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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

CARL MEALING,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF RIDGEFIELD, WASHINGTON;

RIDGEFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT;

RIDGEFIELD POLICE CHIEF BRUCE

HALL; BRUCE HALL in his individual

capacity; RIDGEFIELD CITY MANAGER

GEORGE FOX, and GEORGE FOX in his

individual capacity,

Defendants.

Case No. C05-5778FDB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

FOX’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:

DISMISSAL OF STATE LAW

CLAIMS

Defendant Fox moves for partial summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

Plaintiff Mealing alleges that Defendant George Fox ordered his termination from employment at the

City of Ridgefield on account of race, rather than, as Defendant asserts, that he was terminated

because he had recommenced his past behavior of harassing women while on duty. Defendant Fox

argues that Washington’s claim statute, RCW 4.96.020 applies to Plaintiffs claims under a theory of

intentional infliction of emotional distress and recovery under Washington’s Law Against

Discrimination, Chapter 49.60 RCW; and Washington’s Wage Act, Chapter 49.48 RCW. 

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s outrage claim must be dismissed on its merits because there is

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no evidence that Mealing has suffered the requisite “extreme emotional distress” required to sustain

such a theory. 

Claim Filing Statute

Washington claims statute applies when government officials are sued for actions taken

during the course and scope of employment. See Wright v. Terrell, 135 Wn.App. 722, 736, ¶ 42

(2006). This Court has already held in this case that the claims statute applies in a discrimination

action under RCW 49.60. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not comply with the notice of claim

statute before filing his lawsuit. Defendant Fox was exercising his contractual authority with the City

when he commanded Chief Hall to terminate Mealing for sexually harassing women in Ridgefield, La

Center, and Battle Ground. 

Plaintiff Mealing argues that Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, (2005) held that the

claim filing statute applies only to local governmental entities, not to individuals, that the claim filing

statute was amended after Mealing filed this case, and that he complied with the statute as written at

the time of filing. Mealing also argues that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether

Fox acted in his individual capacity outside the scope of his employment when he terminated

Mealing, made racist remarks, and conducted a biased investigation. 

The Court in Wright v. Terrell, 135 Wn. App. 722, 145 P.3d 1230 (2006) addressed this

issue, namely, the contention that the claim filing statute does not apply to lawsuits against

individuals, and the Wright court stated: 

Where the claims are directed against individuals acting in their official

capacity, we hold that the logic of requiring a plaintiff to present and file the claims

with the governmental entity is compelling. ... Therefore, we hold that the provisions

of chapter 4.96 RCW apply to suits against individuals where the conduct complained

of occurred in the scope of the individuals’ employment with a local government

entity. 

Wright, 135 Wn. App. At 735-36. Moreover, in the Report on Substitute House Bill 3120, which

amended RCW 4.96.020, the legislature expressed that the bill was “a clarification of what was

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originally intended when the Legislature passed the tort claim filing statutes.” H.R. SHB 3120

(House B. Rep.) at 3. As to the assertion that there are factual issues regarding the scope of

employment issue, Wright also is instructive. The defendant there was alleged to have “‘flirted’ with

[the plaintiff], stared at her breasts, and made sexual innuendos,” 135 Wn. App. at 725, ¶ 7, and the

Court held that “all of [the plaintiff’s] allegations related to the scope of [the defendant’s] exercise of

his supervisory duties.” Id. at 737, ¶ 48. Here, Fox had authority to fire Mealing, and although Fox

is alleged to have had improper motives – which allegation Defendants do not concede – 

nevertheless, he was acting within the course and scope of his authority as Ridgefield City Manager. 

Accordingly, dismissal is required for failure to comply with the prerequisite of giving notice

pursuant to the claim filing statute. 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Outrage) 

To prove the tort of “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” requires a showing of (1)

extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3)

actual result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress. Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wn.2d 195, 202

(1998). The conduct must be “so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond

all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community.” Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wn.2d 52, 59 (1975). Defendant argues that Plaintiff will be

unable to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy this element or that he suffered severe emotional

distress beyond the “degree of transient and trivial emotional distress that is part of the price of living

among people.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965), cmt. j. 

Having considered Mealing’s Declaration, the parties’ memoranda, as well as the record

herein, the Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence to support a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and this claim must be dismissed. 

NOW, THEREFORE, 

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IT IS ORDERED: Defendant Fox’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: Dismissal of

State Law Claims [Dkt. # 101] is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant Fox

are DISMISSED. 

DATED this 10th day of May, 2007.

AFRANKLIN D. BURGESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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