J-S74026-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONALD WILLIAMS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 275 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 6, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008316-2009

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and RANSOM, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2017

Ronald Williams appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546. After careful review, 

we affirm.

In November 2008, parole agents found Williams in possession of 

narcotics and multiple firearms; he was also mistreating pit bulls that were 

being trained to participate in illegal dog fighting. Williams was arrested and 

charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance,1 a 

violation of the Uniform Firearms Act,2 and animal fighting.

3

 On February 2, 

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1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 5511. Section 5511 has since been repealed. See Act 2017-

10 (H.B. 1238), P.L. 215, § 3, approved June 28, 2017, eff. August 28, 2017.
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2011, Williams entered a negotiated guilty plea to all charges and was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 6-12 years. He filed no

post-sentence motions or direct appeal. On August 16, 2011, Williams filed a 

pro se PCRA petition, which was amended by counsel. After an evidentiary

hearing, the court denied his petition. Williams appealed that decision; our 

Court affirmed the dismissal of his petition. See Commonwealth v. 

Williams, No. 2962 EDA 2013 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. filed 

Nov. 7, 2014). On March 19, 2015, Williams filed the instant pro se PCRA 

petition, his second. Counsel was appointed and filed a supplemental

amended petition on Williams’s behalf. On November 9, 2016, the trial court 

issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing, pursuant 

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On January 6, 2017, the court dismissed Williams’s

petition.

Williams filed a timely notice of appeal; he presents the following issues 

for our consideration:

(1) Whether the court erred in denying [Williams’s] PCRA 

petition without an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised 

in the amended PCRA petition regarding tr[ia]l counsel’s 

ineffectiveness.

(2) Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA 

petition.

The standard of review of an order denying a PCRA petition is whether 

that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal 

error. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012). 
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The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for 

the findings in the certified record. Id. Moreover, a court has the discretion 

to dismiss a petition without a hearing when the court is satisfied that there 

are no genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not 

entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would 

be served by further proceedings. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

Instantly, Williams’s judgment of sentence became final for purposes of 

the PCRA on March 4, 2011, when the time expired for him to file a direct 

appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Thus, he had until March 4, 2012, to file a timely 

PCRA. His current petition was not filed until March 19, 2015, thus is it is 

patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also

Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054 (Pa. Super. 1997) (generally, 

petition for PCRA relief, including second or subsequent petition, must be filed 

within one year of date judgment is final). 

There are, however, exceptions to the PCRA’s time requirement, set 

forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i),(ii), and (iii). Where the petition alleges, 

and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition 

is met, the petition will be considered timely. These exceptions include 

interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim, newly 

discovered facts or evidence, and an after-recognized constitutional right. 

See Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000). A 

PCRA petition invoking one of these exceptions must “be filed within 60 days 

of the date the claims could have been presented.” Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. 
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§ 9545(b)(2). The timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional in 

nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely petitions. 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003). 

Williams claims that he has pled and proven the newly-discovered facts 

exception to the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), and the PCRA’s 

governmental interference exception, id. § 9545(b)(1)(i). Specifically, 

Williams claims that the Commonwealth had a continued duty to disclose that 

former Philadelphia Police Officer Michael Spicer, who was on the 

Commonwealth’s trial witness list in his case, had been under investigation 

from 2006-2012 for suspected corruption. Williams contends that the 

evidence would have compelled a different result at his trial, that he was 

“entitled to it for impeachment purposes,” Appellant’s Brief, at 19, and that 

had he been aware of the evidence, he would not have pleaded guilty. Id. at 

20. 

Here, Williams filed his pro se petition on March 19, 2015. To meet 

either section 9545(b)(1) exception, the petition must be filed “within 60 days 

of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). 

Williams asserts that he filed his petition well within 60 days of the discovery 

of the new evidence when “on or about February 23, 2015, as a result of an 

investigation by [his] private investigator, . . . [he] discovered that the 

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office had not turned over the 

Commonwealth’s witness list which shows that . . . Spicer was schedule to 

testify at [his] trial . . . and that he was under several investigations from 
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2006 to 2012.” Appellant’s Brief, 18-19. Williams does not explain why, in 

the exercise of due diligence, he could not have obtained a copy of the 

Commonwealth’s witness list prior to this date. Thus he has failed to prove a 

timeliness exception under the PCRA. 

Moreover, Williams’s contention that he would not have pleaded guilty 

if he had been privy to the impeachment evidence about Officer Spicer, is also 

not compelling. The prosecution is not required to disclose potential 

impeachment evidence prior to entering into a plea agreement with a 

defendant. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).

Having determined that are no genuine issues concerning any material 

fact, that Williams is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and that 

no legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings, the PCRA court 

properly declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on Williams’s petition. 

Pa.R.Crim.P 907. Moreover, because Williams’s untimely petition does not 

prove any section 9545(b)(1) exception, the court’s decision to dismiss the 

petition is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

Johnston, supra.

Order affirmed.4

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4 We note that even if Williams’s petition were timely filed, he would not 

succeed in proving an after-discovered evidence claim under the PCRA where 

Williams would be using the allegations against Officer Spicer to attack the 

officer’s credibility for impeachment purposes. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2); 

see also Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017) (to prevail on 

after-discovered evidence claim under PCRA, evidence must not be used solely 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/5/2017

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to impeach credibility). Moreover, we would also be hard pressed to ascertain 

how the use of the evidence would have resulted in a different verdict, had 

Williams withdrawn his plea and gone to trial, where he has not alleged how 

Officer Spicer was in any way connected to his arrest or prosecution. Based 

on the large quantity of drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the residence 

where Williams was apprehended, the jury could infer, without the use of a 

potential expert narcotic officer, that Williams possessed the drugs with the 

intent to deliver.