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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

111TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

S. PRT. 

2009

111–21 

URUGUAY TRADE PREFERENCES: 

A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY 

IN THE SOUTHERN CONE 

STAFF TRIP REPORT 

TO THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 29, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


seneagle
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

Republican Leader designee 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 

Background .............................................................................................................. 2 

Recommendations .................................................................................................... 4 

Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I ................................................................................................................ 6 

Appendix II 7 

Appendix III ............................................................................................................. 9 

Appendix IV ............................................................................................................. 11 

(III)

(v) 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, June 29, 2009. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: My senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member for Latin America, Carl Meacham, visited Uruguay at my direction from May 26–28, 2009, to examine 

ways to deepen our trade relations. 

As Congress debates renewal of trade preferences for several 

South American countries, which are set to expire this year under 

the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), 

it should also consider granting preferences for Uruguayan exports 

that currently face high U.S. tariffs. Uruguay has proved to be a 

reliable partner in the Southern Cone, and the United States would 

benefit politically by strengthening ties with a small but strategically important neighbor of the two largest economies in South 

America. 

I am strong believer in free trade and the power of markets to 

strengthen the growing political and economic relationship between 

our nations and help bring new jobs and goodwill to the region. The 

ultimate goal of expanding commercial ties with Uruguay should be 

a free trade agreement, which I have advocated since 2002. Nevertheless, given the current domestic obstacles to bilateral trade 

deals, a trade preference arrangement is an interim step that 

would advance U.S. interests. Trade preferences are usually designed to promote economic growth in our poorest trading partners. 

Uruguay does not fall into that category, but I believe that preferences should also be used strategically to advance foreign policy 

goals. In the case of Uruguay, the clear U.S. objective is to 

strengthen a bilateral relationship that has important political implications for the wider region, as Mr. Meacham’s report illustrates. 

I hope you find the report helpful as the U.S. Congress reviews 

trade preference programs. I look forward to continuing to work 

with you on these issues, and I welcome any comments you may 

have on this report. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Ranking Member. 

(1) 

1 ‘‘Reif Signals Preference Program Reform May Spill Into New Year.’’ Inside U.S. Trade. 8 

May 2009. 

URUGUAY TRADE PREFERENCES: 

A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY 

IN THE SOUTHERN CONE 

From May 26–28, 2009, Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff traveled to Montevideo, Uruguay, on an official visit. 

During this trip, staff met with senior officials of the Government 

of Uruguay (GOU), Members of the Uruguayan Senate, Uruguayan 

economists, representatives of the apparel and textile industries, 

and the American Chamber of Commerce in Montevideo (see Appendix I for complete list of meetings). At the request of Senator 

Lugar, the purpose of the trip was to: 

• Explore ways to expand trade relations with Uruguay. 

• Assess the implications of deeper commercial relations, with a 

particular focus on the political, strategic, and regional benefits 

for the United States. 

INTRODUCTION

Unilateral U.S. trade preference programs aim to increase trade 

with beneficiary countries in order to foster economic development 

and promote various U.S. foreign policy objectives. Currently, the 

United States offers the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 

and three regional programs, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 

the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), 

and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 

U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk has indicated a willingness 

to work with Congress to reform these programs, though preference 

reform legislation is unlikely to be considered before next year.1

Nevertheless, a review of trade preferences is timely because several preference programs are scheduled to expire during the current calendar year. In South America, preferences for Colombia 

and Peru will expire on December 31, 2009. Preferences for Ecuador will remain in effect until the end of the year unless President 

Obama determines by July 1, 2009, that Ecuador does not satisfy 

certain requirements. Bolivia’s preferences would expire on June 

30, 2009, but the Bush Administration suspended its designation 

as a beneficiary country in November 2008. 

As Congress debates the expiring trade preference programs and 

as the Administration considers a new model for free trade agreements, it should also consider new or expanded trade preference 

opportunities. In the U.S. Congress, Members have already introduced the U.S.-Paraguay Partnership Act of 2009, which amends 

2 

2Office of the United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/ 

americas/uruguay. 3Donnelly, J. M. (22 June 2009). Congressional Research Service Memo on United States Tariff Treatment of Imports from Uruguay. Requested by minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 4 .U.S. Embassy in Montevideo, data from Central Bank of Uruguay. 22 June 2009. 

5MERCOSUR was established by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1991. 

Uruguay’s sales to MERCOSUR have declined since 1998, when they accounted for about half 

of Uruguay’s exports. MERCOSUR currently buys about one-fourth of Uruguay’s exports. 

(Source: U.S. Embassy in Montevideo.) 6 Hornbeck, J.F. (8 April 2009). Congressional Research Service Memo on U.S.-Uruguay Trade 

Relations. Requested by minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 7 Ibid. 

the ATPDEA to include Paraguay on the list of countries eligible 

for unilateral duty-free treatment. But, despite its strategic importance to the United States in South America, one country that 

has been missing from the current debate on trade preferences is 

Uruguay. 

BACKGROUND

Uruguay is a relatively small U.S. trade partner, accounting for 

less than 1 percent of U.S. exports and imports. It is the 79th largest export market for the United States and the 108th largest importer of U.S. merchandise goods. The United States exports intermediate and capital goods to Uruguay, such as machinery, computers, and perfume; the United States imports from Uruguay 

mostly primary goods or simple manufactured goods, such as meat, 

leather, wood, and frozen fish.2 As a GSP beneficiary country, Uruguay mainly uses duty-free treatment to export raw hides and 

skins; in 2008, exports through GSP accounted for 23 percent of 

Uruguay’s total exports to the United States.3

Uruguay’s top three trade partners and their respective share of 

total trade are: Argentina (19 percent), Brazil (18 percent), and the 

European Union (12 percent), with the United States at 5 percent.4

Although Uruguay is a member of the MERCOSUR customs union, 

it has expressed a strong interest in pursuing closer bilateral trade 

relations with the United States. 5

We enjoy a longstanding positive commercial relationship with 

Uruguay that has grown over the past decade, beginning with the 

creation of a Joint Commission on Trade and Investment (JCTI) in 

2002. This led to more formal arrangements, including a bilateral 

investment treaty (BIT) providing greater protections for U.S. investors operating in Uruguay, especially in the area of dispute settlement.6 On January 1, 2007, Uruguay and the United States 

signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), 

which established the U.S.-Uruguay Council on Trade and Investment as the formal mechanism for pursuing means for liberalizing 

bilateral trade and investment. In October 2008, Uruguay and the 

United States signed two protocols to the TIFA on trade facilitation 

and public participation in trade and environment.7 Most recently, 

the Council held its third meeting in Washington, DC on June 5, 

2009, to discuss full implementation of these protocols. 

Uruguay’s ties with the United States help diversify its trade 

and balance its economic dependence on its two large neighbors, 

Argentina and Brazil (a key goal since the economic crisis in 2001– 

2003). Membership of the regional bloc MERCOSUR provides UruVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:14 Jun 26, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\50518.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
3 

8 Uruguay also has a free trade agreement with Mexico since November 2003. It is based on 

a larger agreement, the MERCOSUR-Mexico Economic Complementation Agreement signed in 

July 2002 to establish a legal framework for trade relations between Mexico and MERCOSUR 

as well as for bilateral negotiations between Mexico and individual MERCOSUR countries. Mexico has become an important market for specific Uruguayan goods; it is the second largest market for Uruguayan apparel exports (at 23 percent) and the fifth largest market for fabric exports 

(at 5 percent), according to data provided by the U.S. State Department. 9 U.S. Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay. 15 June 2009. 

10 Ibid. 11 Hornbeck, J.F. (8 May 2009). Congressional Research Service Memo on Proposed Special 

Trade Treatment for Uruguayan Exports. Requested by minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

guay with preferential trade access to the markets of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay (as well as to other South American countries 

with associate membership), yet some GOU officials have expressed 

frustration with the dominance of the two larger members and 

with the limitations this organization places on Uruguay’s ability 

to pursue trade relationships outside of MERCOSUR.8 In addition, 

bilateral disagreements, such as the ongoing dispute with Argentina over the construction in Uruguay of a cellulose pulp mill, have 

weakened Uruguay’s relations with MERCOSUR. According to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Montevideo, the United States now 

has a historically high favorability rating among the Uruguayan 

populace, much higher than in other countries, and it is viewed as 

a strategically important relationship. In this context especially, 

the United States is as an increasingly attractive economic partner 

for Uruguay. 

Nevertheless, Uruguay is now losing markets and jobs to countries that have free trade agreements with the United States. Staff 

found that the GOU is particularly concerned about the situation 

of the Uruguayan textiles and apparel industry, which has shrunk 

over the last decade, with a slight recovery since 2003 (see Appendix II). Heavily based on wool production, this sector employs about 

21,000 workers, though its unemployment rate remains above 20 

percent—almost three times the national average.9 Uruguayan textile and apparel producers face high tariffs in the U.S. market (17.5 

percent for wool-based apparel and 25 percent for wool fabrics), as 

well as strong competition from FTA signatories with the United 

States (mainly Chile, Mexico, and Peru). Uruguay also faces difficulties in exporting fabric to these countries since the FTAs require that apparel be produced with U.S.-sourced or local fabrics. 

According to the President of the Apparel Chamber in Uruguay, 

the combination of MERCOSUR restrictions, high entry tariffs, and 

rules of origin specifications has caused Uruguay to lose its market 

share in the United States.10

According to several GOU officials, U.S. trade preferences for textiles and apparel would help Uruguayan exporters regain market 

access in the United States and have a dramatic positive economic 

impact on Uruguay. These industries are key sources of employment in Uruguay that have been hurt by both U.S. tariffs and the 

economic downturn. 

According to the Congressional Research Service, the marginal 

costs to U.S. industries of allowing these Uruguayan textile products to enter duty free would be small and unlikely to hurt U.S. 

industry’s global competitiveness.11 Furthermore, Uruguay does 

not produce any cotton or cotton-based products, which are the 

main concern for the United States. Preferences for textile exports 

4 

12The ATPDEA would need to be expanded to include wool-based textiles in addition to a geographic expansion to include Uruguay. 13 Hornbeck, J.F. (8 April 2009). Congressional Research Service Memo on U.S.-Uruguay 

Trade Relations. Requested by minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 14 Ibid. 

from such a small economy would not likely affect U.S. producers, 

though they would represent significant economic benefits for Uruguay, thus accruing political benefits for the United States. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Both the United States and Uruguay have expressed interest in 

deepening trade ties via some type of trade agreement, including 

a free trade agreement (FTA). In 2002, Senator Lugar sponsored a 

bill to authorize an FTA with Uruguay, yet after many attempts 

during the Bush Administration a commitment was never reached 

(see Appendix III). Nevertheless, it is important to ‘‘keep the fire’’ 

of a bilateral FTA ‘‘alive,’’ as one former GOU official told staff. 

In the short-term, Congress should consider granting unilateral 

tariff preferences for Uruguayan textiles and apparel, thus complementing recent efforts by the executive branch to expand commercial ties through the U.S.-Uruguay Council on Trade and Investment. Negotiation of an FTA appears politically impossible during 

the global recession, but unilateral tariff preferences might be an 

appropriate intermediate step towards deepening our relations 

with Uruguay. As the case of Peru proves, unilateral trade preferences can lead to the negotiation of a reciprocal FTA. 

Approval of a unilateral trade preference arrangement for Uruguay could occur through the expansion of ATPDEA, petitioning to 

add products to the GSP, or a Miscellaneous Tariff Bill (MTB).12

The most feasible strategy could be to add Uruguay to the U.S.- 

Paraguay Partnership Act of 2009, which was already introduced 

in both chambers of Congress, in order to make a joint case for including both countries in ATPDEA. 

Although Uruguay has one of the higher per capita incomes in 

the region, there is precedent for including a country with 

Uruguay’s level of per capita income in unilateral preferential 

arrangements established by Congress for countries in both SubSaharan Africa and Latin America. Certain Caribbean countries, 

for example, have higher real per capita incomes than Uruguay yet 

retain eligibility for trade preferences (see Appendix IV).13

Regarding Uruguay’s commitment to MERCOSUR, a reciprocal 

FTA with the United States could be seen to violate the common 

external tariff (CET) on which MERCOSUR was founded, but GOU 

officials argue that the CET would not represent a barrier to an 

FTA. A unilateral preference arrangement is a different matter 

because there is no reciprocal treatment required of Uruguay 

and, therefore, no potential violation of the CET.14 The potential 

for trade preferences to lead to the negotiation of an FTA remains, 

however, for MERCOSUR is a highly fluid arrangement that 

has allowed for a number of bilateral arrangements between its 

member countries, some of which fall outside the MERCOSUR 

guidelines. 

5 

CONCLUSIONS

The United States would benefit from deepened trade relations 

with Uruguay in several ways. Despite Uruguay’s small size, a 

U.S. initiative to expand commercial ties could afford an opportunity for the United States to constructively extend its influence 

in the Southern Cone, a sub region historically given less attention 

by U.S. foreign policymakers compared to other areas of Latin 

America. 

By granting Uruguayan goods expanded access to the U.S. market, the USG would solidify its image as a reliable and strategically 

important partner, thereby strengthening the bilateral relationship 

with Uruguay. According to senior GOU officials, U.S. trade preferences would be viewed as a vote of support for the GOU, which 

finds itself in a difficult situation within MERCOSUR. In this regard, staff believes that MERCOSUR perpetuates trade 

asymmetries with Brazil and Argentina, resulting in Uruguay’s interest in diversifying its markets and commercial ties. 

At the same time, promotion of trade on a bilateral basis is an 

important option for the United States given the failure of full regional commercial integration, as seen by the collapse of negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Free trade is 

an engine of job creation and social mobility, and it would contribute to creating a more stable environment for U.S. investors in 

Uruguay. 

Regionally, the United States would signal its clear commitment 

to free trade, an important marker given the anti-free trade rhetoric of many governments in the region. Most importantly, for the 

United States, a trade arrangement with Uruguay could increase 

opportunities for deepening support for our hemispheric agenda, as 

expressed bilaterally or regionally through organizations such as 

the Inter-American Development Bank or the Organization of 

American States. There is no guarantee that Uruguay will agree 

with U.S. positions, but the door may be open for greater collaboration and support through deeper institutional relations. 

A closer trade relationship with Uruguay could encourage some 

heretofore reluctant countries to expand their trade relations with 

the United States; U.S.-Brazil trade, for example, is far from reaching its full potential. Stronger U.S.-Uruguay relations could spur 

greater development of commercial relations between the United 

States and Brazil. 

The United States and South American countries would stand to 

gain from expanded access to each other’s markets. A unilateral 

trade preference program for Uruguay would reinforce our message 

that we value Uruguay as a strategic partner within our broader 

policy towards South America and signal the United States is not 

ceding its interests in the Southern Cone. 

6 

APPENDIX I 

Contributor 

Kezia McKeague, Legislative Assistant, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, United States Senate 

MEETINGS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN URUGUAY

Uruguayan Government Officials 

Senior Trade Officer, Alvaro Ons 

Foreign Minister, Gonzalo Ferna ́ndez 

National Party Senator, Sergio Abreu 

Frente Amplio Senator, Alberto Couriel 

Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mining, Daniel Martı ́nez 

Director of Industry, Roberto Kreimerman 

Minister of Economy and Finance, Cr. Alvaro Garcı ́a 

OTHER INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

Frente Amplio Economist, Fernando Lorenzo 

Uruguayan Textile Association President, Norberto Cibils 

Apparel Chamber of Commerce President, Elbio Fuscaldo 

American Chamber of Commerce 

Binational Center (Alianza) Montevideo facilities representatives 

Welcolan (Apparel manufacturer) representatives 

HISUD (Wood/Textile manufacturer) representatives 

7 

APPENDIX II 

Table 1.—Key Figures 

Textile/apparel exports (2008) $290 million (including wool), 4.8% of total exports (Of which wool exports were $206 million, or 3.5% of total exports (2008)). 

Exports of textiles/apparel to the 

U.S. (2008) 

$7.4 million, 3.4% of total exports to the U.S. (Of which wool is $2.7 

million, apparel $2.7 million, and other textiles $2.0 million. (2008)). 

Total textiles and apparel 

production (2004) 

$372 million (about 4% of total industrial production) 

Employment in T&A (2008) 21,000 jobs 

Table 2.—Wool Exports by Destination 

Total 205,988,542 

China 77,624,918 

Germany 33,561,121 

Italy 20,728,576 

Brazil 11,538,695 

Japan 7,526,220 

Iran 5,636,471 

India 5,095,274 

Bulgaria 5,084,848 

United Kingdom 4,526,009 

Mexico 4,417,789 

Turkey 3,928,133 

Argentina 2,959,220 

Philippines 2,914,661 

Czech Republic 2,846,254 

United States 2,704,704 

Hong Kong 2,216,438 

Colombia 1,536,936 

Spain 1,337,469 

Thailand 1,317,779 

Morocco 1,273,774 

Switzerland 1,023,636 

Rest 6,189,617 

Table 3.—Exports of Apparel 

Total 63,872,099 

Argentina 29,022,934 

Mexico 14,464,388 

Brazil 10,243,937 

United States 2,639,393 

Chile 2,534,023 

Tariff Free Zone Montevideo 1,712,797 

Rest 3,254,627 

8 

Table 4.—Exports of Fabrics 

TOTAL 9,730,122 

Argentina 5,126,617 

Brazil 4,455,317 

United States 2,044,357 

Hong Kong 1,522,822 

Mexico 1,072,267 

Rest 5,508,742 

9 

APPENDIX III 

107TH CONGRESS 

2d Session 

S. 2796 

To authorize the negotiation of a free trade agreement with Uruguay. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

July 25, 2002 

Mr. LUGAR (for himself, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. 

GRASSLEY, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. 

SPECTER, Mr. HATCH, and Mr. COCHRAN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 

on Finance. 

A BILL 

To authorize the negotiation of a free trade agreement with Uruguay. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 

United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United States-Uruguay Free Trade 

Agreement Act.’’ 

SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) Economic growth in the United States has been considerably enhanced by bilateral agreements to lower barriers for 

United States exports. 

(2) Free trade agreements facilitate economic growth which 

enhances the welfare and quality of life of all citizens of the 

countries which are party to the agreements. 

(3) Countries that open their domestic markets, remove barriers to foreign direct investment, and promote free enterprise, 

empower their citizens to escape poverty and maintain social 

and environmental values. 

(4) Since the mid-1970’s, Uruguay has implemented successfully a number of economic and legal reforms, including opening its markets and strengthening the rule of law. 

SEC. 3. UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TRADE. 

It is the policy of the United States to seek the elimination of 

tariff and non-tariff barriers in order to achieve more open market 

access through bilateral free trade agreements. The free trade 

agreements should address the following: 

(1) National treatment and market access for agricultural 

and industrial products. 

10 

(2) Rules for determining which goods originate in the territory of the United States and which goods originate in the territory of the other party to the agreement. 

(3) Customs procedures that facilitate trade and collection of 

trade statistics, while ensuring the validity of claims for preferential treatment. 

(4) Science-based, nondiscriminatory sanitary, phytosanitary, 

and technical standards, including voluntary standards. 

(5) Safeguard provisions consistent with international law. 

(6) Government procurement procedures. 

(7) National treatment and rights of establishment for foreign direct investors. 

(8) National treatment and market access for traded services, including consumption of services abroad, cross-border 

provision of services, rights of establishment of commercial 

presence, and the movement of natural persons. 

(9) Protection of intellectual property. 

(10) Transparency of legal and regulatory regimes. 

(11) Measures to promote electronic commerce. 

(12) Adherence to internationally recognized core labor 

standards. 

SEC. 4. NEGOTIATION OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH URUGUAY. 

The President is authorized to enter into an agreement with 

Uruguay consistent with the policy described in section 3. 

11 

APPENDIX IV 

Staff requested from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 

the following comparisons of Uruguay’s per capita income with 

other countries that receive unilateral tariff preferences. 

* * * * * * * 

One simple measure of development is per capita income (PCI). 

The first comparison presented in Table 3 is a list of per capita incomes for 2006 of selected countries eligible to receive tariff preferences under one of the regional programs (AGOA, ATPA, 

CBERA, CBTPA, HOPE Act), and average PCI for Latin America 

and Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region on 

average, has a 2006 PCI of $648. Although Uruguay’s per capita 

income is much higher than Sub-Saharan African countries on average, the three highest PCIs in the region, Botswana, Mauritius, 

and South Africa, are all comparable to Uruguay’s. Ghana is a 

major outlier at $27,390. Estimates from Latin America and the 

Caribbean are also presented. In addition, annual growth rates for 

PCI are included for 20 

Table 3. Comparisons of 2006 Per Capita Income 

Region/Country 

2006 Per Capita 

Income Growth in PCI 2006 

Uruguay .......................................................... 5,310 6.7

Sub-Saharan Africa ........................................ 648 3.0

Botswana ................................................... 5,570 0.9

Mauritius .................................................... 5,430 8.7

South Africa ............................................... 5,390 3.9

Lesotho ....................................................... 980 6.4

Senegal ...................................................... 760 -0.3

Tanzania ..................................................... 350 3.3

Latin America & Caribbean ........................... 4,785 4.2

Trinidad & Tobago ..................................... 12,500 11.6

Panama ...................................................... 5,000 6.3

Colombia .................................................... 3,120 5.3

Ecuador ...................................................... 2,910 2.8

Paraguay .................................................... 1,410 2.2

Bolivia ........................................................ 1,100 2.7

Haiti ........................................................... 430 0.7

Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2008. Washington, D.C. April 2008. p. 14– 

16. 

A second comparison is presented in Table 4, which provides 

2007 PCI in real terms (adjusted for market prices) for Latin 

American and Caribbean countries that are eligible for tariff preferences under regional programs (not all Caribbean countries are 

included). In real terms, Uruguay’s per capita income is well above 

12 

the average for Latin America and the Caribbean. It actually ranks 

right below oil-rich Trinidad and Tobago among countries eligible 

for U.S. trade preferences in the Western Hemisphere. Nonetheless, there are certain Caribbean countries that retain eligibility for 

trade preferences that do have higher real per capita incomes. 

Trinidad exports to the United States under predominantly the 

CBTPA program, which extends tariff preferences on a temporary 

basis to energy products that, are excluded under the CBERA. The 

Bahamas is another high PCI country because of its financial services industry; it has little merchandise trade with the United 

States. For the most part, the Caribbean countries have developed 

into service economies, with some still producing in the agricultural 

sector, making comparisons with Uruguay more difficult. Preliminary estimates of PCI growth rates for 2008 are also included, a 

statistic that highlights Uruguay’s recent strong economic growth. 

Table 4. Real Per Capita Income for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007 

Region/Country 

2007 Per Capita 

Income ($2000) 

Growth in 

PCI 2008 

Uruguay .............................................................................. 7,255 11.2

Latin America & Caribbean ............................................... 4,732 3.3

Latin America ..................................................................... 4,723 3.3

Caribbean ........................................................................... 5,530 1.9

Bahamas ........................................................................ 18,393 0.3

Trinidad & Tobago ......................................................... 10,916 3.1

Barbados ........................................................................ 6,706 1.2

Panama .......................................................................... 5,205 7.5

Jamaica .......................................................................... 3,028 -0.5

Colombia ........................................................................ 2,853 1.7

Ecuador .......................................................................... 1,624 5.0

Paraguay ........................................................................ 1,467 3.1

Bolivia ............................................................................ 1,090 3.7

Guyana ........................................................................... 910 5.1

Haiti ............................................................................... 392 -0.2

Source: United Nations. Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. Statistical Yearbook 

for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008. Santiago, February, 2009. p. 86 and 88. 

Æ