular intervals, some 

2 International Broadcasting Division.
Although the planning for our program began quite som

ago it should be noted that little could be done to really effect 

cant improvement until last October when additional fund

granted by the Congress. The Campaign of Truth is dependent 

ing adequate resources.

70. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special A

for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to the Direc

the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)1

Washington, May 2

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

General Smith’s memorandum of May 8 to the NSC on th

subject2 raises a number of not clearly separable problems and 

In an admittedly arbitrary delineation, the following discuss

recommendations for a Departmental position in the Senior S

offered, with an indication, where possible, of the views expre

General Magruder and Admiral Stevens.3

1. Increased Scope of OPC Operations

The great increase in number and size of projects which O

been called on to perform and can anticipate since the approval 

10/2,4 and particularly since the Korean war, requires, in 

Smith’s view, a reaffirmation by the NSC of its directive to C

tained in 10/2. He as much as says that the character of the 

for OPC has changed by the change in size and he believes this 

be recognized by NSC.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 611.61/5–265

cret. This memorandum is virtually identical to a draft by Robert P. Joyce of 

Planning Staff to Nitze, May 26; ibid., INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, OPC. The dif

attribution has not been explained. Memoranda from Joyce to Nitze of May 18 

(misdated March) 25, and an unsigned memorandum to Armstrong of May 

same subject, are ibid. 2 See the attachment to Document 68.

3 See Annex 1 and Annex 2 below.

4 See footnote 2, Document 42.
There seems to be no disagreement in the Department or wi

eral Magruder, Admiral Stevens, or CIA itself that there is no 

tive but to pursue vigorously the covert operations and to re-aff

10/2 in the light of the changes noted by General Smith.

2. Cold War Operations vs. Preparation for Hot War

General Smith points out the gradual but pronounced shif

phasis in OPC projects from those in support of cold war activ

those involved in the planning and preparation for covert sup

the event of war. This presents to OPC a competing claim up

sonnel and facilities and General Smith requires further guida

The Department would join with General Magruder and A

Stevens in believing that we have no course but to pursue bot

tives simultaneously. However, the Department would feel tha

light of the continuing and understandable pressure from the M

for activities in support of a hot war, it is necessary to re-affirm 

fundamental mission of OPC is to promote national policy wh

been most recently set forth in the NSC–68 series,5 and that th

primary emphasis must be upon the cold war psychological obj

This would include the underlying principle that every effort, 

ing psychological, should be made to prevent the coming of 

World War, while not overlooking the possibility that such a w

break out and we will need to be fully prepared for it.

3. Guidance Mechanism; Support

General Smith directly and indirectly inquires whethe

should look to the Psychological Strategy Board for guidance 

ordination. At the same time he points out that OPC will not 

to fulfill its mission unless it gets more support in terms of pe

and assistance in military and political plans and policies.

The Department would agree with General Magruder and 

ularly with Admiral Stevens that the PSB was established for j

purpose and it should be utilized to the fullest possible extent. T

can and should be called upon for giving or obtaining from t

decision where decision is needed, for giving continual guida

coordinating the various agencies and for marshalling from th

cies the support required by OPC.

4. Decision and Guidance on Specific Projects

General Smith asks for guidance on a number of specific 

some of which will be in conflict in terms of either the objec

5 See Document 5.
claims upon personnel or facilities in short supply. Notably 

Smith has pointed out that with respect to the problem of sup

counter-revolution in the slave states—how much support sh

given, when to release it, how much reserve to maintain—pr

conflict in terms of the objectives of the cold war on the one ha

of preparation for hot war on the other.

Although General Magruder does not address this point, A

Stevens points out, and the Department of State would war

dorse his position, that such problems cannot be answered with

ther plans and proposals by the CIA and impliedly what the is

as between the conflicting objectives. This and every other pr

which CIA needs specific guidance or decision must be prese

terms of the specific problem to the PSB for coordination, and 

necessary presentation to the NSC and the President.

5. Cover Problems

General Smith’s memorandum points out that under th

specifications of 10/2, all OPC operations must be carried out 

a way as to remain covert and not disclose the interest of the U

ernment; that this tends to limit the effectiveness of OPC, part

in para-military type operations which, on the one hand can

guise US Government interest and on the other can be more eff

carried out under quasi-military aegis.

Admiral Stevens suggests and General Magruder would 

ently concur that this problem too should be presented in term

dividual projects and specific recommendations thereto to the 

resolution. There is no apparent inclination to disagree with 

Smith on this.

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

6. Organization

General Smith’s memorandum does not directly address th

tion but implicit in his approach as well as in the memoranda 

eral Magruder and Admiral Stevens is the problem of organiza

covert activities. The Department would join with Magrud

Stevens in feeling that within OPC and CIA organizational c

particularly in any distinction between wholly covert type op

and para-military operations, should be handled by CIA it

should not be of concern to the other agencies except where th

impinge upon the responsibilities of the other agencies or upon 

telligence effort of the Government. On the other hand, with re

the organizational location of covert operations in the Govern

a whole, the Department would agree with Magruder and Stev

there is no alternative to the present allocation of this responsib

most in toto, to CIA–OPC.
Proposed Action

Only Admiral Stevens has suggested what specific action 

be taken on General Smith’s memorandum. Even General Smit

ommendations call for “guidance”, without any indication as to 

ture or form of such guidance.

The Department would concur in Admiral Stevens’s speci

gestion that the Senior Staff recommend that the NSC approve 

ment of policy with respect to General Smith’s memorandum. 

Admiral Stevens recommends that this statement of policy con

following points:

a. CIA should increase the scope and pace of its cold-wa

ties without jeopardizing its planning and preparation for cove

war activities.

b. There should be no change in the present Governme

ganization for covert activities, but that the newly created Psy

ical Strategy Board should be fully utilized.

c. (1) Present mechanisms for coordination on planning 

war are available with elements of the Military Establishment.

(2) The PSB should give the necessary guidance on any c

which arise in pursuing the objectives for the cold and the hot 

(3) The PSB can and should ensure that political and milita

siderations are applied to covert activities.

(4) All agencies should give fullest possible support to the 

activities and this support should be insured and coordinated t

PSB.

d. PSB should be specifically directed (by the NSC and th

ident) to provide or obtain the guidance required by CIA.

Annex 1

Memorandum From Brigadier General John Magruder 

Department of Defense Representative on the Senior S

the National Security Council (Nash)6

Washington, May 2

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations (memo to NSC from Director, Cen

Intelligence dated 8 May 1951)

1. The Director, Central Intelligence is faced by problems 

by the cold war in which our enemy has the initiative and by 

6 Top Secret; Eyes Only. General Magruder was the Department of Def

sultant to the Office of Policy Coordination.
that our Government as a whole has not adapted itself to the 

ity of action demanded in the circumstances. The Departments 

and Defense in the face of swift and uninhibited manuevers 

Kremlin are still bound by formal traditions of political action a

ventional war planning as if peace and war were absolute con

CIA alone has been conceived and patterned to exercise relative 

of action in a world situation which is more akin to war than p

2. Nationally we are not mobilized to face the kind of ch

forced upon us by the Kremlin. That challenge obviously ca

met by the CIA alone, or by the totality of our so-called psych

resources. The Soviets have enlarged the cold war by the coor

employment actively or potentially of all their resources, orth

well as unorthodox.

3. The issues raised by the DCI are not administrative 

dictional. They can be understood only in light of the inflexi

our governmental organization and concepts in facing urgent 

usual requirements. While the orthodox departments think a

too largely in terms of a D–Day that no man can predict, we 

ourselves of full resources in fighting a cold war which migh

cisive. While our psychological and covert agencies remain a “

line of heroes”, there is no authoritative agency geared to ensu

mutual and continuous support from orthodox national force

4. The National Security Council cannot serve as this agen

can it solve the problems of CIA by any broad statements of p

or detailed delineation of functions. The Council can, howev

expedition in the activation of the required agency and ensur

questioned authority to solve the major issues raised by the 

well as other varied problems yet to be created by the cold w

5. I refer to the Psychological Strategy Board. When activa

organization, within the terms of the Presidential Directive of 

1951,7 can resolve most of the difficulties facing the DCI thro

authority to:

(a) Consider on the national level major covert projects 

nated with all other psychological operations. (b) Give authoritative decision with respect to the neces

propriety of CIA undertaking major projects requiring resour

anced as between cold war demands and future war plans. (c) Provide coordination and guidance which will ensu

covert operations at all times are contributory to the attainmen

tional objectives. (d) Promulgate programs which will include provisions 

supplementary support as may be required from other depa

and agencies, including manpower, money and general logist

7 See Document 60.
6. In view of the foregoing considerations, the followin

ments are pertinent to the Conclusions and Recommendations i

graph 16 of the basic paper, by sub-paragraphs as numbered t

Sub-paragraph a and b. It is useless to belabor the questio

whether or not CIA should continue to be the agency prima

sponsible for conducting “covert” operations. This matter h

been debated with the same conclusion. The answer should be 

ative for two reasons: one, there is no other agency of gove

which can as logically be assigned the responsibility; two, t

war is on, and the ground lost by any major reorganization 

time would be hazardous. The reasonable concern of the D

garding guidance he requires in the stepped-up covert ope

can be dispelled by the coordination and guidance forthcomin

the Psychological Strategy Board which should be expected t

logical distribution of responsibilities in the conduct of co

operations.

If this statement of the scope and authority of the Psych

Strategy Board should be in question, the National Security 

should recommend in unequivocal terms to the President a

pretation of his Directive which would establish the validity 

concept.

Sub-paragraph c(1). Provisions for joint planning with the 

forces for covert operations in war time exist in the establish

cedures for the preparation of covert annexes to joint wa

through the mechanism of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division 

Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the Commander’s Staf

aters of operations. Unusual adjustments should be provided 

programs.

Sub-paragraph c(2). Guidance in the allocation of available re

of CIA for covert operations as between cold war missions and 

rations for overt war should be made in the programs promulg

the PSB.

Sub-paragraph c(3). The PSB should have the authority 

sponsibility for determining the relative weight to be ascribed 

litical and military considerations involved in covert operatio

be the arbiter as to whether the operations should or should no

dertaken by CIA.

Sub-paragraph c(4). The administrative and logistical provi

projects or programs promulgated to operational agencies, in

CIA, by the PSB should provide authoritatively for the necessa

plementary support, if required, in types and quantities of per

and other administrative and logistical assistance.

Sub-paragraph d. The guidance herein requested is a nor

sponsibility of the PSB as prescribed in the President’s Directiv
7. It is probably true that the major departments have lo

CIA for accomplishments wholly beyond its capabilities, part

in available manpower. Furthermore, the same departments, w

quested by CIA for assistance in supporting its overload, ha

loathe to depart from administrative rigidity and war mobiliza

jectives in order to aid CIA. The recruitment of types of America

talents required by the varied operations of CIA is rendered alm

possible by favorable employment conditions in civil life and 

sorption of such types into the armed forces. It is literally im

for CIA to expand operations unduly unless the armed force

available manpower in keeping with the tasks imposed. Decisi

be made as to whether the manpower demands for war mob

or cold war operations are to have precedence in a rational div

scarce categories of personnel. If it be assumed that the cold 

be won, then it is rational to divert manpower for psychologic

ations at a relatively minor charge against orthodox mobilizatio

and routine administrative conveniences.

8. Reconsideration should be given to the provision of N

which requires that covert operations be “so planned and execu

any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident t

thorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government c

sibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” It is obvious tha

ternational atmosphere and conditions requiring this highly re

security provision no longer exist. Publicly announced nationa

asserts the determination of the Government to fight Soviet ag

wherever it appears and implicitly by any means necessary. I

other reason, the magnitude and variety of cold war effort ren

security formula invalid except for genuinely covert operations. C

it is not a secret to the enemy that the U.S. Government supp

conventional warfare. We should not accept the handicaps of 

rigid security measures respecting para-military types of operat

yond those required to obscure our strategy and tactics. The 

ance of this reasoning is important in that it facilitates all a

trative and logistical steps in combining overt and covert nati

sources in pursuing the cold war.

A clear differentiation can be made between two categ

“covert” operations to the first of which the security formula 

10/2 should remain applicable, and to the second of which the 

should be modified. These two categories are:

(a) Covert operations of a political, economic and psych

character, which by their nature remain truly covert and which 

ployed abroad to influence developments favorable to the 

States, and

(b) Operations which, while initially covert, are by thei

designed to create psychical manifestations which cease to be 
such as, sabotage, support of underground and guerilla mov

and para-military activities.

John Ma

Annex 2

Memorandum From the Chief of the Joint Subsidiary 

Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Stevens) to the Joint Ch

Staff Representative on the Senior Staff of the Nationa

Security Council (Wooldridge)9

SPDM–208–51 Washington, May 1

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

1. The action to be taken by the National Security Counci

Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of 8 May 1951, “Sco

Pace of Covert Operations,” hinges on the acceptance or reje

two propositions which are implied but not discussed in that 

randum. They are:

a. Although global overt war may occur at any time, th

bility that the cold war will continue is sufficiently great to wa

strong effort in the planning and conduct of the cold war as w

a hot war.

b. There is a possibility that by the planned use of all ou

bilities, including covert ones, we can win the cold war, thereb

ing global hot war.

2. Acceptance of these two propositions means that we play 

ways, for either war or a continuation of the uneasy “peace,” w

putting all our eggs in either basket. Although there may be diff

of opinion as regards the degree of probability of both of the tw

propositions, there seems to be general agreement as to their 

as stated, and consequently as to the desirability of our playing 

ways. This is the only course which seems consistent with our 

gence and the national thinking behind the great bulk of Natio

curity Council papers in recent years.

3. As a result of past experiences, we are better organized 

with overt war than with the unprecedented situation of a pro

8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

9 Top Secret; Eyes Only. Two copies were sent to Magruder. Admiral Ste

the Joint Chiefs of Staff consultant to OPC.
all out cold war. The President

s directive of April 4, 1951, esta

the new Psychological Strategy Board but requiring maximum 

existing agencies, seems to go far towards providing the ne

mechanism. PSB can be expected to function not only as a co

ing agency for guidance, but, when it is unable to reach decisi

provide guidance itself in the light of approved policy, to fo

and recommend in the premises to the National Security Cou

the President.

4. A decision to play it for both hot war and a continuatio

cold war gives a definite answer to the basic question raised 

CIA memorandum. CIA should increase the scope and pace o

pabilities and action directed towards the winning of the cold 

should not jeopardize its effectiveness for hot war, including p

and preparations therefor by so doing. When detailed and spec

flicts in priorities arise, they can and should be settled through 

chological Strategy Board. CIA is also required to insure that 

ligence activities will not suffer by such an increase in scope an

and its internal arrangements should take this into considerat

5. The extent to which the United States will support and 

up on counter-revolution in the slave states, how much of 

tential to develop, when to release it, and how much to hol

serve, cannot be answered without the development of more 

plans and proposals to this end. Such plans and proposals are 

suitable for presentation by CIA to the PSB, which, after stud

cism and coordination, should obtain final decision from the P

via the National Security Council. The potential forces for 

revolution may, with sufficient time and skill in their developm

capable of eventually providing a final solution for the cold w

case hot war intervenes, of raising covert operations from a s

minor conspiracies to the stature of a weapon on a par with l

and air forces.

6. [1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

7. Consistent with the foregoing, it is suggested that the 

ing action be proposed to the National Security Council on the 

recommendations of the CIA memorandum:

a. As a result of a comprehensive review of the covert op

situation, the CIA should increase the scope and pace of its c

ties and action directed towards the winning of the cold war, bu

not by so doing jeopardize its effectiveness for hot war. b. Covert operational responsibility should remain as n

rected. Although all organizational problems are not completely 

there is no reason to believe that they cannot be solved within 

isting framework. Moreover, the urgencies of the situation will 

mit major structural alterations, which would in themselves cre

problems. Such clarifications of present broad responsibilities 

be essential should be handled through the PSB.
c. (1) Directives are in existence which appear to make b

equate provisions for joint planning with the Armed Forces fo

activities and operations in support of wartime military operatio

mechanism of the PSB should be employed for any clarification

may be necessary. (2) Specific guidance for dealing with the military in field

the same covert apparatus is being developed for both cold a

war purposes should be obtained from the PSB. (3) The PSB should insure that the foreign policy and politi

siderations which are involved in covert operations are brought 

on determinations of politico-military significance. To accompl

the PSB has recourse up to the NSC and the President, and d

operating agencies either directly or through the consultant 

nisms that are established by NSC 10/2 and NSC 59/1. (4) Within the limits of security, all government agencies 

be directed to provide appropriate personnel, administrative, 

gistic support for the covert effort. The detailed nature of this 

should be coordinated through the PSB. d. The Psychological Strategy Board should be directed to 

or obtain guidance as necessary to the covert effort.

L. C. St

Rear Admir

10 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

71. Memorandum of a Meeting of the Senior Staff of the

National Security Council1

Washington, May 2

SUBJECT

General Smith’s memorandum to the NSC of May 8 on the “Scope and P

Covert Operations”2

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, O

Secret. Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. The first page bears the initials 

dicating that this copy was intended for W. Park Armstrong, Jr. The drafting o

those present at the meeting have not been identified. 2 Attachment to Document 68.
Action

It was agreed that CIA–OPC would prepare a written a

presentation of two projects3—Guerrillas in China, and Resis

Eastern Europe—by which the Senior Staff could become mor

iar with the details and therefore the problems involved in su

ects, including such issues as:

a. Personnel and logistic support in short supply and pos

conflict with other projects;

b. Possible conflicts on objectives of the project, particular

tween the cold war and preparation for hot war;

c. Alternative methods such as covert, semi-covert, an

military;

d. Potentialities, including an analysis of the political and 

risks involved in the fulfillment of the project.

Discussion

The discussion touched on the following points:

1. Personnel. OPC is experiencing serious difficulty in ob

the necessary personnel to carry out its operations, and notab

quarters personnel, most of whom would come from the Mili

tablishment—either regular officers or special call-up of reserv

estimate of their needs called for 50 officers per year, of speci

fications in various areas and military specialties.

2. Supplies and Stock Piling. There was no disagreement in 

sponsibility of CIA to budget for its own supplies, but to procu

through the facilities of the Military.

3. Funds. CIA pointed out that to date funds were not a lim

upon their effectiveness in carrying out planned projects, but ra

limitations were in personnel and logistics.

4. Priorities. It was pointed out that there were three types 

ects, the allocation of resources to which represented the basic 

difficulty, namely: (a) political and psychological targets, purely 

cold war; (b) guerrilla operations which could be activated no

the event of hot war; and (c) development of resistance in prep

for hot war. In this connection it was pointed out that any cold

tivity would be helpful toward the preparation for hot war, bu

same time preoccupation with (b) and (c) above could not help 

the effective prosecution of (a).

3 Frank G. Wisner forwarded these studies to the NSC senior staff unde

a memorandum dated June 8. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Dep

tor for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 6)
5. Potentialities and Risks. Considerable concern was felt t

fulfillment of many of the projects under way might materially i

the risk of general war. Obviously the more successful we are in 

ing our cold-war objectives of containment through strengthe

free-world forces, the more we are risking a general war. On th

hand the OPC projects may inherently be more provocative t

general factors of success because they are designed positi

weaken the potential enemy, and in some cases to cause clash

6. Psychological Strategy Board. It was generally felt that t

when it becomes operative, will be in a position to coordinate 

rection given to OPC projects. Two important matters in this 

tion were pointed out:

a. The PSB charter may have to be expanded if it is to be e

in insuring the support as distinct from guidance for OPC from 

ious agencies.

b. Initiative in presenting the issues involved in projects m

heavily upon CIA, which should identify the various issues a

flicting priorities—whether of matériel or objectives—for prese

to the PSB and, where appropriate, the NSC.

7. Scope and Organization. There was no disagreement th

must continue to increase the scope of its activities to fulfill 

larged mission given to it. It was apparent that with possibly 

exceptions CIA should continue to have full responsibility for al

type of work.

In this connection it was pointed out that General Smith’s 

randum was indicative of the growth and success of the OPC 

tions because it raised such problems as conflicting priorities 

effects of successful operations which heretofore have not been 

sary to raise since all of the effort was going into a build-up

same time the memorandum indicated the need for CIA to put f

full analysis of the issues involved in projects in which some d

is necessary and the need for the development of such a facility 

for the resolution of such problems. These problems could n

longer be decided on a blanket and over-all basis but would 

the specific analysis of the issues in individual projects.
72. Terms of Reference for the Economic Intelligence

Committee1

IAC D–22/1 (Revised) Washington, May 2

1. The Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrenc

members of the IAC has established an Economic Intelligenc

mittee, on which shall sit designated representatives of those a

charged with primary responsibility for foreign national secu

telligence, i.e., the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, S

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. An

agency whose interest or competence may be relevant to the 

lar problem under examination may be invited also to sit with 

nomic Intelligence Committee.

2. The representative from the Central Intelligence Agen

serve as Chairman of the Economic Intelligence Committee, 

shall supply the secretariat.

3. The Economic Intelligence Committee shall:

a. Arrange concerted economic intelligence support, on 

major issues, for studies of interagency interest requested by 

telligence Advisory Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.

b. Arrange for the mobilization of the data and analysis av

relevant to appropriate operating problems of any member ag

questing assistance, or of any other agency dealing with econo

curity problems, which may request assistance.

c. Examine continuing programs of fundamental econo

search relating to the national security throughout the Unite

Government and recommend to the IAC for appropriate acti

cation of responsibility for specific fields of inquiry where su

cation appears appropriate.

d. Review and report to the IAC from time to time, on th

nence, extent, and quality of the data and analyses available, 

on the issues analyzed.

e. Recommend to the IAC for appropriate action priorities 

location of responsibilities for the collection and analysis to fill 

gaps in the economic intelligence needed for national security

f. Maintain a continuing review of the foreign economic 

gence activities of the United States Government as they relat

national security.

g. Make such special reviews of economic intelligence d

tion and processing procedures as may appear useful, and m

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 85–50036

Folder 10. Secret. The document was forwarded, presumably to members of t

gence Advisory Committee (there is no list of addressees), under cover of a 

dum from James Q. Reber, Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee. (Ibid.
ommendations for improvement to the Intelligence Advisory 

mittee, which shall have responsibility for instituting such acti

may judge appropriate. h. Prepare coordinated reports which present the best a

foreign economic intelligence.

4. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Economic Inte

Committee may set up such subcommittees and working pa

may be judged necessary.

5. When any member agency is unable to accept a recom

tion of the Committee, the matter may be referred to the Inte

Advisory Committee. All agencies directly concerned shall be a

sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee for the consider

such questions.

73. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence (Jackson) to the Executive Secretary of the

National Security Council (Lay)1

Washington, May 3

SUBJECT

Appraisal of Foreign Economic Intelligence Requirements, Facilities and 

Arrangements Related to the National Security

1. In accordance with the instructions of the National S

Council in NSC Action 282,2 the Central Intelligence Agency h

ducted a study of foreign economic intelligence requirements 

to the national security and of the facilities and arrangements cu

employed for meeting those requirements.

2. As the study has progressed, both the requirements and 

cilities and arrangements have been changing in response to c

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Secret. Jackson’s report was circulated to NSC members under cover of a Jun

orandum from Lay. 2 NSC Action No. 282, February 7, 1950, requested a study of economic in

and existing facilities and arrangements, and a plan for satisfying national need

intelligence through coordinated inter-agency effort. (National Archives, RG 

Records of Action, Box 1)
in the international situation and in the organization of variou

cies of the Government.

3. It is believed that the facilities and arrangements now 

or contemplated by the various agencies will go far toward pr

the basis for the adequate coverage of economic intelligence 

to the national security whose lack prompted NSC Action 282. T

tral Intelligence Agency itself is engaged in strengthening its 

economic intelligence production as a service of common conc

Office of Research and Reports has been established to coordi

economic intelligence activities of other agencies and to produ

economic intelligence as it not otherwise allocated.

4. For reasons explained in Tab A,3 it is believed that it is 

practicable nor desirable to recommend at this time a formal al

by the National Security Council of responsibility for econom

ligence production among the various agencies.

5. What is immediately needed is machinery to insure regu

cedures whereby (1) the full economic knowledge and technic

available in the Government can be brought to bear on specif

involving the national security, and (2) important gaps in the co

economic knowledge of the Government can be identified on 

tinuing basis and responsibility for filling them be allocated as 

disclosed.

6. To meet this need, the Director of Central Intelligence p

to establish an Economic Intelligence Committee. This propo

the terms of reference of the Committee4 described in Tab A (ta

red) have the concurrence of the members of the Intelligence A

Committee. To clarify the role of the Central Intelligence Agenc

coordination and production of economic intelligence, it is 

mended that the National Security Council issue the attached p

NSCID (Tab B5

—also tabbed in red). This proposed NSCID has 

ceived the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Comm

would be desirable to invite the Economic Cooperation Admin

and the Department of Commerce to sit with the National 

Council when this document is being considered. Upon the a

of the proposed NSCID, the Director of Central Intelligence 

tablish the Economic Intelligence Committee.

3 Memorandum to the Intelligence Advisory Committee from the Direct

tral Intelligence entitled “Proposed Economic Intelligence Committee,” und

printed. 4 Document 72.

5 Not printed. The draft NSCID is identical to NSCID No. 15, June 13, co

June 22, Document 254.
7. It is further recommended that the National Security 

call to the attention of the relevant agencies of the Governm

urgency of a collaborative effort to exploit the intelligence reso

the Government for security purposes. A draft of a proposed c

nication from the National Security Council asking that high 

be given to requests for cooperation from the Economic Inte

Committee is attached (Tab C).6

8. The Director of Central Intelligence will keep under con

review the arrangements of the United States Government for t

duction of economic intelligence and will make further recom

tions concerning specific allocations of responsibility should 

pear desirable at any time in the future.

William H. Ja

6 Not printed.

7 Printed from a copy that indicates Jackson signed the original.

74. Department of State Press Release1

No. 532 Washington, June 2

In answer to questions as to the relationship between the 

logical Strategy Board, announced today by the President,2 and 

terdepartmental Committee which has been working in this fi

der the chairmanship of Mr. Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secr

State for Public Affairs, the following statement was issued by 

Secretary of State James E. Webb:

“By agreement with my two colleagues on the Psychologic

egy Board, I can state it is now planned that the Interdepar

Committee which has been serving under the chairmanship of 

sistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs will continue in ex

with responsibility for coordinating the execution of United Sta

eign information programs under the name ‘Psychological Ope

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5

55. No classification marking. 2 The President approved the Psychological Strategy Board on April 4; s

ment 60. This press release made the President’s directive available to the pub
Coordinating Committee.

 This Committee, which has been se

this field for the past year, includes representatives from the 

ment of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Inte

Agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the 

ment of State.3

“Other activities in the Department of State will cont

presently organized under the broad guidance of the new Psy

ical Strategy Board announced by the President.”

3 Under Secretary of State Webb wrote Director of Central Intelligence 

May 2 informing him that this change was taking place, and asking that a C

be made available to serve with the Psychological Operations Coordinating C

Smith replied in the affirmative in an undated letter. (Both in Central Intelligenc

History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Box 5)

75. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Plan

Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitz

Washington, June 2

SUBJECT

The Director of Central Intelligence on the Scope and Pace of CIA Activ

with Particular Reference to Para-Military Operations and Preparations 

for Operations

General Walter B. Smith met this morning with the ad h

mittee of the Senior Staff of the NSC to set forth verbally his i

the above-mentioned subject. The representatives of the Depa

of State, Defense and the JCS who act as consultants to OPC 

were also present.2

General Smith started by querying whether it was desir

CIA to operate as a sort of “covert War Department” for the 

of large-scale guerrilla operations. He added that para-militar

scale guerrilla operations might go on for a period of years in th

1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, NSC 10 Series, 195

cret. Drafted by Joyce. 2 The consultants to the Office of Policy Coordination were Joyce (for th

ment of State), Brigadier General John Magruder (for the Department of Def

Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens (for the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
ent era of the tepid war. He commented that no commander 

accept responsibility for important missions unless he is assure

ceiving proper support. He went on to speak of CIA’s present 

of guerrilla warfare on the China Mainland. He stated that it w

sible that these operations might develop into a very large mili

fort involving perhaps two or three hundred thousand men who 

have to be equipped and supplied. If this situation did in fact d

it would naturally involve a large production program for spe

light weapons and would mean in addition, a large-scale t

shipping and air-supply and re-supply program which would 

to a military operation. In other words an “operation of wa

grand scale.

General Smith doubted that the CIA was the proper agenc

dertake such a program. He stated that our Military Establi

would undoubtedly feel uncomfortable with such an operation 

a civilian agency. He added that although the Secretary of Defe

the top echelon of the three services might agree with such an 

tion to be undertaken by the CIA, nevertheless the working l

the armed services would not be prepared to go along and the 

sult would be that necessary logistic and other support would 

forthcoming in a degree which would permit the CIA success

fulfill its responsibilities. General Smith cited several instances w

support for CIA in terms of personnel had been agreed to by 

retary of Defense but that long delays and whittling down by th

echelons of the three services had resulted in his obtaining only 

imum of support. For example, the Secretary of Defense had 

that CIA should receive from 400 to 500 officers but that after a 

of four months only 40 officers had been supplied to the CIA. 

phasized that the delays in the staff echelons and the reluctance 

available qualified personnel had made it virtually impossible 

Director of Central Intelligence to meet the requirements wh

been laid upon him by the JCS itself. General Smith then spok

responsibility and authority vested in a theatre commander to 

plish certain missions and added that he did not see how the D

of Central Intelligence or his representatives could ever obtain in 

time like authority to accomplish missions of great magnitude 

had been laid upon the CIA. He then stated that it might be p

for high ranking and highly competent generals loaned to CIA 

tain such authority but there were very few of these and the

most difficult to obtain from the Military Establishment. In other 

available talent in this category was limited.

General Smith went on to say that he, acting on his own 

sibility, could do and did do certain things in the field of spe

erations. As an illustration he mentioned activities designed to 

the supply of aviation gasoline to the Chinese communists wh
presently entering the Portuguese port of Macao. He said tha

eration of this kind would only require a few men and his o

tion could handle it. On the other hand, however, a large para-

support program for anti-communist guerrillas in China is ent

other thing and perhaps beyond the capabilities of the CIA giv

ent dispositions and attitudes within the working levels of the 

Establishment.

General Smith went on to say that the major mission of 

is intelligence and that the operations tail are now starting to 

intelligence dog and that CIA was already spread very thin. H

that the obtaining of necessary funds was not presently a pro

the honeymoon with Congress was still going on. He added, h

that these honeymoons never lasted forever and that sooner or 

would probably have to justify to the Congress programs an

projects involving the expenditure of several hundred million 

General Smith stated that as the Director of Central Intelli

would afford him great relief if he could wrap up in one pack

whole problem of guerrilla warfare and present it to the milit

military and not a CIA responsibility. He felt that he must do 

the reasons which he had already set forth and unless there sh

enthusiastic, timely and real support from the Military Establ

which was not presently forthcoming and which he did not an

He went on to point out that the military were apparently placi

hopes in the so-called retardation project. He feared that these 

hopes of what could be done were unrealistic and therefore 

ous. He spoke of the large preparations which would be requi

stated that it had been his experience that by the time an adequ

could be equipped and trained it would undoubtedly be pen

He mentioned the difficulties faced by the French resistance du

emy penetration and stated that in the present case the dan

communist-penetration were much greater and that whole 

which had been painfully prepared might be gobbled up alm

stantly when and if D–Day came. He emphasized that there wa

degree of wishful thinking and unreality within the Military 

lishment as to what could be accomplished by special opera

wartime and that this was a dangerous situation to be allowe

velop further. He stated that the conventional army officer did 

derstand the enormous difficulties involved due to an underst

lack of knowledge of just what guerrilla warfare behind the 

lines involved. He added that there should be a careful auditin

requirements the military were placing upon the CIA in this fi

a view to there being a complete understanding as to the prob

pabilities of the CIA. This would avoid misunderstandings as 

erroneous military planning based on false assumptions.
General Smith stated that, as a minimum, there should 

CIA-military participation in planning and operations in order 

military should bear its responsibility for large-scale guerrilla 

tions. This would assure that the necessary support from the m

for the CIA would be forthcoming. He stated that there migh

up within the JCS a joint staff where CIA and military officer

plan para-military operations. General Smith suggested that C

cialized personnel might assume responsibility for first contac

underground leaders and guerrilla commanders. The CIA mig

assume the responsibility for providing modest supplies to g

movements in order to see how their capabilities develop. If suc

rilla capabilities develop in a large way and turn into importa

tary operations, then the CIA responsibility should cease and 

itary should take over and be charged with the responsibili

supply, re-supply and other logistic support.

Admiral Stevens stated that there was already in progre

planning as between the CIA and the representatives of the J

that he considered that this situation was working out well. He 

that naturally there was a time lag in getting projects approved 

the fact that the JCS had a continually clogged agenda. He add

in his opinion, the military generally speaking were trained an

responsible for formal military operations and that they were in

of waging cold war. General Magruder agreed that there was 

cient flexibility in the formal Military Establishment or in the 

military mind successfully to carry on delicate covert operation

a great deal of flexibility and sophistication in political matt

called for.

It was generally agreed that a great deal of educational wo

necessary before the military could realize the nature and po

ties of covert operations. It was suggested that perhaps the b

for the CIA to obtain the requisite support from the Military 

lishment would be for General Marshall to issue orders to th

that the CIA operation was a national effort of the greatest imp

and that the heads of the military services should see to it do

line that it received what it needed to have in an expeditious 

as a matter closely related to the national security. There was 

sion as to whether it might or might not be desirable for the Pr

to issue the necessary instructions in order that CIA should rece

stinted and generous support.

Robert 
76. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of 

National Security Council (Gleason) to the National S

Council1

Washington, June 2

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

REFERENCES

A. Memo for Special Committee of Senior NSC Staff from Executive Se

same subject, dated May 14, 19512

B. NSC 10 Series3

At the direction of the President, a Special Committee of th

NSC Staff has been studying the scope and pace of covert opera

outlined in the enclosed memorandum from the Director of Ce

telligence.4 In this connection, the Special Committee has had th

fit of further elucidation of the problem by officials of the Centr

ligence Agency responsible for covert operations. The Director of 

Intelligence has expressed to the Special Committee his serious 

that covert operations of the scope and magnitude described in 

closure are beyond the capabilities of CIA without greatly increa

accelerated support from the Departments of State and Defense

On the basis of its study and consideration of the subject, 

cial Committee of the Senior NSC Staff recommends that the N

Security Council take the following actions:

1. Approve in principle as a national responsibility the i

ate expansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10

the intensification of covert operations designed in general o

emphasis to:

a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of po

cluding the relationships between the USSR, its satellites, an

munist China; and when and where appropriate in the light 

and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the re

and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which n

constitute a threat to U.S. security.

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Subject File. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Director of Central In

A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was the Presiden

2 Document 68.

3 See Document 42 and footnote 2 thereto.

4 Not attached; presumably it was a copy of Smith’s May 8 memorandum 

to Document 68. 5 See Document 75.
b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of t

ples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity a

to resist Soviet domination.

c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert an

rilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable 

consistent with 1-a above, and ensure availability of these force

event of war.

2. Reaffirm the responsibility and authority of the Director 

tral Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations in accordan

NSC 10/2 and subject to the general policy guidance prescribed 

and further subject to the approval of the Psychological Strateg

which shall be responsible for:

a. Determining the desirability and feasibility of programs 

individual major projects for covert operations formulated by 

posed to the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert ope

and the allocation of priorities among these operations.

c. Ensuring the provision of adequate personnel, funds, 

gistical and other support to the Director of Central Intelligence 

Departments of State and Defense for carrying out any approv

gram of covert operations.

3. Request the Secretary of Defense to provide adequate 

whereby the Director of Central Intelligence may be assured of t

tinuing advice and collaboration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 

mulation of plans for paramilitary operations during the perio

cold war.

4. In view of the necessity for immediate decision prior to t

ing into operation of the Psychological Strategy Board, autho

conduct of expanded guerrilla activities in China, as outlined in 

tached memorandum and pursuant to the appropriate provis

NSC 48/56.6

It is requested that you indicate your action with respec

above recommendations by completing and returning, as a matt

ority, the attached memorandum form.7

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the h

of this material and that access be limited to individuals requiring th

mation contained herein in order to carry out their official duties.

S. Everett G

6 For NSC 48/5, “U.S. Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,

see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, pp. 33–63. 7 The attached memorandum form, not printed, bears no indication of ap

disapproval by President Truman or the National Security Council.
77. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to

Secretary of Defense Marshall1

Washington, July 

Dear General Marshall:

I have carefully studied the proposed revision of NSCID–5 

pared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff2 and have compared it with t

inal directive which it is designed to replace.3 The proposal of t

Chiefs of Staff appears to disregard the intent of Congress as ex

in the National Security Act of 1947 and as revealed in the re

Congressional hearings prior to the passage of the Act. Durin

hearings it was made clear that the purpose of Congress in e

the law was to centralize control of clandestine activities abro

term, “services of common concern,” as finally written into the 

used, among other subjects, to cover clandestine espionage ope

The proposed revision seems also (see paragraph 1, sub-pa

a of the draft) to disregard the fact that the responsibility of the 

of Central Intelligence is to the National Security Council and th

dent—a status which was reaffirmed recently in the President

written comments on the Joint Chiefs of Staff document propos

sion of NSC 10/2, which also pertains to this Agency.4 The 

operations of this Agency are designed to support in every poss

the requirements of the Departments and Services which operat

the statutory members of the National Security Council but the 

of responsibility to the National Security Council remains clear.

From the practical point of view, it is unwise to have a nu

different authorities conducting clandestine operations. When I a

my present duties, I found that a number of Government Depa

were operating their own “spy nets” abroad. One or two of the

voluntarily transferred to CIA control in accordance with the i

law. Others remain in existence, and we cross trails from time 

sometimes with ludicrous and occasionally with rather tragic res

the whole, however, this multiplicity of control of a very sensit

of operation is a thoroughly bad business. I believe it can be corr

time by establishing a broader base of confidence and cooperatio

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Job 83–01034R, Box 4

Top Secret. 2 The JCS revision was not found.

3 For NSCID No. 5, December 12, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, T

gence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 423. 4 Not found.
operations and by improving those operations to the point whe

meet the needs of the agencies CIA is designed to serve.

NSCID–5 as presently in effect, after stating in paragraph 

the Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized 

espionage operations outside the United States and its possess

the collection of foreign intelligence information required to m

needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned in connecti

the national security, makes exception “for certain agreed activ

other Departments and Agencies.” I am prepared at any time 

cuss any such activities proposed by other Departments and A

and to endeavor to reach an agreement with respect to them. F

more, I am obligated under paragraph 4 of NSCID–5 to coordina

agreed activities of “casual agents” with the organized covert ac

I wish to make it clear that this Agency is entirely willing 

its personnel under the American theater commander in any th

active military operations where American troops are engaged 

equally willing, and indeed anxious, to coordinate its activiti

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If it is necessary to formalize this att

brief statement like that embodied in the recently approved rev

paragraph 4, NSC 10/2,5 should be sufficient. Accordingly, I do 

lieve that the proposed revision merits consideration by the N

Security Council. The present directive seems quite adequate.

Faithfully,

Bedell 

5 See footnote 2, Document 38.

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

78. Minutes of a Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Bo

PSB M–1 Washington, July 

PRESENT

Lieut. General W. Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB 

Secret. This was the first meeting of the PSB. It was held in the DCI’s conferen
Mr. Edward Barrett, for the Under Secretary of State

Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

Mr. Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. James Q. Reber, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. [name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

Functions of the Board and Staff

1. Initial discussion was based on the agenda proposed 

memorandum of 1 June 1951 from Mr. Dulles to the Dir

Central Intelligence.2 In view of Mr. Gray’s appointment, discu

the proposed interim procedure (Tab A of that memorandum) 

necessary. The proposed functions and organization of the St

B) was passed over as it was considered a non-controversial pa

basic difference of view brought out in General Magruder’s 

Sargeant’s papers was discussed briefly but no decision or 

mendation was made. It was agreed that Mr. Gray should hav

portunity to discuss the matter with various interested peopl

forming an opinion.

2. General Smith stated his view that the principal factor 

in our psychological set-up at the present time is a “master pla

ilar to the plan of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the last war 

was decided to concentrate first on Germany and then turn o

He pointed out that everything else would logically flow from 

plan and that economic programs, covert missions, and VOA 

should be related to it.

3. General Smith felt that the PSB and its Staff should wor

preparation of this master plan and act as a high-level projec

board to allocate missions to the various agencies and to surve

fectiveness of operations in progress.

Funds, Space, and Personnel

4. The Board agreed that Mr. Gray and his Staff should b

cally located on “neutral ground” apart from any one of the 

pating agencies.

5. It was understood that Mr. Peel of CIA would assist M

in working out with Mr. Finan of the Bureau of the Budget3 a

resentatives of State and Defense the necessary arrangements 

ing funds and office space for the Board and Staff. General Smith 

to try to make certain slots available for the immediate hiring 

high-level consultants to be assigned to the PSB.

2 A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80

Box 33, Folder 1089. 3 William F. Finan, Assistant Director for Administrative Management, 

the Budget.
Relations With Other Groups

6. The relation of the Board to the NSC was discussed brie

it was understood that the Board would occupy a position som

similar to that of the Senior Staff, reporting directly to the NSC

dination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be effected throug

representative with the Board, Admiral Stevens.

7. The supporting role of the O/PC Consultants and Mr. B

Psychological Operations Coordinating Board was mentioned 

possibility was raised of combining these two groups while p

ing separate overt and covert staffs. It was agreed, however, 

change should be made at the present time inasmuch as both 

were operating satisfactorily.

Scope of “Psychological Operations”

8. The point was made that the scope of the Board’s resp

ity is very broad and covers every kind of activity in support 

policies except overt shooting and overt economic warfare.

79. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartm

Committee on Internal Security (Whearty) to the Natio

Security Council Representative on Internal Security

(Coyne)1

NSC 68/17 Washington, July 2

SUBJECT

ICIS Section of Internal Security Annex for Report on Status and Timing 

Current U.S. Programs for National Security

In accordance with the memorandum for the Senior NSC 

the NSC Executive Secretary, dated July 16, 1951,2 attached h

the ICIS Section of the Internal Security Annex for the report 

subject. It is noted that the Executive Secretary indicated t

initial drafts of the annexes should be available to the draftin

1 Source: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Cou

resentative on Internal Security, 1947–69, NSC 68 (Internal Security), Box 46. T

2 Not found.
not later than July 23, 1951. As you know, this report is to be p

pursuant to the President’s directive to the NSC with respect t

view of the NSC 68 programs.

Raymond P. W

Attachment3

1. Utilizing the personnel and facilities of all Federal agenc

cerned, the ICIS is developing a program designed to bring ab

highest practicable state of internal security. The program inclu

following major elements:

a. Protection of critical governmental, industrial, port an

installations and facilities.

b. Measures designed to afford preventive security agains

ventional attack, including atomic, chemical, biological and radi

c. To establish more effective controls to prevent the entry 

United States of persons who are actually or potentially dang

the national security and the exit of those whose departure wo

stitute a security threat.

d. To strengthen the controls over the importation and 

tion of materials, the entry or exit of which would endanger 

tional security.

e. Procedures designed to protect classified government info

f. Procedures for federal advice to state and local authori

private business in voluntarily restricting the dissemination wi

United States of unclassified technological information, the re

which might endanger the national security.

g. Assurance that responsible federal agencies have ma

quate plans and preparations for the administration of variou

nal security programs, the implementation of which is continge

a state of war or war-related emergency.

h. Coordinating the provisions of emergency legislation a

ulations pertaining to internal security matters.

2. A summary of the progress made to date under items 

above follows:

a. (1) A study, in two parts, covering industrial security, w

mitted to the NSC which approved its recommendations. As 

quence thereof, an Industry Evaluation Board and a Facilities 

3 Secret.
tion Board have been established; the former under the Secre

Commerce and the latter, while administered by the Departm

Commerce, responsible to the ICIS. The functions of these boa

to evaluate industrial plant and related resources; to assign to 

propriate departments and agencies of government the respon

for preparation and supervision of security programs; to establis

all protection policies; to insure the preparation of detailed p

each agency in its area of responsibility; and to review and mon

implementation of such plans.

(2) A plan for the protection of government buildings, p

by the General Services Administration, is currently awaiting fin

approval.

(3) A study on port security submitted to the Treasury 

ment has resulted in the preparation of a detailed plan for au

ing Coast Guard activities in this respect. The plan has been ap

and is currently being implemented.

b. Several studies have been prepared and approved coveri

sible preventive measures against unconventional attack. Some 

five (35) studies by various departments and agencies have be

mitted to ICIS covering the vulnerability of their respective a

responsibility. A study proposing that an overall intelligence 

tion be prepared by CIA, utilizing the IAC agencies, has been 

ted to, and is under consideration by, the NSC. Such an evalu

essential upon which to predicate the degree of implementat

only of protective measures against unconventional attack b

should prove invaluable in the consideration of defense m

against all forms of covert and overt attack.

c. (1) Comprehensive reports covering entry and exit safe

have been prepared and approved by ICIS. Their provisions a

ommendations for strengthening controls have been referred to 

being implemented by the responsible agencies such as the Im

tion and Naturalization Service (Justice), Visa and Passport D

(State), Customs (Treasury).

(2) The “Wartime Regulations Covering Entry and Exit” ha

completely revised and redrafted, and are currently being cir

by State Department to all interested departments and agen

concurrence.

d. (1) A detailed study covering the means of clandestin

duction of unconventional attack media and other materials. Pre

upon its conclusions, recommendations have been made to the 

of Customs and other agencies for the augmentation of alread

ing machinery for detection and prevention of entry.

(2) The authority to control the export of strategic mate

vested in the Secretary of Commerce. The determination o
materials are strategic or which for reasons of economics, etc.

not, in the interest of national security, be exported is not wi

purview of ICIS.

(3) The control of export of unclassified, published techn

information to the Soviet bloc has, at the request of the Secr

Commerce, been actively studied and interim recommendation

No final solution to this extremely complex problem has been d

Special emphasis is currently being placed on finding a soluti

e. (1) Regulations establishing “Minimum Standards for t

dling and Transmission of Classified Government Informatio

been submitted to, and approved by, the NSC and the Preside

tingent upon the resolution of the provisions of a single pa

thereof by the Department of Justice and the Department of D

(2) Regulations establishing “Minimum Standards for 

Clearance for Access to Classified Government Information” ha

submitted to and approved by the NSC and the President who 

rected their publication concurrently with, or immediately fo

the publication of the regulations referred to in (1) above.

(3) Regulations prescribing security procedures to determ

eligibility of foreign visitors to have access to classified U.S. 

ment information have been submitted to the NSC and are c

under consideration by it.

f. A study was prepared by the ICIS which has led to th

lishment of an agency in the Department of Commerce to prov

vice and guidance in this field to state and local authorities an

vate business. Appropriate liaison has been established 

departments and agencies concerned whereby recommendat

made as to the guidance to be given regarding the specific matte

ing under their respective jurisdictions. Appropriate publicity h

given this project, and it is now functioning.

g. This is a general problem which is receiving continui

sideration. In applying the principle it is usually determined t

cific measures fall under one of the categories listed in a. th

above and progress thereunder has been discussed previously

h. This also is a general problem of a continuing and va

ture. In addition to generating such regulations, for example, a

in e. above, the ICIS reviews proposed regulations and legislati

inating in various departments and agencies with a view to 

ing and recommending the resolution of differences pertainin

interests and requirements of other agencies. Since the vari

partments and agencies of the executive branch have become m

more cognizant of the coordinative function of ICIS, the effec

of its efforts in this area of interest has improved.
3. There has been almost unqualified cooperation by the 

departments and agencies in support of ICIS activities. Howeve

of the programs and projects advocated by the ICIS for imple

tion by these agencies have met with the obstacle of lack of fun

example, the Department of Commerce has found it difficult 

vide for the essential staff and administrative cost of the Indust

uation Board and the Facilities Protection Board. Agencies such 

Federal Communications Commission are finding it difficult 

dertake even the planning for physical security of the commun

industry. Once such plans are completed the cost of supervis

enforcement of protective measures will be an additional obst

a further example, plans for removing subversives from critica

and facilities must provide, not only for security checks of em

which is of itself an expensive procedure, but also for the equ

portant protection of the rights of individuals through hearin

appeals procedures. The latter will doubtless entail the establi

of regional appeals boards across the country, probably under 

risdiction of the Department of Labor. That Department conse

must be provided the funds for their establishment and func

Plans are not yet crystalized to the degree that specific costs ca

timated but it is anticipated that impediments and difficulties 

nature will be encountered.

4. The program, as outlined, is considered adequate. Ad

specific problems under the broad outline are constantly aris

are being incorporated thereunder for active consideration. Th

program is an immediate one, and the corrective actions dete

to be necessary are being implemented on an urgent basis as 

the requirement is established. Those measures which are ear

for implementation only in the event of general hostilities neve

are envisaged as being equally urgent for determination as thos

are required to be implemented currently.

5. Inasmuch as all of its functions are considered to be curr

immediate, the target date for readiness is now and not in the 

The ICIS will continue to impart a sense of urgency to all of it

erations and will endeavor to instill the same in the agencies c

with the responsibility of carrying out agreed upon internal s

measures.
80. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secret

Defense Marshall1

Washington, July 2

SUBJECT

A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Securit

United States

1. In response to your memorandum dated 8 June 1951,2 t

Chiefs of Staff have considered the report of the Interdepar

Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) on the above subject.3 Th

considered also a memorandum, dated 13 July 1951, by the Dir

Central Intelligence4 which was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs 

by your memorandum of 19 July 1951.5

2. The ICIS report considers Soviet capabilities, Soviet int

and U.S. plans for the internal security of the United States. It s

the need for further coordination and integration of such matt

draft directive proposed in the report, addressed to the Director 

tral Intelligence as Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committe

is intended to remedy these inadequacies by establishing a p

develop a comprehensive appraisal of Soviet capabilities to in

continental United States. The draft directive contemplates furt

key Defense Department personnel be assigned to the project f

for an estimated period of six months and examination by the 

certain aspects of United States military war plans.

3. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the project p

in the ICIS report involves four distinct steps as follows:

a. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to launch a 

attack on the continental United States.

Comment: This estimate should be prepared under the dire

the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of the IAC. b. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to conduct s

and otherwise disrupt internal U.S. activities.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80

Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret. The memorandum was sent to the members of th

Security Council at the request of the Secretary of Defense on July 30. 2 Not found.

3 Apparent reference to Document 79. A memorandum from DAH (not i

to DCI Smith, July 23, which summarizes a June 1 draft of the ICIS report i

but not printed. 4 See the attachment below.

5 Not found.
Comment: This estimate also should be prepared under th

tion of the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of the 

c. An evaluation of our military capability to counter poten

emy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph 3 a above, and 

mate and report of the probable damage to the United States re

from such attack.

Comment: This is a responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Sta

d. An evaluation of ways and means available to counter 

tial enemy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph 3 b above, 

estimate and report of the probable damage to the United St

sulting from such enemy actions.

Comment: This should be accomplished under the directio

ICIS.

4. Procedures now in effect, whereby members of the IAC 

information and advice to the Director of Central Intelligence

assistance in the preparation of estimates 3 a and 3 b above b

qualified in such matters. Accordingly, such intelligence as is r

for the project is available through normal channels without 

signment of additional Department of Defense personnel on a fu

basis to CIA. In addition, the ICIS is so organized that portion

project allocated to that agency will not entail assignment of ad

full-time personnel.

5. In view of the above, it is believed that the enclosed d

rectives provide a more satisfactory means of accomplishing t

poses of the project than the one proposed in the ICIS report. I

ommended, therefore, that the enclosed directives be issued 

National Security Council in lieu of the directive proposed by t

For the Joint Chiefs 

Omar N. B

C

Joint Chiefs 

6 A handwritten notation at the end of this paragraph reads: “Interdep

Int. Conf.” Regarding the subsequent assignment of this estimate to the Int

mental Intelligence Conference, see footnote 4, Document 86. 7 Printed from a copy that indicates Bradley signed the original.
8 Top Secret.

9 Top Secret.

Enclosure “A”8

PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTI

APPRAISAL OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBAB

COURSES OF ACTION FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK UPON 

CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES DURING 1951–52

1. Pursuant to authorization by the President, the Director 

tral Intelligence, as Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Co

(IAC), is hereby directed to develop, with the assistance and gui

IAC agencies and the advice of other appropriate Government 

ments and agencies, comprehensive intelligence estimates conce

a. The capabilities of the USSR to launch military attacks 

the continental United States, and

b. The capabilities of the USSR to injure or damage person

erty or morale within the United States by subversion and sab

2. For the purpose of implementing this directive, the depa

and agencies of the executive branch of the Government sha

available to the Director of Central Intelligence such intellig

formation and advice as appropriate to the solution of the pro

3. It is desired that these estimates be completed as soon 

ticable and, upon completion, a report be forwarded to the N

Security Council.

Enclosure “B” 9

PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTI

MEASURES FOR THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE 

UNITED STATES

1. Pursuant to authorization by the President, the Inte

mental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) is hereby dir

evaluate, with military advice and guidance from the Joint C

Staff, ways and means available other than those within the p

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to counter potential enemy capab

conduct sabotage and otherwise disrupt internal U.S. activitie

2. The Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of th

gence Advisory Committee (IAC), has been directed to furnis

comprehensive intelligence estimate of Soviet capabilities to i
damage persons, property, or morale, within the United States 

version and sabotage. ICIS, within its normal functions, wil

measures to counter such Soviet capabilities.

3. It is desired that this evaluation be completed as soon 

ticable after receipt of the intelligence estimate (paragraph 2 abo

that a report be forwarded to the National Security Council.

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence S

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Coun

(Lay)10

Washington, July 1

SUBJECT

A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Securit

United States

REFERENCE

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from the Executiv

Secretary, National Security Council, same subject, 5 June 195111

1. There is no doubt of the great need for, and value of, 

posed project. The conclusions and recommendations of the 

partmental Committee on Internal Security are concurred in.

2. It should be noted, however, that the appraisal envisag

much broader scope than the usual National Intelligence Esti

involves the integration of intelligence on the USSR with variou

of information on the United States. It is therefore essential that

vided in Paragraph 2 of the proposed NSC Directive, all Gove

departments and agencies “shall make available to the Director 

tral Intelligence such information in their possession as is nece

the solution of the problem . . .” as well as “the full-time serv

a temporary loan basis, . . . of those individuals who are best q

by experience and knowledge to assist in the project.”

Walter B. 

10 Secret. All ellipses in the original. 11 Not printed. Other memoranda are attached that relate to NSC discussion 

sue in June, including a memorandum from Lay to the National Security Counc

which encloses a June 1 memorandum from Whearty to Coyne that transmits t

draft ICIS report and a proposed National Security Council directive. The latter tw

attached, however, and none of these attachments is printed. 12 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.
81. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Plannin

(Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)1

Washington, August 

Before leaving on my vacation I want to set down my view

lation to developments concerning the Psychological Strategy 

1. The Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951,2 is somew

clear in setting forth the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction in th

a. Refers to psychological objectives, strategy and operatio

out precisely delimiting the meaning of “psychological.” b. Covers by reference NSC 59/13 and 10/24 in the jurisd

the Board without saying specifically whether the inclusion i

tive or illustrative.

c. Vests the Board with power to “formulate policy” in re

psychological activities without defining the relationship betwe

policy and the national foreign policy.

2. In the efforts to get the Psychological Board operating t

eral approaches to the question of the Board’s purpose and juri

have developed—

a. The first is generally advocated for by members of CI

in the initial phases of the Board’s work. It is that the Board 

mary authority with regard to all matters of the conduct of fore

icy short of formal hostilities. b. The second represents the viewpoint of the Department 

and has support from the military. It is that the Psychological 

Board should exercise—

(1) Primary authority in ensuring among all agencies co

maximum effectiveness and unity of objective and effort in re

activities set forth in NSC 59/1 and 10/2.

(2) Secondary authority to see that full account of psych

factors—that is, aspects having impact on the mind, will, and 

of foreign peoples—is taken in the planning and execution of o

tivities bearing on the field of foreign relations, including the p

of the national objectives themselves.

3. These two points of view have been made apparent in 

ical stages of the efforts to establish the understandings and th

nizational arrangements to get the Board’s work under way. 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Psychologica

Secret. Drafted by Charles Burton Marshall, member of the Policy Planning S

2 See Document 60.

3 For NSC 59/1, see Document 2.

4 Regarding NSC 10/2, see footnote 2, Document 42.
the matter up, the Director of the Board

sought to bring ab

agreed definition of psychological operations as concerned 

Board’s jurisdiction. This effort produced two drafts which typ

conflicting approaches:

a. The first representing the radically broad concept of the 

scope is:

“Psychological operations,” as used in the President’s dire

a cover name to describe those activities of the United States i

and in war through which all elements of national power are 

atically brought to bear on other nations for the attainment of U

eign policy objectives.

b. The second, representing the more restricted view, is:

Psychological operations are interpreted within the term

Presidential Directive of 4 April 1951 to consist of activities d

to influence the attitudes, actions and capabilities of foreign p

so as to further U.S. national objectives.

The role of PSB is:

a. To formulate basic plans for the systematic employment 

psychological operations encompassed by NSC 59/1 and NSC 

coordinate their execution, and to evaluate their effect.

b. To ensure in the formulation and application of nation

ical, economic and military policies, that the symbolic and psy

ical aspects thereof are adequately exploited.

In face of the prospect that the two definitions were irrecon

the Director decided to lay aside the effort to remedy the issue 

inition and to concentrate instead on particular problems and 

ation of a staff.

4. It is necessary and desirable, however, to clear up in 

ginning the difference as to the Board’s purpose and jurisdict

to resolve the issue by adopting the narrower concept. This i

on the following considerations:

a. It would be counter to the interests of the Board and to th

ernment in general to have friction develop between the Boa

other agencies concerned over conflicting assumptions about 

ity. The principle that good fences make good neighbors is jus

portant in Government as it is anywhere else. b. Clarity of view as to purpose and function is desirable n

to avoid jurisdictional conflicts at the top level but also to devel

monious collaboration in day-to-day relationships at all levels

c. Clarification is necessary in order to clear the way fo

ahead with planning the Board’s work. In laying out the work i

essary to know not only what the Board’s and its Staff’s proble

be but also to what relationship to the problems the Board and 

will have. Under the radically broad definition, any problem m

expounded by inference to cover the sum total of national po

5 Gordon Gray.
make particular problems manageable, it is necessary to relate 

some restriction in basic concept. It would prove vexatious to 

one concerned if the Board and its Staff were to commence the

without some clear view as to goal and limits. d. It is well to confine the Board to a commitment whic

fulfill and which will make it most useful to the Governmen

than attempting to fulfill a vast responsibility all too likely to 

duplication, conflict, and frustration running counter to the 

usefulness.

5. In the discussions of the organizational problem the 

and some of his immediate assistants have repeatedly stresse

premium will be placed on staffing the organization with ind

from outside the Government service. This may be desirable in 

ing the draining away of talents needed in other agencies and in 

ing the sum of capabilities available to the Government. At th

time, the idea can be pushed too far. A unit composed prepond

of individuals unfamiliar with the labyrinthine ways of the 

ment would all too likely find itself unable to make headway. I

find itself frustrated in trying to get its own work done. Other

find it getting in the way. It is better therefore that a balance b

between new resources of imagination and old wisdom in the 

the Government.

6. The following are recommended:

a. That the Under Secretary seek, at the next meeting of th

to bring about an agreement as to the underlying concept of the 

direction and limits in harmony with the principles stated in t

restrictive view of the Board’s role.6

b. As a matter of less urgency, that the Under Secretary 

caveat against the attitude which discounts the usefulness of 

uals already in the Government and seeks a preponderance 

viduals from outside the Government in staffing the Board.

Paul H

6 The Psychological Strategy Board adopted a statement on Septemb

favored the more restrictive view of its role. It is printed in Foreign Relations, 

I, pp. 178–180. 7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
82. Minutes of a Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Bo

PSB M–2 Washington, August 13, 1951, 2:30–4:

PRESENT

Members

Lt. General W. Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence, Acting Cha

Mr. James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State

Mr. Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Others

Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

Col. Armand Hopkins, JCS Representative

Major General John Magruder, Department of Defense

Mr. Frank Wisner, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Acting Executive Secretary, Psychological Strate

Mr. Robert G. Efteland, Secretary

Progress Report by the Director (PSB D–1)

1. In addition to his statement in Progress Report by the 

(PSB D–1),2 Mr. Gray commented that efforts are being made to 

individuals for permanent appointment to the staff of the Psyc

cal Strategy Board (PSB). He noted that Task Panel “A” (PSB D

was the outgrowth of a meeting at the White House in which 

ant Secretaries of State Rusk and Barrett had participated.

Procedure for Conduct of Board Business

2. The Board agreed that it would meet only when there 

portant problems to discuss. The Acting Chairman and the D

will schedule meetings on a rotation basis at any one of the thre

cies at the convenience of the Board. The members are free t

their alternates as they deem desirable.

3. In the matter of briefing, Mr. Gray suggested that his st

the members’ alternates a few days before meetings of the Boa

alternates would then brief the members in advance of Boar

ings. General Smith and Mr. Lovett favored this procedure. Mr

urged that papers be held to a minimum for security reasons. M

stated that he had not decided how to handle the briefing pro

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB Min

Secret. Drafted on August 14. The meeting was held in the Director’s Office

logical Strategy Board Building. 2 A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Job 80–

Box 32, Folder 1060. 3 A copy is ibid.
4. To prevent problems being placed before the Board for 

until the members have had a chance to study them, it was 

sensus that the Director should determine whether a problem i

the competence of the Board and whether it is necessary for 

staff to present its views to the PSB.

List of Problems of Interest to the Board (PSB D–2)4

5. Mr. Gray, in presenting his views on List of Problems fo

rector and Staff in Order to Work Priority (PSB D–2), called the 

attention to paragraph 4 in which he states his concern that th

should not assume too many problems without careful consid

He said this document is an effort to translate NSC papers into 

It is necessary to convert NSC policies into specific objectives 

mulate plans which will achieve these objectives. As the problem

in Sections II–A, II–B and II–C on page 2 are solved, the rem

problems will become clearer. The staff intends to give top pr

the substantive problems I through II–C which fall generally in

egory of psychological strategy planning not previously initiat

tion II–D will then be considered. Section II–E will be conside

currently inasmuch as these problems are largely concern

relationships. Mr. Gray explained that it is not necessary to r

differing definitions as to what psychological operations mean 

the same work is necessary under either concept. Consequentl

decided to list the problems facing the PSB to provide the Boa

specific terms of reference which would enable it to get on 

work. Therefore, the list of problems (PSB D–2) illustrates the 

interest of the PSB and the Staff. At the same time it provides 

Gray the basis for planning a functioning staff organization.

6. General Smith said that the list of problems appears to 

umental. He asked Mr. Gray how he expected to accomplish the

ects and still attack current problems. Mr. Gray replied that t

intends to use ad hoc groups whenever necessary on new pr

General Smith said that in his opinion the PSB staff would requi

reinforcements to accomplish the work outlined in PSB D–2

lieved that completion of the problems listed would require tw

of effort by the PSB staff and that there was not that much tim

able. He said that the problems listed in Sections I–A (4), I–A 

I–A (7) are enough to keep the PSB staff busy for quite some 

addition, as he looked over the list of problems, it appeared th

others were going to require work by the staff in the very nea

He noted, as an example, that the problem in Section II–K had 

4 Not found.
been assigned a work priority. However, it is a problem whic

be met right now.

7. Mr. Webb said that the Kremlin has a special group wh

votes all of its efforts to maximizing the strength of the USSR 

fractionating and weakening that of the United States. He hop

the members would conceive the function of the PSB as draw

gether U.S. efforts in the same way as the Kremlin group does f

sia. Moreover, he believed the Board should discuss further m

the problems listed in PSB D–2 before the Staff completes its w

reaches a final position on the problems. He said surveys take ti

that we should not overlook each Board member’s ignorance 

work of other agencies. He looked upon the PSB as a central p

the members to meet, discuss problems and make policy. T

should be a central place where guidance would be available. I

give Mr. Webb the feeling that here is a group of knowledgab

ernment Officials who can meet our major problems in the p

logical area.

8. Mr. Lovett said that this list is an encyclopedic approa

gives the Board something to shoot at. He suggested that the Bo

prove the document (PSB D–2) as an identification of problem

call for discrimination as to which should be undertaken first. H

gested that the Board undertake as a matter of urgency the pr

listed in Section I–A (4), I–A (5) and I–A (7). This will enable th

to find out what is being done by Government agencies, what 

directives they are following and what they plan to do. Mr

agreed with Mr. Lovett and said that if these three problem

worked out, the PSB would then know what the agencies in t

Government are working on. It could bring together whateve

tional resources are necessary to achieve our goals and could m

necessary plans for any gaps which might be found to exist. 

Smith agreed with: a) the above, b) that the staff of the Board 

undertake the necessary work in connection with these three 

and c) that the Board should consider at a later date the othe

lems listed in the document. Mr. Gray said that the list will n

be subject to constant revision. He suggested that the staff, in a

to the study of Sections I–A (4), I–A (5) and I–A (7), be allowed 

up any urgent matter which the Board might direct.

Section II–D of PSB D–2

9. The Board discussed at length the problem stated in t

tion of the paper. It was the consensus of the Board that the R

are planning some disruptive action to embarrass us. Possibly th

reaffirm their disarmament suggestions and intensify their peac

It will have the same old sugar coating and will attempt to sh

the United States is preventing disarmament in the world. The S
letter possibly gives a guide to the Russian attitude. No doubt 

sians will say to small countries “if you don’t go along with us 

cept our position, you must bear the consequences.” The Board 

that the United States must take action to meet these Russian 

vers both abroad and in the United States.

Section II–E of PSB D–2

10. Mr. Gray said that he planned to have a Special Assist

dle the relationships of PSB with congressmen and representa

private agencies who are interested generally in psychologica

opments. He does not anticipate any problems in this connect

main thing will be to keep others from doing things we don

them to do rather than the need to encourage cooperation by ou

Mr. Webb asked Mr. Gray if he intended to use other executiv

cies of the Government to talk to representatives of private gro

Gray said that he would use Government agencies but that i

be necessary to have someone available in PSB to talk with 

that they feel they are being given consideration. General Sm

lieved it would be desirable for Mr. Gray to have such an office

with interested private agencies. Mr. Lovett said that the Dep

of Defense would handle most inquiries itself but that it wou

off general inquiries to the PSB. It was the consensus of the Bo

the procedure outlined by Mr. Lovett should be followed.

Organization, Functions, and Budget (PSB D–3)5

11. The Board’s consideration was limited to page 5 of PS

ment D–3. In explaining this estimate, Mr. Gray said that he exp

the staff will be increased somewhat to meet the problems the P

handle. However, he believed that any increase would be rea

and in no case would the staff be increased to anywhere near 

the size called for in the document. The Board agreed that th

sary funds would be provided from appropriate Agency budg

Other Business

12. Mr. Gray discussed two papers as examples of problem

contain psychological implications. He asked that the memb

tion their Agencies to make available to the PSB copies of pape

portance to the work of the Board and its Staff. The members 

that they would instruct their agencies to cooperate in this ma

13. General Smith discussed the question of preventing 

trolled activity in the psychological field now that the PSB has 

ganized. He said that there is a need to develop an over-all psy

5 Not found.
ical strategy plan. Other Agencies and the Army, which is con

only with the tactical military phase of operations, would then 

to carry out assigned missions. General Magruder stated that he 

discuss the Army’s role with Mr. Lovett (who had left the meeti

that the Department of Defense would handle the matter intern

said that the Services would deal with the Board through the JSPD 

was established for this purpose. General Magruder said that 

pers are being prepared concerning the Army’s interpretation of 

tion and that copies will be submitted to the PSB. It was the con

that an over-all psychological strategy plan should be developed 

all activity in the Government is in consonance with it.

83. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secreta

Defense Marshall1

Washington, August 1

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memor

dated 29 June 1951,2 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the 

mendations of the Special Committee of the Senior National S

Council Staff regarding the “Scope and Pace of Covert Oper

forwarded by a memorandum from the Executive Secretary of 

tional Security Council (NSC), dated 27 June 1951.3

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared a Study, a copy o

is attached hereto.4 The Conclusions to this Study are quoted be

ready reference:

“a. In the light of the world situation, the United States 

within its capabilities, bring to bear upon the USSR appropria

war resources and weapons during peacetime with the obje

1 Source: Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File. Top Se

Only. Lay circulated the memorandum to the National Security Council on A

(Ibid.)2 Not found.

3 Document 76.

4 Not printed.
weakening the power and will of the Kremlin to wage either 

hot war;

“b. It is possible that the present cold war may continue 

period of many years. However, the implementation of a well-

United States program of covert operations (as defined in NSC 

against the Kremlin conceivably might shorten the period of th

gle, might also be decisive in winning the cold war, and thu

prevent the eventuation of overt war. These possibilities appe

cient to justify the United States in undertaking a covert effort 

magnitude;

“c. In order to assure a well-planned United States pro

covert operations against the Kremlin during peacetime:

“(1) The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) should dev

strategic concept and national program, based upon national ob

consistent with current military planning and within availa

nomic means;

“(2) After approval by the National Security Council (NSC

concept and program, necessary operational plans, including 

and other appropriate estimates, should be prepared by the ap

ate agencies under the direction of the PSB and subject to its 

and approval;

“(3) In the event of any conflict of interests among the a

directly concerned, the NSC should be the final arbiter in ea

and

“(4) All elements of the national program of covert op

should be reviewed by the NSC at least quarterly;

“d. Responsibility for the conduct of covert operations in w

must be as directed in NSC 10/2. In this connection, it is axiom

all wartime operations in any military theater or area (specifi

cluding covert) shall be under the direction of the military com

of the theater or area. On the other hand, responsibility for the 

of covert operations in peacetime should rest in the Director 

tral Intelligence (DCI);

“e. On the long-range basis, the Central Intelligence Agenc

should procure and maintain its own personnel;

“f. On both long-range and short-range bases, the Depart

Defense should support CIA peacetime covert operations by:

“(1) Providing for approved projects, appropriate equipm

services as practicable which either cannot or should not be o

elsewhere; and

5 NSC 10/2 is in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intellige

lishment, Document 292.
(2) Assisting in training, as practicable, and in providing 

sary training facilities (such as not to interfere with research 

velopment installations and installations required to be mainta

a combat-ready status) particularly when cover is an inherent r

ment for the training;

“g. Department of Defense support of CIA peacetime cove

ations at an increased scope and pace will call for some expansio

mobilization base and mobilization requirements. This ex

should, in general, be related to the increase in CIA covert oper

“h. In view of the present restricted capability of CIA, such 

time projects as can be justified by reason of their immediate u

and of the national importance of the results reasonably to be e

therefrom, should be supported by the Department of Defense

short-term basis, this support in terms of military personnel 

clude a limited number of specially qualified active duty offic

men and certain retired and/or reserve officers not on active dut

of these reserve officers may, on the short-term basis, be calle

tive duty for assignment to CIA for a specific project. This must 

ject, however, to an overriding priority for the Services whe

Service specialty qualification is involved. In addition, assista

the Department of Defense to CIA probably will be necessary w

spect to the duty status and process of procurement of certain 

tial inductees and personnel with reserve commissions: 

“i. The following procedures and restrictions must apply 

assignment of military personnel to CIA:

“(1) Arrangements for assignment of active duty office

men will be made with the Services through the Joint Chiefs 

organization;

“(2) The need for personnel must be justified in each in

Numbers will be limited to the minimum for performance of 

tasks in approved projects and programs;

“(3) As far as practicable, all details or assignments will 

voluntary basis and under no circumstances will an individua

signed to CIA against his will. All details will be temporary in 

and subject to Services practices of rotation;

“(4) No individuals in the Reserve Officers Training Corps 

or in other officer candidate groups will be made available 

and

“(5) CIA must make every effort to assure to the military 

nel assigned to it an equality of opportunity for advancement 

and allowances or rank, etc.) commensurate with that of the

temporaries serving on active duty with their parent Servic

where applicable and feasible, to obtain for individuals concern

muneration consistent with that paid to personnel obtained fro

sources and performing comparable duties;

“j. In order for the Department of Defense to support a CI

erated program the requirements for personnel, supply, and 
should, except in extreme emergency, be forecast sufficie

advance to enable the Services to include such requirements 

mobilization base and requirements. Personnel provided to CIA 

Services should be on a reimbursable basis so that they wil

charged against the authorized strength of the Services; and

“k. All matters concerning the support to be rendered CIA 

Department of Defense will be subject to the overriding res

that such support either for a single project or for the total of 

ects will not jeopardize seriously the capabilities of the Depart

Defense to carry out its responsibilities. If the conflicting need

Department of Defense and the projects for covert operations 

upon the question of the security of the United States, the q

should be decided on a level no lower than the President.”

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the recommen

in the memorandum, subject as above, dated 27 June 1951, f

Executive Secretary of the NSC, be approved, subject to:

a. Acceptance by the NSC of the military considerations, 

with the reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth 

graph 2 above, and

b. The revision of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the recommenda

read as indicated below (with appropriate renumbering of 

ceeding paragraphs):

“1. Direct the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to subm

earliest practicable date a strategic concept for a national pro

covert operations directed against the Kremlin under cold wa

tions designed in general order of emphasis to:

“a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet stru

power, including the relationships between the USSR, i

lites, and Communist China; and when and where ap

ate in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and the risk 

contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet pow

influence to limits which no longer constitute a threat 

security.

“b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United Stat

peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their 

and will to resist Soviet domination.

“c. Develop underground resistance and provide as

to underground resistance movements and guerrillas in s

areas to the maximum practicable extent consistent with 1–

and to provide the base upon which the military may expan

forces on a military basis in time of war within activated 

of operations.

“2. As an interim measure, and subject to future NSC a

the report to be submitted by the PSB as directed in paragraph 

approve in principle as a national responsibility the immed

pansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2, 
intensification of covert operations designed to accomplish th

tives set forth in the three preceding subparagraphs, in accordan

approved plans and projects.”

For the Joint Chiefs 

Omar N. B

Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Bradley signed the original.

84. Memorandum for President Truman of Discussion at t

100th Meeting of the National Security Council1

Washington, August 2

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda items 1: The Situatio

Far East, 2: The Kaesong Negotiations, 3: Probable Soviet Ac

the San Francisco Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty, 4: 

uation in Iran, and 5: Relations between India and Pakistan.]

6. NSC 26/2 (Progress Report, dated July 26, 1951, by the

Department of State on NSC 26/2)2

In response to The President’s request for comments 

Progress Report, General Smith outlined briefly the activities o

sentatives of CIA in the areas in question. [2 lines not declassif

conclusion, General Smith stated to the Council the need which 

for clearer authorization from the Secretary of State or from the 

cil in order to permit CIA to carry out its responsibilities un

policy.

Mr. Lay pointed out that all that was necessary was a for

tion by the Secretary of State of CIA’s responsibility to carry o

cies set forth in NSC 26/2.

1 Source: Truman Library, Memo for the President, Meeting Discussions, 

Secret. Drafted on August 23, but no drafter is indicated. 2 NSC 26/2 is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

The July 26 progress report has not been found, but for the fourth progress rep

7, 1952, see Document 105.
The National Security Council:

Discussed the reference Progress Report and noted that th

tary of State would issue a directive to the Director of Centra

gence formalizing the responsibilities of the Central Inte

Agency in implementing the policies set forth in NSC 26/2.

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda items 7: Security o

gically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries

Position of the United States With Respect to the Philippines

NSC Status of Projects.]

85. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director 

Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)1

Washington, August 2

SUBJECT

Consideration of the JCS memorandum concerning the “Magnitude Pap

ad hoc committee of NSC Senior Staff

This memorandum will record the highlights of a meetin

ad hoc committee of the NSC Senior Staff which was held in M

office on 27 August to consider the JCS memorandum to the S

of Defense2 commenting upon and proposing certain revision

NSC Staff paper on this subject.3 The following individuals we

ent at the meeting: Mr. Lay and Mr. Gleason (NSC); Messrs. 

and Joyce (State); Mr. Nash and General Magruder (Defense); A

Wooldridge (JCS); Mr. Gray (PSB); and Messrs. Jackson and 

(CIA).

In the outset of the meeting it became evident that the ma

not all of those present considered the JCS memorandum to 

fusing and obscure. Numerous questions were addressed to A

Wooldridge in the effort to obtain clarifications of various poin

JCS paper. For example, Mr. Lay stated and others agreed th

could not understand the intent of the changes made by the JC

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for Opera

79–01228A, Box 6. Top Secret. Drafted on August 29. The original was sent t

copies were sent to Dulles (DD/CI) and Johnston (AD/PC). All ellipses in th

2 Document 83.

3 Document 76.
in paragraph 1c of the NSC Staff paper. These changes prop

deletion of the words “facilitate covert and guerrilla operation

the substitution of “provide assistance to underground re

movements and guerrillas”; and the deletion of the words “insur

ability of these forces in the event of war” and the substitution 

provide the base upon which the military may expand these fo

a military basis in time of war within activated theaters of ope

It was concluded that the original language should remain unc

in the absence of any clear reason for changing it. However 

agreed to add the following language to the end of the origin

graph 1c:

“. . . insure availability of these forces in the event of war 

ization in accordance with principles established by the National 

Council, including wherever practicable provision of a base upon w

military may expand these forces on a military basis in time of war w

tive theaters of operation.” (underscored language added)4

Mr. Nash proceeded to analyze the JCS memorandum an

the point that the paper in its entire latter portions dealt with 

which were not suitable for inclusion in an NSC paper but 

should be the subject matter of internal Defense Department d

nation and disposition. Mr. Nash recommended that the atten

the meeting be focused on the forepart of the paper to the exclu

the very detailed administrative provisions of the latter paragr

was agreed that Mr. Nash’s recommendation was sound and 

latter paragraphs of the paper should be the subject of consid

and decision within the Department of Defense and the milita

ices. Presumably there would be an opportunity for CIA to par

in the deliberations leading to the development of the Defen

partment position and papers covering the administrative pro

Admiral Wooldridge urged on behalf of the JCS that two c

be made in the paper in order to take into account and adequa

flect the points of chief concern to the JCS. He proposed the a

of a new paragraph 2 in the paper to read as follows:

“Direct the Psychological Strategy Board to assure that its 

gic concept for a national psychological program includes pr

for covert operations designed to achieve the objectives stated 

graph 1 above.”

It was agreed to adopt this paragraph in order to make m

within the paper the responsibility of the Psychological Strateg

for insuring that the specified objectives should be provided fo

strategic plan which it is required to develop under the directiv

4 Printed here as italics.
sets up the PSB. It was understood that nothing in the new pa

would require the submission to and approval by the PSB of 

programs and activities of the CIA in order for these to procee

tain the necessary support of the Defense establishment.

Admiral Wooldridge’s other point was that paragraph 2c 

be changed to provide that the PSB would coordinate the prov

personnel, funds and other support to the CIA by the Departm

State and Defense, rather than insure the provision of such s

Admiral Wooldridge contended that the PSB as such had no a

to “insure” the provision of support by the other departments. M

son while acknowledging the technical accuracy of A

Wooldridge’s point nevertheless maintained that the assurance 

port for the CIA was essential from the point of view of the 

of CIA, and that whatever words might be added it should 

clear that the CIA should not be called upon to execute program

out the assurance that the necessary support would be forth

Mr. Jackson’s position was fully supported by all present at th

ing and it was agreed to adopt the following language to give 

sion to the technical point raised by Admiral Wooldridge:

“Coordinating action to insure the provision of adequate 

nel . . .”—continues as original.

There being no other points offered or suggested by A

Wooldridge or any others at the meeting, it was agreed that th

indicated changes would be all that were necessary. Mr. Nash in

that he would recommend to the Secretary of Defense that th

send forward to Mr. Lay a statement to the effect that the NSC 

Staff paper is approved by the Department of Defense subject 

the three indicated changes in language.

Frank G. 

5 Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.
86. Record of Action No. 543 of the National Security Cou

Washington, August 3

A Project To Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Se

of the United States (Memos for NSC from Executive Secre

same subject, dated June 52 and August 7, 1951;3 NSC Act

No. 5194)

Approved the draft directive on the subject prepared by th

tor of Central Intelligence pursuant to NSC Action No. 519 and a

to the reference memorandum of August 7 on the subject, in lie

draft directive proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee o

nal Security in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of Jun

Acting Attorney General approved with the following comment

“Since the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference dea

with the internal security aspects of the Nation’s security, it 

sumably understood that the IIC should prepare the estimate p

for in paragraph 1 (b) of the draft directive only in so far as it p

to the internal aspects of the capability of the USSR to condu

tage and otherwise disrupt internal U. S. activities. The foreign 

of Russia’s ability to commit sabotage, of course, are not wit

purview of the IIC, and would appear properly a matter of st

the CIA and the subject of a separate report.”

Note: The Acting Attorney General participated in the ab

tion with the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Dir

Defense Mobilization. The approved directive and comment by 

ing Attorney General subsequently circulated for Council infor

and transmitted to the appropriate agencies for implementatio

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Int

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret. 2 See footnote 9, Document 80.

3 Not found.

4 NSC Action No. 519, approved August 1, noted NSC discussion of the 

the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Document 79) and the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence, and agreed to the fo

in the third paragraph of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum (see Documen

ject to the assignment of paragraph 3–b to the Interdepartmental Intelligence C

and the integration and coordination of the resulting reports by representativ

appropriate departments and agencies by the Director of Central Intelligence i

gle report for the National Security Council; and noted that the Director of C

telligence would prepare a directive derived from the NSC guidelines. 

Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Actio

National Security Council)
87. Report on the Office of Special Operations of the Cen

Intelligence Agency by the Deputy Assistant Director 

Special Operations (Kirkpatrick)1

Washington, August 3

I. Introduction

History of the Organization. The Office of Special Operation

rect carry-over from the Office of Strategic Services. When tha

ization was disbanded at the end of the war, the Secret Inte

Branch and the X–2 Branch (Counterespionage) were retaine

Strategic Services Unit under the Office of the Assistant Secr

War. When the President created the Central Intelligence Group 

uary 1946, the Strategic Services Unit was transferred to that 

zation and became the Office of Special Operations.

Principal assets brought forward from OSS days include

experienced personnel; the nucleus of organizations operating 

pally in Germany and China; the counterespionage files of O

established liaisons with certain foreign intelligence services. W

organization in China has been largely destroyed by the Comm

the organization in Germany has been developed and expan

herited after the conclusion of World War II was the responsib

coverage of Latin America, previously held by the Federal Bu

Investigation.

Today the Office of Special Operations is organized into se

eign divisions operating 131 fixed field stations, three princip

and six subordinate staffs. [3 lines not declassified]

II. Findings—General

1. There is a high degree of professional competence am

Division and Staff Chiefs in OSO, although it is apparent that t

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80

Box 6. Top Secret. In an August 31 covering memorandum to Deputy Direct

tral Intelligence Jackson, Kirkpatrick wrote in part: “The attached report on 

of Special Operations is based upon my participation in certain parts of your 

OSO during July and August 1951, plus independent conversations which I 

with Staff, Division and Branch Chiefs, reports which I have had prepared, an

into various OSO files.” He also noted certain discrepancies in personnel figu

were attributable, he said, to personnel in transit from headquarters to the fiel

versa. The body of the report includes sections on the Staffs, the Foreign Divis

cellaneous, and Recommendations, followed by charts showing OSO Org

Staffing, Field Stations, Distribution of CIA/OSO Intelligence Material, Re

seminated by OSO, and Estimated Personnel Strength of the British Secret Se
fessional competence has not always been utilized to its fulles

in the development of an espionage service directed at the p

targets of intelligence.

2. No particular emphasis is being placed by OSO on esp

against the USSR.2

3. There is an extreme shortage of personnel in all classe

ing from the Branch Chief level to the clerical level. Further, it 

ous that a considerable amount of valuable OSO effort is lost 

sult of a shortage of clerical personnel to handle the paper wo

4. Considerable OSO effort is being dissipated from the ma

sion of establishing a long-term clandestine espionage organ

Particular examples of the dissipation of effort is the emphasis 

porting the 8th Army in Korea with an intelligence detachmen

ally OSO does not have the trained personnel to do this job at th

ent time, and the net gains for CIA will be minor in contrast w

gains by use of the same personnel on long-term espionage ope

5. There is not sufficient emphasis in OSO on counteresp

operations.

6. OSO rules and regulations should be reviewed, to allow 

initiative and judgment by responsible branch, division, staff, a

tion chiefs.

7. The tremendous support-load that OSO performs for o

fices of CIA and other agencies of the Government, should be le

8. There is too great concentration on collection of shor

tactical information, and not sufficient attention to collection o

level political and strategic information.

9. The policy of shifting personnel between areas, and of 

year tour of duty overseas, should be reviewed.

10. [3 lines not declassified]

11. There has been insufficient liaison between OSO headq

and the field.

12. There is no standard system for checking on the act

field stations. In one instance, the only report received from a fi

resentative was a request for supplies—no intelligence has yet b

ceived from this station.

2 In June 1951, CIA formalized the Redcap program to monitor Sovie

abroad and encourage them to defect. See Robert L. Benson and Michae

eds., Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939–1957, p. xxxii. This 

considerable liaison with foreign intelligence services. Attempts were also ma

filtrate agents into the Soviet Union, but, given stringent Soviet controls, these 

codenamed Redsox, enjoyed very limited success. This was recognized by 19

program using legal travelers for short term observation of the Soviet Union w

under the codename Redskin.
13. There is no standard divisional organization.

14. The delay between collection of information and its d

nation to consumer intelligence agencies is in the nature of two 

months except for cabled reports. Two major bottlenecks are r

ble for this: official pouches are extremely slow; and reports con

been allowed to take three to six weeks as an average to pro

ports (this is after the reports are prepared for publication by 

eign divisions).

15. [2 lines not declassified]

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

88. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director of S

Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kirkpa

to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Jackson

Washington, September 2

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Regis

95–G600278R, Box 1, Folder 7. Secret. 3 pages not declassified

89. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Na

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Counc

Washington, October 

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

REFERENCE

Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated 27 

1951,2 and references therein

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secret

Subject File. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Director of Central In

Ellipsis in the original. 2 Document 76.
The Under Secretary of State and the Acting Chairman of 

tional Security Resources Board have approved the recommen

contained in the reference memorandum. The Director of Cen

telligence has concurred therein.

The Acting Secretary of Defense, however, on October 8, 1

proved the recommendations contained in the reference memor

subject to the following changes:3

1. Change paragraph 1–e to read as follows:

“Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert an

rilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable 

consistent with 1–a above, and ensure availability of these force

event of war for utilization in accordance with principles esta

by the National Security Council, including wherever practicab

vision of a base upon which the military may expand these fo

a military basis in time of war within active theaters of operat

2. Insert a new paragraph 2 to read as follows, renumber

ensuing paragraphs accordingly:

“Direct the Psychological Strategy Board to assure that its 

gic concept for a national psychological program includes pr

for covert operations designed to achieve the objectives stated 

graph 1 above.”

3. Change the original paragraph 2–c (now paragraph 3–c) 

as follows:

“Coordinating action to ensure the provision of adequate 

nel. . . .”—continues as in original.

Accordingly, it is requested that you indicate your action w

spect to the above changes by completing and returning, as a m

priority, the attached memorandum form.4

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the h

of this material and that access be limited to individuals requiring th

mation contained herein in order to carry out their official duties.

James S. 

3 See Document 85.

4 The attached memorandum form, not printed, indicates that Presiden

gave his approval on October 23; see Document 90.
90. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Sec

Council (Lay) to the National Security Council1

NSC 10/5 Washington, October 2

SCOPE AND PACE OF COVERT OPERATIONS

REFERENCES

A. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated 

19512

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated Augus

19513

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated Octob

19514

As of October 23, 1951, the statutory members of the Nati

curity Council approved the recommendations contained in R

A as amended by the changes contained in Reference C. The 

of Central Intelligence had concurred therein.

Accordingly, the report as amended and approved is e

herewith for information and appropriate implementation by 

partments and agencies concerned, as indicated therein.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the 

of this report and that access be limited strictly to individuals requ

information contained therein to carry out their official duties.

It is further requested that all copies of the reference mem

be withdrawn and returned to this office upon receipt of this 

James S. 

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Subject File. Top Secret. NSC 10/4 (Document 42) was withdrawn on Decem

ter the approval of NSC 10/5. (Memorandum from Lay to the National Secur

cil, December 13; Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secr

Subject File) 2 Document 76.

3 The August 22 memorandum transmitted the JCS views (Document 

National Security Council. 4 Document 89.

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNC

SCOPE AND PACE OF COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council approves in principle a

tional responsibility the immediate expansion of the covert or

tion established in NSC 10/2, and the intensification of covert 

tions designed in general order of emphasis to:

a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of po

cluding the relationships between the USSR, its satellites, an

munist China; and when and where appropriate in the light 

and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the re

and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no 

constitute a threat to U.S. security.

b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of t

ples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity a

to resist Soviet domination.

c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert an

rilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable 

consistent with 1–a above, and ensure availability of these force

event of war for utilization in accordance with principles esta

by the National Security Council, including wherever practicab

vision of a base upon which the military may expand these fo

a military basis in time of war within active theaters of operat

2. The National Security Council directs the Psychologica

egy Board to assure that its strategic concept for a national p

logical program includes provision for covert operations desi

achieve the objectives stated in paragraph 1 above.

3. The National Security Council reaffirms the responsibi

authority of the Director of Central Intelligence for the con

covert operations in accordance with NSC 10/2 and subject to t

eral policy guidance prescribed therein, and further subject to 

proval of the Psychological Strategy Board which shall be resp

for:

a. Determining the desirability and feasibility of programs 

individual major projects for covert operations formulated by 

posed to the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert ope

and the allocation of priorities among these operations.

6 Top Secret. Also printed in Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry 

pp. 437–439.
c. Coordinating action to ensure the provision of adequ

sonnel, funds, and logistical and other support to the Director 

tral Intelligence by the Departments of State and Defense for c

out any approved program of covert operations.

4. The National Security Council requests the Secretary of 

to provide adequate means whereby the Director of Central Inte

may be assured of the continuing advice and collaboration of t

Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of plans for paramilitary op

during the period of the cold war.

5. In view of the necessity for immediate decision prior to t

ing into operation of the Psychological Strategy Board, the Nati

curity Council authorizes the conduct of expanded guerrilla a

in China, as outlined in the memorandum from the Director 

tral Intelligence enclosed with the reference memorandum of 

1951 (Reference A), and pursuant to the appropriate provisions 

48/5.7

7 NSC 48/5, “U.S. Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” 

in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, pp. 33–63.

91. Fact Sheet1

Washington, November 

1. Name: IAC Watch Committee

2. Established: Established in its present form by IAC decision 

cember 1950.2 It was preceded by the Joint Intelligence Ind

Committee (JIIC), which consisted of full members from the 

services and members of other IAC agencies participating info

3. Chairman: Brig. General John Weckerling, Chief, Intelligen

G–2.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Administration Files: Lot 62 D 220, 

Records on Inter-Agency Relations, 1948–61, Committee Status Book, Box 1. T

The date is handwritten at the bottom of the page. 2 See Document 35.
4. Membership: CIA JCS

State (Mose Harvey, DRS; Air Force

Alternates: Boris Klosson & Army

Howard Wiedemann, DRS) Navy

AEC

FBI

5. Terms of Reference: Terms of reference, as authorized by the I

given in G–2 memorandum (G2–IWW–319.26) dated 20 De

1950.3 The Committee’s mission is to collect, evaluate, analyze 

port indications of Soviet-Communist intentions of hostile act

it is responsible for issuing a weekly report on Indications of 

Communist Intention of Hostile Action.

6. Secretariat: G–2 provides the secretariat which a) regularly 

from all IAC agencies material bearing on the determination of 

Communist intentions, and b) drafts, reproduces and distribu

weekly report.

7. Activity: The Committee meets regularly once a week (Wedn

from 10 a.m. to about 1 p.m.) and has crash sessions when req

8. Background: See memorandum referred to in point 5 above.

9. Effectiveness: The IAC Watch Committee is performing an ex

important function and, in effect, may be regarded as the inte

body charged with the responsibility of alerting the US Gove

of Soviet-Communist intentions to initiate war. The Departmen

ticipation has priority over most other intelligence functions per

by DRS and to a large extent the work of DRS is geared to th

tions problems with which the Committee is concerned.

3 Not found.
92. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Web

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Coun

(Lay)1

Washington, November 

SUBJECT

Third Progress Report on NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program 

Psychological Warfare Planning”

1. NSC 59/1 was approved as governmental policy on M

1950. It is requested that this Progress Report, as of October 1

be circulated to the members of the Council for their informat

2. The activities described in this report were undertake

plementation of NSC 59/1.

3. The Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organizat

redesignated the Psychological Operations Coordinating Com

following the issuance of the Presidential Directive of April 4, 1

tablishing a Psychological Strategy Board.3 It will therefore be 

to hereafter in this report as the “Committee.” Formal announ

of the redesignation is being withheld pending decision on ce

ganizational details.

4. In addition to the Chairman, representatives of the fo

agencies regularly attend the weekly meetings: Department of D

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Executive Office of the President, Depart

State, Economic Cooperation Administration, and Central Inte

Agency. The Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs of psychologi

fare attend when matters of interest to their respective services 

fore the Committee.

5. On the Committee’s recommendation, a survey team w

to Tokyo and Korea in October 1950 to study psychological wa

tivities there. The findings of this group were reviewed by th

mittee at its meeting November 13, 1950. The Committee ha

quently made periodic reviews of psychological warfare acti

Korea in order to help implement the recommendations of the 

team.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, 1935–62

no label. Secret; Security Information. 2 See Document 74.

3 See Document 60.
6. A National Psychological Warfare Plan for General W

prepared by the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (n

Secretariat of the Committee) under the provisions of NSC 59/

Plan was approved by the Committee and forwarded to the N

Security Council. The National Security Council has since r

comments on the Plan from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which w

ferred to the Psychological Strategy Board. The Department 

has also submitted a version of the Plan to the Psychological S

Board.

7. Psychological warfare plans for Russia, Korea and Ind

have been developed and approved. Plans for Germany, the 

East and the Satellite areas are being prepared in the Departm

State. A China plan is also being prepared on the basis of com

from the field on the Interim Plan for China, approved by th

mittee in March, 1951.

8. Project Troy5

Under this project, thirty of the nation’s top scientists an

experts were assembled by the Massachusetts Institute of Tech

under contract to the Department of State to explore all conve

and unconventional means of penetrating the Iron Curtain. Pa

attention was given to the possibilities of utilizing in psychologi

fare the new developments in the electro-magnetic field. The 

submitted by the group calls for a substantial expansion of ou

facilities, which has already been undertaken. A vest-pocket 

being developed along the lines recommended by the group, 

use of the “transistor,” a remarkable device which increases b

life several hundred times and makes it possible to build a rad

this size.

Funds to complete the project, although requested, have n

appropriated by Congress.

9. Propaganda Balloons

There has been continued study of the possibility of using b

to carry our propaganda to the people of Russia and her satelli

lowing Committee approval, the appropriate government ag

cooperation with private organizations including the Crusade f

dom in New York, launched an experimental propaganda ballo

ect from Western Germany with Czechoslovakia as a target. Th

ect was begun the week of August 12, 1951. Balloons were subse

4 The plan, which was discussed at an October 25 meeting of the PSB, is i

tional Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D–8, Box 1. 5 See Document 59.
launched to Poland. Details of the project have since appeare

press. The effectiveness of the project is currently being evalu

10. Defectors

At the Committee’s request, the Department of State pre

detailed history of United States handling of Russian and Sate

fectors during and since World War II. This study was turned 

the Policy Advisory Staff of the Department of State for its use 

ing information aspects of the defector question.

11. Exploitation of Economic Themes

The Committee has recommended that a full-time consu

employed to study the problem of coordinating government ou

economic matters and exploiting economic themes more fully

Working with the Economic Cooperation Administration 

chological Operations Coordinating Committee actively promo

eral economic themes in psychological operations. One of the m

portant of these is the ECA Production-Productivity drive in 

Europe. This is a concerted effort to increase Western Europe

production by $100 billion yearly. The project has become fro

news in most of Europe’s newspapers. By agreement between 

partment of State and ECA the Production-Productivity drive 

a major U.S. project.

12. Prisoners-of-war

A study on propaganda exploitation of Chinese and North 

Prisoners-of-war was approved by the Committee on August 

recommended as guidance to the Far East Command.

13. Contingency of Soviet Leaders’ Death

A contingency plan against the possible death of certain 

leaders has been prepared by an inter-agency working group a

quest of the Committee and is in process of final coordination

14. Current projects

Some of the more important current activities of the Comm

the Secretariat are as follows:

a) With the approval of the Psychological Strategy Boar

terdepartmental working group has been established to stu

broad range of psychological problems growing out of the pre

U.S. military units overseas.

b) A military working group charged with developing key 

for use in propaganda directed to Soviet and Satellite troops h

an interim report to the Committee.

c) On recommendation of the Committee an expanded p

of on-the-job training has been undertaken in the State Departm

military officers in psychological warfare. The military servic

expressed their desire to continue participation in this program
d) The Committee is considering a Navy Department stu

compassing plans to exploit the psychological potential in Sov

marine operations.

e) The Committee is engaged in making plans for the imp

tation of two Korean contingency plans which were prepared 

Psychological Strategy Board.

f) The Secretariat is developing stand-by psychological ope

plans for implementation immediately following the outbreak o

sible general war. When completed and approved by the Com

these plans will be forwarded to the Psychological Strategy Bo

consideration.

James E. 

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Webb signed the original.

93. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Special

Operations (Wyman) and the Assistant Director for Po

Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency (John

to Director of Central Intelligence Smith1

Washington, November 1

SUBJECT

Draft Report on Special Operations

1. From early October until the present date, OPC/OSO an

bers of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division have engaged in t

sideration of three successive drafts of a JCS paper, subject as 

2. This paper is of utmost significance to CIA’s responsibil

war planning in both Europe and for any extension of NATO 

Middle East. It established three principles:

a. That overall guidance for clandestine activities at SHAPE 

NATO countries to be established, will be channeled through the 

ing Group, Washington, D.C.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731

Folder 333. Top Secret; Security Information.
b. That, while in time of war Commanders within NATO 

ercise operational control of U.S. clandestine resources in dir

port of military operations to the extent necessary to ensure co

tion, the command of such resources will be retained in both pe

war by the U.S.

c. It reaffirms the NSC directive that clandestine operatio

ducted in active Theaters of War where American Forces are e

will come under the American Theater Commander or such ot

Commanders as may be designated by the JCS. (The problems 

command responsibilities in Europe are currently under dis

The outcome of these discussions will determine whether CIA 

responsive to a single U.S. Commander or some other U.S. 

mechanism.)

3. The subject paper recommends in paragraph 3.h, pag

closure “A,”2 the establishment of an “ad hoc” committee un

Standing Group to advise it on clandestine matters. It will be no

the proposed DCI memorandum reserves the right later to ask 

tablishment of a permanent committee if such is considered ne

4. Similarly, the subject paper, in paragraph 21., suggests d

ordination between OSO and JCS, through the JSPD. In the p

DCI memorandum to the Chief, JSPD, concurrence is made w

principle advanced, but resolution of what office is to handle 

rect coordination is left to the JCS as an internal matter.

5. In the main, the Report of the JSPD to the JCS guards 

spective OPC and OSO interests and those of CIA as a who

agreeable to the request contained in paragraph 2. of TS 626

“A”),4 it is recommended that the accompanying memorandu

DCI to the Chief of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, the Join

of Staff, be signed and dispatched.

W. G. 

Kilbourne Jo

2 According to the list of enclosures at the end of the memorandum, Encl

was a memorandum from the DCI to the Chief, JSPD. It has not been found. 3 The enclosed draft report, identified as Enclosure “B,” has not been fo

4 Tab “A” was a memorandum from JSPD to the DCI, dated October 26, n
94. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, November 2

SUBJECT

Meeting at Mr. Barrett’s Home on Tuesday Evening, November 20, 1951 

discuss USIE and OPC Relationships

Those Present were as follows:2

For CIA For State

Mr. Dulles Mr. Barrett

Mr. Wisner Mr. Kohler

Mr. Lloyd Mr. Joyce

Mr. Braden Mr. Barbour

Mr. Devine

Conclusions:

It was agreed that:

(1) The proposed RFE Baltic broadcasts would not go on 

as scheduled and that a joint RFE–VOA effort would be made 

care of the displaced personnel. Kohler to confer with NCFE 

re details.

(2) That the next Crusade for Freedom would not be of th

pressure and spectacular nature of this year’s but would be som

in the nature of a magazine and directmail approach with all cop

fully cleared.

(3) That Radio Free Asia would undergo no further expans

til the future course of the Committee for Free Asia had been 

in a manner satisfactory to both CIA and State.

Discussion:

At the opening of the meeting an agenda was distributed in 

was included brief statements proposing what the proper 

of operation of RFE and VOA should be. These proposals w

follows:

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Bo

Secret.2 Officers not otherwise identified are: For CIA, Lloyd was Deputy Chief

logical Staff Division and Braden was Chief, International Organizations Bra

chological Division, Office of Policy Coordination. For State, John E. Devine w

Press Office.
1. Sphere of Activity for RFE and, by extension, RFA

To provide radio facilities so that the potentially most e

émigré groups can speak from nearby points to their captive 

countrymen. By implication this would preclude acknowledge

sorship by American, British or any group other than the speak

grés. It also implies that the broadcasts would be in the s

broadcast band.

2. Sphere of Activity for VOA

To deliver a radio message, by both medium and short w

the name of the United States Government and the American 

These proposals were not agreed to in the meeting.

Following the first reading of these proposals, Mr. Dulles 

out that the RFE Czech program does not now credit émigré gro

rather puts forward effective individuals many of whom are anon

Mr. Wisner advanced the suggestion that perhaps RFE a

should only be continued if they are supplementary and nonc

tive with VOA.

Mr. Kohler generalized this thought in a proposal that RFE 

carry on covert or supplementary activities which will aid the 

United States Government radio. Mr. Wisner did not think t

“Covert” could be logically applied in the case of RFE.

Mr. Joyce commented that at the present time the émig

mittees connected with NCFE are so divided that RFE cannot 

ily get authority to attribute items to any one of the émigré gro

did add that the committees are serving one of their original p

in that they are keeping émigré group pressure from official

State Department.

Mr. Lloyd, in response to a question, said that there is no

little recording of program material by émigré groups in Ne

That was previously the basic arrangement but now the bul

material is originating overseas.

Mr. Barrett referred to the four questions which were posed 

Barnard at the previous meeting and said that we ought to exa

RFE activities in the light of the following questions:

1. Is the activity one that is serving a useful enough pu

justify the funds involved? 2. Can it be done better by this organization than by Gove

directly or by other existing organizations? 3. Is it jeopardizing the existence and success of other im

activities?

4. How can it best be financed?

Mr. Barrett went on to say that according to best available e

the USSR is now spending about two billion dollars a year on 
ganda and directly related activities. Hence, there is considerabl

cation for multiple activities—provided they don’t adversely af

another. He also said that some of the need for non-Governmental 

to participate in a “no holds barred” campaign has disappeared w

toughening attitude of the United States Government vis-à-vis US

that we should study carefully the extent to which such more-e

than-government activities are still justified.

Mr. Barbour stated that the limit on what the United States G

ment may say is probably getting less and less but there will alw

some such area which can better be handled by a non-Govern

organization.

Mr. Kohler stated that he does not see in practical terms w

non-Governmental area is. He mentioned that VOA is now usi

strong anti-Stalin material and the principal yardstick is whe

item is effective propaganda or not. He pointed out that this sa

terion would apply to the operations of a non-Governmental 

zation. Mr. Kohler added that he thinks that the RFE program

probably a little more conservative than VOA because RFE is 

near policy and has to tread carefully on a number of issues. Mr. 

asked whether in the Far East, Radio Free Asia can say things 

United States Government cannot say. Mr. Kohler said that he w

aware that it could. He added that if a third force group appeared 

had something to say that we wanted said and could not say ou

it would then be time to give them radio facilities.

Mr. Barbour stated that he feels that RFE could as a gene

take a more strident line than VOA.

Mr. Barrett raised the question as to whether the Czech op

was actually ideal and suggested that we ought to get more in

tion on it.

Mr. Wisner reported that the French are now taking active 

form a national committee. He also said that the British were 

some moves in that direction but had not gotten far. Mr. Barrett s

instead of a national committee for France, Britain, U.S., and so o

ought to be a committee for Free Europe which would really be 

tional in character. Mr. Dulles said that an international committee 

be very difficult to organize and even more difficult to operat

would be better in his opinion would be three national committe

a permanently sitting coordinating group, probably in Paris.

Mr. Barrett said that he felt we might somehow profit by 

vices worked out by American political parties—organizations 

“New Dealers for Willkie”, “Young Democrats for Dewey” and 

Mr. Kohler raised the question of what we are really after 

ern Europe. He said that he didn’t think we needed propag

Eastern Europe because the Russians are doing our work for u
Mr. Joyce did not agree with this and referred to the NS

documents in which we are directed to increase tension in Eas

rope and try to release the USSR’s hold over its satellites and r

the Soviet borders to the 1939 line.

Mr. Barrett said that he felt it was most important for u

news and ideas to the people in Eastern Europe. Mr. Kohler ad

two radio voices—VOA and RFE—are worse than one when 

not clearly distinguishable by the audience. Mr. Wisner sai

needed more volume to Eastern Europe we should step up th

of America.

Mr. Barrett recalled the fact that Mr. Kohler feels that there 

ing that needs to be said to the Baltic that cannot be said qu

quately by the Voice of America. Mr. Dulles raised the question 

the Baltic plans of RFE could be called off if it is decided not to 

programs on the air. Mr. Kohler said that in his talks with John H

and Adolph Berle4 he had the definite impression that the pe

which had so far been lined up for the Baltic program could b

care of in other ways. He said it would be better to have a h

for a couple of weeks than to live the problem for a couple o

Mr. Dulles pointed out that a responsible group of American 

had participated in the planning for this and other RFE activi

that they and their proposals could not just be casually dismis

Wisner said he felt that a perfectly logical explanation could 

vanced, that political conditions have changed and that the S

partment is now able to carry on the Baltic job; therefore, R

sources could be applied to other directions. Mr. Barrett recal

the request from the State Department for the Baltic broadcast 

had come at a time when State did not have the financial reso

undertake such programs. Mr. Kohler said that the Baltic progra

had first come to his attention in the winter of 1949–50. Mr

reminded the group that in May, 1951 the Department of St

approved RFE broadcasts in the Baltic languages. Mr. Joyce s

this same approval had come as recently as August 8 of this ye

the Department. It was generally agreed that in spite of the

mitments conditions had changed and it was important now t

broadcasts did not go on in the Baltic languages. Mr. Kohler th

that he would get together in New York with RFE representa

help them take the head off RFE in connection with any canc

3 Hughes was a prominent businessman, Ambassador to the Atlantic Co

member of the NCFE. 4 Berle was a prominent lawyer, former Assistant Secretary of State, an

ber of the NCFE.
of the Baltic language broadcast plans. He said that he would 

within a week.

Mr. Wisner asked if the present policy of the Department 

allow subversive broadcasts to this area. Mr. Kohler said there 

necessity for subversive broadcasts since we had not recogni

Soviet rule in these areas and were working with what we fe

the legal governments.

Mr. Dulles said that close liaison between IBD and RFE 

York was needed and he was told that arrangements had alread

made for regular meetings between Mr. Kretzmann5 and Mr. [n

declassified] of RFE.

Mr. Lloyd said that RFE has just about completed work o

stations in Lisbon which are powered with 50 kilowatts each

have been intended for relaying purposes only, with the program

inating in Munich being sent to Portugal and then played back b

wave to Hungary, Romania, and so on. Mr. Barrett made the 

tion that perhaps more radio operations could be justified sim

the basis of tying up Russian facilities and making some pro

the electronic war.

Mr. Dulles raised the question of what should be done ab

Crusade for Freedom next year. Mr. Barrett said that he felt t

present type of campaign was harming the total United State

and making people ask the question whether the Voice of Am

really needed. He did not say that to his surprise no serious qu

came up in the last Congress concerning the apparent duplica

tween Radio Free Europe and VOA. Mr. Barrett suggested that 

of the present type of Crusade for Freedom, a low-pressure p

should be conducted. He said that something along the line of 

berculosis seal campaign in magazines, with coupons, and so on

to be tried out. Mr. Lloyd then said that Abbott Washburn6 w

getting into high speed on the Crusade and that in the next few 

he hoped to be able to work the Crusade for Freedom up to 

where 15 or 20 million dollars could be raised. Mr. Dulles su

that Mr. Washburn be brought down to Washington at an ear

and given the idea of the low-pressure campaign. Mr. Barret

the question of explaining the rest of the RFE budget if the ma

approach raises only about $750,000. He felt than an anonymou

could take care of that problem but Mr. Dulles did not agree 

point. Mr. Dulles raised the question of whether the Crusade f

dom has value in making the public more aware of the intern

5 Roger Kretzmann of IBD.

6 Executive vice chairman of the Crusade for Freedom.
political situation. It was said that this question could not reall

swered. Mr. Barrett felt that it probably made the public mor

in certain respects but on the whole created more problems 

solved.

Mr. Barrett raised the question about Radio Free Asia 

Braden replied that RFA is staying right where it is until they a

further orders. Mr. Barrett said that in regard to the radio aud

China it was his understanding that there is a small and decrea

dience as the result of Communist repressive measures. He fe

was better for OPC to put its RFA money into local, non-U.S.

operations in the Far East. He said that we did not need anothe

ican voice in the area. Mr. Dulles then suggested that RFA be k

ing on its present basis along with CFA for the next few wee

the new head of the organization is selected. He should then be 

in for a discussion of this whole problem. In closing, Mr. Barr

gested that the four questions posed by Mr. Barnard be appli

NCFE and CFA projects. He suggested that CIA appoint one 

and that State appoint another to work as a team to do this 

Dulles said that he would prefer to see a record of this meet

have a chance to discuss it with his colleagues before appointi

a person.

95. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director for

Special Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency

(Kirkpatrick) to Director of Central Intelligence Smith

Washington, November 3

SUBJECT:

Request from G–2 for Discussion of Agreed Activities under NSCID #52

1. Reference is made to our memorandum to you dated 

vember 19513 concerning the above subject. On 23 Novemb

prior to the receipt of the attached memo and proposed agreeme

General Bolling to you, Mr. Roy Tod of G–2 informally coor

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–01034R, B

Secret.2 Document 255.

3 Not found.
with OSO the draft of the proposed agreement entitled 

Establi

of ‘Agreed Activities’ by the Department of the Army Under t

visions of NSCID #5.”

2. The draft has been successfully revised by OSO, and in th

ion of this Office represents a sound statement of the problem

plete coordination with the CIA of the espionage and counteresp

activities being conducted by the Services has never taken pl

would be of great benefit and assistance in reducing duplicatio

inating the undue dissipation of intelligence assets, and provi

orderly controlled maximum utilization of the entire U.S. inte

potential.

3. It is recommended that the proposals in the attached agr

be concurred in and implemented and that the same proposal

tended to include the Navy and the Air Force.

Lyman B. Kirkp

Attachment

Draft Department of the Army Paper5

Washington, November 2

SUBJECT

Establishment of “Agreed Activities” by the Department of the Army U

Provisions of NSCID #5

1. NSCID #5 authorizes and directs that the DCI shall con

organized Federal espionage operations outside the United Sta

its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence informa

quired to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies con

in connection with the national security, except for certain agree

ties by other Departments and Agencies. (The same policy ap

counter-espionage activities.) This directive further provides t

use of casual agents in a covert capacity by any IAC agency 

coordinated by the DCI with the organized covert activities.

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

5 Top Secret.
2. For varying reasons, largely beyond the control of the 

gence agencies, the entire provisions of NSCID #5 have never 

fectively implemented nor has the U.S. attained the position w

can now accomplish espionage operations on the scale required 

completely the continually expanding needs of all the Departme

Agencies concerned. Since the original issuance of NSCID #5 

ary 1947 there has been a steady expansion in the scope and 

of the intelligence information required by the military servi

other agencies. Because this has been paralleled by an expansio

security measures of the USSR and its satellites, the U.S. Gove

has been faced with an ever increasing dependence upon es

and related clandestine activities as the primary means for ob

the information required.

3. Through necessity and with the tacit approval of CIA, th

intelligence elements within the overseas command areas ha

conducting espionage operations, to varying degrees, since th

World War II. Under a strictly legal interpretation of NSCID #

absence of any official arrangements for “agreed activities” by 

partment of the Army, the Army is not empowered to conduc

ized espionage operations and CIA remains responsible for 

duct of espionage operations to meet both the tactical requirem

the overseas commanders and to meet the long range strat

quirements originating at the Washington level. However, th

possesses, by virtue of its trained complements in overseas ar

its present and past “unagreed activities”, espionage asset

should be utilized to the fullest extent in order to meet the 

creasing need for that intelligence information which, under 

conditions, is procureable only through clandestine operation

der to regularize these necessary and desirable espionage activ

ing conducted by the Army, they should be “legalized” by ag

between the DCI and the Department of the Army as prov

NSCID #5. Such agreement would permit the Army, in large m

to conduct espionage operations to meet those tactical informa

quirements which are in direct support of an overseas comm

mission and would place CIA in a better position to concen

long range strategic requirements which usually necessitate dee

more permanent operations.

4. Various ad hoc arrangements have been made between th

and CIA in an attempt to solve the problem of conducting es

operations on a closely coordinated basis as envisaged by NS

During the period 1949–50, G–2, in collaboration with CIA, p

and issued to the intelligence chiefs of FECOM, USFA, and E

policy letters calling for joint planning and coordination of op

between CIA and these overseas commands. However, these 

have not been implemented to a productive and satisfactory e
5. There are established responsibilities for the implement

National Security Council Intelligence Directives. First, NSCID 

vides that “the respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsibl

suring that NSC orders or directives, when applicable, are imple

within their intelligence organizations”. In this connection, the 

NSCID #5 (dated 28 Aug 51)7 was sent by the NSC to the Dir

Central Intelligence and the IAC agencies for appropriate action; 

JCS 202/70 charges the JIC with responsibility for preparation 

guidance to unified commands (under further provision 

1259/27)8 on national policy pertaining to intelligence activit

unified commands have not been notified officially of the rece

sion of NSCID #5 nor have the service intelligence chiefs on t

taken formal action to implement the “agreed activities” portion 

directive, and officially establish the current and continuing esp

operations of the military services as “agreed activities” under 

visions of NSCID #5.

6. It is deemed essential that action be taken to remedy th

ficiencies with the least possible delay so that espionage operat

ing conducted by the Army shall be officially recognized by t

as “agreed activities” under the provisions of NSCID #5 and f

ordinated by him within the framework of an overall program 

sure the most effective use of all espionage capabilities currentl

tentially available to the U.S. Government.

7. The current situation may be sumarized as follows:

a. The United States government is not now in a position 

the full extent of its present needs for clandestine collection of 

gence information. Fulfillment of these needs can only be met t

centrally coordinated utilization of all espionage capabilities cu

or potentially available to the U.S. Government.

b. Army intelligence elements within the overseas comman

are conducting espionage operations without their “accreditat

“agreed activities” under the provisions of NSCID #5.

c. The overseas commands have information requirements

upon their assigned missions, which can only be met throug

onage operations.

d. [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

6 For NSCID No. 1, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the In

Establishment, Document 432. 7 Not found, but see Document 77.

8 Neither JCS paper has been found.
e. As additional areas of the world become critical or sens

terms of their involvement with the struggle between the US

the Western Powers, there will be a further increase in the sc

variety of information targets requiring espionage activity on 

of the U.S. Government.

f. It has now become mandatory that all U.S. espionage c

ties be put to use and that they be conducted in such a man

each capability will be so applied as to best meet the overall i

of the U.S. Government.

8. It is believed that action should be taken to accomp

following:

a. Development of a basic agreement between the DCI 

Department of the Army that will establish the conditions, in

type of espionage operations, and the extent to which Army 

gence elements within the overseas command areas may con

“agreed activities” under the provisions of NSCID #5, espion

erations in direct support of the overseas commander’s missio

such purposes as the DCI and the A.C. of S, G–2 may mutual

to be in the overall interests of the U.S. Government.

b. Development of specific agreements to meet the partic

quirements and conditions existing within each overseas co

area, with particular reference to the areas in or from which th

intelligence elements may conduct espionage operations as 

activities.”

c. Development of a mechanism for centralized coordinat

control of U.S. espionage operations both at the Washington le

in the field, that will:

(1) Promote the most effective use of all espionage capabili

rently or potentially available to the U.S. Government;

(2) Avoid duplication of effort, unwitting multiple use of t

sources, false confirmation, and the dissipation of those intellig

set which are available.

e. Preparation of the necessary directives to implement th

outlined in sub-paragraphs a. through d. above, within th

elements of the overseas commands and appropriate CIA 

overseas.

9. It is recommended that G–2 discuss this proposal inf

with the DCI and suggest to him that appropriate representa

G–2 and CIA/SO be appointed to develop the action outlined 

graph 8 above. This proposal has been informally coordinated 

OSO/CIA and it is understood that the DCI has been informe
96. Notes of a Meeting

Washington, December 

SUBJECT

Psychological Strategy Board

PRESENT

S/P— PSB—Admiral Stevens

Mr. Nitze PSB—Mr. Philbin

Mr. Ferguson (part) C—Mr. Bohlen (part)

Mr. Savage P—Mr. Phillips

Mr. Koch P—Mr. Schwinn

Mr. Marshall R—Mr. Trezise

Miss Fosdick S—Mr. Compton

Mr. Tufts

Mr. Stelle

Mr. Villard

Mr. Watts

Admiral Stevens opened the meeting by saying he was ch

of a small group in PSB charged with “formulating a nationa

gic concept for psychological action” as called for in the direc

tablishing the PSB and as envisioned in NSC 59/1 and NSC 10/

include both covert and overt propaganda activities.

Mr. Nitze said he thought the covert and overt activities 

be kept separate.

Admiral Stevens said that people were worried today becau

felt that our foreign policy was “gone at piecemeal—on a h

mouth basis” with no over-all strategic concept. A strategic con

said was a “point of view—a tentative plan of action, always un

view but not rigid” and he thought that such a concept or plan 

be put down on paper, difficult as it might be to do.

A discussion ensued about the difficulties of getting “eve

down” in NSC papers and the danger of parts being lifted out 

text to fit particular situations.

Admiral Stevens said that, at present, NSC papers are the o

proved guides to national policy and cited the NSC paper 

U.S.S.R. in which the policy of reducing the threat of Soviet pow

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Political and 

logical Warfare. Top Secret. Drafted by Phillip H. Watts, Executive Secretary o

icy Planning Staff.
influence is set forth. How far, he asked, do you have to red

power and influence to have meaning. The fomenting of rev

within the U.S.S.R. is to be treated separately because the U.

prepared for such an undertaking and would have no assuranc

cess, but in order to form an over-all concept it has to be cons

Admiral Stevens referred to the PSB paper dated 15 No

entitled National Psychological Strategy,2 which had been sent to 

partment informally the previous week. He said it was only 

ing draft intended to evince reactions from State and CIA. Wh

like, would be to have Bohlen, Nitze, Joyce and Wisner get 

and see if they couldn’t come up with a “central strategic con

Mr. Nitze suggested that perhaps it would be better to sta

narrowest part of the problem, i.e. how to reduce the threat o

power and influence.

Admiral Stevens said that the PSB draft was an attempt to 

the steps necessary to create a central strategic concept and th

10/53 was a “holding operation” which he defined as “placing t

imum strain on the Soviet structure of power.”

Mr. Nitze pointed out that “maximum strain” were mea

words—that we should get down to the concrete.

Admiral Stevens returned to the PSB draft and said that wh

had been asked for was (a) its point of view about creating rev

in the satellites, (b) what political actions would be undertaken 

holding operation set forth in NSC 10/5, and (c) what could 

complished by other actions including propaganda controlled b

Mr. Nitze again urged that we take a concrete problem suc

retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence. This is 

icy objective of the U.S. Government but not the sum total 

policy—there are a whole hierarchy of objectives. It would b

Soviet power would retract but as you get down to accomplish

you get into many complex problems. Stimulating a revolutio

U.S.S.R. is not now a current practical objective.

Admiral Stevens said a statement to this effect should be 

and approved by the NSC. OPC needs this kind of a statemen

of a central concept.

Mr. Bohlen said there is no single policy but a multiplicity 

cies like the multiplicity of dots which make the whole ima

radarscope. He said he wasn’t clear how a central concept w

helpful—we should look at specific areas—Albania, for exampl

2 A copy is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 100.4–PS

3 Document 90.
are many serious complications which flow from creating a rev

in any satellite country.

Mr. Nitze said he felt that we should develop our capabi

the covert field as far as possible. We should move up in suc

first approximations on an area by area, technique by techniqu

Admiral Stevens agreed with the area by area approach a

that OPC must then come in with what it is capable of doing. 

he realized that a central concept wouldn’t solve all our proble

that we ought to try to put one down on paper.

Mr. Bohlen suggested that it might be possible to take spe

eas such as East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., and as

that we had certain covert action capabilities, take a look at w

political implications of such actions would be. At the same t

might select certain areas and assuming the existence of favora

litical factors have OPC determine what their covert capabilitie

Then the two determinations might be married.

Mr. Nitze said he worried about theoretical situations. Whe

existed a clear problem with concrete possibilities of accomp

something, this approach might be OK, but taking a series o

thetical situations and trying to see through all the branching i

tions and reactions would be a negative exercise.

Admiral Stevens said that some of the fringe areas arou

U.S.S.R. are vulnerable and we should look carefully to see w

be done. He said OPC was capable of carrying out several sim

ous operations if it seemed desirable to do so.

Mr. Bohlen said that Wisner needs to know the general d

in which we want to proceed so that he can lay out his plans an

his agents prepared. Therefore, we should take a look at ind

areas.

Admiral Stevens said it still gets back to a central strateg

cept. Put down on paper that we don’t want to create a revolu

the U.S.S.R. as well as some of the “lesser things” we do wan

It will just be an approximation to be used as guidelines for P

OPC.

Mr. Nitze again emphasized the difficulty of setting forth 

principles until you get down to specific problems. There is alw

danger that people will think that by having broad principles 

specific problems will be solved.

Admiral Stevens said he still thought that we’d make the 

advance if State would undertake to respond to the request in 

paper.

Mr. Nitze said he thought that joint work with OPC and P

called for so that everyone would be clear on the dimension
problem and just what was to be accomplished. He suggested 

address ourselves to the specific question of the retraction and 

tion of Soviet power and influence. He said he could envisage 

broken down somewhat as follows:

a. Reduction and retraction of Soviet power to accepta

portions over a 10-year period.

b. Any thought of revolution in the U.S.S.R. must come at 

of the 10-year period.

c. Reduction of Soviet power in the Satellites in the near 

d. The development of techniques to accomplish a, b, and 

This is a first approximation and should be kept under c

ing review.

Admiral Stevens said he would like to have a “good” S

partment man sit with his committee to coordinate the respons

PSB paper.

Mr. Nitze replied that taking responses and putting them 

wouldn’t work—what was needed was joint work by State, O

PSB.

There followed an inconclusive discussion of the term “

logical strategy”, during which Mr. Nitze pointed out the dan

volved in trying to marry propaganda and covert operation

should be kept separate and made concrete and definable.

Admiral Stevens returned to the PSB paper and asked if Sta

put anything on paper which would be helpful—could it, for i

redraft the three requests made of it?

Mr. Nitze said he considered the framework of the paper 

It appeared that the retraction and reduction of Soviet power 

fluence was the “be all” and “end all” of our policy. If this p

our policy could be taken as a specific problem and so addre

thought we could come up with something useful. He ended th

ing by saying that we would get together with someone from O

PSB and try to map out a course of action.
97. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Sm

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Counc

(Lay)1

Washington, December 1

SUBJECT

Proposed Survey of Communications Intelligence Activities

1. In view of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon 

rector of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency 

tion 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, t

herewith advises the National Security Council that he is grave

cerned as to the security and effectiveness with which the Comm

tions Intelligence activities of the Government are being conduct

2. It is believed that existing means of control over, and co

tion of, the collection and processing of Communications Inte

have proved ineffective to assess and reconcile the Communicat

telligence requirements of the various interested Departments an

cies and, as well, the national intelligence requirements in this fi

3. It is further believed that the system of divided authori

multiple responsibilities which prevails with respect to Comm

tions Intelligence will, if uncorrected, preclude the developmen

consistent, firmly administered security program which is requ

order to preserve this invaluable intelligence source. In recen

a number of losses have occurred which it is difficult to attri

coincidence.

4. Because of the unique value of Communications Intelligen

matter directly affects the national security. Any corrective mea

be taken should be based upon a thorough investigation of the fa

should give due regard to the needs of the National Security Es

ment and those of the various Departments and Agencies conce

5. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Secretary of St

the Secretary of Defense, assisted by the Director of Central Intel

be asked to have the Communications Intelligence activities 

Government surveyed, with the view of recommending any co

measures that may be required to insure the most secure and e

conduct of such activities.

Walter B

1 Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Series 

(CIA Reports). Top Secret. “Approved Dec 13 ‘51 /s/ Harry S Truman” is han

in the bottom left corner of the memorandum.
98. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to

Secretary of Defense Lovett1

Washington, December 1

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In anticipation of the probability of a military cease-fire in 

as well as the possibility of a breakdown in negotiations, it b

important to review our assets in China proper and the effect 

of either development. A year ago the Chinese Nationalist Gove

claimed the existence of 1,500,000 guerrillas on the Mainland o

and although we believe that this figure was exaggerated, w

that during the past year the effective action of the Chinese C

nist forces has greatly reduced the number of guerrillas. The 

CIA estimate is approximately 165,000. A military cease-fire on 

rean peninsula will probably restore freedom of movement to 

portion of Chinese forces now confronting us, and it is to be a

that the Chinese Communist Government will then take actio

tensify the anti-guerrilla campaign.

Another asset is the Chinese Nationalist Forces on Taiwa

army now consists of about 450,000 ground troops in fair state 

unit training but with inadequate equipment and in a poor 

combat effectiveness. Their small Navy and Air Force have bo

riorated militarily as a result of lack of equipment and trainin

ties. These forces will within four years begin to undergo a ra

terioration through age alone. They, like the guerrillas on the M

represent a waning asset which will have to be strengthened, b

and used within the immediate foreseeable future if we are to 

benefit from them.

The military and economic programs for the support of 

such as they are, have attained only limited success. This is du

at least to Nationalist refusal to effect political reform and part

to the failure of the Nationalist Government to eliminate cor

among its officials. Our support to guerrillas has so far failed 

duce the results which had been initially anticipated, due prim

Nationalist reluctance to commit their guerrilla assets to action 

ondarily to the difficulty of Chinese Nationalist regular officer

ior grade to adapt themselves to the conditions and requirem

guerrilla warfare.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for O

Job 79–01228A, Box 11. Top Secret.
Recent studies based on personal observation on the spot 

eral qualified officers serving with this Agency indicate the fol

(a) The Chinese Nationalist forces are not as ineffective pot

as the pessimistic reports made a year ago, by our Service A

then on Taiwan, would indicate. Neither are they as effective as 

timistic reports of Americans now employed directly or indire

the Chinese Nationalist Government would indicate. My belie

they can be made effective and that if U.N. policy permitted, an

Nationalist Government would cooperate effectively, Chinese 

alist divisions could be rotated to Korea and might serve ver

itably. It is the opinion of General Wyman2 and other qualif

servers that the presence of a Nationalist division in Korea in 

with former Nationalist troops now serving the Communist G

ment would have a marked psychological effect.

(b) The existing scattered and relatively ineffective guerrill

on the Mainland, if well led, armed, and given a political rallyin

could be made a potent weapon and might contain much strong

nese Communist forces.

(c) The presence on Taiwan of a Chinese Nationalist force 

in strength as the result of training, improved morale, and im

equipment, would, particularly if its combat training should inc

peated and aggressive raids and temporary thrusts onto the Ma

immobilize for coastal defense a considerable portion of the bette

of the Chinese Communist Army and a large quantity of its militar

port. The Nationalist troops on certain offshore islands are doing 

the present time on a small scale and the threat could be intensi

In my opinion if we are to obtain the full effect of the poss

enumerated above, two things are required. The first is a chang

own policy with respect to employment of Chinese Nationalis

and a more aggressive approach to the use of guerrillas. Seco

litical reform of the Chinese Nationalist Government is essentia

U.S. efforts to encourage such reform have been almost witho

cess as the controlling clique of the KMT has been unwilling to 

its stranglehold on the Government. It is probable that this 

sigeance stems from the belief that maintenance of the status qu

this clique an exclusive claim to reinheritance of the Mainland 

product of U.S. victory in World War III.

Attached are two studies3 bearing on the basic subject whic

gest be given military staff consideration. One of these represe

2 Major General Willard G. Wyman, a so-called China hand, serving as C

der of US Forces, Southeastern Europe at this time. 3 Not printed.
views of the Estimates Division of this Agency

which, altho

an IAC coordinated paper, reflects the most recent estimates of 

itary intelligence agencies. As will be noted, this paper does n

cern itself with the beneficial effects which would result from 

provement of the political situation on Taiwan. The other stud

represents the views of the operating divisions of CIA points 

difficulties resulting from the present unsatisfactory political s

and concentrates upon the importance of a housecleaning in 

and a clarification of U.S. policy if significant results are to be ac

These are my personal views, based on conversations with 

in this Agency who are giving consideration to the exploitatio

assets in the Far East. I recommend, however, that the Joint C

Staff consider this general subject and the attached papers as a 

of urgency for the purpose of amplifying and firming up our 

program and, if indicated by mature consideration, producing 

mendations which will crystallize our governmental policy tow

strengthening of Taiwan as an anti-Communist base militar

nomically, politically, and psychologically. It seems to me that 

interest of the United States demands this.

Personnel of CIA are prepared to participate and assist in th

and in the planning which should follow. For this purpose 

arranged to secure the services of General Frank Merrill5 who

know, is experienced in commando-type operations in the Far E

he would head the CIA contribution to any planning syndicat

you may desire to establish.

Sincerely,

Walter B

4 Estimates Division is the Office of National Estimates.

5 Major General Merrill (Ret.) was a veteran of both the China an

Theaters. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.
99. Editorial Note

On December 13, 1951, President Truman directed the Secr

State and the Secretary of Defense, assisted by the Director of 

Intelligence, to appoint a committee to examine United State

ernment Communications Intelligence (COMINT) efforts and 

ommend measures to improve their conduct and security. (Tru

brary, President’s Secretary’s File) The committee was hea

prominent New York attorney George A. Brownell and in

Charles E. Bohlen, representing the Department of State, Gener

Magruder, representing the Department of Defense, and Wil

Jackson, representing the Central Intelligence Agency. The com

submitted a five-part report on June 13, 1952. Part I was a hi

U.S. COMINT efforts, Part II dealt with the role of COMINT, 

laid out the then-current organization of the COMINT commun

IV detailed the actual conduct of COMINT activities, and Part 

sisted of the report’s conclusions and recommendations.

The major findings of the report were that the four 

COMINT organizations (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Armed Fo

curity Agency (AFSA), which was controlled by the JCS) we

ducting duplicative operations in many areas and that the U.S

munications Intelligence Board (USCIB) lacked adequate auth

correct the situation. The report recommended that AFSA b

greatly expanded authority over the service organizations, t

AFSA director report directly to the Secretary of Defense, a

USCIB be replaced by a new, strengthened COMINT Board cha

the DCI. 

In October 1952, the President and the NSC adopted mos

Brownell Committee’s recommendations and issued a revised 

of NSCID No. 9 on October 24, 1952 (Document 257). In place o

the National Security Agency was created. NSA had the same re

as AFSA, but a different charter. The JCS was removed from th

of command. The Secretary of Defense was made executive ag

the government as a whole for COMINT, subordinate to a speci

mittee of the NSC consisting of himself and the Secretary of St

vised by the Director of Central Intelligence. 

The Brownell Committee report is in National Archives, R

SRH–123, Brownell Committee Report; a declassified version i

able in George A. Brownell, The Origins and Development of the N

Security Agency (Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1981).
100. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 1

SUBJECT

Meeting to Discuss the Crusade for Freedom held in Mr. Barrett’s Office 

January 17, 1952

PARTICIPANTS

CIA—Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Frank Wisner, Mr. Tom Braden and Mr. Gat

NCFE—Mr. C. D. Jackson and Mr. Abbott Washburn

State—Mr. Edward W. Barrett, Mr. Howland H. Sargeant, Mr. Foy Kohl

Robert P. Joyce and Mr. John Devine

Agreement:

As the result of the discussion it was agreed that the Cru

Freedom would be continued in 1952 but in a considerably lo

in comparison with the 1951 Crusade. The precise nature of t

sade is to be worked out cooperatively by NCFE, CIA and 

partment of State.

Discussion:

Mr. Jackson said that he and his colleagues realize that th

not repeat the 1951 type Crusade. He raised the question of w

there should be a Crusade at all and answered it by saying tha

that some sort of Crusade had to continue. He said that the maj

tion was what sort of Crusade could be organized and still 

sent serious problems for the Department of State. Mr. Jacks

that the most troublesome aspect of the 1951 Crusade was its l

three months. He said that a shorter Crusade pitched at a low

would solve many of the problems that had occurred in the p

He said that one good idea that had been developed by local c

tees was to have a one-day civic organization doorbell ringin

paign. Some buildup of publicity would be necessary for a 

doorbell ringing campaign but it would be nothing to compa

the extended Crusade of this year. Mr. Jackson said that the dir

approach had been tried this year with some success and coul

panded. He added that he felt the short campaign would have 

ditional advantage of removing the possibility of the public’s 

invidious comparisons between RFE and VOA. He said that w

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, no fo

Box 48. Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by John Devine of the Burea

lic Affairs on January 21.
short campaign there would not be time for the public to re

such issues.

Mr. Barrett reminded the group that NCFE had started a

ganization to look after and make use of the various Eastern Eu

refugee groups. He recalled that giving these groups a radio vo

something of a later development. He also recalled that the C

was established primarily as a cover for the governmental sup

the enterprise. Mr. Barrett raised the question of whether or 

Crusade had grown to such proportions that it was now a cas

tail wagging the dog. He also raised the question of whether 

or three million dollars that might be raised in the Crusade m

endangering the $85,000,000 involved in the appropriations 

USIE operations. He thought it was important to get back to t

of just enough of a Crusade to give the minimum necessary c

NCFE. Mr. Barrett suggested direct mail solicitation of funds

zine advertisements and coupons, and corporation solicitatio

also said that he thought the device of large anonymous gifts m

looked into further.

Mr. Jackson said that after the 1951 campaign it became 

him that the Crusade had actually done an important selling job 

American public in the matter of psychological warfare and 

portance of such an effort to our nation. He felt that this was 

important aspect of the Crusade and one that had been usuall

looked. Mr. Jackson said also that an efficient field organizat

been built up for the Crusade and it was one which could resp

almost any kind of stimuli we wanted to apply.

Mr. Kohler suggested that the Crusade’s national organ

might be used to communicate to the public other messages 

would be useful in connection with the United States’ psych

warfare effort.

Mr. Sargeant said that if the Crusade’s national organizatio

really going to continue to be a force in the situation, it would 

essary to keep it busy the year around with useful projects such 

shows, publicizing the visits of foreign labor leaders, and partic

in other activities relating to the international propaganda situ

Mr. Barrett said that it was important to secure intern

sponsorship for the RFE broadcasts as had been done for the 

operations.

Mr. Jackson said that the international nature of the balloon m

did not add anything to its effectiveness. He said that current a

to set up committees in France and England along the lines of NC

not succeeding and he doubted seriously whether that was a 

line of further endeavor. Mr. Jackson said that he felt the devel

should be toward the Munich-type of operation to Czechoslovaki
the program has acquired such a predominantly local co

that the American connection is almost completely submerg

Dulles agreed that an international committee was not a w

arrangement.

Mr. Washburn said that two million dollars gross had bee

in the Crusade this year when there was a stated goal. He thou

the next Crusade need not have a specific goal and that such a 

would help keep things in a low key.

Mr. Kohler commented that in the 1951 Crusade, the imp

was given that the combined efforts of RFE and RFA were cove

world as far as radio propaganda needs were concerned.

Mr. Sargeant said that he felt a Crusade national orga

could serve a useful purpose in developing popular interest 

chological warfare and could at the same time assign tasks 

groups which would actually assist in the psychological warfar

He mentioned writing of letters and essay contests.

Mr. Dulles said that he hoped that the group could agre

Crusade’s going ahead this year on a program that will be wor

in close coordination with VOA.

Mr. Jackson said that he hoped a four point decision c

reached:

1. That the Crusade should go ahead this year.

2. That it should take place in September at the earliest 

last more than two weeks.

3. That the Crusade national organization should procee

meantime with the jobs of general education on psychological 

matters, and an explanation of VOA–RFE relationships.

4. That NCFE should collaborate with the Department of 

what should be said to local groups.

Mr. Jackson’s suggestions were discussed but there was 

eral agreement.

Mr. Barrett felt that agreement at this time should be lim

saying that the Crusade organization should not be disband

there should be a Crusade in 1952 of a considerably lower pitc

ture, and that the precise character of the 1952 Crusade sh

worked out in close consultation between NCFE, CIA and Sta

was agreed to by all present.
101. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of t

Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Chief of S

the Air Force (Vandenberg)1

Washington, January 2

SUBJECT

Civil Air Transport’s Application for Commercial Rights in Okinawa

REFERENCE

a. GHQ Far East Command Letter AG 095 (22 November 1951) GD/D, 

November 22, 1951, Subject: Civil Air Transport’s Application for C

cial Rights in Okinawa2

1. It is understood that reference a. has been forwarded by 

partment of the Army to the Department of the Air Force for 

The Psychological Warfare Division of the latter Department 

formally requested this Agency to make a statement of its int

the matter.

2. Civil Air Transport (CAT, Incorporated) is a Chinese flag 

wholly owned by the United States Government and controlled 

Agency. As a commercial airline, Civil Air Transport performs 

variety of covert services for the Agency throughout the Far 

lines not declassified]. It is the single most valuable asset of the 

the Far East, without which the Agency would find it imposs

ther to discharge its operational tasks or to plan the greatly in

activities envisaged under NSC 683 and 10/5.4

3. [1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified]

4. Apart from the U.S. Government’s interest outlined abov

appears to be ample justification for approving Civil Air Transpo

plication on strictly commercial grounds. Firstly, whereas un

terms of the Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement a United States carrie

mitted to serve Formosa, the Chinese Government’s designated 

ment, Civil Air Transport, by virtue of its aircraft limitations, h

unable to avail itself of rights to serve points in the U.S. ter

specified in the route annex of the agreement. Notwithstanding 

cise terms of the agreement, it would seem in order, as a m

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278

Folder 15. Top Secret. Security Information. Drafted in the Far East Division o

January 11. Sent to Vandenberg through the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division of 

Chiefs of Staff. 2 Not found.

3 See Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. I, pp. 234–292. 4 Document 90.
comity, to grant the designated airline of China traffic rights 

an alternate point under United States control which is within 

line’s capabilities to serve. Secondly, the routes flown by Civil A

port naturally include Okinawa and it is hardly justifiable th

nawa, a point in the immediate trading area of Formosa, sh

denied the service of the international airline of China. Third

Air Transport is the only airline in the area which has the capa

the willingness to render low cost cargo and passenger servi

mensurate with the economy of the area; this factor is expecte

tract substantial traffic of U.S. contractors and others on Okina

ploying indigenous personnel. It is not calculated, however, t

appreciable inroad will be made on the business of other com

airlines inasmuch as the type of traffic which could be carried 

Air Transport would not, in any event, be moved by other com

air carriers. Lastly, it would constitute an economic hardship to 

line in serving its routes from Korea to Thailand to have no traff

at Okinawa inasmuch as it would still be necessary to make t

stops at Okinawa for the purpose of fueling.

5. With reference to the final paragraph of reference a. it 

be noted that the Civil Aeronautics Board does not have juri

over civil air operations at Okinawa except where carriers of the 

States are involved. This Agency does not desire that the Unite

Government’s interests in Civil Air Transport be disclosed to th

at this time; conversely, it is believed that coordination with th

without disclosure of United States Government interest migh

unnecessary delays and possible obstructions by representatio

terested United States carriers. It is requested, therefore, that t

ter not be coordinated with Civil Aeronautics Board as sugges

subject has, however, been discussed with Mr. Alexis Johnson, 

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of Sta

has stated that the Department will interpose no objection to a

of Civil Air Transport’s application.

6. The Agency considers it a matter of great importan

urgency that the subject application be approved. Failure to 

such approval will result in the most serious setbacks to the A

operations.

Frank G. 

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
102. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 1

SUBJECT

Meeting with USAF Representatives Regarding USAF Photo Reconnaiss

Requirements

1. [name not declassified] and 1st Lt. C. W. Matt2 attended a m

with representatives of USAF to discuss and explore the requirem

a pre-D-Day reconnaissance of the USSR. Air Force representat

cluded officers from Requirements, Plans, Operations, Intelligen

velopment and the AF State Department representative. Brig. Ge

land was the senior officer present.

2. In opening the discussions, the Chairman stated that it w

essary to develop a firm requirement in order to sell State Dep

in the need for relaxing the diplomatic side enough to permi

tions of sovereignty. It will be necessary to impress on State the 

to which our offensive will rely on pre-D-Day reconnaissance i

to carry out our post-D-Day strikes. Secondly, Air Force must p

the large vacuum existing in intelligence regarding the USS

Chairman stated that SAC had been asked to participate in d

ing a requirement. SAC, however, declined, stating that in the

the requirement should be based on the need for intelligence. S

not want to raise the implication that their offensive would be d

by waiting for reconnaissance!!!

3. The representative from Development outlined what 

hand or would be available in the future. He stated that it wa

sary to obtain guidance on which item or items to push. In other 

where will they put their money? He discussed balloons, dron

con version of the Snark3 and piloted aircraft. The recon Snark 

be available in 1954 and will have speed of Mach .95 and alti

52,000. Drones can now be controlled up to 50 miles and this ca

ably be raised to 200 miles. Gopher balloons will be availabl

fall of 1952.

4. Requirements representative stated that recon was nee

(1) new industrial complexes and air facilities for which ther

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Box 

Security Information. Drafted by [name not declassified], Air Maritime Division, 

Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency. 2 Both of CIA’s Air Maritime Division.

3 Snark was a proposed Air Force strategic cruise missile.
intelligence or for which we need new intelligence, (2) area fro

to FE on which there is no photo coverage and (3) general reco

cover new targets developed since WW II. It was also pointed 

warning requirement was also of prime importance.

5. Air Force State representative reported that State had f

taken a dim view of violations such as photo recon would 

However, he believed that now that international affairs had g

present condition, State might not take as serious objections as 

They might agree that the planes, etc., might get shot down t

cent would not start a war. [sic] He stated balloons might cau

givings in State because of their lack of directional control an

ble aimless wanderings. Representative seemed to think Stat

go along with Snark, drones, etc., if requirement strongly pres

6. CIA representative was asked how CIA might contribut

pointed out that only a very limited capability existed at pr

CIA capability might be developed but will require a large am

support from Air Force. At best, and for some time in the futu

capability will be largely peripheral.

7. It was decided that Intelligence Section of USAF would 

the draft requirement from the intelligence viewpoint. Other 

would assist as required. Presumably, CIA will be specificall

for any future information if Air Force so desires.

[name not decla

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

103. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director for 

Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms

Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence A

(Wisner)

Washington, February 1

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Ope

Job 75–05091R, Box 1, Folder 37. Secret; Security Information. 

not declassified.]
104. Memorandum From the Director of the Psychological

Strategy Board (Allen) to Board Members1

Washington, February 2

SUBJECT

Procedure for Handling 10/5 Matters in PSB

I recommend that the following arrangements and proced

formally approved by the Psychological Strategy Board in ord

it may most effectively discharge its responsibilities under par

3 of NSC 10/5:2

1. A special panel will be created by PSB, the membership o

will consist of the same representatives of the Secretary of State 

the Secretary of Defense who now advise the Central Inte

Agency’s Office of Policy Coordination pursuant to NSC 10

the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who acts in a sim

pacity.3 The membership will also include a representative of t

tral Intelligence Agency and two representatives of the Psych

Strategy Board, designated by the Director, Psychological S

Board, one of whom shall act as Chairman of the panel.

2. This panel shall consider all programs and individua

projects within the scope of NSC 10/5 which are submitted to th

for review by the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. In the light of national policy and preliminary and tenta

timates of available resources, the panel will review the desirab

the programs and major projects which have been referred to 

reach agreement or disagreement as to recommendations for ap

modification, or disapproval.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333. Top S

curity Information. Forwarded to Under Secretary of State Webb under cover 

from Allen of the same date. The letter was returned to Allen with a note dat

ary 25. A handwritten notation on the letter indicates that it was approved 

(Ibid.)2 Document 90. In a letter of March 14 Allen informed H. Freeman M

Deputy Under Secretary of State, that he had received written approval from e

ber of the Board. Allen further stated that C. Tracy Barnes, his deputy, was bei

nated chairman of the special panel to be established under the approved p

(National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 56 D 459, Secretary’s Letters, Defens

3 For text of NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of th

gence Establishment, Document 292. The representatives were Robert P. Joyc

Brigadier General John Magruder (Defense), and Rear Admiral Leslie C. Steve
4. All of the following projects or programs will be referre

panel to the Director of PSB for submission to the PSB:

(a) Any program or “major” project on which the panel as 

cannot reach unanimous agreement;

(b) Any program or “major” project which in the opinion 

member of the panel raises a question of policy, desirability 

bility of sufficient importance to warrant formal consideration 

PSB.

5. Any program or “major” project on which the panel as 

has reached unanimous agreement and which has not been ref

the Director of PSB for submission to the PSB under the provi

paragraph 4 (b) above shall be handled as follows:

(a) The representative of the Director of Central Intellig

the panel shall present the program or project to the Director 

tral Intelligence for his approval if not already formally recom

by him. If he approves, the Director of Central Intelligence sh

and file with the Director of PSB a written statement approvi

project or program and agreeing that the Central Intelligence 

will provide such support as such project or program requires f

Central Intelligence Agency as evidenced by the requireme

proved by the panel.

(b) The representative of the Secretary of State on the pan

present the program or project to the Under Secretary of State 

approval. If he approves, the Under Secretary of State shall s

file with the Director of PSB a written statement approving su

ect or program from the standpoint of national policy and agree

the Department of State will provide such support as such p

program requires from the Department of State as evidenced b

quirements approved by the panel.

(c) The representative of the Secretary of Defense on th

shall present the program or project to the Deputy Secretary of 

for his approval. If he approves, the Deputy Secretary of Defen

sign and file with the Director of PSB a written statement ap

such project or program from the standpoint of national po

agreeing that the Department of Defense will provide such su

such project or program requires from the Department of De

evidenced by the requirements approved by the panel.

6. Any program or project which has received the approv

Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, under the provisions of parag

above, shall be deemed to have received the approval of the 

logical Strategy Board in accordance with the requirements 

10/5.
7. In the event that the Director of Central Intelligence, the 

Secretary of State or the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall rep

his Department or Agency, respectively, is unwilling or unable 

vide the approval and agreement set forth in paragraphs 5 (a

or 5 (c) above, the project or program in question shall be refe

the panel to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board f

mission to the Psychological Strategy Board for its further acti

8. In the event that the Director of Central Intelligence, the 

Secretary of State, or the Deputy Secretary of Defense recomme

amendment, modification, or other changes to the program or 

the program or project, together with such recommendations, 

referred back to the panel for further action, under procedures 

cal to those applicable to the original submission of programs an

ects to the panel.

105. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bruc

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Counc

(Lay)1

Washington, April 

SUBJECT

Fourth Progress Report on NSC 26 Series, “Removal and Demolition of 

Facilities, Equipment and Supplies in the Middle East”

NSC 26/2,2 NSC 26/4 and NSC 26/53 were approved as 

mental policy on January 10, 1949, August 18, 1950 and May 3, 1

spectively. It is requested that this fourth progress report as of M

1952 be circulated to the members of the Council for their inform

Important Developments:

1. July 9, 1951, the Secretary of Defense stated that 

worsening world conditions and increased global requiremen

earmarking of a military contingent for the specific use in con

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secret

Subject File. Top Secret; Special Handling. 2 Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, 

3 Neither printed. (Ibid., RG 273, Policy Papers of the NSC: NSC 26, Box 
with NSC 26/2 should not be done in advance”.4 He added 

JCS were of the opinion that although “under certain circums

force such as the Battalion of Marines now in the Mediterranea

be available for this mission”, “the sending of a force to Saud

must be decided at the time (of the emergency) in view of the 

situation confronting us”.

2. [4 paragraphs (39 lines) not declassified]

3. On August 14, 1951 it was recommended by State [les

line not declassified] field representatives in Dhahran, Saudi A

consultation with local US military officials that the compan

the Saudi Arabian Government in a most general way of den

evacuation plans.5 On August 21, 1951 it was decided by the 

ments of State and Defense in consultation [less than 1 line not 

fied] that not only denial plans, but also broader national polici

area, would be jeopardized by such disclosure to SAG official

time and that no indication should be given that the Western 

might abandon the area.6

4. On August 22, 1951 the National Security Council discu

third progress report and noted that the Secretary of State wou

a directive [3 lines not declassified].7

5. On September 10, 1951 the Bahrein Petroleum Comp

formed the Department of State of its acceptance of the denia

provided: (a) concurrence of the local government were obta

fore the program could be put into effect, and (b) company cl

reimbursement would be “treated upon the same footing as c

other companies elsewhere who cooperate in like measures”.8

6. [3 paragraphs (11 lines) not declassified]

7. [16 lines not declassified] Similar problems in Saudi Arab

been presented to the US military for resolution. No problem

arisen that require action on the NSC level.”9

8. January 16–February 3, 1952, a mission of State–Defens

US oil company representatives visited Middle East oil areas o

States denial responsibility, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrein

to review NSC 26 progress, plans, policies and problems. Con

and recommendations, which are now under State–Defense–CI

will be presented in the next progress report.

4 Not printed. (Ibid.)

5 Not found.

6 Not found.

7 See Document 84.

8 Not found.

9 Not found.
Action Now Contemplated

Further action required to implement NSC 26 includes fur

velopment of Aramco-type denial plans to Kuwait, Kuwait 

Zone, Bahrein and Qatar; [less than 1 line not declassified]; contin

amination of the situation re protective forces; and inter-Depar

consideration of problems observed during the January field m

i.e. implementation of the denial plans in the event of local opp

status of company personnel engaged in denial operations, de

denial throughout Middle East oil areas, clearer definition of 

tional interest in preserving oil reservoirs, notification of local 

ities regarding denial plans, delegation of field responsibility f

26, security of denial plans, coordination of denial plans with p

tion plans, rehabilitation plans, personnel protection, evacuati

counter-sabotage plans.

Policy Evaluation

Policy evaluation will be withheld pending a resolution 

problems mentioned in the above paragraph, following which 

mendations will be made as to whether new Council action, in

the revision of NSC 26, is desirable.

David 

10 Printed from a copy that indicates Bruce signed the original.

106. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of t

Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Ce

Intelligence Smith and the Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence (Dulles)1

Washington, April 1

SUBJECT

United States Policies on Support for Anti-Communist Chinese Forces

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Op

Job 79–01228A, Box 11. Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only.
1. This memorandum is prepared for the information an

the Director and the Deputy Director only. It summarizes the 

sion which took place at the JCS Conference Room at 11

Wednesday, 9 April 1952. The State Department was represe

Messrs. Bohlen, Nitze, Allison and Ferguson. The JCS was repr

by General Bradley, Admiral Fechteler, General Twining, Gene

and General Cabell. The Department of Defense was represe

Mr. Nash, and Mr. Lay was present for the NSC staff. Messrs

and Wisner represented CIA.

2. The stated subject matter of the meeting was the JCS p

the NSC on Formosa,2 although General Bradley pointed out 

subject matter was much broader and stemmed from the Direct

cember letter to the Secretary of Defense.3 The composition of th

ing had been determined at the NSC meeting of the precedin

at the conclusion of which it had been decided that there wou

direct discussion of the policy questions raised by the JCS pap

tween State, Defense, JCS and CIA, as a preliminary to a possib

staff study of the matter. CIA had been included because of t

ter having been originally raised by the Director’s letter and 

cause of the importance of the policy review to large and sig

CIA operations in the area concerned.

3. Mr. Bohlen began for State by giving a brief résumé of o

ent policy with respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist

is largely spelled out in NSC 48/5.4 Following this, Mr. Bohlen s

he would like to take up the points in the JCS paper of 22 Mar

one by one, in order to clarify certain doubts which the State 

ment had as to the significance and underlying meaning of thes

It was not clear to the Department whether the paper refers to w

policy should be on the assumption of a truce in Korea, or wh

proposed modifications of the existing policy either at the pres

or on the basis of some other assumption. He asked whether s

graph (c) meant that the JCS were proposing the lifting of res

now in order to allow the Chinese Nationalists to attack the ma

4. Admiral Fechteler replied that the meaning of this pa

is that we should not close the door to movements westward fr

mosa. It did not mean that the ban against westward mov

should be lifted immediately, but only if conditions should war

in the light of developing circumstances.

5. Mr. Nitze replied that this was a very helpful clarificat

one quite satisfactory to State. The Department had been co

2 Dated March 22; see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 1, pp. 

3 Document 98.

4 For NSC 48/5, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, pp. 33–63.
lest this mean a recommendation for an overt policy change at th

ent time—since such a policy change would be interpreted wor

as a full engagement of U.S. power and prestige in the destru

the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland.

6. Admiral Fechteler asked what the situation would be if t

nese Nationalists should attempt to launch raids against the m

from Formosa now. What would we do; would we try to stop th

if so, by what means would we seek to stop it—by diplomati

military means? Messrs. Allison and Nitze replied that they re

this as an academic question at the present time, since the Nati

are not in a position to launch significant landings against th

land without our help.

7. General Bradley asked Mr. Dulles whether CIA operatio

suffered or are suffering from the existing policy, which prohibit

ments east or west, and if so, what changes we consider neces

order to remove the interferences.

8. [11 lines not declassified] (At a later point in the discussi

Dulles raised the question as to whether the present policy mea

the Nationalists are prevented from reinforcing the offshore 

from Formosa. It was the unanimous response that the presen

does not prohibit the reinforcement or re-supply of the offshore 

from Formosa, since the policy is restrictive only against attack

the China mainland. It was further stated that what happens 

tween the offshore islands and the mainland is not affected by th

ent policy and that it need not be a concern of this Governmen

9. Mr. Nitze stated with respect to subparagraph (c) th

could accept the explanation and interpretation given by A

Fechteler provided its meaning were clearly spelled out as requ

re-examination of all of the circumstances which might be ap

at the appropriate moment in connection with a determina

whether the circumstances might warrant a lifting of the ban on 

ment westward.

10. General Hull stated that he considered the question som

more fundamental and not so easy to dismiss. The existence 

westward ban implies that we have a substantially negative po

the use of present and potential resources on Formosa. The q

is, “Do we build up or don’t we?” If there is to be a build-u

must be at the very least a philosophy understood and accepte

top levels of this Government that we are building toward a p

or affirmative exploitation of the Formosa potential. Lacking t

losophy, Formosa will simply fail to receive the priorities and 

won’t get the stuff. The other competitive demands for our mili

will eat up all of the matériel, and Formosa will get nothing.

11. Mr. Nitze thought the present language of NSC 48/5 

broad enough and sufficiently flexible to permit a build-up n
for defensive purposes but also for possible offensive purpo

quoted portions of the language of this paper in support of hi

12. Mr. Bohlen said he was inclined to agree with Genera

position that the language could be amended slightly to give i

positive ring, provided that it was clearly understood that we 

not tell the Chinese Nationalists that we were changing the po

undertaking the support of a build-up for offensive purposes

plained that the Chinese Nationalists would surely exploit a

statement or information on a world-wide basis with grave 

rassment to our over-all position and at a time when it is still 

to foresee what future developments will bring.

13. Mr. Dulles said that he was troubled about the fact tha

the only spot in the world where we are using our own forces to 

the Communists. Mr. Bohlen replied that this was perhaps theo

so, but he said that we would no doubt move to restrain any oth

whom we have influence if we thought they were likely to laun

aggressive attacks against the USSR or the satellites. He said, m

the “protection of the Communists” is at this time illusory since 

nothing at the moment to protect the Chinese Communists from

14. General Hull in reply to a question from Mr. Allison sta

the JCS did not deem it within the realm of possibility to build 

Chinese Nationalists to the point where they could successfully 

take an invasion of the Chinese mainland without extensive mil

sistance from us. He said, “If they go back, we have got to put them 

15. Reverting to an earlier point in the conversation, Mr. Alli

that it might clarify the situation somewhat if we would state n

if there should be an overt Communist attack against Southeast A

would employ the Chinese Nationalist potential against Hainan 

other places as might be most effectively attacked by these force

16. General Hull said this would be helpful. General Brad

that this last point tended to confuse him somewhat. He was t

sort out in his mind the difference between the paper now un

sideration and discussions of another paper relating to what 

we would take in the event of an attack by the Chinese Com

against Southeast Asia. He reminded the meeting that the pres

cussion grew out of and had been touched off by General Sm

ter, which had taken the line that if we are going to do anythin

Formosa, time is of the essence.

17. Mr. Dulles stated that this was as he understood it to b

eral Smith’s letter had clearly pointed up the aspect of wastin

and the disintegration of the situation on Formosa from both 

tary and political standpoint. There are disquieting reports ab

political and military situation on Formosa—reports of sagging 

and other things which open up alarming possibilities as to w
happen if we do not firm up our policy for that area and take 

priate action under the new policy.

18. General Bradley said that this obviously raises the entir

tion of the validity of our support to Formosa. Why should 

spending several hundreds of millions of dollars and pouring 

tary supplies and equipment if we are not willing to take the ad

steps necessary to insure against a collapse. We are faced with 

distasteful conclusions:

a. As matters now stand, we are allowing a useful pote

waste away and are merely throwing good money after bad. b. It would appear that our present methods cannot be e

to unseat the Communist regime, and that the adoption of th

tional military measures to accomplish this result at this time 

risk our involvement in a general war, at least against China, a

sibly Russia as well. c. If we withhold or withdraw our aid now, Formosa will c

in short order.

With respect to this latter point, General Bradley said that 

has repeatedly taken the position that the loss of Formosa would b

damaging to our over-all strategic position, but that this was n

ciently critical to warrant our putting in U.S. forces to hold Form

19. Mr. Nash stated that the decision of the NSC had, as 

derstood it, been to review the entire situation and not just one 

isolated features of it. He proposed that a working group com

of State, Defense, JCS, CIA and NSC representatives should i

ately address itself to the broader task.

20. Mr. Bohlen agreed that this was the problem. He sai

should be an immediate study of everything that can be don

lidify and stabilize the situation on Formosa.

21. General Bradley also agreed and added that he would 

adopt Mr. Bohlen’s proposal of a slight modification of the p

language of NSC 48/5. He also said that he thought subparagra

and (e) of the JCS paper of 22 March represent existing policy an

fore raise no new questions.

22. Mr. Bohlen remarked that General Chase5 had said w

was here that the average age of the Chinese Nationalist forces 

mosa was some four years younger than the average age of th

sion which he had led in the invasion of the Philippines. (Mr

requested the undersigned to check this point.)

23. Messrs. Nash and Lay reaffirmed Mr. Nash’s earlier 

mendation that a five-ply working group needs to study the pro

the broad context of General Smith’s letter to the Secretary of D

5 Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa.
24. Just at the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. Dulles sta

CIA would be very glad to continue its participation in this e

tion of the problem, not only because of what we might be able 

tribute from the intelligence standpoint but also because of t

operational stake which we have in the outcome of the delib

He reminded General Bradley that CIA had no wish to conti

conduct of such large-scale operations and that General Sm

pointed this out repeatedly and had offered to divest himsel

responsibility if only the JCS or someone else would pick it up

remarks prompted a ripple of polite laughter around the tab

General Bradley stated (with a smile and a bow towards Mr. 

that he saw no reason to revise the present situation or alter 

sponsibilities as they now stand.

Frank G. 

6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

107. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence S

the National Security Council1

Washington, April 2

SUBJECT

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence

In July 1949, the National Security Council directed that 

changes be made in the organization of the Central Intelligence 

The instructions contained in this Directive—NSC 502—have b

ried out in all substantial respects.

There is attached, marked Tab A, a chart of the organizatio

Central Intelligence Agency as of October 1950 and an orga

chart as of 31 December 1951. A comparison of these charts w

cate the general scope of this reorganization.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50 S

Secret. The memorandum was circulated by NSC Executive Secretary Lay on A

a National Security Council Progress Report on the implementation of NSC 50, 

tral Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence,” July 1, 19

2 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 384.
Specifically, there has been established an Office of Nation

mates to produce intelligence estimates of national concern, 

acute situations and on a long-term basis. In its operations thi

utilizes the resources of the total United States intelligence com

The members of the Council are acquainted with the productio

Office of National Estimates, but, for ready reference, there is at

marked Tab B, a list of the National Intelligence Estimates whi

prepared in 1951.3

To provide the National Security Council and appropriate 

of the Government with all-source intelligence on a current bas

was also established during 1951 an Office of Current Intel

Council members are acquainted with the publications of this 

An Office of Research and Reports has been set up to prov

ordinated intelligence, primarily on economic matters, as a se

common concern to interested Government agencies. Althoug

rate appraisal of an enemy’s economic potential is a most im

factor in estimating his military capabilities, this crucially-im

task had previously been scattered among twenty-four separat

cies of the Government.

An Interdepartmental Economic Intelligence Committee h

been established, and the Agency’s Assistant Director for Resea

Reports is its Chairman. His Office is the clearing house for stu

analysis of the economy of the Soviet Orbit and for exploring a

ing the gaps that had developed in the previously unrelated sy

collection and evaluation.4

In cooperation with the Department of Defense, there has b

tablished the Interdepartmental Watch Committee. Its functio

provide constant and periodic review of indications of possible 

action. The Central Intelligence Agency also maintains a twen

hour watch on behalf of the Agency.5

Continuity of high caliber personnel, possessing specialized 

and experience, is essential for the conduct of the Agency’s activi

cordingly, plans for a career service within the Central Inte

Agency are being worked out and the first groups of prospect

ior career officers are in training.

After sufficient career personnel have been recruited and 

in this service, it will be possible eventually to select senior off

the Central Intelligence Agency from among their number. T

velopment will take time. Meanwhile, one of the Agency’s con

3 Not printed.

4 See Documents 72 and 73.

5 See Document 91.
problems will be the difficulty of securing adequately qualif

sonnel, particularly for senior positions.

Four NSC papers approved during the period under rev

quired the special services of the Central Intelligence Agency:

1. [1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

2. NSC 86/16 confirmed the operational responsibility abroa

Central Intelligence Agency with respect to handling defectors. 

this responsibility, improved machinery has been provided 

Agency for interrogating and caring for the high level defectors

not declassified]. Nevertheless, both the number and quality of d

have been disappointing. Studies are being made of inducem

grams to improve this situation, and appropriate recommendati

be made in due course to the Interagency Defector Committee. I

be noted in this connection that the care and rehabilitation of e

and refugees, as distinguished from high level defectors, are n

should not be, a Central Intelligence Agency responsibility. [2 

declassified]

3. The third NSC paper—NSC 66/17

—directed the Centra

gence Agency to provide intelligence support for the Voice of A

with respect to Soviet jamming. This is being done, but the e

ment of an additional monitoring facility to locate Soviet jamm

tions, requested by NSC 66/1 of the Armed Forces Security Age

not been performed, due to technical difficulties. The National 

Council subsequently authorized the Central Intelligence Age

the Department of State to implement this aspect of NSC 66/1 

lot operation, pending further consideration of the plan on t

grounds within the Department of Defense structure. This is bein

4. The remaining paper—NSC 10/58—redefines the Centr

ligence Agency’s responsibilities in a field which was probably 

visaged at the time the National Security Act of 1947, under w

Agency was established, was framed. This is the field of cold wa

activities, including guerrilla warfare. We have accepted these 

sibilities as agents for the major Departments concerned and for 

which are approved by the Psychological Strategy Board. The 

ments of State and Defense are charged with providing the Ce

telligence Agency with the necessary support to accomplish th

sions. The presently projected scope of these activities has, du

6 NSC 86/1, “U.S. Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors,” approved by T

April 19, 1951, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 

7 For NSC 66/1, “Intelligence Support for the Voice of America With Reg

viet Jamming,” see Document 46. 8 Document 90.
past three years, produced a three-fold increase in the clandestin

ations of this Agency and will require next year a budget thre

larger than that required for our intelligence activities. These c

projects are worldwide in scope (with the effort intensified in 

East) and they include psychological warfare as well as paramili

erations; denial programs with respect to strategic materials; stoc

on a limited scale in strategic areas to assist the military in the e

war; the organization and planning of sabotage teams to suppor

ance operations; and the planning and organization of escape a

sion networks and stay-behind movements for use in the event 

Given the necessary support, it will be possible for the Cen

telligence Agency to fulfill these requirements; but since they h

sulted in such a large expansion in the Agency’s budget and 

nel strength, it should be noted that:

1. They are not functions essential to the performance by 

Intelligence Agency of its intelligence responsibilities.

2. They were placed in this Agency because there was n

Department or Agency of the Government which could un

them at that time.

3. They will inevitably militate against the performance b

tral Intelligence Agency of its primary intelligence functions an

continuing and increasing risk to its security. Regrettably, (fr

personal viewpoint) it seems impracticable, for reasons of coord

and security, to divorce these from other covert operations.

There remain a number of unsolved problems—major and 

The following examples will indicate their nature and range:

1. Interrelationship Between Intelligence and Operational Plan

is not necessary for an intelligence officer to know very much 

plans, either civilian or military, but if his product is to be tim

must have adequate advance information at least of the genera

and objectives of any plans toward which he can make an inte

contribution, as well as of such national or international polic

agreements as precede them. The liaison arrangements of CIA 

Department of State on such matters are reasonably satisfact

though there remains room for betterment. Such arrangemen

the Armed Services are still somewhat less than satisfactory, a

some improvement is being made.

2. Security. The utmost diligence has been exercised to ins

security of the Central Intelligence Agency, and I am now con

that it is at least as secure as any activity of the Government. 

maining concern in this regard is largely based on the fact t

Agency is scattered among twenty-eight buildings in the Was

area. Every effort will be made to obtain funds for the constru

a reasonably secure building.
3. Communications Intelligence. Responsibility for this ac

presently divided. It is of particular concern since it affects a 

important source of raw intelligence. The President has directe

survey be made by the Secretaries of State and Defense, assiste

Director of Central Intelligence, to determine what, if any, o

tional changes might improve the security and productivity of th

ice. This survey is now in progress under the supervision of a

pendent committee, appointed for the purpose.9

4. Scientific and Technical Intelligence. The least progress in 

nating intelligence activities has been made in certain fields o

tific and technical intelligence. An interagency committee is p

studying this problem, with the view of recommending the 

steps for the improvement of this situation.

The Council is generally acquainted with the Central Inte

Agency’s secret operations designed to produce raw intellige

though we are making every effort to develop these latter sour

experience so far has been in general disappointing. They are c

comparison with other intelligence operations and they present 

cases a gambler’s chance of obtaining really significant critica

gic information, although they consistently produce a significan

tity of useable information. We must and shall devote our be

to their improvement and to the exploitation of every reasonable 

for penetration. On a few rare occasions there have been really 

accomplishments.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that, in view of the e

of the Soviet security organization, it is not believed that the 

United States intelligence system, or any instrumentality wh

United States is presently capable of providing, including the a

intelligence assets of other friendly states, can produce strategi

gence on the Soviet with the degree of accuracy and timeliness w

National Security Council would like to have and which I woul

provide. Moreover, despite the utmost vigilance, despite watch 

tees, and all of the other mechanics for the prompt evaluation an

mission of intelligence, there is no real assurance that, in the even

den undeclared hostilities, certain advance warning can be prov

As far as our intelligence production is concerned, the Ce

telligence Agency is basically an assembly plant for informat

duced by collaborating organizations of the Government, and 

product is necessarily dependent upon the quality of the contr

of these collaborating organizations.

Walter B. 

9 See Documents 97 and 99.

10 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.
COORDINATON,

OPERATIONS &

POLICY STAFF

LEGAL

STAFF

ADVISORY

STAFF

 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Organization as of 1 October 1950)

INTE

AD

CO

DIRECTOR

OF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

EXECUTIVE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DEPUTY EXECUTIVE

BUDGET

STAFF

MANA

ST

MEDICAL

STAFF

INSPECT

& SECUR

STAFF

OFFICE OF

REPORTS &

ESTIMATES

OFFICE OF

SCIENTIFIC

INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF

COLLECTION &

DISSEMINATION

OFFICE OF

POLICY

COORDINATION

OFFICE OF

OPERATION
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Organization as of 31 December 1951) 

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

TECHNICAL

SERVICES

STAFF

OFFICE OF

SPECIAL

OPERATIONS

OFFICE OF

POLICY

COORDINATION

OFFICE OF

OPERATIONS

OFFICE OF

COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

COUNSEL

ASSISTANT

DEPUTY

(GENERAL

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

OF

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

(PLANS)

AUDITO

OFFICE OF

COLLECTION &

DISSEMINATION

OFFICE OF

RESEARCH

& REPORTS

OFFICE OF

NATIONAL

ESTIMATES

OF

CU

INTE

OFFICE OF

INTELLIGENCE

COORDINATION
108. Briefing Paper Prepared by the Chairman of the 10/5 P

(Barnes)1

Washington, May 

BRIEFING TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOA

ON SOME 10/5 PROBLEMS

A. The Purpose of the Briefing

The word “briefing” on the agenda is somewhat mislea

should be extremely reluctant to “brief” the Board on 10/5,2 as 

you already has considerable familiarity with the subject, qui

from the fact that General Smith is the undisputed expert. Wh

really doing is asking for a “briefing in reverse”; or, in other 

seeking the Board’s help and guidance on behalf of the 10/5 P

that it can function as the Board’s screening agent, as complet

intelligently as possible. Study of the famous “Packet” has sh

as members of the Panel that there are some issues which sh

submitted for Board consideration.

B. Summary of the Steps Leading Up to the Briefing

To provide the proper framework for the issues which we 

raise, I believe it will be of advantage to review briefly the back

of NSC 10/5.

NSC 10/2, approved by the President in June 1948,3 direc

undertaking of covert operations by OPC (then called the Office 

cial Projects) on behalf of the U.S. Government. The DCI was gi

ultimate responsibility and was instructed to ensure, through 

sentatives of State and Defense, that such covert operations we

sistent with U.S. policy. The 10/2 Representatives, consisting 

eral Magruder, General Balmer, and Mr. Joyce, have been meeti

the Chief of OPC each week to give such policy guidance. In ad

there is day-to-day liaison by CIA, not only with State and D

but also with other appropriate departments and agencies.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Political and 

logical Warfare. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The distribution of the paper is indica

Annex. Not printed here is a brief table of contents. The May 8 minutes of the 1

ing of the Psychological Strategy Board indicate that this paper was discusse

time. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB Minutes) All ellipses in the orig

2 Document 90.

3 Printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence 

ment, Document 292.
The normal growth of CIA operations under 10/2, the a

and implementation of the NSC 68 Series,4 and additional requi

placed on CIA by State, Defense, and the JCS (such as support 

grams in Korea and China; the retardation program; resistan

grams; stockpiling; and oil-denial programs), indicated to DCI 

covert program was fast expanding beyond the horizons see

time of its creation. Accordingly, CIA sought additional guidan

NSC in the “Scope and Pace” or “Magnitude” Paper of May 8

in which were set forth two fundamental issues, clarification o

was considered essential to orderly growth. These were—

1. High policy approval of increases in personnel and e

tures required by requested programs, but going beyond limits 

to have been intended by NSC in June 1948, plus approval 

stantial additional increases, if all the programs being thrust up

were even to be attempted; 2. High policy decisions as to the direction and nature o

operations.

[2 paragraphs (12 lines) not declassified]

With respect to the direction and nature of the covert progr

was faced with major decisions. CIA interpreted the NSC 68 S

establishing the desirability of large scale covert operations but 

these policies had not been translated into a directive sufficien

cific for the operational guidance of OPC.

Here is a sampling of the kind of decisions then troubling 

1. Should OPC emphasize covert activities in support of c

or in support of preparation for hot war? For example, shou

properly give top priority to a European retardation plan as re

by the JCS? 2. How should OPC resolve the differing military and polit

cepts relating to the build-up, maintenance and use of resistance 

3. Should activities, such as paramilitary, be changed from 

to overt? If so, when and how?

These basic problems prompted CIA to ask for guidance 

areas: (1) the scope and pace of covert operations for cold w

preparation for hot war; (2) redetermination of responsibil

covert operations; (3) assurance of logistical support; and (4) 

nated guidance from PSB.

The NSC responded to the “Magnitude” Paper in NSC 1

proved by the President on October 23, 1951. This stated that t

“approves in principle as a national responsibility the immed

pansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2”, 

4 See Document 5.

5 Attachment to Document 68.
answering at least in part the primary CIA worry as to OPC

s i

in size. This answer, however, merely emphasizes the rest o

which is devoted to the question of objectives and how to de

covert program.

Obviously, the best size for OPC can never be determined w

gineering accuracy. But equally obviously, the size of OPC sh

responsive, in a general way, to various considerations, among 

in our opinion, are three important ones that will be discussed in 

detail in a moment. These considerations are:

1. What are the correct interpretations of national objectiv

2. What is the national program for achieving them?

3. How large can the OPC program become without disclo

hand of the U.S.?

As to objectives the NSC called for an intensification of cove

ations designed to: (1) place maximum strain on the Soviet stru

power; (2) contribute towards retraction of Soviet power and in

(3) orient the free world towards the U.S., and (4) develop resista

guerrilla operations.

With regard to program, 10/5 in effect says to CIA, “We re

your need for guidance; we will not spell it out for you oursel

will, however, provide you with a mechanism which should 

your dilemmas.”

The mechanism was PSB, then a young and only just flu

fledgling. PSB was directed to include in its strategic concept pr

for covert operations to achieve the objectives just mentioned

over, PSB was given the responsibility for: (1) determini

sirability and feasibility of covert programs and major projec

(2) establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert operation

In furtherance of these responsibilities, the Board on Febru

1952 approved the creation of a panel that includes the 10/2 

sentatives already described, plus two PSB members, Barnes a

nam. At the same time, an administrative procedure was adop

reviewing programs and projects.6

On March 20, 1952, CIA submitted to PSB the “Packet”, wh

sists of the CIA/OPC Strategic Plan, a Budget Analysis for F

Programs and Major Projects over $50,000, and their Support R

ments—a total documentation of about 300 pages, including d

tions of some 100-odd projects.7

6 See Document 104.

7 The “Packet” has not been found, but several documents dealing with De

of State consideration of it are in National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 

litical and Psychological Warfare. The CIA/OPC Strategic War Plan is Docume
The 10/5 Panel has now studied the 

Packet, in the light 

the “Magnitude” Paper, 10/5 and other NSC papers. This study 

vinced us that many of the “Magnitude”-type issues still dema

fication and that serious Board consideration is essential. Whate

may be required for this consideration, however, the Board in o

ion need not delay its approval of much, perhaps all, of the “P

C. Approval of the “Packet”

Without prejudice to any strategy which PSB may later evo

the Stevens Group or by other means; without prejudice to 

analysis of the “Packet” (such as the information which has 

quested by the JCS representative in order to provide more read

parable figures on supporting personnel and materiel being s

by Defense); and without prejudice to questions which any of th

may wish to ask; it is our belief that in general the “Packet” sh

endorsed.

Despite the rapid growth of OPC, the total FY 1953 progr

only calls for about one per cent of the federal budget and, 

only [number not declassified] men.

Unquestionably, the establishment of facilities and the tra

personnel are the top priority needs of OPC today.

OPC can reasonably continue this build-up without losing 

ing flexibility. In the meantime, the individual training plus the 

idation of organization will be assets to OPC whatever jobs are a

to it in the future. Consequently, although no decision is today re

of the Board, the 10/5 Panel does plan soon to submit the “Pac

as much of it as is appropriate, to the Board for its approval.

Obviously, any Board approval of an OPC Packet must be 

to continuous review, as national policy evolves.

But, in particular, the approval which the 10/5 Panel will s

ommend to the Board must be subsequently reviewed by both th

and the Board in the light of future clarifications of national po

objectives.

D. Certain Unresolved Issues

Our study of the “Packet” has made us realize that soon th

is to be presented with some difficult but unavoidable issues.

To eliminate any possible ambiguity—the Board will no

pected to make policy, but if the 10/5 Panel is to operate, it nee

interpretations of policy.

For example, before the Board, or the Panel acting for it, c

on the “desirability” of a project as required by 10/5, it seem

that the Board must provide answers to quite a number of bas

tions, of which I will give two rather closely related examples
1. Does U.S. policy, as properly interpreted, contemplate 

ing overt physical support to revolutionary factions that might 

in the wake of Stalin’s death, if the situation offered a reasonable 

of changing a regime to suit U.S. interests without precipitati

eral war?

It seems to us that if U.S. policy excludes this possibility, th

would prepare for quite a different program than it would if U

icy either included the possibility of such overt physical sup

merely reserved to the nation the freedom to make the decisi

later date.

2. Does U.S. policy, as properly interpreted, include or exc

forts under any circumstances to overthrow or subvert the 

ments of the satellites or the U.S.S.R.?

If U.S. policy excludes such efforts, then any OPC projects d

primarily or largely to those ends should be eliminated or sh

retained only on the ground that preparations for such efforts m

the U.S. some freedom of decision.

If, on the other hand, the answer is “yes”, or merely “maybe

in order to have freedom of decision at the proper moment, it 

seem important for the Board to know now, and for the 10/5 P

find out for the Board, how much military support and what 

military support will be available. For example, do we plan t

on foot? If not, are airborne divisions available or on order? I

der, is the lead time synchronized with the estimated date of n

In stating these examples, no inference is intended that th

is responsible for resolving the questions. However, in order 

Board may discharge its obligation with respect to the OPC pr

it must, in our judgment, be fully acquainted with the answe

whatever source derived. The 10/5 Panel, in turn, must seek s

swers when attempting to perform its delegated functions.

The following passages from a lead article in the April 2

issue of the London Economist express a similar dilemma in the 

mind:

“The discreet silence of western diplomacy about its hop

purposes in Eastern Europe becomes more and more conspicu

“From the viewpoint of the Kremlin this silence of embarra

must look like the silence of conspiracy. From London and Par

the land and sea stations of the Voice of America, from Radio F

rope in Munich, and from such guerilla bases as Madrid and B

and so-called ‘black’ stations, there comes hour after hour a st

criticism and exhortation directed at the Soviet Union and its sa

The effort is comparable only to that of the Cominform itself. To M

monitoring services and to the Russians who read analyses of w

output, it must all look systematic and sinister. To experience

munists, who themselves plan ahead and think in terms of p
warfare, it must seem incredible that all this activity is not ha

to a plan for war and civil war among the western marches of 

viet Union. To encourage resistance by words and to have no int

supporting it later by arms does not, the Russian would argue, mak

(emphasis supplied)

“. . . the general atmosphere of conspiracy is heightened by 

tual and alleged activities of the Central Intelligence Agency 

the Iron curtain.”

“There can, indeed, be little doubt that there is in Eastern 

a widespread belief that time will bring what the rulers call a 

aggression and what the ruled call liberation.”

“. . . This is obviously an unsatisfactory state of affairs

might become dangerous. It may mean that American and Brit

cies are out of step and that there are two policies in Washin

may mean that planning has moved from containment pure a

ple to containment plus all such interference with the Russian 

of influence as can be safely got away with. . . . In a decision to 

Europe from containment to political, economic and social 

attack there is nothing whatever to be ashamed of. . . . What i

is that policy in such a matter should be formed piecemeal un

pressure of special requirements without any formulation of 

it is to go and what its ultimate objectives are to be. . . .”

“. . . The policy of ‘containment plus’ is just beginning to 

East; but unless it is formulated and explained, public opinion 

support it and accept its consequences.”

E. Responsibilities of the 10/5 Panel

To assist in reaching a sensible working relationship betw

Board and the 10/5 Panel, I am including in this final section so

cific requests for guidance.

1. We should like the Board to confirm in principle the con

that OPC cannot create a useful apparatus unless it be autho

develop an over-all program, in dollars and personnel, coveri

riod of, let us say, two or three years.

The 10/5 Panel feels that OPC, like the Army, must be all

tailor its apparatus to an order of magnitude. It cannot toda

mine precisely what operation will be needed tomorrow any m

the Army can prophesy what particular campaign it will be 

to fight. The 10/5 procedure is presently focused on approva

ticular programs and projects. If the 10/5 Panel should forma

perpetuate this type of approval, to the exclusion of more gen

proval, it would tend to stultify OPC’s healthy development, es

if this procedure were in any way construed as requiring OP

lay the creation and training of a useful apparatus until the Bo

approved particular programs and projects.

Such approval, of course, will not affect in any way the 

existing responsibility to review all particular programs and 

submitted under the 10/5 procedure.
It will, however, ensure OPC the flexibility essential for 

velopment of quality as well as of quantity, and it will permit t

Panel to prepare an over-all program for Board consideration.

Moreover, such approval in our opinion would be in keepi

the NSC decision in 10/5 already mentioned; namely, to appr

principle as a national responsibility the immediate expansion 

covert organization established in NSC 10/2. . .” This was an ap

of an increase in order of magnitude.

2. With respect to the Panel’s job of screening particular pr

and projects for the Board, the following are some suggested 

sions which are submitted for ratification by the Board. As y

see, they are efforts to hang flesh on the 10/5 skeleton.

a. The 10/5 Panel should not be called upon to act like a 

manager of the program. This is properly the function of CIA

For example, one project calls for [less than 1 line not decla

We believe that the PSB should not be responsible for approvin

matters as (1) the exact type or amount of stores cached, (2) th

tion of the caches, or (3) safeguards to prevent physical deteri

or loss of secrecy. Anything recommended by the Case Officer 

proved by CIA and the 10/2 [10/5?] mechanism will be conside

sonable, in the absence of actual evidence to the contrary.

The PSB should be responsible for determining that:

(1) The procurement and caching of stores for retarda

reasonable;

(2) [less than 1 line not declassified] is a reasonable country in 

to prepare for retardation; and that (3) The scale of the effort is reasonable.

b. Other recommendations are:

(1) That the 10/2 Representatives continue to provide the d

day-to-day guidance to CIA, while the 10/5 Panel provides th

general guidance, including the strategic concepts to be develo

the PSB. Details should be worked out between the 10/2 Repr

tives and the 10/5 Panel.

(2) That when a program appears to contribute towa

achievement of a national objective, but also appears either to 

consistent with current national policy, or to be in an area wh

tional policy is not clearly defined, the 10/5 Panel should br

program to the attention of the Board.

For example, CIA has two major programs for China: (a) 

of Nationalist Government-controlled guerillas and resistance 

on the mainland [less than 1 line not declassified], and (b) support 

and all” anti-Nationalist anti-communist resistance groups 

mainland [less than 1 line not declassified]. Each program contrib

wards the national objective of reducing communist power in 
The programs, however, raise a basic question: Is U.S. Po

to strengthen the Nationalist Government as a rallying poin

anti-communist activities in China, (b) to encourage the devel

of a “Third Force” to assume control of all anti-communist acti

China at the expense of the Nationalists, or (c) to support at 

the time being both the Nationalist Government and to de

“Third Force”.

(3) That the 10/5 Panel may become concerned with the 

desirability of conducting a 10/5 program overtly rather than c

For example, the “Magnitude” paper points out that after 

forces have reached a certain size, attempts to maintain cover ar

lous. Therefore, an increase in guerilla or resistance forces would 

a further judgment as to the desirability of making the operatio

c. The 10/5 Panel should be authorized to ask questions d

to uncover hidden assumptions and implications in connecti

any matter germane to the responsibilities delegated to it by th

Annex

Distribution is as follows: C

General Walter Bedell Smith

Director of Central Intelligence Agency 

William C. Foster

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

David K. Bruce

Under Secretary of State 

Raymond B. Allen, Director

Psychological Strategy Board 

Frank G. Wisner, Deputy Director/Plans

Central Intelligence Agency 

[name not declassified]

Central Intelligence Agency 

Colonel Kilbourne Johnston

Assistant Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

Robert P. Joyce, Policy Planning Staff

Department of State 

Brigadier General Jesmond D. Balmer

Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Brigadier General John Magruder

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

for International Security Affairs–Psychological Policy 
C. Tracy Barnes, Deputy Director

Psychological Strategy Board 

Palmer Putnam, Special Assistant to the Director

Psychological Strategy Board 

Philip H. Watts, Policy Planning Staff

Department of State 

109. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bruc

to the Executive Secretary of the National Security 

Council (Lay)1

Washington, May 

SUBJECT

Fourth Progress Report on NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program 

Psychological Warfare Planning”

1. NSC 59/12 was approved as governmental policy on M

1950. It is requested that this progress report, as of April 15, 

activities undertaken in implementation of NSC 59/1, be circu

the members of the Council for their information.

2. The organization referred to in NSC 59/1 has been des

The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC)

be referred to in this report as “the Committee.”

3. This report describes only those foreign information ope

and plans which, being interdepartmental in nature, were coor

through the Committee.

4. Consequent to a reorganization of foreign information 

ties within the Department of State, the Chairmanship of the C

tee has been assumed by the Administrator, International Infor

Administration. The following are regularly represented at the 

meetings of the Committee: Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs 

the Mutual Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, A

Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State, and the Arm

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Miscellaneous Lot Files: Lot 62 D 385

Box 56. Top Secret; Security Information. Forwarded to NSC members under c

memorandum from Lay, May 7. (Ibid.) 2 Document 2.
and Air Force chiefs of psychological warfare and the Psych

Strategy Board staff.

5. Troop Acceptability Program

An operational plan for handling psychological problem

ing out of the presence of United States military personnel in 

has been approved by the Committee. The interdepartmental w

group which prepared this plan is now preparing another for 

with psychological problems connected with the presence of 

States military personnel in other areas of the world.

6. Soviet-Dominated Military Personnel

A plan for conducting overt psychological operations vis-à

armed forces of the Soviet-dominated world was prepared b

terdepartmental working group by direction of the Commit

Committee also approved and referred to appropriate operati

sions a number of interdepartmentally-developed propaganda 

to be used in output directed towards military personnel of th

and its captive countries.

7. General Assembly

On the Committee’s recommendation qualified informat

cialists were obtained from the Department of Defense and 

agency to support the public information staff of the United Sta

egation to the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in 

ber, 1951. These officers provided valuable assistance to the De

in the conduct of its information operations.

8. NATO Anniversary

The Committee provided advice and support in the prep

of interdepartmental plans for a broad program of informatio

ity of the U.S. and other NATO member countries to commemo

third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty i

1952. The Committee and its staff participated in arrangement

issuance of a special postage stamp commemorating the anniv

9. Television in Propaganda

An interdepartmental working group established by the C

tee has laid the groundwork for interdepartmental cooperatio

further development of television as a propaganda medium.

10. Operations Newsletter

A “Psychological Operations Newsletter” is issued monthl

Staff. The purpose of the newsletter is to keep appropriate of

POC member agencies, both in Washington and in field establis

informed of current activities in this field.
11. Training Program

In accordance with the Committee’s recommendation, 

panded program of on-the-job training is being conducted in th

Department for military officers assigned to psychological war

ganizations. Fourteen officers have completed the six-months 

or are now following the course.

12. Project Nobel

The Committee has approved and referred to the Internati

formation Administration in the Department of State, for imple

tion, a project designed to associate the living recipients of the 

peace prize with the ideals of the Free World.

13. Current Activities

Some of the more significant current activities of the Com

or its staff, in conjunction with the appropriate operating agenc

as follows:

a. Considering overt psychological warfare operations p

handling Communist charges that UN Forces are using bacteri

warfare in Korea.

b. Coordination, at the request of the Psychological S

Board, of overt psychological warfare operations plans to exp

success or failure of the Korean truce negotiations.

c. Coordinating interdepartmental propaganda activity w

spect to the Soviet note of March 10 dealing with a German peac

d. Review of a proposed statement on Communist sabo

peace negotiations in Korea, which could be issued by Genera

way in event of failure of the negotiations.

e. Interdepartmental planning for overt psychological war

erations following possible outbreak of general war. Known as 

Day Project,” the plans will be forwarded to the Psychologica

egy Board when completed and approved by the Committee.

f. Establishment of liaison arrangements between the Com

and the Information Liaison Group, a U.S. interdepartmental c

tee established in Paris to consider information and propagand

lems in the European area.

g. Development of overt psychological operations plans 

maintain continued Yugoslav independence from Soviet domi

David 

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Bruce signed the original.
110. Memorandum From the Secretary of State

s Special A

for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Secretary 

State Acheson1

Washington, May 

SUBJECT

Progress Report on NSC 50:2 The Central Intelligence Agency and Natio

Organization for Intelligence

The subject report represents General Smith’s account of h

ardship of the Central Intelligence Agency since he assumed 

October 1950; I believe that you will want to read it in full.3 It s

the considerable accomplishments of CIA during this period, th

problems which remain to be solved and a caveat as to what ma

sonably expected of the U.S. intelligence system, given the effic

the Soviet security organization. I would recommend that you 

ment General Smith on the report and on the progress it record

in a very large measure is attributable to his personal leadershi

There are three points to which your attention should be 

and which may be discussed in connection with the review 

Progress Report:

1. Covert Operations. You will observe that General Smith l

siderable stress on the greatly increased scope of this phase 

responsibilities (page 3, paragraph 4), pointing out that in the 

year the [2 lines not declassified]. While it would be undesirable 

exception to the preview given by General Smith of increased 

ties in this field, it would be well to indicate, in connection w

paragraph of the Progress Report, that the Department, for its 

constantly seeking to evaluate the effects of covert CIA opera

terms of overall U.S. objectives and in the light of changing 

tional conditions.

2. Departmental Information. General Smith states on pag

arrangements whereby CIA obtains information on the Depar

planning and policy “are reasonably satisfactory, although t

mains room for betterment.” (Similar arrangements with the 

services are described as “somewhat less than satisfactory

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 

Top Secret. Concurred in by G, S/P, and C. Transmitted through the Under 

and the Executive Secretariat. 2 For NSC 50, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intell

tablishment, Document 384. 3 Document 107.
should know that since the issuance of NSC 50 on July 1, 1949, 

partment has made intensive efforts to make available to CIA 

formation believed to be of concern to it. The Secretariat furn

CIA by rapid means a most comprehensive selection of the 

ment’s telegrams, including telegrams of a policy nature. Simil

telegraphic materials are furnished through one of my divisions

dition, a representative of CIA/OPC has access in Mr. Joyce’s o

the complete file of messages comparable to your daily “log”, sa

those items deleted by Mr. Joyce. Finally, arrangements have bee

whereby certain highly sensitive materials identified as of int

intelligence, such as the record of your recent conversations w

British Ambassador regarding Indochina, are made available by 

fice to the Director of Central Intelligence for highly-limited 

ternal distribution. In view of the nature of the planning and 

making process, and the high degree of security required, it 

doubtful that intelligence will ever be fully satisfied with the 

its information in this regard.

On the other hand, you should be aware that the flow o

mation described above is by no means reciprocated by CIA. P

and operational data are made available only as CIA determin

the Department’s interests are affected. Some information of dir

cern to the Department is not made available and access 

telegrams, which would provide a check on the adequacy of CIA

tices in this regard, is not permitted.

3. Current Intelligence. The Department has some reservat

the discussion in the report of “current intelligence”, to which 

Smith makes brief reference on page 1. The Dulles–Jackson Co

port of January 1949,4 on which NSC 50 is based, took exceptio

various current intelligence summaries (daily, weekly, and m

which were then being published by CIA. The Committee que

the need for such publications, pointing out that they consisted 

entirely of summaries of departmental telegrams (90 percent St

cluding both operational and intelligence material. The result, 

ing to the Committee, was “a fragmentary publication which de

operations as well as intelligence, without necessarily being b

the most significant materials in either category.” The Commit

cluded that (a) “in a summary of this type, circulated to the Pr

and the highest officials of the Government, there is an inhere

ger that it will be misleading to its consumers”; and (b) it du

at considerable expense of manpower and money, summarie

lated by the Department and other agencies.

4 For a summary of the Dulles Report, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, E

of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 358.
The production of these summaries has been improved a

our understanding that the President finds them of great value 

in itself, is reason for a continued effort in their production. 

partment, however, still finds many of the same objections that 

in 1949 and itself finds the summaries of little value. In partic

are concerned that the summaries frequently are the vehicle w

foreign policy problems, with CIA comment, are brought to th

tion of high officials of other agencies and the President, du

period when policy recommendations are being formulated an

the Department is prepared to suggest courses of action. We 

that with due regard for timeliness the provision of certain cu

telligence to the President and to the operating agencies of t

ernment could and should be based on the same principles o

bution and coordination among the agencies as is now effect

respect to National Intelligence Estimates.

Recommendations:

1. That you warmly commend General Smith on this rep

on the leadership he has brought to the Intelligence communi

2. That you state, with reference to CIA covert operations, 

Department, for its part, is constantly seeking to evaluate the e

covert CIA operations in terms of over-all U.S. objectives an

light of changing international conditions.

3. That, if the question is raised regarding the furnishing 

of information from the Department, you invite General Smith 

gest ways in which the existing liaison could be improved, be

mind that (a) his principal problem appears to be with the P

and (b) the flow of information from CIA likewise leaves some

be desired.

4. That, if the question is raised regarding current intellige

indicate that, while you recognize such publications are necess

appropriate for the President, you believe they would serve 

useful purpose if the principles of contribution and coordinatio

apply to National Intelligence were applied insofar as possible 

rent intelligence.

W. Park Armst
111. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Plann

Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)1

Washington, May 2

SUBJECT

Magnitude of CIA Operations

It occurred to me that you might be interested in some so

capitulation of the points brought out in the meeting in your off

terday afternoon in connection with today’s meeting of the PSB

are one or two new elements in the situation that came out of 

ular Wednesday meeting of the 10/2 Consultants yesterday aft

(I did not attend this meeting myself but my representative, Wi

McFadden, reported to me this morning.) The two new elemen

1. Assistant Director of CIA for OPC, Colonel Johnston, sta

if the PSB tomorrow (today) generally bought the CIA “Packet

would consider that it had finally obtained a charter which wou

mit it to expand in a large way and start creating on a world-w

sis an impressive covert apparatus necessary to accomplish 

quirements laid upon OPC of CIA. Colonel Johnston indicat

favorable action today by the PSB would have CIA budgetary 

cance as well. The implication of this is that the CIA could 

forward to obtain the vast amount specified in the “Packet”.

2. General Balmer of the Joint Strategic Plans Division adv

the meeting yesterday that the JCS had finally approved the OP

plan”3 and would communicate such approval with its com

within about one week.

In connection with paragraph one above, there is quoted 

cerpt from a memorandum presented to the Senior Staff of the 

June 8, 1951 by Frank G. Wisner:4

“Unless the decision is made now to provide the resour

apparatus capable of undertaking covert operations of this mag

the United States will not be in a position to conduct such 

activities as national policy may require. Therefore, failure to 

decision at this time is in effect a decision not to proceed w

1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files: NSC 10 Series, 1952

cret; Security Information. Drafted by Joyce. Copy 1 of 6. A handwritten note 

orandum reads “Copies 3, 4 and 5, sent to, seen by & returned by, Nitze, Sarg

Armstrong—destroyed on 9.11.53.” All elipses in the original. 2 See footnote 7, Document 107.

3 Document 61.

4 Not found.
build-up required to implement current national policy as ex

in NSC 68 and other applicable NSC directives”.

I think you might desire to keep in mind the following c

ations at the PSB meeting this afternoon:

a. Paragraph 5 of NSC 10/2 of June 18, 19485 states: “As 

this directive ‘covert operations’ are understood to be all activi

cept as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by th

ernment against hostile foreign states or groups or in sup

friendly states or groups but which are so planned and execu

the United States Government responsibility for them is not ev

unauthorized persons and if uncovered the United States Gove

can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. . . .” The q

might reasonably be asked General Smith if present plans to 

very large “covert apparatus” can possibly meet the requirem

the foregoing provisions of NSC 10/2. Will not large CIA ba

world-wide scale soon be recognized for what they are? Will i

impossible under these circumstances for this Government p

to disclaim any responsibility?

b. Although NSC 10/2 authorizes OPC “in coordination w

JCS to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in w

will not in fact the establishment of large bases for training g

warriors and for staging air drops behind the lines in case of w

have important political repercussions in peacetime?

c. If the CIA proceeds to establish such large and neces

least semi-overt bases throughout the world, all in the line o

rations for a hot war, will not the impression be created in th

lin that this Government is busily preparing to attack the Soviet 

Will not the Russians point to these large and populous base

dence to support their thesis that the United States intends to 

a global war against the motherland of the workers? Will not 

lies in the West react unfavorably and themselves be fearful 

United States is in fact preparing perhaps not to bring about a 

at least engaging in provocative action which might inspire 

from the East leading to increasing danger of war?

d. Does General Smith himself think that he can create 

“covert apparatus” on a world-wide basis which has any chanc

ever of maintaining its covert nature?

e. How effective does General Smith consider the retardat

would be in case of a hot war? Does problematical assistanc

military effort in case of a hot war over-balance the moral a

chological factors referred to in the previous paragraphs?

5 For NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intell

tablishment, Document 292.
f. By generally approving of the 

Packet does the Depart

State endorse in a blanket fashion JCS and CIA plans for prepa

a hot war?

g. Is it a fact, as we understood General Smith to believe 

ago, that CIA planning for a hot war de-emphasizes and limits 

fectiveness of CIA as an intelligence agency and an agency d

to operate covertly in the field of political warfare for the ultim

jective of achieving cold war objectives thus lessening the cha

and perhaps preventing the outbreak of all-out warfare?

I believe that these questions trouble us here in the State 

ment. You may care to recommend that some of these conside

should be studied by the 10/5 Panel before it recommends to 

that the CIA “Packet” should at this time be generally approv

Robert 

112. Letter From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant f

Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Director of C

Intelligence Smith1

Washington, June 

Dear General Smith:

As you know, National Security Council Intelligence Direct

102 places upon the Department of State primary responsibility 

collection abroad, by overt means, of information in the basic s

The Department, under this directive, has additional second

sponsibilities for collection in other scientific and technical fiel

On a limited scale, the Department has, during the past tw

endeavored to meet these responsibilities. The experience gain

ing this period of time has confirmed the importance of several 

in the collection of scientific information:

a. Except in the case of the USSR and its satellites (including 

the traditional and normal channels of intercommunication betw

and foreign scientists are capable of furnishing a large portion 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Atomic Energ

Security Information. Drafted by Theodore M. Nordbeck on May 29. 2 For NSCID No. 10, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the In

Establishment, Document 429.
information required for intelligence purposes. The normal chann

prise interchange of published works and scientific periodicals, 

cal visits and attendance at international meetings and conferen

b. In the case of the USSR and satellites, the limited info

available through normal channels can be effectively supple

only by carefully planned covert activities.

c. In the case of non-Soviet areas, the information which is 

to supplement that received through the normal and tradition

nels mentioned above principally relates either to a specific fiel

entific effort and to research which has not yet reached the pub

stage, or to an overall evaluation of scientific potential in one 

broad fields.

d. The types of information mentioned in (c) above can 

quired most efficiently and economically through overt mea

vided the following factors are kept in mind:

1. The use of relatively young or scientifically unknown 

uals will, in most cases, not only be ineffective, but may tend 

up even the normal channels of intercommunication. Profita

tact with foreign scientists can usually be expected only where 

a reasonable quid pro quo, that is, when the US scientist is a q

leader in a given field, and when the basis of the contact is a le

exchange of scientific ideas and experiences. Relatively unkn

dividuals who only ask questions quickly arouse resentment 

luctance, since it is obvious that their principal purpose is to ex

formation, giving nothing in return. 2. Every effort must be made to keep the collection of bas

tific information removed from the taint of intelligence. Infra

this principle may not only hinder the overt operation, but m

ardize contacts and sources essential to the success of covert ope

3. The degree to which a US scientist can be successful in 

ing information on a specific or general scientific field depen

his own ability and competence in that field rather than upon 

tailed briefing by intelligence.

The Department is keenly aware of the importance of carry

its responsibilities under NSCID–10, and desires to expand its 

activities in this respect. The following steps should be taken 

direction, some of which can be accomplished within the Depar

present resources; others will require additional support.

a. The Department can collect the bulk of basic scientific 

available in published form which CIA requires.

b. The existing scientific attachés can undertake to collect 

additional information which CIA may require within their ind

fields of competence.

c. With appropriate financial assistance, known and co

specialists can be selected and sent overseas for limited period

to three months to cover specific fields of science on a strictly o
sis. These consultants would function in the same manner as 

science attachés, and would make their reports to the office of 

ence Advisor, Department of State. They would have no dire

nection with CIA in any way.

d. The office of the Science Advisor, with additional staf

sistance, could undertake a more extensive program of debrief

entists and engineers who have visited foreign areas under 

sponsorship. The use of this office, which while it has no appare

nection with intelligence, is directly and openly concerned w

ence, will in many cases be more fruitful than debriefing by th

ligence agencies themselves.

e. With adequate financial assistance the Department can i

the competence and scope of coverage of US representation t

national scientific conferences and congresses abroad. It is believ

such meetings are extremely profitable occasions for the inter

of scientific information and ideas, particularly in acquiring pr

cation knowledge of work in progress.

In accordance with paragraphs 1,d and 1,f of NSCID–10, th

views and suggestions are submitted to the Central Intelligence 

for consideration, both as to their validity, and as a basis for furt

cussion as to the degree of support to the overt scientific collec

tivities of the Department which might be appropriate and justi

Sincerely yours,

W. Park Armstro

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.

113. Memorandum by the Director of Naval Intelligence

(Johnson)1

ONI Instruction 003820.36A Washington, June 

SUBJECT

Exploitation of maritime sources for intelligence purposes

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278

Folder 17. Secret; Security Information. The memorandum was sent to “Distrib

F28 (less DIC–17ND),” which has not been identified.
1. Purpose. This instruction outlines an agreement between 

fice of Naval Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agen

cerning the exploitation of maritime sources for intelligence pu

2. Cancellation. ONI Instruction 003820.363 is cancelled 

perseded by this instruction.

3. Background. The National Security Council places the r

bility for the collection of foreign intelligence from domestic 

with the Central Intelligence Agency. Because of the extensiv

interest in maritime matters, and the capabilities of the DIO

ploiting this field, a mutually satisfactory agreement has been 

by ONI and CIA.

4. Procedure.

a. Counter-Intelligence and Security. The exploitation of m

Sources, including but not limited to, masters, officers, crews

tors, owners and agents for counter-intelligence and security pu

is the responsibility of the District Intelligence Officers witho

clearance or coordination with CIA.

b. Foreign Intelligence, Owners, Operators and Agents. Expl

of owners, operators and agents for the purposes of foreign inte

is the primary responsibility of CIA. If deemed advisable howe

subject to prior coordination with the CIA field office, these 

may be exploited for foreign intelligence purposes by the DIO

interviews will be arranged, and at his option participated in

cognizant field representative of CIA. Primary responsibility of 

in this field does not restrict or affect in any way the responsi

the DIOs under paragraph 4a of this instruction.

c. Foreign Intelligence, Masters, Officers and Crews. The expl

of masters, officers and crews of merchant vessels for foreign 

gence purposes is the responsibility of the DIOs. Direct access 

to such sources, in exceptional cases, is not precluded by thi

ment; however such special interviews will be arranged by th

d. Dissemination.

(1) Foreign Positive Intelligence. Foreign positive intellige

tained by DIOs from maritime sources, either afloat or ashore, 

made available to the CIA field office for ultimate appropri

semination by CIA in Washington. The DIOs shall simultaneou

mit reports of such intelligence to ONI for dissemination wi

Naval establishment. Every effort will be made to secure d

copies of enclosures, in order that the CIA field office and the D

2 Known as the “Salt Water Agreement.”

3 Not found.
each forward a copy to Washington. In the event that only a sing

of enclosures is available, and reproduction is impracticable, th

be forwarded to CIA.

(2) Counter-Intelligence. All counter intelligence and infor

secured under the SOMM plan4 will be forwarded to ONI for a

and dissemination. No lateral distribution of such reports will b

to CIA field offices by the DIOs.

e. Sources.

(1) Counter-Intelligence. The names of counter-intelligence 

ants shall not be disclosed to CIA.

(2) Foreign Intelligence Sources. The names of sources fur

foreign intelligence exclusively, whether connected with the m

field or not, will be furnished to CIA field offices.

(3) Overlapping Sources. It is considered probable that som

itime sources, as listed in paragraph 4c of this instruction, will 

classified by the DIOs as counter-intelligence informants or 

plan participants. The release of names of such sources to the C

office is subject to the discretion of the DIO. Sufficient source d

tion will be furnished the CIA field office to obviate false confir

but extreme care is urged in such disclosure that sensitive sourc

plying both types of information are not jeopardized.

f. Requirements. IAC requirements for foreign intelligenc

sources in paragraph 4c of this instruction will be coordinated 

as necessary. General Navy requirements covering the exploit

these sources are presently in the hands of the DIOs, and furth

cific requirements will be furnished from time to time by ON

will make every effort to alert the pertinent CIA field office to 

rival of ships from high priority areas, or of unusual foreign 

gence potential. In such cases a CIA representative may furnis

agency requirements or participate in the interview if necessar

g. DIO–CIA Field Office Relationship. It is manifestly impos

exactly delimit all rights, responsibilities or privileges under a

agency agreement, such as this one, developed within the fram

of NSCID No. 7.5 It is possible, however, to fashion such an agr

into an effective instrument for the complete intelligence expl

of the maritime field. The catalyst required is an amicable wor

lationship between the DIOs and the CIA field offices, which c

be based upon a sympathetic understanding of each other’s pr

and a desire to cooperate in a common effort. District Inte

Officers are directed to make every effort consistent with 

4 Not further identified.

5 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 427.
directives to formulate such a working relationship at the earl

ment, and resolve such local problems as arise in connection w

agreement.

R. F

6 Printed from a copy that bears the typed signature of Deputy Director 

Intelligence Stout who signed for Johnson.

114. Editorial Note

NSC 114/3, “United States Programs for National Securit

5, 1952, included Summary Statement No. 7—Foreign Intellige

Related Activities, prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. 

of Summary Statement No. 7, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, 

II, Part 1, pages 50–53.

115. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory

Committee1

IAC–M–73 Washington, June 

Director of Central Intelligence

General Walter Bedell Smith

Presiding*2

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Loftus E. Becker

Presiding*

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Community Management 

82–00400R, Box 1. Secret; Security Information. The meeting was held in the D

ference room. 2 Asterisks refer to footnote in the original minutes reading, “For p

meeting.”
MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department o

Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G

Department of the Army

Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence, Departme

of the Navy

Colonel Edward H. Porter, acting for Director of Intelligence, Headquar

United States Air Force

*Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence, Atomic E

Commission

Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for Intelligence

The Joint Staff

Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau o

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Ralph Clark, Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. R. J. Sontag, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Paul Borel, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Ludwell L. Montague, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Edgar Hoover, Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. William P. Bundy, Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. Chester Cooper, Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. Harold Ford, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Richard Drain, Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. [name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State

Mr. R. M. Scammon, Department of State

Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Department of State

Mr. Joseph A. Yeager, Department of State

Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army

Lieut. Colonel H. N. Maples, Department of the Army

Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy

Colonel Charles F. Gillis, Department of the Air Force

Colonel S. M. Lansing, The Joint Staff

Colonel John D. Tolman, The Joint Staff

James Q. 

S

Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the last meeting, 29 May 

(IAC–M–72) were approved.4

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

4 IAC minutes are in Central Intelligence Agency, Community Managem

Job 82–00400R, Box 1.
RDB Request for Intelligence Estimate of Soviet Scientific and

Technological Capabilities (IAC–D–51)5

2. Action: Agreed that the RDB request would be met by 

if this proved to be within the latter’s capability. In this even

understood that the JIC would arrange for the RDB promptly 

draw their request on the DCI.

3. Discussion: It was pointed out that the JIC had a study 

progress (JIC 603/1)6 which was along the lines of the RDB re

was thought probable that with some adaptation this study wo

isfy the RDB request and also serve as a scientific and technolog

tribution for NIE–65.7 General Smith stated that a component of 

fense Department, such as RDB, should, where possible, 

intelligence support from the military intelligence agencies. The 

isfies the intelligence requirements of the NSC and, although w

satisfy a need of such organizations as RDB, if practicable, will 

to have such needs satisfied elsewhere. In response to a questi

eral Smith agreed that CIA components would be willing to giv

mal assistance to the military analysts, to the extent that was p

ble in the light of their other duties, but made it clear that CIA d

participate in JIC estimates and assumes no responsibility there

should develop that the JIC could not without outside contributio

the RDB need and the RDB request is not withdrawn, then the DC

he would expect to try to satisfy the request on a community b

[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]

5 Not found.

6 Not found.

7 NIE 65, “Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through 1957,” approved June 16, 

tional Archives, RG 263, Central Intelligence Agency Files)
116. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Nat

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Counci

Washington, June 1

SUBJECT

Organized and Coordinated Program of Covert Preclusive Buying

REFERENCES

A. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated 

February 11, 19522

B. NSC 104/2, pars. 11 and 123

C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Assignment of 

Responsibilities for Economic Defense,” dated November 7, 1951 

and January 25, 19524

Pursuant to Reference A, the Senior NSC Staff requested t

nomic Defense Advisory Committee (formerly the Mutual Trade S

Advisory Committee) to prepare a study of the desirability and 

ity of the initiation of a preclusive buying program. The enclosed 

was prepared by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee in r

to this request; was submitted through the Department of State; a

discussed by the Senior NSC Staff which concurred in it with 

ments incorporated therein. The Senior NSC Staff considered that 

ommendations in paragraph 10 of the enclosure are in accordan

existing policy contained in NSC 104/2, and that action by the N

Security Council on these recommendations is, therefore, not req

In the light of the above, the Secretary of State, pursuant 

erence C, is directing the implementation of the recommendatio

tained in the enclosure through the Economic Defense Advisor

mittee. The enclosed report is accordingly circulated herewith 

information of the National Security Council to indicate the 

which is being taken on the basis of the memorandum of the 

man, National Security Resources Board, in Reference A.

James S. 

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Secret; Security Information. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, 

of Commerce, Acting Director of Defense Mobilization, and the Director of th

of the Budget. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.)

3 For NSC 104/2, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. I, pp. 1059–1064. 4 The November 7, 1951, memorandum circulated to the National Secur

cil a November 6 memorandum on the subject from President Truman, which 

ibid., p. 1214. The January 25 memorandum is in National Archives, RG 59, Cen

1950–54, 460.509/1–2552. 5 Not printed.
117. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/2 (Rev

Washington, June 1

PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICAL NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

In accordance with DCI 4/1,2 paragraph 3, the following l

der of priority of critical national intelligence objectives, with 

to the USSR and its Satellites (including Communist China) i

lished; so the highest priority shall be given to the collection 

mation and to the production of intelligence concerning Sov

Satellite capabilities and intentions for:

1. taking direct military action against the Continental 

States;

2. taking direct military action, employing USSR and 

Armed Forces, against vital U.S. possessions, areas periphera

Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;

3. interfering with U.S. strategic air attack;

4. interfering with U.S. movement of men and material b

transport;

5. production and stockpiling, including location of insta

and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical w

and equipment, and critical transportation equipment;

6. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to 

tional security, short of commitment of Soviet and Satellite 

Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage obj

7. interfering with U.S. political, psychological, and e

courses of action for the achievement of critical U.S. aims and ob

Walter B

Director of Central Int

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 7

Box 1. Secret; Security Information. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., History Staff Job 84–T00389R, HS/HC–600, Box 4)

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
118. Letter From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Ken

the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)1

Moscow, June 1

Dear Doc:

I propose in this letter to speak about matters of such delic

I want you to know before you get into it that it is a letter of 

am keeping no copy, and one which you will probably wish to 

as soon as you have read it.

Since my arrival in Moscow I have become increasingly a

a situation which not only gives me great concern but which s

involve a very important question of principle concerning the 

of our Government as a whole toward this mission and the fu

which it is supposed to perform. I am prepared to go ahead 

cide these questions on my own formal responsibility here, bu

ing so I wish to make sure that the situation is clearly unders

Washington and that my decision here is in accord with the 

authoritative circles in our Government. It is for this reason th

mentioning the matter to you.

I find upon arrival here and upon closer acquaintance with 

tivities of the staff that during the past two or three years th

sion—and by that I mean its personnel, premises and extrate

status—has been intensively and somewhat recklessly exploited 

military intelligence-gathering agencies of the Government f

particular purposes. Their representatives here have, I am afrai

encouraged by their home offices to utilize intensively such f

as they enjoy here by virtue of their diplomatic status, for the p

of assembling every possible shred of information on military s

I do not find that their instructions have called upon them to t

equate account of the effects their actions might have on the 

political and diplomatic potential of the mission, or on those ve

ileges and facilities from which they were profiting. So far as I 

alyze the point of view which lies behind these activities, it is on

has not considered the diplomatic potential of this mission as 

to be seriously taken into account, and which assumes the ve

tence of the mission as a short term provisorium, to be ruthles

intensively exploited while it lasts.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 120.32161/6–

Secret.
I would like to be able to list for you a number of the fac

cidents which lead me to make these observations. Actually, 

bring myself to put them on paper for obvious reasons. I can o

the following about them:

1. Many of them are quite shocking and surprising, alm

credible to anyone who has had any extensive familiarity w

diplomatic profession.

2. In several instances little or no effort has been made t

detection by the Soviet authorities. In certain instances actio

been performed here under the very lenses of Soviet photog

appointed for the purpose of photographing them, and those 

were ones which the Soviet Government had specifically wa

were contrary to local law.

3. Many of these actions seem to me to have been of a 

and “Boy Scout” nature, which, in addition to serving as proo

Soviet Government of systematic misuse of our diplomatic statu

have brought smiles to the faces of higher Soviet authorities a

not have contributed to Soviet respect for the mission.

4. Many of the targets are ones which I think could eas

been reached by other and less dangerous methods.

5. In general, these activities have been the result not of 

neous initiative on the part of the men out here, but of pressu

upon them by their own superiors in Washington.

These activities have had and are having three effects whic

it is important for our Government to note:

1. They are self-defeating in that they lead to a steady an

ual curtailment of the very facilities which they exploit.

I have no doubt whatsoever that the curtailment of travel 

mission represents a reaction of the Soviet authorities to the exten

ploitation of travel facilities by this and other missions for purpose

cannot be viewed by them as legitimate. The same is true of th

and total isolation of the diplomatic corps here, including even 

missions, from contact with the Soviet people. These things hav

bly had a good deal to do with the extraordinary pressures pu

servant and custodial staffs of diplomatic missions. If they are co

we must expect a steady increase in the severity of these restrict

point where life will become practically impossible for foreigner

city unless they wish to sit like prisoners within their buildings 

served by imported servants. The upshot of this is that activitie

nature must be predicated upon a lack of concern for mainten

those very facilities whose existence they assume and exploit.

2. These activities have a deleterious effect on the actua

matic potential of the mission, i.e., of its value as a political re
unit and a channel of communication with the Soviet Governme

have already probably reduced its possibilities significantly i

fields.

What has been said above about the exhaustion of these c

for intelligence purposes has its application in even greater de

the normal purposes that these facilities were supposed to serv

the increasing isolation of the diplomatic corps, the curtailm

travel facilities, and the constant increase in Soviet vigilance v

foreigners, you have the ruin of those last vestigial positions 

made possible, even in a minor way, something resembling nor

and travel in this country. Not only that, but one cannot help 

that the attitude of members of the Soviet Government and off

the Foreign Office toward individual diplomatic officers of our 

must be affected by what they know of the uses to which the 

is daily being put. This applies particularly to the ambassador h

the Soviet authorities can only conclude either that he is aware 

responsible for this employment of his mission, or that he is no

of it or is powerless to stop it. In the first case, they must rega

as the major offender. In either of the latter cases they must reg

as a secondary figure-head who is only being put up for form

protocol purposes like their own ambassadors abroad. I hard

emphasize to you how serious a factor this is. In the end, the g

litical judgments about the nature of Soviet power, its psycholo

its intentions, are of vastly greater importance to our Governme

detailed tidbits of tactical information about the Soviet armed 

much of which can be obtained in other places of (if really well-

people are used) by other and more desirable methods. Yet we 

riously handicapped, in our ability to arrive at these major jud

by the retaliatory actions brought upon us by these periphera

ties of the mission. Furthermore, the maintenance of the missi

channel of communication with the Soviet Government is som

which may be rarely of practical importance but when the m

does come that it is of any value at all, then its importance can b

mous. In the burdening and reduction of the ambassadorial p

by the tolerance of these activities our Government is really t

heavy responsibility in the face of the uncertainties of the futu

3. The continuance of this type of activity actually places 

ardy, in my opinion, the physical security of the members of t

sion and their families.

Thus far the Soviet authorities have been very correct in 

spect, and no American official or employee has, in recent yea

fered (to my knowledge) any physical damage or open unpleasa

However, we know very well that the Soviet authorities are asse

a careful, and, I fear, impressive record of all of our activities. Th
diary is only a small part, I am sure, of what they have in their 

We also know that in the more remote past there have been in

when unwise Americans met with physical violence, judici

monses and other forms of unpleasantness. We must remember 

American employees here—and by this I mean all those person

the diplomatic list—are by Soviet usage completely devoid o

matic immunity for any violations of Soviet law. We have not 

to challenge seriously this position of the Soviet authorities. Tha

that these people are all extremely vulnerable and can in most in

very easily be framed and made subject to court action at any 

Finally, you have the several possibilities that out of the 

delicate international situation there might arise either a ruptu

lations between our countries or an actual state of war. In either 

events, I think it entirely possible, if not likely, that individua

bers of our staff, and perhaps the whole staff might suffer serio

virtue of these activities that have been conducted in the past. O

ernment must therefore realize that if it wishes such activiti

continued at this post, it cannot hold the ambassador and ot

cers of the mission responsible for the maximum safety of mem

the staff in the face of possible consequences that may ensue.

I am aware that this is hardly a matter on which direct wr

structions can be issued to this mission, and not even one abou

there can be official correspondence. I do not wish to place t

ernment in the position of having to give me any written inst

of an undesirable nature. I am therefore writing this letter to 

first of all, that I propose to issue orders to all members of this 

that they are expected to comply strictly with Soviet laws and 

tions so far as they are known, and also they are to avoid eve

of public behavior which might be expected to give the impre

local citizens and officials that they are engaged in improper a

This applies particularly to the use of cameras, radio receiving s

other electrical and auditory devices, and to the visiting or in

of installations or areas of a known military significance. I have 

discussed these matters with the service attachés, who have ta

observations in good part. But one of them points out that t

mean important modifications in his policies and activities, a

these modifications are not apt to be agreeable to his home of

Secondly, I would like to ask that you call to the attentio

heads of the various intelligence-gathering agencies the fact t

is my intention, and that you ascertain whether any of them i

agreement with this position and considers that it is, on balanc

mental to United States interests.

Thirdly, in case there is this feeling on the part of any o

sponsible heads of the agencies involved, I would earnestly 
that you have this matter taken to a high interdepartmental age

thorough discussion and settlement.

Fourth, if my proposed position here meets with the full 

standing and approval of the Government—so that I need not f

any subsequent reproach will rest upon me or this mission for 

duct in this matter—then I will expect no reply of any sort to th

munication, and I will understand that silence means consent.

Fifth, if, on the other hand, it is the considered view of 

propriate higher authorities of our Government that the practice

in mind are of an importance such as to override the disadvan

which I have pointed, and if, therefore, it is the desire of the G

ment that I not alter any of the existing practices, then I would 

ciate it if you could find means simply to inform me that my 

this date has been duly considered but that the Government 

grounds for alteration of existing practices. In such case, how

want it clearly understood, both by the Secretary and the Pr

that I cannot properly be held responsible for such deterioration 

ensue in the value of this mission both as an observation post 

a channel of communication with the Soviet Government, or 

other unhappy consequences.

I am sorry to have to write this letter, but if you will put y

in my place you will see that I have no choice but to do so. I 

allow to proceed a progressive deterioration in the actual dip

potential of a mission entrusted to my care, on a vague assu

that this is what the Government wants. On the other hand, I 

without at least apprising the Government of what I am doing a

ing it an opportunity to overrule me, take administrative measu

which might later conceivably lead to my being charged with 

deprived the United States Government of valuable informati

prejudiced the military interests of the country.2

Very sincerely yours,

George F. K

2 On July 7, Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of Sta

telligence and Research, sent a note to Matthews and followed up with a lette

15 informing him that the Services were asking for copies of Kennan's letter. H

gested that the Department obtain Kennan's agreement to show it to them. (I

July 22 memorandum, Howe stated that Matthews agreed, Kennan was qu

agreed, and that he and Walworth Barbour discussed it with senior represen

the Services. All said they had no serious objection to Kennan's proposals. (

cording to a handwritten note by Howe on the July 22 memorandum, Matthe

letter to Kennan to this effect, but Matthews' letter has not been found. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Kennan signed the original.
P.S. Two afterthoughts:

I neglected to mention above that I am afraid the situatio

described in this letter has led to a certain amount of bitterness 

this mission on the part of other missions in the city, who feel th

status has also been worsened and their opportunities reduced 

sult of our activities. I think there is something in this, if we t

consideration, in addition to the activities discussed in this le

discretions that have been committed by individual American

form of publication or leakage of information about their relatio

other missions and with Soviet citizens here.

Secondly, I should make it plain that the reason I am add

this letter to you now is that the first severe test of the policy I 

to enforce here will come in connection with the Soviet Air Fo

on June 28. I shall not be here myself, but I have given inst

through Hugh Cumming that there is to be no photographin

tening activity on the roofs of Embassy premises here which ca

tected and photographed from other roofs (as has been don

past). If the consensus of authoritative opinion in Washington 

indicate that to Hugh by telegraphic message as suggested ab

will permit the activities; but my own feeling is that it is hig

wise and is bound to appear some day in a propaganda white 

some other disagreeable form, as proof of the systematic abus

American Embassy of its diplomatic status and of its violation 

Soviet laws and regulations.

4 The initials are typed.
119. Memorandum From President Truman to the Chairman 

the Psychological Strategy Board (Smith)1

Washington, June 2

SUBJECT

Organization of Psychological Strategy Board

I have been giving consideration to the organization of t

chological Strategy Board and particularly to the question of w

the directive of April 4, 1951,2 establishing it should be amen

addition to the recommendations of the Board’s first Director 

recommendations of the Board included in your useful and co

tive memorandum of May 16,3 I have had the report of a stu

dertaken at my direction by the Director of the Bureau of the 

It is my view that, as you recommend, no change in the d

of April 4, 1951, or in the organization of the Board should be m

this time. The Board’s decision to rotate the chairmanship, with 

rector taking his turn as presiding officer is consistent with th

of the directive of April 4, 1951.

Adjustments in the relationships of the Director with the N

Security Council and of the Board with the Joint Chiefs of St

ommended in your memorandum similarly can be made wit

framework of the existing directive and are consistent with it

speak with the Executive Secretary of the National Security 

relative to the former. Appropriate representation of the Joint C

Staff with the Board can be arranged by the Secretary of Defen

I believe that it would be helpful to me if the Board could 

occasions when I might become more directly informed of it

particularly of its evaluation of the national psychological 

through a meeting with the Board, the Director and the Execut

retary of the National Security Council.

I am transmitting the report of the Director of the Bureau 

Budget on the organization of the Psychological Strategy Bo

study and appropriate action by the Board.4 The report emphas

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Confidential File. T

Security Information. A June 13 memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Dir

Lawton to President Truman indicates that the proposed memorandum to S

been discussed with Souers, Lay, and Smith, and that all were in agreement with 

2 See Document 60.

3 Not printed. (Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Confidentia

4 Attached but not printed is the April 21 report entitled “The Psycholog

egy Board: Selected Aspects of Its Concept, Organization and Operations.”
primary usefulness of the Board as an instrument for more e

planning through the organized utilization of the resources of 

ticipating agencies. The report further stresses the need for in

emphasis upon the Board’s responsibilities for forward plann

in the evaluation of the total national psychological effort. I 

larly commend these sections of the report to the attention of th

Harry S. T

5 Printed from a copy that indicates Truman signed the original.

120. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of Nationa

Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kent) to 

Deputy Director of Intelligence of the Central Intellig

Agency (Becker)1

Washington, July 

SUBJECT

The Problem of Scientific and Technical Intelligence

1. Herewith some thoughts on the problem of scientific a

nical intelligence which are pretty close to convictions with m

2. Without in any way trying to derogate the importance 

extraordinary difficulty of your administrative problems, let m

that had O/NE not had the assistance of O/SI in drafting the 

SIE–5,2 that estimate would have been a quite different and far

useful document. In fact, it is my belief that without O/SI’s i

tation of the evidence and with no corrective for service interp

of the evidence, C/NE could have done nothing but accept t

ice interpretation which in the light of what I learned from O/S

have been an over-reassuring one.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Job 84–00022R, Box 

12. Secret. 2 Reference is presumably to NIE–5, “The Scale and Nature of the Soviet A

Effort, 1952–54,” December 3, 1951. (Ibid., National Intelligence Council, Job 79

Box 2, Folder 1)
3. Obviously this is for your private eye and just as obvio

give it any further circulation it will be to Washington Platt on a

Only” basis.

Sherman 

Attachment4

Some Thoughts on the Problem of Scientific and 

Technical Intelligence

1. In any country’s security system there are elements upon 

the country in question places great store. These are truly its se

security.

2. Generally speaking these secrets of security if they are 

themselves scientific and technical at least rest on scientific an

nological developments. Ask yourself: Knowledge of what twe

secrets of security would I be most concerned to keep from the 

How many of the twenty really lie outside the scientific/technic

3. The importance which a country attaches to any of th

ments in its security system is an index of that country’s desire 

them secret from all outsiders. Thus the more important they 

more difficult they become as intelligence targets.

4. The security measures in operation in the USSR have b

culiarly successful in the scientific/technical areas. It would 

guess that in no part of our knowledge of Soviet secrets of sec

the ratio of fixed points to voids so large. In the matter of the 

around which Soviet air defense capabilities are built, the pa

fixed points is dramatic in the extreme.

5. In the last analysis the mission of intelligence is to dr

meaningful and objective generalization from the data.

a. If the data, or fixed points, are numerous and the voids b

them small, then meaningful, objective, and probably correct g

izations can be drawn.

b. If the data, or fixed points, are few and the voids betwee

large, meaningful generalizations can still be drawn. But who i

that they are objective and/or probably correct? Who is to say t

anything but pure fiction?

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

4 Secret.
6. In case 5b above, the generalizer, minimally confined 

rected by fixed points, may be engulfed by forces wholly ext

to the problem at hand. It is here that he may be consciously 

consciously taken over by his hopes, his wishes, and his fear

those of his friends or the institution he works for. (I refer yo

men who have designed maps of the heavens and who have 

ized the muscular Orion and his club, belt, and lion skin from 

or so stars.) What he comes up with is something far differe

and usually far more or less than the meager suggestions of t

points. The added something is not from the data; it is from h

7. As long as the national intelligence community can fix 

atively few points in key scientific and technical development

USSR and as long as the voids between these points are very lar

eralizations by any single individual or single intelligence in

may be dangerously skewed by individual wish or institution 

8. Ask yourself: “What would I wish if my future were inte

with that of one of the armed services?” You would wish to b

of the best damn outfit of its sort in existence—an outfit that co

liver enough lethal power to destroy any enemy in a single att

do it without losing a man.

9. Ask yourself the next question: What do I do to get my 

If you are in intelligence you may do two things.

a. To assure yourself that your service will get the funds 

it the best damn outfit of its sort in existence you will not pla

the enemy. You will build him up, especially in gross terms o

fensive capability.

b. To assure yourself that once you’ve got the best damn 

the world, it will carry out its mission you begin to take away f

enemy. You will take away notably in the area of his defensiv

bilities. You are not quite so certain to do this as to build up h

sive capabilities, because of the perils involved. You know tha

significantly undervalue his defensive capabilities and plans ar

upon your evaluation your service may be cruelly hurt in th

You finally fix the point of his defensive capabilities at the plac

the curve of your wish intersects the curve of your fear. The fixe

are so few that you can easily draw your curves to accommoda

10. When you have done these two things you have do

more than describe the ideal enemy; the enemy big enough to 

the perfection of your outfit, but an enemy who is nevertheless 

over in a showdown.

11. You can do this in the field of scientific and technica

gence on the USSR, and no one can say you may [nay?] so lon

ratio of fixed points to voids remains what it is.

12. The above is a long way of spelling out my doubts a

virtues of assigning to given departmental intelligence organiz
primary responsibility in any of the specific areas of scient

technical intelligence. All along I have feared the generalizatio

that ONI may make of the fixed points and voids re Soviet un

ter warfare techniques, that G–2 may make re Soviet tank desi

A–2 may make re Soviet GCI and A–2 radar and AAA. I have h

been somewhat comforted by realizing that if any single service 

up with a wishful generalization, this generalization may be o

to the wish of another service; that the other service will posses

data of the first and that it will be capable of drawing its own 

or opposing generalization.

13. If a service is duly invested with “primary” responsibi

if at the same time it possesses sources of information which it 

may not share with other services and if it chooses not to sh

chances of another service developing a variant or opposing g

ization have shrunk considerably and may have shrunk to a

mate zero.

14. We are in a position today where we cannot anticipat

(a) a dramatic decrease in the ratio of voids to fixed points in t

of scientific and technical developments in the USSR or (b) a d

change in human nature. As long as we do not take out in

against the acceptance of a generalization that must perforce 

heavily of the wish, we are asking for trouble. If I were carry

statutory responsibilities of the DCI the minimum insurance I 

take out would be as follows:

a. Keep O/SI in business pretty much as it is today—e

deavor to strengthen some of its divisions. The ones I would stre

would be those dealing with the most important subject mat

spective of whether another agency had been awarded “prim

sponsibility in this subject matter.

b. Set up a machinery to insure that no one scientific/techn

telligence outfit withheld information which it may have dev

and which it found useful in drawing its own generalizations.
121. Memorandum From the Director of the Armed Forces

Security Agency (Canine) to Secretary of Defense Lov

Washington, July 

SUBJECT

Brownell Committee Report2

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum of 23 June 19523

1. After a careful study of the report of the Brownell Com

I have concluded that it presents a fair and essentially accurate 

of the history and development of COMINT and of its prese

tioning. I have followed closely the work of the Committee t

out their investigation and have been greatly impressed with t

jective approach to and deep penetration of the extremely com

problem which confronted them. It is my opinion that th

reached eminently sound conclusions.

2. In those portions of the report containing historical an

background information, there are a few errors in fact, and also 

statements which may convey erroneous impressions. While th

pear to have had no significant effect on the Committee’s ob

thorough understanding of the essentials involved, and thei

background, it is desirable that certain of these errors be set 

for the record; this is done in inclosure 1.4

3. In my opinion the organization of COMINT activities p

by the Brownell Committee is both workable and practical at 

levels, subject to the comment given below. It would constitut

tension on a joint basis of the vertical principle of organization 

as the Committee points out, now exists in each of the three 

Services separately. I regard as particularly important the degre

thority which the Committee proposes to vest in the Director o

an authority which, for the first time since the creation of the 

will be commensurate with his responsibilities.

4. It is noted that the Committee apparently intends tha

sponsibilities of the Director of AFSA be extended in the Com

tion Security field to embrace the production and protection 

1 Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Serie

Top Secret; Security Information. 2 See Document 99.

3 Not found.

4 Not printed.
codes and ciphers of the entire U.S. Government, rather than 

the Department of Defense as is now the case. I consider such 

tension of jurisdiction in the Communication Security field to 

sirable. However, the Committee has not seen fit to elaborate up

proposal and, in fact, has included in its report very little comm

the problems involved. Moreover, the proposed directive cont

specific provisions as to organization above, within, or below A

the purpose of conducting communication security activities o

tional basis. In this connection it is desirable to invite to your a

two facts:

a. There is in existence an Executive Order dated 3 July 

which created a National Cryptographic Security Board charg

responsibility for the efficient coordination and supervision of a

tographic systems and related procedures of the Federal depa

and agencies. This Board was established as a body apart from t

existing Communication Intelligence Board for the reason tha

ent interests were involved.

b. The United States Communication Intelligence Board (

has considered at some length the advisability of extending 

sponsibilities to include communication security matters but h

far failed to reach agreement.

In view of the foregoing facts, I believe that further study is r

to determine the best national structure for communication secu

tivities. Accordingly, the comments and proposed changes s

herein have to do with COMINT activities only. I will have a s

study made of the communication security problem with a v

ward preparing a separate directive. It is believed advisable to t

two categories separately, and this can be done without detrim

either. An attempt to combine the two in a single directive woul

ably introduce complications which could result in delaying 

mentation of the Committee’s clear-cut recommendations on CO

5. With respect to the latter recommendations, the followin

ment is submitted in response to paragraphs 3 and 4 of your 

randum:

a. Recommendations as to Changes in Organization Above AF

(1) Retention in USCIB of the principle of decision and ac

certain matters by unanimous agreement would serve to per

one of the chief difficulties which according to the Committ

hamper USCIB, since the matters where this would apply are 

tially those to which the Board has confined its attention in th

This would particularly affect the protection of COMINT sourc

net result would be to preserve for each Department and 

5 Not found.
virtual autonomy in the application of COMINT security measu

spite the fact that the maintenance of such security is vital to 

true that the right of appeal to higher authority is provided fo

proposed Board procedures. Nevertheless, this would place 

den of such appeal on the majority, where it would be relucta

ercised, whereas in matters involving the common interest the 

of obtaining exception should rest on the minority. Extensio

majority-rule principle to all of the Board’s decisions and action

not only accomplish the latter but would also simplify the Boar

cedures. Certainly it would appear desirable to extend this rule 

to security matters. (2) Paragraph d. (5) of the proposed Presidential Memo

provides for certain special consideration in matters of appea

involve the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as Ex

Agent. These responsibilities pertain to those matters which fal

the jurisdiction of the Director of AFSA. The propriety of accord

consideration to appeals made by the representative of the S

of Defense is appreciated; nevertheless, since the Director of 

also directly under the Secretary and is the individual immedi

sponsible, it would appear a less complicated arrangement to h

Director rather than the representative of the Secretary of D

given this special consideration in appeals. Accordingly, it is su

that consideration be given to the advisability of this change. (3) Experience has demonstrated that the special na

COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respect

ing outside the framework of other or general intelligence acti

this is not done the protection of COMINT sources is serious

ardized. In recognition of this fact, the current charter of USC

paragraphs 6 and 8 of National Security Council Intelligence D

#9)6 contains certain provisions which I strongly urge be carri

into the new directive.

b. Recommendations as to Organization within AFSA

(1) The introductory statement to this section of the Com

conclusions and recommendations appears to imply that there 

rious weaknesses in the present organizational structure of 

agree in general with what are apparently intended to be sup

comments of the Committee, but it strikes me that these comm

not, in fact, criticisms of structure but are remarks pertaining 

sonnel policies applicable to AFSA. They actually deal with 

bency of the Directorship and other key positions, the alleged h

of turnover of personnel, and various other personnel problem

sume therefore, that the Committee found no basic faults in th

structure as such.

(2) With regard to the recommendation that the Director 

have a civilian chief technical assistant who would have under 

research and development in the cryptanalytic field, it is to b

that the Chief of the Office of Research and Development, on

6 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 435.
three principal subdivisions of AFSA, has been a civilian since J

1952. As a result of recommendations of the Special Cryptolo

visory Group (SCAG) a plan for improving the organization o

activities is now in the process of development with the assist

SCAG members.

(3) It is noted that paragraph 2. a. of the Committee’s pr

Presidential Memorandum excludes from the meaning of COMI

the mission of AFSA the evaluation and dissemination of infor

obtained from intercepted communications, and its synthesis w

formation from other sources. It is noted further that paragra

(2) of the same memorandum states that the responsibility assi

the Director of AFSA does not contravene the responsibilities of 

partments and agencies in respect to these same functions. W

the former statement is positively preclusive, the latter appear

ford the Director some freedom of action provided he does no

fere with the legitimate work of other agencies. Some latitude 

is essential for technical purposes, especially in the field of traffi

sis. It is, therefore, recommended that the former statement be 

and the latter be retained, with a slight modification, as a separ

final provision of the proposed memorandum.

c. Recommendations as to Changes in Organization Below th

Level (In the Service COMINT Organizations)

(1) While the meaning of “COMINT activities” as used in 

Law 513 is probably clear from the context of that Law it may 

to define more specifically the scope of the term for the purp

the proposed directive. When read out of context, the defin

Communication Intelligence contained in the Law could be inte

to include postal censorship and the monitoring and processing 

eign press and propaganda broadcasts. It is believed advisable t

it clear that such activities are not to be included under the pro

of the new directive.

6. Attached hereto as inclosure 27 is a suggested redraft of 

posed Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of State and 

retary of Defense. In addition to certain substantive changes wh

recommended on the basis of the foregoing comment, there is s

arrangement of the section which deals with the directive to 

This rearrangement is considered advisable because of the 

mended change in Board procedure. I consider that the propo

ecutive memorandum contains no information of classification 

than Secret, and have reclassified the proposed revision of Ex

accordingly.

Ralph J. C

Major General, U

7 Not printed.

8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
122. Memorandum of Conversation

Pasadena, California, July 1

PARTICIPANTS

Cal Tech

President L. A. DuBridge

Dean E. C. Watson

Professor C. C. Lauritsen

Professor R. F. Bacher

Professor J. L. Greenstein (Part time)

PSB

Palmer Putnam

CIA

Willis A. Gibbons

[name not declassified]

SUBJECT

Discussion of the Feasibility and Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconn

Purposes

1. Background. At the request of Mr. Palmer Putnam (PSB)

Admiral Luis deFlorez (OTS/CIA), I called Dean E. C. Watso

fornia Institute of Technology (Cal Tech) on 10 July 1952 and 

he could arrange for himself, President DuBridge and Professo

ritsen, Bacher and Millikan to meet with us in Pasadena on Th

July 17th for the purpose of discussing this subject. Dean Wat

that he would be delighted to arrange the discussion. Upon ar

found that Professor Millikan had been called out of town an

not meet with us. Dean Watson said that Professor J. L. Greens

astrophysicist, had conducted some discussion with the Rand 

ration people regarding the vehicle and suggested that Gree

knowledge would be helpful if we were agreeable to inviting h

the discussion. We thereupon asked Professor Greenstein to 

with us.

2. Putnam had brought with him several copies of a pape

he had prepared outlining current capabilities of the Soviets a

cating that by 1957 the Soviets will possess the capability of a 

tion attack with atomic weapons against the United States and 

which the United States can have no effective defense. Putna

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Box 

Security Information. Drafted on July 25 by [name not declassified], Special As

Research, Office of Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency.
that some drastic policies are required and that we need to i

our intelligence take regarding the Soviet Union. He suggested 

utilization of a satellite vehicle for reconnaissance purposes m

one means of increasing our intelligence concerning the Sovie

and of physical structures and the characteristics relating there

3. We made reference to the Rand Corporation report “U

a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance,” R–217. The scientists 

from Cal Tech had read the report.

4. The report contemplated and discussed the feasibility o

ing and launching a so-called satellite vehicle which woul

around the earth at an altitude of some 350 miles above the ear

elling at a speed of five miles per second, thus completing fro

18 complete orbits every 24 hours earth time. The satellite w

powered by an isotope of cerium (Ce–144), a beta emitter, which 

heat mercury into a vapor which in turn would drive an engin

would drive generators for production of power. The power w

utilized, once the satellite was on orbit, for operating the navig

controls and a television camera and transmitter which would 

corporated in the satellite. The orbit of the vehicle would be p

mined with respect to the earth’s latitude and longitude there

mitting intensive coverage from the standpoint of photogra

certain portions of the earth. The Rand study contemplated t

television receiving stations would be erected on the earth to 

the television signals and transmissions from the vehicle. The 

would not be man-carrying.

5. It was the general consensus of the Cal Tech scientists:

a. That it was probably feasible to build such a vehicle;

b. That there would be unforeseen difficulties, which p

could be surmounted, in “marrying” the different technical sys

be contained within the satellite;

c. That the problem of insuring sufficient reliability of el

equipment installed in the satellite when such equipment could 

got at or serviced would be great;

d. Serious question was raised as to the value of picture

from an altitude of 350 miles.

(1) Resolution of presently available television camera equ

was recognized to be of not much significance for objects of le

200 200in size. Question was therefore raised as to the ne

tion to be made by such photographs to our intelligence kno

concerning Soviet territory.

(2) Question was raised as to whether the gross infor

thus obtainable would be worth the cost and the time interva

necessarily must take place before such a vehicle could be dev

and successfully operated.
e. Factors relating to the pitch, roll and yaw characteristic

vehicle were discussed. It was considered that very slight pitc

rolls might seriously interfere with picture collection and mig

difficult the identification of areas of which pictures were take

f. Inasmuch as almost no facts are available concerning t

tures at altitudes above 100 miles from the earth’s surface, it w

sidered that heating and cooling aspects of the satellite vehicl

be subject to considerable speculation and experimentation;

g. Normal atmospheric turbulence was considered to be 

which might interfere with picture taking;

h. It was considered that four or five such satellites might 

be built and launched before one could be launched that wo

on orbit and operate as we required.

6. Professor Lauritsen appeared to be the least impressed 

possibility of use of a satellite vehicle for such reconnaissance p

He asserted that in his opinion it would require from eight to t

to develop and construct such a vehicle for launching. He con

also that the same or better reconnaissance information could be 

by the employment of from six to twelve jet aircraft flying at an 

of 50,000 feet over the Soviet Union. He further asserted that s

craft in one day could secure the photographic information of be

olution and quality than could the satellite vehicle camera. Laur

serted that this could be done immediately with presently a

equipment and that such aircraft could not be picked up by rad

7. At the conclusion of our discussion I posed substanti

following question to the scientists present: “If you were at pre

Director of Central Intelligence what would be your attitude 

tion regarding the satellite vehicle for reconnaissance purposes

ident DuBridge and Dean Watson responded substantially as 

a. They would continue to consider the possibility of ut

of such a satellite vehicle and in so doing they would

(1) consult with the scientists at the Rand Corporation w

studied the matter intensively and have prepared the reports;

b. They would insure that additional and continuing fe

studies regarding the development and construction of such a 

were pursued;

c. They would seriously investigate the nature and qu

pictures (information) that could be secured from operation o

vehicle;

d. They would consider whether the additional intellig

formation that theoretically could be secured from such a vehicl

be worth the possible cost and the time lag necessary to create a

duce it;
e. They would consider whether alternative means for s

the information might not be more effective. Among such alte

means they mentioned clandestine operations and aerial photo

from aircraft or balloons;

f. They suggested that aerial photographic analysis peopl

Air Force be consulted as to their ability to interpret photogr

the approximate resolution to be expected from the satellite ve

8. At the conclusion of our discussion at Cal Tech, Pr

DuBridge arranged for Messrs. Gibbons and Putnam to go t

Monica to discuss the matter further with the Rand Corporati

ple. I did not accompany them for this discussion.

[name not decl

123. Editorial Note

On July 25, 1952, President Truman approved NSC 127/1

for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hos

of the same date. NSC 127/1 was an amended version of N

same title, March 3, 1952. NSC 127 and NSC 127/1 are in N

Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 127 Series, 
124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bruc

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Counc

Washington, July 3

SUBJECT

Fifth Progress Report on NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program 

Psychological Warfare Planning”2

1. NSC 59/1 was approved as governmental policy on M

1950. It is requested that this progress report covering the perio

15–July 31, 1952, of activities untaken in implementation of N

be circulated to the members of the Council for their informa

accordance with the provisions of the third paragraph of the Pre

directive of April 4, 1951,3 a copy of this report is being referre

Psychological Strategy Board for use in its evaluation of the 

psychological effort.

2. The organization referred to in NSC 59/1 has been des

The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC)

be referred to in this report as “the Committee.”

3. This report describes only those foreign information op

and plans which, being interdepartmental in nature, were coor

through the Committee.

4. Under the Chairmanship of the Administrator, the Inter

Information Administration, the following are regularly repres

the weekly meetings of the Committee: Secretary of Defense, the 

Department Office of Information, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Mu

curity Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Assistant Secretary 

lic Affairs, Department of State, the Army, Navy and Air Force 

psychological warfare and the Psychological Strategy Board sta

cordance with the terms of the President’s directive of April 4, 195

among other things authorized the Secretary of State to effect r

ments in the organization established under NSC 59/1, the PO

tariat was transformed into a full time interdepartmental planni

5. During the period covered by this report the Commit

centrated its attention on psychological problems connected w

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, no labe

Top Secret; Security Information. Lay circulated the report to NSC members un

of a July 31 memorandum. (Ibid.) 2 For NSC 59/1, see Document 2.

3 See Document 60.

4 See Document 74.
Korean situation, particularly with respect to the prisoner of wa

both as regards the physical control of prisoners of the United N

Command and also as regards the prisoner issue in the truce n

tions. The recommendations of the Committee were designed 

tribute to the ability of the UN Command to gain and main

psychological initiative in Korea. However, our psychological 

in Korea were directed toward the achievement of the princi

aim in Korea—the conclusion of an armistice.

6. Ascertaining that the United Nations Command was in 

tion of serious disadvantage in handling the problems described 

the Committee took prompt action resulting in the following:

a. An on-the-scene survey of psychological warfare 

arrangements in Japan and Korea by a team comprised of the A

trator, the International Information Administration, Dept. of St

Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army; and 

icy Advisor, International Broadcasting Service, Department of 

b. The establishment in Washington on June 12 of a watc

mittee, with representation from the Departments of Defense an

and the Central Intelligence Agency, whose purpose is to supply 

summary of news, editorials and public comments originating 

U.S. and foreign countries, both Communist and non-Commun

cerning the Korean situation, and to provide suggestions, infor

and advice on psychological matters for fast transmission to Tok

san and Panmunjom.

c. The establishment of a corresponding unit within FECO

prised of military, psychological warfare and public informa

perts whose function is to inform FECOM of current world wi

lic reaction to developments in Korea, and to provide, in q

material and suggestions which may be useful in advancing th

propaganda position relative to Korea.

d. The preparation of an action plan to provide for such a

as the following:

1. Exploitation of signed-in-blood petitions of UNC-held 

ers resisting repatriation;

2. Stockpiling, for possible later use, recorded and pres

views with prisoners of war, and motion pictures of the p

screening process;

3. Exploitation of UNC information and education work 

prisoners of war;

4. Exploitation of rehabilitation work in South Korea.

7. Bacteriological Warfare Charges

The Committee gave considerable attention to Communist 

concerning bacteriological warfare in Korea. The Committee 

the activities of a working group comprised of representative
Departments of Defense and State and the Central Intelligence 

under State leadership for the purpose of developing psych

plans for: (1) countering the Communist charges, and (2) dev

when possible new measures which would be designed to se

maintain the propaganda initiative. The group is effectively co

ing the efforts of the agencies concerned with handling the pro

8. Troop Acceptance in Japan

The Committee provided interdepartmental coordination o

for developing an attitude of acceptance and an active sens

sponsibility on the part of the Japanese Government and peop

regard to the mission of the United States armed forces stati

and about Japan as a consequence of the United States–Japan 

Treaty.

9. X-Day Planning

The Committee has continued to monitor the plannin

X-Day Working Group, which is preparing complete contingen

for overt psychological operations during the initial stages of 

hostilities. When completed and approved by the Committee th

will be forwarded to the Psychological Strategy Board.

10. Yugoslav Plan

The Committee noted and referred to the staff of the Psy

cal Strategy Board for further development a working paper o

tenance of Yugoslav independence from Soviet domination.

11. Review of POC Business

The committee has undertaken an extensive review of un

POC business and is currently completing action on such busin

committee also is reviewing past POC recommendations and 

toring the implementation of approved projects.

12. POC Recommendation Regarding Communist Military Bu

Korea

The POC recommended that there be a full public expositio

facts on the nature and extent of the Communist military bu

Korea during the course of the truce negotiations. As a result o

recommendation appropriate statements were issued by the U

mand, by the British and by other governments having forces in 

David 

5 Printed from a copy that indicates Bruce signed the original.
125. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board1

PSB D–30 Washington, August 

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL E

AND FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGIC

STRATEGY BOARD

[Omitted here are a list of references and a brief summary 

report.]

I. Status of the National Psychological Effort

The Board presents below a statement on the status of n

psychological programs as of 30 June 1952. In submitting thi

ment the Board desires to emphasize the following general conc

1. To be fully effective, psychological planning at the strateg

should ideally be based on an agreed overall strategic concept 

national psychological programs. While efforts to date under

difficulties of formulating such a concept, some progress has bee

in achieving agreement on certain broad criteria to be utilize

tablishing relative priorities within existing capabilities. 

progress toward the development and implementation of an 

strategic concept for our psychological effort can take place only 

junction with a corresponding development of capabilities 

sources and an accompanying adjustment of basic national po

2. The United States is not making significant progress in t

chological field toward its objective of reduction and retraction 

viet power as laid down in NSC 20/4.2 In considering the to

war position of the United States as contrasted with that positio

ago, it is evident that in certain areas, such as Western Europe, 

sition has been strengthened by the good progress recorded 

NATO. However, there has been some deterioration of strength 

tain other areas, notably in the Near East. But this should no

sarily be attributed to superior effectiveness of Soviet propaga

3. A major handicap in psychological operations outside 

Iron Curtain derives from growing resentment in parts of A

throughout much of Europe to a “made in America” label on 

our psychological output. Of even graver significance is the inc

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB F

D–30. Top Secret; Security Information. The report contains Annexes A–E. None 

except for Annexes D and E, which are enclosures 1 and 2 to Document 127. 2 See Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 662–669.
reaction against the military character of some of our political a

nomic activity. Programs designed to have a deterrent effect on 

viet Union are distorted and exploited by communist or anti-A

propaganda and thus are occasioning resistance, neutralism, and 

of agressiveness to the detriment of our psychological effort.

The statement which follows is based on an analysis of cu

ports of the Department of State and the Department of Defen

report by field staff representatives of the Mutual Security Age

of a report by the Central Intelligence Agency, concerning the

ities related to the national psychological effort during the fis

ending 30 June 1952.3

This statement is not presented as a full evaluation of the 

psychological program during the period in question, the Boa

ing decided that such an evaluation is not possible at this tim

ever, the reports on which it is based throw significant light o

aspects of the existing “cold war” situation. There emerges fro

a picture of some substantial progress, mixed with many proble

obstacles which hinder a more complete achievement of our 

logical objectives.

A. Outside the Iron Curtain

The general psychological situation in the non-Soviet wor

bright, but progress has been made in some areas.

In Western Europe the picture is spotty. On the one hand, p

is reported in containing Soviet communism and in the devel

of unity and readiness to build indigenous military strength in t

On the other hand there are disturbing reports of the growth 

tralism and anti-Americanism in France and Britain, if not in 

Europe as a whole.

In the Middle East, irresponsible nationalism is the curren

threat to free world interests. United States capabilities for e

psychological action have declined though some slow progre

ported in certain sections of the Moslem world.

In Africa, intensive communist efforts to gain control over 

ored races are having some success. A modest start has been 

laying the groundwork for future activities aimed at checking 

In Latin America, there has been a recent increase in our c

ties for effective psychological action, and some indication of s

tial progress in combatting anti-American feeling in certain co

3 For the text of the report of the Department of State to the NSC, and s

of the other three reports mentioned, see Annexes A, B, and C, and specially 

Annex D. [Footnote in the original. Regarding these annexes, see footnote 1 a
In South and Southeast Asia, anti-colonialism and associate

resentments have been far more important elements in the psy

ical developments in the military struggle against rebel force

area. On the other hand, communist electoral gains in India hav

the Nehru Government to modify perceptibly its former pos

neutrality in the East-West conflict.

In Formosa and Japan, some gains are reported as a result of 

States psychological activities.

In addition to the above comments on specific areas, the 

ing general observations on the non-Soviet world, drawn from 

partmental reports, may be warranted.

1. A steady operational trend toward the use of indigenous 

for propaganda purposes reflects a recognition that in many are

propaganda bearing the United States label is meeting with inc

indifference or resistance. Further development of non-attribut

chological methods, together with a de-emphasis of overt chann

pears to be logical in this situation.

2. In underdeveloped countries some progress has been m

developing psychological approaches which appeal to local asp

and emphasize local participation and initiative. Such approac

particularly relevant in these areas, where the memory or actu

domination by the white man is a far greater psychological real

the Soviet menace.

3. The overriding abhorrence of another possible war in s

eas, particularly Western Europe, constitutes an important psy

ical liability for the United States. This attitude tends to inhibit 

which may seem to involve any increased risk of war, and m

itself in neutralism, anti-Americanism, and extreme sensitivity 

casional warlike statements by leading Americans. The spread 

attitude makes possible the continued effective use of “peace” as 

ing theme in Soviet psychological aggression.

4. Certain national policies of the United States are psyc

cally damaging in various areas of the non-Soviet world. In the M

world this is true of United States policy toward Israel; in area

European domination it is true of United States identification 

NATO allies which makes it difficult for the United States to av

psychological effects of the colonial policies of those allies; in 

and elsewhere it is true of United States policy toward China.

The same may be said of certain primarily domestic matt

instance, efforts to counteract communist exploitation of t

relations problem in the United States have not been fully suc

Likewise, the restrictive immigration policy of the United State

recently embodied in the McCarran Act, has damaging psych

repercussions abroad. Finally, United States tariff laws severely h
ability of foreign countries to export to this country and thus 

abroad as running directly counter to United States policy of b

up economic stability in the free world by expanding internation

B. Behind the Iron Curtain

The Soviet grip in the Communist-dominated areas of Eur

of the Far East appeared to be even firmer at the end of the fis

1952 than at the beginning. There was no evidence of progress 

achievement of the basic objectives set forth in NSC 20/4, nam

reduction and retraction of Soviet communist power. Moreove

term possibilities of any improvement in this respect appeared 

as to be negligible. In this area of the world our national psy

cal effort, both overt and covert, must continue for some time 

phasize long-term objectives and the discovery of means to b

resources and capabilities.

Among the many problems incident to this buildup, one 

ticular may be mentioned. Our capabilities for effective action 

the communist regime in China are limited in part by the abse

stable and more universal rallying point outside China to whi

seas Chinese could look for political and psychological leaders

by the related need for a thorough-going reform of Nationalist 

military and political institutions.

In the overt information field behind the Iron Curtain, th

of America and Radio Free Europe clearly emerge from the re

the only significant remaining programs which effectively re

people of either or both the USSR and the Satellites. The rep

equally clear, however, as to the need for making the Voice st

powerful. Meanwhile there are ominous indications that we 

falling behind in the electromagnetic war.

Some good use has been made of defectors and escapees f

hind the Iron Curtain during the year, both on the program

Voice and America and in non-attributable activities of other a

Results point to the desirability of a still more highly organize

in this direction.

C. Related Activities

Certain related activities of a highly restricted nature are 

ered in the body of this report. For an evaluative summary of t

tivities, reference is made to the specially classified Annex D.

D. Organizational Progress

An improvement is noted in the effectiveness of policy g

during the period covered by this report. In part, the improvem

resulted from closer cooperation of the departments and agen

volved. Quicker and more effective action both in Washington 
the field, and a consequent improvement in the coordination 

psychological effort, has resulted from a number of forward 

organization. The reports make it clear, however, that much 

mains to be done.

II. Progress in Formulating and Promulgating Over-All Nat

Psychological Objectives, Policies and Programs

During its first year of operation the Psychological Strateg

has taken a number of steps to carry out its responsibility “

formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departme

agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all n

psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the 

nation and evaluation of the national psychological effort.” T

jor effort has been in the planning field. The chief steps taken 

follows:4

A. Plans completed and in effect:

(1) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of C

nist Power in France—designed to encourage and support 

Government efforts to reduce communist power in their coun

point where it will no longer threaten United States nationa

tives in the area. Under this Plan and the parallel Plan for It

below), the initiative for the most important actions lies with 

digenous governments. Supporting actions by the United Sta

under the control of the Ambassador. Progress in France has be

siderable during the past two months and prospects for the fut

pear good.

(2) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of C

nist Power in Italy—parallel to the above plan for France. A

progress in Italy is less substantial than in France, the Italian G

ment is actively considering further effective action in this fiel

(3) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees 

“A”)—designed to provide care and resettlement for current e

and facilitate their use by CIA and the Armed Forces. Receptio

plemental care, and resettlement operations have already begu

small scale and will be considerably expanded within the limit

4.3 million dollars made available to the Department of State 

activity by the Director for Mutual Security.

4 For a more detailed report on planning activities, see specially classifi

E. [Footnote in the original.]
B. Plans and guidances completed but not yet being executed:

(1) Plans for immediate execution: None

(2) Stand-by plans:

a. General war:

i. A plan for the conduct of psychological operation

event of general war has been submitted by the Board to 

tional Security Council and was under study by them as of 

1952.5

ii. A national overt propaganda policy guidance for 

war has been approved by the Board and serves as guid

current operational planning on this subject in the Gover

b. Korean Armistice Negotiations: Two psychological op

plans have been promulgated. One is partly operational at pres

provides for further actions in the event that an armistice is ac

The other plan provides for the contingency that armistice nego

are conclusively broken off and full hostilities are resumed.

C. Plans and projects authorized and in process of development 

most of the critical areas in the world struggle.

A plan for national psychological strategy with respect to G

nearly completed, is to deal with the integration of the Federal R

into Western Europe, the reduction of Soviet capabilities in 

Germany, the problem of German unification, and the role of a 

Germany in the unification of Europe.

Psychological strategy plans to advance national objective

Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Japan are in earlier stages of p

tion. With respect to the Soviet Union a psychological operatio

for exploiting Stalin’s passing from power has been drafted an

ceiving further staff study.

Other plans and papers in preparation, not confined to a

graphic area, include:

(1) an over-all strategic concept for the national psychologic

(2) a plan for stimulating and utilizing defection from th

Orbit beyond the existing flow of escapees (this plan will sup

the “Phase A” plan mentioned in A. (3) above);

(3) an inventory of “cold war” instrumentalities, some 

novel, with a view to harassment and retaliation against the U

the Soviet Orbit;

(4) an analysis of communist “germ warfare” and other “hat

ica” propaganda and the psychological problems arising therefr

5 This plan was approved by the President on 25 July 1952. [Footnote in 

inal. See Document 123.]
(5) a plan designed both to gain greater acceptance in t

world for United States economic security objectives vis-à-vis 

viet Orbit, and to capitalize on and obstruct Soviet economic e

tion of captive Europe and Communist China.

126. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 3/41

Washington, August 1

PRODUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIG

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 3,2 and for the p

of strengthening the over-all governmental intelligence struc

the production of scientific and technical intelligence, the fo

policies and operating procedures are hereby established:

1. Policies

In discharging allocated responsibilities and effecting inte

of intelligence, the interested departments and agencies will ap

following basic principles:

a. No complete separation of areas of interest is possible 

essarily desirable in scientific and technical intelligence activit

b. Full and free interchange of all intelligence information 

ished intelligence between all agencies concerned is essential.

c. No one agency is considered to be the final authority 

field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agencies a

sents recorded.

d. Any agency may make such studies as it believes nece

supplement intelligence obtained from other agencies in order 

fill its agency functions, but such studies should not normally 

seminated outside the producing agency without advance cons

with the agency having primary responsibility for the subject

involved.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–00022R, Box 

Security Information. The Ad Hoc Committee to Survey Existing Arrangeme

ing to the Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence produced a leng

agency report that formed the basis for DCID 3/4. The report is ibid. Annexe

are attached but not printed. 2 For NSCID No. 3, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the In

Establishment, Document 426.
e. An agency charged with primary responsibility in a pa

field will develop special competence in that field and will n

carry out all or most of the research in that field.

f. Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate th

ligence activities of its Technical Services and its other facilities 

intelligence production capabilities with the work of the IAC 

gence agencies and to make available to those agencies the inte

produced by such Services and facilities.

2. Procedures:

a. Delineation of Dominant Interests. The general field of s

and technical intelligence production is subdivided into three b

jor areas, and allocation of primary production responsibilities 

is made as follows:

(1) Intelligence on all weapons, weapons systems, military 

ment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research 

velopment leading to new military material and techniques—

production responsibility of the departments of the Departmen

fense, as exemplified in Annex A.

(2) Intelligence on fundamental research in the basic scie

scientific resources, and on medicine (other than military m

plus intelligence on pertinent applied research and develop

primary production responsibility of Central Intelligence Ag

exemplified in Annex B.

(3) Intelligence on Atomic Energy—production responsi

all interested agencies.

b. It is recognized that despite the above-mentioned spec

cations of primary production responsibilities to the Military 

and CIA, the Military Services will also require intelligence in

trends from fundamental research in basic sciencies, which th

mally will obtain from CIA. Conversely, CIA will also require 

gence on applied research relating to weapons, weapons syste

itary equipment and techniques, and the technical character

existing equipment, which it normally will obtain from the 

Services. Accordingly, there continue to exist areas of common 

lapping interest which require continuing inter-agency liaison a

working-level conferences as may be appropriate.

c. Coordinating Mechanisms

(1) The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee is he

constituted as a permanent interdepartmental committee with t

structure and functions as before.

(2) Subject to the foregoing, there is hereby established th

tific Estimates Committee, a permanent interdepartmental com

to integrate scientific and technical intelligence, as and when r
for the production of national intelligence, to stimulate and 

inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may 

propriate, and to coordinate the production of Chapter VII of t

(3) The Scientific Estimates Committee shall be composed 

ignated representatives as members from CIA, the Joint Staff, 

partments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Atomic Energ

mission, and such other ad hoc representatives as may be dete

necessary by the regular committee members. In order to maint

tinuity and stability, each department and agency mentioned 

will designate a regular member and, if desired, an alternate b

mitting names and titles to the Director of Central Intelligence. 

tion will not preclude the designation of such additional per

may be technically and otherwise qualified to discuss or repo

particular subject under consideration by the Committee. The 

man will be elected annually. The Committee will establish it

ods of procedure. The Central Intelligence Agency shall provid

ecutive secretary and secretariat as required.

(4) It is recommended that the SEC concentrate on the inte

of intelligence opinion (other than that for which the JAEIC is 

sible) as and when required for the purposes of national intel

and only incidentally assist in the coordination of production o

intelligence in scientific and technical fields. The principal occa

activity on the part of the committee will arise when contribut

required for national intelligence purposes. The Committee’s a

will be directed to synthesizing departmental intelligence, an

so doing to bring to light any inconsistencies resulting from t

duction activities of the respective departments and agencies, e

erating within its assigned sphere of responsibility, and to resol

flicting conclusions, or have appropriate dissenting views reg

for the benefit of the national intelligence production organiza

(5) The SEC can best assist in the coordination of produ

intelligence in scientific and technical fields by stimulating an

ing inter-agency liaison and working-level conferences.

3. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/33 is h

rescinded.

Walter B. 

Director of Central Int

3 Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–T00389

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
127. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Na

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Counc

Washington, August 1

SUBJECT

Status of United States Programs for National Security as of June 30, 19

REFERENCES

A. NSC 1352

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary same subject, dated Augus

19523

The following sensitive portions of two of the status rep

tached to the reference memorandum of August 19 on the subj

transmitted herewith for the information of the statutory mem

the National Security Council as part of NSC 135:

Annex D to No. 6, The National Psychological Program, 

“Summary of a Report from the Central Intelligence Agency”

Annex E to No. 6, The National Psychological Program, 

“Planning Activities of the Psychological Strategy Board Throu

30, 1952”.

Paragraph IX, 5 of No. 7, The Foreign Intelligence Progra

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in 

the enclosures and that access thereto be limited to a need-to-know b

James S

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 64 D 563, NSC 13

cret; Security Information; Eyes Only. 2 Regarding NSC 135, “Status of U.S. Programs for National Security as o

1952,” see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 56–57. 3 Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Series)4 The PSB status report, PSB D–30, is printed as Document 125.
Enclosure 1

Annex D to No. 6, “The National Psychological Progra

NSC 1355

Washington, August 

SUMMARY OF A REPORT FROM THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

There has been some progress in achieving the national ob

set forth in NSC 10/2 and 10/5.6 This progress, however, has be

and in most areas severely restricted, partly by the limited na

available resources and capabilities, but even more by time limi

It takes a long time to develop the apparatus and the trained 

nel for covert activities and the development of concepts and d

of the kind discussed in this report. The United States has b

gaged in covert activities for too brief a period, and therefore 

developments fall far short of ultimate potential.

Europe

In France and Italy, CIA reports that Soviet power and in

apparently are being contained. Increased and more effective 

psychological operations in Western Europe may account for 

creasingly violent and indiscriminate nature of the Soviet and 

nous Communist propaganda barrage against the anti-Commu

ganizations in that area.

[2 paragraphs (22 lines) not declassified]

In Eastern Europe, Soviet power and influence have not b

duced to any measurable extent. However, U.S. capabilities fo

covert operations have increased, [less than 1 line not declassifi

cent covert operations have revealed that the Communist aut

do not have complete control of the situation in these countri

that the area can be successfully penetrated. Thanks to much v

experience gained in the techniques of covert psychological 

and political action in Eastern Europe, CIA now possesses cap

for influencing large segments of labor, youth, refugees, pers

women, religious groups, and political parties.

5 Top Secret; Eyes Only. This is Annex D to PSB D–30 (Document 125).

6 For NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelli

tablishment, Document 292. For NSC 10/5, see Document 90.
In the satellite countries of Southeastern Europe, CIA cap

for psychological operations have increased considerably, tho

viet power and influence have not been reduced in the area.

The power and influence of the Kremlin within the USSR 

been affected by U.S. covert activities, and short-term possib

this direction are so slight as to be insignificant. CIA’s effort in t

is now being focused on progressively developing capabilities f

term exploitation.

Pointing out that present policy provides for U.S. support 

regime resistance of the Great Russians, CIA sees a definite n

resolving the policy question of the extent to which it will be 

ted to support clandestinely and exploit operationally any grou

dividual actively interested in the destruction of the Bolshevik 

Middle East

A decline in U.S. capabilities throughout most of the Middl

noted, though this is felt to be only temporary. To some extent

crease in U.S. covert capabilities in the Middle East is attribute

policy conflict arising out of U.S. support for the maintenance of 

position in North Africa, which has psychological repercussions t

out the African, Arab, and Asian worlds. Similarly, an impedimen

capabilities in the area is found in the disparity of our attitudes 

Israel and the Arab States despite a stated policy of impartiality

In the particularly important field of the Moslem worl

progress has been achieved along the following lines:

1. In utilizing nationalist forces for our own purposes, 

deavoring to direct them away from their more destructive ten

and into channels which will be relatively compatible with U.

ests; namely, to endeavor to turn the force of nationalism aga

Communists, to direct it against political corruption, to focus 

demands for social reform and economic progress;

2. In stimulating an increased awareness among the relig

erarchy of the threat of international Communism;

3. In increasing the degree of understanding of the s

Moslems living inside the Soviet orbit; and

4. In laying the groundwork for further expanded activiti

similar lines. Progress will continue to be slow in this field be

the most delicate and dangerous aspect of Near Eastern affa

the point of view of foreign intervention.

Far East

Support of the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formo

scribed as the most significant program now being undertaken 

in the Far East, where the Agency is also actively supporting 
itary authorities in Korea and laying the groundwork for pen

of Manchuria and North China.

While, on balance, the U.S. has achieved some psychologic

in the overt field (Treaty of Peace with Japan, Pacific Military Al

etc.), Soviet power has not been measurably reduced in the F

ern areas under its dominance, and progress toward our objec

the field of covert activities has been negligible, [less than 1 line 

classified]. There, CIA’s activities directed toward discrediting 

Russia, Communist China, the [less than 1 line not declassifie

Communism in general, are having some success.

Korea

CIA regards coordinating machinery between civilian and m

authorities in the field of psychological warfare as inadequate 

tain respects. A coordinating mechanism (CCRAK) was set up

ample, but failed to include the operations of USIE services in 

Close cooperation with the military exists in the field on inte

and tactical psychological warfare measures. However, a com

effective coordination of two major strategic plans with respec

rea has not been realized with respect to coordination of comma

logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy this si

These are expected to result in some modifications of CIA’s re

bilities to ensure that CIA does not commit itself to actions wh

beyond its present or anticipated capabilities.

Latin America

Despite evidence that the Soviet Union is now placing grea

phasis on its covert mechanisms in Latin America, U.S. cove

bilities there have substantially increased during the past year t

the expansion of personnel and facilities. Such expansion, it is p

may increasingly turn toward the formation or support of indi

nationalistic, free-enterprise groups or political parties. Some s

tial results in combating pro-Communist and anti-American inf

have been achieved through covert means [less than 1 line not 

fied]. It is to be noted that Latin America is an area unique for the 

States, because of the overt Good Neighbor and non-interventi

cies of long standing, and the powerful reasons necessitatin

overt policies. The security of covert operations and the furthe

opment of policy and management systems which protect suc

rity both in Washington and in the field are of peculiar importa

this area. Therefore, CIA capabilities have been developed to b

ative only under special conditions.

Africa

In Africa a beginning has been made in laying the groun

for future activities to check Communist efforts to get control o
colored races; but this work has so far been purely preparatory 

progress toward actual achievement in that field is recorded.

General

In general, CIA emphasizes the importance of setting up in

capabilities, particularly in the form of thoroughly-trained A

and indigenous personnel and long-term cover mechanisms. 

parent need exists for establishing at all possible points radio 

cast facilities capable of reaching the USSR.

CIA’s capabilities need to be reinforced for building up a

ratus capable of long-term exploitation against the Chinese C

nist regime. For the shorter terms CIA has had only very limi

cess in the penetration either of Communist China or the USS

CIA points up the vital importance of VOA as constituting 

ent the only effective means the U.S. possesses for conducti

chological operations within the confines of the USSR. Cove

tration has been carried out primarily for the purpose of pr

intelligence, and because of the rigid controls impeding the mo

of agents inside that country, no psychological warfare under 

conditions can be undertaken in the USSR by any other med

cept radio.

Through its covert channels CIA has discovered that VOA 

casts have been audible in the USSR throughout 1950 and 1

though Soviet jamming has considerably reduced the audibility 

broadcasts, nevertheless information [11

⁄2 lines not declassified] i

that considerable segments of the Soviet peoples continue to 

VOA broadcasts despite technical difficulties and personal ris

of these refugees have criticised the VOA broadcasts for not be

ficiently forceful and for devoting a considerable portion of 

grams to irrelevant matters not bearing directly on the curre

West struggle. Furthermore, ethnic groups such as the Ukrainia

complained that the broadcasts are not sufficiently represent

the desires and aspirations of the minority groups within th

But when all this is said, the fact remains that information obta

CIA indicates that the VOA broadcasts do play an important ro

minding the peoples of the Soviet Union that there is an alt

way of life, and in providing them with hope of ultimate libe

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

In Western Europe especially, there was marked progress 

efforts to work through various anti-Communist groups—bot

and rural. At the same time, there have as yet been no very 

results from attempts to penetrate indigenous Communist par

the other hand, efforts to combat Communist influence in th

unions, [1 line not declassified] have met with considerable succ
than 1 line not declassified], and the view is expressed that cap

in this direction should be increased.

Enclosure 2

Annex E to No. 6, “The National Psychological Program

NSC 1357

Washington, August 

PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

STRATEGY BOARD THROUGH JUNE 30, 1952

1. Plans Completed and Being Executed

A. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist 

in France. (PSB D–14/c).

This plan and the corresponding one for Italy (Paragraph 1

developed by the same PSB planning panel and actions under bo

are being coordinated by the same group. Both plans resulted f

tensive inquiry during the summer and fall of 1951, as a result o

the Board concluded that the French and Italian Communist a

the two most powerful in Western Europe, constituted a seriou

to American foreign policy and to NATO plans for defense of W

Europe. In consequence, the Board prescribed specific courses o

for reduction of Communist power in both France and Italy.

Upon approval of both plans on February 21, 1952, a Was

interdepartmental coordinating committee was established un

chairmanship of a member of the PSB staff, and comparable 

were established in Paris and Rome. These groups are in comm

tion with each other with respect to implementation of the pla

Analysis of the Communist position in both France and I

sulted in the conclusion that in both countries the primary sou

Communist power was in their organized control over trade 

Therefore, the main emphasis in both plans is devoted to redu

Communist power over trade unions and the encouragemen

free trade union movement. The most important actions that 

taken in both countries are for the government to give positi

port to the democratic unions in their struggle against Com

7 Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. This is Annex E to PSB D

ument 125).
domination of organized labor, to stop subsidizing and to stop 

with the Communist unions, and to work towards a more e

share of the national income for labor.

With regard to the French plan, progress toward achieving 

jor objectives appears hopeful under the present Pinay Gove

Unlike its predecessors, the Pinay Government has demonstr

more courage and affirmative leadership, and on its own initia

been moving vigorously against the Communists within the 

months. However, this is no guarantee of stability. The governm

given us assurances that it will continue this campaign and th

tends to take specific action to reduce Communist power in th

union field. While making known to the government our con

interest in this problem, we have withheld more affirmative p

tion and are watching the French initiative with hope in its 

for the future.

B. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist 

in Italy. (PSB D–15/b).

As stated in connection with the similar plan for redu

Communist power in France reported in the previous paragra

plan was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952. Devel

of the plan, which was in conjunction with the developmen

French plan, is reported on in the previous paragraph.

With regard to progress concerning the achievement of th

tives of the Italian plan, since September 1951 we have made hi

representations expressing our concern over the continued str

Communist power in Italy. The DeGasperi Government has rep

assured us that it intends to take vigorous measures to red

strength and influence of the Communist movement. Up to t

1952 elections, the government had done very little along the

and, particularly, had not moved against the main sources o

munist power in the trade union field.

The local elections throughout Italy in 1951 and 1952 indic

diminution and perhaps a slight increase of electoral support 

Communist-left socialist bloc. Since the 1948 national election

this bloc polled 31.4%, it has for the first time made substantial 

into the agricultural South. In contrast to this, the electoral sup

the four democratic center parties was substantially reduced co

to 1948 due to a sharp fall off in support for the Christian-D

Party, while the extreme right received a sharp increase in sup

Since the May elections we have received renewed and m

itive assurances that the government means to move against th

munists and there have been indications of formal action. T

ernment will put its main reliance on new legislation. The s
now appears more promising and hopeful than it has been for 

time, but we are awaiting positive results. Since the Commun

pear to be avoiding the provocation of the Italian Government

hopeful that the latter will take positive action on its own initi

C. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees—Phase 

(PSB D–18a).

This plan, approved by PSB December 20, 1951, includes pr

to care for and resettle current escapees, and envisages maximu

sible utilization of escapees [less than 1 line not declassified] und

lic Law 51 (Lodge Amendment), which permits recruitment of e

into the U.S. Armed Forces. (For discussion of Phase “B” see par

3A below.)

On April 7, pursuant to approval by the President, $4.3 

dollars were made available by the Director of Mutual Secu

the Department of State, which had been given responsibility 

program.

The time since funds were made available has been used t

the organization and staff for the continuing administration of t

gram; and to identify and care for the most urgent immediate n

escapees.

Organization. Small staffs are being established and activiti

begun in each of the countries which border the iron curtain. A r

office in HICOG and a policy and coordination unit in the Dep

of State have been established.

Resettlement and Supplemental Care. A general contract was 

on June 16, 1952, with the Provisional Committee for the Move

Migrants from Europe (PICMME, an international body organ

November, 1951) for the overseas transport of up to 14,000 e

during one year at an estimated rate of $100 per capita. The n

thus far moved under the program is negligible, but it is anti

that a scheduled flow may be attained in August.

Projects have been authorized to care for urgent immediat

of escapees resident in Greece, Germany, Austria, Turkey an

needs such as food, clothing, shoes, repair and decontamination 

racks, and medical treatment. In every country of operation 

mediate needs of the escapees are being met.

Propaganda Utilization. No general propaganda utilization 

plans and activities of the escapee program is now contempl

State Department. Newsworthy projects and assistance to ke

viduals will be used in media reaching iron curtain areas wh

propriate. When the program has greater accomplishments to p

the State Department plans more general treatment. Similar 

govern domestic information activity.
Funds. Of the initial authorization of $4,300,000, an es

$1,500,000 was obligated during the fiscal year 1952. An ad

$1,460,500 is being requested to cover an increase in the estimat

ber of escapees already requiring assistance.

Accomplishment of Other Purposes. As requested under th

of the plan, the Department of Defense has somewhat liberal

conditions under which escapees may be recruited under the 

zation of the Lodge Amendment. Of 5194 applications, 3916 ha

rejected, 295 have been accepted (262 on active duty), and 982 

ing processed.

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

D. Public Statements with Respect to Certain Weapons. (PSB D–1

In February 1952, following a series of conflicting statem

public officials as to atomic and related developments, the 

proved and forwarded to the Executive Secretary, NSC, recom

tions for a guidance to appropriate agencies on public stateme

respect to certain weapons. On May 9, 1952, a memorandum 

subject was issued by the President, setting forth the criteria 

mended by the PSB and directing compliance therewith.8 At 

the PSB staff is reviewing the action which has been taken by th

cies and the effect of the application of the criteria.

2. Plans Completed But Not Yet Being Executed—

Stand-By Plans

A. Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire

Negotiations (PSB D–7c).

This plan was approved by the Psychological Strategy B

October 25, 1951. It is designed to establish special psycholog

jectives to be implemented toward our allies as well as our adv

with respect to the Korean conflict. Some of the desired cours

tion are at present in effect, but the majority of the recommen

tions are directly related to the progress made in connection w

cease-fire. The operational planning is substantially complete. 

network has been established among the affected agencies so 

appropriate action can be put into effect without delay as develo

make this necessary.

8 NSC Action No. 622; NSC 126; and memo for NSC from Executive Secr

ject, “Public Statements with Respect to Certain American Weapons”, dated 

1952. [Footnote in the original. For NSC 126, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, v

2, pp. 869–872.]
B. Emergency Plan for Breakoff of Korean Armistice Negotiations 

(PSB J–19d).

This plan was approved by the Psychological Strategy Bo

September 18, 1951. It endeavors to establish for governmen

partments and agencies engaged in psychological operations 

of action for application in preparation for, and in the event of, a 

down in the Korean armistice negotiations. The operational p

is substantially complete. The receipt of certain assurances from 

Eastern Command with respect to logistical support is necessar

der that the affected agencies can establish the appropriate con

plan without delay, should developments make this necessary

C. Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General

Hostilities (PSB D–8b).

This plan was approved by the Board on February 21, 19

submitted to the National Security Council as NSC 127. (As am

and approved by the NSC and approved by the President, this 

culated as NSC 127/1.)9 This plan was designed in order that the 

agencies would be able to conduct psychological operations 

suance of prescribed national objectives during general hostiliti

plan shall be executed upon Presidential proclamation in the e

war or at such time as the President may direct.

D. National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War 

(PSB D–11/b).

This plan was approved by the Board on November 15, 

sets forth the objectives which will govern the national overt 

ganda effort in a general war forced upon the United States 

USSR or any of its satellites. The objectives and tasks which sh

followed by the United States with respect to the world as a wh

USSR and its satellites, our allies and friends, and neutral nati

set forth. This guidance has been distributed to the various 

ments and agencies for their use. The Psychological Operation

dinating Committee (POC) has established an X-Day Committe

is concerned with the inter-departmental coordination of polic

operations in the event of war. This guidance is being used in 

plementation of their planning.

9 See Document 123.
3. Plans Authorized and in Process of Development 

A. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees—Phas

(PSB D–18a/1).

This project is concerned with the stimulation of defect

examination of the psychological and subsidiary military adv

which would result from the proper utilization of these e

Phase “A”, concerned with the care, resettlement, and poss

lization of current escapees, is reported on in Paragraph 1C 

paper.

B. Inventory of Instrumentalities for Countering Soviet Orbit Blac

Tactics (PSB D–19/1).

The Board has had prepared an “Inventory of Cold War We

consisting of a list of certain agencies and instrumentalities (

which are of a novel character). The Board has further directe

toward the feasibility of harassment and retaliation against the 

by use of appropriate instrumentalities.

C. Psychological Operations Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of A

with Respect to Germany (PSB D–21a).

This plan is designed to prescribe certain courses of acti

respect to: (a) the integration of Western Germany into West

rope, (b) the reduction of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germ

the achievement of German unity, and (d) the role of a unifi

many in the unification of Europe.

D. Psychological Strategy Planning for the Middle East (PSB D–2

This plan is to devise by means of coordinated psycholog

erations a national psychological plan, taking into account bo

range and short-range considerations, in order to overcome or 

instability within this area which would threaten Western inte

seeks to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and at the sa

to strengthen Western influence and to establish within the c

nity of nations a new relationship with the states of the area t

ognizes their desire to achieve status and respects their so

equality.

E. Psychological Strategy Planning for Southeast Asia (PSB D–23)

This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated 

logical operations in preventing the free countries of So

Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in develo

these countries the will and ability to resist Communis

within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening of 

world.
F. Psychological Operations Plan for the Exploitation of Stalin

s Pa

from Power (PSB D–24).

This plan is designed to study the actions the United States 

take to develop the maximum psychological results at the 

Stalin’s death.

G. Preliminary Analysis of the Communist B.W. Propaganda Camp

(PSB D–25).

This study concerns itself with the psychological problem

the current “Hate America” Communist propaganda campaig

presented.

H. Statement of U.S. Aims in the Cold War (“Princeton Statement

D–26).

This paper was designed to devise the maximum psycholo

fect which could be achieved by a statement of high U.S. or for

ficials relative to the liberation of peoples now under Soviet C

nist control.

I. Psychological Strategy Plan for the Pro-U.S. Orientation of Japan 

(PSB D–27).

This plan is designed to develop a psychological strategy 

ordinated psychological operations to strengthen Japan and oth

communist powers in Asia. It would promote Japan’s econom

military capacity to contribute to collective security, assure Japa

tinuing commitment to close association and joint action with 

and would assist in restoring Japan to a position of strength 

operative endeavor to secure the non-communist nations of As

Communist subversion or attack.

J. Psychological Strategy for Economic Security Vis-à-vis the Soviet 

(PSB D–28).

This plan is designed to prepare national psychological s

and specific courses of action with respect to the psychological 

of U.S. economic security programs concerned with the Soviet 

increasing the degree of acceptance in the Free World of U.S. ec

security objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet orbit. It also seeks to wea

viet control over the orbit countries by capitalizing on and obst

Soviet economic exploitation of captive Europe and China throu

chological operations.
Enclosure 3

Paragraph IX, 5 (page 8) of No. 7, “The Foreign Intelli

Program” of NSC 13510

Washington, August 1

5. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE

U.S. espionage and counterespionage activities outside th

nental limits of the U.S., with certain exceptions, are conducted 

Through these activities, including the operation of secret 

[11

⁄2 lines not declassified] CIA has collected significant amounts 

able intelligence from areas outside the USSR and the Soviet 

number of high quality, secret sources have been developed in 

areas, capable of producing important clandestine intelligenc

with strategic implications.

Although substantial progress has been made, CIA has 

achieved a satisfactory collection of intelligence on and from th

and the satellites. The tremendously effective State Security ap

of the USSR and the Soviet Orbit make this primary target ex

difficult to attack. Intensive efforts have been expended in an 

to develop within the USSR and the satellite countries a secu

destine intelligence apparatus capable of supporting and pr

communications for agent operations. The collection of inte

from these areas is increasing.

The reduction of available overt intelligence sources by So

satellite security precautions imposes upon CIA a responsibility 

collection of intelligence through espionage and counterespion

degree unparalleled in the past. In view of this and since avai

pionage and counterespionage facilities are not sufficient to ful

ent intelligence requirements, a mechanism for assigning over

orities to intelligence requirements levied on CIA by the vario

intelligence agencies has been established through the Interage

orities Committee, a subcommittee of the Intelligence Advisor

mittee. In general terms, the topmost priority within this frame

being afforded to Soviet and satellite intentions and capabiliti

Substantial progress has been made in organizing stay

agents in areas likely to be overrun in the event of further ho

In the face of known Soviet occupation and control techniq

10 Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. For a summary of Repor

NSC 135, see Document 128.
durability of such stay-behind nets and their ability to function 

appreciable period of time after the outbreak of hostilities h

been firmly established. The effective establishment of stay-beh

other war planning operations is conditioned upon over-all w

ning by Defense agencies which is on a continuing basis.

Counterespionage operations abroad gradually have been b

and concentrated against the Soviet and satellite intelligence s

They are becoming increasingly effective.

128. Report From the National Security Council to Presiden

Truman1

Washington, September 

SUBJECT

Brief on No. 7, “The Foreign Intelligence Program,” NSC 135

The basic handicap of the program is, of course, the paucit

telligence of all types, covert and overt, on the Soviet Orbit. 

theless, atomic estimates, though still uncertain, are more reliab

a year ago. A number of “finds” in Soviet electronics and telec

nications have been made. Intelligence on air defense and on b

entific research is improved. New economic sources and tech

promise better intelligence on Soviet military production. Use 

eign radio broadcasts was good. Target research progressed. T

program (world-wide encyclopedic data) is 45% complete on 

highest-priority areas, and 22% complete as a whole. NATO inte

requirements are being met.

Despite the fact that espionage within the Orbit has failed 

duce significant results, outside the Orbit it is generally good. 

ber of stay-behind nets have been established.

Improvement is needed in coordination between intelligen

policy and between intelligence and operational planning, altho

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Top Secret; Security Information. This is a summary prepared by the NSC Repo

of a 12-page report (Report No. 7 of NSC 135, “Status of United States Program

tional Security”) prepared by CIA with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advis

mittee. The full report is ibid. It omits paragraph 5, which is printed as Enclo

Document 127.
national estimates are now effectively drawing upon governm

sources. Political, social, and cultural intelligence research-in-

needed for areas outside the Orbit. Enemy long-range plans 

tentions, especially in Korea, are not known. Knowledge of th

guided missile program is poor. Collection by the Service att

inadequate. Further exploitation of aerial reconnaissance is in

Knowledge of Soviet work in the field of radio jamming and 

logical and chemical warfare is inadequate. Psychological a

nomic warfare have created unparalleled demands for intellig

There is no guarantee that intelligence will be able to fur

equate warning of attack prior to actual detection of hostile form

Certain last-minute defensive and offensive preparations ma

ever, be detected; opportunities for such detection vary from 

Germany and Korea) to extremely poor (in Transcaucasia and 

east Asia).

129. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Plan

Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)1

Washington, October 1

SUBJECT

PSB and General Smith’s Proposal

I refer to the memorandum2 handed you by the Director 

tral Intelligence at the PSB meeting last Thursday, October 9

outlines General Smith’s recommendation that (in his own 

“The responsibility for guiding policy, for approving projects, 

assessing the results of all covert cold war operations be place

the Psychological Strategy Board; and b) the present representa

the Departments of State, Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff now 

with giving policy guidance to the operating divisions of this 

(or personnel of equal stature and experience) be grouped a

war general staff with the Director of the PSB staff as Chief 

and be given additional responsibility of considering propos

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 55 D 339, New Proposa

Top Secret. 2 Printed below as Attachment 1.
ects, of recommending these projects for approval or disappr

the Board, of periodic evaluation of the conduct of these proje

of recommending periodically whether they are to be continued 

continued.” General Smith goes on to say that “The PSB, as pr

constituted, has not so far accomplished all of the results whic

self had hoped for.” He believes that the concepts and suggest

makes in these informal memoranda would make the PSB “

meaningful body as it would in fact become the device through 

all of our major cold war activities are considered and approv

A meeting was held in Mr. Frank G. Wisner’s office on Oct

at which were present in addition to Mr. Wisner, Admiral Kir

eral Magruder, Mr. Tracy Barnes, and myself, at your direction. 

know, Mr. Barnes took over a week ago as Assistant Directo

CIA for OPC. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss 

Smith’s memorandum and it was thoroughly understood that th

ing was exploratory and that no commitments were expected or 

be made until the important suggestions and recommendations 

eral Smith’s memorandum were thoroughly understood. Admi

stated that he had had long conversations with General Smit

the latter’s thinking relating to the PSB role in clandestine politic

fare. He remarked that he was in general agreement with 

Smith. Both General Magruder and Mr. Wisner had also discus

matter with General Smith and they had clear ideas as to what 

ter was driving at. It was generally agreed that the kernel of 

Smith’s thought was contained in the sentence starting at the 

of page 1 of his memorandum which states: “Moreover, under 

isting mechanism for providing policy guidance and progr

proval, the Agency has continued in the position of having to 

too much responsibility and authority for its own good.” He 

to say that “the rapidly increasing cost of covert operations, c

with the missing elements of objective review and substantiv

leave it open to departmental and Congressional criticism.”

During the meeting I took occasion to clarify certain points 

eral Smith’s memorandum which did not appear to me entirel

1) In speaking of “all of our major cold war activities,” d

eral Smith confine his recommendations only to political war

clandestine means or was he thinking in terms of overt propag

well? The answer was that he was thinking only of covert acti

2) In outlining his concept of the duties of the “advisers a

officers of the three principals,” it was not clear as to whethe

persons would be PSB officials or officials of their respective 

ments and agencies, i.e., State, Defense, CIA and perhaps t

The answer was that these persons who would backstop the 

members would be representatives of their respective depa

and agencies where they would have their offices and perfor

functions.
3) When General Smith spoke of his objection to the for

erence of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the m

partments and the inevitable delays and breaches of security 

process involves, did he mean to shut off the sometimes necess

fruitful direct working relationships between senior CIA offic

senior State Department officials on the working level? The an

this question was no, but it was believed that General Smith d

rigidly controlled, lateral working relationship held to more sen

responsible officials who were in a better position to give th

sary advice and clearances.

General Magruder stated that he was very much in favor 

eral Smith’s basic concept. He commented that the atmospher

the Defense establishment relating to clandestine and unconv

activities had changed very greatly over the past two years. T

tivities at their outset were not clearly understood or apprec

the Military who took an understandably negative view of m

and “unconventionality” which cut across established orthodo

nels and straightforward military concepts. These attitudes wi

Defense establishment had been greatly ameliorated and now 

tudes of top people within the Services and within the JCS v

covert operations reflected much more awareness of the nece

political warfare and all types of covert activities. He went o

that, although it was still difficult for any group including a re

ative of the Secretary of Defense to commit the three Services 

tical support, nevertheless these difficulties could now be me

more easily within the Defense establishment. General M

commented that, in his opinion, expeditious clearances for co

tivities and Department of Defense “no objection” or “yes, p

the most you can” were now possible as long as the activities 

impinge upon the basic constitutional and legislative powers 

thority of the Military establishment.

I think that we should examine very closely General Smit

cept of the assistant, staff officer, or deputy to support each PS

ber. He envisages “highly qualified officers . . . upon whom t

cipals could rely completely as their technical advisers and wh

respective Departments would accept in that status. It would be e

that these selected officers would have the competence to sp

thoritatively and definitively on the various matters to be con

. . .” General Smith qualifies this rather startling allocation of 

ity by stating that: “The selected staff officers would have to 

responsible by the principals for the necessary amount of coord

and checking in their departments.”

I do not believe that this is a workable concept. No State 

ment official would have the necessary qualifications to fulfill 

sponsible functions as I believe are envisaged under General 

concept of a “Board of Directors for all covert cold war activiti
not think that the Secretary or Under Secretary would consider 

off-the-cuff clearances for highly sensitive political operations w

first consulting the most competent persons in the Department o

Certainly, no staff officer or assistant could or should be cloth

any such power or responsibility as this would cut across ba

cepts of departmental handling of policy decisions. If, in an

group as envisaged by General Smith, I or my successor shou

sume to provide policy clearance in highly sensitive fields of i

interest to, let us say, EUR, and in which, let us say, NEA has 

found interest, I should certainly be assassinated instanter by 

sistant Secretaries of these two Bureaus, and quite rightly so. 

opinion that the present mechanism for providing policy guid

OPC of CIA works pretty well. It is perhaps administratively 

what unorthodox, but the activity itself is “unconventional” an

easily fitted into conventional and institutionally correct proce

I inquired of Frank Wisner if he thought that General Sm

sidered that the Department of State was not providing adequ

icy guidance under the present mechanism or whether there we

delays in obtaining clearances due to some of the factors set 

General Smith’s memorandum. Mr. Wisner replied that he did n

that this was in the General’s mind, but rather General Smith

thought was that “no objection” on the part of the Department 

was not sufficient. He rather desired a mechanism which wou

closely commit the Department to responsibility for sensitive 

ceedingly costly activities directly in the field of foreign policy b

means, i.e., political warfare. I may add that whenever the CIA r

a policy decision on an important matter where time was of the e

such decision has been forthcoming sometimes within a m

hours. The Deputy Under Secretary is constantly available fo

high level decisions which have always been made in the pa

out their being referred to the lower levels and fought over b

tively junior officials. In other words, it is my view that General 

memorandum in this respect refers primarily to the delays, lack 

ficient logistic support, and security breaches which have bee

rienced for understandable reasons within the Department of D

and the JCS.

With regard to the General’s insistence upon this Departm

suming more responsibility for these activities, we must, of cour

closely into the degree of authority and control which must 

comitant with such responsibility. As you know, it was the con

General Marshall, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Lovett and Mr. Kennan, wh

was set up in the spring of 1948, that political warfare activities o

means (excluding para-military operations and planning the

case of overt hostilities) was of primary interest to the Depart

State. The idea was explored of placing such activity directly 
this Department, but I believe it was finally decided that the op

should be one step removed from this Department, and it was 

reason that it was placed, faute de mieux, within the framewor

CIA. We are still the Department primarily interested in politi

fare by covert means. If this is so, we should accept General 

basic thesis and accept more responsibility but at the same tim

cise closer control over operations. I inquired whether Genera

had in mind a “theater commander” concept which would m

the Department would say “go ahead” and then his organizatio

take over and all implementation would be considered operatio

within his exclusive responsibility. Mr. Wisner replied that this 

in General Smith’s mind as evidenced by the part of the latter

orandum where he refers to “periodic evaluation of the conduct 

projects and of recommending periodically whether they are to 

tinued or discontinued.” This concept would mean a much gre

gree of State Department control than is presently exercised. W

took over the CIA, General Smith told the Chief of Foreign Serv

sonnel Durbrow that he could use perhaps fifty qualified Forei

ice Officers in a delicate operation where political know-how a

expertise is essential. We have never been able to meet this 

and presently there are only three or four qualified Foreign Ser

ficers serving in OPC of CIA.

As you are well aware, a green light for an operation or a 

jection” is entirely inadequate. My office has endeavored, thro

weekly 10/2 representatives forum and by personal contacts w

ior operational personnel of the OPC to keep abreast of politi

fare operations. This has been difficult and sometimes these op

inevitably get off the beam. It is axiomatic that delicate politic

ations are about as good as the operators. Perhaps this adds u

conclusion that if this Department accepts more responsibility

mean that senior officers of this Department must themselves 

increasing personal attention to monitoring CIA political 

activities.

I think that recent events in the Soviet Union fully justify 

Smith’s observation that “it is inevitable that cold war operati

continue over a long period of time.” If our conflict with St

Russian Imperialism, International Communism, or whatever n

give it may more and more assume the pattern of what we ca

war” over an indefinite period, it seems to me that political wa

clandestine means will increasingly assume major significan

NSC in 10/53 affirmed this conclusion and called for increase

3 Document 90.
and magnitude in covert operations. General Smith speaks of the 

combination of personality and experience, the continuity of w

not insured. I would place more stress than he apparently doe

phrase “the continuity of which is not insured.” An insti

arrangement made at this particular juncture and based to so

gree on personalities might be dangerous. It might work very 

until January 20, 1953. With regard to the State Department end 

eral Smith’s concept, I should like to see, if possible, the foca

within the Department providing policy guidance and control 

litical warfare activities placed upon as high a “professional le

possible.

I attach hereto a memorandum addressed to me on Octobe

Mr. Krentz as well as a memorandum I have just received fr

Tracy Barnes. I think that both of these memoranda will assis

study of the problem presented by General Smith’s memorand

Robert P

Attachment 1

Draft Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligenc

Smith5

Washington, October 

In the field of unconventional and psychological operati

Central Intelligence Agency is an executive and operating 

charged with carrying out projects in support of national policie

projects include political and paramilitary operations, the gen

sirability of which have been determined by the senior departm

the Executive Branch of the Government. As an operating ag

these departments, CIA requires more than policy guidance. 

tual projects which it proposes to undertake in furthering natio

icy should be carefully scrutinized before final approval, and 

value of the operations themselves should be periodically asse

some authority outside the Agency but representative both of i

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

5 Secret; Security Information. For text of the October 30 version of this 

dorsed by the Psychological Strategy Board, see Document 135.
the interested executive departments. The mounting cost of th

erations makes such prior assessment and continuous audit a 

of great urgency.

Ever since I assumed my present responsibilities I have b

ing to arrive at the best method of establishing within the Ag

objective method of project review and analysis, but without re

isfactory results. Moreover, under the existing mechanism for 

ing policy guidance and program approval, the Agency has co

in the position of having to assume too much responsibility 

thority for its own good. Thus, the rapidly increasing cost of co

erations, coupled with the missing elements of objective rev

substantive audit, leave it open to departmental and Congressio

icism. The simple fact is that in the field of cold war, vision an

ination are essential, but these two essential qualities must be h

der wraps. Otherwise, the number of ways they will conjur

spend money is really surprising, and the selective judgment 

tached, objective authority must be applied.

It is inevitable that cold war operations will continue ove

period of time. The involve activities which do not lend thems

precise evaluation and it is impossible to judge in absolute te

successes or failures of particular programs. Unlike military op

which require the continuous and increasing application of f

ward an abrupt and conclusive ending, those in which we enga

ally require a fluctuating effort with no clear termination in p

For this reason, it is all the more important that they should no

dertaken unless all concerned are satisfied as to their desirabi

The ideal situation would be for all cold war projects to 

sidered in detail and passed upon by a committee consisting of 

der Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and 

rector of Central Intelligence (the present PSB). However, i

possible for these fully occupied individuals to devote the am

time necessary for such direct analysis, and they would need 

tent and fully trusted advisors from their respective staffs in 

be adequately informed. I believe, however, that the three offici

tioned, sitting as the Psychological Strategy Board, can if adequa

ported perform these functions without too much additional 

and they are already doing a good deal of it in an informal way 

weekly luncheon meetings. This, however, is the result of a hap

bination of personalities and experience, the continuity of whic

insured. It can be insured only if there is a genuine acceptanc

tain essential principles. The first of these is full recognition by t

Board members of the true significance of their role which w

actually to approve, guide, and assess the value of covert cold 

erations, as well as to give the policy guidance under which th

erations are planned and executed. In this capacity, they wou
effect a board of directors for all covert cold war activities. Seco

somewhat more difficult of attainment would be the provision 

highly qualified officers within the P.S.B. staff upon whom the 

pals could rely completely as their technical advisors, and who

respective departments would accept in that status. It would 

sential that these selected officers have competence to speak a

tatively and definitively on the various matters to be considere

in their capacity as advisors and staff officers of the three pr

and as representatives of the departments from which they 

onded. Time would be lost and insecurity would result from 

reference of cold war projects to the routine machinery of th

departments, since this would have the inevitable result of a

these matters to get down into the depths of departmental sta

to be fought over and widely discussed by a large number of re

junior officials. Hence, the selected staff officers would have to 

responsible by the principals for the necessary amount of coord

and checking within their departments.

The three presently designated representatives of the Depa

of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are all top qu

dividuals. We could not hope to get and would not want to ha

ter people. It seems to me that the only difficulty is that they 

set up in the proper framework at the present time. They or o

equivalent caliber could serve as the principal advisors and as

of the two Under Secretaries. I recommend, therefore, that: (a) 

sponsibility for guiding policy, for approving projects, and for 

ing the results of all covert cold war operations be placed up

Psychological Strategy Board; and (b) the present representative

Departments of State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Sta

charged with giving policy guidance to the operating divisions 

Agency (or personnel of equal stature and experience) be grou

a cold war general staff with the Director of the PSB staff a

thereof, and be given the additional responsibility of consideri

posed projects, of recommending these projects for approval o

proval by the Board, of periodic evaluation of the conduct of the

ects, and of recommending periodically whether they are 

continued or discontinued.

The PSB, as presently constituted, has not so far accompli

of the results which I myself had hoped for. The concept outline

would, to a certain extent, change its present character and woul

it a really meaningful body as it would in fact become the device t

which all of our major cold war activities are considered and ap

The present staff of the PSB would undergo a corresponding chan

respect to its composition, functions and responsibilities.

These are general recommendations. If they are favorably 

ered, they will require detailed analysis and staff action.
Attachment 2

Memorandum From Kenneth C. Krentz of the Policy

Planning Staff to Robert P. Joyce6

Washington, October 1

General Smith’s draft memorandum of October 87 presen

ical and convincing case for the appointment of deputies to 

members who would be responsible, each under the aegis of 

department, for formulating policy guidance and evaluation 

covert political and psychological operations. There is little do

such a set-up would enable CIA to function more effectively 

sponsibly in this field and I can see certain advantages from 

partment of State’s point of view in that decisions be by a dep

tal group rather than solely by State with tacit or other concurr

Defense. However, I can foresee several serious dangers from o

of view unless this project were to be extremely carefully wor

in terms of our own organization.

First, it seems to me that our present small office, functio

and under the direct control of Mr. Matthews is, while not p

very effective means of pulling together day-to-day operation

covert side with all the responsible political officers of the Depa

We know what is going on and can work very closely with the 

ant Secretaries and their Deputies and are in a position const

guide the thinking of working-level people in CIA/opc.

Covert political warfare is so alien to the normal concepts o

ican government in the past, is so labyrinthine and delicate

seems to me maturity of judgment and experience plus the ca

ficer’s intuitive sense of political factors are essential factors in 

with the problem on the day-to-day working levels of the bure

perience, I believe, will demonstrate that the deputies proposed 

in a very short time tend to become involved exclusively in hi

decisions and relationships which would isolate them from 

mate contact with the diverse parts of the Department and CIA

we now maintain.

To set up a new mechanism within the Department to perf

function seems to me dangerous to our ends. I think particul

6 Secret; Security Information. 

7 See Attachment 1 above.
Secretariat approach would tend to place these functions in 

tine and perhaps an unimaginative context in which I do not 

they can be fitted. I am quite aware that our present set-up is 

with horror by organizational and managerial eyes. Neverthele

lieve the nature of the problem requires an unorthodox appro

other words, if we appoint the deputies to sit in the PSB, I belie

should be supported by practically the same set-up which we no

under Mr. Matthews.

We must also consider that the Deputy Under Secretary f

stantive Affairs is likely always to be a high-calibre substantive 

Under the vicissitudes of our system this would not necessarily 

for future Under Secretaries.

General Smith says, “It would be essential that these sele

ficers (the deputies) have competence to speak authoritatively 

finitively on the various matters to be considered, both in their 

ity as advisors and staff officers of the three principals 

representatives of the departments from which they are second

Time would be lost and insecurity would result from formal re

of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the major depar

since this would have the inevitable result of allowing these ma

get down into the depths of departmental staffs and to be foug

and widely discussed by a large number of relatively junior o

Hence, the selected staff officers would have to be held respon

the principals for the necessary amount of coordinating and ch

within their departments.”

In the last analysis this becomes a question of individual

were to set this proposal up tomorrow the individuals would b

self and General Magruder. This would work beautifully becau

of you have several years of intimate experience, knowledge of 

extensive cooperating contacts—built up over several years also t

selected individuals—and the requisite qualities of mind for the jo

also we would run into the violent objection of managers that y

not rely upon individuals. Any comparably competent officers m

able to take over at any time. I think this is the exception that pro

rule. With the departure of yourself shortly and the possible de

of General Magruder at any time, I have a strong feeling that w

be getting into a very undesirable position. Furthermore, I do n

General Smith’s generalization as to Departmental staffs can be 

to the Department of State as it could to CIA or to the Pentag

substantive staffs are relatively small and highly coordinated in 

ditional pattern of Foreign Office operation.

This matter of our own internal set-up should have the mo

ful consideration before we agree to modifications. This is som

which is going to take a large amount of thought and foresight, 
first reaction is that to be successful we should have to maintai

thing within our own building very similar to what we have 

I am thoroughly in accord with General Smith’s stresses 

need for constant evaluation of covert programs and auditing 

to detail. Carefully worked out, the mechanism he proposes m

the best means of achieving this.

Kenneth C. 

8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

130. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Plan

Staff to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs

(Riddleberger)1

Washington, October 1

SUBJECT

Liaison Relationships between OPC of CIA and the Department of State

As you are aware, under NSC Directives the Department 

has certain responsibilities for providing political guidance to 

ganization within the CIA which engages in certain activitie

might be generally referred to as within the field of political 

Primary responsibility for providing this counsel, advice, guida

control is vested in Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, and I have resp

ity as his subordinate for the day to day operation of this fun

the performance of these duties, members of this office and I 

sion consult with you when important policy matters are und

sideration. The ordinary relationship is, however, with the 

Deputy Assistant Secretaries and the office Directors an

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 103.11/10–105

cret; Security Information. Copies were sent to EUR–Perkins, FE–Allison, NEA

and ARA–Miller. Riddleberger’s handwritten note on the first page reads: “

with Joyce. No answer required. JWR, 10/16/52.” 2 On August 1, OPC merged with the CIA’s Office of Special Operation

the Directorate of Plans, under Deputy Director for Plans Frank G. Wisner. The 

OPC was not used in CIA after that date.
Deputies. On occasion, when a particular situation in a particula

try demands and is receiving close attention by the CIA, off

charge are brought in.

My colleagues (Kenneth C. Krentz, Lampton Berry, W

McFadden) and I arrange personal meetings where the approp

ficial of the CIA is able to consult directly with the appropriate 

of the Department of State. I have found it desirable to atten

meetings or to see to it that one of my colleagues is present. O

sion, when the CIA is engaging in important operations in a p

lar country in a rapidly developing situation, my office has aut

a continuing and sometimes daily direct relationship between 

official concerned and the appropriate officer of the Departmen

these contacts, however, my office is kept advised as to the na

the business and the decisions, if any, which were taken. This 

control has proved to be necessary in order that I may be in a p

to be continuously aware of the political advice being supplied 

of CIA and in order that matters of importance may be brough

attention of Mr. Matthews for final decision.

OPC of CIA has expanded very rapidly indeed during t

four years. From a small group of about [number not declassifi

sons in 1948, I believe the organization now has on its rolls som

ber not declassified] persons. The activities of this section of CI

expanded enormously in scope and magnitude on a world wid

This situation has meant (up until recently, for reasons which n

be gone into here) that requests for political guidance and conse

the need for increasing direct contact between CIA officials a

cers of the Department of State has greatly increased. The job o

nelizing and controlling these contacts has been difficult but

opinion, necessary both in the interests of security and effici

seeing to it that OPC obtains the most carefully considered advi

the most competent and responsible officers in the Departmen

A great number of officers of OPC of CIA are on terms of p

friendship with many political officers of this Department, an

has been a continuing tendency for informal contacts betwee

persons on both sides of the house. It is very difficult, and som

undesirable, to endeavor to control too stringently these relati

which are occasionally fruitful. On the other hand, these pers

lationships sometimes work against important security conside

and on occasion the CIA man talks operations with his Depart

State friend who may talk policy. There have been occasions wh

tacts of this nature result in the CIA man considering that he 

tained a policy view or even on occasion a green light from 

partmental contact. In addition to these informal contacts, th

constant disposition on the part of some CIA officials to deal 
with his 

opposite number in the Department of State at tim

out clearance within the CIA or with my office. I believe it wil

derstood that although certain “opposite number” contacts ar

casion desirable, they should nevertheless be controlled. The

been instances in the past when CIA officials have considered 

ported that they have received policy decisions or “no object

sponses from certain Departmental officers following direct an

ordinated contacts.

This situation has been discussed on many occasions w

Frank Wisner, who has had his own difficulties within the CIA 

trolling and channeling relationships between OPC and the 

ment of State. Recently Ambassador Lewis Clark, who is presen

the CIA, has been placed in control of liaison between OPC of C

this Department. He is preparing an inventory of all contacts b

OPC officials and political officers of this Department. He is d

ing that there have developed relationships such as describe

preceding paragraph and that these contacts sometimes caused 

sion and duplication. Mr. Clark is tightening up this liaison r

ship within OPC, and his office will be the clearing house for a

ings between OPC officers and the political officers of the Dep

of State. He has requested, and I have agreed, that a renewed en

be made within this Department to insure that all meetings in

policy guidance shall be arranged for or passed upon by my o

The purpose of this memorandum is to request that you br

matter to the attention of your Deputy and your office Dire

might be suggested to them that they should have no furthe

dealings with CIA officials on policy matters without clearan

my office. Only in exceptional cases, should contact be be

Deputy office director level. Exceptions should be cleared by m

and the office director concerned. I am sure that you will und

that there is no desire on my part to interpose myself or to ch

useful and desirable contacts between officials of the CIA and 

priate political officers of the Department. I believe that you w

that this degree of control is necessary in order to 1) prevent 

derstandings of the Department’s position from developing wi

CIA; 2) insure that political advice and guidance proffered by 

partmental official is coordinated with other areas of the Depa

3) maintain a necessary degree of security with regard to the 

tions of the CIA and the relationship between OPC and the 

ment of State under NSC Directives, and 4) insure that all sub

and important policy guidance decisions are placed before Dep

der Secretary Matthews.
131. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Sm

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Counc

(Lay)1

Washington, October 1

SUBJECT

A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Securit

United States (NSC Action No. 543)2

1. On August 30, 1951, by NSC Action No. 543, the Natio

curity Council directed that the Director of Central Intelligen

pare, in collaboration with the Interdepartmental Committee 

ternal Security (ICIS), the Interdepartmental Intelligence Con

(IIC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), a summary evaluation 

net capability of the USSR to injure the Continental United 

The NSC directive required that this summary evaluation 

pared upon completion of basic studies by the Intelligence A

Committee (IAC) under the direction of its Chairman, the D

of Central Intelligence; by the IIC; by the JCS with collabora

required, of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, (FCD

by the ICIS with collaboration, as required, of the FCDA, as in

Tab A.

2. The IAC study was published on October 23, 1951 as 

Estimate 14, “Soviet Capabilities for a Military Attack on the 

States before July 1952.”3 The IIC study dated October 10

and the ICIS study of May 15, 1952 are enclosed herewith as 

Because of the sensitive nature of the JCS study, it was not dist

outside the JCS organization. Members of the working group 

drafted the summary evaluation were briefed orally on its con

3. The attached summary evaluation represents a step for

planning for the security of the United States and is transm

an example of the caliber of work currently to be expected

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for In

Job 80–R1440R, Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret; Security Information. Smith’s m

dum is attached to an October 21 covering memorandum from Acting Execut

tary Gleason to the NSC, which indicates that the NSC would “at an early meet

sider the recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of Smith’s memoran

Document 137. 2 Document 86.

3 Not printed. A copy is in National Archives, RG 263, Central Intelligenc

Files. 4 Not enclosed but available upon request to the Executive Secretary. [Fo

the original.]
following important respects, however, it falls far short of su

the estimates essential to security planning:

a. An evaluation of the USSR’s capability to injure the 

States should contain a plain statement of the estimated perce

reduction in US capabilities likely to result from Soviet attack

ically, percentage reduction in the fields of: US military strengt

ing, atomic counterattack capability, industrial production, and 

to produce new weapons of critical importance.

b. To provide guidance in current planning for US security

ations on this subject should be projected into the future and co

estimate of prospective developments in USSR’s offensive capa

c. A more adequate and realistic evaluation would cover th

able Soviet capabilities to injure US facilities and strengths in 

of the world, and not merely the capability of USSR to injure t

tinental United States. Such an evaluation should include so

mate of Soviet intentions in the light of net capabilities.

4. Three primary reasons why the attached paper does n

these requirements are:

a. We lack knowledge of Soviet plans and intentions a

knowledge of Soviet capabilities cannot be considered comple

b. The basic underlying studies required to produce the st

mentioned in paragraph 3-a do not exist.

c. There is at present no machinery to plan, guide, coordin

produce an appraisal or estimate based on the integration of 

intelligence with military, political and economic operational da

ing with our own capabilities.

5. It is believed that an appraisal of the type referred to 

graph 4-c would serve to provide a more adequate basis for p

for the security of the United States. To this end it is recommen

the National Security Council:

a. Note the attached summary evaluation as an initial effo

sponse to the NSC directive issued by NSC Action No. 543, an

example of the kind of work currently to be expected on this 

problem.

b. As an interim measure instruct the Director of Centra

gence to prepare, in collaboration with officials of other gover

bodies as required,5 terms of reference for a more adequate ev

of the USSR’s capability to injure the United States.

c. Concurrently, instruct the Director of Central Intelligen

amine, in collaboration with officials of other governmental b

5 From this point, a line is drawn to the bottom of the page where the w

cluding IIC & ICIS” were added by hand.
needed,

the adequacy of present machinery, and the character 

new machinery that may be required in order to plan, guide, coo

and produce for the National Security Council, upon request, 

tions in the nature of “Commander’s Estimates,” of the USSR’s 

ities and intentions vis-à-vis the United States, based upon the 

tion of military, political, and economic operational data dealin

United States’ capabilities and intentions, and national intelligen

Walter B. 

Enclosure8

Washington, October 

NET CAPABILITY OF THE USSR TO INJURE THE 

CONTINENTAL US

Problem

1. To prepare a summary evaluation of the net capability 

USSR, as of mid-1952, to injure the continental United States.

Scope

2. This evaluation considers the injury which could be infli

the continental United States by USSR military action and 

inspired sabotage in connection with the initial attack and in 

tion with attacks immediately following. The US has sub

strengths in being outside the continental United States, and 

mate is expressed herein as to the effect of a Soviet attack o

strengths or the likelihood that the Soviet will allocate parts of i

ing power to such an attack.

Conclusions

3. The Soviet Union, as of mid-1952, has the net capabilit

flict serious but not permanently crippling damage to the con

strengths of the United States.

4. This Soviet capability is primarily that of surprise air at

ing atomic bombs. The Soviet capability for inflicting direct dam

the US by sabotage is small by comparison with damage that c

inflicted by an atomic air attack. However, sabotage in conjuncti

6 From this point, a line is drawn connecting to the line noted in footnote 

7 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

8 Top Secret; Security Information.
an atomic air attack could significantly increase the total phys

psychological impact. Such sabotage could include the use o

weapons smuggled into the US if the Kremlin were disposed t

the considerably increased risk of premature disclosure which 

eration would entail.

5. The Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs, as of mid-1952, 

ably appreciably less than 100. The nature and extent of the 

that could be inflicted by a surprise air attack, involving the la

against US targets of the entire Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs

vary according to the objectives governing the selection of tar

a. An attack on US targets selected with the objective of in

maximum overall damage to US armament production capa

military power would probably prevent the US from regaining 

rent armament production capacity and military power for a p

the order of 2 years.

b. An attack on US targets selected with the primary obje

neutralizing US atomic capabilities (see sub-paragraph 6-a) 

probably not prevent an atomic counter attack from the contine

of a size unacceptable to the Soviet Union in the light of its pre

fenses and vulnerabilities.

c. An attack on US targets selected with the primary obje

neutralizing US ability to sustain large scale military operation

produce new weapons of critical importance (see sub-paragraphs 

6-c), could, under circumstances considered probable for the 

achieve such neutralization for a period of the order of 6 to 12 m

d. Regardless of the primary objective of the attack or the 

target selection, the USSR is incapable of inflicting by such att

ficient mass casualties or disorganization to force US gove

changes or decisions acceptable to the USSR (see sub-paragra

Objectives of the Attacks

6. We believe that any military action or sabotage undert

the USSR against the continental US would be for the purpos

below. Achievement of the first three of these objectives is, for t

ent at least, essential to the ultimate success of any Soviet w

against the western powers.

a. To prevent the launching of atomic attacks against th

Union in the light of its defenses and vulnerabilities. Probable 

targets would include Strategic Air Command bases, aircraft a

trol centers, atomic production facilities and storage sites.

b. To neutralize US ability to sustain large scale military 

tions. Probable primary targets would include concentrated in

critical and basic to war production; basic services, including 

and transport; ports and Naval bases; and atomic production f
c. To neutralize US ability to develop or produce an

weapons of critical importance. Probable primary targets wo

clude Atomic Energy key facilities for new development, guid

sile production and test installations, and applied research fac

d. To so neutralize the general industrial, economic, and p

logical strength of the US that government decisions or chan

ceptable to the Soviet Union would occur, or could be forced b

tional pressures elsewhere in the world. Pursuit of this objective 

probably involve an effort to inflict mass casualities and caus

ganization in urban areas. Probable primary targets would inc

those listed for other more specific purposes in sub-paragrap

6-b, and 6-c above, with the additional targets of government 

centers, population centers, and miscellaneous industry and s

wherever concentrated.

Method and Effectiveness of Attacks

7. Air Attacks. By far the most effective means available 

USSR for injuring the continental United States in the initial s

hostilities is air attack with atomic bombs. It is estimated that th

is capable of carrying out air attacks against any target in th

nental United States and Canada. Some targets listed as essenti

objectives would be difficult to reach with Soviet capability 

1952. USSR capabilities for air attack are estimated in detail as f

a. Penetration of US Defenses.

(1) The capability exists for the USSR to penetrate US, A

and Canadian defense with air attack at any time and place w

might select. The factors favoring this capability are:

(a) The USSR has the initiative.

(b) The US aircraft control and warning net is not com

(c) The USSR can jam and reduce the efficiency of the 

control and warning system. The extent to which the USSR 

this is not known.

(d) The radar net will not detect low flying aircraft 

tances which would make interception feasible. (e) The US Ground Observer Corps is not yet fully e

(f) The regulation of air traffic into the United States is 

ficiently rigid to make identification positive. Also electronic 

fication equipment is not available to supply all friendly air

(g) Sufficient all-weather fighters for US air defense fo

not yet available. Crew deficiencies also exist. (h) Russian bombers can overfly the range of US anti-

artillery.

(2) The net success in penetrating the US defenses in te

bombs on target would vary with the avenues chosen, the met

attack and depth of targets inside peripheral defenses, char

individual targets and their local defenses, and the degree of s

attained. It is estimated that 65 to 85 per cent of bombs launche
be delivered on target in an attack aimed at US armament pro

facilities and military strength in general.

b. Effectiveness of Air Attack with Atomic Bombs. As of mid-1

USSR probably had a stockpile of 50 bombs of approximatel

yield, or the equivalent in bombs of different yields. It is poss

the number of bombs was as low as 25 or as high as 100.

(1) Assuming that (1) the USSR had a stockpile of 100 bomb

were allotted to the optimum targets in the US, (3) all were dropp

near optimum placement, and (4) the entire attack was delive

short period, the Soviet Union could inflict sufficient damage to 

the US from regaining its present armament production capacity 

itary power for at least two years. However, the actual USSR sto

probably appreciably less than 100 atomic weapons; optimum 

selection is improbable; and it is probable that the number of bo

livered on target would be only 65 to 85 per cent of those launch

sequently the probable delay in recovery of US armament pro

capacity and military power might well be less than two years. (2) If the probable Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs we

against US targets selected with a view to preventing the laun

US atomic weapons (see sub-paragraph 6-a), we believe that 

centage of bombs on target would be substantially less than 

percent. This estimate is based on the nature and location of 

gets and on the fact that the aircraft element in these targets is 

Such an attack, under circumstances considered probable for 

emy, would probably not prevent an atomic counter attack f

continental US of a size unacceptable to the Soviet Union in t

of its present defenses and vulnerabilities.9

(3) If the probable Soviet stockpile were directed at the a

the US to sustain large scale military operations and to produ

weapons of critical importance (see sub-paragraphs 6-b and 

livery capability should be high. Under circumstances considere

able for the enemy, substantial neutralization of these US cap

could probably be achieved for a period of the order of 6 to 12 m

(4) If the probable Soviet stockpile were used to achieve 

the purposes stated in paragraph 6, some progress might be m

ward achieving the purpose described in sub-paragraph 6-d. H

the degree of destruction required to achieve that purpose is b

to be well beyond current Soviet capabilities.

c. Effectiveness of Air Attack with Conventional Bombs. Usi

ventional bombs, the USSR could not at the present time inflic

on the continental United States that would be significant in ac

any of the purposes listed in paragraph 6.

9 As noted in paragraph 2 above, no estimate is expressed herein as to th

a Soviet attack on US strengths overseas, or as to the likelihood that the Krem

allocate parts of its striking power to such an attack. [Footnote in the origina

10 US ability to sustain large scale military operations is considered here 

eral ability. If effects were analyzed in terms of sustaining particular military o

i.e. land operations, sea operations, air operations, amphibious and joint opera

ferent predictions would likely result for each. [Footnote in the original.]
d. Effectiveness of Air Attack with Chemical, BW and Other 

ventional Weapons. At the present time the USSR does not have 

pability to use chemical, BW, or other unconventional weapon

attacks to achieve any of the purposes listed in paragraph 6.

8. Effectiveness of Airborne Troop Attacks. The USSR could n

terially contribute to the achievement of any of the purposes l

paragraph 6 by the use of airborne troop or commando air dro

9. Effectiveness of Sea Attack.

a. Surface Forces. The USSR could not inflict significant in

continental United States by use of Naval surface forces, as th

face forces lack the strength and composition necessary for ope

against the continental United States.

b. Sub-surface Forces. Soviet submarines are capable of re

with little chance of detection, positions off the US coasts from 

personnel could be landed and missiles fired at land targets. T

no evidence that the USSR as yet possesses an atomic missile t

be fired from a submarine. Although the possibility exists that th

does have such a weapon, we consider the damage resulting fro

attacks would be minor by comparison to that of atomic air atta

would not materially change the results to be expected from an 

tack which delivered the entire available stockpile.

10. Sabotage. The Soviet capability for inflicting direct damag

US by sabotage is small by comparison with damage that coul

flicted by an atomic air attack. However, sabotage in conjunction 

atomic air attack could significantly increase the total physical a

chological impact. Such sabotage could include the use of atomic w

smuggled into the US if the Kremlin were disposed to accept t

siderably increased risk of premature disclosure which this op

would entail. USSR sabotage capabilities are estimated as follow

a. Use of Saboteurs. Measures to control the movement of p

saboteurs across the borders of or within the United States do n

pletely prevent access to most sabotage targets in the United S

war occurs, however, the entry and departure of potential sa

probably would be quickly and substantially curtailed. The free

action of potential saboteurs also in this event would prob

quickly and substantially curtailed by U.S. Government deten

those Communists and others who are regarded as potential sa

and of resident enemy aliens (including Soviet Bloc diplomatic 

ficial personnel). Plans for the accomplishment of such detentio

been prepared.11

11 See Document 16.
b. Physical Sabotage Capabilities against Specific Types of Ta

estimated as follows:

(1) Industrial Installations and Facilities. Sabotage capabil

high against facilities upon which a war mobilization, war pro

and wartime civilian economy depend. Security supervision 

tained in critical plants engaged in industrial contracts with 

agencies and also in certain essential supporting facilities. 

supervision is maintained in plants serving the essential 

wartime economy. Inadequate visitor control in, and absenc

thority to remove potential saboteurs from, vital non-classified-

plants and inability to prevent Soviet inspired disruptive strik

in classified-contract plants, further add to the vulnerability 

industrial installations.

(2) Key Military Installations (including command facilities a

facilities essential for logistical support of the military within a

Sabotage capabilities are slight in view of present deployment an

ness of area military forces and other protective countermeasure

(3) Port Facilities. Substantial sabotage capabilities exist, s

program for safeguarding port facilities, adopted after evaluatio

risks involved, has necessarily been limited primarily to majo

Even this limited program is proving difficult to implement in 

(4) Forests. Sabotage capabilities consist chiefly of arson. 

forest protection facilities are inadequate to prevent a substa

crease in forest fire loss through sabotage. However, it is belie

such losses would be limited to an extent that U.S. war strength 

not be critically affected. (5) Crops and Livestock. While existing measure for safeg

the nation’s food supply are not adequate to prevent unconv

attacks, they might serve to minimize damage thereto from 

tacks. It is believed that losses in this category would be limit

extent that U.S. war strength would not be critically affected. (6) Public Water Supplies are generally vulnerable to tempor

local BW contamination. The introduction of contaminants int

already in a circulating system is a greater danger than such in

tion on watersheds or in reservoirs.

(7) Essential Government Administrative Operations. Saboteu

some capability for assassination of key government officials, n

standing protective measures to which they have been alerte

teurs also have the capability for disrupting the continuity of e

and other government operations by the clandestine introdu

chemical or biological agents into public buildings. Against th

bility, existing countermeasures are only slightly effective.

c. Sabotage Devices. Potential saboteurs can readily obtain 

variety of sabotage devices, including chemical and biological 

They can also obtain or produce non-fissionable component 

atomic bombs. Each of the foregoing is available in the United S

procurable through smuggling, for which substantial opportun

ist over United States land and sea frontiers and through abuse o

matic immunity and courtesy. There also exists the possibility 

ducing assembled atomic bombs from abroad by such smuggl

effective limit on sabotage capability will continue to be determ
US controls on movements of persons and materials and on a

critical targets rather than by the availability of sabotage devic

With regard to BW agents, programs pertaining to disease 

ing, immunization, research, training, stockpiling, alertness, pro

of veterinary biologicals and physical security of essential bu

are under way in the appropriate agencies. Satisfactory execu

these programs is essential to adequate defense against overt 

as clandestine biological warfare attack.

d. Non-physical Sabotage. While the continued propagan

other subversive efforts of the Communists probably are not w

some result, the prosecutions of national and local Communist 

plus the increasing awareness of the American public of the seri

of this threat, are reducing the Communist potential in this fiel

Tab A12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

on

A PROJECT TO PROVIDE A MORE ADEQUATE BASIS F

PLANNING FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STAT

1. Pursuant to authorization by the President there is her

rected the development of the following comprehensive studie

der to provide a more adequate basis for planning for the sec

the United States.

a. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to launch a m

attack on the Continental United States, to be prepared under 

rection of the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of 

telligence Advisory Committee. b. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to conduct s

and otherwise disrupt internal U.S. activities, to be prepared by 

terdepartmental Intelligence Conference. c. An evaluation of U.S. military capability to counter p

enemy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph a above, and 

mate of the probable damage to the United States resulting fro

attack, to be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the co

tion, as required, of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. d. An evaluation of ways and means available to counter 

tial enemy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph b above, 

estimate of the probable damage to the United States resultin

such enemy actions, to be prepared by the Interdepartmenta

mittee on Internal Security with the collaboration, as required 

Federal Civil Defense Administration.

12 Top Secret; Security Information.
2. Upon the completion of the foregoing studies there wil

pared by the Director of Central Intelligence in collaboration w

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the Inte

mental Intelligence Conference and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a su

evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the Con

United States.

3. The summary evaluation referred to in paragraph 2 abo

be completed as soon as possible and shall be forwarded to 

tional Security Council. Access thereto will be restricted to as 

dividuals as possible and only on an absolute need-to-know b

132. Memorandum From President Truman to Secretary of 

Acheson and Secretary of Defense Lovett1

Washington, October 2

SUBJECT

Communications Intelligence Activities

The communications intelligence (COMINT) activities 

United States are a national responsibility. They must be so or

and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available reso

all participating departments and agencies and to satisfy the le

intelligence requirements of all such departments and agencie

I therefore designate the Secretaries of State and Defense a

cial Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT

Committee shall, with the assistance of the Director of Centra

gence, establish policies governing COMINT activities, and k

advised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of 

tional Security Council.

I further designate the Department of Defense as executiv

of the Government, for the production of COMINT informatio

I direct this Special Committee to prepare and issue d

which shall include the provisions set forth below and such ot

visions as the Special Committee may determine to be necessa

1. A directive to the United States Communications Intelligen

(USCIB). This directive will replace the National Security Cou

1 Source: National Security Agency, Center For Cryptologic History. Top 
telligence Directive No. 9,

and shall prescribe USCIBs new co

tion, responsibilities and procedures in the COMINT fields. T

rective shall include the following provisions:

a. USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and un

Special Committee, and shall operate in accordance with the pro

of the new directive. Only those departments or agencies repr

in USCIB are authorized to engage in COMINT activities.

b. The Board shall be composed of the following member

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the 

man of the Board.

(2) A representative of the Secretary of State.

(3) A representative of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) A representative of the Director of the Federal Bu

Investigation.

(5) The Director of the National Security Agency.

(6) A representative of the Department of the Army.

(7) A representative of the Department of the Navy.

(8) A representative of the Department of the Air Force.

(9) A representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

c. The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive se

who shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of 

jority of the Board.

d. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make 

mendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with 

lowing procedure, with respect to any matter relating to comm

tions intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Dir

NSA.

(1) The Board shall reach its decision by a majority vot

member of the Board shall have one vote except the representa

the Secretary of State and of the Central Intelligence Agency wh

each have two votes. The Director of Central Intelligence, as Ch

will have no vote. In the event that the Board votes and reach

cision, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from s

cision within 7 days to the Special Committee. In the event t

Board votes but fails to reach a decision, any member of the Boa

appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. In either event t

cial Committee shall review the matter, and its determination 

shall be final. Appeals by the Director of NSA and/or the repr

tives of the Military Departments shall only be filed with the ap

of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) If any matter is voted on by the Board but—

2 Dated March 10, 1950; see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of t

gence Establishment, Document 435. NSCID No. 9 Revised is printed as Docu
(a) no decision is reached and any member files an appe

(b) a decision is reached in which the representative of th

tary of Defense does not concur and files an appeal; no action 

taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decid

vided that, if the Secretary of Defense determines, after consultat

the Secretary of State, that the subject matter presents a proble

emergency nature and requires immediate action, his decisi

govern, pending the result of the appeal. In such an emergenc

tion the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(3) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordan

the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Secretary of D

Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, th

tor of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance w

own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Def

(4) The Director of NSA shall make such reports and furn

information from time to time to the Board, either orally or in 

as the Board may request, and shall bring to the attention of th

either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or p

in advance of their adoption by him.

e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters no

within the jurisdiction of NSA;

(1) To coordinate the communications intelligence a

among all departments and agencies authorized by the Pres

participate therein;

(2) To initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and subje

provisions of NSCID No. 5,3 to supervise all arrangements w

eign governments in the field of communications intelligence; 

(3) to consider and make recommendations concerning 

relating to communications intelligence of common interest to 

partments and agencies, including security standards and p

and, for this purpose, to investigate and study the standards an

tices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and pr

COMINT information.

f. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the 

described in paragraph e above shall be binding on all departm

agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous 

the members of the Board. Recommendations approved by a m

but not all, of the members of the Board shall be transmitted 

the Special Committee for such action as the Special Commit

see fit to take.

g. The Board will meet monthly, or oftener at the call of th

man or any member, and shall determine its own procedures.

3 Document 255.
2. A directive to the Secretary of Defense. This directive shall 

the following provisions:

a. Subject to the specific provisions of this directive, the Se

of Defense may delegate in whole or in part authority over th

tor of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

b. The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency 

shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and contro

communications intelligence activities of the United States con

against foreign governments, to provide for integrated operation

cies and procedures pertaining thereto. As used in this direct

terms “communications intelligence” or “COMINT” shall be co

to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception 

munications other than foreign press and propaganda broadca

the obtaining of information from such communications by oth

the intended recipients,4 but shall exclude censorship and the p

tion and dissemination of finished intelligence.

c. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by 

retary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Sta

shall serve for a minimum term of 4 years and who shall be 

for reappointment. The Director shall be a career commission

cer of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and s

joy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency.

d. Under the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with ap

policies of USCIB, the Director of NSA shall be responsible for 

plishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT collect

production resources of the United States are placed under his 

tional and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the op

agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is re

the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COM

erations through them. However, due to the unique technical ch

of COMINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue direc

operating elements under his operational control task assignme

pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elem

accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and direct comm

tion with, any elements of the Service or civilian COMINT agen

any other matters of operational and technical control as may b

sary, and he is authorized to obtain such information and intellige

terial from them as he may require. All instructions issued by th

tor under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be man

subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of 

or head of civilian department or agency concerned.

4 See Public Law 513–81st Congress 1950. [Footnote in the original.]
e. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA incl

following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies 

conduct of the U.S. COMINT activities.

(2) Conducting COMINT activities, including research 

velopment, as required to meet the needs of the departments an

cies which are authorized to receive the products of COMINT

(3) Determining, and submitting to appropriate authori

quirements for logistic support for the conduct of COMINT a

together with specific recommendations as to what each of the 

sible departments and agencies of the Government should sup

(4) Within NSA’s field of authorized operations prescrib

uisite security regulations covering operating practices, includ

transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT materia

and among the COMINT elements under his operational or t

control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervis

trol, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance w

regulations. (5) Subject to the authorities granted the Director of Cen

telligence under NSCID No. 5, conducting all liaison on COMIN

ters with foreign governmental communications intelligence a

f. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with t

of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, th

tor shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMIN

tions for which he is responsible. It is recognized that in cer

cumstances elements of the Armed Forces and other agencie

served will require close COMINT support. Where necessary 

close support, direct operational control of specified COMIN

ties and resources will be delegated by the Director, during su

ods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to milita

manders or to the Chiefs of other agencies supported.

g. The Director shall exercise such administrative cont

COMINT activities as he deems necessary to the effective perfo

of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of personnel 

cilities will remain with the departments and agencies providin

h. The Director shall make provision for participation b

sentatives of each of the departments and agencies eligible to 

COMINT products in those offices of NSA where priorities of i

and processing are finally planned.

i. The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose prim

sponsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective 

ment of the best available human and scientific resources in t

of cryptologic research and development.

j. Nothing in this directive shall contravene the responsib

the individual departments and agencies for the final evalu

COMINT information, its synthesis with information from 

sources, and the dissemination of finished intelligence to user
3. The special nature of COMINT activities requires that 

treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other 

eral intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies, or reco

dations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to 

lection, production, security, handling, dissemination, or utiliz

intelligence, and/or classified material, shall not be applic

COMINT activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by 

tent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board

National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director 

tral Intelligence shall be construed as non-applicable to COM

tivities, unless the National Security Council has made its d

specifically applicable to COMINT.5

5 Pursuant to this revision of NSCID No. 9, the National Security Agenc

tablished on November 4.

133. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board1

PSB D–34 Washington, October 3

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT FOR THE

PERIOD JULY 1, 1952 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 195

[Omitted here are a title page, a copy of the November 

mittal memorandum from Director Alan G. Kirk to NSC Execut

retary Lay, and a Table of Contents.]

I. Significant Psychological Activities During the 

Period Under Review

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary 

chological activities during the reporting period on the part of 

partments and agencies responsible for psychological operatio

Capabilities by Area

2. Some progress toward our psychological goals ha

achieved in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, how

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D

Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only.
our capabilities for making an immediately effective psycholog

tribution to the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and in

These gaps include the USSR itself, Communist China and mo

European satellites. In other areas there has been progress, es

in building capabilities for future development.

3. Radio broadcasting currently is the major active eleme

employed in the psychological field against the USSR. The 

“jamming” continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a pro

the whole field of communications. Insofar as Communist Chin

cerned, the situation is about the same but probably with les

tivity due to shortages of receiving facilities among the masse

Anti-American Attitudes

4. In the free world and especially in Western Europe, 

grievances and generalized discontents continue to find expre

anti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United Stat

aganda and pressure. During the reporting period a substantial 

was made in the volume of guidance and support material for 

and non-attributable propaganda. However, the above trend 

clear the importance of still further increasing our efforts to 

indirect and non-attributable information activities.

Western Europe

5. The benefactor-beneficiary relationship in this area cont

cause difficulty for our psychological efforts to develop attit

vorable to the position-of-strength strategy. European enthusia

tinues to lag for institutions looked on as specifically milit

NATO and EDC. However, U.S. psychological action has con

to an increasing awareness of the communist danger in some co

notably France and Sweden; to the development of pro-integr

titudes in Western Germany; and to progress toward Europea

tional and political unity. All these gains, taken together w

growth of military strength in Europe, contributed to counterac

spread of neutralist sentiments.

Middle East

6. The political crisis in Iran has materially reduced U.S. 

ities to influence the present trend of events in that country, 

some limited results of non-attributable activities are report

danger of further deterioration in Iran emphasizes the impor

rapid preparation of psychological activities in neighboring co

where repercussions of such deterioration would be felt. In Eg

political crisis similarly reduced current capabilities, but the 

situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements th

the future uncertain. In the area as a whole, little progress in 
chological field can be reported for the quarter toward the achie

of national policy objectives. A notable contribution to the nation

chological effort in the area, however, was the airlift by the 

States Air Force of some 3,800 Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to 

Far East

7. In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was in

appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological 

of TCA and MSA agricultural, public health, and other aid pro

Psychological capabilities in Southeast Asia have been expand

pecially in the non-attributable field, but little increase in cur

fectiveness is reported. The tendency in the area to identify the 

States with European colonial powers, and with indigenous lea

groups which are opposed by revolutionary nationalist mov

continues to present a psychological obstacle. In Japan, certa

attributable activities in the labor field continue to make progr

Korea

8. Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of 

ties, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure on th

munists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of vo

repatriation of prisoners of war. This principle has gained wid

acceptance in the non-communist world.

“Hate America” Propaganda

9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been con

with combatting the Soviet-Communist “Hate America” prop

campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on t

ject was provided for both overt and non-attributable propagand

nels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil purpose of 

campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate the release by 

partment of Defense and its components of information on bi

and chemical warfare. The effectiveness of these activities ca

gauged in isolation from other United States operations.

Military Assets for the “Cold War”

10. A number of actions and programs of the Department 

fense and the military services during the reporting period, part

in Western Europe and the Middle East, illustrate the type of co

tion these services can make to the national psychological effor

ever, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for 

of military psychological warfare assets in support of approved n

peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty is encountere

ploiting this potential in the absence of specific authority and m

upon which military psychological activities in peacetime may b

The feasibility of making such a delineation is under study.
[Omitted here are Part II, 

The Work of the PSB; Part III

maries of Reports”: A. Department of State, B. Department of D

C. Central Intelligence Agency, and D. Field Representatives of 

Security Agency; and Annexes A and B.]

134. Editorial Note

On November 5, 1952, James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretar

National Security Council, transmitted a “Key Data Book” prep

the NSC Reporting Unit to President Truman. This briefing bo

tained sections on the national psychological program and the 

intelligence program. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, 

II, Part 1, pages 165–181.

135. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Na

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Counc

Washington, November 1

SUBJECT

Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters

At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence, his 

randum outlining the procedures which the Psychological 

Board has agreed to follow in carrying out its responsibilitie

NSC 10/5,2 is transmitted herewith for the information of the s

members of the Council.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the 

of this memorandum.

James S

1 Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secreta

Subject File. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chie

the Director of Central Intelligence (without enclosure), and the Director of th

logical Strategy Board (without enclosure). 2 For NSC 10/5, see Document 90.
Annex

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Sm

the Members of the Psychological Strategy Board3

Washington, October 3

SUBJECT

Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters

In the field of unconventional and psychological operati

Central Intelligence Agency is an executive and operating 

charged with carrying out projects in support of national policie

projects include political and paramilitary operations, the gen

sirability of which have been determined by the senior departm

the Executive Branch of the Government. As an operating ag

these departments, CIA requires more than policy guidance. T

grams and major projects which it proposes to undertake in fur

national policy should be carefully scrutinized before final ap

and the net value of the operations themselves should be perio

assessed by some authority outside the Agency, but representati

of it and of the interested executive departments. The mounti

of these operations makes such prior assessment and continu

dit a matter of great urgency.

Under the existing mechanism for providing policy guidan

program approval, the Agency has continued in the position of 

to assume too much responsibility and authority. While in the 

cold war both vision and imagination are essential, yet these q

must be controlled by selective judgment of a detached, o

authority.

It is inevitable that cold war operations will continue ove

period of time. They involve activities which do not lend them

to precise evaluation and it is impossible to judge in absolute te

successes or failures of particular programs. Unlike military ope

which require the continuous and increasing application of f

ward an abrupt and conclusive ending, activities of this type re

3 Top Secret; Security Information. For an earlier draft of this memoran

Joyce’s comments on it, see Document 129. There had been considerable disc

the inadequacies of the PSB preceding this memorandum. Documentation is in 

Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 100.4–PSB/9–352, and ibid., S/S-NSC 

62 D 333.
fluctuating effort with no clear termination in prospect. For 

son, it is all the more important that they should not be und

unless all concerned are satisfied as to their desirability.

The responsibilities in their respective departments of t

viduals who make up the PSB, and the demands made upon th

are such as to preclude their giving detailed study, analysis and 

to the covert operations of CIA. There is needed a method b

these persons can depend, in the exercise of their responsibi

members of PSB, on the recommendations of qualified subor

reserving their personal detailed consideration for those cases a

ters which, by their nature, require their direct attention.

Here I have in mind the provision of a few highly qualif

cers upon whom the principals could rely completely as their 

cal advisers, and whom their respective departments would a

that status. It would be essential that these selected officers ha

petence to speak with the greatest degree of authority compati

the individual responsibilities of the members of the PSB on t

ous matters to be considered, both in their capacity as advis

staff officers of the three principals and as representatives of 

partments from which they are seconded. Time would be lost 

security would result from formal reference of cold war projec

routine machinery of the major departments, since this would h

inevitable result of allowing these matters to get down into the 

of departmental staffs and to be fought over and widely discu

a large number of relatively junior officials. Hence, the select

officers would have to be held responsible by the principals for 

essary amount of coordinating and checking within their depa

The Board set up a Panel in its paper dated February 20, 19

ject: “Procedure for Handling 10/5 Matters in PSB”.4 It is not eq

nor staffed for prompt and decisive action. Panels of this size 

ture tend to be slowed down by procedural matters, and their 

dissipated.

I believe a smaller group consisting of one representative fr

of the Departments of State and Defense and CIA, and with 

rector of PSB as permanent chairman, can produce the results 

sire, provided these representatives have the work of this g

which they are assigned as their primary responsibility, to tak

ity over any other work even, if necessary, to the exclusion of o

ties. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide an adviso

Group and the Departments and Agency should furnish aides a

ical assistance as may be necessary.

4 Document 104.
I would stress to each Member of the Board the importanc

lecting a high-quality representative for this Group. Representa

the present Panel are excellent, but unhappily will not be availab

much longer. Replacements must be found of similar stature, a

will have the complete confidence of their respective departme

agency. Needless to say, they require full support from the very t

success of this project will depend upon the persons selected b

Specifically, I recommend the Board amend its previous d

in this field and follow the procedure set forth below except 

cases as may be otherwise provided by the President.

(1) Each Board member should designate as a member 

viewing group a senior representative from his department or 

who will be competent to represent such member in the review 

10/5 programs and projects and to make recommendations t

When designated, such individual should be fully empowered 

tain quick, responsive and effective action on any such progr

project from any level of his department. The work incident to 

signment to this group should have priority over any other w

that he will be sufficiently free of other duties to give all the tim

essary for such review. In the case of the Department of Defense

eral or flag officer representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shou

be designated as military adviser to the reviewing group.

(2) The Director of PSB should chair the reviewing group

(3) The reviewing group should not only review NSC 10

grams and major projects in the first instance and recommend t

proval or disapproval either in whole or in part, but should al

odically review such programs and projects and recommend w

they are to be continued or discontinued, speeded or slowed, in

or decreased.

(4) The reviewing group should propose to the PSB such 

ments to the present 10/5 Procedure as will implement the abo

ommendations, and thereafter propose to the PSB any further 

dures which will enable the group efficiently to expedite its 

responsibility.

(5) Final action in each case will be taken by the PSB.

If this procedure is concurred in, I recommend that it be b

formally to the notice of the National Security Council as the 

which will be followed by the Board in carrying out its respons

under NSC 10/5.

Walter B. 

5 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.
136. Memorandum From the Director of the National Secur

Agency (Canine) and Representatives of the Military S

and Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Lovet

Washington, November 2

SUBJECT

Formal Implementation of the Provisions of NSCID No. 9 Revised2

REFERENCE

Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 4 November 1952,3 subject: Inter

Implementation of NSCID No. 9 Revised

1. Pursuant to the requirements expressed in paragraph 

reference, a working group was formed and developed the 

directives.

2. The proposed directives, concurred in by the undersig

submitted for your approval.

3. In accordance with paragraph 1d of the reference, a li

rectives, orders, or instructions relating to Communications 

gence matters issued by any authorities within the Departmen

fense inconsistent or at variance with the provisions of NSCI

Revised or with the proposed implementing directives inclos

with will be forwarded as soon as compiled.

Ralph J. 

Major General, U

Director, National Security 

C

Robinson 

Major Gener

Representing the Secretary of t

L.S. 

Capta

Representing the Secretary of t

John B. Ac

Brigadier Genera

Representing the Secretary of the A

1 Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Seri

Top Secret; Security Information. 2 See Document 132. NSCID No. 9 Revised is printed as Document 257.

3 Not found.
Edward H

Brigadier Genera

Representing the Joint Chiefs 

Enclosure

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Lovett5

Washington, December 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE 

Secretary of the Army

Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of the Air Force

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director, Communications-Electronics

Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT

Implementation of NSCID No. 9 Revised

REFERENCES

(a) NSCID No. 9 Revised, dated 24 October 1952

(b) Memorandum of 4 November 1952 from Secretary of Defense subjec

Interim Implementation of NSCID No. 9 Revised

1. This Directive is issued for the purpose of implement

provisions of reference (a) and supersedes reference (b).

2. The National Security Agency (NSA) is hereby establishe

agency within the framework of the Department of Defense w

mission assigned to it in reference (a). For the purposes of this D

NSA will be understood to consist of the Headquarters, subo

units, and facilities, including the personnel thereof, that are spe

assigned or attached to, or provided for, NSA by the Secretary 

fense or other competent authority, and over which the Directo

exercises administrative, operational and technical control.

3. Pursuant to the provisions of reference (a), all Commun

Intelligence (COMINT) collection and production resources 

Department of Defense are hereby placed under the operatio

technical control of the Director, NSA.

4. The Director, NSA, will arrange with the appropriate aut

of other departments and agencies of the government for his assu

5 Top Secret; Security Information. Copies were sent to the Secretary of 

rector of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inve

The date is handwritten on the enclosure.
of operational and technical control of the COMINT collect

COMINT production resources of those departments and agenc

5. All military and civilian personnel, funds, records, equ

facilities, and other support available to or authorized for the 

Forces Security Agency (AFSA) are hereby made available to 

thorized for the National Security Agency. Arrangements heret

effect for the provision of personnel, fiscal and other support fo

shall continue in effect for NSA unless otherwise modified.

6. All directives, orders or instructions relating to COMIN

ters issued by any authorities within the Department of Def

consistent or at variance with the provisions of reference (a) wi

mediately brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defens

initiating authorities and/or the Director, NSA.

7. In fulfilling his assigned responsibilities, the Director, N

be guided by the provisions of reference (a) and he will:

a. Transmit the budget estimates and civilian manpower 

ments of NSA, as approved by the Secretary of Defense, to ap

ate authorities for inclusion in designated appropriations of t

tary Departments or the Office of the Secretary of Defense

approved estimates and manpower requirements will not be su

review by the Military Departments. b. Conform to the personnel, fiscal, and property accounti

cies of the Secretary of Defense. A departmental property ac

authorized for NSA.

c. Review COMINT requirements, programs and budget e

of the Military Departments, insure the provision of an adequ

anced program, and support these items in cooperation with 

partments concerned. d. Establish procedures for production and procurement 

cialized COMINT equipments under the cognizance of NSA. e. Assure to the maximum practicable extent, in consonan

Department of Defense policies, standardization of specialized C

equipments and facilities. f. Determine and make known to the Director, Communi

Electronics, the requirements for rapid communications to m

needs of NSA. These will include a statement of anticipated traf

and such additional data as will assist in fulfilling the require

g. Determine and make known to appropriate authorities 

service requirements as needed for the expeditious hand

COMINT traffic and material.

h. In consonance with the policies of the Department of D

provide means for review, coordination, and approval of all C

research and development requirements. i. Establish a research and development program adequa

complish the COMINT mission, and control the assignment 

plementation of all COMINT research and development proje

j. In consonance with the policies of the Department of D

provide technical guidance and support for COMINT traini

ducted by the Military Departments and, to insure necessary l

technical competence, prescribe minimum standards for their C

training curricula.
k. Conduct necessary specialized and advance COMINT t

8. With reference to paragraph 7f above, the D

Communications-Electronics, with the assistance of the Join

munications-Electronics Committee, shall have the authority 

sponsibility for insuring that the Military Departments, with

capabilities, fulfill the military communications requirements o

9. The COMINT responsibilities of the Military Departme

include, among others, the following:

a. Providing the necessary COMINT facilities and resou

the support of military operations and of the National COMIN

in accordance with assigned responsibilities. b. Procuring, organizing, training, equipping, admini

budgeting, and providing logistic support to their respective CO

units. This will include provision of adequate reserve programs 

emergency or wartime requirements. c. Within the limits prescribed by public law and Depart

Defense policies, assigning military personnel to NSA for a mi

period of thirty-six months. Longer assignment of specially q

personnel is authorized as may be arranged with the Departme

cerned. The Military Departments may add, withdraw, or su

personnel within the authorized personnel strength of NSA, su

approval by the Director, NSA. d. Advising the Director, NSA, regarding close support 

and recommending the number and composition of COMIN

needed to fulfill the close support requirements of the Departm

e. Performing COMINT collection and production tasks a

fied by the Director, NSA. f. Submitting COMINT research and development requir

directly to the Director, NSA, for his action, and accomplishin

COMINT research and development and service testing as ap

or assigned by him. This does not preclude the Military Depa

from initiating and pursuing, subject to prompt notification to 

proval by the Director, NSA, such research and development 

be necessary to support their COMINT activities.

10. Where delegation of control is required in close supp

military commander, the Director, NSA, will normally delegate 

tional control of specified COMINT facilities and resources 

COMINT agency of the appropriate Military Department for 

ment to a subordinate unit.

11. The Director, NSA, is authorized to make requests of t

Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and all other gove

agencies and activities for information and assistance which h

tions and responsibilities may require and to furnish such agenc

activities with information and assistance as appropriate.

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.
Enclosure

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Lovett7

Washington, u

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

Secretary of the Army

Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of the Air Force

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director, Communications-Electronics

Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT

Interim Responsibility for Communication Security

Pending the issuance of additional instructions, the resp

ties for Communication Security (COMSEC) activities and relat

ters assigned to the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, sh

tinue to be assigned to the Director, National Security Agency

7 Top Secret; Security Information.

8 Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.

137. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for

Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (Amor

Director of Central Intelligence Smith1

Washington, November 2

SUBJECT

Senior Staff Action on the Summary Evaluation

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for In

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the 

dum indicates it was prepared in the Office of National Estimates. A stamped 

indicates that Smith saw the memorandum on November 26.
1. The Senior Staff approved paragraphs a. and b. of Encl

as its recommendation for action at tomorrow’s meeting of the 

2. In paragraph a., the reference to specific limitations of th

mary evaluation as noted in your transmittal memorandum

deleted. Various individual members of the Senior Staff felt th

are still other defects in the summary evaluation.

3. In paragraph b., your proposal for the preparation of t

reference was adopted, and it was further recommended that t

instruct you to report on the needs for improved machinery for 

ing a more adequate evaluation of the USSR’s net capability t

direct injury on the United States.

4. The main point of controversy was your recommendatio

clarified in paragraph c. of the attached Enclosure. On thi

the Senior Staff decided to take no action at this time, on the 

standing that you might feel free to put the proposal before t

yourself.

5. The opposition to a Senior Staff recommendation at th

came primarily from the military. JCS has just submitted to th

tary of Defense a lengthy memorandum on the subject,3 which 

felt could not be adequately considered prior to the NSC mee

was evident from Admiral Wooldridge’s oral paraphrase that 

view is that no additional machinery is needed to produce 

mander’s Estimates,” the JCS being the agency responsible for 

pable of producing such estimates.

Robert Am

Enclosure A4

SENIOR STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NSC ACTIO

The National Security Council:

5. a.5 Receives the summary evaluation, Net Capability of th

to Injure the Continental U.S., as an initial effort in response to t

Directive issued by NSC Action No. 543,6 and notes that it is 

terized by a number of limitations and inadequacies, including 

2 Not found, but presumably it transmitted to the NSC a revised version o

paper attached to Document 131. 3 Not found.

4 Top Secret.

5 The number “5” is handwritten in front of paragraphs a, b, and c.

6 Document 86.
that developments since the evaluation was prepared have r

it, in part, out of date.

5. b. Instructs the Director of Central Intelligence, in collab

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligen

ference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security 

ficials of other governmental bodies as required, to prepare f

submission to the NSC, terms of reference for a more adequat

ation of the USSR’s net capability to inflict direct injury on the 

States, and recommendations concerning the machinery nece

produce for the NSC such a coordinated evaluation.

DCI RECOMMENDATION (No Senior Staff Action)

5. c. Instructs the Director of Central Intelligence, in collab

with Officials of other governmental bodies as required, to exam

adequacies of the present machinery, and to make recommen

to the NSC concerning the character of any new machinery th

be required in order to produce for the NSC coordinated eval

in the nature of “Commander’s Estimates,” of the Soviet Bloc’

pabilities and probable courses of action vis à vis the United St

curity interests. Such evaluations require the integration of nat

telligence with adequate military, political, and economic ope

information on the United States’ capabilities and contem

courses of action.7

7 For the discussion and the decision taken at the November 26 NSC me

Document 138. Additional documentation on this initiative, which led to the c

the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council (N

approved by President Truman on January 19, 1953, is in Foreign Relations, 1

vol II., Part 1, pp. 205–208.
138. Memorandum for President Truman of Discussion at t

126th Meeting of the National Security Council1

Washington, November 2

[Omitted here are a short paragraph that indicates the Pr

presided at the meeting and discussion of agenda item 1: Th

tion in the Far East.]

2. A Project To Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning fo

curity of the United States (Memo for NSC from Acting Execut

retary, same subject, dated October 21, 1952; Memos for NSC fr

ecutive Secretary, same subject, dated November 25 and 26, 19

August 30, 1951;2 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, 

“Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to In

Continental United States”, dated November 25, 1952;3 NSC Act

543;4 SE–14)5

When the President turned to the second item on the Agen

Lay called the Council’s attention to the views of the Joint C

Staff on the report and to the latest changes recommended by 

rector of Central Intelligence at the instance of the Internal S

Committees and finally, to the two alternative recommendation

by the Senior Staff to replace the first two recommendations by 

rector of Central Intelligence. Mr. Lay pointed out that the Seni

had taken no action on the third recommendation in General 

memorandum.

The President then asked General Smith to comment on t

posals in his memorandum. After explaining briefly the backgr

the present evaluation, General Smith summarized what he ha

of the discussions in the Senior Staff on the first two of his th

ommendations and called the Council’s attention to his most re

vision of his third recommendation, which was at this point 

uted to the members of the Council. General Smith then turne

views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and stated that he agreed with 

ber of the points made therein and disagreed with others. First

could be no question of the need for the production of so-called 

mander’s Estimates” for the use of the President and the N

1 Source: Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files, National Security 

Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted on November 28, presumably by La

2 None of these memoranda has been found, but presumably they trans

the NSC versions of and comments on the paper attached to Document 131. 3 Not found.

4 Document 86.

5 See footnote 3, Document 131.
Security Council. The Joint Chiefs, said General Smith, do not bel

the production of such estimates requires the creation of any n

chinery. With this view General Smith said he could not agree, bu

that if the present evaluation actually met all the requirements of t

ident and the Council there was, of course, nothing more to be 

General Smith then noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did 

lieve that the Director of Central Intelligence was the appropri

cial to prepare Commander’s Estimates. With this view Gener

found himself in agreement, but he went on to say that he did n

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were, themselves, the appropriate 

prepare the kind of estimate which the President and the Cou

quired. The data which must be amassed to provide the kind o

that was required would by no means be purely military data

agencies of the Government which were concerned with pas

fense, civilian defense, sabotage and the like, were also direct

directly involved in the preparation of such estimates. Plainly, 

tinued, the problem was too large and too complicated for 

Government agency to solve by itself. It seemed obvious to 

Smith that the National Security Council alone was the proper 

to guide and coordinate such studies. Obviously it could not 

directly, but it could do so by calling on the instrumentalities a

to it. With all deference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded 

Smith, the problem which concerned the Council transcends th

military sphere, although General Smith conceded that it mig

be possible, as suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to have th

monitor such a study provided the National Security Council 

sured that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would make use, in its prep

of the resources of all the Government agencies which were r

The President then turned to Secretary Foster for his co

stating that the problem was obviously very controversial.

Secretary Foster said he would prefer to listen first to the v

Mr. Gorrie, Mr. Wadsworth and others before stating his own

Mr. Gorrie6 expressed general agreement with the views s

General Smith and said that he agreed with the recommendat

fered to the Council by the Senior NSC Staff.

Mr. Wadsworth7 also expressed agreement with the view 

eral Smith that the civilian agencies would have very signific

tributions to make in the preparation of such evaluations in the 

Mr. Wadsworth further pointed out that he was not in a positi

6 Jack Gorrie, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.

7 James J. Wadsworth, Acting Administrator of the Federal Civi

Administration.
as clear on this problem as he would have liked, since he had n

permitted to examine the basic studies prepared by the Joint 

and others, to back up the conclusions which appeared in the 

report. Mr. Wadsworth concluded by stating his anxiety to be 

imum use in any future attempts along these lines.

Again called upon for his views, Secretary Foster stated 

seemed to him that there were two fundamental points at iss

first of these was the adequacy of the present report on the ne

bility of the Soviet Union to inflict damage on the United Stat

retary Foster said he was frank to admit that there were serio

in this report as far as it constituted the basis for planning Unite

courses of action. Some of these shortcomings, he added, deriv

the very nature of the beast. Such evaluations as the one in q

naturally involved the war plans of the United States. These pl

of course, very sensitive and the Chiefs of Staff quite properly 

over backward to protect the security of these plans. The inevit

sult was to create difficulties for the civilian agencies, though it 

to him that these agencies could not appropriately expect th

Chiefs to reveal the details of such plans. However, continued 

tary Foster, he felt certain that he was speaking for the Joint C

Staff when he stated that they would make available everythi

is really necessary to the production of this type of study to 

propriate civilian officials if the latter were in a position to e

their need to know. Furthermore, continued Secretary Foster, t

Chiefs had expressed their readiness to provide oral presentat

the problem to whatever group of the National Security Counc

determined should receive such information. All-in-all, said Se

Foster, the present methods for producing such estimates were 

that had been found so far and he believed, as a first attempt, th

ent paper represented real progress even if it were obvious t

ther progress was necessary. As a suggestion to that end, Secreta

ter thought an ad hoc committee should be set up to take a care

at the problem raised by General Smith’s memorandum and t

determine whether further evaluations of the type under consid

should be coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Dir

Central Intelligence, or by an augmented NSC staff.

Summing up, Secretary Foster said that he recommended 

Council accept the first recommendation proposed by the Seni

As to the second Senior Staff recommendation, with respect 

preparation of new terms of reference, there was some questio

whether the Council ought to accept it. Whether, as Secretary 

put it, they patient can actually diagnose his own disease. Ne

less, Secretary Foster stated that he had no specific recommend

substitute for the one proposed by the Senior Staff.
The President then asked General Bradley if he desired 

any comment.

General Bradley stated that he did not differ fundamenta

the views expressed by General Smith. On the whole he was 

to believe that the NSC Staff was the group best fitted to un

studies such as these in the future. No single agency could 

studies and no single agency should try. As to the furnishing 

mation on United States capabilities and possible courses of a

the military field, General Bradley emphasized that the Join

were wholly in favor of the “need to know” rule on sensitive m

Within this reservation, however, the Chiefs were prepared t

whatever was necessary for the preparation of such studies. 

of fact, there were too many people who were curious about 

plans and had no legitimate interest in them. General Bradle

ised that the Joint Chiefs would do anything in their power 

to achieve the kind of estimate needed, but would only monito

fort as a last resort.

Asked for his views by the President, Secretary Bruce stated 

that he was in agreement with the recommendations proposed 

Senior Staff.

General Smith then entered the discussion with the statem

he was sure the Council could clean this matter up and that th

ences could be ironed out. This was, he said, a phase of the o

ment between G–2 and G–3. He illustrated the dilemma with w

had been confronted in carrying out the task of preparing the 

report by noting that he had recently required certain assumptio

respect to the civil defense capabilities of the USSR in the cont

of an attack by the United States. We obtained these assumpt

stated, from the Joint Strategic planners orally, but when we 

cast up the score and to write these vital assumptions into the 

this was not permitted because the Joint Chiefs of Staff had n

on these assumptions. It was impossible to prepare a study of 

capability of the USSR to damage the United States under suc

dures. Nevertheless, continued General Smith, by the use of a

tions supplied by the military it was certainly possible to pre

adequate evaluation without jeopardizing the security of war p

The President stated that the current discussion had b

tremely interesting and productive, but that it seemed to him 

problem posed in General Smith’s third recommendation ought 

more study before the Council reached any conclusions on it

pressed the hope that all the requisite agencies would get tog

provide a reasonable basis for Council action at a future meet

General Smith said that he thought it would be most helpf

Amory, as a representative of the Director of Central Intelligenc
sit down with representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in orde

plain what was needed to achieve the right result.

With this proposal Secretary Foster expressed agreeme

added that he, himself, would be glad to talk with Mr. Amory

Mr. Lay then inquired whether it was the desire of the Counc

cept the two recommendations proposed by the Senior Staff, bu

fer action on the third recommendation proposed by General Sm

amended by the paper which he had circulated earlier in the m

The Council concurred in Mr. Lay’s understanding of the desired 

Mr. Murray,8 speaking for the Attorney General, stated that 

one small point which involved the transposition of the words 

quired” in the second recommendation by the Senior Staff. M

ray stated that he was merely anxious to be assured that it wa

site for the Director of Central Intelligence to collaborate with 

agencies mentioned in this paragraph in the production of t

estimate.

Mr. Lay pointed out that this was the intention of the pres

guage and the Council agreed to the wording suggested by Mr. 

In conclusion, Mr. Lay stated that he desired to emphasize 

that the NSC Staff had long recognized the need for more ad

staff studies, not only of the type which the Council was tod

sidering, but to provide the basis for better policy statements 

ally. Where such studies could best be made, whether under t

Staff or elsewhere, was of course, he added, for the Council to 

but there could be no doubt that the NSC Staff was generally 

on the desirability of improvement. He felt that the NSC Staf

undertake this work, but some reorganization would be requi

The President then repeated his view that the Council coul

to no firm conclusion on General Smith’s final recommendation 

meeting, but that the matter should be the subject of further s

The National Security Council:9

a. Received the summary evaluation, “Net Capability of th

to Injure the Continental United States”, transmitted by the re

memorandum of October 21 and amended by the reference 

randum of November 25 on the same subject, as an initial effo

sponse to the NSC directive issued by NSC Action No. 543, an

that it is characterized by a number of limitations and inadeq

8 Not further identified.

9 Paragraphs a–c constituted NSC Action No. 687. (National Archive

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) File: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the Nationa

Council)
including the fact that developments since the evaluation was p

have rendered it, in part, out of date.

b. Instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, in collab

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligen

ference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

required, officials of other governmental bodies, to prepare f

submission to the National Security Council, terms of referen

more adequate evaluation of the USSR’s net capability to infli

injury on the United States, and recommendations for the ma

necessary to produce for the National Security Council such a 

nated evaluation.

c. Deferred action, pending further study, on the recom

tion in paragraph 5-c of the memorandum by the Director of 

Intelligence enclosed with the reference memorandum of Oct

amended as follows by the Director of Central Intelligence an

lated at the meeting.

“c. Instruct the Director of Central Intelligence, in collab

with Officials of other governmental bodies as required, to exam

inadequacies of the present machinery, and to make recommen

to the NSC concerning the character of any new machinery th

be required to produce for the NSC coordinated evaluations, in 

ture of ‘Commander’s Estimates,’ of the Soviet Bloc’s net cap

and probable courses of action vis-à-vis the United States’ sec

terests. Such evaluations require the integration of national inte

with adequate military, political, and economic operational i

tion on the United States’ capabilities and contemplated co

action.”

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to 

rector of Central Intelligence for implementation.

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda items 3: Reappr

United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security, 4: 

tional Psychological Effort, and 5: NSC Status of Projects.]
139. Paper Prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board1

PSB D–31 Washington, November 2

A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOG

PROGRAM WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLD W

OPERATIONS UNDER NSC 10/52

1. Almost all governmental policies and actions have psy

ical content in that they bear on the minds and wills of other p

An attempt to formulate a national psychological strategy c

every intention and action having psychological impact in th

would encompass every aspect of governmental activity. This 

be an effort of unmanageable proportions. In order to formula

tional psychological strategy that will usefully subserve the n

policy it is necessary to divide the task into separate aspects o

ageable proportions. When we ask, “What can usefully be sai

ways and means of bringing about a retraction of Soviet power 

fluence?” we have selected one such aspect and have stated it 

a way that we can perhaps deal with it. The following does not 

to deal with the problems involved in the distribution of resou

tween cold war operations and preparations in support of ove

2. NSC 10/5, paragraph 1, approved “the intensification o

operations designed in general order of emphasis to:

a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of po

cluding the relationships between the USSR, its satellites and 

munist China; and when and where appropriate in the light 

and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the re

and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no 

constitute a threat to U.S. security.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D

Secret; Security Information. A draft of this paper was sent to Under Secretar

Bruce, Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster, and Director of Central Intelligence 

August 20 by the Director of the PSB, who described the paper as the produc

year’s work by a high level group under Admiral Stevens. (Ibid.) In analyzin

per for Bruce in an August 26 memorandum, Nitze stated that the chief virtue 

per was a negative: “it admits inability . . . to propose a strategic concept which 

a program designed to bring about a final solution of the cold war.” (Ibid.) N

made this same point to Stevens in a December 5, 1951, meeting (see Documen

ellipses in the original. 2 In accordance with Presidential Directive of 4 April 1951, which estab

PSB as responsible for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to th

ments and agencies represented for psychological operations of over-all nati

chological objectives, policies and programs, and which defines psychological o

as including all activities under NSC 59/1 and 10/2. [Footnote in the origina

Presidential Directive, see Document 60. For the text of NSC 59/1, see Docum

NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 292. For NSC 10/5, see Document 90.]
b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of 

ples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity 

to resist Soviet domination.

c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert an

rilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicabl

consistent with 1-a above. . . .”

3. NSC 10/5, paragraph 2, directed “the Psychological 

Board to assure that its strategic concept for a national psych

program includes provision for covert operations designed to 

the objectives in paragraph 1 above.”

4. It is the object of this paper to outline a strategic conce

national psychological program with particular reference to c

operations under NSC 10/5. These operations are primarily c

character, but we believe a paper addressed to such operati

provide a concept valuable to overt psychological operation

NSC 59/1 as well, especially those which are concerned with b

about the retraction of Soviet power and influence.

5. The general objective of psychological operations in 

war can be subsumed under the general heading of contributin

“retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence” whe

operations designed to weaken Soviet power in the Commun

or by operations designed to weaken Soviet influence by stre

ing the free world.

6. Our national strategy, as defined in NSC 20/4,3 parag

is to “endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods 

war.” This national strategy calls for efforts to “encourage and p

the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence f

present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundarie

eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet mil

fluence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow . . . ; 

create situations which will compel the Soviet government t

nize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its 

concepts . . .”

7. In the absence of open hostilities, the cold war can be e

to continue in one form or another as long as the Soviet Union

is to say, the Bolshevik Party, adheres to the aims and methods 

has pursued ever since its accession to power, within as well as 

the Party. Recognition of this—particularly public recognition—

essary for understanding and support of continuity of effort. T

throw of the Party by war or successful revolution appears to be 

certain means of forcing such changes. One is excluded, and t

so far beyond our current capabilities as to be presently unfeas

3 For NSC 20/4, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 662–669.
8. We are unable at present to propose a strategic concep

outlines a program designed to bring about a final solution of t

war because (a) we do not have and cannot clearly foresee t

when we will have the capabilities, and (b), because without ad

capabilities the risks involved are clearly disproportionate 

probabilities of success. The time required to develop the ne

capabilities is so great that the nature of an acceptable soluti

not be determined with sufficient accuracy to serve as a guide

capabilities increase, flexibility and opportunism in the light o

appear presently more desirable than commitment to too sp

goal.

9. We should continue to develop our capabilities for 

ing revolution and continue to re-appraise the situation. This 

quire both the development of further capabilities for the expl

of existing techniques and a major program for the developm

new techniques and approaches. It is possible that the cumula

fect of retraction of Soviet power and influence, together with 

events and the inherent problems with which the Soviet gove

and the Bolshevik Party are faced may eventually bring abou

cient change in their aims and methods to provide an accept

lution. Efforts to develop our capabilities and to bring about 

retraction as opposed to a program for a definitive solution 

regarded as the interim strategic concept for a national psych

program.

10. Within the limits imposed by the terms of our nation

egy and the present level of our covert capabilities it is possibl

vance certain general criteria for operations under 10/5, to tes

fields of possible covert action against these criteria, and from 

bination of the two to give more precise form to the psycholog

erations which should be prosecuted in accordance with the 

strategic concept, and to provide an indication of priorities

propaganda should give appropriate support in accordance w

orities as may be determined.

11. The general criteria which present covert operations un

interim strategic concept should meet are those of effectivenes

bility, acceptable risk, and flexibility.

a. Effectiveness: The importance of the effects which succes

erations may be calculated to have in reducing Soviet influen

power or in strengthening the free world against the exertion o

influence and power must be appreciable and must warrant th

cost and risk of the operation. In general, priorities should be 

tional to anticipated effectiveness. b. Feasibility: Our capabilities in terms of trained manpowe

terial, and local or international support, must be adequate to g

sonable promise of success to the operation in the face of suc

bilities as the Communists may have to frustrate it.
c. Acceptable risk: The degree to which the undertaking 

cessful conclusion of the operations may be calculated to prov

itary reaction from the Communists must be sufficiently limit

be an acceptable risk in terms of our national strategy.

d. Flexibility: Operations should be of a type which len

selves within reasonable limits to adaptation or modification to 

such opportunities or undertake such objectives as may beco

sible or advisable subsequent to actual initiation of the operat

12. There is a wide range of activity currently in process 

about the retraction of Soviet power and influence which shou

tinue. Many of these activities, although in themselves incap

producing clear and incontrovertible gains, are of great value 

porting overt policies which can be expected to be effective. O

from the following discussion of many existing projects, does 

ply that they are not considered of value, but rather that the ap

projects should continue as presently conceived and planned

as they meet the above criteria.

13. Within the field of cold war covert operations, it is con

that greatest emphasis should be placed upon the followin

fields of activity, not necessarily in order of priority:

a. Weakening of Kremlin control over the internal asset

Soviet-controlled bloc, and increasingly occupying the Krem

problems within this area.

b. Direct action to reduce subversive Soviet influence i

areas of the free world that are most immediately threatened 

c. Covert manipulation of key elements in unstable coun

the free world to increase the stability and utility to the objec

U.S. foreign policy of those countries.

14. Within these three broad fields of activity, the followi

gories meet the criteria outlined above and should be given gre

phasis than they are currently receiving. Detailed studies ma

that effective action within some of these categories is beyond 

pabilities. Also, events will undoubtedly indicate the desira

concentration on other lines of effort. This will require contin

view of interim strategic policy.

a. Disintegration of Communist Parties Outside the Iron 

Communist parties in the free world are principal vehicles fo

subversion. They are also much more accessible to us than a

within the Iron Curtain. By a combination of covert and over

their effectiveness can be appreciably reduced and in some a

tally nullified. Some of the means that can be employed ar

duction of financial support, (b) penetration and exposure, (

gation of internal conflicts and dissensions among individu

groups, (d) outlawing of local parties, (e) legal action of a

against individuals and groups, (f) promotion of ideologica
tions, (g) creating and intensifying difficulties with local gover

and public opinion.

Individual priority studies should be made by CIA of the d

methods which can be most effectively employed against the 

France, Italy, India, Japan, Iran, and Guatemala, and an appr

the probable over-all effectiveness of such an effort should be m

each of those countries.

A special study should be made by CIA, similar in scope, d

towards disintegrating the influence of the CP and individu

munists on the present Argentine government.

b. Detachment of Albania. Because of Albania’s unique geo

cal position, its detachment from the Soviet orbit may be feasib

principal advantage gained would be its psychological effects 

subjugated countries and in areas under intense Soviet press

though there would also be useful additional by-products of a m

nature, especially as regards the position of Yugoslavia and G

would be a demonstration that a continuing Soviet advance is 

evitable and that a retraction of Soviet power is practically pos

preliminary estimate indicates that detachment could be accom

by Albanian personnel and without the overt participation of W

military forces.

A detailed plan should be made [less than 1 line not decl

covering each step in such action up to its successful complet

cluding time phasing and all logistic aspects. Estimates sho

made of personnel and material requirements, together wit

for meeting them. Detailed appraisal should be made of the p

degree of secrecy that could be maintained throughout [11

⁄2 l

declassified]. The extent to which preliminary disorganizing 

Albanian economy would contribute to the success of the op

should be appraised.

If such studies continue to indicate feasibility, the State 

ment should investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of ob

the acquiescence or the active support of Great Britain as wel

goslavia, Greece and Italy, together with the practicability of r

agreements on political objectives which would preclude such 

difficulties as efforts at domination by these neighboring countr

necessity of recognition of such a revolutionary government sh

appraised, and the necessity, feasibility and timing of overt ec

and logistic assistance, together with its amount and cost.

c. Breeding Suspicion and Dissension Within the Communist 

The inherent suspicion and lack of mutual trust and con

within the communist system and our own experience in exp

them gives grounds for belief that we would be able to incre

suspicion far beyond what we have hitherto accomplished, to th
of systematic removal or elimination of personnel in import

effective positions. The communist reservoir of able and expe

personnel is not unlimited, and individuals of demonstrated 

and effectiveness would be excellent targets. Many techniq

available to apply to these ends, but our access to and know

conditions within the satellites indicate that the best chances 

cess would be obtained by breeding distrust among satellite 

nel and between those individuals and Moscow, although such 

within the Soviet Union should be included to the maximum 

capabilities. It should be noted that this category involves a n

objective than broad attempts to disrupt the system by a va

means other than marking individuals for suspicion and dis

has a definite relationship to and should be correlated with 

fective program.

[1 paragraph (11⁄2 lines) not declassified]

d. Efforts Directed Towards Disruption of Soviet and Europea

lite Economies [less than 1 line not declassified].

The special vulnerabilities of the Soviet economic system 

ject to exploitation on a strategic basis. Such exploitation can 

to produce a reduction in economic and military potential an

rectly to bring about the defection of key Communist officials

not declassified]

(1) [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

(2) Covert activities against illegal trade channels st

possibilities of effecting further appreciable reduction in the 

of imports of strategic commodities into the Soviet orbit, [1 

declassified].

(3) A wide range of passive economic sabotage activities 

undertaken by Eastern Europeans under present conditions w

tive safety. If the incentive of self-interest is added, effectiveness 

a program would be increased [2 lines not declassified].

(4) [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

e. Covert Political Action to Strengthen Critical Free Wor

Against Developments Which Might be Favorable to Communist O

Covert action in this category, directed largely toward cov

nipulation of key individuals, should be designed to shore up 

ent favorably to U.S. interests the governments of areas which 

ical to U.S. interests and which are in danger of developing reg

conditions inimical to U.S. interests. Egypt, Iran, Japan, India 

tain Latin American countries should receive priority in this ca

4 The priority for these countries shall not be at the expense of continu

in Germany, Italy and France. [Footnote in the original.]
Operations on Formosa and among the Overseas Chinese, dire

wards broadening the base of support of the Chinese Nationali

ernment would also fall into this category.

[11⁄2 lines not declassified] should make concrete correlated 

als within the foregoing framework.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that the progressive retraction and 

tion of Soviet power and influence in accordance with our cap

and subject to the limitation of acceptable risk be accepted as 

terim strategic concept for a national psychological program w

ticular reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5.

2. It is recommended that the responsible agencies place 

emphasis in these operations on the three broad fields of activi

tified in paragraph 13 above. This recommendation is withou

dice to those arrangements now in effect whereby a responsible 

is to make preparations for activities after D-Day in support 

proved war plans.

3. It is recommended that the responsible agencies give 

within those broad fields to determining the detailed practicabi

desirability of proceeding along the lines indicted under each c

described in paragraph 14 above. It is further recommended tha

such studies indicate that the foregoing criteria will be met, th

cated actions be given priority in both national and agency pr

proportionate to their probable effectiveness.

4. It is also recommended that our covert capabilities con

be developed with increasing vigor along all lines whose event

ployment may be expected to bring about more drastic reduc

Soviet power and influence.

5. It is also recommended that this interim strategic con

kept under continuous review, and revised in the light of fut

velopments at least annually and also as additional categorie

tion appear to meet the specified criteria.

Feasibility of Logistic Support

Acceptance of this concept is without prejudice to later logi

sibility testing by the Department of Defense of specific course

tion which would require logistic support of that Department.
140. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence S

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley)1

Washington, December 1

SUBJECT

Overseas CIA Logistical Support Bases

REFERENCES2

a) Secretary of Defense TS Memo #23579, dated 6 October 1949, Suppor

Covert Operations of CIA

b) TS Memo #81056 from CIA to Joint Subsidiary Plans Division/Joint 

Staff, dated 13 June 1952, subject as above

c) TS Memo #81111 from Joint Subsidiary Plans Division/Joint Chiefs o

CIA, dated 26 June 1952, subject as above (SPDM–257–52)

d) TS Memo #81949 from CIA to Joint Subsidiary Plans Division/Joint 

Staff, dated 19 August 1952, subject as above

1. In accordance with NSC 10/23 CIA is not only charged 

mission of conducting cold war but also that of planning for co

erations in time of war in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs 

It is essential to establish logistical support for hot war plans 

D-Day. Rather than create separate parallel lines of supply for 

materiels with the military services, it is desired to continue in 

oration with the Department of Defense in the establishment 

port installations, to be used not only for hot war requirements 

for CIA’s cold war support. Further, it is believed appropriate 

agency should use Department of Defense hot war stocks for c

needs on a reimbursable basis.

2. Based on our operational plans, a world-wide support b

cept was formed locating the bases at military installations. T

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B0173

Top Secret; Security Information. Sent through the Chief of the Joint Subsid

Division. An attached note from RWF (not identified) to DCI Smith, Decembe

cates that DD/P prepared the memorandum, which was approved in CPM, D

Wisner recommending signature), and DD/A. The note indicated that JSPD 

dinated the logistical planning and added that the military did not wish to 

with detailed planning until the JCS approved the planning concept, and si

memorandum meant only approving the support and base concept, not the 

thorization of funds. A notation on the note indicates that Smith saw it on Dec

The enclosures, a table entitled Recapitulation for CIA Logistical Support and 

December 8 draft of the memorandum, are not printed. Ellipsis in the origina

2 None of the references (a–d) was found.

3 For NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intell

tablishment, Document 292.
base will be considered a tenant unit on the military base. It 

templated that the major bases will be located [41⁄2 lines not decla

3. A major logistical support base will consist of a CIA bas

quarters, training, communications, medical accommodation fo

uees and storage for six months’ hot war requirements as well 

vide logistical support for CIA operational groups or headquart

latest revised estimate of requirements on a broad basis is liste

attached enclosure. Informal planning along the lines indica

been carried out by elements of CIA with the Joint Subsidiar

Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the general planning 

sistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartim

tary operations.

4. At such time as detailed plans are firm and approved 

Department of Defense and this Agency, CIA accepts the oblig

reimburse the Department of Defense for its proportionate s

these construction requirements in accordance with Referenc

follows:

“Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment will be transported 

seas storage points under military control and supplies and equ

will be stored and protected at such points without reimbur

where additional, extraordinary expenses to the Department of D

are not involved. . . Where the service incurs additional, extrao

expenses in providing transportation or establishing and main

at overseas points, dumps for covert operations, the CIA mus

reimbursement therefor.”

5. It is requested that the strategic planning of this base 

be approved, and that the military services be so advised and d

to assist in the preparation of detailed plans.

Walter B. 

4 Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.
141. Letter From the Executive Secretary of the National Se

Council (Lay) to the Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (Hoover)1

Washington, December 1

My Dear Mr. Hoover:

On October 31 you formally advised this office of certain 

vations in connection with National Security Council Intellige

rective No. 9 (NSCID 9) as revised on October 24,2 and you re

that they be brought to the attention of the appropriate membe

NSC. Those observations were, in effect, as follows:

1. The Attorney General, as Chief Legal Officer of the 

ment, should be a member of the Special Committee of the NSC 

ever matters of interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (

before that Committee; and it should be made explicit that th

to assist the Attorney General and the Special Committee wh

matters are before the Committee.

2. The right granted to the United States Communication

gence Board (USCIB) “to investigate and study the standards an

tices of its member agencies and departments in utilizing and 

ing COMINT (communications intelligence) information” is to

and may lead to abuse.

3. The authority granted to the Director, NSA “to have d

cess to . . . any elements of the . . . civilian COMINT agencies 

matters of operational and technical control as may be necessa

is too broad, as is the Director’s authority “to obtain such info

and intelligence material from (those agencies) as he may requ

With reference to the first point above, I am informed tha

the understanding when the Directive was drafted, that the A

General, under the established procedures of the NSC, wou

member of the Special Committee whenever matters of intere

FBI were before that Committee; and that in such instances, th

ney General could, as a matter of course, have the assistance of 

reau. That understanding has been confirmed by the Presiden

in approving this Directive, he directed that this procedure is t

lowed. NSCID 9 will be revised accordingly regarding the mem

of the Special Committee.

In connection with your second and third points, the Sec

of State and Defense acting as the Special Committee of the N

1 Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Serie

(Other Staff Papers). Top Secret; Security Information. Ellipsis in the original. 2 See Document 132. Hoover’s comments have not been found.
COMINT with the assistance of the Director of Central Intel

have directed me to advise you as follows.

It is understood that your concern regarding these latter two 

is that they might result in encroachment upon or interference w

unique responsibilities of the FBI in the internal security field a

consequently, you desire that the FBI be granted explicit exe

from those portions of the Directive.

With specific reference to your second point, paragraph 1

Directive states that the Board’s authority in the matter under 

sion shall be binding only if it is adopted by the unanimous 

the members of the Board. Furthermore, this paragraph prescri

any recommendation of this sort approved by a majority, but 

of the members of the Board shall automatically be transmitted 

Board to the Special Committee. No such action of the Board th

can be binding on you unless you agree to it and, in the event 

agreement, the matter would be considered by the Special Com

augmented by the Attorney General, as a matter of course and 

a matter of formal appeal on your part.

With specific reference to your third point, above, paragra

the Directive recognizes that elements of the Armed Forces an

agencies will require close COMINT support and that necessar

operational control of specified COMINT facilities and resour

be delegated by the Director to the chiefs of other agencies. Th

of operations contemplated by the FBI undoubtedly would fal

the meaning of a close support requirement for the accomplish

your mission, in which case it would be possible for you to 

with the Director, NSA, for the assignment to your Bureau of s

cilities as are needed for this requirement.

In connection with the authority granted to the Director, N

have direct access to any elements of civilian COMINT agenc

to obtain information and intelligence material from those ag

such access is always established through mutually prescribe

nels. However, the vital element of security would be elimin

normal channels of interdepartmental exchange were prescribed 

conduct of COMINT business. On the other hand, all member

Board would be handicapped severely if they could not particip

erally in all phases of the COMINT operation through mutu

ceptable channels.

With reference to your reservation regarding the allocation 

in USCIB, which was raised orally by your representatives in a

to the points made in your letter, this device was only designe

administrative mechanism to provide a reasonable dividing 

tween civilian and non-civilian issues if such were to arise. In 

your reservation, however, the Special Committee has decided 
FBI representative should cast two votes at Board meetings—a

vided for the representative of the Secretary of State and the 

of Central Intelligence—and that the representative of the Secr

Defense should also cast two votes. This would equalize you

strength with that of the other civilian members and still pro

possible advantage of the reasonable dividing line. NSCID 9 

amended accordingly.

It may be pertinent in conclusion to review the reasons fo

istence of NSCID 9. That Directive was issued for the following 

1. To set forth with exactitude the fundamental principle 

COMINT activities of the U.S. are a national responsibility rath

a matter of primary interest to any one of the departments or a

concerned.

2. To delineate clearly the broad lines of policy which wil

this mutual assumption of responsibility.

3. To reconstitute USCIB in a manner which will assure an 

precise, secure and effective complex of COMINT activities.

4. To set up the most rapid and equitable system which n

would give full protection to the individual agencies and depa

on the Board but also would provide final adjudication, as nee

the Chief Executive.

The Directive, amended as indicated above, would appea

complish the foregoing as regards all agencies participating in C

activities. On the other hand, excepting the FBI from adher

portions of the Directive would weaken the Directive to a poin

it would have little meaning or value because the fundamenta

ple of its creation would have been destroyed. Since COMINT 

set apart from the normal operations of Government and a 

mechanism created to handle COMINT activities, those activit

be coordinated by the bodies which have been created to handle 

namely, the Special Committee and USCIB—on a basis of mu

sponsibility with equitable representation of all interested depa

and agencies.

In summary, however, nothing in the directive should be co

to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilitie

Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal secur

will be made explicit by adding a paragraph to this effect in N

Sincerely yours,

James S. 

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
142. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Plann

Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthew

Washington, December 3

SUBJECT

[less than 1 line not declassified] Activities directed against Poland

I attach hereto a copy of Warsaw’s cable No. 338 of Decem

midnight.2 Yesterday I called [less than 1 line not declassified] 

with me and Mr. Vedeler of EE for a discussion of the implica

this cable and the broadcast on December 29 by the Warsaw st

English Morse which sets forth the Polish line on American esp

activities in Poland, etc. I attach hereto FBIS Report No. 252,3 

think you will desire to read in full.

[1 paragraph (14 lines) not declassified]

At the meeting of the Consultants to OPC yesterday af

(General Magruder for Defense, Colonel Wright representing 

Young of the JCS, and myself representing this Department), th

Polish operation was gone into at length [less than 1 line not 

fied]. The following facts and assumptions emerged:

[6 paragraphs (181

⁄2 lines) not declassified]

I need not point out that this affair represents an appall

back [less than 1 line not declassified] the U.S. Government. The

be political repercussions which might make it exceedingly diff

impossible for our diplomatic mission to maintain itself in Wars

other telegram in from our Embassy on December 27 pointed 

the Polish Foreign Office had advised the Embassy that only 

can Embassy officers on the diplomatic list would be immun

Polish jurisdiction, including the provisions of the Polish legisla

espionage activity.4 We know too little today to arrive at any 

sion as to whether [less than 1 line not declassified] activities in 

over the past two years are directly related to recent moves ind

that the Polish authorities are moving in on the American Emb

the same pattern that has been established in other Eastern S

capitals. EE is watching this entire situation closely, and I have ar

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NSC 10 Series, 

Secret. A notation on the memorandum reads: “Please return to S/P—Joyce.” 2 This telegram transmitted a Polish newspaper account that reported th

authorities had apprehended two U.S. spies who had parachuted from a p

Poland. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 711.5248/12–2752) 3 Not found.

4 Not found.
for [less than 1 line not declassified] to bring in as soon as it is r

all information received from abroad [less than 1 line not declas

[31⁄2 lines not declassified] You will recall that the Korean war 

ready three or four months old, and that there was a very stro

ing within the Military Establishment that the Korean war, as a

overt Communist military aggression, probably represented th

ing stage of Soviet aggression involving real danger of an all-

flict. Late in 1950 and early in 1951 the Military Establishment 

intensely interested in the concept of “retardation”. This concep

that everything possible should be done [less than 1 line not dec

to develop resistance mechanisms within the Eastern Europea

lite area which might be activated and heavily re-supplied in th

of war. The objective was to develop large-scale guerrilla war

sabotage forces behind the Soviet lines. [less than 1 line not dec

heavy pressure by our Military Establishment to accelera

activities.

You will recall that early in 1951 General Smith produced 

called Scope, Pace and Magnitude Paper, and there was consid

by the NSC of the CIA’s mission.5 More than anything else, t

Military requirement for retardation on a vast scale impelled 

Smith to have the NSC re-affirm his charter, particularly as re

the vastly expensive activities in connection with the develop

retardation.

During this period almost two years ago, both the State 

ment, the CIA and notably General Magruder were convinced 

Psychological Warfare Division (General McClure) in the Dep

of the Army as well as other senior officers in the Army and A

were engaging in a very great deal of wishful thinking as to wh

be done by clandestine means in Eastern Europe to develop re

mechanisms capable of producing a massive retardation contr

This thinking within the Military resulted from, in my opinion

complete ignorance of Eastern Europe and what a highly de

totalitarian police state could accomplish in the way of snuf

anything remotely related to so-called resistance organization

ertheless, the CIA, General Magruder and I did not feel that w

block what the Army desired to see accomplished in this field. W

only, and we did what we could, endeavor to educate the Arm

realities of life in an Eastern European Soviet Satellite and to w

perhaps very little indeed could be accomplished in peace tim

way of setting up an organized mechanism capable of spring

5 Reference is to Smith’s paper (see Document 68) which was the basis of 

(Document 90).
being on D-Europe Day. The State Department representative

rally could not oppose covert activities, the objectives of which 

to the national security and were designed to contribute to th

tary effort of the Western Allies in resisting Soviet attack on W

Europe. As stated above, General Magruder and I, as well as 

Balmer, the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative as a consultant 

of CIA, could only point out the extreme difficulties of accomp

anything and endeavor to persuade the Military that their P

should not, repeat not, in the development of strategic plans, c

a resistance potential behind the enemy lines in the first stage

all-out war.

In the meeting [less than 1 line not declassified] yesterday bo

eral Magruder and General Balmer stated that there still exist

Department of the Army a highly optimistic appreciation of w

be done in the way of guerrilla activity in time of war based 

sistance mechanisms developed in times of peace. General Ma

recalled that recently in a briefing General Collins himself had r

to the destruction by resistance elements of bridges behind the 

lines in Eastern Europe in case of war, his idea apparently bei

such actions present no great difficulties of accomplishment. T

is that large bridges to be destroyed by demolition require cha

volving tons and tons of explosives which must be carefully and 

times painfully placed. Needless to say, all strategic bridges 

heavily guarded by military detachments in time of war.6

The Air Force has also exerted pressure on the CIA to dev

cape and evasion capabilities in Eastern Europe in time of war. 

Force interest is, of course, easily explained and quite understa

The fact remains that the setting up of escape and evasion rout

houses and recruiting of native personnel in peace time is an in

complicated, dangerous and time-consuming process.

Prior to the meeting in Paris early in March, 1952 of the 

European Chiefs of Mission, I addressed a memorandum on F

1, 1952 to Messrs. Bonbright, Barbour and Campbell,7 which c

the following paragraphs:

“A general explanation might be given to the chiefs of 

alone, as to the aspects of so-called positive political action wi

Soviet orbit, i.e., plans and preparations which are designed to 

groundwork for massive internal resistance in case of war. In t

of these considerations, do the chiefs of mission consider that t

involved should and must be taken?

6 A handwritten notation in the margin reads, “and peace!”

7 Not found.
What suggestions have the chiefs of mission for the timin

ing, scope and pace of positive political action by covert means 

the Iron Curtain? This question might be dealt with country b

try and individually with the several chiefs of mission.

“It seems to me that these questions lie close to the hear

strategy for the cold war for the next few years. I believe that 

resentatives on the spot not only could contribute a great dea

would be helpful in Washington but also that they should be a

current plans and activities in the countries to which they are as

The Record of Discussions of the meeting in Paris contains 

lowing paragraph under “Conclusions and Recommendations

“II. 3. Covert Operations. Such operations are a necessary 

the total effort aimed at weakening the Soviet grip on the s

They should be aimed not only at securing a maximum of inte

but also at breaking down the Soviet system of control and bui

ganizations for future action. It must be recognized, however, th

ations of this character may endanger the continued functionin

diplomatic missions in the countries concerned.”

The point of the foregoing is to illustrate that all of the C

Mission present at the Paris meeting agreed that in the national 

it was necessary for the CIA to do what it could to develop cove

anisms within the Eastern European satellite countries. With re

Poland, I talked in Paris individually with Ambassador Flack

ferred to the fact that the United States had more friends to the 

inch in Poland than perhaps in any other satellite country an

tioned the five million Poles in the United States. He did po

however, that the Sovietization of Poland had moved forward 

and that Poland had now become an efficient Police State w

formers everywhere and with Soviet officials in all key point

government, particularly in the US. In other words, in spite o

treme difficulties and risk, Flack’s own judgment was that it m

possible to do something in Poland, and in any event the 

should be made.

[1 paragraph (111

⁄2 lines) not declassified]

General Balmer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended the m

with the British and was provided with a copy of the agreed m

He has advised me that the somewhat pessimistic evaluation 

bilities for clandestine activities in Eastern Europe which cam

these meetings with the British was very useful indeed in cou

ing some of the far too optimistic ideas existing within the Depa

of the Army and the Air Force.

8 Not found.
The Military Establishment for obvious strategic reasons w

marily interested in Poland insofar as retardation and escape a

sion were concerned. In addition, opportunities within Poland w

garded as much greater than in the other satellites, with the p

exception of Albania. The Poles historically hate and fear the R

The Poles have perhaps the strongest feeling of nationalism in 

Europe and a long tradition of conspiratorial and underground 

[3 lines not declassified] To sum up, the situation was about as fol

1. Pressure on the CIA by our Military Establishment to d

something in Poland was very great indeed.

2. The Department of State could not and did not oppose [

1 line not declassified] efforts to develop resistance organizat

Poland, and the Department was constantly advised of what 

ing done [less than 1 line not declassified].

The end result was as set forth in the first part of this me

dum. In other words, the efforts in Poland resulted in an extrem

portant set back which might have serious repercussions on th

ations of our Embassy in Warsaw. In addition, the Polish 

obtained information on the techniques and objectives of Am

clandestine activities. The Warsaw Government has made ex

clever and probably most effective propaganda use out of this 

(See FBIS Report No. 252–1952)

[4 lines not declassified] I suggest that the following conclusion

possibly be derived from this experience in Poland:

1. It has become impossible, with only the existing techniq

contacts, [less than 1 line not declassified] to operate in the satell

of Eastern Europe. The perfection of totalitarian police state tech

is approaching “1984” efficiency to a degree where “resistan

probably exist only in the minds of the enslaved peoples of the 

orbit in Europe.

2. No resistance organization can survive in the Soviet orb

the possible exception of Albania.

3. [8 lines not declassified]

4. Unless new techniques are developed, perhaps nothing 

accomplished in the Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe except by 

approach through the air waves, balloon operations and leafle

Recommendations:

1. The Department of State should devote careful study 

than 1 line not declassified] operations within Poland. The Dep

should then provide political guidance [less than 1 line not decl

in terms of long-range political objectives in Eastern Europe, suc

ance to provide the framework within which covert operations 

or should not be attempted.

2. The entire subject of cold war activities by clandestine 

directed against the Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe should be 
by the Psychological Strategy Board or whatever top level agenc

succeed it under the new Administration. (Perhaps the co

presided over by Mr. William H. Jackson9 might review the do

tation mentioned in this memorandum. I understand this co

will review “cold war” activities, particularly in the Soviet 

Europe.)

Robert P. 

9 See Document 151.

10 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

143. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board1

PSB D–35 Washington, January 

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF 

DECEMBER 31, 1952

[Omitted here is Section I, “Purpose and Framework.”]

II. Summary of Significant Psychological Activities

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of 

tus of our national psychological programs as of December 31, 195

on the appended Progress Reports of recent significant activitie

departments and agencies responsible for psychological operati

General Comments

2. U.S. capabilities for psychological action, within the l

the world power position, are slowly but steadily improving, b

remain inadequate for taking immediately effective psycholog

tion contributing to a retraction of the Kremlin’s power and in

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB 

Secret; Security Information. Annex A, Report of the Department of State; An

port of the Department of Defense; Annex C, Report of the Central Intelligenc

and Annex D, Report of the Mutual Security Agency, are not printed. Annex C 

cially classified and was not found. A covering note, which reads, “This repo

proved by the Board at its Seventeenth Meeting, January 15, 1953,” was signe

retary to the Board Charles E. Johnson.
3. Progress has been made in planning and coordinating 

partmental and inter-agency action, in making use of indigen

sources for “gray” or unattributed operations, in building up 

tialities for increased “black” or covert activity, and in expandin

existing programs technical facilities for radio broadcasting.

4. Our national psychological effort is at greatest disadvan

the USSR and Communist China. In these areas, radio broadcas

mains almost the only weapon we are now employing on any 

cant scale. Even here, Russian jamming presents a very seriou

lem, although evidence continues to appear that broadcasts ar

by a limited audience on whom they have some effect. In Com

China listening facilities for the masses are severely limited.

5. In the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe also, radio 

casting constitutes the major active element at our disposal. I

countries, too, jamming constitutes an obstacle, although at pr

less serious one, perhaps, than in the USSR. In the case of som

satellites, however, some progress has been made in building u

capabilities for psychological activities.

6. More positive psychological action directed against the 

orbit necessarily awaits a greater development of our over-all c

ities, and an accompanying adjustment of our basic national p

the present interim position, until a more aggressive strategic 

becomes feasible, psychological planning and programming aga

orbit has gone ahead on the basis of doing everything possibl

gravate its internal conflicts in the hope that this will subsequen

to bring about a retraction of Kremlin control and influence.

7. U.S. psychological programs outside the Iron Curtain

the major portion of the national psychological effort has been a

have moved with moderate success toward the achievement of 

jectives in certain areas. The psychological impact of American 

grams has, despite some difficulties, in most respects been fav

With regard to the psychological problems arising from the larg

bers of American personnel abroad, considerable progress h

made in respect to U.S. troops. Some progress is recorded towar

ing the “neutralist” menace. The US–UN stand against forcib

triation of Korean prisoners of war has gained general acceptan

good psychological effect. There is closer and more effective c

tion between the various agencies carrying out American psyc

cal programs abroad, and steadily increasing recognition of the 

psychological operations in world affairs.

Related Activities

8. Certain related activities are covered in a specially classif

tion of this report, Annex C.
Area Summary

9. In Western Europe there have been set-backs, such as th

in ratification of the European Defense Community accords 

decision of the European member governments to cut their 

contributions under NATO. But the over-all picture contains b

ements as well. The reports of all PSB reporting agencies indic

as 1952 ends, communism is on a slow but definitely percept

cline (with the possible exception of Italy). Furthermore, there 

ment that U.S. psychological programs have made an effective 

est contribution to this decline. Communism remains the 

long-term threat, of course; but other forces tending to disr

world solidarity, and other forms of anti-Americanism, such a

tralism,” constitute more immediate problems.

10. In the Middle East the picture is not so bright. Iran is 

ous danger spot and a classic example of the difficulties and p

dangers confronting the continued existence of freedom in c

where extreme nationalism exists as a major problem in itself, 

that is aggravated and complicated by the fact that it can be e

flamed and exploited by communism. Tension arising from 

the same elements that are found in Iran is growing in Iraq. 

these cases, as in the other Arab countries of the area, it can not 

fidently asserted that there has been progress in the psychologic

In North Africa, nationalist ferment presents increasingly compl

lems of a psychological character, rendered more acute by the p

of important American air bases within the area.

11. This does not mean, however, that the picture in the 

East is entirely dark. Favorable effects continue from such psy

ical initiatives as the Mecca airlift, and the visit of the Fleet to t

Our economic and military aid programs, and their active psy

ical exploitation, have produced good results, particularly in 

which represents an encouragingly stable and friendly factor.

12. In South and Southeast Asia, all the problems and poten

gers in the situation are still present; but from the reports eme

impression that gradually U.S. capabilities for holding our ow

psychological struggle there are being improved. Both on the o

formation side and in non-attributable activities significant gai

been registered, particularly in the Philippines, Indo-China, an

land. In the Indian sub-Continent too, slow progress continues. W

ploitation of the psychological possibilities of our aid progra

agreement to extend military aid to Pakistan, and U.S. accep

the UN of the Indian Resolution on Korea—subsequently reje

of hand by the Soviet bloc—have all had a favorable effect.

13. In the Far East, psychological activities are steadily if slo

panding. A psychological plan to deal with the problems raise
presence of U.S. troops in Japan is now being prepared. Better u

ing made of Japanese indigenous organizations and other reso

combatting communism. New psychological activities under 

East Command include moves to build up escape operations i

and strengthen and improve the organization responsible for 

ventional warfare. A number of psychological programs desi

take advantage of the proximity of U.S. and communist forces i

have been undertaken. Efforts to penetrate Red China were being 

developed, with a significant increase in leaflet dropping, radio 

casting, and some other activities of a non-attributable nature.

14. In Latin America, likewise, the spread of communism 

growing threat of Peronism have led us to increase our capabil

combatting these and other anti-American forces. Overt infor

efforts are combining with TCA aid programs and non-attribut

tivities on an increasing scale. It is evident from current report

ever, that more will be required before we can take care of t

Communist-Peronista threat to hemisphere unity.

Special Problems

15. Coordinated efforts of all the departments and agenc

cerned had, by the year’s end, been undertaken to minimize 

pact of the communist germ warfare charges. Similarly, the 

“Hate America” campaign, as well as the so-called Campaign o

seem to be declining in effectiveness outside the Iron Curtain, 

in part at least, to persistent and better-coordinated U.S. efforts t

teract them. The long-term implications of these campaigns rem

rious, however. There are manifest indications of the effective

the “Hate America” campaign inside the Iron Curtain countri

the need for more effective counter measures continues great.

16. Major psychological problems continue to be raised 

commercial and immigration policies. The repercussions of ou

and tariff restrictions tend in some countries to diminish the p

logical effects of our economic aid programs. The restrictions 

migration and the complications of our visa policy continue t

some of the best efforts of our psychological operations.

17. Quietly effective use appears to have been made of t

chological possibilities inherent in our development of novel 

and other weapons.

[Omitted here are Section III, “The Work of PSB,” and the an
144. Memorandum From Secretary of State Acheson and th

Director for Mutual Security (Harriman) to the Execut

Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)1

Washington, January 1

SUBJECT

Sixth Progress Report on NSC 104/2, “U.S. Policies and Programs in th

Economic Field which may Affect the War Potential of the Soviet Bloc”2

REFERENCES

A. NSC 104/2

B. Memorandum for NSC from Executive Secretary, “Assignment of 

Responsibilities for Economic Defense”, dated November 7, 1951,3

transmitting Memorandum by the President on this subject

C. Memorandum for NSC from Executive Secretary, “Assignment of 

Responsibilities for Economic Defense”, dated January 25, 19524 tra

Memorandum of Agreement between the Secretary of State and the 

Administrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act

In accordance with the President’s directive on the assign

responsibilities for economic defense under NSC 104/2 and the 

randum of agreement between the Secretary of State and the A

trator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, there is su

herewith the sixth progress report on NSC 104/2.5 It is reques

this be circulated to the members of the Council for their inform

Dean A

Appendix II7

RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE FOR ECONOMIC DEF

There are two principal tasks of the intelligence and resea

derlying the operations and policy formulation of economic 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, OCB F

104, Memoranda 1952–53, Box 61. Secret; Security Information. A handwritten 

on the memorandum indicates that it was delivered to Lay at the NSC on Janu

security messenger. 2 NSC 104/2 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. I, pp. 1059–1064. 3 See footnote 4, Document 116.

4 Ibid.

5 The 24-page progress report and Appendix 1, Replies from COCOM 

on Prior Commitments Issue, are attached but not printed. 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The signature blo

Director of Mutual Security is blank. 7 Secret; Security Information.
One is the task of appraising the overall relative economic cap

and vulnerabilities of the Soviet bloc and the West in terms of ec

defense measures and programs; this is a long range problem 

dimensions. The other task is that of keeping close and con

touch with current East-West trade patterns and practices and ec

developments within the Soviet bloc and the West; this is esse

provide the basic facts on specific relative vulnerabilities for p

of current economic defense operations and negotiations.

The drafts prepared in connection with the proposed Nati

telligence Estimate (NIE) 59 represent a systematic attempt to a

the relative overall vulnerabilities of the Free World and the Sov

It is clear, however, that the materials available for any accur

praisal of specific Soviet bloc vulnerabilities are still meager. F

more, the analysis of such materials is still in a very early stag

velopment, and much more work is needed in this importa

Meanwhile, the demands for basic trade analysis and other data 

for day-to-day operations continue to be insistent and continue 

increase. The problem is to plan the work for both the short-run 

rent operating and policy needs and the broader, longer run n

as to achieve the maximum benefit for the East-West trade pro

The progress made in recent months in the fields of shipp

foreign trade intelligence for economic defense backstopping 

marized below.

There has been a notable increase in attention given to sh

intelligence, and a number of papers on this subject have be

pared; considerable work remains to be done, however. Inclu

this effort has been the joint development with the British of an 

intelligence estimate of the facts concerning trade with Com

China, including the volume of trade and the number and cap

vessels engaged in the trade.

A second area in which progress has been made in the p

eral months is the preparation of commodity studies of strateg

entering into East-West trade. In connection with the work of 

technical task groups, (see Title II Activities in body of report) C

the Department of State prepared, and Intelligence Advisory C

tee (IAC) agencies have to some extent reviewed, commodity a

of a number of International List II and III items. A few of thes

ies, on lead, pyrites, electrical machinery, marine boilers and ti

tubes, represented comprehensive analyses. An intensive study 

ber has also been in progress. A great many others, although n

prehensive, represented very considerable efforts in the utiliz

available data. The work was extensive and, though not exhaus

cause of the time element and competing priorities, represents 

portant step forward. It is hoped that by the end of 1953 com

sive analyses will be available on the requirements, producti
trade of the Soviet bloc in each of the major items considered 

important strategic value to the bloc, particularly those items 

to less-than-embargo control.

The companion project to the commodity studies was i

early in 1952, and is a series of country-by-country studies an

the trade relations between the principal Western European c

and the important Soviet bloc countries with which they trad

on these analyses has only begun. The analyses are needed i

planning on “decreasing reliance” and in implementing the Ba

and are aimed at affording policy officers a better factual back

in gauging the bargaining positions of the individual countri

ing with the Soviet bloc. The analyses would also serve to 

prospective difficulties before they have come to a head. Giv

time, it is sometimes possible to avoid the shipment of strategi

by a Western country without prejudicing its economic and 

position. This intelligence need in the trade field was stresse

fourth progress report on NSC 104/2.8

To date, two comprehensive bilateral trade studies have b

pared, and three others are in process. These studies involve 

erable expenditure of man-hours, but the results justify more 

this field.

In addition to the above analyses, The Department of Co

has been pursuing two projects in the compilation of trade s

in accordance with interdepartmental arrangements made 

1952. One is the compilation, from published and supplementa

material, of the trade of each of the significant Free World c

with the Soviet bloc, by country and commodity. Useful refer

bles have been issued quarterly on many of these countries 

others, less frequently. The second part of the project is the col

classified data which the individual COCOM countries submit m

on their exports (or licenses granted for export) to the Soviet 

items included in the International Lists. The Department of Co

summaries provide data from which the trends and pattern of th

can be more readily discerned in certain cases and from which 

to specific commodity or country problems can be develop

much less effort than was formerly required in dealing with t

vidual monthly reports. This work, which marks an importan

step in the development of the needed statistical base, is being re

in an interagency committee.

The Intelligence Working Group (IWG) established 

EDAC–IAC sponsorship was quite active in the second half 

8 Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, O

NSC 104, Memoranda 1952–53, Box 61)
The IWG has provided closer working relationships between 

telligence agencies, on one hand, and the policy and operating s

on the other, with the latter able to indicate directly their needs 

assist in providing necessary background for the work they 

Although there is inevitably room for considerable improvem

the treatment of specific problems, the IWG is improving inte

support of economic defense policy and operations. One of i

significant current projects is the establishment of a unit which w

late the extensive data now being received on Soviet bloc procu

efforts, particularly those efforts which involve evasions of W

economic security controls. The details of the project are not y

worked out, but it has been approved in principle.

In conclusion, there should be mentioned the general pro

disseminating National Intelligence to foreign Governments 

ternational bodies. One difficulty which has impeded United 

negotiations on economic defense matters could be eliminated 

tablishing a better procedure so that our negotiators might use 

terial contained in intelligence documents to maximum adv

Such use of intelligence is inhibited by the pervasive difficult

suring that security is maintained in the course of using such 

rial. This problem should be explored to determine whether 

ments to pertinent NSC directives and other regulations wo

desirable.

145. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Plann

Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthew

Washington, January 2

There is forwarded to you herewith two memoranda, bot

yesterday, on the general subject of the secret intelligence activi

the covert operations abroad of the CIA. The first memorandum

by me, is designed to provide background material and to se

proper framework the second memorandum, which is signed 

erbridge Horsey and prepared by all of us in this Office (Horsey

Strong, McFadden and myself).2

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, State–CIA 

Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads, “R—Mr. How

Howe, Deputy Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence). 2 J. Lampton Berry, Robert C. Strong, and William McFadden.
The basic purpose of these memoranda is to raise fund

problems with regard to the CIA operation abroad and the g

and control of these activities to insure that they shall be closely 

in with our overall strategy and political objectives. The memo

signed by Horsey has been shown to Messrs. Armstrong and 

who have indicated to us that they are in general agreement w

analysis plus the conclusions and recommendations which flow 

from. Armstrong’s office, of course, has a large interest in the 

of the relations between this Department and the CIA, and I 

you will want to bring Armstrong and Howe into any discussion

on this material.

The memorandum signed by me I have drafted in a man

with the idea in mind that it might be read and discussed in du

by General Smith and Mr. Allen W. Dulles.3 I am sure you w

your own ideas as to the timing and manner in which this m

accomplished if you agree with me that it should be. It would 

my suggestion that these two memoranda, together with the 

referred to in them, might very well be placed before the Wi

Jackson Committee,4 which will study the psychological warfa

of the government.

Robert P

Annex 1

Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Plan

Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthew

Washington, January 2

SUBJECT

The Department of State and the CIA

3 Allen W. Dulles succeeded Walter Bedell Smith, who resigned as Direct

tral Intelligence on February 9 and became Under Secretary of State on the 

Allen W. Dulles was appointed Director of Central Intelligence the same day

firmed by the Senate on February 23, and was sworn in on February 26. 4 See Document 151 regarding the June 30 Jackson Committee report.

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

6 Top Secret; Security Information.
There is forwarded to you herewith a memorandum date

ary 26, 19537 which has been prepared in this office by Messrs. 

Berry, Strong, McFadden and myself. In this connection, I refe

memorandum addressed to you on December 17, 1952 with pa

reference to the so-called Kaji case in Tokyo as well as to my 

randum addressed to you on December 31, 1952 entitled “CIA 

ties Directed Against Poland”.8 In the former memorandum I su

that before my departure I should write a memorandum for y

bodying certain conclusions I have reached as a result of fou

close working relationship with OPC of CIA. The memorand

warded to you today endeavors to pose important problems 

have recently arisen as a result of CIA covert activities in the field 

have caused, are still causing, and will probably continue to ca

rious embarrassment to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations

memorandum referred to in the previous sentence, my colleag

I have endeavored to pose the basic questions with regard to 

ment of State and CIA relationships which we believe the n

ministration will desire to deal with in the immediate future 

relate to the presumed new policy of more “dynamism” with 

to the conduct of the cold war.

The kernel of the problem, as I see it, is that the operations 

in the field of secret intelligence as well as secret operations, h

creasingly tended to be less and less geared into what I unders

be the present overall strategy of the United States in the mana

of its foreign relations. Perhaps a better way of stating it wou

say that CIA covert activities lack sufficient policy guidance a

trol, the inevitable result being that such activities, on occasion, 

in the national interest nor do they support our overall policy 

tives. The memorandum of January 26, 1953 endeavors to m

problem head on in the hope that CIA activities abroad may 

studied on the National Security Council level and perhaps a ne

be taken by President Eisenhower himself.

I set forth below certain thoughts and conclusions I have 

at which might be helpful in providing information of a back

and historical nature relating to the organization, growth and 

operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. These observat

late primarily to OPC of CIA.

7 Printed below.

8 The memorandum on the Kaji case was not found, although documen

the repercussions of the arrest and detection in Japan of Waturu Kaji, a Japanese 

by U.S. authorities is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 794.0221. For 

orandum on Poland, see Document 142.
I. Political Background—1949 and 1950

In the autumn of 1949, OPC of CIA was a relatively small a

pact unit within the framework of but somewhat independen

ated in the CIA organization. It was busily preparing to set u

anisms through which it could engage in so-called psycholog

political warfare by covert means as defined in NSC 10/2.9 

tember, 1949, the Russians produced their first atomic explos

eral years ahead of what I understand to be the best calcula

mates. Soviet political warfare on a world-wide scale was co

being stepped up to subvert, divide, weaken and eventually 

large and important areas of the free world in which the U.S

vital stake. On June 25, 1950 the North Korean Communists

Russian control, crossed one of the frontiers of the free world 

itary force. The Communist guerrilla attacks against the French 

Vietnamese were assuming the proportions of a major war; Sov

sure against Iran was increasing; Communist guerrilla wa

Malaya was being stepped up; the Chinese Communists wer

over Tibet; the Communists were succeeding in Guatemala, 

Tito’s Yugoslavia was under constant menace of a military a

the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe.

All of these facts produced within the United States Gove

and among the American people a sense of urgency to prepare 

possibility of additional Communist attacks against the fre

which might lead to an all out military conflict, including a

against the United States. We started our military build-up o

scale during the last part of 1950. During this period, both wi

government as well as outside, there suddenly developed an 

interest in so-called psychological or political warfare. This cau

siderable pressure to be exerted against OPC of CIA immedi

engage in psychological and political warfare activities by 

means. At the same time, exceedingly strong pressure was exert

OPC of CIA by the Defense Establishment to accomplish in th

est possible time those responsibilities set forth in NSC 10/2 

to preparing for resistance activities and guerrilla warfare beh

enemy lines in case of war. You will recall that during the las

1950 powerful elements within the Military Establishment con

that perhaps the Russians in 1954 or 1955 would attain a degre

itary preparation and atomic capability which might lead the 

in the Kremlin either to endeavor to obtain their objectives by 

of overt military force on a grand scale, or the Kremlin would e

threat of force and subversion to obtain control of strategic por

9 For NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intell

tablishment, Document 292.
the non-Communist world. This would necessarily lead to su

tions upon our part that the danger of an all out conflict would 

be very great. Underlying these considerations, was the over-rid

that China was added to the Communist world and Chinese C

nist military forces threatened Southeast Asia.

II. Expansion of OPC

The objective world situation late in 1950 and early in 195

least the subjective reaction thereto on the part of the Governm

the people of the United States) and the pressures referred to ab

to a vast expansion of OPC of CIA. The emphasis understandabl

by the Military to prepare for war and the pressures to o

behind-the-lines resistance, led to constantly increasing em

within the OPC on preparations for a hot war. (In this connecti

fer to my memorandum of December 31, 1952 with regard to [l

1 line not declassified] activities in Poland.) OPC tended to becom

and more of a military and para-military planning agency. At th

time, OPC was endeavoring to meet the demands and pressure

creased activity in the field of covert political action. I believe 

end result of this situation was that OPC tried to do too much 

little time with inadequate personnel. I believe that Mr. Frank 

ner would agree with this estimate. I may say that qualified pe

in this country for OPC planning and operations is extraordina

ficult to come by and difficult to train.

Some unhappy results of this haste inevitably followed:

[7 paragraphs (74 lines) not declassified]

III. Learning the Hard Way

For the reasons stated above, it is my conclusion that the

ures of the CIA are not exclusively CIA failures, but are rather 

can failures attributable, to sum up, to the following factors:

1. The American characteristic of impatience and “wantin

the job done”. The American belief that if enough money, pe

and effort are applied, everything is possible and can be accom

either instanter or certainly within a year or two.

2. The CIA approach during the past three years has been 

heavily influenced by the thinking within and without the Gove

that we had very little time. It is my personal view that NSC 68

expression to and reflected much of this thinking.

3. The role of covert operations in the conduct of foreign 

has been exaggerated. Quietly, securely, and expertly handled p

10 Regarding NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for Natio

rity,” April 14, 1950, see Document 5.
and intelligence operations can undoubtedly make a valuab

on rare occasions, a crucial contribution to the national secu

only if such activities are of a highly professional character. T

never “win the cold war”, but only make a modest but sig

contribution.

4. The CIA, as General Smith himself has stated repeate

tried to take on too much in too little time. CIA has obtained t

ices of a great number of highly talented, loyal and high calibe

icans. Many of them, however, have the characteristics menti

paragraph No. 1 above. In the medium levels of CIA there ar

persons who consider the Department of State to be negative an

These persons over-estimate the role of special operations by 

tine methods and under-rate the difficulties and pitfalls in o

ings with both our allies and our opponents. The Congressiona

issue of January 14, 1953, No. 6, page A–157, contains the fo

statement from a study of “psychological strategy” prepared 

mer Congressman O.K. Armstrong:

“High success in the performances of its [the CIA’s]11 im

tasks, has been due in largest measure to the leadership and d

of Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles. Major handicap, according to 

mary of interviews by key personnel is due to lack of coordina

more accurately cooperation, by some echelons of the State Dep

in following recommendations made by CIA for the security of 

tion.” (Italics supplied)

IV. Observations and Suggestions

[11 paragraphs (59 lines) not declassified]

V. Conclusions

The foregoing, I fear, may sound perhaps captiously crit

negative insofar as the CIA is concerned. I hope that it is not 

this sense. There is a great deal of light in the picture.

My own feeling is that the CIA has made remarkable progr

ing the past five years in perhaps the most tricky, sensitive a

cate of all governmental operations demanding the highest d

sophistication and experience. It takes many, many years to b

what we may term a covert apparatus. The Russians have had 

five years experience. We have had five. The only way to learn 

telligence business is to engage in it. The CIA has been activ

gaging in this business under the enormous pressures referr

previous sections of this memorandum. Glaring mistakes ha

made, but solid accomplishments have already been achieved. 

belief that the senior officials of the CIA are entirely aware of 

11 Brackets in the original.
ficiencies of the organization in its field activities, and remedia

is being taken to tighten up and increase security. The training 

doctrination process has been vastly improved and men wh

shown no talent for the intelligence business have been releas

The CIA organization has made progress in recruiting, t

and seasoning a group of highly talented men who are coming 

sider American Intelligence their life career. Amateurism is 

place to an increasing degree of professionalism. It is being r

that an intelligence bull is misplaced in the world china shop 

and that a cat and later a soft-treading leopard is a more suita

effective animal. I believe that a greater degree of discipline h

established and that there is a real understanding growing up 

the secret intelligence activities and special operations fields 

telligence is not a policy-creating function within the Governm

can never be. Although there are still some officers within t

who have a feeling that intelligence operations abroad are an 

themselves and should be conducted independently of and w

interference from policy-making and implementing Americ

cials. I believe this must and will be corrected with time and a 

degree of discipline in government. The U.S. responsibility is su

amateurism, free-wheeling and heavy-handedness cannot be 

ted in 1953. Our friends and allies must have confidence not 

the goodness of our intentions and objectives but also in ou

ment, discretion and methods. Our dangerous adversaries tu

mistakes against us with telling effect, and this does not make 

confidence in our leadership which we must have to exercise 

tively in the crucial years to come.

One more observation: If we comport ourselves in the intern

arena as though we are urgently preparing for a perhaps in

conflict with the Soviet world, we add fuel to fears and inspire c

action which increase the danger of just such a conflict. This is 

difficult problem—to prepare for war to prevent it—but we mus

how solve it in the next few years to come.

Robert P. 

12 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Annex 2

Memorandum From Outerbridge Horsey of the Policy

Planning Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State

(Matthews)13

Washington, January 2

SUBJECT

The Department of State and CIA Operations Abroad

Problem:

To review CIA–State relationships, in secret intelligence 

covert operations, with the double objective (a) of insuring tha

field activities are of optimum value in the prosecution of Unite

foreign policy objectives and (b) of diminishing the risk of resul

ful to those objectives.

Discussion:

Recent integration within CIA, at headquarters and in the 

the two main fields, “secret intelligence” and “covert operation

phasizes their interdependence. Even in the previous state of 

less water-tight separation of the two activities, either might 

fected, and indeed did affect, the conduct of foreign policy.

“Secret intelligence” is used herein to describe what NS

defines as “all organized federal espionage operations outs

United States . . . for the collection of foreign intelligence info

. . . in connection with the national security . . .” (Counter-espi

excluded from this discussion) Secret intelligence activities a

ducted by the Director of Central Intelligence. Moreover, he 

sponsibility for coordinating covert and overt intelligence a

The senior U.S. representative in each country has the respo

for coordinating overt intelligence collection activities, but the

recognition in theory or in practice of the fact that secret inte

activities can affect the conduct of foreign policy. By law the 

of Central Intelligence is responsible for the protection of inte

sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In general 

in practice resulted in the withholding of detailed informatio

13 Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Horsey, Joyce, Berry, S

McFadden. Ellipsis in the original. 14 Document 255.
cret intelligence activities in both the planning and execution 

The Department and Chiefs of Mission in the field are briefe

time to time on the broad lines of secret intelligence activities i

ticular country. The positive intelligence information developed 

is furnished, in some measure and with varying degrees of p

ness to Chiefs of Mission in the field, and in greater measure a

siderably more delay to the Department in Washington. Occas

CIA will seek policy guidance before or while a particular oper

being conducted, but it does not necessarily follow the advice 

nor is it obliged to do so. In general, information on intellige

lection operations themselves is not sufficiently specific or ti

permit effective policy guidance, even if the Department were r

to provide such guidance, which it is not.

NSC 5015 calls for “closer liaison” between CIA and State 

strengthening the “guidance” received by CIA from intelligen

sumers, but the context of these references makes it clear that 

late to the nature of the intelligence to be collected and not to 

icy implications of the conduct of intelligence collection activiti

operations in a foreign country, however, are bound to have i

tions for the overt conduct of relations with the country concer

deed they can have very serious results, leading to the under

of the stability of a friendly government, the loss of public con

in the U.S. or giving substance to Soviet anti-U.S. charges. Th

ment as to whether and in what manner a covert proceeding 

kind is likely to affect overall objectives in the country conce

one which in the final analysis can be made only by the age

sponsible for the conduct of overall policy.

The British meet the problem of political guidance on secr

ligence activities, as well as the larger problem of coordinating a

foreign intelligence activities, by giving an inter-agency comm

which the Foreign Office representative is automatically Ch

close policy control over the entire foreign intelligence effort of t

The MI–6 man in the field, although he belongs to an independ

ganization whose chief reports directly to the Prime Minister, i

the specific responsibility of clearing with the Ambassador w

activities are likely to affect the conduct of overt relations. Th

man is able to discern the likelihood of political consequences b

he is part of a small highly-trained professional corps, and b

awareness of political factors is an essential qualification. A serio

ure to do so costs him his job.

15 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 384.
The immense range of CIA

s secret intelligence activit

paucity of trained personnel with good political judgment, th

of our involvement in many foreign countries and the seriou

of mistakes, would seem to require that the authority of the S

of State and of the principal U.S. representatives in each foreig

try be extended in some measure into the “secret intelligenc

This is all the more necessary because of the recent merging of 

cret intelligence” and “covert operations” functions within CI

the necessity of continuous political guidance in the second c

is unquestioned, such extension of the Department’s authority 

seem to be the logical corollary of that merging.

The exclusion of the Department and its representatives in 

from any right to full knowledge of what is going on in the inte

field, and of giving policy guidance thereon, has been applied 

tice not only to the subject matter of NSCID–5 but also to the 

inary or fact-finding stages of “covert operations.” (The latter 

fined for the present purpose as activities authorized by NSC 1

NSC 10/5.)16 These fact-finding operations can, however, hav

serious political consequences, for good or for ill, as the actua

tions themselves. Moreover, it is hard to draw the dividing l

given case between the “intelligence” phase and the “operations

when a “project” is submitted through the joint machinery fo

ance under paragraph 3(d)(1) of NSC 10/2. And CIA is the 

which under the present system draws the dividing line.

As to “covert operations” themselves, NSC 10/2 of cours

nized their intimate relationship to the overt conduct of policy. 

lationship was emphasized by providing that the Secretary 

should nominate the man initially in charge of these operatio

10/2 said further that covert operations should be “planned a

ducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military 

and with covert activities” but it left with the Director of Centr

ligence the responsibility for insuring that they were so con

Committee machinery for inter-departmental clearance was esta

with the right of appeal to the NSC itself in case of serious diff

The very nature of covert operations, the necessary use of 

rate communications system and considerations of security in 

leave the initiative largely in the hands of CIA Headquarters a

representatives in the field. Because of lack of knowledge, th

makers are often precluded from giving the necessary guida

cause many of the questions involved do not concern two of th

bers (JCS and Defense) of the Committee of “OPC Consultan

16 For NSC 10/2, see ibid., Document 292. For NSC 10/5, see Documen
cause a number of personal relationships between CIA and S

posite numbers have grown up, and because it is not always u

CIA, this Committee machinery has not been fully effective. In 

full cooperation at the top levels of CIA on policy coordinatio

cordance with the letter and spirit of NSC 10/2 there has bee

dency toward free-wheeling17 at the operating level. There ha

a number of failures recently to obtain State Department cle

sometimes the explanation being given that the matter was not t

to involve a policy question, sometimes that the responsible off

the State Department could not be reached in time, and at lea

with no valid explanation. A number of recent experiences un

the necessity of CIA also recognizing in practice the mandate 

10/2 to clear with State as well as with JCS and Defense the p

implications of projects of a para-military nature. On the othe

there are a number of examples of close and fruitful relations b

CIA and the State Department. This type of cooperation, as 

close relationships which have developed at some posts in the 

however, largely the accidental result of the personalities in

rather than of the system itself. The momentum of a large and 

zationally independent government organization inevitably pul

from cooperation.

If covert operations are to be a really effective arm of forei

icy, the policy officers of the State Department must, through 

organized machinery, be brought into more intimate relationsh

all stages of covert operations and particularly the planning or 

ligence” stages.

In summary, political guidance by the State Department on 

operations” is increasingly difficult to get across in view of (1) th

ing within CIA of responsibility for these operations with that 

cret intelligence collection; (2) the difficulty in practice of disti

ing between the two types of operation and CIA freedom from 

guidance on the second; (3) the immense range of both types o

ity, particularly in view of the military pressure to develop re

and stay-behind organizations; (4) the lack of full knowledge 

part of the Department of State of what is going on in both fie

til and unless CIA chooses to give such information or som

“blows.”

Recommendation:

The Secretary of State and the principal U.S. representative 

country, as part of their overall responsibility for the conduct 

17 An attached handwritten note reads, “It is interesting and pertinent to 

it is current in CIA to say that the State Dept calls anything ‘free wheeling’ w

resents a new idea.”
foreign relations, should have authority, acting through designa

resentatives agreeable to CIA in a manner which will not preju

curity or limit effectiveness, to insure that all covert activities 

including those defined earlier as “secret intelligence”, are plan

conducted consistently with U.S. foreign policy and with the o

ecution of that policy.18

Outerbridge H

18 There is no indication as to what action, if any, was taken in the Depa

implement this recommendation. 19 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

146. National Security Council Report1

NSC 142 Washington, February 1

[Omitted here are a table of contents and Section I, “Ob

consisting of a quote from the National Security Act of 1947 o

the duties of the CIA.]

II. STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS 

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 19

[Omitted here are Parts 1–6. Part 1, The Military Progra

prepared by the Department of Defense. Part 2, The Mobilizat

gram, was prepared by the Office of Defense Mobilization. Pa

Mutual Security Program, was prepared by the Office of the 

for Mutual Security. Part 4, The Civil Defense Program, was p

by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Part 5, The Sto

Program, was prepared by the Department of Defense. Par

Psychological Program was prepared by the Psychological S

Board.]

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 14

Top Secret, Security Information. NSC 142 consisted of eight parts, each prepa

agency having primary responsibility for that particular national security pro

composite report was circulated to the NSC by NSC Executive Secretary Lay 

ary 10. Only Parts 7 and 8 are printed. Part 7 was prepared by the CIA, dated 

6, and concurred in by the IAC. Part 8 was not found attached but a text from 

Record Group is included here.
No. 7—The Foreign Intelligence Program

II. Coordination2

Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so essential 

ducing adequate intelligence for national security purposes, is 

ally good. Although no recommendations on this subject hav

made to the NSC during the year by the Director of Central 

gence, several improvements in intelligence coordination have b

complished by mutual agreement among the intelligence agenc

others. Such activities are under constant review and improv

can also be expected during 1953.

III. National Estimates

1. The organization and procedures established since Octob

for the production of national intelligence estimates have no

proved in practice. The totality of resources of the entire intelligen

munity is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estima

they can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. Th

mates derive authority from the manner of their preparation an

the active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency h

their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded w

timates would be watered down by further efforts to secure agre

2. A production program for national intelligence estima

been initiated. It provides for a re-examination of existing estim

critical areas or problems as well as the production of new es

designed to improve the coverage of important topics. Special 

being made to schedule the completion of basic estimates on th

in advance of the review of budget estimates and NATO plans

3. Close coordination between planners and policy-maker

one hand and the intelligence community on the other is con

being pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced bo

ful and timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the 

furnished with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of t

when the policy is fixed.

4. “Post-mortems,” designed to reveal deficiencies in the 

ration of selected estimates and to stimulate corrective actio

been continued. The experience of past months in this procedu

ticularly as applied in the case of estimates on the Far East, in

that the results are beneficial.

IV. Political, Social, and Cultural Intelligence

1. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence 

good, due allowance being made for the paucity of information 

2 There is no section I.
Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities for 

duction of such intelligence, however, are adequate only for t

urgent needs of the IAC agencies. Less pressing demands can 

only partially and inadequately.

2. The principal deficiency in this field is in the effort dev

the exhaustive research on which sound estimates and analysis 

rent development depend. Only the USSR can be regarded 

quately covered in this respect, the European Satellites and 

Europe nearly so. The agencies have applied special effort to d

ing intelligence on China. Surveys of present programs both wi

Government and in private research are making possible an in

and maximal use of resources. On medium priority areas, such 

Indochina and India, there is considerable lag between produ

immediate interpretation and analysis of longer term factors. 

priority areas, such as Africa and Latin America, such factors 

even less study. World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, 

factorily covered with respect to party strength, political maneu

and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines. Research in

ters of organization, financial support and infiltration into polit

social organizations is inadequate.

V. Armed Forces Intelligence

1. Operational Intelligence

Intelligence needed in support of current military opera

Korea is generally excellent. Information on installations and 

velopments in Manchuria, such as the movement and activitie

Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean units north of 

River, is inadequate. Reliable information of the enemy’s lon

plans and intentions is practically non-existent. Little improve

these deficiencies can be expected in the near future despite our 

2. Order of Battle and Equipment

Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR

munist China, and—to a lesser degree—the European Satellite

tial and inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficult

lection. Intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment 

areas with which the United States or nations friendly to the 

States are in contact is more nearly complete and reliable.

Information on the navies of the Soviet Bloc is, however, 

eral, satisfactory and adequate because of the greater accessi

naval forces to observation. Coverage on order of battle inte

and equipment is generally adequate in respect of nations ou

the Iron Curtain, except in the case of some neutral nations wh

tional policy restricts our access to such information.
3. Targeting

The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data 

nomic and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Sovi

and is in intermediate research stages for Western Europe and 

East; increased research emphasis is being placed upon milit

gets. Current target systems studies are reasonably adequate 

port joint operational planning but more vigorous data collec

forts will be required to maintain these studies on a current b

particular, target intelligence required to counter the Soviet 

threat is handicapped by gaps in current information on 

weapons, stockpiling arrangements and delivery capabilities. P

tion of dossiers for priority combat targets is almost complete 

USSR but coverage varies considerably for the Satellite and ap

areas. Finally, extensive tactical target coverage has been compl

areas adjoining the Korean theater but on other areas is in 

stages of completion.

4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO

NATO requests have been filled with the best available inte

consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. Intelligence stud

intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic intelligence 

the NATO echelons are provided to the NATO Standing Gro

leasable current studies and reports pertinent to the area and t

sion of the NATO major commands are continuously provided

VI. Economic Intelligence

1. Foreign economic intelligence on the free world prese

serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of m

and multiplicity of sources. For the Soviet Bloc, however, such 

gence is far from adequate. Apart from aggregate statistics of 

tain reliability published by the Soviet government, the inte

community is confined to exploiting a diminishing flow of low

data, much of which is becoming increasingly out-of-date. Only 

ing advantage of every possible item of information in the cou

comprehensive, thoroughly planned, and coordinated study 

tional security needs for knowledge of the Bloc’s economic cap

and vulnerabilities be met. This may mean the subordination o

term requirements to the long-range program and a resolute an

inative attack on problems of centralized indexing and exploit

all pertinent materials, whether overt or classified. Within the l

available materials, the next twelve months are expected to see 

duction of individual industry studies of greater substance th

now available. These will form the foundation for inter-industr

ies and other over-all analysis.
2. In the field of economic warfare and support for collect

trols, machinery has been established to speed up the process

evaluation of spot data into intelligence on which action can b

by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee and the covert s

There has been established a coordinating committee which i

ing in bringing available intelligence more quickly and fully to 

questions arising under this program.

3. The target analysis and production activities outlined in 

V, Armed Forces Intelligence, involve the large-scale processing 

eign economic and technological data.

4. The heavy research requirements in the economic field 

imperative that duplicate efforts be kept at an absolute minim

even more determined effort to accomplish this objective will b

during the coming year.

VII. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the US

Satellites made important progress during 1952; however, 

knowledge is still inadequate in terms of national security n

order to obtain sounder scientific estimates in many fields, it 

more apparent than ever that there is a need for serious inte

study and development of new and unconventional technica

of collecting scientific intelligence information. Efforts with t

of collection show considerable promise, and the development 

pansion of these and other techniques is being explored.

2. With the concurrence of the IAC, the DCI on 14 August 

sued a directive delineating areas of dominant interests in the 

field of scientific and technical intelligence,3 allocating prima

duction responsibility between CIA and the intelligence agenci

Department of Defense. At the same time he established a Scien

timates Committee (SEC), primarily concerned with integratin

tific and technical intelligence opinion for the production of 

intelligence. Coordination of technical intelligence for purpos

than the production of national intelligence is the responsibilit

military intelligence agencies, with CIA and the SEC maintain

propriate liaison.

3. There has been continued improvement in our know

Soviet accomplishments in the production of fissionable mater

their conversion to atomic weapons. Intelligence estimates on 

tus of USSR plutonium production are now reasonably sou

good bases have been established for estimating Soviet capabi

3 Document 126.
future expansion of the production of this material. However, 

sence of sufficient evidence on which to base conclusions on in

or planned isotope separation capacity for the production of U

one of the most important gaps in intelligence on the Soviet 

Energy Program. Also, the evidence on activities in the thermo

field is poor. Extensive collection and research programs have b

dertaken which may result in improvement during the coming 

4. Scientific and technical intelligence on conventional m

weapons and equipment of all types is good so far as stand

items in current use are concerned. Necessarily, knowledge of w

improvements in many cases must await Service use. In regard 

velopment of air weapons, information is partial and inad

Knowledge of current Soviet guided missiles programs is p

though certain projects based on German developments are fai

known.

5. While our knowledge of Soviet biological and chemical 

programs continues to be poor, the agencies have undertaken 

tion and research programs which may result in improvement 

1953.

6. On basic scientific research, which is CIA’s responsibil

jor gaps exist in the intelligence in the countries behind the Ir

tain, and present estimates of long-range development are ver

However, knowledge of the current status of over-all Soviet s

research and development is believed to be more nearly adequa

ing 1953, further improvements, particularly in long-range pred

are expected to result from present plans for improving overt 

tion of pertinent information, a more complete and system

ploitation of open scientific literature, and a concerted intellig

search effort on basic foreign scientific activities.

VIII. Psychological Intelligence

Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warfare pr

have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past two ye

intelligence needs of these programs fall largely within the fram

of political and sociological intelligence. The orientation and 

zation of the material for the psychological warfare user calls 

accustomed depth and detail both in the field reporting and in 

sis. State is initiating a reorganization designed to increase coord

of governmental and private research in this field. Inasmuch as r

contracts of military operational agencies involve social scien

ects of use to intelligence, the coordination of these with inte

agencies is important. The Research and Development Board 

tablished a psychological warfare committee to integrate such 

within Defense. Liaison between State, Defense, and CIA should 

coordination for mutual benefit.
IX. Geographic Intelligence

1. Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas, 

ing evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing reg

ports and staff studies for policy and operational planning. 

nated geographic and map intelligence studies are also under

support of the National Intelligence Survey program.

2. Current geographic and mapping information on the Sov

and adjacent areas is grossly inadequate. Geographic intelligence 

gives particular attention to the regional analysis of those geograp

that are required in support of planning and operational intellig

these areas. Within CIA, emphasis is also placed on the study of 

developments in Soviet mapping activities and programs.

X. Basic Intelligence

1. The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), wh

begun in 1949 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, 

tended to meet with U.S. Government’s demands for encyclop

tual intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS program 

gun 1,490 individual sections have been produced on 59 of the 

areas, which is the equivalent of approximately 23 complete NI

upon the rate of production established during the last quart

1952, a production goal of the equivalent of approximately 10 c

NIS has been set for FY 1953, and production to December 31, 

dicates that this goal will probably be attained.

2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS p

and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the latter h

cluded production of NIS on all JCS high priority areas and 

necessary to undertake partial surveys on some other areas. H

NIS production on the group of 24 areas of highest priority is 

imately 48% complete, whereas the entire program is about 22

plete. NIS on ten individual areas are over 75% complete, and 

these are in the JCS high priority list. Geographic research sup

NIS has been excellent.

3. In general the quality of the NIS is good, and can be e

to improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions a

lished under the Maintenance Program which was started in F

Coordination within and between all IAC and non-IAC agen

gaged in the NIS program is excellent and suitable liaison is ma

with the JCS.

XI. Warning of Attack—Current Intelligence

1. As noted above, current information on the Soviet Orbi

tial and inadequate. Accordingly, conclusions concerning Sov

Communist intentions to initiate hostilities at any given time 

tentative generalizations drawn from inadequate evidence. T
often based on estimates of the over-all situation rather than 

tailed factual information.

2. The IAC Watch Committee provides a sound foundation 

tracting intelligence from partial and inadequate information. 

porting the work of the committee, the intelligence agencies ma

ful cross-checks of information from all sources against an el

analysis of possible indicators of Soviet intentions. This metho

relied on exclusively; other approaches are constantly being tr

3. In general there has been improvement during the p

years in the ability of current intelligence to provide prompt no

preliminary evaluations of events and developments in the S

well as in the neutral and friendly areas. This improvement i

utable to increased skill and knowledge of intelligence analysts 

a deepening sense of common purpose among the IAC agenci

4. There is no guarantee that intelligence will be able to give a

warning of attack prior to actual detection of hostile formations. Un

tain circumstances, some last-minute defensive and offensive p

tions on the Soviet periphery may, however, be detected. Oppo

for detection of indications of Soviet or Satellite attack varies fr

in the border areas of Germany and Korea to extremely poo

Transcaucasus and Southeast Asia. Each agency maintains its o

hour Watch arrangements to handle any information that is re

XII. Collection

1. The Foreign Service

In general, the collection activities of the Foreign Service 

isfactory. Intelligence needs are met most adequately in the p

field, less so in certain aspects of the economic field, and lea

factorily in the scientific, technical and psychological fields. Th

ficiencies are generally attributable to a lack of specialized com

in those fields which are not closely related to the basic dip

functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial action has been take

tablishing a comprehensive economic reporting program and 

tinuing program of providing Foreign Service posts with mo

plete and effective guidance on intelligence needs. Additional re

measures in progress concern:

a. the greater use of overseas personnel of certain operatio

grams in collecting basic intelligence information, particularly 

psychological and sociological fields; and b. the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in the n

intelligence effort through the revision of the Foreign Service Ma

include for the first time specific and detailed intelligence instru

As a result of a recent study measures to meet the needs f

scientific information are being carried out.
2. Service Attaché System

The Service Attaché System furnishes extensive useful mil

formation on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attachés in the 

bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume of v

information although, under the restrictions imposed on them b

munist governments, the coverage which they provide cannot be 

ered adequate. The Service Attaché System has been strengthen

the beginning of the Korean conflict through the opening of new 

and the assignment of additional officers to important posts. C

efforts are being made to improve the collection capabilities of 

Attachés by the development of new collection guides and techn

3. Overseas Commands

Armed Forces Commands in Europe are acquiring exten

formation. While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union 

partial and inadequate, it is good in the Eastern Zones of Germ

Austria. Considerable information is gathered by European Com

from returned PW’s, escapees, and refugees.

Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adequate on 

and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communis

and Eastern Siberia. Tripartite Agreements among the respecti

ice agencies for exchange of intelligence on Southeast Asia ha

siderably enhanced collection capabilities in the area and are e

to improve this situation.

4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Because of overriding considerations of other than an inte

nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully the

flight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo reconnaissan

bilities have increased, with a resulting improvement in contribu

this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance are only fair, 

pared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. Photo i

tation capability is generally deficient in the Armed Services; co

measures are underway. The use of photo intelligence in the an

economic and scientific developments in respect of the Soviet 

being strengthened. Research and development effort is being ex

on free balloons, piloted and pilotless vehicles (“guided missi

satellites) to overcome a lack of special reconnaissance vehicles. R

continues in the improvement of various detecting devices.

5. (This paragraph is being given separate limited distribu

security reasons.)4

4 Not found.
6. Domestic Collection

Through offices located in key cities throughout the U.S., C

forms a service of common concern in actively collecting foreign 

gence information from business, financial, educational, and oth

governmental organizations and private individuals. The cooper

these organizations and individuals has consistently been, and 

ues to be, excellent. Particular effort has been recently directed to 

lection of data on foreign scientific and technical developments

the exploitation of the dwindling sources of economic and poli

formation on Communist China. Because the interests of the intel

producing agencies have become more sharply directed toward 

viet Orbit, the domestic collection effort is increasingly pointed 

direction, with particular emphasis on foreign nationality groups 

the United States, defectors, and other recently arrived aliens.

7. Foreign Radio Broadcasts

a. Monitoring

Immediate and extensive coverage of foreign news, infor

and propaganda broadcasts is provided by a world-wide mon

network, maintained by CIA as a service of common con

Moscow broadcast can be received in Washington in translation 

mary within one hour. Coverage of the Soviet Orbit is excellent

for parts of Asia and the Baltic States. Progress made during 1

wards closing these gaps included: the activation of a sta

Hokkaido, Japan, to monitor northeast Asian broadcasts; nego

with the British Broadcasting Company for monitoring of Ba

northwestern USSR transmitters by the BBC under existing re

arrangements; and a monitoring survey in Pakistan to explore t

sibilities of covering hitherto unmonitorable Central Asian bro

b. Propaganda Analysis

Propaganda Analysis in support of psychological warfare 

ties and overt programs such as the VOA, has been further im

Quantitative and content analysis of radio propaganda has be

plemented by some analysis of published propaganda and pr

terial. More rapid and specialized support on radio propaganda 

provided to “watch” groups and estimating offices.

8. Foreign Materials and Equipment

The collection and technical analysis of Soviet Orbit produ

continued to aid in the assessment of USSR scientific, econom

technological capabilities, although the procurement during 

significant items has not come up to expectations. Foreign m

and equipment are vital to the factory markings analysis progra

ing to the relative stability of the fighting front in Korea, the 
of captured materiel of intelligence importance has declined. 

ent the most productive channels for selective procurement o

manufactured items and raw materials are official U.S. missi

covert CIA components overseas. Items procured reasonably 

fully through such channels during the year included powe

pharmaceuticals, rubber products, and metallurgical samp

provement in the coordination, through the Joint Materiel Inte

Agency, of technical analysis requirements and exploitation a

has resulted in a greater yield of information from Soviet 

acquired.

9. Monitoring of Radio Jamming

Under NSC 66/15 the agencies undertook the construction 

ganization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Sov

ming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum. 

operation involving a very limited number of stations is bein

lished. Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jammi

centration of the jamming stations, and related information mu

the initiation and implementation of a much-expanded progra

XIII. Support and Collation Facilities

1. Availability of Materials

With a few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive inte

both raw and finished, is distributed among all interested IA

cies. In addition to the distribution of current material, there i

tinuing effort to locate and extract pertinent information from t

volume of intelligence material that was collected during and 

war, and from other collections in overseas files. The sheer vo

these materials presents formidable and as yet unsolved probl

IAC agency, utilizing existing techniques, is in a position to rec

store all this material and to make the information contained 

readily available to analysts requiring it. Remedy for this pro

being sought through the refinement of agency responsibilities 

development of machine indexing techniques.

2. Library Facilities

While the libraries of the IAC agencies are not yet self-su

they are equipped to satisfy most of the major needs of the

Their utility can be increased and their effectiveness can 

proved in connection with current plans for improving centr

ence facilities.

5 For NSC 66/1, “Intelligence Support for the Voice of America With Reg

viet Jamming,” see Document 44.
3. Biographic Information

Each IAC agency maintains files of biographic data on fore

sonalities for its own particular purposes and makes such dat

able to the other agencies upon request. Excellent data can b

available on political, military, and scientific personalities outs

Iron Curtain; coverage within the Soviet Orbit is necessarily par

inadequate. Personalities in the economic and industrial fie

poorly covered at present although there is considerable infor

available. Means of improvement are currently being studied. 

sult of recent arrangements between the State Department an

the latter is discontinuing biographic intelligence in the polit

cial, and cultural fields and will in the future depend on the 

ment of State for such intelligence.

4. Photographic Files

The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photo

and related documentary libraries consistent with their requir

and responsibilities. Material in each library is available to t

community. Continuing effort must be exerted to increase the 

and quantity of this source of intelligence.

5. Map Procurement and Reference Services

[21

⁄2 lines not declassified] Results during the past three yea

proved the effectiveness of overt collection of maps and relate

mation through the Foreign Service Geographic Attaché pr

Increased emphasis is being placed on the collection of ma

engineering drawings from domestic sources. Service Attaché c

are also being used. The currently published foreign maps requ

intelligence activities are received on a continuing basis thro

change arrangements between the Department of State and ma

eign official mapping agencies. These exchanges are in addition 

of an operational character maintained by the Military S

Excellent map reference services in support of intelligence r

ments are maintained by close working arrangements between t

libraries.

6. Foreign Language Publications

The exploitation of foreign language publications for inte

purposes is presently undertaken in varying degrees by each 

[21

⁄2 lines not declassified] Currently, the IAC agencies are cons

plans with reference to the exploitation of foreign language p

tions which might result in improved coordination in procurem

ploitation, and indexing for intelligence purposes.

Translation is also done by each agency, though coordinatio

fected to prevent duplication. Overseas abstracting from foreign la
publications is presently performed at a number of diplomat

This work is coordinated with similar CIA and departmental a

in the U.S. to avoid duplication and to make the maximum use 

able linguists.

Most publications needed for the intelligence effort are no

obtained, though major gaps exist in regard to Soviet Bloc m

Through overt and covert channels there is an increasing effor

prove procurement in this latter category.

7. External Research

External research in the social sciences of particular intere

telligence has presented difficult problems of coordination. In 

improve coordination CIA and the Department of State are 

strengthening the latter’s External Research Staff, and the Dep

of Defense has taken steps to ensure necessary coordination o

nal research contacts on psychological warfare among militar

cies. It is expected that liaison arrangements between the Dep

of Defense, Department of State, and CIA in this field will 

substantial progress during the current year in minimizing dup

ensuring community benefit of finished research and facilitate m

tional letting of external research contracts. Evaluation of this p

as it affects the Department of Defense cannot as yet be given

No. 8. The Internal Security Program6

Recent information regarding the feasibility of hand-p

atomic weapons makes possible their clandestine use and thus 

a complete reappraisal, which is underway, of virtually the w

ternal security program. Action on initial countermeasures, ap

by the President on December 29, 1952, is being taken by the 

ICIS, and the AEC.

Domestic counter-intelligence has been improved by a g

pansion of informant coverage, with emphasis on subversiv

ments and key industrial facilities. By vigorous prosecution 

tionaries of the Communist Party, USA under the Smith Act, 

action to compel registration of the Party as a Communist ac

ganization under the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Party’s N

Board has been neutralized, its leaders convicted or forced into 

Party and bail funds depleted, membership reduced app

and recruitment drastically hampered. However, such vigorou

6 Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSC Representative on Internal Secu

142, Box 46. Top Secret; Security Information. Prepared jointly by the Interdep

Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Se

attached statement on the objective of the internal security program, consisting 

tation from NSC 142, is not printed.
has also driven the Party further underground and made c

intelligence and continued prosecution more difficult. Inves

agencies assert the need for more intelligence regarding Sov

satellite espionage and sabotage organizations, additional man

and additional funds for military internal security programs.

In the event of war, plans are ready for immediate appreh

of 20,000 dangerous civilians. Related programs are being prep

neutralize dangerous U.S. military personnel, enemy aliens and 

matic personnel. Accordingly, most potentially dangerous indi

should be neutralized within the initial period of a Soviet atta

Although Executive Order 102907 on the safeguarding of cl

security information is in force, an acceptable degree of secu

such information will not be achieved until satisfactory stand

clearance are established for access to such information by gove

employees and consultants, by non-government personnel in cl

contract work, and by representatives of foreign governments. I

ommendations on personnel security and access have been m

not adopted. (The ICIS has not participated in the Loyalty pro

There is a high degree of installation security for some s

government buildings and areas, but uniform standards have 

been generally achieved. Some progress has been made in in

installation security, but protective programs do not include co

sub-contracting plants of classified contractors nor essential 

wartime industrial facilities. Legal sanction is lacking to remov

rity risks in industry and there is difficulty in preventing str

Communist-infiltrated unions. Plant visitors are inadequately 

fied and checked. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise i

sabotage occur.

The port security program, limited to major ports, has not a

reasonable security as regards fire protection and harbor entrance 

ing. No effective security program is in force for telecommunica

Control over the entry of dangerous aliens has not been ac

largely because of personnel limitations in the Coast Guard and t

toms and Immigration Service, lack of control over alien crewm

adequate surveillance of foreign vessels, and poor control over 

diplomatic and official personnel. The Omnibus Immigration 

fective December 24, 1952,8 provides authority for remedying s

adequacies in entry control. There is little control over illegal e

coastal or plane landings. On departures from the U.S., there 

effective exit controls operative, although there is limited scree

7 For E.O. 10290, see 3 CFR 1949–53 compilation, pp. 790–797 or 16 FR 9

8 66 Stat. 163–281.
crewmen under the Magnuson Act. Export and monetary contr

ent no significant problems.

Arrangements to report unconventional attacks have bee

but countermeasures provide little security against clandestine 

and CW unconventional attacks.

147. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence D

to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Vandenberg)1

Washington, May 2

SUBJECT

Air Resupply and Communications (ARC) Wing Program

1. In the fall of 1950, you informed this Agency2 that, in a

tion of CIA requirements for support of covert operations, the 

Force was organizing several Special Operational Wings. At th

it was contemplated that a total of seven such wings, which 

designated Air Resupply and Communications (ARC) Wings

be organized. About a year later, the magnitude of this progr

reconsidered in the light of over-all manpower limitations and t

ber of wings was reduced from seven to four. We now underst

consideration is being given to a still further curtailment which 

duce the number of wings to two, and that as a part of this p

500th ARC Wing will move from Wheelus Field, Libya, to Mol

Air Force Base, England, and the 581st ARC Wing from Clar

R. F., to Okinawa.

2. We are, of course, cognizant of the many problems wh

front the USAF at this time. However, the reduction of the nu

ARC Wings to only two has serious implications upon our pla

for current operations and in the event of a “hot” war.

3. During the “cold war,” CIA has a very substantial an

ing requirement for support in the serial transport, handling a

age of its matériel and supplies. This Agency depends upon t

Wings to furnish a major part of such support. Manifestly, full 

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for O

Job 79–01228A, Box 8. Top Secret; Security Information. Cleared by Wisner an

2 This communication has not been further identified.
tion of the capabilities of the ARC Wings cannot be achieved 

but it is believed that a good beginning toward such full utiliza

been made and we are looking forward to a continuing expan

our joint operations.

4. The wartime mission of the ARC Wings is stated to be

support of Unconventional Warfare Operations; and (2) the p

tion and dissemination of Psychological Warfare materials. W

formal agreement exists that the Wings will be available to supp

covert operations, this Agency has always assumed that they 

be, and war plans have been made on that basis. These war p

quire the availability of effective air support facilities on D-Day 

immediate support of guerrilla and resistance operations. Fo

D-Day, there will be an increasing requirement for this type sup

meet war plans jointly developed by the CIA and the JCS. As I a

you are aware, air support of covert operations requires that t

sonnel be highly trained in the peculiar techniques involved an

the specialized equipment to implement these techniques.

5. If our understanding of the planned reduction to two w

correct, it appears to us that improved utilization of the capabi

the ARC Wings under both “cold war” and “hot war” condition

be effected if storage and packaging facilities could be retaine

Tripoli area, thus giving greater flexibility to the support wh

580th ARC Wing could render to us in the European-Near E

African area. In effect, therefore, the Tripoli facilities would be 

lite of the permanent base at Molesworth. Similarly, in the Far 

would very much like to see comparable satellite facilities mai

at Clark Field because of the vital necessity of maintaining an ad

base in the sensitive Southeast Asia area. Our objective, which 

lieve is apparent, is to insure the maximum utility of ARC by th

tenance of additional packing and storage facilities at Tripoli 

Clark. These facilities would give ARC, and in turn CIA, gre

creased flexibility and would enhance the operational utility o

organizations. By maintaining these additional packing and sto

cilities, the reduction in the ARC program from four to two w

our opinion, would be minimized.

6. For obvious reasons, it is impossible for this Agency to 

accurately the time and place where ARC Wing facilities will b

needed. However, in an endeavor to exploit to the utmost the c

ities of the two wings to give maximum support to the conduct o

operations, the possibility of creating satellite facilities as o

above is offered. While the movement of aircraft presents no 

problem, the transfer of substantial amounts of supplies and m

is very difficult to achieve, especially so under wartime condit

7. Request that USAF units capable of rendering the abo

port be included in the over-all Air Force program.
8. In the event that you feel that this memorandum shou

been addressed to the Secretary of Defense, request you so ad

Allen W. 

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

148. Editorial Note

The United States Government supported the creation o

unteer Freedom Corps, to comprise nationals of Eastern E

countries (other than East Germany). Major U.S. allies oppo

proposal, and consequently, it died a slow death. Consideratio

Volunteer Freedom Corps is covered extensively in Foreign R

1952–1954, volume VIII. The Department of State had major 

tions about the proposals, some of which were raised by Unde

tary Smith in the 145th meeting of the National Security Coun

20, 1953. (Ibid., pages 213–218)

149. Memorandum From William P. Bundy of the Office of

National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Director of Central Intelligence Dulles1

Washington, May 2

SUBJECT

NSC 140/1, the Edwards Report2

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for In

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3. Top Secret; Security Information; Special Security Ha

stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Dulles saw it on June 3

2 Documentation on NSC 140/1, May 18, 1953, also known as the Edwar

is in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 328–349, 355–360, and 367
1. Attached is the Edwards Report,

just in case it should 

the discussion of the Armaments question.4

2. For your present purposes, the following are worth no

a. The Report assumes a Soviet stockpile of 120 in mid-19

300 in mid-1955, and proceeds from these figures with an alloc

these levels between: (1) SAC bases in US; (2) SAC bases overs

other US targets. The assumed stockpile levels are the median 

figures, and the presumed allocations are regarded as logical a

to inflict maximum damage on the US—they do not claim to b

location the Soviets would necessarily make. As General Edw

pointing out in his separate letter, a need exists for a systemati

of Soviet strategy in the event of war.

b. General Webster of the JCS “neither concurs nor non-co

This unfortunate position is the result of the fact that the origina

of reference called for considering overseas installations, with re

to their importance to defence of the continental US and to a U

teroffensive. This limitation was insisted on by General Bradl

sonally, in the original oral discussions with General Smith, spe

in order to avoid covering “every PT boat in the Adriatic.” It 

understanding of all who participated in the original laying ou

project that we would stick to the fewest possible bases abro

those would be related to the air effort. Unfortunately the wor

was omitted from the written form, although the Edwards Com

orally agreed to interpret it in this way. Thus, the JCS working 

got off and allocated a very small number of bombs (10, I bel

non-air targets such as ports and major ground supply dum

Committee threw out this allocation and stuck to the air bases—

the last minute General Webster took the stand that he could n

the report! The actual difference is minimal, and should not re

fect the substance. But there it is.

3. In its basic conclusions, the report fully supports stateme

the Soviets could probably damage the US critically in the n

years. While the damage predicated for mid-1955 is less tha

thought it would be, the curve of bombs-on-target is obviousl

between mid-1953 and mid-1955. The Committee did not cons

possible effect of the early warning McGill and Lincoln lines, 

was thought they could not be effective by mid-1955. Whether th

can be levelled off by defensive measures is now in controvers

3 Attached but not printed.

4 Reference may be to Allen Dulles’ participation in the May 27 NSC meeti

discussed armaments and American policy. A memorandum of that discussio

Part 2, pp. 1169–1174.
150. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to 

Chairman of the Continental Defense Committee (Bul

Washington, June 3

Dear General Bull:

In response to your request of June 15,2 for the views of this 

on organizational arrangements to provide the best possible c

ing production of Net Capability Estimates, the following thou

submitted:

There is no need to argue the necessity for reliable estimat

capabilities as the basis for national policy formulation. These c

be prepared by careful integration of gross-capability intellig

the enemy with our capabilities and plans, so that the net resu

interplay may be forecast as accurately as possible. This nee

confined to the problem of defense of North America but is 

inescapable for planning US requirements and commitments 

part of the globe.

The President and the NSC in practice and pursuant to s

authority depend on the Director of Central Intelligence, repre

the coordinated views of the Intelligence Agencies, for foreign 

gence estimates, and on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf

ing as their representative, for military advice. Thus what is r

to furnish the President and Council with guidance in the mos

and complete form is the effective amalgamation of the func

the two.

Responsibility for such combined analysis cannot rightl

signed to one of these advisers to the exclusion of the other, 

are coordinate staff officers serving the same commander. Ea

consider the factors developed by the other in order to e

reliance on arbitrary assumptions and produce valid and 

forecasts.

It is my view, therefore, that the President and Council sh

tablish a permanent subcommittee on Net Capability Estimat

composed of:

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for In

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3. Top Secret. Security Information. In connection with 

evaluation of the net capabilities of the Soviet Union (NSC 140/1), General Bu

a committee on continental defense, which was supposed to complete its repo

July. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 368. 2 Not further identified.
and that this subcommittee be charged with providing, on its in

or as requested by the Council, estimates of net capabilities as 

to support the formulation of national policy.

The manner in which this subcommittee would discharge i

tion should be left flexible and might very well differ substant

cording to the nature of the estimate undertaken. It should h

thority to secure support and information from all executive b

of the government and should be required to consult with suc

cies and interdepartmental committees as may be able to con

significantly to any estimate. The subcommittee should take s

tion as may be necessary to preserve the security of highly s

information such as U.S. war plans and intelligence sources.

I believe you will find that the views expressed herein a

stantially the same as those stated by General Smith in his me

dum of 14 October 1952 to the Executive Secretary of the Natio

curity Council,3 and orally to the National Security Counci

November 1952,4 and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 Decembe

Thus, though the need has long been recognized, no general 

tinuing machinery has yet been established. It is my earnest ho

as a result of the recommendations of your Committee, the 

will take necessary action along the lines I have indicated.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. 

3 Document 131.

4 See Document 138.

5 No record of these oral comments has been found.

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

151. Editorial Note

The Report of the President’s Committee on Internationa

mation Activities (the Jackson Committee report), June 30, 195

in part with intelligence and intelligence-related activities. For 

of the report, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume II, Part 2

1795–1874. For a progress report on implementation of the repo

pared by the Operations Coordinating Board and circulated o

ber 1, 1953, see ibid., pages 1877–1899.
152. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense (Kyes)1

Washington, July 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE 

Secretaries of the Military Departments

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Assistant Secretaries of Defense

Chairmen of Boards, Committees and Councils, OSD

Assistants to the Secretary of Defense

Directors of Offices, OSD

SUBJECT

Reorganization—Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of 

REFERENCES

Department of Defense Directive C-5132.1

Department of Defense Directive S-3140.12

General Graves B. Erskine, USMC (Retired), has been ap

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Director, Office of Spe

erations, Office of the Secretary of Defense. His office and resp

ities are within the immediate purview of the Deputy Secretar

fense, to whom he will report.

All functions formerly assigned to the Deputy for Psych

Policy and to the Office of Psychological Policy, Office of the S

of Defense, are hereby assigned to the Office of Special Operati

Office of Psychological Policy is therefore abolished; and pe

thereof assigned to the Office of Special Operations.

The functions of the Office of Special Operations encompass 

chological operations activities in which the Department of Defe

ticipates, including monitorship of psychological warfare plann

erations, and research and development; as well as unconv

warfare, international information activities, and other operati

similar nature which are within the cognizance of the Psychologic

egy Board, its successor agencies, or within the provisions of NS

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for O

Job 79–01228A, Box 8. Secret; Security Information. 2 The two references were not found.

3 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 292.
NSC 10/5,

NSC 59/1,and the report by the Presidents Comm

International Information Activities.6

It is also the function of the Office of Special Operations to 

and assist the Secretary of Defense and his staff on all matte

taining to the national intelligence effort, including those provi

der NSCID No. 9 Revised,7 in which the Office of the Secretary 

fense has a direct interest or designated responsibility.

It is the duty of the Director, Office of Special Operations, 

vide staff support for the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy 

tary of Defense in these fields and to perform such other duties 

be assigned. The Director, Office of Special Operations, will 

principal staff representation for the Office of the Secretary of D

in all such matters with other departments and agencies of t

Government.

For these purposes the Director, Office of Special Operat

herewith delegated the authority to obtain such reports and in

tion from the military departments as are necessary to carry ou

sponsibilities, and is authorized to request the military departm

issue the necessary directives to obtain such reports and inform

In the performance of these functions, the Director, Office 

cial Operations, will to the extent practical, utilize the advice

ance, and appropriate facilities of the military departments. Su

lization shall not, however, be construed or so utilized as to 

vent the existing command channels through the Secretaries of 

itary departments for the formal communication of approved p

plans, or other directives.

The reference directives remain in effect except as modi

this memorandum with respect to subordination and title o

pending their reissuance or recision after completion of anti

National Security Council–Executive Branch reorganization n

der consideration.

Roger M

4 Document 90.

5 Document 2.

6 See Document 151.

7 Document 257.

8 Printed from a copy that indicates Kyes signed the original.
153. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board

PSB D–47 Washington, July 2

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIC

EFFORT AS OF JUNE 30, 1953

[Omitted here are a cover page, title page, and table of co

I. Status of the Program on June 30, 1953

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summar

status of our national psychological programs as of June 30, 195

largely on the appended Progress Reports by the departme

agencies responsible for operations.

General

2. While the President’s Committee on International Info

Activities studied the whole problem of the world struggle with 

to basic improvements in the U.S. position, the struggle, on 

chological as on other fronts, was conducted with increased vi

most far-reaching opportunity came with Stalin’s death. Th

dent’s speech of April 162 was signally successful in capitalizin

situation by appealing to the new leaders for an era of worldwid

and friendship. The world at large received the speech with g

thusiasm, and the follow up support through psychological e

tion added to the initial success.

3. Further exploitation of events behind the Iron Curtain h

guided by the requirement that psychological operations m

keyed in with political action. After Stalin’s death, the next m

casion for such action followed the outbreaks in Czechoslova

East Germany. Plans and operations were stepped up according

prospect of conducting a major campaign in the long-range co

take full advantage of the consequences of Stalin’s death.

4. Outside of the Soviet orbit the developments on the 

logical front have been characterized by a disappointing deteri

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB 

Secret. PSB D–47, a Progress Report by the Psychological Strategy Board, wa

ted to the President and the National Security Council on July 29. The title p

report indicates that it was prepared pursuant to a May 27 memorandum from 

ecutive Secretary Lay to the Acting Director of the Psychological Strategy Bo

has not been found. Also on the title page is a note by Charles E. Johnson, Se

the Board, indicating that the Board approved the report at its July 29 meetin

2 Reference is to President Eisenhower’s “The Chance for Peace” spee

Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179–188.
in the attitudes towards the U.S. Non-Communist press and publ

ion in Western Europe has reflected mounting criticism of U.S. 

policy (the possible trend back to isolationism), and allege

Communist “hysteria”. These unfavorable attitudes in comb

with a generally more receptive reaction among Western Europe

ples to the Soviet “peace offensive” now constitute an intensific

anti-American feeling among significant elements of European o

5. World opinion has also been markedly unfavorable towa

development of U.S. foreign trade policies. At the same time 

are sharply reducing our programs for economic assistance, it 

that we are providing little indication that our markets are to be 

up to foreign goods. Congressional criticism of our allies for the

tices in the field of East-West trade, in combination with the n

viet line on expansion of trade with the free world, has begun 

an adverse psychological impact around the world.

6. Urgent planning for stronger psychological measures b

Thailand was set in motion as the result of the invasion of La

the accompanying threat of Communist aggression in Southea

7. While our overt psychological capabilities have been r

by personnel difficulties, pressures in the Congress and approp

cuts, covert capabilities continued to make sound progress, an

and more energetic teamwork was secured through closer r

with the NSC and the operating agencies.

Areas

8. Within the USSR itself, radio still constitutes the only 

tant means used currently to reach the Russian people. Jamm

the Russian radio of our broadcasts continues to present a majo

lem. There was however, a perceptible increase in effectivenes

radio resources in the last six months due to the inauguration 

dio Liberation and the stepped-up activity of Radio Free Russia

dition to the radio, leaflet distribution was utilized to reach Sov

itary forces stationed outside the USSR.

9. Similarly, in Communist China, the major psychologica

ties presently available are radio and leaflet drops. Both of th

being substantially increased. Through Hongkong, increased us

ing made of overt, grey and black propaganda channels with t

nese Mainland.

10. In the European Satelliteslikewise, radio is our major prop

communications medium. RIAS, RFE, and VOA have contribute

building up of pressures that may be instrumental in weaken

Kremlin’s control of the satellites. In most of these Satellite States, p

in other forms of psychological activity, mainly unattributab

been slow, and has centered on the build-up of operating potentia
has, however, been increased action, including leaflet drops, in 

satellites—notably Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania.

11. A high degree of access to East Germany was maintai

spite increasing Soviet security restriction. Virtually the entire 

been continuously subjected to U.S. psychological programs 

mainly indigenous channels.

12. In Western Europe, the presence of U.S. Armed Forces 

Military Aid program provided a significant psychological im

creased emphasis on troop acceptance programs enlisting the 

cooperation of the governments and the local authorities has 

about a definite improvement in most areas in the problem o

ing friction between U.S. military personnel and foreign popu

13. Among the principal problems that have confronted U

chological efforts in Western Europe during the past six month

creased criticism of the U.S. and, especially since Stalin’s de

Soviet “Peace Offensive”. It is evident that many, if not all, Wes

ropean governments have been influenced to some extent by th

lin’s tension-reducing tactics. The effect has been to retard 

toward a number of our objectives, including the build-up of Wes

fenses, the ratification of EDC, and attainment of European inte

14. The U.S. counter-offensive has included fullest exploit

the Department of State’s Information Program of the Presid

augural address3 and of his April 16 speech challenging the ne

ers of the USSR to prove their peaceful professions by deeds, no

Copies of the latter were presented to Foreign Offices all over th

in advance of delivery and kinescopes of the entire speech w

to seventy-three posts within a day of its delivery. One of th

shown over BBC television on April 20 to an estimated aud

6,000,000. Five million pamphlets, handbills, and leaflets on the 

were prepared and distributed, and a documentary film of it i

five languages had been produced and shipped by May 2.

15. In Italy, U.S. efforts to aid the reelection of the Dem

Center Parties fell considerably short of their objective. The De

Coalition was returned to office by a slender margin and the C

nists and extreme Rightists registered significant gains.

16. In France, the municipal elections in May showed 

Communists had suffered a slight set-back in rural areas, but ha

tained their position in the industrial areas in larger cities. 

mental instability was a troublesome factor during the period a

laxation of earlier French official measures to reduce the powe

Communist Party in France resulted. The repercussions of som

3 Ibid., pp. 1–8.
gressional investigations, as well as of the Rosenberg execut

conjunction with the Kremlin’s peace campaign, appear to ha

tributed to an increase in neutralism.

17. In the United Kingdom also, there appears to have 

marked increase in neutralism in its special British form of Bev

Although the belief is still widely held that Western unity m

preserved, three major elements contribute to the growth 

American feeling:

(1) The belief that the U.S. is deeply divided on basic intern

policies,

(2) The development of the Soviet “peace offensive”, and

(3) The desire to exercise a more positive and independen

tive in international affairs.

18. In West Germany and Berlin, the recent riots touched off 

increased pressures for unification, complicating the problems 

man ratification of the EDC. With this exception, however, U

chological programs in Berlin and West Germany, as well as th

jection into East Germany, appear to have been fairly effec

promoting progress toward our major goal of a Democratic G

integrated into Western defense efforts. Since late March Germa

opinion has reflected a decline in confidence in U.S. leadersh

was temporarily halted by the President’s April 16 speech, but h

been resumed. The two major factors contributing to this are

Soviet “peace offensive” and (2) lack of agreement within the 

policy towards Germany.

19. In the Near and Middle East and South Asia, neutralism, 

tendency to associate the U.S. with “colonialism”, continued to 

a major obstacle to the attainment of U.S. psychological objective

Arab States, the alleged pro-Israel bias on the part of the U.S. re

a major handicap, although the visits to Middle Eastern capitals 

retary Dulles and Mr. Stassen may have alleviated this problem, 

temporarily. IIAhas continuously exploited the beneficial aspects 

visits in its output to the area. Turkey, Pakistan, and Greece ap

be the brightest spots in this area, psychologically speaking.

20. In the Far East, the resumption of Korean truce talks rai

jor psychological problems. The exchange of sick and wound

oners necessitated special measures to deal with “brain washing

were taken to achieve more effectively coordinated guidance o

mation matters concerning Korea through the channels of the 

logical Operations Coordinating Committee. The offer of a rew

MIG pilot defectors was followed by an immediate and significa

in Communist air tactics over the Korean battle area.

21. In Japan, severe economic problems and growing ne

resistance to the U.S. objective of Japanese rearmament hav
trouble spots in a picture otherwise fairly satisfactory. 

Grey 

attributable activities have progressed favorably.

22. In Latin America, our capabilities for effective psycholo

tion increased in a number of countries, for the most part in the 

unattributable activity. There has been growing dissatisfaction 

Latin American countries directed mainly against American e

policies. To help offset this, a major psychological move was Dr

Eisenhower’s goodwill tour of South America initiated late in J

Special Items

23. Emergency assistance provided by U.S. Armed Forces 

of national catastrophe has made material contributions to U.S. 

logical efforts in The Netherlands, England, Turkey, Greece, Iran, 

and Japan.

24. A grant of 1,000,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan has had 

larly favorable effect.

25. Carefully planned exploitation of U.S. leadership in th

field, with a coordinated public information program on the 

weapons tests and other special weapons, as well as certain new

that gave rise to widespread speculation as to the explosi

thermo-nuclear device at Eniwetok atoll, contributed to the U

chological effort.

[Omitted here are Section II. The Work of PSB; Annex A

of the Department of State; Annex B, Report of the Departmen

fense; Annex C, Report of the Mutual Security Agency; and A

General Appraisal.]

154. Editorial Note

In March 1951, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was sworn in as P

of Guatemala. A climate of labor unrest and fears of a possib

etization of Guatemala soon prompted opposition groups to beg

ting against the Arbenz regime. Prominent among the plotters 

exiled army colonel, Carlos Castillo Armas. Castillo Armas, b

Honduras, had the active support of Nicaragua’s Anastasio 

and the United Fruit Company. By early 1952, the CIA, concerne

Arbenz’s growing reliance on left-wing activists, including m

of the Communist Party, had made contact with Castillo Arma

for assistance were dropped in October 1952, however, after ru

U.S. involvement became widespread and Arbenz’s forces be

ing preemptive action.
Guatemala re-emerged as a priority during the Eise

administration. On August 12, 1953, the Guatemalans ann

their second expropriation of United Fruit Company land. On th

day, the Operations Coordinating Board authorized the CIA to p

“on a basis of high priority” on the project which was to 

PBSUCCESS. Utilizing a $3 million budget, the CIA trained Cas

mas’ men and expanded contacts with Guatemalan army off

hopes of persuading them to overthrow the government from 

Fears that Arbenz would form an open alliance with the Comm

were reinforced when a Swedish ship carrying Commun

weaponry arrived in Guatemala in May 1954. American officia

this event to reinforce Guatemalan army fears that Arbenz wa

arm a people’s militia, under party discipline, to nullify the 

power.

Castillo Armas and his men invaded Guatemala from Ho

territory on June 18, 1954, and were soon engaged in a serie

conclusive battles with larger Guatemalan army formations. 

American diplomatic and propaganda pressure, as well as ai

by World War II era fighters flown by CIA contract pilots, cr

sense of confusion and crisis among Arbenz and his regime

while, clandestine CIA contacts with the regular army fina

suaded several powerful officers to confront Arbenz, who resig

June 27, 1954. Over the next few days, American diplomats an

ligence officers helped broker the ticklish negotiations between 

Armas and the officers who led the coup. Castillo Armas was 

ally installed as President of Guatemala. See Foreign Relations

1954, Guatemala.
155. National Security Council Report

NSC 161 Washington, August 1

STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY AS OF JUNE 30, 1953

[Omitted here are Parts 1–8 of the report.]

No. 9—The Foreign Intelligence Program

(In concurring in this report, the IAC agencies wish to p

that the effects of recent budget cuts on intelligence activities 

be assessed at this time, and are therefore not reflected in this 

I. Coordination

1. Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so esse

producing adequate intelligence for national security purpose

reducing cost by avoiding duplication, is improving. There is st

duplication of effort which adds to the cost of intelligence, b

are being taken continually to reduce this to a minimum.

2. On March 7, at the recommendation of the Director of 

Intelligence, with the concurrence of the members of the Inte

Advisory Committee, the NSC issued NSCID No. 16,2 direc

DCI to ensure coordination of procurement and processing of 

language publications. No other recommendations for coord

have been made to the NSC during the past six months; h

several improvements in intelligence coordination have b

complished by mutual agreement among the intelligence a

and others. There are at present, in addition to the Intelligenc

sory Committee established by NSCID No. 1,3 nine inte

mental committees to coordinate important intelligence prog

atomic energy, domestic exploitation, defection, watch proc

economic intelligence, economic warfare intelligence, s

intelligence, clandestine intelligence priorities and foreign la

publications.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 

oranda, Box 74. Top Secret; Security Information. NSC 161 replaced NSC 142

142, see Document 146. Although NSC 161 was dated and circulated on Augu

No. 9 was completed, concurred in, and dated August 4. 2 Document 258.

3 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 432.
II. National Estimates

1. The organization and procedures established since Octob

for the production of national intelligence estimates continue t

ate satisfactorily. The totality of resources of the entire intelligen

munity is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estima

they can be improved only as we strengthen these resources

estimates derive authority from the manner of their preparat

from the active participation of all the responsible intelligence 

heads in their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are re

where estimates would be watered down by further efforts to 

agreement.

2. A production program for national intelligence estimate

pared annually and reviewed quarterly at which time ob

changes are made. This program provides for a re-examinatio

isting estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the pro

of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of importa

ics. Continued emphasis is placed on the completion of basic es

on the USSR in advance of the review of U.S. budget estima

NATO plans.

3. Close coordination between planners and policy-maker

one hand and the intelligence community on the other is con

being pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced bo

ful and timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the 

furnished with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of t

when the policy is fixed. This is being done with increasing fre

and directness of application to the policy issues.

4. Special efforts are being made to get greater precision a

ity in estimates generally. As a particular case, considerable p

was made in NIE–65, “Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957”, (

1953), over NIE–64, “Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-19

November 1952):4

a. Greater analytical precision in the section on political 

capabilities, which concentrates upon the critical areas of the 

and which distinguishes between the capability to overthrow 

ments and the capability to influence governments and people

b. Greater emphasis on scientific and technical factors, wh

cupy about a quarter of the discussion in NIE–65. c. Greater clarity in the military strengths and capabilities s

with fewer figures, more emphasis on military programs, and 

specific analysis of Bloc air defenses and of Soviet capabilitie

liver atomic weapons in the U.S.

4 Extracts of NIE 65 are printed ibid., 1952–1954, vol. VIII, Document 5

classified text of NIE 64 is in National Archives, RG 263, National Intelligence E
III. Political, Social and Cultural Intelligence

1. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence h

very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of info

on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilitie

production of such intelligence, however, have been adequate 

the needs of the NSC and the most urgent needs of the IAC a

Less pressing demands have been met only partially and inade

2. The principal deficiency in this field, which varies from 

to serious, has been in the resources devoted to the exhaustiv

age and research on which sound estimates and analyses depen

erage of the USSR, the Eastern European Satellite complex, and 

has been most nearly adequate. Relatively lower priority h

given to research on other areas, with Western Europe, Jap

Southeast Asia at the upper end of the scale, graduating down

Latin America and Africa. The inadequacy of resources has b

flected chiefly in an inability to prosecute sustained research p

at all desired points. Nonetheless, there has remained sufficie

bility to produce individual studies of considerable depth on 

major problems. World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, h

satisfactorily covered with respect to party strength, political 

verings and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines. R

into matters of organization, financial support and infiltration 

litical and social organizations has been less satisfactory.

IV. Armed Forces Intelligence

1. Operational Intelligence

Intelligence covering the combat zone area for the suppor

rent military operations in Korea is generally adequate. There 

mains a serious deficiency in our ability to obtain timely ident

of or information on the movements or locations of Chinese f

all areas behind the immediate front line armies in Korea back 

Manchuria into China. Information on installations and on d

ments in Manchuria, such as types and extent of training, reo

tion and resupply of the Chinese Communist Forces and North 

units north of the Yalu River is inadequate. This deficiency 

substantially unchanged. Reliable information on the enemy

range plans and intentions is practically non-existent.

The extent of our information on Chinese Communist acti

South China is inadequate. The United States is dependent on 

and Associated States sources for operational intelligence con

the Viet Minh and to a lesser extent for information on the 

Communists in the border areas contiguous to Indochina. The 

level of information would be inadequate for support of opera

U.S. forces; however, inherent in any commitment of U.S. force
be the rapid development of combat and operational intellige

forts. The Five-power Intelligence Conference exchanges h

creased U.S. knowledge of the Viet Minh.

A possible early augmentation of U.S. intelligence personn

dochina should improve present U.S. coverage in that area. H

the picture for the major target area in Asia, i.e., Communist C

very dark.

The achievement of any major improvement must depend 

increase in scope and efficiency of clandestine operations agai

itary targets.

2. Order of Battle and Equipment

Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR

munist China and—to a lesser degree—the European Satellites 

tial and inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty 

lection. Intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment 

areas with which the United States or nations friendly to the 

States are in contact is more nearly complete and reliable.

Coverage on order of battle intelligence and equipment is 

ally adequate in respect of nations outside of the Iron Curtain

in the case of some neutral nations whose national policy restr

access to such information.

3. Targeting

The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data 

nomic and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Sovi

and is in intermediate research stages for Western Europe and 

East; increasing research emphasis continues on military targe

rent target systems studies are reasonably adequate to suppo

operational planning but more vigorous data collection efforts 

required to maintain these studies on a current basis and to 

extended systems analysis to meet detailed service requiremen

Target intelligence required to counter the Soviet atomic thr

tinues to be handicapped by gaps in current information on 

weapons, stockpiling arrangements, delivery capabilities and 

air base potentials.

Initial production of dossiers for priority combat targets is 

complete for the USSR but coverage varies considerably for th

lite and approach areas. Extensive tactical target coverage h

completed on areas adjoining Korean theater but on other are

various stages of completion.

4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO

NATO requests have been filled with the best available inte

consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. Intelligence stud
intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic intelligence 

provided to the NATO Standing Group and NATO major com

Releasable current studies and reports pertinent to the area 

mission of the NATO major commands are continuously prov

V. Economic Intelligence

1. Foreign economic intelligence on the free world prese

serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of 

of variable quality and from the multiplicity of sources. For th

Bloc, however, such intelligence is far from adequate. The Sov

ernment does publish some aggregate statistics of uncertain re

which, however, can be profitably utilized by careful analysi

from this source, the intelligence community is confined to ex

a diminishing flow of low-grade data, much of which is becom

creasingly out of date. Only by taking advantage of every possi

of information in the course of a comprehensive, thoroughly 

and coordinated study can national security needs for know

the Bloc’s economic capabilities and vulnerabilities by met. T

mean the subordination of short-term requirements to the lon

program and a resolute and imaginative attack on problems 

tralized indexing and exploitation of all pertinent materials, 

overt or classified. Individual industry studies now being p

will form the foundation for interindustry and other over-all a

Maximum utilization of available data will result from the app

of improved statistical and other techniques.

2. In the field of economic warfare and support for allied 

tive controls, intelligence coverage of movements of carriers e

in trade with the Soviet Bloc is excellent; however, information 

cargoes of these carriers is inadequate. Machinery has been esta

to speed up the processing and evaluation of spot data into inte

on which action can be taken by the Economic Defense Adviso

mittee and the covert services. In this regard, increased attentio

ing given to current trade transactions. There has been estab

coordinating committee which is assisting in bringing availab

ligence more quickly and fully to bear on questions arising un

program.

3. The target analysis and production activities outlined in 

IV, Armed Forces Intelligence, continue to involve the large-sca

essing of foreign economic and technological data.

4. The heavy research requirements in the economic field 

imperative that duplicate efforts be kept at an absolute mi

Closer integration of research programming among the variou

cies concerned with economic research for intelligence is bein

oped through the Economic Intelligence Committee.
VI. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the US

Satellites continued to make some progress during the first half 

However, in the last analysis, production of realistic estimate

dependent upon securing information on Soviet objectiv

progress. There continues to be improvement in the analysis an

uation of available information; however, the flow of informat

scientific and technical nature from conventional sources is be

increasingly inadequate. As a consequence, there is an urgent n

the further development and utilization of new and improved 

ods and techniques for the collection of scientific and technica

gence information. Efforts along these lines have progressed sl

the past six months, notwithstanding present potential in the f

non-communication electromagnetic interception (“noise-list

and photographic reconnaissance.

2. A review of the effects of DCID 3/45 (which allocated p

production responsibilities between CIA and the department

Department of Defense and established the Scientific Estimate

mittee (SEC)) was scheduled for the first half of 1953. In order 

vide more time for an appraisal of the effects of this directive

view has been postponed until August 1953.

3. Through detailed studies of Soviet scientific personne

tific literature, and through improvements in long-range detecti

niques, continued improvement has been achieved in knowledg

viet accomplishments in the production of fissionable material

form the basis of the Soviet atomic weapons stockpile. A rea

good basis has been established for estimates of plutonium pro

to date and for predicting Soviet capabilities for future expan

the production of this material. However, the absence of suffic

idence on which to base conclusions on installed or planned 

separation capacity for the production of uranium–235 result

present time in one of the most important gaps in intelligence 

Soviet atomic energy program. Of equal significance is the lac

idence in the thermonuclear field. In the face of increasing dif

in the collection of relevant information, studies in depth of pe

and research activities looking toward the selection of addition

ful targets offers some hope of further improvement in our kno

during the forthcoming year. To protect sources of intelligence 

field, and assure the availability of a maximum amount of sig

technical intelligence data, the DCI, with the concurrence of t

5 Document 126.
on 11 April 1953 issued a directive establishing controls for 

semination of information on the detection of atomic weapo

within the USSR.6

4. Existing scientific and technical intelligence on conventi

viet armaments other than naval continues to be good so far a

ardized items in current use are concerned. However, intellig

weapons and equipments pertaining to the Soviet air offensive 

fensive capabilities remains generally inadequate. Information 

ing Soviet guided missiles programs is also poor, although cert

ects based on German developments are becoming better kn

general, knowledge of key scientists, test facilities, and trends 

tary research and development remains too inadequate to be 

basis for predicting future Soviet weapons and equipment.

5. While the existence of a Soviet biological warfare prog

not been positively confirmed, there continue to be indicatio

porting the belief that such a program does exist. Existence of 

chemical warfare program has been confirmed; however, very 

ditional information related to this program has been receive

past six months. The limited progress obtained in chemical wa

telligence has come from increased utilization of Soviet open li

in related fields. The extreme scarcity of intelligence in both f

fers an opportunity for the Soviets to obtain technological sur

6. Some progress has been made in the exploitation of o

entific literature and in research in depth on institutions, but 

edge of basic scientific research and development behind the Ir

tain remains inadequate. Information on Soviet long-range s

development programs is similarly poor. Information on the q

of Soviet scientific and engineering manpower is reasonably ad

but estimates of its quality remain less satisfactory. In view o

creasing importance of such basic scientific information to the 

tion of future Soviet potential, a concentrated effort to improv

gence in this field is planned for the coming months.

VII. Psychological Intelligence

1. Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warf

grams have developed to an unprecedented degree in the p

years. The intelligence needs of these programs fall largely wi

framework of political and sociological intelligence. The ori

and organization of the material for the psychological warfare u

for unaccustomed depth and detail both in the field reporting 

analysis.

6 Not further identified.
2. The Department of State has created a Psychological 

gence Research Staff designed to increase coordination of gove

tal and private research in this field.

3. The final report of the Advisory Group on Psychologi

Unconventional Warfare to the Research and Development Bo

ommended methods by which research in these fields might b

balanced and integrated within the Department of Defense. Bec

the pending reorganization of the research and development st

in the Department of Defense, the report has not been acted u

4. A major deficiency in this field is the lack of informat

of coordinated effort among intelligence agencies in determin

sistance potential, psychological vulnerabilities, and of our prop

effectiveness with respect to target audiences behind the Iron C

Encouraging progress has been made individually by intelligenc

cies in the development of an intelligence basis for the support 

chological warfare activities. The results produced thus far do n

operational requirements, in part because of the difficulty of d

those needs.

VIII. Geographic Intelligence

1. Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas, 

ing evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing (a) r

studies, (b) objective and area analyses in support of covert ope

and (c) staff studies for policy and operational planning. Coor

geographic and map intelligence studies are also undertaken 

port of the National Intelligence Survey program.

2. Current geographic and mapping information on the 

Bloc and adjacent areas is inadequate. Geographic intelligence r

gives particular attention to the regional analysis of those geo

facts that are required in support of planning and operational 

gence for these areas. Emphasis has been placed on the expl

and utilization of available Russian technical literature in fillin

cal gaps. Within CIA, particular attention has also been given 

study of current developments in Soviet mapping activiti

programs.

IX. Basic Intelligence

1. The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), wh

begun in 1948 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, 

tended to meet the U.S. Government’s demands for encyclope

tual intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS progra

begun 1,729 individual sections have been produced on 66 of 

NIS areas, which is the equivalent of approximately 26 comple

Of this number, 1,224 have been published. For the first time 

the history of the program, the rate of production by contr
agencies equivalent to 8 NIS, as established by the JCS, was 

in fiscal year 1953. Based on this performance, a similar pro

program has been established for fiscal year 1954.

2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS p

and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the latter h

cluded production of NIS on all JCS high priority areas and 

necessary to undertake partial surveys on some other areas. H

NIS production on the group of 19 areas and 4 ocean areas of 

priority is approximately 54% complete, whereas the entire pro

about 28% complete. NIS on twelve individual areas are over 75

plete, and five of these are in the JCS high priority list. Geogra

search support for NIS has been excellent.

3. In general the quality of the NIS is good, and can be e

to improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions a

lished under the Maintenance Program which was started in fis

1952. However, the time lag between production and publicat

remains a problem. Coordination within and between all IAC a

IAC agencies engaged in the NIS program is excellent and su

aison is maintained with the JCS.

X. Warning of Attack

1. Conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist inten

initiate hostilities at any given time must be tentative general

drawn from inadequate evidence. They must usually be b

estimates of the overall situation, adjusted to available curren

information.

2. The IAC Watch Committee provides an interagency mec

for assuring that new, detailed information is quickly pooled a

uated. Maximum use is thus made of partial and inadequate i

tion. In supporting the work of the committee, the intelligenc

cies make careful cross-checks of information from all sources 

an elaborate analysis of possible indicators of Soviet intentio

method is not relied on exclusively; other approaches are co

being tried.

3. In general there has been improvement during the past 

one half years in the ability of intelligence to provide promp

and preliminary evaluations of events and developments in th

as well as in the neutral and friendly areas.

4. Intelligence cannot assure adequate warning of attack 

actual detection of hostile formations. Under certain circum

some indications of defensive and offensive preparations on th

periphery may, however, be detected. Capability for detection 

cations of Soviet or Satellite attack varies from fair in the bord

of Germany and Austria to extremely poor in the Transcauca
Far East. Each agency maintains its own 24-hour Watch arrang

to handle any information that is received.

XI. Collection

1. The Foreign Service

In general, the collection activities of the Foreign Service ha

satisfactory. Intelligence needs have been met most adequately 

political field, less so in certain aspects of the economic field, an

satisfactorily in the scientific, technical and psychological fields

deficiencies have been generally attributable to a lack of spe

personnel in those fields which are not closely related to the basi

matic functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial action has bee

by establishing a comprehensive economic reporting program 

continuing program of providing Foreign Service posts with mo

plete and effective guidance on intelligence needs. Additiona

dial measures in progress concern:

a. the greater use of overseas personnel of certain operatio

grams in collecting basic intelligence information, particularly 

psychological and sociological fields, and, b. the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in 

tional intelligence effort through the revision of the Foreign 

Manual to include for the first time specific and detailed inte

instructions.

As a result of a recent study, measures to meet the needs for b

entific information are being carried out.

2. Service Attaché System

The Service Attaché System furnishes extensive useful mili

formation on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attachés in th

Bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume of v

information, although under the restrictions imposed on them b

munist governments, the coverage which they provide cannot 

sidered adequate. The Service Attaché System has been strengthen

the beginning of the Korean conflict through the opening of new 

and the assignment of additional officers to important posts. Con

forts are being made to improve the collection capabilities of Ser

tachés by the development of new collection guides and techniq

3. Overseas Commands

Armed Forces Commands in Europe are acquiring exten

formation. While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union 

partial and inadequate, it is good in the Eastern Zone of Germa

Austria. Considerable information is gathered by European Com

from returned PW’s, escapees and refugees.
Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adequate on 

and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communis

and Eastern Siberia.

4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Because of the overriding considerations of other than inte

nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully the

flight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo reconnaissan

bilities have increased, with a resulting improvement in contr

in this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance are onl

compared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. P

terpretation capability is generally deficient in the Armed Servi

rective measures are underway. The use of photo intelligenc

analysis of economic and scientific developments in respect of 

viet Orbit is being strengthened. Research and development 

being expended on free balloons, piloted and pilotless 

(“guided missiles” and satellites) to overcome a lack of specia

naissance vehicles. Research continues in the improvement of 

detecting devices.

5. (This paragraph is being given separate limited distribu

security reasons.)7

6. Domestic Collection

As a service of common concern for the entire intelligen

munity, CIA collects foreign intelligence information fro

governmental organizations and individuals in the U.S., throu

offices and resident agencies in 28 cities. During the past six 

the rate of production of intelligence information reports has d

slightly, due to: (a) increased emphasis on quality and selectivi

porting, (b) distribution of information of limited interest to on

consumers only, rather than wide dissemination in report form

servicing of special requirements for information in support o

gence operations. To improve the collection of foreign technic

mation, arrangements have been made with the Air Technica

gence Center for the assignment of three air technical officers 

CIA field offices, in accordance with the provisions of NSCID 

Methods of exploiting foreign nationality groups and aliens wi

U.S. are being intensively studied in an effort to increase the 

information on the Soviet Bloc.

7 A handwritten note at the end of this sentence reads, “(see next page)

serted page was filed at the end of the report and is printed below as an atta

8 For text, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligen

lishment, Document 427.
7. Foreign Radio Broadcasts

a. Monitoring

CIA’s world-wide monitoring network provides rapid an

minous coverage of foreign news, information and propaganda 

casts as a service of common concern. Speed in field operations 

reporting of important information to Washington is such that 

telligence agencies may receive, by wire service, the translated 

the first part of a long Moscow broadcast while the Russian st

still transmitting the final portions of the broadcast. The Sovie

is well covered, except for Central Asia and the Baltic States. 

the past six months, the possibility of establishing a station in P

to monitor Central Asian broadcasts has been explored but the 

now tabled, with IAC concurrence, in favor of further developin

coverage from existing stations in Cyprus and Japan. Tentat

cussions have been held with Japanese Government officials c

ing eventual joint monitoring operations, and a survey made 

monitoring potential on the west coast of Honshu. Coverage o

and northwestern USSR transmitters by the British Broadcastin

pany still awaits BBC budgetary approval.

b. Propaganda Analysis

Requirements of estimating offices and psychological war

tivities have resulted in a slight shift in emphasis in the prop

analysis effort, leading away from the preparation of weekly 

of the whole propaganda field and towards the production of m

merous specialized propaganda studies on substantive inte

problems.

8. Foreign Materials and Equipment

Collection of Soviet bloc items from overt sources has in

appreciably during the past six months and has provided use

to economic and scientific intelligence and to the factory markin

gram. While military operations in Korea have not led to the 

of many important military end-items since January, plans are 

consideration for more intensive exploitation and analysis of c

explosives, propellants and other material available in the Far 

theater. Significant information on aircraft components was o

from inspection of the MIG 15’s which landed in Denmark

military items recently acquired through covert channels inclu

eral Soviet electronics measuring machines and a teletype pr

the type currently used in the Soviet communications system. T

Technical Intelligence Subcommittee of the JIC has absorbed th

tions of the former Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency in the co

and exploitation of foreign materials.
9. Monitoring of Radio Jamming

Under NSC 66/19 the agencies undertook the construction 

ganization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Sov

ming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum. A p

eration involving a very limited number of stations is being esta

Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jamming, co

tion of the jamming stations, and related information must aw

initiation and implementation of a much-expanded program.

10. Travel Folder Program

The IAC has instituted a program for guiding and facilita

collection of intelligence information through U.S. and U.K

travel within the Soviet Orbit. Travel briefs to orient travelers an

ing of potential travelers to observe industrial, military and s

facilities should improve collection.

XII. Support and Collation Facilities

1. Availability of Materials

With few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive intelli

distributed among all interested IAC agencies. In addition to 

tribution of current material, there is a continuing effort to loc

extract pertinent information from the large volume of intellige

terial that was collected during and after the war, both in the 

States and overseas. The sheer volume of these materials pres

ficult problems of storage, analysis, and collation before they 

made readily available for research analysts and current inte

purposes. The use of microfilm and machine techniques is pr

assistance in dealing with these problems.

2. Reference Facilities

CIA provides a central reference facility for the IAC a

through its collection of basic intelligence documents received 

sources. In addition, separate files of specialized intelligence d

materials are maintained to supplement the basic collection of 

agencies. These include biographic data, industrial data, phot

and motion picture films.

3. Library Facilities

Library services in the IAC agencies should become incr

effective as a result of new measures for interlibrary cooper

publications procurement, indexing and reference service.

9 Document 44.
Another measure, stemming from the scarcity of Soviet Orb

lications, is CIA sponsorship of publication by the Library of C

of the Monthly List of Russian Accessions and the Cyrillic Subjec

Catalog. Both services are based on cooperative reporting of h

by all major U.S. libraries specializing in Slavic publications.

4. Biographic Information

Each IAC agency maintains a file of biographic data on 

personalities in the categories for which they have been assig

sic responsibility, and makes such data available to the other a

upon request. Excellent data can be made available on politic

tary, economic, and scientific personalities. The depth of co

varies with the intelligence interest, and with availability of sou

terial. In those Iron Curtain areas where information is not ea

tained, the IAC agencies provide for more comprehensive cove

the press, radio, and scientific and technical literature. There 

tensive programs for the exploitation of displaced persons, re

PW’s, and defectors, as well as other personnel having a knowl

personalities in various areas. Every effort is made to inc

dossiers that biographic information which is needed by inte

researchers, such as political orientation, ability, susceptibility 

chological warfare, probable course of action, past career, religio

ital status, associates, membership in cliques, location, etc.

5. Industrial Information

Specialized data to meet departmental needs are mainta

the Defense Agencies. CIA collates all other types of foreign in

information, including research establishments doing indust

search and development work. The material is maintained by i

ual establishment and is controlled by a tabulating card index

tem. References to industrial end-products are being inde

tabulating machine methods to speed the analysis of data bei

plied to all IAC agencies.

6. Photographs and Motion Picture Films

The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photo

and related documentary libraries, including motion picture film

sistent with their requirements and responsibilities. Except fo

war coverage of Soviet and Satellite Areas, the photographic 

is nearly adequate for present needs.

7. Map Procurement and Reference Service

Procurement of foreign-published maps and information o

ping abroad is coordinated by a staff within CIA serving an inter

map committee. Results during the past three years have pro
10 Document 258.

effectiveness of overt collection of maps and related info

through the Foreign Service Geographic Attaché program. In

emphasis is being placed on the collection of maps and eng

drawings from domestic sources. Service Attaché channels are 

ing used. The currently published foreign maps required for 

gence activities are received on a continuing basis through e

arrangements between the Department of State and many for

ficial mapping agencies. These exchanges are in addition to tho

operational character maintained by the Military Service. Excell

reference services in support of intelligence requirements ar

tained by close working arrangements between the map libra

8. Foreign Language Publications

Approval of NSCID 1610 has given new impetus to coo

IAC activity in this field, and definite progress is being made 

implementation of the directive. An interagency advisory co

and its subcommittees are working on methods of improving 

ordination of procurement and exploitation of foreign languag

cations for intelligence purposes. CIA is taking action to centr

library, reference, and indexing services for foreign language bo

periodicals, and to facilitate the use of such services by other a

Efforts are being made to coordinate operations, apportion th

load, and reduce duplication between the following activities: o

abstracting by US missions to satisfy the local and departmenta

exploitation by various agencies of technical and other publica

fulfill specific requirements; and exploitation by CIA of fore

guage publications for information of interest to more than on

ligence agency. A central index of translations, maintained by C

vents duplication between the translating activities carried on 

agency, and makes the translated product accessible to othe

gence consumers.

Good coverage of foreign publications needed for the inte

effort is now being obtained, although further intensive collec

tion should be undertaken with regard to Soviet Bloc and Com

Chinese publications.

9. External Research

Plans for developing further coordination of external a

tractual research in the social sciences (i.e., non-governmenta

terest to intelligence suffered modification when the Depart

State felt obliged to cut back severely its expenditure in the E
Research Staff. Contributions from CIA and the Department of D

will permit continuation of the existing program, but by no me

realization of the scale of operation which seemed to be in sigh

the current budgetary allocations were determined. For the fore

future, therefore, there will continue to be imperfections in the 

to minimize duplication in external research, to insure commun

efit from such research and to facilitate the rational letting of e

research contracts.

Positive recommendations for a better balanced and int

program of research in the fields of psychological and unconve

warfare within the Department of Defense have been made by 

visory group to the RDB. Action on the report has been deferre

ing reorganizations of the research and development program 

Defense Department.

The Economic Intelligence Committee plans to compile a r

all government sponsored economic external research on the 

Bloc classified through Secret. The report would include compl

search, research in progress, and contemplated research.

Note: In lieu of a financial statement, not included in the ab

port, the Director of Central Intelligence will make an oral re

the National Security Council on CIA’s expenditures. The ora

will pertain only to CIA data and will not include expenditure

telligence made by the other members of the intelligence comm

Attachment11

Paragraph 5, “Espionage”, of Part XI, “Collection”, 

in No. 9, The Foreign Intelligence Program

Since the submission of the last report, the difficulties inc

the collection of covert intelligence within the Soviet and Sate

bit remain unchanged. Basic control procedures exercised by t

ous opposition security services make it more and more appar

“black” penetration of denied areas is increasingly hazardous, 

cause of its illegal nature does not insure accessibility to strate

gets. In addition, the pressure of these control procedures is a 

uing and serious threat to the limited assets painfully crea

successful operations in the past. Although the situation is re

less critical in Satellite areas, particularly East Germany, recen

may even endanger this coverage.

11 Top Secret; Eyes Only; Security Information. See footnote 7 above.
In an effort to meet this situation, the covert mechanism ha

tained a high degree of flexibility in order that all possible ave

approach are carefully examined in relation to changing condi

this regard steps have been taken to exploit the recent tempering 

trols on foreign travel to the Soviet orbit. The validity of this a

will depend largely on the extent to which the Soviet Union w

push its “peace offensive” by a relaxation of travel controls, 

availability of properly motivated individuals who will natural

into this framework. These contingencies do not permit an op

outlook but represent a possible alternative, and perhaps in ti

serve to avoid an almost complete dependence on illegal entr

Suffice it to say that progress in the delicate and highly 

ized field of covert intelligence collection is hardly perceptib

short-range reporting base and significant successes in the im

future do not seem likely. At the same time meaningful and us

telligence is being produced, support facilities developed and s

ened, and valuable experience, both in operations and career d

ment of personnel, is being acquired.

156. Editorial Note

[text not declassified]

157. White House Press Release1

Denver, September 

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10483 ESTABLISHING THE OPERAT

COORDINATING BOARD

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitut

statutes, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ord

follows:

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG

sification marking. The press release was issued from Lowry Air Force Base. Ei

was vacationing at the “Summer White House” in Colorado.
Section 1. (a) In order to provide for the integrated imple

tion of national security policies by the several agencies, there is 

established an Operations Coordinating Board, hereinafter refe

as the Board, which shall report to the National Security Coun

(b) The Board shall have as members the following: (1) the 

Secretary of State, who shall represent the Secretary of State and 

the chairman of the Board, (2) the Deputy Secretary of Defen

shall represent the Secretary of Defense, (3) the Director of the 

Operations Administration, (4) the Director of Central Intelligen

(5) a representative of the President to be designated by the Pr

Each head of agency referred to in items (1) to (4), inclusive, in t

tion 1(b) may provide for an alternate member who shall serve as 

ber of the Board in lieu of the regular member representing the 

concerned when such regular member is for reasons beyond his 

unable to attend any meeting of the Board; and any alternate m

shall while serving as such have in all respects the same status as 

ber of the Board as does the regular member in lieu of whom he 

(c) The head of any agency (other than any agency represen

der section 1(b) hereof) to which the President from time to time 

responsibilities for the implementation of national security polici

assign a representative to serve on the Board when the Board is 

with subjects bearing directly upon the responsibilities of suc

Each such representative shall be an Under Secretary or corresp

official and when so serving such representative shall have the sa

tus on the Board as the members provided for in the said sectio

(d) The Special Assistant to the President for National Secu

fairs may attend any meeting of the Board. The Director of the 

States Information Agency shall advise the Board at its reques

Section 2. The National Security Council having recomme

national security policy and the President having approved it, th

shall (1) whenever the President shall hereafter so direct, advi

the agencies concerned as to (a) their detailed operational plan

sponsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the coordination of th

departmental aspects of the detailed operational plans develo

the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and coordin

ecution of such policy and plans, and (d) the execution of each 

action or project so that it shall make its full contribution to the 

ment of national security objectives and to the particular climate 

ion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world, and (2) 

new proposals for action within the framework of national secur

cies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation. Th

shall perform such other advisory functions as the Preside

assign to it and shall from time to time make reports to the N

Security Council with respect to the carrying out of this order.
Section 3. Consonant with law, each agency represented 

Board shall, as may be necessary for the purpose of effectuat

order, furnish assistance to the Board in accordance with sec

of the Act of May 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 134 (31 U.S.C. 691).2 Such as

may include detailing employees to the Board, one of whom m

as its Executive Officer, to perform such functions, consistent w

purposes of this order, as the Board may assign to them.

Section 4. The Psychological Strategy Board shall be abolis

later than sixty days after the date of this order and its outstan

fairs shall be wound up by the Operations Coordinating Boar

Section 5. As used herein, the word “agency” may be co

to mean any instrumentality of the executive branch of the 

ment, including any executive department.

Section 6. Nothing in this order shall be construed either 

fer upon the Board any function with respect to internal secur

in any manner abrogate or restrict any function vested by la

assigned pursuant to law to, any agency or head of agency (in

the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Director of the Offic

fense Mobilization).

Dwight D. Eisen

2 This section of the act authorizes Executive branch departments to u

priations to support interagency boards. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Eisenhower signed the original.

158. Memorandum From President Eisenhower to the Exec

Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)1

Denver, September 

I have signed today Executive Order 104832 establishing 

erations Coordinating Board and abolishing the Psychological 

Board.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 430, Establ

ecutive Order. Top Secret; Special Security; Eyes Only. By memorandum of S

3, Lay transmitted the memorandum to the Under Secretary of State, Deputy 

of Defense, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, Director of C

telligence, and to C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President, for appro

plementation. (Ibid., OCG Files: Lot 62 D 430, Establishing Executive Order) 2 Document 157.
Supplementary to that Executive Order, I hereby direct t

necessary classified actions be taken to accomplish the followi

Additional Functions of the Operations Coordinating Board

The following are assigned as additional functions of the 

tions Coordinating Board:

a. The functions of the Psychological Strategy Board assi

paragraphs 2 and 3 of NSC 10/53 approved October 23, 1951, 

as those functions relate to major programs.

b. The policy coordinating functions provided for in par

3d(1) of NSC 10/24 approved June 18, 1948, under such proced

the Board shall determine in order to insure the proper de

security.

c. The functions of the Psychological Operations Coord

Committee established pursuant to NSC 59/15 approved March 

as modified by the President’s directive of April 4, 19516 direc

establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board.

Coastal Raiding and Maritime Interdiction Operations (China)

a. Responsibility for the support of, and training for, the 

operations shall be transferred from the Central Intelligence Ag

the Department of Defense at such time or times as appr

arrangements may be made and approved by the OCB.

b. Those clandestine operations presently conducted by 

conjunction with such operations shall remain the responsibilit

Director of Central Intelligence, or be discontinued as appropr

c. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determ

the basis of the plans and recommendations of the agencies con

how much of the personnel, property, record, and unexpend

ances of appropriations and other funds available, or to be mad

able in connection with these operations, shall be transferred to 

partment of Defense.

Other

a. The President’s directive of April 4, 1951, directing th

lishment of the Psychological Strategy Board, is rescinded.

b. The Consultants Group established pursuant to NSC 10

proved June 18, 1948, is to be abolished.

3 Document 90.

4 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 292. 5 Document 2.

6 See Document 60.
c. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee 

to above is to be abolished.

d. The Operations Coordinating Board shall not perform 

the functions assigned in the NSC 17 series7 to the Interdepar

Committee for Internal Security and to the Interdepartmenta

gence Conference.

Dwight D. Eisen

7 The NSC 17 series of 1948–1949 dealt with internal security. No repo

series are printed. Documentation is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/P–N

Lot 63 D 351, NSC 17, Box 49. 8 Printed from a copy that indicates Eisenhower signed the original.

159. Letter From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant f

Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to the Deputy

Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell)1

Washington, September 

Dear General Cabell:

The 1954 budget of the Foreign Service has been substant

duced. This reduction comes at a time when there are dema

quirements, many of particular concern to CIA, for an increa

telligence collection activities. Moreover, this reduction will n

continue in effect in subsequent years, and will thus have a lo

effect on the functions of the Foreign Service, including the co

of intelligence information from overt sources. Such collection 

cluded: (a) collection of foreign publications; (b) collection of m

cartographic data; (c) peripheral reporting; (d) collection of s

information; (e) foreign press monitoring services.

The Department recognizes that these overt collection activ

responsibilities of the Foreign Service and are important to the 

security. They are hence of concern to the Director of Centra

gence in view of his duty to advise the National Security Co

such matters.

In an effort to satisfy these demands of intelligence and 

tinue to carry out the Department’s responsibilities for the d

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–00161R, HS

Box 3. Confidential. This copy is “Tab A to IAC–D–73.”
and management of the Foreign Service of the United States, 

partment proposes in the attached document2 a framework 

which, on the basis of national security needs, it would be poss

the Director to meet his responsibilities. Under this proposal, CI

provide financial support for collection activities beyond a stat

imum which the Department can provide under its budget.

The Department believes that, if this framework is accep

would probably be desirable to consult or at least inform IAC 

proposal and, if appropriate, advise the NSC. Furthermore, 

partment believes that, when and as appropriate, there should 

sultation with the Bureau of the Budget and with the proper c

tees of Congress.

Sincerely yours,

W. Park Armstro

2 Not found.

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.

160. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Operations Coordi

Board1

Washington, September 17, 1953, 12:

PRESENT

General Walter B. Smith, Under Secretary of State—Chairman

Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Opera

Mr. William H. Godel, alternate for the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Mr. William M. Rand, alternate for the Director, Foreign Operations 

Administration

Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Securit

Mr. George A. Morgan

1. The Board designated Mr. C. D. Jackson to serve for t

being as its Acting Executive Officer and George A. Morgan t

as his Acting Deputy.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 430, Minut

Security Information. The meeting was held in C.D. Jackson’s office.
2. The Board authorized the Acting Executive Officer to 

PSB staff and resources for OCB work until other arrangem

made.

3. The Board decided that the general pattern of present 

ministrative support arrangement should be continued for the 

of this fiscal year.

4. Noting that the table of organization for OCB staff sh

authorized and an administrative support agreement conclu

September 30, the Board instructed Mr. Morgan to prepare d

consideration at the next Board meeting. The Board indicated 

OCB staff should be kept to a minimum and developed onl

workload demands. The basic function should be that of a w

secretariat, including that of acting as chairmen and executiv

taries of meetings and generally serving as catalysts in the co

tion process, but there should also be a small nucleus of plann

5. The Board noted that all PSB approved papers and pro

main in force until specifically dealt with by OCB.

6. It was agreed that Mr. Jackson should review existing P

ects and approved papers and make recommendations to the B

their disposition.

7. The need for good backstopping of the Board in the 

agencies was discussed. It was agreed that each Board membe

have a principal assistant for this purpose who would attend 

Board meetings. It was also suggested that these assistants 

Morgan serve as a senior staff to screen work for the Board, b

sion on this proposal was reserved pending further study.

8. The need for close liaison and a sound division of lab

the NSC Planning Board was stressed. Mr. Morgan was instr

circulate OCB papers to Mr. Cutler for information, notify him 

ings, and in consultation with him recommend any further a

ments needed for OCB–NSC liaison. Mr. Cutler designated M

Koons of the NSC Staff to maintain standing liaison with Mr. 

on OCB matters, and also noted that Mr. Morgan attends P

Board meetings as an adviser. With regard to assignments to OC

NSC, Mr. Cutler mentioned a number of implementation assig

to other agencies now in force. It was agreed that these assig

would stay as they are rather than being transferred to OCB 

time, thus giving OCB a chance to start without assuming such 

load of accumulated responsibilities. Mr. Cutler agreed to put 

orandum of this agreement in the NSC records and to send M

gan a copy.

9. The Board noted its obligation to make progress repor

NSC and decided that these should ordinarily be made at inte

six months, and otherwise only when specially needed.
10. The Board decided to continue existing arrangements f

dling 10/2 matters through a panel composed of representa

State, Defense and CIA, with the addition that the panel is to be 

by Mr. Jackson and that FOA is to designate one officer who 

invited to attend meetings when matters of concern to FOA 

cussed. Mr. Dulles reserved the right to bring certain matters 

field directly to the Board.

11. It was agreed that Mr. Morgan should hold a meeting 

propriate representatives next week to discuss recommendati

OCB assuming the functions of POCC.

12. The Board decided to continue meeting usually on W

days at 12:30 and to follow the informal meeting with a forma

ing at 1:30, which would also be attended by the principal assi

each Board member and necessary secretariat.

13. The Board directed that staff work on the two Christm

ects2 begun by PSB should be completed in time for the Board t

the necessary decisions at its next meeting, including a decision 

ative investment in the two projects in proportion to their relativ

Walter B

C

2 The projects are documented in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp

161. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence D

to the President’s Special Assistant (Jackson)1

Washington, September 2

SUBJECT

Russian Satellite Minorities

REFERENCE

Memorandum from Mr. Jackson to the members of the PSB, dated 1 Sep

19532

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00764R, HS/C

Box 1. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by [name not declassified] on Sept

and rewritten by Wisner on September 16. Copies were sent to the Under Se

Defense, the Under Secretary of State, the Director of the Foreign Operations 

tration, Robert Cutler, and George Morgan. 2 Not found.
1. We agree with your suggestion that a thorough review 

present policy toward the Soviet nationalities should be mad

pears that most of the decisions reached affecting the develop

psychological warfare against the USSR may not have given t

appropriate emphasis to the exploitation of the non-Russian 

groups within the Soviet Union. As I understand the matter, 

State Department policy has rested in large part upon the con

that a showing of interest, on our part, in the non-Russian peop

arouse the antagonism of the Great Russians, who would inter

actions as designed to dismember the Soviet Union, and could, 

reason, be turned against us propagandistically as well as e

within Russia as a strong appeal for internal unity and suppo

Kremlin regime. Within the framework of this approach a p

non-predetermination or ultimate self-determination has been 

and adhered to by all covert asset facilities under our control. S

ria’s liquidation,3 and in view of the latest developments in th

Union, however, we feel that re-evaluation of our present po

desirable. The purpose of such a review should be not to aban

policy of non-predetermination, but rather to extend its applic

permit fuller exploitation of the vulnerabilities inherent in th

system.

2. In this connection, it is my understanding that as a resu

proposed merger of the two PSB documents, i.e. D–40 and D–

Soviet nationalities issue will be once more reviewed by the ne

working group. Their findings and recommendations will then 

mitted either through the Department of State or Mr. George M

to the NSC Planning Board. We can, therefore, expect that the fi

ument will be presented to the NSC, and after its approval it w

as policy authorization for implementation of activities in con

with this important issue.

3. I have one further observation to make in this connectio

though I appreciate that it is at the risk of going into certain 

with which I believe you are quite familiar. The old policy upo

we have been basing our actions and certain of our more im

operations, has never, to the best of my knowledge, achieved 

3 Lavrenty Beria, head of Soviet internal security, was arrested in the Sov

in July 1953. His execution was publicly announced December 23, 1953. 4 PSB D–40, April 23, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 

PSB Documents. PSB D–45 is in Eisenhower Library, PSB Documents, Maste

Vol. IV, folder 1, Interim US Psychological Strategy Plan for the Exploitation 

in Satellite Europe, NSC Registry Series, NSC Staff Papers, Box 16. 5 Acting Director, Psychological Strategy Board.
governmental status. By this I mean that the policy has nev

threshed out at the higher policy levels of Government or go

with sufficient thoroughness, and certainly I do not think it h

gone into by the present Administration to the depth that I c

warranted by a matter of such importance. I know that you a

acquainted with the various sharply-conflicting points of view 

make this such a controversial issue both within the ranks of 

viet emigration and also in American public opinion (includi

gressional opinion). One of the unfortunate results of this cont

is that in the present atmosphere and in the absence of a suff

authoritative policy determination, the governmental officials c

with responsibility for the execution of the policy are subject 

cism and attack to a degree which is unnecessary, and which 

in my judgment, be minimized if we had a sufficiently clear an

level determination of policy.

Allen W. 

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

162. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of t

Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Ce

Intelligence Dulles1

Washington, October 

SUBJECT

Comments of DD/P on Certain of the Proposed Additions and Deletion

Revision of NSC 10/2 and NSC 10/5

1. I question the desirability of deleting in its entirety the la

of old paragraph 2. of NSC 10/22 for the reason that by such co

deletion it seems to me that we deprive ourselves unnecessaril

evidence that there has been a deliberate and conscious determ

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Deputy Director for Op

Job 79–01228A. Top Secret; Security Information. Copies to COP/DD/P, C/PP

and C/PM. 2 Printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence 

ment, Document 292. The comments referred to have not been further identif
on the part of the NSC that covert operations and espiona

counter-espionage operations should be placed within the stru

the Central Intelligence Agency, and that the two should be co

under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence. I ag

portions of the old language should be deleted for various 

since they are no longer applicable and may be undesirable. H

because of the lengthy and often heated philosophical and bure

discussions about the desirability of having CIA made respon

covert operations other than intelligence—and in view of the cr

and attacks which are still being leveled against the Agency al

very line—it seems to me useful for us to be able to point to 

guage which is a clear and unequivocal indication of a determ

of the long disputed issue by the NSC. My purposes in this 

could be accomplished by the following minor changes in the la

of the paragraph. I would retain the first sentence as written, s

is a useful reconfirmation of the fact that the CIA is charged 

NSC with conducting espionage and counter-espionage op

abroad. (We are having enough trouble with other members o

telligence community at the present time to render it undesir

us to voluntarily sacrifice any language from an important 

mental document which either provides or confirms our a

in this particular field.) The last sentence could be changed to 

follows:

“It is therefore determined to be desirable that the respo

for covert operations should be retained within the structur

Central Intelligence Agency where they can best be correlated 

pionage and counter-espionage operations under the control o

rector of Central Intelligence.”

2. Concerning the proposed deletion of paragraph 2. 

10/5,3 I assume that this is deleted for the reason that the resp

ity and authority of the OCB is sufficiently spelled out in the 

tive Order 104834 plus the present supplemental memorand

September 1953.5

3. I question the abandonment of the language of paragr

of NSC 10/5. This language we fought hard to get into NSC 1

felt at the time that we required it in order to receive the mo

factory assurance available that we would have some help in li

support for our activities and operations from the Departments 

3 Document 90.

4 Document 157.

5 An apparent reference to Document 158, or Wisner may have been re

the September 3 date when NSC Executive Secretary Lay transmitted the 

order to the involved government officials for implementation.
and Defense. If this language is deleted in its entirety, we are 

back on our own resources entirely and will have no tangible 

basis for levying demands upon the other departments and 

proved mechanism for laying on such demands. If anything, 

consideration should be given to the inclusion of the newly crea

organization and FOA (formerly ECA–MSA) as departments o

cies upon which we should be in a position to call for such as

and support as they may be capable of providing.

4. In paragraph 3.b. at the bottom of page 3 of Attachm

would recommend the insertion of the word “official” betw

words “with” and “overt.” The present language dangles a b

the overt activities referred to are not in any way specified.

5. In paragraph 4. I notice that the old language of NSC 

retained intact, and although the language is pretty good fr

standpoint in its present form, it does not provide for situatio

as Korea. The present language speaks of “active theaters of wa

American forces are engaged.” It is my recollection that Genera

worked out language with the Pentagon and the Far East Co

to cover the in-between situation and undeclared hostilities, 

language of the telegrams by which this agreement was arrived 

established might be profitably consulted in this connection.

6. For better clarification of the proposed new sentence 

end of paragraph 5. I would recommend the insertion of the 

“conceived as” between the words “initially” and “covert”; a

the inclusion of a comma between the words “definitions” an

responsibility”.

Frank G. W

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.

163. Editorial Note

NSC 162/2 of October 30, 1953, “Basic National Security 

set forth President Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy, which in

several policy formulations of importance to the intelligenc

munity. NSC 162/2 declared that United States security requi

development and maintenance of an intelligence system cap

“1) collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions tha

give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subve
any area of the world; 2) accurately evaluating the capabilitie

eign countries, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undert

itary, political, economic and subversive courses of action affect

security; and 3) forecasting potential foreign developments h

bearing on U.S. national security.”

As a means to reduce Soviet capabilities to control or influ

free world, NSC 162/2 also called on the government to: “a) ta

and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige and ideolog

fective instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the strength 

munist parties and other pro-Soviet elements; b) take all feasib

matic, political, economic and covert measures to counter an

of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to Sov

trol to achieve dominant power in a free world country; and 

dertake selective, positive actions to eliminate Soviet-Commun

trol over any areas of the free world.” NSC 162/2 is printed i

Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume II, Part 1, pages 577–597.

164. Memorandum From Colonel Brad J. Smith in the Offi

Special Operations of the Department of Defense to th

Secretary of Defense’s Assistant for Special Operation

(Erskine)1

Washington, November 1

SUBJECT

Overflights

1. In a conversation with Fred Ayer (Special Assistant to th

tary of the Air Force for Intelligence) today, I learned that at the IA

ing on 17 November, General Samford brought up the subject 

flights to Mr. Allen Dulles.2 General Samford is reported to have 

he was “tired of pushing on one end of a strand of limp spaghe

Mr. Dulles agreed to bring the matter of overflights up before th

2. We have a copy of a paper on overflights which was 

some time ago by Fred Ayer.3 It is possible that this may be of 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 330, OSD Files, Office of Special Operat

Chronological File Jan. 1–Nov. 30, 1953. Top Secret; Security Information. 2 The minutes of the November 17 meeting have not been found.

3 Not found.
to you and might be worth bringing to Mr. Kyes

 attention fo

duction at an OCB discussion some time, especially since it 

that the subject will be introduced at an NSC meeting.

3. Mr. Ayer also mentioned having sent to you a paper on 

overflights.4 Balloon overflights seem to me to present a very i

ing possibility in that the balloons will travel at approximately 

feet, some thousands of feet out of interception range.

4. The Air Force is presently planning a test of the balloo

flight capability which involves releasing the balloons in Haw

hoping to pick them up some place on the West Coast. If the test 

successful, the Air Force will then be able to present the Secr

Defense with a film strip of pictures taken at five-minute interva

80,000 feet of the path followed by the balloon for 2400 miles

with a recommendation that we investigate the possibility of 

overflights in the Soviet Union.

5. I understand the balloon project (in USSR)5 will cos

$40,000,000.

B.J. 

4 Not found.

5 The words “(in USSR)” were inserted by hand.

6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

165. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Kyes) to

Director of Central Intelligence Dulles1

Washington, December 

Dear Allen:

In the course of my trip through Europe in September, m

tion was drawn to a number of areas in which there appear t

rious weaknesses in the furtherance of our over-all intelligenc

While I do not have personal knowledge of some of the items 

shall mention, General Erskine, at my request, examined the 

gence picture from the field commanders’ point of view and p

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278

Top Secret; Security Information.
me with the benefit of his observations. I realize, of course, th

if not all these matters are no strangers to you, but perhaps m

will not be amiss as a slightly different slant.

I am fully convinced that the successful prosecution of a

tary program has its very foundation in the quantity, qual

proper dissemination of intelligence. I am very aware that defi

exist in the Department of Defense intelligence agencies and 

ing steps to correct those faults. Correction of the following d

cies, which lie in the covert field and, therefore, fall with

purview, appears to be of vital importance to the country:

a. Lateral dissemination of information by CIA field agenc

cal commanders appears necessary and logical. For example, 

that USCINCEUR should receive CIA field reports directly an

required to wait for distribution of screened material from Wash

b. The penetration of the “iron curtain” by covert means 

short of our requirements. [51⁄2 lines not declassified]

c. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

d. [1 paragraph (91⁄2 lines) not declassified]

There are other points which should be discussed in de

sure you will agree that improved coordination between our a

will improve the efficiency of our respective intelligence oper

therefore suggest that our appropriate staff officers meet as 

possible to go over these matters of common interest. General 

will represent the Department of Defense if you concur.

With best personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Roger M

2 Printed from a copy that indicates Kyes signed the original.

166. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence D

to Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes

Washington, December 2

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deput

tor for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 13. Top Secret. 1 p

declassified.]
167. Draft Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Pla

the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director o

Central Intelligence Dulles1

Washington, January 

SUBJECT

Policy Guidance for CIA planning to “capitalize on and exploit new upr

the satellites”

1. Referring to our conversations of Wednesday afternoon

uary, at which time you informed me of certain statements m

you by Mr. C. D. Jackson at or following the OCB meeting of th

day, I have looked into the questions of policy guidance and 

tus of our own planning in this field. I do not find that we ha

received definitive or authoritative policy guidance of the kind 

would authorize us to proceed with the development of plans o

eral character to either whip up or exploit uprisings which ma

in the satellites. The only policy guidance which tends to bear 

subject which I have been able to locate is as follows:

a. The guidance which we have received to “keep t

simmering—but to avoid boiling it over”.

FILL IN APPROPRIATE REFERENCES HERE,

INCLUDING EXCHANGES WITH HICOG, ETC., AS

WELL AS REFERENCES TO MR. DULLES’ OWN

EXCHANGES WITH TRUSCOTT ON THIS SUBJECT2

(about the end of the summer).3

b. The “Winter of Unrest” paper,4 the salient features of wh

____________________________________________________

____________________________________________________

____________________________________________________

c. The OCB instruction—already executed—to stockpile 

quantities of explosives and demolition materials at forward p

Europe. These materials have been so stockpiled in order to be a

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Op

Job 79–01228A, Box 18. Secret. Drafted by Wisner and Helms. A note in the up

corner reads, “Orig. To C/ w/note asking him to get together w/C/PPC and c

rounding this out and filling in the gaps. CC sent to Ballmer w/similar messa

2 Not found.

3 A handwritten note in the margin next to this paragraph reads, “NSC 

illegible words] a balanced program.” NSC 174 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1

vol. VIII, pp. 110–127. 4 Not found.
in case of need, but we have NO policy guidance governing t

tration thereof either at the present time or under any specif

circumstances in the future.

2. The fact that there appears to be a lack of understan

higher governmental levels on this general subject is, I believe

serious matter. I think it is essential that we take steps promp

a view to either

a. Disabusing the minds of those who believe we are all s

or are in the process of developing plans to touch off or supp

risings in the satellites; or

b. Getting some governmental policy direction in this fiel

will clarify our responsibilities and position.

3. Actually, it is my own understanding, which is shared 

Helms and by Tracy Barnes—with both of whom I have discu

matter—that present governmental policy does not provide 

support the stirring up or the provision of significant quantities 

port to satellite uprisings. I have never understood how it is 

to support from outside a satellite country a revolt or unres

kind which is not sufficiently strong, in and of itself, to unseat 

ernment in power. This support can only be provided by arm

tary forces prepared to march to the active assistance of the 

tionists for the purpose of helping them complete their attempt

and providing the strength necessary to consolidate and ho

gains. To the best of my knowledge there is no historical prece

a successful revolt in a country where the weight of a large ar

foreign power, supporting the existing regime, is either in the 

or standing on its borders ready to move. Nor is it my unders

that there is any US policy decision in being, nor any adeq

forces to back up any such decision, to move in and give sup

an attempted revolt.

4. None of the foregoing is to say that we should not con

encourage resistance to the Soviet satellite regimes in order to k

pressure on and to retard the consolidation of Soviet controls 

areas. This is what I understand our policy directives to amou

the present time, but it is one of the most difficult, unanswere

tions of the day as to what US or Western policy would be in 

an attempted revolt occurring in any of the satellites within t

seeable future and prior to the withdrawal of Soviet military 

from the immediate or adjacent area. This is the question wh

been posed to us repeatedly by European statesmen, of who

Reuter was one of the most succinct propounders. You may r

repeated predictions that there would be further outbreaks of 

perhaps as early as the Spring of this year, in Eastern Germany

asked just what the West would propose to do in such event. He 
to answer his own question by speculating that we would prob

forced to stand idly by wringing our hands and seeing all po

of future resistance go down in bloody liquidation unless we w

meanwhile, through diplomatic action of the most courageo

forceful character, to bring about a retraction of Soviet power.

168. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to 

Assistant Chief of Staff (G–2) of the Army (Trudeau)1

Washington, January 2

Dear General Trudeau:

In your letter of 24 December 19532 you suggested that pr

relating to clandestine intelligence required a clarification of 

#53 rather than an “Agreed Activities” paper.

NSCID #5 is a fundamental statement of policy. Prior to its i

the underlying philosophies and problems were debated at le

all levels in the interested offices of the Executive Branch of th

ernment and by appropriate congressional groups. Each forma

of the problem of clandestine intelligence operations, after de

the various views presented, came without exception to an acc

of the principles reflected in NSCID #5.

A revision was issued on 28 August 19514 to meet new con

arising from the Korean War and the establishment of NATO, 

paper as revised is still a statement of basic responsibilities rath

an attempt to spell out the conditions that will govern all conc

relationships and circumstances. There is, however, ample flexi

the concept stated in NSCID #5 to meet all such circumstanc

changing needs can best be met by corollary agreements, ba

NSCID #5, which can be readily achieved without calling into p

full machinery of the National Security Council, which ine

would require a rather prolonged procedure.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278

Folder 27. Secret. Drafted on January 4, and rewritten by C.P. Cabell on Janu

legal opinion by CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston is ibid. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., Folder 24)

3 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 423. 4 Document 255.
Therefore, rather than seek a change in NSCID #5, I woul

to pursue the problem of a coordinated program on the basi

“Agreed Activities” paper which representatives of the Armed 

prepared in collaboration with representatives of this Agency, 

of last year. We are now awaiting with interest the return of th

agreement which I understand the JIC ad hoc committee deali

this problem planned to rework on the basis of comments fro

manders in the field.

I would therefore urge that you use your influence to brin

early resumption of negotiation leading to a final “Agreed Ac

paper.

Sincerely,

Allen W. 

5 Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

169. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 15/11

Washington, February 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRODUCTION OF ECONOMI

INTELLIGENCE: SOVIET BLOC2

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID–1, NSCID–3, and NSC

and for the purpose of strengthening the over-all government

ligence structure for the production of economic intelligence on 

viet Bloc, the following policies and allocations are hereby esta

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, D

tives. Confidential. A typed note reads: “Agreed text CIA/State 2/5/54.” For 

version of this directive, see Document 191. 2 The term “Soviet Bloc” as used in this Directive covers the USSR; Poland

slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany; Communist C

North Korea. Supplements to this directive may reduce this coverage or extend 

areas under Soviet domination, if such modification is warranted. [Footn

original.] 3 For NSCID No. 1, see Document 256; for NSCID No. 3, see Foreign 

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 426; for N

15, see Document 254.
1. Policies

1.1 In discharging allocated responsibilities and effecting 

tion of economic intelligence, the interested departments and a

will apply the following basic principles:

a. No complete separation of areas of interest is possible 

essarily desirable in economic intelligence activities. b. Full and free interchange of all intelligence information 

ished intelligence and schedules of research programs, includ

ternal research, between all agencies concerned is essential. c. No one agency is considered to be the final authority 

field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agencies a

sents recorded.

1.2 An agency charged with primary responsibility in a p

lar field will develop special competence in that field and will n

carry out most of the research in that field.

1.3 Any agency may make such studies as it believes nece

supplement intelligence obtained from other agencies in order 

fill its departmental functions; however, basic research studies 

not normally be undertaken without prior discussion with th

cies having primary responsibility for the subject matter invol

1.4 Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate 

telligence activities of its technical services and its other facilit

ing economic intelligence production capabilities with the wor

IAC intelligence agencies and to make available to those agen

intelligence produced by such services and facilities.

2. Responsibility for Economic Intelligence Production

2.1 Responsibility for research and for the production of ec

intelligence on the Soviet Bloc is allocated as follows:

a. The Department of State shall have primary responsib

those aspects of intelligence production in which economic an

ical analysis are interdependent. It will produce intelligence 

nomic policy and politico-economic trends and will undertak

other analyses and studies as may be required in fulfilling its a

primary production responsibilities. b. The Department of Defense shall have primary re

bility for the production of intelligence on the military aspects of th

omy. They will produce intelligence on military requirements, l

ships and ship movements, and on production of military end ite

will undertake such other analyses and studies as may be require

filling their assigned primary production responsibilities. c. The CIA shall have primary responsibility, as a service 

mon concern, for intelligence production on all aspects and all 

of the economy, except for those specified in 2.1 (a) and (b). W

recognition given to the intelligence produced by other agencies

supplement this intelligence by such independent analyses an

ies as may be necessary to produce integrated economic inte

on the total economy of the Soviet Bloc.
2.2 It is recognized that, despite the above-mentioned all

of primary production responsibilities, there will be areas of c

or overlapping interest which require continuing interagency 

and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate.

3. Responsibility for Economic Intelligence Coordination

3.1 To assist the Central Intelligence Agency is carrying ou

ordinating responsibility, the Economic Intelligence Committ

continue to perform the functions outlined in IAC D–22/1 (re

3.2 In accordance therewith, the Economic Intelligence C

tee shall, upon request of the Office of National Estimates, pre

ordinated contributions to comprehensive estimates of Soviet B

pabilities scheduled in the approved program of National Inte

Estimates.5

4 Document 72.

5 Printed from an unsigned copy.

170. Editorial Note

Sections of NSC 5407 (which replaced NSC 161), “Status o

States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1953

circulated on February 17, 1954, and in subsequent circulars 

were prepared. The report was discussed at the 187th, 188th, an

meetings of the NSC on March 4, 11, and 25, 1954. (National A

RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5407) Part 8, “The 

Intelligence Program” was prepared by the Central Intelligence 

(Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Specia

ant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Status of Projec

5407, Boxes 4–5) NSC 5407 is discussed in an editorial note in 

Relations, 1952–1954, volume II, Part 1, page 633.
171. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Sec

Council (Lay) to the National Security Council1

NSC 5412 Washington, March 1

COVERT OPERATIONS

REFERENCES

A. Memo for the Statutory Members of the NSC from Executive Secreta

subject: “The NSC 10 Series”, dated March 3, 19542

B. NSC 10/23

C. NSC 10/54

The President has this date approved the enclosed Nation

rity Council directive on the subject, as submitted by the re

memorandum and adopted by the other statutory members of 

tional Security Council, and directs its implementation by all ex

departments and agencies of the U.S. Government concerned, 

cated therein.

Accordingly, as set forth in paragraph 7 of the enclosure, NS

NSC 10/5 and certain provisions relating thereto of the Pre

memorandum to the Executive Secretary, NSC, supplementing 

tive Order 10483,5 are hereby superseded.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in 

dling of the enclosed directive and that access to it be very strictly lim

an absolute need-to-know basis.

It is further requested that all copies of the reference memorandu

turned to this office for destruction upon receipt of this report.

James S. 

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to the President for Natio

rity Affairs Records. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint 

Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Executive Officer, Operation

nating Board. 2 Not found.

3 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 292. 4 Document 90.

5 See Documents 157 and 158.

6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure7

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 

ON COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the 

covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the 

ments, parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter coll

referred to as “International Communism”) to discredit and de

aims and activities of the United States and other powers of 

world, determined, as set forth in NSC directives 10/2 and 10

in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the o

eign activities of the U.S. Government should be suppleme

covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency had already been cha

the National Security Council with conducting espionage and 

espionage operations abroad. It therefore seemed desirable, fo

tional reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operatio

subject to directives from the NSC, to place the responsibility f

on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with es

and counterespionage operations under the over-all control of 

rector of Central Intelligence.

3. The NSC has determined that such covert operations 

the greatest extent practicable, in the light of U.S. and Soviet c

ties and taking into account the risk of war, be designed to:

a. Create and exploit troublesome problems for Inter

Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Com

China and between them and their satellites, complicate contro

the USSR, Communist China and between them and their s

and retard the growth of the military and economic potential o

viet bloc.

b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International C

nism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other element

c. Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly 

rectly responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant p

a free world country. d. Reduce International Communist control over any area

world.

e. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of 

ples and nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever poss

identity of interest between such peoples and nations and the 

States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups ge

advocating or believing in the advancement of such mutual i

7 Top Secret.
and increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nation

sist International Communism.

f. In accordance with established policies and to the exten

ticable in areas dominated or threatened by International Comm

develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerr

erations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of 

cluding wherever practicable provisions of a base upon which 

itary may expand these forces in time of war within acting the

operations as well as provision for stay-behind assets and esca

evasion facilities.

4. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the Nationa

rity Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs 

Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

a. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Se

of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operati

planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United Sta

eign and military policies and with overt activities, and consulti

and obtaining advice from the Operations Coordinating Boa

other departments or agencies as appropriate. b. Informing, through appropriate channels and on a n

know basis, agencies of the U.S. Government, both at home and 

(including diplomatic and military representatives), of such ope

as will affect them.

5. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, the followi

visions shall apply to wartime covert operations:

a. Plans for covert operations to be conducted in active t

of war and any other areas in which U.S. forces are engaged 

bat operations will be drawn up with the assistance of the Dep

of Defense and will be in consonance with and complementar

proved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. b. Covert operations in active theaters of war and any oth

in which U.S. forces are engaged in combat operations will 

ducted under such command and control relationships as hav

or may in the future be approved by the Department of Defen

6. As used in this directive, “covert operations” shall be 

stood to be all activities conducted pursuant to this directive wh

so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsib

them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncove

U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility fo

Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities 

to: propaganda; political action; economic warfare; preventiv

action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition; escape a

sion and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile st

groups including assistance to underground resistance mov

guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; support of indigeno

anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free wo

ception plans and operations; and all activities compatible w
directive necessary to accomplish the foregoing. Such operatio

not include: armed conflict by recognized military forces, es

and counterespionage, nor cover and deception for military ope

7. This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 10/2 an

10/5. Subparagraphs “a” and “b” under the heading “Addition

tions of the Operations Coordinating Board” on page 1 of th

dent’s memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National 

Council, supplementing Executive Order 10483, are supersede

following provisions:

a. Except as the President otherwise directs, the member

Operations Coordinating Board shall, under appropriate 

arrangements, be advised in advance of major programs in

covert operations related to National Security Council policies

b. The designated representatives of the Secretaries of S

Defense referred to in paragraph 4-a above shall keep the Boar

bers of their respective departments advised as to matters on 

they are consulted by the Director of Central Intelligence, an

have been or are to be referred to the Operations Coordinating 

c. The Operations Coordinating Board will be the normal 

for securing coordination of support among the Departments 

and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

172. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Com

IAC–M–145 Washington, March 1

Director of Central Intelligence

Allen W. Dulles

Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department o

Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Departm

the Army

Rear Admiral H. C. Daniel, acting for Director of Naval Intelligence, De

of the Navy

Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, 

States Air Force

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 85–50036

Secret. The meeting was held in the DCI’s conference room.
Colonel Samuel M. Lansing, acting for Deputy Director for Intelligence, 

Joint Staff

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Atomic Energy Commission Representative to 

IAC

Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau o

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Central Intelligence Agency

Dr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency

**Dr. H. Marshall Chadwell, Central Intelligence Agency2

Mr. James Q. Reber, Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull (Ret.), Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. Ludwell L. Montague, Central Intelligence Agency3

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. William P. Bundy, Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency2

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency3

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], USMCR, Central Intelligence Agency3

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State

*Mr. E. W. Doherty, Department of State3

*Mr. Miron Burgin, Department of State3

*Mr. J. W. Lydman, Department of State3

Lt. Col. Roland L. Kolb, Department of the Army

Lt. Col. James G. Martin, Department of the Army

Lt. Col. Vasco J. Fenili, Department of the Army

Captain Allan L. Reed, USN, Department of the Navy

Cmdr. James G. Thorburn, Jr., Department of the Navy

Colonel Donald H. Ainsworth, United States Air Force

Colonel John J. Morrow, United States Air Force

Colonel Charles F. Gillis, United States Air Force

Mr. John A. Power, United States Air Force

Captain Ray E. Malpass, USN, The Joint Staff

Colonel Orin H. Moore, The Joint Staff

Lt. Col. Perry H. Penn, The Joint Staff

*Mr. John Easton, The Joint Staff3

Richard D. 

S

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated agenda items.]

2 Attended Executive Session. [Footnote in the original.]

3 [Attended] Part of Meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles (IAC–D–81, 10 March)5

6. Action: Agreed to defer action until a later meeeting.

7. Discussion: Admiral Daniel and Colonel Lansing felt 

subject was one allocated to the departments of the Departmen

fense by DCID 3/46 and that to handle a matter primarily 

weapons field through the national intelligence machinery mi

to overcrowding an already overworked mechanism. General T

suggested that the entire community is concerned with at least 

lection effort in this field, an effort which needs stepping up be

isting estimates can be much improved. Mention was made o

rent JIC study (603/16, November 1953)7 pertinent extracts from 

the service members felt might be made available to the Fede

Defense Administration.

8. General Samford thought it desirable to respond as fully 

sible to present and future requestors involved with this sub

doubted that less than a National Estimate would meet the ne

9. Mr. Dulles recognized that this subject had grown in 

tance since DCID 3/4 was issued almost two years ago and 

quire treatment different from that suggested in the Directive

vited members to consider the matter further, pending a full dis

at a later meeting.

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated agenda items.]

5 Not found.

6 Document 126.

7 Not further identified.
173. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

Washington, March 2

PREPARATION OF COORDINATED EVALUATIONS 

OF THE NET CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR TO INFLIC

DIRECT INJURY ON THE UNITED STATES

Problem

1. To create appropriate organizational machinery for the 

ration of continuing coordinated evaluations of the net capabi

the USSR to inflict direct injury on the United States, and to di

preparation of such an evaluation.

Discussion

Introduction

2. By memorandum dated 10 March 1954, pursuant to NSC 

873-d., the Director of Defense Mobilization has submitted cert

ommendations relative to the organizational aspects of the con

defense program.2 These recommendations do not cover parts o

ter VI of NSC 159,3 specifically paragraphs 129–131 relating to qu

of “net evaluation” organization. Since these questions are subst

different from the issues of operational organization, it is approp

deal with the two in separate papers, whether final action is ta

the National Security Council itself or by the Planning Board.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Int

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3. Secret. A note on the paper indicates that the DCI and D

it on May 4, 1954. All ellipses in the original. 2 Memorandum from ODM Director Arthur S. Flemming to Cutler, M

(Eisenhower Library, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, Disaster File Serie

Continental Defense) NSC Action No. 873, taken at the 158th meeting of the NS

gust 6, 1953, directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC Planning Board to su

ther recommendations on continental defense to the Council. In addition, Flem

directed by the President to establish a special task force to study and mak

mendations on improving government organization with respect to interna

functions. A copy of NSC Action No. 873 is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–N

cellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action. 3 NSC 159, “Continental Defense,” circulated to the NSC on July 22, was t

of the Continental Defense Committee chaired by General Bull (see footnote 

ment 150). A copy of NSC 159 is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files

351, NSC 159 Series.
History

3. Two previous evaluations in this field have been prep

the Council, the history being as follows:

a. On August 30, 1951, the Council directed that the Dir

Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Sta

the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), 

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), prepare a su

evaluation, covering Soviet net capability against the con

United States as of mid-1952.4 After considerable delay and d

such an evaluation was submitted to the Council on October 1

with an accompanying memorandum by the then Director poin

shortcomings of the report and recommending that he, DCI, be 

to examine into the creation of new and better machinery to i

operational data with intelligence in this field.5 On November 2

the Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Council the views of 

on the question,6 and there ensued negotiations in which JC

ICIS, and IIC participated and which eventuated in the direc

forth as NSC 140, approved by the President on January 19, 1

b. Under this directive, a Subcommittee headed by Lt. Gen

wal H. Edwards (USAF ret.) completed and submitted to the 

on May 18, 1953 its report, NSC 140/1.8 This differed from th

ous study in that (1) it was projected for two years into the 

through mid-1955; (2) in addition to the continental United St

fined key installations overseas were considered; (3) instead 

maximum estimates of Soviet strength, as had been substantia

before, the evaluation used a probable estimate level in this reg

assumed a Soviet strategy regarded as being consistent with t

timated capabilities. The Report was given to the Planning 

Continental Defense Committee, the so-called Bull Committee, 

used by that Committee along with other relevant material

preparation of NSC 159.

4. The Report of the Bull Committee, NSC 159, July 22, 1

ferred to the substance of the Edwards Report (para. 9), and a

sidered in some detail the problem of permanent organization 

129–131) recommending that a new evaluation be undertaken 

phases, the first covering Soviet attack capabilities—to be don

by the JCS and CIA—and the second covering damage, or vul

ity to the estimated attack capabilities—to be done by a separa

mittee under NSC direction. NSC 159, para. 30, further noted 

Council “might well wish to establish a permanent subcomm

4 See Document 86.

5 The evaluation and the accompanying memorandum have not been f

Document 138. 6 Not found.

7 See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 205–208. 8 NSC 140/1 is ibid., pp. 328–349.
Net Capabilities Estimates composed of the Chairman of the J

the Director of Central Intelligence . . .”

5. Concurrently, the question of net evaluations in gene

considered by The President’s Committee on International Infor

Activities, the Jackson Committee. In its Report submitted to th

cil on June 30, 1953, the Jackson Committee specifically recomm

that machinery for the preparation of such evaluations should 

ated.9 (Jackson Committee Report, pp. 3, 118, Recommendation 

Action by the Council or any agency on this recommendation 

ferred pending the submission of the ODM report directed by N

tion 873 d. to be submitted pursuant to NSC 159 and NSC 159

Importance of the Net Evaluation

6. In view of the usefulness of the Edwards Report and t

sequent recommendations of the Bull and Jackson Committees, 

portance and desirability of continuing net evaluations of So

pability to injure the United States may be regarded as establish

purposes of Council consideration of problems relating to con

defense or the defense of US installations overseas, it is mean

to have gross estimates of Soviet nuclear capabilities, air streng

unless these are merged with existing US and Allied defensiv

bilities so as to produce an evaluation of the net Soviet capabili

ent and prospective.

Organizational Problems

7. Method of Operation. Experience with the 1951–52 project 

strated emphatically that it was not satisfactory to conduct a n

uation on the basis of one-shot contributions by several ag

melded by one agency or by a group. The Edwards Subcommi

erated on the basis of continuing exchange of material by a tigh

operating group producing in effect “successive approximation

ing to a final refined product. Wherever the responsibility 

placed, and on whatever basis agencies participate, this method 

eration is essential. Moreover, this method of operation can also 

ployed—as it was by the Edwards group—to minimize the s

problem involved in the handling of sensitive information th

be supplied particularly by JCS, CIA, and FBI.

8. Allocation of Responsibility. Three allocations have so f

tried or proposed. The Edwards Subcommittee consisted of a Ch

appointed by the Council (General Edwards was actually nom

by the JCS), and representatives of JCS, CIA, the ICIS, and IIC

9 Extracts from the Jackson Committee Report are ibid., Part 2, pp. 1795–

also Document 151.
agencies, notably ODM and FCDA, were in the position of c

tors and advisors, but did not participate in the final work of 

committee. The NSC 159 recommendation would divide the w

two stages, with JCS and CIA acting jointly in the first, and w

second, or damage, stage handled by an ad hoc committee ch

an NSC representative and including Defense, ICIS, IIC, OD

FCDA. The JCS views on NSC 159, submitted to the Council 

tember 1, 1953, take the position that the Department of Defe

adequate resources in conjunction with “other agencies,” to 

the needed evaluation without resort to additional machinery. 

pears to mean that primary responsibility should be placed s

Defense, with power to call on other agencies as needed. The g

ference between these three methods illustrates the complexit

problem of allocating responsibility so as to bring in all intereste

cies to an appropriate degree and at the same time to have a w

set-up. The following points appear relevant:

a. A fully refined net evaluation involves consideration of 

elements, for which different agencies have primary responsib

a minimum, these include Soviet gross overt attack and defen

bilities. CIA and Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) agenc

cerned with foreign intelligence),10 Soviet gross clandestine at

pabilities (IIC, CIA, AEC principally), Soviet strategy (all inte

agencies), US military defensive and gross retaliatory capabiliti

US non-military defensive capabilities (ODM, FCDA), US inte

curity capabilities (ICIS), and US vulnerability in terms of da

be expected from various scales and types of attack (Defense

FCDA principally). None of these can be considered in isolatio

lustrate, the Soviet attack strategy would be based in part on 

viet estimate of US weaknesses and gaps in defense, and in p

on the Soviet estimate of the degree of damage that might be inf

Hence, it becomes necessary to take theoretical possibilities o

and “war-game” them through from a Soviet standpoint. In th

least, this could not be done properly without constant and f

ticipation of all interested agencies. b. On the other hand, such a multi-agency exercise is on 

impractical and endlessly time-consuming. Some compromise 

struck, as was done in setting up the Edwards Subcommittee. c. It is readily possible to separate out the elements relatin

vulnerability in terms of damage. Moreover, although, as indi

a above these are theoretically interlinked with Soviet strategy, 

tice damage estimates based on assumed hypothetical levels o

would be adequate, since in any event such estimates would be 

brush” in character. Thus it is reasonable to separate out the 

aspect, and charge this phase to a separate group.

10 The principal IAC agencies are State, the three services, and the Joint In

Group of the Joint Staff. [Footnote in the original.] 11 [5 lines not declassified.] [Footnote in the original.]
d. However, it appears neither logical nor practicable to c

that damage aspect with the internal security aspect for which I

IIC are primarily responsible. The principal internal security p

belongs in the “capabilities” rather than the “damage” categor

it concerns Soviet clandestine introduction of nuclear or other w

Thus, the Edwards Subcommittee setup was logical on this p

a practical matter, the internal security agencies are believed 

felt that the Edwards and Bull Reports placed at too low a le

likelihood of Soviet employment of clandestine capabilities. H

assuming the internal security agencies have produced an esti

the likelihood of detection if the Soviets used clandestine me

ultimate question of whether the Soviets would be prepared 

this risk is certainly one of basic Soviet strategy involving broad

siderations than those for which the internal security agencies 

sponsible. The split shown by Mr. McDonnell’s dissent to NSC 1

not be remedied by any organizational changes, although of cou

internal security agencies should participate fully in the final jud

e. As to the position stated in the JCS views on NSC 159, 

known whether the views are firmly held by the JCS or by 

partment of Defense. The particular subject of Continental De

one aspect of the larger problem of a permanent organization 

ducing net evaluations on Soviet capabilities, and CIA’s views 

matter have been stated in the Director’s letter to General Bul

30 June 1953,12 a copy of which has been circulated to the P

Board. In brief, it appears to CIA that to place pre-eminent re

bility in the JCS would be to overlook the legal responsibilitie

Director of Central Intelligence in the field of national intelligen

der the National Security Act of 1947. The President and the 

practice and pursuant to statutory authority depend on the Dir

Central Intelligence, representing the coordinated views of the 

gence Agencies, for foreign intelligence estimates, and on the 

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking as the representativ

services, for military advice. Thus, the President and Council c

receive guidance in the most useful and complete form throug

fective amalgamation of the functions of the two.

9. Personnel and Facilities. If it is accepted that a tightly-kn

ating group is the appropriate method of operation, questions 

sonnel and facilities become important. In the case of the Edwar

committee, these were handled by the furnishing of facilities in 

area of the Department of Defense and by the furnishing of sec

and other personnel by the JCS and CIA. It is believed tha

arrangements were satisfactory, and that they could be repeate

out strain on the contributing agencies.

Target Date, Scope and Projection Period

10. Target Date. Since national policy in the field of contine

fense is now laid down comprehensively in NSC 5408,13 with pr

12 Document 150. 13 See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 609–633.
extended for some years into the future, it appears unlikely th

will be a major overhauling of this policy during 1954, barring 

changes in the intelligence picture of Soviet capabilities or int

11. The Edwards Subcommittee completed its work 

months, but found that this was too short a period in which to 

all of the important aspects. The Edwards Subcommittee had 

lar difficulty with the question of Soviet strategy in the event 

whether the Soviets would allocate the bulk of their stockpil

US or a large part of it against non-US targets. A successor gro

find it desirable to submit this question to thorough intelligen

sideration, based on the material on capabilities and damag

oped by the group. This question was referred to by General E

in a personal memorandum to the Executive Secretary, NSC, d

May 1953.14 General Edwards also referred to the desirability 

ering the extent of strategic warning that might be expected, o

nerability study, and of a psychological study of the effects on 

ple of the US of assumed levels of atomic attacks. In view 

complexity of these problems, it appears highly desirable 

new study be allowed at least six months, and if possible lon

completion.

12. To allow six months or more for a new evaluation woul

the completion after 1 October 1954, and would eliminate its 

ness as a supporting element for work on the FY 1956 budge

ever, this disadvantage appears outweighed by the consid

stated in paragraph 11.

13. Scope. The Edwards Report considered not only the co

tal United States but also key US installations outside the US, 

ered in terms of the usefulness of such installations to US 

offensive action. There was some difficulty about the definition 

overseas installations, leading to a misunderstanding affecting 

submission. Apart from avoiding a repetition of this, the scop

Edwards Report appeared workable.

14. Projection. The Edwards Report projected its conclusi

ward for two years, and General Edwards recommended tha

studies adopt a projection period not greater than this. For p

purposes it would be desirable to have a longer projection perio

many policy decisions cannot bear fruit for three or more year

ever, from a working standpoint, it would be extremely difficu

a firm enough picture of either Soviet or US capabilities, in ord

14 General Edwards’ memorandum to the NSC Executive Secretary, Ma

vided comments by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee concerning future ev

of the Soviet Union’s net capabilities to damage the United States. (National 

RG 273, Policy Papers, NSC 140, Box 56)
the 

war-gaming exercise. The Planning Board should c

whether the policy considerations should outweigh working d

ties and limitations.

Recommendations

In the light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the N

Security Council issue an appropriate directive or directives:

a.15 Establishing a Net Evaluation Subcommittee comp

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of 

Intelligence.

b.15 Charging this Subcommittee with the responsibility 

viding estimates of net capabilities as needed to support the fo

tion of national policy.

c. Directing that this Subcommittee prepare by 1 March 

evaluation, covering the period through (mid-1957), of the ne

bilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the continental 

States and on key US installations overseas, the latter being de

terms of their importance to US counter-offensive action.

d. Attaching to the Subcommittee, for the purpose of this 

ation, the Chairman of the ICIS and IIC respectively, with full 

participation on all matters concerning Soviet capabilities that 

internal security of the US, and of the likelihood of Soviet empl

of such capabilities in the event of attack.

e. Establishing a Vulnerability Subcommittee composed of 

retary of Defense, the Director of Defense Mobilization, and t

eral Civil Defense Administrator, with power to call upon othe

cies for contributions.

f. Directing this Vulnerability Subcommittee to prepare ap

ate studies of the damage, both material and psychological, tha

be inflicted on the US under assumed levels of Soviet delivery 

clear weapons or other attack, such studies to be furnished to 

Evaluation Subcommittee and to be incorporated in the evalua

rected under paragraph c above. For this purpose, the Chairma

Vulnerability Subcommittee, or his representative, should be a

to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee in the preparation of th

evaluation.

15 Items a. and b. could be separated from the rest. Arguably the others w

quire only Planning Board action. [Footnote in the original. NSC 5423, “Direc

Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee,” June 23, 1954, subsequently estab

subcommittee. Additional documentation on the creation and work of the su

tee is in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 800–802, and ibid., 1

vol. XIX, pp. 1, 2, passim.]
174. Draft Memorandum From Director of Central Intellige

Dulles to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Do

Washington, March 3

I am writing this memorandum with reference to the pol

ommended by the National Security Council and approved by t

ident, for increasing observation of Soviet Bloc diplomatic rep

tives, including personnel with international organizations

within the continental United States, with special reference 

whose activities are suspected to extend beyond the scope of 

diplomatic assignments. This policy was most recently stated 

20b(9) of NSC 5408.2 As you know, the President has approv

program being undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investiga

It is our opinion that it may be very helpful to our activi

side of the United States to have such a selective surveillance 

fied within the United States, and that such a program may ha

tential in the field of foreign intelligence information which c

exploited on a continuing basis. The individuals who would b

surveillance are in this country temporarily and eventually wil

for their own or other countries. Information and leads deriv

this program would be of assistance to the Central Intelligence 

in carrying out its responsibilities with regard to this class of 

outside the United States.

We understand that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

for Fiscal Year 1955, which has been approved by the Burea

Budget and is before the committees of the Congress, made n

sion for this increased activity and contains no funds which ca

located to its support. Because a program for observation of 

diplomats is one of considerable sensitivity, it is not considere

able to reopen the Bureau’s budget for Fiscal Year 1955, which 

before the Congress, in view of the obviously attendant publi

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Securi

Records, NSC Series, Briefing Notes, CIA-Funds, Box 4. Top Secret. A copy w

the Attorney General for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Two 

ten notations in the upper right corner read: “Copy given to Cabell March 31” 

different handwriting, “RC draft after talking with P.” RC was Robert Cutle

cial Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. A brief memorandu

versation by Cutler describing his talk with the President, at 11:30 a.m. on M

in ibid. The President’s views are reflected in this draft memorandum, which C

sumably prepared for Dulles’ signature. 2 NSC 5408 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp

Paragraph 20b(9) is redacted, however. The fully declassified text of NSC 5408 

tional Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5408.
are, therefore, proposing, because of our interest in developing t

gram on an experimental basis, that the Central Intelligence 

make available during Fiscal Year 1955 to the Federal Bureau 

vestigation, funds from its Contingency Reserve up to an am

bring the program to the full stage of development considere

able by the FBI by the end of Fiscal Year 1955; [1 line not declas

If the program is deemed successful during the course of 

velopment in Fiscal Year 1955, it is understood that the Federal 

of Investigation would provide for the entire activity for Fisc

1956 and thereafter in its regular budget requests to the Congre

would continue to make available to the Central Intelligence 

the information and leads derived from thereafter carrying out 

gram which would be of assistance to the Central Intelligence A

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security 

has explained to the President how this matter is to be arrange

approval of this proposal is, accordingly, requested.3 Upon re

such approval, I will discuss the matter with the Chairmen of the 

and Senate Appropriation Committees.

Central Intelligence 

3 A March 15 letter from Dodge to Dulles indicates Bureau of the Budget 

of the monetary transfer. (Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for Nationa

Affairs Records, NSC Series, Briefing Notes, CIA-Funds, Box 4) 4 The draft memorandum is unsigned.
175. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Com

IAC–M–150 Washington, May 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Allen W. Dulles 

Presiding2

Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull (Ret.)

Presiding2

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department o

Brigadier General John M. Willems, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G

Department of the Army

Rear Admiral H. C. Daniel, acting for Director of Naval Intelligence, De

of the Navy

Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, 

States Air Force

Brigadier General Edward H. Porter, Deputy Director for Intelligence, T

Staff

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Atomic Energy Commission Representative to 

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bure

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency

*Dr. H. Marshall Chadwell, Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified] Central Intelligence Agency

*[name not declassified] Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. Ludwell L. Montague, Central Intelligence Agency

*[name not declassified] Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. R. Jack Smith, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Harold P. Ford, Central Intelligence Agency

*[name not declassified] Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified] Central Intelligence Agency

Dr. Allan Evans, Department of State

Lt. Colonel Vasco J. Fenili, Department of the Army

Lt. Colonel James P. Barry, Department of the Army

Lt. Colonel H. N. Maples, Department of the Army

Captain N. E. Smith, USN, Department of the Navy

Mr. Lawrence Healey, Department of the Navy

Brigadier General Millard Lewis, United States Air Force

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 85–S0036

Secret. The meeting was held in the DCI’s conference room. 2 Part of meeting. [Footnote in the original.]
Colonel Donald H. Ainsworth, United States Air Force

Colonel John J. Morrow, United States Air Force

Colonel Robert Totten, United States Air Force

Mr. Donald F. Benjamin, United States Air Force

Mr. Samuel S. Rockwell, United States Air Force

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, The Joint Staff

Colonel Samuel M. Lansing, The Joint Staff

Captain Ray E. Malpass, USN, The Joint Staff

Richard D. 

S

Approval of Minutes (IAC–M–149, 28 April)4

1. Action: Approved.

Progress Report, Ad Hoc Committee (Watch) (IAC–D–6/1 (Revise

April 1954)5

2. Action: Approved the ad hoc committee’s recommenda

follows:

a. The Terms of Reference (attachment 1)6 were appro

amended, subject to final concurrence by the FBI member be

suance as DCID 1/2.7

b. Implementation of the Terms of Reference and activatio

Indications Center (see attachment 2) should be effected on 1 Ju

or earlier if practicable.

c. The Ad Hoc IAC Committee (Watch) should continue 

tence at least until activation of the Indications Center, should c

supervision of the preparation of the Indications Intelligence P

attachment 3), should prepare for the convening of the propos

ference to systematize and coordinate collection of indication

mation and intelligence, and should continue its examination 

vant systems, procedures, and channels. The ad hoc committe

continuing examination of channels for transmission of warni

asked to develop procedures to insure timely alerting of IAC m

IAC agencies, and other appropriate Government bodies.

3. Discussion: Mr. Dulles stressed the great importance of ade

performing the watch function, as exemplified by its recogn

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

4 Not printed.

5 Not found.

6 Attachments 1–3 were not found.

7 Document 179.
NSC 162/28 as a major intelligence objective. He proposed to 

with the Council, on the basis of this paper as issue

materials available to the NSC and Government agencies may 

vided to the Watch Committee in connection with performing 

sion and functions.

4. It was brought out by discussion of proposed change

draft terms of reference that it is desirable sharply to focus th

function as one of providing maximum prior warning of th

nence of hostile action. At the same time, the watch machine

have unrestricted access to a great variety of materials in orde

form that function. Experience has shown that without such 

and without recognition of the high priority to be accorded th

process, that process tends to become static.

5. Various members commented on the subordinate relatio

Watch Committee to the IAC. It was recognized that the Watc

mittee could present to the IAC any problem, substantive o

dural, affecting its operation and that the IAC’s review of th

Committee’s operation would tend to prevent the developmen

understanding as to the Watch function or product.

6. It was understood that the proposed approach to field 

gence activities would include non-military as well as military a

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda item 7: Annex to N

tion No. 1074.]

8 See Document 163.
176. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, May 

SUBJECT

Meeting in Office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Tuesday, 4 

1954, with Admiral Radford; Mr. Amory, and General Bull were present 

DCI and Rear Admiral Layton, General Porter, and two other officers w

present

1. In the meeting which started at 3 P. M., Mr. Dulles ex

his purpose by stating that he was hopeful that the Director of 

Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could 

changing views come to an agreement on the proposal for prop

ganizational Arrangements for Continental Defense.”

2. Mr. Dulles noted the divergence of judgments between t

Chiefs of Staff and others on one side, and CIA and others on th

side as indicated in the two solutions (alternatives A and B of 

to NSC Action 873–d)2 recommended in papers relating to the “

pabilities of the USSR to inflict damage on the US,” which is n

for resolution by the NSC. He felt that this discussion today cou

up some misapprehension and lead to an agreed view.

3. Mr. Dulles explained that there was a dual responsibility 

equally by the Director of CIA and the JCS for advising the N

the intelligence and operational features respectively of an appr

the net capabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the 

noted that other agencies would have responsibility also but 

limited areas requiring only part time participation to the exte

essary to insure that their responsibilities are fully met but no

extent requiring a disclosure of war plans, or the extensive use 

highly secret documents. He emphasized also that CIA partic

would be on a very limited high level basis, and that the few C

resentatives involved would be professional men who could be 

to protect all information made available to them. He did not 

that revelation of war plans as such would be found necessary b

operational information would be required. He pointed out 

could not carry out his full responsibility as DCI without such 

edge of our own capabilities.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Int

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3. Secret. Drafted by General Bull on May 27. Amo

“Concur” followed by his signature below General Bull’s initials at the en

memorandum. 2 See footnote 2, Document 173.
4. Admiral Radford replied that he frankly didn

t understa

there was any necessity for this high level organization to mak

manders estimate. He felt that if CIA made its coordinated inte

estimate, the JCS and the Defense Department were, with this e

available, competent to do the rest of the evaluation for the N

the President, based on their own knowledge of and responsib

operational matters and war plans. He saw no need for setting 

other coordinating agency. He didn’t see this need as recently 

out in the Continental Defense field.

5. General Bull pointed out that a single intelligence esti

gross capabilities was not the final word on intelligence—tha

necessary to work by phases in a process of comparing gros

gence estimates with our operational capabilities. This pr

would result in new intelligence estimates based on a know

our own strengths and dispositions such as the Kremlin is bel

have to guide its decisions. This knowledge is not now availab

own national intelligence agency. Such a procedure for compa

pabilities on both sides, we believe, is essential and is a sh

sponsibility of DCI and Defense.

6. Mr. Dulles again emphasized that he did not want to 

those areas of classified information not essential to carrying 

responsibility and stated that although the NSC planning for d

ing the net evaluation was stated as urgent he would not pres

tion at the next NSC meeting pending further consideration by 

ral Radford.

7. Mr. Amory called Admiral Radford’s attention to the 

since no defense can be perfect, there will always be a portion 

major attacking force that will get through. This hostile force

senting the remaining net capability of the enemy at that time

a capability for attack. It continues to be the Director’s respo

to evaluate this capability as it was his responsibility before a

ing the operation.

8. In response to Admiral Radford’s expressed desire to 

more thought, the Director, in leaving, stated he would be ple

discuss the problem further and felt sure they could work it o

H

3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
177. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Continental

Defense Committee (Bull) to Director of Central 

Intelligence Dulles1

Washington, May 

SUBJECT

Net Evaluation Procedures

1. In addition to the point that we have been making that 

has a legal responsibility to advise the Commander (and his NSC

intelligence estimates of both gross and net capabilities, prob

tentions and probable courses of action, there are much more 

arguments in favor of joint intelligence operational considera

follows:

a. Admiral Radford and others infer that all they need is t

mal estimate of gross capabilities which they in the Defense Dep

can then use in working out the net capabilities. This view is n

an oversimplification of the problem but it puts the Director in 

sition of abdicating his responsibilities for estimating for “Th

mander” the Bloc’s probable intentions and probable courses of acti

the Director cannot do in a satisfactory and useful manner in a v

excluded from knowledge of our own deployments and our own cap

If the Director’s estimates are done in this manner he is asked 

mate the thinking of the Kremlin leaders which is based on t

telligence of our capabilities which they most certainly know 

detail, whereas the Director in his estimate is permitted to have 

comparable knowledge. The Director’s knowledge of US and a

pabilities and dispositions must be at least comparable to the 

gence possessed by the Kremlin leadership. To think, as I belie

miral Radford and the military in general do, that the Comm

estimate is made by G–3 after receiving a G–2 contribution ov

the sound procedures which govern all good staff operation

G–2/G–3 field.

b. No G–2 makes his estimates of enemy capabilities, p

courses of action, or probable intentions or advises his Comma

an operational vacuum. By the closest hour by hour contact an

daily or more frequent briefings, he is always able to make his e

of probable hostile courses of action based on not only the enem

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Int

Job 80–R0440R, Box 3. Secret. The typed words “Condensed by Robert Am

(with Amory’s handwritten initials) appear below Bull’s signature at the en

memorandum.
capabilities in manpower, weapons, organization, training, lea

dispositions, etc. but also from his estimate of what the enemy 

bly knows concerning our own strengths, dispositions and int

c. The Director as our National G–2 should have the sam

and duties as any G–2 in the lower echelons has. Otherwise he 

fulfill his legal responsibilities.

2. Although I recognize that a case can be made that the “

level” presents different problems with a justified restriction 

lation of war plans, certain planned courses of action, certain 

tions, weapons development, etc. should be made available to D

IAC on a very strict “need-to-know” basis, I believe a clear de

of intelligence requirements in the operational field could be 

out jointly and I doubt that a knowledge of detailed war plan

be necessary. In general, DCI should get only operational info

which it is reasonable to expect the enemy to have in whole or 

We have no present mechanism to meet our minimum ne

are blocked by self imposed departmental restrictions or grou

which severely limit our intelligence investigation of our own 

a handicap not imposed on our enemies.

3. I want to point out also from my experience a real stu

block in getting Defense to accept our proposal. That is, the b

ing of the responsible group to include other agencies such as 

ICIS who have a similar justification for full responsibility in th

limited field—hostile attack on the Continental US by Soviet 

Their exclusion from overall responsibility can be justified on p

grounds only but I think it must be done to make the joint effo

I think it might be acceptable to insure them the right and du

heard at appropriate times and to comment on the final repo

least segments thereof that bear in any way on their responsib

ests. I believe you should support the probable Defense Dep

desire to exclude them but to do so on a practical basis related 

total lack of responsibility in the fields of foreign intelligence 

eign deployments and war plans which quite rightly should 

on a strict “need-to-know”. They will resist as we have but I 

the exclusion can be justified on grounds acceptable to the NS

H
178. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, May 1

SUBJECT

Supplement to Minutes of OCB Meeting of May 5, 1954

At the luncheon meeting of the OCB on May 5, the Boa

curred in a proposal to allocate additional funds to support a s

projects designed to encourage ratification of the European D

Community. This proposal, originating with the Department o

is based on the view that activities in this request to date hav

useful but need to be accelerated to the extent practicable. Th

eration and the additional allocation of funds would be desi

support EDC ratification through such media as the press

speeches, labor groups, etc.

The Board concurred in a request [less than 1 line not decl

to the Director of the Budget for an allocation of such additiona

as may be necessary to expand and accelerate this program. [5 

declassified]

Elmer B

Executive 

1 Source: National Security Council, OCB Record of Project Approvals, 1

Top Secret. Copies were sent to Dulles, Smith, Anderson, and Cutler.
179. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/2

Washington, May 1

TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE 

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 6, NSCID No. 

paragraph 10,a,(1) of NSC 162/2,3 approved by the President o

tober 1953, the following terms of reference for the Watch Co

of the IAC are hereby established:

Preamble

The Soviet/Communist bloc, as a potential aggressor, has 

pability to initiate suddenly at any time and in a place and b

ods of its own choosing, hostile action4 in such strength as to 

threaten the security of the United States. The mission of pr

earliest possible warning of hostile action will be undertaken 

IAC agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of th

est priority. The proper discharge of this mission depends u

carrying out of complementary watch and estimating function

A. Name

Watch Committee of the IAC

B. Mission

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States 

ment of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endan

security of the United States.

C. Functions

1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing 

intelligence plan for the levying upon IAC members, and the 

ing from other U.S. agencies through appropriate channels, o

telligence requirements necessary to provide the maximum d

advance warning and for recommending the collection prio

these requirements.

2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, b

rent and cumulative, on an all-source basis, furnished by the IA

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Misc. NS

Secret. NSC Executive Secretary Lay circulated this directive under cover of 

randum to the National Security Council dated June 1. 2 Document 255.

3 Text in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 577–597. 4 Aggressive action by armed forces, or by organizations or individuals i

of military strategy. [Footnote in the original.]
cies relating to the imminence of hostilities, and to develop th

the conclusions as to indications of:

a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities agai

1 the continental United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S

abroad,

2 U.S. allies or their forces,

3 areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.

b. any other development, actual or potential, susceptibl

rect exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which 

jeopardize the security of the United States.

3. To report promptly their conclusions, together with sig

indications, to the principals of the IAC and other appropriate 

ents. In the event of an impending critical situation, IAC princip

be immediately advised after which the provisions of parag

NSCID No. 1, will apply.

4. To make recommendations to the IAC, or member a

thereof, including such divergent views as may be recorded.

5. The Watch Committee shall avoid duplicating IAC est

functions.

D. Composition and Organization

1. The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Offi

resenting each IAC member organization, one of whom will b

nated by the DCI, after consultation with the IAC, as Chairma

specified period. The Committee will be supported by an Ind

Center, headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and consi

an administrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.

[Omitted here is an organizational chart of the Watch Com

2. The Watch Committee will meet on a regular schedule 

termined by the Committee and on special occasions when re

by one or more of its members or their principals.

E. Duties and Responsibilities

The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the Ind

Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and respons

1. Develop and operate on a current and continuing ba

Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizi

coordinating through appropriate channels the world-wide co

by U.S. agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to th

Committee mission.

2. Arrange through the IAC or the appropriate member 

for exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of infor

and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission; and, 

other actions, arrange, at appropriate times, that representatives 
field intelligence activities confer with the IAC and the Watc

mittee in order effectively to coordinate, but not direct, field 

gence activities with the activities of the Watch Committee.

3. Arrange with the IAC agencies for a systematic screeni

information and intelligence received by them by any means 

purpose of immediately extracting and forwarding to the Ind

Center all items which may contain indications of Soviet/Com

intentions as set forth in C, 2 above (this procedure is in add

the action called for in paragraph 6 of NSCID No. 1); an agen

uation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possi

4. Members will maintain close and intimate liaison with 

spective parent agencies to assist them in ensuring that all p

information and intelligence is being made available to the Ind

Center.

5. Continuously screen all pertinent information and inte

received from all IAC agencies for indications relating to th

Committee mission.

6. Develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of ea

cation in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies b

ified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication 

7. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watc

mittee the selection of indications for consideration by the Co

in regular and special meetings.

8. Prepare material for use by the Watch Committee to ass

deliberations and the formulation of its conclusions.

9. Coordinate the reproduction and dissemination of ap

Watch Committee reports.

10. Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integr

of all available information and intelligence pertinent to the 

Committee mission.

11. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display materia

will most effectively assist in illustrating and interpreting gra

the current and cumulative indications.

12. Concurrently, but not as a substitute for current met

analysis and evaluation, develop and test (with outside assistan

sirable) the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the 

on an experimental basis with a view to their eventual use in 

effectively the Watch Committee in the accomplishment of its m

13. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by 

in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.5

5 Printed from an unsigned copy.
180. Memorandum From the Chief of the International

Organizations Division, Central Intelligence Agency (B

to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intellig

Agency (Wisner)

Washington, May 1

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy 

tor for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 24. Secret. 2 pag

declassified.]

181. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, May 1

PRINCIPLES TO ASSURE COORDINATION 

OF GRAY ACTIVITIES

1. Purpose

1.1 To assure coordination of information (which term as 

this paper includes propaganda and other related activities) u

uted to the U.S. Government, the National Security Council, 

165/1,2 dated 24 October 1953:

a. Authorized the U.S. Information Agency, when conside

visable, and except in the case of operations of the Voice of A

to communicate with other peoples without attribution to the U

ernment on matters for which attribution could be assumed by t

ernment if necessary, and

b. Directed that the Operations Coordinating Board agre

principles which will govern such unattributed activities (her

such activities are included in the definition of gray).

These principles, having been agreed upon by the OCB, a

lished herewith for the guidance of officials concerned.

1.2 The intent of this paper is to underline the need f

coordination, to insure that all information activities are con

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Box 

OCB Executive Officer Staats circulated this paper to the Operations Coordinat

by memorandum on May 18. (Ibid.) 2 Entitled “Mission of USIA”; text in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. 

pp. 1752–1754.
securely and effectively, to prevent duplication and to avoid 

rassment to the U.S. Government. Responsibilities in the wh

black fields are clearly established, but in the gray field respo

has been assigned to more than one agency. Therefore, this pa

cerns itself primarily with the criteria to use in determining w

USIA or the Department of State or the OCB designee will un

a particular gray activity. Thus to carry out fully the intent of 

per, there must be close liaison in the field among representa

the agencies concerned so that each item of gray activity will 

sidered in light of:

a. The assignments of responsibility and the criteria set 

Paragraph 3.

b. The merits of the case, assets available, and other co

tions which may apply locally.

1.3 Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions or Principal Officers (th

ing State Department official at a subordinate post) have the ov

sponsibility for insuring that field coordination at all posts fo

they have supervisory responsibility is satisfactory (Paragra

Moreover, State and USIA both at headquarters and in the field 

responsible for initiating liaison with the OCB designee concern

respective gray activities, so that the latter knows of existing 

templated activities and can preserve the security of its own ac

2. Definitions

For the purpose of this paper, the following definitions o

are used in describing both the content of information and the 

activity.

White Acknowledged as an official statement or act of 

Government, or emanates from a source associated 

enough with the U.S. Government to reflect an offici

point. The information is true and factual. It also 

all output identified as coming from U.S. official so

Gray The true source (U.S. Government) is not r

to the target audience. The activity engaged in p

appears to emanate from a non-official American 

or an indigenous, non-hostile source, or there ma

attribution.3 Gray is that information whose co

such that the effect will be increased if the hand 

U.S. Government and in some cases any American 

3 In areas where activity is conducted without any attribution and it ma

embarrassment to an agency of the U.S. Government, liaison officers will carefu

all aspects of the proposed activity before deciding whether such an operati

be undertaken. [Footnote in the original.]
ipation are not revealed. It is simply a means 

U.S. to present viewpoints which are in the int

U.S. foreign policy, but which will be acceptable o

acceptable to the intended target audience than wi

ficial government statement.

Black The activity engaged in appears to emanate 

source (government, party, group, organization, 

usually hostile in nature. The interest of the U.S. G

ment is concealed and the U.S. Government wou

responsibility. The content may be partially or com

fabricated, but that which is fabricated is made to 

credible to the target audience. Black activity is also 

designed to cause embarrassment to the ostensible 

or to force the ostensible source to take action ag

will.

3. Responsibility for Operations

3.1 Since the responsibility is assigned for gray activity t

than one agency, liaison officers in the field, and in Washington 

ever necessary, must determine which agency will undertake 

tivity. The inherent risk must be assessed by means of criteria s

in Paragraph 3.4, bearing in mind that activities in which USIA 

engage must be those which the U.S. Government could ackno

if necessary.

3.2 Authorized to engage in white activity directed at fore

diences are: The State Department, USIA, the Foreign Operatio

ministration (as assigned in Reorganization Plans 7 and 8) the D

Department and other U.S. Government departments and age

necessary.

3.3 Responsibility for engaging in black propaganda and o

lated activities is assigned solely to the designee of the OCB. L

it should be kept in mind that activities, either gray or black, con

into denied areas from their peripheries, other than radio, are 

responsibility of the OCB designee.

3.4 Responsibility for gray is assigned to the OCB designe

and State. The following criteria will assist in determining the re

bility for the execution of a proposed gray activity. If the answe

of the three questions below is affirmative, the activity is the 

sponsibility of the OCB designee. If government interest is not t

vealed but the answer to all three questions listed below is nega

activity may fall within the charter of State, USIA or the OCB d

a. Would the disclosure of the source occasion serious 

rassment to the U.S. Government or to the agencies responsible 

information activity?
b. Would the activity or the materials disseminated be s

discredited if it were to become known that the U.S. Governme

responsible? c. Would the outlet be seriously damaged if it were to 

known that the activity is subsidized or otherwise assisted 

U.S. Government?

3.5 The Department of State and USIA may engage in gray 

which can be acknowledged by the U.S. Government if necess

vided that before a decision or commitment is made, the OCB de

representative, wherever one is stationed, is consulted and his 

rence obtained. Concurrence shall be given unless the OCB des

of the opinion that a proposed operation will jeopardize its acti

established mechanisms, or does not comply with the criteria i

giving its concurrence the OCB designee is not assuming respo

for the successful completion of an activity conducted by another 

Necessary coordination between State and USIA and the OCB d

will be undertaken through liaison channels described in para

Wherever the OCB designee has no such representative approv

Chief of Diplomatic Mission or Principal Officer will be obtaine

4. Machinery for Application of the Criteria

4.1 The coordination required for application of the criteri

in Paragraph 3.4 is to be achieved by creation and use of app

liaison arrangements in the field and in Washington.

4.2 The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, th

tor of USIA and the designee of the OCB will each designate m

acceptable points of contact in selected missions for field coord

In any case in which an agency authorized to engage in gray a

proposes to use the personnel or facilities of the Departmen

fense abroad, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Specia

ations) will designate a mutually acceptable point of contact at 

propriate location. Responsibility is vested in the Chiefs of Dip

Missions or Principal Officers for insuring that field coordinati

posts for which they have supervisory responsibility is adequ

criteria are correctly applied, and that decisions are within the 

work of national policy.

4.3 Coordination in Washington, to supplement that in t

is the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of State for Pu

fairs and the Director of USIA. They will be responsible for in

appropriate liaison arrangements and clearances within and b

their respective departments and with the designee of the OC

4.4 Whenever deemed necessary by the Assistant Secr

State for Public Affairs, the Director of USIA and the OCB d

representatives of other United States Agencies engaged in i

tion activities abroad will be included in such coordination ma
In any case in which an agency authorized to engage in gray a

proposes to use the personnel or facilities of the Department 

fense abroad, the representative of that Department designat

suant to paragraph 4.2 shall be informed of the nature of the a

4.5 Whenever the field representatives of the agencies here

cerned are unable to reach an agreement as to which agency w

dertake a gray project, the matter will be referred to Washington 

vice and decision by the appropriate representatives of the a

involved. Communications from the field on such matters will be 

channels of the OCB designee whenever the OCB designee is men

4.6 The designated liaison officers at each station in the fi

meet at the earliest practicable date to review all gray opera

State and USIA which are currently functioning, and apply the 

herein described to determine if they should be continued, tran

to the OCB designee, or terminated.

182. Draft National Security Council Directive1

NSC 5423 Washington, June 2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE FOR A N

CAPABILITIES EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

1. Pursuant to authorization of the President there is her

rected the preparation of a report assessing the net capabilitie

USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon t

tinental United States and key U.S. installations overseas. This 

pabilities report will cover the period through July 1, 1957 and 

be submitted to the Council on or before November 1, 1954

cover all types of attack, direct or clandestine, and will deal pr

with the initial phases of war, i.e., the period during which all 

of the Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons might be expended

1 Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSC Policy Papers, NSC 5432, Bo

Secret. The draft was circulated to the National Security Council under cover 

23 note from NSC Executive Secretary Lay. The draft was approved by the Pre

June 24. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, Annotated L

dividual NSC Papers) NSC 5423 superseded NSC 140. For documentation on 

140 series, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 205–208, 328–349

368–370, and ibid., Part 2, 1177–1178. For a CIA view of the evolution of Net 

ties Estimates, see Document 189.
include consideration of the several courses of action which th

is capable of executing and in support of which the Soviet 

weapons stockpile might be expended. In determining the net 

an attack, the report will take into account the mid-1957 s

presently approved defense programs.

2. In order to carry out this directive, there is hereby estab

Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC compose

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Inte

and the following members for the specific purposes noted belo

a. The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Con

and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Inte

curity for matters relating to internal security;

b. The Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for matte

ing to continuity of government, sufficiency and continuity o

try, and urban vulnerability;

c. The Federal Civil Defense Administrator for matters re

civil defense;

d. The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, for matte

ing to Atomic Energy Commission activities.

3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will serve a

man of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee. The S

mittee will have a temporary staff, composed of individuals a

by the participating agencies and headed by a Director chosen 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Centr

ligence. It is expected that members of this staff will be assigne

project as their primary duty during the period of preparatio

net capabilities report.

4. The functions of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subco

will include:

a. Responsibility for the security of the project during the 

of preparation of the report.

b. General supervision of the project at all stages includin

(1) Preparation of subsidiary terms of reference as a guide 

liminary reports on selected factors essential to the assessmen

preliminary reports to be contributed to the project by the vario

cies concerned.

(2) Preparation of planning or intelligence assumptions to 

as a basis for preliminary reports by the various agencies.

(3) Review of preliminary reports contributed and issuan

quests for reconsideration or amplification.

(4) Examination of data used in preparation of preliminary 

as necessary and provided that war plans and intelligence sou

methods are not unnecessarily disclosed.

(5) Decisions concerning handling and distribution of prel

reports and data contributed by the various agencies.
c. Preparation of intermediate working papers as required

d. Preparation and submission of the final report for con

tion by the NSC.

5. The National Security Council staff will furnish an Execut

retary for the Subcommittee. The agencies participating in the w

the Subcommittee are hereby requested to furnish appropriate a

trative services. All personnel participating in the work of the S

mittee will have appropriate security clearances and will be ins

in whatever special security measures the Subcommittee adopts

6. The Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee hereby 

lished is empowered under the terms of this directive to call 

agency of the government for relevant information, evaluatio

estimates, subject only to establishment of appropriate s

arrangements and careful limitation of access to highly sensit

terial so that there will not be any unnecessary disclosure of wa

or intelligence sources and methods.

7. Distribution of the final report of the Subcommittee wil

termined by the President.

183. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board1

Washington, July 2

REPORT ON NSC 59/12 AND NSC 127/13

1. NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program and Psy

ical Warfare Planning,” approved by the President March 19, 19

been largely superseded by subsequent directives, notably: Re

zation Plan No. 8,4 which established the United States Infor

Agency; the President’s letter of June 1, 1953, to heads of Ex

1 Source: National Archives, RG 273, National Security Council Files, NS

Secret. Attached to the report is OCB Acting Executive Officer George Morgan

covering memorandum to NSC Executive Secretary Lay, which indicated tha

erations Coordinating Board approved the report on July 21. The report was f

to the National Security Council under cover of a July 23 memorandum from 

ecutive Secretary Lay. (Ibid.) 2 Document 2.

3 See Document 123.

4 See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1709–1711.
Departments;

and Executive Order No. 10483,which established 

erations Coordinating Board. The functions of the Psychologica

tions Coordinating Committee, established pursuant to NSC 59

transferred by the President by a special memorandum to the NS

September 3, 1953,7 to the Operations Coordinating Board. The PO

been discontinued as a separate coordinating arrangement. OCB 

ments for former POCC functions are described in Annex “A”.8

2. The OCB has noted with approval certain interagency r

ships and arrangements as indicated in Annex “A”. It is con

that these arrangements will serve the requirements of inte

mental coordination of international information activities un

time and under such conditions of hostilities as the President m

erwise direct. In the event that the NSC in its consideration of 

policy and organizational arrangements with respect to prescri

aters of war determines that an information and psychological 

arrangement may be required different from that set forth in 

“A”, the OCB when directed by the NSC, will develop specific 

mendations for its consideration.

3. NSC 127/1, approved by the National Security Council 

24, 1952, NSC Action No. 657, concurred in a plan for conduct

chological operations during general hostilities submitted by 

chological Strategy Board, subject to two modifications:

a. Overt information facilities and personnel in military 

of operations were to be made available to the U.S. military com

designated by the JCS during a period of hostilities. Determin

the facilities and personnel so transferred and their later retu

to be coordinated by the Psychological Strategy Board.

b. Subsequently, the responsibility for the determinati

placed upon the organization established pursuant to NSC 59

4. The President approved NSC 127/1 as a basis for em

planning related to sudden general hostilities and directed th

sidiary plans and measures should provide maximum flexibilit

President in determining the ultimate organization required 

scale general hostilities.

5. NSC 127/1 was designed for a period of full mobiliz

general hostilities and therefore did not apply to the hostilitie

rea. Subsequent to the approval of NSC 127/1, the President on 

12, 1953 assigned responsibility to the ODM and the Bureau 

5 Text in Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 351–354. 6 Document 157.

7 The memorandum is dated September 2; see Document 158.

8 Entitled “Interagency Liaison with U.S. Information Agency,” dated Ju

printed.
Budget, under the coordination of the President

s Advisory C

tee on Reorganization, for the development of a plan of organ

for full mobilization required for general hostilities. No speci

related to information and psychological warfare activities has y

developed. The OCB apparently has no responsibility under NSC 

for any aspects of this planning.

6. A PSB contingency plan, D–11b, “National Overt Propagan

icy Guidance for General War,”9 is still in effect and will continu

utilized as appropriate. The OCB will refer it for revision or ot

posal by the appropriate authority as indicated by the plan of or

tion for full mobilization (par. 5 above) when provisions for info

and psychological warfare activities have been developed and ap

Recommendation

It is recommended:

7. That the NSC, recognizing that the organizational asp

NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 are obsolete, rescind these papers w

prejudice to the principles of operation and the responsibilitie

partments and agencies to engage in psychological warfare a

chological warfare planning enunciated therein or elsewhere.

8. That the NSC note that the OCB serves as the body for 

with requirements for interdepartmental coordination concernin

seas information and psychological warfare activities in carry

NSC assignments or upon specific request by participating 

ments and agencies.

9. That the NSC note that the OCB developed, on an urg

sis, a detailed contingency plan for information and psychologic

fare activities in Indochina and that the OCB will not develop a

ther detailed subsidiary plans of this type for designated areas 

so directed by the NSC.

9 Not found.

184. Editorial Note

In July 1953 Congress created the Commission on the Organ

of the Executive Branch of the Government to look into the organ

of the Executive Branch and report back to the Congress. (P.L. 

proved July 10, 1953; 67 Stat. 142) On July 24, 1953, President Eise

named former President Herbert Hoover as chairman of the c

sion. (Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953, page 516) The Hoover Comm
as it was called, delegated a small sub-group, or task force, und

eral Mark W. Clark to review the relationship of the intellig

ganizations to the executive.

President Eisenhower, wanting a separate report on the C

rectorate of Plans to be presented to him personally and not 

gress, asked General James H. Doolittle to conduct a special st

Document 185. For the Doolittle report, see Document 192.

The Doolittle report was made available to General Clar

force, which completed classified and unclassified reports in M

A May 4, 1955, memorandum from the Secretary of State’s 

Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research Fisher Howe to 

Secretary of State Hoover described the work of the Clark tas

its members’ contacts with Department of State officials, 

Department’s views on areas needing improvement. (N

Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5200/5–455) The c

version of the Clark report is Document 220; the unclassified 

is Document 221.

185. Letter From President Eisenhower to General James H

Doolittle1

Washington, July 2

RE

Panel of Consultants on Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Ag

Dear General Doolittle:

I have requested you, and you have agreed, to act as Chai

a panel of consultants to conduct a study of the covert activitie

Central Intelligence Agency. With your concurrence I have 

Messrs. William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William Pawle

with you as members of the panel. Mr. S. Paul Johnston has 

agreed to serve as Executive Director of the panel.

It is my desire that the Panel of Consultants should und

comprehensive study of the covert activities of the Central Inte

Agency, in particular those carried out under the terms of NS

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Administration Series. Secret.
of August 28, 1951,2 and NSC 5412 of March 15, 1954.3 You w

sider the personnel factors, the security, the adequacy, the effic

the relative costs of these operations and, as far as possible, equ

cost of the over-all efforts to the results achieved. You will ma

recommendations calculated to improve the conduct of these 

tions. To the extent that agencies of the Government, other t

Central Intelligence Agency, are engaged in covert operations 

may parallel, duplicate, or supplement the operations of CIA, y

investigate such other operations conducted by any other dep

or agency of the Government in order to insure, insofar as prac

that the field of foreign clandestine operations is adequately c

and that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort or expen

In view of the particularly sensitive nature of these covert 

tions, their relation to the conduct of our foreign policy, and 

that these sensitive operations are carried on pursuant to Natio

curity Council action approved by me, I desire that your report b

to me personally and classified Top Secret. I will determine wh

not the report or any part thereof should have any further dis

tion. I should appreciate it if your report could be available to m

to October 1, 1954.

As you know, the Commission on Organization of the Ex

Branch of the Government, generally known as the Hoover C

sion, is constituting a Task Force to study and make recommen

with respect to the organization and methods of operations of th

General Mark W. Clark has been designated by Mr. Hoover 

this Task Force which, I understand, will probably be organiz

start its work sometime in September next. Under the law cons

the Hoover Commission, the Task Force shall study and investi

present organization and methods of operation of the Agency 

termine what changes therein are necessary to accomplish the 

of Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and improved ser

a. recommending methods and procedures for reducing e

tures to the lowest amount consistent with the efficient perform

essential services, activities and functions;

b. eliminating duplication and overlapping of services, ac

and functions;

c. consolidating services, activities, and functions of a similar 

d. abolishing services, activities, and functions not neces

the efficient conduct of Government;

e. eliminating nonessential services, functions, and a

which are competitive with private enterprise;

f. defining responsibilities of officials; and

2 Document 255.

3 Document 171.

4 See Documents 184, 220, and 221.
g. relocating agencies now responsible directly to the Pres

departments or other agencies.

As the work of the Hoover Task Force will get under way 

I suggest that you and General Clark confer in order to avoid 

necessary duplication of work as between you. The distinction b

the work of your Study Group and of the Hoover Task Force 

You will deal with the covert activities of the CIA as indi

paragraph (2) above, and your report will be submitted to me. 

Clark’s Task Force will deal largely with the organization an

ods of operation of the CIA and other related agencies within 

its prescribed in the law as outlined in paragraph (4) above. 

of the Hoover Commission are made to the Congress.

The purpose of these studies, both that of the Hoover Tas

and that of your Group, is to insure that the United States Gove

develops an appropriate mechanism for carrying out its over-

ligence responsibilities and the related covert operations. I c

these operations are essential to our national security in the

when international Communism is aggressively pressing its 

wide subversive program.

Sincerely,5

5 Printed from an unsigned copy.

186. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secret

Defense Wilson1

Washington, August 

SUBJECT

Information and Recommendation Concerning Warning Facilities of the 

Intelligence Community

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been informed that the Di

Central Intelligence has submitted a memorandum to the N

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret. A cover

orandum from NSC Executive Secretary Lay, August 4, forwarded the JCS 

dum to the National Security Council, in connection with discussion of the w

cilities of the intelligence community at its August 5 meeting. For the discuss

meeting, see Document 187.
Security Council (NSC)

recommending that the President direc

propriate departments and agencies of the government to keep 

telligence Advisory Committee (IAC) Watch Committee inform

cerning diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action 

United States, contemplated or in process of execution, which mig

about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or it

endangering the security of the United States. The Director of 

Intelligence further recommends that all information and inte

pertinent to its mission, without restriction because of source, p

operational sensitivity, be made available to the Watch Committ

2. The directive recommended by the Director of Central 

gence is not interpreted to mean that either the Watch Comm

the National Indications Center (NIC) will be furnished U.S. Wa

because under the present policy the United States will not initi

tilities with the USSR or its allies.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that this directive wi

available to the Watch Committee information on operations o

sensitive nature that should be strictly maintained in a “need-to

status to reduce danger of disclosure to a minimum. However, t

Chiefs of Staff consider that knowledge of such sensitive operatio

be provided the Watch Committee if it is to carry out its mission 

viding early warning to the United States of hostile action by th

or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States. Th

the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

the recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence in pr

4. The method recommended by the Director of Central 

gence by which the information is transmitted to the Watch C

tee and its subordinate organization, the National Indications 

and the handling of such information by that Committee and 

thereafter requires clarification to make it more precise. Also, to 

that the Services will not be expected to furnish the Watch Com

with a myriad of small details of operations, the transmission a

dling of which would overload the Service organizations as we

NIC, it is considered that the governmental departments and a

should be required to furnish the NIC only with the information 

they believe to be of sufficient importance to cause military rea

early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that you 

the recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence a

fied by the changes below (changes to the Director of Central 

gence recommendations indicated in the usual manner):

2 Dated July 22. A copy of DCID 1/2 is attached. (National Archives, RG 

ficial Minutes, 1947–1961, 209th Meeting, Box 42)
Ask the Council to recommend that the President direc

propriate departments and agencies of the Government:

“a. To keep the IAC Watch Committee (as established by DC

informed, through arrangements with the Director, National Ind

Center, on behalf of the Chairman of the Watch Committee, con

diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the U

templated approved for immediate implementation or in process o

tion, which they believe to be of sufficient import that it might brin

military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its all

engandering the security of the U.S. This information is for the exp

express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the NIC w

to know of it in order to perform their functions.

“b. To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee 

appropriate arrangements with the Director, National Indicatio

ter, on behalf of the Chairman, all information and intelligen

nent to its mission, without restriction because of source, polic

erational sensitivity.”

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that full consideration be g

the NSC to the need for careful development of the method of t

ting and using this information. They consider that this method 

be developed by the IAC, which is the agency responsible for th

function. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it extrem

portant that information of action to be taken by the United State

transmitted until the action is approved for immediate impleme

If a directive on this subject should provide otherwise, the strateg

ning of the United States would be given an undesirable dissem

To further insure against undesirable dissemination, the recomme

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff includes a provision that information o

erational nature is for exclusive use within the Watch Committe

For the Joint Chiefs 

N. F. T

Chief of Staff, United States A

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Twining signed the original.
187. Memorandum of Discussion at the 209th Meeting of th

National Security Council1

Washington, August 

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 209th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thurs

August 5, 1954

Present at the 209th meeting of the Council were the Pres

the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United 

the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, 

Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defens

lization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the A

General (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Bud

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1 and 2); the 

Civil Defense Administrator (for Items 1 and 2); the Chairman

cil of Economic Advisers (for Items 1 and 2); the Acting Direct

Information Agency (for Item 5); the Acting Secretary of the Ar

Acting Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Fo

Items 1 and 2); General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

(for Items 1 and 2); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief o

Operations, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Item

2); Elbert P. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; Robert R. Bow

partment of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assi

the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the Presid

Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NS

the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting 

main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda Item 1: Review of Past Activities and 

ture Program of the National Security Council, and Item 2: Gu

Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956 (NSC 5422/1). Agenda Item 2 is 

in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 700–715.]

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; E

Drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants, on 
3. Transmittal of Information and Recommendation for Future Act

Concerning Warning Facilities of the Intelligence Community

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, 

July 26 and August 4, 1954)2

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this p

Revised CIA recommendations, entitled “Suggested NSC Acti

3”, were distributed, and paragraph 2 of this document was rea

(copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).3

Mr. Allen Dulles said that an effort was being made to i

the intelligence mechanism for providing early warning of a 

attack. An indication center was being set up under the Watc

mittee to study all possible items which might alert us to dang

center would need to have not only foreign intelligence, but 

formation on U.S. policies which might produce hostile reaction

emy countries. Mr. Dulles felt that it would be unwise to adopt 

mula suggested by the Defense agencies, to the effect that th

Committee would be kept informed only of those U.S. policie

in the judgment of the agency passing on the information mig

about hostile enemy reaction.

The President said the only purpose of these arrangement

get the right information to the people who had to study it. H

not want a lot of inconsequential information to be passed o

Watch Committee. He suggested that significant information 

policies might be transmitted to the Watch Committee.

The Attorney General felt that the CIA recommendations 

to set up a kind of supervision over the FBI. He requested as

that adoption of these recommendations would require no ch

FBI methods or operations. He asked whether CIA was not 

ceiving all the information it needed. Mr. Dulles said he did no

because he did not know what information was being held ba

The President called attention to paragraph 2-c of the CIA 

mendations. He said that decision as to withholding informati

the Watch Committee should be referred to him only if the Dir

Central Intelligence and the other agency involved disagreed. 

erated his desire that the Watch Committee get all the informat

could be of real use to it, and suggested that the CIA recom

tions, as amended at the meeting, be adopted subject to the 

of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI agreeing o

rial changes not affecting the substance.

2 See Document 186 and footnotes 1 and 2 thereto.

3 Not found, but for substance, see NSC Action No. 1195, below.
The National Security Council:4

a. Noted that Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/2

the following mission of the Watch Committee of the Intelligen

visory Committee:

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States G

ment of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endang

security of the United States.

b. Recommended that the President, subject to the Director 

tral Intelligence and the Director, Federal Bureau of Invest

agreeing upon editorial changes not affecting the substance, is

following directive to all appropriate departments and agencie

Government:

(1) To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee 

nificant information and intelligence pertinent to its mission an

tions (as defined in DCID 1/2), without restriction because of 

policy or operational sensitivity.

(2) To keep the IAC Watch Committee informed concern

nificant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action 

U.S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of 

tion, which might bring about military reaction or early hostil

by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U

information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch C

tee and those members of the NIC who need to know of it in o

perform their functions.

(3) When, in the opinion of an agency or department, ove

considerations affecting the national security exist which justify 

ception to (1) or (2) above, the decision as to withholding or d

the transmission of the information to the Watch Committee 

taken up with the Director of Central Intelligence and, if there 

agreement, referred to the President.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to 

rector of Central Intelligence for appropriate action.

[Omitted here is Agenda Item 4: Significant Developments Affect

Security.]

4 The following constituted NSC Action No. 1195, August 5. (National 

RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the 

Security Council) The directive adopted in NSC Action 1195–b was subsequ

proved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI with 

itorial changes that did not affect substance, and by President Eisenhower on 

ber 30. The approved directive was circulated as NSC 5438 of the same date. 

Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5438) 5 Document 179.
5. Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Political Warfare, a

Foreign Information Activities (NSC Action No. 1183)6

Discussion of this question arose in connection with Ite

low, “The Foreign Information Program and Psychological 

Planning”.

The President recalled that he had previously emphasized t

for coordination of economic warfare activities (NSC Action N

It now seemed to him that his previous idea—that we neede

rector of Economic Warfare—had been too narrow. Perhaps we 

a director of unconventional or non-military warfare. Policy d

in this field should, of course, be taken by the Council, but 

need a mechanism for objective study, for digesting informati

for coordinating implementation. He did not want half a do

ferent agencies reporting to the Council on this subject. Perh

Planning Board might be supplemented by a special group t

this neglected field.

The President then noted that the Bureau of the Budget 

studying the coordination of economic warfare. He requested 

rector, Bureau of the Budget, to broaden this study to include t

ing of responsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinat

nomic warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and 

information.

Mr. Cutler said that a large part of the issue in this field r

around the question of who would run psychological warfar

event of war—the military or State. The President said neither 

time of war these operations would have to be conducted un

general direction of the President.

The National Security Council:7

Noted the President’s request that the Bureau of the Bu

pand its study regarding the coordination of economic warfar

ties pursuant to NSC Action No. 1183, to include the placin

sponsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinating ec

warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and foreig

mation activities.

Note: The above action subsequently transmitted to the D

Bureau of the Budget.

6 In NSC Action No. 1183, taken at its 207th meeting, July 22, the Cou

the President’s request that the Bureau of the Budget prepare recommendatio

ing responsibility for coordination of economic warfare activities. (National 

RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the 

Security Council) 7 The following constituted NSC Action No. 1197, August 5. (Ibid.)
6. The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Pla

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, 

July 23 and August 4, 1954; NSC 59/1; NSC 127/1)8

Mr. Lay briefed the Council on the background of this p

calling attention to the OCB recommendations transmitted by 

erence memorandum of July 23, and the views of the Joint C

Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 4. M

ler felt that the President’s request for the study described in t

ceding item did not entirely obviate the need for rescinding NS

and NSC 127/1, as recommended by OCB. These papers were 

wreckage; they were completely out of date and referred to a

which no longer existed.

The President said he hesitated to rescind these policies si

Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the reference memorandum of Augus

jected to such a course. He thought we could let this antique 

age stay on the books, even though it was recognized as obsol

til the Council received a further report on the coordina

economic, psychological and political warfare.

The National Security Council:9

Noted that NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 are deemed obsol

deferred further action with respect thereto pending receipt of th

described in the preceding item.

Marion W

8 Lay’s July 23 memorandum transmitted the OCB report, dated July 21 (D

183). For NSC 59/1, March 9, 1950, see Document 2. For NSC 127/1, see Docu

9 The following constituted NSC Action No. 1198, August 5, 1954. 

Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) File: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Acti

National Security Council)
188. Memorandum From the Deputy Operations Coordinat

the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Hulick) to 

Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1

Washington, August 2

SUBJECT

The Doolittle Survey

I have reduced to writing some ideas contained in the a

memorandum which I thought I might use in briefing the D

team on covert operations of CIA. I am far from certain, how

my own mind, as to whether the two examples I have single

illustrative of where improvement is needed and is activel

sought are the kind of things you consider as appropriate for 

partment to raise before the Doolittle group. I should appre

ceiving your guidance on this matter.

As to the list of questions, I discussed these with Frank 

He thought they were appropriate. He was concerned, howeve

the possibility of the Assistant Secretaries striking a critical n

to the fact that in some instances operations have been carried o

out their knowledge but with a higher clearance from you. H

that in the morning briefing it would be made clear to the surve

that there have been occasions when an operation was cleared 

the top; and that these instances could give cause for an Assist

retary to believe the operation had had no policy clearance wha

Attachment2

BRIEFING NOTES

I. The office of the Deputy Operations Coordinator, dire

sponsible to the Under Secretary, performs the functions called 

der paragraph 4 of NSC 5412.3 All covert operations are cleare

vance with the Department through this office, which prov

Agency with written policy guidances. The office consists of t

ficers, one responsible for Western and Eastern Europe, one for 

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NSC 5412, 1954–5

Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Hulick. 2 Top Secret.

3 Document 171.
East and South East Asia and one for the Near and Middle E

Latin America. Working closely with this office but not physic

cated in it are a Special Assistant in the Public Affairs office of 

partment and a Special Assistant for Emigré matters in the O

Eastern European Affairs. It provides a two-way channel of c

nication between the substantive offices of the Department an

ational offices of the Agency.

In order to provide maximum security and control over th

dination of covert operations all personal contact between off

the Department and the Agency on specific projects is suppose

channeled through this office. To a very large degree that is n

case. The exceptions are occasions when the Director of CIA app

the Secretary or Under Secretary directly on highly sensitive m

All records of written communications are filed in this office. No 

are permitted to be filed elsewhere in the Department. While 

guidance is obtained from the responsible substantive areas, t

guidances in written form are prepared in this office only.

CIA covert annexes to OCB progress reports on NSC po

pers are presented to the Under Secretary through this office

can also make them available to the State Department members 

Working Groups.

II. There are two outstanding problems in the field of cov

erations which have not yet been satisfactorily resolved.

1. The Free Europe Committee (FEC) and Radio Free Europ

are powerful propaganda and psychological political instr

which are controlled by the Agency and are supposed to oper

der policy guidance from the Department. The FEC was created 

as a private organization, financed partly by private donatio

partly by funds from the Agency, the latter accounting for abo

thirds to three fourths of the money.

The purpose of FEC was to provide a means of supporti

utilizing prominent political exiles from communist-dominate

tries without recognizing these groups as Governments in Exile 

avoid complications for the Department which maintained dip

relations with the Communist Governments of the countrie

which they fled.

The two major functions performed by FEC are (1) supp

utilization of émigré groups as symbols of resistance and (2) 

casts to the peoples of Eastern Europe through RFE. Both FEC an

which has its base in Munich, Germany, have grown into ver

establishments, staffed by highly competent people. They produ

own analysis of developments behind the Iron Curtain and d

their own programs to influence the people and cause difficu

the Communist regimes.
While FEC and RFE are supposed to function within the 

work of official US policy and under policy guidance from 

partment, they have been gradually assuming a degree of in

ence of operation, which has created a control problem. D

involving matters of policy consequence are frequently taken 

and RFE without reference to the Department through the Agen

is a matter of real concern which the Department and the Age

currently attempting to resolve.

2. The second outstanding problem is that of evolving w

means of coping more satisfactorily with the political reperc

when a covert operation is uncovered. We are deeply involved 

countries in the use of covert assets to influence developme

manner favorable to US objectives. While each such case must 

dled to a large degree on its own merits, there is a need for es

ing a few basic principles of operation. Due to a still prevalen

knowledge and understanding of the support role of CIA und

5412 on the part of some officials, both in Washington and in t

there is often a division of opinion as to how such emergencies 

be handled. This division can freeze initiative and timely act

produce compromise positions which are not adequate to m

problem. The division of opinion, it is believed, stems in part 

from an underlying opposition on the part of some officials t

operations of CIA.

The solution to this problem must be sought through an 

tional process with more briefings in depth by CIA of State 

ment and Foreign Service officers on the task of CIA and the 

in which it attempts to discharge its responsibility. Improv

should also result gradually through the efforts of this office 

about an ever closer coordination between the Department a

so that carefully considered policy guidance is provided in adv

the substantive offices of the Department for each covert oper

support of overt policies as defined in the various NSC docum

On the part of CIA officials it is necessary that they deal w

plete frankness with this office and leave to its judgment wh

cers in the Department are to be consulted in order to obtain 

policy guidance for specific covert operations. There is still a te

on the part of some CIA officials to be so secretive that even th

sometimes has the feeling that it does not know all that it sh

order to discharge its responsibility. In order to establish the r

degree of mutual confidence between the Agency and the Dep

both sides must contribute so that the inhibitions and respe

serves developed on both sides during the early formative year

gradually fade away.

It is of the utmost importance that all responsible officials 

and CIA recognize the fact that NSC 5412 provides for joint C
implementation on NSC policies; that use of covert operations 

port of our overt efforts in the field of foreign policy is an esta

fact; that final decision on the timing and nature of such cove

ations rests with the Department; that when a covert operatio

sour it is a matter of concern to the US Government and not ju

and that problems arising out of exposed covert operations m

met and minimized by the joint efforts of CIA and State as a t

III. The following are types of questions which might be a

the Assistant Secretaries:

1. Have the Agency’s covert operations been generally effe

furthering implementation of overt US policy objectives? If so, 

cite specific examples?

2. If there have been instances in which covert operation

been harmful, do you believe they could have been avoided? D

result from failure of the Agency to coordinate or did they re

coordinated operations involving a calculated risk?

3. Are you satisfied that there is proper coordination an

policy guidance for all covert operations conducted by the Ag

your area?

189. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

Washington, August 2

THE “NET ESTIMATES” PROBLEM

Introduction. One of the most basic problems faced by inte

agencies is that of obtaining adequate information of operation

ters and of using such information to produce meaningful “n

mates” of the capabilities and intentions of other nations, tak

count of our own acts and facts as they must appear to oth

general, U.S. doctrine in the military services has prescribed a 

separation between intelligence and operations than exists in 

and some, if not most, other nations, although in the practica

tion of field staffs this separation is usually mitigated or ov

1 Source: National Archives, RG 263, HS/HC: HRP 82–2/00022, Box 1, HS

Misc. Documents. Secret. The original went to General Clark; copies were sent 

tant Director for National Estimates (Kent), Deputy Director for Intelligence 

and William Bundy.
through working understandings. At the highest levels in the s

however, and even in the State Department, there is a strong te

either to keep operational matters wholly in “operational” ch

or, if they are conveyed to intelligence offices, to impose res

against discussion with outside agencies. This memorandu

with efforts made by CIA since the fall of 1950 to meet this p

in three contexts: (1) National Intelligence Estimates handled 

regular machinery; (2) specific “net estimates” or “net evalu

handled by special machinery; (3) the Watch Committee, hand

telligence from the warning standpoint.

1. Operational Information and National Intelligence Estimates.

In the NIE field, a distinction must be made between the 

ing of operational assumptions and the furnishing of specific ope

facts, especially concerning our own capabilities. The former h

presented great difficulties, and is now in satisfactory shape. 

ter, however, has been troublesome on several occasions, and n

factory overall solution has been reached.

In one type of estimate, dealing with the consequences o

ble U. S. courses of action, operational assumptions as to U.S

are the foundation of the estimate. The only problem is that o

ing that the assumptions have appropriate backing, and this 

usually done through the CIAAdviser to the NSC Planning Boa

may consult the Planning Board as a whole or may deal direc

the departments most concerned. Assumptions are cleared at w

level is necessary to assure their solidity.

In the more general type of estimate, dealing with prob

velopments in a given situation, it is occasionally necessary to 

in addition to the always implicit assumption of no drastic ch

overall US policy—specific assumptions on such matters as 

levels, where the US may affect the situation drastically and i

ately. Since the estimate may be designed to provide the basis 

icy in these very respects, it is sometimes necessary to make 

trary assumption for the future. For example, the currently p

estimate on developments in Taiwan, to be completed for sub

to the Planning Board when the question of aid levels is di

will be based on the assumption that the scope and nature of 

grams remains as at present. Thus, the estimate will not purpo

definitive (even within the usual limits of predictability) but w

benchmark obviously subject to adjustment if a decision is m

alter the scope and nature of the programs ....2 In any event, 

no substantial present problem in obtaining such assumptions

2 Ellipsis in the original.
are usually framed in consultation with the CIA Advisor to th

Planning Board, or occasionally directly by departments prin

concerned.

In contrast with the relative simplicity of the policy-assum

problem, the problem of obtaining specific own-capability fa

even assumptions—has been complex and difficult. Early in 

tory of the present NIE machinery, in April 1951, an ad hoc s

was reached for one case, an estimate (NIE 27)2 on the likelihoo

vasion of Taiwan. For this estimate, it was obvious that the inte

community needed to know, generally at least, the disposition

forces in the area, since these forces were the principal obstacle 

nese Communist action. After some negotiation via the service 

gence heads, appropriate “assumptions” approximating the re

were provided and used.

This specific case was not then made the basis for a gener

tion, although the need was discussed at the working level. N

cific proposal was submitted by O/NE to the Director, or by 

other agencies.

In two major fields, experience has subsequently highligh

vacuity of estimates prepared without clear knowledge of our o

pabilities. With respect to Soviet Bloc capabilities to attack West

rope, all estimates through 1950 had been able to proceed on 

sumption of virtually no Western opposition. From 1951 onwa

assumption became increasingly less valid, and in the prepar

the estimates there were prolonged discussions leading finally 

use of a fairly meaningless formula that the Soviet Bloc could “l

a lot of campaigns, including a full-scale offensive in Western 

Whether any meaningful answer could have been provided in 

ington without duplicating the activities of SHAPE is doubtful, 

fact is that no machinery existed even for getting and incorp

(with proper credit) the current conclusions of SHAPE. As they 

stood the estimates were certainly not helpful to anyone on thi

It was the second field, however, that of air defense of the 

Union, which seemed to General Smith even more forceful, and 

perience in this field, in the spring and summer of 1952, cont

heavily to the campaign launched by him in October 1952, as di

in the next section. What happened was simple. A pioneer nati

timate on Soviet air defense capabilities ran into prolonged agen

agreements, in which it became more and more clear that a

scription of the effectiveness of Soviet defenses depended ent

assumptions as to our capabilities and strategy of attack. Event

2 For NIE 27, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1623–1624.
was recognized that without clear guidance on these matters 

mate was, in the words of General Smith, merely an inventor

viet assets, and it was finally approved by the Intelligence A

Committee after most qualitative statements had been cut out

ter the title had been altered to, “The Scale and Nature of th

Air Defense Effort 1952–54.”3

So far as National Intelligence Estimates are concerned, th

tion since then has been as before—that operational informatio

made available to the intelligence community on any systema

adequate for its employment in such estimates. With the devel

of increasingly close and cordial working relationships both in 

itself and at the National Estimates Board and Staff levels, it i

say that a great deal of such information is in fact fed inform

the estimates. But much operational information is still w

wholly, and the overall situation is far from satisfactory.

2. Special Machinery for “Net Estimates”

In the summer of 1951, concern over continental defense

the National Security Council, led to discussion of the need fo

thoritative “evaluation” of the net capability of the USSR to in

United States. Although General Smith made no affirmative 

have sole primary responsibility for the effort—and in fact is b

to have expressed his opposition to the assignment—the Join

of Staff were diffident, and the upshot was an NSC directive

gust 30, 1951,4 that DCI prepare a “summary evaluation” in 

ration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the internal 

committees.

The resulting exercise, handled through regular chann

without any central mechanism, was a nightmare. The Intellige

visory Committee speedily produced the necessary basic esti

Soviet gross capabilities (SE–14, 18 October 1951),5 and the inte

curity committees furnished adequate contributions. Howe

Joint Chiefs of Staff contribution was delayed for several mon

when finally produced, in May 1952, proved to be based on t

extreme possible estimates of Soviet capabilities and on sever

questionable assumptions, of a largely intelligence nature, con

Soviet attack strategy. General Smith regarded this contributio

satisfactory and assigned two members of the Board of Natio

mates, Mr. E. M. Hoover and Vice Admiral B. M. Bieri (former 

3 See footnote 2, Document 120.

4 NSC Action No. 543, Document 86.

5 Not printed. (National Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIEs, 1950–1955, # 20, B

actual date of SE–14 is October 23, 1951.
Chief of Naval Operations), to the task of producing an integrat

uation merging all contributions, and modifying the JCS contr

The ensuing procedure was trying to all concerned. It finally pr

a report which General Smith accepted as the best obtainable in 

cumstances, and which he forwarded to the NSC on 14 Octobe

In his accompanying memorandum General Smith noted 

fects of the report, and gave three “primary reasons” for the

third of these was:

“c. There is at present no machinery to plan, guide, coo

and produce an appraisal or estimate based on the integration 

tional intelligence with military, political, and economic ope

data dealing with our own capabilities.”

General Smith recommended that as an interim measure he 

structed to prepare terms of reference for a more adequate stud

problem, and that the Council:

“c. Concurrently, instruct the Director of Central Intelligenc

amine, in collaboration with officials of other governmental bo

needed, the adequacy of present machinery, and the character 

new machinery that may be required in order to plan, guide, coo

and produce for the National Security Council, upon request, 

tions in the nature of ‘Commander’s Estimates,’ of the USSR’s c

ties and intentions vis-à-vis the United States, based upon the 

tion of military, political, and economic operational data dealin

United States’ capabilities and intentions, and national intelligen

When General Smith’s recommendations were forwarded 

Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, 

responded by a sharply critical memorandum, dated Novem

1952.7 There ensued negotiations, which were limited to the t

reference and procedure for a new study, but which also gave 

portunity for General Smith to clarify his ideas to the Joint C

Staff on the overall problem. In the light of the change of adm

tions then in process it was finally decided to let the overall 

mendation (subparagraph c. quoted above) lie over, while pro

with a new “net evaluation” on the basis of an entirely nove

dure. This procedure, embodied in NSC 140,8 was approved b

dent Truman on January 19, 1953, and accepted by the Eisenhow

ministration without change. It created a Special Eva

Subcommittee, chaired by a direct Presidential appointee, Lt. 

Idwal H. Edwards, USAF (Ret.)—who was in fact nominated 

Joint Chiefs of Staff under a gentlemen’s agreement with G

6 Document 131.

7 Not found, but see Document 137 and footnote 3 thereto.

8 For NSC 140, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 205–20
Smith—with representatives of the JCS, CIA, and the internal 

committees as full members.

The so-called Edwards Committee was given a very sho

line, May 15, 1953, for the preparation of a new net evaluation 

as the basis for a policy appraisal of the whole field of contine

fense. Through the able leadership of General Edwards and with 

share of credit also to Lt. General H. R. Bull, representing C

deadline was met. The resulting report (NSC 140/1, May 18, 1

though slightly marred by one misunderstanding with the JC

ing level on terms of reference, was a highly valuable effort s

tively. Organizationally it seemed to CIA, and, it is believed, to 

Secretariat and to others familiar with the earlier failure and w

general problem, to prove that net evaluations or estimates c

done, even on the most complex problems, through a process 

stant interchange of intelligence and operational information 

appropriate security safeguards), and that the resulting net pap

a vast improvement on anything that could be done by intellige

operations working at arms’ length from each other.

With this pioneer demonstration, attention turned for a tim

to the more general problem. Largely as a result of CIA urging

port of the President’s Committee on International Informatio

ities (Jackson Committee), published June 30, 1953,10 include

very first recommendation the following:

“1. The necessary measures should be taken to provide 

mates of political, economic and military capabilities.” (Page 3

While this recommendation might have provided a leve

opening the over-all question and resurrecting General Smi

ommendation c. of the preceding October (which was still tec

unfinished business in the NSC), two factors combined to m

appear undesirable to the DCI. One was the replacement of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1953; the other was the fac

its policy consideration of continental defense (NSC 159 seri

NSC referred all organization questions to the Office of Defe

bilization for study (NSC action No. 873 d., August 1953).12 

was at first thought that Office of Defense Mobilization’s study 

be quickly completed, it seemed clearly wiser to await it, and 

out agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a proper proce

9 Text is ibid, pp. 328–349. See also Document 149.

10 See Document 151. 11 See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 465–489. 12 See footnote 2, Document 173.
the limited field of continental defense before taking up the 

question again.

As it worked out, ODM encountered substantial delay 

preparing its recommendations and in getting them cleared by t

Planning Board. Only in April 1954 did ODM’s paper becom

able to NSC.13 At this point the JCS comment on the ODM pr

revealed that the “new Chiefs” were not happy about a net es

procedure under which ultimate final responsibility was not 

solely in them, and there ensued a round of negotiations betw

Dulles and Admiral Radford, which clarified the issue but failed 

duce agreement.14 A split paper was finally submitted to the Pr

and the NSC on June 9, 1954,15 and the issue was resolved by th

ident in favor of joint responsibility in the Chairman of the Join

of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence, with other gove

agencies represented on an appropriate basis.16 The Presiden

nated Admiral Radford as Chairman for the exercise, which is n

ceeding with a deadline of 1 November 1954. Rear Admiral Ro

directing the project on Admiral Radford’s behalf, while Gene

is again representing CIA. Substantively the scope of the stu

been broadened to cover specifically all key US installations ov

thus making possible a far more refined and comprehensive 

Soviet attack strategy than was possible in the Edwards group

durally, it appears at this writing that the project is being han

the working level with a greater degree of close cooperation ev

in the Edwards group.

During the course of the negotiations on the particular con

defense problem, the over-all issue was discussed, and the Dire

Central Intelligence proposed that the device of joint responsib

DCI and the Chairman of the JCS, the one as intelligence adv

other as military adviser, to the President and the NSC, be ex

generally to cover problems for which a specific net evaluation

estimate, procedure is appropriate. (Such problems, generally sp

would be those of substantial scope, involving a complicated s

the interplay of US action and Soviet counteraction. In situation

action on both sides would be simple and predictable, the use 

machinery might not be warranted.) For the present, this sugge

not being pressed, since the success of the new continental defen

ect appears to be important in any decision.

13 Not found. 14 See Documents 176 and 177. 15 Not found. 16 See Document 182.
3. The Watch Committee and Operational Information

For that part of the intelligence community that concent

providing warning of hostile action, knowledge of US or allied 

tions may be even more vital than for more long-range intellig

forts. Without such knowledge false warnings may be given, a

intelligence may be seriously misconstrued (in either directio

intelligence effort may not be focused properly at points and 

tension.

The 1948–54 history of this problem is covered in detail in 

prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the CIA compon

ticularly charged with the watch function and with suppor

Watch Committee. The essence of the story is that there has 

remotely adequate procedure for keeping the Watch Comm

formed of operational matters that could have a bearing on it

ties. However, as a result of the work of an ad hoc Committe

nated by the IAC in 1953 to review the whole Watch Committee 

the Director of Central Intelligence, in July 1954, submitted to t

and the President approved in principle, a directive that ope

information necessary to the Watch Committee’s mission be fu

to it, under appropriate security safeguards.17 At the date of 

the exact wording of this directive remains to be ironed out w

FBI Director. In CIA’s judgment the substance of this directive w

vide a broad and adequate basis for the proper functioning of th

Committee in this respect, though no doubt particular problem

tail and interpretation will arise. The directive provides that 

where an agency believes that overriding security considerati

clude release of information (conceded to be significant to th

Committee), the matter shall be referred initially to DCI, there

the President if DCI and the referring agency are unable to re

Thus, the Director should be in a position to iron out difficulties 

arise.

It is significant that this directive has had the full suppo

JCS, in principle and in its general breadth.18 This JCS attitude 

a significant indication of the possibilities for further improve

the fields of national estimates and of special net evaluation 

ery, discussed in the earlier sections of this memorandum.

17 President Eisenhower approved at the 209th meeting of the NSC; see D

187. 18 See Document 186.
190. Papers Prepared by a Working Group of the Operation

Coordinating Board Assistants for the Operations

Coordinating Board1

Washington, August 2

LIST OF AGREED COURSES OF ACTION

JULY 1, 1954 TO DECEMBER 31, 1954

TO IMPLEMENT NSC 1742

During the six-month period beginning July 1, 1954 the 

ments and agencies plan to take the following specific actions 

a relationship to courses of action set forth in NSC 174 and oth

tinent NSC documents. Underlining indicates quotations from 

graphs of NSC 174. Where actions are not cited, this indicates tha

the department or agency follows in its day-to-day operations t

cies set forth, no explicit project in regard to those paragrap

presently be specified.

The responsibility of the working group is to suggest 

courses of action to implement the specific objectives set forth 

174. The development of detailed plans to carry out such cou

action is the function of the several responsible agencies.

1. Take overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige an

ogy as effective instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the str

Communist parties and other pro-Soviet elements.3 (NSC 162/2, Pa

(NSC 174, Para. 9)

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 

Secret. Circulated to the OCB on August 20 by Staats for discussion at the O

gust 25 meeting. A September 7 memorandum by Staats indicates that the OCB 

the two papers at its meeting. (Ibid.) 2 NSC 174, “U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites,” is dated Decembe

tional Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 174 Series) Extracts f

174 and NSC discussion of the issue are in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. 

110–128. NSC 174 was referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the c

ing agency designated by the President. 3 Although NSC 162/2 does not appear to provide specific policy guid

the starred courses of action when applied to the USSR, it is understood that N

does not direct the abandonment of current operating policies and programs 

overt or covert along these lines. Furthermore, NSC 174, Para. 9, pro

follows . . . “feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures are 

to create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR. . .” Accordingly, in th

of detailed NSC guidance on policy toward the Soviet Union it is assumed t

courses of action are applicable to the USSR. New projects should be carefull

ered, however, in terms of the Policy Conclusions set forth in NSC 162/2. No

footnote applies to all asterisks. [Footnote in the original. Underlined text is p

italics. NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy,” is dated October 30, 1953. 

Archives, RG 59. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 162 Series)]
Actions to be taken:

a. At the General Assembly of the United Nations beginn

tember 21, 1954, support the following actions which are exp

have the result of discrediting the position of the USSR:

(1) Review of the report of the Disarmament Commission

(2) Review of the report of the UN Commission for the 

tion and rehabilitation of Korea.

(3) Review of the report of the Collective Measures Comm

methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen inter

peace and security.

(4) Review of the question of admission of new member

UN.

(5) Review of report of ECOSOC on evidence of existence o

labor.

(6) Review of the Special Committee on the question of d

aggression.

b. Initiate or resume discussion in the UN General Assem

(1) The Austrian Treaty question.

(2) Various items regarding human rights.

(3) Measures for the peaceful solution of the problem of 

ers of war.

c. Anticipate and counteract Soviet moves in the UN Gen

sembly concerning:

(1) Admission of Communist China.

(2) East-West trade.

(3) Guatemala.

d. Assure effective propaganda support of the U.S. positio

issues set forth in a., b., and c., above. (State, primary—USIA a

supporting)

e. The case of the F–84 shot down by Czech fighters in 1

be expedited for presentation before the International Court 

tice. If good case is developed for B–29 and RB–50 shot dow

East by Soviet fighters, these cases should be presented to I.C.

primary—Defense, supporting)

f. Press representations for return of U.S. citizens held in 

if no favorable response appropriate publicity will be consider

continue efforts to secure release of U.S. citizens held in jail in 

slovakia. (State, primary—USIA and CIA, supporting)

g. Develop and use for overseas distribution three speci

designed to demonstrate the Communist technique of takeo

control of sovereign nations. (USIA, primary)

h. Spotlight policies and problems of agriculture in Sovie

exposing failures and playing up ingenious peasant passive res

(USIA, primary)
i. Problems of Communism is being published as an attribu

monthly publication and plans are now well advanced for a

tributed monthly publication which will be devoted to problem

Soviet orbit. (USIA, primary)

j. Place emphasis upon the fact the satellites are captive co

controlled through various techniques by the Soviet military m

as supporting materials are developed and opportunities are pre

(USIA, primary—CIA and Defense, supporting)

k. Employ selected persons who have lived under or suf

the hands of Communist tyranny for speaking tours sponsored 

organizations in U.S. and selected areas abroad. (State and 

primary—FOA and Defense, supporting)

2. Strengthen covert activities in support of the Basic Objectives 

in paragraphs 10 and 11 of NSC 174.

Actions to be taken:

CIA to report on separately. (CIA, primary)

3. Use appropriate means short of military force to oppose, and 

tribute to the eventual elimination of, Soviet domination over the s

including, when appropriate, concert with NATO or other friendly 

resort to UN procedures, and, if possible, negotiation with the USSR

174, Para. 12)

Actions to be taken:

a. Take such actions as may be appropriate to exploit the 

Turk-Yugoslav Friendship Pact as a factor influencing the sa

(State, primary—USIA, Defense and CIA, supporting)

4. Encourage and assist the satellite peoples in resistance to thei

dominated regimes, maintaining their hopes of eventual freedom from 

domination, while avoiding:

a. Incitement to premature revolt.

b. Commitments on the nature and timing of any U.S. action 

about liberation.

c. Incitement to action when the probable reprisals or other resul

yield a net loss in terms of U.S. objectives.4 (NSC 174, Para. 13)

Actions to be taken:

a. Emphasize in appropriate ways our continued interest 

ern Europe and our refusal to recognize Soviet domination of t

as permanent. (State, primary—USIA and CIA, supporting)

4 For example, account should be taken of the undesirability of provoking the l

of important resistance movements or creating false hopes of U.S. intervention. [Footn

original. Subsequent asterisks apparently refer to this note.]
b. Support and offer guidance where appropriate to the 

Committee. (State, primary—USIA, supporting)

c. Exploit the elections in Czechoslovakia. (State, primar

and USIA, supporting)

d. In the event EDC ratification occurs during the perio

a statement or emphasize the concept of a free European Com

open to countries of Eastern Europe upon their liberation from 

Communist tyranny. (State, primary—USIA and CIA, suppor

5. Develop and encourage, as appropriate, increased use of pa

sistance by the peoples of the [USSR and] satellites.* (NSC 174, Pa

6. Be prepared to exploit any future disturbances similar to 

German riots of 1953 by planning courses of action which would b

U.S. interests in such events. (NSC 174, Para. 15)

Actions to be taken:

a. Keep harvest results for the current year under review 

prepared to exploit significant shortages with offers of food 

appropriate action. (State, primary—CIA and FOA, supportin

b. On the basis of an analysis of the June 17, 1953 East 

uprising develop specific courses of action to be taken in the 

a similar occurrence in the future and report thereon by Dece

1954. (USIA and CIA, primary)

7. Foster satellite nationalism as a force against Soviet imperialis

avoiding commitments to national ambitions which would interfere w

post-liberation objectives. (NSC 174, Para. 16)

Actions to be taken:

a. Appropriate statements will be issued and exploited co

orating the following national holidays of the satellite states an

suitable occasions, such as: August 15, Commemoration of Pol

ping Russians on Vistula; August 20, Commemoration of Wars

rising; August 20, St. Stephens Day (Hungarian National Holida

tember 28, Anniversary of Petkov’s Execution (Bulgaria); Oct

Czechoslovakian Independence Day; November 18, Latvian In

ence Day; December 25, Christmas (Gregorian calendar)

primary—USIA and CIA, support)

8. Cooperate with other forces—such as religious, cultural, 

which are natural allies in the struggle against Soviet imperialism

174, Para. 17)

Actions to be taken:

a. Determine whether a practical program of cultural and 

cal exchange of persons with the Soviet bloc can be developed

primary—CIA and USIA, supporting)

5 All brackets in the original.
b. Ensure maximum exploitation in the interest of the U.S

its to the U.S. by delegations from countries behind the iron 

(State and USIA, primary—Defense and CIA, supporting)

9. Stimulate and exploit conflicts within the communist ruling 

in [the USSR and in] each satellite, among such groups, and betwe

and the Kremlin.* (NSC 174, Para. 18)

Actions to be taken:

a. Continue to exploit indications of internal conflict wit

satellite ruling groups and between them and the Kremlin, such 

flicts growing out of the:

(1) “New economic courses.” (USIA, primary—CIA, supp

(2) The satellite government reorganizations undertaken 

formity with the Kremlin’s desire to emphasize a collective lead

(USIA, primary—CIA, supporting) (3) Instances of difficulty between a satellite and the USSR 

example, deliberate snubs of cultural delegations in the USSR 

ble with Soviet occupation (and line of communication) troop

satellites. (USIA, primary)

10. Foster disaffection in [the USSR and] satellite armed forces 

lice, to diminish their reliability in suppressing domestic disturban

their will to fight in the event of war.* (NSC 174, Para. 19)

Actions to be taken:

a. Display military strength of U.S. whenever appropriat

as the visits of U.S. Fleet units to Baltic, or visits of U.S. Air Fo

craft to significant points where news of the event will reach ta

tions. (Defense and State jointly)

b. As opportunity offers and material is available, emphas

conflicts within Soviet and satellite security forces and between th

other elements of the population. (USIA, primary—CIA, suppor

c. Wherever found, exploit dissatisfaction with Soviet “ad

and key personnel among officers and men of the satellite 

(USIA, primary—CIA and State, supporting)

d. Exploit as a propaganda theme the idea that the USSR w

the satellite armed forces as cannon fodder in the event of wa

primary—USIA, supporting)

11. Encourage defection of [USSR and] key satellite personnel 

sible VFC recruits, but not mass defection [in the case of the satellit

assist in the resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees who do escape

174, Para. 22)

Actions to be taken:

a. Support implementation of the extensive operational p

Phase A of Escapee Program approved by OCB, including the 

tious implementation of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. (FOA an

primary—CIA, Defense and USIA, supporting)
12. Support or make use of refugees or exile organizations w

contribute to the attainment of U.S. objectives, but do not recognize 

ments-in-exile.* (NSC 174, Para. 23)

Actions to be taken:

a. Take appropriate action such as messages on nation

speeches by government officials, etc., to bolster the prestige 

organizations meeting the above criteria. (State, primary—U

CIA, supporting)

b. Support relief and rehabilitation projects which are ad

by accredited groups or organizations affecting refugee or e

ganizations which can contribute to the attainment of U.S. ob

(FOA, primary)

13. Maintain flexibility in U.S. economic policies toward the So

and toward individual satellites, in order to gain maximum advant

the limited economic weapons at hand (both restrictions and incentive

174, Para. 25)

Actions to be taken:

a. The Economic Defense Advisory Committee (EDAC) 

member agencies, in line with the decisions of the April and Ju

meetings of the Consultative Group in Paris, are carrying out 

sponsibilities for the following:

(1) Implementing, in coordination with COCOM countr

visions for the more effective enforcement of strategic trade 

on a more limited list of commodities exported to the Soviet blo

primary)

(2) Implementing plans approved by the Consultative Gr

expanded exchange of information among members of COCO

views on Soviet bloc trade trends and tactics. (FOA, primary)

b. Develop plans for making available surplus agricultur

modities in the U.S. to the peoples of the Soviet bloc, as “targe

portunity” present themselves in accordance with basic guideli

criteria approved by the OCB for the disposal of such comm

(State and FOA, primary—CIA, supporting)

14. Continue U.S. diplomatic missions in Poland, Czechoslovak

gary, and Rumania as long as may be in the U.S. interest, and keep u

view the possibility of resuming diplomatic relations with Bulgaria 

bania. (NSC 174, Para. 26)

Actions to be taken:

a. Consider the desirability of consulting further with C

concerning resumption of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria

primary)

15. Exploit the existence, and encourage the development

Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish entente as a means of weakening Soviet p
the Balkan satellites and as an example of free association of inde

Balkan nations serving as a potential alternative to Soviet rule. (N

Para. 27)

Actions to be taken:

a. Continue negotiations for a solution to the Trieste pro

order to clear way for further integration of Yugoslavia into th

ern Defense pattern and the strengthening of the Western p

(State, primary)

b. Take such actions as may be appropriate to exploit the 

Turk-Yugoslav Friendship Pact as a factor influencing the sa

(State, primary—USIA, Defense and CIA, supporting)

c. Explore the advisability of encouraging the Greek and 

governments to seek the cooperation of the Bulgarian Govern

a survey of the upper Meric-Evros River looking to joint devel

of the river. (State and FOA, primary—CIA, supporting)

16. Keep the situation with respect to Albania under continu

veillance with a view to the possibility of detachment of that country f

Soviet bloc at such time as its detachment might be judged to serve t

all U.S. interest. (NSC 174, Para. 28)

Actions to be taken:

a. Upon completion of present negotiations for a favorabl

ment of the Trieste problem, examine the situation with respec

bania and the possibility of detachment of that country from 

viet bloc. (CIA, primary—State and Defense, supporting)

17. Exploit to the fullest extent compatible with the policies regard

many as a whole and Berlin, the special opportunities offered by West Be

the facilities of the Federal Republic to undermine Soviet power in East G

Place the Soviets in East Germany on the defensive by such measures a

taken to keep alive the hope of German reunification. (NSC 174, Para. 

Actions to be taken:

Detailed plans for action against East Germany are set fort

Progress Report of the Working Group for NSC 5404/1, dated 

1954.6 That Group has primary responsibility for coordinating 

ties concerning Berlin.

18. Emphasize (a) the right of the peoples of Eastern Europe 

pendent governments of their own choosing, and (b) the violation of 

tional agreements by the Soviet and satellite governments, whereby th

been deprived of that right, particularly the Yalta Declaration on L

6 For text of the financial appendix to NSC 5404/1, January 25, see For

tions, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1390–1394. The full text of and the progre

on NSC 5404/1 are in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 

5404 Series, Box 77.
Europe and the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary and Ruman

174, Para. 30)

Actions to be taken:

a. Develop opportunities for high U.S. officials through s

and other means to emphasize the right of the peoples of Eas

rope to independent governments of their own choosing and 

lation of international agreements by the Soviet and satellit

(State, primary)

b. Develop opportunities to exploit the voluminous docum

materials being compiled in the Department of State to dem

satellite treaty violations. (State, primary—USIA and CIA, sup

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT NSC 174 WHICH 

NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY WORKING GROUP7

There follows a list of additional actions to implement N

which have not been accepted by the Working Group for the 

stated therein:

1. Distribute inexpensive commodities by balloon or oth

lar means to people in the Soviet orbit in such a way that it 

non-attributable to the U.S. Government.

Reason for non-acceptance:

On September 23 and October 21, 1953 the OCB approv

chase and stockpiling of balloons but determined that final 

for use of balloons for this purpose would be made by the Boa

sequent to that date no agency has recommended a specific pro

no target of opportunity has arisen.

2. Implement the plan to detach Albania from the Soviet 

Reason for non-acceptance:

a. State believes no action should be taken to implement t

while negotiations over Trieste are underway. b. If Trieste problem is satisfactorily resolved, agreement c

future status of Albania should be obtained from neighborin

(Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy) before any action for liberation is 

taken. (See paragraph 16 of “Operational Plans for Period July 

to December 31, 1954” for current Working Group recommend

3. Train leaders and prepare plans for supplying weap

equipment for use in future riots and disturbances in the satelli

Reason for non-acceptance:

CIA will make separate submission.

7 This is the second paper circulated to the OCB.
4. Develop extensive covert operations to organize re

groups among the peoples of the satellites which, in the event 

can offer significant armed resistance to communist forces or

event of an upsurge of popular feeling similar to the East G

riots of 1953, can stage a coup d’etat.

Reasons for non-acceptance:

CIA will make separate submission.

191. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 15/11

Washington, September 1

PRODUCTION AND COORDINATION OF 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID Nos. 1, 3, and 15,2 

the purpose of strengthening the over-all governmental inte

structure for the production and coordination of foreign econo

telligence relating to the national security, the following polic

operating procedures are hereby established:

1. Policies

In carrying out their foreign economic intelligence activit

responsibilities, and in order to effect a better coordination in t

duction and exchange of foreign economic intelligence, the int

departments and agencies will apply the following basic princ

a. No complete separation of interests is possible or nec

desirable in economic intelligence activities.

b. Full and free interchange of all pertinent information, f

intelligence, and schedules of research programs, including exte

search, between all agencies concerned is essential.

c. No one agency is considered to be the undisputed auth

any field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agenc

dissents recorded.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, Box 

43. Confidential. This directive is an updated text of Document 169. 2 For NSCID No. 1 Revised, see Document 256; for NSCID No. 3, see For

tions, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 426; f

No. 15, see Document 254.
d. Each agency will be responsible for fulfilling its depar

requirements for economic intelligence; it will give full recogn

the finished intelligence produced by other agencies, but any 

may make such studies as it believes necessary to supplemen

telligence produced by other agencies. However, basic resear

ies should not normally be undertaken or disseminated out

producing agency without consultation with the agency hav

mary responsibility for the subject matter involved.

e. An agency charged with primary responsibility in a pa

field will develop special competence in that field and will n

carry out most of the research in that field.

f. Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate th

ligence activities of its Technical Services and its other facilities 

economic intelligence production capabilities with the work of 

intelligence agencies and to make available to those agencies 

telligence produced by such Services and facilities.

2. Allocation of Primary Production Responsibilities

a. Production of military-economic intelligence on all 

countries, including by way of illustration intelligence on mil

quirements, military materiel production, shipbuilding and shi

ments, logistic capabilities, economic vulnerabilities to all form

itary attack, and target system analysis (including specific l

physical vulnerability, and supplementary studies as required

responsibility of the departments of the Department of Defen

b. Production of intelligence on all foreign countries on ec

doctrines, political and social aspects of economic organizati

institutions such as trade unions, and on the relationships betw

litical and economic policies, is the responsibility of the Depart

State.

c. Production of all economic intelligence on the Soviet 

the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency except as in

herein. In addition, it will supplement the intelligence prod

other agencies by conducting such independent analyses and 

as may be necessary to produce integrated economic intellig

the Bloc.

d. Production of all economic intelligence on foreign c

outside the Soviet Bloc is the responsibility of the Department 

except as indicated in paragraph 2.a.

3 As used herein, “Soviet Bloc” includes USSR, Communist China, Poland

slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Soviet occupied portions of 

and Austria, and Communist dominated portions of Korea and Indo-China. 

in the original.]
e. Despite the above mentioned allocations of primary pro

responsibilities, there will be areas of common or overlapping 

(including, for example, Soviet Bloc economic policies, East-Wes

and inland transportation) which will require continuing inter

liaison and cooperation.

f. The existing allocations of production responsibility for N

Intelligence Surveys (NIS) are not changed by this directive even 

such allocations may, in some instances, be at variance with age

sponsibilities specified in paragraphs 2.a., b., c., and d. However, 

will from time to time examine such allocations and after consulti

the NIS Committee will make appropriate recommendations.

3. Responsibility for Economic Intelligence Coordination

a. To assist the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying ou

sponsibilities with respect to coordination, the Economic Inte

Committee (EIC) will continue to perform the functions outl

IAC–D–22/1 (Revised), 29 May 1951.4 Further, the EIC will be 

sible for (1) reviewing from time to time the allocations of resp

ity assigned herein; (2) determining how the provisions of thi

tive apply, particularly in areas of common or overlapping inter

(3) recommending to the IAC appropriate changes in the alloca

responsibility assigned herein.

b. In order to minimize the duplication of effort and expe

the EIC will prepare and circulate consolidated periodic lists of 

nomic research being conducted within the intelligence agenc

(2) agencies sponsoring external research projects, involving mo

$5,000, in support of economic intelligence production will sub

scriptions of the scope of such projects to the EIC for review. T

will endeavor to present its recommendations in advance of f

proval by the contracting agency. In its periodic reports to the 

EIC will include a summary of actions on these projects.

Allen W. 

Director of Central Int

4 Document 72.

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
192. Report by the Special Study Group

Washington, u

REPORT ON THE COVERT ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTR

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I. Introduction

The acquisition and proper evaluation of adequate and rel

telligence on the capabilities and intentions of Soviet Russia is 

most important military and political requirement. Several age

Government and many thousands of capable and dedicated pe

engaged in the accomplishment of this task. Because the Unite

is relatively new at the game, and because we are opposed by 

state enemy whose social discipline and whose security measu

been built up and maintained at a high level for many years, 

able information we are obtaining is still far short of our need

As long as it remains national policy, another important 

ment is an aggressive covert psychological, political and para

organization more effective, more unique and, if necessary, mo

less than that employed by the enemy. No one should be perm

stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure accompl

of this mission.

In the carrying out of this policy and in order to reach m

standards for national safety under present world conditio

things must be done. First, the agencies charged by law with 

lection, evaluation and distribution of intelligence must be s

ened and coordinated to the greatest practicable degree. T

primary concern of the National Security Council and mus

complished at the national policy level. Those elements of the p

that fall within the scope of our directive are dealt with in th

which follows. The second consideration is less tangible but 

important. It is now clear that we are facing an implacable 

whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever me

at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto 

able norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United Sta

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Community Management 

82–M0311R, Box 1, Folder 23. Top Secret. Regarding the origins of this report, a

as the Doolittle Report, see Documents 184 and 185. It was forwarded to the 

under cover of a September 30 letter signed by J.H. Doolittle, Chairman, and 

of the Special Study Group William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William D

The covering letter, the table of contents, and the appendices (B–D) are not pr

pendix A is a copy of Document 185.
survive, long-standing American concepts of 

fair play mus

considered. We must develop effective espionage and coun

onage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy 

emies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective m

than those used against us. It may become necessary that the 

can people be made acquainted with, understand and support t

damentally repugnant philosophy.

Because of the tight security controls that have been esta

by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, the problem of infiltration by 

agents is extremely difficult. Most borders are made physically 

by elaborate systems of fencing, lights, mines, etc., backed up 

stant surveillance. Once across borders—by parachute, or by an

means—escape from detection is extremely difficult because 

stant checks on personnel activities and personal documentati

information we have obtained by this method of acquisition h

negligible and the cost in effort, dollars and human lives proh

The defection of Soviet and satellite personnel offers a mo

itable field for exploitation. The Agency is properly focusing 

deal of its effort in this direction, [1 line not declassified]. The in

tion obtained from this source has been of value but is spora

incomplete.

A still greater potential lies in communications intelligen

leads to the conviction that much more effort should be expen

exploring every possible scientific and technical avenue of appr

the intelligence problem. The study group has been extensively 

by C.I.A. personnel and by the Armed Services in the metho

equipment that are presently in use and under development 

area. We have also had the benefit of advice from certain civili

sultants who are working on such special projects. We are im

by what has been done, but feel that there is an immense poten

to be explored. We believe that every known technique should 

tensively applied and new ones should be developed to incre

intelligence acquisition by communications and electronic surve

high altitude visual, photographic and radar reconnaissanc

manned or unmanned vehicles, upper atmosphere and oceano

studies, physical and chemical research, etc. From such sourc

come early warning of impending attack. No price is too high 

for this knowledge.

In the short time that has been available to us we have b

tensively briefed by the Director and staff of the Central Inte

Agency, by the rest of the intelligence community, and by the 

pal users of the intelligence product. We have conferred with 

sentatives of other interested Government agencies and with 

knowledgable individuals whose past experience and present t
have made their views of value. The procedures which have b

lowed, and the list of witnesses who have been heard are det

Appendix B, attached. Our findings and recommendations fol

II. Conclusions and Recommendations

With respect to the Central Intelligence Agency in general 

clude: (a) that its placement in the overall organization of the 

ment is proper; (b) that the laws under which it operates are ad

(c) that the established provisions for its financial support a

ciently flexible to meet its current operational needs; (d) that 

of the limitations imposed by its relatively short life and rapid 

sion it is doing a creditable job; (e) that it is gradually impro

capabilities, and (f) that it is exercising care to insure the loyal

personnel.

There are, however, important areas in which the C.I.A. co

ganization, administration and operations can and should 

proved. The Agency is aware of these deficiencies and in man

steps are being taken toward their solution.

While we believe our study to have been as comprehensive 

sible in the time available to us, we realize that it is not comp

are well aware of the tremendous problems facing the Director a

of an organization such as C.I.A. and appreciate the sincere ef

ing made to solve them. In an attempt to be constructive an

hope that we may be helpful, we make the following recommen

A. With Respect to Personnel

That the Agency personnel competence level be rais

Agency should continually strive to achieve this and if neces

duce its present work load to expedite its realization. Necessa

are:

1. Elimination of personnel who can never achieve a suf

high degree of competence to meet the C.I.A. standard. This 

tail a substantial reduction in present personnel. There is no 

C.I.A. for mediocrity.

2. Review and improvement of recruitment plans and pro

in order to obtain higher quality applicants for Agency jobs. T

required to process them should be reduced.

3. Continual improvement of the present excellent trainin

ties and capabilities in all covert activities to keep step with 

requirements.

4. An intensified training program to include those key pe

in the covert services who require additional training, by 

through C.I.A. training facilities. At present at least 10 percent 

covert personnel should be in training.
5. Assignment to field stations and to country areas of on

people who are fully qualified to handle the highly specialize

lems involved.

6. Maintaining the position of Director above political con

tions in order to assure tenure and continuity as in the F.B.I.

B. With Respect to Security

That greater security be developed at all levels of the Ag

the end that the good name of the United States and the fulfil

C.I.A.’s important mission may not be jeopardized. The followin

should be taken to accomplish these objectives:

1. Elimination, to the maximum extent practicable, of prov

and preliminary clearances in the security processing of pros

Agency personnel.

2. Improved and more standardized security processing 

operational personnel prior to their use by the covert services ov

3. Immediate completion of full field investigations an

graph examinations of the several hundred Agency personn

have not yet been fully processed.

4. Establishing of uniform and tighter security procedures a

quarters and suitable safeguards in the field the better to insure 

curity of the Agency’s facilities, operations, sources and metho

5. Insurance of the closest possible coordination of the cou

pionage activities of the covert services with the over-all count

ligence activities of the Office of Security to prevent, or detect an

inate, any penetrations of C.I.A.

6. Augmentation of the present sound policy of polygrap

new employees and all personnel returning from overseas assig

to include periodic rechecks of all personnel, on a more com

sive basis, whenever effective counterintelligence practices ind

7. Creation of greater security consciousness on the part of 

sonnel by improving initial indoctrination courses and by con

regular “security awareness” programs.

8. Imposition of severe penalties upon employees at any 

levels who advertently or inadvertently violate security.

9. Establishment of a uniform system for the submission 

overseas missions of regular reports on the status of personne

ical, documentary and related elements of security. Such reports 

be submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the Inspect

eral and to the appropriate division of the Deputy Director of 

10. Periodic security inspections by the Security Office of o

missions and of DD/P’s divisions, staffs and facilities in the 

States.
11. Rigid adherence to the 

need-to-know requirement a

sis for dissemination of classified intelligence developed by th

services and for intra-Agency dissemination of classified data

12. Continuous indoctrination and guidance to correct th

ral tendency to overclassify documents originating in the Age

13. Promulgation of definitive standards and procedures 

ing cover for the guidance of all personnel. There should be a 

uing program of monitoring cover in foreign installations. Pe

departing for overseas assignments should be more adequately 

concerning the importance of cover generally, and in particu

mission and personal cover.

14. Insurance that officials of proprietary organizations ad

C.I.A.’s security regulations in order to avoid disclosure, breach, 

promise of the Agency’s covert association with such organizat

15. Assignment of qualified security officers to the larger 

etary organizations to aid in avoiding security compromises.

16. Formulation for immediate implementation of em

plans and preparations, geared to the specific needs of each o

mission and station, to insure, as far as possible, adequate saf

ing of personnel and safeguarding or destruction of materia

event of emergency.

17. Concentration of C.I.A.’s headquarters operations i

buildings with increased emphasis in the interim on improve

the physical security of C.I.A.’s many buildings and the classif

and materials contained therein.

C. With Respect to Coordination and Operations

That one agency be charged with the coordination of all co

erations in peacetime, subject to the provision that necessary 

ity be achievable in time of war. The covert operating capab

C.I.A. must be continually improved. Steps toward these ends 

1. Implementation of NSC 54122 which now makes C.I.A

ordinating agency pending a national emergency.

2. Preparation and test of a readily implementable plan for 

mediate and effective availability of local covert assets to thea

manders at the outbreak of war in their areas.

3. Immediate resolution, by the National Security Counci

misunderstandings that still exist between C.I.A. and some 

Armed Services with respect to “agreed activities.”

4. Development of better understanding between other a

and C.I.A. relative to exploitation of Soviet and satellite defec

2 Document 171.
5. A greater interchange of information, at all working lev

tween C.I.A. and the military services regarding their intelligen

grams and policies.

6. Improvement at all levels of coordination of C.I.A. co

tivities with the State Department.

7. Establishment of definite world-wide objectives for the futu

formulation of a comprehensive long-range plan for their achiev

8. Use, in all areas, of governmental cover by C.I.A. personn

when other cover is not suitable or cannot be made available.

9. Active development of non-governmental cover.

10. The planting of agents under very deep cover in all a

cluding those that may not be of immediate interest, and the 

preservation of such assets.

11. More effective use of “proprietary project” cover throu

ter planning and by using personnel having adequate busin

area experience.

D. With Respect to Organization and Administration

That an intensive organizational study be made to the 

streamlining functions, clarifying lines of responsibility and au

reducing overhead and increasing efficiency and effectivenes

our relatively brief examination of organization it is obvious th

1. The present elaborate staff structure of the Deputy Dire

Plans should be simplified.

2. The covert organization should be so located, organiz

administered as to maintain maximum security with reference 

sonnel and activities.

3. The Inspector General should operate on an Agency-w

sis with authority and responsibility to investigate and repor

activities of the Agency.

4. The activities of the Operations Coordination Board un

N.S.C. should be broadened to provide the D.C.I. with adequa

port on the more important covert projects.

5. Despite the recommended reduction in present person

budgetary economies that the C.I.A. must continue to grow in 

ity until it is able to meet, entirely, its national commitments.

6. Centralized accommodations, hand-tailored to its needs, 

be provided to house the Agency.

E. With Respect to Cost Factors

That although the activities of C.I.A. should be expanded, 

present operations should be reduced. This can be in part, 

plished through:
1. The exercise of better control over expenditures for al

projects, and specifically that (except for those of an extremel

tive nature) they be made subject to review and approval 

Agency’s Project Review Committee.

2. Furnishing the Comptroller (under proper security pro

with sufficient information on all covert projects to enable him 

ercise proper accounting control on a fiscal year basis.

III. Discussion

Introduction—History and Growth of C.I.A.

The Central Intelligence Agency is an organization of mi

gins and recent growth.

The overt side of C.I.A., well described by the Agency’s ti

over in 1947 from the former Central Intelligence Group. It rece

intelligence collected by all government agencies, processes 

seminates and files it. This phase of the work is well administe

der the Deputy Director of Intelligence and serves the whole 

gence community. Since 1947 it has grown to its present 

approximately [number not declassified].

The covert side of C.I.A. started with O.S.O. (Office of Spe

erations) which was a remnant of the former O.S.S. Next cam

(Office of Policy Coordination) which was the “Cold War Sh

offshoot of the State Department. The two operated under C.I.A

tual independence of each other until they underwent a shot-g

riage in 1952, and were put under a Deputy Director for Pla

covert side now numbers approximately [number not declassified

regular table of organization, and approximately as many m

gaged in special projects, or about [number not declassified] in a

Supporting and serving Intelligence and Plans are about 

not declassified] more persons, of whom about two-thirds are grou

der a Deputy Director for Administration, and about one-third 

der Directors or Assistant Directors reporting directly to the Di

Central Intelligence himself, as in the case of Personnel, Train

Communications. The work of these [number not declassified] is la

support of covert operations, as the requirements of the over

gence side are relatively simpler, whether for training or for su

Additional personnel on special projects bring the current 

approximately [number not declassified]. In 1947 the total was l

[number not declassified]. This represents a [number not declass

crease in seven years.

(Note: Throughout this report we have considered as “co

activities that are not “overt.” Specifically, we have included 

“covert” the operations assigned to the Agency by NSC 5412 

as its clandestine espionage and counterespionage operations
A. The Personnel Factors

The most important elements in the successful conduct o

intelligence operations are the people who run them, —from to

agement down to the agent under deepest cover. First consid

therefore, must be given to the recruitment, selection, traini

evaluation of the most highly competent people available. The

then be assigned to jobs where they can be used most effectiv

be given whatever support they require to enable them to ca

their missions.

In the past this Agency has not been entirely successful in 

ing this result. In its short history it has suffered from lack of c

ity in policy direction and management. At its inception it s

from an inheritance of mixed and sometimes mutually antagon

ements from O.S.S. and other predecessor agencies. Then, at 

when still groping toward a stabilized peacetime program, it w

denly called upon to meet the requirements of the Korean Wa

Under this pressure it “ballooned” out into a vast and sp

organization manned by a large number of people some of who

of doubtful competence. Of necessity, sensitive positions were 

times filled with people having little or no training for their jo

Fortunately, the Agency did possess an invaluable asset in t

of a hard core of capable and devoted men as a part of its Wo

II inheritance, and did succeed in attracting to this cadre an ap

ble number of capable people. In some areas they have done, 

doing, an excellent job, but it appears from a personnel standpo

C.I.A. tends to accept more commitments than are warranted by 

man assets. This leads us to the belief that an immediate re-eva

of all programs should be undertaken by the Project Review C

tee to eliminate those of lesser importance and to cut back the 

rates of all but the most essential to bring the over-all program 

more realistic coincidence with current Agency capabilities. W

proved recruitment, adequate training and over-all experience le

tify, Agency activity may again be accelerated.

We have made a study of the educational and experienc

ground of the 34 key people in the Agency’s chain of command

this the following composite figures emerge: all are natural bo

citizens; they range in age from 38 to 66 yrs., averaging 47.9 yrs

married; 17 have 1 or more dependent children; 21 are who

pendent on government salary; all but 2 are college graduates; 

advanced degrees. Twelve have had 1 or more years business 

ence; all but 6 have served in the U.S. Armed Forces; 15 have 

telligence experience (O.S.S., Armed Forces, etc.) prior to 1947; 

have had specialized C.I.A. training. Of this group 32 have had 

or more service with C.I.A., 20 have had 5 years or more, and 
been with the Agency for the full 7 years since it was establish

present form in 1947.

The Office of Personnel supplied an excellent statistical stu

ering [number not declassified] staff employees and agents on th

as of 30 June 1954 from which the following data were taken

make up 58 percent of total, females, 42 percent; average age 

years and two-thirds are in the 25–39 year age bracket. As for 

tion, approximately 68 percent of the total are high school gr

some 47 percent have B.A. (or equivalent) degrees, and about 

cent have done post-graduate work or possess advanced 

Forty-five percent have served 3 years or more with the C.I.A

ing at prior intelligence experience, which includes service w

Armed Forces or with the Agency’s predecessor organizations

alizing that all Agency personnel do not require such training

cent had none, but 29 percent have had 1 year or more and 11 

2 or more years. Of the Agency total, 73 percent have had so

eign language training or experience, and nearly half have ha

prior foreign area knowledge. Slightly over 50 percent are Arm

ice veterans.

From the above we feel that the present personnel potenti

Agency is reasonably good. There is convincing evidence, h

that “dead wood” exists at virtually all levels. We have hear

remark to the effect that there are too many ex-military people. W

been advised that some people coming back to headquarters fro

seas assignments are sometimes not assigned to new jobs for 

riods. Uncertainties in policy, frequent internal reorganizati

gether with competition from industry frequently cause good 

to seek employment outside. As in other governmental agenci

is a tendency through inertia or because of a desire for financ

rity, for the mediocre to stay. As a result, despite the continual a

essary acquisition of additional good people, the competence 

the Agency is not rising as rapidly as is desirable. Prompt and 

action to increase the rate of improvement is indicated. We ar

opinion that a planned reduction of at least 10 percent in pres

sonnel can and should be achieved without reducing the amo

quality of Agency output.

We have been briefed on the Career Service Plan by means o

the Agency hopes to increase personnel stability. Whether the p

achieve this result is as yet unknown, but it will not in itself s

Agency’s personnel problems. Nevertheless we believe that 

Career Service Plan is desirable and should be impleme

promptly as possible.

The C.I.A. has a recruitment program operating in colle

universities throughout the United States. This program has n
entirely successful in producing either the quantity or the qu

applicants needed for Agency requirements.

In part, this is due to the general shortage of technically 

people vis-à-vis heavy current demands by industry in practic

fields. On the other hand we have heard criticism from sc

sources that the C.I.A. approach, both to the school and to th

vidual, is not what it should be, and furthermore, that many 

tially good people are lost because of the very great length of ti

now elapses between initial contact and entry into the job.

Clearance of new personnel at present averages 90 days. T

takes only 30 days maximum for clearing its own personnel. A

we appreciate fully the special problems involved in C.I.A., we 

it is both practical and essential to reduce the present 90 day pe

much as possible.

Many applicants find the necessary clearance procedures u

able and annoying. Some are repelled by misunderstanding of t

pose of polygraphic examination and the techniques employed

(particularly in scientific fields where future professional reputati

depend upon publication of papers, etc.) are unwilling to accept 

plications of a lifetime of anonymity, or of life under a pseudon

do not suggest that these requirements be abandoned or relaxed 

degree. We are certain that they are necessary for maximum secu

success of covert operations. But some better means of approach 

be developed to assure the prospective employee that he is necess

to persuade him that in this Agency he can find a desirable caree

the same time perform a vital service to his country.

We have been impressed by the excellence of the Agency

ing facilities and the competence of its instructor personnel. Ou

ment is that insufficient use is made of these facilities. It is obvio

the language, communication and clandestine agent training 

which we inspected are being operated far under capacity leve

of course, is a reflection of the slacking off in recruiting progra

it suggests also that adequate use of the facilities is not now bein

to improve the over-all quality of Agency covert activities by ne

ing or refresher training of personnel already in the Agency.

We are aware that the present tendency of the Agency to 

more work than it can handle satisfactorily has limited optim

of the training facilities, but it cannot be repeated too frequen

in C.I.A. covert operations quality is more important than qua

small number of competent people in a sensitive agency can b

useful than a large number of incompetents. In the long run it w

to stop some of the less essential operations now to permit 10–

cent of Agency covert personnel to go into training. As the bac

inadequately trained personnel is reduced and the competence 

Agency personnel increased, this percentage may be lowered.
B. The Security Factors

Nothing is more important in the planning and execu

C.I.A.’s covert activities than continuing recognition at al

throughout the Agency of the importance of security in all o

pects. Although many sound and important security steps have 

been put into effect by the Agency, in view of the outstanding 

tance of C.I.A.’s mission to the national security, constant effo

be made to improve security wherever possible.

We have been thoroughly briefed by the Security Offic

Deputy Director of Administration (DD/A), and by appropriat

of the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) on personnel, physica

mentary, operational and cover security. We have examin

Agency’s methods of screening out undesirable applicants or 

employees by interrogation, field investigation and polygrap

niques. We have also examined DD/P’s methods of processi

operational personnel prior to their use by the covert services o

We believe that C.I.A.’s security clearance criteria for pro

Agency personnel are sound. Without exception, they should 

adhered to in practice. The granting of provisional or other 

clearances should be minimized. Full background investigati

polygraph examinations should continue to be prerequisite t

for all positions. Individuals now on the rolls who have not 

benefit of these full security clearance procedures should 

processed at the earliest possible date. (At the time of our stud

were 132 headquarters and 531 field personnel who had not be

graphed because they had entered on duty prior to the instit

the polygraph program in 1948.)

We are impressed with the competent manner in which th

graph program is handled in the Agency and with the results o

therefrom. Polygraph examination has proved extremely u

identifying sexual perverts and other security risks. To Septe

1954, [number not declassified] polygraph examinations had be

ducted, resulting in the elimination of [number not declassified] 

uals as security risks. We endorse the Agency’s continuation 

polygraph program as an aid to investigation and interrogation 

as the present high standards govern the use of this device.

There is considerable room for improvement in existing secu

cessing procedures for alien operational personnel. Because so

sonnel must be used for immediate short term operations, it ma

times be difficult to apply full security clearance procedures to th

lines not declassified.]

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

A uniform requirement should be established for the sub

by all overseas missions of regular reports on the status of pe
physical, documentary and related elements of security. Such 

should be submitted to the Office of Security with copies to 

spector General and the appropriate division of DD/P. We reco

that periodic security inspections should be made by the Offic

curity of all overseas missions and of DD/P’s headquarters an

facilities in the United States. Tighter security procedures a

quarters and particularly in the field will better insure the sec

the Agency’s facilities, operations, sources and methods. Imple

tion of these recommendations should aid in raising the level 

rity throughout the entire Agency, particularly throughout the 

services.

If such a system of reporting and inspecting is adopted, 

rector can, for the first time, look to one office for the security 

entire Agency. He will then have a more precise and timely pi

security-related developments throughout the Agency.

We cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of the c

ation and intensification of C.I.A.’s counterintelligence efforts 

vent, or detect and eliminate penetrations of C.I.A. We endor

the present counterintelligence practices of the Agency which 

polygraphing all personnel returning from overseas assignme

tomatic security checks and file reviews of personnel being con

for transfer in the field or reassignment at headquarters, security 

of personnel nominated for special types of clearance, etc. We 

think that periodic re-investigation of all personnel is now ne

but we believe that comprehensive rechecks of personnel sh

made on a selective basis whenever sound counterintelligenc

tices dictate. Questionable cases should be intensively investiga

expeditiously resolved.

The counterespionage activities of the clandestine services 

one of the most fertile sources of information concerning attempt

etrations of C.I.A. Appropriate steps should be taken to insure t

est possible coordination of DD/P’s counterespionage activities 

field with the over-all counterintelligence activities of the Offic

curity. Any penetration attempt made against C.I.A., whether it i

Agency personnel and/or clandestine intelligence operations, ca

be fully controlled and exploited until all information concerni

attempts—whether made in the United States or overseas—is ch

through one focal point, preferably the Security Office.

“Security consciousness” is an obvious “must” for all C.I.A. 

nel. Constant efforts should be made to improve the Agency’s 

indoctrination courses. Regular “security awareness” programs 

be inaugurated in order that all personnel may be reminded of t

tinuing need for “security consciousness” in the conduct of their 

day affairs.
Most breaches of security committed by C.I.A. personnel 

to be inadvertent rather than intentional. The net effect of such b

on the national security is the same regardless of intent. With

ception, an inflexible attitude must be adopted with respect to 

breaches and severe penalties meted out to employees at all lev

advertently or inadvertently violate security.

Too easy access to much of C.I.A.’s classified data is a p

source of trouble. Except for the tight restrictions drawn aroun

sensitive material, large segments of C.I.A.’s files are open to 

tion and use by Agency personnel without qualification as to 

to-know.” Improvement is needed in carrying out the “need-to

rule as a basis for intra-Agency, as well as interdepartmenta

bution of C.I.A.’s classified data. This situation is aggravated 

erably by the fact that there are too many duplicate records. T

rity of C.I.A.’s data is further jeopardized by a tendency to over

documentary data originating in the Agency, a condition whic

ates in derogation of the security classification system as a wh

Considering C.I.A.’s unduly dispersed headquarters (43 b

in the Washington area), its physical security program is rea

good. The potential security risks inherent in such wide-spr

persal make it essential that the Agency continue its efforts to 

idate the headquarters facilities into fewer, more adequate bu

The physical security measures in effect at C.I.A. insta

which were visited in the general vicinity of Washington are e

The physical security of overseas installations visited by rep

tives of our study group appeared to vary with local circumstan

conditions. The limited number of inspections made was not s

to allow of definitive conclusions as to the general security of 

seas missions. There appear to be, however, no basic, minimu

ical security requirements governing these missions or stations

for the safeguarding of classified documents. We believe that 

able minimum standards should be promulgated immediately 

regular inspections by qualified Security Office personnel sh

made to enforce them.

Detailed plans and preparations should be made for im

implementation of war-emergency measures by all overseas m

and stations, tailored to the local conditions. They should pro

maximum safeguarding of Agency personnel and operations, 

adequate safeguarding or destruction of classified data and ma

the custody of the installations in question.

Secure cover is an inherent part of all clandestine operatio

security of some of the Agency’s cover devices is excellent, sec

others is inadequate. Cover security is a problem that requires 

uous and exhaustive study. Detailed standards and procedur
cies and regulations, should be issued for the guidance of the 

nel concerned. There is need for more adequate briefing of pe

departing for overseas assignments concerning the cover of th

sions and their personal cover problems. The Office of Security 

continually monitor the cover devices used in all foreign statio

Maintaining proper cover in proprietary organizations r

that all personnel concerned actually live within the cover fram

at all times. Vulnerable points are the channels of communicati

tween C.I.A. and the proprietary organizations as well as cont

tween personnel of such organizations and other personnel 

Agency. Another vulnerable feature is in the assignment of pe

from the Agency to the proprietary organizations and the hiring 

side personnel. Any person who has previously served in a kno

pacity with the Agency is a potential security hazard if associat

any proprietary organization. A like hazard exists if a person 

on the outside by the organization without first obtaining a co

clearance from the Agency.

Professionally qualified security officers should be placed on 

of the larger proprietary organizations. Experience shows that or

tions so staffed usually have fewer security compromises. Close 

nation should be maintained with the Agency on the matter of 

ing surveys of proposed “business” sites before they are acquired

any potential security hazard on or near the premises may be di

All officials of proprietary organizations must be indoctrinated in 

cessity of conforming with the security requirements of the Agen

glect of certain basic security requirements by such officials can 

disclosure, breach, or compromise of the covert association.

C. Coordination and Operations

The success of the covert operations of C.I.A. depends up

efficiently they are conducted and how well they are coordinat

other agencies of the Government. These criteria prevail both i

and in war, but both coordination and operations are necessaril

what different during each of these periods. Peace in any ordina

cepted sense of the word, appears to be impossible of achieve

the foreseeable future. The covert operations of the Agency mus

fore be planned and coordinated in order to meet the requirem

a continuing cold war situation as well as the requirements of p

hot war. C.I.A. has this obligation under NSCD 5412 (March 15

Looking toward the possible outbreak of actual hostilities 

theater of operations, a detailed plan should be developed now 

eating the wartime headquarters responsibilities of C.I.A. to ins

appropriate policy guidance, integrated with N.S.C. and J.C.S

be furnished to C.I.A. representatives in the field. In an em

situation time obviously will not permit referral of all critica
operational questions to Washington. Furthermore, the needs 

manders in the field may require the immediate transfer of m

cal C.I.A. covert operational assets to their commands. It is ab

essential, therefore, that well-considered, well-implemented a

tested plans be prepared in advance to insure smooth transfer 

assets and to deal with any other local covert operational pro

In the case of espionage and counterespionage operations 

disagreement between C.I.A. and some of the military service

has yet to be resolved. This relates to the area of “agreed ac

(NSCID 5, August 28, 1951)3 as to which a dispute has dragge

years. Some of the services feel that certain foreign espionage an

terespionage operations must be run directly by them. The Dir

Central Intelligence has been desirous of securing the voluntar

ment of the Armed Services, and has submitted various prop

them as to the delimitation of these areas of “agreed activities.” 

the attempts to resolve the differences have been unavailing. We 

that the prime responsibility for the failure does not lie with C.

with these services. In fact, we believe that the Director of Ce

telligence, in his desire to reach an amicable solution, has gone 

than was intended by the N.S.C. directives. Since agreement has n

reached on a voluntary basis, the dispute should be resolved 

N.S.C. In the settlement of this dispute, in addition to recogni

right of the Armed Services to perform counterintelligence activ

the security of their own installations and personnel, the Armed 

should be allowed to engage in espionage and counterespiona

ations (provided they are coordinated by the Director of Centra

gence) until such time as C.I.A. has the capability to perform 

onage and counterespionage operations outside the United Sta

In order to avoid undue delay in the resolution of such p

in the future, the Director of Central Intelligence (as coordinat

foreign intelligence) should report regularly to the N.S.C. on 

tus of efforts to implement N.S.C. directives, with particular em

on major unresolved questions.

Inasmuch as the exploitation of Soviet and satellite defect

side the United States has been a source of annoyance (and ev

tility) on the part of some of the military services and other a

toward C.I.A. and vice versa, we believe that steps should be ta

mediately to insure full implementation of the defector progra

cordance with the spirit and letter of NSCID 13 (Jan. 19, 1950)

3 Document 255.

4 Referenced in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligen

lishment, Document 433.
The misunderstandings which exist between C.I.A. and the 

Services stem largely from insufficient exchange of information 

ordination with respect to espionage, counterespionage, and co

erations. We have been advised, for example, that in certain in

C.I.A. operators appear to have been too secretive with respec

formation which is of direct interest to the military services a

versa. We have been told of incidents where important covert 

tions have been “blown” because C.I.A. and military intelligen

were operating against each other, without knowledge of each 

interest or activity. The relationship that exists in various count

tween covert C.I.A. personnel and the military attachés is not 

satisfactory. Attachés and MAAG’s are playing important role

collection of foreign intelligence and in the defector program, a

therefore, essential that closer coordination and greater exchang

formation be established between C.I.A.’s representatives and 

itary at every foreign station.

Misunderstandings between some of the services and the 

are not confined to overseas operations. A lack of knowledge o

facilities, and operations seems to exist in some areas between t

tagon and C.I.A. Compartmentation can be carried too far. Im

ment in collaboration at the working levels is particularly esse

Relations with C.I.A.’s other principal customer, the Dep

of State, also are not entirely satisfactory. In Washington, coord

seems to be reasonably good with well-established liaison ch

but misunderstandings seem to exist at many overseas station

is a feeling that C.I.A. is making too much use of [less than 1 

declassified] cover in many places. Such official cover is thin, 

and any compromise creates embarrassing situations. In som

C.I.A. personnel have not coordinated their activities sufficient

those who should know of them in our embassies. As a result, 

have worked at cross purposes, with unfortunate results. It is r

that there are situations in which disclosure of plan and purpose 

be held to a minimum number of people, but in all cases the 

U.S. Representative should be sufficiently advised to insure pro

ordination in accordance with approved N.S.C. intelligence dir

D. Organization and Administration

In the course of investigating the covert operations of the A

we were briefed on the organization of the individual compon

the DD/P complex. We also had the benefit of the thinking of 

ber of key Agency people with respect to the DD/P organizat

whole. As a result certain general observations with respect to 

organization have emerged which are germane to the problem 

efficiency and economy of its operations.
From the remarks that have been made on the subject of 

history and personnel problems, it is clear that the organizatio

in an evolutionary stage. It has suffered from a mixed inheri

lack of policy continuity, tremendous pressures to accept comm

beyond its capacity to perform, and a mushroom expansion. 

sult there has been an absence of long-range planning with con

organizational difficulties. We are strongly of the opinion that 

streamlining of organization, clarification of functions, and str

ing of lines of authority will result in more and better work wi

people at lower costs.

The covert activities of C.I.A. fall under the direction of the 

Director for Plans (DD/P). They are presently conducted by a 

cated organization of a mixed straight-line and functional type i

staff has been superimposed on staff to such an extent that dup

of effort, conflicting command authority, and division of respo

have inevitably resulted in dilution of the total effort.

There are six principal staffs in the DD/P complex rangin

from [number not declassified] people, totaling [number not decl

These are superimposed over seven area divisions ranging in s

[number not declassified]. Five of the staffs have subordinate d

and two of the staffs have subordinate staffs. In addition, eac

divisions has its own set of staffs. Altogether, the DD/P com

tals over 40 major units.

We are strongly of the opinion, based upon our limited re

the DD/P element, that consideration of a complete reo

tion of the element is needed. As an indication of the type o

tion that might be more effective and less costly, we have incl

this report for consideration purposes only, a revised organizati

as Appendix D. A chart of the present DD/P organization is 

cluded, for purposes of comparison, as Appendix C. The person

templated under the revised DD/P organization would num

proximately 1,000 less than are presently employed by this ele

In considering any reorganization, we cannot emphas

strongly our feelings with respect to the need for greater secur

DD/P operations. As the covert side of C.I.A., it should oper

a maximum of anonymity. Knowledge of its physical location

tion and the identity of its personnel should be kept on an ab

need-to-know basis.

We feel that continuous inspection and closer control (both fi

operational) over covert activities are necessary. We realize tha

security risks are involved but we believe they can be handled p

The subject of fiscal control, and the relationship of the 

troller to the organization are discussed under Section E follow

The concept of an Inspector General for the Agency is so

should report only to the Director. He should be given the grea
sible latitude and authority to inspect all aspects of the Agency 

time, including the Director’s own office and the DD/P comp

believe that any limitations that have been placed on this fun

the past should be completely removed.

Because of the rapid expansion of the Agency, its operati

conducted in some 43 buildings in the Washington area. Some 

buildings are of temporary wartime construction and constitu

hazard. This forced decentralization of operations results in gr

of time of personnel whose duties require them frequently to v

ious buildings of the Agency; it increases security problems; an

sults in a great reduction in over-all efficiency. We recomme

sympathetic consideration be given to the Agency’s effort to 

funds with which to provide centralized accommodations for 

tivities, and we suggest that these accommodations would be

the peculiar requirements of the Agency if they were hand-tai

its needs. We are of the opinion that in a relatively short time 

penditure required would be self-liquidating.

Although in the present organizational plan of the Gove

C.I.A. seems to be well integrated into the Intelligence Commu

the National Security Council level, events have occurred recen

example—Guatemala) which indicate that gaps exist in high lev

ning and coordination of important covert operations which m

pose the U.S. Government to unnecessary risks of compromise

all policy guidance comes from N.S.C., and is satisfactory, bu

coordination is needed for the more important covert activities o

at the national level. This is the function of the Operations Co

tion Board, but at the present time it does not appear to be giv

Agency adequate guidance and advice on the more importan

projects. The activities of the Board should be broadened in o

provide the D.C.I. with the support he needs on such projects

E. The Cost Factors

The budgetary procedures of the Agency were reviewed w

Agency Comptroller and representatives of the Bureau of the 

and appear to be satisfactory. Between the fiscal years ended J

1947 and 1955 the total budget has increased from approximate

lar figures not declassified], the latter figure including a reserve 

[dollar figure not declassified]. The 1955 fiscal year budget exclu

the reserve fund is divided approximately as follows:

Direct costs:

Covert operations [dollar figure not declassified

Overt operations [dollar figure not declassified

Indirect or support costs: [dollar figure not declassified

[dollar figure not declassified
Since indirect or support costs are relatively proportiona

rect costs, the total budget may be considered to be approx

[number not declassified] for covert and [number not declassified] f

operations.

The number of civilian employees of the Agency under pe

ceilings has increased from [number not declassified] at June 30, 

an estimated [number not declassified] for the fiscal year ending 

1955, and military personnel has increased during the same peri

[number not declassified] to [number not declassified]. The aggr

[number not declassified] for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955 

allocated as follows:

Covert operations:

Foreign Intelligence [dollar amount not declassif

Political & Psychological [dollar amount not declassif

Paramilitary [dollar amount not declassif

Overt operations [dollar amount not declassif

Indirect or support elements [dollar amount not declassif

[dollar amount not declassif

This total does not include individuals under contract, who are 

ular employees of the Agency, individuals under deep cover an

engaged in proprietary enterprises, and indigenous personnel. 

gregate of persons in these categories is estimated at [numbe

classified], most of whom are engaged in covert operations.

The actual number of individuals to be engaged on Agenc

ities for the fiscal year 1955 will, therefore, be approximately 

not declassified].

The covert operations of the Agency are budgeted and ac

for on a project basis except for headquarters and overseas 

costs. Political and psychological and paramilitary projects ex

a specified minimum dollar total are in general reviewed and ap

by a Project Review Committee. Foreign Intelligence projects 

subject to review by this committee but are authorized by the 

of the Agency, the Deputy Director of the Agency, the Deput

tor of Plans, or certain other individuals depending upon the es

dollar costs of individual projects. We believe that for purposes 

trol and as an aid in auditing, Foreign Intelligence projects (exce

of an extremely sensitive nature) should be made subject to rev

approval by the Project Review Committee.

Due to DD/P’s present secrecy policies with respect to For

telligence projects, the Comptroller of the Agency is unable t

tain meaningful records showing the expenditures made for 

ual projects in this category. The Foreign Intelligence Staff keep
records of such expenditures but on the basis of a calendar rath

a fiscal year. We believe that the Comptroller should be furnish

information which will enable him to record, control and acco

the costs of the individual projects of this element of the Agen

equate protection for security purposes can and should be p

within the Office of the Comptroller.

Certain other projects in the political and psychological an

military areas, of a sensitive nature are occasionally develop

processed without full information with respect thereto being g

the Deputy Director for Administration and the Comptroller. S

necessity, the funds must be made available by the Comptrol

inevitable that he will have knowledge that operations of this 

are being conducted and it is unlikely that more specific infor

relating to the projects can long be kept secret from him. In o

ticular instance where substantial sums were expended, the 

troller was called upon to make the expenditures with no sup

data being furnished to him at the time or at any future date

we requested breakdowns of costs of the operation we found th

were available only in the area division involved and that the

incomplete and unsatisfactory. We are of the opinion that this 

tion from the normal procedure of placing upon the Comptro

responsibility of accounting for expenditures is unsound, and 

justified by the claim that the security of the operation is impro

this deviation.

We are of the opinion that the administrative plans for i

ual covert projects are not in all instances as complete in det

desirable and that if they were amplified the Comptroller a

Auditor-in-Chief would be in a much better position to carry o

respective duties and responsibilities.

193. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, October 1

The President saw General Doolittle and other members 

Committee appointed to investigate the activities of the CIA.

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Dulles, A

13. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memoran
The report was presented by General Doolittle,

who said t

gone over it with Allen Dulles for three reasons: (1) to be ab

fair; (2) to study Mr. Dulles better to watch for his reactions to 

not wholly favorable; (3) and their hope that the maximum goo

come out of the report. Mr. Dulles made several recommendati

were incorporated in the report.

The President prefaced his remarks by saying that of cou

Dulles knew, as does everyone, that no two men would have t

judgments about certain things. That what we wanted to kn

did we have a good man for the CIA head, and was he being s

and skillful in getting his assistants, and was his team working 

in the best interests of the United States.

General Doolittle emphasized that the report was construc

icism and in no sense a white wash. Some of the recommen

were very technical.

About Dulles: his principal strength is his unique know

his subject; he has his whole heart in it, his life, he is a man 

honesty, integrity, loyally supported by his staff. His weaknes

weakness of the CIA is in the organization—it grew like topsy

organization. Mr. Dulles surrounds himself with people in w

has loyalty but not competence. There is a lack of discipline in 

ganization. There is a complete lack of security consciousness t

out organization. Too much information is leaked at cocktail p

There is the family relationship with the Secretary of Sta

relationship can be important as it leads to protection of one 

other or influence of one by the other. Doolittle feels that it i

tionship that it would be better not to have exist. The President t

however, there was something more favorable to be said abou

lationship; he appointed Allen Dulles in full knowledge of t

tionship and thinks it might be beneficial.

About Dulles’ two chief assistants. Frank Wisner is a chap 

promise but not a good organizer.

About Dulles’ readiness to accept criticism, Doolittle said he 

emotional; wherever criticism was against him he took it well; h

for his staff people, however, to the point of becoming emotiona

Doolittle had said that Bedell Smith had at one time s

Dulles was too emotional to be in this critical spot. He said fu

thought his emotionalism was far worse than it appeared on 

face. The President said he had never seen him show the sligh

turbance. He said further that we must remember that here i

2 For the written report, see Document 192.
the most peculiar types of operation any government can ha

that it probably takes a strange kind of genius to run it. The Pr

said that what did disturb him was what the Committee reporte

his assistants—Wisner and Cabell. Doolittle said in his opinio

Dulles did not have an administrative individual in either. Eise

said he was convinced no military man could do the job. Pr

pointed out importance of Allen Dulles’ contacts throughout 

President further said, with reference to lack of security, that 

completely frustrating to find always evidence that people are 

Security Council has gotten pretty good.

President said his next move would be to get Dulles in a

to him about it. The relationship with Secretary of State did n

turb him because part of CIA’s work is extension of work of St

partment. He further feels the confidential relationship betw

two brothers is a good thing.

Someone in room said Bissell was not a good man. Also that 

was an exceptionally fine man.

President said we were interested in two things: (1) impro

within CIA itself; (2) improvement in relationship and better 

standing between CIA and rest of intelligence committees in gove

President said he was astonished at the difficulty of gettin

administrators in government; that he had found a good many 

ministrators throughout his long career.

194. Letter From Edwin H. Land, Chairman of the Technolo

Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee

Office of Defense Mobilization, to Director of Central

Intelligence Dulles1

Washington, November 

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we thin

flight is urgent and presently feasible. I am not sure that we hav

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Sc

Technology, Job 33–02415A, Box 1, Folder 7. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The role of 

nological Capabilities Panel in the development of the U–2 is discussed at length 

ter 1 of The CIA and the U–2 Program, 1954–1974, by Gregory W. Pedlow and D

Welzenbach.
it clear that we feel there are many reasons why this activity i

priate for CIA, always with Air Force assistance. We told you 

seems to us the kind of action and technique that is right for 

temporary version of CIA; a modern and scientific way for an 

that is always supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite s

we feel that you must always assert your first right to pionee

entific techniques for collecting intelligence—and choosing su

ners to assist you as may be needed. This present opportunity 

ial photography seems to us a fine place to start.

With best wishes,

Edwin H

For: Project 3, Technological Capabiliti

Office of Defense Mob

Executive Office of the P

Project M

E. H

James G

Joseph W. K

Edward M

John W

Attachment

Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Dul

Washington, November 

SUBJECT

A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence

For many years it has been clear that aerial photographs 

sia would provide direct knowledge of her growth, of new ce

activity in obscure regions, and of military targets that would 

portant if ever we were forced into war. During a period in wh

sia has free access to the geography of all our bases and major 

facilities, as well as to our entire military and civilian economy, 

2 Baker and Purcell were at Harvard University, Kennedy at Washingto

sity in St. Louis, and Tukey at Princeton University. 3 Top Secret; Eyes Only.
been blocked from the corresponding knowledge about Rus

have been forced to imagine what her program is, and it could 

argued that peace is always in danger when one great powe

sentially ignorant of the major economic, military, and politica

ties within the interior zone of another great power. This ign

leads to somewhat frantic preparations for both offensive and 

sive action, and may lead to a state of unbearable national tensi

fortunately, it is the U.S., the more mature, more civilized, an

responsible country that must bear the burden of not knowing 

happening in Russia. We cannot fulfill our responsibility fo

taining the peace if we are left in ignorance of Russian activity

While aerial photography could be the most powerful sin

for acquiring information, it has until now been dangerous to 

Russia. Up till now, the planes might rather readily be detect

readily attacked, and possibly even destroyed. Thus no sta

could have run the risk of provocation toward war that an in

program of overflights might produce. The Air Force has, for 

time, studied a program of overflight as a natural aspect of its 

naissance mission and has, in recent months, considered seve

posals for airplanes designed for this purpose. While it is im

that such research and development continue in the Air Force, 

present it seems rather dangerous for one of our military arm

gage directly in extensive overflight.

On the other hand, because it is vital that certain kno

about industrial growth, strategic targets, and guided missile 

obtained at once, we recommend that CIA, as a civilian organ

undertake (with the Air Force assistance) a covert program of s

flights. Fortunately, a jet powered glider has been carefully stu

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for overflight purposes. This m

turer proposes to take full responsibility for the design, mock-up

ing, secret testing and field maintenance of this extraordinary 

orthodox vehicle, making it feasible for a CIA task force to un

this vital activity. Such a task force requires highly specialized a

guidance in procurement and operation (by Air Force officers 

craft, by scientists for photographic and electronic equipmen

Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of reach 

ent Russian interception and high enough to have a good ch

avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light (15,000 lbs.), so ob

unarmed and devoid of military usefulness, that it would minim

front to the Russians even if through some remote mischance 

detected and identified.

Since the proposed mission of this plane is first of all photog

and only secondarily electronic, a word should be said about 

formation expected from the photographs, as well as about the 
of the cloud cover over Russia. Photographs are appende

demonstrate the large information content of pictures taken fro

great altitudes. A single mission in clear weather can photograp

vealing detail a strip of Russia 200 miles wide by 2,500 mil

Cloud cover will reduce completeness, of course, but clouds a

serious obstacle because one can afford to wait for good wea

ternate routes over clear areas can be selected in flight; and fin

number of intelligence targets accessible during a single missi

large that even a partial sampling would yield an extraordinary 

of intelligence.

The opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few ye

cause the Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guid

sile defenses for the 70,000 foot region. We therefore recomm

mediate action through special channels in CIA in procur

Lockheed glider and in establishing the CIA task force. No pro

program that we have seen in intelligence planning can so quick

so much vital information at so little risk and at so little cost

lieve that these planes can go where we need to have them 

ciently and safely, and that no amount of fragmentary and ind

telligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to such 

information as can thus be provided.

It is recommended that

(a) The Central Intelligence Agency establish an initial ta

to complete any necessary feasibility studies in a few weeks, a

assuming successful completion of the studies, the following 

actions be taken.

(b) A permanent task force, including Air Force support

ments, be set up under suitable cover to provide guidance 

curement, to consolidate requirements and plan missions in 

priority and feasibility, to maintain the operation on a continu

sis, and to carry out the dissemination of the resulting inform

a manner consistent with its special security requirements.

(c) The procurement of a coordinated system from Lockhe

sisting of CL–282 aircraft with photographic and electronic equ

be authorized.

(d) Such high altitude overflights be authorized in princi

4 Not found.
Attachment5

A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPREHENSIVE

INTELLIGENCE—A SUMMARY

Opportunity

Collection of large amounts of information at a minimum 

through prompt development of a special, high altitude airpla

surance of thousands of photographs that will yield critical ana

vast Soviet complexes. Protection of mission by decisive altitu

vantage over Soviet interception. This protection good for onl

years, thus assured only through very prompt action.

Objectives

Providing adequate locations and analyses of Russian targ

cluding those newly discovered).

More accurate assessment of Soviet Order of Battle and 

warning indicators, thus improving our defenses against s

attack.

Appraising Soviet guided missile development (through ph

test range, etc.).

Improving estimates of Soviet ability to deliver nuclear w

and of their capacity to produce them.

Disclosing new developments which might otherwise lead 

nological surprise.

Appraising Soviet industrial and economic progress.

Organization

Secret task force under Central Intelligence Agency with 

Air Force staff assistance to equip and carry out entire missio

point where flow of useful new intelligence is established. Tas

to include top experts selected from Government agencies, arme

ices, universities and industry to provide for most effective app

of science and technology toward fulfillment of this objective.

Vehicle

Special “powered glider” CL–282 aircraft proposed by Lo

ALTITUDE–70,000 feet. SPEED–500 kt. RANGE–3,000 n. mi. 

WEIGHT–15,000 lbs. TAKE-OFF DISTANCE–1,200 feet. CRE

5 Top Secret; Eyes Only.
pilot in heated, pressurized suit. AVAILABILITY–four aircraft 

use in 17 months assured by Lockheed.

Cameras

Standard Trimetrogon for charting entire overflown stri

lengths from 12–48 inches to be used in multiple mounts for ma

load. Special long focal length spotting camera for detailing 

trated areas down to objects as small as a man. Clear identific

Roads, Railroads, Power Lines, Industrial Plants, Air Fields, 

Aircraft, Missile Sites and the like within a strip 200 miles wide 

miles long per flight.

Electronics

Electronics intercept [less than 1 line not declassified] dat

recorded on special automatic recorders preset for selected freq

More extensive electronic data available by optional use of ad

electronic gear in place of photographic gear.

Schedule

New intelligence to start flowing within twenty months.

Cost

$22,000,000 to initial flow of significant intelligence. (Inclu

curement of design, development and test of six CL–282 aircra

ing and operation of special task force and initial logistic supp

195. Editorial Note

Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles prepared a p

a review of national security policy then underway on Novem

1954. Dulles reviewed the evolving dynamics of the superpow

petition, predicting that, over the next few years, the Sovie

would become a more formidable competitor with the West i

gions of the world. To respond to this growing competition 

Dulles believed would remain primarily diplomatic, economic, 

tural, and was not likely to result in a ground war), Dulles no

the United States needed “to employ in a closely coordinated 

all the cold war weapons at its disposal.” To do so, the governm

quired “the decisive coordination of political, military, econo

covert actions.” The text is in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vo

Part 1, pages 776–781. 
196. Memorandum for Record1

Washington, November 1

Following attended luncheon given by Secretary of Air 

Talbott:

Mr. Trevor Gardner, Asst. to Sec. A.F.

Lt. Gen. Donald Putt A.F.

Dr. Land

Mr. Clarence Kelly Johnson, Lockheed A/C Co.

Mr. Fred Ayers, Asst. to Sec. A.F.

Mr. Allen Dulles, DCI

Lt. Gen. C.P. Cabell, DDCI

It was agreed that the special item of matériel described b

heed was practical and desirable and would be sought in add

the matériel item suggested by Gen. Twining at the earlier m

with him.2

It was agreed that the Project should be a joint Air Force–C

but that regardless of the source of the funds, whether A.F or C

unvouchered channels would be needed to pass the funds.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director for Science a

nology, Job 33–02415A, Box 1, Folder 7. Top Secret. The memorandum was han

by Cabell. 2 The meeting has not been further identified.
197. Memorandum by the Intelligence Advisory Committe

Washington, November 2

SUBJECT

Intelligence

In our opinion there are serious gaps in our Intelligence c

the Soviet Bloc areas, particularly in relation to our ability to de

the capabilities of the Soviet Union to launch nuclear attacks 

the U.S. and to detect indications of their intentions to do so

lieve that we could have a substantially improved capability o

these gaps through the use of aerial reconnaissance and photo

and that today these methods are the most practicable additiona

to this end.

Allen W. Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Spec. Asst. for Intelligence

Department of State

Arthur G. Trudeau

Major General, USA

Asst. Chief of Staff, G–2

Department of the Army

John A. Samford

Major General, USAF

Director of Intelligence

Department of the Air Force

Carl F. Espe

Rear Admiral, USN

Director of Naval Intelligence

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Sc

Technology, Job 33–02415A, Box 1. Top Secret. Although no addressee is giv

memorandum, it went to the President who alone made the decision on over

2 Printed from a copy that shows that Carl Reichardt signed for Tray

Traynor’s typed signature and that shows only Roach’s typed signature.

Edwin T. Layton

Rear Admiral, USN

Dep. Director for Intelli

The Joint Staff, JCS

Harry S. Traynor

Atomic Energy Commis

Representative to the IA

Ralph R. Roach2

Acting Asst. to the Dire

Federal Bureau of Inves
198. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence Dull

Washington, November 2

SUBJECT

Reconnaissance

You are familiar with the large gaps in our Intelligence co

of the Soviet Union which prevent us from obtaining adequate 

edge of Soviet intentions and, in important respects, of Soviet c

ities; and in particular, with respect to their capabilities and int

to launch nuclear attacks on the United States. You are famil

with the current and growing difficulties in the way of fillin

gaps by the more classic means.

In my considered judgment, as well as that of the other m

of the Intelligence Community, there is not the prospect of gain

vital Intelligence without the conduct of systematic and repeate

connaissance over the Soviet Union itself. (Even this does not ass

equacy, but will certainly provide a much closer approach to ade

The members of the Doolittle Committee in their report,2 express

belief that every known technique should be used and new o

veloped to increase our Intelligence by high altitude photogra

connaissance and other means, and that no price would be too 

pay for the knowledge to be derived therefrom. Thus, there is 

nite and urgent National requirement for photographic and el

reconnaissance overflights of the Soviet Bloc.

While we have been considering the problem for a long tim

may recall a discussion I had with you some months ago con

overflights), Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., and members of Project 

nological Capabilities Panel, Office of Defense Mobilization

Land, James G. Baker, Joseph W. Kennedy, Edward M. Purcell a

W. Tukey) have independently arrived at essentially the same 

sion.3 I have also discussed it with Secretary Talbott and with 

Twining.4 We are all agreed that the requirement is an urgent o

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Sc

Technology, Job 33–02415A, Box 1. Top Secret. The date is handwritten. Althou

dressee is shown, internal references indicate the memorandum was addresse

ident Eisenhower, who made the decision on overflights. 2 Document 192.

3 Document 194.

4 Document 196.
that with suitable direction and support, it is feasible of acco

ment with minimum risk.

An existing Air Force aircraft type (the Canberra)5 is con

capable of modification to give it a ceiling of around 65,000 

such an altitude now, the expectation that it would be detected 

low indeed, and the possibility that it would be intercepted a

down is practically nil. The possibility of forced landing in ene

ritory exists, but the chances of that are low. The repercussio

falling into enemy hands can be mitigated if the aircraft sh

manned by non-official U.S. personnel. To the extent practica

would try to man the aircraft with Poles or other non-U.S. na

The aircraft itself, if not completely destroyed, would bear n

ings that would clearly identify its origin. (The Canberra itself i

identical with its British prototype.)

As a follow-on to the Canberra, we would simultaneously 

with the procurement of specially designed reconnaissance 

with more advanced performance characteristics, that would t

around 70,000 feet.6

In addition to this high altitude day reconnaissance, we w

sort to very low altitude reconnaissance at night with appropr

craft. Whereas the night reconnaissance would not provide a 

tute for the high altitude day photography, nevertheless it wo

an opportunity for supplementary reconnaissance, exploitin

technical developments as infrared photography and certain e

ics techniques.

Of course, not even the 70,000 foot opportunity will be o

nite duration. Our problem will be one of keeping ahead and 

new opportunities as the old disappear.

We are all agreed also that, in order to attain a status of re

to launch these flights as early as desired, and then to condu

extraordinary procedures would have to be adopted for aircra

and equipment procurement, testing, training, and for operatio

would require the greatest possible collaboration between the A

and the Central Intelligence Agency.

I recommend that you:

a. Approve the existence of a National requirement for th

reconnaissance overflights.

b. By approval of this document, direct the Secretary of 

Force and the Director of Central Intelligence to establish as a 

5 The aircraft became known as the RB–69.

6 This aircraft would become the U–2.
of urgency, a collaborative project for the procurement and te

the necessary aircraft and equipment, and for the procureme

training of the necessary crews (such crews to be [less than 1 

declassified] to the extent practicable). The Director of Central 

gence is also hereby authorized to obligate in Fiscal Year 1

amount not to exceed [dollar amount not declassified] from the [l

1 line not declassified] for aircraft procurement, and it is expecte

project develops additional authority will be sought by him fo

for maintenance, training, operations, etc.

c. By approval of this document, direct the Secretary of 

Force and the Director of Central Intelligence, subject to appr

policy guidance as directed, to conduct at the earliest possible d

reconnaissance overflights, and to do so in such a way as to red

risk of involvement of the U.S. to the minimum practicable.

Allen W. 

7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

199. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhow

Washington, November 24, 1954, 8

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary of State (for part of meeting)

Secretary of Defense

Mr. Allen Dulles

Secretary of Air Force

General Twining

Lt. General Cabell

Lt. General Putt

Colonel Goodpaster

Authorization was sought from the President to go ahead o

gram to produce thirty special high performance aircraft at a 

about $35 million. The President approved this action. Mr. Allen 

indicated that his organization could not finance this who

without drawing attention to it, and it was agreed that Defense 

seek to carry a substantial part of the financing.

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary. To

Drafted by Goodpaster on November 24.
The Secretary of Defense sought the President

s agreemen

ing one last look at the type of operations planned when the 

are available. The President indicated agreement.

To a question by the President, the Secretary of State indica

difficulties might arise out of these operations, but that “we co

through them.”

In summary, the President directed those present to go ah

get the equipment, but before initiating operations to come in 

last look at the plans.

200. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/31

Washington, December 1

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECT

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence D

No. 4,2 paragraph 1, the following comprehensive national inte

objectives, generally applicable to all foreign countries and ar

hereby established:

a. Basic descriptive data as outlined in NIS Standard Instr

b. Social, economic, and political stability and trends of d

ment; susceptibility to foreign influence or coercion; vulnera

subversion.

c. Military capabilities and vulnerabilities, offensive and 

sive, including economic, scientific and technical, and psych

factors.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC In

Directives. Secret. DCID 4/3 and DCID 4/4 (Document 201) were attached t

cover page, which indicated that both had been prepared by the Director of C

telligence in collaboration with members of the Intelligence Advisory Comm

suant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, and that they 

proved on December 14. 2 Text in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 422.
d. Capabilities to influence, coerce, or subvert other gover

and peoples; capabilities for espionage, sabotage, and other c

tine operations in other countries.

e. Foreign policy, including strategic concepts and intenti

ternational alignment, with particular reference to alignment 

against the US or the USSR; disposition and intention to inte

the internal affairs of other states; preparation for and intentio

sort to armed action against other states.

2. Priority national intelligence objectives, with reference 

cific countries and subjects, will be set forth in a separate DCI

3. DCID 4/1 “National Intelligence Objectives,” 5 Februar

is hereby rescinded.

Allen W. 

Director of Central Int

3 Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B003

HC–600, Box 4) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

201. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/41

Washington, December 1

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence D

No. 4,2 paragraph 2, the following list of priority national inte

objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of inte

collection and production in response to requirements relating 

formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be 

national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Box 2517

telligence Directives. Secret. DCID 4/3 and DCID 4/4 were attached to a sin

page; see footnote 1, Document 200. 2 Text in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 422.
Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority 

the general priority category. Order of listing within thes

groups is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no 

icance with respect to the relative priority of specific items wi

group.

[Omitted here is a graphic depicting priority levels.]

3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence plann

directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period

be reviewed semiannually, or on the request of any member of 

It is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise re

ad hoc treatment, and that the criteria on which the following 

ties are established shall remain under continuing review.

4. DCID 4/2 is hereby rescinded.3

I. Highest Priority Objectives:4 Those of such critical importanc

require a maximum intelligence effort.

a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, an

particularly Soviet intentions and plans to initiate hostilities u

viet or Satellite armed forces.

b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy

tions, and plans, particularly Chinese Communist intentions an

to initiate hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces.

c. Soviet development, production, disposition, and emp

of weapons and other components of weapons systems requ

nuclear attack on the United States and/or key US overseas 

tions or for defense of the Soviet Bloc against air attack. Partic

erence is made to the development, production, and employm

(1) nuclear weapons; (2) delivery systems, including aircraft, 

missiles, and related base facilities; and (3) the components of 

viet air defense systems.

d. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandes

livery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

3 DCID 4/2, “Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives,” w

28 September 1950 and revised 12 June 1952 and 4 August 1953. [Footnote in 

nal DCID 4/2 is Document 25] 4 Note: Order of listing within Category I is a matter of convenience in 

tion and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific ite

that category. [Footnote in the original.]
II. High Priority Objectives:5 Those of such high importance as 

warrant an intensive intelligence effort.

The USSR and European Satellites

a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and int

of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the s

cohesion, and probable development of the NATO Bloc.

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and course

tion, including economic policies and actions, with particular re

to courses designed to weaken and disrupt the NATO alliance o

ment antagonism between Western and Asian powers.

c. Soviet political strengths and weaknesses: the actual l

political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or pol

flicts within the ruling group; Soviet-Satellite relations, with pa

reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the st

and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police 

the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in 

viet and Satellite populations.

d. The character of the Soviet (including Satellite) econom

particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the 

tion, character, and magnitude of current economic developme

grams, their implementation, and their effect upon the econom

litical, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc.

e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and 

nesses affecting Soviet economic and military capabilities.

f. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and 

nesses of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces, including their 

gic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, their logistic

port, and military production and stockpiling.

[29 paragraphs (861

⁄2 lines) not declassified]

Allen W. 

Director of Central Int

5 [21

⁄2 lines not declassified.] [Footnote in the original.] 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
202. Paper by James Q. Reber of the Planning and Coordin

Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency1

Washington, December 2

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION PROGRAM 

THE COORDINATION OF REQUIREMENTS

1. Coordination of collection requirements which are respo

the intelligence production programs of the IAC and its memb

cies is fundamental to obtain the maximum benefit from the co

activities of the Government. A number of these production p

have been fairly defined. They include: the NIS (now in its eigh

National Intelligence Estimates with its annual program an

mortem procedures, research in economic, scientific and technic

ligence, and the Watch Committee and the National Indications 

The recently approved Priority National Intelligence Objectives 

4/4)2 are intended to provide more discriminating guidance than 

fore to these production programs, from which, in the main, 

ments for collection stem directly rather than from the DCID–4

2. Because of the size and number of the research elemen

intelligence community and their remoteness from collection a

the function of collection requirements is the vital link which w

constant and careful attention in order to assure that collectio

ties are supporting, without duplication or other needless co

the priority production programs.

3. It is believed that a first step in providing such attent

bring together in one place the essential, factual material on w

lection mechanisms exist and how requirements are today lev

coordinated. The attached paper purports to be an initial, tho

mittedly incomplete, statement of such.

4. This paper has been prepared through the cooperation 

cers within CIA who are close to and have some responsibility 

ters described herein. As it may be amended and improved, 

serve several purposes:

(a) The Director and the IAC might use it in budget prese

to inform the Bureau of the Budget of this segment of inte

activities

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Collection 

semination. Secret. 2 Document 201.
(b) It might serve as a bench mark established at this ti

place which would later serve as a point of reference and measu

of our program in the future (c) It might acquaint any reader with some of the proble

activities involved in the coordination of collection requireme

in ways not previously possible, thus serving as an educationa

(d) Insofar as it is complete and authorative, it should ser

base for those who have the responsibility for seeking to eff

provements in directing the collection of intelligence informa

ward the most useful purposes.

5. Facts about big bureaucracy with its many people and 

procedures are difficult to come by. Accordingly suggestions fr

readers of this document as to how it can be made more accur

useful would be appreciated.

6. It has been recommended to the Director by the Board 

tional Estimates in connection with its proposed review of DC

(National Intelligence Objectives)3 that the Director initiate a re

the coordination of collection requirements. Such a review wou

essarily require among other things an understanding of the 

which the collection mechanisms themselves are administere

capabilities and their relations with producers as well as requir

officers. While a general review, such as proposed, is appe

should also be kept in mind that there are continual efforts dire

ward improvement in specific areas. For example, as a mean

fecting improvement in the handling of defector exploitation fo

ligence purposes the IAC at its meeting of 20 December 1954 in

certain new arrangements. Of course, a general review and sp

tention to specific collection problems could go forward hand i

James Q. 

3 Document 25.

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency5

Washington, December 2

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION PROGRAM 

THE COORDINATION OF REQUIREMENTS

1. The Foreign Service of the United States: Instructions to 

eign Service for collection are in the last analysis the responsi

the Assistant Secretaries of the respective bureaus in the Dep

of State. Except for agricultural reporting which is now admi

by law directly6 by the Department of Agriculture, the Depart

State must provide reporting of interest to the U.S. Governme

its many non-intelligence interests as well as to the IAC Com

It must also be recalled that this same Foreign Service has othe

responsibilities, namely, representation to foreign governme

protection of U.S. interests abroad. The desk officers in each 

bureau depend to a considerable extent upon the intelligence 

zation of the Department of State for the preparation and coord

of requirements for intelligence reporting.

Increased attention to the collection of information abroad 

use of intelligence is reflected in the new chapter (900) of the 

Service Manual which deals with this subject. In the economic 

“R” Area in the Department of State cooperates with the Div

Foreign Service Reporting to insure that insofar as possible a

resources of the Foreign Service are not requested to collect i

tion available in Washington and that requirements relevant to 

security are given precedence over those for less vital function

Government (such as development of information about possib

kets for U.S. products abroad). State “R” has invited the assis

ORR and the Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) to assis

preparation of guides for economic reporting. The intelligence 

5 Secret. There is no drafting information on the paper.

6 There are current negotiations between the Departments of State and A

which have resulted in a temporary agreement for the continuance of agric

porting on the Soviet Bloc by State. These talks are continuing with regard to 

sistance to Agriculture for agricultural reporting on the Free World (many area

ered by AAs [Agricultural Attachés] can be covered in part by State). [Footn

original.]
ization in State has also invited CIA/OCI to participate in the 

ration of instructions for political reporting.

It should also be borne in mind that the “R” Area itself is 

portant originator of requirements for reporting in the politic

tural and social field and that while it has access to other co

mechanisms, the Foreign Service is a prime collector of inform

the area of intelligence assigned to State. The establishment o

tional intelligence estimating program and the demand on the “

of State for contributions thereto represent an important influ

guiding the “R” Area to requisition information on gaps of 

mental importance. There are comparable effects upon repor

virtue of the “R” Area’s participation in the Watch process, as 

in the NIS production.

2. Peripheral Reporting Program: This program was establish

separate collection device within the Foreign Service under the 

of Mission. Its purpose is to obtain information on the Soviet Blo

tries by the assignment of competent officers to certain posts c

ous to the Soviet Bloc where the potential data on that area is s

tial. This was necessary as a means of supplementing the reporti

missions behind the Iron Curtain area where many local restrict

imposed on our staffs. At present, peripheral reporting units are 

in Frankfurt, Vienna, Paris, Tel Aviv and Istanbul. In Frankfurt 

ripheral reporting unit prepares comprehensive studies in the p

cultural, sociological and economical fields based on informat

lected on the USSR; these reports are called SPONGE reports.

The peripheral reporting officers make use of a variety of 

including defectors, escapees, refugees, travelers and officials o

governments located in the same areas as the peripheral units. T

inal emphasis was upon collection from arrivals from behind t

Curtain. Peripheral officers are now encouraged to develop 

sources among the indigenous travelers to and from the Sov

and staffs of other government located in the same countries as 

ripheral reporting unit. While the peripheral units are encour

develop sources as indicated above, the main sources at presen

follows:

Frankfurt (defectors)

Vienna (refugees)

Paris (émigrés and groups of émigrés)

Tel Aviv (refugees and recent émigrés from Iron 

countries)

Istanbul (émigrés and a few arrivals from Bulgaria)

3. Foreign Map Procurement: The requirements of all the m

agencies of the U.S. Government for foreign maps are coordin

CIA and the Interagency Map Procurement Coordinating Com
on which sit the representatives of the mapping agencies. The 

chaired by the Chief of the Map Library Division, CIA/ORR, w

serves as the Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Libra

Intelligence Acquisition, Department of State (also designate

mally, “Special Assistant for Maps”). Under the direction of 

cial Assistant for Maps, foreign maps are procured through 

partment of State and Foreign Service. Although the function 

collection of maps abroad rests with the Department of State, 

graphic research function has been transferred from State to CIA

the CIA direction of a State collection program. Four map procu

officers are stationed in the field and part-time map procurem

tivity is assigned to other foreign service officers stationed in o

eas. Salaries and administrative support of these field officers 

responsibility of State and during recent budget reductions tw

procurement officers were dropped despite the efforts of CIA 

suade the Department of State to retain them.

The above program for the collection of foreign maps has 

existence seven years. Procurement has been routinized by th

lishment of informal exchange agreements (140) with certain c

under which new map production is received in Washington 

the Foreign Service posts.

Requirements of CIA and Department of Defense compon

maps, air photography and other map information which is a

from U.S. firms engaged overseas in mapping and intelligen

tography are prepared in the Map Library Division, ORR/CIA 

curement by CIA/OO/C.

Frequently, an approaching assignment for production of 

Chapter IX (Map and Chart Approval) on a given area has pro

stimulus for procurement of foreign maps on that area in time 

in Washington in producing the Chapter. In other cases forei

requirements are in direct response to individual agency resear

ects or to recognized gaps in foreign map coverage.

The coordinated interagency map procurement program d

conflict with the map exchange agreements between the mappi

ponents of Defense and the opposite agencies in foreign co

Some of these agreements pertain to joint mapping program

other NATO countries. Agreements between the Army Map 

and the NATO countries’ mapping agencies provide the bulk 

graphical maps on NATO countries (and their colonies).

4. Foreign Publications Procurement is coordinated by the 

pursuance of the responsibility placed upon him in NSCID–16

7 Document 258.
teragency committee has been established which seeks to identi

areas in which needed publications may be obtained through 

operative action of agencies who have collecting capabilities as 

to be alert to new means of procurement. Overt publicatio

curement in the field is divided among military attachés, co

arms of military commands overseas, and personnel of the 

Service. The attachés and overseas commands concentrate on 

cations required by their parent organizations, while Foreign 

personnel fill the requirements of the Department of State, C

about 20 other Government agencies such as the Library of C

and the Department of Agriculture. For this purpose the 

Service maintains at the present time six full-time Publicatio

curement Officers (in Moscow, Paris, Berlin, New Delhi, Tok

Hong Kong) and assigns the function on a part-time basis to 

cer in other important posts. The degree of coordination and 

ation among service attachés and Foreign Service officers 

greatly from post to post. The Foreign Branch of the CIA Librar

ing for this purpose as an operating arm of the Division of A

tion and Distribution of the Department of State, in the last tw

since its establishment, has attempted to improve procurement 

mulating more detailed guidance for publications procureme

cers, by providing them with evaluation on their efforts, and by 

ing closely with those personnel in the defense departments e

in preparing collection requirements for the service attachés i

that the most effective field procurement channel may be uti

any given procurement situation. When publications are not av

through overt channels, arrangements are made whenever p

to obtain the materials through clandestine collection by CIA. 

sult of the USIA Survey, the NSCID–16 subcommittee on Procu

will explore with USIA the extent to which their library centers 

can assist in procurement.

5. Military Attachés: The attachés of the military servi

guided by the “Essential Elements of Information” published 

form or another under the direction of the Chiefs of Intelligence 

ONI and AFOIN. The EEI have been developed painstakingly a

resent the comprehensive needs of the individual services. Wit

general framework specific or ad hoc requirements are levied u

attachés as current needs arise or, more systematically, as requ

meet the needs of each service and the JIC in its service to the 

response to the national intelligence estimating program for m

contributions and in response to both the original and main

production of NIS sections assigned to the military.

6. General Comment With Regard to 1 to 5 above: The foregoi

accordance with the allocation of responsibility for overt co
abroad as outlined in NSCID–2.8 Each agency is free to collect ec

and scientific and technical intelligence information in accordan

its needs. Under NSCID–2 injunction, information, by whome

lected, shall immediately be transmitted to the agency most co

as well as made available to all other interested agencies. The

ties are to be utilized so as to avoid unproductive duplication 

coordinated overlap; “within budgetary limitations” they are t

that “full flow of intelligence information which is the major 

all departments and agencies for the accomplishment of their 

tive missions”. In the field, the senior U.S. representative in e

eign area is responsible for the coordination of “all normal co

activities in his area”. The manner in which this is done will va

post to post, both in respect to the personalities involved and 

and importance of the mission. In March 1954 the Department 

sent a special instruction to all Chiefs of Mission reiterating t

dinating role of mission chiefs under NSCID–2 and urging m

use of all available personnel including military attachés. At t

time, the Army, Navy and Air Force dispatched similar messag

attachés, urging maximum cooperation with mission chiefs in 

oping coordinated collection programs.

7. Regular Collection Offices: Each intelligence agency mai

collection office to coordinate requirements from its research 

assist their research offices in determining the availability of th

mation in Washington (either in its own agency or another 

levy requirements on collectors (either its own collection arm 

of other agencies) and disseminate the information collected 

requirements.

CIA/OCD/LD’s liaison officers, initially working through 

liaison authorities in other (non-IAC) government agencie

through those “non intelligence” government agencies know

lieved to have (or capable of obtaining) foreign intelligenc

OCD/LD collects such intelligence either against specific req

spontaneously.

CIA/OCD/LD administers a debriefing program, makin

able to CIA the knowledge of government officials who ha

abroad. The debriefing program is not limited as to area or sub

is, of course, limited only by the knowledge of the returned o

8. Collection of Foreign Intelligence Within The United States fr

governmental sources: On a selective basis is the responsibility 

8 For text, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligen

lishment, Document 425.
(OO/C) as a service of common concern (NSCID–7).9 Guidance 

selection is provided by the continuing requirements statement

research elements of CIA and the other IAC agencies, in add

consumer evaluations of reports and supplemented by contin

aison to discuss specific needs and individual sources.

To assure that this service is of maximum value to consume

ferences are being scheduled at the working level in all of the m

agencies. In addition, four specific interagency arrangements ar

completed or well on the way to completion:

(a) Three specialized ATIC officers have been placed in d

field offices to guide and actually engage in the collection of te

information. The assignment of a fourth officer, trained in a

tronics, is expected shortly.

(b) A similar arrangement has been worked out throu

for the assignment of two Signal Corps Intelligence officers to 

tic field offices in an effort to increase the quantity and qu

telecommunications-intelligence collection. One of these office

ready being processed.

(c) Arrangements have been completed with the Directo

telligence of the Air Force and with the Air Research and Devel

Command to facilitate the exploitation of civilian employees at 

ious ARDC centers for intelligence information not otherwise a

to the member agencies.

(d) Tentative arrangements have been concluded with G–

similar program to be established in the near future with th

Army Technical Services.

A fifth specific effort to produce more effective and coor

intelligence collection consisted of a program to analyze critic

requirements which have been received by Contact Division fr

producing elements of CIA and the other IAC agencies, and to 

in readily usable form all basic requirements currently outstan

9. Radio Monitoring: Under NSCID–610 a central radio mon

service (CIA/FBID) is established and the monitoring of foreig

aganda and press broadcasts for the collection of intelligence in

tion by other federal agencies is specifically precluded.

Since radio monitoring does not lend itself to exploitation 

cific information on specific subjects, guides or “targets” are p

by IAC offices each week. These are requests for translation 

is said by area transmitters in comment on, reaction to, or men

specific subjects, events or people. Additionally, a list of long-r

9 Ibid., Document 427.

10 Ibid., Document 424.
standing requirements stated in broad terms is provided quarte

target lists are distributed to field installations in order that the 

information may be selected from the great volume of monit

dio broadcasting.

Specific collection requests, especially on the technical as

radio monitoring, but sometimes on the content of radio bro

are levied on CIA/FBID either formally by the requester 

CIA/OCD, or informally to the Liaison Officer, FBID.

Additional guidance is obtained from study of intelligen

ciencies and the NIS and NIE programs. Some requirements 

evident, e.g., radio monitoring coverage of Central Asia p

unique information on an area of the world not otherwise cov

any appreciable extent by intelligence collection activities. Be

vesting funds and personnel in meeting a requirement such 

FBID solicits the IAC agencies to determine their interest.

10. The Collection and Exploitation of Soviet Materials for Int

Purposes is carried out under two programs which are coordina

the one hand the military has established a committee know

Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee (JTIS) with the resp

ity for coordinating military requirements for Soviet material

ing them to field components with a capability for collection 

ordination of the exploitation of Soviet material. Civilian requi

(those of CIA, State and AEC) are coordinated by a “Sovmat 

CIA/OO which levies requirements against not only foreign 

and military collection units but also, when appropriate, again

clandestine collection service. Through the participation of th

of the Sovmat Staff as an Advisor to the Chairman of JTIS co

tion between these two programs is provided.

11. The Travel Folder Program is designed to obtain the m

information from within the Soviet Orbit by direct personal o

tions on the part of American officials stationed in U.S. Miss

hind the Iron Curtain. Approved by the IAC, the program i

vised by CIA in consultation with the Economic Inte

Committee. The program consists of the coordination of IAC 

ments (mainly economic, scientific, technical, and military), 

and debriefing of travelers, the preparation of comprehensive 

of their observations, [31

⁄2 lines not declassified].

12. Research Units Abroad sponsored by CIA (strategic di

attempt to bring to the field more intimately the kind of guidanc

would make field collection more meaningful in terms of he

ters programs. [5 lines not declassified]

13. Collection of U.S. Files Abroad was undertaken by CIA 

A team microfilmed documents containing intelligence inform

the files of the U.S. agencies all over Europe, in anticipation of 
sible overruning of Europe by Russia and the consequent los

information in such documents. In general, such microfilming 

conducted in response to specific requirements and was main

posed of industrial data regarding West European countries.

The entire collection of some 2,000 reels of film is availabl

CIA Industrial Register. Few of the files microfilmed have b

dexed, but the team identified them in terms of subject matter 

ever possible and in terms of source or area when subject ma

formation was not available. Selected portions of the collectio

been incorporated into IR files, and a more complete index i

prepared on a low priority basis.

No direct requirements are levied against the file. The IR a

use this information, among other sources in their files, when 

ing requirements indicate its utility, as do other research analys

using IR files.

14. Captured Enemy Documents: Plans have been established 

ordination in the exploitation of captured enemy documents in w

under a joint military agency known as the Armed Services Doc

Intelligence Center. Civilian agencies requirements will be sati

this program by virtue of a CIA representative serving as an A

Director in the Center who coordinates the requirements of CI

and AEC.

15. The National Security Agency is guided in its collection 

ties through a USCIB subcommittee (Intelligence Committee) 

function includes requirements coordination. This subcommitte

posed of the intelligence agencies representatives, operates u

rather highly sophisticated system of identifying priorities.

16. In the Field of Indications responsibility to improve the 

nation of collection is set forth in DCID–1/2.11 The Watch Com

is supposed to “develop and operate on a current and continu

sis the Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, e

ing and coordinating through the appropriate channels the wor

collection by U.S. agencies of information and intelligence pert

the Watch Committee mission.”

17. [1 paragraph (24 lines) not declassified]

18. External Research: Members of the intelligence commu

well as several other Government agencies, sponsor external r

projects on foreign areas, thus providing an additional source of 

intelligence. This research is performed by Government agenc

private institutions, each of them using whatever sources are a

to them. Government agencies, contracting for private resea

11 Document 179.
foreign areas, frequently supply such contractors with intellig

formation which is, of course, supplemented by the contracto

resources. Government agencies conducting research on behalf 

Government agencies are exploited by informal interagency 

and by such regular collection offices as CIA/OCD.

External research on foreign areas, although performed in r

to departmental needs, is subject to certain coordination effort

intelligence community. These efforts are:

a. A clearing house for information provided by the Exte

search Staff, Department of State (ERS), a joint operation of St

and Defense;

b. Informal monthly discussions among external research 

istrators of various agencies to exchange information on what 

doing and what needs to be done;

c. An Advisory Panel on Research in Special Operations ap

by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Devel

consisting of outside specialists to provide guidance to the Dep

of Defense. USIA, CIA, State, FOA and OCB are represented 

Panel by associate members; and

d. On 11 December 1954 the DCI proposed to USIA, St

fense, OCB and FOA that agencies with intelligence needs in th

aganda and psychological warfare and foreign information fi

operate in the development of a government-wide program of 

research in support of such activities. Each agency would reta

plete responsibility for its departmental external research prog

would benefit by coordination of its program with other agenc

ing related missions.

19. ELINT: Collection of information by the detection, re

and recording of non-communication electronic radiations is 

on by the three services and by CIA/DDP. Analysis of materia

has been collected is conducted separately by the Air Force an

by Army and Navy through the Army-Navy Electronic Ev

Group, (NAEEG). There is limited and spasmodic coordinatio

field with respect to detection, reception and recording of ELI

lection. There is little or no coordination between the groups w

on the analysis of collected material. Present ELINT collection 

ties carried on by the services are primarily directed toward O

information such as the identification and location of radio 

long-range navigation systems and so forth. Insofar as it ha

oped, the CIA/DDP collection effort is directed toward the d

of new and unusual electronic emanations.

20. Interrogations of returning POWs, refugees and defecto

been the subject of various activities by the IAC agencies—[19 

declassified].
[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

Coordination of the U.S. Defector Program at the Washingt

is accomplished by the Interagency Defector Committee (IDC). 

not declassified]

The Armed Services have established a center (Armed S

Prisoner Interrogation Center) to coordinate the exploitation of 

CIA, State and AEC’s interests are represented by an Assistan

tor at the Center. Although its mission is interrogation of captur

oners, it participated in the interrogation of American POWs w

been held and then released by the Chinese.

21. Clandestine Collection Activities of the U.S. Government 

CIA/FI, which also has access to any intelligence products of c

tine operations, the clandestine services of the three military a

and AFOAT. The coordination of requirements for clandestine 

tion by CIA has been effected through the establishment of the 

gency Priorities Committee for Clandestine Collection. Furthe

opment in the efficient utilization of all sources of the Governm

clandestine collection is being developed through the propo

agreed activities under NSCID–512 now under negotiation betw

Director and the intelligence chiefs of the military agencies. Th

dination of information collected by AFOAT and all other so

assured, insofar as possible, under DCID 11/1.13 In the main, a

the direction of collection is concerned, the effect of this woul

alert AFOAT in the event that information regarding an atomic 

sion by the Russians were detected by one of the services oth

AFOAT in order that it could promptly institute collection acti

22. Press Monitoring is done by some of the posts of the 

Service in order to provide themselves with current press opinio

press monitoring activity varies from post to post; in Latin A

only one post (Rio de Janeiro), in Europe 19 posts, in Far East 1

and in Near East and Africa 22 posts conduct press monitorin

Current monitoring of the press of our two major enemie

and Red China, is performed in Moscow and Hong Kong respe

In Moscow there is the Joint Press Reading Service (JPRS), [les

line not declassified]. The JPRS reviews and abstracts from th

newspapers and periodicals of the USSR and issues two tra

12 For NSCID No. 5, December 12, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1945–195

gence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 423. For the revision of A

1951, see Document 255. 13 DCID 11/1, December 7, 1954, “Control of Information Regarding For

clear Explosions,” is in Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B003

4, Folder: HS/HC–600.
series, Section A covers foreign affairs and Section B domestic n

addition, abstracts of leading periodicals are prepared separat

semination is made by State within the Government and to a 

vate institutions. The Hong Kong Press Monitoring Service ha

to (a) [2 lines not declassified] as well as (b) to U.S. procured 

mainland publications. The HKPMS issues three press summari

Review of the Hong Kong Press (issued almost daily covering t

articles of the Hong Kong press), Summary of the Chinese M

Press (produced on the average of three or four issues per wee

ing the main topics of the Chinese language press and dividing 

ics in catagories of subject interest), and Current Background 

of various topics of political, economic and sociological sign

based on press articles extending over an indefinite period o

Wide dissemination of these press summaries is given within 

Government and to 25 private academic institutions or individ

In addition to the press summaries prepared by emba

ployees (whether Foreign Service or USIA, etc.) the missions fre

obtain press summaries from other governments. In approxim

posts, press summaries of the British are obtained while to 

lesser extent, press summaries prepared by the French are rece

nine posts, press summaries prepared by the host governmen

ceived and in one post (Tehran) a press summary prepared by th

is received. Dissemination of press summaries back to Washing

within the Government varies from post to post. A review of t

monitoring activities was prepared by State/IAD and dis

within the Government for the information of the users.

No headquarters requirements are levied for overseas pre

itoring and consequently no coordination is required.

23. Photographic Intelligence Collection and Requirements: 

gence photography is collected from the air, on the ground

records from radarscope presentations. The U.S. Air Force a

Navy operating squadrons and attachés collect approximately 7

15% respectively with the rest attributable to U.S. Army, CIA, an

miscellaneous sources. Most of the aerial photography collecte

Army for the Army Map Service is purchased from comme

ganizations. CIA concentrates its effort toward the collection 

photos from certain firms and foreign governments.

Aerial and ground photographs are required by the inte

analysts and mapping agencies throughout the IAC to corr

other intelligence data and fill existing gaps in intelligence. T

essential to the production and maintenance of accurate lar

topographic maps and the preparation of strategic and tactica

programs (Air Force) now in progress. CIA intelligence analysts 

photographic intelligence in support of intelligence objectives
may be geographic, economic, scientific, or military in nature 

support clandestine operations.

While procedures exist in each agency for the coordinatio

photographic requirements, there has been established, on the 

tion of AFOIN in 1948, an Interagency Graphics Research Coo

ing Group. Orginally, the group was composed of the three ser

was joined by CIA in 1951. This Group, meeting monthly, exc

information regarding photo requirements, location of desire

tography, overseas commercial mapping activities and related m

Highly classified and highest priority aerial photographic requir

are reviewed and coordinated by JCS Plans and Policy with fin

currence of State, Military and CIA.

203. Paper Prepared by a Working Group of the Operations

Coordinating Board1

Washington, January 

ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO POSS

DETACHMENT OF A MAJOR EUROPEAN SOVIET SATEL

Summary

1. Acting on the suggestion of the Board Assistants, the O

its meeting of August 25, 1954,2 requested the Working Grou

view additional possible actions to implement NSC 174,3 part

a major coordinated effort by appropriate agencies designed to 

one of the important European satellites from the Soviet bl

Working Group was requested to submit a preliminary staff a

to the Board which would point up the policy and strategic i

tions and feasibility factors that would be involved in such an 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR a

lites Documents 1953–56. Top Secret. A January 11 covering memorandum fro

B. Staats, Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board, to the Opera

ordinating Board, noted that at its January 5 meeting the Board approved th

mendations in the paper. No further record of this meeting has been found. 2 See Document 190 and footnote 1 thereto.

3 See footnote 2, Document 190.
At their meeting of August 13, 1954,

the Board Assistants agr

Albania should not be considered as an “important” satellite 

purposes of this study.

2. The Working Group first reviewed existing intelligen

mates of the political situation concerning all of the Eastern E

satellites. Then a study was made of the methods that might 

to detach a satellite. U.S. capabilities for such action were review

conclusions flowing from the analysis were drawn. Studies on 

nerabilities of East Germany and Czechoslovakia were prepar

cially for this review.

3. The analysis indicates that the instrumentalities of So

minion in the political, economic and cultural fields, backed 

tary force, continue to be effective in maintaining control over t

lites. The progressive sovietization of the political, social and ec

structure of the satellites, the orientation of the local economies 

the East and the concentrated effort at indoctrination of the ris

eration have served further to support Moscow’s control over t

lite areas. The Soviet orbit nevertheless has vulnerabilities w

susceptible to exploitation by the United States.

4. Without attempting to be categorical, it is the opinio

Working Group that soft treatment cannot be expected to effec

sic changes in the nature of communist regimes which would c

to U.S. objectives; and that therefore, except when relaxations 

culated to obtain carefully defined limited objectives within 

time span or to protect the people against the regime under spe

cumstances of internal tension, pressures should be increased 

any part of the Soviet orbit where suitable opportunities app

importance of this subject justifies study of appropriate implem

actions consistent with U.S. policy as it develops.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Board concur in the following

a. At present, given the strength of the Soviet position, n

Soviet satellite presents vulnerabilities of such extent that t

ploitation can be expected to result in its detachment from th

bloc.

b. U.S. capabilities under present conditions are not suff

accomplish the detachment of any major Soviet satellite by mea

of war.

c. Unless the power balance between the United States 

Soviet Union changes drastically in our favor, there is little lik

4 No record of this meeting has been found.
of detaching a major satellite at any time without grave risk of 

cept by negotiation. The only satellite which now lends itself t

ble detachment by this means is East Germany. If an effort agai

satellite were to be undertaken with any hope of success it wo

quire a concentration of political, economic and psychologica

ures directed to this end. A study of the requirements of such 

centrated effort should now be undertaken with East Germa

target in order that advantage may be taken of any future devel

making possible the unification of Germany by negotiation o

acceptable to the U.S.

[Omitted here are 36 pages of analysis supporting the sum

204. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 5/11

Washington, January 1

COORDINATION OF THE FOREIGN CLANDESTINE

COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMED SERVICES W

THOSE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 

amended,2 and for the purpose of defining under NSCID No. 5

clandestine collection activities which the Armed Services con

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC In

Directives. Secret. On January 11, NSC Executive Secretary Lay circulated this 

by memorandum to the National Security Council and noted that the Directo

tral Intelligence would make reference to it and other directives in his quarter

port at the January 13 NSC meeting. (Ibid.) In a January 12 memorandum to 

tary of State, Armstrong also transmitted this directive and described it as 

“Specifically, DCID 5/1, attached, defines the respective areas of responsibili

and the armed services in the field of clandestine intelligence. As such it rep

long sought agreement between Defense and CIA in this very sensitive, very 

but very important field. Neither the NSC nor DCI Intelligence Directive pro

coordination with the Department on clandestine intelligence activities which b

foreign policy, although coordination of this kind is specifically provided in 

pertaining to covert [psychological] Operations. I do not, however, recommend th

vision be made at this time.” (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, National Intellig

jectives) Brackets and emphasis in the original. 2 Pursuant to P.L. 216 of August 10, 1949, National Security Act amend

1949, the Department of Defense was established to coordinate and direct the U

Navy, and Air Force. (63 Stat. 578) 3 Document 255.
order to carry out their responsibilities and assigned missions

protect the security of their foreign based military command

stallations, and for the purpose of coordinating such activit

those of the Central Intelligence Agency (except in areas where 

States armed forces are engaged in active combat operations, i

event the provisions of paragraph 10 of NSCID #5 shall be dee

plicable), the following is established:

1. Where United States military commands or installation 

cated outside of the United States and its possessions, the com

ers thereof may conduct such foreign clandestine collection a

as they deem essential to the execution of their assigned miss

accordance with the principles and procedures set forth herein

2. Review and coordination of plans for the clandestine co

activities of the Armed Services and plans of the Central Inte

Agency for the clandestine collection of information of intere

Armed Services will be accomplished with each service to th

practicable at the national level.

3. In order to assure field coordination of clandestine co

activities, the designated representatives of the military comm

concerned and of the Director of Central Intelligence will rev

gether all such activities of those military commanders, as we

operational plans and procedures therefor. They will also rev

gether those clandestine collection activities of the Central Inte

Agency which are undertaken in direct support of the milita

manders concerned. Coordination may involve the creation 

lization of common support facilities, the exchange of operati

formation, and the establishment of informal committees.4

4. In the event that the designated representative of the Di

Central Intelligence considers an activity, plan or agent to be po

harmful to the over-all clandestine effort, the proposed action wi

carried out except as provided in paragraph 5 below, without p

proval resulting from agreement between the appropriate milita

ice intelligence chief and the Director of Central Intelligence.

5. In those instances when the military commander consi

action proposed in paragraph 4 above to be essential to the im

conduct of his mission or critical to the security of his forces, a

does not permit referral of the issue to Washington, the action m

ceed on the responsibility of the military commander, pending re

in Washington. The military commander will inform the designa

resentative of the Director of Central Intelligence as to his action

4 Upon the issuance of this Directive, a systematic review and adjustme

necessary, of ongoing operations will be made in the field in conformity wit

visions of this Directive. [Footnote in the original.] 5 Printed from an unsigned copy.
205. Memorandum From the National Security Council

Representative on Internal Security (Coyne) to the Presi

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) a

Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (La

Washington, February 

RE

CIA–The Doolittle Report on CIA’s Covert Activities

Last Friday night2 at the invitation of Allen Dulles, General 

tle, Bill Franke and I dined with Mr. Dulles and several of his 

ficials (Messrs. Cabell, Kirkpatrick, Wisner, White, Bissell, 

Balmer, Scott, Angleton and Roosevelt). Following the dinn

Dulles and his associates gave us a detailed fill-in on the progres

thus far by CIA in its efforts to implement the recommendation

Doolittle Report.3 Highlights of their oral progress report follo

1. NSCID #5:4 Agreement has been reached between CIA 

military services with respect to the conduct of certain espiona

counterespionage operations overseas. (I think this will mark 

substantial step forward, if it serves to clarify those areas of 

activities” which have been the subject of considerable controv

several years.)

2. Operational Security Clearances: An agreement has been 

with respect to the security clearance of agent, service and prop

personnel which is satisfactory to the DD/P and SO areas of the A

3. Counterespionage: A highly experienced official has been 

installed as the Chief of this area of the DD/P complex and im

procedures are being put into effect.

4. Polygraph Program: The backlog of unpolygraphed pe

has been virtually eliminated.

5. Cover Problems: Renewed efforts are underway to cope w

very difficult, practical problem of developing varied covers suit

CIA’s needs on both long-term and short-term bases. Allen Dulle

more might be done on this score, including increased use of al

6. Buildings: Varied and repeated efforts are being made w

tle success to improve the present office-housing situation whic

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 86–B00269

Folder 9. Top Secret. Drafted by Coyne. Coyne forwarded a copy to DCI Dul

cover of a February 18 memorandum, commenting that the President had seen 

orandum and could be preparing to talk with Dulles about it. 2 February 4.

3 Document 192.

4 For NSCID No. 5 Revised, see Document 256.
CIA, through no fault of its own, located in 34 buildings in th

ington area.

7. DD/Support: All normal functions of the Agency, excl

DD/I, DD/P, and IG have been combined under the newly cre

fice of the Deputy Director for Support. By this action, person

ministration, fiscal, communications and related matters are pu

gether under one head. Allen Dulles believes—and I agree—t

should have the effect of rendering more coordinated and bet

port to the various operational segments of the Agency.

8. Organization of the DD/P Offices: Steps have been init

streamline the DD/P set-up. Allen Dulles and Wisner are pre

get this done.

9. Training: Continuing efforts are being made to improve t

ing of personnel. Specific programs have been initiated for this p

10. Projects Review: A new Review Committee is about t

up which will continue the complicated task of examining proje

a view to eliminating those which are less essential so that a

resources may be allocated to those of greater importance 

Agency’s mission.

11. Long-Range Planning: Continued emphasis is being a

this matter and expert scientific and other outside personnel 

Land and Killian) are being tapped to assure maximum result

As Mr. Dulles and his assistants briefed us our views were s

and were quite freely given.

I was impressed, but not at all surprised, at the very cons

approach which Allen Dulles and all of his associates have take

Doolittle Report. I am convinced that assiduous efforts are bein

by the Agency to profit by such of the recommendations co

therein as may be meritorious. The fact that Allen Dulles wou

the time to consult members of an extinct committee is as un

it is desirable, and it speaks well of Allen Dulles’ continuing e

improve the performance of the many important national sec

sponsibilities which devolve upon CIA. (The use of the partici

the Doolittle survey in a continuing, consultative capacity str

as being highly desirable in view of the background which th

accumulated concerning the covert operations of CIA. Allen Du

in mind consulting with these same people on future occasion

I suggest that you give the President a brief oral fill-in on 

going when the opportunity presents itself. I suggest also that a 

appreciation from the President to Allen Dulles would be well d

J. Patrick 

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
206. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Central

Intelligence Agency and the Department of Justice1

Washington, February 1

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General 

United States and the Central Intelligence Agency for th

Entry of Aliens of Interest to the Central Intelligence 

Agency Under Special Circumstances

The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent need for the 

temporary entry of aliens into the United States for intelligen

operational purposes within its jurisdiction.

To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence 

will submit each such alien’s case in writing to the Commissi

Immigration and Naturalization with the request to defer ins

of the subject upon arrival and parole to the Central Intelligence 

under the authority of Section 212(d)(5) of this Immigration a

tionality Act.

In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from s

tries not be outweighed by the dangers, if any, to the internal s

of the United States by the presence of such aliens, the Central 

gence Agency agrees that it will take all necessary steps to e

the bona fides of each prospective entrant prior to submittal to 

migration and Naturalization Service. It further agrees: (a) T

method of entry will only be utilized where it is strictly in the n

interest; (b) That each request will be accompanied by a summ

pertinent background and biographical data with particular em

on aspects bearing on internal security and admissibility under 

migration laws, as well as the result of a current check of the F

and (c) That the place, time and manner of arrival will be coor

with the Service in advance thereof.

Each alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissione

the foregoing procedure will be paroled for such period of time 

be agreed on by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Ser

no instance to exceed one year. Further extensions of parole, si

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278

Secret. Dulles also sent a February 10 memorandum to Wisner stressing CIA’s 

bility for determining the bona fides of aliens admitted under this agreemen

recting him to ensure that all elements of the CIA under his control be inform

contents of the memorandum. (Ibid.)
limited, may be authorized thereafter on a written statement 

which will include the results of a current security check.

Upon arrival each alien will execute an agreement acknow

parole status in a form satisfactory to the Central Intelligence 

and the Service.

After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Age

assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a k

degree it believes consistent with the internal security need

United States during continuance of their parole status. Furthe

case of any alien whose physical custody is not to be maintain

to be terminated, the Central Intelligence Agency will keep the 

informed as to his activities and whereabouts for the duratio

parole status. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency will 

for presentation of each alien for registration pursuant to law a

and place satisfactory to the Service.

Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purp

the United States, or if internal security reasons so require, thes

will be removed therefrom through the arrangements and at 

pense of the Central Intelligence Agency, except in these cases i

other disposition is made of a nature satisfactory to the Servic

the Central Intelligence Agency will inform the Service suffici

advance of each proposed departure as to permit verification 

if the Service so elects.

In accordance with past practice, the Service will apprise 

of the entry and departure or other disposition of these aliens

The Service will maintain separate and secure files un

agreement.

Herbert Brow

Attorney 

Allen W. 

Director of Central Int

2 Printed from a copy that indicates Brownell and Dulles signed the ori
207. National Security Council Directive

NSC 5511 Washington, February 1

DIRECTIVE ON A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTE

1. Pursuant to the recommendations of the National Security 

cil in NSC Action No. 1260–b (November 4, 1954) and my sub

approval thereof,2 I hereby establish a permanent procedure to 

integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in th

of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental U.S. a

U.S. installations overseas, and to provide a continual watch for c

which would significantly alter those net capabilities.

2. Each integrated evaluation should:

a. Cover all types of attack, overt or clandestine;

b. Include consideration of the several courses of action wh

USSR is capable of executing; and

c. Take into account the estimated future status of approv

itary and non-military U.S. defense programs.

3. Each integrated evaluation report should estimate fr

practical standpoint the extent and effect of direct injury, includ

dioactive fall-out, upon the continental U.S. and key U.S. insta

overseas, resulting from the most probable types and weight

tacks which the USSR is capable of delivering during approx

1 Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSC 5511. Top Secret. This directiv

culated by Acting Executive Secretary Gleason to the National Security Counc

were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, Director of the B

the Budget, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Civil Def

ministrator, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligen

man of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Chairman of the 

partmental Committee on Internal Security, with a note stating that the dire

been approved by the President on the same date. See also Foreign Relations, 1

vol. XIX, pp. 56–57; and for the subcommittee’s presentations to the Nationa

Council in 1955, 1956, and 1957, see ibid., pp. 126–130 and 672–676. 2 This NSC action reads: “Adopted the recommendation of the Net Ca

Evaluation Subcommittee that there be established a permanent procedure to 

continuous evaluation of the general nature of the one made by this Subcomm

a continual watch for significant changes; such procedure to provide for a rep

National Security Council at least once a year and, in any event, at whatever tim

become apparent that would significantly alter the net capabilities of the USSR 

direct injury upon the continental U.S. and key U.S. installations overseas.” 

Eisenhower subsequently approved this recommendation “with the understan

the nature of the permanent procedures, including appropriate staffing, w

subject to future determination by the President.” (National Archives, RG 59, 

(Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security 

Box 102)
the first thirty days of general war, taking into account the effec

counterattacks during this period. A separate evaluation will b

assuming each of the following types of initial attack:

a. An initial surprise attack, based on a USSR decision to g

priority to damage to the continental U.S., with no strategic 

but with tactical warning intervals appropriate to target loca

type of attack.

b. An initial attack, based on a USSR decision to balance a

involved in initiating general war; preceded by the amount of 

warning estimated to be most likely under those circumstances

c. An initial attack preceded by sufficient strategic wa

place U.S. military and non-military defenses in a condition of 

and to initiate U.S. retaliatory action.

4. Integrated evaluations should be submitted to the Co

or before October 1 of each year, and relate to the situation on 

cal date normally about three years in the future. In addition 

annual integrated evaluations, an integrated evaluation should 

mitted to the Council at such times as the Subcommittee fee

change has become apparent that would significantly alter th

pabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury upon the continen

and key U.S. installations overseas. The first integrated ev

should be submitted to the Council on or before October 1, 19

5. In order to prepare these integrated evaluations I he

tablish a Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Securit

cil, composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, w

serve as Chairman, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobi

the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director of Centr

ligence, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence 

ence, and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee o

nal Security. Each Subcommittee member shall be consulted re

and given ample opportunity to review the following prior t

tion by the Subcommittee: (a) subsidiary terms of reference, (b

sumptions to be used as a basis for each evaluation report, (c) t

plete evaluation report (less background material, which shall 

available only on a “need to know” basis), and (d) any recom

tions which the Subcommittee may choose to submit. The C

of the Subcommittee, in consultation with the Director, will 

regulations and establish procedures for the handling of high

tive information3 required in the preparation of an evaluatio

so as to safeguard its security on a strict “need to know” basi

3 Information such as that relating to war plans, new weapons and e

techniques and tactics for their employment, the vulnerability of U.S. defense

mestic and foreign intelligence sources and methods. [Footnote in the origina
preclude the assembly of an unwarranted amount of sensitiv

mation in one document.

6. In all matters relating to AEC activities, it is expected 

Subcommittee shall consult with and obtain the advice and as

of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

7. Subcommittee members are designated to act as indiv

but each shall have the right to consult, at his discretion and un

propriate security safeguards, with his agency or committee 

Subcommittee action on matters normally within the cognizanc

committee or agency. In subscribing to the reports and recom

tions of the Subcommittee the individual members shall not 

pected to assume responsibility for technical matters or conclusi

normally within the cognizance of his own parent committee or 

Reports as submitted to the Council should show, so far as pos

textual footnotes, any dissents by Subcommittee members.

8. The Subcommittee will have a staff, composed of indi

assigned by member agencies, as required by the Director, and 

the direction of a Director whom I shall designate. The Direct

be compensated through the National Security Council from co

tions by the member agencies.

9. The Net Evaluation Subcommittee hereby established 

powered under the terms of this Directive to call on any agenc

Government for relevant information, evaluations, and estimat

ject only to establishment of appropriate security regulations a

cedures for the handling of highly sensitive information as p

under paragraph 5, above.

10. Distribution of each completed Subcommittee report 

determined at the time by me.

Dwight D. Eisen

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
208. Executive Order No. 10598

Washington, February 2

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10483, ESTABLISH

THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitut

statutes, and as President of the United States, it is ordered t

sections (b) and (d) of Section 1 of Executive Order No. 10483 

tember 2, 1953 (18 F.R. 5379)2 be, and they are hereby, amended 

respectively, as follows:

“(b) The Board shall have as members the following: (1) 

der Secretary of State, who shall represent the Secretary of S

shall be the chairman of the Board, (2) the Deputy Secretary of D

who shall represent the Secretary of Defense, (3) the Directo

Foreign Operations Administration, (4) the Director of Centra

gence, (5) the Director of the United States Information Agen

(6) one or more representatives of the President to be design

the President. Each head of agency referred to in items (1) to 

clusive, in this Section 1 (b) may provide for an alternate mem

shall serve as a member of the Board in lieu of the regular mem

resenting the agency concerned when such regular member is 

sons beyond his control unable to attend any meeting of the Bo

any alternate member shall while serving as such have in all 

the same status as a member of the Board as does the regular 

in lieu of whom he serves.”

“(d) The Special Assistant to the President for National 

Affairs may attend any meeting of the Board.”

Dwight D. Eisen

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 86–T00268R, 

classified. Reprinted from Federal Register 55–1831, Vol. 20, Number 41, March 

2 Document 157.

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
209. National Security Council Report

NSC 5509 Washington, March 

STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATION

SECURITY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1954

[Omitted here are Parts 1–6.]

Part 7—The Foreign Intelligence Program

(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 

and Concurred in by the Intelligence 

Advisory Committee)

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

Note: Paragraph 10a of NSC 162/22 sets forth the primary m

of the US intelligence system in support of basic national secu

quirements. This report presents a statement and evaluation o

bilities to carry out these objectives as of December 31, 1954. S

of the report is addressed primarily to the first of these three ob

(warning of aggression) and Section II to the other two (cap

and intentions of foreign countries). Section III deals with prob

collection related to all three objectives. Problems of covert co

are considered in Section IV.

I. Warning of Aggression

”Collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions tha

give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in 

of the world.” NSC 162/2, para. 10a(1)

1. National Intelligence Objectives. Pursuant to NSCID #43 t

on December 14, 1954, approved a new statement of “Priority N

Intelligence Objectives” (DCID 4/4)4 which was prepared in t

of NSC 162/2. This basic revision of priority national inte

objectives, which will be reviewed semi-annually, provides im

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5509 Me

Box 85. Top Secret. NSC 5509, prepared by various U.S. Government agenci

National Security Council, is described in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XIX, 

Ellipsis in the original. 2 Superseded by NSC 5501, approved January 7, 1955. The missions of t

telligence system are reaffirmed in the same words (para. 56). [Footnote in the 

For NSC 162/2, see ibid., 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 577–597. For NSC 550

National Security Policy,” January 7, 1955, see ibid., 1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 2

3 See ibid., 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Docu

4 Document 201.
guidance to research and collection throughout the intelligen

munity and focuses attention upon those intelligence area of 

security concern.

2. Watch Committee of the IAC. For the purpose of suppor

mission of the IAC Watch Committee “to provide earliest 

warning to the United States Government of hostile action by th

or its allies, which endangers the security of the United State

has now been established, under the direction of the committe

dications Center. This center is staffed by representatives of th

ligence agencies who, in coordination with their parent agenc

lyze information from all sources and select and collate indica

Soviet/Communist hostile action or intentions affecting U.S. 

security for the consideration of the Watch Committee. This f

is in counterdistinction to the warning provided through rad

ters, and filter centers. For further support of the mission of th

Committee, there was issued on November 30, 1954, NSC 5438, 

mittal of Information to the IAC Watch Committee,”5 which 

izes and directs appropriate departments and agencies of the 

ment to make fully available to the IAC Watch Comm

information and intelligence pertinent to its mission and func

3. Evaluation of U.S. Warning Capabilites. On September 1

the IAC approved SNIE 11–8–54, “Probable Warning of Sovie

on the U.S. Through Mid-1957,”6 which estimates the amoun

vance warning to be expected in the event of various types o

which might be initiated by the USSR. It concludes that the U.

expect possibly as much as six months and not less than 30 day

ing of Soviet preparations for a full-scale ground, sea, and air a

the event of prior mobilization. It also concludes, however, t

ticularly by 1957 only a few hours or in some cases no specifi

ing, other than that provided by early warning radar, could b

upon in event of various types and scales of surprise attack. A 

review and revision of this estimate is contemplated.

Our advance warning largely depends on sifting a large q

of material to discover those indications of enemy activity wh

gest that measures are being taken to implement a decision to 

The enemy’s choice of the type of attack greatly affects our 

warning capability. We are largely dependent on radar and 

observation stations for early warning of air attack, in the ev

our intelligence fails to discover indications of preparations 

and if the USSR should risk launching such an attack witho

5 See Document 187 and footnote 4 thereto.

6 Not printed. (National Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIE’s, 1950–1955, #68
mobilization. We lack adequate penetrations of the Soviet Bloc t

be relied on to provide warning in the event that the enemy is 

to risk a surprise attack without extensive mobilization. Rep

troop movements and logistical activity are usually reported 

or are too inconclusive to give adequate early warning in such a

We are exploiting all available sources of information and con

striving to develop new and improved means of detection of a

As stated in SNIE 11–8–54, “The warning process is . . . affe

the whole context of events in which it operates, including p

logical factors and even pure chance. It cannot be regarded a

chanical process which it is possible for intelligence to set up o

for all and which thereafter operates automatically.”

II. Estimating the Capabilities and Intentions of Foreign Countries

”Accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign countries, frien

neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic, a

versive courses of action affecting U.S. security.” NSC 162/2, para

”Forecasting potential foreign developments having a bearing 

national security.” NSC 162/2, para. 10a(3)

1. National Intelligence Objectives. DCID 4/37 and 4/4 set 

spectively, comprehensive objectives for all countries and are

priority objectives for specific countries and subjects. DCID 4

ticularly delineates more precisely than has been done hereto

specific aspects of capabilities and intentions of certain countr

deserve priority attention.

2. National Intelligence Estimates. Since the last report (NS

Part 8),8 several major estimates have been produced dealing w

viet Bloc capabilities and probable courses of action. Included 

group were three basic annual reviews: “Soviet Capabilities an

ably Courses of Action Through Mid-1959,”9 ”Communist Cou

Action in Asia Through 1957,”10 and “Probable Development

European Satellites Through Mid-1956.”11 In addition, three es

were produced directly or indirectly in support of the NSC S

“Net Capabilities of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury Upon the 

7 Document 200.

8 NSC 5430, Part 8, “The Foreign Intelligence Program and Related A

dated August 18, 1954, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 

5430 Series. 9 Reference is to NIE 11–4–54, September 14, 1954; extracts are in Foreign 

1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 1235–1238. 10 Reference is to NIE 10–7–54, November 23, 1954; ibid., vol. XIV, pp. 93

11 Reference is to NIE 12–54, August 24, 1954, not printed. (National Arc

59, INR Files: Lot 78 D 394, Record Sets of NIE’s SE’s and SNIE’s)
nental U.S. and Key U.S. Installations Overseas”:12 ”Soviet G

pabilities for Attacks on the U.S. and Key Overseas Insta

Through 1 July 1957,”13 ”Probable Warning of Soviet Attack on 

as of Mid-1957,” and “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Prog

the Guided Missile Field.”14 Seventeen estimates were produ

countries outside the Soviet Bloc. Much emphasis was given to 

East, particularly to Indochina. Of the 24 NIE’s published du

six-month period, 16 were related to specific NSC papers o

decisions.

Continuing evaluation is taking place on means for impro

quality of National Intelligence Estimates. The entire produ

1953 and the first six months of 1954 have been reviewed in 

identify and correct intelligence deficiencies. In addition, there 

before the IAC a special detailed “post-mortem” of NIE 11–6–

viet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile 

3. Basic Intelligence. The initial world coverage of the Nati

telligence Survey is essentially 45% completed, including 24

vidual sections, mainly on JCS high priority areas. Present pro

is slightly below the scheduled rate of approximately 8 equiva

per year. The over-all quality is being improved by better colle

support of the program

4. Military Intelligence

a. General. At the present time, military intelligence is g

adequate to provide broad measurements of the military, log

dustrial, and governmental control strengths of the USSR, Com

China, and the Satellites. However, significant detailed info

available is fragmentary and it is essential to develop means 

come present deficiencies in the collection field in order adequ

support U.S. military plans, programs, and operations.

Limited gains were made during the past six months in 

lowing fields: analysis of performance characteristics of new 

Soviet aircraft; data on the development of Soviet nuclear weap

formation on modifications of Soviet tactical doctrine in nucle

fare; technical methods and devices for intelligence collection; 

Communist ground force dispositions; and knowledge of Sov

ship construction.

12 Not found. Soviet capabilities were discussed by the National Securit

on November 4, 1954; see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XIX, p. 25, footno

13 Reference is to SNIE 11–7A–54, September 14, 1954, not printed. 

Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIE’s, Box 1, # 67) 14 Reference is to NIE 11–6–54, October 5, 1954, not printed. (Ibid., RG 59

torical Files: Lot 78 D 394, Record Sets of NIE’s, SE’s and SNIE’s)
Nevertheless, military intelligence on the USSR and, to a le

tent on Communist China and the Satellites, is inadequate in ma

ical fields. There is a serious lack of specific and detailed infor

on the following: the development, production, and deploym

guided missiles; other unconventional weapons; newly develo

modified conventional weapons; delivery systems, logistical c

ties and support; some components of the air defense system; 

entific and technical strengths as they affect military capabiliti

knowledge continues to be inadequate on the movements and 

sitions of Soviet Bloc forces, particularly in the USSR. The cess

hostilities in Indochina has resulted in a reduction of military 

gence on the Viet Minh.

Our knowledge of Soviet atomic energy progress is referr

paragraph 7b below. With respect to information on: (1) speci

cations by the USSR of available nuclear materials to types of w

in the small, medium and large yield categories; (2) specific allo

of nuclear weapons and warheads to various delivery systems; 

actual disposition of nuclear weapons and warheads, our requir

continue to be unfulfilled.

b. Target Materials Production. Approximately 80% of the m

requirements for air target materials, in the Air Objective Fold

gram (OAFP), in support of joint war plans are complete. The 

ing 20% of the minimal requirements are scheduled for comple

the end of CY 1955. Other air target materials, desired by the S

for development of the optimum opportunities for air action, 

proximately 50% satisfied. Production to satisfy the remainder 

requirements continues to the maximum extent practicable an

sonant with priority emphasis on highest and earliest readiness 

port of joint war plans.15

15 The Director of Naval Intelligence notes that the rate of production of 

materials for the highest priority (all-weather) Navy targets continues to be a 

concern. The Target Area Analysis Radar (TAAR) is considered to be the mo

cant piece of target material developed and produced for-all weather, medium 

altitude operations. Between July 1952 and July 1954 the Navy nominated 632 al

targets for inclusion in the Air Objectives Folder Program for production of TA

of December 1, 1954, TAAR production had not been started for 52%. TAAR p

was in process for 22%, and TAAR had been completed for 26%. The TAAR 

useful for low-level, all-weather mining but charts can serve adequately where 

steep gradients along the shore. In other cases the capability for conducting th

ations is greatly reduced. No intelligence solution appears possible. Low-lev

speed aircraft missions require special charts for navigation and approach whi

now available. However, such charts are under development. [Footnote in the 
5. Political Intelligence

a. The Soviet Bloc and Communist China. Political intelligenc

Soviet Orbit is built mainly upon the careful screening and ev

of overt materials from the Soviet and Chinese Communist p

dio, and other information media. The flow of current mater

the accumulated body of evaluated data and the developm

group of experienced analysts, make possible a reasonably accu

terpretation of political developments in the Soviet/Communis

Recent defections of fairly high level Soviet officials have 

to confirm important aspects of existing intelligence analysis. S

the observed course of events over the past year has borne out 

substantial particulars the intelligence estimates of probable po

developments in the USSR.

Our capability for assessing specific short-term intention

USSR and Communist China is inherently limited by the clos

acter of the Soviet and Communist Chinese decision-making s

Although the Soviet/Communist regimes cannot mask their 

international aims and attitudes, only a very high level penetr

these governments would make possible fully assured assessm

particular Soviet/Communist plans and intended actions.

b. The Free World. As a part of a long term look at the p

in the cold war, special emphasis has been placed during the 

months on the situation in the underdeveloped areas of Asia

and Latin America; Communist capabilities in the Free World; 

titudes and reactions in the Free World and in the Soviet Blo

clear weapons developments.

The revolution which overthrew a Communist reg

Guatemala and the disclosure of the Tudeh16 ring in the Irania

have made available to U.S. intelligence a new body of mat

Communist tactics of infiltration and control. Analysis of thes

rials is expected to provide an improved understanding of Com

subversive capabilities in underdeveloped countries.

6. Economic Intelligence

a. General. Economic intelligence, like political intelligenc

sentially the product of collation and analysis of data from p

overt sources. Economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc has im

as a result of additional systematic analysis of the Soviet p

industries. Experimentation is under way on new economic r

techniques for the evaluation of Soviet capabilities for sup

16 Iranian Communist Party.
specialized weapons programs. Among the major unsolved probl

Soviet defense expenditures and Soviet agricultural growth capa

b. Communist China. Economic research effort and the flow 

telligence materials on Communist China have increased, resu

a better appreciation of Chinese Communist productive cap

and of Sino-Soviet economic relationships. The output of certa

industries, such as electric power, and iron and steel, is reasonab

established. Further information and research are required to 

mine agricultural and handicraft output, chemical and munitio

put, transportation capabilities, and over-all per capita consum

c. Economic Defense. In addition to a continuing review o

commodity problems for East-West trade controls, intelligence 

for economic defense includes an assessment of possible long-r

nomic developments within the Soviet Bloc as they relate to ec

defense policies. Intelligence support for enforcement of econo

fense measures has been maintained in spite of diminishing in

tion on trade transactions. Intelligence on shipping engaged in 

Bloc trade continues to be good, and there has been some im

ment in cargo information. Continued joint conferences with 

have produced substantial agreement on intelligence concerni

World trade with Communist China, although significant diff

still exist as to the type and quantity of cargoes reaching Com

China from or via Hong Kong and other trans-shipment points

over, information on unrecorded shipments remains inadequa

d. Free World. Economic intelligence production on the Fre

has concentrated on analysis of (a) improved economic condi

Western Europe; (b) the unfavorable outlook for Japanese foreig

and (c) the problem of economic development in underdevelo

eas. The results of this effort have been satisfactory.

e. Coordination. The Economic Intelligence Committee (E

taken a more active part in guiding economic intelligence pro

and has continued its surveys to uncover economic research a

lection deficiencies. In September, the EIC coordinated a draf

15/1,17 later approved by the IAC, which delineates IAC age

sponsibilities for production and coordination of foreign econo

telligence related to national security.

7. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

a. General. Through intensified collection and research o

derstanding of Soviet basic scientific capabilities, including the 

and quantity of their scientific manpower, has improved. In 

17 Document 191.
fields of science and technology, however, vast gaps in our kno

still exist. Substantial improvement will require successful app

of new collection techniques and improved analytical proces

under development.

b. Atomic Energy. The most significant advances in atomic 

intelligence have resulted from the extensive Soviet nuclear w

test program and the return of German technical personnel f

USSR. Data from the weapons test program and related info

received during the past six months have made more clear the 

status of Soviet nuclear development and indicate that several 

weapon types are probably being stockpiled. These same data 

formation furnish guidelines for estimating the future course o

nuclear developments. Interrogation of German returnees h

firmed previous reports of the activities of German scientists in 

viet atomic program and has provided information that raise

what the level of confidence in the estimates of Soviet U-235 pro

given in NIE 11–3–54.18 The apportionment between weapons 

the Soviet fissionable material stockpile, although susceptible 

mate by indirect methods of varying reliability, cannot yet be co

by direct evidence.

c. Guided Missiles. Preparation of the first NIE on guided 

revealed critical gaps in our knowledge. While certain new co

techniques and data reduction methods give promise of bette

mation, their development has not yet progressed to the poin

viding the information required. A U.S./UK intelligence confer

Soviet guided missiles capabilities, held in London in Novembe

the independently prepared U.S. and UK estimates to be re

close.19

d. Biological Warfare. Following production of SEC 2–54, 

Biological Warfare Capabilities Through 1960”,20 the first com

wide estimate in this field, a joint study of critical deficiencie

logical warfare intelligence and recommended means for the

nation has been undertaken. Coordinated all-source research 

member agencies on certain suspected Soviet biological war

stallations has been largely completed. Despite these efforts, 

knowledge of the existence and nature of a Soviet BW program 

to be established.

18 Not printed. (National Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIE’s, 1950–1955, Bo

19 IAC–D–81/6, “Reports of the US/UK Intelligence Conferences on E

and Guided Missiles,” January 27, 1955, is not printed. (Central Intelligence A

ecutive Registry, Job 85–S00362R, Box 5, Folder 8) 20 Not printed. (Ibid., Transnational Issues Job 79–R00825A, Box 105)
8. Intelligence Support for Foreign Information and Psychologi

fare Programs

The survey of USIA’s intelligence needs and assets repo

IAC–D–55/721 was approved by the DCI, USIA, and the Dep

of State. Pertinent recommendations were approved by the IA

survey report defined the types of intelligence and intelligenc

mation required to meet USIA’s essential needs, which are, in th

also the needs of other agencies with related programs. Arrang

have now been made to insure that USIA, to the maximum exte

sible, will receive the pertinent products of the existing intellige

ganizations. To strengthen existing facilities, increased funds ha

allocated for the expansion and acceleration of production of r

parts of the NIS program. To meet the specialized needs of US

lizing the intelligence produced by other agencies as required

telligence unit has been established with USIA accompanied 

abolition of certain USIA offices. It is expected in the near futu

certain intelligence assets of USIA will be made available to th

ligence community.

III. Collection

1. The Foreign Service. Reporting from and collection by t

eign Service, a primary overt source of intelligence informatio

tinues for the most part to meet expectations.

a. Reporting from behind the Iron Curtain. Reporting remain

equate in the political and sociological fields, principally becau

strictions on movement and the size of missions. Generally sp

reporting from and on the USSR from the intelligence point 

has shown some slight gain; in the case of the Satellites, there h

a decline, at least in political reporting. Some improvement in 

ing has been hoped for because of the greater cordiality of Sov

officials in their contacts with Western representatives, but litt

evident. On the other hand, a decrease in the flow of overtly c

materials is expected as a result of probable retaliatory action 

governments of the USSR and Satellites to recent and pendi

travel and access restrictions on Soviet diplomatic personnel.

b. Reporting outside the Bloc. The principal handicap to im

Foreign Service reporting is reduced staff. However, streng

inter-agency coordination of collection and requirements h

tributed to improved reporting, especially in the economic fiel

21 Not printed. (Ibid., History Staff, Job 84–00161R, Box 3, Folder 6) It w

sis for Acting Director of Central Intelligence Cabell’s recommendation that the 

ignate CIA to disseminate national intelligence to USIA. His memorandum is in 

Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSCID’s.
c. Publications Procurement. The continued absence of sati

publications procurement from London and the Middle East is 

a cumulative effect and for some areas is beginning to impai

sis-in-depth.

d. Map Procurement. Collection of maps from the Soviet B

been limited, by continued security restrictions, to atlases an

scale maps. There has been a marked decrease in the procure

maps and map intelligence from Latin America and from No

Europe, because of lack of specialized collectors in these areas

2. Agricultural Reporting. Under recent legislation, agricul

tachés will report directly to the Department of Agriculture. H

by subsequent agreement between the Department of Agricult

the Department of State, the latter will continue to be respon

agricultural reporting from the Soviet Bloc.

3. Military Attaché System. The attaché system continues 

major source of military intelligence. It provides good covera

side the Soviet Bloc, but the capabilities of attachés in countrie

the Bloc continue to be drastically restricted by counter-inte

measures. In view of these basic restrictions, active considerati

ing given to training of military attachés in special observati

niques, including photography and recording. Also, an improv

gram of collection guidance has been initiated to relate attaché a

more directly to urgent requirements. However, these measu

still leave overt collection capabilities far short of being able 

military intelligence requirements in Soviet Bloc areas. Substan

provement in military intelligence collection under present pe

equipment and operating expense limitations will depend u

proved coordination, guidance, and the development of new co

techniques.

4. Overseas Command. Overseas commands continue to be 

tant sources of information on Communist armed forces and 

tential within the limitations noted in II–4 and IV.

5. Aerial Reconnaissance. The trend toward exploiting aeria

naissance opportunities continues together with improving c

ties. Reconnaissance operations continue to be performed wi

framework of policy considerations of other than an intellige

ture. Research and development are producing promising re

equipment and techniques. Establishment of an Army Photo I

tation Center has been approved.

6. Exploitation of Defectors. Soviet and Satellite defectors as 

East German scientists who, after working under contract in th

were returned to East Germany and defected to the West, con

provide valuable intelligence on the Soviet Orbit. The rate of d

remains constant. In the last six months, 10 Satellite and 7 Sov
fide defectors were received at the Defector Reception Center, Ge

while 28 German scientists were received by the Returnee Expl

Group. MVD22 defectors Yuri Rastvorov, Nikolai Khokhlov and 

surfaced lieutenant colonel, and the Polish Security Officia

Swiatlo, although defecting early in 1954, made outstanding co

tions to U.S. intelligence and psychological warfare programs 

this period. The U.S. also received the intelligence benefits fr

fectors received by various other friendly Western countries.

7. Domestic Collection. This continues to be productive. Th

bility of increased travel by private U.S. individuals within the 

Union may expand the collection potential of such sources. 

progress has been made in the coordination of the activities of C

the military services in the collection of foreign scientific and te

information from U.S. sources within the framework of NSCID 

8. Foreign Radio Broadcasts. World-wide radio monitoring co

continues at approximately the same level as a year ago. Howe

stallations have been improved and the processing of monitor

terial has been further perfected.

9. Foreign Materials and Equipment. Continuing Soviet effor

crease the export of Bloc products and more extensive Soviet 

pation in international trade fairs have facilitated the collection 

viet and Satellite non-military items. There has been a steady i

in the acquisition of factory markings data on Soviet Bloc equ

With the exploitation of available military equipment nearl

pleted, emphasis is now directed toward the exploitation of 

equipment available through commercial channels.

10. Programs in Electronics

a. Monitoring of Radio Jamming. Monitoring of the reception 

broadcasts to the Soviet Bloc, increased under the authority 

16924 by the use of intercept facilities at U.S. embassies behind 

Curtain, contributed significantly to VOA and RFE operations, a

therefore accelerated. In addition, a project to locate and colle

on the Soviet radio jamming system has had significant result

b. Non-Communications Electronic Intercept (ELINT). ELINT 

tion activities have assisted materially in gathering information 

viet equipment and systems, including identification of AI rada

22 Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Soviet foreign intelligence appa

been renamed the KGB in 1954. 23 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 427. 24 NSC 169, “Electro-Magnetic Communications,” October 27, 1953, rece

approval by the President on October 22, 1953. (National Archives, RG 59, 

Files: Lot 63 D 351, Serial Master Files of NSC Documents)
erational use and the establishment of the general nature of Sov

igational systems. Much remains to be done before a satisfacto

gration of the U.S. ELINT effort can be achieved. Meanwhile

with foreign activities in this field, primarily those of the UK, 

proved.

11. Travel Folder Program. The 1955 schedule for revision o

Folders will reflect the priority selections of the entire U.S. inte

community. It will involve 29 routes and 39 town briefs in th

and country questionnaires for 5 Satellites.

12. Foreign Language Publications. Further progress has bee

in the coordination of foreign publications procurement, part

from Communist China, and a greater and speedier flow of 

tions from that area is expected in 1955.

IV. Covert Collection of Intelligence Relating to the Soviet Bloc

1. During the last six months, clandestine operating co

within the Soviet Orbit have been affected by two opposed tr

tightening of internal security measures in both the Far E

Europe on the one hand, and a relaxation of travel restriction

from the Orbit on the other. One has made the maintenance 

destine mechanisms and assets in Communist countries incr

difficult; the other has opened up new opportunities to expl

travellers; i.e., Communist officials who travel in the West an

ern officials, businessmen, and students who travel in the Orb

legal-traveller program in 1954 resulted in 335 positive inte

reports.

2. A greater counterespionage effort and closer cooperati

friendly intelligence services have resulted in a heavier flow 

positive and operational data which will make possible a m

centrated effort directed towards Soviet and Satellite personali

installations abroad. In this connection, the constantly expand

of technical surveillance facilities to cover Soviet and Satellite 

tions abroad has been found increasingly valuable. In additio

new approaches to denied area operations such as ELINT ar

further developed.

3. In order to coordinate more effectively intelligence collect

outstanding requirements capabilities, a program designed to g

ter guidance to the field is being completed. Although an overall 

in the quantity of intelligence is noted, deficiencies in the quali

formation and the specific coverage of priority targets still exist

4. In certain categories, however, the quality of intelligen

mation obtained on the USSR has improved. Intelligence info

of considerable significance has been obtained on Soviet Army 

doctrine and on modifications thereof for nuclear warfare.
210. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the 

(Hughes) to President Eisenhower1

Washington, March 

SUBJECT

Coordination of Economic, Psychological, Political Warfare, and Foreign 

Information Activities (NSC Actions Nos. 11832 and 1197)3

1. When you assigned this study to the Bureau of the Budg

indicated that its primary purpose should be to answer two qu

(1) What is the present status of this work and how are respo

ties placed, and (2) What were my recommendations for imp

planning methods and effectiveness?

2. On November 23, 1954,4 I reported to you on the first q

by supplying you with (1) a chart and narrative description ind

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Coord

Psychological and other Warfare Activities. Secret. Sent on March 3 to memb

National Security Council for discussion at the March 10 NSC meeting. (Ibid.) 

ruary 7 memorandum, Comptroller of the Department of State, Isaac W. Carp

had informed Under Secretary of State Hoover that all Department of State 

Secretaries opposed the proposals and recommendations in this memorandu

For example, Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research Armstrong opp

ation of the “Rockefeller Board” as duplicative in a February 3, memorandum 

penter. (National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, 1945–60, Box 2, R

Board) In a February 4 memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary of State for 

tration Henderson, Max Bishop, Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under 

of State, also opposed the proposal as diluting the authority of the Operation

nating Board. (Ibid., Records of the Bureau of Administration: Lot 62 D 220, TS 

on Interagency Relations, 1948–61, OCB) Despite Department of State oppos

President approved the proposal on March 10. See Foreign Relations, 1955–1957

p. 62.2 At its 207th meeting on July 22, 1954, the National Security Council, in 

tion No. 1183, “Coordination of Economic Warfare Activities,” noted the Presi

quest that the Bureau of the Budget study and prepare recommendations for 

sideration on placing responsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinatin

economic warfare activities. The NSC later transmitted NSC Action No. 1183 

rector of the Bureau of the Budget for implementation. (National Archive

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the Nationa

Council) 3 See Document 187 and footnote 7 thereto.

4 In the November 24, 1954, memorandum to the President, Hughes wro

would await the report on economic warfare then being prepared by Joseph M

Special Assistant to the President for foreign economic affairs, before formally su

the study requested by the President. Accompanying that memorandum wer

nary reports on the existing organization of the Executive Branch involved in th

planning and coordination of economic, psychological, and political warfare, a

mation and a summary of the principal problems raised by that organization. 

Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Coordination of Economic, Psyc

and Political Warfare and Foreign Information Activities)
the functions of agencies involved, committee memberships, etc

were found to be in existence at the time our study was launch

(2) a summary of the principal problems raised by the organizat

then existed. Copies of those papers, together with a copy of my 

randum of transmittal to you, have been supplied to the membe

National Security Council and to the Secretary of the Treasury, 

rector of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

3. The results of this study have been reviewed by a gro

sisting of Presidential Assistants Cutler and Rockefeller, Unde

tary of State Hoover,6 Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, 

of Central Intelligence Dulles, and former Under Secretary 

Smith.7 The recommendations contained in this memorand

based upon their advice and have their concurrence.

4. Two closely related organizational studies were conduc

currently with our review. One was the study of our informatio

ities made for you by Mr. William H. Jackson.8 The other was th

conducted by Mr. Joseph M. Dodge of executive branch organiz

planning and coordinating foreign economic policy.9 This latte

was conducted in close cooperation with the Bureau of the Bud

with your Advisory Committee on Government Organization.

5 Enclosure to Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, 

cember 13, 1954. [Footnote in the original.] 6 On January 29, Hughes prepared a draft memorandum to respond to 

dent’s request for a study on the coordination of economic, psychological, an

warfare and foreign information activities. That draft was reviewed by offic

Department of State. Commenting on the January 29 paper, Robert R. Bowie o

ommended to Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., on February 4 th

effort be made to head off the formation” of what he perceived as a potentia

strategy board to be headed by Nelson Rockefeller. On February 14 Hughes 

vised draft to Under Secretary of State Hoover, DCI Dulles, and Deputy Un

tary of Defense Anderson. Presumably, the remarks appearing in this memora

in response to the revised draft of February 14. (National Archives, RG 59, 

Files: Lot 66 D 148, Planning Coordination Group) 7 Walter Bedell Smith.

8 See Document 184.

9 Apparently this refers to a staff study prepared by Dodge in response 

12, 1954, request by President Eisenhower. On November 22, 1954, Dodge pre

President with the final draft of his report, entitled “The Development and 

tion of Foreign Economic Policy.” As a result of the Dodge study, the Counc

eign Economic Policy was established, and on December 11, 1954, President Ei

appointed Dodge as the first chairman of that council. (“Organization, Proce

Accomplishments of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy;” Eisenhowe

Council on Foreign Economic Policy: Records, 1954–1961) The White House 

lease of December 11, 1954, announcing Dodge’s appointment is in Departme

Bulletin, December 27, 1954, pp. 987–988.
5. At your request, the Budget Bureau and the Advisor

mittee on Government Organization are currently working w

Stassen and Mr. Dodge to develop for your consideration a pa

organization for the conduct of foreign assistance programs. Th

ter is scheduled to be disposed of soon as it involves basic con

tions which must affect your request in the near future to the C

for authority to carry on foreign aid programs in fiscal year 19

subsequent years.

6. In addition, the following recent decisions have been 

which affect the subject matter of this report:

a. The appointment of Mr. Dodge as Special Assistant to th

ident for foreign economic affairs and the establishment of the 

cil on Foreign Economic Policy.

b. The appointment of Mr. Nelson Rockefeller as Special A

to the President to provide leadership on your behalf in the d

ment of increased understanding and cooperation among all 

and in reviewing and developing methods and programs by wh

various departments and agencies of the Government may eff

contribute to such cooperation and understanding.

c. The assignment to a Special Committee chaired by Mr. 

feller of responsibility for coordinating the implementation of t

cies contained in NSC 5505/110 and NSC 5502/1.11

7. In addition to placing into effect the above-mentione

ganizations, I should like to recommend further proposals 

proving planning methods and effectiveness in the area which 

quested us to study.

Organization in Connection with Planning Coordination

A. The Present Situation

1. In making recommendations for improving planning m

and coordination of economic, psychological, political warfare a

eign information activities, and their relation to the military pr

certain existing responsibilities have been kept clearly in mind

a. The NSC Planning Board, utilizing the resources and s

the component agencies (assisted by a small NSC staff), is resp

for developing recommendations for national security policy f

sideration by the NSC and transmittal to the President. Neit

10 NSC 5505/1, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabili

uary 31, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 20–22. 11 NSC 5502/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activi

uary 31, is printed ibid., pp. 12–19.
NSC nor its Planning Board has any responsibility for develop

erating programs under approved national security policy.

b. When the President has approved a national security 

recommended by the NSC, the agencies of Government whi

functions germane to its execution are responsible to him for d

plans and taking actions to carry such policy into effect.

c. The Operations Coordinating Board has two major respon

(1) Whenever the President directs, as to an approved nat

curity policy, the OCB shall (a) advise with the operating agenc

cerned as to the coordination of the interdepartmental aspect

detailed operational plans developed by such agencies to carry o

policy and as to the timely and coordinated execution of such 

tional plans, and (b) initiate proposals for action within the fram

of national security policies in response to opportunity and ch

the situation. The operating agencies concerned have the resp

ity for developing and carrying out their respective program

approved national security policies or other approved policie

mitted by the President to OCB.

(2) Under NSC 5412,12 the Central Intelligence Agency’s 

for covert operations, the members of OCB are advised in adv

major programs involving covert operations relating to policies 

OCB is the normal channel for securing coordination of sup

covert work among the Departments of State and Defense and 

Later in this paper it is recommended that NSC 5412 be ame

remove any conflict with the functions assigned to the Speci

mittee referred to in d. below and with the duties recommen

low to be given to the Planning Coordination Group.

d. As indicated above, the President recently approved th

lishment of a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of 

Assistant Nelson Rockefeller to coordinate the implementation 

cies contained in NSC 5502/1 and NSC 5505/1. Besides the 

Assistant as Chairman, this Special Committee is composed of 

der Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and 

rector of Central Intelligence (each of whom may be represe

day-to-day operations by deputies appointed by them), with 

pation as appropriate of representatives of the Department of 

the Foreign Operations Administration, the U.S. Information 

and other interested departments and agencies. The duties 

Special Committee include reviewing current programs and d

ing new programs to carry out the above-mentioned national 

policies, ensuring coordination of actions taken thereund

12 Document 171.
making evaluative progress reports to the President throu

National Security Council. This Special Committee mechanis

established in this connection because of need for high-level, re

attention to developing the sensitive programs, and the coord

of actions thereunder, called for by the above-mentioned n

security policies.

e. At present, except for operations exclusively covert, th

through working committees representative of the responsible a

coordinates the implementation of the plans and programs prop

such agencies to carry out approved policies. In the case of cove

ations, other than under NSC 5502/1 and NSC 5505/1, such co

tion is effected through direct liaison between the CIA and the 

ments of State and Defense and other departments and agencies 

as through the members of the OCB as prescribed in NSC 5412.

B. Proposals

1. As stated above, the working up of plans and program

plement national security policies rests with the agencies prim

sponsible therefor. But there is a continuing need in Governmen

fuse in such plans and programs dynamic, new and imaginativ

to diagnose precisely how best to meet the over-all problems of 

country or area, to bring into balance all aspects of a problem an

sources available to solve it, to find ways effectively to utilize U

vate organizations and foreign individuals and groups and forei

lic and private organizations. The promotion of such imag

planning, based on the best intelligence obtainable, should ma

aid in coordinating economic, psychological, political warfare, a

eign information activities so as to further international cooperat

understanding, to reduce the Communist threat, to strengthen 

ties with the U.S., to promote the freedom, well being, and di

the individual man, and to improve the world climate of opinio

2. It is believed that a small, high-level group should be g

sponsibility for meeting the need just referred to. This group 

aid in developing planning in both overt and covert fields.

3. To accomplish this objective, it is recommended as follo

a.13 The above-mentioned Special Committee, consisting 

Special Assistant, Mr. Rockefeller, the Under Secretary of St

Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligen

representation from other agencies when appropriate), establi

coordinate the implementation of policies under NSC 5502

5505/1 should be reestablished, within the framework of OCB

13 A note in the margin reads: “approved by the President March 4, 1955
it might be designated as the Planning Coordination Group. Th

would be a special grouping of OCB members chaired by Mr

feller and reporting directly to the Chairman of OCB. It wou

such small staff as might be convenient to its special purpose, 

ing the duties assigned to it under c. below. Such staff, while 

from the OCB staff, could call upon OCB for housekeeping 

and other administrative assistance. The Chairman of OCB w

time to time, transmit progress reports of the Planning Coord

Group to the President through the National Security Council

b. The Special Assistant, Mr. Rockefeller, should be desig

member of the OCB under Section 1 (b) (5) of Executive Or

10,48314 and should also be designated vice chairman of the B

c. The Planning Coordination Group, with reference to ov

covert actions to implement those national security policies app

to its functions, including those assigned to OCB for coordination

advise and assist the responsible operating agencies in the coor

development of plans and programs to carry out such national 

policies. The implementation of such plans and programs, with 

to overt actions, will be coordinated by the Operations Coor

Board. In addition, the Planning Coordination Group should h

be advised in advance of major covert programs initiated by the 

Intelligence Agency under NSC 5412 or as otherwise direct

should be the normal channel for giving policy approval for su

grams as well as for securing coordination of support therefor 

the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Inte

Agency. With reference to NSC 5502/1 and NSC 5505/1: the n

action should be taken to revise NSC Action No. 1314–d, Jan

1955,15 to substitute the Planning Coordination Group for the abo

tioned Special Committee and to bring the resulting arrangem

conformity with the foregoing provisions of this paragraph.

d. The Planning Coordination Group should keep close a

tinuing contact with the work of the Operations Coordinating 

14 Document 157. 15 NSC Action No. 1314–d, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellit

bilities,” was discussed at the 234th meeting of the National Security Council o

27. The cited paragraph concerned the NSC recommendation that the President 

a special committee to be headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller to review programs to 

policy stated in NSC 5505, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulne

dated January 18. On March 10 at the 240th meeting of the National Security C

special committee was replaced by the Planning Coordination Group through a

ment to NSC Action No. 1314–d by NSC Action No. 1349, “Coordination of Econ

chological and Political Warfare and Foreign Information Activities.” (National 

RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the N

curity Council, 1955)
The Planning Coordination Group would not itself engage in 

tions or enter into the stream of agency operations.

e. Because action respecting covert operations should be re

so far as possible to those who have a need to know and sh

kept at a high level, it is recommended that NSC 5412 be amen

as to substitute therein the members of the Planning Coord

Group specifically mentioned in 3 a. above for the members of th

and to bring the resulting arrangement into conformity with t

going provisions of 3 c. above.

f. The location of the Planning Coordination Group wit

framework of OCB is in line with the basic principle of integr

national security policy formulation and implementation. The 

be done by this group can contribute greatly to the imaginat

namic quality and the effectiveness of coordinated agency plan

carry out approved national security policies.16

Rowland H

16 On March 10 President Eisenhower designated Rockefeller a member o

erations Coordinating Board and the OCB Vice Chairman. The President also ask

efeller to serve as chairman of the Planning Coordination Group. (Eisenhowe

Whitman File, Administration Series, Rockefeller, Nelson, 1952–1955) At its 24

ing that same day, the National Security Council noted that the President had s

March 10 letter requesting Rockefeller to assume the responsibilities. The NSC 

proved the recommended amendments to NSC 5412. (Eisenhower Library, Whit

NSC Meetings, 1955) See Document 212. 17Printed from a copy that indicates Hughes signed the original.

211. Editorial Note

In the course of a discussion on the Formosa crisis in the Pre

office at 2:30 p.m. on March 11, 1955, which was attended by S

of State Dulles, DCI Dulles, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta

ford, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Twining, Chief of Naval Op

Carney, the President’s Staff Secretary Goodpaster, and Special A

for National Security Affairs Cutler, President Eisenhower also 

some more general questions regarding U.S. intelligence, as foll

“i. The President complained about conflicting intelligenc

mation coming to him. He said he wanted steps taken to centra

centrally evaluate all intelligence. It was agreed that the NIC 
be beefed up and put on a 24 hour basis. Secretary Dulles sa

are three aspects to intelligence:

“a. rapid communication of intelligence from the fie

“b. coordination of intelligence in Washington

“c. obtaining accurate intelligence as to Chinat loy

Formosa

“The President said that—under emergent circumstances 

present—he wanted (1) intelligence transmitted from the field t

ington very fast; (2) a prompt evaluation of such intelligence a

tral point where all interested agencies were represented, so a

tain a commonly agreed assessment as quickly as possible; (3

case of something ‘hot’, a warning to himself and other key p

pending such central evaluation.” (Memorandum for the Rec

pared by Cutler; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellan

ries, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC) The full text of Cutler’s memo

is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volume II, pp. 355–360

212. National Security Council Directive1

NSC 5412/1 Washington, March 1

COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the 

covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the 

ments, parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter coll

referred to an “International Communism”) to discredit and de

aims and activities of the United States and other powers of 

world, determined, as set forth in NSC directives 10/22 and 10/

in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the o

eign activities of the U.S. Government should be suppleme

covert operations.

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to the President for Nati

rity Affairs Records. Top Secret. This Directive was circulated under cover of a 

note from Executive Secretary Lay to the National Security Council. The note 

that the President approved the directive, which superseded NSC 5412, that 

The NSC approved the amendments to NSC 5412 (Document 171) at its March 

ing. See Document 210 and footnote 16 thereto. 2 Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishme

ment 292. 3 Document 90.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency had already been cha

the National Security Council with conducting espionage and c

espionage operations abroad. It therefore seemed desirable, for 

tional reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operatio

subject to directives from the NSC, to place the responsibility f

on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with esp

and counter-espionage operations under the overall control of 

rector of Central Intelligence.

3. The NSC has determined that such covert operations 

the greatest extent practicable, in the light of U.S. and Soviet c

ties and taking into account the risk of war, be designed to:

a. Create and exploit troublesome problems for Intern

Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Com

China and between them and their satellites, complicate contro

the USSR, Communist China and their satellites, and retard the 

of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.

b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International C

nism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other element

c. Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly 

rectly responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant p

a free world country.

d. Reduce International Communist control over any area

world.

e. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of t

ples and nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever possi

identity of interest between such peoples and nations and the 

States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups ge

advocating or believing in the advancement of such mutual in

and increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nation

sist International Communism.

f. In accordance with established policies and to the exten

ticable in areas dominated or threatened by International Comm

develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerr

erations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of 

cluding wherever practicable provision of a base upon which 

itary may expand these forces in time of war within active the

operations as well as provision for stay-behind assets and esca

evasion facilities.

4. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the Nationa

rity Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs 

Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

a. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Se

of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operati

planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United Sta

eign and military policies and with overt activities, and consulti

and obtaining advice from the Planning Coordination Group 

Operations Coordinating Board and other departments or age

appropriate.
b. Informing, through appropriate channels and on a n

know basis, agencies of the U.S. government, both at home and 

(including diplomatic and military representatives), of such op

as will affect them.

5. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, the follow

visions shall apply to wartime covert operations:

a. Plans for covert operations to be conducted in active 

of war and any other areas in which U.S. forces are engaged 

bat operations will be drawn up with the assistance of the Dep

of Defense and will be in consonance with and complementar

proved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. b. Covert operations in active theaters of war and any ot

in which U.S. forces are engaged in combat operations will 

ducted under such command and control relationships as ha

or may in the future be approved by the Department of Defen

6. As used in this directive, “covert operations” shall be 

stood to be all activities conducted pursuant to this directive w

so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsib

them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncov

U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility fo

Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities 

to: propaganda, political action; economic warfare; preventive d

tion, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition; escape and 

and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or 

including assistance to underground resistance movements, g

and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and ant

nist elements in threatened countries of the free world; deceptio

and operations; and all activities compatible with this directiv

sary to accomplish the foregoing. Such operations shall not 

armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and cou

pionage, nor cover and deception for military operations.

7. This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 10/2, NS

and NSC 5412. Subparagraphs “a” and “b” under the heading 

tional Functions of the Operations Coordinating Board” on p

the President’s memorandum for the Executive Secretary, N

Security Council, supplementing Executive Order 10483,4 are 

seded by the following provisions:

a. Except as the President otherwise directs, the regular m

of the Planning Coordination Group shall hereafter be advise

vance of major covert programs initiated by the Central Inte

Agency under this policy or as otherwise directed, and shall be 

mal channel for giving policy approval for such programs as 

4 Document 157. The President’s memorandum is Document 158.
for securing coordination of support therefor among the Depa

of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. b. The designated representatives of the Secretaries of St

Defense referred to in paragraph 4-a above shall keep the mem

the Planning Coordination Group from their respective depa

advised as to matters on which they are consulted by the Dir

Central Intelligence, and which have been or are to be referred 

Planning Coordination Group.

213. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Nat

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Counci

Washington, March 1

SUBJECT

The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning

REFERENCES

A. NSC 59/12

B. NSC 127/13

C. NSC Action. Nos. 11974 and 11985

D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 

1. The attached NSC Staff memorandum sets forth a brief 

of measures which have been periodically considered or a

within the Executive Branch to provide organizational arrang

and principles for coordination and planning in the field of p

logical operations. It illustrates the difficulties and divergences 

ion hitherto encountered in attempting to provide adequate d

and coordination for psychological operations at a high govern

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 12

Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the Bure

Budget, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director of Central Intellig

ellipses in the original. 2 Document 2.

3 Document 123.

4 See footnote 3, Document 210.

5 In NSC Action No. 1198, “The Foreign Information Program and Psyc

Warfare Planning,” the National Security Council, on August 5, 1954, noted 

59/1 and NSC 127/1 had been deemed obsolete. The Council, however, defe

ther action pending completion of the Bureau of the Budget study on coo

of economic, psychological and political warfare and foreign information 

(National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Recor

tion by the National Security Council, 1954) 6 Not found; see numbered paragraph 6 below.
level. It also affords a historical record to those presently co

with the desirability of providing further policy and organi

arrangements in this area.

2. NSC 59/1 (“The Foreign Information Program and Psy

ical Warfare Planning”, March 9, 1950) and NSC 127/1 (“Plan f

ducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities”, 

1952) have clearly become obsolete in many of their provision

major change in Executive branch organization during the p

years. Therefore, they should be rescinded, revised, or otherw

with.

3. The current status of action on these policies has devel

the following manner.

a. A special memorandum from the President to the NSC

September 3, 1953,7 transferred the functions of the POCC (esta

pursuant to NSC 59/1) to the OCB. The OCB continued only th

Subcommittee, the “X-Day Working Group”, charged with dev

plans for psychological operations in support of hostilities.

b. The “X-Day Working Group” was authorized by OCB in 

ter part of 1953 to propose revisions in NSC 127/1 deemed nece

the light of the numerous Executive Branch organizational 

brought about since the adoption of the policy in question.

c. In carrying out their task, the X-Day Committee found i

able to make agreed recommendations on several major issue

departmental conflict of views.

d. As a result, the OCB in its report to the NSC dated 

1954,8 recommended recision of NSC 59/1` and NSC 127/1, “

prejudice to the principles of operation and the responsibilitie

partments and agencies to engage in psychological warfare a

chological warfare planning enunciated therein or elsewhere”

4. On August 3, 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted 

mendations to the NSC opposing recision of NSC 59/1 and NSC 

pointing out that these policies, although obsolete in some r

contained “essential formal statements of national policy on 

logical warfare matters”.9

5. The NSC on August 5, 1954, deferred further action 

spect to NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1, pending receipt of a stu

the Bureau of the Budget which was to include “the placin

sponsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinating ec

7 Document 158.

8 Not found, but for a memorandum of discussion of this paper by the 

Security Council on August 5, 1954, see Document 187. 9 Not printed, but see Document 187.
warfare, psychological warfare and foreign information activ

However, the study in question does not deal specifically with th

lems posed by NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1.

6. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated J

11, 1955, subsequently circulated to the NSC on February 8, 19

a supporting memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, th

Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their views of August 3, 1954 and ad

ally set forth certain provisions which should be contained in 

vised policy.11

7. As suggested by the attached historical summary, a num

major issues are identifiable, which must be dealt with in any 

to provide for organizational arrangements in this area:

a. Departmental Responsibility. State’s primary prerogative 

ing in this area in peacetime policy guidance, with related re

bilities, has been generally recognized. Military prerogat

wartime have been likewise generally recognized. However, th

nizational expression of carrying out these responsibilities has 

considerably (ICS, IFIO, NPSB, PSB, OCB).

b. The Necessity of Continuity. This concept has been appr

in various ways, including:

(1) The organization for coordination of planning in th

should be the same in peace and war;

(2) Peacetime arrangements should generally prevail on a 

rary basis during the first stages of general war—to be modifie

placed later by a permanent organization whose nature and au

would subsequently by determined;

(3) A special interim organization should be provided for in 

time to be activated during the initial stages of general hostil

limited war);

(4) A permanent organization should be provided for in 

time for the period of general war, or some variant of this 

with (3);

(5) No binding decision should be made at this time on 

ture of the permanent organization for coordination and planni

ing general hostilities.

c. The Governmental Level of Responsibility.

(1) Should the organization be at the Assistant Secretary 

higher?

(2) Should the organization have the authority to make p

logical warfare policy and to issue directives, operational and o

should it be more exclusively coordinating in nature?

10 This was NSC Action No. 1198; see footnote 9, Document 187. 11 Not found but see numbered paragraph 31 in the attachment printed 
(3) To what extent should the organization have an inde

staff?

(4) What provision should be made for access to the top 

making levels in the Government and to the President?

(5) To what extent should the directing officer of such an 

zation be independent from the departments and have direct a

the President?

(6) To what extent does the changed nature of general 

presently envisaged bear on the necessity and importance o

lishing in peacetime an organization for the conduct of psych

operations in the initial stages of general war?

(7) To what extent is it necessary in peacetime to provid

psychological warfare area, trained personnel and stockpiled re

for use in wartime?

8. In view of the past history in this field and the nature o

sues identified in the preceding paragraph, it is believed tha

level review of the existing arrangements in the light of NSC 5

NSC 127/1 should be undertaken with a view to preparing ap

ate recommendations for consideration by the National Securit

cil. Such a review should be undertaken with a full understan

the existing arrangements and current plans and programs in th

as well as the status of planning for the possibility of limited 

eral war.

9. Mr. Cutler therefore recommends that the responsibility f

ing such a review and recommendations be assigned to Mr. Nelso

efeller as Special Assistant to the President “to provide leadersh

development of increased understanding and cooperation am

peoples and in reviewing and developing methods and prog

which the various departments and agencies of the Government 

fectively contribute to such cooperation and understanding”. In 

signment Mr. Rockefeller should be provided with such adv

assistance as he requires from the Bureau of the Budget, the O

Defense Mobilization and the Operations Coordinating Board a

the responsible operating departments and agencies.

10. Mr. Rockefeller and the NSC Planning Board concu

above recommendation.

James S. L

12 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment

SUMMARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ARRANGEM

WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SINCE WORLD WAR 

(with particular respect to the problems posed by 

NSC 59/1 and 127/1)

World War II

1. Approximately six months after U.S. entry into World 

the OWI (Office of War Information) was established by Execu

der in June 1942.14 The OWI was responsible for domestic an

foreign information programs and answered directly to the Pr

Policy guidance was provided by the Committee on War Infor

chaired by the Director of OWI, with representation which in

the departments of State, War, and Navy.

2. Subsequently, in 1943, the OSS (Office of Strategic Servic

established and made responsible, among other functions, for t

duct of covert information and propaganda activities abroad, a

ing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. There was no psychological warfare organization for th

ices as a whole, although there was created within SHAEF a 

psychological warfare staff division on a level with G–2. In the

military operations, each commander set up his own psych

warfare organization and coordinated psychological warfare w

combat operations.

Post-World War II

4. Following the end of the war, the OSS was dissolved a

tain overt activities of the OWI, including the VOA facilities, wer

ferred to the Department of State. At the same time the CIA to

the intelligence and covert psychological warfare activities of t

The military services retained their psychological warfare un

greatly reduced scale, though they conducted significant activ

this area through the reorientation program necessitated by th

pation of Germany and Japan. This was the status of organ

within the Government in early 1947 when the exigencies of t

rent cold war posed increased challenges and demands on U.S

ities in this field.

13 Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper. 14 President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9182 on 

1942. (Department of State Bulletin, June 27, 1942, p. 566)
5. At the end of 1947, by interdepartmental agreement, t

Department was charged with the responsibility for current pe

propaganda activities (NSC 4 Dec. 9, 1947).15 To provide fo

policy coordination and integration of facilities and programs

terdepartmental Coordinating Staff (ICS) was established un

direction of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

sentatives of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA participated 

joint staff. The organization was to develop psychological ob

for cold war programs and to coordinate the activities of the op

agencies.

6. This agreement accordingly placed responsibility upon 

retary of State for peacetime psychological operations during 

war; the question of wartime conduct of psychological warfare 

covered by this early agreement but was left for further study. 

1949, interdepartmental agreement was reached on the establ

in the State Department of a planning organization to develo

for interim arrangements for foreign and domestic informati

grams and overt psychological operations abroad during th

stages of war (NSC 43, March 9, 1949).16 The director of this p

staff was appointed by the Secretary of State in consultation 

rectly interested agencies. The staff was composed of State a

tary personnel, with liaison representatives from CIA and NS

icy consultants to the director of the staff were designated 

Secretary of State and Defense, the Director of CIA and the Ch

of the NSRB. The functions and personnel of this staff overlap

considerable degree with the Interdepartmental Coordinati

(ICS). This condition and subsequent experience led to a revie

isting arrangements (see NSC 43/1, Aug. 2, 1949).17

NSC 59/1

7. As a result, in March 1950 revised basic principles for h

psychological warfare planning and operations were adopted 

into effect. (NSC 59/1, March 9, 1950). The principle that prop

in both peace and war is a continuing mechanism of nationa

directed toward the achievement of national aims was reaffirm

der NSC 59/1, the Secretary of State was charged with respo

for:

15 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Documents 252–265. 16 NSC 43, “Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warf

National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 43 Series. 17 Ibid.
a. The formulation of policy and plans for the National 

Information program during peacetime. b. The formulation of national psychological warfare p

time of national emergency or threat of war and during the initia

of war.

c. The coordination of policy and plans for these activiti

other appropriate agencies. The policy and planning for per

emergency and the initial stages of war were to be coordinat

the joint war plans of the Department of Defense, and whe

plans had a direct impact on war plans, they were to be subjec

concurrence.

8. In accordance with NSC 59/1, a revised central plann

coordinating mechanism based on the consolidation of the form

was established to deal with these responsibilities. The ICS bec

Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS). The direc

appointed by the Secretary of State and was in fact the Assista

retary of State for Public Affairs. The group of consultants was re

This combined mechanism became the Interdepartmental Fore

formation Organization (IFIO).18

9. Again there was avoided coming fully to grips with th

of jurisdictional responsibility for psychological warfare policy 

rection during war, because of the fundamental differences b

State and the military services on the question. Agreeme

been reached only for planning through the initial stages of w

even this concept was left without precise definition. This arran

proved unsatisfactory and the cause of friction from many asp

10. The IFIS joint staff was charged with planning for em

and wartime psychological operations and completed a study 

after the outbreak of war in Korea on the assignment of psych

warfare responsibilities for the initial stages of war (defined as 

90) and for the subsequent stages of war. This study was tran

to the departments for adoption in July 1950.19 It provided tha

a. During the initial stages of war, the Secretary of State w

(1) Formulate psychological warfare policy and issue polic

ance directives to operating agencies.

18 The IFIO became the body charged with psychological warfare policy 

national emergency or during the initial stages of war. Following the Presiden

tive of April 4, 1951, establishing the PSB, the IFIO was redesignated the PO

chological Operations Coordinating Committee. The POCC created a subcomm

X-Day working group, to prepare the required plans. [Footnote in the origina

April 4 directive, see Document 60.] 19 The study cited presumably is NSC 74 of July 10, 1950, “A Plan for Nati

chological Warfare,” which was sent to NSC members and the Secretary of the 

The NSC did not formally approve NSC 74. A copy is in National Archive

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 74. See also Document 17.
(2) Coordinate these functions with agencies executing 

logical warfare functions. (3) Prepare detailed plans and programs for implement

policies. (4) In areas other than theaters of military operations, execu

psychological warfare programs, provide for coordination wit

psychological warfare and coordinate U.S. psychological warf

cies and operations with our allies. b. To handle psychological warfare during the subsequen

of war, there should be established an independent agency: (1) Authorized to issue directives to operating agencies.

(2) Providing for representation of the operating agencies

(3) Authorized to provide coordination with our allies.

(4) Having direct access to the President, but recognizing 

thority of the State Department in areas other than theaters of 

operations, the Department of Defense having authority in such 

11. Furthermore, for the initial stages of war, an interdep

tal board was to be established within the State Department t

the “executive agent” of the Secretary of State in formulatin

plans for, and coordination of, the world-wide conduct of psy

cal warfare.

12. The transition from the peacetime organization to th

stages of war organization was to take place on D-Day, or earli

discretion of the President. The IFIO would be designated the 

Psychological Warfare Board and strengthened; as executive a

the Secretary of State, it would issue directives.

13. These recommendations led to further controversy. In 

of 1950 Secretary of Defense Johnson advocated the immediat

lishment of the Interim Psychological Warfare Board in the E

Office of the President and immediate consideration of the que

composition and urgency of a National Psychological Warfare 

He proposed that the latter Board would be independent of exis

partments and have full-time public members in the majority

other hand, the Department of State was not willing to accep

lishment of the Interim Board as an executive agent for the Secr

State at that time. The issue was posed as to whether or not suc

terim board would impair the Secretary of State’s responsibility 

conduct of foreign affairs. Accordingly, an impasse developed.

14. Meanwhile, in August 1950, in the light of the Korea

opments, State strengthened the IFIO organization. The inte

mental consultants group was expanded and renamed the N

Psychological Strategy Board. It was headed by the Assistant S

of State for Public Affairs and was composed of representative

Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the Director of CIA and the Arm

ecutive Agent of the JCS for the conduct of psychological wa

Korea.
20 See Document 60.

15. Attempting to break the organizational deadlock, Sta

posed in December 1950 a new concept, emphasizing continui

chological effort (rather than phased operations) for both pea

war. The conclusion was that the same organization should 

sponsible for formulation of policy and programs in both pe

war. It was proposed to place responsibility for all phases in t

retary of State with an interdepartmental coordinating agent to 

the Secretary on policy and to coordinate planning operation

proposal was rejected by Defense.

16. A new memorandum of agreement and disagreement w

worked out interdepartmentally. It set forth the issue somewha

lows. Agreement was reached on the following points:

a. The peace-to-war phasing was eliminated and the need 

ganizational and policy continuity recognized. The responsibilit

JCS in theaters of military operations and of State in other are

reaffirmed.

b. A single official, designated by the President:

(1) Should be responsible for formulation of psychologica

within the framework of approved national policy and coord

and evaluation of the psychological effort; and

(2) Should be authorized to issue policy guidance to the op

agencies.

c. Representatives at the policy levels, also agencies execut

jor portions of the psychological effort, should advise this offic

coordinate operations.

17. There was disagreement as to whether or not the sin

cial designated by the President should be the Secretary of Sta

independent official responsible to the President. Arguments w

forth for both propositions, and the matter was referred to th

dent for decision in January 1951.

Establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board.

18. The problem was worked on by the BOB, the NS

and a final agreement was negotiated by the agencies concerne

resulted in the directive of the President on June 20, 1951, estab

the Psychological Strategy Board.20 The principle of psycholog

erations was recognized. However the designation of a single 

as the focus of responsibility was replaced by the concept of 

composed of the Undersecretary of State, the Undersecretary 

fense, and the Director of CIA. A director appointed by the Pr

served under the Board, and was placed in a position to take in
in, and give direction to, governmentwide psychological ope

The Board was directed particularly to:

a. provide more effective plans of psychological operation

the framework of approved national policies;

b. coordinate psychological operations of all departme

agencies of government, and

c. evaluate the effectiveness of the national psychological 

19. In the meantime the IFIO have been continuing to 

with the formulation of a “national psychological warfare p

general war, to include principles of operation, delineation of 

sibilites and organizational principles, etc. Since the PSB now h

given authority for such planning, the IFIO plan along with a

departmental versions was, accordingly, referred for further stu

action to the PSB.

NSC 127/1

20. The PSB in due course resubmitted the plan for con

psychological operations during general hostilities to the NSC 

proval, (NSC 127/1). It provided, among other things:

a. A statement of national objectives which will maintain i

dition of general hostilities (based on NSC 20/4).21

b. Basic principles of operations.

c. Delineation of responsibilities, including:

(1) PSB responsibility for formulation and promulgation 

ance of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and pr

and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psych

effort (para. 7, NSC 127/1).

(2) The JCS to be responsible, in conformity with nationa

and PSB guidance, for planning and execution of U.S. psych

operations in military theaters of operations (para. 8, NSC 127

(3) State in conformity with national policy and PSB guid

sponsible for the planning and execution of U.S. overt psych

operations in areas other than military theaters of operations 

NSC 127/1).

(4) “In situations in which a military theater of operati

braces territory of a government which exercises civil authorit

which a U.S. diplomatic mission is accredited . . . the Depart

State shall be responsible for the U.S. information program dire

ward the nations of the country concerned”. (para. 10, NSC 12

(5) “The Psychological Strategy Board shall insure thro

government agency or agencies appropriate... any necessary 

nation of national psychological operations, policies, or plans w

appropriate agencies of other governments” (para. 14, NSC 12

21 NSC 20/4, “U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Sovi

to U.S. Security,” November 23, 1948, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol

pp. 662–669.
21. NSC 127/1 further provides that plans for the transfe

cilities and personnel from State and other overt agencies to m

control in military theaters of operations should be coor

through the organization established pursuant to NSC 59

POCC). Originally the PSB draft of 127/1 had provided for s

ordination by the PSB, but this was changed subsequent to a 

mendation by the Bureau of the Budget. In approving NSC 12

President made clear that this policy was to serve as a basis fo

gency planning relating to sudden general hostilities and “d

that the subsidiary plans and measures authorized provide 

mum flexibility whenever the President deems it desirable to 

mine the ultimate organization appropriate to protracted fu

general hostilities” (NSC 127/1, Note by the Executive Secreta

25, 1952).

Establishment of the Operations Coordinating Board

22. The effort of the Psychological Strategy Board to carry 

variegated mission was not a happy one. In reviewing its activ

Jackson Committee22 found that:

“there is no ‘strategic concept for psychological operations’ s

and distinct from a strategic concept for gaining national aims w

war. When PSB has developed, for example, a ‘regional psych

plan’, it has really formulated a plan for the achievement of n

aims involving the use of propaganda, diplomacy, economic p

and military strength in various combinations. It is this fact wh

caused so much controversy between PSB and the establishe

ning agencies within the State Department”.

Accordingly, the Jackson Committee recommended abolishmen

PSB and the establishment of the OCB as a coordinating body 

would:

a. Aid in coordinating the implementation of detailed ope

plans prepared by responsible departments and agencies to ca

approved NSC policies.

b. Assure the timely and coordinated carrying out of such 

c. Initiate new proposals for action within the framework 

tional security policies in response to opportunity and other c

in the situation.

d. Assure that each project or action was so executed as t

its full contribution to the particular “climate of opinion” wh

United States is seeking to achieve in the war.

22 See Document 151.
Subsequent Arrangements for X-Day Planning

23. The Jackson Committee noted that the POCC, which 

isted as a mechanism through which the State Department co

ordinate the Foreign Information Program, was responsive to 

sary function, but recommended that the POCC be abolished 

function made a responsibility of the OCB and the OCB staff.

24. As a result, in a special memorandum to the NSC by t

ident, dated September 3, 1953 the functions of the POCC wer

ferred to the OCB. The OCB did not immediately abolish the 

but after the lapse of a little time discontinued it as a separate 

nating arrangement. However, the OCB continued an ad hoc c

tee on X-Day planning to carry on the work of developing p

conducting psychological operations in support of hostilities

had been the function of the “X-Day Committee” of the now 

POCC.

25. In the fall of 1953 the ad hoc Committee on X-Day p

reported to the OCB that due to reorganization measures wi

Government subsequent to NSC 127/1, revision of this policy w

essary in order that the X-Day Committee could go ahead w

tasks. Reorganization Plan No. 8 had established the USIA.23 

tive Order No. 10483 had established the OCB, and the func

the POCC had been transferred to the former. The X-Day w

group felt that 127/1 could be revised easily in order to take 

count these changes within the Government structure. Acco

it was authorized to present proposals for such revisions to t

for transmittal to the NSC. These proposals did not long 

“non-controversial” as was originally hoped. On March 22 th

Working Committee presented proposals to the OCB for the 

of NSC 127/1, which in effect reopened many of the old argum

tween the agencies concerning jurisdiction and the conduct 

chological operations during wartime. The matter was further 

cated by trying to propose revisions to cover all types of ho

in order that “support planning should anticipate as far as 

every such situation from limited combat, as in Korea, to gener

There was no agreement within the Committee on the follow

jor issues:

a. DOD, USIA and CIA representatives supported the posit

in time of hostilities the Operations Coordinating Board shoul

sponsible for “the formulation of national psychological obj

and “the coordination of psychological operations and progra

23 On June 1, 1953, President Eisenhower submitted Reorganization Pla

Congress. The text and supplementary information on that plan are printed 

ment of State Bulletin, June 14, 1953, pp. 849–856.
b. The State representative supported the position that th

should be responsible for “assuring the formulation and coord

of guidance” and “the coordination of programs” for psycholog

erations in time of hostilities. (This would leave to the OCB to 

mine where the organization to provide guidance should be 

lished, within the OCB or outside, etc.).

c. On the military enclave situation (NSC 127/1, para. 10), D

CIA and USIA supported the position that the military com

should have the responsibility of coordinating over-all psych

operations, with the USIA operations “insofar as practicable

placed under his direction as an entity in charge of a designe

USIA when the former deems it necessary for support of the m

operations. d. State supported the position that in this situation USIA 

operate under the direction of the State Department Chief of M

The area of disagreement was possibly even broader, howe

the State Department representative with the X-Day Working 

reserved State’s rights throughout to reconsider further at a 

level.

26. The OCB considered this problem (primarily at the Bo

sistants’ level) for some time and in its report to the NSC on t

ject, dated July 21, 1954, generally came to the conclusion that 

risdictional issues raised concerning final authority over psych

operations during general war were (a) difficult of resolution 

present time, and (b) did not perhaps need to be resolved at th

ent time.

27. The OCB recommended:

a. That the NSC rescind NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 “witho

udice to the principles of operation and the responsibilities of 

ments and agencies to engage in psychological warfare and p

logical warfare planning enunciated therein or elsewhere.” b. “That the NSC note that the OCB serves as the body f

ing with requirements for interdepartmental coordination con

overseas information and psychological warfare activities in c

out NSC assignments or upon specific request by participat

partments and agencies.” c. “That the NSC note that the OCB developed, on an urg

sis, a detailed contingency plan for information and psychologic

fare activities in Indochina and that the OCB will not develop a

ther detailed subsidiary plans of this type for designated areas 

so directed by the NSC.” (the implication being that if and wh

ited, rather than general, war should occur the OCB could d

plans and coordinating arrangements for Psywar operations 

would be appropriate in the circumstances).

Current Status

28. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their views dated 3 Augu

objected to the recision of NSC 59/1 and 121/1 on the groun

“although obsolete in certain organizational respects, (they) con

sential formal statements of national policy on psychological 
matters. Without a formal statement of responsibilities of gove

tal agencies concerned, there can be no valid basis for psych

warfare planning”. The JCS further recommended that NSC 5

NSC 127/1 should be revised or superseded.

29. On August 5, 1954, by NSC Action No. 1198, furthe

with respect to NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 was deferred pen

ceipt of an expanded study by the Bureau of the Budget (NSC 

No. 1197) which was “to include the placing of responsibility 

the executive branch for coordinating economic warfare, psy

cal warfare, political warfare, and foreign information activities

ever, the Bureau of the Budget was not specifically directed to 

a solution to the organizational and jurisdictional problems c

ing psychological warfare operations during hostilities which ar

by NSC 127/1 and which have such a long history, and its p

report does not propose a solution to this matter.

30. In a letter to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilizatio

February 7, 1955,24 the Executive Officer of the Operations Co

ing Board noted that the OCB is currently responsible for the 

nation of the transfer of overt information facilities, personnel

the theater commander in a period of general war “and that a

authority and procedures exist utilizing the OCB structure to c

this responsibility in a limited conflict.” However, he furth

mented that in the absence of detailed plans for full mobiliz

time of war, it did not appear to be feasible for the OCB to 

such plans for psychological warfare to be applicable in the 

general war.

31. In a memorandum dated January 11, 1955, subseque

culated to the NSC on February 8, 1955, with a supporting me

dum from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rea

their views of August 3, 1954, and specifically proposed that a

ument designed to supersede NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 shou

“a. Contain an approved definition of psychological warf

“b. Contain an approved definition of psychological oper

“c. Adequately define responsibility and authority for the 

of psychological warfare under conditions of declared war or 

ties involving the engagement of U.S. forces under conditions 

declared war.

“d. Delineate agency responsibility for use of facilities w

theater.

“e. Provide guidance for the orderly transfer of facilities a

ginning of hostilities.

“f. Provide for a coordinated psychological warfare effo

agencies of government.”

24 Not found.
214. Memorandum of Discussion at the 247th Meeting of th

National Security Council1

Washington, May 

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 247th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thurs

May 5, 1955

[Omitted here is a paragraph listing the participants at the m

1. Status of United States Programs for National Security As of De

31, 1954: The Internal Security Program (NSC 5509, Part 8)2

Mr. Coyne introduced his presentation with a brief analysi

internal security arrangements under the National Security C

with particular reference to the functions, responsibilities and 

bership of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) 

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). He th

indicated that he would confine his presentation to five majo

lems relating to internal security. He added that he would paus

end of his discussion of each of these five problems, to answ

questions.

Mr. Coyne then analyzed the Communist movement in the 

States, using charts to illustrate his major points. At the conclu

this discussion the President inquired, apropos of Mr. Coyne

ment that publishing activities helped to provide revenues for th

munist Party, USA, what publishing houses were maintained 

Communist Party and what kinds of material they publish

Coyne and others described the publications, and the Preside

inquired whether such publications were clearly tabbed as Com

in character. Mr. Coyne replied that this was not normally the c

that it was not difficult to discover their character after a brief r

The Vice President inquired as to the character of the firm 

published the Matusow book.3 Mr. J. Edgar Hoover explained th

grounds of Angus Cameron and Albert Kahn, who had publish

volume.

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Pre

Gleason on May 6. 2 A copy of NSC 5509, Part 8, is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–N

Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5509 Series. 3

Reference is to Harvey Matusow, False Witness (New York: Cameron a

1955).
At the conclusion of this discussion Mr. Coyne continued 

presentation, dealing successively with the following subjects

viet bloc intelligence targets, overt and covert; (2) legal and 

entry of foreign persons and materials into the United States; (3

curity of critical facilities; and (4) the security of vital informa

copy of Mr. Coyne’s report is filed with the minutes of the mee

At the conclusion of the presentation the President referre

account given by Mr. Coyne of the manner in which a Czech 

had brought into Idlewild from Montreal six diplomatic pouch

taining 1500 pounds of contents, while managing to avoid eit

toms or immigration inspection. The President said he could n

ine how an individual with so much material could have avoid

kind of customs inspection. Mr. Coyne replied that the courier 

tion had simply managed to fool both the customs and imm

officials, and had removed his pouches in an automobile wh

been sent for that purpose.

The President said that despite the privileges of diplom

munity, would it not be right that if we catch an individual p

to evade our regulations, that individual should lose his dip

inviolability?

Mr. Coyne said that he would prefer that members of the S

partment answer the President’s question. Secretary Hoover sta

while it would be possible to go after a particular man, it woul

tremely difficult to change the system which allowed for the 

bility of the diplomatic pouch. We could declare an individual 

non grata. Mr. Rose,5 acting for the Secretary of the Treasury, 

the circumstances of the case Mr. Coyne had cited, and indica

the Embassy of Czechoslovakia had firmly denied that its cou

evaded regulations.

The President said he was sure of at least one thing. He wo

feel that he was a very good and effective administrator if he co

think up some way to delay such an individual as this Czech 

long enough to discover what were the contents of his bagg

pouches without actually opening them.

Secretary Wilson said that was it not obvious that there w

sistent abuse of the pouch privilege by Soviet bloc people. Th

dent replied that of course they consistently abused the privil

the difficulty was that the United States in turn was dependen

ing able to transmit diplomatic pouches to and from its mis

countries behind the Iron Curtain. Indeed, in one respect at 

4 Not found.

5 H. Chapman Rose, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
needed these pouches more than the Soviet bloc diplomats, be

was necessary in many cases to send food in the pouches.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he was convinced that there w

tain additional steps which the United States could take to red

viet bloc abuse of the pouch privilege, although, he said, man

people in the Central Intelligence Agency did not agree with th

of view.

The President said that he hated to be a sucker when he kn

the other fellow was fooling and abusing him.

Mr. Coyne assured the President that certain members of th

cil, including Admiral Radford, not to mention the members of 

internal security committees, were hard at work to see what ad

actions we could take to cope with this problem

Admiral Radford said that he was indeed interested, and h

to canvass the three Services as to possible reduction of their d

ence on pouch material sent to Washington by the Military A

He had not been very successful in persuading them that it w

necessary to rely so heavily on this pouch material. Neverthe

still felt personally that the United States loses more than it g

its strict adherence to the inviolability of the diplomatic pou

means of securing intelligence materials on the Soviet bloc.

The President said that he thought it would be a good idea 

tact our Embassies in the Soviet bloc countries and to ascerta

them just how important our own pouches really are. If this 

tance proved not to be vital, we might contemplate new regu

In any event, said the President, he admitted that the problem 

trolling abuse of the pouch was not as easy as it looked on the 

Mr. Dillon Anderson then inquired of the President whe

wished further study and recommendations by the two intern

rity committees on this subject. The Attorney General, Mr. J

Hoover and Mr. Coyne pointed out that the two committees w

ready engaged in restudying the problem.

Governor Stassen, reverting to the problem of illegal entr

the United States from foreign countries, which Mr. Coyne h

derlined, inquired whether the time may not be close at han

everyone in the United States must be compelled to have an i

cation card. It might, for example, be possible to insist on such 

fication cards under cover of the requirements for civil defen

President replied that of course the system of identification ca

been common in many European countries for a good many ye

he believed that an attempt to introduce this system in the Unite

would raise a great political storm, although it might be possibl

by with a civil defense cover.
The National Security Council:6

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the subject by t

Representative on Internal Security, based upon Part 8 or NSC 

b. Noted that the internal security committees are prepari

port for Council consideration on the internal security proble

ated by Soviet bloc use of the diplomatic pouch in relation to 

of the diplomatic pouch in the Soviet bloc countries.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to th

men, IIC and ICIS.

[Omitted here are the remaining agenda items.]

6 Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constituted NSC Action No. 

tional Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records 

of the National Security Council)

215. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence D

to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (E

Washington, May 

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Regis

95–G00278B, Box 1, Folder 29. Top Secret. 1 page not declassif

216. Memorandum From the Chief of Foreign Intelligence,

Central Intelligence Agency (Steward) to Director of C

Intelligence Dulles

Washington, May 1

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy 

of Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 30. Secret. 3 pages not decla
1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, Box 

Drafted by J.M. Ault in the Office of Research and Reports. 2 Soviet Materials.

3 Not found.

4 Brackets in the original.

217. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Offic

Research and Reports, Central Intelligence Agency (Gu

to the Assistant to the Deputy Director for Intelligence

(Planning), Central Intelligence Agency1

Washington, May 1

SUBJECT

Sovmat2 Program

REFERENCE

Memorandum from Assistant to DD/I (Planning) to AD/RR, dated 20 A

1955, same subject3

1. The collection and exploitation of Soviet Bloc materials h

been considered by this Office to be a potential source of valuab

itive, economic intelligence information. The potential of this 

has also been recognized by the ORR [Office of Research and R

Panel of Economic Consultants in at least two of their annual 

Economic intelligence information to be derived in this fashio

either be confirmatory or could provide economic information 

tainable from other sources.

2. The development of the Sovmat Program has not been, 

most part, as was initially anticipated. While collection of the m

of Sovmat type items is a matter of opportunity and consequen

be geared only to a long range research program, this Office 

been completely satisfied with respect to the length of time in

the cost and the responsiveness of exploitation reports for thes

The answers to the specific questions raised in the referenced 

randum reflect the nature of our dissatisfaction.

3. The research programs of this Office require informatio

as that sought through the Sovmat Program. Because of the ma

appointing results from the Sovmat Program, serious consider

being given to other sources which while lacking the same po

can provide somewhat similar information on the same items 

would be more timely and responsive to our requirements. This 

also effect a considerable savings of money for what appears to 

justifiable expense for exploitation.
5 Brackets in the original.

6 Brackets in the original.

4. The following comments concerning the Sovmat Prog

submitted in response to the specific questions raised in the ref

memorandum:

a) Do you consider the time between levying the requi

and receipt of report of exploitation excessive?

[Answer]5 It has been the experience of this Office that ec

exploitation requirements are usually fulfilled by the following 

categories of exploitation facilities:

[Heading and 1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

2) Exploitation Facilities of the Armed Services

The Sovmat Staff has direct contact with the separate 

through their representation to the Joint Technical Intelligen

committee (JTIS). After serving our exploitation requirements 

Services, the Sovmat Staff has indicated by memoranda to thi

that they have no further responsibility for the requirements a

the Office of Collection and Dissemination is the proper cha

obtaining exploitation reports. The exploitation reports prepare

Services are not published in the Sovmat “OO-T”series, but foll

own format. A check of some of these reports which have been r

by this Office indicates that the time between receipt of the item 

Services and receipt of the published exploitation report will v

tween one and two years.

Recently, a JTIS publication identified all exploitation repo

pared by the various Services and CIA. According to this pub

the exploitation reports vary in their degree of availability and 

all disseminated. There is not sufficient description of the repor

in this publication to indicate whether the exploitation reque

this Office has been accomplished.

An inquiry was made of Liaison Division/DCD [Domes

tact Division, DDP]6 to ascertain the method by which exploita

ports were acquired from the Services in response to our requir

It was discovered that DCD has no record of the requirement

are served on the Services by Sovmat Staff and has no follow

struction from the Sovmat Staff. Hence, no reports will be rec

direct response to our requirements and we will receive only 

ports as will be disseminated by the Services.
A specific document request was made through Liaison D

OOD for an exploitation report on Soviet ammunition, whi

described as a “Preliminary Report” by the Ordnance Corps a

never disseminated nor was it listed in the JTIS publication. 

covered that the report contained [2 lines not declassified]. Suc

mation was of considerable value to this Office. A similar situat

discovered in requesting a non-disseminated report from anoth

vice with respect to Soviet ball bearings.

Under these circumstances, the time interval between levy

quirements and the receipt of exploitation reports is certainly ex

and there is no certainty that an exploitation report will be re

or if exploitation is accomplished, that it will include our requir

3) Exploitation Facilities of Non-Military Government Agencie

This Office does not consider the time interval between 

requirements and receipt of exploitation reports to be excessive 

the exploitation is accomplished by non-military government ag

b. Do you consider that the best and most economical me

used for exploitation of Sovmat materials?

The Sovmat Staff notifies this Office of the cost of exploitati

in those instances where in their judgment there is an unusual 

or where they feel that additional justification, other than the r

ment, is warranted. This Office has, therefore, no knowledge of 

ploitation cost of a great majority of the exploitation accompli

response to our requirements.

In most instances where this Office has been made awar

exploitation cost, it does appear that there is excessive cost for 

ploitation contemplated in a number of our requirements and 

and most economical means are not always used for exploitati

felt that greater reliance should be placed on this Office by the 

Staff for substantive guidance, interpretation of our requiremen

suggestions for exploiting facilities and companies with a view 

minimizing the cost of exploitation.

[1 paragraph (16 lines) not declassified]

There are additional instances which have tended to create 

pression in this Office that the cost of exploitation is excessive

example, where we had requested that an exploiting facility pr

brief evaluation of a Sovmat item, the exploitation report for

by the Sovmat Staff for evaluation by this Office contained the 

of elaborate testing and comprehensive technical description

excess of our request. On the exploitation reports, the Office c

to evaluate the reports in the requesting Office or an Office wit

jor interest. Since this Office was the only Office requested to ev

it was presumed that we were the only requester. On other e

tion reports where ORR and OSI [the Office of Scientific Intel
7 Brackets in the original.

8 Brackets in the original.

DDI]were both indicated as requesting Offices, informal dis

between interested analysts of the two Offices has revealed tha

port goes far beyond the interest of either Office.

c. [2 paragraphs (12 lines) not declassified]

d. Do you have any suggestions for improvement of the 

Program?

This Office has frequently made suggestions to the Sovm

for improvement in the Sovmat Program through regular chann

example, in January 1954 this Office forwarded comments by 

sador [Joseph]8 Flack of Embassy Warsaw and Mr. George A

former employee of Embassy Moscow, which described diffic

the Sovmat Program. Comments received by this Office from 

ing attachés and State personnel regarding lack of adequate co

guidance have been informally discussed with the Sovmat Staf

tinuous flow of evaluations from this Office call to the attentio

Sovmat Staff specific instances where the exploitation report

better be focused on requirements of this Office.

Some of the major suggestions of this Office which might 

sidered for improvement of the Sovmat Program are outline

and stem in part from the comments in preceding paragraphs

1. The Sovmat Staff should arrange for adequate follow

exploitation requirements served on the Services to insure, in

possible, that the requirements are accomplished by the Serv

that exploitation reports are received in response to these requir

2. The Sovmat Staff should provide exploitation cost info

and whenever possible, total procurement costs to enable the 

ing Offices to consider this factor in the preparation of the per

visions of the Sovmat Collection Guide. This information wil

direct influence in the preparation of collection requests for th

or similar items. In this way, adequate prior consideration will b

to insure that the value of the information to be derived from 

is commensurate with the cost of procurement and exploitatio

3. The Sovmat Staff should utilize the special knowledg

requesting Offices for substantive guidance, interpretation of 

ments, and suggestions for exploiting facilities. It cannot be e

that the Offices can provide adequate support to the Sovmat S

mere exchange of memoranda. [19 lines not declassified]
9 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

4. Greater emphasis should be made by the Sovmat Staff 

dinating the common interests of several Offices in certain t

items to establish periodic collection and standard exploitation 

items. This would eliminate any possibility of duplication of col

incomplete exploitation, and excessive administrative and expl

costs. As examples of programs which can be effected where 

this community of interest in similar items, [2 lines not declassifie

is mutual interest in the same type products. Standard collecti

cedures have been arranged. The result is a minimum of adm

tive detail and cost and complete and satisfactory exploitation 

interested Agencies.

5. The Sovmat Staff should take greater advantage of t

gested exploitation section of the [1 line not declassified] in orde

ticipate exploitation for those items which are expected to be pu

or have been purchased and are awaiting shipment.

6. The Sovmat Staff should consider the practicality of hav

or two industry experts evaluate an item at CIA facilities togeth

representatives of the respecting Offices prior to formulation 

tensive exploitation requirements. An example of the value 

practice can be shown in the examination of a [2 lines not decla

This examination evaluation precluded costly and compre

exploitation.

7. The Sovmat Staff should provide more adequate collecti

port and cooperation in those instances where high priority co

and exploitation is required by this Office. As an example of the 

cooperation and support we have received from the Sovmat Staf

respect, our recent priority requirements for collection and expl

of a [10 lines not declassified]. Furthermore, the Sovmat Staff advi

Office that they preferred to rely on existing procedures for su

lection and exploitation. As we could not provide detailed infor

on the collection of the sample and because of the reluctance 

Sovmat Staff to interfere with regular channels, we were requ

obtain the information on the basis of informal relationships a

side of liaison channels which were available to the Sovmat St

Otto B. 
218. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All

Diplomatic and Consular Posts1

CA–7918 Washington, May 1

SUBJECT

The Watch Committee and the National Indications Center

The purpose of this instruction is to review the responsi

the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee 

the National Security Council, and to provide notice of the es

ment of the National Indications Center (NIC), which has been s

increase the Watch Committee’s capability to discharge its miss

instruction is being circulated to Foreign Service posts to pro

formation on how posts should cooperate in carrying out the 

sibility the Department bears to the Watch Committee and the 

The Watch Committee is chaired by the Deputy Director of t

tral Intelligence Agency, at present Lt. Gen. Cabell, and his sen

resentatives from each of the following: State, Army, Navy, A

JIG, CIA, AEC, and the FBI. Its mission is: “To provide earlie

ble warning to the United States Government of hostile actio

USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United 

(“Hostile action” is defined as aggressive action by armed forc

ganizations or individuals in support of military strategy.)

The Watch Committee has the following functions:

1. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligenc

current and cumulative furnished by IAC agencies relating 

imminence of hostilities, and to develop therefrom conclusio

indications of:

a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities aga

continental US, US possessions, or US forces abroad; US Allies 

forces; areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.

b. Any other development, actual or potential, susceptib

rect exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which 

jeopardize the security of the U.S.

2. To report promptly their conclusions to the principal

IAC and to other appropriate recipients. If immediate action 

sion on the part of the President or the National Security Counc

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 101. 2/5–14

Drafted by McAfee on May 3, cleared in 10 bureaus, and approved by Furna
to be required a meeting of the IAC will be convened by the D

of Central Intelligence.

The Watch Committee is always on call for emergency sessio

meets regularly on Wednesday of each week.

The National Indications Center has been established to pr

central staff devoting full time to the problems faced by the Watc

mittee. It is charged, among other responsibilities with:

1. Developing and operating the Watch Committee Inte

plan for world wide collection of information pertinent to the 

Committee mission;

2. Arranging for exploitation of all sources of information 

on the mission;

3. Arranging with IAC agencies for systematic screening o

formation and intelligence received by them for the purpose 

warding to the Indications Center all items which contain ind

of Soviet/Communist intentions.

In support of the Watch Committee and NIC, the Presiden

November 1954 approved NSC 5438,2 directing all appropri

partments and agencies of the Government:

“1. To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee 

formation and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to 

sion and functions without restriction because of source, policy 

erational sensitivity.

“2. To keep the IAC Watch Committee informed concern

nificant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action 

U.S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of 

tion, which might bring about military reaction or early hostil

by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U

information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch C

tee and those members of the National Indications Center wh

to know of it in order to perform their functions.”

The Department of State’s responsibility to the Watch Co

and the National Indications Center covers evaluation of politi

economic indications which might bear on Soviet/Communis

to initiate hostilities. Within the Department, the Office of the 

Assistant, Intelligence (R) bears the responsibility for the disch

the Department’s commitments. However, the responsibility 

checking constantly for such indications is shared by the othe

of the Department and by Foreign Service posts. Information 

2 Regarding NSC 5438, see Document 187 and footnote 4 thereto.
such indications should be brought immediately to the attentio

Department by telegram when appropriate, and should be f

up when necessary by dispatch containing available further i

tion, including information on the source and reliability of the 

At posts where Service Attachés or CAS are present, the i

tion should also be passed to those officers.

Directly bearing on the question of Soviet/Communist inten

tiate hostilities, of course, would be information on attempts to s

fissionable material or other types of unconventional warfare w

or sabotage devices into the country. Any information of this typ

be reported immediately by telegram and followed by dispatch 

ing full details as to the source and reliability of the information

gin and destination of the material and the alleged use to be ma

At posts having CAS or Legal Attachés, all available information 

also be passed to them.

This instruction neither supersedes nor modifies any othe

instruction concerning the requirements of other government a

for specialized information having to do with threats to the 

of the United States (e.g. Secret Circular Instruction, June 1

concerning the smuggling into the U.S. of radiological, bio

chemical, and other weapons, or sabotage devices.)4

3 McAfee elaborated on the watch functions of the Department of S

August 19 memorandum to Robert G. Barnes, Director of the Executive Secretari

tribution throughout the Department. According to McAfee, the Department wa

with evaluating diplomatic indications of Soviet/Chinese intent to initiate host

for reporting to the Watch Committee significant Soviet/Communist hostile re

certain U.S. diplomatic negotiations and economic measures. In particular, Depa

ficials were asked to look for such indications when reviewing memoranda of co

and observing Soviet reactions to U.S. negotiations for base rights, military assista

or transit rights with states adjacent to the Soviet orbit, and to such steps as precl

chasing, embargoes, blockade, and interference with Soviet/Communist marine o

port. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 101.2/8–1955) 4 Not found.
219. Editorial Note

NSC 5520, “U.S. Scientific Satellite Program,” was discussed 

National Security Council at its May 26, 1955, meeting and appro

the President on May 27. The potential for intelligence collectio

major factor in the decision to proceed with satellite developme

5520 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volume XI, pages 7

220. Report by the Task Force on Intelligence Activities of 

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch 

of the Government1

Washington, Ma

PREFACE

Scope of the Study

“Intelligence”—A Definition

The fate of the nation well may rest on accurate and comp

telligence data which may serve as a trustworthy guide for to

governmental decisions on policy and action in a troubled world 

so many forces and ideologies work at cross purposes.

The Congress has recognized the importance of the role of 

gence in our national security. It has authorized the expenditure 

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 86–B00269

Top Secret. Regarding the background to this report, see Document 185. Th

which includes two appendices, is attached to a transmittal letter from the t

members to Herbert Hoover, May 1955, not printed. The letter outlined the ta

awareness of “the grave responsibility implicit in its assigned mission,” and it e

the members’ “personal appreciation for the wholehearted and enthusiastic co

given us by the departments and agencies involved.” It also noted, however, 

task force was severely hampered by the security restrictions imposed upon 

survey of the clandestine operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Whi

cessity for carefully safeguarding sensitive material is well recognized, the fac

that the restrictions complicated the conduct of the survey of this vital segme

national intelligence community.” The letter also transmitted the unclassifie

which was subsequently published and sent to Congress (Document 221). Only 

ace and Introduction to the classified report are printed here.
sums of money by appropriate departments and agencies to c

this work.

Immediately after World War II, at the suggestion of th

Executive of our Government, the Congress approved the cre

a new agency unique and in many ways strange to our dem

form of government. It is known as the Central Intelligence 

(CIA).

The CIA operates without the customary legislative restra

reins under which other departments must function. Its work i

in secrecy, and it is virtually a law unto itself.

In order to evaluate the extent and effectiveness of intellig

carried out under these conditions, the Task Force on Intellige

tivities found that it was confronted at the outset with the pro

arriving at a common understanding and agreement on the m

of the word “intelligence,” as applied to its own areas of w

investigation.

The word has many definitions and is subject to varying 

of interpretation and meaning. In a certain context it might 

“ability to learn”; in another context, “intellect,” or perhaps “a

meet a new situation”; and in yet another sense, “common se

In the search for an acceptable definition as applied to o

field of study, it was found that each department or agency su

had its own definition. Many of these definitions were lengthy

volved use of words requiring additional interpretation or delim

to get to their precise application.

The task force sought a definition as simple and clear as 

and arrived at the following:

“Intelligence deals with all the things which should be kn

advance of initiating a course of action.”

Useful for our purposes, also, as a supplemental and ex

definition is that given in the Dictionary of United States Militar

for Joint Usage:

“INTELLIGENCE—The product resulting from the co

evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all avai

formation which concerns one or more aspects of foreign natio

areas of operations, and which is immediately or potentially 

cant to planning.”

Scope of Task Force Study Refined

Initially, this task force was instructed by the Commission 

ganization of the Executive Branch of the Government, her

referred to as the Commission or the Hoover Commission, t

and make recommendations as to the structure and admini
of the Central Intelligence Agency and other kindred inte

activities.

Later, those instructions were changed by the Commission 

brace studies of all intelligence activities of the Federal Gove

and to submit recommendations to effect changes considered 

sary to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service in th

The task force gave thorough consideration to the decisio

Commission to broaden the scope of the task-force studies to 

all intelligence activities of the Federal Government. It develop

there are at least twelve major departments and agencies which

manner or another, are engaged in intelligence. Among these 

Department of State, the Department of Defense (including th

Navy, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff), the Central Inte

Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department o

merce, and the Department of Agriculture. In addition, there ar

more minor agencies or activities which expend public funds 

or indirectly on behalf of the intelligence effort of the Governm

Thus, under the broad definition of its terms of reference, 

force was confronted with the Herculean job of studying and 

ing on more than twenty major and minor departments and ag

It readily became apparent that any attempt to spread the effort

task force over such a large area would mean either that only 

results could be expected within the allotted time or the work 

should be extended beyond the date contemplated for dissolu

the Commission on May 31, 1955. Therefore, it was apparent 

scope of the task-force work had to be refined if any useful resu

to be derived from its efforts and expenditure of funds.

Positive Foreign Intelligence Vital

The most pressing need under present conditions is for th

ficials in responsible positions in Government, especially th

sponsible for foreign policy, to have readily available full and 

foreign intelligence. The word “foreign” as used here denotes 

get of information as distinct from the geographical source.

Thus, it appeared to the task force that within the given tim

the best interests of the Government would be served if the ta

directed its attention to the departments and agencies whose e

primary responsibilities lie in the field of positive foreign inte

as it pertains to national defense and security, and in whose c

sums of money and unique authority have been entrusted. Th

the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Cen

telligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Federal 

of Investigation (to the extent that it deals in security intelligen

the intelligence activities of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Directive to the Task Force

Accordingly, a proposal to delimit the scope of the task-for

ies was made to and approved by the Commission, as follows

1. Survey the work of the Central Intelligence Agency. Cove

tivities of CIA, wherever located, including but not limited to 

tion, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence, obligat

expenditure of funds, examination of auditing of funds, secur

sonnel, projects carried out through other agencies, relations

coordination with other governmental intelligence agencies, 

nications, supply and storage; a determination of the respon

of the agency, as prescribed by legislative enactment or admin

action, and a study as to whether the responsibilities have be

quately defined and are being implemented.

2. Survey the intelligence activities of the Department of Defens

all intelligence activities, wherever located, of the Departmen

fense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Agency, Army, Na

Air Force, including, but not limited to, collection, evaluation, 

semination of intelligence, obligation and expenditure of fund

rity, personnel, projects carried out through other agencies, co

cations, relationship and coordination with other gover

intelligence agencies, supply and storage; a determination of 

sponsibilities of the Department and all its elements for intellig

prescribed by legislative enactment or administrative action, and 

as to whether the responsibilities have been adequately defined 

being implemented. No survey will be made of the organizatio

ganizational structure of tactical units in the Army, Navy, and A

engaged primarily in producing tactical or combat intelligence.

3. Survey the intelligence activities of the Department of Stat

all intelligence activities related to national defense, wherever 

of the Department of State, including but not limited to, co

evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence, obligation and e

ture of funds, security, personnel, projects carried out throug

agencies, communications, relationship and coordination wi

governmental intelligence agencies, and supply; a determinatio

responsibilities of the Department for intelligence, as prescribed 

islative enactment or administrative action, and a study as to w

the responsibilities have been adequately defined and ar

implemented.

4. Survey the intelligence activities of the National Security Cou

clude a study of the history, legislation, development, organizat

operations of the National Security Council as they affect inte

activities. Include study of the Operations Coordinating Board

telligence Advisory Committee, and related activities.

5. Survey limited segments of the intelligence activities of oth

cies. The segments to be studied would be developed as the ta

gathers information.

6. General Considerations. Determine which of the intelligen

ices, activities, and functions performed by any of the agenc

veyed are (a) essential; (b) not necessary; (c) of similar nature, a

consolidations are in the public interest; (d) non-essential, an

are competitive with private enterprise; and (e) duplicate or 

those of other agencies.
This requires a determination in the basic surveys outlined 

graphs 1 to 5 as to what services, activities, and functions ar

performed by each agency studied. Upon completion of the ba

veys, a functional survey of the work done by the agencies w

undertaken from the data developed. With such a scope, the ta

would cover, among other things:

(1) The intelligence function of the National Security Cou

(2) The value and effectiveness of the information supplied 

operating agencies. (3) The effectiveness of the coordination of intelligence agen

(4) The organization, procedures, methods, and performanc

several Government agencies in the field of overt and covert intel

(5) An examination of the operation and physical p

the agencies as to economy, adequacy, effect on efficienc

utilization.

(6) The various programs of the several agencies in such f

training, research and development, stockpiling, reference m

and security. (7) The personnel policies and manpower utilization.

(8) All programs and procedures for the collection, develo

and dissemination of information to include collection appara

dissemination media.

(9) The interrelationship between the several areas thus a

and actual areas of coverage, mutual support of one another.

In the execution of this extensive undertaking, the task f

certain areas, had to employ the “sampling” method, particu

the case of the study of those activities of the agencies oversea

Sensitive Portions of Agencies Surveyed

In giving its approval of the foregoing proposal, the Com

directed that a first paragraph be added as follows:

“1. The study and survey of the sensitive portions of the a

will be undertaken by General Clark with a minimum staff on a 

to-know’ basis.”

Pursuant to the foregoing directive, arrangements wer

orally between Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Inte

Agency, and General Mark W. Clark, chairman of the Task Forc

telligence Activities, initially for General Clark and Colonel H

O. Lane, a member of the task-force staff, to have access to CIA 

ities, both overt and covert. Shortly after this arrangement was 

mented, it developed that a requirement existed for at least on

tional member of the task force to have access to covert activitie

agency. Accordingly, Admiral Richard L. Connolly’s name was 

to the list.

This arrangement continued until a decision was made t

tain members of the task force and staff should inspect intellige

tivities in the European and Far East areas. Since General Cla
unable to take part in one of these inspection trips, the probl

fronting the task forces, as a result of the existing restriction

clearance of the task force to sensitive material of the agency, w

sented to the Director of Central Intelligence. The following qu

ter was received from the director:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington 25, D.C.

Office of the Director 

27 January 1955

General J.G. Christiansen

Staff Director

Task Force on Intelligence Activities

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov

Washington D.C.

Dear General Christiansen:

With further reference to your letter of 20 January 1955,2 

telephone conversations of yesterday evening and today, 

arranged clearance for Mr. Henry Kearns and for you to hav

to CIA activities, both overt and covert, in connection with y

to the Pacific area. It is also understood that all members of t

Force and you, yourself, will be cleared to consider the report 

spect to both overt and covert activities of the CIA which may 

mitted by those members of your staff who have been cleared 

the-spot investigation of those activities. I quite appreciate tha

necessary in connection with the preparation of the Task Force 

This procedure has been cleared with Governor Adams.

Faithfully yours,

Allen W

Cost of the Intelligence Effort

Precise figures on the cost in money and manpower eng

intelligence activities in the interest of national defense and 

are not a matter of record. Any attempt to compile such data ac

would require the expenditure of money out of all proportio

value of the findings. The task force estimates, however, that 

nual expenditure is in the order of $800 million.

2 Not found.
Organization of the Task Force

Security Impact on Selection of Personnel

The Task Force on Intelligence Activities was the last to 

thorized by the Hoover Commission. The director and deputy 

staff assumed their duties on October 1, 1954. The limited pool o

able personnel in the United States with prior experience in th

ligence field influenced to some extent the structure of the staff 

methods of operation.

Personnel of the Intelligence Task Force and of the staff ha

screened carefully for background security and possible prejud

terest arising from prior association with departments and agen

der investigation.

Before a member of the task force or staff could have acces

material, a security background investigation was conducted 

individual declared by proper authority to be eligible for access 

Secret” information. In each case where the inquiry involved a

atomic energy data, a special clearance was obtained.

It was found that each department and agency had evolved 

teria, practices, and standards for clearance. The task force ad

policy in conformity with the policies and requirements of the 

ment or agency involved in each specific investigation.

In the interest of security and economy, the task force also d

to keep its staff as compact as possible. Sensitive material was 

generally on the premises of the agencies.

Staff Organization

After careful consideration by the task force of the possibl

ods of organizing the staff and its work, it was decided that th

practical course would be to assign some teams composed of 

two staff members to study specific agencies, and to delegate t

teams specific across-the-board survey functions. Individual ta

members were assigned across-the-board responsibilities paralle

work of designated staff teams. Thus, all members would be in 

tion to interject their influence and guidance in the staff activit

at the same time obtain valuable first-hand knowledge of the 

problem.

Initially, five staff study groups were organized. Some w

signed responsibility for study of a single department; others

feasible, covered two or more agencies.

The restrictions imposed on the staff in its survey of the 

Intelligence Agency necessitated that the work be broken dow

two classifications, with one group studying the covert aspects 

and the other surveying the overt operations of the Agency. Th

teams carefully coordinated and correlated their studies, excep
information on the more sensitive areas of the Agencys work 

stricted to designated individuals. This arrangement proved ve

bersome, was time-consuming, and seriously interfered with 

duct of the survey.

As each task group completed the study of a particular 

ment or agency, it was assigned to studies of specific functio

mon to two or more agencies.

Procedures for Gathering Data

The task force scrupulously avoided the use of questionnai

statistical matter which appears throughout this report was e

from documentary files maintained by the departments and a

The task force and staff had the benefit of detailed briefings 

agency studied. These briefings were characterized by informal

questions and answers were the rule rather than the exception. 

batim transcriptions of the conversations and comments of w

were deemed necessary. In some instances, however, copies of 

pared briefings were furnished to the staff for ready reference.

Discussions were had with all echelons of personnel in e

partment and agency, from the clerk at the working level to 

cluding the Secretary of State, the Secretary and Deputy Secr

Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

The task force also had the benefit of expert advice from m

dividuals who are not in Government employ but who previo

cupied positions of prime responsibility in the developmen

present intelligence operations and organization. Their help 

vice were of inestimable value.

Some of these witnesses appeared before the task force a

pense to the Government and at considerable personal sacrif

task force wishes to express its unqualified appreciation t

public-spirited individuals in private life who gave freely of th

and who by their objective approach to the problem materi

lightened the task force.

Teams Make First-Hand Studies Abroad

In order to obtain a clearer picture of intelligence operatio

teams, each composed of a member or members of the task fo

members of the staff, were sent abroad for on-the-spot investi

One team visited the European sector and the other went to 

East.

These staff groups had discussions with the senior Unite

representatives, senior military commanders, and representativ

Central Intelligence Agency in the countries visited. The visits 

cussions afforded the task force first-hand information which c

obtained in no other fashion.
The conclusions reached and the recommendations conta

this report reflect the benefits of those personal tours of inspec

Results of the Recommendations Made in 1948 by the First H

Commission As They Related to Intelligence

The first Hoover Commission3 directed its attention prim

the functional responsibilities and relationships of the heads of 

ious departments and agencies established under the Nationa

rity Act. The principal recommendation relating directly to inte

was incorporated in the following general recommendation:

“That more adequate and effective relations be developed a

ing level among the appropriate committees of the Joint Chiefs 

on one hand, and the National Security Council, Central Inte

Agency, Research and Development Board, Munitions Board, 

National Security Resources Board on the other hand. That v

steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency 

work.”

Results

The Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 19534 transferred the fu

of the National Security Resources Board and Munitions Boar

Office of Defense Mobilization. The functions of the Research a

velopment Board were transferred to the Secretary of Defense 

organization Plan No. 6 of 1953,5 where they are incorporated 

functions of the Assistant Secretary of Research and Develo

There are apparently no relationships on working levels in the 

gence field between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of D

Mobilization, except through the representation of the Secretary 

fense in the National Security Council. As far as the intelligen

tions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Inte

Agency on working levels are concerned, they are implicit in 

resentation of the joint intelligence group of the Joint Staff, Join

of Staff, on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The degree 

dination effected through these relationships will be discusse

fully in this report in the section devoted to the Joint Chiefs 

The steps taken subsequent to the publication of the report of 

Hoover Commission to improve the Central Intelligence Age

3 Some documentation on the first Hoover Commission (1948) is in For

tions, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Documents 351

and 399. 4 Effective June 12, 1953; 67 Stat. 634.

5 Effective June 30, 1953; 67 Stat. 638.
discussed in the following paragraphs relating to the recommen

of the task force of the first Hoover Commission.

Observations, Recommendations, and Results of the Task Force on

Intelligence Activities within the National Defense Organizatio

The task force of the first Hoover Commission confined it

vations and recommendations to the Central Intelligence Ag

internal problems, and its relationships with the Joint Chiefs 

the State Department, the National Security Council, and the 

gence agencies of the three military services.

The present task force has been unable to determine the d

which these observations and recommendations were publish

disseminated, except as they are reflected in the recommend

the Commission discussed previously. However, as they influe

some degree the direction of the efforts of this task force, a b

cussion of the observations of this task force in the same area

lieved to be pertinent.

Observations of the Task Force of First Hoover Commission and Co

of this Task Force Thereon

1. “Judgment as to the effectiveness of the CIA must be te

by considerations of its apparent youth, its lack of tradition 

tablished, time-tried procedures, and of continuity of personn

soundness of that observation is self-evident and is supported 

observations of this task force as set forth in its report.

2. “There seems to be an excess of administrative person

there is undue interference with operating agencies. Reductio

ministrative overhead is possible and desirable, and interferen

operating agencies should be eliminated.” There still exists s

cess of administrative personnel because of considerations rel

compartmentalization for security reasons, and because of the 

the agency is now scattered among thirty-four buildings. This 

istrative overhead is a matter of constant concern and study 

agency. Plans for new construction have been initiated and fu

be requested.

3. “The CIA is scattered among twenty-two buildings, 

many administrative difficulties, although some scattering 

desirable for security reasons.” The number of buildings now o

by the agency has been increased to thirty-four, thus magnify

administrative difficulties.

4. “The CIA has fallen short of its objectives as a source of 

intelligence, especially in the fields of scientific intelligence, in

medical. This information should be evaluated centrally.” Thi

vation will be commented upon in the discussion following 

mendation 3 below.
5. The CIAs main problem is one of securing and retainin

ified personnel. This is also true of other intelligence agencies.” 

curing and retaining of qualified personnel has been largely so

the agency as it has had sufficient funds to attract the best q

people, sometimes, unfortunately, at the expense of the inte

agencies of the three services. This situation will be discusse

fully in the section covering the Central Intelligence Agency 

military services.

6. “The services must rid their intelligence estimates of 

bias.” Attempts on the part of service intelligence agencies to 

honest intelligence estimates particular to that agency are som

“slanted” by the command echelons of the services in support o

etary requests. This tendency should not be charged to inte

agencies, which on the whole, are doing an honest job as far 

task force has been able to observe.

7. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

8. “Thought should be given to desirability of splitting CIA 

of war, and transferring operational services, such as open and 

collection, to the Department of Defense. Changes should be m

peacetime organization to facilitate this split.” Much thought h

given by the officials of the CIA and the military services con

the proper relationships in time of war between the CIA and t

itary services. Present plans of the CIA do not contemplate th

fer of any of CIA’s current functions and responsibilities to 

partment of Defense in time of war. However, current plans (ap

by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI) envisage the transfe

erational control over CIA’s component forces in active theaters 

where American Forces are engaged to the military commander 

who will exercise such control in the same manner as control 

cised by him over components of the Army, Navy, and Air F

signed to the same command (see Appendix II). The task force b

that the seriousness of this ever-present problem warrants con

study to arrive, if possible, at the most suitable solution prio

outbreak of war.

9. “The military services, including Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

withhold details of operational information and military plans 

grounds of security.” This situation has not been solved to th

plete satisfaction of all interested parties.

10. “The ties binding the JCS, among others, to the CIA 

tenuous.” This observation resulted in recommendation 3 of t

force and will be commented on in the discussion followi

recommendation.

11. “Any proposals for the revision of laws so as to permit 

tion, regardless of intent, in cases of dangerous disclosures by in
and irresponsible persons, should be examined most carefully 

gress in the light of our concepts of freedom.” As far as this ta

has been able to determine, no statutory authority exists or is 

plated which covers the situation of former employees who ma

gently or otherwise, without intent, make unauthorized disclosu

12. “The National Security Organization, as established by 

tional Security Act of 1947, is soundly conceived. In order to i

operations, the NSC should give more thought and attention t

lationships of CIA with other agencies, and by working thro

Secretaries of State and Defense, should encourage the impro

of other intelligence agencies.” This observation is incorporate

ommendation 1 of the task force below.

13. “Such of the reforms as suggested by this committee, as 

those of the Dulles Committee,6 should be made promptly, but w

tion has been taken, the agencies affected should be permitted 

of internal development free from examination and its attenda

licity.” Any comment on this sound observation would be redu

Recommendations of the Task Force of the First Hoover Commission

1. “That more adequate and effective relations be establishe

working levels between appropriate committees of the JCS and 

Staff and their countermembers in (1) the National Security 

(2) the Central Intelligence Agency, (3) the Research and Deve

Board, (4) the Munitions Board, and (5) the National Security R

Board, to the end that in their strategic planning the JCS will w

equately and on a systematic, reciprocal basis, considerations of 

policy, intelligence, scientific research and development, and e

capabilities.” This recommendation is substantially the same as 

ommendation of the commission, and the results will be discusse

sections of this report devoted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. “That the Secretary of Defense be the sole representativ

national military establishment on the National Security Coun

Committee suggests, however, in order that the JCS may be fu

currently posted on our national policy, that they be invited, a

eral rule, to attend meetings of the NSC, but without mem

thereon. The civilian departmental secretaries, although not m

should also be invited to attend council meetings in appropr

cumstances.” The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, n

vides that the Secretary of Defense is the sole National Defens

lishment member. However, secretaries and under secretarie

military departments may serve as members at the pleasure of t

6 For a summary of the Dulles Committee Report, see Foreign Relations, 1

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 358.
ident. The law also provides that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be t

cipal military advisers to the President, the National Security C

and the Secretary of Defense. It has been observed by this task fo

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff habitually attends the m

of the National Security Council and the other members attend f

items in which the Joint Chiefs are concerned. When departmen

ters are before the Council which are of concern to the Secretarie

Army, Navy, or Air Force, the secretary concerned will be invi

may bring his military chief as an adviser, in which case that 

chief will not be attending in his role as a member of the JCS.

3. “That vigorous efforts be made to improve the interna

ture of the CIA and the quality of its product, especially in th

of scientific and medical intelligence; that there be established 

the agency at the top echelon an evaluation board or section com

of competent and experienced personnel who would have no 

istrative responsibility and whose duties would be confined s

intelligence evaluation; and that positive efforts be made to 

relations of mutual confidence between the CIA and the sev

partments and agencies it serves.” This task force has observ

positive efforts have been made to improve the quality of scient

medical intelligence. The Office of Scientific Intelligence is ade

staffed to include medical personnel. In the quality of its produ

agency is definitely handicapped by the inability of the inte

community as a whole to collect information from the Soviet b

Office of National Estimates is a top-echelon evaluation boar

posed of competent and experienced personnel with no admini

responsibilities and whose duties are confined solely to inte

evaluation, the product of which appears in the form of nation

mates. Specific recommendations with regard to deficiencies in 

lations of the Central Intelligence Agency with the services 

found in those sections devoted to CIA and the Department of D

4. “That the Research and Development Board and the C

joint undertaking, establish immediately within one or the other 

an efficient and capable unit to collect, collate, and evaluate s

and medical intelligence, in order that our present glaring defi

in this field be promptly eliminated.” The Research and Devel

Board has been dissolved and its functions transferred to the Se

of Defense. Progress made by the Central Intelligence Agency 

field of scientific and medical intelligence is fully discussed in 

tion of this report devoted to that agency.

INTRODUCTION

The machinery for accomplishing our intelligence objective

inafter called the intelligence community when referred to as a 

includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security C
the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigat

the intelligence sections of the Department of State, of the Ar

Navy, and the Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Commissio

of these agencies approach or exceed the operations of the CIA 

tions and in expenditures. However, since CIA is charged with t

all responsibility for coordinating the output of all intelligenc

the task force gave special attention to the work of that Agenc

Our investigations showed that the sensitive and vital wor

intelligence community is being led by a group which is sinc

dedicated to the service of the nation. We discovered no valid 

for the suspicion that the CIA or any other element of the inte

family was being effectively contaminated by any organized 

sive or Communistic clique. Charges were made by some ind

alleging a few members of the intelligence community to be 

curity risks. All such cases, except those obviously without me

investigated by proper authority, or investigations are in the 

of being made.

On the basis of its comprehensive studies, the task force f

the American people can and should give their full confidence a

port to the intelligence program, and contribute in every possi

to the vital work in which these agencies are engaged. We fo

Director of Central Intelligence to be industrious, objective, self

thusiastic, and imaginative. We are convinced, however, that in 

thusiasm he has taken upon himself too many burdensome du

responsibilities on the operational side of CIA’s activities. The ta

feels that certain administrative flaws have developed in t

which must be corrected to give proper emphasis and directi

basic responsibilities

The major aim would be greater concentration on the colle

intelligence information from our primary target—Russia and h

lites, and Communist China.

The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adeq

telligence data from behind the Iron Curtain. The information w

on the political plans, scientific progress, and military potenti

Communists is there to be had, and we must exert every con

and practicable effort to get it. Proper directional emphasis, ag

leadership, boldness and persistence are essential to achieve 

sired results.

The glamor and excitement of some angles of our intellig

fort must not be permitted to overshadow other vital phase

work or cause neglect of primary functions. A majority of the ta

is convinced that an internal reorganization of the CIA is nece

give assurance that each of these functions receives adequate a

without diversionary interest.
7 A reference to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, approved 

1949, which exempted the Central Intelligence Agency from disclosure of cert

mation concerning its organization such as functions, official titles, and numb

sonnel. (63 Stat. 208)

The task force further is concerned over the absence of satis

machinery for surveillance of the stewardship of the Central 

gence Agency. It is making recommendations which it believes w

vide the proper type of “watch-dog” commission as a means of 

lishing that relationship between the CIA and the Congress so e

to and characteristic of our democratic form of government, bu

was abrogated by the enactment of Public Law 1107 and other 

relating to the Agency. It would include representatives of both 

of Congress and of the Chief Executive. Its duties would embra

view of the operations and effectiveness not only of the CIA, b

of all other intelligence agencies.

One of the aims in the creation of a compact commission 

type would be to keep the public assured of the essential an

worthy accomplishments of our intelligence forces, and to enl

lic support and participation in the intelligence effort.

Action of this sort is needed to promote a general awaren

appreciation among the people of the significance and objective

intelligence program. There is a corollary demand for clarific

misunderstandings which have arisen in the public mind, larg

result of the misapplication of secrecy. However, it must be reco

that intelligence operations require a large element of secrecy a

sential to success.

The task force further is greatly concerned about the inad

guidance being given to NSA by the United States Communica

telligence Board, and about certain aspects of communication

ommendations to improve the current status are made in App

Parts 1 and 2.

The intelligence community should draw more widely 

available pool of retired citizens with wide previous business 

ence in the foreign field, and among retired military personn

have specialized over a long period in the intelligence field. It 

develop a more attractive program of career incentives for its o

and of benefits for its overseas employees.

Recommendations to achieve these desirable results are b

fered by the task force.

[Omitted here are the body of the report and the Append
221. Report by the Commission on Organization of the Exe

Branch of the Government to the Congress1

Washington, Ju

[Omitted here are a list of the members of the Commission 

the Task Force on Intelligence Activities, a transmittal letter, 

contents, acknowledgments, and preface.]

PART I

The task force, in order to give assurance to the Nation 

segments of the Intelligence Activities are efficiently carried 

that the expenditures are properly administered, recommend

permanent “watchdog” committee be created. They recomme

such a committee be created from Members of the Senate and 

together with eminent citizens serving part time as needed, t

pointed by the President.

The Commission believes, however, that while mixed c

sional and citizens committees for temporary service are use

helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate an

recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present diff

We therefore make the following recommendation.

Recommendation

(a) That the President appoint a committee of experienced 

citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and repor

periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence a

This committee should also give such information to the publ

President may direct. The committee should function on a p

and per diem basis.

(b) That the Congress consider creating a Joint Congr

Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Comm

Atomic Energy. In such case, the two committees, one presiden

the other congressional, could collaborate on matters of spe

portance to the national security.

Other measures requiring legislation or of an administrati

acter are recommended by the task force and we suggest these 

consideration of the Congress and the Departments concerned

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 86–B00269

Unclassified. The title page of Part II bears the date May 1955, but it was rele

the rest of this publication on June 29, 1955. Regarding the preparation of th

see Document 220 and footnote 1 thereto. For Eisenhower’s Implementation 

mendation (a) above, see Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1956, p. 72.
The unclassified report of the task force requires no deta

view, and we therefore include it in full as Part II of this repor

PART II

Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Governme

[Omitted here are the title page of Part II, names of the c

sioners and task force personnel, a table of contents, acknowled

transmittal letter, and preface.]

Introduction

The machinery for accomplishing our Intelligence objectiv

after called the Intelligence community when referred to as a 

includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security 

cil, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Invest

and the Intelligence sections of the Department of State, of the 

the Navy, and the Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Comm

Some of these agencies approach or exceed the operations 

CIA in functions and in expenditures. However, since CIA is c

with the overall responsibility for coordinating the output o

telligence forces, the task force gave special attention to the w

that agency.

Our investigations showed that the sensitive and vital wor

Intelligence community is being led by a group which is sincere a

icated to the service of the Nation. We discovered no valid gro

the suspicion that the CIA or any other element of the Intelligen

ily was being effectively contaminated by any organized subve

communistic clique. Charges were made by some individuals al

few members of the Intelligence community were poor security r

such cases, except those obviously without merit, were investig

proper authority, or investigations are in the process of being ma

On the basis of its comprehensive studies, the task force fe

the American people can and should give their full confidence a

port to the Intelligence program, and contribute in every possib

to the vital work in which these agencies are engaged. We fou

Director of Central Intelligence to be industrious, objective, self

thusiastic, and imaginative. We are convinced, however, that in 

thusiasm he has taken upon himself too many burdensome du

responsibilities on the operational side of CIA’s activities. The ta

feels that certain administrative flaws have developed in th

which must be corrected to give proper emphasis and directio

basic responsibilities.

The major aim would be greater concentration on the colle

Intelligence information from our primary target—Russia and h

lites, and Communist China.
The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adeq

telligence data from behind the Iron Curtain. Proper directio

phasis, aggressive leadership, boldness, and persistence are e

to achieve the desired results.

The glamor and excitement of some angles of our Intellig

fort must not be permitted to overshadow other vital phase

work or to cause neglect of primary functions. A majority of 

force is convinced that an internal reorganization of the CIA i

sary to give assurance that each of these functions gets adeq

tention with diversionary interest.

The task force further is concerned over the absence of sati

machinery for surveillance of the stewardship of the Centra

gence Agency. It is making recommendations which it believes w

vide the proper type of “watch-dog” commission as a means of 

lishing that relationship between the CIA and the Congress so e

to and characteristic of our democratic form of government, bu

was abrogated by the enactment of Public Law 1102 and other 

relating to the Agency. It would include representatives of both 

of Congress and of the Chief Executive. Its duties would embr

view of the operations and effectiveness not only of the CIA, 

of all other intelligence agencies.

One of the aims in the creation of a compact commission 

type would be to keep the public assured of the essential an

worthy accomplishments of our Intelligence forces, and to enl

lic support and participation in the Intelligence effort.

Action of this sort is needed to promote a general awaren

appreciation among the people of the significance and objectiv

Intelligence program. There is a corollary demand for clarific

misunderstandings which have arisen in the public mind, larg

result of the misapplication of secrecy. However, it must be rec

that Intelligence operations require a large element of secrecy a

sential to success.

The Intelligence community should draw more widely 

available pool of retired citizens with wide previous business 

ence in the foreign field, and among retired military personn

have specialized over a long period in the Intelligence field. It 

develop a more attractive program of career incentives for its 

and of benefits for its overseas employees.

Recommendations to achieve these desirable results are b

fered by the task force.

2 See footnote 7, Document 220.
Scope of the Studies

Early Instructions

Initially, this task force was instructed by the Commis

Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (h

referred to as the Hoover Commission or the Commission) t

and make recommendations as to the structure and administr

the Central Intelligence Agency.

Later, those instructions were changed by the Commission 

brace studies of all Intelligence operations of the Federal Gove

and recommendations for changes necessary to promote econo

ficiency, and improved service in this field.

The task force gave thorough consideration to the decisio

Commission to broaden the scope of the studies. It found at 

major departments and agencies engaged in Intelligence in on

or another. In addition, 10 or more minor agencies or activities 

public funds directly or indirectly in behalf of the Intelligence e

the Government.

Thus, under the broad definition of its terms of reference, 

force was confronted with the Herculean job of studying and 

ing on more than a score of major and minor departments an

cies. It quickly became evident that any attempt to spread its 

gations over such a large area would mean that only sketchy 

could be achieved within the allotted time.

Task Force Procedure Revised

The most pressing need under present conditions is for off

important positions in Government, particularly those respons

foreign policy, to have readily available full and factual foreig

ligence. (The word “foreign” as used here denotes the target o

mation as distinct from the geographical source.)

Accordingly, the task force suggested to the Commission 

best results could be obtained if the dimensions of the inquir

limited to certain key departments and agencies.

This proposal was approved by the Commission with the 

standing that the task force would determine which of the Inte

services, activities, and functions of the agencies surveyed it 

ered essential; those not necessary, or of similar nature and re

consolidation in the public interest; those nonessential and com

with private enterprise; and those representing duplication o

lapping of work between agencies. Under this revised progr

task force would cover, among other matters:

(1) The Intelligence functions of the National Security Co

(2) The value and effectiveness of the information supplied 

operating agencies.
(3) The effectiveness of the coordination of Intelligence a

(4) The organization, procedures, methods, and perform

the Government agencies in the field of Intelligence. (5) An examination of the operation and physical plan

agencies as to economy, adequacy, effect on efficiency, and uti

(6) The various programs of the agencies in such fields a

ing, research and development, stockpiling, reference mater

security. (7) Personnel policies and manpower utilization.

(8) All programs and procedures for the collection, devel

and dissemination of Intelligence information within the Gove

including collection apparatus and dissemination media. (9) Effectiveness of the coverage by the various agencies 

specific areas of assignment, and extent of teamwork betwee

agencies.

Two Reports Prepared

In the preparation of this report, the task force was motiv

a sincere desire to present as complete an account of its finding

sidered judgment indicated would best serve the public intere

tain other facts and recommendations prepared by the task for

been omitted from this report on the ground that their disclosu

licly might give aid and comfort to our potential enemies or mig

ardize our national defense and security. These findings have 

corporated in a separate, highly classified, comprehensive repo

has been placed in the hands of the Chairman of the Commis

Teams Make Firsthand Studies Abroad

In order to obtain a clearer picture of intelligence operatio

teams were sent abroad for on-the-spot investigations. Each te

composed of a member or members of the task force and mem

the staff. One group visited the European sector and the other 

the Far East.

These staff groups held conferences with the senior Unite

representatives and senior military commanders in the count

ited. The visits and discussions provided the task force with fi

information which could have been obtained in no other fash

The conclusions reached and the recommendations containe

report, and in the more comprehensive report to the Chairma

Commission, reflect the benefit of those personal tours of inspec

Organization of the Task Force

Security Impact on the Selection of Personnel

The Task Force on Intelligence Activities was the last inves

group authorized by the Hoover Commission. The director and 

of the staff assumed their duties on October 1, 1954. The limit

of available personnel in this country with prior experience in 
telligence field influenced to some extent the structure of the s

its methods of operation.

The task force personnel and staff had to be screened caref

background security and possible prejudicial interest arising fro

association with departments and agencies embraced in the surv

Before a member of the task force or staff could have acces

material, a security background investigation was conducted 

individual declared by proper authority to be eligible for access 

Secret” information. In each case where the inquiry involved a

atomic energy data, a time-consuming special clearance was ob

It was found that each department and agency had develo

own criteria, practices, and standards for clearance. The tas

adopted a policy in conformity with the policies and requirem

the department or agency involved in each specific inquiry.

In the interest of security and economy, the task force also d

to keep its staff as compact as possible. Sensitive material ge

was studied on the premises of the agencies.

Staff Organization

After careful consideration by the task force of various p

methods of organizing the staff and its work, it was decided 

most practical course would be to assign teams composed of 1 o

members to study specific agencies, and to delegate to other tea

cific across-the-board survey functions. Individual task force m

were assigned across-the-board responsibilities paralleling the 

designated staff teams.

Thus, all task force members were in a position to interje

influence and guidance in the staff activities and at the same t

tain valuable firsthand knowledge of the overall problem.

Procedures for Gathering Data

The task force and staff had the benefit of detailed briefing

officials and employees of each agency studied. These briefin

characterized by informality. Oral questions and answers usual

employed. In some instances, however, copies of prepared b

were furnished to the staff for ready reference.

Discussions were had with many echelons of personnel 

department and agency, from the clerks up to and including th

of the executive departments.

In the execution of its extensive undertaking, the task force 

tain areas found it necessary to employ the “sampling” metho

ticularly in the case of the study of activities overseas.

The task force also received expert advice from many in

als no longer in Government employ, but who previously oc
positions of prime responsibility in the development of our 

Intelligence operations and organization. Some of these witne

peared before the task force at no expense to the Governmen

considerable personal sacrifice. Their help and suggestions we

estimable value.

“Intelligence”—A Definition

[Omitted here is language similar to the Preface of Docume

I. The Intelligence Community—National Level

The National Security Council

The function of the National Security Council is to advise t

ident with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and 

policies relating to the national security so as to enable the 

services and the other departments and agencies of the Govern

cooperate more effectively in matters involving national secur

The Council is composed of the President, the Vice Presid

Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Foreign Op

Administration, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobiliza

Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departme

military departments when appointed by the President, to serv

pleasure.

The Council, in addition to performing such other function

President may direct, for the purpose of coordinating more eff

the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of t

ernment relating to national security, subject to the direction of t

ident, shall:

1. Assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and 

the United States in relation to our actual and potential military 

in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making 

mendations to the President to meet these problems.

2. Consider policies on matters of common interest to the 

ments and agencies of the Government concerned with the nat

curity, and make recommendations to the President on these m

In order to accomplish its mission, the National Security 

has at its disposal several groups which function in varying 

within the field of national Intelligence.

Duties of Special Assistant to the President

The Council is linked closely to the President, not only bec

Chief Executive is Chairman and a member of it, but also becau

designation by him of a Special Assistant to the President for N

Security Affairs who, as a member of the White House Staff, has 

and direct access to the President and enjoys his complete confi
This Special Assistant to the President is, in fact if not in na

Executive Officer of the NSC and is chairman of the highly im

Planning Board of the NSC.

He personally briefs the President on national security affa

with the President’s approval prepares the agenda for the NSC 

ings. This Special Assistant to the President does not preside 

NSC meeting, but sits (just beneath the Council itself) at the 

the NSC administrative machinery.

Progress in National Intelligence Policies

The National Security Council has issued several Intelligenc

tives.3 They express the policy by which the Intelligence effort is 

and coordinated; establish, within the Intelligence community, c

tees for the fulfillment of specific Intelligence functions; and pinp

responsibility for specific duties in designated fields of Intelligen

The national Intelligence policy, as expressed in these dir

calls for integration of all departmental Intelligence relating to n

security through a process of coordination of effort by the Dir

Central Intelligence and correlation of Intelligence by the Cen

telligence Agency.

Other groups have been established as appendages to the 

cil, through some of which Intelligence, advice, and recommen

have been received by the Council for its use in advising and 

recommendations to the President.

The Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the National S

Act of 1947,4 is charged with the responsibility of coordinating

ating, and distributing Intelligence data affecting the national s

The Director of Central Intelligence gives advice and recommen

to the National Security Council on such matters.

The CIA well may attribute its existence to the surprise at

Pearl Harbor and to the postwar investigation into the part Inte

or lack of Intelligence played in the failure of our military force

ceive adequate and prompt warning of the impending Japanese 

That investigation of events leading up to the “day of infam

pressed upon Congress the fact that information necessary to 

pate the attack actually was available to the Government; but th

was no system in existence to assure that the information, p

3 National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) issued from 1

are printed at the end of this volume. Earlier directives are in Foreign Relations, 1

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment. 4 61 Stat. 343.
evaluated, would be brought to the attention of the President 

chief advisers so that appropriate decisions could be made and 

instructions transmitted to the interested military commander

It also demonstrated that in the prewar Government orga

no single official was responsible for whatever failure of Inte

was involved; and the blame for the military surprise fell, justl

justly, on the military commanders present and immediately i

in the debacle.

Therefore, in 1947, when legislation for a national Intellig

ganization was being considered, there was a widespread feeling 

members of the Congress that responsibility for the coordinatio

production of national Intelligence, as distinguished from depa

Intelligence, and for its dissemination, must be centered at one p

Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its 

charged with the coordination of the Intelligence effort, was 

ized to fill this need. The Director of Central Intelligence, in 

formance of this responsibility, receives pertinent information 

branches of the Government engaging in collection of Intellige

cluding the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides for 

ministration of the Agency and grants the Director wide auto

authority.

II. The Intelligence Community—Departmental Level

Department of Defense

Office of Special Operations (OSO)

Authority, Responsibility, and Functions

The responsibility of the Secretary of Defense for Intellige

tivities in the military services is not specifically defined in leg

or Executive order, but is implicit in the following provision of 

tional Security Act of 1947:

The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to t

ident in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Und

tion of the President, and subject to the provisions of this Act, 

have direction, authority, and control over the Department of D

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operatio

designated to fulfill a requirement for staff participation an

sentation in matters affecting defense and national Intelligence 

His authority and responsibilities are set forth in various direct

memoranda of the Secretary of Defense.

The organization is small and is neither intended nor prep

exercise administrative control over day-to-day Intelligence a

of the armed services.
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Intelligence Unit

As an adjunct of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is a Joint 

gence Committee composed of the Intelligence chiefs of the m

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee members are: the 

Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff, who acts as committe

man; the G–2 of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; 

Director of Intelligence, Air Force.

The Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff he

Joint Intelligence Group, performing the Intelligence functions 

ties assigned to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Dir

the Joint Staff.

Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff are 

the Department of Defense, the Joint Intelligence Group supp

Secretary of Defense in Intelligence matters.

Department of the Army

Responsibilites of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Intelligence (AC/S

The AC/S, G–2, under supervision of the Deputy Chiefs of 

and of the Comptroller of the Army, within his scope of responsi

plans, coordinates and supervises the collection, evaluation a

semination of Intelligence information pertaining to the war po

topography, military forces and military activities of foreign natio

the strategic vulnerability of the United States and its possessio

The AC/S, G–2, also gives staff guidance and coordinatio

Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) and to the Army Intelligence 

(AIC).

Attaché System

Army efforts in the Intelligence collection field are carr

largely through its Attaché System which maintains stations i

foreign countries.

Officers are assigned in the Attaché System on a highly s

basis in conformity with rigid requirements and standards esta

for candidates for this type of duty.

After selection, officers are assigned to language and Inte

schools to prepare them for their assignments.

G–2 Training Interest

G–2’s training interest lies principally in the areas of polic

ance and planning. The training division establishes the policie

which Intelligence and language schools operate, and monito

program.
Elements of the division also monitor training programs in 

telligence field, which are conducted by the various field com

and agencies, to insure conformance with G–2’s guidance.

Counter-Intelligence Corps

This Corps operates under the command of a major gener

is also, in effect, a deputy of AC/S, G–2, for CIC matters. H

while the Corps commander is responsible for certain admin

and security functions, he does not exercise a true command 

over the personnel of the Corps. Based on the principle that 

is a function of command, elements of the Corps generally are a

to field units and operate directly under command of the unit t

they are assigned.

The mission of the CIC is to ferret out any treason, s

subversive activity or disaffection, and to detect and prevent 

espionage or sabotage within the Army Establishment and its 

jurisdiction.

In the pursuit of their primary functions, members of the 

Counter-Intelligence Corps acquire some intelligence data, an

are fed into the Intelligence system.

Relationship to Other Agencies

G–2 operates generally in a healthy atmosphere of coopera

understanding in its relationship with other segments of the 

gence community. Committee, subcommittee, and working gro

vide for ready interchange of material, practices, methods, an

pertinent Intelligence information.

Much of the effectiveness of this system is achieved throu

sonal contacts. Material of an urgent nature can be disse

throughout the Intelligence community through these contac

out being delayed to await scheduled committee meetings. 

positive evidence of an aggressive willingness and desire amon

engaged at the working level to promote the overall Intelligenc

Language Training Program

Language training for the Attaché System and for the Forei

Specialist Training (FAST) is conducted at the Army Language 

in Monterey, Calif. Use also is made of the Naval Language S

Washington, D.C., and civilian colleges. The Army conducts la

courses for CIC personnel at Fort Holabird, Md.

Department of the Navy

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

The Office of Naval Intelligence is part of the organiz

the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Director o
Intelligence is designated as an Assistant Chief of Naval Ope

and reports directly to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. He a

a direct responsibility to the Secretary of the Navy.

Under the authority and direction of the Chief of Naval 

tions, the Director of Naval Intelligence is required to adminis

erate, and maintain an Intelligence service fulfilling the Intellige

counterintelligence requirements of the Department of the N

the purpose of:

1. Informing the Naval Establishment of the war-making c

ities and intentions of foreign nations.

2. Providing the Naval Establishment with the Intelligence 

for plans and operations.

3. Warning naval authority of threats to security of the 

Establishment.

4. Providing the naval contributions to joint, national, an

national Intelligence.

5. Promoting the maximum Intelligence readiness of the 

ing forces and other components of the Naval Establishment.

6. Coordinating the Intelligence effort of the Naval Establis

7. Developing and promulgating, subject to approval of t

retary of the Navy, policies for the protection of classified ma

cluding such policies applicable to industrial security.

8. Advising the Chief of Naval Operations concerning all 

relating to naval Intelligence and security policies for the prote

classified matter.

Organization in the Field

In the field, three organizations assist in carrying out the 

gence mission of the Navy:

1. Naval District Intelligence Officers, who are under ONI

agement control and operate in the continental United States 

certain outlying areas.

2. Intelligence organizations within the forces afloat, wh

though directly under their respective commanders, are stil

ONI’s technical supervision.

3. The Naval Attaché System, which also is under jurisdi

the ONI.

The primary functions of the District Intelligence Officers 

conduct of counterintelligence and the implementation of s

policies. The District Intelligence Officer serves on the staff 

Naval District Commandant, and in certain designated distr

additional duty on the staff of the commander of the sea fro

which his district is located. The Naval District Intelligence Off
the major source of domestic counterintelligence of special co

the Navy.

In the forces afloat, each area, fleet, type and task force com

and all flag officers exercising command have a staff Intellige

tion. This is headed by an Intelligence officer who is respon

the collection, processing, and dissemination of Intelligence 

command. ONI supports their Intelligence requirements and 

them collection missions within their capabilities to execute.

Naval Attaché System

Naval attachés and their staffs are officially a part of ONI, b

also have a responsibility to the Ambassador or Minister wh

chief of the diplomatic mission to which they are assigned. N

attachés are stationed only in those countries which are of 

naval interest to ONI.

Each of the ambassadors to countries having ports of call 

naval elements would like to have a naval attaché to take care 

problems arising from these visits and the attendant shore lea

Administration

Administrative work in the Office of Naval Intelligence is 

by the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, Administratio

power and management surveys are conducted continuously 

division to maintain efficiency and economy throughout ONI

“Special Duty Only”

Most of the military personnel assigned to Intelligence du

line officers, not specialists. The Military Personnel Act of 194

provision for Intelligence specialists in the Regular Navy. Howev

by law none of these “Special Duty Only” officers may succeed 

mand, and since command is the usual stepping stone to flag r

“Special Duty Only” class of service is unpopular among line o

Department of the Air Force

Organization for Intelligence Work

The civilian staff of the Secretary of the Air Force include

cial Assistant for Intelligence who is responsible for review an

uation of all matters pertaining to plans, policies, and progra

tive to the Air Force Intelligence program. He is also charg

supervision and ultimate review of the personnel security p

both military and civilian.

5 61 Stat. 512.
The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, is responsible for 

Force Intelligence activities, communications activities, and ato

ergy matters.

The Department’s Inspector General is responsible to the C

Staff, USAF. Among his other duties, he conducts investigations 

ters involving major crimes, violations of public trust, subver

tivities, sabotage and espionage; and performs related counte

gence functions for the Department.

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, is dire

sponsible to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. This organiz

relationship places him in a position subordinate to a Deputy C

Staff. The interposing of an echelon between the major Intellig

ement of the Air Force and the Department’s Chief of Staff and 

other functional Deputy Chiefs of Staff, such as the Comptro

fects adversely the efficiency of staff operation. Elevation of th

tor of Intelligence to the level of Deputy Chief of Staff would 

enhance the prestige of Intelligence in the Air Force. This is a d

and appropriate step in view of the tremendous importance of 

gence in the overall mission of the Air Force.

Air Force Intelligence Training

Recognizing the need for continuing Intelligence training, 

Force has established such a program for officers and airm

bracing courses ranging from those of an introductory nature t

appropriate for staff officers in higher headquarters.

In addition to the service schools, college facilities are used 

guage training and special studies. Training courses are also a

for Air Force reserve personnel.

The Air Force training program generally is adequate for 

requirements, even in technical areas where the personnel turn

heavy. Periodic studies should be made, however, to assure t

quacy of training facilities in relation to worldwide staff requir

The staffing of foreign posts with inadequately trained personn

be not only uneconomical, but might result also in the loss of 

tunities to collect Intelligence.

Department of State

Responsibility for Foreign Policy

A primary function of the Secretary of State is to act as p

adviser to the President in the determination of American fore

icy and to implement and supervise its execution by diplomatic 

By virtue of the authority the Secretary exercises over all the a

of the Department and the Foreign Service, he derives princip

port for the accomplishment of this task from the Under Secr
the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Aff

Special Assistant—Intelligence, and the Director of the Policy P

Staff.

The Special Assistant—Intelligence, with rank equivalen

of an Assistant Secretary, develops and implements a coordina

gram for foreign Intelligence for the Department and for produ

ports essential to determination and execution of foreign polic

Effect of Diplomacy on the Overall Collection of Intelligence

The task force has recognized the incompatibility in method 

the practice of diplomacy and the more direct and active opera

cident to the collection of Intelligence and the conduct of cold w

While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts betwee

must be resolved, usually on a high level, and always in the 

interest. It must be realized that diplomacy is not an end in its

while political ends must be served and unjustifiable risks avoi

collection of Intelligence is a vital element in the fight to prese

national welfare and existence. Instances have come to the atte

the task force where too conservative an attitude has prevaile

to the detriment of vigorous and timely action in the field.

Creation of the Intelligence Area

Prior to World War II, Intelligence for the support of Amer

eign policy was produced by the inadequate research staffs of 

mental policy offices which had many other duties to perfor

ation of the Intelligence Area of that Department, by Executiv

9621 of September 20, 1945, recognized the need for improv

quality of Intelligence demanded by the tense international si

The Secretary of State is a member of the National Securit

cil. The Intelligence Area provides staff assistance to the Secret

senior policy officers of the Department of State, and maintain

with the other members of the Intelligence community in the d

of the Department’s responsibility in the total Intelligence pro

the Government.

Better Quarters Needed

The Intelligence Area maintains its offices and records in 

verted apartment building, which does not constitute sati

quarters for this special type of work. The cost of adequate 

measures consequently is high.

Existing plans for an addition to the New State Buildin

proved under the provisions of Public Law 519, would improv

ing conditions and efficiency, produce savings through the vac

leased spaces, and reduce costs of security, maintenance, and 

laneous services for this branch of the Intelligence effort.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

A Bureau of Investigation was created, under jurisdiction 

Attorney General of the United States, by Executive order of 

1908. The policies now followed in the administration of the 

Bureau of Investigation were established in 1924, and in July 19

agency became known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In view of the limited activities of the FBI in the positive a

eign Intelligence fields, a detailed study of this agency was no

However, its functions in the counterintelligence effort were 

with deep interest by the task force, in order to fill out the Inte

picture.

We found the Director of the FBI, through his forcefulness

tive, and managerial ability, to have developed his agency into a 

organization of its kind. We are confident that in the FBI we 

most effective counterintelligence service.

FBI Responsibilities in Counterintelligence

Among other assigned responsibilities, the FBI has juris

over investigations relating to espionage, sabotage, treason, an

matters pertaining to the internal security of the United States. 

risdiction places the FBI directly in the field of counterintellige

Executive Order 10450 (May 27, 1953),6 which established 

curity procedure covering “all persons seeking the privilege 

ployment or privileged to be employed in the departments an

cies of the Government,” provides that:

All investigations conducted by any other agencies, which d

adverse information involving loyalty or information showin

cion of an employee to act contrary to the interests of the nati

curity, shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of In

tion for a full field investigation.

Relationship to Other Departments and Agencies

The Director of the FBI—along with the Assistant Chief 

G–2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligen

partment of the Navy; and the Director of Special Investigatio

Inspector General, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force—is a membe

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) which is resp

for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic esp

counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related Inte

matters affecting internal security.

6 18 FR 2489 and 26 FR 6967.
The IIC Charter does not disturb the responsibilities of th

ber agencies, but makes mandatory such action of those agenc

necessary to insure complete investigative coverage of this fie

out duplication of effort, through appropriate exchange and co

tion of information and action among the various pertinent a

and departments of the Government.

III. Foreign Intelligence

Evolution of Our Plans

Traditionally, Americans are a peace-loving people. But, a 

ophy of peace is no guarantee of peace. In a tortured world 

greed, intrigue, and lust for power exist, protection of liberty 

surance of survival lie in alertness and strength. Alertness invo

equate Intelligence data on which to base adequate preparedn

From the beginning, the United States has tried consistently 

tain relationships with other countries openly and to refrain from 

ipation in secret treaties. This principle likewise established the e

tern for the conduct of our Intelligence activities. The colle

information concerning political and military policies and plan

eign governments was accomplished openly and with the full kno

of the foreign powers. The work was performed through the o

our diplomatic representatives abroad and accredited military a

A substantial volume of material was collected, but there 

machinery at home to pull this information together into a c

mass and to draw from it logical conclusions upon which to b

tional policy and future plans.

On July 11, 1941, the Chief Executive, in his capa

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, established an Offi

Coordinator of Information to

collect and analyze information data, military or otherwise, wh

bear upon national defense strategy; to interpret and correlate suc

gic information; to make it available to the President and such o

ficials as the President may determine, and to carry out, when re

by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitat

curing of strategic information not available to the Government

This office came into being only 5 months before Pearl Harbo

Through a process of evolution, there finally emerged th

of Strategic Services as an operating agency of the Joint Chiefs 

This organization remained intact until the end of World War 

Postwar Organization

In the fall of 1944, the Chief Executive wrote to the Dir

Strategic Services requesting recommendations as to the orga

of a postwar Intelligence organization. The Director submitted 
for the creation of a central Intelligence service. The plan pla

proposed central Intelligence service in the Executive Office of th

ident and called for the appointment by the President of a Dir

Intelligence who would discharge and perform his functions a

ties under the direction and supervision of the President.

It also provided for the establishment of an Intelligence A

Board consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, an

others as the President deemed necessary. The duties of the 

would be to advise and assist the Director of Intelligence.

The plan placed in the hands of the Director the work of 

nating, collecting, evaluating, and disseminating Intelligence 

tional purposes. It also recognized that various departments of t

ernment should have their own Intelligence bureaus for the co

and processing of such information and material as might be 

in the performance of their daily functions and duties. Each o

bureaus would be under the sole control of its department he

would not be encroached upon or impaired by the functions 

to any other governmental Intelligence agency.

The plan further contemplated that in time of war or un

emergency, all programs of such an agency in areas of actual or p

military operations would be coordinated with military plans 

subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or in case of t

solidation of the armed services, under the supreme commande

Functions Divided

Under the pressure of prompt dissolution of wartime agenc

Chief Executive, on September 20, 1945, divided the function

sonnel, and physical resources of the Office of Strategic Serv

tween the State Department and the War Department. The resea

presentation element was transferred to the State Departmen

absorbed or liquidated so that the element would cease to exist 

cember 31, 1945.7

On January 22, 1946, the Chief Executive created the Nati

telligence Authority consisting of the Secretaries of State, W

Navy, and the President’s personal representative, to plan, d

and coordinate Federal foreign Intelligence activities so as to 

the most effective accomplishment of the Intelligence mission 

tional security. This presidential directive also created a Cen

telligence Group (CIG) under the direction of a Director of 

Intelligence (DCI), designated by the President to assist the N

7 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establish

key documents dealing with the organization and administration of U.S. Go

intelligence organizations during that period.
Intelligence Authority (NIA) and to be responsible to it. The d

specified that the head of the CIG would sit as a member of t

It charged the Central Intelligence Group with the task of 

ing, evaluating, and disseminating Intelligence relating to the 

security; with coordinating such activities of the Intelligence age

the State, War, and Navy Departments as related to the nation

rity; and with performing other services of common concern.

By the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (Public L

80th Cong., July 26, 1947), the Congress established a Nation

rity Council (NSC) which took the place of the old Nationa

gence Authority; and created under the National Security C

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with a Director of Centra

gence (DCI) as its head. The National Intelligence Authority c

exist.

Under the provisions of this act, the National Security Cou

tablished an Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) made u

various Intelligence chiefs, to advise the Director of Central Inte

in his efforts to coordinate the Intelligence activities of the Na

[Omitted here is Section IV, Intelligence Personnel and Se

V. “Watchdog” Commission

The task force fully realizes that the Central Intelligence 

as a major fountain of Intelligence for the Nation, must of neces

erate in an atmosphere of secrecy and with an unusual amount 

dom and independence. Obviously, it cannot achieve its full 

if subjected to open scrutiny and the extensive checks and b

which apply to the average governmental agency.

Because of its peculiar position, the CIA has been freed by t

gress from outside surveillance of its operations and its fiscal a

There is always a danger that such freedom from restraints could 

laxity and abuses which might prove costly to the American pe

Although the task force has discovered no indication of a

powers by the CIA or other Intelligence agencies, it neverth

firmly convinced, as a matter of future insurance, that some 

systematic review of all the agencies and their operations sh

provided by congressional action as a checkrein to assure both t

gress and the people that this hub of the Intelligence effort 

tioning in an efficient, effective, and reasonably economical m

Within the Armed Services Committee, there is a liaison 

between the Congress and CIA which serves a worthy purp

which cannot include private citizens in its membership and 

attempted to encompass the wide scope of service and continuit

this task force considers essential for “watchdog” purposes.
The task force recognizes that secrecy is necessary for pro

eration of our foreign Intelligence Activities but is concerned o

possibility of the growth of license and abuses of power where 

sure of costs, organization, personnel, and functions are pre

by law.

On the other hand, sporadic investigations in this field m

advertently result in unauthorized disclosure of classified infor

to the detriment of the Intelligence effort. Periodic audits or stu

some qualified, impartial agency would remove both of these d

and would also allay any suspicions and distrust which have 

oped in the public mind by the complete secrecy of these ope

Such a procedure also might serve to shield our Intelligence p

from unjustifiable attacks upon the agencies concerned, and e

public confidence and support of this vital work.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 legalized the 

istrative procedures for the Agency. It was passed by the Cong

the unanimous recommendation of the Armed Services Comm

Agency Gets Wide Exemptions

The Act exempts the Agency from compliance with any pr

of law limiting transfers of appropriations; any requirements f

lication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, of

tles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by the Agen

any regulations relating to the expenditure of Government fun

The widespread conviction among Members of Congress t

situation should be corrected is indicated by the fact that more 

score of resolutions have been introduced in the current sessi

ing for a review or watch over our Intelligence activities, usua

large joint committee of the two Houses.

The task force, however, envisions as the proper agency 

watchdog job a small, permanent commission modeled after th

mission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern

a bipartisan group including members of both Houses of Congr

distinguished private citizens appointed by the President.

Members chosen from private life to serve on this pr

watchdog commission should come from a select group of loya

ified, and public-spirited citizens who command the respect a

fidence of the American people.

Comprehensive periodic studies of the foreign Intelligenc

ities of the United States would be made by the commission, w

cial attention to the questions of whether the assigned work o

Intelligence agencies is being carried on efficiently and effe

whether there is any unnecessary overlapping or duplication o

between civilian and military Intelligence agencies; whether th
are a size justified by their assigned functions and producing t

ligence required for the security of the Nation; whether expendit

within budget authorizations and in keeping with the expresse

of the Congress; whether fiscal policies and procedures are in c

ity with sound accounting principles and practices to the maxim

tent possible; whether any of their activities or policies are in 

with the foreign policy aims and program of the United Sta

whether the effort of any of these Intelligence agencies is bein

pated or adversely affected by assignment of added functions 

Intelligence. The commission would require a small permane

with the usual provisions for employing attorneys, experts, con

and auditors, for expenses and for compensation of members 

ployees. It would be empowered to hold hearings and to subpo

nesses, under adequate safeguards to prevent the public discl

classified defense information which it might receive; but wou

the authority to demand and receive from any source any info

it might need for its own use.

The overall aim would be the promotion of aggressive lea

which would unify the Intelligence effort, make it more pro

and inspire a higher spirit of teamwork through elimination 

competitive jealousies.

Would Study Complaints

The proposed commission should hold itself available to 

and to study all complaints against any of our Intelligence age

maintain a familiarity with the activities of these agencies as 

guard against the abuse of their proper functions; to consider 

of the agencies for legislation, and, where advisable, to sup

needs of the Intelligence community before the Congress, and 

the Congress on the effects of proposed legislation on our Inte

effort. An integral part of its duties would be reports of its 

and its recommendations to the President and to the Congres

ally and at such other times as might be appropriate or neces

One of the fundamental purposes of these reports wou

keep the public informed, within the bounds of security, of th

and the vital accomplishments of the Intelligence community a

vide an answer to unfounded complaints and criticisms whi

tended to arouse fears and distrust of the Intelligence effort in th

of the people.

Public support thus engendered certainly would improve 

fectiveness of the Intelligence operations, and foster public p

tion in the collection of overt Intelligence data. The people w

port these operations are entitled to assurance that the inves

paying dividends. With such assurance, they would develop 
thusiasm and alertness which could bring in valuable inform

times to supplement the work of the regular Intelligence force

VI. Functional Intelligence

Map Procurement

The task force found map requirements and production fo

ligence purposes well coordinated. Through the years, there 

veloped by mutual cooperation among the departments and ag

a committee whose primary function is to prevent duplication 

procurement.

There is established within the Bureau of the Budget an Ex

of Surveys and Maps, who coordinates all map-making prog

avoid duplication and overlapping of functions. The system s

be efficient and effective.

Trustworthy and up-to-date Intelligence cartography is on

major elements utilized in Intelligence operations. The cost 

phase of the work is substantial, but we found this expense to 

tified by the results achieved.

Intelligence Libraries

On the basis of visits made to the Intelligence libraries mai

by the military services, the CIA, and the State Department, t

force believes that these libraries in general are efficiently op

There is a workable system in effect among the agencies for n

tion of availability and exchange of information.

There has been considerable discussion of the idea of put

the material in the possession of all Intelligence agencies in o

tral library.

The value of a library depends on the ready accessibility of 

terial to the users. Its use and effectiveness declines when tho

need it must become involved in complicated procedures and 

in obtaining material.

The task force feels that a central library would foster the 

opment of private desk-side libraries and the retention by indi

of material for protracted periods, with the resultant denial o

in access to others. Establishment of a central library, therefore

impracticable.

However, for the purpose of providing ready reference an

facile access to the various Intelligence data by any departm

agency, the task force suggests that all departments within the D

Establishment and the Department of State adopt the single-ind

tem based on the Intelligence subject code now in use by the C

the Air Force libraries. The value of such a standardized pro

probably would be well worth the expense involved.
Various elements in the Intelligence family have come up 

vergent definitions and interpretations of certain words and 

in common use by the Intelligence community. The resultan

sion could be eliminated by standardization. To that end, the ta

proposes that the National Security Council produce an agre

sary of terms and definitions and provide for periodic review 

glossary.

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

In summarizing its findings and its recommendations, 

force at the outset found, in general, that the Intelligence effo

ing pursued in a diligent and dedicated manner. It noted thro

the Intelligence community an atmosphere of urgency and a d

get on with the job of breaking through security barriers erected 

potential enemies.

However, instances of inefficient practices were disclosed, 

ommendations to correct them have been made.

The domestic counterintelligence effort was found to be eff

coordinated among the departments and agencies concerned. 

direction and mutual support are provided through the opera

the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Inte

mental Committee on Internal Security. Specific responsibilit

domestic area of each counterintelligence agency is establish

tially by statute, and is further definitively specified by a “D

tions Agreement” to prevent overlapping and duplication of e

Recommendations covering overseas counterintelligence 

tions, carried out by the military services and the Central Inte

Agency, are contained in our classified report.

The domestic security and counterintelligence function

Federal Bureau of Investigation were found to be conducted ef

and effectively. This Bureau renders competent and highly coo

assistance to other Government Intelligence agencies and perf

essential and important function in the overall intelligence eff

The National Intelligence Survey is an invaluable pub

which provides the essential elements of basic Intelligence in 

of the world. While its production involves an extensive and 

sive effort, all members of the Intelligence community derive 

mediate benefit from the contributions they make to it and pro

the final product. There always will be a continuing requirem

keeping this survey up to date.

Administrative Flaws Noted

The task force concluded that the legislation and o

tional setup for Intelligence purposes are soundly conceived, 
administrative flaws are in evidence. Accordingly, it has pointe

of its suggestions in that direction.

Failure to produce certain elements of Intelligence has be

in part to the restrictive effects of some of our national attitud

policies toward the collection of Intelligence so necessary for e

resistance to Soviet aggression. Also, among some of those resp

for implementation of our foreign policy by diplomacy and n

tion, there seems to exist an abhorrence to anything that might 

diplomatic or even protocol complications.

This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at times 

fled initiative and action in the collection of Intelligence. Some 

efforts, if permitted to proceed properly, might have brought dir

immediate results and made positive contributions to the nation

fare that would have justified the attendant political risks and 

ble inconsequential diplomatic embarrassment.

Data on Soviet Bloc Inadequate

Security measures adopted by the Communists have be

vokingly conceived and boldly employed. They have been qui

tive in comparison with our security measures, which have pe

the collection of vital secrets in this country with relative ease. 

formation we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is pot

available. Through concentration on the prime target we mu

every conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success in th

depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to 

certain calculated political and diplomatic risks, and full use 

nological capabilities.

The task force is of the opinion that the Director of Centr

ligence should employ an Executive Director, or “chief of staff,

Agency so that the DCI might be relieved of the chore of man

to-day administrative and operational problems, and thus be 

give more time to the broad, overall direction of the Agency 

coordination of the entire Intelligence effort.

Recommendations With Respect to Personnel

The effectiveness of our national Intelligence effort is meas

a large degree by the character and ability of the personnel, bo

itary and civilian, engaged in this work. The diligent and dedic

fort of the Intelligence community was evident to the task forc

Some problems, however, exist in the personnel manageme

These problems, taken collectively, seriously affect the mor

availability, and the quality of the Intelligence personnel.

The task force presents detailed recommendations later 

report, with a view to improving the prestige of the civilian 
developing real career incentives in Intelligence; relieving the 

shortage of qualified Intelligence personnel by tapping the v

pool of retired civilian business men and experience abroad, an

pecially trained and qualified retired military personnel; bro

the base of civilian employment to provide greater flexibilit

cruitment of the best qualified individuals; improving the co

of service of CIA personnel stationed abroad, and increasing the 

of certain key officials in CIA.

Recommendation No. 1

That the Central Intelligence Agency be reorganized inter

produce greater emphasis on certain of its basic statutory fun

and

That the Director of Central Intelligence employ an execu

ficer or “Chief of Staff” of that Agency.

Recommendation No. 2

That a small, permanent bipartisan commission, comp

members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spir

izens commanding the utmost national respect and confidenc

tablished by act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the 

zation, functions, policies, and results of the Government a

handling foreign Intelligence operations; and to report, under a

security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the C

and to the President, annually and at such other times as may 

essary or advisable. The proposed “watchdog” commission sh

empowered by law to demand and receive any information it 

for its own use. It would be patterned after the Commission o

nization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoove

mission). Appointments by the President of persons from pri

to the proposed Commission should be made from a select lis

tinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and 

with records of unselfish service to the Nation.

The tremendous importance to our country of the Intelligen

tion, and the unpublicized and selfless duties performed, dem

the prestige of this function, and of the personnel involved, b

nized through the use of adequate career incentives and benefi

courage full development of talent within the Intelligence comm

8 Details and supporting factual matter relating to this recommendatio

tained in the separate classified report of the task force. They cannot be incorp

this public report for security reasons. [Footnote in the original.]
Recommendation No. 3

That the Executive Pay Bill of 19499 be amended to incre

annual salary of the Director of Central Intelligence to the equ

of the pay of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (now $20,000); t

the compensation of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligenc

$17,500, the same as that of most Under Secretaries of the ex

branch; and to provide operating directors of areas of responsi

Intelligence with proportionate salaries; and

That the chiefs of the various Intelligence units of the milita

ices be elevated in the organizational structure to the level of 

Chiefs of Staff in the Army and the Air Force, and Deputy C

Naval Operations in the Navy; and

That the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 be amen

provide:

(a) Additional medical and hospital benefits and services 

pendents of CIA employees when stationed overseas, similar 

benefits authorized for dependents of members of the Foreign 

(b) Statutory leave benefits (and accumulation of leave) 

ployees of CIA overseas, as now applied to members of the 

Service.

Retired civilians with long business experience in the forei

constitute a possible source of important contributions to the 

gence effort, and this resource should be exploited fully. There 

a valuable reservoir of retired military personnel with foreign 

ence which might well be utilized. One major advantage in 

ploitation of these groups would be the speed with which the

be fitted into the Intelligence picture because they would come 

a large part of the necessary training already behind them.

Recommendation No. 4

That the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 be amen

authorize employment by the CIA of retired military personne

armed services without any arbitrary limitation on the number 

employees (the limit now is 15) and without regard to the law 

ing their compensation; except that such personnel should be 

ized to accept either their military retirement pay plus any di

between their retired pay and the proper pay of the office they 

hold in CIA or the proper pay of the office, but not both; and

That the Department of Defense make extensive use of S

A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive appointm

9 P.L. 359, approved October 15, 1949. (63 Stat. 880)
the employment by the military services of civilian Intelligen

lysts and other specialists in order to provide the necessary fl

in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel (to include ret

izens with wide previous business experience in the foreign fi

to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between zone of 

competitive service and the overseas excepted service.

The task force is satisfied that the personnel security progr

procedures within the Intelligence community are adequate 

mize the possibility of security risks and to make extremely 

their employment in sensitive positions in the Intelligence agen

cept in the procedure for systematic rechecking of all personnel 

sure that the passage of time has not altered the trustworthines

employee, and to make certain that none has succumbed to som

ness of intoxicants or sexual perversion, or developed some oth

coming that would disqualify him from further sensitive wo

Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate safeguards again

a danger.

Recommendation No. 5

That measures be instituted in all agencies for rechecking 

curity status of all personnel engaged in Intelligence activities 

odic intervals not to exceed 5 years in any individual case.

Our Government and its Intelligence forces are not fully 

ing the possibilities of valuable military and technological dat

tially available in scientific reports and technical publications i

foreign countries. The State Department now is charged with th

Under this arrangement, we lack adequate collection facilities a

experts to evaluate the material.

Recommendation No. 6

That the responsibility for procurement of foreign publicati

for collection of scientific Intelligence be removed from the S

partment and placed in the hands of the CIA, with authorit

point such scientific attachés as may be necessary to carry on th

abroad.

Efficient handling of Intelligence information demands 

quarters for the personnel and the records. The Central Inte

Agency, after 8 years of operation, still lacks such facilities.

Recommendation No. 7

That the Congress appropriate as soon as practicable th

necessary to construct adequate headquarters facilities for C

near Washington, D.C.

The task force believes not only that great care must be 

the selection of highly qualified persons, both technologica
Intelligence-wise, for the group supervising atomic energy d

that changes in the group should be made as infrequently as p

Recommendation No. 8

That steps be taken to introduce highly selective methods o

ing members of the coordinating committee on atomic energy 

gence, not only to get the benefit of service by the most compe

dividuals, but also to assure long tenure in this important assig

Lack of adequate linguistic preparation often has proved 

serious handicap to our representatives abroad. This became p

apparent during the Korean war. The ability to write and sp

language fluently, and to interpret foreign words and idioms acc

always helps an American to get around in an alien land, to 

confidence of its people, and to understand them.

Recommendation No. 9

That a comprehensive, coordinated program be develope

pand linguistic training among American citizens serving the 

gence effort; and

That the Department of Defense expand and promote la

training by offering credit toward reserve commissions to RO

dents and drill credit to Reserve personnel for completion of s

language courses.

222. Editorial Note

[text not declassified]
223. Central Intelligence Agency Comments on the Report 

Technological Capabilities Panel1

NSC 5522 Washington, June 

[Omitted here are a June 8 note from the NSC Executive S

to the NSC, a memorandum of July 1 to all holders of NSC 5522

of contents, an index to agency comments, a summary of agen

ments, and Annexes A and B containing comments by the Dep

of State and Department of Defense, respectively.]

ANNEX C2

TAB A

Technological Capabilities Panel Recommendations on Whi

Central Intelligence Agency Has Full Responsibility for Stud

Report to the National Security Council

Specific Recommendation C. 4

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

“We need to examine intelligence data more broadly, or t

some new technique, for the discovery of hoaxes. As a first s

recommend a National Intelligence Estimate, with adequa

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, C

on the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel. Top 

typed notation at the bottom of the first page reads: “Revised 7/26/55.” On 

14, the Technological Capabilities Panel (the Killian Panel) of the Science Advis

mittee reported to President Eisenhower on “Meeting the Threat of Surpris

Background on that report and extracts from it are printed in Foreign Relations, 1

vol. XIX, pp. 41–56. See also the editorial note, ibid., p 83. The full report is in 

Archives, RG 59, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, Top Secret Restricted Data. On J

ecutive Secretary of the National Security Council Lay circulated to NSC mem

per entitled “Comments on the Report to the President by the Technological 

ties Panel of the Science Advisory Committee” under NSC Action No. 13

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action of the Nationa

Council) Comments on the February 14 Panel Report were submitted by th

ments of State and Defense, Office of Defense Mobilization, Atomic Energy Co

Bureau of the Budget, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference–Interdep

Committee on Internal Security, the Special Committee established to coordina

plementation of NSC 5513/1, the NSC Planning Board, and the Central In

Agency. (Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Comme

Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel) Also see Fo

tions, 1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 95–108. The judgment of the report at that time 

United States had no reliable early warning and the Strategic Air Command 

nerable, perhaps tempting, the Soviets to attempt a surprise attack” was to h

nificant impact on the course of the nascent U–2 program. 2 The CIA comments in Annex C were sent to the Executive Secretary o

tional Security Council under cover of a June 6 memorandum from Director 

Intelligence Dulles. (Ibid.)
guards, of our success in keeping secret our most useful techni

intelligence. This estimate would suggest the extent to which 

emy might be manipulating the information obtained throug

sources.”

2. Discussion:

The problem of ascertaining the validity of information c

ing the USSR, collected through various sources available to 

continuing one in the intelligence process. Thus, while no attem

been made in the past to prepare a comprehensive estimate c

ing Soviet attempts at deception, and the effect of such activity 

validity of National Intelligence Estimates, a considerable am

research and analytical time has been expended. This effort cou

fully be brought to bear in the preparation of a study of Soviet 

in penetrating our most useful techniques of intelligence. A c

hensive study will be initiated through an appropriate mechanis

initial investigations do not reveal any requirements for additio

sonnel or funds for the accomplishment of this task.

[Omitted here are Specific Recommendation C. 9 and dis

of it.]

Specific Recommendation C. 10

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

“A heavy long-term investment should be made in the p

tion of covert agents as eventual sources of high-level intellige

2. Discussion:

This recommendation, as amplified by the pertinent discu

the report,3 has implicit in it the expansion of clandestine netw

non-communist areas looking to the time, perhaps even twent

from now, when some of these areas may be critically important

gests the slow and careful preparation of agents in the event o

litical coup, a threatened coup, or some similar governmenta

and finally, the use of such agents in legal travel operations aga

communist countries and in the penetration of communist a

communist groups outside of the communist-controlled areas.

3 ”It has become exceedingly difficult to obtain significant information fro

operations inside Russia. The security zones at the border, the general restricti

interior, the thousands of security police, and the innumerable informers among 

ulation are brutally effective in limiting the infiltration, exfiltration, and usef

agents. Therefore, we must more and more depend upon science and technolo

sist and complement the best efforts of classical intelligence.” (National Archiv

S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, The Report to the President of the Technological 

ties Panel)
It is noted that a recent recapitulation of high-level intellig

forts with long-term potential shows that the CIA possesses 

score agent assets of this type situated in almost every sensiti

orbit area of the world and in many areas which, though not p

significant, could become so in the years to come. It is this type 

facility which has contributed to the success of certain politica

tions which have been reported to the NSC.

The CIA accepts and endorses the emphasis placed in th

on the importance of using individuals of great intelligence, 

and experience [11⁄2 lines not declassified]. This type of activity h

a part of our operational program for some time but it clearly d

an effort above that which we are now putting forth. It is most 

to locate people who are not too selfish, too insecure, or too 

produce material of value within such a program. The security 

tions erected by the Russians, the Chinese and the Satellites h

posed very rigid requirements in the selection of such indi

Therefore, an expansion of our present activities is certainly ca

including the availability of additional manpower to make possi

and careful development of highly intelligent penetration agen

Laying the groundwork for extensive covert operations i

country available to our agents, to the extent outlined above

require additional effort through intensification and limited ex

of our U.S. case officer selection and training facilities, an inc

our case officer corps, and a limited broadening of our several 

structures (administrative, communications, and technical). A 

estimate of the proportion of the required increases in terms of 

ficer personnel would be approximately 10%.

TAB B

Recommendations On Which CIA Has Primary Responsibil

Reporting to the NSC, Subject to Coordination With Other A

General Recommendation 6 and Specific Recommendation C 7:

1. These recommendations read as follows:

GR6: The National Security Council establish policies and 

tions which will permit the full exploitation of the intellige

other advantages which can be made available to us through 

tablishment [1 line not declassified].

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

2. Discussion:

The Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with 

partment of Defense, concurs in these recommendations. [4 

declassified]

[4 paragraphs (48 lines) not declassified]
Specific Recommendation C 3

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

We must find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon 

our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategi

ing, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce t

ger of gross overestimation or gross under-estimation of the th

this end, we recommend adoption of a vigorous program for 

tensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most ad

knowledge in science and technology.

2. Discussion:

The CIA agrees with these statements and recommendatio

Director of Central Intelligence has developed plans for imple

tion in the near future which will make possible a further step 

the achievement of the objective underlying the TCP recommen

namely: to “use the ultimate in science and technology to impr

intelligence take.”

The Agency has created a permanent Scientific Advisory 

composed largely of former members of the Technological Cap

Panel, to advise the Director and to supplement existing activi

The Agency’s plans envisage:

a. The establishment of a suitable unit, with its supportin

ratory facility, to insure the continual creation, recognition and 

cation of new scientific and technical methods for the acquisitio

essing, and production of all forms of foreign intelligence,

b. The establishment of procedures for developing the co

tant equipment and instrumentation peculiar to the productio

telligence, and

c. The establishment of close working relationships betw

unit mentioned in paragraph a. above, and all correlative d

mental divisions within the intelligence community and in pa

with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D).

TAB C

Recommendations Under Which Primary Responsibility W

Assigned to Other Agencies Subject to Coordination 

With the Central Intelligence Agency

[Omitted here are the CIA comments on General Recomme

11 and Specific Recommendations A. 9, B. 12c, C. 1, C. 5, and C

Specific Recommendation C. 8

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

“Intelligence applications warrant an immediate program 

to very small artificial satellites in orbits around the earth. Cons
of large surveillance satellites must wait upon adequate solu

some extraordinary technical problems in the information ga

and reporting and its power of supply, and should wait upon 

opment of the intercontinental ballistic missile rocket propuls

tem. The ultimate objective of research and development on t

satellite should be continuous surveillance that is both extens

selective and that can give fine scale details sufficient for the 

cation of objects (airplanes, trains, buildings) on the ground.”

2. Discussion:

The psychological warfare value of launching the first ear

lite makes its prompt development of great interest to the inte

community and may make it a crucial event in sustaining the 

tional prestige of the United States.

There is an increasing amount of evidence that the Soviet U

placing more and more emphasis on the successful launching of t

lite. Press and radio statements since September 1954 have ind

growing scientific effort directed toward the successful launchin

first satellite. Evidently the Soviet Union has concluded that the

lite program can contribute enough prestige of cold war value or 

edge of military value to justify the diversion of the necessary ski

material and labor from immediate military production. If the S

fort should prove successful before a similar United States effo

is no doubt but that their propaganda would capitalize on the t

the scientific and industrial superiority of the communist syste

The successful launching of the first satellite will undoub

an event comparable to the first successful release of nuclear en

the world’s scientific community, and will undoubtedly recei

parable publicity throughout the world. Public opinion in both 

and allied states will be centered on the satellite’s developm

centuries scientists and laymen have dreamed of exploring oute

The first successful penetration of space will probably be th

satellite vehicle recommended by the Technological Capabilitie

The nation that first accomplishes this feat will gain incalculab

tige and recognition throughout the world.

The United States’ reputation as the scientific and in

leader of the world has been of immeasurable value in com

against Soviet aims in both neutral and allied states. Since the 

reputation of the United States’ scientific community has been 

challenged by Soviet progress and claims. There is little doubt 

the Soviet Union would like to surpass our scientific and in

reputation in order to further her influence over neutralist sta

to shake the confidence of states allied with the United State

Soviet Union’s scientists, technicians and industrialists were 

ently to surpass the United States and first explore outer sp
propaganda machine would have sensational and convincing e

of Soviet superiority.

If the United States successfully launches the first satellite, it 

important that this be done with unquestionable peaceful intent. 

viet Union will undoubtedly attempt to attach hostile motivation 

development in order to cover her own inability to win this race. 

imize our cold war gain in prestige and to minimize the effectiv

Soviet accusations, the satellite should be launched in an atmosp

international good will and common scientific interest. For this 

the CIA strongly concurs in the Department of Defense’s suggest

a civilian agency such as the U.S. National Committee of the 

pervise its development and that an effort be made to release s

the knowledge to the international scientific community.

The small scientific vehicle is also a necessary step in the d

ment of a larger satellite that could possibly provide early warn

formation through continuous electronic and photographic surv

of the USSR. A future satellite that could directly collect intelligen

would be of great interest to the intelligence community.

The Department of Defense has consulted with the Agen

we are aware of their recommendations, which have our full 

rence and strong support.

[Omitted here are annexes bearing comments by other U

partments and agencies on the Technological Capabilities Pane

of February 14, 1955.]

224. Editorial Note

A group of national security experts headed by Nelson A. 

feller met in Quantico, Virginia June 5–10, 1955, to explore vuln

ties of the Communist bloc. See Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volu

page 84. A summary of the recommendations of the Quantico 

printed ibid., 1955–1957, volume V, page 216. Walt W. Rostow, 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of th

published an account of the Quantico deliberations in Open Skie

hower’s Proposal of July 21, 1955 (Austin: University of Texas Pres

Another panel called together by Rockefeller in late Augu

met in Washington, D.C. and Quantico to discuss and revi

psychological aspects of U.S. national security policy. The Qua

Panel, as it was often called, submitted its recommendations t

dent Eisenhower in early December 1955. See Foreign Relations

1957, volume XIX, pages 153–154.
225. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Com

IAC–M–200 Washington, June 14, 1955, 10

Director of Central Intelligence

Allen W. Dulles

Presiding2

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell

Presiding2

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department o

Major General Robert A. Schow, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, 

Department of the Army

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of 

Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, 

United States Air Force

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Jo

Mr. Charles H. Reichardt, acting for Atomic Energy Commission Repres

to the IAC

Mr. M.W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. H. Marshall Chadwell, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Otto E. Guthe, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Abbot E. Smith, Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Edward W. Proctor, Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. P.A. Trezise, Department of State

Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State

Colonel J. H. Montgomery, Department of the Army

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Job 85–500362

Folder 6. Secret. The meeting was held in the Director’s Conference Room i

ministration Building in the Central Intelligence Agency. 2 Part of meeting. [Footnote in the original.]
Lieutenant Colonel W.J. Lage, Department of the Army

Lieutenant Colonel V.J. Fenili, Department of the Army

Captain Bruce E. Wiggin, Department of the Navy

Mr. Lawrence Healey, Department of the Navy

Colonel P.D. Wynne, United States Air Force

Lieutenant Colonel Van A. Woods, Jr., United States Air Force

Mr. John A. Power, United States Air Force

Colonel John E. Leary, USA, The Joint Staff

Colonel Robert Totten, USAF, The Joint Staff

Captain Ralph Metcalf, USN, The Joint Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda items 1. Approva

minutes of the June 7, 1955 meeting, and 2. Noting of Watch C

tee Report No. 253.]

3. Proposed DCID 3/6: Establishment of a Guided Missile Intelligen

Committee (IAC–D–81/9, 31 May 1955)3

a. The Chairman stressed the importance to the security of 

of doing everything possible to improve intelligence on guid

siles. He stated that he would not wish to take the responsib

not going forward with some community approach which 

sponsive to the need. He further stated that he realized that t

gested draft was not the only way to get at the problem and 

was more anxious to press for the principle of interagency coop

in this field than for the details of the present proposal.

b. The Service members generally took exception in prin

the proposed draft as an invasion of the weapons field now a

to the services under DCID 3/4.4 Moreover, they tended to v

key gap in the field of guided missiles intelligence as collectio

has been given a high priority by the services and it is not cle

the establishment of another committee would improve current 

c. The Air Force member referred to the Air Force program 

tack the problem more broadly and indicated that while collect

an important aspect of the problem, there also were possibilitie

field of research and analysis. He suggested that an alternative 

ting up a new committee would be to broaden the charter of 

entific Estimates Committee.

d. The State member stated that he would support the prop

indicated that his department had a less direct interest in this 

than did the other members. The AEC member was in favor 

proposal. His agency has been pleased with the JAEIC approac

3 Not found.

4 Document 126.
1 Source: National Archives, RG 306: USIA Files Lot 63 A 190, B. 172, I

randa (IAN), 1954–56. Confidential; Official–Informal. A cover letter from Clar

son, Deputy Assistant Director, Near East, South Asia and Africa, U.S. In

Agency, to Dear ______, June 22, 1955, suggests that the letter was intended 

to multiple U.S. posts abroad. 2 Not further identified.

important problem and he felt that the establishment of a GMI

help AEC augment its contribution in this field. He believed 

biggest gain would be in the development of new techniques an

ods for exploiting intelligence in this field. The FBI member had 

jection to any proposal designed to improve the end-product b

cated his agency would not be competent to sit on the comm

formed.

e. The Chairman and General Cabell reiterated that the p

was in no way designed to supersede individual efforts but 

them added impetus. Mr. Kent pointed out that under the prese

it is not clear who takes the action called for in agreed post-

findings in this field. The pulling together of all individual e

thus left largely undone.

f. Action: The IAC deferred action on the draft directive p

the receipt in two weeks of a report prepared by the SEC in co

tion with EIC. The SEC report is to include a proposal of how 

jectives of the draft DCID could be met by SEC, the changes i

charter which an assumption of this responsibility would ent

an evaluation of current Air Force efforts in the field of guided 

intelligence.

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda item 4. The North 

and Arab-Israeli Situations.]

226. Letter From the Chief of the Office and Research and

Intelligence, U.S. Information Agency (Loomis) to the C

Public Affairs Officer at the Embassy in South Africa

(Graves)1

Washington, June 2

Dear Mr. Graves:

Several weeks ago an addition to your operating manual w

to all posts for inclusion in Part 1, Section 223.2 This addition i
about four pages describing the organization and functions of 

fice of Research and Intelligence (IRI). While this statement de

what we are supposed to do, it was, of necessity, written in form

ernment language.

I thought it might be helpful if I filled you in more complet

more informally, with particular emphasis on how we hope t

service to you.

When IIA was part of the Department of State,3 it depen

the Intelligence Area of the Department (OIR) to collect and p

the kind of intelligence needed for policy and programmin

arrangement was never completely satisfactory since OIR had 

cient resources to devote to our requirements, and of course 

impossible after USIA was separated from the Department.4

About a year ago Mr. Streibert5 went to Mr. Allen Dulles an

him to take a look at the problem of how best to supply USIA 

the information it required to function. Mr. Dulles accepted the j

appointed a task force which studied the issue for several mo

great detail both in Washington and in selected posts overseas

Both the National Security Council’s Intelligence Advisor

mittee (IAC) and the Agency accepted the recommendations of 

force6 and they were put into effect in September 1954.

The survey team first identified six types of information 

were needed by USIA. I am enclosing an excerpt from the Repor

describes these in detail.

The survey team concluded on the basis of these requireme

the intelligence needs of USIA did not differ in kind from the 

gence required to support the political, economic, and military 

ties of the Government, but that USIA did require such inte

“with an emphasis, a detail and a form not normally require

telligence produced for other purposes”. I should point out th

telligence”, as used in this letter and with respect to USIA in g

does not mean covert or “cloak and dagger” operations. Rather, 

to the entire process of overt collection, collation, evaluation a

semination of information and analyses on subjects relevant t

activities.

3 For documentation on the establishment and responsibilities of the Inte

Information Administration (IIA) on January 16, 1953, see Foreign Relations, 1

vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1591ff. 4 For documentation on the creation of the U.S. Information Agency (U

in 1953, see ibid., pp. 1709–1711. 5 Theodore E. Streibert, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

6 The task force and its recommendations have not been further ident

many features of the report are summarized below and quoted in the enclosu
The survey concluded further that:

(a) The total available intelligence of the types required by U

been inadequate in character and quantity, and should be increa

(b) The primary responsibility for the provision of the typ

telligence required by USIA should continue to be assigned to 

partment of State and in a lesser degree to the other agencies o

telligence Community;

(c) USIA should establish its own intelligence organizatio

lor the output of the other intelligence agencies to the particu

peculiar applied needs of the Information Agency.

This, in a nutshell, is our primary function.

The survey group also concluded that on occasion the U.

mation Agency, particularly its field staff, was a unique source 

ligence information. This would include information that field 

pick up about the organization and operations of foreign and 

nist media in a particular country. The survey group conclud

USIS should, therefore, have the responsibility of reporting this 

type of information in coordination with the reporting by th

sections of the Embassy. You can use the most convenient cha

this reporting; the psychological section of the WEEKA, State 

ment despatches, or USIA despatches. One point was stressed

field personnel should not be expected to undertake activities 

sole purpose of gathering information. Rather, their responsibi

report information which they had gathered as a by-product 

regular activities in support of the general USIA program.

Another point stressed by the Survey group was the fun

evaluation. The group concluded, and we strongly concur, tha

sponsibility for evaluating the program cannot be separated f

executive responsibility for running and planning the program

lieve that IRI’s job is to provide to the responsible USIA execu

the facts and figures which are available, and upon which t

base their judgment as to what actions they should take.

For example, if IRI were asked—“Is the radio program in th

of South Africa7 any good?”—we would say that it was not o

tion to answer that question since it involves judgment—progra

ment. We would try to work out with you the questions to w

wanted answers, such as:

“How many people listen to USIS radio programs as comp

the competition?”

“What type of people listen?”

7 The words “Southern Rhodesia” are crossed out and “the Union of Sou

has been inserted by hand.
Why do they listen to the programs?

“What is their opinion of the programs?”

etc. We would then present those findings to all levels con

you, your radio officer, IBS, the Area Directors, etc. You all co

gue as to whether or not the findings indicated that the progr

good, bad or indifferent, and whether or not the program 

change. IRI will follow the same principles as the FBI, which, 

know, has always been scrupulously careful never to tell any 

ing unit what to do as a result of its findings. Our mission in IR

fore, is completely a service mission to provide both the USIS fie

sions, and the headquarters elements of USIA, with the infor

they want about foreign programs, issues and conditions. Spec

IRI is not responsible for gathering or analyzing statistics 

the output of USIS programs. That is the responsibility of each 

concerned.

The survey team found that the following four separate uni

ing with various phases of research and intelligence, existed 

USIA: the Evaluation Staff (IEV) (which, among other thing

tracted for research studies with universities and private r

firms); the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence (CPI) (wh

a group of some 35 people assigned to the State Department, b

by USIA); the Research and Library Section of IBS; and the IPS 

Upon approval of the Report, these units were abolished and 

central organization was established called the Office of Resea

Intelligence (IRI).

After the usual delays caused by the merging of functions 

ganizations and the slow recruitment and appointment of qualif

sonnel, IRI is now getting to the point where it can begin to ca

its responsibilities.

As a manual outlines, IRI is composed of four divisions: 

tion and Liaison, Library, Production, and External Research. T

of these, the Collection and Liaison Division, is primarily respons

collecting the raw and finished intelligence from other inte

agencies, both within this Government and from foreign govern

falling within the six categories spelled out in the IAC Survey

dition, this division has the job of trying to convince other age

produce finished intelligence for us. To the extent that it succe

work of the Production Division is simplified.

The Collection Division also disseminates the raw and finis

telligence which it collects to all elements of USIA. They distr

USIS in the field, and to other Government agencies, the finish

duction turned out by IRI. They are the people responsible for 

scripts declassified which have utilized paraphrases of some cl

material in their preparation.
Another major responsibility of the Collection and Liaiso

sion is to formulate intelligence requirements. Normally, peop

to us with a vague desire for “all the facts” on a given subject. 

must get them to refine and sharpen their requirements until w

exactly what they want, and how they plan to use the informa

then list the minimum information which must be collected.

The Division lays requirements on the other intelligence a

(State, Defense, CIA) to do production for us when they ar

equipped. It will lay requirements on the field to collect info

when you are the best source. As I mentioned above, this will 

ily be where we are anxious to learn about the Communist 

digenous activities in the various media. In other words, this D

is the middleman between the user of intelligence and those w

lect and produce it.

The Collection and Liaison Division is headed by Ed Carr

had a lot of wartime service with OSS in Europe, and was with 

telligence Collection group in the Department of State for the p

years.

The second Division is the Library Division. The nucleus of 

lection and personnel of this Division is the old IBS and IPS l

The Division is headed by Roth Newpher, who headed the IBS 

and Research Staffs for 12 years. The Library has four rather 

collections.

The first section is the book and periodical collection. We hav

25,000 volumes and 260 periodicals and newspapers. The coll

heavily weighted with Russian and Communist materials, b

cover the waterfront. Also, of course, we have excellent relati

with all other libraries, both Government and private, so tha

brary can obtain almost any book on very short notice.

The second section is the unclassified morgue, which has m

5 million items, classified under 80,000 headings. This is a un

cility in Government. Nowhere else is there such a large amoun

classified intelligence material.

The third section is the classified file. This resembles the u

fied, except that all documents in it are classified. This is a new 

for the Agency, and is rapidly expanding. We have excellent r

ships with the CIA Library so that if we do not have a classif

ument ourselves, we can get it shortly from CIA.

The fourth section is the propaganda collection, which is uniqu

collections in or out of the intelligence community. It represent

tensive collection of the published propaganda of foreign countr

contains some 30,000 items organized by country of distribution

tensively cross-indexed. We must rely heavily on you to send 

amples from your area. Many have already contributed signi
This material is constantly used by the Director and other he

ters personnel because it is particularly effective in demonstra

opposition.

The Library Division is prepared to give you very rapid 

The Library provides reference service for Agency personnel in 

ington. It can do so by telegram or despatch for you.

The third IRI division is the Production Division, headed 

Olom, who for three years was Chief of the CPI unit located in t

Department, and who has been in intelligence for the last 15 y

The Production Division has the responsibility of answerin

tions from any part of USIS or USIA. Sometimes these questi

be answered on the telephone very speedily. Sometimes they 

considerable work and result in a memorandum of some leng

The Production Division does not always answer these qu

itself. If a large and comprehensive study is required, we will 

requirement on other appropriate intelligence organizations

CIA, Defense as well as non-IAC agencies such as Labor, Agr

and Commerce Departments. The Production Division will mak

effort to meet any deadline which you establish. We are a “qu

dirty” shop completely geared to the operational needs of the A

We will give you whatever information we are able to obtain 

your time limit—an hour, a day, or a week. We believe you, t

rather than we, should establish the deadline, since you know h

when you expect to use the information. Obviously, the sho

deadline, the more superficial the answer.

Requests from the field for information can be sent either 

to IRI or to IPS, depending on the type of product desired. B

and IRI often work on the same requests. We in IRI do the re

and try to obtain all the facts bearing on the subject and place 

some logical order, irrespective of whether they help or hin

cause. IPS utilizes these facts, as appropriate in its output. T

therefore, no reason for you to change whatever system you a

using. However, if you only wish a fact or an intelligence analysi

than a story, it might be a little quicker if you made that reques

The Production Division has seven branches—the five reg

eas, the USA Branch, and the Functional Branch.

The Functional Branch is responsible for following intern

Communism, front organizations as well as local and nationa

propaganda methods and activities. They also follow media a

worldwide, so that we can detect and analyze changes in emp

procedures in Communist radio, Communist movies, etc. Paul 

is Acting Chief.

The USA Branch is headed by Dick Fitzpatrick, and is resp

for providing background information on the United States, wh
and other elements of this Agency request. Again, if you want 

cle about some facet of the United States, or American life, w

provide the material to IPS and they, of course, do the final w

The Soviet-Satellite Branch is responsible for obtaining the f

figures about the Soviet and European Satellites, and for follow

activities, particularly their current propaganda lines and operati

Division is headed by Mike Fodor, who has lived in the area fo

years, and most recently was the editor of the Neue Zeitung.

Your Branch, the Near East Branch, does not yet have a 

Chief, although Joe Dees is acting in that capacity. Joe was at o

in the operational intelligence division of the Voice, but came to 

Radio Liberation.

The fourth Division is the External Research Division, wh

the mission of supplementing classical intelligence, using the 

techniques of social science. The most obvious area not touched 

ditional intelligence seems to be public opinion surveys. We 

that suveys of public opinion are a unique and important add

other sources of information, such as newspaper comment, e

comment, and estimates of the situation by qualified observer

We are now using the survey technique to get two differe

of information. The first is opinion on political matters, particu

they concern our global themes—such matters as:

What is your opinion of the United States?—of Russia?

In your opinion, how are the relations between your coun

the United States at the present time? Do you think the local Communist party is an independe

or is it controlled by the Soviet Union? If Western Europe were attacked with atomic or hydrogen 

would you approve or disapprove of the use of such bombs on 

cities?

Survey techniques also provide unique information on 

USIS activities, such as exhibits, radio programs, etc. In these 

we ask such questions as:

What radio programs did you listen to last night?

How often do you listen to _____________ program?

What is your opinion of the program?

Which do you think gives you more reliable reports of the 

radio or newspaper? What is your opinion of the exhibit you have just seen?

What part did yo like the best?

Which the least? Why?

etc.

Through the science of sampling and questionnaire resea

opinions of small, carefully selected groups can be used to estim

attitudes of larger groups with a high degree of accuracy (3–5
the sample-size generally employed). This tool can be used t

the opinions of the entire adult population, or just of certain gr

the youth, the educated, the city dweller, or whatever particu

ment you are interested in.

We are now conducting political surveys every four months 

countries of Western Europe, which we are calling Barometer R

We began survey operations in Western Europe, in part becau

lic opinion in the American sense of the word is more meaningfu

and in part because the local research concerns were further dev

We believe that one of the chief values of these surveys is that i

both us and you to chart trends in opinion with more accura

any other method. We plan to extend these surveys to the othe

countries of the world as rapidly as possible. We have just fini

exploratory survey in four countries of Latin America, and hop

them also on a regular basis.

The External Research Division is very small—only five 

sionals—since the work is essentially a field function. The Age

thus far established a TO of twelve research officers overseas

are already assigned as follows: England, France, Germany, A

Italy, Brazil and Mexico. We hope to establish research offices 

India, Thailand, Japan, Egypt and Iran. These officers will be 

members of the PAO’s staff, reporting to him, spending his G

order to provide the PAO with the facts and figures he needs, t

individual research, local contractors, or any other means avai

If some headquarters’ element in Washington, or som

Agency, such as the National Security Council, desires local su

formation, we will lay that requirement on the Public Affairs 

Under this system, the Research Officer becomes really famili

his country and can produce rapid, efficient, and meaningful r

studies. This is particularly true of research dealing with the im

the USIS programs. During the initial stages, we are supplemen

post’s GOE with additional funds, earmarked for research, bu

only an interim measure until the Public Affairs Officer can inc

search in his regular budget. However, whenever IRI places a

tional requirement on any post, which is over and above its 

concern, we will provide the Public Affairs Officer with ad

funds so that these special requirements will not be a financial 

The function of the External Research Division is to provid

nical backstopping services to these research officers. Also, th

sion prepares the detailed requirements, such as questions to b

in order to satisfy headquarters’ needs. In the case of those co

which do not have a research officer, the External Research D

will provide as much help as possible to the Public Affairs O

the PAO has some particularly pressing problem, IRI is prep
send one of its Washington staff on TDY for as long as necessar

tain the information required by the PAO.

The Division is headed by Leo Crespi, who was Research 

in Germany for six years. This Division will no longer emphasi

range basic studies. It, like the Production Division, is now a 

shop trying to provide information as quickly as possible, so th

be of practical use to all elements of USIS and USIA.

I am afraid this letter has become a little long, but I wante

scribe in some detail our assets, and our mission, so that you co

derstand it better, and therefore use it. Our sole mission is to be 

ice, and we will change our methods and procedures as req

give you what you want.

I will be very glad to get your comments on our service, bo

and bad, particularly any recommendations which you may h

improvement.

Sincerely,

Henry L

Enclosure9

IDENTIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDS

USIA has essential needs for the following types of inte

and intelligence information:

1. Selected segments of societies: selected classes, groups, o

tions (public and private), and their leadership, present and p

a) Size, composition, ideologies and attitudes, predisp

and reactions to: (1) the United States, the USSR and other c

of greatest significance and their basic policies, (2) critical fore

internal problems.

b) The patterns of influence among groups, organizatio

leaders (including the government); specifically, who is influe

whom, how, and how much

2. Media Research and Analysis:

a) Communication habits and types of media in the countr

publications, radio, motion pictures, TV). b) Organizational aspects of each medium, including locat

personnel, finance, distribution and exhibition outlets, and a 

tion of the facilities of the media.

8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

9 Confidential.
c) The political orientation of the media.

d) The content of the communications output by the med

e) Location, size and type of audience receiving the outpu

media.

f) The reactions of the audience to the media, and why.

3. Foreign Propaganda, both friendly and unfriendly, includ

change of persons or cultural exchange

a) Facilities and personnel.

b) Program content and plans.

c) Estimate of probable courses of foreign propaganda.

d) Analyses of foreign propaganda vulnerabilities.

4. Impact of factors affecting public opinion and attitudes 

net impact of such factors on people of a country. Such factors 

include historical attitudes of people, and the influence of curr

mestic and foreign official and unofficial activities.

5. Descriptive Detail, that is, unclassified or declassified inte

information to supplement the content of USIA media with i

local interest in order to make the output appear more interest

more authoritative, particularly in denied areas.

6. International Communism:

a) International organizations, personalities, programs, fis

port, methods and success or failure of operations.

b) Local applications, including counterespionage infor

with emphasis on communications facilities.

227. Editorial Note

In an effort to improve coordination of intelligence colle

the field, Secretary of State Dulles on June 23, 1955, instructed 7

matic posts on domestic and field procedures for acquiring inte

and requested those posts to report on their current handling 

ligence collection coordination. The Secretary suggested that m

with USIA and FOA staffs could include representatives of thos

cies in the collection activities. (CA–9152, June 23, 1955; N

Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 120.201/6–2355)
228. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to 

Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hughes)1

Washington, June 2

Dear Mr. Hughes:

For some time I have been concerned with the adequacy o

sources of the Department of State’s intelligence organization

consulted with Mr. W. Park Armstrong on this question and stu

detail the proposed strengthening of the State Department’s 

gence program as reflected in the Department’s FY 1957 bud

mates. On the basis of this study I am convinced that the incr

personnel and funds sought must be granted in order to avoid 

impairment of the national intelligence effort.

The intelligence framework of the Government has its pa

problems in that, to a degree not often found in other gover

functions, each intelligence agency is heavily dependent upon 

and the President and the National Security Council are de

upon the community as a whole, not simply upon one or seve

parts. I might add that this governmental area differs from oth

in that the Director of Central Intelligence has certain statu

sponsibilities with regard to the coordination of the activitie

several intelligence agencies; this indeed accounts for, and I bel

tifies, my present comment.

A careful review of the intelligence produced by the Dep

of State for National Intelligence Estimates and for other purp

direct concern to this Agency indicates the need for increased p

particularly in the following fields of endeavor:

Special Intelligence—In this period of intensive diplomatic 

the Department’s particular responsibilities in this field must 

charged promptly and thoroughly, and the present limited staff 

overstretched.

Intelligence on the Soviet Orbit and Its Integration—We are 

a period of significant change in the organization of the Com

Bloc and relations between Communist parties and governme

ability to anticipate major Communist moves and to conduc

priate cold war countermeasures requires a major stepping-up 

analysis of the techniques, strengths, and weaknesses of the C

nist Bloc mechanism. This can only be accomplished by the m

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 59 D 27, B

cret. Drafted by Robert Amory, Deputy Director for Intelligence, on June 24.
tailed scrutiny of each item of evidence, whether overtly or c

obtained, by highly competent political analysts.

Intelligence on Underdeveloped Areas—The ferment that exist

large and highly populated areas of the world in which the U

the USSR are engaged in an acute struggle for men’s minds r

far more detailed knowledge, both economic and political, t

have as yet been able to produce. Here the problem does not li

paucity of information but in adequate resources for compiling 

alyzing data.

Public Opinion Analysis—We are only just beginning to deve

equate barometers of public opinion in the Free World and 

coming more and more aware of the need to respond to and in

such if our leadership of the Free World coalition is to be e

USIA’s efforts to collect raw data in this field must be suppo

highly competent evaluation by political intelligence experts.

Watch Function—With the approval of the NSC, the Natio

dications Center has been established on a 24-hour basis. Moreo

Watch Committee’s activities have materially stepped up as a r

a constantly increasing danger of devastating damage to the U.S

event major aggression caught us flat-footed. The Department o

political intelligence is as vital a contribution to this work as is 

itary contributions; hence the additional positions requested 

work are indispensable to the over-all discharge of our early w

responsibility.

United Nations and International Conference Biographic Supp

an era of intensive diplomatic activity including special conf

and lengthy sessions of the United Nations, the Departmen

graphic resources have been found badly overstrained. This co

is enhanced by the large number of personalities included in 

munist delegations and by the growing need to handle effectiv

representatives of small but crucial countries.

Private Research—The need to maximize the contribution t

ligence by private and institutional research is obvious, not o

cause of its substantive merit, but because in the long run it i

a saving to the tax payer. Every effort is being made to insure 

intelligence agencies carefully coordinate their efforts in this fie

a considerable work load falls on the Department of State. The

contributes not only to the Department but to the entire inte

community.

Summing up the foregoing, I would like to emphasize tha

creases sought by the Department are necessary to the nationa

gence effort. They will not constitute a duplication of effort cu

expended by the intelligence community nor could they be m

ically performed by another intelligence agency. I would like 
stress the care with which the necessity for the proposed incre

been scrutinized. This is in part borne out by the fact that if all 

posed increases are granted, the intelligence organization of 

partment of State will still be substantially smaller than in FY 

I strongly recommend that the Bureau of the Budget give 

port to the proposed intelligence program of the Department 

for FY 1957.

Sincerely,

Allen W. 

2 Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

229. Editorial Note

The U.S. Air Force had been developing the concept of pla

loon reconnaissance since 1946. After studying the use of pla

loons as carriers of photographic and electronic reconnaissanc

ment since 1948, the Air Force by 1953 was experimenting and 

the balloons directed at the Soviet bloc. By the middle of 1954 

Force had test-launched over 500 reconnaissance balloons in 

Moby Dick and had by fall 1954 drawn up a basic operational 

for all future important reconnaissance programs. On March 2

Air Force headquarters assigned the Strategic Air Command 

dertake a pioneer reconnaissance of Soviet territory. (Memoran

conversation by Robert F. Packard, July 22; National Archives

INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix; John T. Bohn, “History of the 

Division,” unpublished history done in SAC History Division

of Information, Headquarters, SAC, November, 1956, vol. 1, p

Project Genetrix, the codename ultimately adopted for the f

Air Force large-scale, unmanned, high altitude balloon intellige

eration, was conceived and designed by the RAND Corporation 

Air Force as a means of overcoming the lack of photographic 

teorological intelligence on the Soviet bloc land mass. SAC was 

with operational responsibility for Genetrix. The plans for Gene

tially called for free flight of balloons from west to east across 

viet land mass from launching sites in either England, north

rope, or the eastern Mediterranean. On June 28, the Air Force re

concurrence of the Department of State for conducting nego

with German, Norwegian, and Turkish authorities to obtain c

tion on Genetrix activities on their territories.
1 Source: National Security Agency, Accession 23034, H02–0106–1, 

Correspondence–Memos concerning ELINT. Secret.

By August 19, the German and Turkish Governments had a

to the operation, and, according to the Ambassador to Norw

Norwegian Government was expected soon to accept the U.S

for Genetrix operations within its boundaries. (Memorandum 

versation by W. Park Armstrong, Jr., November 29; National A

RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 700.5411/11–2955; memoranda 

versation by Robert F. Packard, July 22 and August 22; both ibi

Files: Lot 61 D 167, Genetrix)

While British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden consented 

operation on Genetrix, he told President Eisenhower on August 

if Genetrix followed soon after the Geneva Foreign Ministers’ 

ence scheduled for October, the Soviet Government could conc

contrast the balloon operation with the President’s aerial ins

proposals made at the July summit conference. Consequently

dent Eisenhower agreed on August 23 to postpone the initiation 

etrix from November 1 until after the United States could ass

results of the Geneva Foreign Ministers’ meeting. (Memorand

W. Park Armstrong, Jr., August 23; letter from Secretary of State 

to Sir Robert Scott, British Embassy, August 23; copy of an unda

ter to President Eisenhower from Sir Anthony Eden, noted as r

by the President on August 19 in a memorandum by John W. 

Jr., August 24; all ibid.)

President Eisenhower described his proposal on mutual ae

servation to the Soviet Government in Geneva on July 21 and 

July 27 White House press conference. (Public Papers: Eisenhowe

pages 713–716, 731–733)

230. Department of Defense Directive1

S–3115.2 Washington, July 1

SUBJECT

Electronics Intelligence (ELINT)
I. Establishment

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defe

subject to his authority, direction and control, and in accordan

NSCID 17,2 the Secretary of the Air Force is hereby assigned 

sponsibility and delegated the necessary authority to direct and 

vise the consolidated processing, analysis, and dissemination 

mation on foreign non-communication electromagnetic radiati

to guide and coordinate Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) activit

agencies of the Department of Defense. In the development an

cation of ELINT policies and procedures, the Secretary of the A

will give due consideration to recommendations of the U.S. Co

cations Intelligence Board and the advice of the Joint Chiefs of 

II. Purpose

The objectives of this directive are to consolidate Depart

Defense ELINT analysis activities under a single direction, t

and coordinate Department of Defense collection of ELINT i

tion and to provide for optimum interaction and mutual sup

tween ELINT and COMINT in order to produce efficiently the b

sible ELINT results for all users, and to provide for the establ

of a Technical Processing Center pursuant to NSCID 17. The S

of the Air Force will bring about the orderly consolidation of 

arate ELINT analysis and processing centers heretofore operate

several military Departments and agencies. In carrying out th

jectives, the Secretary of the Air Force will not abridge the auth

operational commanders over integral ELINT resources in su

their operations nor the freedom of such commanders to e

ELINT materials for their mutual support. Consistent with the 

policies established by the Secretary of the Air Force, operation

manders will be authorized to establish such policies, procedu

mechanisms as they deem necessary for the rapid lateral inte

of ELINT information.

III. Mission

The Secretary of the Air Force will provide common serv

ELINT, specifically to include:

1. Organization and administration of the Technical Pro

Center for central technical analysis based on all ELINT obse

and other relevant information. The results of the central t

analysis will be made directly available to all consumers of t

of information.

2 Document 259.
2. Effective and timely guidance to Department of Defen

collection agencies and advice to the Central Intelligence Agenc

guidance shall be expeditiously transmitted through appropria

nels as prescribed by the several Departments and agencies con

Such guidance will reflect the interests of all users and will pro

the coordination of and technical assistance to field activities t

mize their total usefulness.

3. Guidance and advice, as in paragraph III. 2. above, con

methods and procedures for the improvement and standardiz

the operations and equipment related to ELINT collection, a

evaluation, and dissemination, and recommendations concern

search and development programs as appropriate.

4. Technical support to the Department of State in its nego

for the acquisition of intercept sites in foreign countries; techni

port to designated representatives of the U.S.; and technical re

tation on behalf of the Department of Defense in ELINT discu

IV. Administration

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall 

with the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretaries of the other tw

itary Departments, the Director of Central Intelligence, and h

other appropriate Departments and Agencies for the financing 

consolidated activities provided for by this directive.

The Secretary of the Air Force may reassign his responsibil

the ELINT activities as prescribed by this directive within th

mand structure of the Department of the Air Force. It is the in

this directive that the Secretary of the Air Force will provide 

performance of the functions of the consolidated activities wit

organizational structure of his Department and that he shall 

tablish a joint agency for that purpose, although individuals 

from other Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency 

integrated therein. This provision, however, will not preclude 

tablishment of such advisory committees or groups as may be 

ered necessary for the effective administration of the conso

activities.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assure act

ticipation by their Departments through the detail of qualified m

and civilian personnel to staff the consolidated activities and t

such other measures as may be mutually agreed.

The Secretary of the Air Force, in collaboration with the h

the other Military Departments and Agencies, will issue the ne

implementing instructions to accomplish actions required by 

rective. The Secretary of the Air Force will periodically report 

activities under this directive to the Secretary of Defense.
1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Papers of John Foster Dulles. Confidential

and Private; Eyes Only. Drafted by R.L. O’Connor of the Secretary’s staff. T

randum bears the handwritten notation “Copy to Mr. Hoover.”

V. Participation

The Secretary of the Air Force will collaborate fully with t

tral Intelligence Agency as an active collector and user in the 

ELINT, as well as with other interested agencies, and will pro

the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in the oper

the Technical Processing Center, in accordance with NSCID 17

RB An

Acting Secretary of 

231. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 1

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1

101.21/7–1955. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

232. Memorandum of Conversation Between President

Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles.1

Washington, August 5, 1955, 12

SUBJECT

Nelson Rockefeller

I raised with the President the situation re Nelson Rockefel

ing that I simply wanted the President to know at this stage 

were having a very difficult time working with him and that, a

I was trying to work the situation out, I was not at all sure that 

be successful in doing so. I then described to the President bri

own thinking as to the proper role that someone in Rockefelle
tion should play. I said that I felt that his primary function was to 

the many ideas, written and oral, that came into the White H

the field of foreign affairs and to see to it that the worthwhile on

put into proper Government channels for further consideration 

lowed up. I said that I recognized that the regular departmen

often so tied to daily routines that they did not have time or re

fulness in dealing with new ideas. However, I said that if som

like Nelson Rockefeller built up a staff of his own, as he appe

have every intention of doing, he in turn became a bureaucrat 

feated the whole purpose of the exercise.

I then showed the President the copy of the memorandu

ernor Adams had given me from Nelson Rockefeller to the Pr

outlining his staff requirements.2 The President expressed som

prise at the size and complexity of the proposed staff and said 

had been unaware of all these arrangements.

2 Not found.

233. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of St

Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State’s Sp

Assistant for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong)

Washington, August 1

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–55, 10

1955. Top Secret. 1 page not declassified.]
234. National Security Council Report

NSC 5525 Washington, August 3

STATUS OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY PROG

AS OF JUNE 30, 1955

[Omitted here are Parts 1–6.]

Part 7—THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred 

the Intelligence Advisory Committee)2

[Omitted here is a Table of Contents.]

(Note: The intelligence community was recently investig

the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission.3 The finding

Commission, which are presently under advisement, are not 

or commented on in this report. The comments of the organiza

ported on are being transmitted separately to the White Hous

cordance with customary procedure.)

I. Summary

A. Evaluation of U.S. Capabilities to Provide Warning of Atta

We believe, as we did at the time of our previous report, 

U.S. could expect possibly as much as six months and not less 

days warning of Soviet preparation for full-scale land, sea, an

tack, providing that the Soviets went to full, or nearly full m

tion prior to the attack.

The current estimate of the growing air capabilities of th

has made us somewhat more pessimistic than we were last 

garding our ability to give advance intelligence warning of sur

attack. Should the USSR attempt a major surprise air attack aga

U.S. from forward bases in 1955, the preparations might be d

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 

Secret. The full report was transmitted to the National Security Council unde

an August 31 memorandum from Acting Executive Secretary of the Nationa

Council Gleason. 2 On July 19, A. Sidney Buford III, Director of the Office of Libraries a

gence Acquisition, Department of State, sent to the IAC the State Departmen

bution to the IAC’s semi-annual report on the Foreign Intelligence Program 

tional Security Council. The Department of State report is in National Archiv

INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, IAC–D–55 Series on Foreign Intelligence Program. 3 See Document 220. For the public report by the task force on intelligence

ument 221.
and if they were, would provide a generalized degree of war

several days, and specific warning of unusual and possibly th

ing air activity on the order of 18–24 hours. A lesser scale of att

volving about 250 aircraft, if accompanied by an extraordinar

rity effort could be launched as early as 1955 with no assur

specific advance warning to U.S. intelligence (apart from that p

by early warning radar). Attacks against U.S. bases or forces ov

or against U.S. allies, could be made with equal or greater lik

of being accomplished without advance warning.

In the period between now and 1958, Soviet capabilities 

prise attacks will almost certainly increase. Furthermore, the US

have a progressively increasing capability for launching attack

U.S. from interior Soviet bases. Such a method of attack would 

bly provide no specific advance warning to U.S. intelligence.

The USAF now operates world-wide on a 24-hour basis a

cations System for detecting imminent Communist attacks, es

air attack with nuclear weapons. Major air commands have sub

centers tied in with Washington by preferential use channels 

munication for flash transmission of early warning intelligen

system is in turn tied in with the unified command indications 

and with the National Indications Center in Washington, w

maintained on a 24-hour basis by the Watch Committee of the 

B. Evaluation of Soviet Capabilities and Intentions

Intelligence to support over-all assessments of the strength

USSR, Communist China, and the Satellites is generally improvi

general limitations of intelligence on the USSR are evident in the 

of attempting to measure the forces shaping Soviet policy. We c

minate the broad outlines of the chief problems confronting Sovi

ership, but we are still unable to determine the degree to whic

problems, such as allocation of Soviet economic resources and G

rearmament, generate pressures on Soviet policy. The main ques

political intelligence often involve matters of judgment on which 

no factual evidence can be brought to bear—the degree of indepe

enjoyed by Communist China in matters of major policy, the de

likelihood that the USSR will withdraw from East Germany, th

hood of open intervention by the USSR in hostilities between 

and Communist China which threatened the existence of the lat

We have made progress in economic intelligence on the 

most notably in improving techniques for measuring economic 

4 For a description of the National Indications Center and the Watch Com

the IAC, see Document 218.
However, there remains the basic problem, that of determining 

tent to which the Soviet economy is capable of meeting the com

claims for resources arising from the various internal and extern

mitments of Soviet policy. In an effort to find some solution 

problem, we have recently focused attention on a particularly 

aspect of intelligence on Soviet resources allocation, the estima

nomic cost of the over-all Soviet military effort.

New techniques for acquiring and analyzing data have ad

our knowledge of Soviet scientific and technological cap

Progress has been made in intelligence on Soviet develop

guided missiles and electronic equipment, and on the Soviet 

program. Despite advances in these and other fields, importa

tions such as the characteristics of various guided missiles, th

ence and nature of a Soviet biological warfare program, 

apportionment of nuclear material among various types of w

and systems, remain to be answered.

Although we have succeeded in collecting much informa

the separate branches of the Soviet armed forces, we have yet 

struct the picture of probable Soviet strategy so essential to est

general trends in the Soviet military establishment, probabl

choices in weapons systems, or the strength of particular milita

ponents. The requirement for such estimates is particularly u

the present time because of recent indications that Soviet militar

ing is adjusting to the impact of modern military technology.

C. Collection

In most respects there has been little over-all change in 

lection capabilities within the Bloc, largely because of the co

strict enforcement of Sino-Soviet security and counterinte

measures. However, there has been a considerable improveme

collection of intelligence data through technological means 

ELINT, together with increasing use of aerial reconnaissance. 

tion of U.S. forces from Austria will deprive the military serv

significant intelligence base. Service collection units in Austria 

transferred to West Germany, where operational requirements 

ing carefully considered in U.S.-West German negotiations on 

Forces Arrangement.5

5 Under the terms of the Austrian State Treaty signed in Vienna on May 15 

War II allied occupying powers were scheduled to evacuate Austria within 9

the treaty coming into force. (See Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. V) This pr

in Article 20 of the treaty, which is printed in full in Department of State Bu

XXXII, June 6, 1955, pp. 916ff. In preparation, the U.S. Government was neg

new status of forces agreement with the West German government. (Foreign 

1955–1957, vol. XXVI, pp. 242 and 300)
235. Letter From the Chairman of the Planning Coordinatio

Group (Rockefeller) to the Director of the Bureau of th

Budget (Hughes)1

Washington, September 2

Dear Rowland:

This is to confirm our conversation in which I recommen

you that the Planning Coordination Group be abolished, and th

sign as Vice Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board. 

preparing an informal memorandum for you setting forth th

lems that must be considered in regard to the functions of the 

I would suggest that December thirty-first be considered 

mination date as this would give time to arrange for the orderl

fer of existing responsibilities and completion of the work in p

I am sorry to make this recommendation. However, it is c

ter six months experience that this mechanism will not be abl

complish the objectives set forth in the memorandum of March 3

which was approved by the President.

A meeting of the Planning Coordination Group members 

held next week. At that time I will discuss this recommendati

them.3

Sincerely,

Nelson A. Rock

Special A

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG, C

tion of Psychological and other Warfare Activities. Confidential. 2 Document 210.

3 Rockefeller informed the PCG of his intention at the Group’s September 

ing. Item 4 of the minutes of this meeting reads:

“The Chairman announced his conviction that after six months’ experienc

cannot discharge its functions and made a recommendation that it be abolishe

cember 31, 1955. The CIA representative indicated no objection to this recomm

and discussed briefly methods by which the coordination of major covert progra

be handled after the abolishment of PCG. The State and Defense representatives 

position on the recommendation by the Chairman. Copies of a letter from the C

PCG, to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, dated September 23, 1955, recom

the abolishment of PCG, were furnished the PCG members.” (Minutes of Th

ing, September 26; National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PC

dination of Psychological and other Warfare Activities.) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rockefeller signed the original.
236. Letter From the Secretary of States Special Assistant f

Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Director of C

Intelligence Dulles1

Washington, October 

Dear Allen:

The Task Force on Intelligence Activities (“Clark Commi

the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of t

ernment (Hoover Commission), in its public Report to the Con

Intelligence dated May 1955, but released in June,2 makes a nu

disparaging statements concerning the attitude of the Depart

State toward intelligence collection activities. In the Conclusi

Recommendations (Part VII, pages 37–38) it is stated:

“. . . Also among some of those responsible for implement

our foreign policy by diplomacy and negotiation, there seems 

an abhorrence to anything that might lead to diplomatic or ev

tocol complications. “This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at time

initiative and action in the collection of intelligence. Some of t

forts, if permitted to proceed properly, might have brought di

immediate results and made positive contributions to the natio

fare that would have justified the attendant political risks an

ble inconsequential diplomatic embarrassment.”

Further on, referring to the inadequacy of data on the Sov

the Report says that:

“. . . Success in this field depends on greater boldness at 

icy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated political an

matic risks, and full use of technological capabilities.”

The Department is naturally concerned at such allegations 

sires to learn what the basis for them might be. In the Top Sec

Force Report dated May 1955,3 I can find no substantiating da

gumentation for the implied charges against the Department 

the public report. However, according to the Top Secret Rep

pendix II, which has not been available to the Department, fu

cusses [less than 1 line not declassified]. Would it be possible fo

make this Appendix available to me on a highly restricted ba

ternatively, could you send to us a statement, generally summ

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5200/11

cret. Drafted by Fisher Howe on October 5, concurred in by W. Tapley Benne

Robert G. Barnes (S/S), and Loy Henderson (O). All ellipses in the original. 2 Document 220.

3 Document 221.
the Reports position on this matter, as was, I believe, suggested 

President’s Military Secretary.

Directly related to the question of what was said by the pub

Force Report would be the views of your Agency on the que

the Department’s attitude toward intelligence and intelligence 

tions. Naturally the Department would wish to know it if this 

sis is correct in your view, and would wish promptly to take re

action if legitimate intelligence activities are inhibited by the ac

Foreign Service or Departmental officers.

Sincerely,

W. Park Armstro

4 Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.

237. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of 

for European Affairs (Barbour) to the Under Secretary 

State (Hoover)1

Washington, October 1

SUBJECT

Abolition of the Planning Coordination Group

At a PCG Alternates meeting this morning we discussed 

tached draft documents2 to accomplish the abolition of the P

Coordination Group.3

Substantive comment was made on the following two p

the proposed memorandum to the Chairman of the OCB.4

1. CIA proposed that Par. 4(a) be redrafted to amend NSC 

to specify the individuals originally designated in Sec. 4(a) of th

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG. N

fication marking. 2 Not printed.

3 See Document 235 and footnote 3 thereto.

4 The Under Secretary of State was chairman of the Operations Coordinati

5 Document 212.
paper, i.e. a representative of the Secretary of State and Secretar

fense and to omit reference to members of the OCB. The reason

vanced was that while the State Department representative is t

as the representative designated for this purpose in 5412,6 it is n

whether the Defense representatives will be the same. (The q

was not (repeat not) raised but it may be noted that the effec

CIA proposal would be, unless further altered, to exclude Nelso

efeller. The “representative of the President” is not mentioned 

5412.

2. Defense (Charlie Sullivan) questioned whether in Par. 

memorandum to the Chairman of OCB it is sufficient to state 

original objectives of the PCG continue valid and other means 

be sought to achieve these objectives. Sullivan thought the PC

consider suggesting some alternative means. I took the line a

supported by Nelson and CIA that that statement went far eno

the time being and we should not consider alternative mech

now.

One additional point was raised by Nelson Rockefeller, na

explain the reason for his resignation as Vice Chairman of th

His explanation was that the Budget Bureau have never liked 

of establishing a Vice Chairman of the OCB. He did not expa

ther on the matter.

I took the general position on these points that in your a

could not give Departmental approval but that we would c

them further when submitted.

6 Document 171.
238. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/51

Washington, October 1

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence D

No. 4,2 paragraph 2, the following list of priority national inte

objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of inte

collection and production in response to requirements relating 

formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be 

national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effo

tinction is made, however, between three levels of priority wi

general priority category. Order of listing within these three gr

a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significan

respect to the relative priority of specific items within the grou

3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planni

directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period

be reviewed annually, or on the request of any member of the 

is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requi

hoc treatment, and that the criteria on which the following p

are established shall remain under continuing review. These 

were issued in IAC–D–50/7, 16 August 1955,3 and define categ

priority as follows:

a. First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which w

mit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or ac

foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to 

and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or 

within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US.

b. Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which w

mit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or ac

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC In

Directives. Secret. On December 7, the Department of State sent this directive to 

matic posts and Hong Kong and Singapore in Circular Airgram 4388, to aid 

partment in improving the organization and coordination of intelligence repor

the field. (Ibid., Central Files 1955–60, 101.21/12–755) 2 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 422. 3 Documentation on IAC–D–50/7, “Criteria for Determining Priority Na

telligence Objectives,” August 16, is in National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: 

776, Box 27.
foreign states which would have serious consequences for the 

(2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or action

them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.

c. Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which w

mit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or ac

foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the 

(2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or action

them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US.

4. DCID 4/4 is hereby rescinded.4

I. First Priority Objectives5

a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, an

particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet o

lite armed forces, and to disarmament and arms inspection.

b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy

tions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostiliti

Chinese Communist armed forces.

c. Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nu

tack on the United States or key US overseas installations and 

fense against air attack.

d. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandes

livery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against the U

US overseas installations.

II. Second Priority Objectives6

The USSR and European Satellites

a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and int

of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the s

cohesion, and probable development of the NATO Bloc.

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and cours

tion, including economic policies and actions, with particular r

to courses designed to weaken and disrupt the NATO alliance 

ment antagonism between Western and Asian powers.

c. Soviet political strengths and weaknesses: the actual 

political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or pol

4 DCID 4/4, “Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives,” w

14 December 1954. [Footnote in the original. For DCID 4/4, see Document 20

5 Note: Order of listing within Category I is a matter of convenience in 

tion and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific ite

that category. [Footnote in the original.] 6 Note: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in 

tion and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific ite

that category. [Footnote in the original.]
flicts within the ruling group; Soviet-Satellite relations, with pa

reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the st

and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police 

the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in 

viet and Satellite populations.

d. The strength and weaknesses of the Soviet (including S

economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a ma

the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic 

opment programs, their implementation, and their effect up

economic, political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc; th

bilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet and Satellite internal c

nications systems.

e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and 

nesses substantially affecting Soviet military, economic, and p

capabilities.

f. The general capabilities of the Soviet and Satellite armed 

[9 headings and 31 paragraphs (96 lines) not declassified]

Allen W. 

Director of Central Int

7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

239. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense1

Washington, u

COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON T

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOOVER COMMISSION T

FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERN

The following comments are addressed to the Recommen

of the Task Force which are applicable to the Department of D

1 Source: Defense Intelligence Agency Files. No classification marking. T

was enclosed in a November 10 letter from Secretary of Defense Wilson to 

Eisenhower, and both were under cover of a November 10 letter from Wilson 

land R. Hughes. Attached to the paper, but not printed, is Tab A, a draft of De

of Defense comments on all nine recommendations. Both of Wilson’s letters ind

the responses were to the unclassified Hoover Commission Report on Intellig

tivities. For extracts from this unclassified report, see Document 221.
Recommendations (a) and (b) of the Commission itself, and Rec

dations Nos. 1, 2, and 7 of the Task Force, are considered not to 

ciently applicable to the Department of Defense to justify comme

Recommendation No. 3

“That the chiefs of the various intelligence units of the 

services be elevated in the organizational structure to the 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army and the Air Force, and Depu

of Naval Operations in the Navy.”

Non-concur

Comment

The Department of Defense agrees that it is essential tha

gence be given adequate weight and representation in the sta

nization of the military services if it is to function with optim

ciency,—but it considers that this can be assured without the 

mended organizational changes at this time.

Implementation: None at this time.

Recommendation No. 4

“That the Department of Defense make extensive use of S

A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive appointm

the employment by the military services of civilian intelligen

lysts and other specialists in order to provide the necessary fl

in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel (to include ret

izens with wide previous business experience in the foreign fi

to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between zone of 

competitive service and the overseas excepted service.”

Concur

Comment

Each of the three Services has taken or is developing measur

ply Schedule A to elements of its civilian intelligence staff. In a

the Department of Defense is studying the matter with a view to 

an optimum balance between desirable flexibility in hiring and 

of skilled career personnel on the one hand and providing the full

ticable job security and incentive (as a vital morale factor) on th

Implementation: Take action in accordance with the results of suc

Recommendation No. 5

“That measures be instituted in all agencies for rechecking 

curity status of all personnel engaged in intelligence activities 

odic intervals not to exceed 5 years in any individual case.”
Concur in principle

Comment

It is considered that the current security practices and the 

dures for acting on adverse information essentially fulfill the ob

of these recommendations. Within the objectives, however, it i

able to leave to each individual service reasonable latitude 

method of implementation. For example, it may in some cases 

investigation not to alert the individual involved by suspendi

Measures are taken, of course, in such cases to insure that class

formation is adequately safeguarded. This general subject is b

viewed in order to insure that the underlying objectives of th

ommendations are adequately served.

Implementation: Additional precautions indicated by such revie

Recommendation No. 6

“That the responsibility for procurement of foreign publicati

for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State 

ment and placed in the hands of CIA, with authority to appoint s

entific attachés as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad

Concur in part

Comment

The collection of scientific intelligence is one of the most im

intelligence activities of the Government. It is of vital concern to 

partment of Defense. The CIA should have coordinating respon

but it would be unwise and inefficient to give it or any other 

a monopoly in this field, nor does any one agency now have 

monopoly. The Department of Defense considers it inappropriate 

Central Intelligence Agency to have overt attachés stationed abr

Implementation: None by Department of Defense.

Recommendation No. 8

“That steps be taken to introduce highly selective methods o

ing members of the coordinating committee on atomic energy 

gence, not only to get the benefit of service by the most compete

viduals, but also to assure long tenure in this important assignm

Concur

Comment

The salaries the Department of Defense can pay for top-fli

ent in this field compare unfavorably with those offered outs

Government, and this makes it difficult to insure long-term con
Implementation: The Department of Defense will use its best e

carry out this Recommendation.

Recommendation No. 9

“That a comprehensive, coordinated program be develope

pand linguistic training among American citizens serving the 

gence effort; and

“That the Department of Defense expand and promote la

training by offering credit toward reserve commissions to RO

dents and drill credit to Reserve personnel for completion of 

language courses.”

Concur in principle

Comment

The Department of Defense endorses the importance of a 

hensive program of foreign language and area specialist training 

sons serving the national intelligence effort and allied activities. I

elements have taken various measures during the past years to 

such a program. But in the case of ROTC and reserves, the Dep

of Defense is reluctant to provide for additional language trainin

training must be at the expense of training in primary military 

Specifically, the Task Force’s recommendation would make for wi

ticipation but would, not by itself, produce well-trained linguist

Implementation: The various existing programs are being studie

light of this recommendation with a view to achieving an o

balance between qualitative and quantitative standards.

240. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Se

of State Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence D

Washington, November 22, 1955, 3

The Sec. referred to Grayback.2 Radford has written Wilso

took it up with the Pres., requesting that he be authorized to p

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone 

tions, General. No classification marking. Drafted by Phyllis D. Bernau. Secret

placed the call. 2 Formerly known as Project Genetrix. See Document 229.

3 Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secret

fense, November 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5261/
The Sec. has reservations about it—this is a dangerous and c

some way of going about it. AWD said there are two feelings 

fense. AWD talked with Quarles the other day. AWD thinks it 

them so alerted it will spoil other things he thinks have more 

tial.4 The Sec. has to make a decision. AWD suggested they, R

Wilson and Quarles get together—AWD does not feel he 

enough about the potential to pass good judgment. The Sec. sa

want authority here before December 1. The Sec. may call W

see if it can wait until next week, or maybe Hoover can handle 

Sec. said the Pres. is dubious about it on general principles. T

said a lot of money was spent on it. The Sec. will find out how 

has to move.

AWD said Strauss will use “megaton” instead of “large” in 

lease for Thursday’s papers. The Sec. said o.k.

4 Dulles is alluding to the U–2 which would fly over Eastern Europe in J

241. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to 

Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence a

Research (Armstrong)1

Washington, November 2

Dear Park:

This is with reference to your letter of 5 October 19552 con

the statements made in the report of the Task Force on Intellige

tivities (Clark Committee)3 regarding the attitude of the Dep

of State toward intelligence collection activities.

As you point out, there is no substantiating data or argume

for the implied charges made against the Department of Stat

Top Secret Task Force Report, dated May 1955—at least not 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5200/11–

Secret. The letter is attached to a November 29 memorandum from Armstron

ing that Dulles’ letter was being forwarded to Hoover, Murphy, and MacArth

2 Document 236.

3 Documents 220 and 221.
portion of the report, which excludes pages 76–204,made ava

this Agency.

We have once again carefully reviewed Appendix II whi

with certain aspects of CIA’s work.5 The pertinent portions of 

port appear to be:

“The allocation of funds for all projects of psychological w

specific areas, more particularly for propaganda, has been con

influenced and too frequently interfered with by low-level State 

ment representatives since the beginning of the cold-war progra

intervention in the program by such representatives, whose inte

narrow and restricted to their assigned country areas, has at tim

past resulted not only in misdirected efforts on the part of the C

tine Services, but in serious financial losses to the Government als

out a fair measure of gainful return. These might have been avoi

the DCI been given long-range national policy guidance at high

Department level and had been permitted then to act on his ow

ment, or, better still, had NSC more clearly defined the preroga

the DCI in carrying out his cold-war mission. To the surveying 

is significant that NSC gave to the DCI the sole responsibility fo

ing out cold-war operations aimed at the Communist bloc. Now

NSC directives pertaining to this mission is it indicated that the D

sponsibility therefor may be delegated to, or shared with, any oth

ernment agency. . . . While there is no evidence revealed in this 

concerning any serious disagreement between CIA officials an

same representatives with respect to psychological warfare, it i

indicated that, as far as the Office of the Secretary of State is con

such policy advice has come on a piece-meal basis and too often n

specifically designated representatives of that agency.”

[1 paragraph (31

⁄2 lines) not declassified]

I consider that there is no real basis of fact for the above all

regarding the State Department’s attitude. As regards policy gu

the Department has been wholly cooperative and I do not consi

there has been any improper “intervention” or “interference” in 

rying out by CIA of cold war programs. [3 lines not declassified]

Sincerely,

Allen W

4 Pages 76–88 concerned the Department of State and pages 89–205 exa

intelligence role of the Department of Defense. (Memorandum from Dillon An

Goodpaster, February 14, 1956; Eisenhower Library, Hoover Commission Rep

telligence Activities, May 1955–October 1956) 5 Appendix II, which discussed the clandestine service of the Central In

Agency, is not printed.
242. Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to Presid

Eisenhower1

Washington, December 

SUBJECT

“Operation Grayback”2

I have been fully briefed by the Air Force on “Operation Gray

It is my view that while I would not today start the operation in 

possible newer techniques, nevertheless the operation is already m

at a cost of approximately $70,000,000, with personnel all over the 

The operation will probably produce intelligence data of considera

nificance. Also, reasonable cover has been devised in that simila

tions have, in fact, been conducted from a good many points in the 

States and elsewhere, designed to obtain meteorological data. Th

will probably not fool the Soviets, but it will create a situation su

they cannot take any very great offense publicly.4

On balance, I would be inclined to go ahead with it if Sir A

Eden is also prepared to do so. While some operations will be 

from Norway, Germany and Turkey, there is, I believe, prim

pendence upon the British Isles.

I would suggest your authorizing me to advise Eden of t

going attitude on our part and see what his reaction is.5

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5261/12–

Secret.2 Formerly known as Project Genetrix. See Document 229.

3 The Secretary of State received an Air Force briefing on Grayback on N

29. (Memorandum of conversation by Armstrong; National Archives, RG 59, I

Lot 58 D 766, Genetrix) 4 According to the memorandum of the November 29 briefing, the Air F

posed to say that the balloons were part of a worldwide meteorological resear

that the U.S. Government had been conducting for years. (Ibid.) 5 A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “I concur C.E. Wilson O.K

this note President Eisenhower wrote: “Original query to be of a non-pressure type

retary Dulles wrote a December 1 letter to British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins 

he noted that he had discussed “Grayback” with the President who had asked h

tify Prime Minister Eden, through Makins, that he, the President, was disposed 

operation proceed. He would, however, not take final action until he had Eden’s 

(Ibid., Central Files 1955–60, 711.5261/12–155) On December 3, Secretary Dulles 

Secretary of Defense Wilson that he had solicited Eden’s views and would let Wil

of Eden’s response. He added: “I showed the President my memorandum with 

currence with respect to ‘Grayback’. The President said that he was disposed to 

provided Eden concurred. However, the President asked me, in putting it up to 

make clear that the President was not trying to pressure him. I gathered that the 

has not much enthusiasm for the project.” (Ibid., INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetri
243. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence D

to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intellig

and Research (Armstrong)

Washington, December 

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 

12–355. Top Secret. 5 pages not declassified.]

244. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence D

to Secretary of Defense Wilson1

Washington, December 

SUBJECT

Research on Psychochemicals

1. For the past four years the Central Intelligence Agency h

actively engaged in research on a group of powerful chemical

ing the human mind called psychochemicals. We have develo

tensive professional contacts, experience and a considerable am

information on many psychochemicals including in particular 

rial known as LSD. This Agency is continuing its interest in th

and in the light of its accumulated experience offers its coop

and assistance to research and development programs which 

partment of Defense is considering at this time.

2. The Agency became interested in the potential impor

psychochemicals, primarily because of the enthusiasm and fore

Dr. L. Wilson Greene, Technical Director of the Chemical and 

logical Laboratories at the Army Chemical Center. Dr. Greene

were included in a report written by him in 1949 entitled “

chemical Warfare, a New Concept of War”.

3. Since 1951 this Agency has carried out a program of 

which has provided important information on the nature of 

normal behavior produced by LSD and the way this effect var

such factors as size of dose, differences in the individual and e

ment. The behavioral effects of repeated doses given over a lo

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731

Secret.
has been studied. We have established that individuals may de

tolerance to LSD. A search for possible antidotes is being made

been found that LSD produces remarkable mental effects whe

in exceedingly small doses. The foregoing became increasingl

esting when it was recently discovered that LSD could be synt

in quantity.

4. There are many characteristics of LSD and other psych

icals which either have not been studied or require further stu

are continuing to search for a satisfactory antidote for LSD as 

other defensive measures. More data should be accumulated if 

sired to predict the precise effect upon a given individual unde

circumstances. It would appear to be important that field trials b

to determine the effects on groups of people or on individuals e

in group activities.

5. This Agency’s scientists who have been responsible for 

search in psychochemicals have maintained close and effective 

with various research and development groups in the Departm

Defense who are aware of our interest and, in varying degrees

progress in psychochemicals. Some of these individuals are:

Dr. L. Wilson Greene, Technical Director, Chemical Corps, 

ical and Radiological Laboratories, Army Chemical Center

Dr. Bruce Dill, Scientific Director, Chemical Corps, Medica

ratory, Army Chemical Center

Dr. Amendeo Marrazzi, a scientist at the Medical Laborator

Chemical Center

Capt. Clifford P. Phoebus, Chief, Biological Sciences Divis

fice of Naval Research

Brig. Gen. Don D. Flickinger, ARDC, U.S.A.F.

Lt. Col. Alexander Batlin, Office of the Assistant Secretary 

fense (Research and Development)

6. In addition, this Agency has provided financial support 

tain projects in the field of psychochemicals being conducted 

Chemical Corps and by the Office of Naval Research. We hav

with considerable interest the current Department of Defense s

the potential importance of certain psychochemical materials 

ing LSD which is being carried out by the Ad Hoc Study Gr

Psychochemicals under the Technical Advisory Panel on CW a

of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research a

velopment. If our accumulated information, experience and 

sional contacts can be of any assistance, this Agency gladly o

co-operation in this program.

Allen W. 

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
245. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Com

IAC–M–222 Washington, December 13, 1955, 10

Director of Central Intelligence

Allen W. Dulles

Presiding2

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell

Presiding2

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department o

Major General Ridgely Gaither, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Departmen

Army

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department o

Navy

Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, 

States Air Force

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Jo

Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative to the 

Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigatio

1. Report of the IAC Ad Hoc Guided Missile Intelligence Survey

Committee (IAC–D–81/13, 25 November 1955)3

a. Colonel White, Chairman, Ad Hoc Guided Missile Inte

Survey Committee led off the discussion by summarizing bri

conclusions reached by the Committee.

b. Admiral Layton, supported by Admiral Espe and 

Gaither, took the position that under existing NSC directives, 

missiles intelligence, being intelligence on weapons, fell clearly 

the responsibility of the Department of Defense. In short, that 

missiles intelligence is departmental intelligence. He further ex

the view that the creation of an IAC subcommittee on guided 

was not the answer to what is basically a collection problem.

c. General Samford stated that, based on the experience o

Force as the primary collector of guided missiles intelligence

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 85–50036

Folder 6. Secret. The meeting was held in the IAC Conference Room, Adm

Building, Central Intelligence Agency. 2 Part of meeting. Lieutenant General Ralph Canine, Director, Nationa

Agency, attended part of the meeting. [Footnote in the original.] 3 Not found.
lieved that there was merit in the idea of a coordinated commu

proach. This approach had demonstrated its value in the field of 

energy intelligence.

d. Mr. Dulles expressed the view that guided missiles inte

was national intelligence of the highest priority, probably of even 

ultimate importance to our national security than atomic energy 

gence. A concerted attack on the problem by the community, un

guidance of an IAC guided missiles committee, is therefore e

if he and the community are to discharge their responsibilitie

existing NSC directives.

e. It was agreed that Mr. Dulles would draw up his views f

entation to the National Security Council under the procedure p

in NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3 a.4

4 Document 255.

246. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning

Coordinating Group (Rockefeller) to the Chairman of 

Operations Coordinating Board (Hoover)1

Washington, December 1

SUBJECT

Report of the Planning Coordination Group

I. Background

1. The Planning Coordination Group was established wit

framework of the OCB by letter of the President of March 10

The Group’s functions and composition are described in the 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG, P

Secret. Attached to Rockefeller’s memorandum was a December 14 letter from 

rector of the Bureau of the Budget expressing concurrence in the abolition of 

ning Coordination Group. When Hoover sent Rockefeller’s memorandum to 

Eisenhower under cover of a December 16 memorandum, he recommended tha

posal to abolish the PCG be approved. (Ibid.) 2 See footnotes 1 and 16, Document 210.
Directors memorandum to the President of March 3, which t

ident approved March 4, subject: “Coordination of Economic, 

logical, Political Warfare, and Foreign Information Activities.”

2. Paragraph 3 a of the Budget Director’s memorandum st

the Planning Coordination Group should report directly to th

man of OCB, who would from time to time transmit progress 

of the Group to the President through the National Security C

Accordingly, this report is submitted with the request that 

transmitted.4

II. Report

3. The Planning Coordination Group was established to ai

veloping planning in both overt and covert fields and to adv

assist the responsible operating agencies in the coordinated d

ment of plans and programs to carry out those national secur

cies appropriate to its functions. After seven months’ experien

clear to the four members of the Group that the Planning Co

tion Group mechanism will not be able to accomplish these ob

The Group therefore recommends that the President abolish th

ning Coordination Group effective December 31, 1955.

4. The Planning Coordination Group was also given spe

sponsibilities for being advised of and channeling support t

covert programs (NSC 5412/1)5 and for being the coordinating 

for the statements of policy in NSC 5505/1 and NSC 5502/1.6

a. Respecting covert operations, the Group recommends 

President approve that paragraph 7 a of NSC 5412/1 be ame

as to read substantially as follows:

“Except as the President otherwise directs, the designate

sentatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Def

ferred to in paragraph 4 a, above, and a designated represent

the President whenever one has been designated for this purpo

hereafter be advised in advance of major covert programs i

by CIA under this policy or as otherwise directed, and shal

normal channel for giving policy approval for such programs 

as for securing coordination of support therefor among the 

ments of State and Defense and the CIA.”

3 Document 210.

4 Document 248.

5 Document 212.

6 For NSC 5505/1, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 20–22

5502/1, see ibid., pp. 12–19.
and that paragraphs 4 a and 7 b of NSC 5412/1 be amended a

sary to take account of the termination of the PCG and to con

the substance of the language quoted above.7

b. Respecting the coordination of NSC 5505/1, the OCB 

warded to the Special Assistant for National Security Affa

Group’s recommendation that that policy statement (as well as 

lated policy statement in NSC 1748) should be reviewed by th

Planning Board in the light of and subsequent to the pending r

of NSC 5501.9 By December 31, 1955, the Group will have tran

to the NSC a progress report on NSC 5505/1. The Group reco

that the President designate the OCB as the coordinating age

the statements of policy in NSC 5505/1 and NSC 174 effect

cember 31, 1955.

c. Respecting the coordination of NSC 5502/1, the Group 

mends that the President designate OCB as the coordinating ag

fective December 31, 1955.

(With reference to the recommendations in this paragraph, the 

sary action should be taken to revise NSC Action 1349, March 10

to reflect the President’s actions.11)

Nelson A. Rock

7 In NSC Action No. 1497, “Abolition of the Planning Coordination Gro

cember 28, the National Security Council amended NSC 5412/1 to take accou

abolition of the PCG. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Fil

D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) For NSC 5412/2, s

ment 250. 8 For NSC 174, “U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Eur

cember 11, 1953, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 110–127. 9 Ibid., 1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 24–38.

10 In NSC Action No. 1349, “Coordination of Economic, Psychological a

cal Warfare and Foreign Information Activities,” the National Security Council 

amendments to NSC 5412 at its March 10 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, 

(Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security 

See footnote 16, Document 210. 11 On December 20, President Eisenhower approved the recommendation

ish the Planning Coordination Group and to designate the Operations Coo

Group as the coordinating agency for NSC 5505/1, NSC 5502/1, and NSC 174 

December 31. The National Security Council was notified of the President’s ac

December 27 memorandum from Executive Secretary of the National Security 

Lay. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 148, 

Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Political Warfare and Foreign Inf

Activities)
247. Memorandum From the Secretary of States Special A

for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Secretary 

State Dulles1

Washington, December 2

SUBJECT

Board of Consultants for the Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Allen Dulles informed me today that the White Ho

soon announce the appointment by the President of a Board 

sultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, with broad authority 

itself informed and to advise the President on matters falling 

that field.2 Subject to final acceptance in the case of some indi

the following are expected to make up the Board:

Gen. John E. Hull, USA (Ret.)

Adm. Richard E. Connolly, USN (Ret.)

Gen. James Doolittle, USAF (Ret.)

Mr. James Killian, President of MIT

Mr. David Bruce

Mr. Benjamin Fairless, U.S. Steel Corp.

Mr. Morris Hadley

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that all of the above, except M

less, have had extensive experience in the use of intelligence or 

mittees that have made detailed surveys in the intelligence fie

move, at least in part, is intended to blunt the drive manifesti

on the Hill to set up a joint committee in Congress to superv

eign intelligence activities.

W. Park Armst

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 101.21/12–225

Use Only. Copies were sent to Murphy, Henderson, MacArthur, and Bowie. A 

ten notation on the memorandum by Dulles’ secretary Phyllis D. Bernau reads, “

2 The President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activitie

tablished by President Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10656, February 6, 1956. I

ceeded by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), estab

Executive Order 10938, May 4, 1961, in the wake of the failed Bay of Pigs in

Cuba and increased attention to the role and activities of the intelligence com
1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, In

Matters. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 28.

248. Editorial Note

Under a December 27, 1955, covering memorandum to the N

Security Council, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted an undate

prepared by Nelson Rockefeller, “Coordination of Foreign Politic

itary, Economic, Informational, and Cover Operations,” which 

mended farreaching changes in military theater and command 

zation and in the Operations Coordinating Board. (Eisenhower 

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, William H. J

Records, President’s Papers) Rockefeller was scheduled to def

views before the NSC Planning Board on February 20, 1956. Do

tation on the Department of State’s opposition to Rockefeller’s 

mendations is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 6

Subsequently, Eisenhower’s Assistant, Sherman Adams, as

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, W

H. Jackson, to examine Rockefeller’s proposal. Jackson prepare

ical memorandum on April 2, 1956. (Eisenhower Library, Spe

sistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records, O

ganization) Finally, on March 26, 1957, following the issu

Executive Order 10700 of February 25, 1957 (22 Federal Registe

which amended E.O. 10483 of September 2, 1953, by placing 

erations Coordinating Board within the National Security 

structure, Eisenhower agreed that Rockefeller’s report could 

moved from the NSC’s agenda. At the same time, however, he r

the relevant recommendations for wartime responsibility for 

information and psychological operations to the Director of th

of Defense Mobilization to prepare plans. (National Archives, 

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, 1935–62, Box 115)

249. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhow

Washington, December 2

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles

Assistant Secretary Gardner (Air Force)

General Twining
General Cabell

Colonel Randall

Colonel Goodpaster

The President said that the background regarding project 

back”2 was very hazy in his mind. He did not know how it h

ten started, although he did recall that it had been mentioned 

Land in his office at the time of the Killian Report.3 He now 

stood that it represents about a $75 million investment, and t

ready for initiation very soon. General Twining said that Admi

ford had stated that he had presented the matter to the Presi

consideration, and he also said that Mr. Quarles had also sta

the matter had been presented to the President. He said that 

nothing in the records about this. Secretary Dulles recalled t

prior to the Geneva meeting he had raised with the President th

tion whether it should be held in abeyance.4

The President then said that regardless of how the mat

gressed, it is timely to consider what should be done now. He 

stood that a plane that is being developed is coming along ver

It also appeared that if the balloons were discovered, as they 

certain questions become important—such as what will public 

be in the UK and Japan, how many of them are likely to be sho

whether their release will spur the development of higher 

radar, etc. General Twining said it is practically impossible to pi

up by radar. It is also practically impossible to intercept them—

Force has made extensive attempts to do so and has never suc

Replying to a question by the President, Mr. Gardner sa

are approximately 2500 of these balloons. It is expected that 50

would pass through to the Western coast of the Pacific. One-hal

travel at about 40,000 feet and the other half could be sent much 

The project is manned with 4400 people in the United States a

overseas. The President asked whether the project should not 

sented as meteorological, with pictures taken to show ground 

etc. Secretary Dulles said a further question is whether to do 

Mr. Gardner said that by late April or May four alternativ

with trained crews, should be available and capable of oper

2 Previously known as Project Genetrix. See Documents 229, 240, and 24

3 Headed by James R. Killian, President of Massachusetts Institute of Te

the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee prepare

issued on February 14, requested by the President on U.S. technological capab

duce the threat of surprise attack. See Document 223. 4 See Document 229.

5 The U–2, a joint CIA–U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft.
approximately 80,000 feet.General Cabell viewed the present 

as a supplement, and thought if the balloons were kept below 

feet they would not stimulate a “crash” radar program. There w

cussion whether possible political reaction might tend to prev

of the alternative when it is ready—in that case it might be well 

sider delaying the whole project a year. The President said th

is a natural tendency toward reluctance for a bold program. If 

sults seem necessary, he would do it, but that is the quest

thought that an effort involving 2500 in a few months migh

alarm, where a dozen or so a week would not have a “crash” 

cance (Secretary Dulles asked what would be lost if the action w

layed for a year—Mr. Gardner said that the force will have to be 

disbanded and material would crack and disintegrate).

Mr. Gardner said that low altitude winds are satisfactory th

out the year except in July and August, and that if the lower a

were used—which seem desirable—the release could be phas

The President thought they should be released at a number o

throughout the world. Mr. Dulles felt an agreed news release 

extremely important, and the President said it must tell a goo

General Cabell suggested that other countries be approached 

them to return the equipment gondolas when they come dow

Dulles agreed that it made a great difference if they were rel

few at a time and in many places all over the world. The Pr

thought that the announcement should be on the basis that w

winds are right, we will get off a number from all stations. He t

that if this is presented as a meteorological operation, it woul

right; he did not feel it could be done just in January and Febru

it should not be a “crash” program. Mr. Dulles suggested the 

ing as points on which to agree: Launchings should be spre

time; medium altitudes should be used—50 to 55 thousand fee

should be released from Japan, Honolulu and Alaska; notice sh

given to other countries and to the world at large. The Preside

cated agreement and suggested that this notice bring out that we 

like to have the items returned; that if any country wanted to d

the prints, they should take care not to destroy the negatives; 

languages should be used on the request for return, includin

ian; that State Department should review the cover plan (Se

Dulles to get a little group together to look at this); that the lon

aspect of the thing should be emphasized, bringing out that ef

the past have been too intermittent and relating it to the “jet 

shift responsible for the recent floods in California. To a q

by Secretary Dulles as to how the photographing operation 

6 Gardner apparently is alluding to the U–2.
explained, it was indicated that operations are well advanced to 

the authorities of the International Geophysical Year7 of this ac

a means of mapping cloud formations (which is, in fact, all th

photographs will show.)8

Colonel, CE, U

7 The International Geophysical Year was scheduled to begin July 1, 1

worldwide scientific observations of earth and astronomical phenomena. It w

tinue for one and a half years. 8 President Eisenhower was given a technical briefing on December 27. O

day Secretary Dulles told Fisher Howe that those attending the briefing includ

tary Dulles, General Twining, Trevor Gardner, and an aide to Secretary of De

son. The Secretary indicated at the briefing that the British had given their go 

December 25, and the President approved the operation subject to “certain 

tions,” which included slowing down the rate of launching, extending the tim

of the operation, and resubmission of the program to Secretary Dulles to whom 

ident “delegated authority for the final decision and triggering of the operatio

orandum by Fisher Howe, December 28; National Archives, RG 59, INR Files

67, Genetrix) Another account of this December 27 briefing is in a telegram from 

to General LeMay, December 28. (Ibid.)

250. National Security Council Directive1

NSC 5412/2 Washington, u

COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the 

covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the 

ments, parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter coll

referred to as “International Communism”) to discredit and de

aims and activities of the United States and other powers of 

world, determined, as set forth in NSC directives 10/22 and 10/

in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, th

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to President for Nationa

Affairs Records, President’s Papers. Top Secret. This directive was transmit

NSC under cover of a December 28 note from NSC Executive Secretary Lay. L

that the President had approved the directive on the same date. 2 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 292. 3 Document 90.
foreign activities of the U.S. Government should be suppleme

covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency had already been cha

the National Security Council with conducting espionage and c

espionage operations abroad. It therefore seemed desirable, for 

tional reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operatio

subject to directives from the NSC, to place the responsibility f

on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with esp

and counter-espionage operations under the over-all control of 

rector of Central Intelligence.

3. The NSC has determined that such covert operations 

the greatest extent practicable, in the light of U.S. and Soviet c

ties and taking into account the risk of war, be designed to:

a. Create and exploit troublesome problems for Intern

Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Com

China and between them and their satellites, complicate contro

the USSR, Communist China and their satellites, and retard the 

of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc. b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International C

nism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other element

c. Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly 

rectly responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant p

a free world country. d. Reduce International Communist control over any area

world.

e. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of t

ples and nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever possi

identity of interest between such peoples and nations and the 

States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups ge

advocating or believing in the advancement of such mutual in

and increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nation

sist International Communism.

f. In accordance with established policies and to the exten

ticable in areas dominated or threatened by International Comm

develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerr

erations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of 

cluding wherever practicable provision of a base upon which 

itary may expand these forces in time of war within active the

operations as well as provision for stay-behind assets and esca

evasion facilities.

4. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the Nationa

rity Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs 

Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

a. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Se

of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operati

planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United Sta

eign and military policies and with overt activities, and consulti

and obtaining advice from the Operations Coordinating Boa

other departments or agencies as appropriate.
b. Informing, through appropriate channels and on a n

know basis, agencies of the U.S. Government, both at home and 

(including diplomatic and military representatives), of such op

as will affect them.

5. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, the follow

visions shall apply to wartime covert operations:

a. Plans for covert operations to be conducted in active 

of war and any other areas in which U.S. forces are engaged 

bat operations will be drawn up with the assistance of the Dep

of Defense and will be in consonance with and complementar

proved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Covert operations in active theaters of war and any oth

in which U.S. forces are engaged in combat operations will 

ducted under such command and control relationships as ha

or may in the future be approved by the Department of Defen

6. As used in this directive, “covert operations” shall be 

stood to be all activities conducted pursuant to this directive w

so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsib

them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncov

U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility fo

Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities 

to: propaganda; political action; economic warfare; preventive d

tion, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition; escape and 

and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or 

including assistance to underground resistance movements, g

and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and anti-

nist elements in threatened countries of the free world; deceptio

and operations; and all activities compatible with this directiv

sary to accomplish the foregoing. Such operations shall not 

armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and 

espionage, nor cover and deception for military operations.

7. Except as the President otherwise directs, designated re

atives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defens

rank of Assistant Secretary or above, and a representative of th

dent designated for this purpose, shall hereafter be advised in 

of major covert programs initiated by CIA under this policy or 

erwise directed, and shall be the normal channel for giving po

proval for such programs as well as for securing coordination 

port therefor among the Departments of State and Defense and 

8. This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 10/2, NS

NSC 5412,4 NSC 5412/1,5 and subparagraphs “a” and “b” un

4 Document 171.

5 Document 212.
heading Additional Functions of the Operations Coordinating 

on page 1 of the President’s memorandum for the Executive Se

National Security Council, supplementing Executive Order 10

6 Document 157.

251. Paper Prepared by J. Patrick Coyne of the National Se

Council Staff1

Washington, u

Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Governme

Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Execu

Branch of the Government

By the Task Force on Intelligence Activities

CHAPTER I—Brief History of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Acti

(Pages 1–12)

This Chapter contains no recommendations.

CHAPTER II—The Central Intelligence Agency (Pages 13–

Recommendation 1 (page 72): That “covert intelligence” an

war” functions of the current DD/P be assigned to separate 

Directors whose areas of responsibility shall be administrativ

logistically self-supporting. (A minority of the Task Force memb

not concur in this recommendation, believing that “covert intell

and “cold war” operations should be under the staff and operati

trol of a single operating Deputy Director—as at present.)

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Subj

Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activ

1955–October 1956. Top Secret. President Eisenhower had referred the classified C

Force Report (Document 221), along with departmental and agency comments o

able sections of it, to Dillon Anderson, the President’s Special Assistant, on Dec

for further action and recommendations as appropriate. This report is Coyne’s 

tion of the departmental and agency responses, including his added “Addition

Required” and “Observations,” which he completed in early 1956. (Memorand

Anderson to Goodpaster, February 14, 1956; Eisenhower Library, Hoover Comm

port on Intelligence Activities, May 1955–October 1956, and memorandum from 

NSC Executive Secretary Lay, January 20, 1956; ibid.) Some documentation o

mental and agency responses to the Clark Task Force Report are ibid. and in the 

Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.52 and 711.5200. All ellipses in the o
Agency Comment: CIA opposes the recommendation 

grounds that: (1) “the experience of CIA during the period of s

operation prior to 1952 proved the operational disadvantage

tempting to conduct, on a secure and efficient basis, two wor

clandestine organizations, each compartmented from the oth

(2) organizations of separate supporting elements for each of t

destine services would be duplicative, costly and ineffective.

Additional Action Required: Presidential decision as to whe

Task Force (majority) recommendation or the contrary views 

should be adopted.

Observation: CIA’s view should be adopted since the major

posal of the Task Force has been tried previously and found le

factory than present organizational arrangements which com

covert and cold war functions of CIA. (The CIA view is consist

that of the Doolittle Committee2 whose survey of CIA’s clan

services was much more extensive than that made by the Task 

Recommendation 2 (page 73): That CIA be reorganized wi

rector, a Deputy Director, an Executive Director, a general Sec

necessary staff sections and offices of the administrative and 

services and an operating Deputy Director of Intelligence wit

operating offices thereunder, including an Office of Basic Inte

Agency Comment: CIA concurs in the creation of, and ha

lished, an Office of Basic Intelligence. CIA notes that the balanc

recommendation consists of suggesting that the names of fou

offices under the Deputy Director of Intelligence be changed. C

change the name of one of these offices shortly, but believes th

will be accomplished in effecting the other name changes sug

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 3 (page 73): That CIA re-establish the Offic

ecutive Director to relieve the DCI of the necessity of having to 

a large part of his time to the solution of many daily admin

and minor operational problems.

Agency Comment: CIA is opposed on the grounds that th

position of another command echelon would not necessarily 

plish the intended objective. CIA is giving this recommendat

ther study, however.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or th

Observation: This recommendation does not involve any m

icy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recom

should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

2 Document 192.
Recommendation 4 (page 73): That the status of the three m

erating Deputy Directors be changed from Civil Service app

(now Grade GS-18) to Public Law Presidential appointees, at an 

salary of $16,000.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs in the recommended pay in

but thinks it unwise that the Operating Deputy Directors 

Senatorial approval, particularly where an individual’s back

and competence in clandestine operations would have to 

viewed. CIA has received no indication of any Senatorial d

review CIA appointments, other than the appointments of the D

his Deputy.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or NS

is taking action through appropriate channels in an effort to ob

pay increases recommended.

Recommendation 5 (page 73): That the “cold war” operating 

director be designated as CIA’s representative on the Operati

ordinating Board to free the DCI to devote a greater share of h

to the Agency’s intelligence functions.

Agency Comment: CIA is opposed. It notes that the DCI is r

to personally attend OCB meetings by virtue of a Presidentia

tive, and that his participation in OCB meetings is not undu

densome. CIA notes further that the Deputy Director/Plans is 

associated with OCB activity in that CIA members of OCB w

groups are drawn from CIA’s clandestine services.

Additional Action Required: Presidential decision as to whe

Task Force recommendation should be adopted.

Observation: Because the benefits derived from DCI’s partic

in OCB meetings outweighs the burdens occasioned by such 

pation, the Task Force recommendation should be rejected. If 

servation is concurred in advice should be communicated to C

the President’s reaffirmation of the directive which provides fo

membership on the OCB.

Recommendation 6 (page 73): That a comprehensive intern

agement survey of the Agency be conducted by CIA within a y

lowing the reorganization of CIA, as recommended by the Task 

Agency Comment: CIA presently has in progress three con

programs of an internal management nature.

Additional Action Required: None, at this time.

Recommendation 7 (page 74): That all NSC, IAC, and DCI 

gence Directives be reviewed by the IAC and others concerne

a view to establishing clearer areas of responsibility and to all

intelligence tasks in accord with each agency’s capability, inter

paramount national responsibilities.
Agency Comment: The DCI will recommend the establish

an IAC Subcommittee to review all such Intelligence Directives

essary, to clarify areas of responsibility or reallocate tasks.

Additional Action Required: Action at appropriate levels (IA

NSC) to be taken on the basis of the review of Intelligence D

being initiated by CIA.

Recommendation 8 (page 74): That responsibility for procu

of foreign publications and collection of scientific intelligence be 

from State to CIA, and that CIA be authorized to appoint scien

tachés to U.S. diplomatic missions as necessary.

Agency Comment: CIA agrees that facilities for procuremen

eign publications and collection of scientific intelligence sh

strengthened. The substance of this recommendation is unde

study by State and CIA and it is hoped that an agreement ther

be reached at an early date.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or th

Recommendation 9 (page 74): That the Scientific Estimate

mittee be abolished and in lieu thereof there be established un

IAC a Scientific Intelligence Committee with appropriate subc

tees to insure community-wide coordination.

Agency Comment: CIA is in general agreement with this 

mendation. The substance thereof is under active consideratio

IAC.

Additional Action Required: None, other than the normal 

which will flow from IAC consideration of the recommendati

Recommendation 10 (page 74): That the effectiveness of CIA

rity program be re-evaluated to establish a system assuring pe

security rechecks on a minimum five year basis.

Agency Comment: CIA reports that the recommended prog

been in effect as of March 26, 1955 and, in addition, that there 

tinuing review made of the security of its employees, includin

matic rechecks in the case of personnel actions, such as transfe

motions, appointments to special activities, etc.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 11 (page 74): That Congress be requeste

propriate funds to construct adequate CIA housing facilities in 

Washington.

Agency Comment: CIA reports this has been done.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 12 (page 74): That the CIA Act of 1949 be a

to authorize employment of “any” (instead of 15 now authori

tired officers or warrant officers of the Armed Services; and to 

rize overseas personnel additional dependent medical bene
employee leave accumulations equivalent to those authorized 

eign Service personnel.

Agency Comment: CIA would welcome an increase in the n

of retired officers of the Armed Services authorized to be emplo

the Agency. It believes that the authorized number should be b

twenty-five and fifty. CIA concurs in granting additional Foreig

ice benefits for dependents as well as leave benefits and leav

mulations for CIA employees.

(Current inquiry of CIA reflects the Agency has prepared d

islation—now being processed by the Budget Bureau—designe

thorize employment of as many as forty retired officers of the 

Services, as well as draft legislation designed to carry into ef

Task Force recommendations concerning CIA personnel, their le

cumulations, and additional medical benefits for dependents 

employees stationed abroad.)

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 13 (page 75): That legislation be sought to i

the annual salary of the DCI to $20,000; to increase the compe

of the Deputy DCI to $17,500; and to authorize the appointme

Executive Director of CIA at an annual salary of $16,000.

Agency Comment: The recommended increases in the salarie

DCI and the Deputy DCI have been included in proposed amen

to the Executive Pay Bill of 1949.3 CIA, as indicated in Recom

tion 3 above, opposes establishing the office of Executive Direc

is giving further study to the Task Force recommendation on thi

Additional Action Required: None.

CHAPTER III—The Department of State (Pages 76–88)

Recommendation 1 (page 87): That the personnel strength of 

telligence Area be maintained at a level consistent with functi

sponsibilities and work load.

Agency Comment: State concurs. An increase of ten persons 

present fiscal year has been authorized for the Intelligence Are

is budgeting a substantial increase for its intelligence function 

year 1957.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 2 (page 88): That NSCID No. 104 be rev

place responsibility for collection of information in the basic s

in CIA.

3 See footnote 10, Document 221.

4 Dated January 19, 1949; text is in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergen

Intelligence Establishment, Document 429.
Agency Comment: State reports that while it is not possible 

ment favorably or unfavorably on this recommendation at th

meetings on the subject are being held with CIA and every ef

be made to develop a satisfactory solution.

Additional Action Required: Action is dependent upon the o

of the State–CIA meetings mentioned above and on the IAC re

all Intelligence Directives (to which reference is made in Ch

Recommendation 7).

Recommendation 3 (page 88): That State finalize its plans for 

riodic review of all personnel coming within the provisions o

tive Order 10450.5

Agency Comment: State has given substantial thought to th

and agrees that a program for periodic review should be carefu

sidered. Through its normal channels State will pursue the mat

interested agencies, such as Justice and the Civil Service Comm

Additional Action Required: None, beyond that indicated in 

comment.

Recommendation 4 (page 88): That intelligence personnel 

ing positions which have been designated as Foreign Service 

ments be included in State’s program for accelerated language a

training.

Agency Comment: State reports that such personnel are elig

participation in these programs and that the Intelligence Area 

resented in the planning and selection process for such trainin

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 5 (page 88): That in implementing the 

Service Integration Program due regard should be given the 

qualifications of intelligence personnel transferred to foreign po

to the extent practicable special qualifications developed sh

safeguarded upon reassignment.

Agency Comment: State concurs and is developing proced

accomplish the intent of this recommendation.

Additional Action Required: None.

CHAPTER IV—The Department of Defense (Pages 89–20

A. Office of Special Operations (Pages 89–94)

Recommendation 1 (page 94): That DOD Directive 5105.76 b

ined with a view to clarifying and eliminating any ambiguitie

would lead to a misinterpretation of the functions and misapp

5 Security Requirements for Government Employment, April 27, 1953. (18 

6 Not found.
of the authority of OSO; and that the relationships of OSO with 

telligence organization of the JCS and the military departm

spelled out more specifically to reduce possibilities of friction a

understanding.

Agency Comment: DOD does not consider that the Directiv

biguous. However, DOD will give continuing attention to the 

tions of OSO under the Directive.

Additional Action Required: None, beyond that referred to in 

comment.

B. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Pages 94–99)

This Section contains no recommendations.

C. Department of the Army (Pages 99–137)

Recommendation 1 (page 137): That the Army Attaché Sys

manned to permit full exploitation of its collection potential a

present personnel ceilings imposed by DOD be lifted in order to 

greater flexibility and permit more extensive prior training of a

personnel.

Agency Comment: DOD agrees with the concept calling fo

mum exploitation of the intelligence potential of the Attaché 

It does not agree that present personnel ceilings are seriously 

tive. DOD reports that its ceilings on Attaché strength (in the thr

ices) are flexible; that DOD now has underway a program for 

idating and simplifying the Attaché functions of the services; a

it is studying ways of improving selection and training of Atta

Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to lifti

sonnel ceilings in the Attaché System.

Recommendation 2 (page 137): That the (Army) Assistant C

Staff, Intelligence, be elevated to the level of Deputy Chief of S

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It notes that the t

of the Army was recently reorganized following a balanced co

ation of all its aspects and it concludes that it would be prem

reorganize now as recommended, particularly since legislation 

be necessary to achieve the Task Force’s recommendation.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or th

Observation: This recommendation does not involve any ma

icy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recomm

should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 3 (page 137): That the National Security 

revise NSCID No. 57 to provide for clandestine intelligence act

7 Document 256.
the part of the Military Services consistent with their capabili

statutory responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1

Agency Comment: DOD notes that this recommendation 

the strong and unanimous views of the Services” and that “it i

a fundamental issue within the intelligence community.” Bec

the importance of this particular recommendation the remaind

Defense comment thereon is quoted in full:

“NSCID No. 5 has been interpreted as assigning to CIA 

clusive right to control and conduct covert foreign intelligenc

tions. Such activities as the services have been allowed to cond

ing the past 7 or 8 years in this important field even in war 

have been essentially on the sufferance of CIA. Meanwhile, h

CIA’s record of performance in covert intelligence operations 

interest to the mission of the Armed Services has been disapp

particularly against primary Soviet orbit intelligence targets. T

ices, which consider that they have generally a longer record 

rience in this work, are convinced that they can produce throug

operations more effectively than CIA various needed categori

telligence related to their particular missions and requiremen

point out moreover that CIA’s covert operations are conduc

large extent under military cover.

The Agreed Activities paper (DCID No. 5/8)8 represent

tious compromise, which is not altogether satisfactory to the s

It provides for a measure of participation by them in covert op

on a best-qualified basis. The services believe their right to pa

should be explicit in a NSCID and not dependent on a su

agreement.

It is too early to judge whether this agreement will prov

able. First steps have been taken by CIA to function under th

ment, and the services are proceeding to strengthen their cov

lection resources. Each side tends to be wary of the other; an

generosity and good will than has been shown in the past will 

essary if the present tentative arrangement is to work.

Monitorship over this problem has been assigned to the A

to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) who has been 

to keep the developments under continuing review. If events 

favorably under the Agreed Activities paper, revision of NSCI

may prove to be unnecessary.”

Additional Action Required: Further action may be taken by I

NSC now or it may be delayed, depending upon: (1) develo

8 A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B0038
under the Agreed Activities Paper, as revised, or (2) the outc

the proposed review of all NSC, DCI and IAC Intelligence Dir

as set forth in Chapter II, Recommendation 7 of the Task Force 

Observation: It is to be noted that: (1) the Task Force Rep

the comments thereon present only the military side of this 

versy; and (2) CIA, despite its primary responsibility in the field

cognizant of—and, therefore, has had no opportunity to comm

this and other military-related segments of the Task Force Repor

are germane to the primary mission of CIA. The controver

NSCID No. 5 has raged too long (several years); IAC and, if ne

NSC should act upon it at an early date.

Recommendation 4 (page 137): That the implementation of 

No. 139 be extended to permit participation in the Soviet and S

defector inducement program by the Military Services and CI

rect proportion to the capabilities of each.

Agency Comment: DOD reports that the three Services strong

port this and related recommendations, believing that at the w

level CIA has often tended unnecessarily to restrict their partic

in this area of intelligence operations which is of vital import

them. The Military Services believe they have substantial pres

potential capabilities in the inducement of defection of which 

should be made. DOD will undertake to negotiate with the Dir

Central Intelligence to bring about optimum participation by th

ices and fullest realization of their potential in the defector pro

Additional Action Required: NSCID No. 13 should be exped

reviewed by IAC and modified by NSC, if modification is dete

to be necessary.

Observation: This recommendation of the Task Force appea

somewhat at variance with its Recommendation 6, Appen

wherein it proposes “that the inducement phase of the Defec

gram, as applicable to active participation by diplomatic and 

representatives serving overtly abroad, be discontinued.”

Recommendation 5 (page 137): That consideration be given 

extensive use of “Schedule A”10 in the employment of civilian a

and other intelligence specialists in the Department of the Arm

der to achieve necessary flexibility.

9 Document 252.

10 The U.S. Civil Service Commission defined “Schedule A” positions as t

that were other than confidential or policy determining in character, and for 

was impractical to require examinations. “Schedule A” positions also were excep

the regular competitive U.S. Civil Service. (5 CFR, 1956 SUPP., 6.100)
Agency Comment: DOD concurs in general and has initiated 

ough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its 

the problem.

Recommendation 6 (page 137): That the Army aggressivel

the linguist problem by developing and using outside sources f

ing in colleges and universities through the method of (for e

its comprehensive ROTC and Reserve programs.

Agency Comment: DOD reports that considerable use is no

made of civilian facilities for the purpose indicated, but that th

lem involves quality rather than quantity and is most acute in 

of rare languages. The recommendation concerning ROTC la

training requires further study.

Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its 

study.

Recommendation 7 (page 137): That measures be instituted 

periodic security rechecking of personnel assigned in sensitive 

intervals not to exceed 5 years.

Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security p

essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The 

subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the u

ing objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required: Apart from the review referre

DOD, no additional action is required.

D. Department of the Navy (Pages 138–156)

Recommendation 1 (page 156): That the Navy put its coun

ligence program on a wider base so as to bring its worldwide 

tion up to an adequate level.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs but believes that the actual 

of expansion should be further investigated.

Additional Action Required: Further investigation as sugge

DOD, followed by action consistent with its investigative findi

with the objective of establishing an adequate counterintellige

gram in the Navy.

Recommendation 2 (page 156): That the Navy provide for 

review of the security status of intelligence personnel who com

the provisions of Executive Order 10450.

Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security p

essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The 

subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the u

ing objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required: None.
Recommendation 3 (page 156): That the Navy expand its inte

collection effort.

Agency Comment: See DOD’s comment on Recommendati

the Task Force Report on the Department of the Army, (page 7, 

Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to lifti

sonnel ceilings in the Attaché System.

Recommendation 4 (page 156): That the Navy continue and 

its efforts to improve intelligence consciousness at all ranks an

of the Department.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. Instruction on the missi

role of intelligence is included in the regional training schools

gence centers, and in the curricula of line schools at all levels.

Additional Action Required: None.

E. Department of the Air Force (Pages 156–179)

Recommendation 1 (page 178): That the position of Directo

telligence, Air Force, be raised to that of a Deputy Chief of Sta

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It notes that the Tas

made a similar recommendation (which DOD opposes) with re

the Director of Intelligence, Army, but that it made no recom

tion respecting the position of the Director of Naval Intelligen

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or th

Observation: This recommendation does not involve any ma

icy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recomm

should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 2 (page 178): That a limited number of civil

sonnel spaces for Air Force Intelligence be exempt from certa

Service requirements.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs in general and has initiated 

ough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its s

the problem.

Recommendation 3 (page 178): That a board or commission 

tablished to make an equitable and coordinated allocation am

member agencies of personnel spaces exempt from certain Civ

ice requirements.

Agency Comment: DOD has initiated a thorough study of the p

Additional Action Required: None, pending the completion of 

study.

Recommendation 4 (page 178): That the Air Attaché System b

tained at a level which will insure an adequate collection ca

and that Air Attaché qualifications be commensurate with the 

tion potential of the station.
Agency Comment: See DODs comment on Recommendat

the Task Force’s Report on the Department of the Army (page 7, 

Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to the 

System, its adequacy, personnel strength, training, qualificatio

Recommendation 5 (page 179): That an Intelligence Resear

ter be established under CIA to guide the total intelligence 

program.

Agency Comment: DOD notes that each service intelligence 

and CIA conduct research programs and it agrees that a com

search service would be desirable. However, it believes that th

to establish such a center “should be under the DCI acting for 

and not under the CIA.”

Additional Action Required: Joint consideration of this reco

dation by the IAC agencies.

Observation: It would appear desirable that CIA be apprised 

be afforded an opportunity to comment on, this recommendati

is particularly so if the “additional action” indicated above is n

(if such action is taken, CIA will automatically have such an o

nity by virtue of its identification with the IAC).

Recommendation 6 (page 179): That a board be establishe

pervise declassification of security information.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It believes such 

dure would be cumbersome, and is of the view that its prese

tices in this area are adequate.

Additional Action Required: None, because ultimate respo

for such matters is lodged in the head of the Department con

Recommendation 7 (page 179): That a periodic examination b

of Air Force intelligence publications to assure justification for 

publication and distribution thereof.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs; the recommended action 

being implemented.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 8 (page 179): That mechanical and electr

vices to analyze, classify, file, and produce intelligence inform

put into use at the earliest possible moment.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. It believes that automatio

telligence production has undoubted value and it notes that c

able investigation has been conducted along the lines indicate

recommendation.

Additional Action Required: Implementation of the recomme

by DOD.

Recommendation 9 (page 179): That all possible resources 

to exploit technological means for intelligence collection.
Agency Comment: DOD concurs, advising that the recom

tion is currently receiving attention.

Additional Action Required: None (assuming the attention 

afforded this matter by DOD results in the implementation 

recommendation).

Recommendation 10 (page 179): That the use of “overflights

cure vital information receive constant consideration.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that the constant 

of other U.S. Government agencies is required if full results a

achieved. (DOD observes that upon resolution of some of the 

involved in this recommendation, it may be advisable to seek N

tion thereon.)

Additional Action Required: Presidential and/or NSC consid

following receipt of DOD’s recommendation on the subject.

Recommendation 11 (page 179): That the Air Force develop ad

procedures for the periodic security review of personnel occupy

sitive positions.

Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security p

essentially fulfill the objective of this recommendation. The 

subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the u

ing objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required: Apart from the review referre

DOD, no additional action is required.

F. Covert Operations—Department of Defense (Pages 179–205)

Recommendation 1 (page 204): That under the terms of the “

Activities” paper, the services expand their clandestine collec

forts with primary emphasis focused on targets in the Soviet 

and Communist China. Personnel and funds to accomplish thi

tive should be made available to the military intelligence serv

Agency Comment: DOD concurs and suggests that the satell

cluding areas of Southeast Asia, should be added to the prim

get area.

Additional Action Required: This recommendation should 

viewed and acted upon by the IAC and, if necessary, the NS

Chapter II, Recommendation 7, which calls for IAC review of a

DCI, and IAC Intelligence Directives and Chapter IV, C, Reco

dation 3, which calls for revision of NSCID No. 5 in particular

Observation: It is noted that CIA has not been advised of, n

erwise afforded an opportunity to comment on, this recommen

which involves one of the primary missions of that Agency. (T

uation will be remedied if the additional action mentioned a

carried into effect.)
Recommendation 2 (page 204): That the intelligence commu

tablish adequate and positive measures for the identification 

ing of all clandestine operators as provided in IAC Directive 

approved July 24, 1952.11 Mutual trust regarding the divulgen

telligence sources should be cultivated within the community

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that an effort h

made under the IAC Directive to create a national source contro

anism. DOD thinks it probable that the recommendation can 

plemented effectively on some clearly mutual basis, such as 

the chairmanship of the source control mechanism.

Additional Action Required: None for the reasons set forth in 

lowing paragraph.

Observation: The Task Force seems in its recommendation 

missed the point of IAC–D–54. This directive is designed to 

for the entire intelligence community “papermills” and “fabr

who have been exposed as such. It does not provide that each 

gence agency disclose to the others the identities of their “clan

operators”—such a practice would be foolhardy. Current inq

flects that in the main the intelligence agencies are exchangin

mation concerning fabricators, frauds, etc., as provided in IAC

Recommendation 3 (page 204): That the defector program, 

ing inducement policies, early access to the defector and pro

termination of the use to which he is to be put, be improved, w

objective of making defection more attractive and of deriving 

benefit for the entire intelligence community.

Agency Comment: DOD’s comments on this general sub

set forth under Recommendation 4, Chapter IV (page 9, abov

was not furnished with the section of the report which conta

recommendation.

Additional Action Required: IAC review of NSCID No. 13.

Recommendation 4 (page 205): That the military services 

mitted greater latitude in offering inducements to potential de

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. The gist of DOD’s comm

this and related aspects of the defector program are summari

der Chapter IV, Recommendation 4 (page 9, above).

Additional Action Required: As set forth under Chapter IV, 

mendation 4.

Observation: This recommendation of the Task Force is, in 

least, contrary to its Recommendation 6, Part II, wherein it is p

11 IAC–D–54, approved July 24, 1952. (Central Intelligence Agency, Co

Management Staff, Job 82–00400R, Box 2, Folder 9)
that the inducement phase of the Defector Program, as applic

active participation by diplomatic and military representatives 

overtly abroad, be discontinued.

Recommendation 5 (page 205): That the National Security Cou

view present assets and direct the necessary action to assure a

preparation for evasion and escape and support of guerrilla wa

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. To facilitate the review 

mended DOD suggests that CIA and DOD report the pertinent 

the NSC with recommendation for necessary action. To that en

will initiate a proposal looking to the preparation of an appr

report.

Additional Action Required: None, pending preparation of 

erenced report.

Recommendation 6 (page 205): [14 lines not declassified]

Recommendation 7 (page 205): That when military cover 

steps be taken to insure that the person so covered lives in cons

with the cover position and duties.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that an interim effo

ing made to insure that all persons wearing the uniform are q

to play the role convincingly.

Additional Action Required: None, other than continuing effo

the lines mentioned above.

CHAPTER V—Atomic Energy Intelligence (Pages 206–22

Recommendation 1 (page 220): That CIA pay special attentio

production of atomic energy intelligence.

Agency Comment: CIA reports that that agency and the en

telligence community long ago agreed that the highest priority 

corded this subject. Continuous attention at the highest level is d

to seeing that this program is energetically implemented.

DOD concurs, noting that in CIA’s appointed role as coor

for the production of national intelligence it should pay spe

tention to the coordination of the production of atomic energy 

gence. DOD believes that the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligenc

mittee is an adequate instrument for this purpose and is now 

so used.

Additional Action Required: None, since CIA reports that th

est priority and continuous attention is already being accord

subject by the entire intelligence community.

Recommendation 2 (page 220): That the responsibility of AEC 

telligence be defined in an NSC Intelligence Directive and that 

Intelligence Directive set forth the responsibility, authority, fu

and composition of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Comm
Agency Comment: AEC agrees. It is of the belief that this t

recommendation may be accomplished by one NSC Intellige

rective; that such a Directive should also establish the respon

of the other IAC agencies for atomic energy intelligence “in or

ambiguities of present directives . . . be clarified.”

CIA advises that AEC’s intelligence responsibilities are n

der discussion between CIA and AEC, and that at the appropri

an intelligence directive thereon will be proposed to the NSC.

DOD concurs in this two-fold recommendation. It fa

NSCID for the purpose of defining AEC’s intelligence respon

but it believes that since the JAEIC is a subcommittee of the 

DCID (rather than an NSCID) will suffice to carry out the lat

of the recommendation.

Additional Action Required: None, pending completion of IA

cessing of the directives envisaged by this recommendation.

Recommendation 3 (page 220): That the AEC define the r

bility and functions of its Division of Intelligence.

Agency Comment: AEC reports that its Division of Intellige

received the informal concurrence of the other intelligence age

to its national intelligence responsibilities. Following Commiss

sideration thereof, the intelligence agencies will be formally no

same.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 4 (page 220): That each of the member age

the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee insure that it 

sented on that Committee by the best qualified individual a

concerning the matter under discussion, and that changes i

sentation be made as infrequently as practicable.

Agency Comment: AEC concurs. AEC reports that every ef

been and will continue to be made to comply with this recomme

CIA reports that it has pressed for the assignment of the be

ified personnel to the Committee, and it notes that the recor

Committee in the matter of continuity and length of tenure i

favorable one.

DOD concurs in this recommendation noting that it will c

to make every effort to insure the fulfillment thereof.

State reports that it has been following the practice recom

by the Task Force.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 5 (page 220): That there be a thorough re

the processes for development of the atomic energy portions 

tional Intelligence Estimates to insure, in the first place, that eve

practicable is done to develop intelligence regarding intention
programs, policies, doctrines and capabilities of the Soviet Uni

regard to war-time use of atomic energy and, secondly, that 

tional Intelligence Estimates reflect the full extent of available 

gence in those matters.

Agency Comment: AEC strongly endorses this recommen

noting that the accuracy and completeness of estimates on 

atomic energy capabilities are of deep concern to it.

CIA reports that its Board of Estimates is already carrying 

recommendation; that the Board is not only going into Soviet w

use of atomic energy, but is working on peace-time applications 

and that it goes without saying that every effort is being made 

the National Intelligence Estimates reflect the full extent of a

knowledge on the subject.

DOD concurs in this recommendation.

State concurs. In order that the National Intelligence Estima

reflect the full extent of available intelligence in this field, St

ommends specific courses of action which appear appropriate 

consideration.

Additional Action Required: Consideration by the IAC.

CHAPTER VI—The Federal Bureau of Investigation (Pages 22

This Chapter contains no recommendations.

CHAPTER VII—Intelligence Production (Pages 227–244

Recommendation 1 (page 244): That an agreed glossary of 

gence terms be produced and reviewed periodically.

Agency Comment: DOD agrees and suggests that an IAC S

mittee be appointed to produce it.

State has no particular difficulty in this area, but it will be 

to assist IAC in implementing the recommendation.

CIA reports that it has compiled a glossary of intelligenc

and that action will be taken through the IAC to secure acc

thereof as the authoritative dictionary of intelligence nomencla

Additional Action Required: Completion of the project by th

Recommendation 2 (page 244): That positive measures be t

increase the quantity and improve the quality of information co

with special emphasis on the primary target area, to include t

sion of existing directives to assign more explicit responsibility t

cies which can fulfill the requirement.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, adding that in its opinion 

the opinion of the military services the briefing and debriefing 

telligence purposes of U.S. travelers (now exclusively the prer

of CIA) could profitably be decentralized to some extent. It b
that review of official cover requirements may indicate tha

intelligence operations now being performed by CIA may be m

fectively conducted by other agencies. As to the Task Force 

mendation that there be special emphasis on the primary targ

DOD notes that, in general, the service intelligence agencies ha

sights set on the primary target.

CIA notes that NSC, IAC and CIA intelligence directives a

reviewed with a view to revision where appropriate (as indi

Chapter II, above). As to the Task Force exhortation that, in th

tion of intelligence, there be special emphasis on the primary tar

CIA notes that the entire intelligence community has invariably a

the Soviet Union the highest priority as a target of intelligence.

Additional Action Required: None, other than that now be

ried out, or that which may be indicated by current intelligen

the review of Intelligence Directives referred to by CIA.

Observation: The oft-repeated exhortations of the Task Force 

mary emphasis be placed upon the USSR as the primary intellig

get are in a sense misleading in that they could leave the casua

with the erroneous impression that the USSR is not the primar

gence target. Individually and collectively the intelligence force

United States Government concentrate on the USSR, its satelli

International Communism in general, as the primary U.S. inte

target. U.S. intelligence agencies are not satisfied with the qu

quantity of intelligence gained thus far with respect to this prim

get, but they have felt it better to accept criticism such as that le

the Task Force Report and in the published report on the subje

than risk disclosure of highly sensitive operations which do indi

some inroads are being successfully made on the primary targe

CHAPTER VIII—Functional Intelligence (Pages 245–254

Recommendation 1 (page 254): That the intelligence commu

tively give recognition to this primary intelligence target, i.e., th

Union, and take such actions as are necessary to present a conc

fort for the single purpose of breaking this vital intelligence blo

Agency Comment: State notes that the intelligence commu

been doing precisely this for some time and it adds that it is p

to give continuing support to this intelligence priority.

Defense and CIA (as indicated previously) have comme

the several instances wherein the point of this recommenda

been made) that the intelligence community is concentrating u

USSR as a primary intelligence target.

Recommendation 2 (page 254): That the State Departmen

grams for integration and expansion of the Foreign Service 

acceleration of language and area training be pursued vigorou
Agency Comment: State reports that this matter is the subjec

orous action at all levels of the Department on a continuous a

priority basis.

CHAPTER IX—Personnel (Pages 255–274)

Recommendation 1 (page 273): That DOD give consideratio

exploitation of the ROTC and reserve intelligence programs 

guage training purposes by offering credit toward reserve comm

and drill credits respectively, for the completion of selected la

courses.

Agency Comment: DOD notes that considerable use is now 

made of civilian facilities for the purpose indicated in this reco

dation; that the problem involves quality rather than quantity; 

recommendations concerning ROTC language training requi

ough study; and that it would be unwise to give blanket accre

for language work regardless of the type of service for which the 

is destined.

Additional Action Required: Completion of DOD’s study a

sideration of the recommendation.

Recommendation 2 (page 273): That DOD conduct periodic 

of service personnel procedures to insure that adequate consid

is being given to the requirements of the intelligence agencies f

share of the best qualified military personnel.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. DOD believes its 

practices are adequate. It agrees that the highest practicable sta

should be applied in the selection of attaché personnel.

Additional Action Required: None, assuming DOD’s curren

tices are in fact adequate.

Recommendation 3 (page 273): That DOD require that the M

Services study the problem of improving the prestige of the civi

alyst vis-à-vis his military colleagues.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that in practical term

is no easy solution to this problem. DOD reports much has bee

on the problem and that it will keep same under review.

Recommendation 4 (page 273): That DOD facilitate the empl

as intelligence specialists of qualified retired military personne

tiating action toward amending the laws concerning Federal e

ment of retired military personnel, with a view to removing th

ent ceiling on the Federal pay of such individuals.

Agency Comment: DOD believes present laws on this sub

too restricted; on the other hand it is fearful lest statutory amen

be such as to permit retired officers with intelligence experi

automatically find employment as civilian intelligence analyst
reports that the CSC has developed a proposal to relax exist

islative requirements along the general lines of this recommen

Additional Action Required: Executive Branch processing of CS

islative proposal and submission thereof for Congressional consid

Recommendation 5 (page 273): That DOD give consideration 

extensive use of “Schedule A” in the employment of civilian 

and other intelligence specialists, in order to provide necessary 

ity in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel by the milita

ices, and to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between t

of Interior competitive service and the overseas excepted servic

Agency Comment: DOD agrees that greater flexibility in hir

in the ability to shift civilian personnel between the Zone of t

rior and foreign stations is essential. It believes a degree of re

of Civil Service regulations is desirable to deal with these pr

DOD has initiated a thorough study of the matter.

Additional Action Required: Appropriate action by DOD fo

completion of its study of the problem.

Recommendation 6 (page 273): That DOD, in the consider

future economies, give proper weight to the importance of inte

in peace time, so as to avoid serious reductions-in-force in our 

of intelligence production.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that the purpose of 

ommendation can be further served by applying such reduct

force as do occur to overhead positions rather than to basic pro

elements.

Recommendation 7 (page 274): That DOD take prompt actio

sure that proper consideration in personnel planning is give

impact of the time lag involved in our present clearance requi

for filling sensitive positions.

Agency Comment: DOD believes this recommendation requ

ther study.

Additional Action Required: Further study and appropriat

by DOD.

CHAPTER X—Security (Pages 275–283)

Recommendation 1 (page 273): That any individual employ

intelligence organization “about whom sufficient doubt concer

security has been raised . . . should be removed from emp

pending final determination of his case.”

Agency Comment: DOD considers that its current security p

and procedures essentially fulfill the objectives of this recom

tion. However, it reports that the general subject will be revi

order to insure that those objectives are adequately served.
CIA reports that it is carrying out the intent of this recom

tion in that it adheres carefully to Executive Order 10450 whi

vides for the suspension of Federal employees when a reasonabl

exists as to their security status. State reports that “this recom

tion requires no implementation in the Department of State” . 

State’s regulations do not preclude employee suspensions 

circumstances.

Additional Action Required: Strict adherence to Executive 

10450 by the agencies concerned—such adherence will accomp

objective of this recommendation.

Observation: State has missed the point of this recommen

All agencies now have the authority to suspend employees un

circumstances indicated in the recommendation. The point th

Force appears to be making is that some of the agencies fail to s

when there is sufficient cause and it is the Task Force’s view tha

intelligence organizations of our government in particular, su

pension should occur pending final determination of the emp

case.

Recommendation 2 (page 283): That the “findings and propo

position of those cases which were reported as still in proces

time the survey by this Task Force was concluded should be r

to the President.”

Agency Comment: DOD did not comment on this point.

CIA noted that under normal reporting procedures as esta

by Executive Order 10450, information is furnished to the Civil 

Commission or the FBI on such cases, and that thereafter the s

such cases is available to the President, through the executive a

he has designated, to report on the implementation of Execut

der 10450.

State advises that detailed reports concerning the very sm

centage of such employees in its Intelligence Area have been 

available to the Civil Service Commission, and that CSC makes 

posite report periodically on such cases in all government age

Observation: CIA and State seem to have missed the point of 

ommendation. (DOD did not comment upon it at all.) If the reco

dation is deemed to have validity, the White House may wish to 

that the heads of the intelligence agencies concerned report the f

and disposition of alleged security risk cases (in their intelligenc

in process at the time the Task Force concluded its survey.

Recommendation 3 (page 283): That measures be institute

agencies to recheck the security status of all personnel engage

telligence activities at periodic intervals not to exceed 5 years 

individual case.
Agency Comment: CIA reports that this is now being done 

agency. State reports that the problem of periodic review of su

is being given serious study, following which State will bring i

thereon to the attention of the agencies concerned, such as the C

the Department of Justice.

DOD considers that its current security practices essential

the objectives of this recommendation. However, the general 

will be reviewed to insure that the underlying objectives of 

ommendation are adequately served.

Additional Action Required: This recommendation should be 

Observation: This recommendation has been made in varyin

on a number of occasions in the Task Force report. In theory it 

tensible merit; in practice it is unsound. In lieu of subjecting 

ees to reinvestigations at least every 5 years a good counterinte

program is what is needed. When employees are initially bro

board they should be exhaustively checked. Thereafter they sho

be harassed by reinvestigations, but should be accepted as loy

fide Americans unless counterintelligence discloses reasons 

trary views. Wholesale investigations of the type called for by 

Force would constitute unjustifiable use of manpower and 

would not be productive of substantial results, and would be 

to the morale of the employees concerned. Reinvestigations sh

made on a selective, rather than wholesale, basis and only wh

is reasonable cause therefor.

CHAPTER XI—Counterintelligence (Pages 284–292)

Recommendation 1 (page 292): That the Navy give due co

tion to the requirement for additional competent and trained c

intelligence personnel in order to provide adequate security for 

sonnel and facilities.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs in principle, but believes 

actual method of expansion should be investigated.

Additional Action Required: Further investigation as sugge

DOD, followed by action consistent with its investigative f

and with the objective of providing adequate security for na

sonnel and facilities. (See Recommendation 1, Chapter IV, D, p

above.)

CHAPTER XII—Maps and Libraries (Pages 293–305)

Recommendation 1 (page 305): That the IAC consider the a

of a single index system based on the Intelligence Subject Co

in use by CIA.

Agency Comment: CIA and DOD concur. CIA reports that 

ommendation is currently under study in a special subcomm
the IAC. The subcommittee is expected to report to the IAC wi

next few weeks.

CHAPTER XIII—Coordination in Overseas Areas (Pages 306

Recommendation 1 (page 309): That senior military comman

the field be given greater flexibility in their use of informatio

need-to-know basis, giving due regard to the protection of its 

Agency Comment: CIA comments that it is not aware of an

plaints of restrictions on use of information supplied. CIA repo

it is fully cognizant of its obligation and responsibility to get in

tion to the senior officer responsible for action and policy.

DOD considers that “current practices in the DOD are satis

within the regulations imposed by other agencies.”

CHAPTER XIV—Development of New Equipment and Techn

(Pages 310–311)

Recommendation 1 (page 311): That the IAC take positive a

insure that a definite and concerted effort is made to develop ne

niques, methods and equipment for the collection and produ

intelligence and insure that a free exchange of information con

such projects is accomplished within the intelligence commun

Agency Comment: CIA reports that compliance with this 

mendation will be accomplished in conjunction with IAC actio

rently underway and that the means of producing intelligence 

Soviet/Sino Bloc are “always under continuous scrutiny.”

DOD concurs, stating that continuing efforts are being dev

fulfillment of this recommendation. DOD observes that in all ca

effectiveness can be achieved only with a frank and free inter

of information.

State concurs, noting that it has initiated a number of step

cial science, psychological and research areas, all of which are d

to further the objective of this recommendation.

CHAPTER XV—“Watch-Dog” Commission (Pages 312–31

Recommendation 1 (page 317): That a small, permanent, bip

commission, composed of members of both Houses of the C

and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost nati

spect and confidence, be established by Act of Congress to ma

odic surveys of the organization, functions, policies, and result

Government agencies handling foreign intelligence operations

report, under adequate security safeguards, its findings and 

mendations to the Congress, and to the President, annually and 

other times as may be necessary or advisable. The proposed 

dog” commission should be empowered by law to demand and 
any information it needs for its own use. It would be pattern

the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of t

ernment (Hoover Commission). Appointments by the Presiden

sons from private life to the proposed commission should b

from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned 

integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the n

Agency Comment: CIA does not concur in this recomme

CIA believes, with the Hoover Commission itself, that “whil

Congressional and citizens committees for temporary service ar

and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate an

recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present diffi

CIA points out that it now reports to the Armed Services Com

of the Senate and House, and to the Senate and House Approp

Committees. As a consequence CIA does not consider that a Jo

gressional Committee would add any essential helpful element. C

concur, however, in the appointment (as recommended by the 

Commission, but not by its Task Force) by the President of a co

of experienced private citizens to examine and report periodicall

work of the Government’s foreign intelligence activities.

DOD believes that the permanent, bipartisan commission 

mended by the Task Force would afford improved protection 

well as efficiency in, foreign intelligence operations.

Additional Action Required: None, in view of the establishm

January 13, 1956 by the President of a Board of Consultants12 to 

periodically the foreign intelligence activities of the Governm

CHAPTER XVI—Summary of Conclusions and Recommend

(Pages 318–348)

This Chapter is merely repetitious of information appear

lier in the Report. Conclusions and recommendations are res

verbatim fashion in some instances; in other instances they a

phrased and combined with still other opinions and recommen

contained in the body of the report. This Chapter does not ap

contain any new information. It merely restates, repeats, 

emphasizes certain of the points previously made.

Appendix

The recommendations discussed below are from Appendix 

Task Force Report. The Department of Defense comments are 

mentary to those submitted by the Director of Central Intellig

the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) 

12 Regarding the creation of this board, see Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1956, 
United States Communications Security Board (USCSB), in wh

Department of Defense and the three Services concur.

Recommendation No. 1

“That the National Security Council direct USCIB to e

COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other inte

sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear a

cinct as to require minimum interpretation by the Director, N

what is required and its degree of importance. USCIB should 

marily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, sho

termine the best way of producing the end product. If USCIB 

ter a reasonable length of time to provide more adequate guid

the Director, NSA, then the latter should be made a member of 

telligence Advisory Committee.”

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur, subject to comment.

2. Comment:

It is doubtful that IAC membership for the Director, NSA

solve the problem; it would probably raise additional complic

In this connection, the Department of Defense considers 

present status and membership of the IAC give rise to ambiguity 

this particular recommendation would only sharpen. The IAC is 

in being neither a policy nor an operational body, but a mixtur

two. This is the result partly of unforeseen evolution within t

and partly of significant changes which have occurred within 

partment of Defense since the IAC was established.

To the extent that the NSC intended the IAC to serve as a 

body, its Defense membership (the three Services and JCS) is 

diffuse and incomplete in that the Service representation is la

an operating rather than a policy level and the Secretary of De

not directly represented, although the JCS representative (Ch

Joint Intelligence Committee) coordinates with the appropri

ments of OSD. On the other hand, to the extent that the IAC se

a body concerned with the coordination and formulation of inte

estimates and the coordination of operational intelligence mat

present formalized structure may not be entirely necessary. Th

Service intelligence chiefs are suitable representation in this 

and although the Chairman, JIC, does not conduct operations, h

appropriate indirect representative of the Secretary of Defense f

matters. In its dual capacity the IAC works, but in an unnec

complicated and probably uneconomical context of differing l

activity.

The Department of Defense considers that a more desirab

mate organization of the top structure of U.S. intelligence 
involve a single board with policy cognizance over all aspec

telligence. The Secretary of Defense’s representative would b

propriate civilian official, competent to act for him. Under th

would be several specialist committees to deal with operation

ters; one concerned with communications and electronics inte

and communications security (as recommended by the Cla

Force); another with intelligence operations; a third with inte

production; and possibly others. Representation on these com

would be provided by the Service intelligence chiefs and othe

tors (such as the Director, NSA) when appropriate.

The following main points summarize the views that are cr

ing in the Department of Defense on the general subject of intel

1. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense m

sume final responsibility for guidance and control over all as

intelligence.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence as the actual executiv

must have adequate and clearly defined coordinative power

the Secretaries of State and Defense.

3. National intelligence policy is under the cognizance of 

tional Security Council. However, because of the sensitive natu

portant elements of intelligence, intelligence matters might m

propriately be dealt with by a Special Committee of the NSC 

is now the case, to the satisfaction of all concerned, with re

COMINT and COMSEC matters: the Secretaries of State and D

and the Attorney General for matters under his cognizance, w

advice of the Director of Central Intelligence, constitute the 

Committee of the NSC).

4. The concept behind USCIB has proved to be the most 

tory solution so far in one important intelligence area. Appro

modified, it could usefully be applied to the entire intelligenc

The changes which this general concept would involve do 

quire legislation. Internal reorganization within the IAC and p

an executive order to establish the new organization would su

The Department of Defense proposes to discuss this sub

ther with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Depart

State, and hopes in due course together with them to arrive at an 

proposal for submission.

Recommendation No. 2

“That the Director, NSA, be given clearcut directives wh

enable him to make much greater and continuing effort to 

high-level communications intelligence. This is of such great 

tance that monetary considerations should be waived and an 

least equal to the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once
Department of Defense Position:

With respect to that portion of the Recommendation adv

“an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project” [1 line not 

fied] the Department of Defense considers some expansion on 

CIB comments is warranted.

[24 lines not declassified]

With this objective in mind the Department of Defense 

thorized the Director, NSA, to bring the best possible analytica

from outside NSA to bear on the problem (if they can be foun

USCIB has recommended that this country undertake a maxim

fort to [11

⁄2 lines not declassified].

The Department of Defense considers that [11

⁄2 lines not 

sified] as to warrant the full force of the government behin

projects.

Recommendation No. 6

“That the Department of Defense carefully study the or

tional structure and proper positioning within its respective ser

the three cryptologic agencies—AFSS, ASA, and NSG—with a v

ward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby stre

ing their personnel assignment policies and logistical support.

Department of Defense Position:

USCIB considered that this recommendation pertains to a

nal problem within the Department of Defense, and has acco

referred it to this Department for comment.

The Department of Defense has long recognized that high 

sional standards and opportunity for a rewarding career for m

and civilian personnel engaged in the communications intellig

fort must be strengthened if we are to deal successfully with 

creasingly difficult technical problems confronting that effo

means of achieving this objective is to constitute the Service 

logic agencies as major commands. These should be subordin

ther to the intelligence nor to the communications elements wi

Services, but should in each case report directly to the chief 

Adequate recognition of cryptology as a major operational care

cannot be otherwise achieved.

The Air Force cryptologic agency, the Security Service (AF

been so constituted for approximately seven years. The AFS

sponsible for COMINT production [less than 1 line not declassifi

COMSEC activities, and in addition operated the Air Force’s g

based ELINT stations and its SSO (Special Security Office

tem for the dissemination of COMINT. Largely because of its s

a major command, the AFSS has developed a dynamic and pro
program for recruiting, developing and holding on to technica

ified military career personnel.

Until recently the Army cryptologic agency (the Army 

Agency (ASA)) was responsible for COMINT production [les

line not declassified] and for COMSEC. It was subordinate to G

23 June 1955, the ASA was designated as a major command r

ble to the Chief of Staff, with virtually complete cognizance 

Army aspects of COMINT, COMSEC, ELINT and communicatio

tromagnetic countermeasures (ECM). It is anticipated that thi

will facilitate development of an energetic Army cryptologic car

gram paralleling that of the Air Force.

The Navy cryptologic activity, the Navy Security Group (N

not so constituted. It operates at a lower echelon and under 

intelligence and communications cognizance. The NSG does n

inally have a commanding officer; it functions under the Chie

curity Branch who in turn reports to the Director, Naval Com

tions. The responsibilities of the NSG include COMINT product

than 1 line not declassified] COMSEC, and ELINT.

The Secretary of Defense proposes in the near future to 

Secretary of the Navy to review the placement of the Navy cry

organization to determine whether a subordination and structu

closely paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force migh

advantageous.

Recommendation No. 7

“That the military Services give greater attention to select

cers for COMINT duties, assign regular or ‘career’ reserve office

maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT 

sending them to command field stations, and establish career o

nities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service 

Rotation and replacement procedures should be improved. Th

bility of using [less than 1 line not declassified] should be thoroughl

“It is also recommended that the Congress enact legislatio

thorize the National Security Agency to employ specially qual

tired military personnel as presently authorized the Central Inte

Agency and with no restriction on the number so employed. Su

lation should also permit the Secretary of Defense to recall reti

cers to active duty with NSA and have those officers counted ag

authorized strength of NSA but not of the respective military se

Department of Defense Position:

The Department of Defense submits the following ad

observations in expansion of the USCIB comment on this reco

dation. As set forth in its comments on Recommendation No

Department of Defense believes that the establishment of maj
tologic commands in each of the military services will do much 

mote the career possibilities advocated in Recommendation No. 

with the support of this Department, the Army and NSA are 

embarked on a program to develop [less than 1 line not declassifi

cently the Secretary of Defense endorsed a Navy proposal to a

the Naval Security Group with civilians.

With respect to the employment by NSA of specially q

retired military personnel, the Department of Defense suppo

proposal for NSA in principle as an element of the Departme

would emphasize that the highest objective standards of profe

or technical skill should be applied in hiring such persons, in o

avoid possible abuses which could seriously prejudice career 

morale.

Full consideration of the application of this proposal is cu

in progress among personnel and legislative experts within 

partment of Defense.

Recommendation No. 8

“That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to 

location of an appropriate number of ‘super grades’ and positi

der Public Law 31313 to NSA; to the possibility of further induc

or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges exten

civilians overseas.”

Department of Defense Position:

The Department of Defense is supporting the efforts of 

rector, NSA, to obtain additional super grades from the Civil 

Commission. Further, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Ma

and Personnel) is seeking as a priority matter (within existin

lation) to meet the request of the Director, NSA, for further 

ments to selected consultants and privileges for civilians em

overseas. The consultant problem is not confined to NSA alo

the Department prefers to resolve it for NSA as part of an over

partment of Defense solution. Such additional legislation as 

required to achieve these objectives is also under consideratio

13 Reference presumably is to the law relating to the compensation of th

sional and scientific services in the War and Navy Departments, approved A

1947. (61 Stat. 715)
Appendix I

Part 1—The National Security Agency (Pages 1–58)

Recommendation 1 (page 46): That NSC direct USCIB to e

COMINT requirements in the light of COMINT realities and 

eration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This ope

guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to requi

mum interpretation of what is required and of its degree of imp

USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and 

rector, NSA, should determine the best way of producing 

USCIB fails after a reasonable length of time to provide more a

guidance to the Director, NSA, the latter should be made a me

the IAC.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers the first part of this rec

dation to be in hand in that a revised COMINT requirements 

pared with NSA participation, has been approved by a Workin

mittee within USCIB and will soon be presented for USCIB a

With respect to the second part of the recommendation, USCIB d

believe that NSA membership on the IAC should be related to 

velopment of or failure to develop USCIB directives or requirem

DOD concurs, but is doubtful that the problem to which 

ter part of the recommendation is addressed would be solved 

ing the Director, NSA, a member of the IAC. DOD is presen

talizing its views on the general subject of intelligence and 

ultimate organization of the top structure of U.S. intelligence. D

poses to discuss the matter with State and CIA and hopes in due 

together with those agencies, to arrive at an agreed proposal 

mission.

Additional Action Required: As to COMINT requirements—n

to NSA’s membership on the IAC—defer decision pending a d

nation as to whether USCIB’s revised COMINT requirements 

tute sufficient guidance for NSA. (In the interim consideration 

be given to granting observership status on the IAC to the D

NSA.)

Recommendation 2 (page 48): That the Director, NSA, be giv

cut directives which will enable him to make much greater a

tinuing effort to produce high level communications intelligen

is of such great importance that monetary considerations sh

waived and an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project sh

exerted at once. (It is noted that in forwarding Appendix I, Pa

14 This section of Coyne’s report was classified Top Secret; U.S. Eyes Onl

Via COMINT Channels Only.
Task Force indicated that the importance of the adoption of 

mendation 2 is especially emphasized—this is believed to be 

the intelligence effort.”)

Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in the implicati

guidance or lack thereof has adversely affected the production 

level communications intelligence. USCIB notes that “emphas

the guidance factor has tended to obscure the real, and critical

ness which does exist, namely, [4 lines not declassified]. As to t

posed initiation of efforts in this field along the lines of the Ma

Project, USCIB states that it is not now in a position to determ

nature and scope of the increased effort which might be applie

solution of COMINT’s chief problem [less than 1 line not decla

USCIB believes it will be in a better position to decide this mat

result of NSA’s plan for implementing the new COMINT objecti

or as a result of a special study which is being undertaken by 

qualified, technical experts in an effort to [less than 1 line not 

fied] problem referred to above. USCIB is convinced that maxim

sistance would be provided to NSA in the solution of its majo

lem by the [2 lines not declassified]. Based thereon, the Special Com

of the NSC for COMINT (Sec/State and Sec/Def) has agreed 

optimum, if not indeed a prerequisite, step toward [2 lines not 

fied] and should be accorded maximum priority. To that end t

cial Committee has authorized marshalling of all relevant [les

line not declassified] resources of the intelligence agencies.

Additional Action Required: Reconsideration by NSC’s Specia

mittee for COMINT of the recommended expansion of NSA’s e

Observation: Such reconsideration should be deferred p

completion of the study and related steps referred to by USC

summarized above.

Recommendation 3 (page 49): That ELINT and COMINT 

grated to the extent of placing ELINT under NSA for analysi

product and guidance and coordination in the collection and d

nation of ELINT. The authority of operational commanders o

integral ELINT resources, however, should not be abridged. U

the combined board which is recommended in this report to re

should exercise only policy control over ELINT matters.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes this recommendation h

overtaken by the issuance of NSCID No. 1715 and by the DOD 

15 Document 259.
tive on ELINT dated July 13, 1955.USCIB believes no furthe

should be taken on this recommendation until these recent d

have been implemented and tried.

Additional Action Required: Following a reasonable trial pe

reference directives should be re-examined in the light of this 

mendation.

Observation: The USCIB response is unclear. By inference it 

that ELINT has not been placed under NSA, as recommended 

Task Force.

Recommendation 4 (page 50): That the military services an

continue to strive for a higher degree of cryptographic secur

the problem of communications security be restudied by US

the combined board as recommended in this report) with a vie

ducing to the lowest practicable level the quantity of informa

leased through telecommunications; and that NSC 16817 be re-ex

to ascertain if the Director, NSA, has sufficient authority to c

his COMSEC responsibilities.

Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the need for a highe

of communications security and feels that efforts to attain t

should continue; however, it does not consider that the recom

tion falls within the purview of USCIB.

USCSB reports that, at all times, the military services an

keep the problem of cryptographic security under thorough 

USCSB concurs in the recommended review of NSC 168, but no

in essence this review is already underway pursuant to the pr

of NSC 168 itself.

Recommendation 5 (page 51): That a single board with app

technical subcommittees have policy guidance over commun

intelligence and communications security. If the recommend

place the evaluation and analysis of ELINT under NSA is adopt

policy guidance for ELINT as well as COMINT and COMSEC 

be exercised by the proposed single board.

Agency Comment: USCIB is not now willing to recommen

lishment of a single board “because the basic functions and o

tional arrangements within a number of the interested agencies 

ficiently divergent to justify the continued separate existence o

and USCSB.” USCSB opposes the recommendation because of 

ficulties of implementation which would result from the establ

of a single board, as proposed.

16 Document 230. 17 The title of NSC 168, November 1953 was “Communications Securi

mentation on this NSC paper is in the National Archives, RG 273, Policy Pap
Recommendation 6 (page 51): That DOD study the organiz

structure and proper positioning within its respective service

three cryptologic agencies—AFSS, ASA, and NSG—with a view 

improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengtheni

personnel assignment policies and logistic support.

Agency Comment: USCIB endorses the aim of this recomme

but considers it a problem internal to DOD. DOD believes t

means of achieving the objective of this recommendation is to 

tute the service cryptologic agencies as major commands. The A

Cryptologic Agency (AFSS) has been so constituted for abou

years. The Army Cryptologic Agency (ASA) was designated a

jor command following the submission of the Task Force Repo

Navy Cryptologic activity (NSG) is not so constituted at presen

will in the near future ask the Secretary of the Navy to review h

tologic organization to determine whether it might be re-esta

on a basis paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force.

Recommendation 7 (page 52): That the military services give 

attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular 

reer” reserve officers to the maximum extent possible, indoctri

ficers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field s

and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to thos

line or general service officers. Rotation and replacement pro

should be improved. The feasibility of using civilian intercept 

tors should be tested. It is also recommended that Congress en

islation to authorize NSA to employ especially qualified retire

tary personnel with no restriction on the number so employe

legislation should also permit Sec. Def. to recall active officers 

with NSA and have those officers counted against the aut

strength of NSA, but not of the respective military services.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation. D

ports that full consideration of these proposals is currently in p

within DOD.

Recommendation 8 (page 54): That the Secretary of Defense g

ther consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number 

per grades” and positions under Public Law 313 to NSA; to th

bility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultan

to privileges extended to civilians overseas.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation

also concurs and is taking the steps it deems appropriate in a

to accomplish the objectives of this recommendation.

Recommendation 9 (page 55): That USCIB or its successor boa

ify the objectives and functions of intelligence liaison detachmen

NSA, establish uniform procedures to be followed for such 

ments in their relationship with NSA, and specify maximum n
of personnel to be assigned for liaison duties after examining 

tent of interest of each agency concerned. Intelligence perso

signed to liaison duty with NSA should be required to atten

doctrination course conducted by NSA.

Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in this recommen

It agrees that mutual familarization with the requirements, cap

and operations of both NSA and consumer agencies is desirable

however, that because the necessary functions of intelligence 

detachments vary continuously with the missions of the co

agencies and the character of COMINT production activit

arrangements called for by this recommendation cannot succ

be rendered uniform.

Additional Action Required: Decision as to whether the view 

Task Force or the view of USCIB should be adopted.

Observation: USCIB’s view is most sound. The Task Force 

mendation should be rejected.

Recommendation 10 (page 56): That NSA and the three cry

services give greater emphasis to, and continue to develop mu

operation in, improving the technical factors of intercept stati

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs. Greater emphasis has bee

this matter and USCIB considers the arrangements which ha

undertaken in this regard to be satisfactory.

Recommendation 11 (page 56): That more thorough peri

investigations of personnel be made. Particular effort should 

centrated on persons occupying the more sensitive positions.

Agency Comment: USCIB has established a special committ

vestigate the matter, and USCIB is prepared to act on whate

ommendations are made by that committee.

Observation: See “Observation” Section of Chapter X, Reco

dation 3.

Recommendation 12 (page 57): That the Director, NSA, be g

thority to inspect the service cryptologic schools and make ap

ate recommendations for improvement where COMINT is aff

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs.

Part 2—Communications and Electronics in Support of Intel

Activities (Pages 1–44)

Recommendation 1 (page 37): That an Intelligence Commun

and Electronics Subcommittee (ICES) to the Combined Inte

Board (this assumes that USCIB and USCSB have been combin

a single board, as proposed elsewhere in the report) be establ

review and produce recommendations to the Combined Inte

Board with respect to all communications and electronics pr
from intelligence activities which call for facilities, equipments

ditional personnel which cannot be obtained from existing res

and to supply technical advice to the Board on such matters as i

request.

Agency Comment: USCIB does not agree. It believes that th

of this recommendation is being accomplished by expert comm

tions and electronics advice provided from within the agenci

cerned with the subject.

Additional Action Required: None, assuming the USCIB co

on this recommendation is accurate.

Recommendation 2 (page 38): That more effective use b

within DOD of the high potential value and know-how availabl

Joint Communications-Electronics Committee of the Joint C

Staff to deal with communications and electronics problems re

the broad intelligence field. Responsibility should be placed 

group for reviewing and commenting on communications an

tronics requirements that the NSA considers necessary to meet 

telligence objectives, and the demands being placed by NSA 

special communications and electronics groups in the military s

under NSA operational control; and for submitting recommen

to the Secretary of Defense on ways and means to insure maxim

ordination and effectiveness in the over-all communications an

tronics effort in support of intelligence.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers that existing procedure

viewing and commenting on NSA requirements are satisfactor

Recommendation 3 (page 38): That more effective technical 

be injected into USCIB deliberations to permit development o

appropriate statements of the intelligence objectives to be accom

by communications or electronics means.

Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the spirit of this reco

dation and believes that it is now being carried into effect.

Recommendation 4 (page 38): That the present basic policy 

provision of point-to-point communications services to inte

community activities from existing governmental or civil comm

tions services be continued. That any attempt to set up separ

plicate, or paralleling point-to-point communications facilities 

thorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully review

agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electroni

committee recommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in the first sentence of 

ommendation. It agrees with the second sentence to the exten

lieving that no separate facilities should be established for inte

use without full consideration by appropriate authority.
Recommendation 5 (page 39): That a basic policy of utilizin

ing facilities, services, and equipment to the maximum degre

plied wherever it is determined to be technically feasible 

COMINT, ELINT, and COMSEC operations (this applies part

to certain aspects of the technical training phases, operationa

dures, and logistics); that exceptions to this policy be authoriz

when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agre

the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommi

ommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers that the spirit of this 

mendation is now being carried out. It does not agree that the ad

review (called for in the last sentence) is either necessary or de

Recommendation 6 (page 39): That any arrangements with 

to centralized control of ELINT give adequate consideration to 

mediate and vital interest of the military in this field and the 

keep electronic countermeasures (ECM)—a tactical weapon—

under military operational control.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes that this recommenda

been overtaken by the issuance of NSCID 17 and the related 

ment of Defense Directive of July 13, 1955.

Recommendation 7 (page 39): That all planning and oper

communications and electronics efforts in support of intellig

tivities include full consideration of the following to meet 

emergency conditions:

a. Day-to-day operation and training be based on realism 

of the situation and facilities expected to be available in time o

national emergency. This applies in a special manner to plann

erations to be effective in case of heavy jamming operations. b. Key intelligence installations, served by costly, hard-to

electronics equipment and associated records be located out

tablished target areas. That these installations have integrated p

national emergency or disaster operations. That all agencies i

in planning new, alternate, or emergency locations for Feder

cies expedite action to assist NSA in its current efforts to obtai

able site.

c. Pending accomplishment of b, that effective interim 

plans be developed promptly for each key intelligence install

include as a minimum (1) alternate site, (2) installed and teste

mum equipment with necessary basic records at the alternate s

(3) adequate knowledge of disaster plans by key personnel.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-a a

siders that it is now being carried out. USCIB agrees in princip

Recommendation 7-b but notes that the great extension of targ

by fallout hazards would require relocation at such great distan

reduction in operational efficiency would be unacceptable 

agency concerned would be unable to retain or attract key pe
USCIB reports that plans for the location of alternate NSA sites a

being developed by DOD. USCIB concurs in Recommendation 

reports that it is being carried into effect except for bulky, cos

complex cryptoanalytic machinery.

Recommendation 8 (page 40): That the present basic comm

tions (cryptographic) security plan, providing for centralized 

with effective decentralization of operations, be continued; th

agency and service maintain effective inspection and vigorous t

programs to reduce to the minimum cryptographic operation

rity violations.

Agency Comment: USCSB concurs, noting that the Commun

Security Plan referred to represents, in reality, a number of com

cations security arrangements each of which is considered satis

Recommendation 9 (page 40): That NSC determine ways and 

to control more effectively release of valuable intelligence to p

enemies via clear text messages being transmitted over gove

and civil communication networks.

Agency Comment: USCSB considers that the policy respon

for control of governmental clear text messages falls within its 

It reports that it has long recognized this problem and is work

ward its solution. It does not believe that the problem is one f

consideration. USCSB considers that the policy responsibility f

trol of nongovernmental clear text messages over civil commun

networks is outside its purview.

Additional Action Required: Referral of the nongovernmental 

of the subject to Commerce for consideration in the light of it

assigned responsibilities relating to the safeguarding of uncl

strategic information.

Recommendation 10 (page 40): That the general tendency wi

communications intelligence and the communications securit

cies to overemphasize the special security facets of their ope

with respect to basic communications and electronics features 

amined objectively and comprehensively by [a] competent, tech

qualified authority to insure that such overemphasis is not pro

unnecessary duplication of facilities and operations in peacetim

will grow to completely unrealistic figures in wartime, and pro

a system which may fail in an emergency because it will requ

siderable readjustment of basic operational practices at a critic

Agency Comment: USCIB believes existing procedures for re

communications requirements are adequate. USCIB does not beli

the security aspects of COMINT are significantly overemphasiz

cordingly, USCIB opposes creation of the special committee calle

this recommendation. USCSB, in essence, concurs in USCIB’s vie

lieves that no separate examination of the problem is required.
Recommendation 11 (page 41): SPECIAL RECOMMENDA

That the President set up a special commission composed of 

cally qualified civil and military communications and electron

resentatives, to survey and produce recommendations as to w

means to insure the more effective utilization of all commun

and electronics resources of the United States in the national i

in case of war or national emergency. (This recommendation w

gled out by the Task Force as one worthy of special emphasis 

one believed to be of great importance.)

Agency Comment: ODM expressed the view (7/6/55)18 that 

port which was shortly thereafter to be made to the NSC by 

ence Advisory Committee would contain organizational reco

dations somewhat more far reaching than those suggested in 

Force Report and, if adopted, would probably satisfy the reco

dations of the Task Force Report.

Additional Action Required: DOD, ODM and CIA views sh

obtained on this recommendation, including recommendatio

its implementation. (The ODM comment of 7/6/55 is not 

enough to assess the validity of the Task Force recommendati

Appendix II19

The Clandestine Services of the Central Intelligence Agen

Recommendation 1 (page 42): That the “covert intelligen

“cold war functions” of the Deputy Director/Plans be assigned 

arate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility should 

ministratively and logistically self-supporting.

Agency Comment: CIA does not concur, noting that the 

mended system had been tried prior to 1952 and abandoned; th

experience during the period of separate operations proved th

ational disadvantages of attempting to conduct on a secure a

cient basis two worldwide clandestine organizations, each c

mented from the other.

Additional Action Required: See Chapter II, Recommend

Page 1, above.

Recommendation 2 (page 42): That the part of CIA’s July 

Directive appointing area division chiefs as executives of the D

providing for their direct dealing with him and senior oversea

sentatives20 be rescinded.

18 Not found. 19 This section of Coyne’s report was classified Top Secret. 20 Printed in Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, pp. 465–467.
Agency Comment: CIA reports this Directive has been review

rescinded.

Recommendation 3 (page 42): That the DCI re-establish the o

Executive Director of that agency.

Agency Comment: CIA is opposed to this recommendation 

ground that the interposition of another command echelon wo

necessarily accomplish the intent of the recommendation. 

study, however, is being given the subject.

Observation: Because this is purely of an intra-agency char

would seem appropriate to defer to DCI’s judgment thereon.

Recommendation 4 (page 42): That CIA’s espionage and cou

pionage programs against Soviet targets be intensified.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs fully, noting that it is assid

pursuing the course recommended. Recent organizational c

have stimulated a more intensified effort on the part of the clan

services in the espionage and counterespionage fields.

Recommendation 5 (page 42): That the proposed annual C

chological warfare budget and allocations be submitted for N

proval and subsequent changes presented by DCI to the OCB.

Agency Comment: CIA does not agree. CIA notes that the 

mendation is inconsistent with the charter and function of th

that NSC is an organ for the formulation of basic policy; that NS

not have the time and staff required to consider details of budg

funds allocation. CIA notes that in developing its psychologic

fare budget, it is careful to conform to policy established by the 

cil, and to request Council authorization for any proposed action 

is not covered by existing policy. In addition it is the practice 

to keep the NSC closely informed concerning psychological 

programs.

Additional Action Required: Decision as to whether the Tas

recommendation should be adopted.

Observation: In view of the reasons advanced by CIA, all o

are valid, the Task Force recommendation should not be adop

Recommendation 6 (page 42): That the inducement phase of 

fector Program, as applicable to active participation by diploma

military representatives serving overtly abroad, be discontinue

Agency Comment: CIA does not concur. It notes that cov

ployed by CIA personnel overseas often precludes direct conta

potential defectors and the use of overt diplomatic and milita

sonnel for this purpose is a natural and essential adjunct to th

tor program, provided their activities are closely coordinate

CIA. CIA believes that the fact that such work may result in occ

embarrassment is a calculated risk which it considers wor
inasmuch as the intelligence and cold war gains for defectio

cruitment of Soviet personnel are considerable.

Additional Action Required: Expeditious review of NSCID N

IAC and, if necessary, NSC.

Observation: This recommendation of the Task Force is n

consistent with its recommendations on pages 137 and 205. (O

137 the Task Force recommends greater participation by the 

services in the Soviet and Satellite defector inducement prog

page 205 the Task Force recommends that the military services 

mitted greater latitude in offering inducements to potential de

Recommendation 7 (page 43): That the program for training 

cialists in covert intelligence collection and for the developmen

guists be intensified.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs and has in effect a number o

ures the objectives of which coincide with this recommend

mandatory quota of five per cent of all clandestine service pe

are in training at all times.

Recommendation 8 (page 43): That submission of individua

ets to the CIA Project Review Committee by the area division c

discontinued and funds for each cold war component be prepa

der the supervision of its chief and submitted for the compone

Project Review Committee.

Agency Comment: CIA observes that this recommendation 

on a separation of CIA “cold war” and “covert intelligence fun

with which CIA does not concur. It notes, however, that in rel

its existing organization the programming system of the clan

services now being put into operation assures a review by t

and his staff of the budget recommendations of the area divi

CIA clandestine services.

Recommendation 9 (page 43): That the number of auditor

regular CIA audit staff be increased materially.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs. This action is being taken 

idly as possible in line with an internal organization survey m

CIA several months ago.

Recommendation 10 (page 43): That greater efforts be ex

establish long-range deep cover for CIA personnel serving 

overseas.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs. It has been working toward 

jective of this proposal for many years. As a result of a curren

of all aspects of “cover,” recommendations are now being 

which are designed to produce better results in this complex f

Recommendation 11 (page 43): That the NSC render a spe

terpretation of the provisions of paragraph 4-b, NSC 5412/1 

fects the several members of the intelligence community.
Agency Comment: CIA notes that the reference paragraph 

that the DCI shall be responsible for “informing through appr

channels and on a ‘need-to-know’ basis, agencies of the U.S. 

ment, both at home and abroad, including diplomatic and milit

resentatives, of such operations as will affect them.” CIA repo

it has been scrupulously careful to keep other agencies appro

informed pursuant to the “need-to-know” principle; and that i

ing constantly to remedy and prevent individual instances of 

on the part of its personnel in their efforts to strike the diffic

ance between the proper range of interests of another agency 

restrictive principle of “need-to-know.” CIA points out that as a 

ard procedure it provides individual briefings for Ambassad

other State personnel, Defense Commanders, Chiefs of Milita

sions, Attachés, etc.

Recommendation 12 (page 43): That the CIA Act of 1949 be am

to authorize the employment of “any” (instead of fifteen now 

ized) retired officers or warrant officers of the armed services.

Agency Comment: See Chapter II, Recommendation 12, 

above.
National Security Council Intelligence Direc

1950–1955

252. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1

Washington, January 1

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE DEFECTO

OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d)(4) of the Nati

curity Act of 1947,2 as amended, Section 4(a)(7) of NSC 50,3 and 

No. 5,4 the National Security Council hereby authorizes and dire

1. It is in accord with the best U.S. tradition to endeavor 

tect and assist those fleeing from persecution. Under presen

tions, and with due regard for the effects of such action on th

matic and political interests of the United States, it is also 

important interests of national security that defectors be welcom

assisted in obtaining a degree of personal and economic secu

made to feel that there is a place for them in a free society. T

sources of information and intelligence on the Soviet world, ne

in the interests of the national security, are defectors from Sov

trol. The most effective agents to destroy the communist myt

Soviet paradise are defectors who are able to tell the truth ab

ditions of life behind the Iron Curtain.

2. The term “defectors” is here employed to denote ind

who escape from the control of the USSR or countries in the So

bit, or who, being outside such jurisdiction or control, are un

to return to it, and who are of special interest to the U.S. Gove

(a) because they are able to add valuable new or confirmator

mation to existing U.S. knowledge of the Soviet world, (b) beca

are of operational value to a U.S. agency, or (c) because their d

can be exploited in the psychological field.

a. A potential defector is a person who may reasonably be e

to become a defector if he is induced to do so.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lo

NSCIDs. Top Secret. NSCID No. 13 received NSC approval by memorandum 

January 19. (Ibid., Records of Action by the National Security Council) 2 61 Stat. 495–510.

3 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 384. 4 Ibid., Document 423.

790
b. A declared defector is a person who has left the servic

country and therefore requires protection and assistance.

c. Inducement means the commission of an act by, or manif

the instigation of, an American official which is demonstrably in

to bring about a defection and for which the U.S. Government 

if the act were discovered, be called upon to account.

Potential Defectors

3. CIA shall be responsible for inducing the defection of p

defectors, except in the cases where it is manifestly in the int

security or efficiency that representatives of other agencies un

such action.

Declared Defectors

4. The ranking American official in the area concerned sha

sponsible for determining the manner and degree to which 

ceptance or rejection of a declared defector may affect the dip

and political interests of the United States. Any overt public

propaganda exploitation of a defector shall be coordinated w

Department of State.

5. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible 

covert exploitation of defectors, and shall, within the framew

paragraph 4, coordinate all matters concerned with the handl

disposition of declared defectors from the Soviet Union and th

lite states in order to assure the effective exploitation of all d

for operational, intelligence, or psychological purposes by the U

ernment.

6. CIA shall seek the guidance of the appropriate Departm

insure that no action taken under this directive jeopardizes th

tary, security, political, or diplomatic interests of the United Sta

shall keep the other IAC agencies adequately informed of action

with respect to individual defector cases.

7. Subject to the over-all direction of the Chief of Missio

representatives in the field shall have operating responsibility 

U.S. occupied areas for:

a. Providing secure facilities and preliminary assessment 

fector’s bona fides and his intelligence or other potential valu

U.S. Government.

b. Assuring that the other IAC agencies have adequate o

nity to exploit a defector for intelligence or operational purpo

cluding immediate access to the defector in the field. c. Arranging secure movement of defectors as required.

8. In U.S. occupied areas CIA shall establish, together with 

partment of State and that military department having execu

thority in the area, adequate procedures designed to carry out 

ligations listed in paragraphs 7 a–c.
9. Field representatives of the IAC agencies shall be respons

a. Informing promptly the ranking American official and 

representative of any potential or declared defector who comes 

attention.

b. Directly or through questionnaires, representing the 

gence interests of their respective agencies in the debriefing 

defectors.

10. To the extent that there are available funds, CIA sha

sponsible for the final disposal and rehabilitation of defectors. T

agencies shall provide all possible assistance to CIA in esta

rapid and effective means of disposal.

11. If it appears to be in the national interest to bring a 

to the United States for intelligence purposes or operational u

shall be responsible for coordinating with the interested depa

and agencies for policy approval and for making necessary a

ments in advance for entry. CIA shall also be responsible for h

and disposal of the defector in agreement with the interested 

ments or agencies. In each case, notice and full available bio

and background information will be given to the Federal Burea

vestigation in advance. No commitments for entry for intelligen

poses or operational use will be made by any United States 

without coordination and notice as set forth in this paragraph

253. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1

Washington, March 

EXPLOITATION OF DEFECTORS AND OTHER ALIENS W

THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act o

as amended, and Section 4 of NSC 50,3 the National Security C

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lo

NSCIDs. Top Secret. NSCID No. 14 received NSC approval by memorandum 

March 3. (Ibid., Records of Action by the National Security Council) 2 61 Stat. 495–510.

3 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 384.
with the concurrence of the Attorney General of the United 

hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. Exploitation of aliens within the U.S. for internal secur

poses shall be the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Invest

Exploitation of aliens as sources of foreign intelligence inform

for other foreign intelligence purposes shall be the responsibilit

Central Intelligence Agency. This allocation to the Federal Bu

Investigation and to the Central Intelligence Agency of separa

of alien exploitation responsibility does not preclude joint explo

which must be encouraged whenever feasible. It further carries 

the obligation for each agency to give to the other, without de

directly, all information pertinent to the activities and respons

of that other agency, such as the FBI notifying CIA promptly o

of potential foreign intelligence interest who may come to its a

and CIA notifying FBI of information it obtains relating to inte

curity problems.

2. Exploitation of aliens by the Central Intelligence Agenc

the other member agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Com

shall be conducted for the following purposes:

a. To obtain foreign intelligence information required in 

terests of national security or by the member agencies of the 

gence Advisory Committee.

b. To obtain internal security information or other data r

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the discharge of its d

responsibilities.

c. For such other purposes as the National Security Coun

deem to be in the interests of national security.

3. In the case of any official, employee, or other individu

cially attached to a foreign government or one of its agencies, 

cial of a political party officially recognized by its governmen

official of an international organization, in an overt or covert c

who defects within the United States, the Federal Bureau of In

tion shall:

a. Immediately notify CIA, as well as the other IAC memb

other interested agencies, of the actual or potential defection.

b. Determine insofar as is possible the legitimacy of such r

potential or actual defection within the United States, and whe

individual’s determination to defect or his defection is or is not 

to his government.

c. Immediately notify the Attorney General and the Dep

of State of the identity of the individual concerned and his offic

nection with a foreign government, as well as his status as a d

Comments and observations will be solicited from the Attorne

eral and the State Department.
d. Be initially responsible for exploitation of all such actua

tential defectors, and maintain sole jurisdiction over them un

pletion of its internal security exploitation, unless it is jointl

mined that the foreign intelligence interest shall be paramoun

particular case.

e. Determine whether such potential defector can be utili

clandestine capacity and when so utilized provide through CIA

other interested agency, for satisfaction of foreign intelligence 

ments. Appropriate security restrictions will be agreed upon 

vidual cases. If, for operational reasons, it is not possible for th

immediately fulfill foreign intelligence requirements of th

agency, such notice will be provided to CIA and the other age

f. Make immediately available to CIA with copies to in

IAC members all foreign intelligence information resulting f

initial exploitation of such a defector, and provide, through esta

channels, for his interview by other member agencies of the IA

their request, prior to the full exhaustion of internal security 

ments if feasible.

g. On request by CIA, arrange for the transfer of such a 

to the jurisdiction of the CIA upon completion of its internal 

exploitation, unless it is jointly determined that the foreign inte

interest is paramount prior to that time. The CIA will assume 

sibility for necessary maintenance and custody during the peri

exploitation and shall be responsible for the final disposal an

bilitation of all such defectors. Internal security problems will 

the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. T

disposition of the alien and reimbursement of maintenance e

will be determined by mutual agreement in advance among 

and interested agencies in each case, based upon future ope

considerations.

h. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the Nati

curity Act of 1947, as amended, upon the written request of th

tor of Central Intelligence, provide all available information a

tinent observations with respect to the internal security factors i

in the exploitation of each defector for foreign intelligence infor

4. In the case of aliens within the U.S., other than those 

in paragraph 3 above, CIA shall:

a. Be responsible for their exploitation for foreign intellige

der the provisions of NSCID No. 7.4

4 Ibid., Document 427.
b. In order that the statutory responsibilities and domest

ligence jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may 

equately handled and in order to prevent confusion in intern

rity matters, the CIA or any other authorized intelligence agen

prior to exploiting an alien within the United States, advise th

advance of the exploitation. The FBI will then provide inform

has which may be of assistance in the exploitation by the other 

and will make such observations as are pertinent, including not

exploitation by the other agency would interfere with matters in

in internal security or execution of the statutory obligations of 

c. After determining priorities, arrange for exploitation of t

for foreign intelligence purposes by any other IAC agency or a

which may request independent exploitation of the alien. The C

assume responsibility for necessary maintenance and custody 

the period of exploitation. During the period of such maintena

ternal security problems will remain the responsibility of the 

Bureau of Investigation, except as is provided below. Reimbur

of maintenance expenses will be determined by mutual agree

advance among the CIA and interested agencies in each case.

d. Notify the FBI immediately of information obtained thro

own facilities or from other IAC agencies that an alien within 

has defected or may defect. To accomplish this end, the other IA

cies will transmit without delay all such pertinent information 

CIA and the FBI.

5. If it appears to be in the national interest to bring a def

the United States for intelligence purposes or operational use 

the provisions of this Directive, CIA shall be responsible for 

nating with the other interested departments and agencies fo

approval and for making necessary arrangements in advance 

try. CIA shall also be responsible for handling and disposal of 

fector in agreement with the interested departments or agenc

until such disposal will make adequate provisions to insure t

defector does not endanger the internal security of the United 

In each case, notice and full available biographic and backgro

formation will be given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

vance. No commitments for entry for intelligence purposes or 

tional use will be made by any United States official w

coordination and notice as set forth in this paragraph.

6. Any overt publicity and propaganda exploitation of a d

shall be coordinated with the Department of State.
254. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1

Washington, June 1

COORDINATION AND PRODUCTION OF FOREIGN 

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) of the Nati

curity Act of 1947,2 as amended, the National Security Counci

authorizes and directs the Central Intelligence Agency to perf

following functions with respect to foreign economic intellig

lating to the national security:

1. Maintain a continuing review of the requirements of the 

States Government for foreign economic intelligence relating to 

tional security, and of the facilities and arrangements available 

those requirements, making from time to time such recommen

to the National Security Council concerning improvements as 

quire National Security Council action.

2. Insure through regular procedures that the full ec

knowledge and technical talent available in the Government is 

to bear on important issues involving national security, inclu

sues on which assistance is requested by the National Securit

cil or members thereof.

3. Evaluate, through regular procedures, the pertinence

and quality of the foreign economic data available bearing on 

security issues, and develop ways in which quality could be im

and gaps could be filled.

4. Conduct, as a service of common concern, such fore

nomic research and produce such foreign economic intelligence 

be required (a) to supplement that produced by other agencie

in the appropriate discharge of their regular departmental mis

in fulfillment of assigned intelligence responsibilities; (b) to f

quests of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

1 Source: Truman Library, President’s Secretary Files, Subject File. Co

NSCID No. 15 was approved by the NSC at its 94th meeting on June 13 (N

No. 495). (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 9

of Action by the National Security Council) A correction to NSCID No. 15 w

on June 22. The text was unchanged, the only change being a minor adju

format. 2 61 Stat. 495–510.
255. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 R

Washington, August 2

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATION

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) of the Natio

curity Act of 1947,2 the National Security Council hereby aut

and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all org

Federal espionage operations outside the United States and 

sessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information r

to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, 

nection with the national security, except for certain agreed a

by other Departments and Agencies.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all org

Federal counterespionage operations outside the United States 

possessions and in occupied areas, provided that this authori

not be construed to preclude the counter-intelligence activities 

army, navy or air command or installation and certain agreed 

ties by Departments and Agencies necessary for the security 

organizations.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible 

ordinating covert and overt intelligence collection activities.

4. When casual agents are employed or otherwise utilize

IAC Department or Agency in other than an overt capacity, th

tor of Central Intelligence shall coordinate their activities with 

ganized covert activities.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate s

telligence information to the various Departments and Agencie

have an authorized interest therein.

6. All other National Security Council Intelligence Direc

implementing supplements shall be construed to apply solely 

intelligence activities unless otherwise specified.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSCIDs. Top Secret. This revision o

No. 5, December 12, 1947 (see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the In

Establishment, Document 423) added paragraphs 7–10. These paragraphs were 

by the Department of Defense and circulated to the NSC under cover of July 30 

gust 8 memoranda from NSC Executive Secretary Lay. (Truman Library, Presid

retary’s Files, Subject File) The revised NSCID No. 5 was approved by the NSC 

orandum action on August 28 (NSC Action No. 534). It was circulated to 

members by Lay by a memorandum of the same date. (Ibid.) 2 61 Stat. 495–510.
7. In an occupied area, the representative of the Director 

tral Intelligence will coordinate espionage and counterespion

erations in or from the area with the senior U.S. Representat

keep the Senior U.S. Military Commander informed in genera

clandestine collection activities conducted by DCI in or from su

8. In an area other than theaters of war or occupied areas, 

resentative of the Director of Central Intelligence will keep th

U.S. Representative appropriately advised of the espionage an

terespionage operations in or from the area.

9. When CIA requires Service support for espionage an

terespionage projects, such support as may be authorized by 

partment of Defense will be planned jointly with the Joint C

Staff.

10. In time of war or when the President directs, the Dir

Central Intelligence will coordinate espionage and counteres

operations in or from a theater of active military operations w

Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war, where America

are engaged, representatives of the Director of Central Intellige

ducting espionage and counterespionage operations in or from 

ater shall be under the direct command of the United States 

commander.

256. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 R

Washington, March 2

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National 

Act of 1947,2 and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs 

1 Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSCIDs. Secret; Security Informatio

vised version of NSCID No. 1 was approved by the National Security Counci

orandum action on March 28 (NSC Action No. 623). (National Archives, RG 59, 

Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council). NSCID 

originally adopted by the NSC on December 12, 1947, is printed in CIA Cold W

The CIA Under Harry Truman, pp. 169–171. For the revision of July 7, 1949, s

Relations, 1945–1950, Emergency of the Intelligence Establishment, Documen

Document 431, footnote 2. For the revision of January 19, 1950, see ibid., Docu

2 61 Stat. 495–510.
(e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and 

that:

1. To maintain the relationship essential to coordination b

the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizati

Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of the Director of 

Intelligence, who shall be chairman thereof, the Director, Fede

reau of Investigation, and the respective intelligence chiefs from 

partments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and from the Jo

(JCS), and the Atomic Energy Commission, or their representativ

be established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence. Th

tor of Central Intelligence will invite the chief, or his representa

any other intelligence Agency having functions related to the n

security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenev

ters within the purview of his Agency are to be discussed.

2. To the extent authorized by Section 102 (e) of the Natio

curity Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence, or repr

tives designated by him, by arrangement with the head of the 

ment or agency concerned, shall make such surveys and inspec

departmental intelligence material of the various Federal Depa

and Agencies relating to the national security as he may deem 

sary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and to ma

ommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities.

3. Coordination of intelligence activities should be design

marily to strengthen the over-all governmental intelligence st

Primary departmental requirements shall be recognized and s

ceive the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence A

a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making 

mendations or giving advice to the National Security Council p

ing to the intelligence activities of the various Departments and 

cies, transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurr

non-concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisor

mittee; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among 

partment heads of the National Military Establishment, the Dir

Central Intelligence shall refer the problem to the Secretary of D

before presenting it to the National Security Council.

b. Recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligenc

when approved by the National Security Council, issue as 

Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence. The respectiv

ligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such or

directives, when applicable, are implemented within their inte

organizations.

c. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the Nati

curity Council to insure full and proper implementation of 

directives by issuing such supplementary DCI directives as 
required. Such implementing directives in which the Intelligenc

sory Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by the 

of Central Intelligence, and shall be implemented within the 

ments and Agencies as provided in paragraph b. Where disag

arises between the Director of Central Intelligence and one 

members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee over such di

the proposed directive, together with statements of non-conc

shall be forwarded to the NSC for decision as provided in para

4. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce inte

relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as nation

ligence. In so far as practicable, he shall not duplicate the inte

activities and research of the various Departments and Agen

shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall ut

partmental intelligence for such production purposes. For de

see NSCID No. 3.3

5. a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall dissemin

tional Intelligence to the President, to members of the Nation

rity Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC Agencies, and 

Governmental Departments and Agencies as the National 

Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence so disse

shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies 

carry a statement of substantially differing opinions.

b. Unless otherwise provided by law or NSC Directive, 

rector of Central Intelligence is authorized to disseminate Nati

telligence on a strictly controlled basis to foreign governments 

ternational bodies upon determination by the Director of 

Intelligence, concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Commit

such action would substantially promote the security of the 

States; provided that any disclosure of classified military info

included in such national intelligence is in accordance with t

cies laid down in the U.S. National Disclosure Policy (MIC 2

such determination to be made by the Army, Navy, and Air Fo

provided further that any disclosure of FBI intelligence info

will be cleared with that Agency prior to dissemination.

6. Whenever any member of the Intelligence Advisory C

tee obtains information that indicates an impending crisis si

such as the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, o

dition which affects the security of the United States to such a

that immediate action or decision on the part of the Presiden

3 See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab

Document 426. 4 For a partial text of the National Disclosure Policy, see ibid., 1948, vol

p. 575.
National Security Council seems to be required, he shall imme

furnish the information to the other members of the Intelligen

visory Committee as well as to other officials or agencies as ma

dicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central Intelligen

immediately convene the Intelligence Advisory Committee. A

ceiving the views of the Intelligence Advisory Committee m

the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly prepare a

seminate the national intelligence estimate in accordance wit

graphs 4 and 5 above.

7. When Security Regulations of the originating Agency 

the Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate to the Fed

reau of Investigation and other Departments or Agencies inte

or intelligence information which he may possess when he deem

dissemination appropriate to their functions relating to the n

security.

8. The Director of Central Intelligence shall perform for t

efit of the existing intelligence Agencies such services of comm

cern to these Agencies as the National Security Council determi

be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

9. The intelligence organizations in each of the Departme

Agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency a

each other, as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a 

uing interchange of intelligence information and intelligence a

to them.

10. The intelligence files in each intelligence organization, 

ing the CIA, shall be made available under security regulation

Department or Agency concerned to the others for consultatio

11. The intelligence organizations within the limits of the

bilities shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may be re

by the Director of Central Intelligence or by one of the other 

ments or Agencies.

12. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make arrang

with the respective Departments and Agencies to assign to the 

Intelligence Agency such experienced and qualified officers an

bers as may be of advantage for advisory, operational, or other pu

in addition to such personnel as the Director of Central Intelligen

directly employ. In each case, such departmental personnel will 

ject to the necessary personnel procedures of each Department.
257. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 R

Washington, December 2

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 and Section 10

National Security Act of 1947,2 as amended, and to the Preside

rective approved October 24, 1952,3 which

a. Stated that the communications intelligence (COMINT

ties of the United States are a national responsibility, and that th

be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum th

able resources in all participating departments and agencies an

isfy the legitimate intelligence requirements of all such depa

and agencies;

b. Designated the Secretaries of State and Defense as a 

Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT, whic

mittee shall, with the assistance of the Director of Central Inte

establish policies governing COMINT activities, and keep th

dent advised of such policies through the Executive Secretar

National Security Council (The President in approving thi

tive also directed that the Attorney General shall be a membe

1 Source: Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File. Top S

March 10, 1950, version of NSCID No. 9, is Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Eme

the Intelligence Establishment, Document 435. For the original July 1, 1948, ve

ibid, Source note. This version was originally issued on October 24, 1952. (T

brary, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File) After its issuance, on October 

rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover wrote to Execu

tary of the National Security Council Lay with three “observations.” First, Hoo

the Attorney General should be a member of the Special Committee whenev

of interest to the FBI were before the Committee. Second, the right of the USC

vestigate and study the standards and practices of its member agencies” was 

Third, the authority of the NSA Director to “have direct access” and “technica

of “any elements” of the member agencies also was too broad (Ibid.) In his 

17 reply, Lay informed Hoover the decision of the Special Committee to amen

No. 9. There were three changes. First the sentence in parentheses at the end 

bular paragraph “b” was added. Second, in paragraph 1 d. (1) the Secretary o

and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were added to those 

given two votes. Finally, paragraph 4 was added. (Ibid.) Montague has an inte

count of the interagency sensitivities involved in this episode in General Wa

Smith As Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953, p. 253. 2 61 Stat. 495–510.

3 By memorandum of October 28, Executive Secretary of the Nationa

Council Lay informed the Secretaries of State and Defense that President Tru

approved this revised version of NSCID No. 9 on October 24. (Truman Libr

dent’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File)
Special Committee whenever matters of interest to the Federal 

of Investigation are before that Committee.); and

c. Further designated the Department of Defense as ex

agent of the Government, for the production of COMINT infor

the Special Committee of the National Security Council for CO

hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. Directive to the United States Communications Intelligenc

(USCIB).

a. USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and un

Special Committee, and shall operate in accordance with the pro

of this directive. Only those departments or agencies represe

USCIB are authorized to engage in COMINT activities.

b. The Board shall be composed of the following member

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be Chair

the Board.

(2) A representative of the Secretary of State.

(3) A representative of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) A representative of the Director of the Federal Bu

Investigation. (5) The Director of the National Security Agency (NSA).

(6) A representative of the Department of the Army.

(7) A representative of the Department of the Navy.

(8) A representative of the Department of the Air Force.

(9) A representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

c. The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive se

who shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of 

jority of the Board.

d. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make reco

dations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the follow

cedure, with respect to any matter relating to communications inte

which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of NSA:

(1) The Board shall reach its decision by a majority vot

member of the Board shall have one vote except the representa

the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of t

eral Bureau of Investigation, and of the Central Intelligence 

who shall each have two votes. The Director of Central Intellig

Chairman, will have no vote. In the event that the Board vo

reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board may 

from such decision within 7 days to the Special Committee. In th

that the Board votes but fails to reach a decision, any membe

Board may appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. In 

event the Special Committee shall review the matter, and its d

nation thereon shall be final. Appeals by the Director of NSA 

the representatives of the Military Departments shall only be fil

the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) If any matter is voted on by the Board but
(a) no decision is reached and any member files an a

(b) a decision is reached in which the representativ

Secretary of Defense does not concur and files an appeal;

no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until 

peal is decided, provided that, if the Secretary of Defense determ

ter consultation with the Secretary of State, that the subject ma

sents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediat

his decision shall govern, pending the result of the appeal. In 

emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the Pre

(3) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordan

the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Secretary of D

Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, th

tor of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance w

own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Def

(4) The Director of NSA shall make such reports and furn

information from time to time to the Board, either orally or in 

as the Board may request, and shall bring to the attention of th

either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or p

in advance of their adoption by him.

e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters no

within the jurisdiction of NSA:

(1) To coordinate the communications intelligence a

among all departments and agencies authorized by the Pres

participate therein; (2) To initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and subje

provisions of NSCID No. 5,4 to supervise all arrangements w

eign governments in the field of communications intelligence; 

(3) To consider and make recommendations concerning 

relating to communications intelligence of common interest to 

partments and agencies, including security standards and p

and, for this purpose, to investigate and study the standards an

tices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and pr

COMINT information.

f. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the ma

scribed in paragraph e above shall be binding on all departments 

cies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of th

bers of the Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, 

all, of the members of the Board shall be transmitted by it to the 

Committee for such action as the Special Committee may see fit 

g. The Board will meet monthly, or oftener at the call of th

man or any member, and shall determine its own procedures.

2. Directive to the Secretary of Defense.

a. Subject to the specific provisions of this directive, the S

of Defense may delegate in whole or in part authority over th

tor of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

4 Document 255.
b. The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency 

shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and contro

communications intelligence activities of the United States con

against foreign governments, and to provide for integrated ope

policies and procedures pertaining thereto. As used in this di

the terms “communications intelligence” or “COMINT” shall 

strued to mean all procedures and methods used in the intercep

communications other than foreign press and propaganda bro

and the obtaining of information from such communications b

than the intended recipients,5 but shall exclude censorship and 

duction and dissemination of finished intelligence.

c. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by 

retary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Sta

shall serve for a minimum term of 4 years and who shall be 

for reappointment. The Director shall be a career commission

cer of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and s

joy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency.

d. Under the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with ap

policies of USCIB, the Director of NSA shall be responsible for 

plishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT collect

production resources of the United States are placed under his 

tional and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the op

agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is re

the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COM

erations through them. However, due to the unique technical ch

of COMINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue direc

operating elements under his operational control task assignme

pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elem

accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and direct comm

tion with, any elements of the Service or civilian COMINT agen

any other matters of operational and technical control as may b

sary, and he is authorized to obtain such information and intellige

terial from them as he may require. All instructions issued by th

tor under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be man

subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of 

or head of civilian department or agency concerned.

e. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA inclu

following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies 

conduct of the U.S. COMINT activities.

5 See Public Law 513, 81st Congress, 1950. [Footnote in the original. P.L. 

13, 1950 (64 Stat. 159) deals with the safeguarding of communications in

information.]
(2) Conducting COMINT activities, including research 

velopment, as required to meet the needs of the departments an

cies which are authorized to receive the products of COMINT

(3) Determining, and submitting to appropriate authori

quirements for logistic support for the conduct of COMINT a

together with specific recommendations as to what each of the 

sible departments and agencies of the Government should sup

(4) Within NSA’s field of authorized operations prescrib

uisite security regulations covering operating practices, includ

transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT materia

and among the COMINT elements under his operational or t

control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervis

trol, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance w

regulations. (5) Subject to the authorities granted the Director of Cen

telligence under NSCID No. 5, conducting all liaison on COMIN

ters with foreign governmental communications intelligence a

f. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with t

of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, th

tor shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMIN

tions for which he is responsible. It is recognized that in cer

cumstances elements of the Armed Forces and other agencie

served will require close COMINT support. Where necessary 

close support, direct operational control of specified COMIN

ties and resources will be delegated by the Director, during su

ods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to milita

manders or to the Chiefs of other agencies supported.

g. The Director shall exercise such administrative cont

COMINT activities as he deems necessary to the effective perfo

of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of personnel 

cilities will remain with the departments and agencies providin

h. The Director shall make provision for participation b

sentatives of each of the departments and agencies eligible to 

COMINT products in those offices of NSA where priorities of i

and processing are finally planned.

i. The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose prim

sponsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective 

ment of the best available human and scientific resources in t

of cryptologic research and development.

j. Nothing in this directive shall contravene the responsib

the individual departments and agencies for the final evalu

COMINT information, its synthesis with information from 

sources, and the dissemination of finished intelligence to user

3. The special nature of COMINT activities requires that 

treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other 

eral intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies, or reco
dations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to 

lection, production, security, handling, dissemination, or utiliz

intelligence, and/or classified material, shall not be applic

COMINT activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by 

tent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board

National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director 

tral Intelligence and related implementing directives issued by 

rector of Central Intelligence shall be construed as non-applic

COMINT activities, unless the National Security Council has m

directive specifically applicable to COMINT.

4. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroac

or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the Federal Bu

Investigation in the field of internal security.

258. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1

Washington, March 

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National S

Act of 1947,2 as amended, and for the purposes enunciated i

graphs (d) and (c) thereof, the National Security Council her

thorizes and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure the co

tion of the procurement of foreign language publications for 

gence purposes, it being understood that captured documents 

cepted from this provision.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide, as a p

responsibility, for the following services to the IAC agencies.

a. Preparing and disseminating English language excerpt

maries, abstracts, and compilations from foreign language publi

b. Developing and maintaining indexes, accession lists, a

erence services regarding foreign language publications of inte

interest.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSCIDs. Confidential. NSCID No. 16 

NSC approval by memorandum action on March 7 (NSC Action No. 732). 

Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Acti

National Security Council) 2 61 Stat. 495–510.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure the co

tion of the above activities, as well as the coordination of tra

services, with similar activities maintained by the intelligence a

in accordance with their needs; such coordination shall not p

the maintenance of facilities necessary to meet departmental de

4. The intelligence agencies of the Government shall gran

Director of Central Intelligence, upon request, access to fore

guage publications in their possession.

5. An Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publ

shall be established to assist the Director of Central Intelligenc

implementation of this directive. It shall be composed of the IA

cies and other agencies of the Government will be invited to 

the Committee on matters which concern them.

259. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1

Washington, May 1

“ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE” (ELINT)

Pursuant to Sections 101 and 102, as amended, of the N

Security Act of 1947,2 The National Security Council authori

directs that:

The following organization and procedures are hereby esta

in order that Electronics Intelligence, hereinafter called ELINT, 

made most effective.

1. Definition: The term ELINT is defined as the collection 

vation and recording), and the technical processing for later inte

purposes, of information on foreign, non-communications, 

magnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic det

sources.

2. The USCIB, in addition to its authority and responsibilit

fined in NSCID #9,3 and operating under the procedures esta

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC In

Directives. Secret. NSCID No. 17 was approved by the NSC by memorandum 

May 16. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in N

17, except the FBI which had “no comment” on the directive. (Ibid.) 2 61 Stat. 495–510.

3 Document 257.
under paragraph 1-(f) of that Directive, shall be the nationa

body for ELINT, including policy in relation to the Technical P

ing Center provided by paragraph 4 below, arrangements with 

governments in the field of ELINT, and recommendations con

research and development requirements.

3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, the Dep

of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency shall be respons

their respective ELINT collection activities.

4. The technical processing of all ELINT shall be accompli

a center to be organized and administered by the Departmen

fense. However, parallel processing in the field may be accom

for essential immediate operational or tactical purposes. This 

shall be jointly staffed by individuals detailed from the Depart

Defense and the CIA in a proportion to be determined by th

tary of Defense and the DCI.

5. All data collected by the collection agencies shall be mad

able forthwith to the Technical Processing Center, subject only 

imum delays necessitated by prior exploitation in the field for 

tactical or operational purposes.

6. The Technical Processing Center shall effect fullest and m

peditious processing possible and furnish the results thereof to 

terested Departments and agencies, and to the extent practicabl

form desired by them.
Acheson, Dean:

CIA budget issues, 30

CIA changes made at request of NSC,

110

Economic intelligence relating to

national security, 144

Europe (Eastern), 144

National Intelligence Surveys, 41

Psychological warfare planning, 49

Soviet Union, 144

Ackerman, Gen. John B., 136

Adams, Sherman, 248

Advisory Committee on Government

Organization, 210

Aerial/photo reconnaissance:

Air Force, recommendations made by

U.S., 102

Balloons used in, 164, 229, 240, 242,

249

Dulles’s (John F.) assessments, 240,

242

Eisenhower authorizes production of

thirty high performance aircraft,

199

Eisenhower-Dulles (Allen W.)

communications, 197, 198

Foreign Information Program, 146,

155

Lockheed-Air Force (U.S.) meetings,

196

NSC Papers:

NSC 142, 146

NSC 161, 155

NSC 5509, 209

Project Genetrix, 229

Project Grayback, 240, 249

Smith’s (Walter B.) assessments, 164

Technological Capabilities Panel, 194

Africa, 61, 125, 127, 155

Agricultural reporting, 209

Agriculture Department, U.S. (USDA),

220

Ainsworth, Donald H., 175

Air America, 15

Air Force, U.S.:

Aerial/photo reconnaissance, 102,

164, 194, 196, 198, 199, 229, 242

Air Force, U.S.—Continued

Collection (intelligence) requ

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organiza

the Executive Branch of 

Government, 220, 221, 2

Cryptographic systems, 251

Disclosure of classified milit

information, 255

Electronic intelligence, 230

Europe (Eastern), 142

Missiles, guided, 225

NSC-Air Force relations, 256

NSCID 1, 256

Project Genetrix, 229

Project Grayback, 240, 241, 2

Psychological warfare plann

213

Search projects, special electr

airborne, 6

Soviet Union’s capability to 

U.S., evaluating the, 173

Warning facilities of the inte

community, information

recommendations conce

234

Watch Committee, IAC, 91, 2

Air Objective Folder Program (

209

Air Resupply and Communica

(ARC) Wing program, 147

Air Technical Intelligence Cent

(ATIC), 202

Albania, 59, 190

Aliens into U.S. for intelligence

operational purposes, 206

Allen, Raymond B., 104

American Committee for Freed

15

Amory, Robert, Jr., 115, 137, 17

177, 193, 228

Anderson, Dillon, 214, 241

Anderson, Robert B., 230

Appleton, John B., 41

Armas, Carlos C., 154

Armed Forces Security Agency 

21, 40, 99, 121

Index

References are to document numbers
Armstrong, W. Park, Jr., 9, 19, 35, 39,

115, 175, 197, 233, 243

Aerial/photo reconnaissance, 229

Bureau of the Budget’s study for

coordinating economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210

Central Intelligence Agency:

Board of Consultants on Foreign

Intelligence Activities, 247

Budget issues, 30

Changes made at CIA in response

to requests from NSC, 110

Defense Department-CIA relations,

204

State Department-CIA relations, 24,

46

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 236, 241

Covert operations, 70, 71

Foreign Service, 159

Intelligence Advisory Committee,

policies and procedures of the,

29

Missiles, guided, 225

National Intelligence Estimates, 37

NSC Paper 50, 110

Office of Special Operations, 24

Psychological warfare planning, 59

Scientific/technical intelligence, 

112

Soviet Union’s capability to injure the

U.S., evaluating the, 172

State Department-Defense

Department Staff Study on

intelligence, 22

Troy Report, 59

Army, U.S.:

CIA–Army relations, 95

Collection (intelligence) requirements,

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220, 221, 251

Communications intelligence, 99

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 213

Cryptographic systems, 251

Disclosure of classified military

information, 256

Army, U.S.—Continued

NSC-Army relations, 256

NSC Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 1, 256

NSCID 5, 95

Psychological warfare plann

213

Watch Committee, IAC, 91, 

Ashcraft, 50

Asia, Southeast:

Aid/personnel to, American

Air Resupply and Commun

Wing program, 147

Committee for a Free Asia, 1

Covert activities, 68

Foreign Information Program

Psychological warfare plann

NSC Paper 135, 127

Progress report (PSB) as o

1, 1952, 125

Progress report (PSB) as o

30, 1952, 133

Progress report (PSB) as o

5, 1953, 143

Progress report (PSB) as o

1953, 153

Radio Free Asia, 94

Troy Report, 59

War plans, CIA/OPC strateg

Assessing the Soviet Threat: The 

Cold War Years (Kuhns), 12

Atkins, George, 217

Atomic Energy Commission (A

207, 218, 221, 225

Atomic energy/war/weapons

155, 209, 251

Attaché system, military, 202, 

221

Ault, J.M., 217

Austria, 127, 234

Ayers, Fred, 164, 196

Babbitt, Theodore, 27

Bacteriological warfare, 124

Bahrein Petroleum Company, 

Baker, James G., 194, 198

Balloons used for aerial/photo

reconnaissance, 164, 229, 2

249

Balloons used for propaganda, 

Balmer, Gen. Jesmond D., 108, 

167, 205

Barbour, Walworth, 94, 118, 14

Barnard, John L., 37, 41

References are to document numbers
Barnes, C. Tracy, 104, 129

Barnes, Robert G., 48, 218, 236

Barrett, Edward W., 7, 26, 52, 78

Crusade for Freedom, 100

Psychological warfare planning:

Cabinet Committee, 47

Interdepartmental Foreign

Information Organization, 57

Psychological Strategy Board, 67,

74

Supervise, debate on who should,

49

Troy Report, 59

Radio Free Europe, 94

Voice of America, 94

Barry, James P., 175

Batlin, Alexander, 244

Belmont, Alan H., 245

Benjamin, Donald F., 175

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., 236

Beria, Lavrenty, 161

Berle, Adolph, 94

Berry, J. Lampton, 130, 145

Bieri, B.M., 189

Biographic information on foreign

personalities, 146, 155, 206

Biological warfare, 209

Bishop, Max, 210

Bissell, Richard, 31, 193, 205

Boggs, Marion W., 187

Bohlen, Charles, 85, 96, 106

Bohn, John T., 229

Bohnaker, W.J., 57

Bolling, Gen. A.R., 35, 65

Borel, Paul, 115

Bowie, Robert R., 187, 210

Braden, Thomas, 94, 100

Bradley, Gen. Omar N.:

CIA–Defense Department relations,

54, 56

Covert operations, 83

Search operations, special electronic

airborne, 6

Security of the United States, project

to provide a more adequate basis

for planning the, 80

Soviet Union’s capability to injure the

U.S., evaluating the, 138, 148, 149

Support bases, overseas CIA

logistical, 140

Taiwan and China, conflict between,

106

British Broadcasting Company, 146

Broadcast monitoring, foreign, 24

Brownell, George A., 99

Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 206

Brownell Committee Report, 99

Bruce, David, 247

Oil issues, 105

Psychological warfare plann

Cold War, 139

NSC Paper 10/5, 139

Progress Report (State Dep

as of May 7, 1952, 109

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Commit

124

Smith’s (Walter B.)

recommendations to

consolidate/strengthe

PSB, 135

Soviet Union’s capability to 

U.S., evaluating the, 138

Buford, Sidney, III., 234

Bulgaria, 190

Bull, Gen. Harold R., 150, 172, 

176, 177

Bundy, William P., 115, 149, 172

Bureau of European Affairs, 37

Bureau of the Budget, 52, 92, 2

213

Burgin, Miron, 172

Buying, organized/coordinated

program of covert preclus

116

Cabell, Gen. Charles P., 29, 106

168, 172, 174, 196, 199, 205

Aerial/photo reconnaissance

Missiles, guided, 225, 245

Project Grayback, 249

U.S. Information Agency, 209

Cameron, Angus, 214

Campaign of Truth, 69

Canine, Maj. Ralph J., 29, 121, 

Carpenter, Issac W., 210

Central Intelligence Agency (C

also Dulles, Allen W.; Forei

Information Program; Inte

Advisory Committee; Ope

Coordinating Board; Psych

warfare planning; Smith, W

Aerial/photo reconnaissance

194, 196

Army (U.S.)-CIA relations, 9

Board of Consultants on For

Intelligence Activities, 2

Budget issues, 24, 30, 111

References are to document numbers
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Continued

Buildings/offices, improving, 205

Central Intelligence Act of 1949, 220,

221, 251

Central Intelligence Group, 221

Collection (intelligence) requirements,

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 186, 220, 221, 234,

236, 239, 251

Communications intelligence, 107

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210, 213

Cover problems, 205

Covert operations (see also Office of

Policy Coordination and Office of

Special Operations below):

Aliens into U.S. for

intelligence/operational

purposes, 206

Commission on the Organization

of the Executive Branch of the

Government, 251

Doolittle Report, 184, 185, 188, 192,

193, 205

JCS’s assessments, 83

Johnson’s (Louis) support of, 1

Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, 

93

Joyce’s assessments, 145

NSCID 5, 255

NSC 5412, 171

NSC 5412/1, 212

NSC 5412/2, 250

Planning Coordination Group to be

advised before operations

initiated by CIA, 212

Policy Planning Staff’s

assessments, 145

Private organizations/businesses

used by, 15

Scope and pace of, 68, 70, 83

Support bases, overseas logistical,

140

Watch Committee, IAC, 3

Crusade for Freedom, 100

Current Intelligence Bulletin, 51, 53

Daily Summary, 48, 53

Defectors, using/exploiting, 107, 

253

Central Intelligence Agency (C

Continued

Defense Department-CIA re

Budget/finance/personne

34

Director of Central Intellig

Directive 5/1, 204

Doolittle Report, 205

Dulles (Allen W.)-Kyes

communications, 165

Marshall’s (George C.) an

U.S. intelligence, 32

Smith (Walter B.)-Bradley

communications, 54, 

Director of Central Intelligen

Directives: 

DCID 1/2, 179, 187, 202

DCID 3/3, 126

DCID 3/4, 126, 155, 172, 2

DCID 4/1, 200

DCID 4/2, 25, 202

DCID 4/3, 200, 209

DCID 4/4, 200, 201

DCID 4/5, 238

DCID 5/1, 204

DCID 14/1, 18

DCID 15/1, 169, 191

Duties and responsibilities, 

ECA–CIA relations, 31

Economic intelligence relatin

national security, 72, 14

Electronic intelligence, 230, 

Europe (Eastern), 144

Foreign Service, 159

Guerrilla warfare, 75

Interdepartmental Economic

Intelligence Committee, 

International Information A

Committee, 151, 153, 17

Japan, 101

JCS–CIA relations, 77, 176, 2

Joyce’s assessments, 145

Korean War, 12

Kyes’s assessments, 165

Maritime sources for intellig

purposes, exploitation o

Middle East, 105

National Intelligence Estima

Net intelligence estimates of 

capabilities/intentions o

nations, 177, 189

NSC–CIA relations, 8, 107, 1

NSC Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 1, 256

References are to document numbers
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—

Continued

NSC Intelligence Directives—

Continued

NSCID 5, 255

NSCID 13, 252

NSCID 14, 253

NSCID 16, 258

NSCID 17, 259

NSC Papers:

NSC 26/2, 84

NSC 50, 110

NSC 174, 190

NSC 5525, 234

Office of National Estimates, 27, 107

Office of Policy Coordination:

Acheson-Barrett communications,

49

Budget estimates/studies, 8

CIA–OPC relations, 96, 130, 145

Covert operations, 108

Economic intelligence relating to

national security, 92

Europe (Eastern), 71

Expansion of, 145

Guerrilla warfare, 42

Intelligence Advisory Committee,

policies and procedures of the,

29

Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, 93

Korean War, 12

NSC Paper 10/2, 111

NSC Paper 10/5, 108

NSC Paper 68, 8

Office of Special Operations,

merging with, 50, 130

Personnel problems, 71

Poland, U.S. spies captured in, 142

Policy guidance, 7, 26

Political background, 145

Private organizations/businesses,

using, 15

PSB–OPC relations, 96

Radio Free Asia, 94

Scope of operations, increased, 70

State Department-CIA relations, 24

State Department-OPC relations,

129

Taiwan and China, conflict

between, 71

United States, policy governing

conduct within the, 33

War plans, OPC/CIA strategic, 61,

111

Central Intelligence Agency (C

Continued

Office of Reports and Estima

Office of Research and Repo

Office of Special Operations:

Armstrong’s assessments, 

Commission on the Organ

of the Executive Branc

Government, 221

Doolittle Report, 192

History of the organization

Joint Subsidiary Plans Div

Office of Policy Coordinat

merging with, 50, 130

Reorganization, 152

Office of Special Projects, 4

Operational planning,

interrelationship betwee

intelligence and, 107

Pearl Harbor, surprise attack 

Planning, long-range, 205

Planning Coordination Grou

relations, 212, 237, 246

Polygraph program, 205

Priority National Intelligence

Objectives, 25, 238

Problems facing, 23, 29

Publication procurement, for

258

Radio Free Europe, 94

Satellites, developing/using, 

Scientific/technical intelligen

112, 120, 126, 155

Security, NSC’s status report

national:

June 30, 1952, 127

December 31, 1953, 170

June 30, 1955, 234

Security clearances, operatio

Security of the United States

to provide a more adequ

for planning the, 80, 107

131

Soviet Union:

Aerial/photo reconnaissan

Capability to injure the U.

evaluating the, 80, 131

207

Director of Central Intellig

Directive 15/1, 169

REDCAP program, 87

REDSKIN program, 87

REDSOX program, 87

Satellites, developing/usin

References are to document numbers
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—

Continued

Soviet Union—Continued

Sovmat Program (Soviet materials),

217

State Department-CIA relations:

Armstrong’s assessments, 24

Daily Summary, 48

Jackson (William H.)-Armstrong

communications, 46

Joyce’s assessments, 129

Memorandum of agreement, 34, 51

State Department-Defense

Department Staff Study on

intelligence, 20

Taiwan and China, conflict between,

106

Technological Capabilities Panel, 

223

Training issues, 205

Voice of America, 94, 107

Warning facilities of the intelligence

community, information/

recommendations concerning, 186

War plans, OPC/CIA strategic, 61,

111

Watch Committee, IAC, 91, 107,

189

Chadwell, H. Marshall, 172, 175, 225

Chennault, Claire, 15

China, Communist (see also China,

conflict with under Taiwan), 234

Civil Air Transport’s application for

commercial rights in Okinawa,

101

Collection (intelligence) requirements,

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220, 221, 234

Covert operations to wartime needs,

conversion of peacetime, 61

Director of Central Intelligence

Directives:

DCID 4/4, 201

DCID 4/5, 238

Foreign Information Program, 146,

155

Intelligence objectives, Smith’s

(Walter B.) priority list of critical

national, 117

NSC Papers:

NSC 5412/1, 212

NSC 5509, 209

China, Communist—Continued

Operations Coordinating Bo

Psychological warfare plann

59, 92, 125, 153

Security Council, admission 

Troy Report, 59

Christiansen, Gen. J.G., 220

CIA. See Central Intelligence A

CIA Under Harry Truman, The 

29, 42, 90, 251, 255

Civil Air Transport (CAT), 101

Civil War, U.S., 59

Clark, Mark W., 184, 185, 220

Clark, Ralph, 115

Clark Task Force of the Hoove

Commission. See Commis

the Organization of the Ex

Branch of the Governmen

Clausewitz, Carl von, 59

Coast Guard, U.S., 79

Colby, Walter F., 29, 35

Cold War:

Air Resupply and Commun

Wing program, 147

Commission on the Organiz

the Executive Branch of 

Government, 251

Joyce’s assessments, 142

NSC Paper 162/2, 163

Psychological warfare plann

129, 133, 139

Real war, Cold War operatio

preparation for, 70

Smith’s (Walter B.) recomme

to consolidate/strength

PSB, 129

Support bases, overseas CIA

logistical, 140

Collection and Liaison Divisio

Office of Research and Int

226

Collins, J. Lawton, 21

Commerce Department, U.S., 7

Commission on the Organizat

Executive Branch of the

Government:

Air Force, U.S., 220, 221, 234

Army, U.S., 220, 221, 251

Atomic energy, 251

Central Intelligence Agency, 

221, 234, 236, 239, 251

China, Communist, 200, 221

Communications intelligenc

251

References are to document numbers
Commission on the Organization of the

Executive Branch of the

Government—Continued

Cost of the intelligence effort, 220

Covert operations, 251

Defense Department, U.S., 220, 239,

251

Dulles (Allen W.)-Armstrong

communications, 236, 241

Eisenhower-Doolittle

communications, 185

Europe (Eastern), 220, 251

Evolution of foreign intelligence, 221,

251

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 220,

221, 251

Functional intelligence, 251

Hoover Commission, First (1948), 220

Intelligence, defining, 220, 221

Introduction, 221

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 221, 251

Library facilities, 221, 251

Map procurement, 221, 251

National Security Council, 200, 221,

234

Navy, U.S., 220, 221, 251

NSC Paper 5525, 234

Office of Special Operations, 221

Office of the Coordinator of

Information, 221

Organization of the task force, 220,

221

Origins of, 184

Personnel, 251

Positive foreign intelligence, 220

Scientific/technical intelligence, 251

Scope of the task force, 221

Security clearances, operational, 251

Sensitive data and a need-to-know

basis, 220

Soviet Union, 220, 221, 234, 251

State Department, U.S., 221, 251

Summary/conclusions, 221, 251

Committee for a Free Asia, 15, 94

Communications intelligence

(COMINT) (see also Electronic

intelligence):

Brownell Committee Report, 99, 121

Central Intelligence Agency, 107

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220, 251

Doolittle Report, 192

Expansion of, 19

Communications intelligence

(COMINT)—Continued

Lay-Hoover (J. Edgar)

communications, 141

NSCID 9, 136, 257

Smith’s (Walter B.) assessme

Truman’s assessments, 132

Communications Intelligence B

U.S. (USCIB), 19, 121, 132, 

257, 259

Communism outside the Sovie

146, 155, 214

Compton, Wilson S., 96

Congress for Cultural Freedom

Connolly, Adm. Richard E., 220

Connors, W. Bradley, 57

Conway, Rose A., 63

Cooper, Chester, 115

Covert operations (see also

Psychological warfare plan

under Central Intelligence 

and National Security Cou

individual subject headings), 

Coyne, J. Patrick, 79, 205, 214, 

Crespi, Leo, 226

Crusade for Freedom, 94, 100

Cryptographic systems, 121, 25

Current Intelligence Bulletin, 53, 

Cutler, Robert, 160, 161, 173, 17

205, 210, 211, 213

Czechoslovakia, 92, 100, 153, 1

Daniel, Adm. H.C., 172, 175

Davison, Phillips, 67

Dees, Joe, 226

Defectors, using/exploiting:

Intelligence Advisory Comm

202, 252, 253

Interagency Defector Comm

NSC Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 13, 252

NSCID 14, 253

NSC Papers:

NSC 86/1, 107

NSC 5509, 209

Psychological warfare plann

REDCAP program, 87

State Department-CIA relatio

Troy Report, 59

Defense Department, U.S. (see 

Defense and Office of Spec

Operations under Central

Intelligence Agency):

Aerial/photo reconnaissance

References are to document numbers
Defense Department, U.S.—Continued

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220, 239, 251

Communications intelligence, 132,

257

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210, 213

Covert operations:

JCS’s assessments, 83

NSC 10/2, 171

NSC 10/5, 171

NSC 5412, 171

NSC 5412/1, 212

NSC 5412/2, 250

Electronic intelligence, 230

European migrants, 127

NSC Intelligence Directive 9, 257

Psychological warfare planning, 28,

124, 125, 129, 135

Soviet Union’s capability to injure the

U.S., evaluating the, 173

State Department-Defense

Department study on

intelligence, 20, 22

Taiwan and China, conflict between,

106

Technological Capabilities Panel, 223

Watch Committee, IAC, 107

DeFlorez, Adm. Luis, 122

DeLoach, C.D., 35

Devine, John E., 94, 100

Dill, Bruce, 244

Director of Central Intelligence

Directives (DCID). See under

Central Intelligence Agency.

Disclosure of classified military

information, 256

Dodge, Joseph M., 174, 210

Doolittle, Gen. James H., 184, 185, 192,

193, 205, 247

Doolittle Report, 184, 185, 188, 192, 193,

205

Drain, Richard D., 115, 172, 175

DuBridge, L.A., 122

Duff, Gen. Robinson E., 136

Dulles, Allen W., 100, 160, 166, 196, 215,

216, 243

Aerial/photo reconnaissance, 164,

197, 198

Air Resupply and Communications

Wing program, 147

Dulles, Allen W.—Continued

Aliens into U.S. for intellige

operational purposes, 2

Appointment as director of 

Intelligence Agency, 145

Board of Consultants on For

Intelligence Activities, 2

Bull, communications with, 

Bureau of the Budget’s stud

coordinating economic/

psychological/political 

and foreign information

activities, 210

CIA changes made at reques

110

Commission on the Organiz

the Executive Branch of 

Government, 220, 221, 2

Comprehensive National In

Objectives, 200

Covert operations, 43, 205

Crusade for Freedom, 94

Defense Department-CIA re

165

Director of Central Intelligen

Directive 4/5, 238

Economic intelligence requir

relating to national secu

Eisenhower-Doolittle meetin

Europe (Eastern), 167, 174

Foreign persons/materials i

U.S., 214

JCS–CIA relations, 176

Missiles, guided, 225, 245

Net intelligence estimates of 

capabilities/intentions o

nations, 150

NSC Intelligence Directive 5

NSC Papers:

NSC 10/2, 162

NSC 10/5, 162

Office of Policy Coordinatio

Office of Special Operat

merging the, 50

Priority National Intelligenc

Objectives, 201, 238

Project Grayback, 241

Psychochemicals, 244

Psychological warfare plann

78

Radio Free Europe, 94

Soviet Union, 149, 161, 172

State Department intelligenc

assessments of, 228

References are to document numbers
Dulles, Allen W.—Continued

Superpower competition, 195

Taiwan and China, conflict between,

106

Technological Capabilities Panel, 223

Voice of America, 94

Warning facilities of the intelligence

community,

information/recommendations

concerning, 187

Watch Committee, IAC, 175

Dulles, John F.:

Aerial/photo reconnaissance, 199,

240, 242, 249

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 227

Covert operations, 212

Project Grayback, 240, 242, 249

Rockefeller and, relations between, 232

East, Near/Far (see also Asia, Southeast;

Middle East), 68, 92

Easton, John, 172

ECA. See Economic Cooperation

Administration.

Economic Cooperation Administration

(ECA), 28, 31

Economic Defense Advisory

Committee, 116

Economic Intelligence Committee:

Collection (intelligence) requirements,

coordination of, 202

Director of Central Intelligence

Directive 15/1, 169, 191

Foreign Information Program, 155

NSC 5509, 209

Smith’s (Walter B.) assessments, 107

Terms of reference for, 72

Economic intelligence relating to

national security:

Collection (intelligence) requirements,

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210, 213, 248, 254

Director of Central Intelligence

Directive 15/1, 169, 191

Europe (Eastern), 144

Economic intelligence relating 

national security—Continu

Foreign Information Program

155

Jackson’s (William H.) assess

73

NSC Action 1183, 187

NSC Intelligence Directive 1

NSC Papers:

NSC 142, 146

NSC 161, 155

NSC 5509, 209

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Committe

Soviet Union, 144, 169, 191

Ecuador, 153

Eden, Anthony, 229, 242

Edwards, Gen. Idwal H., 149, 1

189

Edwards Report, 149

Efteland, Robert G., 82

Eisenhower, Dwight D.:

Aerial/photo reconnaissance

198, 199, 229, 240, 242, 2

Board of Consultants on For

Intelligence Activities, 2

Cold War, 163

Commission on the Organiza

the Executive Branch of 

Government, 184, 185, 2

239, 251

Communist movement in th

214

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political w

and foreign information

activities, 210, 213, 248

Covert operations, 171

Doolittle, meetings with, 193

Doolittle Report, 184, 185, 19

Dulles (John F.)-Rockefeller r

232

Economic intelligence relatin

national security, 187

Europe (Eastern), 174

Executive Orders:

10450, 251

10483, 157, 158, 171, 208, 2

10598, 208

10700, 248

Foreign persons/materials in

U.S., 214

International Information Ac

Committee, 151, 153, 173

References are to document numbers
Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued

Net Evaluation Subcommittee, 207

NSC Papers:

NSC 59/1, 2, 187

NSC 127/1, 2, 187

Operations Coordinating Board, 157,

158, 183, 208, 210

Planning Coordination Group, 246

Project Grayback, 242, 249

Psychological warfare planning, 2,

187

Quantico Panel I/II, 224

Soviet Union’s capability to injure the

U.S., evaluating the, 207

Taiwan and China, conflict between,

211

Technological Capabilities Panel, 223

Warning facilities of the intelligence

community, information/

recommendations concerning,

187

Watch Committee, IAC, 218

Electronic intelligence (ELINT):

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 251

Communications Intelligence Board,

U.S., 259

Defense Department’s assessments,

230

NSCID 17, 259

NSC 5509, 209

Search operations, special electronic

airborne, 6

Erskine, Gen. Graves, 152, 164, 165, 

215

Espe, Adm. Carl F., 197, 225, 245

Europe (Eastern):

Collection (intelligence) requirements,

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220, 221, 251

Covert operations, 68

Defectors, using/exploiting, 252, 253

Director of Central Intelligence

Directives:

DCID 4/4, 201

DCID 4/5, 238

Doolittle Report, 192

Economic intelligence relating to

national security, 144, 191

Explosives/demolition materials,

OCB and the stockpiling of, 167

Europe (Eastern)—Continued

Foreign Information Program

155

Foreign persons/materials i

U.S., 214

Free Europe Committee, 188

Joyce’s assessments, 142

National Committee for Fre

15, 26, 94, 100

NSC Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 13, 252

NSCID 14, 253

NSC Papers:

NSC 174, 190

NSC 5509, 209

Office of Research and Intel

226

Provisional Committee for t

Movement of Migrants 

Europe, 127

Psychological warfare plann

142, 143, 153

Quantico Panel I/II, 224

Radio Free Europe, 15, 68, 9

125, 188

Satellites, developing/using

Search operations, special el

airborne, 6

Security, NSC’s status repor

national, 127

Smith’s (Walter B.) assessme

State Department personnel

Dulles’s (Allen W.) requ

increase in, 228

Surveillance of Soviet Bloc d

representatives, 174

Troy Report, 59

Uprisings in, policy guidelin

CIA Planning to capital

167

Volunteer Freedom Corps, 1

Warning facilities of the inte

community, information

recommendations conce

186

War plans, CIA/OPC strateg

Europe (Western):

Covert operations, 68

Foreign Information Program

155

National Committee for Fre

15, 26, 94, 100

Psychological warfare plann

133, 153

References are to document numbers
Europe (Western)—Continued

Security, NSC’s status report on

national, 127

Troy Report, 59

War plans, CIA/OPC strategic, 61

European Defense Community (EDC),

178

Evans, Allan, 35, 175

Executive Orders:

10450, 251

10483, 157, 158, 208, 248, 250

10598, 208

10700, 248

Export of strategic materials, authority

to control the, 79

External Research Division of the Office

of Research and Intelligence, 226

Facilities Protection Board, 79

Fairless, Benjamin, 247

False Witness (Matusow), 214

FBI. See Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

Fechteler, Adm. William M., 106

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(see also Hoover, J. Edgar):

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220, 221, 251

Defectors, using/exploiting, 253

Europe (Eastern), 174

NSC–FBI relations, 256

NSC Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 1, 256

NSCID 14, 253

Watch Committee, IAC, 91, 218

Federal Civil Defense Administration

(FCDA), 131, 172, 173, 207

Federal Communication Commission

(FCC), 79

Fenili, Vasco J., 172, 175, 225

Ferguson, John H., 96, 106

Finan, William F., 78

Fitzpatrick, Dick, 226

Fleming, Arthur S., 173

Flickinger, Don D., 244

Ford, Harold, 115

Foreign Broadcast Information Division

(FBID), 202

Foreign Information Program 

(see also Psychological warfare

planning):

Aerial reconnaissance, 146, 155

Africa, 155

Foreign Information Program—

Continued

Armed forces intelligence, 14

Asia, Southeast, 155

Biographic information, 146, 

China, Communist, 146, 155

Collection, 146, 155

Communism, world, 155

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political w

and foreign information

activities, 146, 155, 210, 

Domestic collection, 146, 155

Economic intelligence, 146, 1

Europe (Eastern), 146, 155

Europe (Western), 146, 155

Foreign language publication

Foreign Service, 155

Geographic intelligence, 146, 

Industrialization information

Japan, 155

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 146

Korean War, 155

Latin America, 155

Library facilities, 146, 155

Map procurement and refere

service, 155

Materials/equipment, foreig

National Intelligence Estima

155

National Intelligence Surveys

National Security Council’s

assessments, 2, 128

North Atlantic Treaty Organ

146, 155

NSC Papers:

NSC 161, 155

NSC 5509, 209

Operations Coordinating Boa

taking over functions of

Order of battle intelligence a

equipment, 155

Overseas commands, 146, 15

Photographs and motion pic

films, 146, 155

Political/social/cultural inte

146, 155

Radio, 146, 155

Scientific/technical intelligen

155

Service Attaché System, 146, 

Soviet Union, 146, 155

Support and collation faciliti

155

References are to document numbers
Foreign Information Program—

Continued

Targeting, 146, 155

Travel folder program, 155

Watch Committee, IAC, 155

Foreign Operations Administration, 

210

Foreign persons/materials into the U.S.,

206, 214

Foreign Service, 155, 159, 209

Formosa. See Taiwan.

Fosdick, Dorothy, 96

Foster, William C., 31, 137

France, 100, 125, 127, 153

Franke, William B., 185, 192, 205

Free Europe Committee (FEC), 188

Furnas, Howard, 225

Gaither, Gen. Ridgely, 245

Gardner, Trevor, 196, 249

General Services Administration (GSA),

79

General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of

Central Intelligence (Montague), 23,

29, 63, 257

Geographic intelligence, 146, 155

Germany (East), 92, 127, 153, 190

Germany (West), 92, 127, 153, 190, 229,

234, 242

Gibbons, Willis A., 122

Gillis, Charles F., 115, 172

Gleason, S. Everett, 76, 131, 207, 234

Godel, William H., 160

Goodpaster, Andrew, 199, 241, 249

Gray, Gordon, 78, 82, 85

Great Britain, 84, 100, 124, 145, 153, 229,

242, 249

Greece, 127, 139, 153, 190

Greene, L. Wilson, 244

Greenstein, J.L., 122

Guatemala, 154, 209

Guthe, Otto, 217, 225

Guzman, Jacobo A., 154

Hadley, Morris, 185, 192, 247

Hanes, John W., Jr., 229

Harriman, W. Averell, 31, 144

Harvey, Mose L., 115

Healey, Lawrence, 175, 225

Helms, Richard, 50, 103, 167, 205

Henderson, Loy, 210, 236

Henderson, Malcolm C., 29, 115

Hillenkoetter, Adm. Roscoe, 10, 11

Communications intelligence, 19

Hillenkoetter, Adm. Roscoe—C

Defector Committee, Interag

Intelligence objectives, prior

critical national, 25

Office of Special Projects, 4

State Department-Defense

Department Staff Study 

intelligence, 20, 22

Hong Kong Press Monitoring 

202

Hooker, Robert J., 110

Hoover, E.M., 189

Hoover, Herbert, 184, 185, 220

Hoover, Herbert, Jr.:

Bureau of the Budget’s stud

coordinating economic/

psychological/political 

and foreign information

activities, 210

Doolittle Report, 188

Foreign persons/materials i

U.S., 214

Planning Coordination Grou

246

Watch Committee, IAC, 218

Hoover, J. Edgar, 115

Communications intelligence

Communist movement in the 

Emergency situation, action 

16

Interdepartmental Intelligen

Committee, 65, 66

NSCID 9, 257

Hoover Commission. See Comm

the Organization of the Ex

Branch of the Government

Hopkins, Armand, 82

Horsey, Outerbridge, 145

Houston, Lawrence, 23, 168

Howe, Fisher, 13, 29, 39, 118, 1

236, 249

Howze, Hamilton, 29

Hughes, John, 94

Hughes, Rowland R., 210, 235

Hulick, Charles E., Jr., 26, 188

Hull, Gen. John E., 106, 247

Humelsine, Carlisle, H., 7, 13, 

34, 45, 47

Hungary, 190

IAC. See Intelligence Advisory

Committee.

Immigration and Naturalizatio

Service, 79, 206

References are to document numbers
Indochina, 92

Industrial information/security, 79, 155

Industry Evaluation Board, 79

Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC)

(see also Commission on the

Organization of the Executive

Branch of the Government):

CIA, problems facing the, 23

Collection (intelligence) requirements,

coordination of, 202

Communications intelligence, 19

Defectors, using/exploiting, 202, 218,

252, 253

Director of Central Intelligence

Directive 4/5, 238

Duties and responsibilities, 256

Economic Intelligence Committee, 72,

155, 169, 191, 202

Economic intelligence relating to

national security, 144

Europe (Eastern), 144

Foreign Service, 159

Interagency Defector Committee, 18

Interdepartmental Committee on

Internal Security, 79

Meetings:

October 20, 1950, 29

December 7, 1950, 35

June 5, 1952, 115

March 16, 1954, 172

May 4, 1954, 175

December 20, 1954, 202

June 14, 1955, 225

Missiles, guided, 225, 245

National Indications Committee/

Center, 186, 211, 234

National Intelligence Estimates, 29, 155

National Security Act of 1947, 29

NSC Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 1, 256

NSCID 13, 252

NSCID 14, 253

NSC Paper 5525, 234

Policies and procedures, 29

Political/social/cultural intelligence,

155

Priority National Intelligence

Objectives, 209

Scientific/technical intelligence, 126

Security, NSC’s status report on

national, 234

Security of the United States, project

to provide a more adequate basis

for planning the, 80

Intelligence Advisory Committ

(IAC)—Continued

SNIE 11–8–54, 209

Soviet Union (see also Watch

Committee, IAC under S

Union), 80, 115, 131, 172

State Department-CIA relatio

Warning facilities of the inte

community, information

recommendations conce

186, 187, 209

Intelligence Communications a

Electronics Subcommittee 

251

Intelligence Estimates. See Nati

Intelligence Estimates; Spe

National Intelligence Estim

Intelligence Working Group (IW

144

Interagency Defector Committe

Interdepartmental Committee o

Internal Security (ICIS):

NSC Meeting, May 5, 1955, 2

NSC Paper 5511, 207

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Committe

Psychological Strategy Board

Security of the United States

to provide a more adequ

for planning the, 79, 80, 

Soviet Union’s capability to 

U.S., evaluating the, 80, 

138, 173, 207

Interdepartmental Coordinatin

(ICS), 213

Interdepartmental Economic

Intelligence Committee, 10

Interdepartmental Foreign Info

Organization (IFIO), 57, 92

Interdepartmental Foreign Info

Staff (IFIS), 28, 213

Interdepartmental Intelligence

Committee (IIC):

Hoover’s (J. Edgar) assessme

66

NSC Action 543, 86

NSC Meeting, May 5, 1955, 2

Smith’s (Walter B.) assessme

66

Soviet Union’s capability to 

U.S., evaluating the, 131

138, 173, 207

International Broadcasting Div

(IBD), 94

References are to document numbers
International Information Activities

Committee, 151, 153, 173, 189

International Information

Administration (IIA), 226

International Information and

Educational Exchange, 69

Iran, 143, 153, 209

Italy, 125, 127, 139, 153

Jackson, C.D., 158, 160, 161, 248

Jackson, William H., 35, 85, 88, 99, 

142

Bureau of the Budget’s study for

coordinating economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210

CIA changes made at request of NSC,

110

Covert operations, 68

Crusade for Freedom, 100

Defense Department-CIA relations, 34

ECA–CIA relations, 31

Economic intelligence relating to

national security, 73

Guerrilla warfare, 42

Intelligence Advisory Committee,

policies and procedures of the,

29

National Intelligence Estimates, 29

Office of Special Operations, 87

State Department-CIA relations, 46

Voice of America, 44

Japan, 249

Civil Air Transport’s application for

commercial rights in Okinawa,

101

Emergency assistance, 153

Foreign Information Program, 155

Kaji case, 145

Psychological warfare planning:

NSC Paper 135, 127

Progress report (PSB) as of August

1, 1952, 125

Progress report (PSB) as of January

5, 1953, 143

Progress report (PSB) as of July 29,

1953, 153

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Committee, 124

JCS. See Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Jessup, Phillip, 30

Johnson, Alexis, 101

Johnson, Charles E., 24, 82, 153

Johnson, Clarence K., 196

Johnson, Adm. Felix L., 29, 35, 

Johnson, Louis, 1, 6, 213

Johnston, Kilbourne, 93

Johnston, S. Paul, 185

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligen

Committee (JAEIC), 126, 1

251

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (see a

Bradley, Gen. Omar N.):

Aerial/photo reconnaissanc

240

Air Resupply and Commun

Wing program, 147

Armed Forces Security Agen

Central Intelligence Agency

Defense Department-CIA 

64

JCS–CIA relations, 77, 176

Problems facing the, 23

Collection (intelligence) requ

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organiz

the Executive Branch of 

Government, 220, 221, 2

Communications intelligenc

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political 

and foreign information

activities, 213

Covert operations:

Joint Subsidiary Plans Div

Joyce’s assessments, 43

NSC Intelligence Directive 

NSC 10/3, 43

NSC 5412, 171

NSC 5412/2, 250

Scope and pace of, 83, 85, 

Support bases, overseas C

logistical, 140

Wartime needs, conversio

peacetime to, 61

Foreign Information Program

Guerrilla warfare, 75

Joint Intelligence Committee

relations, 95

Middle East, 105

Net intelligence estimates of 

capabilities/intentions o

nations, 189

NSC Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 1, 256

NSCID 5, 255

NSC–JCS relations, 255

References are to document numbers
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)—Continued

NSC 10/2, 111

Office of Policy Coordination’s war

plan, approval of, 111

Office of Special Projects, 4

Project Grayback, 240

Psychological warfare planning:

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Committee, 124

Psychological Strategy Board, 28,

78, 129, 135

Smith’s (Walter B.)

recommendations to

consolidate/strengthen the

PSB, 129, 135

Search operations, special electronic

airborne, 6

Security of the United States, project

to provide a more adequate basis

for planning the, 80, 131, 138

Soviet Union:

Capability to injure the U.S., 80,

131, 137, 138, 149, 173, 189, 207

CIA’s assessments, 173

Kennan’s assessments, 118

Weakening the power/will to wage

cold/hot war, 83

Taiwan and China, conflict between,

106

Warning facilities of the intelligence

community, information/

recommendations concerning,

186, 189

Watch Committee, IAC, 91, 186

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 95,

115, 172

Joint Intelligence Indications

Committee (JIIC), 91

Joint Press Reading Service (JPRS), 202

Joint Subsidiary Plans Division (JSPD),

93

Joint Technical Intelligence

Subcommittee (JTIS), 202, 217

Joyce, Robert P., 7, 38, 52, 70, 75, 85,

100, 104, 108

Central Intelligence Agency:

Changes made at request of NSC,

110

Matthews, communications with,

145

OPC–CIA relations, 130

Cold War, 142

Covert operations:

Europe (Eastern), 142

Joyce, Robert P.—Continued

Covert operations—Continue

NSC 10/3, 43

Scope and pace of, 43, 111, 

Poland, U.S. spies captured i

Psychological warfare plann

Assessments of, 142

Europe (Eastern), 142

Psychological Strategy Boa

135

Smith’s (Walter B.)

recommendations to

consolidate/strengthe

PSB, 129, 135

Radio Free Europe, 94

Voice of America, 94

Justice Department, U.S., 210

Kahn, Albert, 214

Kaji, Waturu, 145

Kearns, Henry, 220

Keay, Victor P., 35, 172

Kennan, George F., 4, 15, 118, 1

Kennedy, John R., 41

Kennedy, Joseph W., 194, 198

Kent, Sherman, 115, 120, 172, 2

Khokhlov, Nikolai, 209

Killian, James, 198, 247, 249

Kirk, Alan G., 129, 133

Kirkpatrick, Lyman, 35, 50, 87, 

205

Koch, Henry, 96

Kohler, Foy D., 94, 100

Kolb, Roland L., 172

Korean War:

Air America, 15

Armistice negotiations, 127

CIA devoting massive efforts 

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political w

and foreign information

activities, 213

Covert operations to wartim

conversion of peacetime

Foreign Information Program

NSC Intelligence Directive 5

Psychological warfare plann

Interdepartmental Foreign

Information Organiza

Office of Policy Coordinat

Prisoners, forcible repatria

143

Progress report (PSB) as of 

1, 1952, 125

References are to document numbers
Korean War—Continued

Psychological warfare planning—

Continued

Progress report (PSB) as of October

30, 1952, 133

Progress report (PSB) as of January

5, 1953, 143

Progress report (PSB) as of July 29,

1953, 153

Progress report (State Department)

as of October 17, 1950, 28

Progress report (State Department)

as of November 8, 1951, 92

Progress report (State Department)

as of July 31, 1952, 124

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Committee, 124

Psychological Strategy Board, 127

Security, NSC’s status report on

national, 127

Krentz, Kenneth C., 129, 130

Kretzman, Roger, 94

Kuhrtz, Meffert, 29, 175, 225

Kuwait, 105

Kyes, Roger M., 152, 164, 165, 166

Labor Department, U.S., 79

Ladue, L.K., 40

Lage, W.J., 225

Lalor, Capt. W.G., 6, 40

Land, Edwin H., 194, 198, 249

Lane, Herman O., 220

Langer, William L., 35

Lansing, Samuel M., 115, 172, 175

Latin America:

Covert operations, 68

Psychological warfare planning:

NSC 10/2, 127

Progress report (PSB) as of August

1, 1952, 125

Progress report (PSB) as of January

5, 1953, 143

Progress report (PSB) as of July 29,

1953, 153

Security, NSC’s status report on

national, 127

Lauritsen, C.C., 122

Lawton, Fred, 47, 119

Lay, James S., Jr., 2, 16, 19

Buying, organized/coordinated

program of covert preclusive, 116

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 251

Lay, James S., Jr.—Continued

Communications intelligenc

257

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political 

and foreign information

activities, 213, 248

Covert operations:

Buying, preclusive, 116

NSC Action No. 400, 38

NSCID 5, 255

NSC 10/2, 38

NSC 10/3, 43

NSC 5412, 171

Scope and pace of, 68, 85, 

Defense Department-CIA re

204

Economic intelligence relatin

national security, 73

Guerrilla warfare, 42

Middle East, 105

NSC Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 5, 255

NSCID 9, 257

NSC Papers:

NSC 10/3, 63

NSC 10/4, 63

NSC 10/5, 90, 162

NSC 59/1, 183

NSC 127/1, 183

NSC 135, 127

Operations Coordinating Bo

Planning Coordination Grou

Psychological warfare plann

Key Data Book, 134

Progress report (PSB) as o

30, 1952, 133

Progress report (PSB) as o

1953, 153

Progress report (State Dep

as of October 17, 1950

Progress report (State Dep

as of March 19, 1951, 

Progress report (State Dep

as of November 8, 19

Smith’s (Walter B.)

recommendations to

consolidate/strengthe

PSB, 135

Security, NSC’s status repor

national, 127

Security of the United States

to provide a more adeq

for planning the, 131

References are to document numbers
Lay, James S., Jr.—Continued

Soviet Union’s capability to injure the

U.S., evaluating the, 131, 138

Warning facilities of the intelligence

community, information/

recommendations concerning,

186, 187

Layton, Adm. Edwin T., 175, 176, 197,

225, 245

Leary, John E., 225

Legislation (see also National Security

Act of 1947):

Central Intelligence Act of 1949, 220,

221, 251

Executive Pay Bill of 1949, 221, 251

Immigration and Nationality Act, 

206

Library facilities, 69, 146, 155, 221, 226,

251

Lloyd, Gates, 50, 94, 100

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 194, 

196

Loomis, Henry, 226

Lovett, Robert:

Communications intelligence, 136

Covert operations, 4

NSC Papers:

NSC 10/3, 63

NSC 10/4, 63

Office of Policy Coordination, 129

Psychological warfare planning, 47,

78, 82

Taiwan and China, conflict between,

98

LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), 244

Lydman, J.W., 172

Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), 244

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 28

MacArthur, Douglas, II, 241

Magruder, Gen. John, 1, 22, 26, 38, 43,

82, 85, 99, 104, 108

Covert operations, 70

Guerrilla warfare, 75

Poland, U.S. spies captured in, 142

Psychological warfare planning, 78,

129, 142

Mails used as an access point to Soviet

Union, 59

Makins, Roger, 242

Malpass, Ray E., 172, 175

Manchuria, 155

Manfull, Melvin L., 48

Maples, H.N., 115, 175

Maps, procurement of foreignpublished, 155, 202, 209, 2

Marchant, J.C., 35

Maritime sources for intelligen

purposes, exploitation of, 

Marrazzi, Amendeo, 244

Marshall, Gen. George C., 4

CIA-Defense Department rel

36, 64

CIA–JCS relations, 77

Covert operations, 83, 129

Intelligence, analysis of U.S., 

Security of the United States

to provide a more adequ

for planning the, 80

Martin, James G., 172

Massachusetts Institute of Tech

57, 92

Matthews, H. Freeman, 30, 52, 

142, 145

Matusow, Harvey, 214

McCool, Capt. R.G., 29, 35

McFadden, William, 111, 130, 1

McKee, Samuel, Jr., 35

Media research/analysis and O

Research and Intelligence, 

Megee, Gen. Vernon E., 29

Metcalf, Ralph, 225

Middle East, 61

CIA’s assessments, 127

NSC Paper 135, 127

Oil issues, 61, 105

Psychological warfare plann

Progress report (PSB) as of 

1, 1952, 125

Progress report (PSB) as of 

30, 1952, 133

Progress report (PSB) as of 

5, 1953, 143

Progress report (State Dep

as of November 8, 195

Security, NSC’s status report 

national, 127

Military attaché system, 202, 20

221

Missiles, guided, 209, 225, 245

Montague, Ludwell, 23, 27, 29, 

175

Montgomery, J.H., 225

Moore, Gen. Ernest B., 29, 35

Morgan, George A., 160, 161, 1

Morrow, John J., 172, 175

Motion picture films, 69, 155

Muccio, John J., 28

References are to document numbers
Murphy, Robert, 241

Mutual Security Agency, 125

Mutual Trade Security Advisory

Committee, 116

Nash, Frank C., 68, 70, 85, 106

National Committee for a Free Europe

(NCFE), 15, 26, 94, 100

National Cryptographic Security Board,

121

National Indications Committee/Center

(NIC), 186, 211, 234

National Intelligence Authority (NIA),

221

National Intelligence Estimates (NIE):

Barnard’s assessments, 37

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 251

Foreign Information Program, 155

Intelligence Advisory Committee, 

29

NIE:

10–7–54, 209

11–3–54, 209

11–4–54, 209

11–6–54, 209

11–7A–54, 209

12–5–54, 209

27, 189

59, 144

64, 155

65, 115, 155

NSC 5509, 209

Operational assumptions and facts,

distinguishing between, 189

Soviet Union’s capability to injure the

U.S., evaluating the, 209

Technological Capabilities Panel, 223

National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), 41,

146, 155

National Psychological Strategy, 26, 96

National Security Act of 1947:

Collective responsibility, doctrine of,

20

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220, 221

Communications intelligence, 97, 257

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 254

Covert operations, 38, 43, 171

National Security Act of 1947—

Defectors, using/exploiting, 

Duties and responsibilities o

National Security Coun

Electronic intelligence, 259

Espionage and counterespio

operations, 255

Intelligence Advisory Comm

155

JCS–CIA relations, 77

National Security Organizat

NSCID 15, 254

NSC Papers:

NSC 5412/1, 212

NSC 5412/2, 250

Publication procurement, fo

National Security Agency (NS

Collection (intelligence) requ

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organiz

the Executive Branch of 

Government, 220, 221, 2

Communications intelligenc

136, 141, 257

NSCID 9, 257

National Security Council (NS

also Intelligence Advisory

Committee; Operations

Coordinating Board):

Actions:

No. 282, 73

No. 283, 2

No. 367, 84

No. 400, 38

No. 519, 86

No. 534, 256

No. 543, 86, 131, 137, 138

No. 623, 256

No. 687, 138

No. 873, 189

No. 873-d, 173

No. 1183, 187, 210

No. 1195, 187

No. 1195-b, 187

No. 1197, 187, 210, 213

No. 1198, 213

No. 1260, 207

No. 1314-d, 210, 246

No. 1349, 210, 246

Aerial/photo reconnaissanc

Agricultural reporting, 209

Air Force (U.S.)-NSC relatio

Air target materials in the A

Objective Folder Progra

References are to document numbers
National Security Council (NSC)—

Continued

Army (U.S.)-NSC relations, 256

Atomic energy/war/weapons, 209

Biological warfare, 209

Buying, organized/coordinated

program of covert preclusive, 116

Central Intelligence Agency:

Budget issues, 30

CIA changes made at request of

NSC, 107, 110

NSC–CIA relations, 8, 107, 110, 

255

Classified government information,

clearance for access to, 79

Collection (intelligence) requirements,

coordination of, 234

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220, 221, 234, 251

Communications intelligence, 19, 132,

136, 257

Communist movement in the U.S., 214

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210, 213, 254

Covert operations (see also

Psychological warfare planning

below):

Doolittle Report, 192

NSCID 5, 255

NSC 10/2, 38, 162, 171

NSC 10/3, 24, 43, 171

NSC 10/5, 162, 171

NSC 5412, 171

NSC 5412/1, 212

NSC 5412/2, 171, 250

Office of Policy Coordination, 8

Office of Special Projects, 4

Planning Coordination Group, 

212

Scope and pace of, 68, 70, 71, 75,

76, 83, 85, 89, 90, 108

Soviet Union and its satellites, 5

Defectors, using/exploiting, 209, 252,

253

Domestic collection, 209

Duties and responsibilities, 256

Economic intelligence relating to

national security, 73, 144, 187,

209

Edwards Report, 149

Electronic intelligence, 259

National Security Council (NSC

Continued

Europe (Eastern), 144, 174

FBI–NSC relations, 256

Foreign Information Program

128

Foreign persons/materials in

U.S., 214

Foreign Service, 209

Guerrilla warfare, 42

Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 1, 155, 169, 179, 191

NSCID 2, 202

NSCID 3, 169, 191, 256

NSCID 4, 201, 209, 238

NSCID 4/2, 201

NSCID 5, 38, 43, 64, 77, 95

145, 168, 185, 192, 202

205, 251, 255, 257

NSCID 5/8, 251

NSCID 6, 202

NSCID 7, 202, 253

NSCID 9, 44, 132, 136, 141

NSCID 10, 112, 251

NSCID 10/2, 212, 250

NSCID 10/5, 212, 250

NSCID 11/1, 202

NSCID 13, 18, 192, 251, 25

NSCID 14, 18, 253

NSCID 15, 73, 169, 191, 25

NSCID 16, 155, 258

NSCID 17, 230, 251, 259

Interdepartmental Committe

Internal Security, 79

JCS–NSC relations, 256

Maps, procurement of foreig

published, 209

Materials/equipment, collect

foreign, 209

Meetings:

June 18, 1948, 4

June 13, 1951, 254

May 20, 1953, 148

May 27, 1953, 149

March 4, 1954, 170

March 11, 1954, 170

March 25, 1954, 170

July 22, 1954, 210

August 5, 1954, 187, 210

January 27, 1955, 210

March 10, 1955, 210

May 5, 1955, 214

Middle East, 105

Military attaché system, 209

References are to document numbers
National Security Council (NSC)—

Continued

Missiles, guided, 209

National Security Act of 1947, 38, 43

Net Capabilities Evaluation

Subcommittee, 182, 207

OCB–NSC relations, 160

Office of Research and Intelligence, 226

Papers:

NSC 4, 52

NSC 10/2, 8, 29, 33, 38, 42, 43, 52,

64, 68, 76, 77, 81, 83, 96, 104,

108, 111, 140, 145, 152, 158,

162, 171

NSC 10/3, 24, 42, 43, 63, 81, 171

NSC 10/4, 63

NSC 10/5, 90, 104, 107, 108, 129,

135, 139, 152, 158, 162, 171

NSC 17, 158

NSC 20/4, 125, 139, 213

NSC 26/2, 84, 105

NSC 26/4, 105

NSC 26/5, 105

NSC 43, 52, 213

NSC 48/5, 76, 90, 106

NSC 50, 8, 20, 29, 37, 107, 110, 145,

253

NSC 59, 49, 52

NSC 59/1, 2, 28, 57, 81, 92, 96, 109,

124, 139, 152, 158, 183, 187, 

213

NSC 66/1, 44, 107, 146, 155

NSC 68, 5, 8, 68, 101, 108

NSC 74, 17, 49, 52, 213

NSC 86/1, 107

NSC 104/2, 116

NSC 114/3, 114

NSC 127/1, 123, 183, 187, 213

NSC 135, 127, 128

NSC 140, 189

NSC 140/1, 149, 189

NSC 142, 146, 155

NSC 159, 173, 189

NSC 161, 155, 170

NSC 162/2, 163, 179, 190, 209

NSC 165/1, 181

NSC 169, 209

NSC 174, 167, 190, 203, 246

NSC 5401/1, 190

NSC 5407, 170

NSC 5408, 174

NSC 5412, 171, 185, 188, 192, 210,

250

NSC 5412/1, 212, 237, 246, 250

National Security Council (NS

Continued

Papers—Continued

NSC 5412/2, 171, 250

NSC 5430, 209

NSC 5432, 182

NSC 5438, 187, 218

NSC 5501, 209

NSC 5502/1, 210, 246

NSC 5505, 210

NSC 5505/1, 210, 246

NSC 5509, 209, 214

NSC 5511, 207

NSC 5520, 219

NSC 5525, 234

Political intelligence, 209

Priority National Intelligenc

Objectives, 209

Psychological warfare plann

CIA’s assessments, 127

Cold War, 139

National Psychological W

Plan for General War

NSC 10/5, 139

NSC 135, 127

PSB–NSC relations, 28, 78

Smith’s (Walter B.)

recommendations to

consolidate/strengthe

PSB, 135

Summary of psychologica

arrangements within 

government since Wo

II, 213

Truman’s approval of, 2

Publication procurement, fo

209, 258

Radio broadcasts, foreign, 2

Satellites, developing/using

Scientific/technical intellige

209

Security, status reports on n

June 30, 1952, 127

February 10, 1953, 146

December 31, 1953, 170

March 2, 1955, 209

May 5, 1955, 214

June 30, 1955, 234

Security of the United States

to provide a more adeq

for planning the, 86, 13

Soviet Union’s capability to 

U.S., evaluating the, 131

138, 173, 207, 234

References are to document numbers
National Security Council (NSC)—

Continued

State Department-Defense

Department Staff Study on

intelligence, 20, 22

Taiwan and China, conflict between,

106

Technological Capabilities Panel, 

223

Travel Folder Program, 209

Voice of America, 44

Volunteer Freedom Corps, 148

Warning facilities of the intelligence

community, information/

recommendations concerning,

187, 209, 234

National Security Organization, 220

National Security Resources Board

(NSRB), 28, 213, 220

National Student Association, 15

Navy, U.S.:

Air target materials in the Air

Objective Folder Program, 

209

Collection (intelligence) requirements,

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 220, 221, 251

Communications intelligence, 99

Cryptographic systems, 251

Disclosure of classified military

information, 255

Maritime sources for intelligence

purposes, exploitation of, 113

NSCID 1, 256

NSC-Navy relations, 256

Psychological warfare planning, 124,

213

Search operations, special electronic

airborne, 6

Target Area Analysis Radar, 209

Watch Committee, IAC, 91, 218

Netherlands, 153

Newpher, Roth, 226

NIE. See National Intelligence

Estimates.

Nitze, Paul H.:

Covert operations, 68, 70

Psychological warfare planning:

Cold War, 139

National strategic concept for

psychological action,

formulating a, 96

Nitze, Paul H.—Continued

Psychological warfare plann

Continued

NSC Paper 10/5, 139

Psychological Strategy Boa

81

Troy Report, 59

Taiwan and China, conflict b

106

Nixon, Richard M., 214

Nobel Project, 109

Nordbeck, Theodore M., 41

North Atlantic Treaty Organiza

(NATO), 109, 146, 155, 238

Norway, 229, 242

NSC. See National Security Cou

OCB. See Operations Coordina

Board.

Ocker, Capt. John, 29, 35

Office of Defense Mobilization 

173, 189, 194, 207, 213, 248

Office of National Estimates, 1

Office of Naval Intelligence (O

Office of Policy Coordination (

See under Central Intelligen

Agency.

Office of Research and Intellige

(IRI), 226

Office of Special Operations (O

under Central Intelligence 

Office of Special Projects, 4

Office of Strategic Services (OS

87, 213, 221

Office of the Coordinator of

Information, 221

Oil issues, 61, 105

Olom, Lou, 226

OPC. See Office of Policy Coor

under Central Intelligence 

Operations Coordinating Board 

China, Communist, 158

Collection (intelligence) requ

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organiza

the Executive Branch of 

Government, 251

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political w

and foreign information

activities, 210, 213, 248

Doolittle Report, 192

Europe (Eastern), 167, 203

European Defense Commun

References are to document numbers
Operations Coordinating Board

(OCB)—Continued

Executive Order 10483, 157, 158, 208

Executive Order 10598, 208

Explosives/demolition materials, 167

Foreign Information Program, 183

Gray activities, principles to assure

coordination of, 181

Guatemala, 154

International Information Activities

Committee, 151

Meetings:

September 17, 1953, 160

May 5, 1954, 178

NSC–OCB relations, 160

NSC Papers:

NSC 59/1, 183, 187

NSC 127/1, 183, 187

NSC 174, 190

NSC 5412, 171

NSC 5412/2, 250

Planning Coordination Group:

Abolition of, talks about the, 237

Bureau of the Budget’s study for

coordinating economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210

Taking over responsibilities of, 

246

Psychological warfare planning:

PSB’s staff/resources to be used by,

160

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Committee, 158,

213

Summary of psychological warfare

arrangements within U.S.

government since World War

II, 213

Rockefeller as chairman of,

Eisenhower designates, 210

Rockefeller’s resignation, 235, 237

Satellites, developing/using, 203

OSO. See Office of Special Operations

under Central Intelligence Agency.

Packard, Robert F., 229

Pakistan, 153

Parrott, Thomas A., 26

Partridge, Gen. Richard C., 115

Pawley, William D., 185, 192

Pearl Harbor, surprise attack on, 221

Penn, Perry H., 172

Peoples Republic of China. Se

Communist.

Philbin, T.R., 96

Phillips, Joseph B., 26, 96

Phoebus, Clifford, 244

Photographs (see also Aerial/p

reconnaissance), 146, 155

Pinay, Antoine, 127

“Plan for National Psychologi

Warfare,” 17

Planning Coordination Group

Abolition of Group, conside

235, 237, 246

Bureau of the Budget’s stud

coordinating economic/

psychological/political 

and foreign information

activities, 210

CIA-Planning Coordination 

relations, 212, 237, 246

NSC Paper 5412/1, 212

OCB taking over responsibili

Status Report as of Decembe

1955, 246

“Planning for Wartime Condu

Overt Psychological Warf

Plutonium production, 155

Poland, 142, 145, 190

Political warfare (see also Psych

warfare planning), 59

Polygraph program, 205

Population growth, 59

Porter, Gen. Edward H., 115, 13

Port security, 79

Power, John A., 172, 225

Press monitoring, 202

Press program and Campaign 

69

Prisoners, 92, 143, 202

Private organizations/busines

by the CIA, 15

Proctor, Edward W., 225

Production Division of the Off

Research and Intelligence

“Production of National Intell

20, 22

Project Brain Wave, 57

Project Genetrix, 229

Project Grayback, 240, 241, 242

Project Nobel, 57, 109

Project Vagabond, 57

Provisional Committee for the

Movement of Migrants fro

Europe (PICMME), 127

References are to document numbers
PSB. See Psychological Strategy Board

under Psychological warfare

planning.

Psychochemicals, 244

Psychological Operations Coordinating

Committee (POCC). See under

Psychological warfare planning.

“Psychological Operations Newsletter,”

109

Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). See

under Psychological warfare

planning.

Psychological warfare planning (see also

Foreign Information Program;

under Korean War and Operations

Coordinating Board):

Balloons used for propaganda, 26, 59,

92

Cabinet Committee, 47

Campaign of Truth, 69

China, Communist, 26, 59, 92, 125, 

153

CIA’s assessments, 127

Cold War, 127, 129, 133, 139

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210, 213, 248

Covert operations, 83

Defectors, using/exploiting, 92

Europe (Eastern), 142

Kennan’s assessments, 4

Key Data Book, 134

NSC Papers:

NSC 10/5, 139

NSC 59/1, 2, 28, 57, 81, 92, 96, 109,

124, 139, 152, 158, 183, 187, 213

NSC 74, 52

NSC 127/1, 123

NSC 135, 127

NSC 5509, 209

Office of Policy Coordination, 26

Office of Special Operations, 152

Office space, 78

Operations Coordinating Board

taking over functions of, 158, 183

Origins of, 2

Program planning, 69

Progress report (State Department) as

of October 17, 1950, 28

Progress report (State Department) as

of March 19, 1951, 57

Progress report (State Department) as

of November 8, 1951, 92

Psychological warfare planning

Continued

Progress report (State Depar

of May 7, 1952, 109

Progress report (State Depar

of July 31, 1952, 124

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Committe

Bacteriological warfare, 12

Defectors, 92

Economic intelligence rela

national security, 92

Interdepartmental Commi

Internal Security, 74

Japan, 124

North Atlantic Treaty Orga

109

Operations Coordinating B

taking over functions 

213

Prisoners-of-war, 92

Project Nobel, 109

“Psychological Operations

Newsletter,” 109

Security, State Department

report on national, 124

Soviet Union, 92, 109

Television in propaganda, 

Training program, 109

Troop acceptability progra

United Nations, 109, 124

X–Day planning, 124, 127, 

Yugoslavia, 124

Psychological Strategy Board

Acheson-Souers meetings, 

Africa, 125

Anti-American attitudes, 1

Asia, Southeast, 125, 127, 1

China, Communist, 125, 15

Cold War, 127, 133, 139

Conduct of board meeting

procedures for expedi

57

Covert operations, scope a

of, 85, 89

Draft directive on, 45, 47

Emergency assistance prov

other countries, 153

Europe (Eastern), 127, 143

Europe (Western), 133, 153

Executive Order 10483, 15

Expanded charter, 71

France, 125, 127, 153

Functions of, 78, 82

References are to document numbers
Psychological warfare planning—

Continued

Psychological Strategy Board—

Continued

Funding issues, 78, 82

Germany, 127

Great Britain, 153

Guerrilla warfare, 76

Interdepartmental Committee, 

74

Italy, 125, 127, 153

Japan, 125, 127, 153

JCS–PSB relations, 78

Joyce’s assessments, 142

Latin America, 125, 153

Meetings: July 2, 1951, 78

Meetings: August 13, 1951, 82

Meetings: December 5, 1951, 96

Middle East, 125, 133

National Psychological Strategy, 96

National Psychological Warfare

Plan for General War, 92

National strategic concept for

psychological action,

formulating a, 96

New PSB, plans for a, 67

Nitze’s assessments, 62, 81

NSCID 135, 127

NSC 10/2, 127

NSC 10/5, 108, 127

NSC 74, 52

NSC–PSB relations, 28, 78, 104

OPC–PSB relations, 96

Operations Coordinating Board

taking over functions of, 

160

Origins of, 17, 28, 60, 74, 213

Procedures for the conduct of

business, 82, 104

Progress report (PSB) as of August

1, 1952, 125

Progress report (PSB) as of October

30, 1952, 133

Progress report (PSB) as of January

5, 1953, 143

Progress report (PSB) as of July 29,

1953, 153

Project Brain Wave, 57

Project Nobel, 57

Project Vagabond, 57

Radio, 69, 133

Radio Free Europe, 125

Satellites, developing/using, 122

Scope of, 28

Psychological warfare plannin

Continued

Psychological Strategy Boar

Continued

Smith’s (Walter B.) recommendations to consoli

strengthen the, 129, 13

Soviet Union, 122, 125, 15

Stalin, Joseph, 127

Summary of psychologica

arrangements within 

government since Wo

II, 213

Taiwan, 125

Trade policies, 153

Troy Report, 57, 59

Truman’s assessments, 119

Voice of America, 125

War, plan for the conduct 

psychological operati

event of a general, 12

Weapons, public statemen

respect to certain, 127

Security, NSC’s status repor

national, 127

Summary of psychological w

arrangements within U

government since World 

213

Supervise, debate on who sh

49

Troy Report, 59, 62, 92

Truman signs NSC Paper 59

Publication procurement, forei

202, 209, 258

Purcell, Edward M., 194, 198

Putnam, Palmer, 122

Putt, Gen. Donald, 196, 199

Qatar, 105

Quantico Panel I/II, 224

Quarles, Donald A., 249

Radar reconnaissance, 146

Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 176

211, 214, 240, 249

Radio and political warfare (se

Voice of America):

Collection (intelligence) requ

coordination of, 202

Foreign Information Program

NSC Paper 5509, 209

Office of Research and Intel

226

References are to document numbers
Radio and political warfare—Continued

Psychological warfare planning, 69,

133

Radio Free Asia, 94

Radio Free Europe, 15, 68, 94, 100,

125, 188

Soviet Union, 153

Rand, William, 160

RAND Corporation, 122, 229

Rastvorov, Yuri, 209

Reber, James Q., 48, 51, 72, 78, 115, 172,

202

REDCAP program, 87

REDSKIN program, 87

REDSOX program, 87

Reed, Allan, L., 172

Reichardt, Charles H., 172, 175

Republic of China. See Taiwan.

Research and Development Board

(RDB), 115, 220

Roach, Ralph R., 197

Rockefeller, Nelson:

Coordination of economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210, 213, 248

Dulles (John F.) and, relations

between, 232

Operations Coordinating Board:

Resigning as vice chairman, 235, 237,

246

Vice chairman, appointment as, 210

Planning Coordination Group:

Abolished, Rockefeller’s

recommendation that group

be, 235, 237, 246

Status report from group as of

December 14, 1955, 246

Quantico Panel I/II, 224

Rockwell, Samuel S., 175

Romania, 61, 153, 169, 190

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 213

Rostow, Walt W., 224

ROTC, 251

Samford, Gen. John A., 164, 172, 175,

197, 225, 245

Sargeant, Howland H., 7, 69, 78, 100

Satellites, developing/using, 122, 219,

223

Saudi Arabia, 105

Savage, Carlton, 96

Scammon, R.M., 115

Schow, Gen. Robert A., 225

Schwinn, Walter K., 96

Scientific/technical intelligence

Areas, field subdivided into 

basic, 126

Armstrong’s assessments, 11

Central Intelligence Agency, 

120, 126, 155

Collection (intelligence) requ

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organiza

the Executive Branch of 

Government, 251

Coordinating mechanisms, 1

Director of Central Intelligen

Directive 3/4, 126

Economic intelligence relatin

national security, 209

Electronic intelligence, 230

Foreign Information Program

155

Intelligence Advisory Comm

Interdepartmental Committe

Internal Security, 79

Kent’s assessments, 120

Missiles, guided, 209, 225, 24

NSC Paper 5520, 219

Policies and procedures, 126

Psychochemicals, 244

Satellites, developing/using, 

223

Scientific Estimates Committ

146, 155, 225, 251

Search operations, special ele

airborne, 6

Soviet Union’s capabilities, I

assessment of, 115

Sovmat Program (Soviet mat

217

State Department-CIA relatio

Technological Capabilities Pa

223

Troy Report, 57, 59, 62, 92

Scott, Robert, 229

Scott, W.K., 52

Search projects, special electron

airborne, 6

Security clearances, operationa

251

Service Attaché System, 146, 15

Sheldon, Huntington D., 175

Smith, Abbot E., 225

Smith, Brad J., 164

Smith, N.E., 175

Smith, R. Jack, 175

References are to document numbers
Smith, Walter B., 12, 24, 47, 58

Bureau of the Budget’s study for

coordinating economic/

psychological/political warfare

and foreign information

activities, 210

Changes made at CIA in response to

requests from NSC, 107, 110

Communications intelligence, 97

Covert operations:

Guerrilla warfare, 75

Joyce’s assessments, 111

NSC 10/2, 38

NSC 10/3, 43

Scope and pace of, 68, 70, 71, 75,

111

Current Intelligence Bulletin, 53, 55

Defense Department-CIA relations,

36, 54, 56

ECA–CIA relations, 31

Europe (Eastern), 71

Intelligence Advisory Committee, 

29

Interdepartmental Intelligence

Committee, 65, 66

JCS–CIA relations, 77

Joyce’s assessments, 145

Marshall’s (George C.) analysis of

U.S. intelligence, 32

National Intelligence Estimates, 29

Net intelligence estimates of the

capabilities/intentions of other

nations, 189

NSC Papers:

NSC 10/3, 63

NSC 10/4, 63

NSC 26/2, 84

Objectives, priority list of critical

national intelligence, 117

Operations Coordinating Board, 

160

Psychological warfare planning:

Progress Report by the Director, 82

Psychological Strategy Board, 67,

74, 78, 82, 129, 135

Truman’s assessments, 119

Resignation of, 145

Scientific/technical intelligence, 126

Security of the United States, project

to provide a more adequate basis

for planning the, 80, 131

Soviet Union’s capability to injure the

U.S., evaluating the, 115, 131,

137, 138, 148, 189

Smith, Walter B.—Continued

Support bases, overseas CIA

logistical, 140

Taiwan and China, conflict b

98

Volunteer Freedom Corps, 1

Watch Committee, IAC, 35

SNIE. See Special National Inte

Estimates.

Snyder, John, 17

Somoza, Anastasio, 154

Sontag, R.J., 115

Souers, Adm. Sidney W., 4, 16

52

Soviet Union (see also Europe (

Aerial/photo reconnaissanc

102, 194, 197, 198

Aircraft (U.S.) shot down in 

Biological warfare, 209

Collection (intelligence) requ

coordination of, 202

Commission on the Organiz

the Executive Branch of 

Government, 220, 221, 2

Covert operations, 5, 61

Defectors, using/exploiting, 

253

Director of Central Intelligen

Directives:

DCID 4/4, 201

DCID 4/5, 238

Doolittle Report, 192

Economic intelligence requir

relating to national secu

169, 191

Edwards Report, 149

Ethnic groups, non-Russian, 

Foreign Information Program

155

Intelligence Advisory Comm

115, 131, 172

Kennan’s assessment of mili

intelligence-gathering s

118

Mails used as an access poin

59

NIE 65, 115

Non-Russian ethnic groups, 

NSC Action 543, 131

NSC Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 13, 252

NSCID 14, 253

NSC Papers:

NSC 162/2, 163

References are to document numbers
Soviet Union—Continued

NSC Papers—Continued

NSC 174, 190

NSC 5412/1, 212

NSC 5509, 209

Office of Research and Intelligence, 226

Political warfare aimed at, 59

Press monitoring, 202

Psychological warfare planning:

NSC Paper 10/5, 139

Progress report (PSB) as of August

1, 1952, 125

Progress report (PSB) as of July 29,

1953, 153

Progress report (State Department)

as of November 8, 1951, 92

Progress report (State Department)

as of May 1, 1952, 109

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Committee, 92

Satellites, developing/using, 122

Radio, 153

REDCAP program, 87

REDSKIN program, 87

REDSOX program, 87

Satellites, developing/using, 122, 203

Scientific/technical intelligence, 112,

115, 120

Security, NSC’s status report on

national, 127

Security of the United States, project

to provide a more adequate basis

for planning the, 80, 86, 115, 127,

131, 138

Smith’s (Walter B.) assessments, 117

Sovmat Program (Soviet materials),

217

State Department personnel and

funding, Dulles’s (Allen W.)

request for increase in, 228

Superpower competition, 195

Technological Capabilities Panel, 223

Troy Report, 57, 59, 62, 92

U.S. evaluation of the possibility of

being injured by:

CIA’s assessments, 173, 189

Intelligence Advisory Committee,

115, 172

Interdepartmental Committee on

Internal Security, 80, 131, 137,

138, 173, 207

Interdepartmental Intelligence

Committee, 131, 137, 138, 173,

207

Soviet Union—Continued

U.S. evaluation of the possib

being injured by—Conti

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 80, 13

138, 149, 173, 189, 207

Lay’s assessments, 138

NSC No. 543, 86, 131, 138

NSC No. 1260, 207

NSC 5509, 209

NSC 5511, 207

NSC 5525, 234

NSC’s senior staff’s assess

137

SNIE 11–8–54, 209

Voice of America, 44, 57, 59

Warning facilities of the inte

community, information

recommendations conce

186, 209

Watch Committee, IAC:

CIA’s assessments, 81, 107

DCID 1/2, 179, 187

Fact sheet, 91

Foreign service posts, Stat

Department airgram t

218

JCS’s assessments, 186

Meetings: December 7, 195

Meetings: May 4, 1954, 175

Meetings: June 14, 1955, 22

NSC 142, 146

NSC 161, 155

NSC 5509, 209

NSC 5525, 234

Trueheart’s assessments, 3

Weakening the power/will t

cold/hot war, 83

Spalding, Hobart A., 41

Special Cryptologic Advisory G

121

Special electronic airborne sear

operations (SESP), 6

Special National Intelligence E

(SNIE):

SNIE 11–8–54, 209

Staats, Elmer B., 178, 203

Stalin, Joseph, 59, 127

Stassen, Harold, 210, 214

State Department, U.S. (see also

Acheson, Dean; Armstrong

Park, Jr.; Dulles, John F.; H

Herbert, Jr.; National Intel

Estimates; Operations Coo

Board):

References are to document numbers
State Department, U.S.—Continued

CIA-State Department relations:

Armstrong’s assessments, 24

Daily Summary, 48

Jackson (William H.)-Armstrong

communications, 46

Joyce’s assessments, 129

Memorandum of agreement, 34, 51

Commission on the Organization of

the Executive Branch of the

Government, 221, 241, 251

Defense Department-State

Department study on

intelligence, 20, 22

Dulles’s (Allen W.), assessment of

intelligence produced by, 228

Personnel and funds, Dulles’s (Allen

W.) request for increases in, 228

Propaganda policy guidance, 7

Psychological warfare planning:

Progress report as of October 17,

1950, 28

Progress report as of March 19,

1951, 57

Progress report as of November 8,

1951, 92

Progress report as of May 7, 1952,

109

Progress report as of July 31, 1952,

124

Stelle, Charles C., 96

Stevens, Adm. Leslie, 38, 67, 70, 75, 96,

104, 139

Steward, Gordon, 216

Stone, Adm. Earl E., 40

Stout, R.F., 113

Strauss, Lewis L., 240

Streibert, Theodore E., 226

Strong, Robert C., 145

Sullivan, Charlie, 237

Support bases, overseas CIA logistical,

140

Swiatlo, Josef, 209

Sykes, O.B., 115

Taiwan:

China, conflict with:

Chinese Nationalist Forces on

Taiwan, 98

Eisenhower’s complaints about

conflicting intelligence

information, 211

Guerrilla warfare, 71, 75, 76, 98

NSC 10/2, 108

Taiwan—Continued

China, conflict with—Contin

NSC 10/5, 108

NSC 135, 127

Security, NSC’s status rep

national, 127

Smith’s (Walter B.) assessm

State/JCS/Defense/NSC/

joint meeting between

Psychological warfare plann

Talbott, Harold E., 196, 198

Target Area Analysis Radar (TA

Taylor, Robert, 31

Technological Capabilities Pan

223

Television in propaganda, 109

Thompson, Clary, 226

Thorburn, James G., Jr., 172

Tod, Roy, 35, 95

Tolman, John D., 115

Totten, Robert, 175, 225

Travel Folder Program, 155, 20

Traynor, Harry S., 197

Treasury Department, U.S., 79

Trezise, Philip H., 96, 225

Troy Report, 57, 59, 62, 92

Trudeau, Gen. Arthur G., 168, 

Trueheart, William C., 3, 35, 11

Truman, Harry S., 58

Buying, organized/coordina

program of covert precl

CIA–JCS relations, 77

Classified government infor

clearance for access to, 

Communications intelligenc

132, 257

Covert operations, 5, 76, 89

Current Intelligence Bulletin, 

Foreign Information Program

NSC Intelligence Directive 9

NSC Paper 26/2, 84

Psychological warfare plann

Cold War, 139

Key Data Book, 134

NSC Paper 10/5, 139

NSC Paper 127/1, 123

Origins of, 2

Psychological Strategy Bo

60, 74, 119, 213

Security of the United States

to provide a more adeq

for planning the, 138

Soviet Union’s capability to 

U.S., evaluating the, 138

References are to document numbers
Tufts, Robert W., 96

Tukey, John W., 194, 198

Turkey, 127, 153, 229, 242

Tuttle, Elbert P., 187

Twining, Gen. Nathan, 106, 186, 196,

198, 199, 211, 249

United Fruit Company, 154

United Nations, 26, 109, 124, 143

United States Communications

Intelligence Board (USCIB), 19, 44

United States Communications Security

Board (USCSB), 251

U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 181,

183, 209, 210, 213, 226

U.S. Information and Education (USIE)

Program, 69, 94

Vandenberg, Gen. Hoyt S., 101

Van Slyck, Forrest, 27

Venona: Soviet Espionage and the

American Response, 1939–1957

(Benson & Warner), 87

Villard, Henry S., 96

Visa and Passport Divisions, 79

Voice of America (VOA):

CIA’s assessments, 127

Crusade for Freedom, 100

Foreign Information Program, 146

NSC Paper 66/1, 44, 107

NSC Paper 135, 127

Psychological warfare planning, 125,

213

Radio Free Europe’s displaced

personnel taken care of by, 94

Troy Report, 57, 59, 62, 92

Volunteer Freedom Corps, 148

Wage issues, 221, 251

Warner, Michael, 29

Washburn, Abbott, 94, 100

Watch Committee, IAC. See under

Soviet Union.

Watson, E.C., 122

Watts, Phillip H., 96

Webb, James E., 9, 11

CIA-State Department relations, 24

Office of Special Projects, 4

Psychological warfare planning:

Cabinet Committee, 47

Interdepartmental Committee, 74

Nitze’s assessments, 62

NSC 10/5, 104

NSC 74, 52

Webb, James E.—Continued

Psychological warfare plann

Continued

Office of Policy Coordinat

Program planning, 69

Progress report (State Dep

as of November 8, 195

Psychological Operations

Coordinating Commit

Psychological Strategy Boa

67, 74, 82, 92

State Department-Defense

Department Staff Study 

intelligence, 22

Weckerling, Gen. John, 64, 91

Whearty, Raymond P., 79

Willems, Gen. John M., 175

Wilson, Charles E., 186, 239, 24

Wisner, Frank G., 7, 50, 67, 82, 

205

Aliens into U.S. for

intelligence/operational

purposes, 206

CIA–OPC relations, 130, 145

Civil Air Transport’s applica

commercial rights in Ok

101

Covert operations, 71, 85, 111

ECA–CIA relations, 31

Eisenhower-Doolittle meetin

Europe (Eastern), 167

Intelligence Advisory Comm

29

NSC–CIA coordination, 8

NSC 10/2, 162

NSC 10/5, 162

Office of Policy Coordination

Office of Special Projects, 4

Psychological warfare plann

Radio Free Europe, 94

Soviet Union, 161

Taiwan and China, conflict b

106

Voice of America, 94

Woods, Van A., Jr., 225

Wright, Edwin M., 41, 142

Writ of habeas corpus, 16

Wyman, W., 50, 93

Wynne, P.D., 225

Yalu River, 155

Yeager, Joseph, 115

Young, Frederick R., 57, 142

Yugoslavia, 59, 124, 139, 190

References are to document numbers